Hebrew Scholasticism in the Fifteenth Century: A History and Source Book (Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Philosophy, 9) 1402037155, 9781402037153

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HEBREW SCHOLASTICISM IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY A HISTORY AND SOURCE BOOK

Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought

Editor: Reinier Munk, Leiden University and Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Editorial Board: Resianne Fontaine, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Robert Gibbs, University of Toronto, Canada Warren Zev Harvey, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel Albert van der Heide, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Arthur Hyman, Yeshiva University, New York, U.S.A. Howard Kreisel, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel David Novak, University of Toronto, Canada Kenneth Seeskin, North Western University, Illinois, U.S.A.

VOLUME 9 The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.

HEBREW SCHOLASTICISM IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY A HISTORY AND SOURCE BOOK by

Mauro Zonta Università di Roma ‘La Sapienza’, Rome, Italy

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN-10 ISBN-13 ISBN-10 ISBN-13

1-4020-3715-5 (HB) 978-1-4020-3715-3 (HB) 1-4020-3716-3 (e-book) 978-1-4020-3716-0 (e-book)

Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. www.springer.com

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All Rights Reserved © 2006 Springer No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner. Printed in the Netherlands.

CONTENTS

Foreword Introduction The Influence of Scholasticism on Fourteenth Century Jewish Philosophy: an Overview “Hebrew Scholasticism” in Fifteenth Century Spain “Hebrew Scholasticism” in Fifteenth Century Italy and After

1. Abraham Bibago Treatise on the Plurality of Forms English Paraphrase

2. Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics English Translation of Selected Passages Commentary on the De Anima English Translation of Selected Passages

3. Abraham Shalom and Eli Habillo Abraham Shalom Eli Habillo Introduction to the Hebrew Translation of Antonius Andreas’s Quaestiones Super XII Libros Metaphysicorum English Paraphrase Preamble Introduction to the Hebrew Translation of Johannes Versor’s Questions on the Physics (Partial English Translation) Habillo’s Two Questions and Shalom’s Responses English Summary

4. Judah Messer Leon Commentary on the Physics, Books I–III English Translation of the Introduction and Chapter 1 of the Commentary on the Physics, Book I

vii 1 3 13 24

33 41 45

109 115 120 155 157

165 165 166

175 178 184

199 201 202

209 214 217

vi

contents Scholastic Sources Explicitly Quoted in the Commentary on the Physics, Book I List of Questions Debated in the Commentary on the Physics, Books I–III Compendium and Questions on Porphyry’s Isagoge English Paraphrase

267 272 280 283

Index of Authors of Antiquity, Middle Ages and Early Modern (up to 1600)

305

Index of Modern Authors

313

Index of Manuscripts

317

Hebrew Section

*1 *1 *11

Latin glosses in Habillo’s translation of Antonius Andreas’s Questions on the Metaphysics

*25 *34 *52 *52 *56

FOREWORD

This book was written in the summer and autumn of 2003 and revised in 2004; therefore, it reflects the state of research on its subject at that time. Its major aim is to show the knowledge of Scholastic philosophical literature or, better, the use of Latin sources by some fifteenth century Jewish philosophers; therefore, it does not deal with Scholasticism per se. For this reason, the bibliographical references to Latin authors and Scholastic doctrines are limited to what is strictly necessary for identifying the sources read and used by those Jewish authors. In writing this book, I have used materials (mostly manuscripts, incunabula and sixteenth century printed works) which I have found in many libraries, namely the Biblioteca Palatina in Parma, the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, the Biblioteca Corsiniana e dell’Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, the Biblioteca Angelica, the Biblioteca Casanatense and the Biblioteca Vallicelliana in Rome, the Biblioteca Ambrosiana in Milan, the Biblioteca Universitaria in Pavia, the Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria in Turin, the Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana in Florence, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris, the Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek in Cologne, the University Library in Cambridge, the Bodleian Library in Oxford. I am obliged to the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts of the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem, and to its director, Mr. Binyamin Richler, for their kind help in procuring me microfilmed copies of some manuscripts which I have not been able to see. I owe many thanks to Dr. Resianne Fontaine (University of Amsterdam) and Professor Reinier Munk (Leiden University and Universiteit, Amsterdam) for having promoted the publication of this book in the series Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought, and to Dr. Paolo Baracchi for revising the English text. Pavia and Rome September 2005

M. Z.

INTRODUCTION

A number of philosophers active in some of the most important Jewish cultural centres of the second half of the fifteenth century (the kingdom of Aragon in North-Eastern Spain; Florence, Mantua and Padua in Central and Northern Italy) seem to have grown increasingly unsatisfied with one of the main traits that characterised Spanish and Proven¸cal Jewish philosophy during the previous two centuries—namely its reliance upon Averroes’s interpretation of Aristotle and, in general, upon traditional Jewish Aristotelianism, mainly based upon medieval ArabicIslamic philosophy. In their pursuit of a renewal of Jewish philosophy, these authors turned to the doctrines and methods of contemporary Latin Scholasticism. Thus, after three centuries, Scholasticism partly replaced Arabic-Islamic philosophy’s role as a guide in the development of European Jewish thought. These philosophers, who apparently read Latin very well, were impressed by the new theories formulated by their Latin colleagues, from Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas onwards. They tried to assimilate these theories in two ways. In the first place, they produced a wave of translations of Latin Scholastic texts into Hebrew, intended to replace the old translations of Arabic Aristotelian texts produced between 1200 and 1350. Secondly, they composed original works in Hebrew (mainly commentaries and questions on Aristotle), in which they faithfully reproduced the techniques and terminology of late Scholasticism, and explicitly quoted and discussed Scholastic texts and doctrines. Some of these authors—possibly also in order to avoid being accused of interest in non-Jewish doctrines—declared that a deeper understanding of the subtleties of contemporary Scholasticism was not only useful for updating Jewish philosophy and theology, but was also necessary for engaging in religious controversies with Christian scholars. Thus, in fifteenth century Italy and Spain there came into being what we may call a “Hebrew Scholasticism”: Jewish authors composed philosophical treatises in which they discussed the same questions 1

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and used the same methods as contemporary Christian Schoolmen. These thinkers were not simply influenced by Scholasticism: they were real Schoolmen who tried to participate (in a different language) in the philosophical debate of contemporary Europe. Although these “Hebrew Scholastic” works depended heavily (as we shall see) on Latin sources, they were not mere translations or compilations: their authors, adopting a technique employed also by their Christian colleagues, mixed words and doctrines taken from these sources with words and doctrines that were, instead, original. Consequently, the relationship of “Hebrew Scholasticism” to its Latin counterpart, rather than one of mere dependence, is one of “parallelism”, involving the independent elaboration of similar conclusions from the same premises.1 1 A history of “Hebrew Scholasticism” in the fifteenth century is yet to be written. As a matter of fact, the phenomenon of “Hebrew Scholasticism” is usually neglected even in general studies about the relationship of Christian and Jewish cultures in the late Middle Ages (cf. e.g., the recent book by H. Santiago Otero [ed.], Dialogo ´ filos´ofico-religioso entre Cristianismo, Juda´ısmo e Islamismo durante la Edad Media en la peninsula iberica, Turnhout 1994, where only a very short mention of it can be found on pp. 376–377). Generally speaking, as Daniel Lasker correctly points out, “the study of the Christian impact on late medieval, especially Iberian, Jewish philosophy remains in its infancy” (D.J. Lasker, The Impact of Christianity on Late Iberian Jewish Philosophy, in B.D. Cooperman [ed.], In Iberia and Beyond. Hispanic Jews Between Cultures, Newark 1998, 175–190, p. 175). However, some of the most recent historical sketches of fifteenth century Jewish philosophy and of its relationship with Scholastic philosophy contain timely references to “Hebrew Scholasticism” and to the role played by its chief figures: H. Tirosh-Rothschild, Jewish Philosophy on the Eve of Modernity, in D.H. Frank and O. Leaman (eds.), History of Jewish Philosophy, London–New York 1997, 499–573, especially pp. 504–505, 514–516; T.M. Rudavsky, The Impact of Scholasticism upon Jewish Philosophy in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, and A. Ackerman, Jewish Philosophy and the Jewish-Christian Philosophical Dialogue in Fifteenth-Century Spain, in D.H. Frank and O. Leaman (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Cambridge University Press 2003, 345–390, especially pp. 348–350, 380–382. A sketch of “Hebrew Scholastic logic” has been recently published by Ch.H. Manekin, Scholastic Logic and the Jews, “Bulletin de philosophie m´edi´evale” 41 (1999), 123–147. For a short, tentative bibliographical overview of “Hebrew Scholasticism”, see M. Zonta, The Relationship of European Jewish Philosophy to Islamic and Christian Philosophies in the Late Middle Ages, “Jewish Studies Quarterly” 7 (2000), 127–140, especially pp. 138–140; see also Id., The Autumn of Medieval Jewish Philosophy: Latin Scholasticism in Late 15th-Century Hebrew Philosophical Literature, in J.A. Aertsen and M. Pickav´e (eds.), “Herbst des Mittelalters”? Fragen zur Bewertung des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts, “Miscellanea Mediaevalia” 31, Berlin–New York 2004, 474–492—part of which has been recast in this introduction.

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The Influence of Scholasticism on Fourteenth Century Jewish Philosophy: An Overview “Hebrew Scholasticism”, however, was not a totally new phenomenon in the history of medieval Jewish thought. It is well-known that a group of Jewish philosophers, active in Central and Southern Italy (especially in Rome) between 1250 and 1350, had been in close contact with their Christian colleagues: Christian doctrines and methods were absorbed and applied to the questions peculiar to Judaism. Moses of Salerno, in his commentary on Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed, written around 1270, often refers to his previous co-operation, in Naples, with the Christian scholars Nicholas of Giovinazzo and Peter of Hibernia (one of the teachers of Thomas Aquinas).2 Some of these Jewish philosophers composed philosophical-theological writings in which Thomas Aquinas was one of their main sources. This is the case with Hillel of Verona’s The Book of the Retributions of the Soul (Sefer tagmuley ha-nefesh), written between 1287 and 1291; in this work, Thomas’s De unitate intellectus contra Averroim is literally (although not explicitly) quoted, as well as Domingo Gundisalvi’s De anima.3 The most important thinker in this group, and the first true “Hebrew Schoolman”, was Judah Romano, active in Rome and at the court of Robert of Anjou, probably between 1310 and 1330. Judah translated into Hebrew passages of various lengths explicitly taken from Latin philosophical and theological treatises. His Latin sources include Domingo Gundisalvi ( Judah translated into Hebrew the whole text of his De uno et unitate, falsely ascribed to Boethius),4 Albert the Great (Judah translated the complete text of his De spiritu et respiratione, and knew and employed Albert’s De anima, De intellectu et intelligibili, De causis et processu universitatis, part of his Summa de creaturis, and, very probably, his lost Summa de bono, of which he has transmitted to us some otherwise unknown 2

See C. Rigo, Per un’identificazione del “sapiente cristiano” Nicola da Giovinazzo, ˇ collaboratore di rabbi Moˇseh ben Selomoh da Salerno, “Archivum fratrum praedicatorum” 69 (1999), 61–146. 3 See J.B. Sermoneta (ed.), Book of the Retributions of the Soul by rabbi Hillel ben Samuel of Verona (in Hebrew), Jerusalem 1981, pp. 4–26 (for passages from Gundisalvi), 35–145 (for passages from Thomas). 4 ¨ Cf. M. Steinschneider, Die hebraeischen Ubersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher, Berlin 1893 (reprint Graz 1956), p. 467.

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fragments),5 Thomas Aquinas (Judah quoted his commentaries on the De anima and the De causis, translated into Hebrew his treatise De ente et essentia and an apocryphal treatise On the Difference of the Soul’s Faculties, as well as passages from the De fallaciis, the Summa theologica, the Summa contra Gentiles and the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum),6 Giles of Rome (Judah translated parts of his commentaries on the Posterior Analytics, the Rhetoric, the Physics and the De anima, as well as parts of his original writings Quaestiones metaphysicales, Quodlibeta, De regimine principum, Theoremata de esse et essentia and parts of a number of minor works, some of which possibly not by Giles),7 and two minor representatives of contemporary Italian Thomism, namely Angel of Camerino (Judah quoted his commentaries on the Categories and the De interpretatione) and Alexander of Alexandria ( Judah quoted his commentary on the Metaphysics).8 Moreover, in some of his original works—e.g., in his commentary on Averroes’s De substantia orbis9 —Judah tried to reproduce the techniques used

5 See C. Rigo, Un passo sconosciuto di Alberto Magno nel Sefer ‘es.em ha-shamayim di Yehudah b. Mosheh Romano, “Henoch” 11 (1989), 295–318; J.-P. Rothschild, Un traducteur h´ebreu qui se cherche: R. Juda b. Mo¨ıse Romano et le De causis et processu universitatis, II, 3, 2 d’Albert le Grand, “Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litt´eraire du Moyen Age” 59 (1992), 159–172; C. Rigo, Yehudah b. Mosheh Romano traduttore di Alberto Magno (commento al De Anima III, II, 16), “Henoch” 15 (1993), 65– 91; Ead., Yehudah b. Mosheh Romano traduttore degli Scolastici latini, “Henoch” 17 (1995), 141–170, pp. 157–161. 6 See G. Sermoneta, Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opusculum de ente et essentia a Rabb`ı Jehud`ah ben Moˇs`eh ben Dani’`el Romano primum hebraice redditum (saec. XIV incipiente) (in Hebrew), in A.Z. Bar-On (ed.), From Parmenides to Contemporary Thinkers: Readings in Ontology (in Hebrew), Vol. 1, Jerusalem 1978, pp. 184– 214; Id., Jehudah ben Moˇse ben Daniel Romano, traducteur de Saint Thomas, in G. ´ Nahon and Ch. Touati (eds.), Hommage a` Georges Vajda. Etudes d’histoire et de pens´ee juive, Louvain 1980, 235–262 (some complements to the latter work are found in Rigo, Yehudah b. Mosheh Romano traduttore degli Scolastici latini, pp. 165– 169). 7 See C. Rigo, Egidio Romano nella cultura ebraica: le versioni di Yehudah b. Mosheh Romano, “Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale” 5 (1994), 397–437. Among the above mentioned Egidian or pseudo-Egidian minor works, there are the De plurificatione intellectus possibilis, and two short writings on the faculties of the human soul and on the generation of syllogisms. 8 See Rigo, Yehudah b. Mosheh Romano traduttore degli Scolastici latini, pp. 161–164. 9 An edition of this work is found in C. Rigo, Il De substantia orbis di Averro`e: edizione della traduzione latino-ebraica con commento di Yehudah b. Mosheh Romano, doctoral thesis (unpublished), 2 vols., Universit`a di Torino 1992.

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by Latin Schoolmen.10 These facts led Giuseppe Sermoneta to speak of the existence of a sort of “Hebrew Thomism” in Italy in the years around 1300,11 and possibly extending to the second half of the century. This hypothesis is corroborated by the existence of a complete Hebrew translation of Thomas’s Sententia libri De anima, probably composed in Italy after 1350.12 However, an explicit “Hebrew Thomism” appears to be limited to Italy and to constitute an isolated phenomenon within European Jewish philosophy of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It is true that some new doctrines in physics and metaphysics set forth by Proven¸cal Jewish philosophers in the fourteenth century display surprising similarities with analogous theories developed at the same time within Scholastic philosophy. In fact, these philosophers seem to be influenced by the most discussed themes in Proven¸cal Scholasticism during the first half of the fourteenth century—namely the “new physics” of William Ockham and John Buridan, the theology of Duns Scotus and his doctrine of individuation and, perhaps, early fourteenth century debates about universals. However, it is not yet clear whether these doctrines were the result of a historical development internal to Jewish thought, or whether they were also somehow stimulated by contemporary discussions of the same questions among Christian thinkers. Scholars have tried to point out parallels with contemporary Scholasticism in the works of several Jewish authors active in Provence between the end of the thirteenth century and the Black Death (1348–1349).13 Georges Vajda was the first to remark on the 10

Cf. C. Rigo, Un’antologia filosofica di Yehuda b. Mosheh Romano, “Italia” 10 (1993), 73–104. 11 Cf. G. Sermoneta, Pour une histoire du Thomisme juif, in G. Verbeke and D. Verhelst (eds.), Aquinas and Problems of His Time, “Mediaevalia Lovaniensia” s. 1, Vol. 5, Leuven–The Hague 1976, 130–135, and Id., Per una storia del Tomismo ebraico, in Tommaso d’Aquino nella storia del pensiero, 2 vols., Napoli 1976, Vol. 2, 354–359. On Judah Romano as representative of this “Hebrew (or “Jewish”) Thomism”, cf. G. Sermoneta, La dottrina dell’intelletto e la “fede filosofica” di Jehud`ah e Immanuel Romano, “Studi Medievali”, s. III, Vol. 6, fasc. 2 (1965), 3–78; cf. also W.Z. Harvey, Knowledge of God in Aquinas, Judah Romano and Crescas (in Hebrew), “Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought” 14 (1998), 223–238. 12 On this point, see M. Zonta, La filosofia antica nel Medioevo ebraico. Le traduzioni ebraiche medievali dei testi filosofici antichi, Brescia 1996, p. 233. 13 The first, pioneering study on this topic is: S. Pines, Scholasticism after Thomas Aquinas and the Teachings of Hasdai Crescas and His Predecessors, first published

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similarities between the “Averroistic” doctrines of the unique intellect and of the “double truth” propounded by Isaac Albalag (active either in Catalonia or in Provence at the end of the thirteenth century) and theories ascribed to Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia.14 Affinities have been detected between the physics of Gersonides (Levi ben Gershom, 1288–1344, who worked as an astronomer at the papal court in Avignon15 ) and a number of possible influences— namely pseudo-Siger of Brabant’s questions on the Physics (relative to the concept of “now”),16 Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on the Physics (relative to the “absolute generation of first matter”),17 William Ockham’s doctrine of natural motion18 and, most recently, Walter Burley’s theory of the existence of indivisible magnitudes and a doctrine from the questions on the Physics possibly written by Marsilius of Inghen.19 Moreover, Gersonides’s discussions about the freedom of man, God’s knowledge of future contingents and divine attributes, have been compared to similar discussions in contemporary in Hebrew in 1967 (see the most recent and complete re-edition, in Alfred L. Ivry’s English translation, in S. Pines, Studies in the History of Jewish Thought, eds. W.Z. Harvey and M. Idel, “The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines” V, Jerusalem 1997, pp. 489–589); this study, however, focuses its attention not on “Hebrew Scholasticism”, but on looking for implicit traces of Latin Scholasticism in the works of some major Jewish philosophers of the fourteenth century. 14 Cf. G. Vajda, Isaac Albalag, averro¨ıste juif, traducteur et annotateur d’al-Ghazˆalˆı, Paris 1960, pp. 246–266. 15 On Gersonides’s contacts with the papal court (which are certain in the last decade of his life, but might have started earlier), see J.L. Mancha, Gersonides’ Astronomical Work: Chronology and Christian Context, in C. Sirat, S. Klein-Braslavy and O. Weijers (eds.), Les m´ethodes de travail de Gersonide et le maniement du savoir chez les scolastiques, Paris 2003, 39–58. 16 See Pines, Scholasticism, pp. 497–500. 17 See S. Harvey, Did Gersonides Believe in the Absolute Generation of First Matter? (in Hebrew), “Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought” 7 (1988), 307–318, especially pp. 317–318. 18 See R. Glasner, Gersonides’s Theory of Natural Motion, “Early Science and Medicine” 1 (1996), 151–203, especially pp. 201–203. 19 See R. Glasner, On the Question of Gersonides’ Acquaintance with Scholastic Philosophy, in Sirat, Klein-Braslavy and Weijers (eds.), Les m´ethodes de travail de Gersonide, pp. 281–287. The Quaestiones in octo libros Physicorum that Glasner ascribes to Duns Scotus (p. 285 and note 6) are certainly not by Scotus; they are possibly the work of Marsilius of Inghen (cf. Pines, Scholasticism, p. 495 note 7).

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Scholasticism (where resemblances with Gersonides’s “indeterministic” positions have been detected).20 Shlomo Pines has tentatively traced back to William Ockham and other Scholastics (Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas) some new interpretations of Aristotle’s physics set forth by a contemporary and countryman of Gersonides, Yedayah Bedershi ha-Penini (c. 1285–1350)—namely the doctrine of “discrete and continuous” and the doctrine of a “force” exerted by heavenly bodies upon terrestrial ones.21 However, Ruth Glasner has recently questioned this hypothesis. In her view, Yedayah may have had some knowledge of the physical doctrines upheld by contemporary Christian philosophers (John Buridan, William Ockham, John Duns Scotus);22 but, since he did not know Latin, what knowledge he had must have depended exclusively upon personal contacts with Christian scholars. Furthermore, some of his doctrines may reflect conclusions drawn independently from Greek and Arabic sources.23 Bedershi’s oral contacts with Christians may also explain his interest for the principle of individuation, a topic much debated in fourteenth century Scholasticism. This interest is apparent in the unpublished Treatise on Personal or Individual Forms, where Bedershi—without ever mentioning Scotus or any Scotist author— seems to adopt a solution similar, if not identical to Duns Scotus’s doctrine of the existence of “individual forms” as principles of 20

Cf. Pines, Scholasticism, pp. 493–496, 519–524, 582–584 (where Pines compares Gersonides’s and Thomas Aquinas’s views about determinism). S. M¨obuss, Die Intellektlehre des Levi ben Gerson in ihrer Beziehung zur christlichen Scholastik, Frankfurt a.M.–Bern–New York–Paris 1991, especially p. 133, notes a relationship between the theology of Gersonides and theories found in contemporary Latin “Averroism” (Siger of Brabant, John of Jandun) and in some representatives of the Franciscan School (William Ockham); in particular, M¨obuss tries to highlight the relationship between Gersonides’ and Ockham’s doctrines of universals (see pp. 77–82). 21 Cf. Pines, Scholasticism, pp. 547–553. 22 For example, Glasner has shown the similarity between Yedayah’s doctrine of void and that found in two works ascribed to Duns Scotus: the authentic Quaestiones quodlibetales and the Quaestiones in octo libros Physicorum (by Marsilius of Inghen? See above, note 19). See R. Glasner, Yeda‘aya ha-Penini’s Unusual Conception of Void, “Science in Context” 10 (1997), 453–470, especially pp. 466– 468. 23 See R. Glasner, A Fourteenth Century Scientific Philosophic Controversy. Jedaiah Ha-Penini’s Treatise on Opposite Motions and Book of Confutation (in Hebrew), Jerusalem 1998.

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individuation.24 Finally, the radical nominalist doctrine of universals that characterises the critique of Gersonides’s logic by Samuel of Marseilles (1294–1340) has recently been compared to the thought of some early fourteenth century Latin authors (Peter Aureol, Durandus of Saint-Pour¸cain, Ockham).25 More compelling evidence has been presented for the knowledge of Latin sources by Joseph Ibn Caspi and Nissim of Gerona. Joseph Ibn Caspi (1279–1340), in his Biblical commentary Pure Silver (Tam ha-kesef ), explicitly discusses the problem of God’s knowledge of “possible future occurrences”—in Hebrew, ha-‘atidot ha-efshariyyot. This appears to be a literal rendering of the Latin expression contingentia futura; and contingentia futura were the object of the contemporary “Pelagian” controversy in Latin Scholasticism.26 Warren Z. Harvey argues that the Catalan thinker Nissim of Gerona (c. 1310– 1375) read directly, and quoted the doctrines about the creation of a unique first matter common to heavens and earth in William Ockham’s physics. Harvey also believes that Nissim may have known something of John Buridan’s doctrine of creation.27 As a matter of fact, none of the fourteenth century Jewish Proven¸cal scholars directly or indirectly involved in this “renewal” refer explicitly to Latin Scholastic sources or use them directly. As a rule, these philosophers show no knowledge of the most important topics discussed in contemporary Scholastic philosophy and 24 The Treatise on Personal Forms is preserved in the ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 984, ff. 66r–93v. For a summary and discussion of its contents, with reference to Scotus’s thought, see S. Pines, Individual Forms in the Teaching of Yeda‘aya Bedershi (in Hebrew), in Harry A. Wolfson Jubilee Volume, Jerusalem 1965, Hebrew section, 187–201, as reprinted in S. Pines, Studies in the History of Jewish Philosophy: The Transmission of Texts and Ideas (in Hebrew), Jerusalem 1977, 263–276, especially pp. 270–274; cf. also the sketch in Rudavsky, The Impact of Scholasticism, pp. 356–357 and notes. 25 See M. Zonta, Una disputa sugli universali nella logica ebraica del Trecento. Shemuel di Marsiglia contro Gersonide nel Supercommentario all’Isagoge di Yehudah ben Ishaq Cohen, “Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale” 11 (2000), pp. 409–458. 26 See S. Pines, Joseph Ibn Caspi’s and Spinoza’s Opinion on the Probability of a Restoration of a Jewish State (in Hebrew), “Iyyun” 14 (1964), 289–317, as reprinted in S. Pines, Studies in the History of Jewish Philosophy. The Transmission of Texts and Ideas (in Hebrew), Jerusalem 1977, 277–305, especially p. 283. 27 W.Z. Harvey, Nissim of Gerona and William of Ockham on Prime Matter, “Jewish History” 6 (1992), 87–98.

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science, and seem to be acquainted only with some matters of detail. Besides, when they discuss the same topics as their Latin colleagues, they use different methods. For instance—if we exclude some possible echoes in Gersonides28 —they seem to have totally ignored one of the most important Scholastic methods of discussion: the quaestio disputata.29 The exception is Scholastic logic. Peter of Spain’s Tractatus or Summulae logicales were translated into Hebrew more or less literally at least twice during the fourteenth century: by Shemariah the Cretan (ha-Ikriti), a philosopher from Negroponte active in Italy in the first half of the century, and by Abraham Avigdor, a Proven¸cal Jewish author active between 1367 and 1393. Moreover, Peter’s work was summarised and commented in Hebrew by Hezekiah bar Halafta, working in Provence around 1320.30 In any case, the reason for this interest in Scholastic logic was probably of a practical nature: the Tractatus could provide Jewish physicians with a basic knowledge of logic useful for their studies in medical schools. Besides, knowledge of Peter’s work was mostly limited to the parts dealing with the so-called logica antiqua (the same found in medieval Arabic philosophy), to the exclusion of the logica modernorum (as developed by Christian Scholasticism during the thirteenth century).31 From this overview, one can conclude that, although in some limited cases there may be substantial clues (in Ibn Caspi and Nissim of Gerona) or even solid evidence (in the case of the logical tradition) in favour of a direct knowledge of Scholastic philosophical literature, the influence of Scholasticism on fourteenth century Jewish Proven¸cal thought seems to have been mostly indirect (not through the reading of Latin texts, but through conversations), limited (relative only to some particular points of Scholastic doctrine), 28 Cf. C. Sirat, Un recueil de questions, in Sirat, Klein-Braslavy and Weijers (eds.), Les m´ethodes de travail de Gersonide, 149–157. 29 These facts have been noted by Gad Freudenthal in the case of Gersonides, but they hold true for most of the authors in question: see G. Freudenthal, Gersonide, g´enie solitaire. Remarques sur l’´evolution de sa pens´ee et de ses m´ethodes sur quelques points, in Sirat, Klein-Braslavy and Weijers (eds.), Les m´ethodes de travail de Gersonide, 291–317. 30 See Ch.H. Manekin, When the Jews Learned Logic from the Pope: Three Medieval Hebrew Translations of the Tractatus of Peter of Spain, “Science in context” 10 (1997), 395–430. 31 See Manekin, Scholastic Logic, pp. 123–129, 138–139.

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and implicit (since it was not openly recognised in Hebrew literature).32 Generally speaking, what we have said holds true also for the Jewish culture that developed during the fourteenth century in the four Iberian kingdoms of Navarra, Aragon, Castilia and Portugal. It is very likely that the philosophical and theological works by Avner of Burgos (c. 1270–1344), most of which originally written in Hebrew, were heavily influenced by Scholasticism and Christian theology. On the other hand, these works were probably composed after Avner’s conversion to Christianity (under the name of Alphonso of Valladolid), and so it is improbable that they played a direct role in the development of Jewish philosophy.33 Besides Avner’s isolated case, remarkable parallels, which may reflect a non-declared interest in contemporary Scholasticism, have been observed in Hasdai Crescas and in some philosophers of his circle, active in Catalonia between 1380 and 1411. Recent research, mostly after Pines’s 1967 study, has detected in Crescas’s writings—in particular in his Lebenswerk, The Light of the Lord—an impressive number of similarities with the “new physics” of the fourteenth century and the thought of Duns Scotus and his followers. Crescas was a student of Nissim of Gerona, and, like his master, probably had personal contacts with Christian scholars skilled in philosophy. Possible referents are the Catalan writer Bernat Metge (1345–1413)34 as well as the teachers and students of the

32 The “non-citation” of Christian sources in Jewish philosophical texts before the fifteenth century (with the exclusion of the Italian authors mentioned above) is traditionally explained as a sort of “literary custom”: see Pines, Scholasticism, p. 51. Very recently, Gad Freudenthal has questioned this explanation, by pointing out that some fourteenth century Proven¸cal Jewish authors did occasionally refer to Christian scholars as “the sages of the nations” or in similar ways (although they never called them by name, and mentioned them only in the context of personal oral contacts); consequently, the fact that some authors (in particular, Gersonides) did not even mention Christian scholars in these terms seems to indicate that either they had no real contacts with them qua philosophers and scientists, or, more plausibly, that such contacts were not determining for the development of their own thought: see Freudenthal, Gersonide, g´enie solitaire, pp. 314– 315. 33 On this point, cf. Rudavsky, The Impact of Scholasticism, p. 353. 34 See W.Z. Harvey, Hasdai Crescas and Bernat Metge on the Soul (in Hebrew), “Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought” 5 (1986), 141–154; Id., L’`anima: un tema comu´ a Rab´ı Hasday Cresques i Bernat Metge, “Calls” 4 (1990), 53–68.

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Franciscan school (studium generale) in Barcelona.35 However, there is no evidence that Crescas directly read and literally quoted Latin philosophical works. Pines writes that “Crescas was a quite typical representative of certain trends in the Scholasticism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries”;36 but in reality his “Scholasticism”—if any at all—is always implicit. Pines has compared Crescas’s doctrine of the extension of matter to that of Ockham, his doctrine of time as a measure not only of motion but also of rest, to the doctrines of Gerald Odonis and Peter John Olivi, his doctrine of infinite space to that of Nicholas Oresme, his doctrine of the possibility of an infinite chain of causes to that of Nicholas Bonet, his proofs of the existence of God to those of Duns Scotus, his theory about the relationship between essence and existence to those of Scotus and Henry of Ghent, his doctrine of divine attributes (among which infinity) to that of Scotism, and his doctrine of divine will to a Christian doctrine reported by Scotus.37 Other scholars have noted parallels between the ideas of faith of Crescas and Thomas and between the deterministic views of Crescas (in his Sermon on the Passover) and Scotus.38 Further parallels have been pointed out concerning particular points of Crescas’s physics and metaphysics. For instance, Crescas’s discussion on the possibility of many worlds has been compared to similar discussions in Oresme39 and in other thirteenth and fourteenth century Christian thinkers,40 and Crescas’s doctrine of time as a purely mental being has been traced back to Peter Aureol and William Ockham.41 As for metaphysics, one of the two solutions of the problem of divine omniscience proposed by Crescas in The Light of the Lord seems related to the solution proposed by Duns Scotus.42 In any case, Pines himself admits that “even if we accept the idea (. . .) 35

W.Z. Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics in Hasdai Crescas, “Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought” 6, Amsterdam 1999, p. 138. 36 Pines, Scholasticism, p. 501. 37 Pines, Scholasticism, pp. 502–532. Cf. also Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics, pp. 118, 145–146, who claims that Crescas’s doctrine of the divine will should be traced back to an evident Scotist influence. 38 See A. Ravitzky, Crescas’ Sermon on the Passover and Studies in His Philosophy (in Hebrew), Jerusalem 1988, pp. 49–60. 39 See Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics, pp. 23–29. 40 Cf. Rudavsky, The Impact of Scholasticism, p. 360 and note 81. 41 See Rudavsky, The Impact of Scholasticism, p. 362. 42 See Ravitzky, Crescas’ Sermon, pp. 38–43.

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that Crescas is to be placed within the scholastic framework, one must remember that he maintained a marked independence, and in discussing physical problems related explicitly (. . .) to another tradition—the Arabic-Jewish philosophical one”.43 Crescas is sure to have had first-hand and sound knowledge of only one field of Christian thought, namely dogmatic theology. Crescas argued against it in detail in his Refutation of the Christian Principles (this work, however, was probably composed in Catalan or in Aragonese rather than Hebrew).44 It should be noted that even in this work Crescas does not explicitly quote his theological sources; nor does he always rely on orthodox interpreters of Christian dogmas.45 Daniel J. Lasker suggests that Crescas’s reluctance to reveal his Latin sources may reflect the general climate of hostility between Christians and Jews in late fourteenth century Spain;46 it is clear, however, that, in the light of extant evidence, it is impossible to regard Crescas as a “Hebrew Schoolman” in the sense we have given to this expression. Overt references to Latin sources—but always in the context of anti-Christian polemics—make their appearance at the end of the fourteenth century in the works of a younger contemporary of Crescas (and, possibly, a member of his circle), the Catalan author Profiat Duran, who died around 1414. In Disgrace of the Nations, he explicitly mentions and draws from Peter Lombard’s theological work (the Sententiae), Nicholas of Lyra’s Biblical commentary (the Postillae) and Vincent of Beauvais’s Speculum historiale. It is also possible that his discussion of Catholic dogmas reflects contemporary Christian criticisms.47 43

Pines, Scholasticism, p. 510. R. Hasdai Crescas, Sefer bittul iqqarei ha-Nozrim, trans. by Joseph Ben Shem Tov, ed. D.J. Lasker, Ramat-Gan—Beer Sheva 1980. In the notes to this edition, Lasker gives many references to medieval Christian theological sources (mostly to passages of Thomas Aquinas’s Summa theologica and Summa contra Gentiles); but none of these references corresponds to a literal quotation of a Latin text in Crescas’s work. 45 See, e.g., the unorthodox doctrine of Jesus’ “glorified body”, which Crescas might have taken from Bonaventure, Albert the Great or William of Auvergne (cf. Hasdai Crescas, Sefer bittul, ed. Lasker, p. 72 note 16), or the doctrine about the sin of the demons (cf. ibidem, p. 90 note 4). On this and other similar cases, cf. Lasker, The Impact of Christianity, pp. 178–180. 46 Cf. Lasker,The Impact of Christianity, p. 179. 47 Cf. Lasker, The Impact of Christianity, p. 181, quoting F. Talmage, The Polemical Writings of Profiat Duran, “Immanuel” 13 (1981), 69–85. 44

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In the late fourteenth century, a sure case of knowledge of contemporary Latin Scholasticism is that of Leon Joseph of Carcassonne, a Proven¸cal Jewish physician who worked at Perpignan from 1370 to 1418. He was well versed both in Latin (he read John of Tornamira’s medical works) and in the method of the quaestio disputata. Rather significantly, he seems to have converted to Christianity some years before his death.48 However, a fully fledged “Hebrew Scholasticism”—characterised by the production of Hebrew philosophical works that use Latin Scholastic texts, doctrines and techniques in a way that is direct and clearly identifiable, systematic and mostly explicit—does not come into being before the late fifteenth century in Spain and Italy.49 In its maturity, “Hebrew Scholasticism”, with its extensive use of Aristotelian philosophy (metaphysics, psychology, physics, logic) and Christian theology (studied for the purpose of inter-religious debate), did not influence the whole of contemporary Jewish thought; it seems, however, to have constituted an important branch of it, one parallel to—and no less important than—the ongoing traditions of Jewish “Averroism”, Kabbalah, and religious apologetics. “Hebrew Scholasticism” in Fifteenth Century Spain Scholars have identified a number of possible, implicit or occasional references to Latin Scholastic sources in some of the key works of fifteenth century Iberian Jewish theological and philosophical literature. These works comprise Joseph Albo’s Book of the Roots,50 48

See J. Shatzmiller, Etudiants juifs a` la facult´e de m´edecine de Montpellier, dernier quart du XIVe si`ecle, “Jewish History” 6 (1992), 243–255, pp. 248–252. 49 However, some isolated traces of “Hebrew Scholasticism” have been recently discovered also in late fifteenth century Provence. Some instances of an “encounter between Arab and Scholastic logic in Hebrew writings” have been detected in a series of comments on Averroes’s Compendium of theOrganon, sometimes ascribed to Moses Narboni, but actually written by the Proven¸cal physician Mordecai Natan (fl. 1450–1470): see Ch.H. Manekin, Some Aspects of the Assertoric Syllogism in Medieval Hebrew Logic, “History and Philosophy of Logic” 17 (1996), 49–71, pp. 66–67. 50 See, e.g., R. Lerner, Natural Law in Albo’s Book of Roots, in J. Cropsey (ed.), Ancients and Moderns, New York 1964, 132–147, who points out Albo’s use of Thomas Aquinas’s fourfold division of law (in his Summa theologica and in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics); cf. also Lasker, The Impact of Christianity, p. 182 and notes 53–55.

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Abraham Bibago’s The Path of Faith,51 Abraham Shalom’s The Abode of Peace,52 Isaac Arama’s The Binding of Isaac53 and Isaac Abravanel’s Biblical commentaries and other works.54 However, as we observed in the previous section, fifteenth century Spanish “Hebrew Scholasticism” constituted a far more systematic phenomenon and appears to reflect a surprisingly extensive absorption of Christian culture between 1430 and the expulsion of Jews from Spain in 1492. Indicators of this absorption—constituting necessary premises for the development of “Hebrew Scholasticism”—include a possible better knowledge of Latin among the Jewish cultural e´ lite; the possible Jewish attendance at Christian schools; the possible existence of similar Jewish schools of philosophy; the evident employment of Scholastic methods by Iberian rabbis; the explicit references to Latin Scholastic authors by Jewish “Averroists”; and, last but not least, a number of Hebrew translations of Latin philosophical texts. There is proof that knowledge of Latin among Iberian Jewish scholars improved after the middle of the fourteenth century, when increasing numbers of Jewish apologists were required to speak Latin fluently, so as to be able to take part in inter-religious debates. This does not mean that these scholars could necessarily read Latin.55 However, marginal notes in some Hebrew manuscripts copied in that period and milieu suggest that a good reading knowledge of Latin was quite widespread. These notes prove that some copyists were 51

See below, chapter 1, list of Bibago’s works, on number 15. See below, chapter 3. 53 See S. Heller-Wilensky, The Philosophy of Isaac Arama in the Framework of Philonic Philosophy (in Hebrew), Jerusalem–Tel Aviv 1956, pp. 64 note 7, 186 note 9, 190 note 13a, 218–219 note 69 (most of these references concern Thomas Aquinas). 54 ¨ See, e.g., Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 80 note 238 (on Abravanel’s quotations of Paul of Venice) and p. 486, §297, no. 7 (on his quotations of Thomas Aquinas and other Christian authors); B.Z. Netanyahu, Don Isaac Abravanel. Statesman and Philosopher, Philadelphia 1982, pp. 295–316, various notes (on Abravanel’s apparent dependence on Thomas’s works, in particular on his Summa theologica); A. Melamed, Abravanel and Aristotle’s Politics: A Drama of Errors (in Hebrew), “Daat” 29 (1992), 69–82 (on Abravanel’s reading of Aristotle’s Politics through the mediation of Scholastic commentaries on the Politics). For a general historical overview of this literature, see C. Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press 1985, pp. 345–397; Tirosh-Rothschild, Jewish Philosophy, pp. 500–512. 55 See the many examples given by Lasker, The Impact of Christianity, pp. 176– 177. 52

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apparently able to correct Hebrew translations of Latin texts by direct comparison with the original or with similar Latin works.56 Moreover, the Latin terms inserted in some of the works of the fifteenth century “Hebrew Schoolmen” Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish and Eli Habillo presuppose a fairly good knowledge of Latin—at least in some of their readers.57 Possible evidence of attendance at Christian schools by members of the Jewish e´ lite in fifteenth century Spain, or at least of their employing Christian private teachers, is found in some contemporary Hebrew sources: Meir Alguadez,58 Solomon Bonafed,59 Eli Habillo,60 and perhaps Joseph Gar¸con.61 If this were true, it would 56

See, e.g., the marginal corrections of the Hebrew translation of pseudoAristotle’s Economics, found in some fifteenth century Spanish manuscripts, pointed out in M. Zonta, La tradizione ebraica degli scritti economici greci, “Athenaeum” 84 (1996), 549–554; cf. also Id., La filosofia antica, pp. 135–136, 260–262. 57 Cf. below, chapters 2 and 3. There still exists a Hebrew-Latin philosophical glossary, written in Spain in the fifteenth century and preserved in the ms. Moscow, Rossiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Bibliotheka, G¨unzburg 264, ff. 111– 112: see J.-P. Rothschild, Remarques sur la tradition manuscrite du glossaire h´ebreuitalien du commentaire de Mo¨ıse de Salerne au Guide des e´ gar´es, in J. Hamesse and D. Jacquart (eds.), Lexiques bilingues dans les domaines philosophique et scientifique (Moyen Age–Renaissance), Turnhout 2001, 49–88, pp. 59, 75 (number 27). 58 Cf. the analysis of his introduction to the Hebrew translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (as published in L.V. Berman, The Latin-to-Hebrew Translation of the Nicomachean Ethics [in Hebrew], “Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought” 7 [1988], 147–168, pp. 157–158) in Zonta, La filosofia antica, pp. 83–85. 59 See Manekin, Scholastic Logic, pp. 131–132: Bonafed wrote that a student of his contemporary and countryman Isaac Arondi employed a Christian scholar to teach him logic in Latin; he himself admitted the superiority of Scholastic logic over the old Arabic logic (see Sh. Rosenberg, Logic and Ontology in Jewish Philosophy in the 14th Century, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1973, pp. 37–38). Cf. also M. Saperstein, The Social and Cultural Context: Thirteenth to Fifteenth Centuries, in Frank and Leaman (eds.), History of Jewish Philosophy, 294–330, p. 318 note 55, p. 320 note 79. 60 See below, chapter 3. 61 Gar¸con’s ambiguous mention of attendance at the yeshivat ha-h.okmot hah.is..suniyyot, lit. “the academy of external sciences” (quoted in J. Hacker, On the Intellectual Character and Self-Perception of Spanish Jewry in the Late Fifteenth Century [in Hebrew], “Sefunot” 17, n.s. 2 [1983], 21–95, pp. 55–56), may refer either to a Christian school, or to a Jewish academy where philosophy and other “profane” sciences were taught (as recently suggested by C. Sirat, Looking at Latin books, understanding Latin texts. Different attitudes in different Jewish communities, paper read at the international colloquium Hebrew to Latin–Latin to Hebrew. The Mirroring of Two Cultures in the Age of Humanism, The Warburg Institute, London, October 18th–19th, 2004).

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help to explain the clear influence exerted on Spanish “Hebrew Scholasticism” by the different currents of contemporary Scholastic philosophy in Spain (Thomism, Scotism, Nominalism). Scholars have also tried to prove that in fifteenth century Spain there existed quasi-institutional Jewish establishments where philosophy was taught, and these were attended by a number of Jewish scholars: Harry A. Wolfson and others argue that this was the character of the “academies” (yeshivot) of Hasdai Crescas and Abraham Bibago.62 Evident influence of Scholastic methods has been recognised even in fifteenth century Iberian religious literature, in collections of rabbinical sermons. Marc Saperstein has noted that Isaac Aboab, Joel Ibn Shu‘eib, and other rabbis active in the last decades of the century used the methods of the syllogism and the quaestio disputata, according to the habitual Scholastic schemes.63 It should also be remembered that Aristotelian logic was already familiar to Spanish talmudists from 1400 onwards.64 This increasing interest in Scholasticism naturally influenced also the still living tradition of Jewish Aristotelianism based upon Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle. The commentaries (expositiones) on Aristotle’s works by, or ascribed to, Thomas Aquinas (especially his Sententia libri Ethicorum) were among the most important channels for the knowledge of Scholastic philosophy. The importance of this particular text reflects the widespread interest in Aristotle’s ethics in fifteenth century Iberian Judaism65 —an interest 62

Cf. the overview by Saperstein, The Social and Cultural Context, pp. 305–306, who, however, seems rather skeptical about the “institutional” status of these schools. 63 See M. Saperstein, “Your Voice Like a Ram’s Horn”: Themes and Texts in Traditional Jewish Preachings, “Monographs of the Hebrew Union College” 18, Cincinnati 1996, pp. 83–86, 200–207. These sermons belong to the literary genre of the “collection of philosophical sermons”, widespread in fifteenth century Spanish Judaism: see Ackerman, Jewish Philosophy, p. 382. 64 Cf. Tirosh-Rothschild, Jewish Philosophy, p. 503 (quoting D. Boyarin, Sephardi Speculation: A Study in Methods of Talmudic Interpretation [in Hebrew], Jerusalem 1989, pp. 47–68). 65 Cf. H. Tirosh-Rothschild, Human Felicity—Fifteenth-Century Sephardic Perspectives on Happiness, in Cooperman (ed.), In Iberia and Beyond, 191–243, pp. 205– 206; cf. also J.-P. Rothschild, Les philosophes juifs d’Espagne au XVe si`ecle, l’Ethique a` Nicomaque et le projet philosophique de Joseph Ibn Shem Tob (´etude preparatoire), in J.M. Soto Rabanos (ed.), Pensamiento medieval hispano. Homenaje a Horacio Santiago Otero, 2 vols., Madrid 1998, Vol. 2, 1289–1316.

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shared, and probably influenced by contemporary Christian Spanish culture.66 Lawrence V. Berman has drawn attention to the fact that, probably around 1400, there started to circulate a Hebrew supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. This text, originally ascribed to Thomas Aquinas, has been shown to be an original work, partly inspired by (but, as a rule, not literally taken from) Aquinas’s authentic commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics.67 Two facts suggest a Spanish origin.68 First, its most complete manuscript was copied in Spain (in the little town of Agramunt, in the kingdom of Aragon) in 1444.69 Second, this work was known and used some years later by the Spanish philosopher, apologist and exegete Joseph Ibn Shem Tov (active about 1440– 1460).70 Jean-Pierre Rothschild71 and Hava Tirosh-Rothschild have found traces of Scholastic philosophical and theological doctrines in the writings of Joseph Ibn Shem Tov, in particular in The Glory of God (Kevod ’Elohim). In this work, Ibn Shem Tov paraphrased book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, possibly drawing on Thomas’s own commentary and, with greater certainty, on some passages of his Summa contra Gentiles.72 Finally, it should be noted that some explicit 66

Cf. on the latter A.R.D. Padgen, The Diffusion of Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy in Spain, ca. 1400–ca. 1600, “Traditio” 31 (1975), 287–313. 67 See L.V. Berman, Ibn Rushd’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics in Medieval Hebrew Literature, in J. Jolivet (ed.), Multiple Averro`es, Paris 1978, 287–321. 68 Berman, however, argues that the supercommentary was possibly written in a philosophical circle of followers of Samuel of Marseilles, active in Provence around 1350 (see A.Z. [L.V.] Berman, A Manuscript Named “Shoshan Limmudim” and its Relationship to a Proven¸cal “Circle of Scholars” [in Hebrew], “Kiryath Sepher” 53 [1978], 368–372, p. 372). 69 See A. Neubauer, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts of the Bodleian Library, Oxford 1886, c. 508, no. 1426 (Opp. 591); cf. also M. Beit-Ari´e and R. May, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts of the Bodleian Library. Supplement of Addenda and Corrigenda to Vol. I (A. Neubauer’s Catalogue), Oxford 1994, c. 237. The supercommentary is also preserved in the mss. Rome, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, vat. ebr. 556, and Leiden Bibliotheek der Rijks Universiteit, Or. 4786 (Warner 48). 70 Cf. L.V. Berman, The Hebrew Versions of Book Four of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (in Hebrew), Jerusalem 1981, p. 16. 71 Cf. J.-P. Rothschild, Le dessein philosophique de Joseph Ibn Shem Tob (flor. 1442– 1455), “Revue des e´ tudes juives” 162 (2003), 97–122. 72 Cf. Tirosh-Rothschild, Human Felicity, pp. 212–224. Tirosh-Rothschild has pointed out striking similarities between Ibn Shem Tov’s analysis of human felicity in the first pages of his work, and the Summa contra Gentiles, book III,

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references to Thomas Aquinas (although not all of them clearly identifiable in Thomas’s authentic works) are scattered in the numerous supercommentaries—on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Physics,73 on his Middle Commentary on the De generatione,74 and on his Middle Commentary on book I–II of the De Anima75 —written in the period 1478–1480 and ascribed to Joseph’s son, Shem Tov ben Joseph Ibn Shem Tov, or to some of his students.76 The most solid proof of the popularity of Latin Scholasticism among fifteenth century Iberian Jews are the extant Hebrew translations of Latin philosophical works carried out in this period and milieu. Very often these translations were by the same authors who were engaged in the creation of “Hebrew Scholasticism”, such as Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish, Abraham Shalom and Eli Habillo. It is important to note that in fifteenth century Spain some of Aristotle’s works were translated into Hebrew, not only from the old-fashioned medieval Latin versions by William of Moerbeke, but also from contemporary Humanistic translations (e.g., by Leonardo Bruni). These translations were mostly regarded as substitutes for the old Hebrew translations of Averroes’s Arabic Long and Middle Commentaries, no longer adequate for the new study of Aristotle based upon Latin Scholastic sources. In two successive waves—between 1400 and 1430 and around 1480—the Nicomachean Ethics was translated twice (by Meir ¨ chapters 18–25. Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 487, had already noted traces of Ibn Shem Tov’s apparently direct knowledge of Thomas Aquinas’ works, as well as of Peter Lombard’s Sententiae. On Ibn Shem Tov’s critique of Scholastic casuistry, with references (not always correct!) to Ockham and Raymond Lull, see Manekin, Scholastic Logic, p. 131, who mentions a passage of Ibn Shem Tov’s commentary on Profiat Duran’s Alteca Boteca (as quoted in Rosenberg, Logic and Ontology, p. 45). 73 See the text of the supercommentary in the ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 967, ff. 205r–343v, in particular f. 341r, where a quotation of “Thomas” (T . omas) might refer to Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Physicorum, book VIII, lectio 21, §2. 74 See ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 967, ff. 172r–204v, on f. 181v. 75 See ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 967, ff. 110r–171v, on f. 112r (the text of this supercommentary is also preserved in the ms. New York, Jewish Theological Seminary, microfilm 2341, ff. 317r–352r). 76 On Joseph and Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov’s dependence on Scholastic literary genres for some of their philosophical works (a sort of auctoritates and a tabula of the Nicomachean Ethics), see also Zonta, La filosofia antica, p. 262.

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Alguadez and Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish); pseudo-Aristotle’s Economics was translated twice (by an anonymous translator and, possibly, by Ibn Ya‘ish himself); and books I–XII of the Metaphysics (those studied in Christian universities at the time)77 were translated by Ibn Ya‘ish.78 The translators of the original works of late medieval Latin Scholasticism, mostly active in the kingdom of Aragon between 1470 and 1490, seem strongly influenced by the two main philosophical and theological schools represented in contemporary Spanish universities (especially in the Aragonese area), namely Scotism and Thomism.79 Significantly, the Scholastic texts translated or read by these authors were sometimes the same ones first published in late fifteenth century Spanish incunabula. Eli Habillo’s translation of Antonius Andreas’s questions on the Metaphysics and his planned translation of John the Canon’s questions on the Physics80 are clearly indicative of an attempt to lay the foundations of a sort of “Hebrew Scotism”, since those two works seem to have been often regarded as belonging to a Scotist philosophical corpus81 (Scotism was, at the time, officially adopted by the University of L´erida, not too distant from Monz´on, where Habillo worked). On the other hand, Habillo and his colleagues seem to have attempted to create a “Hebrew Thomism”. This endeavour is attested by their translations of Thomas Aquinas’s works (the commentary on the Metaphysics, translated by Abraham Ibn Nahmias in Oca˜ na near Toledo in 1490,82 and 77

See L.M. de Rijk, The Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in O. Weijers and L. Holtz (eds.), L’enseignement des disciplines a` la Facult´e des Arts, Turnhout 1997, 303–312, p. 312: in Christian universities, only books I–II, IV–X and XII of the Metaphysics were part of the official curriculum. 78 On these fifteenth century translations, see the historical sketch in Zonta, La filosofia antica, pp. 258–262, 269–274. 79 Cf. T. Carreras y Artau and J. Carreras y Artau, Historia de la filosofia espa˜nola. Filosofia cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV, 2 vols., Madrid 1939–1943, Vol. 2, pp. 564–585. 80 See below, chapter 3, list of Habillo’s works, on numbers D.3.1. and D.3.2. 81 I owe this observation to prof. Kent Emery, Jr. (University of Notre Dame, Indiana). 82 The unique manuscript of this translation has been now rediscovered. See the Hebrew text of Ibn Nahmias’s introduction as published by Senior Sachs in “Kerem Hemed” 8 (1854), pp. 110–111 note; see also Steinschneider, He¨ braeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 485–486, and Zonta, La filosofia antica, pp. 156– 157. Ibn Nahmias’s translation may be one of the sources of the anonymous Hebrew commentary on the Metaphysics in the ms. Leiden Bibliotheek der

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the Quaestiones disputatae de anima and the De ente et essentia, translated by Habillo).83 One should also not forget Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish’s liberal use of Thomas’s commentaries on the De anima and on the Nicomachean Ethics, as well as translations of some minor works falsely ascribed to Thomas (De potentiis animae, De universalibus).84 However, this “return” to Thomas was apparently intended as a means to absorb contemporary Christian Thomism, as represented by Paris professors, such as Jean Letourneur (whose corpus of questions on Aristotle and Thomas was almost completely translated by Habillo in the 1470s)85 and Thomas Bricot (whose Textus abbreviatus philosophiae naturalis was translated in Avignon shortly after 1492 by the Spanish exile, David Ibn Shoshan).86 It is significant that interest in Thomism was undergoing a revival in Christian Spain, and particularly in Catalonia, during the last three decades of the fifteenth century. Of course, interest in Scotistic and/or Thomistic philosophy did not prevent some of these translators—whose philosophical interests, as usual with medieval Jewish philosophers, seem to have been rather eclectic—from paying attention to authors belonging to other philosophical schools: they translated into Hebrew minor works such as the summae on the natural sciences by Robert Grosseteste87 and Rijks Universiteit, Or. 4796 (Warner 58). The latter is almost completely preserved (only the beginning is lost) and was probably written in Spain in the fifteenth century (cf. M. Steinschneider, Catalogus codicum Hebraeorum Bibliothecae Academiae Lugduno-Batavae, Lugduni Batavorum 1858, p. 264); it consists in a sort of Scholastic expositio of the Metaphysics, and includes several quaestiones in which “Thomas” (T . omas) is quoted as a source (cf. f. 29v, last line). A possible quotation from Ibn Nahmias’s translation is contained in one of Isaac Aboab’s rabbinical sermons, written in 1490–1493: see Saperstein, “Your Voice Like a Ram’s Horn”, p. 79 note 17. 83 See below, chapter 3, list of Habillo’s works, on numbers D.1.1. and D.1.2. 84 See below, chapter 3, on numbers D.1.4. and D.1.3. According to Moses Almosnino (Greece, sixteenth century), Isaac Abravanel translated into Hebrew Thomas’s Quaestio de spiritualibus creaturis, but this translation is now apparently lost (see Netanyahu, Don Isaac Abravanel, p. 295 note 72; cf. Steinschneider, ¨ Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 487). 85 See below, chapter 3, list of Habillo’s works, on number D.2. 86 ¨ See Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 468. 87 See Zonta, La filosofia antica, pp. 267–268 and note 25. This translation— undertaken by an anonymous scholar probably active in Spain before 1460– 1470, and preserved in the mss. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 1004, ff. 106r–117r, and Oxford, Bodleian Library, Reggio 44, ff. 30r– 39v—is different from the one found in the ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library,

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Albert of Orlam¨unde, and a corpus of logical questions ascribed to Marsilius of Inghen (and whose real author has not yet been ascertained).88 The anonymous fifteenth century Hebrew translation of Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum was possibly also written in Spain.89 The choice of texts to translate might have depended in some cases on the geographical area where the translator was working: this seems to be the case for Habillo’s translation of a work on universals by the Catalan preacher Vincent Ferrer.90 Finally, it should be remembered that, well before the golden period of “Scholastic” translations, Samuel Benveniste, working in 1412 in Asentiu (Catalonia), had translated the Catalan Scholastic “translation-commentary” of Boethius’s De consolatione philosophiae by the two fourteenth century Catalan authors, Pere Saplana and Antoni Ginebreda.91 This framework provides some important premises, which, however, are not per se sufficient to explain the development of “Hebrew Scholasticism” in fifteenth century Spain. Some scholars have wondered why this remarkable “duplication” of the currents of contemporary Latin philosophy (and, in particular, this blooming of interest in Scholasticism) occurred in Jewish cultural e´ lites during Michael 288, ff. 112r–126r, completed in 1537 in Italy by Elijah Nolano (see ¨ Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 476): see Zonta, La filosofia antica, 269. The same translator translated into Hebrew a book De anima falsely ascribed to Robert Grosseteste, which has no parallel in the Latin tradition: see Zonta, La ¨ filosofia antica, p. 268 and note 26, and Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 476–477. 88 As for Albert of Orlam¨unde and the (pseudo?)-Marsilius, both translated by Abraham Shalom, see below, chapter 3. 89 On this translation, found in a unique manuscript, see A. Melamed, The anonymous Hebrew translation of Aegidius’ De Regimine Principum: an unknown chapter in medieval Jewish political philosophy, “Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale” 5 (1994), 439–461. This translation was possibly produced in early-fifteenth century Spain, shortly after two previous Iberian translations of Giles’s work (one in Castilian around 1350, and the other in Catalan at the end of the fourteenth century). 90 See below, chapter 3, list of Habillo’s works, on number D.4.3. 91 See Zonta, La filosofia antica, pp. 262–267; Id., Le origini letterarie e filosofiche delle versioni ebraiche del De consolatione philosophiae di Boezio, in F. Israel, A.M. Rabello and A.M. Somekh (eds.), Hebraica. Miscellanea di studi in onore di Sergio ◦ J. Sierra per il suo 75 compleanno, Torino 1998, 571–604, especially pp. 572–585; cf. also F. Ziino, The Catalan Tradition of Boethius’s De consolatione: a New Hypothesis, “Carmina Philosophiae. Journal of the International Boethius Society” 10 (2001), 31–37.

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a period of evident inter-religious tension, on the eve of the traumatic expulsion of Jews from Spain in 1492. Even more surprising is the fact that, in this same period and milieu, Scholasticism seems to have been successful also among some of the most conservative Jewish authors, whose attitude to philosophy was generally quite diffident—this is the case, for instance, with Abraham Bibago. Ari Ackerman and Hava Tirosh-Rothschild argue that the development of “Hebrew Scholasticism” in Iberia can be explained as an attempt to strengthen Jewish thought to enable it to fend off more effectively the two greatest threats to Judaism in fifteenth century Spain, namely Christian apologetics and theology on the one hand, and radical rationalism (as found in Jewish “Averroism”) on the other.92 This explanation, based upon the fundamental role that Jewish-Christian polemics indisputably played in fifteenth century Spanish Jewish culture, seems confirmed by some explicit statements by “Hebrew Schoolmen” about the reasons of their own adhesion to Scholastic philosophy. Eli Habillo declares that the new arguments of contemporary Scholasticism are necessary, both for fighting “Averroism” and for debating Christians.93 It should also be recalled that fifteenth century Spanish Jewish authors had a strong interest in Scholastic logic, which they saw as a useful tool for constructing effective replies to Christian critiques in inter-religious disputes.94 It would seem reductive, however, to explain fifteenth century “Hebrew Scholasticism” merely as a kind of defence against the opponents of contemporary Judaism, and against Christianity in particular.95 The need to update Jewish philosophy by absorbing Scholastic doctrines and methods was felt not only for religious reasons, but apparently also for philosophical reasons, in order to allow Jewish philosophers to fully partake in the development of contemporary European thought. (This is exactly what seems to have happened 92

Cf. Ackerman, Jewish Philosophy, pp. 380–381; Tirosh-Rothschild, Jewish Philosophy, pp. 504–505. 93 See below, chapter 3. 94 See Manekin, Scholastic Logic, pp. 130–133. 95 See, e.g., Lasker, The Impact of Christianity, p. 183, according to whom “the more involved a Jewish author was with anti-Christian polemics, the more impact Christianity had on his works”. Lasker’s thesis has been judged as “trop systematique” by Rothschild, Remarques, p. 63 note 18.

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in the case of Judah Romano in early fourteenth century Italy.)96 Of course, the appreciation of Scotist and Thomist Scholasticism by some hardline defenders of Jewish religious tradition against rationalism can be explained as a sort of alliance of “conservative” Judaism with “conservative” Christianity against radical philosophy.97 But it is also difficult to dismiss the fact that some fifteenth century Iberian Jewish philosophers felt the need to study Scholasticism as something “new” and as a useful instrument for the advancement of Jewish thought.98 As a matter of fact, the major Iberian Jewish “Schoolmen” of the fifteenth century (Abraham Bibago, Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish, Abraham Shalom, Eli Habillo) appear to have been most interested in the results reached by Scholasticism in the areas of philosophy more closely associated with theology, namely metaphysics, ethics and human psychology. These thinkers seem to have been emulators rather than mere imitators of their Christian sources: they used Scholastic doctrines and methods as points of departure for the independent discussion of philosophical and even theological matters (sometimes, of course, in contrast with their Christian colleagues).99 Their general approach to Latin sources appears to be rather free and, even in translations, not slavishly literal. In a recent study on some aspects of 96 Giuseppe Sermoneta (in his La dottrina dell’intelletto, pp. 75–76 note 159) has very aptly compared early fourteenth century “Hebrew Scholasticism” in Italy with late fifteenth century “Hebrew Scholasticism” in Spain, and has defined Habillo “the Spanish Judah Romano”. 97 See Ackerman, Jewish Philosophy, p. 381; Manekin, Scholastic Logic, p. 131: “One may even speak of a coalition of interests between Christian and Jewish philosophy, both increasingly theologically conservative, against the philosophical naturalism of an earlier age”. On the “conservative” tendency of fifteenth century Jewish philosophy in Spain, see H.A. Davidson, Medieval Jewish Philosophy in the Sixteenth Century, in B.D. Cooperman (ed.), Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth Century, Cambridge, Massachusetts–London 1983, 106–145, p. 112. 98 One can consider, e.g., some statements found in Abraham Ibn Nahmias’s introduction to his translation of Thomas’s commentary on the Metaphysics: Abraham criticises some contemporary Jews for their hostility to philosophy, and attributes it to their lack of understanding of the relationship between philosophy and religion. He praises Christian scholars (h.akmey ha-Nos.erim) for their results in this field, thus emphasising the necessity of studying their philosophy (cf. Sachs’s article cited above [note 82], p. 110; cf. Steinschneider, Hebraeischen ¨ Ubersetzungen, p. 485). 99 See the remarks in M. Zonta, Einige Bemerkungen u¨ ber “hebr¨aische Scholastik” im 15. Jahrhundert in Spanien und Italien, “Im Gespr¨ach” 7 (2003), 52–60, pp. 53–56.

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the dependence of late medieval Hebrew philosophical terminology on the vocabulary of Latin Scholasticism, I have shown that skilled translators from Latin into Hebrew, such as Eli Habillo, preferred to paraphrase the more difficult “technical” terms, rather than give a literal rendering of them. These translators even resorted to glosses, inserting in the margins of the manuscripts the Latin or Spanish philosophical or theological terms corresponding to their Hebrew paraphrases in the text.100 The same features also appear in the original works of Spanish “Hebrew Scholasticism”, where literal references to Scholastic sources are sometimes modified and adapted to the new context created by the Jewish author.101 “Hebrew Scholasticism” in Fifteenth Century Italy and After Late fifteenth century Italian “Hebrew Scholasticism” is, in many respects, analogous to the same phenomenon in contemporary Iberia; but there are also some substantial differences. First of all, as said above, Italian Jewish culture had a longer tradition of contacts with Christian thought; this fact presumably facilitated the development, or rather the revival, of “Hebrew Scholasticism” in Italy. Despite the apparent scarcity of contemporary Hebrew-Latin glossaries of philosophical terms,102 it is generally believed that the Italian Jewish e´ lite of the fifteenth century possessed a rather good and extensive knowledge of Latin. There is substantial evidence that in fifteenth century Italy members of the Jewish cultural e´ lite attended Christian schools to improve their knowledge of philosophy and science (in this period, some of them started to 100

See M. Zonta, Arabic and Latin Glosses in Medieval Hebrew Translations of Philosophical Texts and Their Relation to Hebrew Philosophical Dictionaries, in Hamesse and Jacquart (eds.), Lexiques bilingues, 31–48, pp. 44–48; Id., The Relationship between Hebrew and Latin Philosophical Vocabularies in the Late Middle Ages, in J. Hamesse and C. Steel (eds.), L’elaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Age, Turnhout 2000, 147–156. 101 Cf., e.g., the references to Thomas Aquinas in the commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics by Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish’s school: see below, chapter 2. 102 In the list of glossaries in Rothschild, Remarques, pp. 70–88, only the ms. Warsaw, Zydowsky Instytut Historyczny, no. 255 (containing Latin translations of Hebrew philosophical and scientific terms of Abraham Ibn ‘Ezra’s Reshit h.okmah) can surely be ascribed to this period (1460) and area (the Tuscan town of Lucca) (see ibidem, p. 88, number 90).

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attend university courses, especially medicine, in Bologna and, possibly, Padua).103 Furthermore, in fifteenth century Italy there also existed Jewish academies where philosophy was taught alongside traditional religious disciplines—for instance, Judah Messer Leon’s yeshivah in the second half of the century.104 In these schools, traditional Jewish Averroism was not regarded as a non-religious or an old-fashioned philosophy, but it was still considered by “Hebrew Schoolmen” as the core of Jewish Aristotelianism.105 Jewish thought in the fifteenth century was, of course, heavily influenced by the parallel development of Humanism in Christian thought. Humanist thinkers considered obsolete the medieval and Scholastic approach to Aristotle, and were more interested in Platonism and other currents of ancient thought. Italian “Jewish Humanism” has been studied extensively,106 and I shall not try to sketch its history here. What I intend to stress here is the fact that the new Humanistic trends in fifteenth century Jewish thought did not hinder the development of a parallel Italian “Hebrew Scholasticism”— although the latter appears to have been different in character and more limited in scope with respect to its Spanish counterpart. In fact, in some cases the same person partook of both Scholasticism and Humanism. For instance, Judah Messer Leon, the foremost Italian “Hebrew Schoolman”, was also the author of a well-known treatise on Hebrew rhetoric, The Honeycomb’s Flow, which has been recognised

103 Cf. Saperstein, The Social and Cultural Context, p. 301 and note 46; Rudavsky, The Impact of Scholasticism, p. 350; Tirosh-Rothschild, Jewish Philosophy, p. 512 (cf. also the bibliography quoted there, especially Robert Bonfil’s writings on this subject). On the Jewish attendance at university courses in fifteenth century Italy, see also Shatzmiller, Etudiants juifs, pp. 244–246; J. Shatzmiller, Jews, Medicine, and Medieval Society, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London 1994, pp. 27–35. In fifteenth century Italian Jewish authors there is also some possible evidence of the knowledge of contemporary university practices, such as, e.g., the so-called disputationes circulares in Bologna: see Zonta, Una disputa, p. 412. 104 On Messer Leon’s academy, see Saperstein, The Social and Cultural Context, p. 306 and note 78; see also the data provided below, chapter 4. 105 Cf. A.L. Ivry, Remnants of Jewish Averroism in the Renaissance, in Cooperman (ed.), Jewish Thought, 243–265, pp. 243–245; Tirosh-Rothschild, Jewish Philosophy, pp. 512–519. 106 For a general historical overview of “Humanism” in fifteenth century Italian Jewish philosophy, see Sirat, A History, pp. 398 ff.; Tirosh-Rothschild, Jewish Philosophy, pp. 519–525. Cf. also H. Tirosh-Rothschild, In Defence of Jewish Humanism, “Jewish History” 3 (1988), 31–57.

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as a patchwork of some of the most important sources of contemporary Humanistic rhetoric, such as Cicero’s De inventione, pseudoCicero’s Rhetorica ad Herennium, Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria and Victorinus’s commentary on Cicero.107 Italian Jewish authors interested in Latin Scholasticism were certainly less attracted by theological questions than their Spanish colleagues; surviving Italian “Hebrew-Scholastic” writings are mostly on logic108 and physics.109 However, these texts adhere to their Latin sources more closely and literally than their Spanish counterparts: Italian “Hebrew Schoolmen” reproduce Latin words and contents more faithfully, and create also a new terminology by literally reproducing in Hebrew Latin Scholastic terms and expressions (significant instances of this linguistic approach appear in Judah Shalom’s translation of Peter of Spain’s Tractatus,110 and in the works of Judah Messer Leon).111 The exponents of Italian “Hebrew Scholasticism” seem to have been particularly interested in the texts known and employed by Paduan Scholasticism. This Paduan focus is revealed by the extant translations of Latin philosophical works made in Italy during the fifteenth century, and by the Scholastic texts that were surely read and quoted by Italian “Hebrew Schoolmen” (in particular, Judah Messer Leon)112 . Among the main sources of Messer Leon and his school, there are works on Aristotelian logic and physics by two professors in the university of Padua, Paul of Venice (d. 1429) and 107

On the sources of The Honeycomb’s Flow, see Judah Messer Leon, Nofet Zufim On Hebrew Rhetoric, ed. R. Bonfil, Jerusalem 1981, pp. 54–69; see also A. Altmann, Ars Rhetorica as Reflected in Some Jewish Figures of the Italian Renaissance, in Cooperman (ed.), Jewish Thought, 1–22, pp. 5–13. 108 On the diffusion of Scholastic logic in fifteenth century Italian Jewish culture, see Manekin, Scholastic Logic, pp. 134–138. 109 See Zonta, Einige Bemerkungen, p. 56. 110 See Manekin, When the Jews, p. 423, who points out three features of Judah’s translation: “Great commitment to the Latin original (. . . ); linguistic accuracy, even to the extent of the Hebrew syntax mirroring the Latin; the adoption of new Hebrew philosophical terms, or new meanings for old ones that better capture the Latin”. 111 See Zonta, The Relationship, pp. 152–153. 112 On Judah Messer Leon as a “Hebrew Schoolman”, see the sketch in TiroshRothschild, Jewish Philosophy, pp. 514–515; Manekin, Scholastic Logic, pp. 137–138 (where he is defined as “a scholastic logician writing in Hebrew”); see also below, chapter 4.

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his successor, Gaetano de Thiene (1387-1465). Furthermore, when Italian “Hebrew Schoolmen” had to refer to earlier authors, they relied on the same sources as the Paduan Schoolmen, such as Walter Burley and John of Jandun.113 Alongside this Hebrew “extension” of the Paduan school, there was also a sort of “Hebrew Latin Averroism”. The latter was based, rather than on the old translations of Averroes’s works from Arabic into Hebrew, on new Hebrew translations of texts pertaining to the Latin Averroism that was flourishing again in Italy after 1450. The translations of Averroes’s Long Commentary and of John of Jandun’s questions on the De anima (if they were really composed in Italy) should be ascribed to this trend.114 On the contrary, not much attention seems to have been paid to the old sources of Italian “Hebrew Thomism”—although Messer Leon in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics refers repeatedly to the commentaries on this work by Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome.115 Finally, we should take into account some further translations that bear witness to the interest of fifteenth century Italian Jewish thinkers in medieval Latin philosophy: the translation of the Tractatus mentioned above, by Judah Shalom,116 the version of the De consolatione philosophiae by Bonafous Bonfil Astruc (patterned after the Scholastic “translation-commentaries” of Boethius’s work),117 113

On these sources, see M. Zonta, Scholastic Commentaries in Hebrew: Some Notes About Judah Messer Leon (Italy, 15th Century), in G. Fioravanti, C. Leonardi and S. Perfetti (eds.), Il commento filosofico nell’Occidente latino (secoli XIII–XV), Turnhout 2002, 379–400; see also below, chapter 4. 114 On these translations, see below, chapter 2. 115 See below, chapter 4. Thomas’s works were not totally neglected by fifteenth century Italian Jewish authors: see, e.g., Elijah del Medigo’s explicit refer¨ ence to the Summa contra Gentiles (see Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 487 note 149), or the quotation of Thomas’s commentary on the Metaphysics (T . omaso be-ve’uro le-Mah she-’ah.ar) in the anonymous commentary on some parts of Avicenna’s Canon, book I, preserved in the ms. Florence, Biblioteca MediceoLaurenziana, Pluteo LXXXVIII no. 26, folios 81r–91r, f. 81r (copied in fifteenth century Italy). 116 On this translation, see Manekin, When the Jews, pp. 422–425; Id., Scholastic Logic, pp. 136–137. 117 Bonafous Bonfil Astruc’s translation, written in 1423 in Macerata Feltria (now in the Italian province of Pesaro-Urbino), was published by S. Sierra, Boezio De consolatione philosophiae. Traduzione ebraica di ‘Azaria ben r. Joseph Ibn Abba Mari. . . , Turin-Jerusalem 1967. On its possible sources (not only Boethius’ original work, but also two Scholastic commentaries on it, by the pseudo-Thomas Aquinas and by Nicholas Trevet), see Zonta, Le origini, pp. 586–604.

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and the Hebrew translations of two Scholastic logical works, namely pseudo-Thomas’s De fallaciis ad quosdam nobiles artistas, translated by an anonymous scribe,118 and Raymond Lull’s Ars brevis, translated by Pinhas Tzvi ben Natanael Mozon.119 Also the Hebrew translation of the medico-scientific Quaestiones falsely ascribed to Albert the Great was probably made while the translator, a Portuguese Jew, lived in Italy.120 However, it seems that the role of translations in Italian “Hebrew Scholasticism” was very limited in comparison with fifteenth century Spain, where the number of Latin-to-Hebrew translations was far greater. As far as we can tell, Judah Messer Leon’s approach to Scholasticism was rather atypical in fifteenth century Italian Jewish thought.121 Among his students, only Abraham Farissol seems to have followed the path of his master,122 while well-known figures such as Yohanan Alemanno and Judah’s own son, David Messer Leon, were mostly attracted by Platonism and Kabbalah.123 The 118 This translation was inserted by an anonymous scribe into the text of Abraham Avigdor’s Hebrew version of the Tractatus: see the ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 929, written in 1472 (Manekin, Scholastic Logic, p. 135). 119 This translation, preserved in the unique ms. New York, Jewish Theological Seminary, microfilm 2312, was completed in Senigallia (province of Pesaro¨ Urbino) in 1474. See Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 475–476; Rosenberg, Logic and Ontology, p. 107. 120 This work was translated into Hebrew by Moses Ibn Habib (d. c. 1505), a Jewish physician, philosopher and grammarian from Lisbon, probably around ¨ the end of the fifteenth century (see Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 776–777). There is evidence that from c. 1480 onwards Ibn Habib lived in Italy, first in Naples and then in Bitonto and Otranto (in Puglia): see A. David, Ibn Habib, Moses ben Shem Tov, in Encyclopaedia Judaica, CD Rom Edition. Version 1.0, Judaica Multimedia (Israel) 1997. 121 Of course, as well as the works of the authors mentioned above, there are isolated cases of anonymous “Hebrew Scholastic” texts which can be dated to this period and area: see, e.g., the ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Opp. Add. 4◦ 10 (Neubauer 1324), ff. 89r–90r (probably copied in early fifteenth century Italy), where there is a question by a certain Solomon ha-Qatan, “if souls are created before the creation of bodies or not”, quoting Augustine and other Christian authors, and patterned after a typical quaestio of Scholastic theology. 122 On Farissol, see D.B. Ruderman, The World of a Renaissance Jew: The Life and Thought of Abraham ben Mordecai Farissol, Cincinnati 1981; cf. also below, chapter 4, note 3. 123 See M. Idel, The Magical and Neoplatonic Interpretations of the Kabbalah in the Renaissance, in Cooperman (ed.), Jewish Thought, 186–242 (about Alemanno’s

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only other major contemporary Italian Jewish philosopher who was deeply interested in Scholasticism and wished to participate in the development of contemporary Scholastic philosophy was Elijah del Medigo (1460–1493). He was active in Padua and Florence and wrote Scholastic commentaries and translations of texts belonging to the Aristotelian tradition.124 Scholars have tried to detect in del Medigo’s thought traces of Paduan “Averroism”, as represented by Pietro Pomponazzi or his source, John of Jandun.125 However, del Medigo’s usual language, while acting as Schoolman and translator, was not Hebrew, but Latin. His extant Scholastic works in Hebrew, the commentary on Averroes’s De substantia orbis and the Two Questions on Soul, were originally written in Latin between 1482 and 1485, and later translated into Hebrew by the author.126 Spanish “Hebrew Scholasticism” came to an untimely end in 1492, as a consequence of the expulsion of Jews from the Iberian peninsula, which led to the dispersion of the Judaeo-Spanish cultural e´ lite and its heritage. Some Jewish philosophers, whether of Spanish origin or not, continued to follow the path traced by their ancestors in the countries where exiled Jews took up their new

role); H. Tirosh-Rothschild, Between Worlds. The Life and Thought of Rabbi David ben Judah Messer Leon, Albany 1991; cf. also Ead., Jewish Philosophy, pp. 515, 525– 529. 124 On Elijah del Medigo’s works and thought, see D.M. Geffen, Faith and Reason in Elijah Del Medigo’s Beh.inat Ha-Dat and the Philosophic Backgrounds of the Work, Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1970 (non vidi); Id., Insight into the Life and Thought of Elijah Del Medigo Based on His Published and Unpublished Works, “Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research” 41–42 (1973– 1974), 69–86; cf. also J.J. Ross’ introduction to Eliyyahu Del Medigo, Sefer behinat ha-dat, ed. and trans. J.J. Ross, Tel Aviv 1984, 11–61, and Tirosh-Rothschild, Jewish Philosophy, pp. 515–517. 125 On del Medigo’s Averroism, see the overview in Ivry, Remnants, pp. 250– 261; see also S. Feldman, The End and Aftereffects of Medieval Jewish Philosophy, in Frank and Leaman (eds.), The Cambridge Companion, pp. 414–445, pp. 416–420. 126 Del Medigo’s Hebrew versions of the above mentioned philosophical works, which are still unpublished, appear to differ from their Latin originals only in some passages, concerning autobiographical data and references to religious questions. See K.P. Bland, Elijah del Medigo’s Averroist Response to the Kabbalahs of Fifteenth-Century Jewry and Pico della Mirandola, “The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy” 1 (1991), 23–53; Id., Delmedigo, Elijah, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 10 vols., London and New York 1998, Vol. 2, 861–863.

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residence. There was a “Hebrew Scholasticism” in sixteenth century Greece, especially in Salonica, where philosophers like Joseph Taitazak127 and Moses Almosnino128 wrote philosophical works in Hebrew, in which they employed late medieval and Renaissance Latin sources and reproduced their techniques. In Italy, there is evidence of the persistence of an interest in Latin Scholasticism in the works of some Jewish philosophers active in the sixteenth century, such as Ovadiah Sforno (c. 1470–1550).129 However, sixteenth century Jewish philosophy in Greece and Italy seems substantially different from late medieval Jewish Aristotelianism, since it involved an eclectic fusion of various doctrinal trends: Aristotelianism, Renaissance Platonism and Humanism, and also Kabbalah, which had begun to replace philosophy as the major expression of Jewish thought. *** As observed at the beginning of this introduction, fifteenth century “Hebrew Scholasticism” has been long neglected by scholars: serious research on it seems to have begun only in the last decade, almost one century after Moritz Steinschneider’s preliminary 127 See J.B. Sermoneta, Scholastic Philosophic Literature in Yosef Taitazak’s Porat Yosef (in Hebrew), “Sefunot” 11 (1971–1978), 137–185. 128 See Tirosh-Rothschild, Jewish Philosophy, pp. 531–545; see also Ead. (under the name H. Tirosh-Samuelson), The Ultimate End of Human Life in Postexpulsion Philosophic Literature, in B.R. Gampel (ed.), Crisis and Creativity in the Sephardic World, 1391–1648, New York 1997, 223–254, 351–380, pp. 232–233 and notes (about Almosnino’s Scholastic sources in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics), and Ead., Happiness in Premodern Judaism. Virtue, Knowledge, and Well-Being, “Monographs of the Hebrew Union College” 29, Cincinnati 2003, pp. 423–438; cf. also below, chapter 2. 129 See Tirosh-Rothschild, Jewish Philosophy, p. 518; see also Ead. (under the name H. Tirosh-Samuelson), Theology of Nature in Sixteenth-Century Italian Jewish Philosophy, “Science in context” 10 (1997), 521–570, especially pp. 524–536. Cf. also R. Bonfil, The Doctrine of the Soul and Holiness in the Teachings of Obadia Sforno (in Hebrew), “Eshel Beer Sheva” 1 (1976), 200–257. Bonfil points out the similarities between a question about the immortality of the soul in Sforno’s The Light of the Nations (’Or ‘ammim) and Thomas Aquinas’s Summa theologica, I, q. 75 (De homine), a. 6. Bonfil stresses the “Hebrew Scholastic” character of The Light of the Nations, which was even translated into Latin by the author: in Renaissance Italy, “Hebrew Schoolmen” like Sforno and Elijah del Medigo were apparently eager for their Christian colleagues to know the results of their work.

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inventory of sources.130 Most of the sources themselves remain unpublished, and their contents and relationship to Latin sources have not yet been studied in detail. These reasons lead me to believe that it would be premature to try to write a general historical overview of “Hebrew Scholasticism”. What is needed now is to present, edit, translate and comment on some of the most significant texts of “Hebrew Scholasticism”, so that scholars can attain a more precise idea of its extent and character. This book aims to respond to this need. 130 Among the best few recent works on this subject, one should mention JeanPierre Rothschild’s study of some of Eli Habillo’s “Scholastic” philosophical questions: cf. below, chapter 3, note 9.

1. ABRAHAM BIBAGO

Abraham ben Shem Tov Bibago (or Bibag) is the best known and most studied philosopher among the Spanish Jewish thinkers of the fifteenth century who took a strong interest in contemporary Latin Scholasticism.1 All the same, the data about his life are few and uncertain. He was active in some Aragonese towns during the second half of the century: there is evidence that he was in Huesca in 1446 (when he apparently was the father of some young children, so that we can suppose he was born around 1420) and again in 1465; as a young man (perhaps around 1460) he held a discussion with a Christian scholar at the court of John II, king of Aragon (1458–1479); possibly between 1466 and 1470 he had to leave Huesca, perhaps under suspicion of heresy because of his philosophical studies;2 in 1471 he was in Saragosa, where he apparently directed a Jewish academy (yeshivah) 1

The most important studies on this author are: M. Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago’s Schriften, “Monatschrift zur Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums” 32 (1883), 79–96, 125–144, 239–240 (cf. also Steinschneider, Hebraeischen ¨ Ubersetzungen, pp. 89–90); M. Joseph, Bibagos Religionsphilosophie, unpublished dissertation, Berlin 1901 [non vidi] (cf. M. Joseph, Bibago, Abraham, in J¨udisches Lexicon, Vol. 1, Berlin 1927, pp. 961–963); A. Nuriel, The Philosophical Doctrine of R. Abraham Bibago (in Hebrew), Ph.D. Thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1975 (a revised and corrected version is in: A. Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Jerusalem 2000, pp. 179–298); A. Lazaroff, The Theology of Abraham Bibago, Alabama University 1981 (cf. A. Nuriel’s review in “Daat” 52 [1983], 154–166, now reprinted in Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed , pp. 299– 311); cf. also Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy, pp. 384–389; Rothschild, Les philosophes juifs d’Espagne au XVe si`ecle, pp. 1294–1296. A general bibliography about the life, work and thought of Abraham Bibago is in Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 299–300, notes; it has been updated by Dov Schwartz in his introduction to Nuriel’s book (cf. ibidem, pp. 15–16, notes and p. 21 notes 44– 45). In some manuscripts, the name of Abraham’s father is not “Shem Tov” but “Yom Tov”, and his surname is written “Bibag”, “Bivagch” (perhaps the most correct form) or “Vivas” (Hebrew Bibag, Bibas. or Bibas): cf. Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, p. 79 notes 1–2; Lazaroff, The Theology, pp. 1 and 51–52 notes 1–5. 2 It should be noted that there is nobody by the name of “Bibago” in a list of Jews living in Huesca drawn up in 1475: see E. Benedicto Gracia, La aljama de Huesca a finales del siglo XV: la nomina de casatenientes de la juder´ıa de 1475, “Sefarad” 63 (2003), 227–236. 33

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in which philosophy was taught;3 he probably died between the end of 1488 and February 1489.4 Bibago is usually credited with a direct and extensive knowledge not only of Jewish and Arabo-Islamic philosophy, but also of Latin Scholasticism and Christian culture in general.5 In fact, some of his writings have (and others might have had) a Scholastic structure, directly referring to Scholastic texts and doctrines. However, his relationship to Scholasticism seems to have been more limited than that of other fifteenth century Spanish philosophers (e.g., Eli Habillo and Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish). A tentative chronological list of Bibago’s extant and lost writings (the latter known only through self-quotations) has been drawn up by Abraham Nuriel: 1. The Vision of the Almighty (Mah.azeh Shadday), a lost treatise on astronomy, where Bibago refutes the concept of resurrection as a merely physical process;6 2. Epistle on the Quiddity of the Material Intellect (’Iggeret‘al mahut hasekel ha-hiyyulani), now lost;7 3. The Tree of Life (‘Es. h.ayyim), a philosophical discussion on the creation in two parts. In the first part Bibago argues for the superiority of the Jewish doctrine of creation; in the second part he comments on the description of the creation in Genesis (parashat ma‘aseh bereshit). This text is preserved in the unique ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 995, ff. 1r–44v;8 3

Cf. Saperstein, The Social and Cultural Context, p. 320 note 76. For these biographical data, see Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 181–182; Lazaroff, The Theology, pp. 1 and 52–53 notes 6–11. 5 For example, in his theological treatise The Path of Faith (see below, on number 15) Bibago quotes a passage from Eusebius of Caesarea’s Praeparatio Evangelica (see Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, pp. 89 and 143), which he apparently did not read in the original Greek, but in the fifteenth century Latin translation by George of Trebizond: see Ch. Wirszubski, Flavius Mithridates Sermode passione Domini, Jerusalem 1963, pp. 72–75. Moreover, Bibago himself states that he studied a little Christian theology in his youth: see Lazaroff, The Theology, pp. 4 and 60 note 126. 6 See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, pp. 95–96; Lazaroff, The Theology, pp. 5 and 63 note 159; Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, p. 183 (text of the quotations). 7 See Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, p. 183. 8 See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, p. 96; Lazaroff, The Theology, pp. 5 and 62–63 note 146; Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 184–185 (edition of the beginning and the end of the work) and 291–293 (list of quoted sources). 4

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4. a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (probably a supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Physics), now lost;9 5. two letters to his friend Moses Arondi on two questions: (1) whether “motion” is said univocally or equivocally (be-haskamah ’o be-shittuf); (2) to which category does “motion” belong. These letters are preserved in the unique ms. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 2631, ff. 103r–112r, where they are followed by Arondi’s reply (ff. 112r–115r);10 6. a supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, based upon the thirteenth century Hebrew translation of Averroes’s work by Jacob Anatoli. This text (written in Huesca in 1446 and now preserved in two manuscripts) belongs to the Late Medieval tradition of Jewish Averroism; its main source seems to be Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Posterior Analytics in the Hebrew translation by Qalonymos ben Qalonymos (1314). Bibago’s work refers also to a number of Ancient, Islamic and Jewish philosophical texts (in particular, he criticises Gersonides); it has also been supposed (perhaps wrongly) that a Latin translation of Averroes was among Bibago’s sources;11

9 See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, pp. 127 and 135 note 51; Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, p. 185. 10 See Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 186–188 (edition of the beginning and end of each letter, and of the beginning of Arondi’s reply). The manuscript tradition does not seem to back up Lazaroff’s claim that the letters were written in 1470 (see Lazaroff, The Theology, p. 5). In the description of the manuscript in B. Richler and M. Beit-Ari´e, Hebrew Manuscripts in the Biblioteca Palatina in Parma. Catalogue, Jerusalem 2001, p. 359, number 1316, the letters are erroneously ascribed to a certain “Abraham ben Yom Tov Ibn Savoga”. 11 See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, pp. 126–127 (and Steinschneider, ¨ Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 91); Lazaroff, The Theology, p. 5; Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 188–189 (edition of the introduction) and 293–294 (list of quoted sources). On the dependence of Bibago’s commentary on Averroes’s Long Commentary, see e.g., al-Farabi’s quotation at the beginning of Bibago’s text (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 959, f. 12r), which is clearly drawn from Qalonymos’s translation of Averroes’s Long Commentary (ms. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, hebr. 32, f. 61r, ll. 12 ff.).

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7. a commentary on Averroes’s Colliget, now lost;12 8. a supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. This work, based upon the Hebrew translation of Averroes’s text by Qalonymos ben Qalonymos (1317), is now preserved in three incomplete copies: the mss. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, hebr. 357 and hebr. 57 (the latter is a copy of the former), which contain books I–IX of the work, and the ms. Patmos, St. John Monastery’s Library, no. 324, which contains books I–VI.13 According to Moritz Steinschneider’s accurate description,14 after an introduction in which Christian philosophy is implicitly extolled over contemporary Jewish thought, Bibago’s commentary contains the discussion of some questions, none of which, however, closely reflects the structure of a Scholastic quaestio.15 Among its sources, there may be the Arabic text of the Middle Commentary (but this hypothesis is still in need of confirmation);16 moreover, as well as references to a number of Ancient, Islamic and Jewish philosophical texts, there is direct mention of the metaphysical

12

See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, p. 137; Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, p. 189 (list of extant quotations). 13 Bibago’s work is found on pp. 12–44 of this manuscript, which I have consulted in the microfilm no. 30367 of the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts of the Jewish National and University Library, Jerusalem. Cf. M. Zonta, La tradizione ebraica del Commento Medio di Averro`e alla Metafisica di Aristotele, tesi di dottorato (unpublished), 2 vols., Universit`a di Torino 1995, p. 39∗ note 171. It should be noted that copies of Bibago’s commentaries on Averroes on the Metaphysics and on the Posterior Analytics were found among the manuscripts of the Italian humanist and hebraist Domenico Cardinal Grimani (d. 1520): see G. Tamani, I libri ebraici del cardinal Domenico Grimani, “Annali di Ca’ Foscari” 34 (1995), 5–52, pp. 32–33, numbers 120 and 128. 14 See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, pp. 127–137 (cf. Steinschneider, ¨ Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 168–171) and 138–141 (edition of Bibago’s introduction); see also Lazaroff, The Theology, pp. 4 and 61–2 notes 134– 142; Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 189–191 (re-edition of the introduction). 15 However, the text contains some “conclusions” (toladot), “questions” (sefiqot), “refutations” (setirot), and expositions of doctrines “in the form of a disputation” (‘al derek ha-vikkuah.), which appear to echo Scholastic patterns: see Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, p. 130 notes 28–29. 16 See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, p. 130 and note 30.

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doctrines of three Scholastic authors: Nicholas Bonet,17 William Ockham18 and John Duns Scotus;19 9. some short philosophical treatises in a Scholastic style, preserved in the ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 1004, ff. 37r–53v:20 A. on ff. 37r-47v, the discussion of four philosophical propositions (1. [f. 37r, ll. 20 ff.] “being is divided into potentiality and actuality”; 2. [f. 37v, ll. 24 ff.] “the definition makes known the essence and the reality [’emtat] of the defined thing”; 3. [f. 41r, ll. 23 ff.] “the definition concerns only form and its parts”; 4. [f. 42r, ll. 25 ff.] 17

See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, p. 134 note 47. The reference to Bonet (Nicolau Bonet.) is found in the ms. Munich, hebr. 357, f. 108v: “Nicholas Bonet [ . . . ] said that [being] is not predicated in anteriority and posteriority, but is a first genus, and a supreme genus divided into its first species, which (according to him) are limited quiddity and unlimited quiddity: limited quiddity is divided into other species (and so the division is completed), while unlimited quiddity is the quiddity of the thing, concrete reality (mammashut) and essence . . . ”. For this doctrine, one might compare Nicolaus Bonetus, Metaphysica, Barcelona 1493 (facsimile reproduction, Ann Arbor, Mich.–London 1979), f. 18va, ll. 11–17 (book I, chapt. 15): Ens enim dividitur in ens quidditativum et in ens non quidditativum, antequam dividatur in decem praedicamenta. Ens enim quidditativum postea dividitur in ens finitum et in ens infinitum. Ens autem finitum dividitur in decem praedicamenta . . . 18 See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, pp. 133–134 and note 46 (ms. Munich, hebr. 357, f. 133v). 19 See ms. Munich, hebr. 357, f. 134v (reproduced in Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, p. 133 note 45): “There is another opinion, that of a scholar called Scotus (’Esqot.), who says that specific plurality comes from form, according to Aristotle, while individual plurality and the ostensible (ramuz) distinction found in a substantial thing come from the substance of the ostensible thing, and constitute the specific degree existing in that ostensible thing, since that specific existence is distinct according to many, infinite degrees, and those degrees are related to that ostensible subject; they are the essence (‘asmut) and quiddity of that ostensible thing, and are called in Latin gradus hypostaticus, i.e., distinct degrees. It follows from this that particularity (prat.iyyut), ostensibility (remizut) and individuality (ishiyyut) are essences . . . ” Bibago does not seem to be referring here to any specific text by Duns Scotus: this passage might have been taken from, or inspired by a Latin compendium of Scotus’s philosophy. 20 See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, p. 125; Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 191–192 and 294–295 (list of quoted sources). Nuriel publishes the beginning and the end of the text found on ff. 37r–47v only of the Paris manuscript, since he believes that this text is certainly by Bibago, while the authorship of the texts found on ff. 48r–53r is doubtful.

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“there is a difference between finding the intellect as a separate, selfsubsisting thing, and conceiving it as separate”), preceded by a short introduction signed by Bibago himself, and followed by a discussion about some points of Aristotelian physics (f. 43r, ll. 8 ff.);21 B. on ff. 48r–51v, the discussion of eleven physical problems (beh.inot): 1. (f. 48r, ll. 1 ff.) “whether there is a substrate of generation”; 2. (f. 48v, ll. 6 ff.) “whether this prime matter is in actu”; 3. (f. 49r, ll. 13 ff.) “whether potentiality is different from prime matter”; 4. (f. 49v, ll. 9 ff.) “whether form exists alone, without prime matter”; 5. (f. 50r, ll. 1 ff.) “whether prime matter exists alone”; 6. (f. 50r, ll. 20 ff.) “whether generation does not concern the compound”; 7. (f. 50v, ll. 17 ff.) “that generation concerns prime matter”; 8. (f. 51r, ll. 5 ff.) “that generation concerns form”; 9. (f. 51r, ll. 18 ff.) “whether prime matter is desired”; 10. (f. 51v, ll. 2 ff.) “that (prime matter) is generated and incorruptible”; 11. (f. 51v, ll. 19 ff.) “that prime matter and privation are the same thing”; C. on ff. 52r–53v, what seems to be the beginning of a Scholastic quaestio “whether the universal is found outside of mind in individuals”, containing only the exposition of thirteen negative arguments by William Ockham (f. 52r–v) and twenty positive arguments by Duns Scotus (f. 53r–v); 10. Treatise on the Plurality of Forms (Ma’amar be-ribbuy ha-.surot): on this work, see below; 11. Treatise on the Quiddity of the Soul (Ma’amar be-mahut ha-nefesh), now lost;22 12. a treatise arguing that sacrifice (qorban) is “a physical and intellectual way of becoming closer to God” (sibbah .tiv‘it ve-siklit lehitqarev ’el ha-Shem);23 21

The only direct reference to Scholasticism in this work (a mention of Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of the unity of form in the substrate) is on f. 46v, where Bibago declares himself to be, on this point, “a pupil of Saint Thomas” (anah.nu ba-zeh talmidey San T . omas: l. 24); according to Bibago, this doctrine is found in Thomas’s Sententia libri De anima, book I, and in his De ente et essentia. This looks like a sign of Bibago’s “eclectic” approach to Scholasticism, since the doctrine by Thomas that he approves here is at variance with the Scotist doctrine of the plurality of forms that he defends in his treatise on that subject (see below). 22 See Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, p. 194. The treatise is mentioned both in the introduction and in a passage of the Treatise on the Plurality of Forms: see below, note 59. 23 See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, p. 125; Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 194–195.

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13. responses to the critique of Maimonides in Nahmanides’s commentary on the Pentateuch;24 14. This will comfort us (Zeh yenah.amenu), a sermon on the text of Genesis 5, 29; published in Salonica in 1522, it is also preserved in two manuscripts;25 15. The Path of Faith (Derek ’emunah), preserved in at least four manuscripts (but only one has the complete text) and in a manuscript summary. This work, divided in three books (on God, on the human relationship to God, and on the principles of Judaic faith), and first published in Constantinople in 1521,26 is a sort of treatise on Jewish dogmatic theology. It shows traces of the influence of the theology of Thomas Aquinas,27 although there is no explicit reference to Scholastic authors; in any case, the doctrinal and methodological influence of Christian theological treatises is limited to a few points (e.g., it contains some questions patterned after Scholastic quaestiones disputatae). According to Allen Lazaroff, this work was written around 1480;28 16. a treatise about the forms of the elements is mentioned twice by Bibago as a forthcoming work in his Treatise on the Plurality of

24

See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, p. 125; Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, p. 195. 25 See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, p. 95; Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 195–196 and 298 (list of quoted sources). 26 For a general survey of the contents of the book, as well as a list of quoted sources, see Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, pp. 84–95, and Lazaroff, The Theology, pp. 2–4; for a general exposition of Bibago’s thought, mostly, if not totally, based upon an analysis of The Path of Faith, see Lazaroff, The Theology, pp. 8– 47, and Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 196–311; for an examination of the manuscript tradition of Bibago’s work, see in particular the study by H. FraenkelGoldschmidt mentioned in Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, p. 299 note 6 (non vidi). There are two facsimile reprints of the 1521 edition: one by Meqorot, Jerusalem 1970 (in which folios 98–101 are missing), and another by Gregg, Farnborough 1969. No modern critical edition of The Path of Faith exists, but there is a good annotated anthology: Abraham Bibago, Derek Emunah, edited, introduced and annotated by H. Fraenkel-Goldschmidt (in Hebrew), Jerusalem 1978. 27 See e.g., the discussion (patterned after a Scholastic quaestio) on the concept of “faith” in The Path of Faith, book II, “door” 7 (cf. the Constantinople edition, ff. 67va–72vb), which is clearly based upon two definitions of “faith” discussed in Thomas’s Summa theologica, secunda secundae, q. 14: cf. Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 267–268, 303–304. 28 See Lazaroff, The Theology, p. 54 note 27.

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Forms;29 this work, absent from Nuriel’s list of Bibago’s writings, is now lost;30 17. an anonymous collection of philosophical sermons, found in an unique manuscript, has been sometimes connected with Bibago;31 18. finally, Colette Sirat has recently connected with Bibago a series of marginal notes found in a copy of the Arabic text of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the De anima, and consisting of extracts from a version of the Arabic text of Averroes’s Long Commentary on the De anima.32 From the above data, it appears that, although many of Bibago’s major works show his knowledge of Scholastic theology and philosophy (in particular, logic and metaphysics), only some specific works reproduce Scholastic patterns closely enough to be included in “Hebrew Scholasticism”: this is the case with the letters to Moses Arondi (n. 5), the short philosophical treatises in the Paris manuscript (n. 9) and, most of all, the Treatise on the Plurality of Forms (see below). Moreover, Bibago—whose approach to Scholasticism appears to be rather “eclectic” and sometimes contradictory—was evidently interested in both Thomism and Scotism, the two main currents of Latin philosophy present in fifteenth century Spain. This did not prevent him from criticising particular doctrines of Thomas and Scotus, and from taking part in anti-Christian polemics.33 Finally, it should be noted that the occasional presence of Latin 29 See below, notes 62 and 67 (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 1004, ff. 8r, l. 2, and 10r, ll. 15–16). 30 This work may be identical with the work on “corporeal forms”, in which Bibago defended Averroes’s doctrine in response to Eli Habillo; this work is mentioned by Saul ha-Kohen Ashkenazi (end of the fifteenth century) in his letters to Isaac Abravanel, published in Venice in 1574: see Lazaroff, The Theology, pp. 5 and 63 note 163 (where Steinschneider’s apparently erroneous identification of this work with the Treatise on the Plurality of Forms is mentioned). 31 See D.S. Sassoon, Ohel David, London 1932, Vol. 2, pp. 671–675, no. 702. 32 These notes (in Arabic, but written in Hebrew characters) are found in the ms. Modena, Biblioteca Estense, α. J. 6. 23 (or. 13), f. 54v. See about them C. Sirat and M. Geoffroy, L’original arabe du Grand Commentaire d’Averro`es au De Anima d’Aristote. Pr´emices de l’´edition, “Sic et non”, Paris 2005, pp. 63–68 and 79–86. 33 See Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 182 and 285 (on a dispute between Jews and Christians in front of King John II of Aragon, in which Bibago assumed the defence of Judaism). On Jewish philosophers’ acknowledged use of Christian theology for the purpose of inter-religious debates in fifteenth century Spain, see also the case of Eli Habillo: cf. below, chapter 3.

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and Castilian glosses in his writings34 —a common practice among Spanish “Hebrew Schoolmen”—bears evidence that Bibago read his Scholastic sources directly in their original languages. Treatise on the Plurality of Forms The unique copy of this text is in the ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 1004, ff. 1r–29v.35 Bibago’s authorship, although not explicitly stated in the manuscript, has been demonstrated on the basis of internal and external evidence.36 The traces of frequent changes of mind and the numerous corrections and additions in the margins of the manuscript suggest that this may be the original text of the work—possibly an autograph by Bibago himself. The structure of the work is very complex, and it displays many characteristics typical of Scholastic philosophical treatises: it consists of a discussion on the general question of the possibility and nature of the “plurality of forms”, and contains arguments pro and contra the various opinions on the question in general and on its various consequences in particular; it also comprises a number of excursus in relation to special questions that are raised in the discussion. What follows is a very general sketch of the main contents of the treatise. Bibago discusses three fundamental opinions about the plurality of forms: 1. the first opinion (Duns Scotus’s), the correct one according to Bibago, holds that there exist many substantial forms predicated in quid (ff. 1v, l. 12–5r, l. 1); 1.1. Excursus: the whole is different from its parts (as Duns Scotus affirms; the arguments are apparently taken from John the Canon) (ff. 3v, l. 7–4v, l. 25); 2. the second and third opinions (those of Averroes and Thomas Aquinas) are shown to be incorrect (ff. 5r, l. 2–8r, l. 18); 34

See Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 295 (constituci´on) and 297–298 (formalitas, gradus hypostatici, permissive, positive). 35 The manuscript is described in H. Zotenberg, Catalogue des manuscrits h´ebreux et samaritaines de la biblioth`eque imp´eriale, Paris 1866, p. 180. 36 See Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, p. 95; Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 192–194 (including an edition of the introduction) and 295–298 (list of sources).

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2.1. Excursus: privation is different from matter, in contrast with Ockham’s opinion (ff. 5v, l. 8–6v, l. 26); 2.2. Excursus: the soul should be defined as “the first perfection”, not as “the second perfection” (ff. 7r, l. 23–7v, l. 18). 3. According to Bibago, also the preconception that the number of forms, if they are many, should be equal to that of the predicates in quid is incorrect (ff. 8r, l. 18–10r, l. 3); 3.1. Excursus: indeterminate dimensions are substance, as affirmed by Alexander of Hales (in reality, Alexander of Alexandria), not accident (ff. 8v, l. 2–9r, l. 4). 4. The plurality of substantial forms can be conceived in different ways (ff. 10r, ll. 4–20): 5. the correct view, for Bibago, is that there are many forms, distinct according to the distinction of actions, since things are distinct due to something universal that has an extra-mental existence in actu (ff. 10r, l. 20–12v, l. 8). 6. For Bibago, the preconception mentioned above is incorrect, since matter does not enter into the definition of something (ff. 12v, l. 8–14r, l. 22); 6.1. Excursus: Aristotle’s proposition “what has (the name of) something for the sake of that thing is worthier of (the name of) that thing than is the thing itself” is valid for homonymous things that have a substantial and quidditative relationship, as affirmed by a scholar (ff. 12v, l. 25–13r, l. 25); 6.2. Excursus: difficulty in understanding does not come from the relationship between things and mind, as affirmed by Duns Scotus (ff. 13v, l. 19–14r, l. 2). 7. According to Bibago, there are different opinions about the role of form and matter in generation: according to the correct one—Aristotle’s—matter precedes generation (ff. 14r, l. 22–14v, l. 26); 8. there are also different opinions about the quiddity of a thing: according to the correct one—Aristotle’s—it consists in the compound of form and matter (ff. 14v, l. 26–15r, l. 23); 9. despite this, the proper quiddity of something ostensible is only its form (ff. 15r, l. 23–16r, l. 7). 10. Bibago gives here a threefold division of the theoretical sciences (partly taken from Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish?) according to their subject and their relationship to form and matter (ff. 16r, l. 7–20v, l. 24).

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10.1. Excursus: some people (Antonius Andreas, John the Canon) are wrong in their critique of Averroes’s statement that the subject of physics is the moved body (ff. 16r, l. 24–16v, l. 8); 10.2. Excursus: the quiddity of accident is not related to its substrate, since accident has a quiddity of its own (ff. 17r, l. 1–20r, l. 24); 10.2.1. sub-excursus: the critique by some people of Averroes’s statement that the subject of metaphysics is the separate substance is incorrect (ff. 18v, l. 17–19r, l. 20). 11. Although the quiddity of something is only form, generation concerns the compound of matter and form (ff. 20v, l. 24–21v, l. 6); 12. on the contrary, generation concerns neither only form— since form (according to Aristotle) is generated only accidentally, as a consequence of the generation of its compound—nor only matter (ff. 21v, l. 6–24v, l. 15). 13. According to Bibago, the same matter cannot have all its forms at the same time, but one form after another, since corruptible and incorruptible things cannot belong to the same genus (ff. 24v, l. 15–29v, l. 6 [the argument ends abruptly]); 13.1. Excursus: an explanation—inspired by Thomas Aquinas—of the reasons why corruptible and incorruptible things are different in genus (ff. 25r, l. 5–25v, l. 26); 13.1.1. sub-excursus: the difference between “different” and “distinct” (according to Scotus) (ff. 25r, l. 21–25v, l. 1); 13.1.2. sub-excursus: how the ten categories are distinct (according to Nicholas Bonet) (f. 25v, ll. 1–12); 13.2. Excursus: what is the cause of individuation? (from John the Canon) (ff. 26v, l. 4–29v, l. 1) 13.2.1. according to Peter Aureol, this is a false problem; but Gerald Odonis has refuted this opinion (f. 26v, ll. 7–24); 13.2.2. Bibago lists and refutes five incorrect opinions about the cause of individuation (four of them are taken from Scotus, while the fifth is Francis of Meyronnes’s) (ff. 26v, l. 24–28v, l. 1); 13.2.3. the correct opinion, according to Bibago, is Scotus’s: the cause of individuation are the ultimate degrees, i.e., the gradus hypostatici, of an individual (ff. 28v, l. 1–29v, l. 1). From the above sketch, it is apparent that this treatise is an example of “Hebrew Scotism”, since, in most cases, the opinions and the solutions of the questions that Bibago sets forth seem close to those of John Duns Scotus or of later Scotist authors. This fact, however,

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does not hinder the originality of Bibago’s work.37 The treatise is not a mere collection or patchwork of Scholastic arguments, since Latin sources are by no means always used literally. Moreover, Bibago’s attitude towards Scotism is sometimes critical, since he implicitly refutes some of Scotus’s typical doctrines.38 The extent of Bibago’s knowledge of fourteenth and fifteenth century Scholasticism is surprisingly wide:39 among the sources he quotes explicitly—as well as the works of Aristotle and Averroes (which he appears to have read in Hebrew translations as well as in Latin Medieval ones)—are Albert of Saxony’s Quaestiones de generatione et corruptione, Alexander Bonini of Alexandria’s In duodecim Metaphysicae libros expositio, Jean Letourneur’s Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, Nicholas Bonet’s Metaphysica, possibly one of the various versions of Scotus’s commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sententiae, Thomas Aquinas’s Sententia libri Physicorum, the De potentiis animae falsely ascribed to Thomas, William Ockham’s Summa logicae and Summula philosophiae naturalis. Moreover, Bibago repeatedly refers to the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas, often comparing them to doctrines of Scotus and well-known Scotist authors of the fourteenth 37 It should be noted that Bibago was probably well aware of the fact that some of the Scotist doctrines discussed in his treatise may have been already known to fourteenth century Jewish philosophers. In his Supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics, he explicitly mentions Yedayah Bedershi’s Treatise on Personal or Individual Forms (Ma’amar . . . ba-s.urot ha-prat.iyyot ’o ’ishiyyot), where Bedershi (without referring explicitly to Scotus: see above, Historical Introduction) discusses and adopts a doctrine apparently close to Scotus’s doctrine of individual forms as principles of individuation: cf. Steinschneider, Abraham Bibago, pp. 134–135 and 141–142. In this work, however, Bibago criticises Bedershi’s doctrine as based upon an insufficient knowledge of Aristotle’s Metaphysics—a text which Bibago alleges Bedershi knew only through Averroes’s Compendium of the Metaphysics. Moreover, Bibago considers Bedershi’s doctrine substantially different from Scotus’s. In making this critique, Bibago was possibly aware of the superiority of his accurate and first-hand knowledge of Scotism and of Latin Scholasticism in general, with respect to the approximative understanding and vague references in earlier Jewish philosophers, like Bedershi. 38 For instances of Bibago’s implicit disagreement with Scotus, see e.g. below, notes 49, 64, and 69. 39 A cursory list of the Scholastic authors known to Bibago, based upon the explicit references found in his works, is in Nuriel, The Philosophical Doctrine, pp. 24–26; Id., Concealed and Revealed, pp. 291–298; Lazaroff, The Theology, pp. 1– 7. However, neither Nuriel nor Lazaroff have verified and examined in detail the real extent of Bibago’s use of Latin sources.

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century, such as Francis of Meyronnes40 and Gerald Odonis; he refers twice to Peter Aureol.41 Finally, Bibago frequently refers to anonymous “scholars” who are, in most cases, impossible to identify. However, it seems that Bibago did not always have direct access to the works of these authors: e.g., his references to doctrines found in Scotus’s extant writings bear no evidence that Bibago read those texts directly; on the contrary, it is likely that most of his knowledge of Scotus depends on an unspecified later Scotist work—such as, e.g., John the Canon’s questions in the Physics, which he seems to have read and employed many times as a direct source, although he never mentions it by name. English Paraphrase (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 1004, ff. 1r–29v) 1r1–25: Literary introduction to the work. 1r25–1v2: “In this treatise I will report the opinions on the plurality of the forms of the compound: whether these forms are many or only one, and, in case they are one, whether they are one potential form and many actual forms, or one actual form and many potential forms”. 1v2–6: First opinion: there exist many forms, which are predicated in quid. For example, in Ruben there exist many substantial forms: substance, body, life, man, etc. This is the correct opinion.42 1v6–8: Second opinion: the first and prior form that exists in the compound is potential and it is related to its second, more specific form; the same holds true for the second form with respect to the 40

Bibago might have known the thought of Francis of Meyronnes through the Tractatus formalitatum secundum doctrinam Francisci Mayronis, a text used as a source also by Eli Habillo: see below. 41 It is possible that Bibago did not know Aureol’s works directly, but referred to them through quotations found in John the Canon: however, about this question see below, note 111. 42 This is the opinion of Duns Scotus: cf. the sketch given in P. King, Scotus on Metaphysics, in T. Williams (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, Cambridge 2003, 15–68, p. 51 ff.; cf. also R. Cross, Philosophy of Mind, ibidem, 263–284, p. 273; E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot. Introduction`a ses positions fondamentales, Paris 1952, pp. 492–497.

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third, and so on; but all these forms cannot have a separate actual existence. 1v9–12: Third opinion: in the substrate there exists only one form: it is simple and has a perfect actual existence, it determines (megavvelet) the species and is assumed in the definition of that thing.43 These are the main opinions about the plurality of forms; I will mention more particular opinions later on. 1v12–3v7: Fourteen arguments (.ta‘anot) supporting the first opinion: 1. 1v13–19: the thing that moves in animals is the soul (Physics, VII and VIII; see Physics, III: “form moves and matter is moved”). If matter is moved, there is a form in it, since everything that is moved is a body (Physics, VI), and the thing that moves is a form; if so, there are many forms in the same substrate: the form that moves and the form for the sake of which (ba‘avurah) the thing is moved. No matter moves without form (Physics, V); therefore, if it moves there is a form in it; 2. 1v19–2r2: Porphyry affirms that genus precedes species by nature, but he does not understand that what has an extra-mental existence is matter. Genus and species have no extra-mental existence, since they are different44 only insofar as they are secondary rationes (sevarot)—while primary rationes, which have an extra-mental existence and to which secondary rationes refer, do not differ.45 Now, if this precedence is not found in things that have an extra-mental existence, it should be found in things that exist in mind; but in such things there is not a natural precedence, but a temporal one; therefore, they can exist without each other, and all of them exist in the same substrate; 3. 2r2–7: animality and rationality are distinct in man, since, if they were not, laughter—a substantial property of man, related to

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According to Bibago, the second and third opinions are by Averroes and Thomas Aquinas respectively: see below. 44 As a rule, for the sake of uniformity, I have translated as “different” the Hebrew term muvdal or the various derivations of the Hebrew verb yuvdal, “to be separated, to differ”—although in some cases these terms correspond to the Latin term distinctus. 45 The concept of ratio is typical of Scotus’s metaphysics, and designates “a generalization of the strict notion of Aristotelian ‘definition’ ” (King, Scotus on Metaphysics, pp. 22–23).

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rationality—would be related also to animality—and this is absurd. In fact, property is a consequence of form—i.e., what is proper (meyuh.edet) to something—and is a consequence of proper principles; 4. 2r7–9: the parts of definition are forms (Averroes, Physics, I); definition and the defined thing are the same thing actually; if so, in the same substrate—i.e., the defined thing—there are many forms— i.e., the parts of definition; 5. 2r10–11: the foetus has first a vegetal life, then an animal life, and then a human life (Aristotle, De animalibus); if so, there are many different forms in one substrate; 6. 2r11–19: this argument derives from the previous one. If in man there were not many forms, when the second form comes along the first form would be destroyed—and this is absurd. For example, the coming along of the rational soul in man does not cause the destruction of the previously existing animal soul, since the actions of vegetation and animality in man cannot derive from rationality alone (see above, argument 10); 7. 2r19–2v1: the soul is a substance whose existence is found in a substrate actually (Averroes, Metaphysics, VII); if so, there exists another form for the sake of which that matter is in actu. Nobody could say that matter is in actu only with its accidents, since, if so, an accident would precede the form, and the substantial form would be an accident (since everything which occurs to another thing existing perfectly in actu is an accident)—and both things are absurd. Therefore, the soul which is in a substrate in actu is a substantial form, while the form which is cause of the act is also a substantial form, so that many forms are found in the same substrate; 8. 2v1–8: if there existed only one form in one substrate, the destruction of that form would entail the destruction of all the accidents that exist in that substrate—and this is absurd.46 In fact, each accident exists in a substrate in actu, and the cause of that act is a substantial form; but in that substrate many qualities and other accidents would survive (Gen. et corr., I, summa 4: “In sensible things there exists 46

This argument may coincide with one of Scotus’s best-known arguments about the plurality of forms: “when a living body dies, its body remains, in the absence of its vivifying soul; hence, the form by which its body is the body it is must differ from its soul” (King, Scotus on Metaphysics, p. 51).

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something substantial, like corporeity which remains in water and air when they are generated from each other, transparency, moisture and the other accidents”); 9. 2v8–11: the forms of man, of flesh and of bones are different, since their definitions are different, but they are found in the same substrate. Now, that thing which is found between prime matter and ultimate form is bodily form (Averroes, Physics, I); if so, there are many forms;47 10. 2v11–22: wherever the action of a form exists, that form exists (Metaphysics, VIII: “As change [shinnuy] makes matter known, action makes form known, but [only] in one compound; e.g., in man there exist the actions of the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational souls, since the existence of vegetation, sensation and ratiocination, etc.”). If somebody objected that this is true for a specific action, not for a common action (and this argument refers to a common action), so that it is not necessary for many forms to exist, one should reply that the action of vegetation, e.g., is not common to the soul, since, in this case, the substance would enter into its category through an accidental thing—and this is absurd. In fact, accident enters neither into the category of substance due to substance, nor into the category of substance due to accident; 11. 2v22–3r5: if many forms did not exist in the same substrate, generation would not be possible—and this is absurd. In fact, the generated thing must be either matter or form, or a compound of both. Now, the generated thing cannot be a compound—since the generation of a thing that exists actually is a passage from one existence to another existence, and if the compound were generated, it would not exist after a privation (and this contradicts Physics, I). Nor can the generated thing be matter—since matter is neither generated nor corrupted (Physics, I, last chapter; see also below). If the generated thing is form, it must be either an intelligible form or another form: and it cannot be an intelligible form, since in this case it would be emanated from God or from the Giver of Forms (noten ha-.surot). Therefore, the generated thing is another form—and, if 47 This argument seems to be based upon Scotus’s doctrine that is “probable” that each bodily organ has a different form: cf. Cross, Philosophy of Mind, p. 282 note 54. See Scotus’s Ordinatio, book IV, d. 11, q. 3, no. 46: plura organa . . . probabile est, quod distincta specie per formas substantiales.

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so, there exist many forms (the intelligible form and the generated form) in the same substrate;48 12. 3r5–15: if many forms did not exist in the same substrate, no thing could be predicated of another thing—and this is absurd. In fact, if the form of the human body were not different and distinct from the rational soul, two opposites would be predicated of each other—and this is absurd. Moreover, if so, Porphyry’s five predicables would not exist, nor would secondary rationes, nor would the art of logic (which studies secondary rationes insofar as they signify primary ones); 13. 3r15–3v1: if many forms did not exist in the same substrate, the mixture (me‘orav) would not be a mixture—and this is absurd. In fact, if in the compound (murkav) there are the forms of the elements, then there are many forms in the compound; otherwise, the mixture would not be a mixture. Somebody could object that the forms of the elements do not have a strong and actual existence, but rather a feeble and broken (nishbar) one (see Averroes, Gen. et corr., I); but this is not true, since the sign of their extension (’ot ha-rah.aviyyut) is either that mixture, or an act resulting from that mixture (and, in the latter case, it is a caused thing, and the caused thing and the cause are the same thing in actu: cp. Physics, II).49 If I had time here, I would refute the opinions of Averroes, Avicenna and others about the forms of the elements; but I will explain this in its place, since those opinions are not correct, according to many scholars; 14. 3v1–7: the last, and strongest, argument is as follows. If there did not exist many forms in the same substrate, the whole would not be different (nivdal) from its parts taken together with it in actu— and this is absurd.50 Therefore, in the same substrate there are many forms: those of the whole and those of its parts. In fact, if there exist

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This may be a different form of Scotus’s argument that at least two forms are involved in the generation of man: the human soul, given by God, and the substantial form, given by the parents: cf. King, Scotus on Metaphysics, p. 52. 49 This opinion is the opposite of Scotus’s, since, according to the Christian philosopher, in the mixture of many elements there are not many substantial forms because of the mixture itself: see King, Scotus on Metaphysics, p. 53. 50 It is also Scotus’s opinion that “a substance is more than just the sum of its parts” (Cross, Philosophy of Mind, p. 274); see Scotus’s Ordinatio, book III, d. 2, q. 2, no. 7: Ostendo quod totum sit ens aliud ab omnibus partibus coniunctim et divisim.

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two things of which opposite things are predicated, the two things are different actually; now, opposite things are predicated of the whole and of its parts taken together, since the whole is not said to make something subsist in actu, while the parts, on the contrary, are said to make the whole subsist in actu.51 3v7–9: Many scholars hold the opposite opinion about the last question (i.e., “whether the whole is different from its parts”). They say that the whole is not different from its parts taken together. Some of their arguments are as follows:52 1. 3v9–16: if the whole were different actually from its parts taken together, the whole would exist without its parts—and this is absurd (cp. Physics, I). In fact, there is a difference between two things in actu only when each of them can exist without the other. Moreover, if the whole and its parts were different actually, there should be a medium (’em.sa‘i) in actu between them, so that the whole could exist without its parts. Finally, the whole and its parts are correlated (mi.s.tarefim), and correlated things cannot exist without each other; 2. 3v17–22: if it were so, the definition would not signify the quiddity of the whole defined thing—and this is absurd (cp. Metaphysics, VI; cp. also Averroes, Physics, I: “the whole is nothing but the parts taken together”). In fact, if it were so, there should be three existences: the existence of matter, the existence of form, and the third existence different from the parts—and this is not signified by the definition; 3. 3v23–4r1: if it were so, there would be an endless series of existences—and this is absurd (Physics, I). In fact, if the whole and 51

Cf. also below. The four arguments that follow, supporting the thesis that the whole is not different from its parts, are mostly taken (with a partial literal correspondence, which suggests that Bibago read this Latin source directly) from John the Canon’s Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum, book I, q. 5: Utrum totum per se sumptum dicat aliquam entitatem tertiam distinctam realiter ab omnibus partibus simul sumptis (cf. Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum quaestiones, Venetiis 1481 [copy in Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, 112 G 22], ff. 23vb–25va). In particular, Bibago’s argument 2 combines John the Canon’s arguments 1 (based upon the passage of Averroes quoted above, Physics, I: f. 23vb, ll. 12–13) and 2 (Nam tunc sequeretur quod diffinitio non diceret totam entitatem diffiniti, ascribed to Peter Aureol: f. 23vb, ll. 13–20); Bibago’s argument 3 closely corresponds to John the Canon’s argument 4 (Sequeretur processus in infinitum: f. 23vb, ll. 28–37); Bibago’s argument 4 is identical to John the Canon’s argument 3 (Arguit unus alius quod numerus ternarius esset quaternarius: f. 23vb, ll. 20–28). 52

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its parts were different actually, this would cause a third existence. Now, this third existence is either different actually from the parts taken together, or it is not—so the argument would be endless; 4. 4r1–6: if it were so, number three would be number four—and this is absurd. In fact, when we add another unit to three units, we obtain number four; and if the above mentioned third existence were added to three units, we would obtain number four. 4r6–20: The above opinion is incorrect (nifsad), as shown by the following arguments: 1. 4r6–14: one property should necessarily be one substrate— for property and substrate are convertible (yithaffeku), since they are equal in predication (be-massa’). But the parts taken together are not one substrate, since they are many; if so, they need another substrate; therefore, the parts taken together are not the whole, and the whole is different actually from its parts. If somebody objects that the parts taken together are not one thing, I reply that the parts found in the whole are not one substrate (otherwise, the whole would have only one part, which is absurd), but many: therefore, they are parts only insofar as they are taken together with the whole (cp. Physics, IV: “the part separated [nivdal u-mufrash] from the whole is not a part”);53 2. 4r15–20: the existence which is different in actu from another thing does not make that thing subsist in actu: otherwise, opposite things would be found in the same thing—and this is absurd (Metaphysics, III)—and that thing would make itself subsist—and this is absurd too. In fact, the existence of the whole is composed (meh.ubbar) or subsists due to another thing (mequyyam); therefore, there is something, different from it, which makes it subsist: this is the existence of its parts taken together. 4r20–4v25: Refutation of the above four arguments against the correct opinion—i.e., that the parts taken together are one thing in actu (note that something can be necessary to another thing in two ways: either it is necessary to its extra-mental, real existence, or it is necessary to its quidditative existence in mind):54 53

This argument appears to have been inspired by a very similar one by Scotus: cf. Cross, Philosophy of Mind, pp. 273–274 and note 58. 54 Also this refutation of the four arguments displays some similarities to John the Canon’s refutation (see above, note 52): Bibago’s refutation of argument 2 discusses a statement found at the beginning of John the Canon’s corresponding passage (Concedo consequentiam quod diffinitio et diffinitum distinguuntur ex

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1. 4r24–4v1: when you say “if the whole were different actually from its parts taken together, the whole would exist without its parts—and this is absurd”, the conclusion is that the whole exists without its parts. Now, it is true that the whole can exist without its parts, as a quidditative existence, but it cannot exist without them as a real, extra-mental existence; 2. 4v2–14: I deny that “the definition would not signify the quiddity of the whole defined thing”. Some people affirm that the whole and its parts taken together are distinct only according to the nature of the thing (i.e., ex natura rei)—i.e., the difference does not result from the action of the intellect, like the difference between man and ass.55 (We shall not explain the distinction here, since this has already been done by a scholar before us.) In reality, the whole and its parts are different actually. When you say that, in that case, the defined thing would signify three existences, I reply that it signifies only one existence—i.e., the quiddity of the whole different from its parts—and the definition signifies the parts for the sake of which the whole exists—i.e., the “consequential” (hemsheki) existence: the whole is “consequent” to its parts. As for Averroes’s words “the whole is nothing but the parts taken together”, they mean that the whole, as a consequent existence, signifies the same thing that is signified by the parts as an existence which makes the whole consequent (mamshik); 3. 4v15–19: I deny that “there would be an endless series of existences”. The third existence and the parts could be the cause of the whole only if this third existence and the parts were one in actu and the other in potentia—and this is not so; 4. 4v19–25: when you say “number three would be number four”, I deny it. “Unit” (’ah.adut) is said in two senses: material and formal; “formal unit” is the existence of that whole; “material unit” is the unity (’ah.adut) of those parts. The conclusion is true if we add to natura rei: f. 25va, ll. 1–2), while the refutations of arguments 3 and 4 appear to be shorter versions of John the Canon’s refutations of his arguments 4 and 3 respectively (f. 25va, ll. 7–42). 55 This definition and this example of distinctio ex natura rei (also used by Eli Habillo in his introduction to the Hebrew translation of Antonius Andreas’s questions on the Metaphysics) are taken from Andreas’s Tractatus de modis distinctionum: see below, p. 187. It is not clear whether Bibago read Andreas’s work or relied on Habillo’s introduction; in any case, the “scholar” he mentions later on may well be Habillo, who worked in the same period and geographical area.

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those three units a material unit, but it is not true if we add to them a formal unit. 4v25–5r1: From the above arguments it follows that there should exist many forms in one substrate—not as Averroes and others think—since there exist the form of the whole and that of the part, which are different in actu. 5r2–7: The second opinion is Averroes’s. He says that the first form is potential with respect to the second form, and so on, but all these forms become one thing—i.e., it is not possible that many forms exist in one substrate. This is also the third opinion, i.e., Thomas Aquinas’s, although there is a difference between them: Thomas affirms that there is only one form, and no problem as to its potentiality or actuality. The following arguments support these two opinions: 1. 5r7–21: if there were many forms in one substrate, there would be more than three principles of generation—and this is absurd. In fact, form is one of the two substantial principles (Physics, I: “every generated thing is generated from two opposites”; cp. Gen. et corr. I: “prime matter is not deprived of two opposite things: form and privation, the two opposites of generation”; this is valid for the generated form, not for the destroyed form, which is an accident of generation) and the multiplication of forms implies the multiplication of principles, which is absurd (Physics, I): if there were more than three principles of generation, the same thing would have two opposites in species—and this is absurd (De caelo, I; Metaphysics, X). In fact, if this were the case, two forms, i.e., two opposite things, would correspond to the principle of privation; 2. 5r22–5v8: if it were so, there would exist many matters— and this is absurd. In fact, one form implies necessarily only one matter, since form and matter are correlatives (Physics, II): one actuality (i.e., form) corresponds to only one potentiality (i.e., matter), since potentiality and actuality differ (yuvdelu) in privation and possession, i.e., as two opposites, and one thing has only one opposite in species (De caelo, I; Metaphysics, X). Nobody could say that matter, which exists potentially (Physics, I), is not a potentiality: if potentiality were different from prime matter, the principles of generation would be four—and this is absurd. Moreover, nobody could say that potentiality and privation are the same thing, since Aristotle has shown the difference between them (Physics, I: “potentiality is an existence, while privation is not an existence”);

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5v8–21: In any case, this is William Ockham’s opinion in his Physics: according to him potentiality and privation are the same thing, and privation and matter are one thing in number and in actu. He writes: “Privation is not an extra-mental thing, other than matter, form and their compound: everything conceived by the intellect, when it is generated, is either matter or form or their compound. However, if you mean that there should exist something which is evidently different from those things, and is a principle of generation, this is privation” (f. 5v, ll. 9–12). 56 He then provides many arguments supporting this point, and these are his very words: “That privation is not different from matter, form and their compound, should be demonstrated through some arguments and statements (ba-.ta‘anah u-va-ma’amar). The first argument is: if privation were different from matter, privation should be in matter, according to those who assume that matter is different from privation; but privation cannot exist in matter, since privation should be distinct in relation to distinct forms. In fact, according to those people, each privation should be without the other, and each form should be taken without the other, so that in matter there would be an infinite number of such things—and this is absurd, since there do not exist infinite inferior things that differ with respect to each other and do not form one thing per se, in the nature of things” (f. 5v, ll. 13–20).57 Ockham gives other arguments, 56 The last sentence appears to be a misunderstanding of Ockham’s original text (see below, next note), as if it read: nisi forte velis dicere quod ultra ista est res (in the original: accidens), de quo manifestum est quod (the original adds: non)est privatio quae est principium generationis (the original adds: substantiae). 57 The two passages are quoted literally from William Ockham’s Summula philosophiae naturalis, book I, chapter 4, as published in Venerabilis Inceptoris Guillelmi de Ockham Brevis summa libri Physicorum, Summula philosophiae naturalis et Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. S.F. Brown, “Guillelmi de Ockham Opera philosophica et theologica” VI, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1984, pp. 163, l. 5–164, l. 21: Primo tamen ostendendum est quod privatio non est aliquid imaginabile extra animam distinctum a materia et forma et composito. Sed quicquid est intellegibile in re extra quando res generatur, vel est materia vel forma vel compositum; nisi forte velis dicere quod ultra ista est accidens, de quo manifestum est quod non est privatio quae est principium generationis substantiae. Quod autem privatio non sit aliquid distinctum a materia et forma et composito, primo probandum est per rationem, secundo per auctoritatem. Per rationem sic: si privatio esset aliquid distinctum a praedictis, oporteret quod esset in materia, secundum quo illi ponunt qui ponunt privationem distingui a materia et forma. Sed privatio non est in materia, quia si privatio esset in materia cum respectu distinctae formae sit distincta privatio, secundum sic ponentes, pro eo quod una privatio aufertur sine alia, secundum hoc quod una forma inducitur sine alia, sequeretur quod in

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which I will not report here; but I will give arguments supporting the thesis that matter and privation are the same thing, as follows: 1. 5v21–6r4: when all the accidents of matter and the things external to it are destroyed, what remains is part of the quiddity of matter and is identical with matter; when accidents and things external to matter are destroyed, only privation remains; if so, privation is identical58 with matter. In fact, when all things external to matter are destroyed, either matter with form remains, or it does not. In the former case, form would be part of the quiddity of matter—and this is absurd; in the latter case, privation, being part of the quiddity of matter, remains, since that matter is deprived of every form. If you object that this is not privation, but only negation (shelilah), I reply: either this refers to the predisposition (hakanah) to receive form found in that matter, or it does not; if it does, matter has the potentiality (koh.aniyyut) to receive form, but, wherever there is negation and potentiality, there is privation (Metaphysics, IV); 2. 6r5–8: if it were not so, in matter accident would precede every substantial form. In fact, if privation were perpetual (ni.sh.i) in matter and were not part of its quiddity, it would be an accident; and, since no form is perpetual in matter, accident would precede substantial form—and this is absurd (Metaphysics, VI; Averroes, De anima, II); 3. 6r8–10: what is essentially (be-‘a.smuto) non-existent is a privation, and matter is essentially non-existent (cp. Physics, I); 4. 6r10–13: matter, in its quiddity, is either perfect as form is, or it is not; if it were perfect, it would not desire form; if it is not, it has a deficiency, and privation is a deficiency; therefore, in its quiddity matter is a privation; 5. 6r13–17: things which are one thing in number are such substantially and quidditatively (since the truest existing unity is numerical unity: cp. Topics, I); matter and privation are one thing in number (Physics, I); therefore, they are one thing substantially and quidditatively; materia essent tales res infinitae; quod est absurdum, quia nulla infinitas, infinitorum secundum se distinctorum non facientium unum per se, est in rerum natura. 58 The question of the identity of privation and matter is discussed in a typical Scotist work on physics, Antonius Andreas’s De tribus principiis rerum naturalium; cf. Antonii Andreae Quaestiones super tribus principiis rerum naturalium et formalitates, Paduae 1475, art. III, q. 1, on ff. 47va–49ra: Utrum privatio quae est tertium principium in natura sit idem quod potentia materiae.

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6. 6r17–20: form is taken (yuva’) in matter, not in form, either because matter, in its quiddity, desires form, or for some other reason. In the former case, its quiddity includes privation; in the latter case, one should find another cause—and this is impossible; 7. 6r20–23: what is deficient in its quiddity includes privation in its quiddity (privation lacks something, as a deficient thing does), and matter is deficient in its quiddity (cp. Physics, I: “matter desires form as what is deficient desires what is perfect, and woman desires man”). 6r23–26: From the above arguments, Ockham’s opinion, as found in book I of his Physics, would appear to be valid. In reality, his opinion is very incorrect, as shown by the following argument: 6r26–6v8: when, of two things, one receives and the other is received, they are not the same thing (and this is evident). Now, matter and privation are two such things, since matter is the first substrate and the recipient. Moreover, if privation were not different from matter, the principles of generation would be only two: matter and form—and this is absurd (Physics, I: “in generation, one recipient and two opposite things are needed”; the “opposite things” are form and privation, while the recipient is matter). 6v8–26: Refutation of the above seven arguments: 1. 6v8–11: it is absurd to say that what remains after the destruction of matter’s accidents is not form, but privation; it is not correct to speak of “potentiality with negation”, since this is a fundamental negation (shelilah yesodit), not a formal negation, and this argument is true for formal negation, not for material negation; 2. 6v12–14: I deny that, in this case, “in matter accident would precede every substantial form”; it is true that “if privation were perpetual in matter and were not part of its quiddity, it would be an accident”, but, just for this reason, in matter form precedes privation; 3. 6v14–16: I admit that “what is essentially non-existent is a privation”, but I deny that “matter is essentially non-existent”, since it is non-existent only in the sense that it is always attached (meh.ubbar ve-dabbeq) to privation; 4. 6v16–19: I say that matter is perfect in its quiddity, as form is; as for your saying that “if it were perfect, it would not desire form”, matter does not desire form per se, but only insofar as privation is attached to it; 5. 6v19–21: “one in number” has two senses, according to whether it refers to the numbered thing (i.e., the subject of number) or to the

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numbering thing. Matter and privation are one thing in the former sense, not in the latter; 6. 6v21–24: “desire” has two senses: natural and formal desire. Matter desires form due to a natural, not a formal desire; 7. 6v24–26: it is true that “what is deficient in its quiddity includes privation in its quiddity”, but I deny that “matter is deficient in its quiddity”. Matter is deficient outside of its quiddity, since it includes privation.] 6v26–7r2: The above arguments clarify the second argument. Now, let us return to our previous intention; 3. 7r2–6: in his De substantia orbis, Averroes affirms that “the existence of more than one form in one matter is impossible”, since matter is one in all the generated and corrupted things (Gen. et corr., I) and it is bound (yugval) to only one form (cp. the previous argument); 4. 7r6–10: if many forms existed in one substrate, that substrate would have many names (since the name derives from the form) and many quiddities (since, as shown below, only form is the quiddity of something); moreover, in this case one thing would be many things in actu—and this is impossible; 5. 7r11–16: against Avicenna’s statement that there exists a bodily form different and distinct from natural form, Averroes (Physics, I) argues that, if that were the case, the substantial and natural form would be an accident, since it would occur in a substrate in actu, and everything which occurs in another thing, when the latter is perfectly in actu, is an accident. Moreover, in this case generation would be an alteration (hishtanut)—and this is impossible; 6. 7r16–18: according to Averroes (Physics, I and IV; Metaphysics, IV), it is evident that the elements are composed (yeh.ubbaru) by only one matter and one form, since they are simple; consequently, there is no bodily form, as Avicenna thought; 7. 7r18–23: if many forms existed in one substrate, the soul would not be the first perfection—and this is absurd. In fact, if a form preceded another form (since it is impossible for there to be many forms at the same time), this form would be the first perfection, and the form that followed it would be a second perfection; but the definition of the soul is “the first perfection of the organic natural body”; 7r23–25: Some people think that Aristotle did not give a correct definition of the soul. According to them, the soul is not a first

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perfection, but a second perfection; they support this thesis by means of many arguments, which I will mention in my treatise The Knowledge of the Quiddity of the Soul and Its Faculties.59 Here I will give only one of those arguments: 7r26–7v8: if the soul were a first perfection, in man there would be something more perfect and excellent than the intellect—and this is absurd. In fact, the first act is not as perfect as the second, and the second perfection is more perfect than the first (E.N., II); the intellect is the first perfection according to Aristotle, so that there should be something more perfect than the intellect. The second act is more perfect and excellent since happiness depends upon it: in fact, happiness is a very excellent thing (E.N., II), and, according to Aristotle (E.N., I), happiness depends upon an action (pe‘ullah) more perfect than potentiality, which is the first act (cp. Averroes, De anima, II, inc.). 7v9–18: This argument can be refuted as follows: I deny that “if so, in man there would be something more perfect than the intellect”; and, if you say that the act resulting from the soul is more perfect than the soul itself, I reply that “act” can be understood in two senses: (1) as an accident; (2) as the end brought about by that act. In the former sense, this act is more deficient than the soul, since substance precedes accident in perfection; in the latter sense, the second act is more perfect than the soul. “Soul” too can be understood in two senses: (1) as a substance; (2) as ascribed and ordered (mityah.h.eset u-mesudderet) to that action. In the former sense, the soul is more perfect than that action; in the latter, the action is more perfect than the soul. Therefore, the soul is the first perfection (as in De anima, II).] 8. 7v18–8r8: if there existed many forms, when something was destroyed, it could not be destroyed as far as prime matter is concerned—and this is absurd. In this case, when a form is destroyed another would survive, and the resolution (hatakah) would not affect prime matter. In his About the De generatione, book I, question 5, Albert of Saxony (Alber.t de Sasoniah) says: “‘Resolution’ (hatakah) can be understood in two senses: (1) concerning substantial form (e.g., no form survives in a generated thing if it was not in a corrupted thing before); (2) concerning accidental forms (e.g., no accidental 59

On this work, see above, list of Bibago’s works, on number 11.

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form survives in a generated thing if it was not in a corrupted thing before)”; “some people60 suppose that in one substrate there are many forms: one of these forms is perpetual, and for its sake matter is a body (it is the bodily form), while the other form determines that body to be a particular (meyuh.ad) body. Those people deny that the resolution affects prime matter and substantial form: they say that when, e.g., a bull is generated, the substantial form for the sake of which it is a bull is destroyed, but the bodily form for the sake of which it is a body survives” (ff. 7r, l. 20–8r, l. 1).61 They also say that the elements have many forms; but we shall discuss this point in a special treatise.62 To sum up, the hypothesis of the plurality of forms makes it impossible for resolution to affect prime matter (contradicting Gen. et corr., I); moreover, in this case the substrate of generation would not be in potentia—and this is absurd, since generation is a coming out from potentiality into actuality; the creation of form is generation, and if another form preceded that form, the substrate would be in actu before generation (from which many absurdities follow, as we said above); 9. 8r8–9: Aristotle affirms (Metaphysics, VI) that man is “animality and rationality”, and these prototypes (hemshel rishon)63 can refer to only one form; 60

That is, Scotus and other thirteenth century Latin philosophers: cf. Scotus’s opinion as explained in Cross, Philosophy of Mind, p. 272. 61 The passage is quoted literally from Albert of Saxony’s Quaestiones de generatione et corruptione, book I, question 5, as published in Marsilius von Inghen– Albert von Sachsen, Quaestiones in libros de generatione et corruptione, Venetiis 1505 (repr. Frankfurt am Main 1970), f. 135ra, ll. 45–49: Huiusmodi resolutionem [i.e., resolutio in materiam primam] possumus imaginari dupliciter: uno modo quantum ex parte formae substantialis, sicut videtur quod nulla forma substantialis maneat in genito quae prius fuit in corrupto; alio modo quantum est ex parte formarum accidentalium, sicut videtur quod nulla forma accidentalis maneat in genito quae prius fuit in corrupto; f. 135ra, ll. 53–63: Aliqui imaginantur in eodem supposito plures formas substantiales, unam quam ponunt manere perpetue in materia, scilicet formam corporeitatis, per quam materia est corpus; et aliam formam substantialem per quam tale individuum ponitur in tali specie vel in tali. Et isti quantum est ex parte formae substantialis negant resolutionem usque in materiam primam in generatione vel corruptione simpliciter. Unde dicunt quod cum bos interficitur, tunc forma substantialis per quam fuit bos corrumpitur, sed adhuc manet forma corporeitatis per quam fuit corpus. 62 Bibago is probably referring to a treatise he wrote on the forms of the elements, which is now apparently lost (see also above, list of Bibago’s works, on number 16). 63 That is, “animality and rationality”.

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10. 8r9–18: if in one substrate there were many forms, e.g., the vegetative, sensitive and rational souls in man, the vegetative soul would be accidental (Metaphysics, VI: “what is an accident in something is substantial in another thing, and vice versa”; and the vegetative soul is substantial in plants)—but this is absurd, since what vegetates (s.omeah) cannot subsist without what makes it vegetate. Nobody could say that these souls are accidental in man, since one could not find the reason why, e.g., the sensitive soul is accidental in man and substantial in animals—although some people think that, e.g., the sensitive soul does not exist in an ass. 8r18–22: There is a preconception (da‘at qadum) according to which, if the first of the opinions about the plurality of forms stated above is correct, the number of forms in one substrate should be equal to the number of the predicates in quid said of that substrate. This opinion is very wrong, and I will give many arguments against it, as follows: 1. 8r23–9r4: if so, there should exist a material substrate composed of opposite and perpetual things—and this is absurd. In fact, I say that man is a “substance” or a “body”, and this is a substantial predication since there is a bodily form; but if this form were different from natural form, this predication would be incorruptible, since its base (mekinah) cannot be destroyed, and the three dimensions (i.e., the bodily form of matter) are perpetual and are not accidents (like some people think); 8v2–9r4: If dimensions were accidents, they should enter into the category of quantity—but this is absurd because, although dimensions signify quantity, indeterminate (bilti mugvalim) dimensions cannot enter into this category, since they have no definition of quantity.64 In fact, quantity is “that whose whole is measured by a part of it”, and an indeterminate dimension cannot be measured. Nobody could say that, e.g., poverty (rish) can be measured insofar as it is a physical quantity, or that it can be divided into infinite parts, insofar as it is a logical quantity: this is nonsense, since quantity cannot be defined as “logical”. 64 This thesis appears to be at odds with Scotus’s doctrine of the existence of a quantitas interminata, a quantity with indeterminate and generic dimensions (cf. T.B. Noone, Universals and Individuation, in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, 100–128, p. 117).

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If we investigate this question, we find that logical quantity means physical quantity, and the above mentioned definition of quantity is valid also for indeterminate dimensions, since it has in it something possible, and indeterminate dimensions are possible, as Alexander of Hales (in reality, Alexander Bonini of Alessandria), a follower of Thomas Aquinas, said in his Metaphysics, book VII, question 1: if Averroes, when he said in his De substantia orbis that indeterminate dimensions precede (substantial form) and are accidents, had meant that indeterminate dimensions are many things in the same number of that form, he would be saying absurdities which no-one could believe, since he would be contradicting his master, Aristotle. If, on the contrary, he meant that indeterminate dimensions are a potentiality which exists in combination (mequbbas.) with the corruptible, indeterminate form, (he is right).65 From this it appears that indeterminate dimensions are a substance, and this can be demonstrated as follows: it is either possible that those indeterminate dimensions that precede natural form cause matter to come into actuality, or it is not; if it is possible, they are a substance, since I have said above that accident, which occurs only in a perfect thing, does not cause matter to come into actuality. Therefore, they are either matter, or form, or the compound of both. They cannot be matter, since, if this were the case, a thing would be its own substrate; and it is also evident that they cannot be the compound; consequently, they are form. If you object that they are neither matter, nor form, nor compound, but accidents, they should have a substantial form that precedes them (since accident needs a perfect substrate in actu)—but this is absurd, according to Averroes’s above mentioned words, which affirm that indeterminate dimensions precede form and are perpetual.] 65

The source of this passage may be the In XII Metaphysicae libros expositio by the thirteenth century Italian Thomist Alexander Bonini, published in Venice in 1572 and falsely ascribed to Alexander of Hales. In Alexandri de Hales In duodecim Aristotelis Metaphysicae libros dilucidissima expositio, Venetiis 1572, f. 190va, ll. 6–12 (book VII, text 8, question 8: Utrum verum sit quod dicit Philosophus quod esse substantiae primo de materia dicitur), there are a number of statements that show some similarity (although no literal correspondence) to Bibago’s argument, as follows: Licet quantitas secundum esse interminatum praecedat formam substantialem, ut dicunt aliqui: et Commentator in De substantia orbis hoc videtur admittere; tamen secundum esse terminatum sequitur. Et sic esse formae substantialis praecedit esse formae accidentalis terminatum.

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2. 9r4–8: if those forms were equal to the number of predicates, we could not suppose a prime matter as the substrate of all substantial changes—and this is absurd. In fact, without that matter there would be only the substrate of generation, i.e., bodily form, and we could not suppose a difference between that form and that matter; 3. 9r8–11: form is to matter as figure is to the portrayed body (Physics, I); as we cannot think of a portrait having many general figures, so we cannot think of a matter having many substantial forms; 4. 9r11–19: if so, there would exist many forms even in God (since in Him there are many attributes and predicates: substance, corporeity, etc.), in the separate intellects and in celestial bodies—and this is absurd. In fact, celestial bodies are not composed of matter and form—in the sense that they are not composed of the matter of earthly bodies, which is attached to privation, but they are composed of matter in actu (De caelo, I); therefore, celestial bodies do not have many forms—and this is all the more valid in the case of the separate intellects and of God, who is pure act; 5. 9r19–9v2: if so, in Ruben one form would correspond to body, another to substance, etc., so that in man there would be another form more perfect than the intellect—and this is absurd. In fact, there would exist in man a form insofar as he is Ruben, and, since this form would be the ultimate form and the form that determines (megavvelet) the other forms (and what determines is more perfect than what is determined), this form would be more perfect than the intellect—which is absurd; 6. 9v2–6: if so, nature would act in vain—and this is absurd (De caelo, I: “God and nature do not act in vain”). In fact, there is no need to act with many things, when only one thing would suffice; 7. 9v6–10: if so, there would be an endless series—and this is absurd (Metaphysics, I: “In formal causes we cannot have an endless series, neither in direction [yosher] nor in species”). For example, the form, for the sake of which the ass is an ass, is a substance and a bodily form; it has many predicates: consequently, it would have many forms, which in their turn would have other forms, and so on; 8. 9v10–17: if so, in a horse, e.g., there exists a form other than the sensitive soul for the sake of which it is an horse and it differs from an ass—and this is absurd. In fact, the sensitive soul makes a horse different only from another horse, so that a horse would need yet another form to make it different from other animals. But, if so, a horse would be intelligent and rational—and this is absurd. In fact,

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the only form that is more perfect and excellent than the sensitive soul is the rational soul; 9. 9v17–25: if so, we could not have a natural knowledge, e.g., of a horse or an ass—and this is absurd (cp. what Aristotle says in his natural books). In fact, we do not know how many forms a horse has, nor all its predicates in quid: a horse could have a form that is unknown to us, and in this case we would not know it (Physics, I: “we know something when we know all its causes and principles”; An. Post., II; Averroes says that, if we know the substantial parts of something, then we know that thing perfectly); 10. 9v25–10r3: if so, in a fish there would exist more forms than in a man—and this is absurd. In fact, there are many species of fish: there are more differentiae within the genus “fish” than within the genus “man”; consequently, there would be more predicates (and therefore more forms) inherent in a fish than in a man—but this is absurd, since in a fish there are only the sensitive and the vegetative souls. 10r4–5: Now, let us refute these arguments, which are also at variance with the correct opinion about the plurality of forms. 10r5–20: The plurality of substantial forms can be conceived in different ways:66 1. 10r6–13: the Ancients (“those of the concealment”, ba‘aley hahat.manah) held that forms are concealed in the mixture. Anaxagoras said that “everything is in everything”; he thought that, e.g., in flesh there exist the forms of bones and man: it is called “flesh” only because flesh prevails in it. According to these scholars, all forms exist actually, concealed in everything. This opinion would be correct if Averroes were right in his claim that all forms exist potentially; but it is not so. Aristotle mentions this topic in Physics, I and in Gen. et corr. I, but I do not intend to discuss it here; 2. 10r13–16: there are those who say that the forms of the elements remain in the mixture. I do not intend to discuss this opinion, which has already been explained in the De generatione et corruptione: I will deal with it in a special treatise;67 66

The subsequent discussion of the different opinions on the plurality of substantial forms may be inspired by Scotus’s discussions on this subject: cf. King, Scotus on Metaphysics, pp. 51–53; cf. also Cross, Philosophy of Mind, p. 282 note 54. 67 This is probably the same treatise on the forms of the elements mentioned above, note 62.

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3. 10r16–17: another opinion is that the plurality of substantial forms depends upon the plurality of quidditative and substantial forms in one substrate; this is akin to the first opinion about the plurality of forms;68 4. 10r17–18: according to another opinion, the plurality of substantial forms depends upon the plurality and distinction of actions: e.g., in man there exist many forms since he is rational, sensitive, vegetative, etc.;69 5. 10r18–20: yet another opinion is that the plurality of substantial forms depends upon the plurality of forms as quantitative parts: accordingly, there is one form in bones, another in flesh, etc.70 Here I will speak only of the last three ways of conceiving the plurality of substantial forms. 10r20–22: As for the fourth way, some people say that forms are distinct according to the distinction of actions. Others refute this correct opinion by assuming the following two hypotheses: 1. 10r22–10v4: in every act, action is said primarily of form, while passion is said primarily of matter (Gen. et corr., I; Physics, III: “form is the mover and matter is the moved thing; everything ascribed to form is moving, and everything ascribed to matter is moved”; “in what is essentially a potentiality, an actuality and a compound of matter and form, the moving part is moved together with the moved part, so that each part is moving and moved” [literal quotation]); 2. 10v4–8: apart from the First Agent, there exist particular agents; but they need something predisposed to that action; otherwise, the agent cannot act, as Aristotle said. 10v8–11r20: Other people think that the above hypotheses entail the following conclusions: 68

This is Scotus’s opinion: see above, note 42. This opinion, held by some Schoolmen of the Franciscan School and apparently shared by Bibago, is explicitly rejected by Scotus: see the references in King, Scotus on Metaphysics, p. 52 note 103. Cf. also Cross, Philosophy of Mind, p. 275. 70 Scotus considered this opinion “probable”: see above, note 47. The correspondence between the various organs of animals and their substantial forms is discussed also in question 4 of article II of Antonius Andreas’s De tribus principiis rerum naturalium: cf. Antonii Andreae Quaestiones super tribus principiis, cit., ff. 36vb–40va (Utrum formalis distinctio organicarum partium animalis sit propter formas substantiales specifice ac realiter distinctas). 69

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1. 10v8–11r12: from one form or from one act many distinct and opposite actions can result, and this happens in eight ways: 1.1. 10v11–13: because of the predispositions (hakanot) of passive things (mitpa‘alim), which have distinct predispositions (e.g., fire’s heat dries matter, melts frozen water, etc.); 1.2. 10v13–16: because of the distinction of auxiliary (‘ozerim) agents (e.g., medicine makes the ill healthy and the healthy ill, because of the natural distinction between ill and healthy); 1.3. 10v16–22: because of the particular, determining (magvilim) agents. For example, the sun operates the generation of man and of horse, because of the particular, specific agents (De caelo, II: “man is generated by man and sun”). Only through these particular agents are God and the separate intellects able to operate distinct and opposite actions in inferior things; 1.4. 10v22–11r1: because of the distinction of qualities, potentialities or predispositions ordered to one form (e.g., the actions performed by fire or by the sun); the same form, through distinct predispositions, can have a certain effect when it is close, and another, opposite effect when it is distant; 1.5. 11r1–2: because of the distinction of the various instruments (e.g., the goldsmith produces different figures through the use of distinct instruments); 1.6. 11r3–6: because of the distinction of non-homogeneous parts (e.g., through one part of an egg you can operate something which you cannot operate through another); 1.7. 11r6–8: because of the distinction of actions due to the will (cp. Metaphysics, VIII: “the difference between rational and irrational faculties [koh.ot] is that the rational faculty can carry out two opposite things”; “man can heal or make ill through the same drug”); 1.8. 11r8–12: because of the distinction of actions due to the way (s. ad). From the same form one thing can result substantially and the opposite thing accidentally (Meteor., II; Physics, VIII; e.g., heat can heat substantially and cool accidentally; cp. Physics, II: “the existence of salt in a ship saves it, but its absence destroys it”); 2. 11r12–20: from this hypothesis of many distinct and opposite actions it does not follow that we have to posit many forms in one substrate. Otherwise, in one substrate there would exist more forms than really exist in it: e.g., in an ass there are vegetation, generation and nutrition, so that an ass would have a vegetating form, a

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generating form and a nourishing form; in a magnet there would exist one form that attracts iron downwards and another form that attracts iron upwards, since “down” and “up” are opposites. 11r20–11v1: The above two hypotheses can be refuted as follows. Faculties (koh.ot) are different from actions, and actions differ according to their objects (De anima, II). “Object” (munnah.) has two senses: (1) “formal object” and (2) “material object”, being the particular determinate (mugval) object. For example, colour, which is the object of sight, has two senses: (1) particular colour, e.g., “that whiteness”, and (2) “whiteness in general”, insofar as it is a genus. Particular colour is a material object; general colour is a formal object. 11v1–8: True, somebody could say that colour cannot be the object of sight, since it does not respect the six conditions (tena’im) of the object listed by John Duns Scotus (’Esqot.)71 in book I of his commentary on the Sentences (called in Latin Liber sententiarum).72 One of the six conditions of the object is that nothing can be perceived if it is not included in the object. Now, colour does not respect this condition, since sight can see many things which have no colour, i.e., transparent things, like glass. I reply that we see those things due to the colour developed (mefuttah.) in them, since they partake of all colours. Therefore, colour as a genus is a formal73 object. 11v8–21: When actions are distinct according to their formal subject, and their formal object is distinct, I say that the forms from which those actions result are also distinct; but when the material object is distinct, it is not so, since in that case many distinct actions 71

’Esqot. is the Hebrew transliteration of the Catalan form of the last name of John Duns Scotus. 72 The so-called Ordinatio (the Opus Oxoniense) of Scotus’s commentary on book I of the Sententiae does not seem to contain an explicit list of the “six conditions of the object”: cf. Ordinatio, book I, prologue, part 3, q. 3, nn. 212–213, where there is only a very general reference to stipulations about the object (ratio primi obiecti est continere in se primo virtualiter omnes veritates illius habitus; obiectum non esset adaequatum habitui nisi virtualiter contineret omnia illa ad quae consideranda habitus talis inclinat). Of course, it is possible that a more precise list of “conditions” may be found in one of the unpublished versions of Scotus’s commentary (on these, see the general sketch by T. Williams, Introduction, in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, 1–14, pp. 10–12). It is also possible that Bibago found this list in a later Scotist work, in which Scotus’s commentary on the Sententiae was referred to, but not quoted precisely. 73 In the manuscript: “material”.

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can result from only one form. As for the example of the ass with many forms, one for each of its actions (see above, f. 11r, ll. 12 ff.), it should be considered that all those actions are the material object, not the formal object, since they result from the vegetative soul, and the formal object of the vegetative soul is not generation (which is its material object) (cp. De anima, II; see also [pseudo-]Thomas Aquinas’s treatise or question De potentiis animae).74 11v21–12r6: Actions distinct in matter can result from one form, for the following four reasons: 1. 11v22–25: because of the objects, since objects perform their actions in the soul. As those people say (see above, f. 10v, ll. 16 ff.), agents and their faculties can perform distinct actions; now, the distinction of actions is due to the distinction of objects, insofar as the latter are agents; 2. 11v25–12r1: because of the distinction of material and bodily instruments, which are predisposed in distinct ways to perform distinct actions. These predispositions are the faculties of the soul; 3. 12r1–4: because of the non-homogeneity of parts (see above, f. 11r, ll. 3 ff.) which, however, does not change the thing’s specific nature and form; 4. 12r4-6: in man there is a specific faculty, i.e., will or choice, through which it is possible to carry out one of two opposite actions (E.N., III). 12r6–21: One conclusion follows from the above reasons: the vegetative soul, like the sensitive soul, is a non-homogeneous form. In fact, in the case of a particular homogeneous form, the whole is called by the name of its parts, and vice versa, since they have the same definition and the same name. Now, the vegetative soul, like the sensitive soul, is a part of that which has sensation (ha-margish), but its name is not derived from the name of the whole. The minor premise is demonstrated: e.g., a part of water is called “water”, like the whole, and has the same definition as the whole. As for the major premise: one part of the substantial form of an ass does not have the same existence and the same definition as the whole ass, 74

Very probably, Bibago is referring to the work bearing the same title, falsely ascribed to Thomas Aquinas and translated into Hebrew by Eli Habillo around 1470: see below, chapter 3, list of Habillo’s works, on number D.1.4.

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since not all the parts of an ass are called “ass”; if so, an ass has nonhomogeneous parts. In fact, the parts of flesh and bones (which are non-homogeneous) are not subordinated to the same species, nor do they have the same definition. In his introduction to the De anima, Averroes said that the same applies to the body’s predispositions— and also to its non-homogeneous parts; and Aristotle said that it is on this basis that a lion’s limbs differ from those of a gazelle. Cp. also De caelo, II, chapter 1: “(even) if animals were made up of homogeneous parts and had the same forms as the heavens, there would be distinct faculties”—and this is because the distinction is given by the form existing perfectly in actu. 12r21–12v3: William Ockham holds the opposite opinion. According to him, there are things that are different and distinct with no need of any universal extra-mental thing, and universal thing is but a term (gevul) or a synonym (shem meshuttaf, lit. “common name”). Ockham states this opinion at the beginning of his Logic,75 where he says that Averroes and Aristotle thought that “man” and “humanity” were the same thing, and that the prototype (hemshel rishon) and the derivative noun were the same thing.76 Ockham claims that, if it were not so, one should say that “man” is not found in “humanity”—but this is absurd. His arguments on this matter are nonsense; but this is not the place to refute his arguments to the effect that the universal has no extra-mental existence: I have quoted his opinion only for the sake of our present discussion. 12v3–8: The correct opinion is that it is impossible for two things to be distinct or identical except through something universal and absolute that has an extra-mental existence in actu. In fact, actual things are identical because of something actual. For example, men are identical because their humanity, which is found in men in actu, is a universal form that exists actually and is predicated of men 75

Cf. William Ockham’s Summa logicae, part I, chapter 7, as published in Venerabilis Inceptoris Guillelmi de Ockham Summa Logicae, eds. P. Boehner, G. G´al and S.F. Brown, “Guillelmi de Ockham Opera philosophica et theologica” I, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1974, pp. 23 ff. See in particular p. 23, ll. 4–8 (Quia dictum est esse de intentione Aristotelis et Commentatoris sui ‘hominem’ et ‘humanitatem’ esse nomina synonima [cf. Summa logicae, part I, chapter 6] . . . quomodo verum sit et quomodo non, et an secundum veritatem sint synonima, declarare curabo) and p. 24, ll. 1–2 (ergo ‘homo’ non significat aliquam rem quae non significetur per hoc nomen ‘humanitas’). 76 On the concepts of “prototype”, cf. above, note 63.

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according to its quiddity and essence—although it cannot be said that all the predicates in quid that pertain to those men are forms. 12v8–13: Somebody could say that the forms cannot be in the same number as the predicates in quid since, if so, the form would not be the only quiddity of something—and this is absurd. In fact, quid (mahu’) is derived from “quiddity” (mahut) (cp. Porphyry’s Isagoge). Moreover, the absurdity of this can be demonstrated by many arguments,77 as follows: 1. 12v13–15: Aristotle said in Metaphysics, VI: “matter has no quality, no quiddity, no quantity, except potentially”; “form is what is assumed in the definition of a thing, and signifies that definition”; 2. 12v15–25: matter does not enter into the definition and quiddity of a thing. What is pure potentiality is not a thing; prime matter is pure potentiality; therefore, prime matter is not a thing. In fact, pure potentiality is absolute privation, and absolute privation is not a thing (Physics, I). Moreover, as things found in the genus “actuality” tend to a pure, infinite and simple actuality, which is God (since there cannot exist another actuality purer and simpler than He), so things found in the genus “potentiality” tend to a pure potentiality, which should be matter. See An. Post., I; Metaph. I: “What has (the name of) something for the sake of that thing is worthier of (the name of) that thing than is the thing itself”; 12v25–13r25: Many authors stipulate a condition for this proposition. Some of them affirm that it is valid only for agent causes, while others affirm the opposite. In particular, one of the great scholars who once lived in the kingdom78 said that this proposition is true for synonymous (lit. “agreed”, muskamim) things: when we say “what has the name of something for the sake of that thing and exists for that thing (and thus has the status of a caused thing), etc.”, this is true. This is what Aristotle intended to say, if one examines his words. In fact, he said in Metaphysics, I: “The end in particular is the cause of the other things which agree (maskimim) with it in their name and meaning”

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A discussion on the presence of matter in the quiddity of something is found also in Antonius Andreas’s De tribus principiis rerum naturalium, art. I, q. 5 (ed. cit., ff. 21va–25rb: Utrum in rebus naturalibus compositis ex materia et forma, materia sit aliquid pertinens essentialiter ad rationem quidditatis specifice). 78 Apparently, the kingdom of Aragon.

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(literal quotation); and this affirmation explains that proposition according to the meaning proposed by those scholars. For example, if that thing is hot, we could say that the sun is worthier of being hot; but I have mentioned Aristotle’s saying that these things are those “which agree with it in their name and meaning”, and this is not valid for the sun, since “heat” is not said of “hot” and “sun”. As for those who affirm that that proposition is valid only for agent causes, it is strange that they have not understood the affirmation by Aristotle that we have just quoted. However, apart from the condition found in this affirmation, there are other conditions for that proposition, namely: there should be a substantial and quidditative relationship between those two things; and that thing should not be an accidental and instrumental (kilyit) cause. In fact, somebody could object: the fire and the fire that is generated by it are both hot and agree in the name and definition of heat, but the former is not hotter than the latter; the father is the cause of the son’s being rational, father and son are rational, but the father is not more rational than his son. I reply that that proposition is valid for synonymous things that have a substantial and quidditative relationship, and that are not accidental and instrumental causes. For example, the father is an accidental cause of the son, since he is an external agent cause of the son: the son survives when the father is destroyed, and this means that there is no substantial and quidditative relationship between them; motion is a cause of heat, but it cannot be worthier of being hot, since it is only an instrumental cause of heat. On the contrary, matter is the cause of potentiality, and it is worthier of being called “potentiality” than are the other things that have potentiality. 3. 13r25–26: Averroes said in Metaphysics, VI: “The quiddity of man is his form, but it is not man in general, since man is composed of matter and form”; 4. 13v1–4: the definition is only the form (Physics, II: the parts of definition, i.e., genus and differentia, are forms); the quiddity of a thing is its definition (in fact, the definition includes the quiddity of the defined thing); therefore, the quiddity of something is only its form; 5. 13v4–8: Aristotle said in De caelo, I: “There is a difference between ‘heavens’ and ‘these heavens’, since ‘heavens’ signifies only the form, while ‘these heavens’ signifies also the matter”. Therefore,

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the definition (i.e., the quiddity) does not concern an ostensible (i.e., generable and corruptible) thing, because it concerns only eternal things (An. Post., I); and since the definition does not concern “this thing” because “this thing” refers to matter, the definition concerns form; 6. 13v8–19: if matter were part of the quiddity of something, what is known would be known through what is unknown—and this is absurd. In fact, since the thing is known through its quiddity, if we include matter in the quiddity, we would know the known through the unknown, i.e., matter. Matter is unknown to us per se, not because of the feebleness of our mind, since it is pure potentiality—a concept very difficult to understand as such. Things that have more actuality and less potentiality—e.g., the separate intellects—are difficult to understand because of our mind (Metaphysics, I: “with respect to things that are very well-known in nature, our intellect is like the eyes of a bat in front of the light of the sun”; cp. also Averroes’s commentary on these words); but things that have more potentiality and less actuality are difficult to understand because of the concept itself. Because of this, matter is understood only as related to form (Physics, I). 13v19–14r2: Scotus held the opposite to be true, according to Johannes Versor (Versoryo) in his Metaphysics, book I, question 2:79 “Scotus’s opinion was that the difficulty (to understand) does not come from things absolutely, nor from our mind absolutely, but from the bad relationship between the intellect and the intelligible (f. 13v, ll. 20–22)”. His argument is the opposite of ours: he explains that a thing that is intelligible per se always remains so, whatever other 79

The literal source of the passage in brackets is Johannes Versor’s Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, book II (not I), question 2 (Utrum difficultas in cognitione veritatis veniat ex parte rerum vel intellectus nostri). See Johannes Versor, Quaestiones super metaphysicam Aristotelis, Coloniae 1494 [= Frankfurt am Main 1967], f. 13ra, ll. 18–21: Sed huic conclusioni adversatur Scotus dicens quod nec ex parte rerum absolute, nec ex parte intellectus absolute, venit huiusmodi difficultas, sed ex improportione intellectus ad intelligibile. The same source inspired also the subsequent statements, from “His argument is the opposite of ours . . . ” to “. . . but not for relative things”. See ibidem, f. 13ra, ll. 25–32: Contra dictam conclusionem arguit Scotus sic. Quod secundum se est tale cui(cumque) comparetur semper est tale. Ergo, si aliqua res secundum se sit difficulter intelligibilis, tunc omni intellectui etiam divino difficulter cognoscibilis erit. Et similiter si intellectus noster secundum se difficulter sit cognoscitivus, tunc omnem rem cum difficultate cognoscit. Sed facile est hanc rationem solvere, quod illud principium veritatem habet in absolutis, et non in respectivis.

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thing may be related to it; if a thing is difficult to understand per se, it remains so, whatever intellect may be related to it—were it even the divine intellect. The same is valid for the intellect: if it perceives things with difficulty per se, it will perceive everything with difficulty. One should observe that Scotus’s argument is valid for absolute, but not relative things: e.g., number two is double in relation to number one, but not in relation to number three;80 and “difficulty” is said in relation to something. 14r3–11: Matter is unknown insofar as it is pure potentiality, while the definition includes what is known. On this point there are three different opinions: (1) a thing can be known only by proof, and not by definition (Hyppocrates); (2) a thing can be known neither by proof nor by quiddity and definition (Plato); (3) the right opinion, half-way between the first and the second, is that a thing can be known by quiddity and definition (Aristotle). The conclusion is that matter cannot enter into the definition of something. 14r11–22: Against the above conclusion, there are the following arguments: 1. 14r11–13: Aristotle (Metaphysics, VI) argues against Plato that genus and species do not signify only form, but the whole compound of matter and form; if so, since definition includes genus and differentia, it should signify also matter; 2. 14r13–16: Averroes (Metaphysics, VI) affirms that man is nothing but life and rationality, which signify the whole compound; if so, quiddity is the whole compound, not only form; 3. 14r16–22: if matter were not in the quiddity, it would be an accident—and this is absurd (Metaphysics, VI; De anima, II). In fact, everything that exists in a thing outside of its quiddity is an accident. Moreover, according to Aristotle (Physics, II), there are four kinds of causes, two external (agent and end) and two internal (matter and form); therefore, matter is internal to a thing, i.e., it is a part of its quiddity. 14r22–14v26: Moreover, there are three different opinions about the above conclusion: 1. 14r23–26: Ruben, or an ass, are not composed of essential and quidditative parts, like matter and form, but of quantitative parts, 80

The passage from “but not to relative things . . . ” to “ . . . number three” is added in the margin of the manuscript.

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since the existence of a compound begins with generation and ceases with destruction, and generation has no substrate preceding it. 14r26–14v3: This opinion is evidently false: according to all the philosophers preceding Aristotle, nothing is generated from a privation (Physics, I). 14v3–18: Somebody could object: if all philosophers in general agreed on this, this opinion could not exist. I reply that a thing can be (Metaphysics, I) either generated from a substance, or from a part that precedes the generation (and in this sense all philosophers said that no substance is made from a privation), or made from a preceding limit (gevul) which has been destroyed (and in this sense the supporters of this opinion said that what is made is made after the destruction of something). But in the second case there would be no compound of matter and form: a thing would be made after the destruction of another thing, according to a natural process— which is absurd, since in the generation of accidents there should be a substrate of those accidents; moreover, as in artificial production, also in natural production both a substrate and a matter are needed. Finally, if a man were made from nothing, there would be no reason for this. They say that the reason is to create a place for that man, since place is matter (Physics, IV); but this is not sufficient, since a generated body can have a place without the destruction of another one; 2. 14v18–23: the whole, or the compound, exists, and nothing is generated anew when its existence begins—there is only a change due either to a process of coming in and out (ne‘us. vi-yes.i’ah), or to a local motion, or to massiveness (miqshiyyut) (Gen. et corr., I). In this case, the compound would not be of matter and form, but of quantitative parts, i.e., of atoms. Opinions 1 and 2 are those of the philosophers before Plato; 3. 14v23–26: Plato’s and Aristotle’s opinion, situated half-way between the two previous opinions, is that matter precedes generation: the existence of a thing begins when matter and form join together. 14v26–15r23: From the above opinions, there derive three further opinions: 1. 15r1–7: according to Physics, II and other passages, the substantial compound (e.g., Ruben) is only matter, while form is merely a ratio (‘inyan) or an accident. Therefore, the quiddity of everything is matter. This was Antiphon’s opinion (Physics, II). Because of this,

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somebody says that man is “a body that has a soul”, not “body and soul” (geshem ve-nefesh). This opinion is incorrect, since what is said in quid—i.e., quidditatively—is a form, since form is what characterises (meyah.edet) and determines the species (Metaphysics, VI); 2. 15r7–13: the ostensible thing is only that form, e.g., the rational soul in man. According to this, which is Plato’s opinion, many bodies can have the same soul, metempsychosis is possible, the soul is the only everlasting substrate, and particular and universal things signify only form. This is the opposite of the previous opinion, and it is incorrect (see the above arguments in favour of the presence of matter in quiddity, f. 12v, ll. 13 ff.); 3. 15r13–23: this opinion, which is Aristotle’s, is the correct one, and is situated half-way between the two previous opinions. According to it, the compound is neither only matter, nor only form: quiddity is the whole compound, the compound consists of the parts of the thing, and the parts are matter and form. Moreover, all actions are related to body and soul together (De anima, III: “Who says that the soul is worried, fearful or joyful, should say that it is weaving or building, too”). The rational, not the soul, is man; and who affirms that man is only soul should ascribe to the soul all the actions ascribed to man—and this is absurd. 15r23–15v6: This should be understood in different ways: e.g., it can be said that the quiddity of something is only its soul. In fact, quiddity and form can be understood in many senses (beh. inot). “Quiddity” can be understood as follows: (1) in a metaphorical sense (‘al s. ad ha-ha‘varah), for those predicates or concepts81 that are predicated in quid, and that signify the extra-mental thing (this quiddity is the definition and its parts: genus and differentia); (2) as quiddity proper (be-yih. ud), said of this ostensible, extra-mental thing, without those predicates or concepts. In the former sense, form is not the quiddity of something: a quiddity is different from the thing which has that quiddity, since the thing is real while the quiddity is only a concept. In the latter sense, quiddity is not different from the thing, since this kind of quiddity is extra-mental. 15v6–13: Also “form” has different senses: (1) we can understand it in general and abstractly (bi-peshit. ut) per se, without any specification, 81 In Hebrew: mah.ashavot. In the margin of the manuscript: “called in Latin consept”.

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insofar as it is the quiddity of something in general; (2) we can understand it insofar as it is the form of an ostensible thing. In the former sense, the quiddity of something is only form; in the latter sense, matter would enter into the definition of that thing, since matter signifies “that thing” (and in this sense we can say that the definition of the soul is “the first perfection of the natural, organic, animal body in potentia”). 15v13–22: On this point there are some very strange pronouncements, especially by many Christian scholars. According to their argument, the definition of the soul given above is not correct, since the definition of accident (Metaphysics, VI) is something added and external, and everything that assumes the substrate in its definition is an accident; if so, since in the definition of the soul there is its substrate (i.e., body), the soul would be an accident—and this is absurd, because the soul is the cause of the existence of a substance (i.e., man). These scholars solve this problem by adopting two definitions of the soul, one material and the other formal. The formal definition, which does not include the body, is: “the soul is that by which we perceive, conceive, eat, have local motion”; the material one is: “the soul is the first perfection”, etc. 15v22–16r7: I reply to this by means of many arguments: only form is the quiddity of the thing, according to the above mentioned second sense of “quiddity”. Matter, form and the compound are understood sometimes as extra-mental things, sometimes as quidditative predicates. In the latter case, every quiddity is form; and this is Aristotle’s meaning in Metaphysics, VI. Only form is assumed in the definition of the thing; matter is in the definition only as a condition for the existence of accidents. If so, matter is needed for the existence and distinction of the individual—and the cause of individuation (’ishiyyut) can be either ostensible matter (as Aristotle says), or quantity (as some people say), or individual form (as Duns Scotus says).82 Therefore, Averroes’s words quoted above (Physics, 82

Scotus’s well-known identification of the principium individuationis as a forma individualis is found in many points in his writings, e.g., in his Quaestiones in libros Metaphysicarum, book VII, quaestio 13, nn. 108–109 and ff. (cf. Noone, Universals and Individuation, p. 119). It is remarkable that in Bibago’s treatise there appears to be no direct reference to Scotus’s doctrine of “individual forms” as discussed and defended in Yedayah Bedershi’s Treatise on Personal or Individual Forms—a work which Bibago surely knew: see above, note 37.

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II; Metaphysics, VI: see above, f. 13r, ll. 25–26) should be understood as follows: he understands “form” in the second sense, as the thing which signifies the extra-mental thing, i.e., the predicates in quid. 16r7–17: Otherwise, I can reply better by quoting a universal scholar (h. akam kolel), expert in every science:83 “As Aristotle said in many places, especially in Physics, II and De anima, I, definitions are divided into three parts, according to the divisions of theoretical actual (‘iyyuniyyot u-po‘aliyyot) sciences, which are three (Metaphysics, V: “science is divided into theoretical and practical sciences, as a genus is divided into species”). Theoretical science is divided into three parts: mathematics, physics and metaphysics, which are actual sciences. Aristotle illustrates in many places the difference between those sciences, and their definitions. He says that the difference consists in the fact that a thing can be understood in three different ways (beh.inot): (1) insofar as it is in matter, since it cannot be imagined or conceived except in matter; (2) insofar as it is abstract from matter in mind only, while outside of mind it is in matter; (3) insofar as it is separated (nivdal) and abstract from matter outside and inside of mind, since it can be imagined only as separated from matter”. 16r18–24: The first way is physics, since the natural philosopher studies a thing insofar as it is in matter also outside of mind: physics studies motion, since according to Averroes the subject of physics is the moved body, while according to Thomas Aquinas it is the moved being,84 and according to Duns Scotus it is the finite substance, insofar as it is natural.85 (Here I have no space to discuss these three 83 The passage that follows, which reflects Thomas Aquinas’s opinion as found in his Sententia libri Physicorum, book I, lectio 1, §§2–3, might have been taken by Bibago from the lost “Thomistic” commentary on the Physics by Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish. This same text might have also inspired, in part, Bibago’s subsequent descriptions of physics, mathematics and metaphysics (ff. 16r, l. 18–20v, l. 24): cf. the extant fragment of this work published below, chapter 2. 84 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Physicorum, book I, lectio 1, §4 (according to M. Maggiolo’s ` edition, Taurini 1954): Hic autem est liber physicorum, qui etiam dicitur de physico sive naturali auditu, quia per modum doctrinae ad audientes traditus fuit: cuius subiectum est ens mobile simpliciter. Non dico autem corpus mobile, quia omne mobile esse corpus probatur in isto libro; nulla autem scientia probat suum subiectum. 85 This definition is not explicitly given by Scotus; however, one can compare the discussion on the subject of physics as substantia naturalis in In Met. 6, q. 1, nn. 78–81. Cf. also the definitions of the subject of physics as “natural substance qua natural” in Antonius Andreas’s De tribus principiis rerum naturalium (ed. cit., f. 6rb, ll. 38–40: Substantia naturalis in quantum naturalis vel substantia physica, scilicet

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opinions.) Therefore, if the natural philosopher studies motion or change, he should study them insofar as they are in matter, since what moves must move in matter. 16r24–16v8: Some isolated fools (qes.atam sekalim nifradim), who disagree with Averroes,86 affirm that the subject of physics is not the moved body, since in this science many incorporeal things which move per se are studied, i.e., the angels (but their arguments are clearly false). They criticise Aristotle and Averroes by saying that the philosophy of the former is contradictory and false, and that the latter ignores the motion of angels—but this is not true, since we have no knowledge of non-existent things (An. Post., I), and this motion cannot exist. Moreover, they say that Aristotle’s opinion is incorrect from the point of view of faith—and this might be true, in a certain sense, also from the point of view of our Holy Law; but they in quantum physica—quod idem est–est primum subiectum et adaequatum philosophiae naturalis), and as “finite substance in suo conceptu communi” in the Quaestiones super Physicam preserved in the ms. Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, no. 368/590, and ascribed to Andreas himself (in reality, they correspond to John the Canon’s Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum: cf. P.J.J. Bakker and D.-J. Dekker, Antoine Andr´ee ou Jean le Chanoine?, “Bulletin de philosophie m´edi´evale” 42 [2000], 101–131): see M. Gensler, Two Quaestiones Concerning the Subject Matter of Physics: An Early Scotist Interpretation of Aristotle, in J. Marenbon (ed.), Aristotle in Britain During the Middle Ages, “Rencontres de Philosophie M´edi´evale, 5”, Turnhout 1996, 195–209, pp. 206–207. A definition of the subject of physics basically identical to that ascribed to Scotus is in John the Canon’s Quaestiones, book I, q. 1 (ed. cit., ff. 1rb–7ra), where he asks utrum substantia finita in suo conceptu communi in quantum naturalis sit primum subiectum et adaequatum scientiae naturalis. 86 In this passage, Bibago refers to a Scotist doctrine found in the introductive question of Antonius Andreas’s De tribus principiis rerum naturalium: here Andreas criticises the opinion (Averroes’s one) that the moved body is the subject of natural philosophy, by affirming that “there are substances which are mobile, yet incorporeal, namely angels”, and concludes his argument by stating that “the Philosopher [i.e., Aristotle] . . . spreads views which are not only sacrilegious in disregarding the angels but also unsatisfactory and erroneous” (Gensler, Two Quaestiones, pp. 202–204; cf. Antonii Andreae Quaestiones super tribus principiis, cit., ff. 3va–3vb, esp. f. 3vb, ll. 29–31: Dici potest quod philosophus tamquam sacrilegus ibi insufficienter et erronee tradidit scientiam naturalem). Gensler points out that a similar argument is also found in book I, question 1 of pseudo-Andreas’s (in reality, John the Canon’s) Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum (see above, previous note), which was probably the direct source of Bibago in this passage: cf. Joannis Canonici Super octo libros physicorum quaestiones, ff. 4ra, l. 57–4rb, l. 11 (Aristotelis non solum secundum theologum sed etiam secundum physicum vel secundum veritatem philosophiae fuit insufficienter et falso modo locutus de naturali philosophia).

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add that his opinion is unsatisfactory (bilti maspiq) and false—and we cannot accept this, since “he has illuminated our intellect and has separated light from darkness in philosophy”. 16v8–10: Therefore, the subject of physics is the moved body, and physics studies motion insofar as it is in the moved thing, so that the natural philosopher studies matter, and matter enters into his definition. 16v10–15: The mathematician studies things insofar as they are abstract from sensible matter and are found only in mind—although they cannot be separated from matter in their existence. Such things are the same that are studied in physics, but here they are not studied in sensible matter, but abstract from sensible matter, so that the mathematician defines them without employing matter. 16v15–22: Somebody could object that this contradicts Aristotle (Metaphysics, VI: “substance is the cause of accident’s quiddity and existence”). I reply that Aristotle by “quiddity” meant the agent cause; he wanted to explain that the definition of accident is found in the substrate: and this is valid not only for derived accidents (e.g., black or white), but also for abstract accidents, called “prototypes” (e.g., blackness or whiteness). If so, the mathematician defines the triangle as an accident, without employing matter. 16v22–17r1: Nobody could say that the mathematician defines the triangle without employing sensible matter, but employing general, non-sensible matter, since this would be impossible: non-sensible matter cannot receive an accident. In fact, if the substrate of accidents is sensible and individual (as some people think), the mathematician should give a definition of accident without substrate— which is absurd. 17r1–17v20: The quiddity of accident is not related to the substrate, but is essentially (be-‘as.muto) a nature and an absolute quiddity in its genus,87 as shown by the following arguments: 1. 17r1–19: the substrate can be either the material cause, or the formal cause, or the final cause, or the agent cause of an accident. Now, substance is neither the material cause of the accident, since accident has no matter (otherwise it would be a compound—and this is absurd), nor its formal cause, since accident has no form (otherwise it would have a matter as well; moreover, since the substrate 87

This is also Scotus’s view (cf. King, Scotus on Metaphysics, pp. 29–30).

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supports [nose’] the forms, in this case the substrate would support itself—which is absurd; finally, since a thing is called by the name of its form, in this case the accident should be called “substrate”— which is also absurd), nor its final cause, since, if a thing is called by the name of its form, it is also called by the name of its final cause (Physics, V: “a thing or a motion derives its name from that to which it is directed [mah she-’elayw]”—where the expression “to which it is directed” refers to the final cause)—but the accident cannot be called by a name derived from “substrate”. If so, substance is the agent cause of the accident; therefore it is not part of its quiddity, since the agent cause is external to the thing; 2. 17r19–22: if substance were part of the quiddity of the accident, the ten categories would not exist, since they would all be the same thing (i.e., substance)—and this is absurd (Metaphysics, VI: “the categories are different from each other”); 3. 17r22–25: if the substrate were part of the quiddity of the accident, the substrate would be assumed in the definition of accident— and this is absurd. In fact, every part of the quiddity of something is assumed in the definition of that thing; but what is in the definition of something is internal to that thing, while the substrate is something external and added to the thing; 4. 17r25–17v2: if the substrate were assumed in the definition of the accident, the substrate would be predicated of the accident according to the first species of substance (An. Post., I: “the parts of definition are predicated of the defined thing according to the first species of substance”)—and this is absurd; 5. 17v2–4: the substrate is not assumed in the definition of “whiteness”, which is: “the colour distinctive of sight (mar’eh mafrid ha-re’ot)”; 6. 17v4–8: the substrate is not part of the quiddity of the accident, since everything has its proper genera and differentiae (e.g., “colour” is a genus of “whiteness” and “blackness”); if so, the quiddity of the accident would necessarily be different from what is said of the substrate; 7. 17v8–13: that which includes many things is more perfect than what is included in it (e.g., “man” is more perfect than “animal” since it includes also “rational”); if the substrate were part of the quiddity of the accident, the accident (which would include the substrate, i.e., a substance) would be more perfect than the substance—and this is absurd, since substance precedes accident in perfection;

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8. 17v13–20: if the substrate were part of the quiddity of the accident, accident could not be imagined without the substrate (since a thing cannot be thought without a part of its quiddity)—and this is absurd. In fact, if it were so, accident and substance would be the same thing. 17v20–18r11: According to Avicenna, existence is a necessary accident of being;88 the accident has an essential quiddity, since the substrate gives the accident its existence; actual existence is an accident, since “being” or “non-being” is not said of the accident, according to the following argument: what is being by nature is a necessary existence; what is a necessary existence cannot be anything but a being; what cannot be anything but a being is always a being; if so, if accident were a being, it would always be a being—and this contradicts the quiddity of accident (Porphyry, Isagoge: “accident is that thing whose generation and destruction can be imagined without the destruction of its substrate”; Topics, I: “accident is what it is possible to be not”). Therefore, accident should include neither existence nor non-existence. But how can accident not include nonexistence, if it cannot include existence? How can accident be other than non-being by nature? The reply is: what is non-being by nature should necessarily not be; therefore, if accident were a non-being, accident would not be—but this contradicts the evidence that accident is. Therefore, existence and non-existence are only accidents of accident; and the quiddity of the accident is not related to the substrate, since actual existence (given by the substrate) is not found in accident’s nature and quiddity. 18r11–17: There are two kinds of existence: (1) “real (s.odeq) existence”, i.e., actual existence; (2) concrete (mummash) existence, i.e., the existence of quiddity. The former is given to the accident by the substrate, and it cannot be outside of mind; the latter is found in the accident by nature and quiddity, since accident has a quiddity and nature independent of its substrate. 18r17–23: There are many kinds of definition: (1) quidditative definition signifies only “what” (mahu, quid) something is, not “which” (’ey zeh davar, quale), “from what” (mimmah hu’, a quo), “where” (’es.el mah hu’, apud quid) or “for the sake of what” (ba‘avur 88 The necessary connection between essence and existence is upheld also by Scotus: cf. King, Scotus on Metaphysics, pp. 55–56; Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, pp. 204 ff.

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’ey zeh davar hu’, ad quem) it is. This is a simple definition, a mere description, and indicates actual existence (maybe Aristotle deals with it in Metaphysics, VI); (2) a definition which signifies not only “what” something is, but also “from what” and “for the sake of what” it is, and all its causes in general. This definition is more complex than the former, and it is the most perfect kind of definition (maybe Aristotle deals with it in Metaphysics, VII). 18r23–18v3: “Accident” can be understood in two senses: (1) insofar as it is found in a substrate, which is derived from the name of the accident; (2) insofar as it has a genus and a differentia. For example, “whiteness”, being “the colour distinctive of sight”, has “colour” as its genus, and “distinctive of sight” as its differentia. In this definition, the substrate is not assumed; and this solves many of the following arguments, which support the opinion that the substrate is part of the definition of the accident: 1. 18v3–8: Aristotle said (Metaphysics, VI): “substance precedes accident in definition, in knowledge and in time”; what precedes in definition enters into the definition of what follows; if so, substance is assumed in the definition of accident. Moreover, “precedence in time” implies that there are many eternal accidents (e.g., transparency in the heavens); cp. also Averroes: “matter always precedes, although it exists in another form”. 18v8–14: Other people say that substance and accident are understood in many ways: (1) insofar as they are substantial or accidental terms (gevulim)—e.g., the ten categories; (2) insofar as they have an extra-mental existence. According to these people, the former is the meaning given to substance and accident in Metaphysics, VI: in fact, the defined thing is only a term, since it is convertible in predication with its definition, while substance and accident existing outside of mind are not convertible in predication. 18v14–17: I deny this, since in metaphysics Aristotle studies actual things; in fact, metaphysics is the most excellent of actual sciences, and its subject is being qua being. 18v17–25: Some people contest Averroes’s opinion that the subject of metaphysics is the separate substance. They say that this is absurd, since in metaphysics every subject should be preceded by the demonstration of its existence (An. Post., I), but the existence of the separate substance is demonstrated only in Metaphysics, XI. Averroes replies, against Avicenna, that this existence had already

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been demonstrated in Physics, VIII; but Avicenna has argued that in that book Aristotle demonstrates its existence only insofar as that substance is a mover. 18v25–19r6: Moreover, one of the six conditions of the subject is that all the things studied in that science should be related to that subject.89 But not all the things that are studied in metaphysics are related to the separate substance or to the First Cause, since, e.g., “anterior” and “posterior” cannot be related to the First Cause, which is eternal—although some people incorrectly think that the subject of metaphysics are the principles. 19r6–15: My reply to Averroes is as follows: although I affirm that the subject of metaphysics is being qua being—according to Thomas’s and Scotus’s90 opinions (cp. Thomas’s Physics, I)91 — Averroes is right, according to the opinion of many recent scholars (ha-’ah.aronim), since “subject” can be understood in many senses: (1) as a subject in anteriority (bi-qedimah); (2) as a subject in principle (bi-teh.illah). Now, Averroes speaks of being in a satisfactory way (be-sippuq), while Aristotle speaks of being in anteriority and posteriority—and being is said “in anteriority” of the separate substance (cp. Metaphysics, III), and “not in anteriority” of the other substances. Therefore, the foremost (yoter qodem) and most general subject of metaphysics is being qua being but, since the foremost substance is God, Averroes says that its subject—“in principle”—is God (Averroes, Metaphysics, III). 19r15–20: Metaphysics has many names: it is called “divine science”, since it studies God and the separate substances; “metaphysics”, since it comes after physics, and studies things different 89

A list of four (not “six”, as in Bibago) conditions of the subject of a science is found at the beginning of Antonius Andreas’s De tribus principiis rerum naturalium: the fourth condition is that “everything that is determined in a science is reduced to, and has attribution to its first subject” (Gensler, Two Quaestiones, pp. 199–200). 90 Aristotle’s definition of the subject of metaphysics as “being qua being” (Met. 1026a30–32) is defended in Duns Scotus’s Quaestiones in libros Metaphysicorum, book VI, quaestio 4; cf. also ibidem, book VI, quaestio 1, no. 52 (metaphysica est de substantia . . . tantummodo in quantum ens) and King, Scotus on Metaphysics, p. 16 note 3. 91 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Physicorum, book I, lectio 1, §4: Omnibus scientiis praemittitur philosophia prima, in qua determinatur de iis quae sunt communia enti in quantum est ens.

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from those studied in physics; “first philosophy”, since it studies first beings.) 19r20–24: if substance precedes accident in definition, it should be assumed in the definition of the accident; if so, it should be a part of its quiddity; therefore, the quiddity of the accident is related to the substrate; 2. 19r24–19v1: Aristotle said (Metaphysics, VI): “Accidents do not exist but belong to being (davar mah me-ha-nims.a’)”; if so, their quiddity consists in their being in a substrate or in relationship to it, since they exist only in relationship to being; 3. 19v1–5: the being that an accident has in its substrate should be either a substance (but this is absurd) or an accident. If so, it is either the same thing as the accident, or an accident of the accident— and this is absurd, since if so we should continue endlessly. Therefore, the quiddity of the accident is the same as its being in the substrate; 4. 19v5–8: a thing is in truth like it is in existence (Metaphysics, I: “each thing is in truth like it is in existence, and vice versa” [literal quotation]); in existence, a thing is not defined without its substrate, since the latter gives the thing its actual existence; if so, in truth too a thing cannot be defined without its substrate. 19v9–26: Refutation of the above arguments: 1. 19v9–13: the accident is defined by its substrate, if “definition” is understood in its former sense (see above), since in this case we take the accident insofar as it is found in a substrate; but if we take the accident insofar as it has genera and differentiae, accident has a real (s.odeq) definition, independent of its substrate; 2. 19v13–18: when Aristotle says that “accidents . . . belong to being”, he means: “they belong to actual being”, i.e., that accident, as an actual being, is something related to the substrate, but its existence is an accident too (see above, f. 18r, ll. 5 ff.); 3. 19v18–24: from the fact that “the being that an accident has in its substrate should be either a substance or an accident” it does not follow that the accident should have accidents: “accidentality” (miqriyyut), contrary to “accident”, does not need to be in a substrate; and that being which is not a material accident is not in a substrate. Rather, from the above statement it follows that, since that being cannot be a substance, substance is not part of the quiddity of the accident;

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4. 19v24–26: that “a thing is in truth like it is in existence” is true for concrete existence, but not for actual existence. 19v26–20r3: All the doubts about this question have been solved. It appears that Averroes was right, provided that his claim that existence and quiddity are the same thing92 does not refer to real (s. odeq) existence, which is an accident. 20r3–5: Therefore, accident has a quiddity independent from its substrate, since the mathematician studies a thing insofar as it is abstract from matter, and the definition of that thing reflects his study of it. 20r5–11: Somebody could object: if accident has a definition, how can Aristotle say (An. Post., I): “That which has a demonstration has no definition, and vice versa”? “Demonstration” refers to the substantial property, i.e., to accident. Moreover, Aristotle says (An. Post., II): “Definition concerns only substance”. To respond to this objection, some people claim that “concerns only substance” means “concerns only species”, while others claim that also individual has a definition. 20r11–22: A scholar (h.akham ’eh.ad) said that it is possible that “individual” has a definition, but only in some senses. In fact, “individual” has three senses: 1. abstract from actual, real existence. Such an individual does not enter into the genus of substance, since it includes only the nature of the species and the individual property derived from the species for the sake of which this ostensible thing exists; 2. insofar as it includes actual, extra-mental existence. This existence is intermediate between substance and accident, and is called “intrinsic mode”.93 Francis of Meyronnes said that the individual consists of those intrinsic modes (f. 20r, ll. 17–18);94 92 Does this refer to Averroes’s above mentioned affirmation that “form is the quiddity of something” (cf. f. 13v, ll. 25–26), or to another, unidentified passage? 93 In Hebrew: to’ar penimi, followed by the Latin term: modus intrinsecus. The concept of “intrinsic degree” is typical of Scotus’s metaphysics, and in particular of his doctrine of modal distinction: cf. King, Scotus on Metaphysics, p. 25; Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, p. 53. See e.g., Scotus’s Ordinatio, book I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, no. 90: “infinitum” . . . dicit modum intrinsecum illius entitatis (i.e., of God). 94 In the text: Fransisqo. This statement is not explicitly found in the Tractatus formalitatum secundum doctrinam Francisci Mayronis, where, however, it is affirmed that haecceitas (one of the names given to the Scotist principle of individuation) nihil aliud est nisi quidam modus intrinsecus: see Franciscus de Mayronis, In Libros Sententiarum, Quodlibeta, Tractatus Formalitatum, De Primo Principio, Terminorum Theologicalium, Declarationes, De Univocatione, Venetiis 1520 (repr. Frankfurt a.M. 1966), f. 264rb, ll. 38–39.

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3. insofar as it includes all the accidents found in it. Such an individual exists accidentally. According to this theory, the first sense of “individual” has a definition, and Aristotle’s expression “concerns only substance” means “concerns essence and quiddity”. Therefore, to say that “accident has a substance” means that “accident has a quiddity”. 20r23–24: Other people claim that Aristotle’s statement refers to quidditative definition, which accident does not have.] 20r24–20v24: What is valid for the mathematician is valid also for the metaphysician, who studies a thing insofar as it is abstract from matter both outside of mind and in mind. Therefore, he defines a thing without employing matter: e.g., he defines man employing concepts other than matter, since he says that man is “a rational animal (h.ay)” (although, according to Porphyry, life [h.ayyut] is here in the place of matter).95 In fact, the metaphysician conceives the quiddities of things, which are forms without matter, while the natural philosopher studies things insofar as they are ordered to motion and change, and this cannot be without matter. Therefore, the natural philosopher defines man as “a rational animal composed of bones, flesh and sinews”, where matter is flesh and bones; the metaphysician, who studies the thing abstract from motion, defines man as “a rational animal”, employing only form. Although the best known form in man is rationality, we do not define man employing only this form, since the specific (meyuh.edet) form does not exist without the general form: both forms are found in the same thing actually; they are different only in mind, but they are the same thing according to a formal identity (’ah.adut .surit). Matter enters into the physical definition of a thing (in fact, the natural philosopher conceives things insofar as they are moved, and a thing is not moved without matter); but matter could not be imagined without form. Therefore, the natural philosopher should study matter insofar as it is a potentiality of form (Physics, VI: “the nature of this matter is conceived in relationship to form”, etc.). The natural philosopher cannot conceive matter without form, while the metaphysician studies prime matter only insofar as it has a specific quiddity, different from the quiddity of 95

Cf. Scotus, In Met. 6, q. 1, 63: Metaphysicus, definiendo, omnino abstrahit a materia, quia sicut ens quod primo considerat, ita et quidlibet, in quantum sub eius consideratione cadit, non includit materiam.

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form; he conceives matter without form, and defines a thing without employing matter. 20v24–21r3: Somebody could object: if the quiddity of a thing were only its form, generation would concern only form—and this is absurd (Metaphysics, VI: “generation concerns neither form nor matter, but the compound of both”). In fact, generation concerns the quiddity of something, since in absolute generation the name and the definition (i.e., the quiddity) of something change. 21r3–21v6: The thesis that generation concerns only the compound96 is supported by the following argument: both matter and form are neither generated nor corrupted; if so, the corrupted thing is the compound. That matter is neither generated nor corrupted appears from Physics, I, last chapter: “if matter were generated and corrupted, it should be generated from something and corrupted into something, e.g., the substrate; and if prime matter were generated, it would have a substrate from which it is generated, so that it would be the substrate of itself: in fact, a potentiality does not differ from another potentiality, since the cause of difference is actuality, i.e., the form for the sake of which things differ from each other”. Moreover, one of the three conditions of principles is not to be made from something else (Physics, I); but, if prime matter were made from something else, it would not be a principle—and this is absurd. As for form, if it were generated and corrupted, the principles of generation (matter, form and privation) would not be three—and this is absurd, since in this case form would have a form, and so on. Moreover, if form were generated or corrupted, it should be generated either from matter (but this cannot be, since matter is a potentiality—although this can be, if we intend as “generation” the fact that an actuality, i.e., form, comes after a potentiality, i.e., matter) or from the compound (but this cannot be, since then a form would be generated from another form and so on—and this is absurd). In fact, if a form were generated from the compound, it should be generated either from matter or from form (and both things are impossible, as explained), or from both (and this cannot 96 This thesis, found also in Scotus (see Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, pp. 433–437), is discussed in Antonius Andreas’s De tribus principiis rerum naturalium, art. IV, q. 1 (ed. cit., ff. 49ra–52va: Utrum in rebus naturalibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus ipsum compositum ex materia et forma per se primo terminet generationis actum).

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be, since the whole is not different from its parts). Therefore, generation necessarily concerns the compound (Metaphysics, VI: “neither matter nor form, but the compound of both is made”, where “to make” means “to generate”). Moreover, the definition of generation is: “coming out of non-existence into existence, or coming out of potentiality into actuality”; and this can occur only in a thing that has parts (i.e., the compound). 21v6–8: Somebody could object: form and matter are generated, while the compound is not; but how can form generate? The reply makes use of the following arguments: 1. 21v8–10: generation is from non-existence into existence (Physics, I: “generation is existence after privation”), and this applies only to form; 2. 21v10–14: absolute generation (i.e., the generation of substance) is like any generation (i.e., the generation of accidents) (Physics, I, and elsewhere). But the generation of accidents generates only that accidental form, neither matter nor the compound; so, also the generation of substance generates only that substantial form; 3. 21v14–18: every thing that is generated is corrupted, and vice versa, according to Aristotle’s doctrine of conversion; therefore, since form is corrupted (e.g., from the egg’s form the chicken’s form is generated), form is also generated; 4. 21v18–20: what is generated is emanated from the Agent, and only form is such; 5. 21v20–25: what is generated is the terminus (gevul) of generation (in fact, the thing is called by the name of its final cause, which is its terminus), and only form is such a terminus (in fact, the thing in which motion and change end is the terminus ad quem, and when form is in matter actually, motion and change end with it). 21v25–22r16: Against the above thesis (i.e., that generation concerns only form) we affirm that: 1. 21v26–22r1: what is truly generated is matter (Averroes, Physics, I); 2. 22r2–6: what is generated is the substrate of generation, and matter is this substrate. In fact, what is white is the substrate of whiteness, and the same is valid for generation: the accident is always found in the name of its substrate; 3. 22r6–8: Averroes said (De caelo, IV): “The principles of generated and corrupted things are generated and corrupted, while the

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principles of eternal things are eternal”; if so, matter, as a principle of generated and corrupted things, is itself generated and corrupted; 4. 22r8–12: the substrate of generation is to generation what the substrate of motion is to motion. Motion is the action of the moved thing, therefore generation is the action of the generated thing (Physics, III); the substrate of motion is the moved thing, therefore the substrate of generation is called “generated”; 5. 22r12–16: Aristotle said (Physics, III): “All things existing in us when we move are moved, and vice versa”, and the same is valid for generation and corruption; therefore, when all things existing in matter are generated and corrupted, matter is generated and corrupted too. 22r16–23: Moreover, in order to refute the above five arguments against the generation of form, one should know that “generation” has two senses: (1) substantial generation, and (2) accidental generation. Form is not generated substantially, since it does not exist per se (like the compound), but is generated accidentally, since it is assumed in the generation of the compound, which is a substantial generation. 22r23–22v14: There are three opinions about the generation of forms: 1. 22r23–25: form is made ex nihilo (mi-lo’ davar) by the Creator (i.e., the Giver of Forms), so that it is generated substantially—this is Avicenna’s opinion; 2. 22r25–22v4: form is generated neither substantially nor accidentally; forms exist actually in the compound, and precede everything. This is the opinion of Anaxagoras: he and others thought that forms were concealed (t.emunot) actually in things—but this is absurd, since in that case generation (which is “coming out of potentiality into actuality”) would not exist; 3. 22v4–14: this is Aristotle’s opinion, and it is half-way between the two previous opinions. Aristotle affirms that form is generated (as in opinion 1), but he thinks that it is not generated substantially (as in opinion 2); rather, he claims that it is generated accidentally. Moreover, while the two above opinions state that forms exist in their substrate actually, Aristotle believes that forms exist only potentially. 22v14: Therefore, form is generated and corrupted with the generation of the compound of which it is a part—and this per

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accidens. Now, “generation of something from another thing” has three senses: 1. 22v15–20: a thing is generated in the sense that it is the substrate of generation. Averroes’s claim (Physics, I) that “what is truly generated is matter” should be understood in this sense: matter is the substrate of generation. This refutes argument 1 (see f. 21v, ll. 26 ff.); 2. 22v20–24: a thing is generated in the sense that it exists after having not existed, and this has two senses: (1) as a generation in general and of a whole thing; (2) as a generation of a part after another part—and parts can be either substantial or quantitative. Now, if only form is generated, this is a generation of a whole thing, since form has no parts and is essentially simple. 22v24–26: Ockham disagrees with this opinion: he thinks that every form is essentially divided and has parts (e.g., the forms of an ass, of a horse, etc.), except the rational soul.97 23r1–3: On the contrary, the compound is generated in the second sense in each of its quantitative parts, but not in its essential parts (i.e., neither in form nor in matter); 3. 23r3–5: a thing is generated perfectly (bi-shelemut). According to Aristotle’s opinion, the compound is generated substantially and primarily (i.e., in this sense). 23r5–11: We can also say that the generation of form is neither substantial nor accidental, since “form” can be understood in two ways: (1) in general (when we conceive the form and its quiddity in general) and (2) in particular (when we conceive the particular form of something). The former is not generated, since it has no matter in it—and, according to some people, Aristotle’s saying that form is not generated refers only to general form, not to particular form. 97

Cf. e.g., Venerabilis Inceptoris Guillelmi de Ockham Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis. Prologus et libri I-III, eds. V. Richter and G. Leibold, “Guillelmi de Ockham Opera philosophica et theologica” IV, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1985, p. 558, ll. 110–115 (Nam ipsa forma est divisibilis sicut materia in tantum quod si forma separata esset a materia et materia a forma, ita esset forma divisibilis in infinitum sicut materia nec plus materia quam forma. Hoc etiam patet quia ipsa forma ita habet partes integrales sicut ipsa materia habet, ergo ita potest sibi competere dividi sicut ipsi materiae) and p. 580, ll. 214–216 (Non est intelligendum quod forma sit per se indivisibilis quia de se non habet partes, quia hoc est simpliciter falsum. Forma enim ita habet de se partes sicut materia).

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23r11–16: Somebody could object: what is the specific terminus of generation, the compound or the form? In one sense, it seems that it is the form, since generation is from privation to form; but in another sense it seems that it is the compound, since form precedes the compound and gives the compound its existence, so that the compound is the final cause—i.e., the end—of generation. 23r16–21: I reply that, if generation is understood as the generation of a whole thing, its terminus is only form; but if generation is understood as the generation of a part after another part, its terminus is the compound (e.g., if we say that a man generates another man similar to him, the latter is the terminus of generation). 23r21–23v25: From this derive the following refutations of the above five arguments (supporting the thesis that generation concerns form: see f. 21v, ll. 8 ff.): 1. 23r22–23v1: if we understand generation as the generation of a whole thing (bi-kelalo), it is true that generation concerns only form, since this generation is from non-existence to existence; but if we understand generation as the generation of a part after another part—i.e., substantial and primary generation—this is not possible of form, which has no parts; 2. 23v1–6: the comparison between absolute generation and any generation is not general, but particular: e.g., the terminus of change cannot be called “changed” (mishtaneh), while the terminus of generation is called “generated”. “Changed” and “generated” are different things, since the substrate of generation is not perceived by the senses, while the substrate of change exists actually in a perfect way; 3. 23v6–9: it is true that “every generated thing is corrupted, and vice versa”, but form is not corrupted, since in the simile of the egg (see above, ff. 21v, ll. 14 ff.) the corruption is accidental, and the subsequent generation is in general (kefi kelalutah); 4. 23v9–11: I deny that “what is generated is emanated from the Agent”, since what is generated comes out of the potentiality of matter, not out of an agent, as Avicenna thought. 23v11–21: However, the specific agent is what prepares that matter to receive that form, while the general agent is, e.g., the heavens, which produce a mouse from mould without a particular agent. According to Averroes, De animalibus, XI, the mouse produced in this way is like silver produced alchemically from other silver: when a male mouse and a female mouse copulate, they generate a male,

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but a female mouse is generated from mould, or vice versa, so that the two mice generated in different ways belong to different species. On the contrary, Albert the Great affirms that they are of the same species,98 and this agrees with the doctrine of creation found in our Holy Law; 5. 23v21–25: if we assume that the terminus of generation is the end intended by the agent, it is not true that “what is generated is the terminus of generation”; if we assume that the terminus of generation is the attained thing in general, form is not the terminus of generation—unless we mean that form is generated accidentally. 23v25–24v5: Now, I shall reply to the above five arguments (f. 21v, ll. 26 ff.) which support the thesis that matter is generated and corrupted: 1. 24r1–5: it is true that “what is truly generated is matter” only if “generated” means “the substrate of generation” (i.e., the first sense of generation listed above, f. 22v, l. 15); 2. 24r5–8: also the argument that “what is generated is the substrate of generation” is true only according to the first sense of “generation”; 3. 24r8–16: when Averroes says that “the principles of generated and corrupted things are generated and corrupted”, “principles” means “the proximate causes and the specific predispositions without which generation is impossible”, not merely “the substantial things and principles of that thing”. Of any corruptible thing, some principles are generated and corrupted, while others are eternal: therefore, Averroes’s proposition is particular, not general; 4. 24r16–19: the comparison between the substrate of generation and the substrate of motion is particular, not general (see above, f. 23v, ll. 1 ff.); 5. 24r19–24v5: as for Aristotle’s statement that “all things existing in us are moved when we move”, which is valid also for generation— so that matter, which exists in us, is generated—I reply that matter is generated only in the sense that it is the substrate of generation (and this is the sense that Aristotle means here). Better, we can reply that Aristotle’s statement is valid only for things found in a body, e.g., the quantitative parts. In fact, Aristotle affirms (Physics, V): “motion is in the moved thing, and everything found in the moved thing is 98

F. 23v, l. 19: Albert. Mayor.

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moved by the same motion”; but this is true only if those things are quantitative parts; otherwise, also motion should be moved and have a motion, and so on—and this is absurd. 24v5–15: Therefore, generation concerns the compound; quiddity is the whole compound, and in a certain sense it is only the form—as is clear in Ockham’s Physics: “There is another division of cause: some causes are substantial, and some are accidental. ‘Cause’ can be understood in two senses: an extra-mental thing is said to be the substantial or accidental cause of something, and this division is valid only for agent causes, among which are fortune and chance (I will speak about them below); but this division is not valid for formal causes, since there is no accidental form,99 nor for material causes, since one matter is not the accidental cause of a compound more than another matter is” (f. 24v, ll. 7–12).100 Therefore, matter is the accidental cause of the compound and only form is the quiddity of a thing; and, if form in general is not generated and corrupted, a particular form is. 24v15–21: Somebody could object: if form were generated and corrupted, how can matter and form connect? Not only a corruptible thing is not always connected with an incorruptible one, but those things may not even belong to the same genus (Metaphysics, IX). I reply that a particular form exists in a particular matter: the same matter cannot have all the forms together, but one form after another in succession;101 if not, they could not connect. However, that a corruptible thing and an incorruptible thing cannot belong 99 Bibago’s words here are probably the result of a misunderstanding of Ockham’s statement: “since one form is not the accidental cause of anything” (see next note below). 100 The above passage is quoted literally from William Ockham’s Summula philosophiae naturalis, book II, chapter 8, published in Guillelmi de Ockham Brevis summa libri Physicorum etc., ed. Brown, pp. 232, l. 2–233, l. 12: Praeter praedictos duos modos causarum est alia divisio causae, quia quaedam est causa per se et quaedam per accidens. Quae etiam dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo ut aliqua res extra animam dicatur causa per se et alia per accidens eiusdem rei. Et sic intellecta, ista divisio non habet locum in aliquo genere causae nisi in genere causae efficientis in quo ponuntur fortuna et casus, de quibus posterius dicetur. Non enim habet locum in genere causae formalis eo quod nulla forma est causa alicuius per accidens, quamvis contingenter sit causa sicut forma quaelibet contingenter est causa. Nec habet locum in genere causae materialis, quia non plus est una materia causa per accidens compositi quam alia. 101 This is also Scotus’s opinion: see Ordinatio, book IV, d. 10, q. 2, no. 4 (Impossibile est eamdem materiam esse simul sub duabus formis substantialibus).

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to the same genus follows from the commentators’ arguments, as follows: 1. 24v21–25r2: things that belong to the same genus have the same common matter (Metaphysics, V), and such things can be altered and changed into each other (De caelo, I); now, if a corruptible thing and an incorruptible thing belonged to the same genus, they would have the same matter; if so, they could be changed into each other—but this is impossible, since an incorruptible thing cannot be made from a corruptible thing; 2. 25r2–5: according to Averroes, things that belong to the same genus have opposite or material differentiae; but “corruptible” and “incorruptible” have only privative (ne‘ederiyyim) differentiae; if so, they cannot belong to the same genus. 25r5–25v26: Thomas (Aquinas) explains this point by means of two arguments:102 1. 25r6–21: things that have privations that are different in genus are different in genus; the privation of corruptible and that of incorruptible are different in genus; if so, corruptible and incorruptible are different in genus.103 102 The two arguments that follow, on the “differentia in genus” between “corruptible” and “incorruptible”, are probably not literal quotations from any of the works by, or ascribed to, Thomas Aquinas; rather, they may have been inspired (with some substantial alterations) by the treatment of this subject in Thomas’s Sententia libri Metaphysicorum, book X, lectio 12 (Bibago may have either read this text, or he may have taken his re-elaboration of Thomas’s arguments from a later Thomist work). 103 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Metaphysicorum, book X, lectio 12, §§2–3 (according to M.R. Cathala and R.M. Spiazzi’s edition, Taurini-Romae 1950): Secundum est, quod corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt contraria. Quod probat ex hoc, quod impotentia opposita determinatae potentiae est quaedam privatio, ut in nono habitum est. Privatio autem est principium contrarietatis. Unde sequitur, quod impotentia sit contrarium potentiae. Corruptibile autem et incorruptibile opponuntur secundum potentiam et impotentiam. Sed diversimode. Nam si accipiatur potentia communiter, secundum quod se habet ad posse agere vel pati quodcumque, sic corruptibile secundum potentiam dicetur, incorruptibile secundum impotentiam. Si autem dicatur potentia secundum quod non est posse aliquid deterius, sic e converso, incorruptibile dicetur secundum potentiam, corruptibile vero secundum impotentiam.Cum autem ex his videretur concludendum quod corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt specie, concludit quod sunt diversa genere. Et hoc ideo, quia sicut forma et actus pertinent ad speciem, ita materia et potentia pertinent ad genus. Unde sicut contrarietas quae est secundum formas et actus, facit differentiam secundum speciem, ita contrarietas quae est secundum potentiam, facit generis diversitatem. However, Bibago’s interpretation of this argument is clearly different from Thomas’s.

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As for the major premise: every privation signifies a relationship (Metaphysics, III), since every privation is a privation of a man, or of an ass, or of a horse. Some people disagree with Aristotle when he says (Physics, I): “We have two species of privation: absolute privation and relative (musar)104 privation”; they affirm that there can be no absolute privation, since every privation is relative. But those people are wrong, since by “absolute privation” Aristotle did not mean the privation of a form, which is in relation to that form, but a “nothing at all” (lo’ davar kelal), from which nothing is made. When we speak of absolute privation, we do not intend “privation” according to the meaning of the name, but according to the ratio (‘inyan), since “privation” properly (be-yih.ud) always signifies a relationship (while “absolute privation” refers to a “nothing at all”); that relationship refers to a form, and form is what gives existence to the thing and distinguishes that thing from another thing—while matter is common (Metaphysics, VI). Therefore, privations are different in genus, and things that have privations are also different in genus. As for the minor premise: “impassiveness”—i.e., the privation of “corruptible (ha-bilti hitpa‘alut)—is a privation of corporeity that belongs to the second genus of quality; “matter”—i.e., the privation of “incorruptible”—is a privation of corporeity that belongs to substance; and substance and quality are not only different genera, but also distinct genera. 25r21–25v1: There is a difference between “different” [nivdal] and “distinct” [mith.allef]: “different” things are distinct in something and share something else in quiddity—e.g., man and ass are different due to a specific differentia which determines each of them, but they share animality, i.e., the genus of their quiddity [the Hebrew translators might be wrong in translating Porphyry’s Isagoge, since they write many times “man is distinct from ass”, when they should have written instead “man is different from ass”, or their “distinction” should in any case be intended as a “differentia”; but they did not understand this difference]; “distinct” things, on the other hand, do not share anything at all in quiddity.) 25v1–3: Somebody could object: if distinct things do not share anything, how can the ten categories be distinct? They should be 104

The Hebrew term musar (usually meaning “moral”) is probably employed here in the sense of the Latin term respectivus.

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different, rather than distinct, since they share the quiddity of being.105 25v3–12: A commentator (Nicholas Bonet)106 replies: “The distinction of the ten categories can be—or can be understood—in two senses: 1. the categories either agree in nothing at all, or they agree in no existing thing ex natura rei (mi-t.eva‘ ha-davar)—and it should not be admitted that the ten categories are absolutely simple or distinct, since they must necessarily agree in the first common and univocal (ha-kolel . . . ve-ha-muskam) predicate, i.e., the quiddity of being, so that they are not absolutely simple, nor are they non-resoluble (bilti natakim); we can say that the categories have absolutely simple concepts (mussagim)—e.g., ‘prime determined (mugval)’ and ‘prime determining (magvil)’—(and) that they are said to be absolutely simple with respect to the inferior things (tah.tonim) which are resoluble (natakim) into characteristics which are resoluble in their turn; 2. when we say ‘distinct things’, this can be understood in the sense that they are composed of primary differentiae which are wholly distinct. In this sense we say that the ten categories are distinct, since the differentiae do not include the being in quid”. These are Bonet’s actual words in his Metaphysics.107 105

This question concerns a key point of Scotus’s metaphysics. Cf. King, Scotus on Metaphysics, pp. 20–21: “Two things are different when there is some real common factor that is combined in each item with a real distinguishing element. Such is the case with coordinate species under their proximate genus: they share the genus as a real common factor, but each is set apart from the other by the presence of a differentia, which, in combination with the genus, produces each species. Two things are diverse [Bibago qualifies them above as “distinct”] when there is no real common factor and hence no foundation for a distinguishing element. Such is, traditionally, the case with the ten categories ( . . . ). Now, Scotus’s account of metaphysics seems to replace the ontological diversity among the ten categories ( . . . ) with mere difference. ( . . . ) If ‘being’ is univocally predicable in quid of the ten categories, then it seems as though it will be the supreme genus above them all”. 106 The name Bonet. is added in the margin of the manuscript. 107 The passage is quoted literally (with some slight alterations, perhaps due to variant readings in the Latin text) from Nicholas Bonet’s Metaphysica, book I, chapter 15, published in Nicolaus Bonetus, Metaphysica, Barcelona 1493 [facsimile ed., Ann Arbor, Mich.–London 1979], ff. 17vb, l. 15–18ra, l. 4: Praedicamenta esse primo diversa potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quod in nullo sint convenientia (in the text: idem entia), nec in aliquo ex natura rei convenientia, et sic non est concedendum quod sint simpliciter simplicia, vel primo diversa, quod necessario conveniunt in

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3. 25v13–26: things that are subordinated to the same genus and different under that genus are different due to specific differentiae; but those differentiae are not specific, since they are found in each one of the ten genera; therefore, etc.108 As for the major premise: things are said to be different due to specific differentiae since, if it were not so, they would be different due to common differentiae—and this is absurd. In fact, (in this case) there would be a contradiction in terms (setirah ba-gevulim), since we speak of “differentia” and “common”, which are in contradiction, and from this an absurdity results—i.e., that the thing would determine itself. The determined genus would be common and the determining differentia would be common too, so that common would determine common—and this is absurd. As for the minor premise, it is demonstrated per absurdum (beh.ippush): we found substances, some of which are corruptible, and some are not; and also in the category of quantity we found incorruptible quantities—such as the quantity of non-generated and incorruptible things (e.g., time and motion, which are found formally in the category of quantity), the quantity of celestial bodies and the quantity of the elements, which are corruptible in part but incorruptible as a whole. Also in the category of quality we found incorruptible and corruptible qualities: among the former, transparency illo predicato communi univoco, scilicet in quidditate entis, et ideo nec sunt simpliciter simplicia, nec omnino irresolubilia—sed potest dici quod habent conceptus simpliciter simplices, quia illa quae immediate includunt habent conceptus simpliciter simplices, sicut primum contrahibile et primus contrahens: dicunt enim simpliciter simplicia respectu inferiorum quae sunt resolubilia in conceptus iterum resolubiles; secundo potest intelligi primo quod primis omnino primo diversis sunt constituta et diversa vel communia. Ad secundum dicitur quod non erunt generalissima cum habeant supra se aliquid praedicatum quidditativum sicut ens generalissimum. 108 For this argument and its subsequent interpretation, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Metaphysicorum, book X, lectio 12, § 8: Et ex hoc sequitur ex necessitate, quod corruptibile et incorruptibile sint genere diversa. Manifestum est enim quod contraria quae sunt in uno genere, non sunt de substantia illius generis. Non enim rationale et irrationale sunt de substantia animalis. Sed animal est potentia utrumque. Quodcumque autem genus accipiatur, oportet quod corruptibile et incorruptibile sint de intellectu eius. Unde impossibile est quod communicent in aliquo genere. Et hoc rationabiliter accidit. Nam corruptibilium et incorruptibilium non potest esse materia una. Genus autem, physice loquendo, a materia sumitur. Unde supra dictum est, quod ea quae non communicant in materia, sunt genere diversa. Logice autem loquendo, nihil prohibet quod conveniant in genere, in quantum conveniunt in una communi ratione, vel substantiae, vel qualitatis, vel alicuius huiusmodi.

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in the celestial body, and the light in the sun and in the moon. Those are intrinsic modes of being, and because of this Averroes says (Metaphysics, III): “The name common to ‘corruptible’ and ‘incorruptible’ is equivocal (be-shittuf ha-shem)”.] 25v26–29v6: Now, I will give my own arguments supporting the thesis that the corruptible and the non-corruptible do not belong to the same genus: 1. 26r1–10: if it were so, the infinite would exist actually—and this is absurd. In fact, the infinite is neither corrupted nor corruptible, while the finite is corrupted, since there is a time before its generation and after its being. Now, if the corruptible and the incorruptible could belong to the same genus, they would both belong either to the genus of actuality or to the genus of potentiality—and this is absurd, because the finite exists only in actuality, while the infinite exists only in potentiality, since it is a privation of end (Physics, III). 26r10–24: Somebody could object that, if corruptible and noncorruptible did not belong to the same genus, accidents or intrinsic modes would change their specific nature—and this is absurd. In fact, corruptible and incorruptible are intrinsic modes, not quidditative and essential modes, since they cannot be differentiae of being. Moreover, being is not divided into species by quidditative differentiae: being is primarily divided into finite and infinite, determinate and indeterminate, self-subsisting and subsisting-in-another-thing— which are intrinsic modes. But intrinsic modes do not change the specific nature of a thing, as is evident from their description, since the intrinsic mode, when added to something, does not change the formal ratio (‘inyan)109 —while, on the contrary, the formality (s. uriyyut), called formalitas in Latin, when added to something, changes the formal ratio. Therefore, Francis (of Meyronnes)110 and many others think that what constitutes (meqayyem) the individual are the intrinsic modes—which do not change the formal ratio—but not quidditative differentiae, since an individual has non-quidditative differentiae. 109

See the Tractatus formalitatum published in Franciscus de Mayronis, In Libros Sententiarum etc., on f. 263vb, ll. 2–4: Modus intrinsecus est ille qui adveniens alicui formae vel quidditati non variat eius formalem rationem. Cf. also f. 266ra, ll. 35–36: Modus autem non est formalitas. 110 In the text: Fransisqo. For the possible source of this affirmation, see above, note 94.

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26r24–26v4: Somebody could object: if it were so, whiteness in man should be an intrinsic mode, since it does not change the formal ratio. We can reply that, when we say that the intrinsic mode does not change the formal ratio, we mean that, when added to something, it does not change the specific nature of that thing; but this definition does not apply to whiteness. In fact, although whiteness does not change the specific nature of Ruben or Simon, it can change the specific nature of the things that belong to the category of quality, since in quality there is a species different from blackness. 26v4–7: Now I will give the different opinions about the question: what is the thing constitutive of the individual, i.e., the cause of individuation? 26v7–15: A Christian scholar (Peter Aureol)111 thought that this question—i.e., why the individual is an individual—was a false question, and explained this by means of two arguments: 111

The name Aureolis is added in the margin of the manuscript. A passage almost identical to this one is found in John the Canon’s Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum, book I, q. 6. Cp. Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum quaestiones, cit., f. 26rb, ll. 29–53: Contra hoc arguit Aureolus. Dicit enim quod quaestio qua queritur “per quid individuum sit individuum realiter” nihil est quaerere et quaestio est nulla. Sed quaerere per quid res est singularis est quaerere per quid res est res; ergo est nulla. Nam in eo quod res est singularis, nulla enim res ut dicit est universalis—quod potest sic probari. Quia «omne quod est extra animam, ideo est quia unum numero est», ut dicit Boethius in libro De unitate et uno. Postea: omnis quaestio supponens falsum est nulla; praedicta est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet 7 Metaphysicorum. Minor probatur: nam ista quaestio praesupponit quod in rerum natura sit aliquid indifferens ad hoc et ad illud, et quod contrahatur per illas rationes indivisibiles. Quod autem hoc sit falsum alibi probatur sic. Omne indifferens ad aliquos actus oppositos vel distinctos potest ab uno in alium transmutari. Si ergo homo est indifferens ad hanc differentiam individualem vel ad illam, potest transmutari ab una in aliam, et sic humanitas Socratis potest transmutari in Platonem—quod est absurdum. However, as Christopher Schabel (University of Cyprus) has suggested, a possible source of John the Canon’s works is Gerald Odonis’s lost Toulouse Reportatio on the Sentences. Since in the subsequent passage Bibago explicitly mentions Odonis (whose name is not found in the text of John the Canon), it is possible to surmise that the Toulouse Reportatio was the literal source of both John the Canon’s and Bibago’s passages. As a matter of fact, Odonis’s most extensive treatment of Aureol on individuation is in book II, distinction 6, question 4, of the Paris Reportatio on the Sentences (which is still unpublished): Nona opinio est Petri Aureoli, qui dicit quod ista quaestio potest quaerere “per quid individuum formaliter”, et sic dicit quod quaestio est nulla et hoc quaerere est nihil quaerere. Vel potest quaerere quantum ad conceptus, ut sit sensus “quem conceptum addit individuum”, ut hic homo ad conceptum specificum, scilicet ad hominem. ( . . . ) Istas conclusiones probat, primo primam sic: illa quaestio est nulla quae quaerit per quid res est res; sed res est singularis eo quod res est res, eo enim est singularis quo est; sed

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1. 26v9–12: the question “why the thing is a thing?” is a false question, since, along with that due to which the thing is the thing that it is, the thing has a numerical entity (heyot), according to Boethius (in reality, Domingo Gundisalvi) in his De uno et unitate : “Every being is such since it is one in number”. Now, it is self-evident that the question “why the individual is an individual?” is the question: “why the thing is a thing?”; if so, etc. 2. 26v12–15: a question which postulates something absurd is false (Metaphysics, VI), and it is evident that this is one such question, since it postulates the existence of an indistinct nature for a certain thing—and this is absurd since, if so, things could be changed into each other (and this is absurd); if so, etc. 26v15–24: To these arguments Gerald (Odonis) replied as follows:112 est per essentiam suam; quare etc. Item, quaestio est nulla quae supponit falsum; sed ista supponit falsum cum supponit quod res sit indifferens ad singularia et quod post per aliquid adveniens ei fiat singularis; ergo etc. Next, Odonis gives first Scotus’s position, then (at length) his own; lastly, he replies to all positions, especially Aureol’s. However, there is no literal correspondence between these passages of the Paris Reportatio and Bibago’s quotations from Aureol and Odonis. I am very grateful to Christopher Schabel for sharing with me his conclusions about John the Canon’s knowledge and use of Odonis’s work (cf. C. Schabel, The Sentences Commentary of Gerardus Odonis, “Bulletin de philosophie m´edi´evale” 46 [2004], 115–161), and for supplying me with the text of Odonis’s passage. 112 In the text: Geraldus. I have been unable to find the direct source of the arguments that follow. There are some literal correspondences to them in the refutations of Aureol’s two previous arguments,in John the Canon’s Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum (ed. cit., ff. 26rb, ll. 53–58; 26va, ll. 13–14): Respondeo [to Aureol’s argument 1]negando minorem. Ad probationem, cum dicis: “Omne quod etc.” Uno modo dicitur hic quod “omne” vel distribuit per singulis generum, vel pro generibus singulorum. Si pro singulis generum sic est vera, si pro generibus singulorum sic est falsa (. . . ). Ad secundam concedo quod supponit “aliquod tale est indifferens”, et hoc non est falsum. However, John the Canon does not give the complete text of both refutations, nor does he ascribe them to Odonis. It is possible that Bibago is quoting here a passage, now lost, by Odonis, and not merely re-elaborating John the Canon’s text. As a matter of fact, both refutations closely reflect Gerald Odonis’s doctrines as these are formulated in his question Utrum entitas vel unitas universalis sit ex opere intellectus (preserved in the ms. Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, no. 4229, ff. 205v–206v) and, in more general terms, in his commentary on the Sententiae, book I, distinctio 19, quaestio 1 (ms. Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria, no. 65, ff. 113r–114r). On these questions (both unpublished) see the study by J. Spruyt, Gerardus Odonis on the Universal, “Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litt´eraire du Moyen Age” 63 (1996), 171–208, esp. pp. 178–191; cf. also L.M. de Rijk, Works by Gerald Ot (Gerardus Odonis) on Logic, Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy Rediscovered in Madrid, Bibl. Nac. 4229, “Archives d’histoire doctrinale

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1. 26v16–20: this sign (hora’ah)—i.e., “every”—can be divided or separated either according to the particulars of the genera, or according to the genera of particulars. The former division is true— and this means that many things which exist outside of mind would have a numerical unity; the latter division is false—and this means that those things which exist outside of mind would have a numerical unity according to the numericalness (mispariyyut) of the substrate.113 This is the reply to the first argument: 2. 26v20–24: when he affirms that “the question . . . etc.”, I accept this, but when he affirms that “this question is such”, I deny this; when he explains this by saying that then there would exist an indistinct nature for a certain thing, I accept this, but when he affirms that “if so, things could be changed into each other”, I say that this is true in species but not in number. 26v24–29v1: Here are the opinions on the above mentioned question:114 1. 26v25–27r1: the specific nature—i.e., the individual—is individual and one essentially, i.e., per se.115 This opinion is false, according to the following arguments: et litt´eraire du Moyen Age” 60 (1993), 173–193, pp. 190–191. The first argument reflects the following statement by Odonis: Cum probatur quia “omne quod est, ideo est, etc.”, dico quod hoc signum “omne” distribuit pro singulis generum, non pro generibus singulorum (ms. no. 65, f. 114r, as reproduced ibidem, p. 191 note 67); for the second argument, cf. Odonis’s discussion on the idea of “indistinction” as a basis for the specific unity of individuals, summarised ibidem, p. 185 and note 49. Of course, it is possible that also this passage was taken from Odonis’s lost Toulouse Reportatio on the Sentences, even though according to Schabel the Paris Reportatio contains no similar argument (see the previous note). 113 In Bibago’s text, the former division is erroneously said to be “false” and the latter “true”. This is probably due to a polar error by the author himself. I have restored the correct meaning on the basis of the Latin text (see above). 114 The direct source of the subsequent six opinions on the cause of individuation appears to be John the Canon’s Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum, book I, q. 6, art. 2, conclusiones (ed. cit., ff. 26va–28ra). However, at least five of these opinions correspond in part to Scotus’s discussion on this point in his Quaestiones in libros Metaphysicorum, book VII, quaestio 13: cf. the general sketch given in Noone, Universals and Individuation, pp. 114–121. 115 See Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum, cit., f. 26va, ll. 33–34: Prima est ista: quod substantia materialis et quaecumque natura specifica non est de se haec et singularis. The two negative arguments that follow reproduce almost literally John the Canon’s arguments 1 and 2 (ed. cit., f. 26va, ll. 35–51). This opinion is discussed also by Scotus in In Met. 7, q. 13, nn. 48–49 (Opinio prima: natura de se est singularis. Una est quod natura quaelibet de se formaliter, sicut est natura, ita est singularis, etc.).

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1.1. 27r1–3: a thing that has a numerical plurality cannot be one per se or particular, since to accept this predicate would imply a contradiction. The specific nature has a plurality of subjects (Porphyry, Isagoge); if so, it is neither one nor particular per se ; 1.2. 27r3–8: the mind can understand the truth through its opposite; but this cannot be if the specific nature is particular per se. In fact, if the mind conceived that nature insofar as it is a universal, it would conceive that nature as opposite to the individual, which is particular. Therefore, that nature is not particular. 27r8–11: The supporters of this opinion employ the following argument. Aristotle said (Metaphysics, VI): “Substance, whichever it be, is specific to the thing of which it is the substance”; therefore, if nature is specific to the thing to which it belongs, and not to something else, it is particular per se. 27r11–15: I reply: the entity (heyot) of a nature specific to something can be understood in two senses: (1) per se and (2) for the sake of something else which determines it, and due to which it is found in one thing and not in another. Now, nature is specific to something not in the former sense, but only in the latter sense. If so, the argument of the supporters of this opinion is inadequate;116 2. 27r15–17: that specific nature is said to be a particular and individual being in the way of negation and privation.117 This opinion is absurd, according to the following arguments: 2.1. 27r17–22: no imperfection is opposed to something formally and substantially were it not because of a positive (hanah.i) being; to be divided into many subjects is an imperfection opposed to the individual (in fact, this is opposed to God’s being, so that it has 116

This discussion (f. 27r, ll. 8–15) partly reflects that by John the Canon (ed. cit., f. 26vb, ll. 5–15). Cf. also Scotus’s reply to the above opinion (In Met. 7, q. 13, no. 80): Et ad hoc dicendum quod definitio non est naturae secundum se, sed secundum quod consideratur a ratione per hoc quod intellectus format conceptum generis et differentiae, et definit per ea. Unde definitio est res secundae intentionis. 117 See Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum, cit., f. 26vb, ll. 15–16: Secunda conclusio est ista: quod individuatio non potest esse per negationem. The two negative arguments correspond to John the Canon’s (ed. cit., f. 26vb, ll. 16–26). This opinion is close to that ascribed by Scotus to Henry of Ghent (In Met. 7, q. 13, no. 51): Alia est opinio de duplici negatione, etc. Also the negative arguments given by Bibago seem to reflect Scotus’s; cf. Noone, Universals and Individuation, p. 114: “Scotus’s line of criticism is quite predictable ( . . . ). If the negations ( . . . ) are meant as ontological principles, they must be positive, or be meant to point to something positive, since the numerical unity they are trying to explain is a positive feature of things”.

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some deficiency); therefore, its particular being will result from a positive existence which is not found in it, not from negation and privation;118 2.2. 27r22–26: there is no negative existence that supports (meqayyem) a positive existence formally and substantially; the existences of negation and privation are negative; if so, they cannot substantially compose an individual endowed with a positive existence. 27r26–27v3: The supporters of this opinion employ the following argument. Every indivisible thing, insofar as it is indivisible, is such due to its indivisibility; the individual is said to be indivisible; if so, its being derives from its indivisibility, which is a privation; therefore, the individual derives from privation.119 27v3–5: I reply: if you mean that the indivisible is a privation formally, I deny it; but if you mean that the indivisible implies a privation, I accept it, since it does not contradict my opinion; 3. 27v5–8: the being of the individual comes out of real existence,120 i.e., the intrinsic mode. This is Francis of Meyronnes’s opinion.121 27v8–12: I argue the opposite of this as follows: an inseparate (bilti nivdal) and indeterminate thing cannot be a principle which separates (mevaddelet) another thing; now, real existence is an inseparate and indeterminate thing, since all the modes of existence are found 118

The manuscript text of this argument seems corrupt, probably because of some polar errors (“perfection” instead of “imperfection”, etc.). My paraphrase is based upon a comparison with the Latin source (Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum, cit., f. 26vb, ll. 16–23): Nulla imperfectio repugnat alicui formaliter nisi per aliquid positivum. Sed dividi per plures partes subiectivas est quaedam imperfectio, et ideo non competit essentiae divinae, cui etiam repugnat individuatio. Ergo hoc non erit nisi per aliquam perfectionem et entitatem positivam sibi inexistentem. Ergo hoc non est proprie per negationem nec per privationem. 119 See Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum, cit., f. 26vb, ll. 29–32 (but Bibago’s subsequent reply does not correspond to anything in John the Canon’s work). 120 See Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum, cit., f. 26vb, ll. 39–40: Tertia conclusio est ista: quod individuum non habet esse per actualem existentiam. 121 The name of the Latin author is not mentioned in the text, but Bibago affirms explicitly: “We have already mentioned this scholar before—the same who thinks that the intrinsic modes are constitutive of the individual” (cf. above, f. 20v, ll. 17–18). For the possible source of this mention of Francis of Meyronnes’s doctrine—which is not found in John the Canon’s Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum—see above, note 94.

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in real existence.122 Moreover, in order to reply to the question “why is that real existence found in a certain thing?”, we should continue endlessly; 4. 27v12–13: the individual is such due to matter and form.123 I argue the opposite of this as follows: 27v13–19: the thing that comes out of the quiddity of the specific nature is not what limits (magvil ) that specific nature in its inferior degree, since, if so, it should limit itself; and matter and form come out of the quiddity of the specific nature. Moreover, since matter is one in the generated and corrupted thing (De gen., I; Physics, I), if the individual were due to matter, it should be generated and corrupted twice. 27v19–28r2: This opinion is defended as follows: 4.1.1. 27v20–22: that the individual is due to form is evident from Aristotle’s saying (De anima, II and III; Metaphysics, VI) that “actuality makes things different and distinct”; form is actuality, so that it makes things different from each other; therefore, the entity of the individual is due to form; 4.1.2. 27v22–25: that the individual is composed of matter is evident from Aristotle’s saying (Metaphysics, IV) that “those things that are one in matter are one in number”; this can be only if the individual is one in number due to matter; 4.1.3. 27v25–28r2: the entity of the individual is composed of matter and form. In fact, it is evident that a thing has a differentiated (nivdal) being due to the same thing because of which it has a being, since the principles of being and of differentiation (havdalah) are the same (Metaphysics, VI); and the existence of an individual is due to matter and form, since it is a compound of both. 28r2–11: I reply to the above arguments as follows: 4.2.1. 28r2–3: that “actuality makes things different” is true in the sense of the specific differentia, not in the sense of the numerical differentia; 122 The above argument appears to have been taken from John the Canon’s work (ed. cit., f. 26vb, ll. 41–45). 123 See Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum, cit., f. 27ra, ll. 24–26: Quinta conclusio est: quod individuatio non habet esse per materiam nec per formam. This view corresponds in part to the third opinion discussed by Scotus in his In Met. 7, q. 13, nn. 15, 37–42, according to which the cause of individuation is only matter; cf. in particular In Met. 7, q. 13, nn. 87–96, where two distinct opinions are discussed: materia est principium distinguendi and forma est principium distinguendi.

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4.2.2. 28r3–9: “matter” can be understood in two senses: (1) insofar as it signifies a part of the quiddity—and this matter (that intended by Aristotle in the passage quoted above) is not a cause of individuation; (2) insofar as it is not a part of the quiddity—and in this sense matter is that thing by which the individual is an individual. In fact, matter is the subjective principle of that (ostensible) form, and the individual ratio (‘inyan) is that thing by which the individual is the subject of nature; 4.2.3. 28r9–11: I accept that “a thing has a differentiated being due to the same thing because of which it has a being”, but, when you say that “the existence of an individual is due to matter and form”, this is true for specific existence, not for numerical entity.124 5. 28r11–13: the individual owes its existence to quantity.125 This opinion can be refuted as follows: 5.1. 28r13–16: a thing whose formal and intrinsic existence is anterior does not exist due to a posterior thing; but the partial and individual substrate is anterior to every accident, since it is a substance, and a substance precedes every accident (Metaphysics, VI);126 5.2. 28r16–19: divine omnipotence can separate the substrate from every accident, since substrate and accident are separated in many extra-mental things; now, quantity is an accident, so that it can be separated from the individual; 5.3. 28r19–23: if the individual owed its existence to quantity, the terminus of generation (i.e., the individual) would be a composite thing (mequbbas.) (since quantity makes a thing composite)—and this is absurd (Metaphysics, VI).127 124 The above discussion of the fourth opinion (ff. 27v, l. 13–28r, l. 11) closely reflects the discussion in Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum, cit., ff. 27ra, l. 26–27rb, l. 6 (with alterations of the argument’s order: Bibago’s arguments 1, 2, 3 correspond to John the Canon’s arguments 2, 3, 1 respectively). 125 See Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum, cit., f. 26vb, ll. 52–54: Quarta conclusio: quod individuatio non habet esse per quantitatem nec per aliqua accidentia. This is clearly the second opinion discussed by Scotus in his In Met. 7, q. 13, nn. 14, 30–36, 97–98 (Quantitas est principium individuationis) (this opinion is ascribed to Godfrey of Fontaines: cf. Noone, Universals and Individuation, pp. 114–115). 126 The literal source of this argument is John the Canon (ed. cit., f. 26vb, ll. 54–57). Cf. also the argument against the above mentioned opinion in Scotus, In Met. 7, q. 13, no. 21: Substantia prior est omni accidente natura; ergo et haec substantia, etc. (cf. also ibidem, no. 34). 127 The direct source of the two arguments above is John the Canon (ed. cit., f. 27ra, ll. 4–8).

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28r23–28v1: The supporters of this opinion affirm that divisibility and indivisibility exist in quantity first (Physics, I), and that the existence of the individual is indivisible. I reply that divisibility has two senses: quantitative divisibility, which is due to quantity, and substantial divisibility, which is not due to it.128 6. 28v1–6: according to the correct opinion—Scotus’s one—the individual’s entity (heyot) is due to the degrees (madregot) of existence which posit it in a proper (meyuh.ad) genus, and those degrees can be called by a specific name (“individual differentiae”) or by a general name (“inferior degrees”129 ).130 The following arguments support this opinion: 6.1.1. 28v6–8: as a result of the refutation of the previous opinions: individual is neither matter, nor form, and it is something intrinsic to that (ostensible) individual; if so, it is a thing constitutive (meqayyem) of the individual, as is the entity supposed above; 6.1.2. 28v8–11: every ultimate unity has its existence from last degrees; numerical unity is an ultimate unity; if so, it has its existence from ultimate inferior degrees; 6.1.3. 28v11–20: each differentia is valid for things which are essentially distinct in general—otherwise differentiae would be endless; an individual differentia is a differentia of differentiae—since the truest existing unity is numerical unity (Topics, I), and the truest distinction is numerical distinction (Topics, IV). Therefore, each differentia is valid for many things generally distinct in their essence; but those things, since they are common, cannot be the specific 128 Cf. Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum, cit., f. 27ra, ll. 19–22 (with no literal correspondence). 129 In Hebrew: madregot tah. tonot, followed by a transcription of the Latin term: gradus hypostatici. 130 See Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum, cit., f. 27rb, ll. 6–15: Sexta conclusio est affirmativa Scoti, quod una unaquaeque res est individua et singularis per aliquem gradum entitatis positivum determinantem per se naturam ad singularitatem. Illi autem gradus nomine communi vocantur “differentiae individuales” vel “differentiae ultimae”; nomine autem magis speciali vocantur “haecceitates” vel “entitates hypostaticae”, id est quidam gradus incommunicabiles et principium incommunicabilitatis et gradus sub natura specifica vel sub hypostasi contenti. This opinion seems to combine Scotus’s various views on the cause of individuation (listed in Noone, Universals and Individuation, pp. 118–119), and in particular the one set forth in In Met. 7, q. 13, where he describes the cause of individuation as forma individualis and ultimus gradus formae and illustrates the concept of differentia individualis (discussed by Bibago below, argument 3 and reply on f. 29r, ll. 11 ff.) (cf. In Met. 7, q. 13, nn. 119 ff.). Cf. also Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, pp. 460–466, esp. p. 463.

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nature of the individual; therefore, the individual needs something else which limits its nature in that ultimate degree. 28v20–29r11: (Peter) Aureol argues against this opinion as follows:131 6.2.1. 28v20–29r2: no posterior thing is the cause of what precedes it—since the cause precedes the caused thing (Physics, II); individual differentia is posterior to specific nature (in fact, that differentia implies [yas.ia‘] that nature, since otherwise it would not reach that nature; everything subsisting per se is ostensible insofar as it exists; nature precedes individual differentia insofar as it exists in this way, since otherwise it would not precede it); if so, nature has an entity per se, and not due to the ultimate degrees which determine it; 6.2.2. 29r2–6: this individual differentia is common to many differentiae; therefore, single individual differentiae are either ostensible per se, or because of something else: if per se, see the previous argument; if because of something else, we should continue endlessly— and this is absurd; 6.2.3. 29r6–11: if nature were ostensible and particular in those individual and ultimate differentiae, nature would be infinite, since what can be divided into infinite differentiae (and nature can, since individuals are infinite—see Porphyry’s Isagoge, chapter on species— and each of them has its proper differentia) is infinite—and this is absurd.132 29r11–15: I reply that nature should not precede individual differentia in any meaning (hora’ah) or sense (shi‘ur) found in that term (’ot): it precedes differentia in degree and perfection.133 Therefore, the refutation of the above arguments is as follows: 131 The three arguments that follow, ascribed to Peter Aureol, are substantially the same as those in Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum, cit., ff. 27vb, l. 44–28ra, l. 8 (the passage begins as follows: Contra conclusionem principalem quod illa differentia individuali non sit principium individuationis per rationes Aureoli); however, Bibago’s words are partly different from John the Canon’s and, in some cases, obviously more wide-ranging than his (see e.g., below, notes 132 and 134). Did Bibago read these arguments directly in one of Aureol’s works? 132 Bibago’s argument here is much more detailed than the corresponding argument in John the Canon (cf. ed. cit., f. 28ra, ll. 6–8: Omne quod potest dividi differentiis infinitis est infinitum; species per se dividitur istis differentiis infinitis; ergo, etc.). 133 This reply is inspired by John the Canon’s reply to Aureol’s arguments, but with some alterations in form and content (cf. Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum, cit., ff. 28ra, ll. 22–25; 29 ff.; 45 ff.; 53–56).

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6.3.1. 29r15–20: when you say “no posterior thing is the cause of what precedes it”, I accept this in any meaning or sense; but “individual differentia is posterior to specific nature” in perfection, not in any meaning or sense. Moreover, it should be noted that nature is ostensible in the individual differentia, although it is not an ostensible thing per se ; 6.3.2. 29r20–23: I deny that “individual differentia is common to many differentiae”, since only its name is common, not its real existence; 6.3.3. 29r23–29v1: I deny that “nature would be infinite” and the explanation following this statement, since division into infinite differentiae is possible if “infinite” means “indeterminate” (bilti mugvalim), but not according to the meaning that “infinite” has in Physics, III; it can be as a possibility—in Latin, permissive—but not as a positiveness (‘al .sad ha-hanah.ah)—in Latin, positive—i.e., in the sense that all of them are in actu.134 ] 29v2–5: Since Scotus’s opinion (i.e., that the cause of individuation are the ultimate degrees) is now proved to be correct, I return to the question. “Corruptible” and “incorruptible” are not distinct in genus, since they are intrinsic modes, and the intrinsic mode, when added to something, does not change the specific nature or the formal ratio (‘inyan) of that thing; 2. 29v5–6: it appears that “corruptible” and “incorruptible” are subordinated to one genus . . . 135 134

Cf. the corresponding argument in John the Canon’s Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum (ed. cit., f. 28ra, ll. 53–56), which is much more concise than Bibago’s: Ad tertiam—“dico quod omne quod potest dividi, etc.”—dico quod verum est quod est infinitum permissive, non autem positive. 135 Bibago’s text ends abruptly here.

2. BARUCH IBN YA‘ISH

We know next to nothing of the life of Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish.1 He belonged to a renowned Spanish Jewish family of Andalusian origin.2 During the fourteenth century, some members of his family took an interest in philosophy and the sciences, translating and composing medical works in Hebrew and, probably, in Arabic. In the first half of the century, Solomon ben Abraham Ibn Ya‘ish—according to Moritz Steinschneider, the same person as the Sevillan physician Solomon ben Abraham “ben Gais” (or “Aben Yaez”) ben Baruch (d. 1345)— composed a very long Arabic commentary on Avicenna’s Canon; book I and some fragments of book II survive in Arabic, as well as some re-elaborations and summaries in Hebrew.3 He also wrote a supercommentary on Abraham Ibn ‘Ezra’s commentary on the Pentateuch.4 David ben Solomon Ibn Ya‘ish of Seville, perhaps a son 1 Some biographical hypotheses are in the encyclopaedia entry by H.J. Zimmels, Ya‘ish, Baruch ben Isaac ben, in Encyclopaedia Judaica, Jerusalem 1971, Vol. 16, c. 704. On Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish’s life and works in general, see also M. Zonta, Un’ignota versione ebraica delle Quaestiones in De anima di Jean de Jandun e il suo traduttore, “Annali di Ca’ Foscari” 32, s.or. 24 (1993), 5–34, pp. 19–23; Rothschild, Les philosophes juifs d’Espagne au XVe si`ecle, pp. 1297–1298. 2 On the Ibn Ya‘ish family, see M. Steinschneider, Miscelle, “Hebraeische Bibliographie” 19 (1879), 93–95; E. Birnbaum, Ibn Ya‘ish, Aben Ya‘i sh, in Encyclop´edie de l’Islam, nouvelle ed., Leyde–Paris 1971, Vol. 3, p. 992. From the colophon of the ms. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 2348 (olim De Rossi 1243) (cf. Richler and Beit-Ari´e, Hebrew Manuscripts, p. 136, number 682) we know that in 1470– 1474 there was in Seville a synagogue named “Ibn Ya‘ish” (beyt ha-keneset Ibn Ya‘ish z”l); several Hebrew manuscripts were copied there (see M. Schmelzer, Hebrew Manuscripts and Printed Books among the Sephardim Before and After the Expulsion, in Gampel [ed.], Crisis and Creativity, 257–266, p. 258). 3 On Solomon ben Abraham Ibn Ya‘ish and this work, see P. Perreau, Correzioni ed aggiunte al Catalogo Derossiano. Intorno ad alcuni Comenti del Canone di Avicenna, in lingua ebreo-rabbinica, “Bollettino Italiano degli Studii Orientali” n.s. 16–17 ¨ (1879), 344–348, 354; Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 686–687. On the identification of the three extant copies of book I, see Y.T. Langermann, Shelomoh Ibn Ya‘ish’s Commentary on Avicenna’s Canon (in Hebrew), “Kiryath Sepher” 63 (1990–1991), 1331–1333. 4 Only scattered fragments of this commentary survive: see Steinschneider, ¨ Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 939. This work should not be confused with a similar work by another member of the same family, Solomon ben Meir Ibn

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of the previous author, translated into Hebrew the Arabic version of Bryson’s Economics in about 1375.5 As for Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish himself, the only information we have concerns his activity as a writer. The works that can be surely ascribed to him, all unpublished, are the following: 1. a Hebrew translation of books I–XII of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, based upon the medieval Latin translation by William of Moerbeke. This work, of which four manuscripts survive,6 was discovered by Steinschneider, who dated it c. 1485, certainly before 1490. Baruch states in the preface that the translation was written for a certain Samuel Sarfati;7 2. a Hebrew commentary on chapters 1–10 of book I of Avicenna’s treatise on Cardiac Drugs (in Arabic, Al-adwiyya al-qalbiyya, in Latin Cardiaca), preserved in a unique manuscript (Oxford, Bodleian Library, Mich. Add. 16).8 This medical work includes direct references to several ancient, Arabic and Latin philosophical sources (Aristotle, Averroes, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas);9 Ya‘ish of Guadalajara, preserved in various manuscripts—e.g., Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parm. 2196 (De Rossi 205), ff. 1v–96r (cf. Richler and Beit-Ari´e, Hebrew Manuscripts, p. 103, no. 545), and Oxford, Bodleian Library, Hunt. 293 (cf. Neubauer, Catalogue, cc. 42–43, on no. 232). 5 ¨ Cf. Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 228–229; the translation of Bryson was published by M. Plessner, Der OIKONOMIKO der Neupythagor¨aers Bryson und sein Einfluss auf die islamische Wissenschaft, Heidelberg 1928, pp. 145– 203. 6 A list of manuscripts is in Zonta, Un’ignota versione, p. 20 note 41; but the fifth and sixth manuscripts listed there (note 42) contain only book I, chapters 1–2, of the Metaphysics, as translated by Eli Habillo (see below, chapter 3, list of Habillo’s works, on number D.4.4.). 7 ¨ Cf. Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 157–158; for Baruch’s preface, see also the Italian translation in Zonta, La filosofia antica, p. 87. 8 Cf. the description of the manuscript in Neubauer, Catalogue, c. 721, no. 2110; cf. also Beit-Ari´e and May, Supplement of Addenda and Corrigenda, c. 391, where the manuscript, written in a Sephardi hand, is dated back to c. 1478; if this datation is correct, the manuscript may be a copy made by, or for, the author. One Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish (a great-grandson of our author) published a Biblical commentary in Constantinople in 1576 under the title Meqor Baruk: cf. Zimmels, Ya‘ish, c. 704. 9 ¨ Cf. Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 701–702; Zonta, Un’ignota versione, p. 20 note 44. The commentary is based upon an anonymous ArabicHebrew translation of Avicenna’s work, in some points similar to the ArabicLatin translation by Arnald of Villeneuve. Among the philosophical texts quoted by Ibn Ya‘ish in this work, there are the De caelo, book V of the Politics (the

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3. a Hebrew commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, whose existence was first established in 1997 (see below); 4. a Hebrew translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, based upon the Humanistic Latin translations from the Greek carried out in the fifteenth century by Leonardo Bruni and John Argyropoulos. This work is preserved in a unique manuscript (Hamburg, Staatsund Universit¨atsbibliothek, L´evy 114), where the name of the translator is not mentioned.10 However, as Hava Tirosh-Rothschild first noted, this text was used and quoted in the sixteenth century by the Greek Jewish philosopher Moses Almosnino who ascribes it explicitly to Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish.11 In the margins of the Hamburg manuscript, there are some fragmentary commentaries on passages of the Nicomachean Ethics, probably by Baruch;12

passage, in ms. Oxford, ff. 1r–1v, corresponds to Pol. 1302a5–7), book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Albert the Great’s De anima (book II, 1, 7 is the source of the quotations of ’Albert.o in ms. Oxford, 6v, ll. 18 ff. and 7r, ll. 3 ff.), and Thomas Aquinas’s De ente et essentia (which, according to Steinschneider, Hebraeischen ¨ Ubersetzungen, p. 484, may have been quoted from Eli Habillo’s Hebrew translation of Johannes Versor’s questions on it: see below, chapter 3, list of Habillo’s works, on number D.1.2.). 10 Cf. the description of the manuscript in E. R´oth and H. Striedl, Hebr¨aische Handschriften, Teil 3 (Die Handschriften der Sammlung H.B. Levy an der Staatsund Universit¨atsbibliothek Hamburg), Wiesbaden 1984, pp. 160–161, number 117, where it is described as a Sephardi manuscript written by many hands in the sixteenth century, but its content is wrongly identified as the translation of the Nicomachean Ethics by Meir Alguadez. 11 This translation is quoted many times by Almosnino in his Peney Mosheh (“Moses’ face”), a commentary on books I, II and X of the Nicomachean Ethics written in 1558. In this work, Almosnino suggests the dependence of Ibn Ya‘ish’s translation on Argyropoulos’s Latin version: cf., in the unique manuscript of the Peney Mosheh (Oxford, Bodleian Library, Mich. 409 [Neubauer 1435]), ff. 33v, ll. 30 ff.; 34r, ll. 15 ff.; 35v, ll. 26 ff.; 41v, ll. 3 ff.; 42r, l. 11; 67v, third line from the bottom; 68r, l. 4; 71r, l. 35; 71v, ll. 3 and 25 ff.; 72r, l. 35; 88v, ll. 1 ff.; 89r, ll. 28 ff.; 91v, ll. 8 ff.; 93r, ll. 19 ff.; 98v, ll. 18–19; 99r, ll. 31 ff.; 100v, ll. 27 ff.; 101v, ll. 9 ff. and 15 ff.; 103v, ll. 33 ff.; 104v, third line from the bottom; 112r, l. 18; 118r, l.3; 119r, seventh line from the bottom; 120v, ll. 1 ff. and sixth line from the bottom. See Tirosh-Rothschild, Jewish Philosophy on the Eve of Modernity, pp. 536–545, and pp. 559–560 note 154 (according to Tirosh-Rothschild, the translation was written “in the 1480s either in Portugal or in Italy”); Zonta, La filosofia antica, pp. 273–275. 12 See e.g., ms. Hamburg, f. 9v, margin; f. 31r, margin; f. 31v, inferior margin. Other marginal quotations in the manuscript are from the supercommentary that Joseph Ibn Shem Tov wrote in 1455 on the Hebrew translation of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (on this work, see Steinschneider,

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5. a Hebrew commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, compiled in 1484–1485 by a student of Ibn Ya‘ish, and based upon the translation of this work mentioned above (see below); 6. a short homily on Exodus 16,7 (“your complaints against God”), including a philosophical interpretation of this Biblical passage (inc.: “It is known that there can be two causes of our ignorance of the things of which we have no knowledge: either because we do not know their cause, or because we see in them an effect which is opposed to their temperament”). This text is preserved in the unique ms. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parm. 2627 (De Rossi 1398), folios 135v, l. 34–137r, l. 11, in the transcription made in the sixteenth century by the Portuguese or Spanish Jewish exile Joseph ben Hayyim Sarfati.13 Two further unpublished texts can be ascribed to Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish: 1. an anonymous fifteenth century Hebrew translation of pseudoAristotle’s Economics, preserved in a unique manuscript (New York, Jewish Theological Seminary, microfilm 2315, ff. 123r–129v). I identified this translation in 1996 and attributed it tentatively to Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish; it is terminologically very close to the latter’s translation of the Nicomachean Ethics and it too is based upon Bruni’s Latin version of the Greek original;14 2. a Hebrew commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, now lost. Its existence can be presumed from what looks like a self-quotation at the beginning of the commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics mentioned above (see below).15 ¨ Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 212–213; see also above, Historical Introduction, notes 71–72) and from Meir Alguadez’s Hebrew version (c. 1400). As for the latter work, it seems plausible that Ibn Ya‘ish (who calls it nosah. ’ah.er, “other text”) used it as one of the sources for his own translation. It is worthwhile to recall that one of the manuscripts of Alguadez’s translation (Oxford, Bodleian Library, Mich. 168 [Neubauer 1428], written in Spain in the late fifteenth century, according to Beit-Ari´e - May, Addenda and Corrigenda, c. 238) was bought from Samuel Almoli by a certain Shem Tov Ibn Ya‘ish, possibly a descendant of Baruch (cf. Neubauer, Catalogue, c. 509). 13 Cf. the description of the manuscript in Richler and Beit-Ari´e, Hebrew Manuscripts, pp. 395–396, no. 1385. 14 See Zonta, La filosofia antica, p. 274; M. Zonta, La tradizione ebraica degli scritti economici greci, “Athenaeum” 84 (1996), 549–554, pp. 553–554. 15 See below, note 51.

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Finally, two unpublished texts have been attributed, albeit dubiously, to Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish: 1. an anonymous Hebrew translation of the medieval Latin version of Averroes’s Long Commentary on the De anima, written before 1475 and preserved in four manuscripts;16 2. an anonymous Hebrew translation of John of Jandun’s Quaestiones in De anima, preserved in a unique manuscript (Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale, III. F. 5), which I identified in 1993.17 There is no doubt that both these works are by the same translator, since they share the same terminology and render some passages of the De anima in exactly the same way;18 but it is questionable whether this translator be Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish. Harry A. Wolfson attributed the translation of Averroes’s Long Commentary to Ibn Ya‘ish in 1963 on the basis of very feeble evidence, consisting in the fact that the same Hebrew word h.iddot (lit. “tales”) is used to render Aristotle’s Greek term mythoi (“myths”) both in this translation and in Baruch’s translation of the Metaphysics.19 However, quotations from the same passages of Aristotle’s De anima are substantially different in wording, style and terminology in this translation and in Ibn Ya‘ish’s commentary on the De anima mentioned above. Of course, this might depend upon the use of different sources: in the Hebrew translation of the Long Commentary, the De anima was translated from Michael Scot’s Latin version, which was based upon an Arabic translation of Aristotle’s work; Ibn Ya‘ish, however, in his commentary, seems to rely upon the medieval Latin version by William of Moerbeke, based directly upon the Greek text of the De anima.20 Clearly, this does not amount to evidence in favour of Baruch’s authorship. Moreover, the translation of the Long Commentary seems to have been written in an Italian milieu, and (if we exclude some ¨ See Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 150–151; M. Zonta, Osservazioni sulla tradizione ebraica del Commento grande di Averro`e al De anima di Aristotele, “Annali di Ca’ Foscari” 33 s.or. 25 (1994), 15–28. 17 This translation might preserve a version of Jandun’s work different from that known to the Latin tradition: see Zonta, Un’ignota versione, pp. 9–17. 18 Cf. Zonta, Un’ignota versione, pp. 17–19. 19 See H.A. Wolfson, Revised Plan for the Publication of a Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, “Speculum” 38 (1963), 88–104, pp. 100–104. 20 On this, see below. 16

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suppositions)21 there is no proof that Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish was ever in Italy. Two of the four surviving manuscripts of this work (one of which includes the translation of Jandun’s Quaestiones in De anima mentioned above) were copied in Italy: one in Rome around 1460– 1470, and another in 1475 for a certain Abraham of Benevento.22 Finally, translations of Averroes and Jandun (a renowned “Averroist”) show an interest in Averroism that is characteristic of fifteenth century Italy.23 To sum up, the extant data show that Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish was active in the period 1480–1490: apart from the date 1484–1485 of the commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, we only know that he was still alive when Abraham Ibn Nahmias wrote his Hebrew translation of Aquinas’s Sententia libri Metaphysicorum (dated 1490).24 If Ibn Ya‘ish were the author of the translations of Averroes’s and Jandun’s works, the beginning of his activity would date to c. 1450–1460. But this hypothesis is now doubtful. Philosophically, Baruch was close to Thomism: he consistently used Thomas’s commentaries as a model and, in many cases, as a source for his own commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics and the De anima; the same is possibly also true of his commentary on the Physics, as far as we can tell from its only surviving fragment.25 Ibn Nahmias provides another possible clue in this direction at the beginning of his translation of Thomas, where he seems to make a connection between that work and Baruch’s 21

Zimmels, Ya‘ish, c. 704 affirms that Baruch “lived and died in Italy”, but does not substantiate his statement; see also Zonta, Un’ignota versione, p. 19, and below, note 29. 22 Cf. Zonta, Osservazioni, pp. 16–17. Moreover, this translation may have been unknown in fifteenth century Spain, since it does not appear to be a source of the non-literal and non-explicit quotations of Averroes’s Long Commentary on the De anima in Abraham Bibago’s Path of Faith (see above, chapter 1, list of Bibago’s works, on number 15): cf. Bibago’s quotations and the parallel passages of the above translation in Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, pp. 233–235. Bibago’s source seems to be the medieval Latin translation of Averroes’s work: cf. the edition of the latter in F.S. Crawford (ed.), Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, Cambridge, Mass. 1953, pp. 383, l. 6–384, l. 21; pp. 385, l. 63–386, l. 80. 23 Cf. Zonta, Un’ignota versione, p. 23. 24 ¨ Cf. Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 158; Wolfson, Revised Plan, p. 102. On Ibn Nahmias’s translation, see above, Historical Introduction, note 82. 25 See below, note 51.

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previous version of the Metaphysics.26 In any case, Baruch’s evident acceptance of many of Thomas’s doctrines did not prevent him from formulating doctrines of his own: for instance, in some passages of his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, he openly disagrees with Thomas.27 Generally speaking, Baruch does not depend passively upon his Latin sources, but he freely re-elaborates their schemes and doctrines. Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics Three manuscripts preserved in Paris, at the Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, have transmitted to us the text of a Hebrew commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. This work, if not composed directly by Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish, appears to be the result of his activity as a teacher of Scholastic philosophy. The manuscripts are the following: 1. h´ebreu 1001:28 copied in 5245 (=1484–1485) in Benavente29 (in the province of Zamora, in Le´on) by Samuel ben Solomon Altortos. This manuscript contains what is probably the archetype of this text. Unfortunately, the beginning of the commentary is missing (the text opens with book II, summa 2, chapter 1),30 but the colophon (f. 220r, ll. 10–13) states its author and origin: “I, Samuel b. Rav Salomon A(l)tortos, have copied and written down this from what I have heard (. . .) from the mouth of my teacher, the perfect 26

Cf. the Hebrew text of Ibn Nahmias’s introduction, published by S. Sachs in “Kerem Hemed” 8 (1854), pp. 110–111, note; cf. also the Italian translation of some passages in Zonta, La filosofia antica, pp. 156–157. 27 See below. 28 A short description of this manuscript is in Zotenberg, Catalogue, p. 179. A microfilm of the manuscript is in the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts (IMHM) in the Jewish National and University Library (JNUL) in Jerusalem, no. 14686. 29 In the manuscript: B-y-n-’-w-y-n-t.-y. This appears to be a transliteration of the Spanish name Benavente, rather than of the Italian name Benevento (the reading accepted by most scholars), which should be transliterated as B-y-n-yw-y-n-t.-w. Very recently, Hava Tirosh-Samuelson (see her The Ultimate End, in Gampel [ed.], Crisis and Creativity, pp. 365–366 note 58; see also Ead., Happiness in Premodern Judaism, pp. 540–541 note 83) has tried to support her conjecture that Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish worked in Italy by reading this name as “Benevento” rather than “Benavente”. 30 This corresponds to f. 59r, l. 8, in ms. h´ebreu 1002, and to f. 44r, l. 19, in ms. h´ebreu 1003.

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and erudite sage, the divine philosopher rav Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish”.31 The manuscript bears many signs of corrections and changes, apparently by Altortos, as well as a number of vernacular glosses only partly reproduced in the other two copies; 2. h´ebreu 1002:32 copied in a Sephardi or Proven¸cal hand by an anonymous scribe around the close of the fifteenth century (according to Zotenberg), it contains the complete text of the commentary; it bears no title and lacks the above colophon; 3. h´ebreu 1003:33 copied in an Ashkenazi hand by an anonymous scribe in the sixteenth century, it contains the same text as the previous manuscript, under the title: perush le-sefer ha-middot le-’Arist.o, “commentary on Aristotle’s Book of Ethics”. At the end of the manuscript (f. 271r, ll. 12–15) there are three eulogies, all beginning with the word baruk—probably, a reference to Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish as the indirect author of the text. A cursory philological comparison between the three manuscripts suggests that mss. 1002 and 1003 were independent copies (direct or indirect) of ms. 1001. For my study of the text, I have mostly employed ms. 1002, as the most ancient complete copy of the work. The colophon of ms. h´ebreu 1001 suggests that Samuel Altortos was a student of Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish and that he compiled the commentary on the basis of lectures given by Baruch, probably in a yeshivah directed by him, where philosophy was also taught. If so, this commentary should be regarded as a sort of Scholastic reportatio of Baruch’s teaching on the Nicomachean Ethics, as JeanPierre Rothschild first suggested.34 However, in several cases Altortos seems to keep his master’s teaching at a distance: he refers to 31 He‘etaqti ’oto ve-katavti mimmah she-shama‘ti ’ani Shemu’el ben rav Shelomoh A.tort.os (. . .) me-fi mori he-h.akam ha-shalem ha-kolel ha-filosof ha-’elohi rav Baruk Ben Ya‘ish. 32 Description in Zotenberg, Catalogue, p. 180; microfilm in Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts of the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem, no. 14687. 33 Description in Zotenberg, Catalogue, p. 180; microfilm in Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts of the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem, no. 14688. 34 Cf. J.-P. Rothschild, Du latin a` l’hebreu: quelques probl`emes pos´es par des traductions m´edi´evales, in G. Sed-Rajna (ed.), Rashi (1040–1990). Hommage a` Ephra¨ım E. Urbach, Paris 1993, 695–712, p. 696. On the different interpretations of the origin of this commentary, see also Id., Les philosophes juifs d’Espagne au XVe si`ecle, p. 1300 note 41.

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Ibn Ya‘ish’s interpretations of some passages of Aristotle’s text with the introductory formula “according to the opinion of my master Ibn Ya‘ish” (kefi da‘at he-h.akam mori Y”A),35 and often compares these interpretations to the opinions of Aquinas on the same matters.36 In fact, Thomas Aquinas’s Sententia libri Ethicorum appears to be the main source of this commentary. This is shown by several non-literal (as often in Ibn Ya‘ish) references to Thomas’s doctrines,37 as well as by the general scheme of the work, that corresponds to that of a Latin Scholastic expositio of Aristotle’s text. Our commentary, like Thomas, introduces each book and each chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics with a brief sketch (in the form of a “division”) of its contents, which are connected to those of the previous and following parts of the work; a literal commentary on each passage of that chapter follows. Both parts (introductory sketch and literal comment) evidently depend on Thomas’s commentary by indirect use of its contents rather than by direct literal references (see below, where the incipit of each book is set next to the corresponding passage in Thomas’s commentary). The only exception is some questions inserted here and there in the commentary, that are not found in Thomas; they are patterned after the Scholastic scheme of the quaestiones disputatae, although many are shorter than their Latin models.38 In general, this commentary appears to offer a “Hebrew Thomist” interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics. It should be recalled that 35

For the use of the abbreviation Y”A for “Ibn Ya‘ish”, see Steinschneider, ¨ Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 158. 36 See e.g., ms. h´ebreu 1002, f. 3v, l. 15 (see below); f. 26v, l. 4; f. 40v, l. 3; f. 42v, l. 11; f. 44r, l. 4; f. 56v, l. 2; f. 69r, l. 21; f. 80r, l. 17; f. 81r, last l.; f. 85r, last l.; f. 101v, l. 7; f. 132r, l. 12; f. 241r, l. 6, etc. 37 See e.g., the references to “Thomas’s opinion” (kefi da‘at T . omas) in ms. h´ebreu 1002, f. 2v, l. 19 and f. 3v, l. 12; f. 5v, l. 7; f. 12r, l. 17; f. 17v, l. 11; f. 31r, l. 19; f. 38v, l. 19, and f. 39r, l. 22; f. 42v, l. 11; f. 46v, l. 19; f. 55v, l. 22; f. 69r, l. 18; f. 80r, l. 15; f. 81r, l. 18; f. 86r, l. 3; f. 94v, l. 14; f. 121r, l. 11; f. 239r, l. 10; f. 241r, l. 5, etc. 38 See e.g., f. 5v, ll. 23–24: ha-’im kol ’ah.at me-ha-pe‘ullot yiksefu davar mah .tov, “whether each one of the (human) actions desires something good”; f. 11r, ll. 8–9: ha-’im yims.a’ ba-devarim ha-’enoshiyyim taklit ’eh.ad ve-hu’ ha-t.ov ha-‘elyon ’asher lahem, “whether there is in human things an end, that is the supreme good of them”; f. 76v, ll. 12–13: ha-’im ha-‘inyanim ha-h.elqiyyim ’asher bahem yugval ha-po‘al hem ’eh.ad, “whether the particular things (i.e., the circumstances) by which the act is determined are only one”; f. 160v, l. 16: ha-’im ha-h.aluqqah ’asher h.illeq hafilosof ha-h.eleq ha-sikli me-ha-nefesh ’el yodea‘ ve-’el medabber hi’ maspeqet u-shelemah ’o lo’, “whether the division made by the Philosopher, who divides the intellectual part of the soul into knowing and rational, is adequate and perfect or not”.

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Thomas’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics had been used before in medieval Hebrew philosophical literature. Substantial traces of a direct knowledge of Thomas’s work are present in the Hebrew supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, studied by Lawrence V. Berman: one can even speak of non-explicit literal quotations. However, the structure of this supercommentary does not follow the pattern of Scholastic expositiones or quaestiones, and there is no evidence that either Ibn Ya‘ish or his student knew it and employed it as a source.39 Indeed, our commentary bears more similarities in structure and contents—though, apparently, no direct relationship—with an anonymous Hebrew commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, preserved in the unique ms. Leiden, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, Or. 4782 (olim Warner 44), possibly written in the same Spanish milieu in the same period (second half of the fifteenth century).40 Apparently, these similarities depend upon the common reference—direct or mediated through a Thomist Latin commentary—to Thomas’s commentary. However, Aquinas was not the only source used for this Hebrew reportatio. In the introduction two further authors are briefly mentioned (see below): Albert the Great’s Ethica is explicitly, but not literally, referred to,41 and there are two explicit quotations, allegedly from the commentary Super VI libros Ethicorum by the Spanish Thomist Pedro Martinez De Osma (a contemporary of Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish), although there is no literal correspondence in this work, neither as it appears in print, nor in the manuscript tradition.42 Baruch 39

On this commentary, see above, Historical Introduction, notes 67–68; see also a comparison between the incipit of its interpretation of book I of the Nicomachean Ethics and the incipit of our commentary, below (note 71). 40 This commentary, preserved on ff. 7r–42r of the manuscript (described in Steinschneider, Catalogus, pp. 214–215; cf. also Steinschneider, Hebraeischen ¨ Ubersetzungen, p. 218), includes only books VI (beginning lost), VII, VIII, IX and X (end lost) of the Nicomachean Ethics, and follows the scheme of a Scholastic expositio, in which many quaestiones are inserted. Cf. the incipit of book X below (note 87). 41 See below, note 56. 42 The references are in the introduction: on them, see below, notes 62–63. I have consulted De Osma’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics in the ms. Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, no. 2604. Of course, it is possible that Ibn Ya‘ish used De Osma’s work in a redaction unknown to the Latin tradition (cf. the case of Vincent Ferrer’s Tractatus de unitate universalis, translated by Eli Habillo: see below, chapter 3, list of Habillo’s works, on number D.4.3.).

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Ibn Ya‘ish and his student also show a good knowledge of Christian theology. For instance, the commentary on chapter 7 of book I (see below) deals in detail with the fourfold Catholic division of “grace” into “subsequent”, “prevenient”, “participant” and “participated grace”—the first two being found not in Aquinas’s commentary, but in his Summa theologica,43 while the origin of the other two is obscure.44 Another clue of the relationship between this commentary and the one by De Osma is the fact that both refer, more or less directly, to the same source, namely the Latin translation of the Nicomachean Ethics by Leonardo Bruni (1417). Moreover, De Osma and Ibn Ya‘ish both divide Aristotle’s text into tractatus (Hebrew kolel, “summa”) and chapters, while Thomas divides it differently. To be more precise, while De Osma imports Bruni’s version literally into his work, the short quotations from Aristotle in our reportatio seem to depend upon Bruni’s version in a mediated way: they seem to be taken, rather than from the older Hebrew version of the Nicomachean Ethics by Meir Alguadez (mainly based upon William of Moerbeke’s revision of the thirteenth century Latin translation by Robert Grosseteste),45 from Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish’s Hebrew version of Aristotle, which (as we For other possible traces of the use of De Osma’s commentary, see below, note 70. 43 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, prima secundae, q. 111, a. 3: Utrum gratia convenienter dividatur in praevenientem et subsequentem; on this division, cf. also Id., Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, book II, distinctio 26, a. 5. There may be further traces of the knowledge of Thomas’s theological doctrine by Ibn Ya‘ish (or his pupil): e.g., the quotation at the beginning of chapter 6 of book I of the commentary (ms. h´ebreu 1002, ff. 34r, l. 23–34v, l. 2: “Because of this Denis [Dyonisyo] said that evil does not exist; rather, there exists the evil man”), which clearly refers to Pseudo-Denis the Aeropagite (De divinis nominibus, chapter 4, § 20: “evil is not existent”), might have been taken from Thomas’s Summa theologica (prima, q. 48, a. 1 [see also a. 3]: Dionysius dicit, 4 cap. De div. nom.: Malum non est existens). 44 On this, see below, note 96. 45 On the translation of the Nicomachean Ethics by Meir Alguadez, see Berman, The Latin-to-Hebrew Translation (quoted above, Historical Introduction, note 58), where an edition of the introduction and of the first three chapters of this translation is given. A draft of a critical edition of this translation, prepared by Berman, can be consulted in electronic form both in the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem, and at the University of Stanford: see Rothschild, Les philosophes juifs d’Espagne au XVe si`ecle, p. 1299 note 38. On the dependence of Alguadez’s translation on the so-called textus recognitus of Grosseteste, see Rothschild, Du latin a` l’h´ebreu, pp. 697–698, note 6.

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said before) is based upon the fifteenth century Latin translations by Bruni and Argyropoulos.46 Finally, the manuscripts of the commentary follow the practice, common in Spanish “Hebrew Scholasticism”, of including a number of glosses in the text; others are added in the margins. Most of these glosses are clearly Castilian (legal, adecuado, acci´on, magnanimidad, dimiso, epilogaci´on, cogitaci´on, recompensaci´on, etc.), but there are also some Latin words (laudabiles, zelum, virtutes cardinales, simpliciter, secundum quid).47 These glosses mostly concern technical terms of Aristotelian philosophy which the commentator (or his student) apparently regarded as difficult to render into Hebrew.48 Remarkably, the commentator does not translate many of these terms literally in the text, preferring to explain them through circumlocutions or paraphrases. English Translation of Selected Passages 1. Introduction (mss. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 1002, ff. 1r, l. 1–5v, l. 2; h´ebreu 1003, ff. 1r, l. 1–4v, l. 7; cf. the text in the Hebrew section) Before letting you know the intention of the contents of the book (i.e., the Nicomachean Ethics), I should specify: (1) the order of this science among the other sciences; (2) the order of this science with respect to its parts; (3) the subject of this science.49 46

See Zonta, Un’ignota versione, pp. 21–22; Id., La filosofia antica, pp. 273– 274. 47 For the Castilian glosses, see ms. h´ebreu 1002, f. 2r, ll. 8–9; f. 3v, ll. 23–24; f. 31v, l. 5; f. 66v, l. 20; f. 67r, l. 22; f. 73r, ll. 22–23; f. 174r, ll. 17–18; f. 212r, l. 3; for the Latin glosses, see ibidem, f. 46r, l. 2; f. 60v, ll. 20–21; f. 66r, ll. 13–14; f. 71r, l. 24; f. 71v, l. 1. 48 On the use of glosses in Spanish “Hebrew Scholasticism”, see Zonta, Arabic and Latin Glosses, pp. 44–48; Id., The Relationship, p. 151. 49 Exactly the same three questions are examined in Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 1, §§ 1–7, namely: the order of the parts of philosophy and, in particular, the subject of moral philosophy (§§ 1–5); the division of moral philosophy in monastica, oeconomica and politica (§ 6); Aristotle’s intention in the Nicomachean Ethics (§ 7). Ibn Ya‘ish (or, better, Samuel Altortos) reproduces neither Thomas’s words nor the exact order of Thomas’s arguments; his arguments are either longer or shorter than Thomas’s. Ibn Ya‘ish (or Altortos)

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A. As for the first point, one should note that the sciences—as the Philosopher said in the introduction to the Metaphysics50 —are first of all divided into three parts: 1. the sciences which are studied as an introduction (in the vernacular language, introductivas), e.g., grammar, logic, rhetoric; the subject of these three sciences is not one of the beings, but words that mean beings. In fact, the science of grammar is a rectification and ordering of the terms by means of which we refer to the meanings (‘inyanim) of beings; the science of logic is an ordering of the syllogisms and arguments by means of which we examine truth and falsehood and distinguish between them; rhetoric, as it appears, is the way of ordering syllogisms in the most appropriate way. Generally speaking, these three species of sciences share the condition of being an introduction and a preamble (has..sa‘ah) to the other sciences; 2. the theoretical sciences, whose principle is nature; in the vernacular language, they are called reales, since their existence does not depend upon another thing, as is the case with the other species of sciences, which are sciences insofar as we create them. We have already explained this point in the Commentary on the Physics:51 this seems to recast some of Thomas’s concepts (e.g., his definition of the intention of the Nicomachean Ethics) in a different framework. Only on occasion some definitions, or even single Latin expressions, are reproduced literally. 50 A similar reference is found at the very beginning of Thomas’s commentary: Sicut dicit Philosophus in principio Metaphysicae, sapientis est ordinare; Ibn Ya‘ish (or Altortos) may be referring here to book I, chapter 2 of the Metaphysics. 51 The passage beginning here, up to “it is not necessary for them to have a material existence”, might be the only surviving fragment or witness (not a literal quotation, perhaps) of a commentary on the Physics, apparently by Ibn Ya‘ish, if one assumes that Altortos took the expression “we” from the mouth of his teacher. It is notable that Ibn Ya‘ish’s division of the sciences into natural science, mathematics and metaphysics follows arguments similar to those in Thomas Aquinas’s Sententia libri Physicorum, book I, lectio 1, §§ 2–3 (according to M. Maggio` lo’s ed.): Sciendum est igitur quod quaedam sunt quorum esse dependet a materia, nec sine materia definiri possunt: quaedam vero sunt quae licet esse non possint nisi in materia sensibili, in eorum tamen definitione materia sensibilis non cadit. Et haec differunt ad invicem sicut curvum et simum. Nam simum est in materia sensibili, et necesse est quod in eius definitione cadat materia sensibilis, est enim simum nasus curvus; et talia sunt omnia naturalia, ut homo, lapis: curvum vero, licet esse non possit nisi in materia sensibili, tamen in eius definitione materia sensibilis non cadit; et talia sunt omnia mathematica, ut numeri, magnitudines et figurae. Quaedam vero sunt quae non dependent a materia nec secundum esse nec secundum rationem; vel quia numquam sunt in materia, ut Deus et aliae substantiae separatae; vel quia non universaliter sunt

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species of science is divided into three parts: natural, mathematical and metaphysical sciences. We have already explained there that this division is necessary because beings have three ways of existence, according to their dependence upon, and relationship to matter: 2.1. things that are not abstract from matter, neither in their existence nor in their intellectual perception and knowledge. The science that studies this species of beings is natural science; in fact, natural things are not abstract from matter in any way, neither in mind nor outside of mind. Because of this, definitions of natural things are distinct from definitions in the other sciences, since matter appears in natural things (e.g., when you say: “man is a rational animal composed of matter and form”), and this does not happen in other definitions; 2.2. things that, as to their existence outside of mind, are not abstract from matter but, as to their existence in mind, are not necessarily so. In fact, the intellect knows these things without examining whether they are in one matter or in another. Mathematical things belong to this species, since these things, being accidental in their existence, do not exist without matter, and intellect perceives them without considering their existence in an ostensible (ramuz) matter (e.g., when you say: “a triangle is that thing whose angles correspond to two right angles”, in order to know this there is no need for a triangle to exist in stone, or in wood, and so on); because of this, matter does not appear in its definition; 2.3. beings that have no dependence at all upon matter, neither in mind nor outside of mind: these are studied by the metaphysician. There is no distinction attached to whether they do not exist in any matter according to their substance and quiddity (e.g., God and the angels), or whether they do not necessarily exist in matter according to their nature and quiddity, although they do exist in matter (e.g., being, essence, and the other things studied by the metaphysician: in fact, those things exist in matter, but, according to their substance, in materia, ut substantia, potentia et actus, et ipsum ens. De huiusmodi igitur est metaphysica: de his vero quae dependent a materia sensibili secundum esse sed non secundum rationem, est mathematica: de his vero quae dependent a materia non solum secundum esse sed etiam secundum rationem, est naturalis, quae physica dicitur. This passage of Ibn Ya‘ish’s commentary on the Physics might also be the source of a very similar passage in Abraham Bibago’s Treatise on the Plurality of Forms: see above, chapter 1, note 83.

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it is not necessary for them to have a material existence). In the appropriate place, we have explained in different ways the necessity of such a classification: this topic should be studied there; 3. the sciences which are necessary to man insofar as he is political (medini) by nature, and which depend upon our actions: this is the political science, which studies human actions52 insofar as they are human. This division is necessary, according to what has been said: in fact, the number of the species of sciences corresponds to the number of the species of beings, given that sciences consist in the knowledge of the species of beings. Now, the species of beings are two: necessary beings and the beings related to our actions. Therefore, the species of sciences are: (1) the science which studies necessary beings, and (2) the science which studies the beings related to our actions. B. As for the second point, one should note that the political science is divided first of all into two parts: 1. the part which studies each single regimen, i.e., the part which rules over the actions appropriate only for a certain geographical area; this is called “juridical” (datit), and in the vernacular language, legal. It is regulated by the rulers and legislators of a country (yo‘es.ey ’eres.), and is suitable only for a certain part of the human species; 2. the part which studies the actions of the human species, the actions appropriate to man insofar as he is man; this part does not make a difference between one man and another, or between one geographical area and another. This is the science by means of which we study the human actions that are appropriate to every man insofar as he is man, not insofar as he is a man of a country in the Orient or in the Occident, and so on; this is because Aristotle’s wisdom does not apply to one individual but not to another: it is universal, and is called, in the vernacular language, moral.53 Nothing prevents 52

See in Thomas’s commentary the expression operationes humanae, employed in the same context. 53 The above sentences, which have no correspondence in Thomas’s commentary, might have been inspired by De Osma’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. See ms. Salamanca, f. 17vb, ll. 16–31: Moralis vero quae apud universos homines eadem impermutata permanet ab Aristotele libris Economicae atque Politicae et praesertim in hiis Ethicorum traditur. Legalis vero sicut aliae civitates a hiis gubernantur legibus, sic infinita quodam modo est—qua de causa Aristoteles (. . . ) civitatis legislatoribus ac gubernatoribus legalis curam relinquerat. Nemo enim civitati cuiquam leges

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this science, which studies human actions, from studying actions appropriate to man per se, although it studies actions appropriate to man because of his association with others; moreover, nothing prevents this science from studying the actions of man insofar as he is associated with others for necessity and during his life, although it studies that association as the best one. Now, in accordance with the three species of human actions, the Philosopher composed three books on this science: 1. the study of the actions of man insofar as he is man: this subject is treated in this book, and it is the regimen of man; in the vernacular language it is called Etica; 2. the study of the actions appropriate to man in relation to his necessary association: this is the study of the regimen of the house, in the vernacular language, Economica. In fact, man is political by nature, and he needs to live with his dear ones, his children, his wife and his familiars—and this is necessary for man, for the survival of his species; 3. the third part concerns not the association which is merely necessary for man, but that which is the best one for him; and this study is specifically found in the book on the regimen of the state (medinah), called in the vernacular language Politica. It studies the specific actions of man insofar as he is part of a state; and to be part of a state is best for man, since he does not need that kind of life out of necessity (because man lives with his children and his wife even without being part of a state), but he should live the best and most appropriate life. This exposes the error of those who claim that this book (i.e., the Nicomachean Ethics) studies political science in general, and that the subject matter of the other two books (i.e., Economics and Politics) is more particular, as is the case with the Physics in relation to the other books specifically dealing with each of the natural sciences. In fact, this book studies the actions appropriate to man insofar as he is happy and the nature of happiness, while the other books study the actions done by man insofar as he is associated with other men. However, this book comes before the other two in importance and proprias et utiles tradere potest, si regionem, civitatis situm, nationemque gentis non satis cognoverit.

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order: in fact, who is unable to rule himself—and this is the specific subject matter of this book—is also unable to rule those who live in his house and those who live in his state. C. As for the third point, i.e., what is the subject of this science, modern philosophers (ha-’ah.aronim me-ha-filosofim) are in disagreement with one another. According to Thomas Aquinas’s opinion (kefi da‘at T . omas), its specific subject are human actions insofar as they are human—more precisely, human actions, insofar as they are human and are ordered (mesuddar) to an end, which man knows and is able to choose or reject.54 In order to understand this perfectly, you should know that things ordered to an end exist in three ways: 1. some things are ordered to an end without being aware of it. This happens in the case of actions which are absolutely natural: e.g., the action of fire is to heat, but fire heats without being aware of its heating—and this is the case for all other absolutely natural actions. Although they do not know their end, they are ordered to it, since the First Agent brought them into existence; but he is not the only one who knows their end, since, e.g., in the case of an arrow reaching its target, the end is not known to the arrow, but it is known to him who shoots the arrow; 2. some things are ordered to an end and are aware of it, but they have no power over it. This species of things includes animals, since they move towards an end of which they are aware, but are unable to choose or reject it; 3. some things are ordered to an end, are aware of it, and have power over it. This species of things includes man, because he acts towards an end, is aware of it, and chooses it. Now, the human actions which fall under this third category are the subject of this science. When Thomas says that the subject of this science are human actions, he excludes non-human actions, like pulling out hair and 54

Thomas’s actual definition of the subject of moral philosophy (book I, lectio 1, end of § 2–beginning of § 3 of his commentary) is: Moralis philosophiae, circa quam versatur praesens intentio, proprium est considerare operationes humanas, secundum quod sunt ordinatae ad invicem et ad finem. Dico autem operationes humanas quae procedunt a voluntate hominis secundum ordinem rationis.

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so on: these are not human actions because they are not ordered to an end and happen only per accidens. He excludes also the actions of man which are ordered to an end but are not understood by man (e.g., the actions of feeding), for these actions are not found in man insofar as he is man, nor are they human actions, since man does not know their end. When he says “insofar as they are human”, he distinguishes them from actions which are done by man and which are ordered to an end, but are common to other animals (e.g., the actions of sense-perceiving and other actions which are not chosen); in fact, these actions are not done by man insofar as he is man, and for this reason the excellent Thomas (ha-me‘ulleh T . omas) says that the specific subject of this science are human actions insofar as they are human.55 Albert the Great (’Albert.o) thinks that the subject of this science is the human good, insofar as it is the human good.56 These authors (i.e., Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great) disagree because they consider the same subject in more general or less general terms. In fact, there are two species of human good: 1. the perfect good in actu (e.g., happiness),57 which is the action of the soul according to its virtue; 2. the good according to habit58 (e.g., the ethical or dianoetic virtues); this species of good is not perfect and in actu in man, but it is a predisposition to something more perfect—i.e., the action of virtue.59 Now, since this book studies these two species of human good (i.e., virtue and the action of virtue), Albert the Great says that its subject is the human good insofar as it is the human good, because it 55 The above arguments in defence of Thomas’s opinion are not found in Thomas’s own commentary. 56 Ibn Ya‘ish follows the definition of the subject of ethics in Albert the Great’s Ethica, book I, treatise I, chapter 5, decisio quaestionis. As with his use of Thomas’s commentary, there are no literal correspondences, but rather echoes of Albert’s doctrines and the occasional use of the same expressions, rendered into Hebrew. 57 Cf. Albert’s affirmation in the above mentioned passage: hoc enim bonum accipitur ut perfectum . . . et perfectum quidem est felicitas. 58 This seems to be an echo of Albert’s expression in ordine ad opus. 59 Albert says: virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum.

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includes both. If the subject of the book were human actions insofar as they are such—as Thomas says—it would include only the first species of human good, i.e., the perfect good, the good in actu, but not the good according to habit or to potentiality, such as the ethical and dianoetic virtues. If we accepted Thomas’s opinion, we would say that the subject of this science is assumed from the most perfect and excellent part of it (i.e., action), although this science devotes a specific study to another part as well—i.e., virtue and the acquisition (i.e., habit) of that action. According to the opinion of my master Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish (heh.akam mori Y”A), the subject of this science is the man who is free and is not a slave in any way.60 This subject can be understood in two senses: 1. how a man can be free—and this is perfected through the action of virtue; 2. the free man by nature. According to this interpretation, the latter is a subject of this science insofar as anything studied by this science is attributed to the free man and is possible to him (and this subject is called, in the vernacular language, atribuitivo); but, since the specific study of this science concerns how a man can be free, not the man who is already free (apart from what is attributed to him), how a man can be free is the specific subject of this science (and this subject is called, in the vernacular language, adecuado). Thus, this opinion agrees with that of Albert the Great.61 As for the philosopher maestre De Osma, he says that the subject of this science is that man should not be devoted to bodily pleasures, should control his instincts, should not be unfaithful, should deal with these passions appropriately, and the other conditions that

60

The reportatio-technique of this commentary is evident: Altortos is quoting his teacher’s opinion and comparing it to the opinions of different Latin Schoolmen. The use of this technique is not an argument against Ibn Ya‘ish’s authorship of the commentary—acknowledged by Altortos in the colophon mentioned above. 61 Ibn Ya‘ish seems to believe that the “attributive” subject (what is attributed to the free man) corresponds to Albert’s concept of “happiness”, while the second kind of subject (how to become a free man) corresponds to Albert’s concept of “action of virtue”.

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should be applied to what pertains to virtue (e.g., wrath, fear and the other passions bound to virtue).62 But this opinion is incorrect, because the specific subject matter of this book is not only the virtue connected to passions, but also that connected to actions, be they actions according to theoretical happiness, or actions according to practical happiness, as appears from what follows. Those who have other opinions as to the subject of this science raise some doubts on this matter. They say that the subject of any science is not explained in that science, but is taken by that science from outside. Now, the existence of human actions, as well as what is done by will, is explained in book III of this work, while the quiddity of human actions is explained in book VI; therefore, human actions are not the subject of this work. The response to this is that the knowledge of the existence of human actions insofar as they are human can have two senses: 1. a formal knowledge (yedi‘ah .surit), in the way of a definition and a description, without knowing whether these actions are some of the concomitant accidents (massigim) of man; 2. insofar as these actions are some of the concomitant accidents of man, specific to him insofar as he is man. Therefore, if somebody says: “if human actions are the subject of this science (according to what is explained in books III and VI of this work), then the above mentioned doubt arises necessarily”, we reply: if we say that they are the subject of this science according to a formal knowledge and to a definition, this doubt can be admitted; but the explanation of the existence of human actions and of their quiddity in this work is different: it is a demonstrative explanation that voluntary actions are some of the concomitant accidents of man insofar as he is man. So, since this is explained in ways that are different from the way mentioned above, that doubt does not arise. The philosopher maestre De Osma raises a question on this point, asking “whether the study of human actions is a science or not”. 62 Although there is no identical statement in the text of De Osma’s commentary known to us, one can compare, in the ms. Salamanca, ff. 17vb, l. 40–18ra, l. 3: Erit itaque huius scientiae materiae animi perturbationes et precipue voluptas et dolor, sicut igitur medicinae materiam dicimus corporis morbos et vulnera.

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It appears that it is not: in fact, this book studies the principles of human actions, i.e., virtues. Now, the principle (hath.alah), i.e., the beginning of an act, is a potentiality, because every act comes out of a potentiality; if so, the study of human actions cannot properly bear the name of “science”: rather, it should be called a potentiality, since it is the beginning of an act.63 The response to this is that De Osma’s words are true when he affirms that every act comes out of a potentiality specific to that act. But this can be intended in two senses: 1. insofar as that potentiality is the absolute beginning of an act (i.e., irrespective of the quality of that act, and in a non-determined way)—but, in the case of this science, the beginning is a potentiality insofar as it is determined towards that act; 2. insofar as a beginning is ordered to an act, not in an absolute way, but in a convenient time, in relationship to what is convenient, and in a convenient way—but the study of such a thing is not a potentiality, but a science, since it has a specific subject matter. After this preamble, we should explain the intention of this work. I say that the study of this work is divided first of all into two parts: 1. the study of the things which should be placed at the beginning, as a preamble; 2. the thesis (derush munnah.), i.e., the knowledge of the supreme end of the work. Part 1 is divided into three parts: (1) it assumes the thesis, the knowledge of which is the aim of this work and is specifically studied in it; (2) it explains which is the order of study in this work, i.e., which demonstrations are employed in this science: whether they are a priori demonstrations (mofet sibbah), a posteriori demonstrations (mofet re’ayah), or something else; (3) it explains who is the suitable student for studying politics.64 The reason why these three conditions are stipulated in this science (and this is not the case in the other sciences) is that, in this 63

Only the following statement can be found in De Osma’s commentary (cf. ms. Salamanca, f. 18va, ll. 12–16): Sola speculativa proprie dicitur scientia apta, practica vero proprius potentia quam scientia aut philosophia nominabitur. 64 A similar division is also in Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 1, § 7: Primo enim ostendit de quo est intentio. Secundo modum tractandi (. . .). Tertio qualis debeat esse auditor huius scientiae.

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science, the postulated premises are assumed on the basis of what is commonly accepted; for the things which are the present object of research, there is no absolute demonstration, but only common acceptance (pirsum) and ascertainment of what is commonly accepted. Therefore, it is impossible to give any demonstration of this to one who does not have a natural knowledge that enables him to judge on all those things. On the contrary, in the other sciences we use absolute demonstrations to explain the things discussed in them and, although we are not predisposed to understand those things, there exists a demonstration for this purpose. Parts 2 and 3 are explained in chapter 3. As for part 1, first it assumes something, in the form of a preamble necessary to attain the intended thesis—and this is found in chapter 1; then it attains the intended conclusion, i.e., the quiddity of the thesis whose knowledge is the object of the research—and this is found in chapter 3. As for part 1, where the preamble of the intended thesis is found, it explains three things: (1) that the good, which is the end (taklit) of all things, is desired in every species of human actions; (2) that ends multiply as a consequence of the multiplication of actions; (3) it compares the ends, and explains that they are ordered to one another, since the knowledges of these ends are ordered to one another; then, in chapter 2, it attains the intended thesis, i.e., that the supreme end, which is desired by any other end, and does not desire any other thing, is the supreme good.65 The reason for this preamble is that the thesis is the knowledge of that which is the supreme good; now, end and good are convertible, and when in something there is more good, there is more end in it as well. The supreme good must be the supreme end, so that it should be established first of all that all actions are ordered to an end and to some good, that ends multiply as a consequence of the multiplication of actions, and that ends are ordered to one another.

65

The above paragraph seems partly inspired by Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 1, § 7: Circa primum duo facit. Primo praemittit quaedam, quae sunt necessaria ad propositum ostendendum. Secundo manifestat propositum (. . .). Circa primum duo facit. Primo enim proponit necessitatem finis. Secundo comparationem habituum et actuum ad finem (. . .). Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit, quod omnia humana ordinantur ad finem. Secundo diversitatem finium (. . .). Tertio proponit comparationem finium adinvicem.

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From this should follow the existence of one supreme end of all things, i.e., the supreme good, whose quiddity we should know. Now, let us begin the first part. 2. Incipits of the Commentary on Each One of the Ten Books of the Nicomachean Ethics, Compared to the Relevant Passages of Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary66 Book I (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 1002, f. 5v, ll. 3–22)

Book I, lectio 1, § 8

“Every art and every learning etc.”. You should know that the principles of actions, as Aristotle says in book III67 of the De anima, are two: intellect and desire, etc. Intellect is divided into two parts: one studies those things whose end is 68 not knowledge but practice (ma‘aseh)—and this is called “practical intellect”. According to Thomas Aquinas, the speculative intellect and the practical intellect are identical in subject (be-massa’) and in substance, but different in mode (bi-veh.inah) and in speech, so that the intellect69 that studies

Circa primum considerandum est, quod duo sunt principia humanorum actuum, scilicet intellectus seu ratio, et appetitus, quae sunt principia moventia, ut dicitur in tertio De anima. In intellectu autem vel ratione consideratur speculativum et practicum.

66 Sancti Thomae Aquinatis (. . .) In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio, cura et studio P.Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzi O.P., Taurini 1964. 67 In the manuscript: “two”. 68 The passage in brackets is missing in the manuscript. 69 The manuscript adds: “speculative”.

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only things whose end is speculation and knowledge is called “speculative intellect”, while, when it extends to things whose end is practice, it is called “practical intellect”.70 Desire too is of two species: one is the desire of something which does not extend to the attainment of that thing in actu; the other is the desire of something which extends to the attainment of that thing in actu. Therefore, Aristotle’s expression “every art” refers to the actions of the intellect which are ordered to some act; his expression “and every learning” means the actions of the intellect ordered to speculation only; his expression “and so every practice” means the species of desire connected to the search of the desired thing; and his expression “and every choice” seems to refer to the species of desire which does not extend to the desired thing in actu. He says that all those species of actions seem to be ordered to some end, which is the good found in that act.71

In appetitu autem rationali consideratur electio et executio. Omnia autem ista ordinantur ad aliquod bonum sicut in finem; nam verum est finis speculationis.

Quantum ergo ad intellectum speculativum ponit doctrinam per quam transfunditur scientia a magistro in discipulum. Quantum vero ad intellectum practicum ponit artem, quae est recta ratio factibilium, ut habetur sexto huius. Quantum vero ad actum intellectus appetitivi ponitur electio. Quantum vero ad executionem ponitur actus.

70 This discussion is not found in the parallel passage of Thomas’s commentary; but cf. De Osma’s commentary (ms. Salamanca, f. 18r, ll. 29 ff.): Practicus et speculativus intellectus uterque cognitivus est, modo tantum differenti: speculativus enim proprius tantum, practicus vero voluptatis aut appetitus intendit perfectionem. 71 Cf. the different discussion in the supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (see above, note 39) in the ms. Oxford, Opp. 591 (Neubauer 1426), f. 3r, ll. 7–22: “You should know what Aristotle

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Book II (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 1002, f. 52r, ll. 1–22)

Book II, lectio 1, § 245

After having dealt with virtues in general, by dividing them into intellectual and moral virtues, the Philosopher begins to study virtues. Firstly, he studies things which are virtues absolutely and per se; secondly, he studies things which are not virtues absolutely, but are connected to virtue, although they are not virtues per se. This second part begins with book VII, where he begins to study continence and incontinence, and continues in books VIII and IX, where love and other things, which are not virtues but are connected to virtue, are studied. As for part 1, firstly it studies moral virtues; secondly, it studies intellectual virtues. This is

Postquam Philosophus determinavit ea quae sunt praeambula ad virtutem, hic incipit de virtutibus determinare. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima determinat de ipsis virtutibus. In secunda de quibusdam, quae consequuntur ad virtutes, vel comitantur eas, in septimo libro (. . . ).

Prima autem pars dividitur in duas partes. In prima determinat de virtutibus moralibus. In secunda

teaches us in book III of the De anima, and Averroes writes in his Compendium of the De anima, about the rational faculty. He says there: ‘From this it appears that this faculty is divided into two parts: practical intellect and speculative intellect. This division necessarily follows the division of the objects (mussagayw) (of the intellect). In fact, the utility and perfection of the former part is found in artificial possible things (‘inyanim melakutiyyim ’efshariyyim), that of the latter is found in necessary things, whose existence does not depend on our choice’. (After this quotation, there follow other quotations from Averroes’s Long Commentary on the De anima and from book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics.) From what I have said, it is evident to you that the principles of human actions are the intellect and the desiring faculty (ha-koah. ha-mit‘orer), which are the moving faculties (ha-koh.ot ha-meni‘im). This is said by Averroes in book III of (his Long Commentary on) the De anima . . . ”. In general, the similarities between this supercommentary and the commentary by Ibn Ya‘ish seem to depend upon the fact that they both, independently and in different ways, make use of the same source, namely the commentary by Thomas.

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due to the fact that moral virtues precede intellectual virtues, because, without the perfection of moral virtues, the perfection of intellectual virtues is impossible. This second part begins with book VI.72 As for part 1, firstly it studies moral virtues in general; secondly, it studies them in particular. This part begins with summa 2 of book III. As for part 1, firstly it studies virtue in general; secondly, it studies the principles of virtuous actions, without which it is impossible to attain a virtuous action. This second part begins with the beginning of book III, where Aristotle studies will and choice, which are the principles of virtuous action. Part 1 is studied in this book (i.e. book II), where three things are explained: 1. the quiddity of the agent cause of virtue, be it natural or not— and this is found in summa 1; 2. the quiddity of virtue—and this is found in summa 2; 3. the quality and way of our attainment of virtue, since it is difficult to attain—and this begins with summa 3. As for part 1, firstly it illustrates the cause from which 72

I read v’, “six”.

de intellectualibus, in sexto libro (. . .). Et ratio ordinis est, quia virtutes morales sunt magis notae, et per eas disponimur ad intellectuales.

Et prima pars dividitur in partes duas. In prima determinat ea quae pertinent ad virtutes morales in communi. In secunda determinat de virtutibus moralibus in speciali. (. . .) Prima autem dividitur in duas partes. In prima determinat de virtute morali in communi. In secunda determinat de quibusdam principiis moralium actuum, in tertio libro (. . . ).

Prima autem pars dividitur in partes tres. In prima inquirit de causa virtutis moralis. In secunda inquirit quid sit virtus moralis (. . .). In tertia parte ostendit quomodo aliquis possit fieri virtuosus (. . . ).

Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quod virtus moralis

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virtue is generated, i.e. the agent cause; secondly, it resolves a doubt about what has been said—and this begins with chapter 4 of this summa (i.e. summa 1).

causatur in nobis ex operationibus. Secundo ostendit ex qualibus operationibus causetur in nobis (. . .). In tertia parte movet quamdam dubitationem circa praedicta ( . . . ).

Book III (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 1002, f. 71r, ll. 1–22)

Book III, lectio 1, § 382

After having completed the study of virtue in general as far as its agent cause, its quiddity and the way of attaining it are concerned, before studying virtue in particular (i.e., each one of the virtues), the Philosopher first studies the principles of virtuous actions (i.e., will and choice), and then he studies each one of the virtues. Will and choice should be studied for two reasons: (1) because the definition of virtue shows that virtue is a chosen habit etc., and from this it appears that choice enters into the quiddity of virtue. If so, will and choice should be studied, since if something is needed for completing the knowledge of the quiddity of virtue, that thing is part of the quiddity of virtue; (2) because the Philosopher wants to study each one of the virtues in particular, and because it is evident that we are not praised and virtue is not

Postquam Philosophus determinavit de virtute in communi, hic determinat de quibusdam principiis actuum virtutis.

Dixerat enim, definiens virtutem, quod virtus est habitus electivus, eo scilicet quod virtus per electionem operatur: et ideo nunc consequenter de electione determinat, et de voluntario et voluntate. Horum trium voluntarium commune est. Nam voluntarium dicitur, omne quod sponte est. Electio autem est eorum quaesunt ad finem. Sed voluntas respicit ipsum finem.

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found in us unless we practice virtuous actions through our will and choice; in fact, if our voluntary actions (lit. “voluntarities”, ras.oniyyot) did not depend upon our choice, we would not be worthy of praise, even if we did a virtuous action, since every virtue depends upon choice, and the formal content of virtue, through which virtue becomes what it is, is the chosen thing. For this reason, virtue should be studied. Therefore, three things in general are explained in this book: 1. it studies will and choice, which are the principles of virtuous actions; 2. it studies courage—and this part is found in summa 2; 3. it studies the virtue of temperance (histappequt)—and this begins with summa 3. As for part 1, firstly it studies the voluntary, then it studies will and choice—and this second part is found in chapter 4. And this is the way it should be, since the voluntary is composed of will and choice. As for part 1, firstly it studies the involuntary, secondly it studies the voluntary; and the reason for this is evident—the second part begins with chapter 3. As for part 1, firstly it studies the involuntary because of compulsion (be-hekreah.), secondly it studies the involuntary

Dividitur ergo pars ista in partes duas. In prima determinat de tribus praedictis principiis virtuosorum actuum. In secunda parte comparat huiusmodi principia ad actus virtutum (. . .).

Circa primum tria facit. Primo determinat de voluntario et involuntario. Secundo determinat de electione (. . .). Tertio determinat de voluntate (. . .).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod ad praesentem doctrinam considerare pertinet de volontario et involuntario. Secundo de eis (. . .).

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because of ignorance of that action.73 Book IV (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 1002, ff. 106v, l. 13–107r, l. 7)

Book IV, lectio 1, § 649

“After this, let us speak of generosity etc.”—after having completed the study of the virtues that pertain to the internal things which preserve our bodies and through which life subsists, the Philosopher begins to study the virtues that pertain to external things.

Postquam Philosophus determinavit de fortitudine et temperantia, quae respiciunt ea quibus conservantur ipsa hominis vita, hic incipit agere de aliis medietatibus, quae respiciunt quaedam secundaria bona vel mala. Et primo determinat de medietatibus laudabilibus, quae sunt virtutes. Secundo de his quae virtutes non sunt, sed passiones (. . .). Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de virtutibus respicientibus res exteriores. Secundo de virtutibus pertinentibus ad actus humanos (. . .).

This is divided into two parts: firstly, he studies the virtues that pertain to external passions in particular (be-yih.ud); secondly, he studies the virtues that pertain to actions in particular—and this begins with book V, where he studies justice. As for part 1, firstly he studies the virtues that are properly (beyih.ud) said to be such; secondly, he studies a thing that is not a virtue proper, but a praiseworthy passion, i.e., shame—and this begins at the end of this book, at the end of summa 4.74

73 This division corresponds to that in Thomas’s commentary, book III, lectio 3, § 406: Postquam Philosophus determinavit de involuntario per violentiam, hic determinat de involuntario per ignorantiam. 74 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book IV, lectio 17, § 867: Postquam Philosophus determinavit de medietatibus quae sunt virtutes, hic determinat de quadam medietate quae non est virtus, idest de verecundia.

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As for part 1, firstly he studies the virtues that pertain to passions in particular, secondly he studies virtues that pertain to passions,75 but not in particular, i.e., those that pertain to the association and friendship of men—and this begins with summa 3.76 As for part 1, firstly it studies the virtues that pertain to external goods, secondly it studies the virtue that pertains to external evils, i.e. patience, that comes from wrath—and this begins with chapter 4 of summa 3. As for part 1, it is also divided into two parts, corresponding to the two species of external goods, i.e. richness and honour: part 1 studies the virtue that pertains to money; part 2 studies the virtue that pertains to honour—and this begins with summa 2. As for part 1, it is also twofold: firstly it studies the virtue that pertains to a moderate sum of money, i.e. generosity; secondly, it studies the virtue that pertains to a great sum of money, i.e. munificence—and this begins with chapter 3 of summa 1. 75

Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de virtutibus quae respiciunt exteriora bona. Secundo de virtute mansuetudinis, quae respicit exteriora mala (. . .).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de virtutibus respicientibus divitias. Secundo de his quae respiciunt honores (. . .).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de liberalitate. Secundo de magnificientia (. . .).

I read hippa‘aluyyot, “passions”. Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book IV, lectio 14, title: Ostenditur, quale sit vitium pertinens ad superabundantiam delectationis in communi convictu hominum. 76

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Book V (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 1002, f. 131v, ll. 5–16)

Book V, lectio 1, § 885

“Justice and injustice should be studied etc.”—after having completed the study of the virtues that pertain to passions, the Philosopher begins to study the moral virtue that pertains to actions. The treatment of this topic is divided into two parts: firstly, it studies justice in absolute; secondly, it studies a thing which is similar to justice, but is not justice, i.e., imaginary justice77 —and this is found in the last chapter of this book. As for part 1, firstly it studies equitable (shaveh) justice; secondly, it studies a thing that is added to justice, i.e., the practice of charity (‘asiyyat ha-h.esed). As for part 1, firstly it studies equitable justice; secondly, it raises a doubt about what has been said, and resolves it—and this is found in summa 3. As for part 1, firstly it studies legal justice; secondly, it studies particular justice—and this begins with summa 2.78 As for part 1, firstly it studies justice without adjectives

Postquam Philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus quae sunt circa passiones, hic determinat de virtute iustitiae quae est circa operationes; et dividitur in partes duas.

77

In quarum prima determinat de iustitia proprie dicta. In secunda determinat de iustitia metaphorica (. . .).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de virtute iustitiae. Secundo determinat de quidam virtute, scilicet epichia, quae est communis iustitiae directiva (. . .).

In Hebrew: ha-s.edeq ’asher kefi ha-dimyon, lit. “justice according to imagination”. 78 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book V, lectio 1, § 888: Incipit determinare de iustitia. Et primo distinguit iustitiam particularem a iustitia legali.

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(’almoni); secondly, it explains the meaning of legal justice— and this begins with chapter 2 of summa 1. As for part 1, firstly it declares the intention and object of research; secondly, it declares the way of learning this object; thirdly, it begins to study this object.

Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur propositum (. . .).

Book VI (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 1002, ff. 158v, l. 13–159r, l. 3)

Book VI, lectio 1, § 1109

After the Philosopher has completed the treatment of the virtues found in the first part of the human soul (i.e., in the irascible or appetitive part, which is connected to the intellect), the study of the virtues found in the intellectual part of the soul begins. This study is divided into two parts: firstly, it studies each one of the intellectual virtues;79 secondly, their qualitative relationship to happiness—and this is found in summa 4. As for part 1, firstly it studies the intellectual virtues per se; secondly, it studies other things connected to virtue per se 80 — and this begins with summa 3.

Postquam Philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus, in hoc sexto libro determinat de intellectualibus.

79

Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book VI, lectio 2, § 1124: Postquam Philosophus distinxit partes animae rationem habentis secundum quod est necessarium ad propositum, hic incipit agere de ipsis virtutibus intellectualibus quibus utraque pars animae rationalis perficitur. Et primo determinat de singulis intellectualium virtutum. 80 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book VI, lectio 10, § 1217: Postquam Philosophus determinavit de prudentia et aliis virtutibus intellectualibus principalibus, hic determinat de quibusdam virtutibus adiunctis prudentiae.

baruch ibn ya‘ish As for part 1, firstly it studies virtues per se; secondly, it studies them by comparing them, and explains which one of them is the most perfect81 —and this is found in chapter 4 of summa 2. As for part 1, firstly it studies them in general; secondly, it studies them in particular. As for part 1, firstly it illustrates things which should necessarily be explained as a preamble; secondly, it begins to study the object of research—and this is what Aristotle means when he says: “Now, we will mention what we have said before” (E.N. 1139a4). As for part 1, firstly it explains and determines what is the thing already explained before; secondly, it explains what we should study about it—and this is what Aristotle means when he says: “Here, we have divided virtues before, etc.” (E.N. 1139a1) As for part 1, firstly it explains the thing we should study—i.e. the study of the right reason (ha-sekel ha-yashar); secondly, it explains what we should study about it. Book VII (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 1002, f. 182r, ll. 9–25) 81

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Et primo prooemialiter dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo determinat propositum, ibi: “Prius quidem igitur dictum est etc.” (. . .).

Circa primum tria facit. Primo dicit quod dicendum est de ratione recta. Secundo ostendit quid de eadem dicendum est (. . .). Tertio continuat se ad praecedentia, ibi: “Animae autem virtutes etc.” (. . .).

Book VII, lectio 1, § 1292

Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book VI, lectio 7, § 1184: Postquam Philosophus determinavit de singulis virtutibus intellectualibus, hic ostendit quae sit praecipua inter eas.

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After having completed the study of all virtues, be they moral or intellectual, the Philosopher begins the study of habits, which are not virtues in absolute, but virtues in a certain sense—e.g., continence, love and its contrary. In fact, one who is continent is virtuous in a certain sense, since he too practices virtuous actions, but he is not virtuous in absolute,82 since one who practices virtue does it with pleasure or without pain, while one who is continent does not practice continence with pleasure, so that he is not virtuous in absolute; in the same way, love is a special action of every virtuous man, and virtuous men love each other, but it is not a virtue in absolute, since it is ordered to one man but not to another, and virtue should not be ordered to a specific man and not to others. This part is divided into two parts: firstly, it studies continence, since this is the principle of virtue; secondly, it studies love, since this is the necessary consequence of virtue— and this in books VIII and IX. As for part 1, firstly it studies the quiddity of continence and 82

Postquam Philosophus supra determinavit de virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus, hic incipit determinare de quibusdam quae se sequuntur ad invicem.

Et primo de continentia, quae est quoddam imperfectum in genere virtutis. Secundo de amicitia, quae est quidam effectus virtutis, in octavo libro (. . .). Tertio de fine virtutis in decimo libro (. . .). Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de continentia et eius

Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book IV, lectio 17, § 883: Inducit simile de continentia; quae cum sit laudabilis, non est virtus, sed habet aliquid virtutis admixtum.

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incontinence; secondly, it studies it as far as their matter and substrate are concerned, i.e. pleasure and sorrow—and this begins with summa 2. As for part 1, firstly it explains how man is related to (bad) actions,83 and that these actions are three, and it explains which of them should be studied, and the way and order of learning them; secondly, it begins to study continence.

opposito. Secundo de delectatione et tristitia quae sunt earum materia (. . . ).

Book VIII (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 1002, f. 209r, ll. 7–22)

Book VIII, lectio 1, § 1538

After having completed the understanding (nikkur) of continence, which is the principle of virtue (since the continent man is he who knows and practices virtuous actions, and this happens to him in re, not in habitu,84 as we have explained), the Philosopher begins to study love, since love follows virtue necessarily (because lovers are those who have a virtue) but it is not a virtue itself. In fact, love, as we intend it, is a passion towards somebody similar to us (since lovers are similar), and therefore it is ordered to one man but not to another;

Postquam Philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus et continentia, quae est quoddam imperfectum in genere virtutis, hic consequenter determinat de amicitia, quae supra virtutem fundatur, sicut quidam effectus virtutis.

83

Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit continentiam ab aliis quae sunt eiusdem generis. Secundo determinat de ea (. . .).

In Hebrew: ’eykut hitrah.asut (sic; lege hityah.asut) ha-’adam ’el ha-pe‘ullot. In Hebrew: zehu ’eynennu lo’ ‘al .sad ha-qinyan, ki ’im (manuscript adds: lo’ ) ‘al .sad ha-‘inyan. 84

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while love as a virtue in absolute is not restricted to a particular man, but is ordered to every man, whether he is aware of this or not—and the latter is the species of love studied in book IV of this work, where we have studied virtues in particular. Now, you should not assume love in this sense here: it is ordered to one man but not to another because of some similarity between the lover and the loved; therefore, it is not a virtue—rather, it is a thing caused by and resulting from a virtue. In this way, a doubt which might arise here is resolved. In fact, there appears to be a contradiction in Aristotle’s words, since the study of love is found in book IV of this work, and in this study there would seem to be an excess and a defect; but this doubt is resolved by what we have explained. The treatment of love is divided into two parts: firstly, it studies love between equals; secondly, it studies love between unequals—and this begins in summa 2. As for part 1, firstly it assumes as a preamble that love should be studied, and what love should be studied here; secondly, it begins to study it—and this is found in chapter 2.

Et primo prooemialiter dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo incipit de amicitia tractare (. . .).

Circa primum quod facit. Primo ostendit, quod ad moralem pertinet de amicitia tractare. Secundo ostendit, quae sunt circa amicitiam tractanda (. . .).

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Book IX (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 1002, f. 231v, ll. 2–11)

Book IX, lectio 1, § 1757

After having completed the treatment of love and its species, here the Philosopher begins to study its properties: firstly he studies its properties; then he resolves doubts about love—and this begins in summa 2. As for part 1, which is found in summa 1, firstly it studies the properties of love as far as its preservation and subsistence are concerned; secondly, it studies its actions, as far as love’s effects are concerned— and this is found in chapter 4. As for part 1, firstly it studies the properties which cause the preservation of love; secondly, it studies the causes by which love is destroyed—and this begins with chapter 3. As for part 1, firstly it illustrates the properties by which love is preserved; secondly, it resolves some doubts concerning what has been said—and this is found in chapter 2.85 As for part 1—found in chapter 1—firstly it explains the causes and properties by which love is preserved and subsists; secondly, it illustrates

Postquam Philosophus ostendit, quid est amicitia, et determinavit de amicitiae speciebus, hic in nono libro determinat de amicitiae proprietatibus.

85

I read b’, “two”.

Et primo ponit proprietates amicitiae. Secundo movet quasdam dubitationes circa praedeterminata (. . .).

Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat ea quae pertinent ad conservationem et dissolutionem amicitiae. Secundo determinat de amicitiae effectibus (. . . ). Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat ea quae pertinent ad conservationem amicitiae. Secundo determinat quaedam, quae pertinent ad dissolutionem ipsius (. . .). Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit id quod est amicitiae conservativum. Secundo ostendit quomodo propter huiusmodi defectum amicitia turbatur (. . .).

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the complaints and grievances which are the causes of the disturbance86 of fraternity and love; thirdly, it explains how to eliminate those complaints.

Tertio docet rimedia contra huiusmodi perturbationem (. . .).

Book X (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 1002, ff. 255r, l. 13–255v, l. 2)

Book X, lectio 1, § 1953

After the Philosopher has completed the discussion of moral and intellectual virtues, and of things connected to virtues— i.e., continence and incontinence (since continence is the principle of virtue) and love (since this is a thing that is specifically linked [meyuh.ad] to virtue: in fact, it follows virtue, which is linked to the definition of the object of happiness—i.e., the action of the soul according to virtue)—the study of the end of virtue, which is happiness, begins. This is divided into two parts: firstly, it studies the end of virtue as to the virtuous man per se; secondly, it studies the fact that the virtuous man is part of the state—and this begins with summa 3. As for part 1, firstly it studies the end of virtue according to the opinion of many philosophers other than Aristotle, who think that it is pleasure (hana’ah); secondly, it studies

Postquam Philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus, et etiam de continentia et amicitia quae quamdam affinitatem cum virtute habent, in hoc decimo libro intendit determinare de fine virtutis.

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Et primo quidem de fine virtutis quae est hominis in seipso. Secundo autem de fine virtutis in respectu ad bonum commune, quod est bonum totius civitatis (. . .). Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de delectatione, quae a quibusdam esse ponitur virtutis finis. Secondo de felicitate determinat, quae secundum omnes est finis virtutis (. . .).

I read hafra‘at, “disturbance”, instead of hafra’at, as in the manuscript.

baruch ibn ya‘ish the end of virtue according to the Philosopher—and this begins with summa 2. As for part 1, firstly it studies pleasure, according to the thought of some philosophers other than Aristotle; secondly, it explains its meaning according to Aristotle’s opinion—and this begins with chapter 4 of summa 1. Part 1 is also divided: firstly, it illustrates, as a preamble, what should be studied about happiness; secondly, it illustrates the opinions of the philosophers about pleasure—and this begins with chapter 2.87

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Circa primum duo facit. Primo prooemialiter ostendit quod determinandum est de delectatione. Secondo post prooemium prosequitur suum propositum (. . .).

3. Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapter 7 88 (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 1002, ff. 37v, l. 9–40v, l. 14) After having verified his definition of happiness by means of what (the other philosophers) said about it, Aristotle begins to explain it as well, with special arguments. To this purpose, he begins to study first 87

One can compare the exposition of the contents of this book found at the beginning of book X of the anonymous “Hebrew Scholastic” commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics in the ms. Leiden, Bibliotheek der Universiteit, Or. 4782, f. 36v, ll. 43 ff.: “In this book it is said that the true pleasure (‘oneg) is the intellectual pleasure; and it is divided firstly into two summae. The first summa deals with pleasure and the second one deals with happiness. Summa 1 is divided into four chapters, and we will explain them in their place. Chapter 1 says that the political (or: ethical) philosopher (he-h.akam ha-medini) should deal with pleasure, and is divided into two parts. Part 1 explains three arguments that the political (or: ethical) philosopher should employ for dealing with pleasure”. The last sentence refers to the three arguments mentioned by Thomas Aquinas in his own commentary on the beginning of book X, §§ 1955–1957: Probat quod de delectatione sit agendum, tribus rationibus. (. . .) Et quia moralis philosophia de rebus humanis considerat, pertinet ad moralem de delectatione considerare. 88 This chapter corresponds to chapter 10 of E.N. in modern editions.

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the agent cause of happiness, since from this the intention and the object of his research appear. The intention begins with his words: “What is said here agrees with the previous statements, etc.”89 —and this is Thomas Aquinas’s opinion.90 According to the opinion of my master Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish, the question of the explanation of the agent cause of happiness, here, is as follows. After having verified his definition by means of the statements of those who have spoken about happiness, he begins to explain what is the agent cause of happiness—and from this it appears that in the definition of happiness we have assumed only the formal and material causes, i.e., the causes which enter into its quiddity, since the agent and final causes do not enter into the quiddity of a thing. However, nothing prevents us from studying the agent cause, by which our knowledge of that thing is completed, while there is no study of the final cause, since the status of happiness is that of an end, so that it is not ordered to any other end. The object of this research is divided as follows: firstly, Aristotle illustrates the cause; secondly, he studies each one of the parts of this cause; thirdly, he explains the quiddity of the agent cause of happiness. As for part 1, it begins with: “And it should be sought, whether by learning or by habit etc.” (E.N. 1099b9). In the first place, you should know that this division is necessary, since the agent cause of everything must necessarily be either substantial or accidental. In the former case, it must be either divine or human—and this is necessary, since the principles of everything are two: nature, which derives from God, and human choice. If it is a human agent cause, it must necessarily be either by learning (as in speculative things) or by habit (as in moral virtues) or in another way—e.g., by exercise and practice (as in an action of courage and force, which is not attained through learning or habit, but through bodily exercise and training). In fact, a man does not fight without such a bodily act, and without any exercise and practice of it.91 89

I am unable to find this quotation in the E.N. Probably, Ibn Ya‘ish (or Altortos) is referring to the beginning of Thomas’s commentary on book I, lectio 14, § 165: Postquam Philosophus ostendit quomodo diversae opiniones concordant definitioni felicitati suprapositae, hic inquirit ex consequenti de causa felicitatis. 91 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 14, § 165: Circa primum considerandum est quod necesse est felicitatem procedere, vel a causa per se et determinata, vel 90

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These are the three species of human agent cause: by learning, by habit and by exercise; otherwise, the agent cause is divine, or accidental. Aristotle says: “It comes either from God, or from chance (E.N. 1099b11)”; and he begins to explain each one of those divisions of agent cause by saying: if there is something sent by God, it should be the happiness given by the Divinity (i.e., the separate intellects): in fact, the supreme good should come from the supreme power, which is the divine power; to this the following proposition is attached: but the existence of those beings derives from God; if so, we should say that happiness comes from a divine cause92 —and you should not be anxious of studying this point here, because this study is proper (meyuh.ad) to metaphysics, so it should not be made here. Aristotle begins to study the human agent cause, by saying: if it is not sent by God, but it comes from learning, which is by human cause, nothing prevents it from being one of the divine things (cf. E.N. 1099b15 ff.). You should know that the Philosopher does not deny that the cause is something given by God: he wants to explain here that learning is acquired (niqneh) through a human cause, since this is necessary for anything acquired through a human cause; but Aristotle does not deny that it is sent from God, because its principle is found in choice, and this can happen in different ways. In fact, the agent cause of something can be of two species: either a remote cause, or a proximate cause. The proximate and immediate agent cause of happiness are human actions made by choice; the remote agent cause is God, since it is He who impresses in any thing that by which that thing desires its own perfection—and this desire is found in natural things, since they incline toward their proper place, which acts as their form and perfection. Moreover, God impresses in the human species a nature and a predisposition by which man desires the attainment of his perfection, and which is different from a causa per accidens et indeterminata, quae est fortuna. Si autem a causa determinata et per se, aut hoc erit a causa humana, aut a causa divina. A causa autem humana fit aliquid in nobis tripliciter. Uno modo addicendo, sicut scientia. Alio modo assuescendo, sicut virtus moralis. Tertio modo exercitando, sicut militaris industria, et alia huiusmodi. 92 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 14, § 167: Dicit ergo primo, quod si aliquid aliud ex dono Deorum, idest substantiarum, quas antiqui Deos vocabant, datur hominibus, rationabile est quod felicitas sit donum Dei supremi, quia ipsa est optimum inter bona humana.

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perfection itself. Now, the remuneration (seker) which comes to us from God when we attain that end is called by theologians (ba‘aley h.okmat ha-’elohut) gracia subsequente, since that perfection results from our actions and from the perfection of the human species, in all its parts. The first species of grace that comes to us from God, which is the habit through which we desire to attain the end, i.e., divine grace and the supreme good, is called by theologians gracia preveniente, since it does without previous good actions, and it comes as a favour from God (may He be exalted, since He provides for His creatures).93 In this sense, human happiness is sent from God, although it is a human thing, since its proximate agent cause is the human agent. This is the explanation and the meaning of Aristotle’s saying “and it appears that, if this is not a thing sent from God, but is by learning etc.”: this is one of the divine things, since it is the remuneration of virtue and the supreme good of human actions;94 it is praiseworthy, divine and blessed, since it comes from God.95 This is also Thomas’s opinion. The Philosopher, by saying that human happiness and the supreme good are an action, does not contradict what is found in the divine Law on this matter, i.e., that the supreme happiness is the conjunction of the active soul (ha-nefesh ha-po‘el) after its separation from the body. In fact, happiness has two senses: (1) the essence of happiness and the subject in which happiness is found in absolute—and this is called by theologians gracia participada; (2) that from which happiness comes to us and is completed in us, i.e., God (may He be exalted, for the supreme good and our expected perfection come from Him)—and this is called gracia participante.96 In the latter sense, human perfection and the supreme good are the conjunction of the 93 This first division of “grace” is probably taken from Thomas’s Summa theologica, I–II, q. 111, a. 3: see above, note 43. 94 In the manuscript: ve-ha-pe‘ullot ha-’enoshiyyot, “and (sic) human actions”. 95 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 14, § 169: Et dicit quod si felicitas non sit aliquod donum missum immediate a Deo, sed adveniat homini propter virtutem (. . .) vel propter aliquam disciplinam (. . .) vel propter aliquam exercitationem (. . .) nihilominus felicitas esse videtur aliquid divinissimum, quia cum sit praemium et finis virtutis, sequitur quod sit optimum et divinum aliquid et beatum. 96 I have been unable to find the theological source of this second division of “grace”. In any case, the doctrine of “participated grace” is inspired by Thomas’s theology: cf. for example, Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 29, a. 1 (Quod est bonum per essentiam, non indiget bonitate participata. Sed Christus est bonus per essentiam, quia est verus Deus. Ergo non indiget gratia, quae est bonitas participata).

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soul (i.e., the human intellect) with the separate intellect—and this is the remuneration of virtue. In the former sense, happiness is a human action—and this is the sense of what the Philosopher says about supreme happiness; this is its essence and proper subject. Aristotle says: “Now, it is also general (kelali) etc.” (E.N. 1099b18)—and here he explains that the principle of happiness is human choice, by means of the following argument: the end and perfection of something should be attained by all things which share that genus by nature, and is common (kolel) and shared by all of them; in fact, if it were not attained by all of them, the existence of a part of that species would be in vain, since it would not attain the end for the sake of which it exists. Now, if happiness were a thing sent from God, it would not be common, but selective, i.e., for sage and virtuous men only. Therefore, happiness is not something sent from God, but it is from choice, because it is common to all men, since it can be attained by any man who does not lack predisposition and intellect (I mean the lack of intellect found in those who are accustomed to country life et similia, e.g., in the inhabitants of the area near the equator).97 Now, some philosophers raise the doubt that happiness, being an action of the soul, is not common, but is found in a few men chosen by God. In reply, I say that the statement of the Philosopher is as follows: since there is no hindrance and impediment to virtuous actions except from human nature (in any case, there is no impediment from the actions of the intellect, which are general and shared by the whole human species), the fact that, because of an impediment (i.e., because of the irascible part of their soul), some men are slaves of their lust is due to their bad habit, not to a defect ascribable to God and to nature. From this (i.e., from Aristotle’s statement that happiness should be common to all men) Thomas Aquinas concludes that what many authors think about happiness is absurd98 —and one of these authors is Averroes, who says, in his book 97

Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 14, § 170: Si felicitas est finis humanae naturae, oportet quod possit esse communis omnibus vel pluribus habentibus humanam naturam. Et illud salvatur si sit ex causa humana. Quia si sit per quamdam disciplinam et studium, poterit provenire omnibus non habentibus aliquod impedimentum ad operandum opera virtutis, vel per defectum naturae sicut qui sunt naturaliter stulti, aut per malam consuetudinem quae imitatur naturam. 98 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 14, § 170: Ex quo patet, quod felicitas de qua Philosophus loquitur, non consistit in illa continuitate ad intelligentiam separatam,

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The possibility of conjunction (of Agent intellect to man), that the supreme end of man is the conjunction to the Agent intellect while still in life, for he thinks that man is capable of knowing all the natures of beings and their quiddities, and of passing from being a potential intellect to being an actual intellect. This opinion is absurd for many reasons: firstly, this conjunction is not common, since only some men of the older generation (yah.id be-dor ’avahih) were able to attain it. Secondly, this conjunction might even be impossible, since what is attained through the intellect is attained before through the senses, so that to receive a sense-perception means to receive a knowledge (according to the Posterior Analytics, book I); but it is quite impossible to know through the senses all the species found in the sea and in all the abysses; if so, they cannot be known through the intellect, and so the intellect is unable to know their quiddity and nature. Therefore, it is impossible for man to be an actual intellect while still in life and, if99 we supposed that the human end were to be an actual intellect, the existence of the human species would be in vain, since men are unable to attain such an end. Aristotle says: “And if it is better to be happy etc.” (E.N. 1099b20)— here, he explains that it is impossible for the cause of human happiness to be chance (hizdammen).100 Firstly, he argues as follows: “if it is better to be happy thus” means that, since the cause of happiness is human actions, chance should not be the principle of happiness, but it would be better if the cause of happiness were human choice. In fact, it is better that the means by which man attains his perfection are found in him, rather than dependent on chance; therefore, it is better that the cause of happiness is choice, rather than chance. Then, repeating his explanation, he says: “Things which are by nature etc.” (E.N. 1099b22), meaning that the things made by nature are made in the best possible way, according to what the nature of the substrate allows; they are made by appropriate means, so that they are capable of attaining their end. This holds true also for things made by art and by any cause, since they are made in the best possible way; therefore, this per quam homo intelligat omnia, ut quidam posuerunt. Hoc enim non provenit multis, immo nulli in hac vita. 99 I read ve-’illu, “and if”, instead of ve-lo, “and to him”, as in the manuscript. 100 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 14, § 171: Ostendit intolerabile esse quod felicitatis causa sit fortuna. Et hoc duabus rationibus.

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holds even more true for chosen things, i.e., for human choice.101 In fact, this is more chosen than by nature, since natural things per se do not understand their end, although they are ordered to it. Now, the principle of human things (‘inyanim) and actions is intellect; therefore, it is more appropriate that in human things there be the intellect. In fact, these things are ordered to their end (whereby they attain their perfection) through the most appropriate means; and it is evident that the most appropriate means are human actions, since these actions exist in those things. In the case of chance, this is not so; therefore, chance is not the principle and cause of human happiness. Secondly, he argues as follows. Human and supreme happiness should be ordered to the most perfect and supreme human actions; if so, it would be a wicked thing, which intellect could not admit, that such a great and praiseworthy thing were entrusted to chance.102 Aristotle says: “As for the object of our research (derush mevuqqash), etc.” (E.N. 1099b25)—here, he explains the thesis (derush munnah.) assumed in the definition of happiness: we say that it is an action of the soul; chance is not so; if so, etc.103 Aristotle says: “As for the other goods, etc.” (E.N. 1099b27)— according to my master Ibn Ya‘ish, this means: to resolve the above doubt, it would be enough to argue that it would be bad that a divine and praiseworthy good be entrusted to chance, if happiness is, as we have assumed, an action of the soul according to virtue; but this argument is insufficient if we assume that the supreme104 good and 101 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 14, § 171 (immediately after the passage quoted in the previous note): Quarum prima talis est. Ea quae sunt secundum naturam optime se habent, sicut apta nata sint. Et idem est etiam de omnibus quae fiunt secundum artem vel secundum quamcumque causam; et maxime secundum optimam causam a qua videtur felicitas dependere, cum sit quoddam optimum. 102 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 14, § 172: Secundam rationem ponit (. . .). Quae talis est. Felicitas est maximum omnium bonorum humanorum. Quia omnia alia ad ipsam ordinantur, sicut ad finem. Esset autem maxime perniciosum, si hoc a fortuna dependeret; quia multo magis alia humana bona essent fortuita. 103 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 14, § 173: Et dicit manifestum esse ex definitione felicitatis supraposita, quid sit verum circa id quod quaeritur in praemissa quaestione. Dictum est enim supra, quod felicitas est operatio animae rationalis secundum virtutem. Id autem quod est secundum virtutem, est secundum rationem motam ab aliqua causa divina. Quod autem est secundum fortunam est praeter rationem. Felicitas igitur non est a fortuna. 104 I read ‘elyon, “supreme”, instead of ‘iyyun, “study”, as in the manuscript.

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human happiness are external goods, since, if so, there would be no absurdity at all in assuming that the agent cause of happiness, according to the followers of this opinion, is chance. Now, to resolve this doubt, Aristotle says that some of the other goods (i.e., external goods) are necessarily ordered to happiness, since some of them are intended as instruments for attaining perfection. Human happiness, which is the supreme good, is desired per se, not for the sake of something else; external goods are desired for the sake of something else; if so, happiness cannot possibly be one of the external goods. Therefore, we cannot assume that its agent cause is chance. Aristotle says: “Now, this statement is accepted, etc.” (E.N. 1099b29)—according to Thomas, this is said to explain the intention of this chapter (i.e., to demonstrate that the definition of happiness is necessary and true) without verifying it by means of the previous statements about happiness; and what has been explained before in this chapter is a sort of preamble to this conclusion.105 According to my master Ibn Ya‘ish, the meaning of this is: to verify what has been assumed here, i.e., that the agent cause of happiness is human action, as the previous statements show. Aristotle assumes that “the laudable good is the end of politics,106 etc.” (E.N. 1099b30). This means that the agent cause of happiness is human action. In fact, this agrees with the previous statements, according to which the end of politics is praiseworthy because politics tries to improve uncivilized men (’anshey ha-mah.aneh) and make them good and good-doing; therefore, it appears that human perfection comes to man through good actions. As a consequence, one should not speak of happiness in the case of animals, since animals have no act (po‘al) at all—and this is evidence in favour of the truth of the thesis; moreover, for this reason we should not speak of happiness in the case of infants, since infants cannot act because of their young age, and cannot be happy but on account of expectation 105

Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 14, § 174 (where there is, in any case, no exact correspondence to these words): Deinde cum dicit “confessa autem” ostendit quod praedicta felicitatis definitio non solum consonat opinionibus aliorum de felicitate, sed etiam his quae sunt secundum suam opinionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod consonat his quae ab eo supra de felicitate sunt dicta. Secundo concludit quid secundum hanc sententiam recte dicendum sit (. . .). Dicit ergo primo: “hoc” scilicet felicitatem esse operationem secundum virtutem; “confessa sunt”, idest consona his quae in prooemio diximus. 106 I read ha-medinit, “politics”, instead of ha-medinim, as in the manuscript.

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(ba‘avur ha-toh.elet), since happiness requires a perfect virtue and a perfect life.107 Commentary on the De anima The existence of Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish’s commentary on the De anima was announced in 1997 by Y. Tzvi Langermann, who identified a copy of this work (the only one found to date) in the ms. St. Petersburg, Library of the St. Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, B 182.108 The manuscript appears to have been written by an anonymous Spanish scribe in the late fifteenth century, possibly not long after the composition of the work (c. 1480) and certainly after the death of the author. Unlike the commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, this work is explicitly ascribed to Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish; in the manuscript (f. 1v, ll. 1– 2) it bears the following title: Be’ur le-sefer ha-nefesh le-he-h.akam ha-kolel ha-’elohi rav Baruk Ibn Ya‘ish z”l, “Commentary on the ‘Book on the Soul’ by the erudite and divine sage r. Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish, of blessed memory”. Its definition as a be’ur is apparently due to its character of “literal explanation” (corresponding to a Latin expositio): almost every sentence of Aristotle’s text is commented on, and some specific questions are discussed following a simplified Scholastic pattern; usually a short summary of contents opens each chapter. These features are shared by the commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics—a fact that testifies to the common authorship of these two works, and appears to derive from the same source, namely Thomas 107 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 14, §§ 174–176: Posuimus enim (. . .) quod optimum humanorum bonorum, scilicet felicitas, sit finis Politicae, cuius finis manifeste est operatio secundum virtutem. Politica enim ad hoc praecipuum studium adhibet (. . .) ut faciat cives bonos et operatores bonorum. (. . .) Dicit quod nullum animal irrationale dicitur esse felix. Et hoc convenienter quia nullum eorum potest communicare in operatione virtutis, quae est secundum rationem, quam diximus esse felicitatem. (. . .) Excludit a felicitate etiam pueros. Et dicit quod propter eamdem causam, etiam puer non potest dici felix. Quia propter defectum aetatis nondum plenum habet usum rationis, ut possit esse operator virtuosarum operationum. Et si aliquando dicuntur beati, hoc est propter spem futurae perfectionis (. . .). Ideo autem in praesenti non sunt felices, quia felicitas (. . .) indiget virtute perfecta ad hoc, quod sit, non solum bona, sed optima operatio et vita perfecta, ad hoc quod sit bona operatio continua et diuturna. 108 Cf. “The Jewish Quarterly Review” 88 (1997), p. 69. I have consulted the microfilmed copy of the manuscript in the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts of the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem, no. 53326.

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Aquinas’s commentaries (or sententiae) on Aristotle’s works. Indeed, a comparison between some key passages of Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish’s work and the corresponding passages of Thomas’s Sententia libri De anima109 (see below, notes to some of the translated passages) shows that Ibn Ya‘ish used Thomas’s work not only as a direct source, but also as a general model. Although only a few short sentences seem to have been taken literally from the Sententia libri De anima, the whole commentary closely follows Thomas’s method of analysis and shows Ibn Ya‘ish’s “Thomistic” approach to Aristotle. The only exception are some questions discussed here and there in the commentary and not found in Thomas (e.g., see the first question, translated below). The model of these questions was probably a commentary or a collection of quaestiones on the De anima by some Thomist Schoolman: a possible source is the Quaestiones super libros De anima by Johannes Versor (Jean Letourneur),110 a work known in fifteenth century Spain and translated into Hebrew by Eli Habillo.111 Another characteristic shared by the commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is the presence in the text of a number of vernacular glosses (lo‘azim) designating specific Latin Scholastic terms and concepts. In both commentaries the glosses do not usually have a precise, literal correspondence in Hebrew;112 however, the glosses in the commentary on the De anima are generally Latin (see, e.g., the glosses in some of the passages below: docibilis, attentus, benivolus, enthymema, honorabiles) rather than Castilian or Catalan. This may be due to the fact that the commentary on the De anima was not written 109 This work, as it was read in the Middle Ages, is actually a combination of two different texts: book I is a reportatio of Thomas’s lectures by his student Reginald of Piperno, while books II and III are by Thomas himself. The Sententia was translated into Hebrew, probably in Italy, during the fourteenth century (see Zonta, La filosofia antica, p. 233); but there is no evidence that Ibn Ya‘ish knew or employed this translation for his commentary. 110 See e.g., Versor’s Quaestiones in De anima, book I, q. 2 (Utrum anima sit subiectum scientiae huius libri), in Johannis Versoris In divi Aristotelis philosophiae libros glosulae exactissimae, Coloniae 1489 (copy in Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, Inc. 129), f. 195va, ll. 9 ff. 111 On this translation, see below, chapter 3, list of Habillo’s works, on number D.2.3. In any case, there is no evidence that Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish read or used Habillo’s translation of Versor’s questions; if he knew them, it is likely that he read them in the Latin original. 112 On the general characteristics of vernacular glosses in the works by Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish, see above, p. 120.

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by a student (as in the case of the former work), but by Baruch himself, who may have been better acquainted with Scholastic Latin. Finally, a comparison of the short passages from the De anima quoted in this commentary with the corresponding passages in the Hebrew translation (from Latin) of Averroes’s Long Commentary on the De anima indicates that Baruch did not use the latter as a source.113 It is possible that, like Aquinas, he used the Latin translation of the De anima by William of Moerbeke. English Translation of Selected Passages (ms. St. Petersburg, Institute of Oriental Studies, B 182) 1. Introduction (ff. 1v, l. 1–2r, l. 9) After having completed the study of what changes (ha-mishtaneh) insofar as it changes (in the Physics), the study of simple being which changes through local motion (in the De caelo) and the treatment of simple being which changes in order to receive a form (in the De generatione et corruptione), the Philosopher begins to study composed being which changes in order to receive a form. This being is divided into two species: (1) composed being which changes in order to receive a perfect form—like the animal, which is a perfect being because it has a soul; (2) composed being which changes in order to receive an imperfect form—i.e., imperfect beings, like hail, rain and snow. Imperfect forms precede perfect forms in the order of generation; for this reason, after the De generatione, the Philosopher first wrote the Meteorologics, where he dealt with imperfect beings; after this, he began to study composed being which changes in order to receive a perfect form—and this is found in the present book (i.e., the De anima) and in the De animalibus114 which follows it. Now, since what is common (kolel) to many things should precede what is not, but is proper (meyuh.ad) and particular to some things, the Philosopher begins with the De anima, because in this book he studies something common to all animals, and after this he studies what is 113

See above, p. 113. This was the name given to the corpus of Aristotle’s zoological books known to the medieval Arabic and Hebrew traditions, consisting of the Historia Animalium, the De partibus animalium and the De generatione animalium. 114

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proper to each one of the different species of animals—and this is found in the De animalibus.115 The subject studied in this book is divided into two parts: part 1 is a sort of preamble and premise (has..sa‘ah ve-haqdem) to what should be studied in this book; part 2 begins to study the quiddity of the soul, first according to the opinions of the Ancients, then according to Aristotle’s own opinion. As for part 1 (i.e., what precedes, as a preamble, the examination of the intention of the book), it is divided into three parts. In fact, the teacher of a science should approach that science under the following three conditions: 1. he should set forth things and reasons so that the listener is filled with longing and desire—in Latin, benivolus; 2. he should adopt the easiest approaches and methods for understanding that knowledge, so that the listener is prepared and ready for learning that science—in Latin, docibilis—since in this way the desire of attaining it is increased; 3. he should make the listener not inattentive, but interested in attaining that science; this occurs when it is clear that that knowledge is difficult to attain—in Latin, attentus.116 First of all, the Philosopher illustrates here, in this chapter, those things through which we desire to attain the quiddity of the soul,

115 As for the last sentence, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri De anima (according to A.M. Pirotta’s edition, Taurini-Romae 1959), book I, lectio 1, § 1: Rerum autem animatarum omnium quoddam genus est; et ideo in consideratione rerum animatarum oportet prius considerare ea quae sunt communia omnibus animatis, postmodum vero illa quae sunt propria cuilibet rei animatae. Commune autem omnibus rebus animatis est anima: in hoc enim omnia animata conveniunt. Ad tradendum igitur de rebus animatis scientiam, necessarium fuit primo tradere scientiam de anima tamquam communem eis. Aristoteles ergo volens tradere scientiam de ipsis rebus animatis, primo tradit scientiam de anima, postmodum vero determinat de propriis singulis animatis in sequentibus libris. 116 For the two parts of the book and the three conditions above, cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 1, § 2: In tractatu autem de anima, quem habemus prae manibus, primo ponit prooemium, in quo facit tria quae necessaria sunt in quolibet prooemio. Qui enim facit prooemium tria intendit. Primo enim ut auditorem reddat benevolum. Secundo ut reddat docilem. Tertio ut reddat attentum. Benevolum quidem reddit, ostendendo utilitatem scientiae: docilem, praemittendo ordinem et distinctionem tractatus: attentum, attestando difficultatem tractatus. Quae quidem tria Aristoteles facit in prooemio huius tractatus.

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and after that he studies the other two conditions. Therefore, he begins as follows.117 2. Commentary on De anima, 402a1–5 (ff. 2r, l. 9–2v, l. 9) “Since we think that theoretical knowledge etc.” (De an. 402a1). Aristotle wants to give the reason why we should desire to study this book. He explains this through two arguments. The first argument is as follows: theoretical knowledge is118 about excellent and honourable things; the study of the soul is part of theoretical knowledge; if so, the study of the soul is about excellent and honourable things. The Philosopher does not bother to posit the minor premise and the conclusion of the syllogism explicitly, since they are evident per se. This way of learning and demonstrating is called in Latin enthymema: in it, everything relevant is included in the major premise119 of the syllogism, so that there is no need of positing all the premises. The meaning of Aristotle’s words is: desired things can be desired either because they are good per se and honourable (in Latin, honorabiles) or because they are useful and good with respect to other things. Now, Aristotle says that theoretical knowledge concerns things desired per se, because they are useful and honourable; moreover, he explains that this science is also useful to other sciences, besides being honourable and excellent. Aristotle says: “And we think that theoretical knowledge etc.”. In this way, he wants to explain how the science of the soul is more excellent and honourable than the other theoretical sciences. So, he says that the excellence of each of the theoretical sciences can be due to two reasons: (1) either to the excellence of its subject— e.g., the art of medicine and the art of building: the former is more excellent than the latter, since the subject of medicine, which deals with man, is more excellent than the subject of the art of building, which is the house; (2) or to the exactness of its proofs—e.g., mathematics is more excellent than physics, since mathematical proofs are based upon a priori demonstrations (mofetey sibbah), while physical 117

I read yath.il, «he begins», instead of y-’-t-y-n, as in the manuscript. I omit here the words ha-‘iyyuniyyim hi’ me-ha-devarim, found in the manuscript. 119 I omit here the word ’o, “or”, found in the manuscript. 118

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proofs are based upon a posteriori demonstrations (mofetey re’ayah). Aristotle affirms that in this science these two reasons (i.e., the excellence of its subject and the exactness of its proof) are found together. Therefore, we should treat this separately, and this point should precede anything else.120 3. Question (ff. 2v, l. 9–3r, l. 14) From what we have explained, some questions arise. The first is whether the subject of this book is the soul. To begin with, it appears that it is not so, and this because of two arguments: 1. the first argument is as follows: if this book were about this subject (i.e., the soul), such a subject should be assumed and accepted as such, and it should not be explained in this book, according to what is explained in the Posterior Analytics. But here the quiddity of the soul is studied and explained; therefore, the soul is not the subject of this book; 2. the study found in this book is a part of natural science; the soul is not one of the natural things, because it does not change and it does not move; therefore, the soul is not the subject of this book. The opinions of all the commentators agree against this. In replying to the above arguments, first of all I say that the subject of this book is the soul; and this is evident. In fact, if a science studies the characteristics (massigim) proper to something, that thing is the subject of that science—and this is self-evident. Now, this science studies the characteristics proper to the soul and its faculties; therefore, the soul is the subject of this book. As for the two negative arguments, one can reply to the first one as follows: the Philosopher’s claim (i.e., that there is no science whose subject is explained in the science itself) should be understood as 120

Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 1, § 6: Haec autem scientia, scilicet de anima, utrumque habet: quia et certa est, hoc enim quilibet experitur in seipso, quod scilicet habeat animam, et quod anima vivificet. Et quia est nobilior: anima enim est nobilior inter inferiores creaturas. Et hoc est quod dicit, «nos opinantes notitiam», idest scientiam speculativam «omnium esse bonorum», id est de numero bonorum, «et honorabilium». Sed altera scientia est magis bona et honorabilis altera dupliciter. Aut quia est magis certa, ut dictum est: unde dicit «secundum certitudinem», aut ex eo quod «meliorum», illorum scilicet quae sunt in sua natura bona, «et mirabiliorum», idest illorum quorum causa ignoratur, «propter utraque», idest propter haec duo «animae historiam».

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referring to the existence of the subject; but the quiddity of the subject can be explained in the science itself. Now, this is true in this case, since this science studies the quiddity of the soul and not its existence, because the existence of the soul is self-evident. But it is not sufficient, since the Philosopher’s claim should be understood as referring to both existence and quiddity, without any difference between them, just as the science of medicine studies neither the existence of the body121 nor its quiddity, but health and illness, which are characteristics proper to the body itself. Therefore, the most apt reply to this doubt is as follows. The Philosopher’s claim should be understood in the sense that in specific (meyuh.adot) and first premises the subject of a science cannot be explained in the science itself; but in general, non-specific premises this can be done, since no absurdity results from this. Now, what Aristotle explains here about the existence and quiddity of the soul is contained in general logical premises. As for the second argument, I deny the minor premise by saying that, although it is true that the soul does not move, this does not prevent it from being a part of natural science, since the soul is the principle of natural being, and any science studies the principles of its own subject. In this sense, the soul is comprised in natural science. 4. Commentary on De anima, 403b20–404a5 (ff. 10v, l. 15–11r, l. 16) Aristotle says: “And in our study it is convenient etc.”. After having explained the preamble which should precede the study of the quiddity of the soul, Aristotle begins to explain the question dealt with in this book, i.e., the study of the quiddity of the soul. Firstly, he explains the opinion of the Ancients on this matter, according to his usual practice; secondly, he explains the absurdities that follow from this opinion, refutes it, and then gives his own opinion—and this begins in book II. As for the first part, first he gives the reasons for which, according to their opinion, what they say about the quiddity of the soul is right; then, he explains their opinion.122 121

In the manuscript: ‘af ha-gerem, which seems to have no sense. Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 3, § 1: Supra posuit philosophus prooemium, in quo intentionem suam, quid agendum, et difficultatem huius operis ostendit: hic vero prosequitur tractatum secundum ordinem promissum. Dividitur autem 122

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Therefore, he says that people think that what is corporeal is different from what is incorporeal in two specific respects: (1) substantial motion, and (2) sense and knowledge. The Ancients agree that these two characteristics are found in every corporeal thing, but they disagree about which of these two things is more proper to the soul: knowledge and sense, or motion. In fact, the same disagreement is found in their opinions about the quiddity of the soul: some of them think that motion is more proper to the soul, others think that knowledge is more proper instead.123 Those who affirm that motion is more proper think that the substance of the soul is a nature that moves itself and moves124 other things. In fact, since they think that the soul is not moved by anything else, they conclude that the soul is a nature that moves itself and other things; and who thinks that among the elements there is something that moves125 other things and moves itself, thinks that this is the substance of the soul itself.126 This is the opinion of Democritus, who thinks that “the soul is fire or something hot”, since we find that fire moves itself; in fact, he tractatus iste in duas partes. Primo enim tractat de natura animae secundum opinionem aliorum philosophorum. Secundo vero secundum veritatem; et hoc in secundo libro. Prima pars dividitur in duas partes. Primo enim narrat opiniones aliorum philosophorum de anima. Secundo vero inquirit de opinionibus illis (. . .). Prima pars dividitur in duas. Primo enim ostendit ex quibus philosophi habuerunt viam ad investigandum de anima. Secundo vero ostendit quomodo diversi devenerunt in diversas opiniones de anima. 123 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 3, § 2: Illa autem manifesta in quibus animata differunt ab inanimatis, sunt duo, scilicet sentire et moveri. Nam animata videntur differre ab inanimatis maxime motu, ut scilicet moveant seipsa, et sensu seu cognitione. Unde credebant quod quando scirent principia istorum duorum, scirent quid est anima. Unde laboraverunt causam motus et sensus scire, ut per hoc scirent naturam animae: et credebant quod id quod est causa motus et sensus, esset anima: et in hoc omnes antiqui philosophi conveniebant. Sed ex hoc antiqui in diversas opiniones divisi sunt. Nam aliqui conati sunt devenire in cognitionem animae per motum, aliqui vero per sensum. 124 I read yannia‘, “moves”, instead of yaniah., “brings rest”, as in the manuscript. 125 See the previous note. 126 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 3, § 3: Et ideo cum dicit dicunt enim ostendit horum diversitatem. Et primo de illis, qui inquirebant naturam animae a motu. (. . .) Circa primum sciendum est, quod illis, qui inquisierunt animae naturam a motu, erat unum commune, scilicet quod si moventur animata, quod anima sit movens et mota. Et huius ratio est, quia existimabant quod id quod non movetur, non contingit movere alterum, idest quod nihil movet nisi moveatur. Si ergo anima movet animata, et nihil movet alterum nisi moveatur ipsum, manifestum est, quod anima maxime movetur. Et hoc est, propter quod antiqui naturales arbitrati sunt animam esse eorum, quae moventur.

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thinks that there are indivisible parts (i.e., atoms) in infinite number, which are the elements of all natural things, and of which the “roots” (shorshiyyim) found in the elements, insofar as they are elements, are composed. Therefore, he thinks that the soul consists in igneous127 spherical indivisible bodies (i.e., atoms), since what is spherical in form can move in any direction, with no difference between the directions.128 127

I read ’ishshiyyim, “igneous”, instead of ’ishiyyim, “individual”, as it is apparently written in the manuscript. 128 Cf. Thomas’s commentary, book I, lectio 3, § 4: Et ideo cum dicit unde Democritus ponit primo opinionem Democriti, de anima. (. . .) Ideo dicit ipsam animam «esse ignem quemdam aut calorem». Et opinio sua fuit talis. Ipse enim nihil ponebat esse in rerum natura nisi sensibile et corporale: et volebat quod principia omnium rerum sint corpora indivisibilia, et infinita, quae vocabat atomos. (. . .) Et quia inter alias figuras, figura rotunda est magis apta ad motum, cum non habeat angulos, quibus impediatur a motu; et quia credebant animam maxime moveri, ex eo, quod arbitrati sunt animam efficere motum animalibus, ideo inter ista infinita corpora, illa quae erant inter illa rotunda corpora, dicebat esse animam.

3. ABRAHAM SHALOM AND ELI HABILLO

Abraham Shalom According to the scanty data found in Jewish chronicles and in contemporary documents, the philosopher Abraham ben Isaac ben Judah ben Samuel Shalom was active in Catalonia and Aragon during the second half of the fifteenth century; he probably died in Aragon in 1492. He might be the same person as a physician of the same name who worked in Cervera (now in the Spanish province of Lerida) during that period and was in contact with Christian patients.1 Shalom is well-known for one great work, the Neveh Shalom (The Abode or Indwelling of Peace), first published in 1539: this is a philosophical-theological study, in thirteen books, of the principles of Judaism, which the author considers to be the “dogmas” of his religion, according to the doctrines of Moses Maimonides, Hasdai Crescas and Joseph Albo.2 This treatise depends mostly upon Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle and upon medieval Jewish philosophical writings;3 it shows almost no sign of knowledge of Scholasticism, apart from a short direct quotation and a possible reference to the contents of his own translation, from Latin into Hebrew, of the so-called Philosophia Pauperum (a very extensive compendium of Aristotelian natural sciences often ascribed to Albert the Great, but possibly the work of a thirteenth century scholar of Albert, Albert of Orlamu¨ nde).4 Shalom translated into Hebrew another Latin 1 On Abraham Shalom’s biography, see H.A. Davidson, The Philosophy of Abraham Shalom. A Fifteenth-Century Exposition and Defense of Maimonides, Berkeley–Los Angeles 1964, p. 1; cf. also Id., Shalom, Abraham ben Isaac, in Encylopaedia Judaica, Jerusalem 1971, Vol. 14, cc. 1270–1271; Sirat, A History, pp. 392–393. 2 On the contents of the Neveh Shalom, see Davidson, The Philosophy; cf. also H. Tirosh-Rothschild, The Political Philosophy of Rabbi Abraham Shalom: The Platonic Tradition (in Hebrew), “Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought” 9 (1990), 409–440. 3 See Davidson, The Philosophy, pp. 13–15. On the traces of the Philosophia Pauperum, see p. 1, note 5; p. 72, note 60. 4 Abraham Shalom’s translation is preserved (incomplete: it ends in the middle of the paragraph on the rational faculty of the section devoted to the De anima)

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Scholastic work, namely some questions on the Isagoge, the Categoriae and the De interpretatione which he ascribes to a certain “Marsilius” (this work is often ascribed to the fourteenth century Dutch Nominalist philosopher Marsilius of Inghen, but these questions do not correspond to the latter’s authentic Quaestiones in veterem artem).5 Apart from these translations, only two short original writings of Shalom’s belong to “Hebrew Scholasticism”: the replies to two physical questions by Eli Habillo (in the ms. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 2631, on folios 58r–64v: see below) and, possibly, another exchange of philosophical letters with Habillo (in the ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Hunt. 613, ff. 27–41).6 The references in the former text to the Latin Scholastic authors “Marsilius” (be he Marsilius of Inghen or someone else) and Walter Burley suggest that Shalom, unlike Bibago and Eli Habillo, was not particularly interested in Scotism and/or Thomism; he may have had a preference for the so-called Nominalist school (which also had some followers in late fifteenth century Spanish universities).7 Eli Habillo The life of Eli (‘Eli)8 ben Joseph Habillo is known to us only through what he tells us in the introductions and colophons to his works. His activity as a translator of Latin philosophical texts and as a “Hebrew in the unique ms. Hamburg, Staats- und Universit¨atsbibliothek, hebr. 265 (cf. M. Steinschneider, Catalog der hebr¨aischen Handschriften in der Stadtbibliothek zu Hamburg, Hamburg 1879, p. 110, number 266): see Steinschneider, Hebraeischen ¨ Ubersetzungen, p. 465. Another, less literal Hebrew version of the same work was written in Germany in the fourteenth century; in this text, unlike Shalom’s, all references to Christianity found in the Latin original are omitted: see Y.T. Langermann, Another Hebrew Translation of Philosophia Pauperum (in Hebrew), “Kiryath Sepher” 64 (1993), 1103–1104. 5 This translation is preserved in two manuscripts: Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 991, and Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University, Houghton Library, hebrew 38, ff. 1r–57v. Shalom’s introduction and the incipits of the questions were published according to the manuscript now in Harvard, by A. Jellinek, Marsilius ab Inghen/Haqdamat ha-ma‘atiq ha-she’elot ve-ha-teshuvot ‘al Mavo’, Ma’amarot u-Melis.ah le-he-h.akam Marsilyo, Leipzig–Wien 1859; on the text, ¨ see Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 469, and Manekin, Scholastic Logic, pp. 132–133 and note 37 (on the question of authorship), and pp. 143–144 (list of questions, translated into English). 6 See below, list of Habillo’s works, on number A.3. 7 See Carreras y Artau, Filosofia cristiana, Vol. 2, pp. 582–585. 8 In many texts he is mistakenly called “Elijah”.

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Scholastic” philosopher appears to have been more far-reaching and wider in scope than that of most of his colleagues. A biographical sketch has been recently drawn up by Jean-Pierre Rothschild:9 Eli Habillo (whose surname is better spelt “Habilio”, as in Hebrew, or “Jabillo”, as in modern Spanish) belonged to a family of Castilian origin that had moved to the little town of Monzon ´ (now in the province of Huesca) in the kingdom of Aragon.10 The first indication of Habillo’s scholarly activity is the ms. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 2978, which he copied in 1464. His self-description in the colophon as a “young man” (Hebrew .sa‘ir)11 suggests that he was born around 1435. Habillo’s activity as a translator and philosopher was mainly in the decade 1470–1480: in 1472 and 1473, Eli composed in Monzo´ n at least five of his six translations of Versor’s questions;12 in 1477 (or 1471), he translated pseudo-Aristotle’s De causis.13 Habillo corresponded with other Spanish Jewish philosophers, including Abraham Shalom,14 Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov and probably Abraham Bibago.15 ˇ˙e m ¯ ¯i H Cf. J.-P. Rothschild, Questions de philosophie soumises par ‘ El . abilio a` S¯ ˙ ˇ ¯ Ibn Sem T T . ob . ob, v. 1472, “Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litt´eraire du Moyen Age” 61 (1994), 105–132 (a list of the short mentions of Habillo in earlier bibliographies is on p. 109 note 14). Cf. also Id., ‘Eli H . abilio, philosophe juif et traducteur de latin en h´ebreu ( flor. ca. 1465–post 1477), “Mediaevalia” 5–6 (1994), 9–20; Id., Les philosophes juifs d’Espagne au XVe si`ecle, pp. 1296–1297. 10 Some authors surnamed “Habillo” lived in Palestine and in the Balkans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (cf. the data collected in Rothschild, Questions, p. 109 note 15), but we do not know whether they were relatives of Eli. A Rabbi Jacob ben Joseph Habillo “from the sages of Castile, now in Monz´on” (apparently a brother of Eli) owned the ms. London, British Library, Or. 6365 (see there, f. 246v), which contains some of Eli’s translations (cf. G. Margoliouth, Catalogue of the Hebrew and Samaritan Manuscripts in the British Museum, Vol. 3, London 1915, pp. 184–186, number 889). Habillo’s family may have moved from Castile to Aragon during the fourteenth century, when many Jews left Castile, largely as a consequence of the Castilian civil war begun in 1356: see M. Diago Hernando, La movilidad de los jud´ıos a ambos lados de la frontiera entre las coronas de Castilla y Arag`on durante el siglo XIV, “Sefarad” 63 (2003), 237–282. 11 Cf. Rothschild, Questions, p. 113; the manuscript (olim De Rossi 489), a copy of Moses ben Nahman’s (Nahmanides) commentary on the Pentateuch, is described in Richler and Beit-Ari´e, Hebrew Manuscripts, p. 114, number 595. 12 Cf. Rothschild, Questions, pp. 112–113; see also below. 13 Cf. Rothschild, Questions, p. 107. For 1471 as a possible date, see Zonta, La filosofia antica, p. 271 note 34. 14 See above. 15 The ms. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 2631, ff. 103v–115r, contains a philosophical correspondence between Abraham Bibago and Moses Arondi, 9

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There are clues that Habillo, at some stage during his life, had direct or indirect contacts with institutional Latin Scholasticism. In the introduction to his translation of Versor’s questions on the Physics, he remarks that Versor “was in Paris some years ago”;16 a possible interpretation of this remark is that Eli was there shortly before 1472. Habillo shows some familiarity with the Latin Scholastic university curriculum: at the end of his translation of the first two chapters of book Alpha maior of the Metaphysics, he affirms that “only these (chapters) are studied in the universities (yeshivot) of the Christians”,17 and in the introduction to his translation of Thomas Aquinas’s Quaestiones disputatae de anima there is a possible hint at Latin libraries.18 Finally, if new evidence should confirm the identification, upheld by Moritz Steinschneider,19 of a certain “Eli” (also known which was apparently sent to Habillo: see above, chapter 1, list of Bibago’s works, on number 5. 16 Ms. London, Or. 6365, f. 2v (according to the quotation in Margoliouth, Catalogue, p. 185): he-h.akam Versoryo ’asher hayah zeh yamim me‘at be-Paris h.ibber sefarim . . . , “the scholar Versor who was in Paris some years ago (and) wrote books . . . ” (according to Rothschild, Questions, p. 112–113; but the sentence might also mean: “the sage Versor who, some years ago, while in Paris, wrote books . . . ”). 17 Cf. below, note 46. Cf. also Zonta, La filosofia antica, p. 86 note 32; there I point out that Aristotle’s Metaphysics was not studied in fifteenth century Spanish Universities (see J. Riesco Terrero, La metaf`ısica en Espa˜na (siglos XII al XV), “Repertorio de historia de las ciencias ecclesiasticas en Espa˜ na” 4 [1972], 203–259, pp. 204 ff.), but it was certainly studied in Paris (from 1200 onwards: cf. A. Gabriel, Metaphysics in the Curriculum of Studies of the Mediaeval Universities, in P. Wilpert and W.P. Eckert [eds.], Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, “Miscellanea Mediaevalia” 2, Berlin 1963, 92–102). As a matter of fact, in the fifteenth century in the Arts faculties of some European universities, book I (Alpha maior) of the Metaphysics was studied with some limitations which closely agree with Habillo’s statements: e.g., according to the statutes of 1405, in Bologna only the proemium of this book (corresponding to chapters 1–2) was studied; in Oxford the whole book seems to have been excluded from study, since in its major parts (i.e., the parts not translated by Habillo) it treated of “the opinions of the ancients” (liber in quo pro magna parte tractatur de opinionibus antiquorum). See A. Maieru, ` Gli atti scolastici nelle universit`a italiane, in L. Gargan and O. Limone (eds.), Luoghi e metodi di insegnamento nell’Italia medioevale (secoli XII–XIV), Galatina 1989, 247–288, pp. 266–267 and note 67. Finally, traces of knowledge of the curriculum of Christian Universities have been found also in Hasdai Crescas’s The Light of the Lord (Or ha-Shem) (Crescas apparently refers to Christian Universities as “their comprehensive schools” [battey midrashehem ha-kolelim]): see Pines, Scholasticism, p. 539 note 99. 18 See Rothschild, Questions, p. 112. 19 ¨ See Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 321. Steinschneider supports his claim by pointing out that a passage (reporting the opinion of a certain

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as “Maestro Manuel”), the author of various philosophical works in Hebrew, with Eli Habillo, one might suppose that, for a time, Habillo converted (or feigned conversion) to Christianity, in order to attend University courses (in Paris?) under the name of “Maestro Manuel” (“Maestro” was the title usually given to University graduates). The works ascribed with greater or lesser certainty to Eli Habillo can be classified as follows: A. original works: A.1. five philosophical questions sent to Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov, about controversial points of Aristotelian logic, physics, metaphysics, ethics, as well as a medical question. They are preserved in the unique ms. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 2631, ff. 2r–26v, and their contents have been studied and summarised by Rothschild.20 Although these questions follow the typical Scholastic scheme of the quaestiones disputatae, they contain no explicit reference to Latin sources, but exclusively to Ancient, Arabic and Jewish sources;21 A.2. two “Hebrew-Scholastic” questions to Abraham Shalom, and Habillo’s replies to Shalom’s responses, preserved in the same manuscript (on ff. 55v–57v and 65r–103r respectively). The former are summarised below; A.3. an exchange of letters between Habillo and Abraham Shalom concerning some points of Aristotelian physics (where Mosheh Narboni is quoted), preserved in the ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Hunt. 613, ff. 27–41, according to Malachi Beit-Ari´e;22 B. lost original works: B.1. the ms. New York, Jewish Theological Seminary, microfilm 2371, preserves (on ff. 1r–47v, 53v–68r and 68v respectively) some Isaiah) quoted in the commentary on al-Ghazali’s Intentions ascribed to “Maestro Manuel” is found also in Eli Habillo’s translation of Versor’s questions. Moreover, it should be noted that the ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 907 that contains most of the passages ascribed to Eli/Manuel, contains also a passage of Habillo’s translation of Versor’s questions on the De caelo (cf. Rothschild, Questions, p. 114, no. 8). 20 Cf. Rothschild, Questions, pp. 118–129. 21 Cf. Rothschild, Questions, pp. 116–117. 22 Cf. Neubauer, Catalogue, cc. 792–793, no. 2279; Beit-Ari´e and May, Addenda and Corrigenda, c. 437. To the works mentioned above, one might add two poetic compositions ascribed to a certain Eli ben Joseph “the young” (ha-s.a‘ir, like in the ms. Parma, parmense 2978: see above), in the ms. London, British Library, Or. 2538, ff. 65v–72v: see Margoliouth, Catalogue, pp. 516–517 (number 1100), esp. note ++, p. 517.

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very abridged passages from The Wars of the Lord by Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides), from Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics (in Qalonymos ben Qalonymos’s Medieval Hebrew translation) and from al-Farabi’s Compendium of the Metaphysics (in its anonymous Medieval Hebrew translation). These passages seem to be the incipits of the lemmata of lost commentaries on these works written by Eli Habillo;23 C. doubtful original works, ascribed to Eli/Manuel: C.1. a supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Categories, De Interpretatione and Prior Analytics, according to Jacob Anatoli’s Medieval Hebrew translation. This work, preserved in two manuscripts, is ascribed to “the sage Eli” (he-h.akam ‘Eli).24 Although it contains no direct reference to Scholastic sources, the work includes many “philosophical questions” treated according to a technique that was certainly used by Habillo; C.2. a commentary on the physical and metaphysical sections of al-Ghazali’s Intentions of the Philosophers. Several long passages of this work, ascribed to “Eli” or to “Maestro Manuel”, are preserved in two manuscripts;25 D. translations. According to Habillo’s statements in some of the introductions,26 these can be arranged chronologically as follows: D.1. works ascribed to Thomas Aquinas: D.1.1. Quaestiones disputatae de anima: the translation of these twenty-one questions survives in at least one manuscript.27 Habillo’s 23

See Rothschild, Questions, pp. 116–117, and Zonta, La tradizione ebraica, pp. 39∗ –41∗ . 24 ¨ See Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 87; Rosenberg, Logic and Ontology, pp. 110–111; Rothschild, Questions, p. 115; cf. the description of the two manuscripts in Neubauer, Catalogue, cc. 487, no. 1364 (ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Hunt. 519), and 868, no. 2451 (ms. Oxford, Christ Church College Library, no. 200). According to Beit-Ari´e and May, Addenda and Corrigenda, c. 228, the former manuscript should be dated back to c. 1467–1469; this date constitutes the terminus ante quem for the writing of this work. 25 Mss. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 907, and h´ebreu 909: see Zotenberg, Catalogue, pp. 157–158. Cf. Steinschneider, Hebraeischen ¨ Ubersetzungen, p. 321, and Rothschild, Questions, p. 115 and note 46. 26 See below. 27 Ms. Hamburg, Staats- und Universit¨atsbibliothek, hebr. 265 (Steinschnei¨ der 267), ff. 62r–158v: see Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 483– 484. Rothschild (Questions, p. 114, nos. 3–4) believed that the ms. New York,

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version of questions 6 and 7, together with his introduction to the whole work, was published by Adolph Jellinek around 1850;28 D.1.2. De ente et essentia: the unique copy of this translation is preserved in the above mentioned ms. Parma, parmense 2631, ff. 164r–174r;29 D.1.3. Pseudo-Thomas’s De universalibus (inc.: “Circa universalia multiplex fuit et diversorum philosophorum opinio . . . ”): this anonymous translation, which should be ascribed to Habillo on the basis of his own declarations,30 is preserved in at least one manuscript;31 D.1.4. Pseudo-Thomas’s De potentiis animae: this anonymous Hebrew translation, ascribed to Habillo by Steinschneider, and first published by Jellinek, is preserved in the unique ms. Hamburg, Staatsund Universitaetsbibliothek, hebr. 265;32 D.2. questions by the fifteenth century French Thomist philosopher Johannes Versor (Jean Letourneur), as follows: D.2.1. Quaestiones super libros Physicorum: completed on 27 shevat 5232 (6 February 1472) and preserved in four Jewish Theological Seminary, microfilm 2341, ff. 352v–353v contained a second copy of the work; however, Rothschild himself has recently shown that these folios contain a partial and abridged anonymous Hebrew translation of pseudo-Thomas’s De potentiis animae. Cf. J.-P. Rothschild, An unknown Hebrew translation of Ps.-Thomas Aquinas, De potentiis animae (in the circle of the Ibn Shem Tovs, Spain ca. 1450–1475), paper read at the international colloquium Hebrew to Latin– Latin to Hebrew. The Mirroring of Two Cultures in the Age of Humanism, The Warburg Institute, London, October 18th–19th, 2004. As shown by Caterina Rigo, this translation is an abridgement of Habillo’s version (see below, list of Habillo’s works, on number D.1.4.). Cf. C. Rigo, Le traduzioni dei commenti scolastici al De Animaeseguite da Yehudah b. Mosheh nella tradizione filosofica ebraico-italiana dei secoli XIII–XIV, in F. Vattioni (ed.), Sangue e antropologia nel Medioevo, “Sangue e antropologia” 8, Roma 1993, Vol. 2, 1073–1095, p. 1087 note 42. 28 A. Jellinek, Die VI. und VII. Frage aus den “Quaestiones disputatae de anima” von Thomas von Aquino, s.d., s.l. 29 See Richler and Beit-Ari´e, Hebrew Manuscripts, p. 359, number 1316; see also G. Tamani and M. Zonta, Aristoteles Hebraicus, Venezia 1997, p. 140. 30 See below, p. 201. 31 Ms. Hamburg, Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek, hebr. 265, ff. 161r–165v: ¨ see Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 484–485 (according to which this text is preserved also in the ms. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 2631, ff. 117r–121r); see also Manekin, Scholastic Logic, p. 133 and note 41 (according to which the text preserved in Parma is another Latin work on universals, translated by Habillo). 32 See Steinschneider, Catalog, p. 112, number 267; Id., Hebraeischen ¨ Ubersetzungen, p. 484; A. Jellinek, Philosophie und Kabbala, Vol. 2, Leipzig 1854, pp. 26–31.

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manuscripts.33 Habillo’s introduction to this work (partially published by G. Margoliouth)34 is informative about the translator’s approach to Scholastic philosophy; for that reason, part of it is published in English translation below; D.2.2. Quaestiones super libros De generatione et corruptione : completed on 21 tevet 5233 (22 December 1472) and preserved in three manuscripts;35 D.2.3. Quaestiones super libros De anima: completed on 23 tevet 5233 (24 December 1472) and preserved in the unique ms. Oxford, Christ Church College Library, no. 187;36 D.2.4. Quaestiones super libros Parvorum Naturalium: completed on 26 adar I 5233 (24 February 1473) and preserved, as the previous one, in the unique ms. Oxford, Christ Church, no. 187; D.2.5. Quaestiones super librum De ente et essentia (by Thomas Aquinas): completed on the same day as the previous one and preserved in two manuscripts;37 D.2.6. Quaestiones super libros De caelo et mundo: the entire translation of this work, completed on 12 kislew 5234 (2 December 1473), is preserved in one manuscript;38 33 ¨ See Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 487–488; for an updated list of manuscripts, cf. Rothschild, Questions, p. 114, no. 7 (but it should be noted that the mss. Parma, De Rossi 281 [now parmense 2261], and Turin, Valperga 181 [now in the Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, A. VI. 25], found in Rothschild’s list, do not contain this work). A comparison between the mss. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 1000 and Parma, parmense 2978 (mentioned above) backs Steinschneider’s suggestion that the former is an autograph by ¨ Habillo (see Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 488). 34 See Margoliouth, Catalogue, Vol. 3, pp. 184–185; cf. also Rothschild, Questions, p. 111 and note 29 (transcription of part of the introduction), and J.-P. Rothschild, Motivations et m´ethodes des traductions en h´ebreu du milieu du XIIe a` la fin du XVe si`ecle, in G. Contamine (ed.), Traductions et traducteurs au Moyen Age, Paris 1989, 279–302, p. 289. 35 ¨ See Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 488; Rothschild, Questions, p. 114, no. 9. For its datation, see Neubauer, Catalogue, c. 870, no. 2453. 36 ¨ See Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 488; Rothschild, Questions, p. 114, no. 10. The manuscript, copied in Provence around 1500, is described in Neubauer, Catalogue, cc. 869–870, no. 2453; cf. also Beit-Ari´e and May, Addenda and Corrigenda, c. 481. 37 ¨ See Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 484 (who seems to ascribe the questions to Thomas himself!); Rothschild, Questions, p. 114, no. 13. 38 ¨ See Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 488; Rothschild, Questions, p. 114, no. 8 (the ms. Paris, h´ebreu 907, ff. 96r–102v, contains only a short part of book I, corresponding to questions 2–5).

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D.2.7. Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum: this translation, not dated and without the name of the translator, is preserved in three manuscripts.39 This work may have been written after the translation of Antonius Andreas’s questions on the Metaphysics (see below, no. D.3.1.), since there is no mention of it in the list of Habillo’s translations found there;40 D.3. works pertaining to the Spanish Scotist school: D.3.1. Antonius Andreas (Antoni Andreu), Quaestiones super XII libros Metaphysicorum, preserved in two manuscripts. This translation is supplied with an important introduction by Habillo (see it below, in an English paraphrase); D.3.2. Andreas’s De tribus principiis rerum naturalium and John the Canon’s (Johannes Canonicus) Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum: Habillo mentions his intention to translate these two works, but no trace of these translations has been found to date;41 D.4. minor works, by several authors: D.4.1. William Ockham’s Summa logicae : a translation of chapters 14–17 of part I of this work, ascribed to Habillo, is preserved in the ms. Parma, parmense 2631, ff. 158v–163v;42 D.4.2. Pseudo-Aristotle’s De causis, according to Gerard of Cremona’s twelfth century Latin version (but Habillo possibly also consulted Zerahyah Hen’s Arabic-Hebrew version, completed in 1284): this translation, dated 6 elul 5237 (15 August 1477),43 is preserved in the ms. Parma, parmense 2631, ff. 148v–158r. It has been edited and studied by Rothschild;44 D.4.3. Vincent Ferrer’s De unitate universalis: an anonymous Hebrew translation (apparently from a redaction different from the ¨ See Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 489; Rothschild, Questions, p. 114, no. 12 (for a complete list of the manuscripts that contain this translation in whole or in part). 40 See below, pp. 180–181. 41 See below, pp. 182–183. 42 ¨ See Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 470; see also Tamani and Zonta, Aristoteles Hebraicus, p. 140. The translation includes some notes by Habillo: see Rosenberg, Logic and Ontology, p. 110. 43 On this datation, see Rothschild, Questions, p. 107; cf. also above, where the alternative datation “6 elul 5231” (23 August 1471) is suggested. 44 See the edition in J.-P. Rothschild, Les traducteurs h´ebraiques du Liber de causis latin, th`ese de doctorate in´edite, Paris 1985, Vol. 1, pp. 174–243; cf. also Id., Les traductions du Livre des causes et leurs copies, “Revue d’histoire des textes” 23 (1994), 393–484. 39

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published one), probably by Habillo. This work is preserved in the ms. Parma, parmense 2631, ff. 126v–144r;45 D.4.4. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, according to William of Moerbeke’s thirteenth century Latin translation: a translation of chapters 1–3 (corresponding to chapters 1–2 in modern editions) of book I (Alpha maior) is in the mss. New York, Jewish Theological Seminary, microfilm 2371, ff. 52r–53r; Moscow, Rossiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Bibliotheka, G¨unzburg 139, ff. 1v–3r; Rome, Biblioteca Casanatense, no. 3083, ff. 144r–145v.46 Finally, some anonymous texts preserved in the ms. parmense 2631, mentioned above, may be original works by Habillo, or translations by him of Latin Scholastic works. The author of these texts has yet to be identified.47 Most of Habillo’s original works and translations belong to “Hebrew Scholasticism”. However, his identification with Eli/Manuel suggests that, for a period, he followed (and later rejected) the traditional Averroistic orientation of late medieval Jewish philosophy. As a “Hebrew Schoolman”, Habillo appears to have engaged with the trends and interests prevalent among his Christian colleagues, namely Thomism and Scotism (the most influential Christian schools of thought in fifteenth century Spain). 45

See M. Zonta, The Original Text of Vincent Ferrer’s Tractatus de unitate universalis Discovered in an Unknown Hebrew Translation?, “Bulletin de philosophie m´edi´evale” 39 (1997), 147–151. 46 See Zonta, La tradizione ebraica, p. 36∗ , notes 155 and 157, and pp. 40∗ –41∗ ; cf. also Zonta, La filosofia antica, pp. 85–86, 258, 271. The colophon of the translation reads as follows: Nishlamah haqdamat “mah she-’ah.ar ha-t.eva‘” le-’Arist.o ve-hi’ bi-teh.illat ha-ma’amar ha-rishon ve-’eyn ba-ma’amar ha-hu’ ’ah.ar zeh raq sippur de‘ot ha-qadmonim be-hath.alot u-bit..tulam. Ve-lazeh hu’ mimmah she-’eyn bo to‘elet ve-lo’ yiqqare’ mimmennu bi-yeshivot ha-Nos.erim zulat zeh, “here ends the introduction to Aristotle’s Metaphysics: it is found at the beginning of book I (i.e., Alpha maior), and, after this, there is only the exposition and confutation of the opinions held by the Ancients about the principles. For this reason, this book is useless, and, apart from this short introduction, it is not read (= studied?) in Christian universities”. This translation was probably made as an introduction to Habillo’s lost commentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics (see above, list of Habillo’s works, on number B.1.), for the purpose of supplying part of book Alpha maior, not included in Averroes’s work. 47 Cf. Rothschild, Questions, pp. 107–108, 114. Manekin (Scholastic Logic, p. 133) holds that the anonymous Hebrew texts on logic and universals in the ms. Parma, parmense 2631, ff. 117r–126v and 144v–148r, are “probably . . . translated by Habillo”.

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Unlike his contemporary Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish, he preferred the technique of the quaestiones disputatae (more popular in that period), to that of the expositiones of Aristotle’s works, used by Thomas Aquinas.48 The fact that they were produced in limited numbers49 does not imply that Habillo’s works were not widely read: of some of them (such as the translations of Versor’s questions on the Physics and on the De generatione) we can trace more than two complete copies in different countries (Spain, Provence, Italy) in the period c. 1470–1550. Moreover, Habillo’s philosophical correspondence with other “Hebrew Schoolmen” shows that his writings and doctrines raised considerable interest during his lifetime. This proves that Hebrew Scholasticism, far from being limited to isolated thinkers and translators, was one of the most discussed subjects in Jewish philosophy during the fifteenth century. Introduction to the Hebrew Translation of Antonius Andreas’s Quaestiones Super XII Libros Metaphysicorum Habillo’s translation of Andreas’s questions on the Metaphysics is preserved in two manuscripts: 1. Turin, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, A. VI. 25: this manuscript, written in Spain around 1475, is either an autograph, or a copy made for Habillo and corrected by him (as suggested by some marginal transcriptions of Latin terms, added after the completion of the manuscript). Unfortunately, due to the fire that devastated the Turin library in 1904, only ff. 2–127 survive (from the table of contents at the beginning to the first half of quaestio 6 of book VI), and some of these leaves are very difficult to read (especially the translator’s introduction);50 48

See also what Habillo himself writes in his introduction to Versor’s questions on the Physics (below). 49 Cf. Rothschild, Questions, pp. 114–115. 50 For a description of the manuscript before the fire, see B. Peyron, Codices Hebraici manu exarati Regiae Bibliothecae quae in Taurinensi Athenaeo asservatur, Torino 1880, p. 200, number 188 (where the text is wrongly identified as “William of Ockham’s philosophical questions”; this mistake is repeated by Steinschnei¨ der, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 470, and Rothschild, Questions, p. 114, no. 5); Tamani and Zonta, Aristoteles Hebraicus, pp. 162–163, number 122 (where the text is identified correctly). A description of the contents of this manuscript

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2. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 2261 (olim De Rossi 281): this manuscript was written in Northern Italy, in an Italian hand, in the period 1500–1530 (Malachi Beit-Ari´e ascribes it to an anonymous scribe and dates it to after 1550). It appears to be a copy (direct or indirect) of the previous manuscript.51 The translation is preceded by a long introduction by the translator. This introduction can be divided into three parts: 1. a proemium in rhymed prose, of no philosophical interest; 2. a sort of historical preface in which Habillo declares his intentions and clarifies the meaning of his work as a translator. This part begins with a general division of contemporary Latin Scholastic philosophy into Thomism, Scotism and Ockhamism.52 Habillo claims that these schools differ on account of their view of nature: Duns Scotus is a realist, Ockham a “nominalist”, while Thomas holds an intermediate position. Habillo has decided to translate Thomistic works first because they are “simpler” than Scotistic works (here Habillo lists his previous translations, especially those of Versor). There seems to be also a religious motivation to these translations: as he explained in his introduction to Versor’s questions on the Physics (see the translation, below), Habillo wanted to use Scholasticism in an attempt to build a Jewish philosophy that would be more respectful of religion and no longer reliant upon Averroes, who contradicted many of the theoretical principles of Judaism. Habillo informs us that, after having completed his project of Thomistic translations, (including many quotations from its introduction) is contained in an unpublished letter, sent shortly after its acquisition by one of its owners, Tommaso Valperga di Caluso, to Giovanni Bernardo De Rossi on 7 October 1795 (Valperga mistakenly identifies the text as Habillo’s questions on Thomas’s De ente et essentia). This letter is preserved in Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, Lettere autografe di uomini illustri, cassetti 109–123. 51 See Tamani and Zonta, Aristoteles Hebraicus, p. 124, number 58; Richler and Beit-Ari´e, Hebrew Manuscripts, pp. 349–350, number 1290. A microfilmed copy of the manuscript is in the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts of the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem, number 13425. 52 These were the three major philosophical schools of late fifteenth century Spanish Christian Scholasticism. Thomism seems to have prevailed in Catalonia, while Scotism was strong at the University of L´erida, in Aragon; “Nominalism” (in some cases, following Ockham’s doctrines) was accepted at the Universities of Salamanca and Alcal´a de Henares (in the old kingdom of Castile) at the beginning of the sixteenth century (cf. Carreras y Artau, Filosofia cristiana, Vol. 2, pp. 578–585).

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he started translating the questions on the Physics by the fourteenth century Scotist John the Canon. This enterprise, however, had to be abandoned because of the author’s difficult language. Habillo then decided that he would first translate the questions on the Metaphysics by the fourteenth century Catalan philosopher Antonius Andreas, a closer follower and interpreter of Duns Scotus53 (here Habillo hints at the existence of different currents within fourteenth century Scotism). After this translation, he apparently intended to translate Andreas’s treatise De tribus principiis rerum naturalium. Finally, Habillo declares his intention to write a Hebrew-Latin philosophical dictionary as a preface to his forthcoming translation of John the Canon; for the present, he will limit himself to studying Scotus’s concept of distinctio; 3. an explanation of the seven different meanings of the term distinctio in Scotism (rationis, ex natura rei, formalis, realis, essentialis, subiective, obiective), preceded by a general introduction to the concept itself. Habillo’s exposition reflects in part two Latin Scholastic sources: a short unpublished treatise ascribed to Andreas, the Tractatus abbreviatus de modis distinctionum,54 and the Tractatus formalitatum secundum doctrinam Francisci Mayronis.55 Apart from the odd literal quotation, Habillo paraphrases and re-elaborates some of the doctrines contained in these two works, adapting them to the interests of a Jewish audience, as well as adding doctrines of his own. However, like Bibago’s, Habillo’s approach to Scotism is not uncritical: he explicitly affirms that he is relating Andreas’s position on

53

In the fifteenth century, both John the Canon’s questions on the Physics and Andreas’s questions on the Metaphysics seem to have been regarded as parts of a sort of “Scotistic” Aristotelian corpus (see above, Historical Introduction). 54 On this work, see M. Gensler, Catalogue of Works by or Ascribed to Antonius Andreae, “Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum” 31 (1992), 147–155, p. 154. The work is preserved in at least two manuscripts: Assisi, Biblioteca Conventuale, no. 970, ff. 97r–101r (fifteenth century) and Padua, Biblioteca Universitaria, no. 1580, ff. 113ra–114va (according to Gensler: 110d–114d) (fourteenth century). (The latter manuscript contains also, on ff. 1r–110v, a copy of Andreas’s questions on the Metaphysics.) On Habillo’s use of Andreas’s work, see Zonta, Arabic and Latin Glosses, pp. 47–48; Id., The Relationship, pp. 155–156. 55 Published in Franciscus de Mayronis, In Libros Sententiarum, Quodlibeta, Tractatus Formalitatum, De Primo Principio, Terminorum Theologicalium, Declarationes, De Univocatione, Venetiis 1520 (repr. Frankfurt a.M. 1966), ff. 263ra–268va.

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the seven distinctions without discussing his doubts on the matter.56 In at least one case, he seems to reject one of these distinctions—the “essential distinction”, based upon the Christian dogma of trinity, which Jews cannot accept.57 Habillo’s introduction and translation is replete with Latin glosses (in some cases added in the margins of the manuscripts). This is further evidence of Habillo’s deep knowledge of contemporary Scholasticism: he transliterates and translates into Hebrew most of the technical terms of Scotism. These glosses are listed in the lexicon (see below, in the Hebrew section). English Paraphrase (mss. Turin, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, A. VI. 25, ff. 7r, l. 6–13r, l. 14, and Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 2261, ff. 5r, l. 20–12v, l. 26; cf. the text in the Hebrew section) I, Eli ben Joseph Habillo from the Kingdom of Castile, live in this mountain place (ba-har ha-zeh), Monz´on, near the border of the Kingdom of Aragon. Following my mind and God’s advice, I have paid attention to what Christians say: I have found in their books that on which God and the human intellect agree.58 Now, Christian scholars have different ways of studying philosophy. There is a straight way, which is preferred by those who are looking for peace and truth. This is the way followed by the distinguished scholar Thomas Aquinas (T . omas de ’Aqino), a follower of Aristotle. (Apparently, these words are followed by a harsh critique of Thomas as an apologist for Christianity.) Then, there is the way of a strong man, who has attained the understanding of the heaven; he wields clever remarks and hairsplitting arguments (pilpulim), and pays no attention to Averroes and his master Aristotle in his many commentaries. This man is John Duns Scotus (’Esqot.), who does not cease (lo’ yishqot.) to raise 56

See below, p. 186. See below, note 86. Other critical observations on Scotist doctrines are found in Habillo’s reply to Shalom’s responses to his two questions: cf. below, note 109. 58 This short passage was first published in Sermoneta, Scholastic Philosophic Literature (quoted above, Historical Introduction, note 127), p. 140. 57

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queries, and to speak deep and subtle (raqqim) words which are not understood by vacuous (reqim) men. Then, there is another way, which is followed by a man of strife and contention, who has very distinctive opinions; one cannot resist his wrath. This man is William Ockham (’Oqam), a controversial man, who does not reach Scotus’s level in profundity and difficult language. These different ways have been followed in the study of nature. The middle way is that of Thomas, according to whom the plurality of beings is half-way: not all of them are in mind only, but some of them are in mind while others are real; he assumes that unity is formal (ba-s.urot), while plurality is virtual (ba-koh.ot), and the distinction of beings is real and is due to souls endowed with many faculties (koh.ot). According to him, the ten categories have an extramental existence, but not a manifold (mitrabbeh) existence. There can be only two kinds of distinction between things: either a mental distinction, or an extra-mental distinction. Scotus inclines to the right way: he assumes that there are an extra-mental plurality, a virtual plurality and a formal plurality; the distinction of the ten categories is an extra-mental one.59 He assumes the existence of seven kinds of distinction: distinction in mind; distinction in the nature of things; formal distinction; real distinction; essential distinction; subjective distinction between two things in their totality; objective distinction between two things in their totality.60 He assumes that the distinction between the relationship and the foundation (yesod) of the relationship is a real distinction, while the distinction between privation and matter is a formal distinction; he assumes that the distinction between the parts and the whole is a distinction in the nature of things, and he assumes many other doctrines about the existence of universals and the degrees (madregot) of the individual universals by means of which individuals are distinct. According to him, these degrees concern the species, like the degrees of whiteness; they are not mere accidents, nor are they 59

The subsequent description of Scotus’s doctrine of universals seems based upon a Scotist Scholastic compendium, rather than upon a direct knowledge of Scotus’s works. On Scotus’s doctrine, see Noone, Universals and Individuation, pp. 105–112. 60 These seven distinctions, not explicitly found in any of Scotus’s known works, are listed by Antonius Andreas and other authors: see below.

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formally substance (in the sense that substance includes them): rather, they and substance are one and the same thing.61 Moreover, Scotus assumes that unity in species and unity in genus have an extramental existence. Finally, according to some of his followers, Scotus assumes that the distinction between motion and the limit (gevul) of motion is a real distinction, as well as many other subtle doctrines, which is why he is called “subtle teacher” (in Latin, doctor subtilis). On the contrary, Ockham inclines to the left way: he assumes that the plurality of things is only mental; of the ten categories, he assumes that only two—substance and quality—have an extramental existence, while the others are only mental. He assumes that a quantity is really identical to what has that quantity, so that quantity, substance and what has that quantity are really identical, and they differ only in mind. He assumes that a property and what has that property are really identical, and they differ only in mind. The same holds true, according to him, for matter and potentiality, the whole and its parts, a figure (temunah) and what has that figure. He assumes that the plurality of forms is found in man because of his rational soul; according to the opinion of some people, he assumes that in every compound there are two forms. Moreover, Ockham assumes that the faculties of the soul are only in mind; he does not assume that motion can be distinguished from the limit of motion. These are the ways followed by modern scholars. I have found no debated thing in which they agree, except for one. They agree that the generated form does not have a real existence in matter before its generation, contrary to what Averroes, Albert the Great (’Albert.) and many other philosophers thought: this is their difference with respect to earlier philosophers. Apart from this, either two of these ways differ from the other, or each way differs from the others; but none of the Christians pays attention to this.(These words are followed by what seems to be a cryptic allusion to Christian doctrines.) I have undertaken to translate some of the books of the above philosophers into our language, for myself and for others who are interested, and I have begun with the simplest and easiest ones to understand, which follow the way closest to Aristotle’s—i.e., Thomas’s way. Therefore, I have translated Versor (Versoryo)’s books on the 61 The last paragraph refers to Scotus’s doctrine of “modal distinction”, about which cf. King, Scotus on Metaphysics, pp. 25–26.

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Physics, the De caelo et mundo, the De generatione et corruptione, the De anima, the De sensu et sensato and the other treatises called by the Latins “little natural treatises” (the Parva Naturalia). Moreover, I have translated the questions Versor wrote on Thomas’s treatise De ente et essentia, together with other treatises by this author (i.e., Thomas)—notably his questions on the human soul, where he defends the survival of the soul.62 Having done this, I thought it appropriate to grasp the various branches (kenafayim) of Scotus’s doctrine, which is extremely deep. In fact, Scotus’s expressions and his concepts concerning the above mentioned distinctions are very difficult to understand in Latin; accordingly, they are much more difficult in Hebrew. The reason for this is that, because of our faulty knowledge of these matters due to our present troubles (cf. Maimonides, Guide, part I, chapter 61),63 we lack terms with which to render perfectly the meanings of the concepts in our mind, and this fact compels us to employ complex and difficult expressions to convey those concepts in our language. As a matter of fact, in many cases while translating I have deemed it necessary to create new expressions which are not found in our literary language; in other cases, I have used existing expressions, but with meanings different from the usual ones. No doubt, this fact will confuse the reader, so that, if he is not a upright and modest person, he will ascribe this to the ignorance of the translator, to his imperfect command of Hebrew, and to his faulty knowledge of the technique of translation (’ofney ha-ha‘taqah). Obviously, in this case, the purpose of the translation is not fully attained. For this reason, I have postponed till now the translation of a long book where this difficult doctrine (i.e., Scotus’s) is expounded. Moreover, our people are not yet able to understand these questions, since Jewish science has not yet reached its true end, which is the knowledge of truth (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, book II; Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics, book I). But, since they are usually content with a superficial knowledge of these things that is 62

This seems to be a reference to Thomas Aquinas’s Quaestiones disputatae de anima: see above, list of Habillo’s works, on number D.1.1. 63 Habillo might be referring to the difficulty of interpreting the Hebrew names of God in Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed, part I, chapter 61 (see the English translation by Shlomo Pines in Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, Vol. 1, Chicago–London 1963, pp. 147–150).

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superficial and does not distinguish what is true from what is false, if they could take a glance only at the books of science, a new knowledge (shoresh munnah.) would be born in their minds. Who will remove from our minds the obviously absurd idea that the words of Averroes on science are perfect, just like God’s words? In fact, one should judge between two different philosophical schools by comparing their words and their arguments. This idea is widely accepted, since Averroes is well-known and very skilled in philosophy; Avicenna too was an expert in every science, but Averroes thought that he deviated from Aristotle’s doctrine, and ridiculed him in his Destruction of the Destruction of Philosophers. Now, Christian scholars do not act in this way, and in many cases they follow Avicenna. This is right, since he who defends the words of Averroes cannot dismiss the words of Avicenna—just like Averroes himself could not, although he criticised Avicenna with his words. Moreover, in some cases the words of Averroes have led some of his fanatical followers into error and heresy. Indeed, I wonder how these people can justify Averroes’s opinion on the human soul, on the possibility of its conjunction with the separated intellect, on the nature, the motion and the number of celestial spheres, and on God’s attributes, when it is evident that what he says about the nature of heaven in his treatise On the substance of heaven (De substantia orbis) is groundless and contradicts Aristotle’s words—and his own as well. Here it will suffice to read what Maimonides said on this subject. For this reason, I began some years ago (zeh yamim) to translate the questions on the Physics by John the Canon,64 who defends Scotus’s doctrine or, at least, a doctrine of the Scotists (in fact, Scotus’s school has many branches, which agree on fundamental issues, but differ greatly from each other, so that they have become different schools; and this is due to the difficulty of Scotus’s books). However, at the beginning of this translation I came across great difficulties, which I was unable to solve: in order to do this, I should have diluted the text with many explanations, but this would have destroyed its original meaning. If in translating the text I had employed expressions which are usual among us, nobody would have been able to understand its 64

In the text: Goan Qalongi (elsewhere it is written Qanongi), apparently a transliteration of Joan Calongi or Canongi—probably a Catalan rendering of the Latin name Johannes Canonicus, “John the Canon”.

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contents, since Scotus’s school uses concepts that are different from the ones we are used to in our philosophy, and, in order to express them, new images (h.iqquyim), terms and expressions are needed. Therefore, I interrupted my translation, since I thought it necessary to deal with other subjects. I have recently come across the Questions on the Metaphysics by Antonius Andreas,65 who follows Scotus’s doctrine strictly, without inclining to the opinions of Francis of Marchia (Fransisqo de Margiah), Francis of Meyronnes (Fransisqo de Mayronis), Gerald Odonis (Geraldo Odonis) and the other philosophers who follow Scotus’s doctrine in general but disagree with him on many particular points. The words of Andreas are not as difficult as John the Canon’s: therefore, I have decided to translate this book into Hebrew; moreover, one must recognise that Scotus’s doctrine, more than any other, provides a very valuable key for the knowledge of metaphysics. However, I believe that Scotus’s doctrine is not equally useful for the knowledge of physics; and the followers of Scotus are well aware of the fact that they are mostly experts in metaphysics, as will be clear to the reader of this book. After having translated this book, I hope to translate also Andreas’s On the Three Principles of Nature (De tribus principiis rerum naturalium), so that the reader will be able to survey the whole of Scotus’s doctrine. Moreover, one must note that Andreas, in the Questions on the Metaphysics, omits to deal with some questions because he relies upon what he has already said in the Principles of Nature. In translating this book, I will use expressions close to those that are familiar to us, but I will employ them broadly and in a metaphorical sense (be-harh.avah u-ve-ha‘varah). In this way, I am sure that the reader will find it easy to understand their meaning and will become accustomed to their use while reading. In many places I will write some expressions directly in Latin, for two reasons: (1) if the reader is unable to understand them, he can ask a Christian scholar to help him understand their meaning, and perhaps to render them in a different way; (2) since these expressions are very far removed from everyday language, it would be difficult for the reader to render (heshiv) them in that language, or these renderings would not 65

In the text: Ant.oni Andrev, apparently a transliteration of Antoni Andreu, the Catalan name of Antonius Andreas.

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be appropriate, so that it would become impossible to debate with Christian scholars on these matters, even if one spoke in their language in order to avoid misunderstandings.66 In any case, those who want to know precisely the specific expressions used in Scotus’s doctrine will be able to study them in my translation of the questions on the Physics by John the Canon: there, I will write down all these expressions, alphabetically arranged, in Hebrew and in Latin, and I will explain their use, their meaning and their truthfulness. Now, in order to understand the meaning of this book, it will suffice to explain the above mentioned seven distinctions; and I will now begin to explain them according to the intention of Antonius Andreas. Preamble Since “the same (hu’ hu’ )” and “the other (zulat)” are characteristics (massigim) of being qua being, which is the subject of metaphysics (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, book I, introduction, according to the redaction used by Latin scholars [ha-nims.a’ ’es.el ha-Nos.erim],67 and book VI), and since every science should study the characteristics specific to its subject, since its aim is to explain by demonstration how these characteristics exist in that subject (cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, book I, and Metaphysics, book IV), the metaphysical philosopher should begin by understanding which are, conceptually (‘al derek ha-s.iyyur), the different kinds of otherness (zulatiyyut) and sameness. The different kinds of otherness meant here are not those assumed in book IV of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (i.e., the distinctions in number, species, genus and relationship), since this division is based upon external things (i.e., upon the subjects), and not upon the otherness found in the real existence of things. In fact, the distinction between Ruben and Simon in their real existence is also found in the distinction between the individuals of man and the individuals of horse, since, as the individual of man does not depend upon the individual of horse so that the generation and corruption of the 66

For some comments on this passage, see Zonta, La filosofia antica, p. 119. Habillo is referring to chapters 1–2 of book I of the Metaphysics, which he translated from Latin: see above, list of Habillo’s works, on number D.4.4. 67

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former do not depend upon the generation and corruption of the latter, in the same way Ruben does not depend on Simon, and vice versa. The distinction where the whole is assumed as one thing is internal, i.e., it is assumed from things intrinsic (penimi) to the distinctions themselves; this is the distinction in existence. As for the distinction concerning the subjects, it is external, and therefore it is not essential; in fact, what is essential is assumed from the real subsistence of the thing. From this division derive the different degrees of distinction according to Scotus and the Scotists. The distinctions commonly known to us are only two: the mental distinction and the extra-mental distinction, which is called “real distinction” (h.illuf be-davar). The Ancients did not know any other kind of distinction, since they argued that everything exists either in mind or outside of mind (and the fact that a thing exists in mind means that it depends upon an act of mind, i.e., it is a mental act). Therefore, the distinction, which is one of the characteristics of being, must be either in mind or outside of mind. As for the things for which Scotists assume a “formal distinction” or a “distinction in the nature of things”, they can be things or not. If they are not, there is no real, extra-mental distinction between them; if they are, there is between them neither a formal distinction nor a distinction in the nature of things, but the distinction that the Ancients called “extramental distinction”. If so, there are only two distinctions; this is the opinion of Thomas Aquinas. Now, Scotus argues against this: he claims that it is necessary to suppose another distinction, since Aristotle (De anima, book III) affirms that a magnitude and its being (i.e., its quiddity) are not the same thing—and this is valid, generally speaking, both for the quiddity and for what has that quiddity. Now, there is no real distinction between quiddity and what has that quiddity, since they cannot be separated, so that their distinction is in the nature of things. Quiddity and what has that quiddity are individuals of the substance: cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, book VII, where the philosopher discusses the question whether quiddity is separated from what has that quiddity, as Plato thought (this question has been explained by Averroes and Thomas Aquinas). John the Canon studies the case of man and of the quiddity of man, and concludes that there is a distinction between “man” and “rational animal” which is independent of

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the act of mind, and which he calls “distinction in the nature of things”.68 After this preamble, I will explain the meanings of the seven distinctions assumed by Scotus, as follows: (1) distinction in mind; (2) distinction in the nature of things; (3) formal distinction; (4) real distinction; (5) essential distinction; (6) subjective distinction between two things in their totality; (7) objective distinction between two things in their totality.69 I will explain this doctrine as briefly as possible, without giving my own comments about what is true and what is doubtful, and without giving a resolution to such questions; nor will I insist on the examples they give of each distinction (e.g., they claim that the distinction between human intellect and human will is in the nature of things; but this is not an easy question, since this claim conflicts with the opinion of all the other philosophers). To tackle this question would involve an examination of most philosophical questions, since these distinctions are one of the main pillars of Scotism; so, I will present their doctrine as an hypothesis, without discussing it. Now, since these distinctions are difficult to understand, I will explain each distinction according to its concept, as follows. Distinction in mind or in intellect—in Latin, distinctio rationis. Things which are distinct in mind are made distinct by an act of intellect which relates and connects them, or by another connecting faculty of the soul. The act of intellect (cf. Aristotle, De anima, book III) can be of two kinds: (1) either the intellect perceives the simple quiddities—and this act operates no distinction at all, since 68 I have been unable to locate the literal source of this passage. However, one can compare it with John the Canon, Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum, book I, q. 5: Diffinitio [e.g., “rational animal”]et diffinitum [e.g., “man”]distinguuntur ex natura rei (cf. Joannis Canonici Super octo libros Physicorum quaestiones, Venetiis 1481, f. 24ra, ll. 43–44). 69 Cf. the Tractatus formalitatum . . . Francisci Mayronis, ed. cit., f. 265ra, ll. 58– 62: Modi distinctionum sunt septem, quoniam quae distinguuntur aut distinguuntur ratione, aut ex natura rei, aut distinctione formali, aut distinctione reali, aut distinctione essentiali, aut distinctione se totis subiective, aut distinctione se totis obiective. Cf. also Antonius Andreas’s Tractatus abbreviatus de modis distinctionum, ms. Padua, Biblioteca Universitaria, no. 1580, f. 113ra, ll. 10–17: Prima distinctio est: eorum quae distinguuntur quaedam distinguuntur ratione, quaedam ex natura rei. Secunda distinctio est: eorum quae distinguuntur ex natura rei, quaedam distinguuntur realiter, quaedam distinguuntur formaliter, quaedam essentialiter. Tertia distinctio est: distinctorum essentialiter quaedam distinguuntur se totis subiective, quaedam se totis obiective.

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the distinction is a relationship between two things; (2) or the intellect combines and divides things—and this is the distinction in mind (e.g., the distinction between the way from Jerusalem to Hebron and the way from Hebron to Jerusalem, which exists only in the mind).70 Distinction in the nature of things—in Latin, distinctio ex natura rei. Things which are distinct in the nature of things are distinct regardless of any act of intellect: e.g., being an ass is not opposed to being an animal, but it is opposed to being a man, so that there is a distinction between ass and man, since affirmation and negation cannot be true of the same thing. Therefore, this distinction is called “distinction in the nature of things”—because, despite the absence of any act of intellect, there is a distinction between these things in their very nature.71 One can understand this distinction by considering divine intellect and will: God’s intellect perceives good and evil, but God’s will wants only good, so that there is a distinction between intellect and will. 70

This passage is almost a literal translation of the corresponding passage of the Tractatus formalitatum . . . Francisci Mayronis, ed. cit., f. 265rb, ll. 32–45: Distinctio rationis vel illa distinguuntur ratione quae distinguuntur per actum collativum vel comparativum intellectus, vel alicuius potentiae collativae (. . .) iuxta doctrinam Aristotelis III De anima, ubi ait: intellectus agens est omnia facens. (. . .) Actus ipsius intellectus est duplex. Primum est simplices quidditates rerum apprehendens, et iuxta istum modum nec est identitas nec distinctio. Secundum est comparare vel dividere, et penes istum modum creatur distinctio rationis, qualis est via de Athenis ad Thebas, quae solum est rationis. Andreas’s Tractatus treats the same question differently: cf. ms. Padua, ff. 113ra, l. 17–113rb, l. 1: Illa distinguuntur ratione, non quidem ratione reali reperta in re distinguibili vel distincta secundum rationem, idest in intellectus fabricatione, quaecumque distinguuntur per actum collativum seu comparativum intellectus possibilis vel alterius potentiae collativae (. . .). Dico autem actum collativum quod duplex est actus intellectus possibilis, scilicet: primarius sive rectus et secundarius sive reflexus sive comparativus. Primarius actus dicitur quo fertur in obiectum absolute; secundarius sive collativus quo fertur in obiectum ipsum alii comparando. (. . .) Ergo dicitur distinctio rationis vel aliquid distinguitur ab alio ratione quando id distinguitur ab illo non quidem primo sive recto actu intellectus possibilis seu alterius potentiae, sed quando actu secundo sive reflexo, quod quidem actus reflexus dicitur comparativus non solum autem intellectus possibilis est potentia collativa–scilicet voluntas et imaginatio (. . .). Praedictae duae potentiae possunt creare vel originare distinctionem rationis. 71 This passage seems to reflect both the Tractatus formalitatum (ed. cit., f. 265va, ll. 1–6: Circa distinctionem ex natura rei queritur per quod distinguuntur ex natura rei, et dico quod illa quae habent esse praeter opus intellectus. [. . .] Vel aliter: illa distinguuntur ex natura rei de quibus praedicata contradictoria possunt verificari praeter opus intellectus) and Andreas’s Tractatus (ms. Padua, f. 113rb, ll. 6–10: Illa distinguuntur ex natura rei precise quorum distinctio precise dependet ex rationibus propriis terminorum et non ab actu alicuius potentiae collativae qualis est distinctio hominis ab asino).

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The philosophers explain that this distinction can be of three kinds: 1. the first is opposition as a mutual relationship: there is a distinction between true opposite things that are mutually related. For example, the mover and the moved thing are mutually related (mis.tarrefim); now, will is the mover of intellect, since the former orders the latter to perceive, and the latter is moved by the former; therefore, there is a distinction between intellect and will. Such a distinction cannot be a real distinction, since these two things cannot be separated; therefore, it is a distinction in the nature of things; 2. the second is contrariety: there is a distinction between true contraries (hefekim). For example, the substrate and its specific passion (e.g., man and laughter) are contraries, since the substrate exists per se while the specific passion exists in another thing; therefore, there is a distinction between them which is not a real distinction, but is a distinction in the nature of things; 3. the third is contradiction: the existence of something and its opposite cannot be true of the same thing. For example, the parts make the whole exist, but the whole does not make anything exist; if so, there is a distinction between the parts and the whole, but it is not a real distinction, since the parts as a whole cannot be distinguished from the whole; therefore, this is a distinction in the nature of things.72 72

The source of the above “division” is, with some alterations, the Tractatus formalitatum . . . Francisci Mayronis, ed. cit., f. 265va, ll. 18–35: Secundo noto quot modis investigatur talis distinctio, et breviter dico quod quattuor modis, scilicet per quattuor genera oppositionum, scilicet: contrariam, contradictoriam, relativam et privativam. Per relativam sic: nam movens et motum opponuntur relative, et applicantur intellectui et voluntati. Nam voluntas vult et est movens : nam ipsa est tamquam regina in regno et imperat intellectui quod intelligat; ergo ipsa est movens, intellectus vero movetur. Ergo distinctio est inter ista praeter fabricationem intellectus, non realis (ed.: realem) secundum Augustinum, ergo ex natura rei. Secundo per oppositionem contrariorum: et sic investigatur distinctio ex natura rei inter ens ad se et ens ad aliquid, quae opponuntur proprie, et applicantur subiecto et propriae passioni. Nam subiectum est ens ad se: puta hominem; propria passio est ens ad aliquid: puta risibilita [tem]; ergo distinctio est inter illa non realis, ergo ex natura rei. Tertio per oppositionem privativam (. . .) (this form of distinction is omitted by Habillo). Quarto et ultimo per oppositionem contradictoriam, applicando ista duo contradictoria, scilicet constituere et non constituere; nam partes constituunt, totum vero non constituit. Ergo est distinctio inter illa non realis, ergo ex natura rei.

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Formal distinction—in Latin, distinctio formalis. In the first place, it should be noted that the formality (s.uriyyut) of something is not what defines that thing, as some people say,73 since there are many things that have no definition, but have a real formality, general characteristics (massigim kolelim) and ultimate differentiae (hevdelim ’ah.aronim), so that the act of intellect is not determined by definition. Therefore, it would appear that the formality of something consists in its being finite or infinite, in its having an addition or a defect, since, when the thing is perceived by the intellect, the act of intellect is determined by those things, called “modes of existence”—but those things are not “formality”, according to Scotus. Francis of Meyronnes wrote that “formality is the quidditative thing which a thing has, regardless of whether it has a definition”.74 Nicholas Bonet said: “Formality is that which, when it is added to a thing, changes the formal ratio (‘inyan) of the things that subsist (mequyyemim) in that thing; or that which is included in a thing primarily, per se”.75 From this, three conclusions follow: 1. essential divisive things are formalities when a distinction is assumed in what subsists (mequyyemim) through them (i.e., in the species which subsists in that genus, and in the essential divisive differentia of the genus which makes that species subsist); 2. all predicates concern being; being, in general, concerns individuals, which, in general, are not formalities; 3. the first formality is the quiddity of being, which is the subject of metaphysics. After having explained this point, one can say that things that are formally distinct are those things one of which, according to an ultimate abstraction (ba-hafshat.ah ha-’ah.aronah), is not included in 73

Cf. Tractatus formalitatum . . . Francisci Mayronis, ed. cit., f. 263va, ll. 2–3: Formalitas non est ratio diffinitiva rei adaequate. 74 This is an explicit, literal quotation of the Tractatus formalitatum secundum doctrinam Francisci Mayronis, ed. cit., f. 263va, ll. 11–12: Formalitas est quidditas uniuscuiusque rei, sive ipsum sit diffinibile, sive non. 75 The literal source of this quotation is the definition of “formality” in Nicholas Bonet’s Formalitates. See Nicolaus Bonet, Formalitates secundum viam doctoris subtilis, Venetiis 1489 (copy in Rome, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Stamp. Barb. BBB III 16, variously paged), on f. 1va, ll. 31–34, of the text of Bonet’s work: Illud est formalitas, vel quidditas, quod idem est: quod additum alteri variat rationem eius formalem, scilicet, constituti ex illo cui additur, vel per se est inclusum in ratione formali alicuius.

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the quiddity of the other. In this sense, there is a formal distinction between a subject and its specific passion, i.e., between what has a property and the property itself, since the passion is not included in the quidditative characteristic of the subject. For example, laughter is not included in the quidditative characteristics of man; from this it follows that there is a formal identity (’ah.adut) between animal and man, since animal is one of the first characteristics of man, while the reverse is not true (since man is not one of the first characteristics of animal). It can be said that, when one thing is included in another primarily, it is identical to it according to a formal identity.76 Predication has two senses: (1) formal predication; (2) the predication that Latins call identica. Formal predication concerns essential predicates; in this case, one has to use a derivative (nigzar)77 noun, e.g., “man is an animal”. The predication called identica concerns universal things outside of any genus, which are called in Latin trascendentes, e.g., being, the one and the good; in this case, one can use either a derivative or a primitive (nifrad) noun: e.g., “the good is a being”; “goodness is an existence”. I say “outside of any genus”, since these things are said of created and non-created beings.78 A thing can be abstracted from another when it includes that thing in its signification; and the more things it includes, the more things it can be abstracted from. The composite noun includes something in its signification in either of the following five ways: 76 Cf. Andreas’s Tractatus, f. 113rb, ll. 10–17: Illa distinguuntur formaliter quaecumque inter se habent quod unum ab alio ultimative abstractum non includit quidditative reliquum, sicut in divinis bonitas a virtute et sapientia ultimative abstracta non includunt se quidditative, sive istis rationibus quidditativis, licet includant se identice. In this case, the definition given in the Tractatus formalitatum is different (ed. cit., 265va, ll. 37–40: Quae distinguuntur formaliter . . . sunt illa quorum praedicata non ponuntur in eadem diffinitione, scilicet in diversis, ut homo et asinus). 77 A “derivative” term is any noun or adjective derived from a “primitive” term which refers to a general concept: e.g., “good” with respect to “goodness”. 78 Cf. Andreas’s Tractatus, f. 114ra, ll. 7–26 (this passage is included in the discussion of the distinctio realis): Praedicatio quidem essentialis distinguitur secundum mentem Scoti in quolibet significatu suo, quia quaedam est praedicatio identica, quaedam formalis. Ad praedicationem autem identicam duo necessario requiruntur: primum est quod primum et secundum sunt idem essentialiter ( . . . ). Secundum est quod utrumque extremum scilicet secundum et primum vel eorum alterum sit infinitum vel formaliter sicut in divinis, vel permissive sicut in transcendentibus simpliciter ( . . . ). Prima autem praedicatio est formalis in qua primum pertinet identice ad rationem quidditativam.

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1. the superior is found in the inferior, e.g., “animal” is found in “man”; 2. the nature includes the individual subject, e.g., “man” includes “Socrates”; 3. one quidditative thing includes another quidditative thing, e.g., “genus” includes “differentia”; 4. sometimes the name of the accident happens to include the substrate, e.g., “sighted” (ba‘al mar’eh) includes “eye”; 5. sometimes the relationship includes the foundation of the relationship, e.g., “similar” includes “white”. The modes of abstraction correspond to the above modes of composition, as follows: 1. the superior is abstracted from the inferior, e.g., “animal” from “man”; 2. the nature is abstracted from the individual subject, e.g., “humanity” from “Socrates”; 3. one quidditative thing is abstracted from another quidditative thing, e.g., “animal” from “rational”; 4. the accident is abstracted from the substrate, e.g., “whiteness” from “wood”; 5. the relationship is abstracted from the foundation of the relationship, e.g., “similarity” from “whiteness”. Some of these abstractions can be found in God Himself: the abstraction of the superior from the inferior, e.g., being abstracted from this particular being; or the abstraction of the nature from the individual subject—and this is found in the Christian doctrine of God; or the abstraction of one quidditative thing from another quidditative thing, e.g., God’s will abstracted from God’s knowledge.79 79

These “divisions” are almost literally taken from the Tractatus formalitatum . . . Francisci Mayronis, ed. cit., ff. 266rb, l. 56–266va, l. 12 (although in this work they are treated under the heading “real distinction”): Sciendum est quod concretum quantum ad praesens spectat est quadruplex (sic) differentia. Nam prima est secundum quod superior concernit suum inferior; exemplum sicut animal concernit hominem. Secundum est secundum quod natura concernit suum suppositum, ut humanitas Petri. Tertia, secundum quod una ratio quidditativa concernit aliam; exemplum sicut genus differentiam. Quarta, secundum quod accidens respicit subiectum, ut coloratum lignum. Quinta, secundum quod relatio concernit suum proprium subiectum, ut filiatio concernit filium. Secundum ergo numerum et diversitatem praedictarum concretionum numerantur vel diversificantum abstractiones, ita tantum quod primus modus abstractionis est secundum quem superius abstrahitur ab inferiori, ut sicut animal abstrahitur

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In substantial things, only one kind of abstraction is absent: that of the superior from the inferior. Some things are neither identical according to a formal identity, nor formally distinct: in fact, the mode of existence of a thing, as far as its name is concerned (kefi shemiyyuto), is neither identical to that thing according to a formal identity, nor is it distinct from it according to a formal distinction. A formal distinction occurs only between two species of formalities, and the mode of existence intrinsic to something is not the formality of that thing. When we say that two individuals that belong to the same species are identical “in form”, this does not mean that they are formally identical: in fact, any thing that is formally identical to another thing is included in it primarily, and this is not the case with two individuals of the same species. Moreover, any thing that is formally identical to another thing is really identical to it; however, two individuals are not really identical, but really distinct, since they are two distinct things. Therefore, the statement that two individuals of the same species are identical in form should be intended in a different way. This distinction can be intended either according to definition, or according to division, or according to description, or according to demonstration: 1. according to definition, since those things that have distinct definitions are formally distinct; 2. according to division, since, when something common to opposite differentiae is divided, every thing that is included in one part of the division is formally distinct with respect to every thing ab homine; secundus modus est secundum quem natura abstrahitur a proprio supposito, ut humanitas a Socrate; tertius modus est secundum quem una ratio quidditativa abstrahitur ab alia, sicut animalitas a rationabilitate, et e contrario; quartus est secundum quem relatio abstrahitur a suo fundamento, ut sicut filiatio abstrahitur a filio. Circa quae quattuor sunt hic notanda: primum quod in divinis possunt fieri quattuor abstractiones, sive quattuor modi abstrahendi. (Habillo accepts only the following three abstractions.)De primo patet quod ibi superior abstrahitur ab inferiori, sicut ens ab hoc ente, et sapientia ab hac sapientia, scilicet divina, et sic filiatio ab hac filiatione, scilicet divina. De secundo patet, nam essentia divina potest abstrahi a quolibet supposito, sic divinitas a Patre, Filio et Spiritu Sancto. De tertio patet, nam essentia divina potest abstrahi a quolibet attributo, ut divinitas a bonitate. This topic is discussed in a very similar, though not identical, way in Andreas’s Tractatus, ff. 113va, l. 20–113vb, l. 11 (where, like in Habillo, it is treated under the heading “formal distinction”).

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that is included in the other part (e.g., being is divided into absolute and relative; every thing that is included in absolute being is formally distinct with respect to every thing that is included in relative being); 3. according to description, since the distinction results from a genus and a specific passion; those things that have distinct specific passions have distinct definitions, so that they are formally distinct; 4. according to demonstration, since, when the existence of something is demonstrated in one thing, but its existence in another thing cannot be demonstrated, those two things are formally distinct (since demonstrations are distinct due to their middle terms: cf. Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, book I). The iteration (hekfel ) of a term indicates its formal meaning: e.g., “man insofar as he is man”; in this also the formal distinction is evident: e.g., “a man, insofar as it is man, is an animal”; “a stone, insofar as it is stone, is not an animal”—where man and stone are formally distinct.80 Formality does not always depend upon a specific form, i.e., when many species of formalities are assumed for a thing, that thing does not always have the same number of forms.81 Sometimes this happens because the formality of genus and the formality of differentia are assumed in a substantial compound of distinct forms; on the contrary, e.g., whiteness is a simple form, but two species of

80

The above “division” is taken literally from the Tractatus formalitatum . . . Francisci Mayronis, ed. cit., ff. 265va, l. 62–265vb, l. 14: Noto quot modis investigatur distinctio formalis, et dico quod quattuor modis, scilicet diffinitione, divisione, descriptione, demonstratione. Primo diffinitione, quare illa quae sic se habent quod unum non ponitur in diffinitione alterius, ut homo et asinus. Divisione investigatur sic: nam quoniam aliquid commune dividitur per differentias oppositas omne contentum sub uno membro distinguitur formaliter ab alio, et ab omni contento sub illo. Pono tibi tale exemplum accomodatum. Nam ens dividitur per absolutum et respectivum: omnia contenta sub absoluto distinguuntur formaliter a respectivo et ab omni contento sub respectivo. Descriptione investigatur sic: nam descriptio constat ex genere et differentia et propria passione, scilicet quae habent distinctas proprias passiones habent distinctas descriptiones, et per consequens distinguuntur formaliter. Demonstratione sic: nam quandocumque aliquid est demonstrabile de uno, sed (ed.: quod) non de reliquo, talia distinguuntur formaliter, cum demonstrationes varientur per media, ut patet I Posteriorum. Alio modo potest investigari sic, scilicet per viam reduplicationis. Nam reduplicatio dicit causam formalem, arguendo sic: homo in quantum homo est animal; lapis in quantum lapis non est animal; ergo distinguuntur formaliter. 81 On this doctrine, cf. the Tractatus formalitatum, ed. cit., f. 263rb, ll. 13–21.

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formalities are assumed in it: the formality of colour and the formality of whiteness. Real distinction—in Latin, distinctio realis. Things that are really distinct are things each one of which is formally positive (hanah.i) (i.e., in its form and essence there is something affirmative, neither negative nor privative [he‘ederi]), and each one of which is a whole thing, not a part of a thing (e.g., Socrates and Plato: each of them is a whole thing, not a part of a thing, and each of them is positive, neither negative nor privative). Therefore, there can be no real distinction between privation (he‘eder)82 and existence, since privation is not a positive thing.83 Real distinction concerns two positive things. However, from the fact that they are not really distinct, it does not necessarily follow that they are really identical: rather, they are non-identical (lo’ ’eh.ad); in fact, “non-identical” is more general than “distinct”, since every distinct thing is non-identical, but the reverse is not true. How can we distinguish between things and parts of things? For example, let us consider two men; each of them subsists per se, but is made up of the combination of two parts: matter and form. One of two individuals can subsist without the other, but this is not true in the case of substrate and accident. In the case of two things primarily included per se in the same thing, each of them is a part of a thing, not a thing proper. For this reason, there can be no real distinction between man and animal, since, with respect to man, animal is not a thing, but a part included in it. This distinction can be meant in three senses: in the sense of generation, in the sense of corruption, and in the sense of separation. 82

The term for “privation” employed here has also the sense of “nonexistence”. 83 Cf. Andreas’s Tractatus, ff. 113vb, l. 30–114ra, l. 4: Illa distinguuntur realiter quaecumque intra se habent quod quodlibet formaliter est positivum et unum ab alio ultimative abstractum nullo modo includit aliud nec potest de illo identice nec formaliter praedicari. Dico autem primo, quod quodlibet formaliter sit positivum: nam ad hoc quod aliquid sit distinctum proprie realiter (ms. realis) requiritur quod utrumque sit formaliter aliquid positivum, et ideo negationes et privationes intra se nec ab aliquo alio realiter distinguuntur, quia non dicunt formaliter aliquid positivum, licet privationes concernant et connotent seu in suo significatu interiori dicunt aliquid positivum; secundo dico quod unum ab alio ultimative abstractum non possit de alio praedicari. A different definition is in the Tractatus formalitatum, ed. cit., f. 266ra, ll. 37 ff.

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1. In the sense of generation: if one thing is generated and the other is not, these things are really distinct. This is the meaning of the distinction between matter and form. 2. In the sense of corruption: if one thing is destroyed and the other survives, these things are really distinct. This is the meaning of the distinction between the relationship and the foundation of relationship (e.g., the similarity [dimyon] and the whiteness, the accident and the substrate), since the former is destroyed but the latter survives. 3. In the sense of separation: if two things are separated from each other or can be understood separately, they are really distinct (e.g., Socrates and Plato, the accident and the substrate). The distinction is superior to the separation, since every separate thing is distinct, but the reverse is not true. Many people err on this point, because they think that the only real distinction is between things that are separated from each other, in a way that would necessarily entail that substance and accident are really identical.84 Essential distinction—in Latin, distinctio essentialis. Things that are essentially distinct are those things each one of which exists without the other, e.g., accident and substrate, matter and form. This distinction can be meant in the sense of generation and corruption (since, when one thing is generated or corrupted and the other does not change, the two things are essentially distinct), in the sense of separation (since things that can be separated from each other are essentially distinct, e.g., accident and substrate), and 84

This division is taken from the Tractatus formalitatum . . . Francisci Mayronis, ed. cit., f. 266rb, ll. 1–18: Nota quot modis investigatur distinctio realis. Et breviter dico quod quattuor modis. (. . .) (Habillo omits the first mode.) Secundo modo via generationis. Nam si unum generatur, reliquum vero non, illa realiter distinguuntur, et isto modo investigamus inter materiam et formam. Nam forma generatur, materia vero non, quia est ingenerabilis et incorruptibilis, ex I Physicorum. Tertio via corruptionis, et hoc sic: nam quando aliqua sic se habent quod unum corrumpitur, reliquum vero non, illa realiter distinguuntur, et isto modo investigatur inter relationem et fundamentum, accidens et subiectum. Nam relatio corrumpitur manente fundamento, ut patet (. . .). Si diceres ex quo illa sunt corrupta est distinctio inter illa, dico quod non, nam distinctio realis duo extrema requirit in actu. Quarto via separationis. Nam quando aliqua sic se habent quod separata existunt vel possunt esistere, illa realiter distinguuntur, ut Socrates et Plato.

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in the sense of genera and species (since diverse [zulati] genera and their species are essentially distinct).85 This distinction and the real distinction are always found together in created things (in fact, two created things that are really distinct are also essentially distinct), but not in non-created things. In fact, Scotists do not assume an essential distinction between those divine things they call personas,86 since they believe that their essentiality (heyotiyyut) and essence (‘as.mut)87 are the same, but they assume a real distinction between them.88 However, we should not bother about this; therefore, this fifth distinction is useless, as if it did not exist. Subjective distinction between two things in their totality—in Latin, se totis subiective. Things that are thus distinct are those whose essences are distinct, and which are separated from each other in their existence in actu, like two individuals of the same species.89 Someone might object that this distinction is always found together with the real distinction; but this is not so, since a separation in actu is not necessarily found in a real distinction, while it is necessarily found in this distinction. 85

This definition reflects both Andreas’s Tractatus (f. 114rb, ll. 10–17: Illa distinguuntur essentialiter quaecumque inter se habent quod uno existente aliud non existit vel non opus existere, ut quando unum est natum prius alio vel quando uno corrupto vel destructo non opus aliud corrumpi, vel quando unum potest poni sine alio per potentiam aliquam in actuali existentia, sicut homo et angelus), and the Tractatus formalitatum (ed. cit., f. 266va, ll. 36–38: Illa distinguuntur essentialiter quae per aliquam potentiam possunt esse separata, ut materia et forma, accidens et substantia). 86 Habillo is apparently referring to the Christian doctrine of the three persons of the Holy Trinity. 87 Cf. also below. 88 Cf. the Tractatus formalitatum, ed. cit., f. 266va, ll. 41–45: Distinctio realis simpliciter in plus se habet quaedam essentialis. Nam bene sequitur: distinguuntur essentialiter, ergo realiter; tantum non convertitur in divinis. In creaturis autem convertibiliter se habent, quoniam quaecumque distinguuntur realiter distinguuntur essentialiter, et e converso. Scotus upholds the doctrine according to which there is a real distinction between the three persons of the Trinity, but no real distinction in God’s essence: see J. Ross and T. Bates, Duns Scotus on Natural Theology, in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, 193–237, on p. 233, note 68. 89 The source of this passage is Andreas’s Tractatus, f. 114rb, ll. 18–24: Illa distinguuntur se totis subiective quaecumque inter se habent quod realitates eorum sunt distinctae numero vel individuo vel in actuali existentia vel quando realitas unius est particularizata et divisa a realitate alterius, sicut Petrus et Andreas et quaelibet individua eiusdem speciei.

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This distinction bears this name because the individual is called “subject” with reference to its existence per se (cf. Aristotle, De anima, book III); in this sense, the individual is the subject of all things, and all things are predicated of it. Two individuals of the same species, even though they are identical in their form, as to their essences and quiddities, are distinct in their totality, as to their subjective existence due to which they are subjects; in fact, neither of them depends at all upon the other, and their existences are distinct in their totality. Objective distinction between two things in their totality—in Latin, se totis obiective. Things that are thus distinct are those things which do not share the same really existing characteristic, predicated of them univocally (be-haskamah meshuttaf ) (e.g., two divisive differentiae of being, since they do not share the same really existing characteristic, predicated of them univocally), because there is nothing superior to them apart from being itself, and being is not predicated of them univocally. In fact, what is predicated univocally is predicated in quid, since this is its quidditative characteristic, but the divided genus cannot be predicated of its divisive differentiae in quid (cf. Aristotle, De anima, book III, where he explains why being cannot be a genus).90 This is a very difficult matter, because it contradicts most of Scotus’s own doctrine, which affirms that being is predicated univocally of all the other things.91 Despite this, I have mentioned this point now, because it is related to the Scotist doctrine that the divisive differentiae of being do not share the same common (muskam) characteristic, since being is not predicated of them in quid. If you object that, if so, those differentiae are not beings, you should read book I, question 1, and book IV, question 4, of this book (i.e., Andreas’s Quaestiones in Metaphysicam):92 there you will find the resolution of this question according to Scotus. 90

For the model of this passage, cf. Andreas’s Tractatus, f. 114rb, ll. 24–31: Illa distinguuntur se totis obiective quod numquam inveniuntur in aliquo una realitate seu ratione quidditativa vel a quibus non potest abstrahi aliquis conceptus univocus realis seu propriae rationis sicut sunt differentiae formales et individuales et alia quae habent conceptum quidditativum et qualitativum sicut ens et bonum. 91 On this doctrine, see King, Scotus on Metaphysics, pp. 18–21. 92 See Antonii Andreae Super XII libros Metaphysicorum quaestiones, Vicentiis 1477 [copy in Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, 111 G 15], ff. 1rb–8vb (book I, q. 1: Utrum ens simpliciter sumptum quod est commune Deo et creaturae sit scientiae metaphysicae subiectum primum primitate adaequationis) and ff. 41vb–43ra (book IV,

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This distinction bears this name because things that are thus distinct do not share any characteristic insofar as they are objects of an act of intellect. Obviously, these things are distinct in their totality in their subjective existence; but, when the intellect perceives them, they have no common characteristic: this is why I say “objective”, since by “object” (munnah.) I intend the thing which is assumed (yunnah.) as opposed to potentiality, so that one can act through it or receive an action from it (e.g., sight with respect to the potentiality of seeing, or voice with respect to the potentiality of hearing). In our language, we are in the habit of calling the object “substrate” (nose’ ), but this term is usually employed in a metaphorical sense;93 accordingly, I have decided to use here the term “object” (munnah.) instead, because what is meant here is the object as opposed to potentiality, not the “substrate”. The prime substance is called by Christians obiectum, while the second substance is called subiectum, and the sense of obiectum is “that which stays opposed”, while the sense of subiectum is “that which stays below”. Those differentiae which are said to be objectively distinct in their totality are called “diverse” (zulati), not “different” (nivdal), since different things are such due to their differentiae, but agree in something (i.e., the substrate of the differentiae), while diverse things are different in their totality (e.g., the ultimate differentiae of the species: cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, book X). Different things should be reducible to diverse things,94 otherwise the differentiae would be endless. In fact, a different thing is such due to a differentia, and a differentia is either diverse or different. If it is diverse, the result is evident; if it is different, it has a differentia: in the latter case, one should continue the investigation until he encounters a diverse differentia, otherwise there would be endless differentiae—and this is absurd (see Aristotle, Metaphysics, book II). This is a concise explanation of these distinctions, according to the opinion of the author of this book(i.e., Antonius Andreas), which q. 4: Utrum istud principium: impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse, sit firmissimum et notissimum). 93 Habillo is probably referring to the fact that in Medieval Hebrew nose’ is often employed to mean the “subject” of a proposition. 94 Cf. the Tractatus formalitatum . . . Francisci Mayronis, f. 267rb, ll. 7–13: Omnia illa quae sunt diversa distinguuntur se totis obiective. (. . .) Aliud est dicere aliqua esse diversa et differentia. (. . .) Iuxta quod dicit Scotus quod omnis differentia differentium reducitur ad aliqua diversa.

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I begin to translate here. These distinctions are assumed and distinguished according to their own order, but the orders of distinction and identity are opposite.95 In fact, in the case of identity, the second identity is always the necessary result of the first identity (since what is identical in the nature of things is formally identical and really identical, and so on), while the reverse is not true (i.e., not every thing that is really identical is formally identical, and so on). In the case of distinction, however, the opposite is true, since what is distinct according to the second distinction is also distinct according to the first distinction, while the reverse is not true. In some places in this introduction, I have called the formal distinction “distinction in form” and the real distinction “extra-mental distinction” or “distinction in existence”, since this distinction differs from the preceding distinctions in that it has a true extra-mental existence and is not affected by the act of intellect; moreover, this expression can be understood easily. I have called the essential (heyoti) distinction “‘as.muti distinction” or “distinction in ‘as.mut”, since in Hebrew we are used to calling essentiality (heyotiyyut) “‘as.mut”96 (in Latin, essentia) and the ‘as.mut of something is its essence. The reader will understand the meaning of all this. After this introduction, which is necessary for understanding the sense of the book, let us begin our translation. Introduction to the Hebrew Translation of Johannes Versor’s Questions on the Physics (Partial English Translation) (ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 1000, ff. 4r, l. 28–4v, l. 5; ff. 4v, l. 9–5r, l. 3) I, Eli ben Joseph Habillo from the kingdom of Castile, whom God has lead to this place, Monz´on, near the border with the kingdom of Aragon, have devoted myself to studying, investigating and knowing various things, and I have paid attention to what Christians say. I have seen this problem: Jews have widely studied the books of 95 Cf. Andreas’s Tractatus, f. 114rb, ll. 31 ff. (Quotiens distinguitur distinctio, totiens et identitas) and f. 114rb, l. 40–114va, l. 2: Descriptiones istarum identitatum (ms. identitatis) sunt accipiendae per oppositionem ad descriptiones supradictas de modis distinctionum. 96 In Medieval Hebrew, ‘as.mut usually has the meaning of “essence” (cf. J. Klatzkin and M. Zobel, Thesaurus philosophicus linguae Hebraicae et veteris et recentioris, Lipsiae 1928–1933, Vol. 3, pp. 160–161).

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Aristotle and of the non-Jewish followers of Aristotle, who are not illuminated by the light of the Torah, (. . .) but the result of starting from these premises (shorshim) in the study of metaphysics is that our own premises in the divine Law are neglected and denied (. . .). On the contrary, Christian scholars, while studying being, have demonstrated those premises by means of true arguments which are in agreement with the study of religious Law (ha-‘iyyun ha-toriyyi), and have striven to destroy what is in disagreement with it. Consequently, those who want to learn those sciences can study books whose principles are based upon premises which agree with the true faith (I mean what they share with us in faith, since they have no arguments in favour of their own special beliefs, which are totally false and invalid). The sons of our people study the books of Aristotle and of his follower Averroes; and since they study no other books, when the premises and propositions (shorshim ve-haqdamot) assumed by those philosophers are firmly established in their hearts, they are no longer able to deny their conclusions (especially those of Averroes, who is totally at variance with the Torah), and they have no doubt about them, but are so confident in this position that they devote themselves to writing books about the treatises that contain these heresies, as if they were self-evident truths (. . .).97 Therefore, I have decided to translate into our holy language some of the available books on these sciences, for two good reasons: (1) because of what I have already written about the relationship of those premises and studies with our faith (e.g., the reader of the book I begin to translate here should not say that the possibility of creating something else appears as a total privation with respect to God, but that its positivity [h.iyyuv] is demonstrated by theoretical propositions—and this for all the other questions); (2) so that we might have at our disposal very subtle arguments concerning these sciences, arguments unknown to the philosophasters (mitfalsefim) (. . .) because of their heresy. Therefore, these doctrines are worth knowing because of their truth; and the most important (meyuh.ad ) among Christian scholars is the excellent scholar Thomas Aquinas (T . omas de ’Aqino). He has strengthened the faith in what is written in our Torah, according to his religion; his doctrines are in agreement with the premises of the 97 Habillo is apparently referring to Hebrew “supercommentaries” on Averroes.

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true philosophers, insofar as they are in agreement with faith; and he is an important scholar and believer (h.oqer u-ma’amin). I have already translated his Quaestiones disputatae de anima, his treatise De ente et essentia, his treatise De universalibus and other short treatises. He has written very long expositiones (be’urim) of Aristotle’s works, but no philosophical quaestiones (she’elot) on them: the latter have been written by his followers, especially by the scholar Versor (Versoryo), who was in Paris some years ago and wrote books98 containing quaestiones on logic, physics, metaphysics and politics.99 This scholar incorporates in his books all that is found in Aristotle on these matters, and adds a detailed explanation (be’ur ve-diyyuq) of all the words and doubts of Aristotle; he resolves these doubts, and adds new questions, in agreement with Thomas Aquinas. Because of this, I have decided to translate into our holy language the four books of Versor that I have at my disposal: these are the questions on the Physics, the De caelo, the De generatione and the De anima. And, if God will supply me with his other books on these sciences, I will translate them too, for myself and for others. Habillo’s Two Questions and Shalom’s Responses As we have previously mentioned, the ms. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 2631 (olim De Rossi 457), includes unique copies of a number of philosophical works by Habillo. The contents of this manuscript have been recently studied by Jean-Pierre Rothschild,100 who has shown that it cannot be an autograph by Habillo.101 Among its most interesting texts are two questions by Habillo (on ff. 55v–57v), one on a metaphysical problem (“whether substance admits of less and more”), and one on a physical problem (“whether the generation of a thing from another thing is by nature”). The 98

On these statements, see also above, note 16. The term employed by Habillo is h.okmah medinit, lit. “science of the state”, which includes ethics, economics and politics. 100 Cf. Rothschild, Questions, in particular pp. 106–108. 101 For a description of this manuscript (olim De Rossi 457), cf. Richler and Beit-Ari´e, Hebrew Manuscripts, p. 359, number 1316; cf. also Tamani and Zonta, Aristoteles Hebraicus, pp. 139–140, number 84. Rothschild, Questions, pp. 118– 120, notes 57, 60 and 63, has shown that the manuscript contains some scribal errors which cannot be reasonably ascribed to the author. A palaeographical comparison with the ms. parm. 2978 (an autograph by Habillo) appears to confirm Rothschild’s statement. 99

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questions are discussed rather briefly by the author, who follows the Scholastic technique of listing some arguments pro and contra;102 he draws no conclusions and does not refer explicitly to Scholastic sources. These questions are followed by Abraham Shalom’s critical responses: Shalom refutes each of Habillo’s arguments, making use of Aristotle and Averroes, as well as of Latin sources (the logical questions ascribed to “Marsilius”, which he translated into Hebrew, Walter Burley’s commentary on the Physics, and, probably, Marsilius of Inghen’s questions on the De generatione). Shalom’s own judgements conclude his discussions (see below, f. 64v, ll. 11 ff.). From the point of view of Habillo’s approach to Scholasticism, the most interesting part of his long reply to Shalom (ff. 65r–103v) is the general introduction (summarised below, part 3). In this text, Habillo criticises Shalom’s use of “Marsilius”’s logical work, which he takes to belong to the school of John Buridan, whom he accuses of misinterpreting Aristotle. English Summary103 (ms. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 2631, ff. 55v, l. 3–66r, l. 5) 1. Habillo’s Questions 55v3–56v15: Question 1: whether substance admits of less and more (’im ha-‘es.em yeqabbel ha-pah.ot ve-ha-yoter) 55v4–25: Negative arguments (t.a‘anot sholelot): 1. less or more is not said of the terms which are predicated univocally (be-haskamah); substance is predicated univocally of the things of which it is predicated; therefore, less and more are not said of substance; 2. what is attained without motion does not admit of less and more; in attaining substance there is no motion; therefore, substance does not admit of less and more; 3. if substance admitted of less and more, the individuals of substance would be distinct as to less and more either through the 102

On the technique of the Scholastic quaestio in this work, see Rothschild, Questions, p. 116. 103 I have mostly translated only the first paragraph of each argument.

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addition of a substance or of an accident; but an accident cannot change the reality (’emtat) of a substance, while a substance added to another substance is a form which changes the quiddity of the latter, so that two distinct species of substance would result. Therefore, substance cannot admit of less and more. 55v25–56v15: Positive arguments (t.a‘anot meh.ayyevot): 1. the individuals of substance have temperaments (mezagim) that are distinct as to less and more; therefore, they have forms that are distinct as to less and more; 2. actions distinct as to less and more are attained by quiddities that are distinct as to less and more; the actions of the individuals of substance are distinct as to less and more; therefore, they are attained by quiddities that are distinct as to less and more; 3. if substance did not admit of less and more, the individual of substance would not be a prime substance; but the consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is also false. 56v16–57v12: Question 2: whether the generation of a thing from another thing is by nature (’im hawiyat davar mi-davar hi’ mimmah she-ve-t.eva‘) 56v17–57r12: Positive arguments: 1. what happens always (ha-davar ’asher hu’ tamid) is by nature, not by necessity; the generation of a thing from another thing happens always, since the chick is always generated from the egg by nature; therefore, the generation of a thing from another thing is by nature; 2. what has its principle internally, is natural; generation has its principle internally; therefore, etc.; 3. if the generation of the chick from the egg were by necessity, the egg would not aid the generation; but the consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is also false. 57r13–57v12: Negative arguments: 1. an act that has an agent that is external to it is not by nature; the agent of generation is external; therefore, etc. 2. what is opposed to the inclination and the natural desire of a thing is by necessity, not by nature; the generation of a chick from an egg is opposed to the inclination and the natural desire of the egg; therefore, the generation of a thing from another thing is by necessity;

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3. what is not found in a natural thing is not by nature; generation is not found in a natural thing; therefore, the generation of a thing from another thing is not by nature. 2. Shalom’s Responses 58r14–59r5: General introduction, in literary style. 59r5–23: Preamble: Shalom states that his response will be based upon “the words of the sage Marsilius (Marsilyo) and other nonJewish scholars” (f. 59r8), since it is not difficult to refute thus one (Habillo) who found his arguments in non-Jewish authors (meh.abberey ha-goyim). Shalom also gives a general description of the technique of the Scholastic quaestio (f. 59r, ll. 11 ff.) which he intends to follow in his response. 59r23–60v16: Response to the negative arguments of question 1: 1. 59r25–59v25: substance is not predicated univocally, but according to less and more (ba-pah.ot va-yoter); substance is predicated in quid of God and of the separate intellects, and also of the inferior substances; but it is not said univocally of God and of the other things, and it is said of the inferior substances only according to anteriority and posteriority; therefore, substance admits of less and more. To support his thesis, Shalom quotes, among others, Marsilius and Walter Burley’s (Gont.ier 104 de Burley) commentary on the Physics, book I,105 according to which synonyms (ha-shem ha-muskam, “the univocal name”) are meant in two ways: in general and in particular (bi-kelal u-ve-yih.ud) (f. 59v, ll. 13–15); 2. 59v26–60v1: the concept of “attainment” (hagga‘ah) used in this argument is unintelligible, according to Shalom, since the attainment of motion has two perfections: the perfection of rest (which disappears through the motion) and the perfection of the natural thing (which is a synonym of “motion”). I say that “motion” 104

Gont.ier (in Hebrew letters, g-n-t.-y-r) is a Catalan or Aragonese reading of Gualterus (the usual Latin rendering of the first name of Walter Burley), not a transcription of “Inghen”, as implicitly supposed by Rothschild, Questions, p. 117. 105 Cf. Gualterus Burlaeus, Expositio in libros octo Physicorum, Venetiis 1482, f. 15va, ll. 1–2: Univocum dicitur tribus modis: communiter, proprie et magis proprie.

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is said in general and in particular: if it is assumed in general, in the substance there is motion (generation, change, etc.); if it is assumed in particular, in the substance there is no motion; 3. 60v1–16: the thing added to substance can be neither substance nor accident; moreover, in addition to the distinction in species, there can also be an individual distinction according to less and more, so that your argument is incomplete and invalid. 60v16–62r15: Response to the positive arguments of question 1: 1. 60v16–25: the consequence (hemshekut) is not valid, since from the distinction of the temperaments according to less and more it does not follow that substantial forms are distinct according to less and more; 2. 60v26–61r24: the major premise of Habillo’s syllogism is not true, since actions that are distinct according to less and more are attained by a quiddity which cannot be distinct according to less and more, e.g., the actions attained by sun or by fire; (a discussion of Habillo’s minor premise follows); 3. 61r24–62r15: the expression “according to less and more” has two meanings: (1) the first meaning concerns distinctions that depend upon the increase and decrease of quantitative degrees, as found e.g., in hotness, coldness, whiteness et similia, which are distinct according to less and more due to their quantitative degrees, as studied in natural science; (2) but there are also things that are distinct according to less and more even though their substantial form has no quantitative degree: this is the second meaning of the expression “less and more”. Now, substance admits of less and more in the latter sense, but not in the former. 62r15–18: “This is my opinion as to the refutation of your (i.e., Habillo’s) negative and positive arguments, which you have set forth in your first question, without employing Marsilius’s opinion (mi-beli sheloah. yad le-da‘at Marsilyo) and his arguments on this point . . . ” 62r18–63r3: Response to the positive arguments of question 2: 1. 62r19–25: the major premise is not true, since e.g., the ascent of fire upwards and the descent of stones downwards occur always, but these movements are not by nature; 2. 62r25–62v17: the minor premise is true only for the passive principle of generation, not for the active principle of generation, since the latter remains external;

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3. 62v18–63r3: the egg, qua egg, does not aid the generation of the chick, but opposes it greatly, since the chick is living and the egg is not. 63r4–64r11: Response to the negative arguments of question 2: 1. 63r4–17: the fact that generation has an external agent can be taken in two senses: in the first sense, that which is generated is generated for the sake of something external, and through the internal potentiality that is found in it. This holds true for the artificial agent intended in the major premise, but not for the agent intended in the minor premise, since the latter is not the artificial agent but the material cause, which is by nature; 2. 63r17–22: it is not true that the generation of a chick from an egg is opposed to the inclination and the natural desire of the egg; on the contrary, the opposite is evidently the case; 3. 63r23–64r11: while the minor premise is true, the major premise is not; in fact, if what is not found in a natural thing were not by nature, then prime matter would not be a natural thing—which is false.106 64r11–26: Shalom’s response to the two questions above: (1) substance admits of less and more, but it does not admit of less and 106 In the ensuing discussion, Shalom argues that “there is a great difference between the two matters and the two generations: as one matter is simple and the other is composite, so one generation is absolute and the other is according to alteration (hishtanut), as is clear from De generatione, book I, summa 3, chapter 3, question 1; and these two generations are called in their language (i.e., in Latin) generatio simpliciter dicta et generatio secundum quid, since the intention of the former is substantial form, which substantiates prime matter only, while the intention of the latter is form together with the accidents common to composite matter—and the difference between them is great for those who know the truth through the study of philosophy” (f. 63r, ll. 8–15). The source of this passage is very probably Marsilius of Inghen’s Quaestiones de generatione et corruptione. See Marsilius, De generatione et corruptione cum expositione Aegidii, Venetiis 1500, f. 50rb, ll. 48–56, 59–61 (book I, quaestio 3: Utrum generatio sit alteratio): Quantum ad primum, est notandum quod duplex est generatio, scilicet generatio simpliciter et secundum quid dicta. Patuit quid sit utrumque ex praecedenti quaestione. (Cf. ibidem, ff. 48vb– 50ra, book I, quaestio 2: Utrum aliquid possit simpliciter generari et corrumpi.) Secundo est notandum quod generatio aliquando accipitur pro dispositione praevia disponente materiam ad introductionem formae substantialis, et sic non differt ab alteratione, sicut patet per commentatorem, aliquando autem per introductionem formae substantialis, et sic dicitur generatio simpliciter (. . .). Generatio secundum quid connotat simplicem productionem secundum aliquod praedicamentum aliud a praedicamento substantiae, ut productionem albedinis aut consimilis.

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more in the above mentioned senses; (2) the generation of a thing from another thing is by nature, since the name “nature” is given to the four changes (shinnuyim) which are found in generation and corruption, and is predicated of the actions carried out by nature. Moreover, we state that the generation of a thing from another thing is by necessity, but this does not contradict the former statement, since necessity is one of the natural aspects of the relationship between form and matter. 64r26–64v16: Literary conclusion. 3. Introduction to Habillo’s Reply 65r1–66r5: Habillo criticises some trends of Scholasticism (in particular, Buridan’s school) in order to support his own opinions and defend himself against the Latin sources used by Shalom (e.g., Marsilius of Inghen’s logical works). In particular, on ff. 65r, l. 17–65v, l. 12, Habillo admits that he knows Latin (leshon ha-Nos.erim) and that he has translated some Latin books into Hebrew (he‘etaqti qes.at sefarim li-leshonenu); he states, however, that the only Latin work on logic he has read is Ockham’s Logic (i.e., the Summa logicae, in Hebrew hegyon ’Oqam), and he declares moreover that he has never heard that Marsilius composed a work on logic,107 although he has seen his commentary on the De generatione (devarayw be-sefer ha-Hawayah).108 Habillo is amazed that a scholar who has access to Averroes’s writings should study “Marsilius”’s work, since “Marsilius” did not really know Aristotle: the only aim of “Marsilius” is to solve some doubts with subtle arguments which are at variance with Aristotle. According to Habillo, “Marsilius” and his friends Albert “the Modern” (’Albert. ha-’Ah.aron, i.e., Albert of Saxony) and John Buridan (Buridan) knew nothing of Aristotle, nor are their works useful for understanding any of Aristotle’s writings. Moreover, they defended many false doctrines: they claimed that compound elements are incorruptible, despite Aristotle’s and Averroes’s statements to the 107 Although Marsilius of Inghen did compose some Quaestiones in Veterem artem, the questions on logic ascribed to “Marsilius”, translated into Hebrew and used by Shalom have been proved apocryphal: see above, note 5. 108 See above, note 106.

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contrary; they held that substance and quantity are the same thing, but are distinct in mind (ba-beh.inah). And when it is pointed out to them that Aristotle, in book VIII of the Physics, affirms that, when both substance and quantity exist, they are in reality two beings, they reply that Aristotle is talking here about the division of “what has a quantity” (ba‘al kammah), although this is clearly absurd. Only in some cases are they right, when they follow the sage Thomas Aquinas (T . omas de ’Aqino), who—in Habillo’s opinion—has perfectly understood Aristotle’s words.109 109 In Habillo’s reply to Shalom’s refutation of his first negative argument relative to question 1, there are some brief critical references to Scholastic doctrines: on f. 67v, ll. 3–6 Habillo declares that, according to the Scotist school (minhag Esqot.istas, there is a distinction between the two senses of “substance”, but this is absurd and contradicts Aristotle’s words; on f. 68v, ll. 10–13, Habillo criticises “Marsilius”, Walter Burley (Gont.ier) and Antonius Andreas (in the De tribus principiis rerum naturalium), according to whom it is not true that “Zayd is not more alive than ‘Amr, and today Zayd is not more alive than yesterday”; on f. 68v, ll. 15–18, Habillo refers to Aristotle’s definition of synonym in the Categories to refute “Marsilius”’s and Walter Burley’s statements about synonyms “in general and in particular”, which Shalom uses in his argument against him (see above, f. 59v, ll. 13–15); finally, on f. 69r, ll. 3–4, at the end of his reply, Habillo states: “This is what, according to me, is sufficient to support the first negative argument: it is a true and correct judgement, which ‘Marsilius’ has not supported and has not understood”. It should be noted that, as Rothschild points out (Questions, p. 117), Habillo inserts here some Latin glosses into the text (f. 66v, l. 26: reductivus; f. 67v, ll. 15–16: positivus, comparativus, superlativus).

4. JUDAH MESSER LEON

Judah ben Yehiel Messer Leon (c. 1425–1498)1 worked in some of the main cultural centres of fifteenth century Italy as a physician, philosopher and teacher of philosophy. He wrote various works on Hebrew grammar, rhetoric and Biblical exegesis. Possibly born in Montecchio Maggiore (now in the Italian province of Vicenza), tradition has it that he was given the title “messer” by the Emperor Frederick III in 1452, as a reward for his work as a physician. In the years around 1450, he directed a Jewish academy (yeshivah) in Ancona. In this academy, which was to follow him in his various places of residence, he lectured on Jewish traditional texts as well as on non-Jewish texts. He taught various subjects—especially Aristotelian logic and physics.2 Between 1456 and 1472 he lived in Padua and Bologna, where it is possible that he attended courses in medicine and philosophy at the local Universities. He is said to have received the title of doctor from the Emperor in Padua in 1469. After a short stay in Venice, he was in Mantua from 1473 to 1475, where Abraham Farissol (perhaps one of his students) worked for him as a scribe.3 1 On Judah Messer Leon’s life and works, see the detailed study in Judah Messer Leon, The Book of the Honeycomb’s Flow, Sepher Nophet S.uphim, ed. I. Rabinowitz, Ithaca–London 1983, pp. xvii–l (including the bibliography); cf. also the sketch in H. Tirosh-Rothschild, Between Worlds. The Life and Works of Rabbi David ben Judah Messer Leon, New York 1991, pp. 25–33. For Messer Leon’s role in Medieval Jewish philosophy, cf. Sirat, A History, pp. 403–404. 2 According to Tirosh-Rothschild, Between Worlds, pp. 35–37, the order of studies in Messer Leon’s academy is the same as that of Yohanan Alemanno (d. 1504), a Jewish philosopher active in Padua and Florence and one of Messer Leon’s best known students. It includes many Hebrew translations of Medieval Arabic philosophical texts (mostly Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle), but no translations of Latin Scholastic texts (see M. Idel, The Study Program of R. Yohanan Alemanno [in Hebrew], “Tarbiz” 48 [1979], 303–330). 3 On the contacts between Messer Leon and Farissol (a Jewish scholar from Avignon, active in Northern Italy in the second half of the fifteenth century), see D.B. Ruderman, The World of a Renaissance Jew. The Life and Thought of Abraham ben Mordechai Farissol, Cincinnati 1981, pp. 17–18, 112–113, 173–174 note 4, 176 note 26, pp. 179–180 note 49; cf. also E. Engel, Abraham ben Mordecai Farissol: Sephardi Tradition of Book Making in Northern Italy of the Renaissance Period, “Jewish Art” 18 (1992), 149–167, esp. pp. 156–158. Ruderman and Engel locate the

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Messer Leon was surely in Naples after 1480 and, according to a conjecture by Israel Rabinowitz, after 1495 he fled to Monastir (now Bitula, in Macedonia), where he died.4 Most of the writings that comprise Messer Leon’s vast literary legacy are still unpublished. Many have not even been studied and are known only from lists and catalogues of manuscripts. Unfortunately, there is not enough space to list them all here.5 Some of the many philosophical texts ascribed to Messer Leon or his milieu were influenced by the doctrines and techniques of Latin commentators on Aristotle active in Italian universities (Padua in particular) during the first half of the fifteenth century (especially Paul of Venice and Gaetano de Thiene). As Hava Tirosh-Rothschild affirms, it is known that “Judah Messer Leon was trained by Christian logicians”, and that he composed for his students “summaries (sefeqot) to the Scholastic quaestiones debated by the Italian academic community”, in which he followed the Scholastic style and methods.6 However, a systematic study on Messer Leon as a “Hebrew Schoolman” is still wanting.7 traces of Farissol’s work as a student (in Avignon, 1467–1468) and as a teacher of philosophy (in Ferrara, 1473–1474), including a correspondence with Messer Leon (some of whose philosophical works he copied and summarised for use in his school) preserved in the ms. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 1957 (olim De Rossi 145). On this manuscript, cf. the recent description in Richler and Beit-Ari´e, Hebrew Manuscripts, pp. 375–376, number 1349; cf. also Tamani and Zonta, Aristoteles Hebraicus, pp. 120–121, number 50. 4 This hypothesis is questioned by Tirosh-Rothschild, Between Worlds, p. 253, note 104: according to her, Messer Leon died in Naples around 1497. 5 An important source for reconstructing Messer Leon’s bibliography is a letter written in Hebrew by his son, David ben Judah Messer Leon, to David of Tivoli, preserved in the ms. Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, Pluteo LXXXVIII, n. 12, ff. 1r–2r, and published several times; an English translation by Israel Rabinowitz is in Judah Messer Leon, Honeycomb’s Flow, pp. xlvi–l. A list of Messer Leon’s writings is in M. Steinschneider, Leon, in Allgemeine Encyklopaedie der Wissenschaften und Kuenste, eds. J.S. Ersch and J.G. Gruber, Sektion I, Band 43, Leipzig 1852, pp. 118–122 (reprinted in M. Steinschneider, Gesammelte Schriften, eds. H. Malter and A. Marx, Vol. 1, Berlin 1925, pp. 216–228). 6 See Tirosh-Rothschild, Between Worlds, pp. 26 and 33; see also H. TiroshSamuelson, Messer Leon, Judah, in Craig, Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6, 331–335. 7 Some brief remarks on Messer Leon’s role as a “Hebrew Schoolman” (on his use of Latin philosophical sources, his possible relationship with the Paduan School and his technique) are in Robert Bonfil’s introduction to Judah Messer Leon, Nofet Zufim. On Hebrew Rhetoric, Jerusalem 1981, pp. 22–32 (including bibliography and lists of manuscripts); Zonta, Scholastic Commentaries (quoted above, Historical Introduction, note 113).

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Consistent evidence of the employment of Scholastic sources and techniques has been found in three philosophical works by Judah Messer Leon: 1. a logical summa, Miklal yofi (Perfection of Beauty), composed between January and February 1455, preserved in a number of manuscripts and still unpublished.8 As Charles Manekin has recently remarked,9 its structure is very close to that of one of its possible sources—the Logica parva by Paul of Venice;10 2. a supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentaries on the Isagoge, the Categories and the De Interpretatione (the so-called Logica Vetus), written before 1472: preserved in many manuscripts, it is unpublished, but has been studied in part by Isaac Husik in an essay written in 1906.11 As Husik notes, the commentary includes some questions in Scholastic style—an unusual characteristic in Hebrew supercommentaries on Averroes;12 3. a commentary on Averroes’s Middle and Long Commentaries on the Physics, as well as on the corresponding parts of Aristotle’s Physics according to one of its Medieval Latin translations: this commentary (written in Mantua between 1473 and 1475) originally covered four books of Aristotle’s work, but only the commentary on Physics I–III survives (see below). There are signs of Scholastic influence also in Messer Leon’s supercommentaries on Averroes’s Middle Commentaries on the Prior Analytics and on the Posterior Analytics, possibly written between 1470 and 1472. Both are unpublished and preserved in several manuscripts.13 David ha-Sefardi, a student of Messer Leon, refers to the 8 ¨ On this text, see Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 79–80; Manekin, Scholastic Logic, pp. 146–147 (list of extant manuscripts). 9 Cf. Manekin, Scholastic Logic, pp. 138 and 145–146. 10 Paul of Venice’s Logica Parva, also called Summulae, written in 1395–1396, was adopted as a textbook in the University of Padua in the fifteenth century: cf. F. Bottin, Logica e filosofia naturale nelle opere di Paolo Veneto, in A. Poppi (ed.), Scienza e filosofia all’Universit`a di Padova nel Quattrocento, Trieste 1983, 85–124, pp. 89–91. 11 I. Husik, Judah Messer Leon’s Commentary on the “Vetus Logica”, Leyden ¨ 1906. For a list of manuscripts, see Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 81–85. 12 Cf. Husik, Judah Messer Leon’s, pp. 25–27. 13 Cf. the list of manuscripts compiled by R. Bonfil, in Judah Messer Leon, ¨ Nofet Zufim, p. 26 notes 50–51; cf. also Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 85.

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supercommentary on the Posterior Analytics as a sort of “translation” of Paul of Venice’s work;14 this statement, however, awaits confirmation from a scholarly examination of the sources of Messer Leon’s work. Furthermore, some anonymous Hebrew philosophical works in Scholastic style, not listed among Messer Leon’s works, bear traces of having been written by Messer Leon or by one of his students.15 They are unpublished and preserved in two manuscripts (Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 994, and Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, Pluteo I, n. 26), as follows: 4. a summary of the Isagoge and the Categories together with nine questions on the Isagoge, preserved in both manuscripts.16 The attribution to Messer Leon is most probable for this logical text, whose style and language are very close to those of the commentary on Physics I–III mentioned above (see below); 5. a commentary on Physics I–IV and on the beginning of Physics V in the form of conclusions (toladot), preserved in the Paris manuscript. As Moritz Steinschneider first suggested, there are some clues that Messer Leon wrote this work (whether it be a translation of a lost Latin original or an original work).17 Most of these conclusions—brief statements summarising the thesis of each chapter (or part of a chapter) of Aristotle’s text—are identical to those found in Walter Burley’s Expositio in octo libros Physicorum, and recall a technique typical of the school of Paul of Venice;18 14 David ha-Sefardi wrote: zeh ha-perush she-‘asah maest.ro Paolo, u-Messer Leon he‘etaqo mi-leshon nos.eri ’el ha-‘ivri, “this commentary (i.e., that on the Posterior Analytics) was written by Master Paul (of Venice), and Messer Leon translated it from Latin into Hebrew” (cf. R. Bonfil’s introduction, in Judah Messer Leon, Nofet Zufim, pp. 26–27 and note 53). It is unclear whether David ha-Sefardi is referring to Paul of Venice’s Expositio in libros Posteriorum or to his Conclusiones Posteriorum. 15 A possible candidate is Abraham Farissol, who wrote a Hebrew compendium of the Perfection of Beauty: cf. Manekin, Scholastic Logic, p. 138. Steinschneider ¨ (Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 80) was the first to ascribe these texts tentatively to Judah Messer Leon. 16 Cf. Tamani and Zonta, Aristoteles Hebraicus, p. 92. These texts are found on ff. 108r–120v of the Florence manuscript, and on ff. 84r–92r of the Paris manuscript. 17 M. Zonta, New Data on Judah Messer Leon’s Commentaries on the Physics, in ¨ “Aleph” 1 (2001), 307–323, pp. 312–316; Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 125. This text is found in the Paris manuscript, on ff. 116r–139r. 18 Cf. Zonta, Scholastic Commentaries, pp. 383 and 396–399.

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6. a commentary on the previous work, preserved in the Florence manuscript. This text—a kind of supercommentary—deals only with books I–II and part of book IV of the Physics.19 Of course, if the previous work is by Messer Leon, this one should be ascribed to one of his pupils; 7. a series of philosophical definitions allegedly taken from maestro Paolo (probably Paul of Venice), preserved in both manuscripts.20 In his commentaries and questions, Judah Messer Leon drew extensively on Scholastic sources—sometimes the same as those used by the Schoolmen at the University of Padua. Husik identified Walter Burley’s Super Artem veterem expositio as the major, indeed practically unique source of Messer Leon’s commentary on the Logica vetus.21 However, Burley’s Expositio (also one of the main sources of Paul of Venice’s logical commentaries, and in particular of his Expositio super Praedicabilia et Praedicamenta)22 was probably not the only source of Messer Leon’s logical questions. Indeed, some of these seem closer to Radulphus Brito’s Quaestiones in Veterem artem,23 a text which seems to have been widely used in schools, and which appears to be one of the major sources of the questions on the Isagoge preserved in the Florence manuscript. As for physics, many of the questions in the first book of Messer Leon’s commentary on Physics I–III are identical, at least in their formulation, to the questions in Gaetano de Thiene’s Recollectae super octo libros Physicorum. Moreover, one of the major sources of Messer Leon’s commentary—Burley’s Expositio in octo libros Physicorum, mentioned above—is also the main source of 19

Cf. Zonta, New Data, pp. 317–321; cf. Tamani and Zonta, Aristoteles Hebraicus, p. 93. The text is found in the Florence manuscript, on ff. 143v– 164r. 20 See in the Florence manuscript, ff. 120v–121r; in the Paris manuscript, ff. 92r–94r. 21 Cf. Husik, Judah Messer Leon’s, pp. 80–92. 22 Cf. A.D. Conti, Alcune note sulla Expositio super universalia Porphyrii et artem veterem Aristotelis di Paolo Veneto: analogie e differenze con i corrispondenti commenti di Walter Burley, in A. Maieru` (ed.), English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries. Acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, 10–14 November 1980, Napoli 1982, 293–303, esp. p. 295: Conti points out that Paul of Venice refers to Burley’s opinions, shares his doctrines and even incorporates long passages of his commentary—just like Judah Messer Leon. 23 See Zonta, Scholastic Commentaries, pp. 385–390.

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Gaetano de Thiene’s work.24 Messer Leon’s commentary contains many literal, mostly direct references to other thirteenth and fourteenth century Scholastic commentaries on the Physics, and to Paul of Venice’s Summa naturalium. From all this, it is clear that Judah Messer Leon was a real “Hebrew Schoolman”: he wrote in Hebrew the same type of philosophical texts (commentaries on Aristotle, conclusiones, quaestiones) that his Italian Christian colleagues were writing in Latin.25 Although his texts depend heavily on their Latin sources, Messer Leon seems to have been more than a mere translator or compiler: he probably used the same technique as contemporary Paduan Schoolmen, mixing words and doctrines from his sources with words and doctrines of his own. Like his Jewish colleagues in Spain, he borrowed doctrines and methods from Christian Universities, but his model was not Thomism or Scotism (as for Bibago or Eli Habillo); rather, he seems to have belonged to a sort of Jewish “prolongation” of the philosophical Paduan School, where Averroes was still regarded as a valid authority and not as an old-fashioned interpreter of Aristotle.26 Commentary on the Physics, Books I–III In a list of Judah Messer Leon’s works, his son David writes: “While in Mantua, he composed a commentary on four books of the Physics, fine and impressive; there he explained all Averroes’s words, put together the Long Commentary, the Latin text and the Middle 24

Cf. F. Bottin, Gaetano da Tiene e i calculatores, in Poppi (ed.), Scienza e filosofia, 125–134, esp. p. 132. 25 This is also the opinion of Charles Manekin (cf. Manekin, Scholastic Logic, p. 137: “With Judah ben Jehiel Messer Leon [ . . . ] we encounter something new: a Jewish scholastic logician writing in Hebrew”; pp. 139–140: “Judah Messer Leon [ . . . ] is the only Jew who deserves the title of a scholastic logician. His works on logic are not merely influenced by scholastic logic—they are part of scholastic logic, and ought to be studied alongside other works of scholastic logic from the fifteenth century”). 26 The same can be said of the whole of Italian “Hebrew Scholasticism” (see above, Historical Introduction). This fits in with Manekin’s remark that “Messer Leon’s use of scholastic logic was not directed against the older logical tradition of the Arab peripatetics. On the contrary, he saw himself as a defender of Averroes and Aristotle against the bold and audacious attacks of the heretic Gersonides” (Manekin, Scholastic Logic, p. 138).

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Commentary, and added all the questions concerning each book”.27 I was able to identify this text with a very lengthy anonymous Hebrew commentary on the first three books of Aristotle’s work (the comment on the fourth book, very probably Physics IV, seems to be missing).28 The original text of the commentary on each book of the Physics is preserved in a different manuscript, as follows: 1. ms. Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, S 38 sup., comprising 235 numbered folios.29 The watermark is very similar to a watermark found in Mantua from 1459 onwards, so the manuscript might have been copied in this period and area.30 It contains Messer Leon’s complete commentary on book I of the Physics; 2. ms. Cambridge, University Library, Add. 631, comprising 175 numbered folios (the first twelve folios are missing),31 and bearing the same watermark as the previous manuscript. It contains the mutilated text of Messer Leon’s commentary on book II, beginning at the middle of the “exposition” (shi‘ur) of chapter 1; 3. ms. Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Q 24 sup., comprising 164 numbered folios (mistakenly numbered from the end to the beginning).32 It contains the complete commentary on book III. 27

The Hebrew text of this passage, as found in the ms. Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, Pluteo LXXXVIII, n. 12 (see above, note 5) is as follows: gam h.ibber be-Mant.uah perush ‘al ’arba‘ah ma’amarim min ha-Shema‘ ha-t.iv‘i, ne’ah we-norah, u-meva’er divrey Ben Rushd kullam, u-meyashev ha-’aruk ‘im ha-nush.a’ (ha-) nos.erit we-ha-’ems.a‘i, u-mevi’ kol ha-derushim be-kol ma’amar u-ma’amar. 28 M. Zonta, Aristotle’s Physics in Late-Medieval Jewish Philosophy (14th–15th Century) and a Newly-Identified Commentary by Yehudah Messer Leon, “Micrologus” 9 (2001), 203–217, esp. pp. 207–211. This article rectifies the first description of this commentary in Zonta, La filosofia antica, pp. 233–235, where I was unable to identify the author. 29 Described in C. Bernheimer, Codices Hebraici Bibliothecae Ambrosianae, Firenze 1933, pp. 97–98, number 79; cf. also Tamani and Zonta, Aristoteles Hebraicus, p. 110, number 33. 30 The watermark of this manuscript is very similar to n. 2669 in Briquet’s list (cf. C.M. Briquet, Les filigranes, Leipzig 1923, Vol. 1, p. 192, “basilisc”). 31 The contents of this manuscript were already known to Moritz Steinschneider ¨ (cf. Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, pp. 122–123), who failed to identify the author. See also the description in S.C. Reif, Hebrew Manuscripts at Cambridge University Library, “University of Cambridge Oriental Publications” 52, Cambridge 1997, pp. 378–379 (where, however, no reference to Judah Messer Leon is found). 32 Described in Bernheimer, Codices, pp. 98–99, number 80; cf. also Tamani and Zonta, Aristoteles Hebraicus, p. 111, number 34.

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These three manuscripts, comprising together more than one thousand pages of text (probably one of the longest philosophical texts in Hebrew), were most likely copied by a scribe employed by Messer Leon during his stay in Mantua (1473–1475): they appear to be the first copy (possibly not the only one made) of this work, produced under the supervision of the author, or at least with his approval. The scribe may even be one of the anonymous students of Abraham Farissol, active in Ferrara in 1473–1474, who copied several folios of the ms. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 1957.33 As for the structure of the commentary,34 after a general introduction at the beginning of book I, containing an accessus ad auctores, each chapter of the Physics is, as a rule, summarised and commented according to the following scheme: 1. the relevant passage of Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Physics, from Qalonymos ben Qalonymos’s Hebrew translation (c. 1315); 2. the relevant passage of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Physics, from Qalonymos ben Qalonymos’s 1316 Hebrew translation; 3. the relevant chapter according to the Latin version of the Physics by William of Moerbeke, probably translated into Hebrew by Messer Leon; 4. a supercommentary on the passage of Averroes’s Long Commentary (point 1), often bearing the title “things needed for understanding the passage” (ha-devarim ha-s.arikim le-havanat hama’amar); 5. explanations or expositiones (shi‘urim) of points 1, 2 and 3, in syllogistic form; 6. one or more questions (derushim), patterned after Scholastic quaestiones. Although this structure is not rigidly adhered to in the comment on any single chapter of the Physics, it reflects the main frame of the work. Remarkably, it appears to be similar, if not identical, to the structure of Paul of Venice’s Expositio super octo libros Physicorum necnon super commentum Averrois, where each passage of the Physics is 33 34

On this manuscript, see above, note 3. Cf. Zonta, Aristotle’s Physics, pp. 208–209, and Zonta, La filosofia antica, p. 234.

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commented by means of a comparison with the relevant passage of Averroes’s Long Commentary.35 As already noted, the main Scholastic sources of Judah Messer Leon’s commentary are, very probably, Walter Burley’s Expositio, Paul of Venice’s Summa naturalium and Gaetano de Thiene’s Recollectae— although, as a rule, Messer Leon does not explicitly acknowledge his dependence on these works.36 However, a number of other Latin sources (mostly commentaries on the Physics) are frequently quoted explicitly. Among them are Robert Grosseteste’s Physics (probably known through Burley), Albert the Great’s Physica, Thomas Aquinas’s Sententia libri Physicorum, Giles of Rome’s Sententia super librum Physicorum, William Ockham’s Expositio in libros Physicorum,37 and John of Jandun’s Quaestiones in libros Physicorum.38 English Translation of the Introduction and Chapter 1 of the Commentary on the Physics, Book I (ms. Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, S 38 sup., ff. 3r, l. 1–13r, l. 19; cf. the text in the Hebrew section) 3r1–8: In the first place, we say that each science needs a special subject whose parts and properties it studies (as is clearly proved), and relative to which it makes its statements, enumerates its propositions and explains all its conclusions without deflecting from the right way. Consequently, we agree that, before we start speaking about the contents of this book (i.e., the Physics) and explaining its words, we should identify and understand the subject of natural science (h.okmah .tiv‘it) in general, the knowledge of which is the quiddity of the subject of this book which God has assigned to us to explain— may His help be with us. Afterwards, we will divide this science into its first parts. 35

Cf. Pauli Veneti Expositio in Physicam Aristotelis et commentum Averrois, Venetiis 1499. 36 On Messer Leon’s use of these sources, see below. 37 Some of these quotations are found in book II of Messer Leon’s commentary: cf. ms. Cambridge, Add. 631, ff. 44v, l. 5–46r, l. 1, quoting Guillelmi de Ockham Opera philosophica. Vol. 4, Expositio in libros Physicorum [books I–III], eds. V. Richter and G. Leibold, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1985, pp. 259,16–261,80 and pp. 263,152– 265,193 (from book II, chapter 3) 38 For a list of the above quotations, as found in ms. Milan, S 38 sup., see below.

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3r8–10

Therefore, the first question is: whether the moved body is the subject of natural science in general. Firstly, we argue in the negative, in many ways.

Caietani de Thienis Recollectae super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Vicentiae 1487 [copy in Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, 110 G 8], f. 1vb, ll. 24–26 Dubitatur utrum corpus mobile sit subiectum in scientia naturali. Negative arguitur primo.39

3r10–14 1. Because it is impossible that the moved body be the subject of natural philosophy. In fact, there is no science of accidental being, and the moved body is an accidental being; if so, etc. This syllogism is in the first mode of the second figure.40 The minor premise is commonly accepted, because motion is an accident of body; the major premise is evident by proof, and is found in book VI of the Metaphysics.

F. 1vb, ll. 27–37 Nullum ens per accidens est subiectum in aliqua scientia; sed corpus mobile est ens per accidens.

3r14–23 2. If the moved body was the subject of natural philosophy, it would follow that this science

Ff. 1vb, l. 37–2ra, l. 2 Secundo arguitur: nulla scientia probat suum subiectum esse; scilicet scientia naturalis probat

Igitur patet consequentia cum minori. Maior arguitur: quia de subiecto scientiae potest haberi scientia; sed de ente per accidens non potest haberi scientia ut habetur sexto Methaphysicae : ergo etc. Minor patet quod corpus mobile est aggregatum ex substantia et accidente; ex his autem non fit unum nisi per accidens.

39 Cf. also Johannes Jandunus, Quaestiones in libros Physicorum, Venetiis 1488 [copy in Rome, Biblioteca Corsiniana, Col. 53 C 29], f. 2va, ll. 56–59: Quaeritur de subiecto scientiae naturalis utrum ens mobile vel corpus mobile sit subiectum eius. Et arguitur primo quod non. Also the three subsequent arguments are inspired by very similar ones by John of Jandun: see ibidem, ff. 2vb, ll. 21–24, 46–53, and 2vb, ll. 28–32. Cf. also Zonta, Aristotle’s Physics, pp. 212–214. 40 That is, a syllogism of the kind cesare.

judah messer leon demonstrates its own subject; but this cannot be, because no science demonstrates its own subject; if so, etc. The conclusion (hith.ayyevut) is evident, since from the opposite of the consequent (nimshak) the opposite of the antecedent follows. The opposite of the consequent is commonly accepted (see book I of the Posterior Analytics); the antecedent is evident, because Aristotle proved the existence of the moved body in book VI of the Physics. In fact, he proved there that every moved thing is a body insofar as every moved thing is partly in a term a quo and partly in a term ad quem, as far as its motion is concerned. Therefore, the conclusion is as follows: every moved thing is a body; if so, the body is moved, because the general positive premise is converted accidentally (as explained in my summa—i.e., the Miklal yofi— and in book I of the Posterior Analytics); from this, it follows that the moved body exists. 3r24–3v2 3. If the subject of the science of nature is the moved body, then the still body is also its subject; but this cannot be, because nobody says that the still body is a subject of the science

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corpus mobile esse: ergo, maior patet primo Posteriorum: quia de subiecto oportet primo cognoscere quia est et quid est.

Minor patet sexto Physicorum, ubi probatur omne mobile esse corpus, quia omne quod movetur est partim in termino a quo, et partim in termino ad quem.

Sed sequitur: omne mobile est corpus; ergo corpus est mobile per conversionem; et per consequens corpus mobile est, quare etc.

F. 2ra, ll. 3–11 Tertio. Natura est ita principium corporis quiescibilis sicut corporis mobilis, ut patet ex eius diffinitione posita secundo Physicorum. Ergo non magis est subiectum in scientia naturali corpus mobile

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of nature; if so, etc. The opposite of the consequent is commonly accepted by induction by all authors; the antecedent is evident, because both motion and rest are nature, and they do not precede one another, because nature is the principle of motion and rest, etc.—as is commonly accepted on the basis of book II of the Physics.

quam corpus quiescibile; sed corpus quiescibile non ponitur in ea subiectum; ergo nec corpus mobile erit ponendum.

3v2–7 4. Not all the words of this science refer to the moved body; if so, the moved body is not the subject of this science. The conclusion is evident, because the necessary condition of a subject is that everything which is said in that science must be predicated with reference to that subject. The antecedent is evident, because natural science deals with God (may He be exalted) and the angels which are the movers of the celestial bodies, and God and the angels are not moved bodies.

2ra, ll. 11–21 Quarto: illud non est subiectum in scientia naturali ad quod non habent attributionem omnia considerata in scientia naturali; sednon omnia considerata in scientia naturali habent attributionem ad corpus mobile: ergo etc. Patet consequentia cum maiori, et minor probatur, quia in scientia naturali considerantur motores caelorum qui non sunt corpora mobilia: et per consequens ad corpus mobile non videtur attributionem habere.

3v7–11

Paulus Venetus, Summa naturalium, Venetiis 1476 [copy in Rome, Biblioteca Corsiniana, Col. 52 D 9], f. 2rb, ll. 22–26 Nec ens mobile nec corpus mobile est subiectum adaequatum totius philosophiae naturalis. Probatur. Nihil potest esse adaequatum subiectum totius et partis. Scilicet corpus mobile vel ens

5. If the moved body is the subject of natural science, the same thing is both the subject of the whole science and of a part of it; but this cannot be, because the same thing cannot be both

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the subject of a science as a whole and of a part of it. If so, etc. The opposite of the consequent is evident, and so is the antecedent, since it is clear that the moved body is the subject of this book.

mobile est subiectum adaequatum partis philosophiae, igitur non totius.

3v12–21

Caietanus de Thienis, op. cit., f. 2ra, ll. 22–4141 In oppositum arguitur. Illud est subiectum in scientia naturali quod est communissimum et principaliter in ea consideratum cuius partes et passiones declarantur: et ad quod cetera in scientia naturali considerata habent attributionem; sed corpus mobile est huiusmodi; igitur.

We argue in the positive as follows. What is most common (kolel ) in a science, i.e., what is principally (be-’ofen ‘iqqari) studied by that science, since that science explains its parts and its properties, and since everything dealt with by that science refers to it, is the subject of that science; the moved body is referred to by natural science in this way; if so, etc. This syllogism is in the third mode of the first figure.42 The major premise is evident from book I of the Posterior Analytics, and the minor is evident by induction. In fact, in the subsequent part of book I of the Physics it is said that matter and form are the quidditative parts of the moved body; book II deals with internal and external causes; the other books deal with motion, place, void, infinity, time, and other such properties of the moved body.

Patet consequentia cum maiori ex primo Posteriorum, et minor declaratur discurrendo per omnes libros philosophiae naturalis. Unde in primo Physicorum investigatur materia et forma quae sunt partes et principia essentialia corporis mobilis. In secundo investigantur eius causae extrinsece; in sequentibus libris tractatur de motu infinito, vacuo, loco, tempore et reliquis huiusmodi, quae sunt ipsius passiones; et similiter

41 Cf. Paulus Venetus, op. cit., f. 2rb, ll. 35 ff.: Illud est adaequatum subiectum illius scientiae quod est communissimum in illa . . . 42 That is, a syllogism of the kind darii.

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Similar things are contained in the other books of the Physics.

in aliis libris apparebit, quare etc.

3v21–23 You should know that some of the major commentators said that moved being is the subject of the science of nature— among others, Averroes in the Middle Commentary on the Physics.

F. 2ra, ll. 41–48 Ad istam dubitationem reperti sunt varii modi dicendi. Nam quidam dixerunt ens mobile esse subiectum hic: quia aut corpus mobile est hic subiectum aut ens mobile ex sufficienti divisione: sed non corpus mobile, ut arguitur secunda ratio superius inducta, quare etc.

3v23 Some people think that this opinion can be refuted in many ways. 3v23–4r6 First. Being does not conform to the categories through substantial differentiae; in fact, if it did, since the differentia is outside the concept (s.iyyur) of genus, there would be something outside the concept of being—but this is evidently absurd. Therefore, being conforms to the categories through the modes of existence; and once this is acknowledged it is evident that the science that studies being studies all the modes of existence; and the result of this is that the science that studies moved being is first philosophy (i.e., metaphysics), not the science of nature (i.e., physics). From this argument, the ensuing syllogism follows: every study that

judah messer leon concerns being or any of the modes of existence pertains to metaphysics; the study of moved being concerns such things, since “to be moved” is one of the modes of existence; if so, etc. Those who defend this important opinion claim that it is commonly accepted. 4r6–9 Second. Motion is not a property of being and does not result from its principles substantially; if so, there is no science that refers to this subject substantially. The conclusion is evident, since science refers to substantial things, and the antecedent is commonly accepted. 4r9–10 In order to solve these doubts, you should know the following. 4r10–26 1. Every subject has a formal specificity (yih.ud), because of which it is true that it is the subject of a specific science—and this is evident, since, if the subject were not specified, the science itself would not be specified. We say, e.g., that logical being is the subject of the art of logic, since it is not true that its subject is being in an absolute sense, unless we add the term (gevul )“logical” which

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specifies it—as if we said that being, insofar as it is logical, is the subject of this art. In the same way, we say that discontinuous (mitpareq) quantity is the subject of arithmetic, and continuous quantity is the subject of geometry—and all these are formal specificities without which the subject would not be the subject. If sometimes we call the subject by a single word—e.g., we say that number is the subject of arithmetic, and line is the subject of geometry, and so on, according to common usage—this does not contradict what we have said, since we assume number as included in discontinuous quantity, and line as corresponding to continuous quantity. If this were not so, how could each of these things be specified, in order to be the subject of this science rather than that science? We cannot say that the same subject pertains to all the sciences! Moreover, in what way does the specificity apply to each specific science? We necessarily come to speak of the specificity of the subject, since a science is said to be “one” because of its subject— as is explained in book I of the Posterior Analytics. There is no doubt that this specificity is formal, since matter is determinate only because of its

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form—as is explained in this book (i.e. in the Physics). 4r26–4v3 2. This term, as such, sometimes indicates the way of deduction (derek ha-hemshekhut) alone, sometimes the way of deduction together with the cause,43 sometimes the way of specification. The first two ways use double premises, while the third is called “specification”, in the sense that it is true that the basic (‘iqqari) predicate concerns the basic subject— and all this is explained in my summa (i.e., the Miklal yofi), in the “door” concerning premises. 4v3–7 3. The first modes of being, through which being conforms to the ten categories, are “substantially” and “accidentally”, as is explained in book V of the Metaphysics. “Moved”, “sensitive”, and so on, are modes of being through many other (intermediate) modes; moreover, they refer to one of the parts of being, not to being as a whole. 4v7–18 4. The above mentioned way (i.e., that of specification) and 43

In the margin (f. 4r): “Explanation. An example of the first case: man, insofar as he laughs, is rational—this is called ‘way of deduction’ since laughter is a consequence (hemshekhut) of rationality: laughter is not a cause of rationality, but a consequence of it. An example of the second case: man, insofar as he is a rational animal, laughs”.

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the formal specification by means of which the subject is specified with reference to a specific science, cannot be converted with the subject. For example, in the case of the statement: “being qua being is an adequate subject of the Metaphysics”, it is evident that a term, as such, does not create a double premise; in fact, if so, this would be true for every being, as I explain in my treatment of double premises (in the Miklal yofi)—and the falsity of this would be evident, since not every being is a subject of the Metaphysics. On the contrary, the meaning of “qua being” is “as far as being in general is concerned”. Therefore, that way of specification is “as far as being in general is concerned”, not “insofar as it is one of the parts of being”—and this is a formal specification by means of which being is the specific subject of metaphysics. In fact, it is evident that this is not true for every being, since not every being is assumed in this way; and there is no doubt that what is valid for that formal specification is not convertible with the specific thing. 4v18–21 5. Motion is assumed sometimes in a broad sense,

judah messer leon including all the species of change (shinnuy), as explained in the Categories where Aristotle says: “the species of motion are six”. There is no difference if we speak of a “moved being” or a “moved body”, or if we speak of a “changed thing” or a “changed body”. 4v21–27 6. The basic (‘iqqari) subject and the adequate (shaweh) subject are different things, since the basic subject is the most important thing dealt with by that science; it is the end of that science, and the basic element (‘iqqar) studied in it—e.g., God in metaphysics and the soul in natural science. As for the adequate subject, it is what we have said above: the thing to which all the statements made in that science most commonly refer—and I have explained this in my summa (the Miklal yofi), where I have also explained in how many ways the subject is predicated. Here, the object of our research is the adequate subject. 4v27–5r11 7. In my opinion, the most correct explanation of “moved body” is “the body, insofar as it is moved”. This is the expression that Ab¯u H . a¯ mid

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al-Ghaz¯al¯ı uses in the Intentions of the Philosophers as if it were a commonly accepted one; Averroes, in chapter 2 of summa 2 of book I of his Middle Commentary on the Physics writes: “The subject of natural science is: the natural beings insofar as they are moved”. If so, according to his opinion, being, with this specification, is the subject of the science of nature. However, “moved” is not assumed insofar as it is a property of the body or of substance, but as the formal specification by means of which the body is the specific subject of natural philosophy—just as we say that being, insofar as it is being, is the subject of metaphysics, and being, insofar as it is logical, is the subject of logic. If so, if we say that being, insofar as it is moved, is the subject of the science of nature, or if we say that the body, insofar as it is moved, is its subject, there is no difference except in expression: both statements refer to the same thing. 5r11–17 It is strange that thinkers argue on this question, and spend so much time replying to it. Moreover, I do not know what is new in maestro Paolo’s statement that the natural body is

Paulus Venetus, op. cit., f. 2rb, ll. 33–35

Corpus naturale est subiectum adaequatum philosophiae naturalis.

judah messer leon the subject of natural science, because, if the study of philosophy has as its object the body insofar as it is natural, there is no doubt that natural science studies the body insofar as it is moved, and vice versa, since nature is the principle of motion and rest, as is explained in the Physics. “Moved”, whether it be assumed insofar as it is a formal specification of being or of the body, defines the subject of natural science: it is different from the subject of the other sciences, and the definition of “adequate subject” applies to it. 5r17–21 Therefore, in my opinion, the intention of the important thinkers who say that the subject of natural philosophy is moved being, and that of others, who say that its subject is the moved body, is the same: they differ in expression, not in meaning— “they are independent but not separate”.44 5r21–22 After having settled this point, I reply to the syllogisms in favour of the negative, firstly with reference to the moved body. 44

In Hebrew: yitlabbedu we-lo’ yitparedu.

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5r22–5v6 1. As for the first syllogism, we say that it has no relevance to our research, since its meaning is that the body is the subject in this sense, i.e., insofar as it is moved; and this is a formal specification which differentiates this study from the other studies that concern the body, i.e., insofar as it is a being (i.e., metaphysics), or has dimensions (i.e., mathematics), etc. (if there are other studies that concern the body). In our opinion, the meaning is not that the subject is the compound of the subject and the property, i.e., the moved body—and the first syllogism supposes this. In fact, “moved” is assumed as the formal specification of the body insofar as it is the subject of natural philosophy—as if, in order to understand the true nature of things, we assumed properties as if they were substantial differentiae. If we accepted this syllogism, you would perhaps be unable to deny this conclusion.45 5v6–13 If you defended the opinion of some commentators by saying that the moved body is the

Caietanus de Thienis, op. cit., f. 2va, ll. 29–40 Si quis tamen Albertum defendere vellet ad rationes in principio adductas sic posset respondere.

45 Judah Messer Leon seems to be referring to the difficulty in understanding his own argument.

judah messer leon subject of natural science in a different way than we said, one could reply to the first syllogism that “accidental being” has two meanings: “accident” means either the specific accident deriving from the principles of species (and in this sense the question arises whether “moved” is convertible with “body”—but this is not the meaning of “accidental being” in the Posterior Analytics, since this kind of accident is called “essential”) or accident in general (this is what is called “accidental being” in the Posterior Analytics, and there is no doubt that there is a science of it—but this does not pertain to our research). 5v13–18 2. We reply to the second syllogism by denying the antecedent; and we explain that Aristotle wants to demonstrate neither the existence of body, nor the existence of motion, nor the existence of this compound (i.e., the moved body), since all these things are postulated by him; in book VI of the Physics it is demonstrated that “moved” is convertible with “body” as a true property—but this does not harm our thesis in any way.

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Ad primam dicitur quod duplex est ens per accidens: quoddam est cuius unio non habet causas per se et indeterminatas, ut homo albus, et de tali loquitur Aristotelis sexto Methaphysicae dicendo quod de ipso non potest haberi scientia. Aliud est ens per accidens cuius habet causas de se et determinatas sicut corpus mobile, cum mobilitas insit mobili per principia intrinseca eius, et de tali ente potest haberi scientia.

Ff. 2va, l. 41–2vb, l. 1 Ad secundam negatur minor, et conceditur tantum quod in sexto Physicorum probatur quod omne mobile per se est corpus: sed hoc non est probare corpus mobile esse; licet ad illud sequatur, quoniam corpus mobile esse est per se notum et manifestum ad sensum; ideo dicit Aristotelis parum infra. Nobis autem subiciantur omnia aut quaedam moveri.

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5v18 –22 3. The major commentators reply to the third syllogism by denying the antecedent, since it is better to say that the moved body is the subject of natural science for different reasons: (1) “moved” is more general than “still”, since every still thing is moved but not vice versa, because not every moved thing is still (e.g., the celestial body is moved without having ever been still); (2) motion is a habit, while rest is a privation: privation is known from habit, but not vice versa.

F. 2vb, ll. 3–1146 Ad tertiam dicit Albertus quod corpus mobile magis debet poni subiectum quam corpus quiescibile. Primo quod corpus mobile est communius: nam omne corpus quiescibile est corpus mobile et non e converso.

Secundo quia motus est habitus: quies vero privatio; privatio autem non cognoscitur nisi per habitum, ut dicitur nono Metaphysicae.

5v22–27 4. We reply to the fourth syllogism by denying the antecedent. We reply to what is said about God (may He be exalted) that there is no need for a subject to be predicated of all the things dealt with in the science of which it is the subject; it is sufficient that those things are somehow related to it and said with reference to it. In natural science, if there is something that is said about God (may He be exalted), this is insofar as He is the mover of the moved body, and this is said with reference to it. 46

Cf. Alberti Magni . . . Physica, pars I. Libri 1–4, ed. P. Hossfeld, Monasterii Westfalorum 1987, l. I, tr. I, cap. 3, pp. 5, 84–6,8.

judah messer leon 5v27–6r6

5. We reply to the fifth syllogism by denying the antecedent, since this (i.e., the moved body) is the subject of the whole of natural science and the subject of this book, in different ways, as follows. It is the subject of the whole science in that it can be limited to being the subject of a part of it, but it can also be assumed in relationship to this science as a whole. On the contrary, it is the subject of this book insofar as it is assumed absolutely (bi-stam) without being limited to any specific one of the natural questions, because it studies what is common to all natural things.

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Johannes Jandunus, Quaestiones in libros Physicorum, Venetiis 1488 [copy in Rome, Biblioteca Corsiniana, Col. 53 C 29], ff. 3vb, l. 56–4ra, l.3 Ad aliud dicendum est quod ens mobile aliter est subiectum in tota scientia naturali, et aliter in isto libro. Nam si consideretur ipsum ens mobile quantum ad omnem modum essendi possibilem in se et in aliis suis principiis et in suis partibus specialibus, sic est subiectum in tota scientia naturali. Si vero consideretur ens mobile in universali et secundum rationem abstractam, id est communem omnibus entibus naturalibus vel pluribus et quantum ad passiones communes, sic est subiectum in scientia ista.

6r6–1947 The reply to the above two arguments in favour of the negative, with respect to moved being,48 is evident from what we have said. In fact, if one says that the same science should study being and the modes of being, this is true in the case 47

To these arguments there is no reply in Gaetano de Thiene’s commentary, where it is stated: Ad argumenta vero alia pro ultima opinione facientia respondeat qui scit respondere (Caietanus de Thienis, op. cit., f. 2vb, ll. 31–33). 48 Cf. above (ff. 3v, l. 23–4r, l. 9).

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of the first modes of being, through which being conforms to the categories; but, if this science studies the other modes of existence, it is evident that it studies them only insofar as they are beings, although the particular sciences study them in specific ways. In the case of the second syllogism, we deny the conclusion, since we have already explained that “moved” is not assumed insofar as it is a property or an accident, but as the formal specification due to which the subject is specified as the subject of this science. Moreover, the meaning is not that this science refers to moved being as a compound of subject and accident, be it specific or general; the meaning is that being is the specific subject of this science, as specified by its specifying concept—and it has already been explained that from this it does not follow that “being” is convertible with “subject”. It is now evident what the general subject referring to the whole science is, and what the specific subject of this book is. 6r19–23 From what we have said above, it follows that natural science is one because it has one

Paulus Venetus, op. cit., f. 2va, ll. 11–18 Secundae vero sequitur quod scientia naturalis est una ratione unitatis subiecti, scilicet non est una

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subject, but that unity is neither a unity in number, nor in species, nor in genus. Just as we say that the army is one because its commander, or the king, is one, we say that the science is one because the subject, with reference to which all the contents of this science are studied, is one.

unitate numerali, nec specifica nec generica alicuius praedicamenti. Igitur est una unitate generis subiecti iuxta modum loquendi philosophi primo Posteriorum. Sicut enim exercitus dicitur unus ratione unitatis principis, ita scientia dicitur una ratione unitatis subiecti.

6r24–6v13

Gualterus Burlaeus, Expositio in libros octo physicorum, Venetiis 1482 [copy in Rome, Biblioteca Corsiniana, Col. 52 F 14], f. 2ra, ll. 15–55

The division of the books that deal with this science is as follows. If we assume the moved body, we must assume it either absolutely, without the possibility of specifying and determining it, or with a specification. If we assume it in the former way, the result is the Physics. If we assume it with a specification, we must assume it either according to a local motion, or as related to other motions. If we assume it in the former way, the result is the De caelo et mundo. If we assume it in the latter way, it must refer either to the acquisition of the general form, or to the specific form. In the former case, the result is the De generatione et corruptione, since this work studies the forms of the elements, which are

Aut enim de ipso corpore mobili in se et absolute considerat, et illa consideratio traditur in libro Physicorum qui primus est inter omnes partes philosophiae. Aut de ipso contracto ad ubi: et haec consideratio habetur in secunda parte, scilicet in libro Caeli.

Aut de ipso contracto ad formam, et hoc dupliciter: quod aut ad formam simplicis, et haec consideratio habetur in libro De generatione, quae tertia pars est scientiae naturalis;

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general if compared to the forms of composed things. In the latter case, either motion is related to the form of imperfect composed things—and the result is the book Meteorologica; or motion is related to the form of perfect composed things. In the latter case, these things can be either inanimate—and the result is the De mineralibus—or animate.

The latter can be in two ways: either these animate things are dealt with in a general way— and this is found in the De anima;

or they are dealt with in a specific way—and this is in two ways: either insofar as they have only a vegetative soul (and the result is the De plantis), or insofar as they have also a sensitive soul (and the result is the

aut de ipso contracto ad formam mixti, et hoc dupliciter: quia aut contracto ad formam mixti imperfecti, et haec consideratio traditur in parte quarta in libris Methaurorum; aut contracto ad formam mixti perfecti, et hoc dupliciter: quod aut inanimati aut animati: si inanimati haec consideratio traditur in libro in quinta parte, in libro scilicet Mineralium (. . . ). Si autem sit consideratio de ipso contracto ad formam mixti animati, haec consideratio in tres partes est partita. Nam volentes nos de animatis corporibus determinare, oportet prius de eorum anima inquirere: quae pars et causa est eorum. Cognitio enim causati ex cognitione suarum causarum pendet, et haec consideratio traditur in parte sexta naturalis philosophiae quae liber De anima inscribitur (. . . ). Post illam considerationem de anima conveniens est ut de corporibus animatis determinetur; quorum cognitio acquiritur ex potentiis et operibus animae non absolute consideratis, sed ut habent quamdam concretionem ad corpus: et prout determinatas partes corporis et determinata organa requirunt. Et hoc dupliciter: quia aut sit de ipsis determinatio in generali, et hoc traditur in Parvis libris naturalium ( . . . ), aut sit de ipsis consideratio in speciali, applicando omnia haec ad singulas species animalium et

judah messer leon De animalibus). As for the De sensu et sensato, it is a sort of completion of the De anima.

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plantarum ( . . . ) et haec consideratio traditur in libris quos scripsit De animalibus et Plantis.49

6v14–15 So, the whole of this science is divided into eight books, the first of which is this book, called Physics (lit. De physico auditu). 6v15–20

Some commentators say that this book is called Physics (lit. De physico auditu), since Aristotle wrote his books in one of the following two ways: either by composing and writing them down; or by teaching them, so that his students, hearing his words from his mouth, collected them and wrote them down. This book was made in the latter way: his students wrote these things about natural science as they heard them from Aristotle’s mouth. 49

Egidii Romani In libros de Physico Auditu Aristotelis commentaria, Venetiis 1504 [copy in Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, 28 H 47], f. 2rb, ll. 41–46 Intitulatur autem hic liber “de physico auditu” quoniam, ut dicitur, philosophus in naturalibus quosdam libros edidit scribendo, quosdam vero docendo. Et quoniam liber physicorum sic traditus fuit, quoniam auditores sub philosopho philosophiam audiendo hunc librum recollegerunt, ideo intitulatus est “de physico auditu”, quoniam fuit audiendo recollectus.

Messer Leon’s treatment of the last parts of natural philosophy, namely De anima, De plantis, De animalibus, De sensu, seems the result of a combination of Burley’s and Paul of Venice’s treatments of these subjects. Cf. Paulus Venetus, op. cit., f. 2rb, ll. 7–19: Sexto considerat corpus animatum, cui considerationi spectat sexta pars philosophiae quae dicitur de anima ( . . . ). Septimo considerat ut corpus animatum habens solum operationes animae vegetativae ( . . . ) et ad istam considerationem sequitur septima pars philosophiae quae dicitur de vegetabilibus et plantis ( . . . ). Octavo considerat ut corpus animatum habens operationes animae sensitivae ( . . . ) cui considerationi correspondet octava et ultima pars philosophiae quae dicitur Parvorum Naturalium.

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6v20–24

At the beginning of his Long Commentary on the Physics, Averroes wrote: “The meaning of his title (i.e., De physico auditu) is ‘a treatise on nature’; but, as in a discourse which is heard, Aristotle composed this treatise in the form of questions, and with alterations for the sake of linguistic beauty and due to the peculiarity of some primitive nouns, according to what is explained in the Rhetorics etc.”.

Aristotelis Opera, Vol. 4, cur. Marco Antonio Zimara, Venetiis 1560, f. 2r, ll. 39–43

Nomen huius libri est Auditus naturalis, sive Sermo naturalis: sed cum acciderit sermoni quod audiatur, mutatum est loco sermonis auditus, secundum mutationem et alterationem, propter delectationem et extraneitatem existentem in verbis mutatis, secundum quod declaratum est in Rhetoricis.

6v24–7r1 Here end the matters that I decided to resolve before commenting on this book. I renounce the treatment of its reasons and usefulness, since Averroes expatiates on this subject in the introduction to his commentary on this book, and those who feel the need of such a treatment will find it there. Therefore, let us proceed to explain the words of this book, in the name of God. 7r2–10 Text of the Long Commentary Chapter 1, on the intention of this science Aristotle said: “Since the question of knowledge and truth, in all the ways (derakhim) that have principles or causes or elements, passes through the knowledge of these—in fact, we think we know a question when we know its simple causes and its first principles, until

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we reach its elements—it is evident that, also in the case of the knowledge of nature, we first have to look for the explanation of its principles”. 7r11–7v3 Text of the Middle Commentary We say that, since this art (i.e., the art that studies moved beings) is a theoretical art, and the theoretical art meant here consists in attaining the knowledge of the causes of the thing studied in that art (in fact, we think we know a thing perfectly when we know its causes and its first principles, until we reach its elements and the simple things of which it is composed—and this happens for everything that has the four causes), and since this art is one of the theoretical arts, it is evident that the intention of this art is to understand the four causes of natural things (i.e., matter, form, agent and final causes), be they remote or proximate, general or specific. Therefore, the intention of this book is to expound the first causes common to all natural beings, and their general characteristics (massigim), as far as it is possible to expound them in this science: these are prime matter and the last moving cause—while, as for prime form and the prime final cause, there is in this science no premise from which we can attain their knowledge (as will appear later), since the understanding of these two causes pertains to metaphysics. 7v4–9 Latin text of the Physics Since understanding and knowledge refer to all the sciences that have principles or causes or elements according to their predisposition (in fact, we think that we understand a thing when we attain its first causes and its first principles, as far as the elements), it is evident that, to examine the contents of natural science, we must first explain its principles. 7v10 Things needed for understanding this passage: 7v11–15 1. Averroes said (in his Long Commentary to the above passage): “‘The question of knowledge and truth’ is not a case of

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synonymy (hardafah), since synonyms are not used in demonstrative teaching; it means ‘knowledge combined with truth’, i.e., perfect knowledge, since knowledge of the cause is a perfect knowledge; in fact, knowledge is either perfect (i.e., knowledge of the cause), or imperfect (i.e., knowledge in which the cause is not attained)”. 7v15–8r2 For a better understanding of Averroes’s words, you should know that “perfect” is said in two ways, according to what Aristotle explains in book V of the Metaphysics, in the chapter devoted to “perfect”: (1) perfect in absolute; (2) perfect in its genus. An example of the first way is: if we know a man insofar as he is a man, an animal, an animate body, a body and a substance through an a priori demonstration (mofet ‘illah), and we also know all the properties predicated of him substantially, such a knowledge is called “perfect knowledge in absolute”. An example of the second way is: if we know about a man something predicated of him substantially through a

Gualterus Burlaeus, op. cit., f. 7rb, ll. 5–22 Perfectum dicitur dupliciter, ut patet quinto Metaphysicorum, capitulo de perfecto. Nam uno modo perfectum dicitur simpliciter, alio modo in genere. Applicando igitur ad propositum, dico quod notitia perfecta complexa dicitur dupliciter, scilicet simpliciter, et in genere. Scientia simpliciter perfecta de aliqua re est illa qua cognoscitur illa res secundum omnem rationem considerandi per se, secundum quam potest considerari, et quantum ad omnia praedicata per se de illa re: ut si consideretur animal secundum omnem rationem considerandi ipsum per se, et in quantum ad omnia quae praedicantur de ipso per se, scilicet in quantum est animal et corpus animatum et in quantum substantia, et quo ad omnes per se passiones sibi convenientes secundum omnes

judah messer leon demonstration propter quid (mofet lammah), then this knowledge is “perfect in its genus” or “in its species” since it is subordinated to the first way of knowledge, but it is not called “knowledge in absolute”. However such a knowledge may be, it is in any case perfect knowledge, as Averroes said about knowledge a posteriori (min ha-mit’ah.er). 8r2–4 2. Averroes said: “By ‘ways’ Aristotle means the theoretical arts. He calls them ‘ways’ because those who study them go from determinate things to other determinate things, passing through determinate things”. 8r4–13 Averroes means that knowledge is similar to a way in which three things are found: the terminus a quo, the terminus ad quem and what lies in between—e.g., we go from Alexandria to Cairo by travelling over the way between them. The same happens in knowledge, since we go from non-knowledge (which is the terminus a quo) to the perfection of knowledge (which is the terminus ad quem) through all the intermediate points between the former and the

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istas rationes. Sed scientia perfecta in genere est illa qua res cognoscitur secundum aliquam rationem determinatam, et quantum ad predicata quae conveniunt ei per se in quantum tale ens solum, ut si cognoscatur animal solum ut animal, et quoad per se accidentia ipsius animalis, ut animal eodem modo est in aliis.

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latter; and, since the way cannot be infinite but must necessarily begin in a determinate place and end in a determinate place, and what lies between these determinate things must also be determinate, the same applies to knowledge: it is not infinite, but it is determinate in its beginning and end, as well as in its middle points. All this is demonstrated in book II of the Posterior Analytics. 8r13–17 3. Averroes said: “Aristotle said ‘that have principles or causes or elements’, since some of the theoretical arts, or some of their parts, include the study of simple things which have no principles”. The true knowledge of these things does not pass through the knowledge of causes, since these things have no cause; in fact, the theoretical knowledge of first principles concerns being qua being. 8r17–26 In my opinion, Averroes means here that some of the theoretical arts, or some of their parts, study simple things that have no principles. For example, a part of first philosophy (i.e., metaphysics) studies God (may He be exalted), who is essentially simple and has no principle, and the first composed

judah messer leon principles (i.e., “first”, “positive” and “negative”), which have no principle in the genus of premises and pertain to being qua being. Now, since this is not clear, a doubt arises. Averroes says: “Since some of the theoretical arts, or some of their parts etc.”: in fact, it is evident that there is no art as a whole which studies simple things that have no principle— and it has been already demonstrated, in book II of the Posterior Analytics, that the first things are the simple things found in the premises. 8r26–8v4 4. Averroes said: “Aristotle said ‘principles or causes or elements’ in order to include the different species of causes: by ‘principles’, here, he means agent causes, by ‘causes’, final causes, and by ‘elements’, what is part of a thing, i.e., matter and form—as if he used the words ‘principle’ and ‘cause’ in a specific sense, not as synonyms (as when they are used in a general sense). And this, in my opinion, is Alexander of Aphrodisias’s interpretation”. 8v4–9 “In order to include the different species of causes” means that they are all included in the words spoken by Aristotle;

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therefore, Aristotle pronounces the words which include the different species of causes, since they are all called “principle” or “cause” or “element”, but men have given a specific meaning to each one of these words, as Averroes explains. The Latin translation of Averroes’s Long Commentary, instead of “in order to include the different species of causes”, has “in order to distinguish the different kinds of causes. Therefore, by ‘principles’, here, he means ‘moving agent causes’ etc.”. 8v10–16 In order to understand this passage better, you should know that Averroes, in his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, says that “principle” in a specific sense means only external causes (i.e., agent and final causes), while “element” means only internal causes (i.e., matter and form), and “cause” means both external and internal causes. For this reason, at the beginning of this passage, he says: “by ‘principles’, here, he means”, so as to avoid synonymy and redundance (dibbur motar), i.e., so as to give each one of those words a specific

Cf. Aristotelis Opera, cit., p. 3v, ll. 5–7 Et dixit: principia, aut causas, aut elementa, propter diversitatem modorum quatuor causarum: et intendebat per principia in hoc loco causas agentes et moventes . . . Gualterus Burlaeus, op. cit., ff. 6va, l. 60–6vb, l. 6 Intelligendo tamen quod commentator duodecimo Metaphysicae ponit talem differentiam inter principium, causam et elementum: quia scilicet proprie loquendo principium dicitur solum de causis extrinsecis, videlicet de efficiente et finali. Et elementum proprie solum dicitur de causis intrinsecis, scilicet de materia et forma. Causa vero proprie dicitur de utroque, id est tam de principiis intrinsecis quam de principiis extrinsecis.

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meaning which has nothing in common with the meaning of any other word—although, in a specific sense, this is not so. 8v16–26 5. Averroes said: “Aristotle follows this opinion in his work, in order to declare that not every art studies every cause, but some arts (i.e., mathematics) study only the formal cause; some others (i.e., metaphysics) study only three causes: matter, form and the final cause; some others (i.e., natural science) study all four causes; and, as if it were not clear, he raises a doubt, as follows. He says ‘that have principles or causes or elements’, meaning that this happens when one assumes things that have either agent principles, or final causes, or elements, or all of these; here, “or” (’o) cannot have the meaning of waw (i.e., “and”), which is a conjunction. In fact, true knowledge can concern things that have only some causes, because the knowledge of the causes found in those things would be the same if they had all the causes”. 8v26–9r4

50

Gualterus Burlaeus, op. cit., f. 6vb, ll. 13–2450

Cf. also Paulus Venetus, op. cit., f. 3ra, ll. 12 ff.

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In order to understand this, you should know that mathematics has a subject (which is the material cause) and studies it; it also has a final cause (since every knowledge is ordered to some final cause) and studies it; but it has no cause which it studies as a medium for demonstrating its conclusions, apart from the formal cause— and here “formal cause” means the cause which expresses the quiddity for which the major term is predicated of the minor one in the conclusion; it consists of definitions or predicates in quid.

Intelligendum etiam quod scientiae mathematicae habent alias causas quam formalem tantum quia habent subiectum et finem; sed tamen non habent nisi causam formalem per quam procedunt demonstrationes mathematicae. Nec considerat mathematicus nisi causam formalem, intelligendo per causam formalem causam exprimentem quidditatem per quam concluduntur passiones de subiecto (. . . ) ut sunt diffinitiones et predicata in quid.

9r4–17 6. Averroes said: “When Aristotle says ‘when we know its simple causes’, he seems to mean the first, non-composed causes that exist in a thing, i.e. prime matter and last form51 , since, apart from prime matter and last form, each one of the natural things is made up of composed matters and composed forms. When he says ‘and its first principles’, he apparently means the first causes external to that thing, i.e. the first agent and the last end of every existing thing. When he 51

That is, the ultimate form. I have chosen to call it “last form” in order to preserve the linguistic ambiguity of the Hebrew term .surah ’ah.aronah discussed by Judah Messer Leon below.

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says ‘until we reach its elements’, by ‘elements’ he means the proximate essential causes that exist in a thing; and he indicates that ordered learning starts from the knowledge of the first causes of what we want to know perfectly; we should aim for the most proximate knowledge and for the most proximate of remote causes, until we reach the proximate causes. For this reason, Aristotle uses here the word ‘element’, and this is the reason why he uses the word ‘question’ (‘inyan) in his first statement. This depends, as usual in Aristotle, upon his insufficient choice of words”. 9r17–24 You should know, in order to understand this, that some commentators say that by “prime matter” Averroes means the simple matter which is not composed of matter and form; by “composed matter” he means the matter which is composed of matter and form (e.g., the elements which are the matter of the compound, and the bones and flesh which are the matter of animals); by “last form” he means the form 52

Gualterus Burlaeus, op. cit., ff. 6vb, l. 55–7ra, l. 752 Est intelligendum quod per materiam primam intelligit materiam simplicem non compositam ex materia et forma, et ad talem materiam simplicem oportet devenire quia aliter esset processus in infinitum, et per materiam compositam intelligit materiam compositam ex materia et forma, ut sunt elementa quae sunt materia mixti et caro et ossa quae sunt materia animalium, et per ultimam formam intelligit formam quae non est resolubilis in

Cf. also Paulus Venetus, op. cit., f. 3ra, end of page.

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which does not include another form or does not dissolve into another form preceding it (e.g., the form of elements); by “composed form” he means a form which includes another form (e.g., the form of the things composed of elements—i.e., the form of blood and flesh, in which the form of elements is found potentially). 9r24–9v3 Somebody else says that by “prime matter” Averroes means matter understood in its complete totality, which is the first in the way of composition; by “composed matter” he means specific matter, composed of matter and form (e.g., the elements with reference to the compound, and flesh with respect to animals); by “composed form” he means the form which can dissolve into another form preceding it (e.g., the form of horse dissolves into the form of animal, and the form of animal dissolves into the form of animate body, and the form of animate body dissolves into the form of body, and the form of body dissolves into substance). 9v3–15 Now, it is difficult to give the reason why he ascribed

formam priorem nec includens priorem formam in eius virtute cuiusmodi est forma elementi, ut est forma ignis sive forma aquae; sed forma composita est forma quae includit priorem formam in eius virtute, cuiusmodi est forma mixti resultans ex commixtione elementorum, ut est forma carnis et sanguinis in quibus formae elementorum manent in virtute.

judah messer leon “lastness” (’ah.aronut) to form: in fact, he does not speak of “prime form”, while he speaks of “prime matter”. Now, we will try to give this reason. Let us admit that Averroes’s intention in saying “last form” conforms to the first opinion mentioned above. In fact, existence as a whole has two limits: the first is God (may He be exalted) who is absolute actuality, without any potentiality; the second is prime matter, which is absolute potentiality, without any actuality per se. What is found between these two things is composed of actuality and potentiality: in what is closer to God, actuality prevails; in what is closer to prime matter, there is a high degree of potentiality. Now, the status (beh.inah) of form is the opposite of the status of matter, since the latter goes from the bottom upwards, if you want to reach the extreme possibility of matter’s existence; but if you want to examine the former, in order to reach extreme simplicity (i.e., prime matter), you have to start from absolute actuality and descend to the form of the elements: this descent will end with forms. We can say this in accordance with what is clarified by the words of Averroes.

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9v16–10r3 Somebody might think that the “last form” mentioned in Averroes’s Long Commentary is what he calls, in the Middle Commentary, “last moving cause”— i.e., God (may He be exalted), whose status (‘inyan), insofar as He is a mover, is explained in book VIII of the Physics. These people assume the two extremes (i.e., the most general causes and the simple causes) and interpret accordingly what Aristotle adds (i.e., “simple”) in his second statement; in fact, in his first statement he says “principles or causes or elements” without adding the word “simple”. Now, according to this interpretation, we can say that Averroes’s statement (i.e., “apart from prime matter and last form, each one of the natural things has composed matters and composed forms”) means that in natural things there is no matter without form and no form without matter, but every matter, except prime matter, is combined with form, and every form is combined with matter, except for the prime moving form (which the natural philosopher studies insofar as it is a mover, since he does not study any other form which is not combined with matter). No wonder Averroes

judah messer leon uses the word “form” in the Long Commentary and the word “cause” in the Middle Commentary, since God (may He be exalted) is an agent form and a final cause with respect to all beings, as is explained elsewhere. According to this interpretation, it is not strange that Averroes calls this form “last”, since matter is the first thing we meet, and God (may He be exalted) is the last thing, where the ascent ends. 10r3–12 Now, we should criticise the words of the authors mentioned above. What Averroes says in his Long Commentary about the “last form” is different from what he says in his Middle Commentary about the “last moving cause”, for several reasons: 1. he speaks of “first causes that exist in a thing etc.”, so that it seems that they are internal causes, since it is right to say of the internal causes that they are “in a thing”; 2. if the meaning of “last form” is “last moving cause”, why does he say, talking about principles, “that is, the first agent”? 3. this discussion is not found in the passage of the Middle Commentary that

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corresponds to this passage of the Long Commentary, but the relevant passage of the Middle Commentary says: “we think we know a thing perfectly when we know its causes and its first principles etc.”. 10r12–14 You should know that, instead of what is found in the Hebrew text, i.e., “this depends, as usual in Aristotle, upon his insufficient choice of words”, the Latin text (i.e., the Latin translation of Averroes’s Long Commentary) has: “. . . upon his insufficient care with words”. 10r14–18 7. Al-Farabi (Alfarabius) said: “The necessary things in each science are three: 1. the principles, which do not enter into the demonstration in actu; 2. the essential principles of the demonstration, i.e., the middle terms on which the force of the demonstration depends: they enter into the demonstration in actu, but not into the conclusion; 3. the things which enter into the conclusion”.

Egidii Romani, op. cit., f. 4ra, ll. 3–9 Alfarabius autem vult quod ad quodlibet scire occurrant tria, scilicet: primo, propositiones, quae sunt animi communes conceptiones, quae non ingrediuntur demonstrationem secundum substantiam, sed secundum virtutem, quas propositiones ipse appellat “prologos”; secundo, concurrunt ibi principia propria demonstrationis, cuius sunt ipsa media quae ingrediuntur demonstrationem secundum substantiam, sed non intrant conclusiones.53

53 At this point there is an evident lacuna in the published text of Giles of Rome’s commentary, corresponding to the third terms needed for each science (probably “propositiones quae intrant conclusiones”).

judah messer leon 10r18–21 He said: “What Aristotle means is that we think we know each one of the things (‘inyanim) when we know its simple causes (i.e., the principles found in the demonstration in potentia) and its first principles (i.e., the middle terms that enter into the demonstration in actu, but not into the conclusion), until we reach its elements (i.e., the things that enter into the conclusion in actu)”. 10r21–10v1

8. Thomas Aquinas said: “The meaning of ‘principles’ is ‘moving causes’, since the order of abstraction (hitpasht.ut) is more specific in this case; the meaning of ‘causes’ is ‘formal and final causes’, since relying upon this interpretation the question can be resolved according to its reality in a more basic (‘iqqari) way; the meaning of ‘elements’ is ‘specific material causes’; and the meaning of ‘until we reach its elements’ is ‘until we reach matter’, which is the last perceived thing since it is known only because of form. Aristotle does not use those three words in the last passage in a sense

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Egidii Romani, op. cit., f. 4ra, ll. 9–13 Est ergo sensus quod tunc cognoscimus unumquodque quando scimus principia, id est communes animi conceptiones, et causas, id est propositiones praemissas et propria principia demonstrationis, et hoc usque ad elementa, id est usque ad ea quae ingrediuntur conclusionem.

Cf. Sancti Thomae de Aquino Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum, Taurini 1954, book I, lectio 1, § 5 Sic igitur per principia videtur intelligere causas moventes et agentes, in quibus maxime attenditur ordo processus cuiusdam; causas autem videtur intelligere causas formales et finales, a quibus maxime dependent res secundum suum esse et fieri; per elementa vero proprie primas causas materiales. ( . . . ) Nec oportet ut aliter accipiamus hic causas et elementa et principia quam supra, ut Commentator vult, sed eodem modo. Dicit autem usque ad elementa, quia id quod est ultimum in cognitione est materia. Nam materia est propter formam.

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different from that in which he uses them in the first passage, as Averroes thought”.54 10v1–3 9. In this passage, Aristotle wants to explain the reason for what is said in this book on matter, form, the prime mover and their general characteristics, as Averroes said in his Middle Commentary. 10v3–7 10. The study of this book concerns God (may He be exalted) only insofar as He is a mover (and we perceive this a posteriori, when we know that He is the last mover), while the study of God insofar as He is prime form or prime final cause exceeds the limits of this science and is specific to metaphysics, which deals with the first principles of existence. 10v7–10 11. The “understanding” and the “knowledge” of which the Latin text of the Physics speaks are not synonyms; some commentators say that “understanding” refers to the attainment of the principles, while “knowledge” refers to the attainment of the conclusions.

Gualterus Burlaeus, op. cit., f. 6va, ll. 39–42

Aliter posset dici, videlicet quod per “intelligere” philosophus intelligit cognitionem principiorum, et per “scire” intelligit cognitionem conclusionum.

54 As a comparison with the original Latin text shows, this passage is a rather free paraphrase of Thomas’s passage.

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Others say that the meaning of “understanding” is “to comprehend through definition”, while the meaning of “knowledge” is “to comprehend through demonstration”. 10v11–13 12. We deal with natural things mostly a posteriori, as Aristotle says, as in the case of things known through examination and experience; for this reason, the Latin text of the Physics writes: “To examine the contents of natural science”. 10v14–24 Explanations (shi‘urim) of the three passages (i.e., Long Commentary, Middle Commentary and Latin translation of the Physics) [Explanation of the above passage of the Long Commentary] “Since the question of knowledge and truth concerning things that have causes, principles or elements depends upon our knowledge of those causes, principles or elements”—this is the major premise, and the minor one is omitted, that is: “and this is valid in the case of the science of nature”. In fact, this is commonly accepted, as Averroes said. “In fact, we think etc.” is the explanation of the major premise: Averroes says that Aristotle here offers a witness of its truth, because this explanation should be qualified as a witness—and this or something similar is explained in book I of the Posterior Analytics. “It is evident that etc.” is the conclusion which should give the reason of what is dealt with in this book, not the conclusion of the above syllogism. The complete syllogism would be: “You reach the knowledge of everything that has causes and elements through the knowledge of its causes and elements; every natural thing has causes and elements; if so, etc.”. 10v25–11r1 Explanation of the [above passage of the] Middle Commentary. “We say that, since this art . . . ”: these are the words of Averroes, and

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this is the minor premise of the syllogism, although it makes known the subject of this art, i.e., moved being; “and the theoretical art meant here etc.” is the major premise of the syllogism. “And since this art is one of the theoretical arts etc.”—here Averroes modifies the minor premise of the syllogism: in fact, what he has said before, although it acts as a minor premise, aims first of all to declare the subject of this art, and should not be called “superfluous”, as some commentators say, “because of linguistic redundance”. “It is evident that its intention etc.” is the conclusion of the syllogism. “Therefore, the intention of this book etc.”—here Averroes explains, on the basis of the aforementioned syllogism, the reason of the things dealt with in this book: Aristotle intends to explain this conclusion here, so as to present the order of this study and the things that are included in it. What results from this is evident from what has been said before. 11r12 The explanation of the Latin text (of the Physics) follows the explanation of Averroes’s Long Commentary. 11r13–15 The question concerning what is dealt with here is as follows: Whether for a perfect knowledge of some caused thing it is necessary, as a rule, for the knower to know all its causes. First, we argue in the negative, in many ways. 11r15–23 1. All mathematical things have causes, although these causes are not evident but mediated by form; if so, etc. The conclusion and the second part of the antecedent are evident from what Averroes says above; the first part of the antecedent is commonly accepted. In fact, since these things are in a substrate,

Caietanus de Thienis, op. cit., f. 2vb, ll. 34–38 Utrum ad habendam scientiam de aliquo causato oporteat omnes eius causas cognoscere. Negative arguitur primo.

F. 3ra, ll. 2–13 Secundo. Res mathematicae habent causas et tamen de eis non habetur scientia nisi per causam formalem; igitur etc. Patet consequentia cum minori ex auctoritate commentatoris statim allegata; et maior declaratur: nam formae mathematicae sunt in subiecto, ideo habent causam materialem. Habent etiam causam

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the substrate should be their material cause; and there is no doubt that they have a formal cause, since they are evident through this cause; moreover, their figures are made ex novo (me-h.adash), since the tracing of lines and the creation of squares and circles in handicraft are commonly perceived by the senses, so that they have an agent cause; and it is evident that they have a final cause, since all things are ordered to God (may He be exalted) as to the last final cause.

formalem (. . . ). Habent etiam causam efficientem, cum circuli, quadrata, lineae ac superficies perducantur de novo. Et similiter habent causam finalem, cum omnia ordinentur in Primum simpliciter tamquam in finem.

11r23–11v1 2. The knowledge of defined things passes through their definitions, since definition is the beginning of demonstration and each demonstration is different by assumption (behannah.ah), as explained in book I of the Posterior Analytics. Now, it is evident that knowledge through definitions (“definitional knowledge”, yedi‘ah gidriyyit) does not involve all the causes, since definition includes only internal causes, which are part of the quiddity; however, such a knowledge is perfect. From this it follows that he who knows in this way does not necessarily know all the causes of the thing he knows.

F. 3ra, ll. 13–21 Tertio. De re diffinita per diffinitionem habetur scientia, cum diffinitio sit principium demonstrationis aut conclusio, aut tota demonstratio positione differens. Sed per diffinitionem non cognoscitur res per omnes suas causas: ex quo non omnes causae ponuntur in diffinitione, sed intrinsecae tantum pertinentes ad quidditatem. Ergo etc.

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11v1–4 3. One can know something through only some of its causes; if so, etc. The conclusion is evident, and the antecedent is commonly accepted on the basis of book II of the Posterior Analytics, in which Aristotle teaches how to demonstrate something from each one of its causes—and there is no doubt that the demonstration of something is an acquisition of a perfect knowledge. 11v5–10 4. If the perfect knowledge of something were impossible without the knowledge of all its causes, nothing, big or small, would be perfectly known without the knowledge of God (may He be exalted) who is the Cause of all beings; but this is not true, since many things are known without the knowledge of God (may He be exalted); if so, etc. The conclusion is evident, since God (may He be exalted) is the Cause of Causes; the opposite of the consequent is commonly accepted, since we know many things in physics, in mathematics and in many disciplines, and this knowledge does not involve the knowledge of God (may He be exalted).

F. 3ra, ll. 21–27 Quarto. Per demonstrationem, propter quod habetur scientia de aliquo effectu, quamvis non omnes eius causae cognoscantur. Igitur etc. Patet consequentia, et assumptum colligitur ab Aristotele secundo Posteriorum, ubi per quodlibet genus causae docet demonstrare.

judah messer leon 11v10–11 There are some things you should know in order to resolve these doubts. 11v11–16 1. Intellectual perception is of two kinds: the perception of simple things (e.g., man, horse, sphere, etc.)—and this is called “knowledge through definitions”; the perception of composed things (i.e., the perception of the existence of the predicate in the subject). The latter is the perception of the propositions which are said to be affirmative, negative, true or false, as explained in book III of the De anima—and this is called “demonstrative knowledge”. 11v16–23 2. Causes are either substantial or accidental. A substantial cause is that from which the caused thing follows necessarily, and the caused thing cannot exist without it; an accidental cause is that from which the caused thing does not follow necessarily, and the caused thing can exist without it. For example, Ruben is the accidental cause of the house, since the house can exist without him, as it can be built by Simon, Levi, and so on; Judah is the accidental cause of his son Peres, since the latter might be brought

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into existence by another man; but fire is not the accidental cause of heat, for it is its substantial cause, from which heat derives necessarily, since heat cannot exist without it. 11v23–27 3. Demonstration is of two kinds: either a priori (min haqodem)—i.e., it demonstrates the existence of a property in a subject, according to true conditions valid for the demonstration, as explained in book I of the Posterior Analytics; or a posteriori—i.e., it leads to the knowledge of the cause from the caused thing (as in many natural demonstrations), or it demonstrates the caused thing from its remote cause. 11v27–12r10 After having settled this matter, here is the first conclusion: 1. in order to have a perfect knowledge in absolute (bi-stam u-muh.lat.) of some known thing, be it a simple knowledge or a composed one, as a rule the knower should know all the essential causes of that thing. In fact, it is impossible to know in absolute any caused thing if one does not know all the things on which its existence depends necessarily, since that thing cannot do without them; now, all essential causes have

F. 3vb, ll. 27–48 His praemissis sit haec prima conclusio. Ad habendam noticiam simpliciter perfectam de aliquo causato, sive complexam sive incomplexam, requiritur cognitio omnium causarum per se. Probatur: quia ad habendam noticiam perfectam simpliciter de ipso causato requiritur omnium eorum cognitio per quibus a se dependent. Sed causatum per se dependet ab omnibus suis causis per se. Igitur, etc. Patet consequentia cum minori, et maior arguitur: quia eadem sunt

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this qualification; if so, etc. The conclusion and the second part of the antecedent are evident, while the first part is commonly accepted, since a thing is related to its existence just as it is related to its knowledge—as explained in book II of the Metaphysics. An opponent (menagged) might object that this is true with respect to demonstrative knowledge, but not with respect to knowledge through definitions, since the definition of internal things is sufficient for an absolute and perfect knowledge of that kind.

principia a quibus causatum per se dependet in esse vel fieri, et in cognosci, ut patet secundo Metaphysicae.

12r10–11 This objection is empty and incomprehensible. I will argue against it as follows.

F. 4ra, ll. 1–5 Sed contra hanc responsionem insequentium Burlaei instatur probando noticiam diffinitivam habitam solum per causas intrinsecas non esse notitiam incomplexam perfectam simpliciter. Et arguitur sic.

12r11–19 There is no perfect knowledge in absolute if there is always a knowledge that is more perfect than any given knowledge; in the case of knowledge through definitions as specified in this objection, there is a knowledge that is more perfect than it; if so, etc. The conclusion and the major premise are evident; the minor premise

F. 4ra, ll. 5–21 Illa notitia incomplexa non est perfecta simpliciter qua datur alia incomplexa perfectior. Sed notitia habita per causas intrinsecas solum datur alia incomplexa perfectior, scilicet illa quae est tam per extrinsecas quam intrinsecas. Igitur, etc. Patet consequentia cum maiori, et minor probatur:

Forte ad haec dicitur quod ratio bene arguit de noticia complexa et demonstrativa, sed de noticia incomplexa et diffinitiva non procedit, quia ad illam sufficit cognitio solum causarum intrinsecarum.

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can be demonstrated as follows: every knowledge that relies upon a more perfect definition is more perfect than that which relies upon a less perfect definition; but the knowledge that relies upon the definition that includes all the species of causes relies upon a definition more perfect than the knowledge that relies upon a definition which includes only some of them; if so, etc. The conclusion and the major premise are evident; the minor premise can be demonstrated as follows: every definition that includes all that is included in another definition plus something else is more perfect than that definition; the definition that includes all the species of causes includes all that is included in the definition that includes some causes, plus something else; if so, etc. 12r20–12v4 Then, I assume that strength and weakness in accidental forms result from the addition of a degree to another degree, and that both degrees remain; then, I assume that knowledge is a gradual quality which admits of strengthening and weakening. After having settled this, we assume that Ruben,

primo, quia illa notitia incomplexa est perfectior quae perfectiorem diffinitionem habet. Sed illa quae habetur per diffinitionem aggregantem omnia genera causarum habetur per diffinitionem perfectiorem quam illa quae habetur per diffinitionem datam solum per causas intrinsecas. Igitur, etc. Patet consequentia cum maiori, quia perfectior diffinitio perfectiorem notitiam gignit, et minorem adversarii concedunt.

F. 4ra, ll. 21–35 Secundo supponitur: primo quod intensio fiat per additionem partis gradualis formae ad partem gradualem, utraque remanente; secundo quod cognitio sit qualitas gradualis intensibilis et remissibilis. Deinde ponatur quod Socrates habeat de aliquo causato notitiam incomplexam per causas intrinsecas solum

judah messer leon insofar as he knows something by way of a knowledge through definitions and through a definition which gives only its internal causes, attains two degrees of knowledge, while Simon, who knows that thing through a definition which gives all the species of causes, no doubt attains two degrees of knowledge.55 From the above assumptions (hannah.ot) it follows that Simon’s knowledge includes additional things that have greater strength—i.e., the perception of the agent and final causes, the knowledge of which is more perfect; and we cannot say that agent and final causes contribute no addition to knowledge, since such definitions (e.g., “wrath is to look for revenge” or “man is destined for happiness”) are definitions concerning the final cause, and it is evident that they substantially contribute to the knowledge of the things they define.

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intensibilem ut duo, et debeat acquirere supra praeexistentem notitiam complexam per causas extrinsecas intensibilem ut unum, et tunc sequitur vigore suppositionum praemissarum quod ex illis duabus notitiis resultabit notitia prima intensior, et ex consequenti perfectior.

12v4–14 Moreover, as for demonstrative knowledge: any knowledge which does not solve every question is not a perfect knowledge in absolute; any 55 From a comparison with the Latin text by Gaetano de Thiene, it appears that Judah Messer Leon misunderstood his source.

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knowledge thus specified (e.g., any knowledge that concerns only some causes, not all of them) does not solve every question relative to the knowledge itself; if so, etc. The conclusion and the major premise are evident, since, if any question were not solved, this would be doubtful and not absolutely known; the minor premise is commonly accepted, since if, e.g., we call a caused thing A and we call its causes B, C, D, E, F, G, it is evident that if B (which is the cause) is not known, then A is not known either; B too is not known in absolute if C is not known; C is ignored if D is not known; the same happens to D if E is not known, and to E if F is not known; and F is not understood if G is not known. Now, it is evident that a perfect knowledge in absolute is impossible unless we know all the causes of something—which was what had to be proved. 12v14–13r2 2. Second conclusion: for a perfect knowledge in its species (not in absolute), it is not necessary for the knower to know all the causes of that thing. Now, geometry demonstrates its conclusions exclusively through the formal

Ff. 4ra, l. 43–4rb, l. 6; f. 4rb, ll. 12– 20 Secunda conclusio. Ad habendam scientiam perfectam in genere de aliquo causato non oportet omnes per se eius causas cognoscere. Patet, quia de triangulo habetur in geometria scientia perfecta in genere, et tamen non habetur per omnes per se causas trianguli,

judah messer leon cause—e.g., it demonstrates that the triangle has three angles the sum of which is two right angles, without knowing all the causes of the triangle, although mathematics has found all those causes, as we have explained above. There is no doubt that such a knowledge is perfect in its species, since it does not demonstrate through the last causes: in fact, geometry abstracts from matter and from the motion intended by an agent in order to reach an end; in geometry it is sufficient to demonstrate through the cause that is investigated in its study, just as another art which demonstrates through many causes can demonstrate through those causes—as it is commonly known, due to the words of Averroes mentioned above. So, it is evident that, in order to demonstrate the existence of laughter in man only with reference to those who affirm it, this knowledge is perfect in its species, since, in order to affirm laughter, there is no need to know man in other respects (i.e. how he learns or attains happiness, etc.); however, this is not an absolute knowledge of man, but a knowledge of man insofar as he laughs. To attain a perfect knowledge of man in

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cum triangulus habet efficiens, materiam et finem, de quibus non considerat geometria, sed demonstrat passionem de subiecto per diffinitionem formalem. (. . . )

Et hoc voluit commentator commento primo dum dicit: nam dispositio scientiae certae invenitur in rebus habentibus causas quasdam per scientiam illarum causarum, scilicet consideratarum in illa scientia, sicut invenitur in habentibus omnes suas causas, scilicet consideratas in illa scientia.

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absolute, I must know all the things essential to him, as well as their causes. 13r2–6 3. Third conclusion: for a perfect knowledge in absolute, it is not necessary for the knower to know accidental causes. In fact, such causes are indeterminate, and could be infinite: e.g., this house could be built by builder X or builder Y and so on; and such things are not included in any knowledge. 13r7–19 Response to the above syllogisms in the negative: 1. to the first syllogism, I reply that the knowledge of those things (i.e., of mathematical things) is perfect in its species, not in absolute. In fact, if we demonstrate the existence in a triangle of three angles the sum of which is two right angles, by using the external angle, this knowledge is perfect in its species—i.e., I do not need anything else for knowing the existence of this property in the triangle, but, despite this, I do not know the triangle in absolute if I do not know all its causes; in this case, I know it only insofar as it has that property; 2. to the second syllogism, I reply by denying the

F. 4va, ll. 12–16 Quarta conclusio. Ad nullam notitiam perfectam requiritur cognitio causarum per accidens. Patet, quia causae per accidens possunt esse infinitae, et infinitum, ut sic, est ignotum, primo Physicorum.

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conclusion, if “knowledge” here means perfect knowledge in absolute: since it concerns definition, I reply that the definition which gives all the causes that exist in that thing is more perfect—as explained above; 3. to the third syllogism, I reply by denying the conclusion, if “knowledge” here means knowledge in absolute: what is said in book II of the Posterior Analytics refers to perfect knowledge in its species; 4. in the case of the fourth syllogism, I admit the antecedent (since, in order to know something in absolute, one needs to know God—may He be exalted—insofar as He is its Cause), but to the opposite of the consequent I reply that the knowledge of those things (i.e. those things into which the knowledge of God does not enter) is perfect in its species, but not in absolute. End of this chapter. Scholastic Sources Explicitly Quoted in the Commentary on the Physics, Book I Here below an almost complete list of the explicit literal quotations of Latin Scholastic texts found in Messer Leon’s commentary on Physics I is given. The second column gives the name of the author (sometimes of the text too) as it is found in the manuscript.

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Ms. of Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, S 38 sup. 5r12 Paul of Venice Cf. Paulus Venetus, Summa nat(Maestro Paolo) uralium, Venetiis 1476, f. 2rb, ll. 33 ff. 10r21–10v1 Thomas Sancti Thomae de Aquino Aquinas (Tomaso Commentaria in octo libros D’Aquino) Physicorum, ed. M. Maggiolo, ` Taurini 1954, book I, lectio 1, § 5 15r27–15v2 ff. Idem Cf. ibidem, book I, lectio 1, § 7 16r4–14 Robert Cf. Walter Burley, In Physicam Grosseteste Aristotelis expositio et quaestiones, (Lincolniense) Venetiis 1501 [= Hildesheim– New York 1972], f. 7ra, ll. 49– 59 23r1–5 Thomas Aquinas Cf. Sancti Thomae de Aquino, op. cit., book I, lectio 1, §§ 8 and 10 24r1 Walter Burley Cf. Walter Burley, op. cit., f. (Burleo) 10va, ll. 42–44 31r15– 31v6 Thomas Aquinas Sancti Thomae de Aquino, op. cit., book I, lectio 2, § 2 31v8–11 Giles of Rome Aegidii Romani In libros de (Egidio) physico auditu Aristotelis commentaria, Venetiis 1502, f. 5ra, ll. 48–52 31v12–14 Walter Burley Cf. Walter Burley, op. cit., f. (Burleo) 11rb, ll. 56–59 55v12–18 John Duns Scotus Cf. e.g., John Duns Scotus, (Scoto) and Anto- Quaestiones super Praedicamenta nius Andreas (An- Aristotelis, q. 7, ad argumenta, tonio Andreu) § 1 (no literal quotation) 57v26–58r25 Albert the Great Alberti Magni Physica, pars (Alberto) I, libri 1–4, ed. P. Hossfeld, Monasterii Westfalorum 1987, p. 22, ll. 32–81 (altered) 60r26 Idem Cf. ibidem, p. 33, ll. 53–54 66r2–11 Idem Ibidem, p. 21, ll. 46–59 (altered)

judah messer leon 66v, margin

Walter Burley

88v12–22

Giles of Rome

88v22–25 88v25–27 89r21–89v11

Idem Idem Walter Burley

90r6–90v2 90v3–23

Idem Giles of Rome

97r5–14

Walter Burley

97r15–16

Giles of Rome

97r25– 97v2

Thomas Aquinas

97v2–6

Idem

97v6–12

Walter Burley

97v13–21

Thomas Aquinas

97v22

Walter Burley

97v26–98r3

Thomas Aquinas

98r3–5

Walter Burley

102r4–18

Giles of Rome

109v13–24

Thomas Aquinas

109v24–110r6

Walter Burley

111r17–25

Giles of Rome

269

Cf. Walter Burley, op. cit., f. 16rb, ll. 36–37 Cf. Aegidii Romani, op. cit., f. 9va, ll. 30 ff. Cf. ibidem, f. 9vb, ll. 30 ff. Ibidem, f. 10rb, ll. 29–32 Walter Burley, op. cit., ff. 19ra, l. 42–19rb, l. 11 Ibidem, ff. 19va, l. 25–19vb, l. 7 Aegidii Romani, op. cit., f. 11rb, ll. 46–47, 34–39, 48–60 Cf. Walter Burley, op. cit., f. 18va, ll. 36–52 Aegidii Romani, op. cit., f. 12vb, ll. 30–31 Sancti Thomae de Aquino, op. cit., book I, lectio 6, § 10, second part Ibidem, book I, lectio 6, § 11 (summarized) Cf. Walter Burley, op. cit., f. 19rb, ll. 39–49 Sancti Thomae de Aquino, op. cit., book I, lectio 7, § 3 Walter Burley, op. cit., f. 19va, l. 10 Cf. Sancti Thomae de Aquino, op. cit., book I, lectio 7, § 5 Cf. Walter Burley, op. cit., 19rb, l. 62–19va, l. 2 Aegidii Romani, op. cit., f. 11vb, ll. 12–33 Sancti Thomae de Aquino, op. cit., book I, lectio 9, § 7 (summarized) Walter Burley, op. cit., f. 20va, ll. 27–39 Aegidii Romani, op. cit., ff. 13ra, l. 56–13rb, l. 2

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hebrew scholasticism in the fifteenth century

111r26–111v4

Thomas Aquinas

113v3–6

Walter Burley

119v5–7

119v14–120r2 120r17–24 126v19–21

Robert Grosseteste Giles of Rome Albert the Great, “book I, part 3, chapter 13” Idem Idem Walter Burley

126v22–26

Giles of Rome

126v26–127r2

Thomas Aquinas

127r2–5

John of Jandun ( Joan de Janduno)

135r12–135v1

Thomas Aquinas

138v2–7

Giles of Rome

150r27–150v12

Walter Burley

150v18–151r21 151r22–23

Robert Grosseteste Giles of Rome

153v18–154r13

Walter Burley

119v10–11 119v13–14

Sancti Thomae de Aquino, op. cit., book I, lectio 9, § 9 Cf. Walter Burley, op. cit., f. 21vb, ll. 39–47 Cf. ibidem, f. 24vb, ll. 54–56 Not identified Cf. Alberti Magni, op. cit., pp. 68–69 (book I, part 3, charter 15) Ibidem, p. 70, ll. 7–33 Cf. ibidem, p. 62, ll. 67–77 Cf. Walter Burley, op. cit., f. 21va, ll. 53–57 Cf. Aegidii Romani, op. cit., ff. 13rb–14ra (no precise correspondence can be found) Cf. Sancti Thomae de Aquino Sentencia libri De anima, Taurini 1959, book II, lectio 8, §9 Cf. Johannis de Gandavo Quaestiones libri Physicorum, Venetiis 1488, book I, q. 16, f. 17va, ll. 3–9 Sancti Thomae de Aquino, Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum, cit., book I, lectio 10, §2 Aegidii Romani, op. cit., ff. 14va, l. 62–14vb, l. 6 Cf. Walter Burley, op. cit., f. 24va, ll. 40–61 Walter Burley, op. cit., ff. 24vb, l. 52–25ra, l. 33 Cf. Aegidii Romani, op. cit., f. 16rb, ll. 14–16 Walter Burley, op. cit., f. 25va, ll. 1–37

judah messer leon 154r14–24

Giles of Rome

154r26–27 154v1

Idem Walter Burley

158v7–25

Giles of Rome

178v12–18 ff.

Idem

181r22–181v2

Walter Burley

181v2–11

Idem

181v11–182v17

Idem

184r1–9

Idem

185v25–186r5 187r15–17 192v22–25

Idem Idem Albert the Great

193r7–8 ff. 201r24–201v14 206r10–14

Idem Idem William Ockham (Occam)

206r14–18

Walter Burley

206r19–20

Paul of Venice, “book on Demonstration”

206v1–2

Giles of Rome

271

Aegidii Romani, op. cit., f. 16vb, ll. 21–34, 41–42 Ibidem, f. 16vb, ll. 46–48 Cf. Walter Burley, op. cit., f. 25va, ll. 31–32 Aegidii Romani, op. cit., ff. 17va, l. 38–17vb, l. 3 Cf. ibidem, f. 19ra, ll. 22–31, 40–54 (very altered) Walter Burley, op. cit., ff. 28va, l. 61–28vb, l. 13 (summarized) Ibidem, f. 28vb, ll. 21–36 (summarized) Ibidem, ff. 28vb, l. 36–29rb, l. 1 (summarized) Ibidem, ff. 29rb, l. 57–29va, l. 7 Cf. ibidem, f. 30rb, ll. 43–50 Cf. ibidem, f. 30va, ll. 55–57 Cf. Alberti Magni, op. cit., p. 54, ll. 40–42 Cf. ibidem, p. 56, ll. 58–61 Ibidem, pp. 59, l. 70–60, l. 16 Guillelmi de Ockham Opera philosophica. Vol. 4, Expositio in libros Physicorum [books I– III], eds. V. Richter and G. Leibold, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1985, p. 183, ll. 28–36 (book I, chapter 17) Walter Burley, op. cit., ff. 30vb, l. 56–31ra, l. 4 Pauli Veneti Expositio in libros Posteriorum Aristotelis, Venetiis 1494, f. 74vb, l. 39 (idem est diffinitio et medium) Aegidii Romani, op. cit., f. 20vb, ll. 14–15

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207v22–208v27

Walter Burley

213r22–213v9

Giles of Rome

213v19–214r10 218r11–17

Idem Thomas Aquinas

218r17–23

Walter Burley

218v8–27

Giles of Rome

232v2–7

Albert the Great

233r19–25

Giles of Rome

Walter Burley, op. cit., ff. 31rb, l. 32–31va, l. 59 Aegidii Romani, op. cit., f. 22ra, ll. 32–47, 55–59 Ibidem, f. 22rb, ll. 20–50 Cf. Sancti Thomae de Aquino, op. cit., book I, lectio 15, §§ 2 and 8 (no literal quotation) Cf. Walter Burley, op. cit., f. 33vb, ll. 22–29 Aegidii Romani, op. cit., ff. 23ra, ll. 29–37; 23ra, ll. 6–10 (altered); 23rb, ll. 6–14 Alberti Magni, op. cit., p. 76, ll. 21–34 (summarized) Aegidii Romani, op. cit., f. 23vb, ll. 3–12

List of Questions Debated in the Commentary on the Physics, Books I–III Judah Messer Leon, Commentary on Physics I, ms. Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, S 38 sup.

f. 11r: ’im la-yedi‘ah ha-shelemah be-his..taref ’el ‘alul mah yith.ayyev ke-h.oq ha-yodea‘ la-da‘at kol sibbotayw, “whether for a perfect knowledge of some caused thing it is necessary, as a rule, for the knower to know all its causes” f. 17r: ’im ha-mevu’arim ’es.lenu bezot ha-h.okmah hem ha-mevu’arim ’es.el ha-t.eva‘, “whether the

Caietani de Thienis Recollectae super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Vicentiae 1487 [copy in Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, 110 G 8], questions on Physics I f. 2vb: Utrum ad habendam scientiam de aliquo causato oporteat omnes eius causas cognoscere

f. 4vb: Utrum eadem sint nobis magis nota et natura

judah messer leon things evident to us in this science are evident to nature” f. 23r: ’im ha-kelalim yims.a’u h.us. la-sekel, “whether universals are found outside the intellect” f. 23r: ’im ha-kolel yadua‘ lanu teh.illah min ha-devarim ha-h.elqiyyim, “whether the universal is known to us before particular things” f. 41r: ’im ha-t.iv‘i yukal le-va’er hath.alotayw, “whether the natural (philosopher) is able to explain his principles” f. 54v: ’im ha-nims.a’ yenasse’ behaskamah ‘al ha-ma’amarot ha‘asarah, “whether being is predicated in a synonymous way for the ten categories” f. 57v: ’im ha-kamut mith.allef me-ha-nose’ h.illuf ‘inyani,56 “whether quantity is really different from its substrate” f. 60v: ’im ha-nequdah we-ha-qaw we-ha-shet.ah. hem davar ’eh.ad ‘im ha-geshem, “whether point, line and surface are identical to body” f. 64r: ’im kol ha-h.alaqim hanilh.aqim yah.ad hem davar ’eh.ad ‘im ha-kol, “whether all the parts, when they are assumed together, are identical to the whole” 56

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f. 6rb: Utrum universalia realia sint ponenda

f. 8va: Utrum universalia sint nobis magis et prius nota quam singularia

f. 13ra: Utrum philosophus naturalis possit probare sua principia affirmative f. 14rb:Utrum ens dicatur equivoce de decem predicamentis

f. 15rb: Utrum quantitas distinguatur realiter a materia

Cf. Gualterus Burlaeus, op. cit., f. 16 (book I, q. 13): Utrum punctus, linea, superficies distinguantur a corpore f. 17ra: Utrum totum sit realiter idem cum omnibus suis partibus simul sumptis

This is the text written prima manu; in the margin of the manuscript, it is corrected as follows: ’im ha-kamut ’eh.ad ‘im ha-nose’ ’ah.adut ‘inyani, “whether quantity is really identical to its substrate”.

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f. 91r: ’im ‘im menuh.at hamitdabbeq kullo ’efshar she-hah.eleq yitno‘ea‘ tenu‘ah meqomit, “whether, when the continuous whole is still, it is possible for its part to have a local movement” f. 92r: ’im zot ha-haqdamah ’emittit: levad ha-’eh.ad nims.a’, “whether this proposition is true: ‘Only the one exists’ ” f. 115r: ’im ha-bilti ba‘al taklit mi.sad mah she-hu’ bilti ba‘al taklit hu’ bilti yadua‘, “whether the infinite qua infinite is unknown” f. 118r: ’im ha-s.urah qademah be-’ofen mah ba-h.omer qodem hithawwutah bo, “whether form is in some way in matter before being generated in it” f. 122r: ’im ba-devarim ha.tiv‘iyyim yims.a’ shi‘ur mugval begodel ’o be-qat.nut, “whether in natural things there is a discreet measure, big or small” f. 127v: ’im ha-geshem ba‘al taklit yikleh mifney leqih.at geshem ba‘al taklit mimmennu pe‘amim harbeh, “whether the finite body is consumed when a finite body is taken from it many times” f. 128r: ’im yedi‘at ha-kamut tihyeh mi-s.ad yedi‘at h.elqayw hakemutiyyim, “whether the knowledge of quantity depends upon the knowledge of its quantitative parts” f. 143v: ’im hath.alot ha-‘inyanim ha-t.iv‘iyyim hem hofkiyyim,

f. 19ra: An possibile sit toto continuo quiescente partem eius moveri secundum locum

Cfr. f. 24ra: Utrum omne compositum ex principiis infinitis sit ignotum

f. 20vb: Utrum forma antequam generetur in materia preexistat

f. 30va: Utrum prima principia rerum naturalium sint contraria

judah messer leon “whether the principles of natural things are contrary” f. 160v: ’im ha-h.omer ha-rishon nims.a’, “whether prime matter exists” f. 162v: ’im ha-h.omer ha-rishon hu’ ‘es.em, “whether prime matter is a substance” f. 163v: ’im hath.alot ha-devarim ha-t.iv‘iyyim hem shalosh levad, lo’ pah.ot we-lo’ yoter, “whether the principles of natural things are only three, neither less nor more” f. 190r: ’im ’efshar she-ye‘assah davar mah me-’ayin ras.oni lomar meha-he‘eder ha-muh.lat., “whether it is possible for something to be produced ex nihilo, i.e., from absolute privation” f. 192r: ’im ha-he‘eder hu’ hath.alah la-devarim ha-t.iv‘iyyim mith.allef min ha-h.omer, “whether privation is a principle of natural things different from matter” f. 197r: ’im koah. ha-h.omer hu’ ’eh.ad ‘im ha-h.omer mi-s.ad hamahut, “whether the potentiality of matter is essentially identical to matter” f. 200v: ’im le-kol ha-‘as.amim hagashmiyyim ’o bilti gashmiyyim yihyeh h.omer ’eh.ad, “whether all the substances, corporeal and incorporeal, have the same matter” f. 222r: ’im yit’ammet divrey Ben Rushd ha-’omer be-zeh ha-rishon

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f. 33rb: Utrum tantum tria sint prima principia rerum naturalium

Cf. Gualterus Burlaeus, op. cit., f. 37 (book I, q. 23): Utrum illud ex quo aliquid generatur sit ens vel non ens

f. 36vb: Utrum privatio sit principium rerum naturalium a materia realiter distinctum

Cfr. f. 41va: Saepe dicit commentator in primo hoc in caelo non esse

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hebrew scholasticism in the fifteenth century

u-ve-ma’amar be-‘es.em ha-galgal uvi-meqomot ’ah.erim she-lo’ yims.a’ ba-shamayim h.omer, “whether the words of Averroes are true, when he says in this book (i.e., the commentary on Physics I), in his treatise De substantia orbis and in other places that the heavens have no matter” f. 225v: ’im ha-h.omer yishtoqeq ’el ha-s.urah, “whether matter desires form” f. 226v: ’im ha-he‘eder hu’ sibbah le-hishtoqequt ha-h.omer ’el ha.surah, “whether privation is the cause of matter’s desire for form” f. 234r: ’im ha-h.omer ha-rishon howweh we-nifsad be-‘es.em, “whether prime matter is generable and corruptible per se”

materiam. Ideo dubitatur utrum caelum componatur ex materia et forma

Judah Messer Leon, Commentary on Physics II, ms. Cambridge, University Library, Add. 631

Caietani de Thienis Recollectae super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Vicentiae 1487, b. II

f. 15v: ’im ha-devarim hamelakutiyyim yith.allefu me-hadevarim ha-t.iv‘iyyim h.illuf ‘inyani mi-s.ad ha-s.urah ha-melakutit ha-nosefet ‘aleyhem, “whether artificial things are distinct from natural things according to a real distinction, because of the artificial form added to them” f. 19r: ’im geder ha-t.eva‘ ’asher hevi’o ha-filosof hennah hu’ geder

f. 44vb: An res artificiales realiter a naturalibus distinguantur per formas artificiales eis superadditas

f. 40ra: Utrum privatio sit causa appetitus materie ad formam

Cf. f. 45rb: Intelligendum Burlaeus dicere de intentione commentatoris

judah messer leon ’emitti, “whether the definition of nature given here by the Philosopher is a true definition” f. 26r: ’im ’efshar she-mes.i’ut ha.teva‘ yitba’er be-mofet, “whether the existence of nature can be demonstrated” f. 38v: ’im ha-h.omer we-ha-s.urah hem .teva‘, “whether matter and form are nature” f. 48v: ’im ha-nims.a’im halimmudiyyim hem nifradim meha-murgashim, “whether mathematical beings are separate from those perceived by sense” f. 51r: ’im ha-limmudiyyim ra’uy she-yiggaderu me-ha-h.omer hamuskal, “whether mathematical beings should be defined on the basis of intelligible matter” f. 54r: ’im ha-nims.a’im hat.iv‘iyyim yiggaderu be-’ems.a‘ut ha-h.omer ha-murgash, “whether natural beings are defined through sense-perceived matter” f. 68v: ’im me-h.oq ha-t.iv‘i li-h.qor ‘al ha-h.omer ha-rishon, “whether the study of prime matter pertains to the natural philosopher” f. 87v: ’im ha-h.omer hu’ sibbat hadevarim ha-t.iv‘iyyim, “whether matter is the cause of natural things” f. 88v: ’im h.elqey ha-geder hem .surot, “whether the parts of definition are forms”

277

quod diffinitio data ab Aristotele de natura non est demonstrabilis a priori . . . Cf. Gualterus Burlaeus, op. cit., f. 48 (book II, q. 7): Utrum naturam esse possit demonstrari

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f. 130r: ’im ha-’efshari be-shawweh yims.a’ ba-koh.ut ha-po‘alut, “whether the possible is equally found in potentiality and in actuality” f. 133r: ’im ba-shamayim yims.e’u hif’at ‘as.mo we-ha-hizdammen, “whether self-destruction and chance are found in the heavens” f. 133v: ’im hif’at ‘as.mo we-hahizdammen hem koh.ot be-miqreh, “whether self-destruction and chance are accidental potentialities” f. 133v: ’im geder ha-hizdammen ha-natun hennah me-ha-filosof hu’ geder ’emitti, “whether the definition of chance given here by the Philosopher is a true definition” f. 155v: ’im ha-taklit hu’ sibbah, “whether the end is a cause” f. 157r: ’im ha-t.eva‘ po‘el ba‘avur ha-taklit, “whether nature acts for the sake of an end” f. 157r: ’im shibbushey ha-yes.irah hem mekuwwanot me-ha-t.eva‘, “whether the errors of creation are the result of an intention of nature” f. 175r: ’im hekreh.iyyut ha-pe‘ullot ha-t.iv‘iyyot yith.ayyev me-h.omer hadavar ha-t.iv‘i, “whether the necessity of natural actions results from the matter of the natural thing” Judah Messer Leon, Commentary on Physics III, ms.

Cf. Gualterus Burlaeus, op. cit., f. 58 (book II, q. 17): Utrum contingens aequaliter reperiatur in potentiis et actis

One might compare Gualterus Burlaeus, op. cit., f. 68 (book II, q. 24): Utrum monstra sint producta a casu

judah messer leon Milan, Bibl. Ambrosiana, Q 24 sup. f. 160v: ’im hu’ min ha-hekreah. she-’im tuskal ha-tenu‘ah yuskal ha-t.eva‘, “whether it is necessary that, if motion is ignored, nature (too) is ignored” f. 134v: ’im hayetah ha-tenu‘ah shelemut ’o po‘al mah she-be-koah. k”w, “whether motion is a perfection or an act which is still potential etc.” f. 134v: ’im ha-tenu‘ah ba-menia‘ ’o ba-mitno‘ea‘, “whether motion is in the mover or in the moved thing” f. 134v: ’im ha-tenu‘ah ’o hahishtanut ha-pit’omi hem davar mith.allef bi-veh.inat kullo h.illuf ‘inyani me-ha-devarim ha-qayyemim, “whether motion or violent change is a thing wholly distinct, according to a real distinction, from still things” f. 117v: ’im ha-menia‘ ha-t.iv‘i yitno‘ea‘ be-heni‘o, “whether the natural mover is moved when it moves (another thing)” f. 117v: ’im ha-haf‘alut we-hahitpa‘alut hem ma’amarot mith.allefim, “whether action and passion are distinct categories” f. 91r: ’im ha-bilti taklit yihyeh hath.alah levad ‘im hanah.at mes.iout’, “whether the infinite is a principle only when its existence is assumed” f. 48r: ’im ’efshar hims.e’ geshem muh.ash bilti ba‘al taklit,

279

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“whether it is possible to find a sense-perceived infinite body” f. 48r: ’im ’efshar hims.e’ ribbuy mah bilti ba‘al taklit be-po‘al, “whether it is possible to find an actual infinite multiplicity” f. 28v: ’im ha-godel yeh.aleq le-bilti taklit, “whether magnitude can be divided infinitely” f. 28v: ’im yis.dequ divrey Ben Rushd she-ha-heh.ser yavi’ ’el hahe‘eder ’asher sibbato ha-h.omer, “whether Averroes’s statement, that subtraction leads to a privation whose cause is matter, is true”

Cf. Gualterus Burlaeus, op. cit., ff. 98-99 (book III, q. 18): Utrum magnitudo possit diminui in infinitum

Compendium and Questions on Porphyry’s Isagoge Two manuscripts preserve an anonymous Hebrew compendium (kelalim, lit. “generalities”) of Porphyry’s Isagoge, followed by nine questions (t.a‘anot) on the same work, similar in structure to analogous Scholastic writings. These manuscripts are: 1. ms. Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, Pluteo I, n. 26, ff. 108r–118v (written in a cursive Italian hand in the second half of the fifteenth century);57 2. ms. Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France, h´ebreu 994, ff. 85r–91r (copied in 1488 by Pinhas ben Judah Marcaria, in Mantua or Ferrara).58 In both manuscripts these texts (apparently independent copies of a lost archetype) are followed by a compendium of the Categories59 and a list of philosophical definitions ascribed to maestro Paolo (Paul of Venice, an author well-known to Judah Messer Leon);60 both manuscripts include also extensive passages from Messer Leon’s 57 The most recent description of the manuscript is in Tamani and Zonta, Aristoteles Hebraicus, pp. 91–93, number 4. 58 Described in Zotenberg, Catalogue, p. 178. 59 See ms. Florence, ff. 119r–120v; ms. Paris, ff. 91r–92r. 60 On this list of philosophical definitions, see above, p. 213.

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philosophical works, mainly from his logical summa, the Perfection of Beauty. The archetype of this collection may have been a textbook for students compiled in Messer Leon’s academy. On this basis, Moritz Steinschneider first suggested that the compendium and the questions on the Isagoge were either parts of (probably lost) works by Messer Leon, or “materials” collected by him in preparation for writing his works (perhaps in view of his summa).61 The compendium and questions are very close in style and terminology to Messer Leon’s commentary on Physics I–III: for instance, the parts of the syllogism are usually designated with the same terms (qodem, “antecedent”; nimshak, “consequent”; gedolah, “major premise”; qet.annah, “minor premise”; hith.ayyevut and toledah, “conclusion”; hakh.ish, “to deny” [a part of a syllogism]). However, the questions are not the same as those discussed by Messer Leon in his supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Isagoge, even though there are some similarities between four of them, as the following comparison shows: Judah Messer Leon, Supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, questions (cf. Husik, Judah Messer Leon’s, pp. 23–25) 1. ’im ha-kelali hu’ ha-nose’ hashaweh le-zeh ha-sefer ras.oni lomar sefer Porfirios, “whether the universal is the adequate subject of this book, i.e., Porphyry’s book” 2. ’im ha-higgayon hi’ h.okmah, “whether logic is a science”

3. ’im ha-sug we-ha-min hem mema’amar ha-mis..taref, “whether

Questions on Porphyry’s Isagoge (cf. the edition below)

’im ha-kelali ’efshar she-yims.a’, “whether it is possible that the universal exists”

’im ha-kelalim hem h.amishah bi-levad lo’ pah.ot we-lo’ yoter, “whether the universals are exactly five, neither less nor more” (cf. question n. 10 of the Supercommentary) ’im Porfirius yedabber be-‘inyaney hamin ‘al ’ofen ha-nakon, “whether

¨ See Steinschneider, Hebraeischen Ubersetzungen, p. 80: “Es w¨are . . . zu untersuchen, ob diese St¨ucke nicht ebenfalls Ausz¨uge aus Leon’s Schriften, oder Materialien fur ¨ dieselben, enthalten”.

61

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genus and species pertain to the category of relation” 4. ’im ra’uy she-niqqah. ’eh.ad min ha-mis..tarefim be-geder h.avero, “whether we have to assume each one of the relatives in the definition of the other” 5. ’im roshem ha-min ’asher ’amar bo she-hu’ ha-nasu’ ‘al rabbim wek”w hu’ roshem ’emitti le-min haminim, “whether the description of species (i.e., that it is predicated of many etc.) is a true description of the species specialissima” 6. ’im ha-medabber sug le-’adam ule-mal’ak, “whether ‘rational’ is the genus of ‘man’ and ‘angel”’

7. ’im ha-nims.a’ hu’ sug le-kol hama’amarot ha-‘asarah, “whether ‘being’ is a genus of all the ten categories” 8. ’im ha-perat.im hem me-’eyn taklit, “whether particulars are infinite”

9. ’im zeh ha-roshem ras.oni lomar she-ha-miqreh hu’ ’asher yedummah we-k”w hu’ roshem ’emitti la-miqreh, “whether this description, i.e., that accident is the thing (whose generation and destruction can be

Porphyry speaks correctly about species” (cf. question n. 5 of the Supercommentary) ’im mah she-hu’ mi-ma‘al yenasse’ ‘al mah she-hu’ mi-tah.at, “whether what is superior is predicated of what is inferior” ’im nesi’ut ha-segullah ‘al ha-min ’o le-hefek hu’ nesi’ut ‘al shaweh, “whether to predicate property of species or vice versa is a predication adaequate”

’im moti hu’ hevdel ‘as.mi we-’im yunnah. she-ha-medabber sug le-adam u-le-mal’ak,“whether ‘mortal’ is a substantial differentia, if one supposes that ‘rational’ is the genus of ‘man’ and ‘angel”’ (cf. question n. 6 of the Supercommentary) ’im divrey Porfirius nekonim bema’amar ha-hevdel, “whether Porphyry’s words on the differentia are correct” ’im ha-segullah hi’ nasu’ mah bilti mishtattef ‘im yeter ha-nesu’im, “whether property is a predicable that has nothing in common with the other predicables” ’im geder ha-miqreh she-hu’ ’asher yedummah hawiyato u-bit..tulo hu’ s.odeq, “whether the definition of accident as ‘the thing whose generation and destruction can be imagined (without the generation and destruction of its substrate)’

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imagined without the genera- is true” (cf. question n. 9 of the tion and destruction of its sub- Supercommentary) strate), is a true description of accident” 10. ’im ha-nasu’im hem h.amishah levad she-lo’ yihyu lo’ pah.ot we-lo’ yoter, “whether the predicables are exactly five, neither less nor more” 11. ’im ha-mishtattefim hem maskimim u-ken be-hefek, “whether homonyms are synonyms and vice versa” Finally, as noted above, one of the main sources of Messer Leon’s nine questions is clearly Radulphus Brito’s Quaestiones in Veterem artem, where one can find literal correspondences with Messer Leon’s questions and discussions. This fact fits in with Messer Leon’s supposed relationship to the Paduan School, since Brito’s questions were often used in the fifteenth century as textbooks for university logic courses.62 English Paraphrase (mss. Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, Pluteo I n. 26, ff. 108r, l. 1–118v, l. 16; Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale, h´ebreu 994, ff. 84r, l. 1–91r, l. 7; cf. the text in the Hebrew section) 1. Compendium of the Isagoge The subject of any science must respect three conditions (An. Post.): 1. it should be the most evident and commonly accepted thing in that science; 2. it should signify all the evident things in that science, and everything dealt with in that science should be said for the sake of it and in relationship to it; 3. it should signify those evident things exclusively according to what is known in that science. The third condition is necessary because, even though being in general signifies all things (be they logical or non-logical) and is 62

I owe this information to Prof. Sten Ebbesen (Copenhagen).

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the most evident and commonly accepted thing, it is not the subject of the art of logic, since it does not signify those things exclusively according to what is known in that art; in fact, it signifies them insofar as they are or are not natural. Therefore, logical being is the subject of the art of logic. In fact, the subject of any art is the most commonly accepted thing in that art, it signifies all the evident things in the art, and it does this according to what is known in that art; logical being is such with respect to the art of logic; if so, etc. The major premise is commonly accepted on the basis of the above conditions. The minor premise is evident, as follows: the most general thing is the most commonly accepted one; logical being is the most general of the things dealt with by logic; if so, it is the most commonly accepted thing in logic (where the minor premise is evident by induction, while the major one is taken from the Physics). As for the other two conditions, they are evident by induction. Since every science is divided according to the division of its subject (An. Post.), I think that the books of logic should be divided according to the division of logical being. Now, logical being is either simple or composed. If it is simple, it is dealt with in the Categories, which consider the ten categories as designated by the use of single expressions. If it is composed, this can be in two ways: either through the composition of only one predicate and one subject, or through the composition of many predicates with many subjects. The composition of one predicate with one subject is dealt with in the De interpretatione. The composition of many predicates with many subjects can occur in two ways: either it is assumed according to a general division, i.e., without any specification (and this is found in the Analytica Priora), or it is assumed specifically, and in this case it is composed either of necessary statements (and this is found in the Analytica Posteriora), or of dialectical statements (and this is found in the Topica), or of sophistical statements (and this is found in the Sophistici Elenchus). The subject of the Isagoge is the universal, since the universal respects all the above conditions, but is inferior to logical being, since it is a species of the latter. In the Isagoge a question arises concerning the assumption of species in the definitions of genus and vice versa. I postulate that the parts of a definition are more commonly accepted than the defined thing (An. Post.). Then, I construct the

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following syllogism: every thing from which the false follows is false; from Porphyry’s words the false follows; therefore, they are not true. The major premise does not need any explanation, since it is commonly accepted among philosophers. The minor premise is evident, since from Porphyry’s words it follows that the same thing is at the same time both more and less commonly accepted than another thing—and this is false. In fact, since species is assumed in the definition of genus, species is more commonly accepted than genus, and since genus is assumed in the definition of species, species is less commonly accepted than genus, according to our postulate (has..sa‘ah)—but this contradiction is impossible. We reply by denying the minor premise and its explanation based upon the postulate. This postulate is not true in the case of definitions of correlatives (i.e., it is not true that each part of the definition of a correlative is more commonly accepted than the defined correlative itself), and the reason is as follows. Each correlative is assumed in the definition of the other, but this is not due to the fact that that correlative, being part of the definition, is more commonly accepted than the other, but to the fact that one correlative cannot be known without knowing the other—and this resolves the question, since this is the meaning of Porphyry’s saying: “And nobody should object etc.”. There is another possible reply to this question: Aristotle’s statement that the parts of the definition are more commonly accepted than the defined thing is true in the case of parts assumed simply (i.e., when each of them is predicated of its subject simply, according to a substantial predication, without the addition of formative letters63 or other parts of the definition of man, of animal, etc.), and this is not found in the definitions of species and genus. The individual can be either doubtful (mesuppaq), e.g., “a man”, or named (mekunneh), e.g., “son of Simon”, or ostensible (ramuz), e.g., “this man”, or marked (mesumman), e.g., “Ruben” and “Simon”. The properties by which each individual is distinguished from another are seven: figure; attribute; place; time; family; name; city. According to Porphyry, the reason why the genus is predicated of the species is that the former is divided into many species. But from this the opposite should follow, i.e., that the genus should not 63 In Hebrew: ’ot(ot) ha-shimmush. They are the letters used to alter the word roots to construct the various grammatical forms.

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be predicated of them. The fact that the house is divided into many parts (roof, wall, foundation) does not make it true that the house is predicated of each one of its parts, since one does not say, e.g., that the roof is a house. We reply to this objection by saying that the reason set forth by Porphyry is right; the house is not predicated of its parts, since the house is a complete (shelemuti) whole, but the genus, on the contrary, is a universal whole which is found in each one of its parts, so that it is predicated of them. It would appear that genus is not predicated of species: in fact, opposites are not predicated of each other; genus is an opposite; if so, it is not predicated of its opposite, which is species. The major premise is evident by induction. The minor premise is taken from the Categories: two correlatives are opposites. I reply by accepting this syllogism, which is not in contrast with my intention: when we say that genus is predicated of species, we do not mean that the noun “genus” is predicated of the noun “species”, since, in this sense, genus and species are opposites; rather, we mean that the thing signified by genus (i.e., animal) is predicated of the thing signified by species (i.e., man). 2. Questions on the Isagoge Question 1. Whether it is possible that the universal exists.64 The first reply is “no”. 1. What is not one is not a being65 (nims.a’, “existent”), and the universal is not one, therefore it does not exist. The major premise is evident from Aristotle’s claim, in many places, that every one is a being, and every being is one. Also the minor premise is evident: the universal is that thing that exists in many things and is predicated of many things, and the being which is in many things is not one. 2. Every being must be either substance or accident; but the universal is neither substance nor accident; if so, it is not a being (i.e., it does not exist). The major premise is commonly accepted; the minor one is evident: in fact, if the universal were a substance, the 64

An identical question (with a different development, but a similar conclusion) is in Messer Leon’s supercommentary: cf. the ms. Florence, Biblioteca MediceoLaurenziana, Pluteo III, n. 5, f. 56v ff. 65 The Hebrew term employed here is nims.a’, which has both the sense of “being” and of “existent, existing thing”.

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other nine categories would not be universals, since a substantial thing cannot include an accident—but this is absurd. If the universal were an accident, there would be no universals in the category of substance, since an accidental thing cannot include a substance— and this too is absurd, since within each category there are many universals, mutually subordinated. To defend the existence of the universal, I say: 1. everything that is truly predicated of an existent thing exists; the universal is truly predicated of an existent thing; if so, it exists. The major premise is commonly accepted; the minor one is evident by induction, since it is truly predicated of an ostensible man that he is an animal, he is rational, he is laughing, he is white. 2. If the universal did not exist, none of the ten categories would exist; but each one of them exists; if so, the universal exists. The conditional premise is evident, since each one of the categories is a universal. The opposite of the consequent (nimshak) is evident by induction. Therefore, the universal exists, and I will now only try to refute the syllogisms which affirm the opposite. 1. To the first syllogism, I reply by denying its minor premise: according to evidence, since the universal exists in many things, the universal qua universal is one, but multiplicity affects it because of the multiplicity of matters. 2. To the second syllogism, I reply by denying its minor premise. The universal is substance and accident: the substantial universal is included in the category of substance, while the accidental universal is included in the other categories. Question 2. Whether the universals are exactly five, neither less nor more.66 The first reply is: they are more than five. 1. Definition is a predicate, and it is not one of the five predicables found in the Isagoge: if so, the predicables should be more than five.67 It is evident that definition is a predicate, since it is predicated 66 An identical question (in different terms) is in Messer Leon’s above mentioned supercommentary: see ms. Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, Pluteo III, n. 5, ff. 23v, l. 19–24v. 67 Cf. Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones in veterem artem, Venetiis 1499 [copy in Rome, Biblioteca Vallicelliana, Inc. 292], f. 15ra, ll. 37–41 (q. Utrum sint tantum quinque

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of many things different in number in quid; and it is commonly accepted by induction that it is not included in the five predicables found in the Isagoge. 2. Matter is a predicate, and it is not one of the five predicables found in the Isagoge: if so, the predicables should be more than five. The first antecedent is evident, since matter is predicated of this matter and of each ostensible matter, according to a self-evident predication. The second antecedent is evident by induction. 3. Form is a predicate, and it is not one of the five predicables found in the Isagoge: if so, the predicables should be more than five. Both antecedents are commonly accepted. 4. Individual is a predicate, and it is not one of the five predicables found in the Isagoge: if so, the predicables should be more than five.68 The first antecedent is evident, since “individual” is truly predicated of many things, e.g., of Simon, Levi and Reuben, etc. The second antecedent is commonly accepted. Now, to support the thesis that the universals are fewer than five, the following is said: the fact that everything is either a species or a genus does not create a predicable other than species or genus; every property is either a species or a genus; if so, property does not create a predicable other than species or genus. The major premise is commonly accepted; the minor one is evident by induction, since every property (laughter, joy, youth, etc.) is included in the general property as a species is included in a genus; therefore, it is commonly accepted that that general property is a superior genus of all properties, and all the other properties are species subordinated to it. According to this syllogism, the predicables are only four. To defend the thesis that the universals are exactly five, one can say that every predicate is either substantial or accidental. If it is accidental, it can be of two kinds: either it is predicated in a convertible way, or not. If it is predicated in a convertible way, it is a property; if not, it is an accident. If it is a substantial predicate, it too can be of two kinds: either it is predicated in quale, or in quid. If praedicabilia nec plura nec pauciora): Item arguitur quod sint plura. Quia diffinitio est praedicamentum et praedicamentum et praedicabile sunt idem. Ergo diffinitio est praedicabile et sic ad minus erunt sex praedicabilia. 68 Cf. Brito’s Quaestiones, f. 15ra, ll. 41–45: Item individuum est quoddam praedicabile dicendo Socrates est individuum, Plato (in the published text: + et) est individuum, et sic de aliis. Ergo plura sunt praedicabilia quam quinque.

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it is predicated in quale, it is a differentia; if it is predicated in quid, this can be in two ways: either it is predicated of many things different in species—and this is genus; or it is predicated of many things different in number—and this is species.69 For this reason, the five predicables are five, neither less nor more, since this is evident: their number is taken from the number of the ways of predication. Now, since nothing can be predicated of anything except in one of these five ways, the predicables must be exactly five. Now, let us reply to all the syllogisms which affirm the opposite. 1. To the first syllogism, I reply by denying the conclusion, since definition is not predicated insofar as it is one of the five predicables; rather, definition is predicated insofar as it is identical to species in predication, and it is predicated in the same mode as species itself. Therefore, its predication is included in the predication of species. In any case, if we assume that definition is not one of the five predicables, since it is not predicated in quid as distinct from each one of them, but according to a predication that follows (rodef) that of the species, the conclusion of the syllogism cannot be true. 2. To the second syllogism, I reply by denying the conclusion, since matter, although per se it is not one of the five predicables, is identical to species in predication because it is predicated of all its individuals in the same way as species. 3. This reply is also valid for the third syllogism. 4. To the fourth syllogism, I reply: the individual can be assumed in two ways: either in the sense of “what is” (in quid) a name predicated of many things, or in the sense of “what is” the thing signified by that name. If it is assumed in the latter sense, I deny the first antecedent, since individual is not predicated of many things in this sense; if it is assumed in the sense of “what is” the name predicated of many things, I deny the second antecedent, since individual is an 69

Cf. Brito’s Quaestiones, f. 15rb, ll. 18–28: Dico quod praedicabilia sunt tantum quinque ( . . . ). Primum declaratur quod praedicabilia distinguuntur (. . . ). Omne quod praedicatur aut habet modum praedicandi essentialiter, aut accidentaliter. Si essentialiter, aut est in quid aut in quale. Si in quale, sic est differentia. Si in quid, aut praedicatur de pluribus differentibus numero, aut specie. Si specie, sic est genus. Si secundo modo, sic est species. Cf. also f. 15va, ll. 9–12: Aliqui autem dicunt sic. Si praedicatur in quale accidentale, aut hoc est convertibiliter, aut non convertibiliter etc.

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accidental predicate.70 Moreover, we can reply in another way, by denying the first antecedent: individual is not a predicate, since a predicate should be predicated as a synonym (be-haskamah) of those things of which it is predicated; but individual is not predicated as a synonym of those things. To the syllogism that defends the doctrine that the predicables are fewer than five, I reply that property can be assumed in two ways: either with reference to things that are subordinated to it (and in this sense I accept the whole syllogism, since it does not contradict my intention), or with reference to a subject (and in this sense it creates a predicable other than the remaining four). The latter is the sense in which each one of the five predicables is assumed in the Isagoge, and for this reason the minor premise of the above syllogism is false, since in this sense property is neither a genus nor a species. Question 3. Whether Porphyry speaks correctly about species. The first reply is that Porphyry’s words on this subject are not appropriate. 1. Each one of two opposites is said in the same ways as the other; genus and species are opposites; if so, species is said in the same ways as genus. Now, since Porphyry affirms that genus is said in three ways and species in only two ways, and the division of the former does not correspond to the division of the latter, his words about species are not appropriate. 2. What makes something subsist (meqayyem) precedes the subsisting thing; the differentia makes the species subsist; if so, it precedes the species. One should conclude from this that Porphyry is wrong when he puts the explanation of species before the explanation of differentia. 3. What is simple precedes what is composed; the differentia is simple insofar as it is assumed as a form, while the species is composed of genus and differentia; the conclusion of this syllogism is the same as that of the previous one. 70

Cf. Brito’s Quaestiones, f. 16ra, ll. 12–21: Ad aliam, cum dicitur individuum est quoddam praedicabile, etc. Dico quod individuum potest accipi vel pro re subiecta intentioni, vel pro ipsa intentione. Si accipiatur pro ipsa re subiecta secundae intentioni, sic non praedicatur de pluribus, sed solum de se ipso. Si autem accipiatur pro intentione, sic praedicatur denominative, sicut accidens de subiecto.

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4. Porphyry says that the species is subordinated to the genus; but this is not true, since from this it should follow that the individual is a species, given that the individual too is subordinated to the genus. To defend what Porphyry says about the species, I say: everybody who deals with something according to what is intended in that thing deals with it correctly; Porphyry deals with species according to the intention of the Isagoge; if so, he deals with it correctly. The major premise is commonly accepted, while the minor one is evident, because the purpose of the Isagoge is the knowledge of the definition of the species and of its difference and specificity with respect to the other predicables; and this is what Porphyry does when he explains this to the readers. Therefore, Porphyry deals with species correctly, and we reply to the syllogisms which contradict this. 1. To the first syllogism, I reply that Porphyry, when he divides genus and species, does not assume them insofar as they are opposites, since they are not opposites in the same ways according to which each of them is divided, but only in the last way, i.e., that according to which the genus is subordinated to the species and the species is subordinated to the genus. Therefore, the species is divided into the same divisions as the genus, so that, as the genus is divided into genus of genera and intermediate genus, the species is divided into species of species and intermediate species. 2. As for the second syllogism, I accept that the differentia precedes the species as a cause precedes the caused thing; however, from this it does not follow that the differentia precedes the species in the order of learning, since many things have a causal precedence but not a precedence in learning. Now, since genus and species are correlatives and neither of them can be known without knowing the other, it is necessary to deal with the species immediately after the genus. 3. To the third syllogism, I reply that the rule is that the consideration of simple things precedes the consideration of composed things only if there is no reason against this order. Now, here you can see that, since genus and species are correlatives, Porphyry could not respect this order; therefore, it does not follow that his words here are not appropriate, since it was necessary for him to explain these things in this way.

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4. To the fourth syllogism, I reply that the subordination of something to the genus is twofold: mediate or immediate. So, when Porphyry says that the species is subordinated to the genus, he means that it is subordinated immediately; this solves the problem of the individual, since the individual is subordinated to the genus mediately, i.e., through the mediation of the species. Question 4. Whether what is superior is predicated of what is inferior (i.e., subordinated to it).71 First, it seems that this is not true. 1. If what is superior were predicated of what is inferior, it would follow that in an affirmative proposition (haqdamah meh.ayyevet) the predicate would not be identical in number to the subject; but in an affirmative proposition the predicate is identical in number to the subject; if so, what is superior is not predicated of what is inferior. The consequent of the conditional premise is evident: if animal is predicated of man, the predicate “animal” cannot be identical in number to the subject “man”, since it is identical to man neither accidentally (in fact, animal is not an accident of man), nor in its definition, nor in its property, nor in its name (in fact, animal does not have the name, the definition or the property of man); from this it follows that animal is not identical in number to man. But also the opposite of this consequent is evident: it is not sufficient that the predicate is identical in genus to the subject, since then ass would be predicated of man; nor is it sufficient that the predicate is identical in species, since then Socrates would be predicated of Plato; if so, it must be identical in number. 2. When animal is predicated of man, this is either the animal “man”, or an animal in general. Now, we cannot say that this is an animal in general, since then ass would be predicated of man. Therefore, this is the animal “man”; but from this it would follow that the predication of animal in the case of man is convertible— and this is false. So, what is superior cannot be predicated of what is inferior. To defend the thesis that the superior thing can be predicated of the inferior, I say: when there is something that includes the whole 71 The same question (in different terms, not as an independent question) is in Pauli Veneti Universalia Predicamenta Sexque Principia, Venetiis 1494 [copy in Rome, Biblioteca Vallicelliana, Inc. 424], ff. 24ra–rb.

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quiddity of something else in an indeterminate way (bilti hagvalah), the former thing is predicated of the latter; what is superior includes the whole quiddity of what is inferior in an indeterminate way; if so, what is superior is predicated of what is inferior. The major premise is commonly accepted, while the minor one is evident since “animal” affirms the whole quiddity of man and includes it in an indeterminate way. Therefore, what is superior is predicated of what is inferior. 1. As for the first syllogism which affirms the opposite of this thesis, I deny the consequent: if one says that animal is not identical to man in its name, in its accidents, in its property and in its definition, I reply that, in fact, it is identical to man in its definition; and if one says that animal is not a definition of man, I deny this, since in some sense animal is a definition of man—i.e., in quid, including the whole quiddity of man, although in an indeterminate way,72 and it is only a part of the definition of man. 2. As for the second syllogism, it affirms that, if the nature of animality were predicated in quid in an indeterminate way, with respect to man, ass and so on, the result of this would be that ass is predicated of man. I deny this conclusion, since this would follow if animal included all the species actually; but “animal” refers to all of them potentially. Question 5. Whether to predicate property of species or vice versa is a predication adaequate (‘al shaweh).73 First, it seems that this is not possible. 1. No caused thing is equal to its cause; property is caused by species; if so, property is not equal to species. From this it follows that when each of them is predicated of the other one, this is not a predication adaequate. The major premise is evident: the caused thing and the cause are different in many ways, since the latter is more important than the former and precedes it in nature, etc. Also the minor premise is evident, since in the case of this kind of precedence (i.e., as when species precedes property) what precedes should be the cause of what follows (Categories). 72

The Hebrew text adds the expression pirsum ha-h.alaqim, which appears to have no sense. 73 Lit. “according to equality”; but this expression should be understood as a translation of the Latin term adaequate.

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2. What can be a genus is not equal to what cannot be a genus; species can be a genus, but property cannot; if so, species is not equal to property. Therefore, the predication of species and property is not a predication adaequate. The major premise is commonly accepted, since these things are different in that sense. The minor premise is evident from Porphyry’s words. 3. What always exists in a substrate in actu is not equal to what does not; species always exists in a substrate in actu, while property does not; if so, species is not equal to property. The major premise is commonly accepted, since these things are different in that sense. The minor premise is evident from Porphyry’s words. 4. Things that have different definitions are not equal to each other; the definitions of species and property are different; if so, they are not equal to each other. Therefore, when one of them is predicated of another, this is not a predication adaequate. The major premise is commonly accepted, while the minor one is evident from Porphyry’s words. To defend the opposite thesis, I say: when the subject is not more general than the predicate, it is predicated adaequate ; property is not more general than species, and vice versa; if so, when each of them is predicated of the other, it is predicated adaequate. Therefore, to predicate property of species or vice versa is a predication adaequate : in fact, neither of them is more general than the other; although they are distinct in quiddity, or in definition or in any other thing, they are not distinct in quantity, so that it does not follow that they are not equal, but it follows only that they are not identical or similar. In fact, equal and non-equal are not said, except with respect to quantity. This confutes all the syllogisms which support the opposite; to all of them we reply by denying the major premise: they all demonstrate that property and species are not identical or not similar, but from this it does not follow that they are not equal. Question 6. Whether “mortal” is a substantial differentia, if one supposes that “rational” is the genus of “man” and “angel”. First we reply positively, for the following reasons.74 74 Cf. Brito’s Quaestiones, f. 31ra, ll. 34–35: Utrum mortale sit differentia. Et arguitur quod sic.

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1. Everything that creates a species under a genus is a substantial differentia; “mortal” creates a species under a genus; if so, it is a substantial differentia. The major premise is commonly accepted in accordance with Porphyry’s words about differentia. The minor one is evident, since “mortal” is constitutive of the species “man” under the genus “rational”, since “rational” can be “mortal” or “immortal”. 2. “Mortal” is predicated of many things in the same species in quale; if so, it is a differentia which takes the place of the definition. The antecedent is evident, since “mortal” is predicated of man, ass, horse, etc. in quale.75 3. Everything that completes a definition is a substantial differentia; “mortal” completes the definition of “man”; if so, “mortal” is a substantial differentia. The two antecedents are evident from Porphyry’s words. 4. Everything that divides a genus into its species is a substantial differentia; “mortal” and “immortal” divide the genus “rational” into the species “man” and “angel”; if so, “mortal” is a substantial differentia.76 Both antecedents are evident from Porphyry’s words. 5. The opposite of this thesis is false; if so, it is true that “mortal” is a substantial differentia. This is a conclusion per absurdum, and the antecedent is evident: if one supposes that “mortal” is not a substantial differentia, it would follow that there is no differentia distinguishing “man” and “angel”—and this is false. 6. “Mortal” adds “man” as species to “rational” as genus; if so, it is a substantial differentia. The conclusion is based upon the definition, while the antecedent is evident.77 To defend the thesis that “mortal” is not a substantial differentia, I say: 75

Cf. Brito’s Quaestiones, ff. 31ra, l. 36–31rb, l. 1: Illud quod praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale est differentia; sed mortale est huiusmodi; ergo, etc. Maior propositio est nota per diffinitionem differentiae, et minor apparet: quia mortale praedicatur de homine et equo, et sic de aliis quae differunt specie et praedicatur de eis in quale. Quod si quaeratur quale est convenienter respondetur mortalem. 76 Cf. Brito’s Quaestiones, f. 31rb, ll. 1–3: Item, illud per quod differunt species ad invicem est differentia, sed mortale est huiusmodi, ergo etc. 77 Cf. Brito’s Quaestiones, f. 31rb, ll. 8–16: Item quod ponitur in diffinitione alicuius et non est genus est differentia. Sed mortale ponitur in diffinitione hominis et non est genus; etc. Maior patet, quia diffinitio constat ex genere et differentia. Minor patet quia in diffinitione hominis ponitur mortale secundum Porphyrium, qui dicit quod homo est animal rationale mortale.

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1. “mortal” does not distinguish things that belong to the same genus essentially (bi-yeshutam); if so, it is not a substantial differentia. The conclusion is based upon the definition, while the antecedent is evident: death is not a substance, since every substance subsists per se. 2. “Mortal” is non-constitutive; if so, it cannot be a constitutive differentia. The conclusion is per absurdum, while the antecedent is evident: “mortal” means a destruction, since it means the absence of substance occurring to something, and such a thing cannot be constitutive. From this, it follows that it is not a substantial differentia, since every substantial differentia is constitutive. 3. Every substantial differentia is the principle and cause of some substantial thing; but “mortal” cannot be the cause of any substantial thing; if so, “mortal” is not a substantial differentia. The major premise is commonly accepted: differentia is the principle and cause of the creation of a species; the minor premise is evident: accident cannot be the cause of any substance; if so, “mortal” is not the cause of any substantial thing. The conclusion is based upon what is universally affirmed,78 while the antecedent is evident: what is vile cannot be the cause of what is excellent. Therefore, “mortal” is not a substantial differentia, if one supposes that “rational” is the genus of “man” and “angel”. As for the reason given in the syllogisms that defend this thesis, since there are many substantial differentiae which are not commonly accepted and are unknown, when we want to refer to those differentiae we have to consider the constitutive differentiae that are subordinated to them, not insofar as they are constitutive but insofar as they are assumed in order to signify something substantial but not commonly accepted. In this sense, “mortal” is assumed in the definition of man, not in the sense that “mortal” is that substantial differentia due to which “man” is different from “angel”, but in order to signify that differentia which is not commonly accepted. In this way, many of the syllogisms that defend the opposite of our affirmation can be confuted. 78

I accept the reading of the Paris manuscript (me-ha-qol ha-kelali), which seems to agree with the general meaning of this passage better than the reading of the Florence manuscript (me-ha-kol ha-kelali, “the universal whole”).

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Now, let us reply to each one of those syllogisms. 1. To the first syllogism, I reply by denying the minor premise, that “mortal” does not create the species “man” in quid, since we assume this under a substantial differentia unknown to us. 2. To the second syllogism, I reply by denying the antecedent, that “mortal” is not predicated of those things (i.e., “man”, “ass”, etc.) in quid, but in the sense we have mentioned. In any case, if “mortal” were predicated in quid, from this it would not follow that it is a substantial differentia. In fact, only from a quale inserted in the definition of a substantial differentia, a substantial quale can be understood.79 3. To the fourth syllogism, I reply by denying the minor premise, that “mortal” is neither assumed in the definition of man, nor does it divide the genus “man” into its species, but is assumed in the sense we have mentioned. 4. To the fifth syllogism, I reply by denying the antecedent: when one says that, according to evidence, if we did not say that “mortal” is a substantial differentia, there would be no substantial differentia between “man” and “angel”, we reply that the conclusion is not true: from the fact that we do not know a differentia, it does not follow that that differentia does not exist. 5. To the sixth syllogism, I reply that, when we say that the differentia adds a species to a genus, this addition must be understood only as referring to something substantial; therefore, although “mortal” adds “man” to “rational”, from this it does not follow that “mortal” is a substantial differentia, since it adds nothing to the substance. Question 7. Whether Porphyry’s words about the differentia are correct. First, it seems that these words are not true.80 79 The reply to the third syllogism seems to be missing in both manuscripts. The end of the reply to the second syllogism and the beginning of the reply to the third might be missing due to a lacuna between the words “ass, etc.” and “in quid”, since what follows seems to refer to the third syllogism rather than to the second. 80 Cf. Brito’s Quaestiones, f. 30vb, ll. 30–35: Consequenter quaeratur de diffinitione differentiae qua dicitur differentia est quae praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale, utrum ista diffinitio sit bona. Et arguitur quod non.

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1. He says that definitions are complete only due to substantial differentiae; but the opposite is true; if so, his words are false. The conclusion is per absurdum, while the antecedent is evident in two senses. In the first place, the definitions of accidents are not complete due to substantial differentiae—e.g., we define “whiteness” as “the colour which distinguishes sight”; the distinction of sight, which in this case is a differentia, is not a substantial differentia, since it is an accident; and the same happens in the case of the definitions of accidental things. Secondly, if one said that in this case “substantial” is not only what is included in the category of substance, but is the quidditative thing found in everything (and in this sense the distinction of sight is a substantial differentia, i.e., a quidditative differentia of whiteness), the above premise would be true in any case, since there are many definitions which cannot be complete due to quidditative differentiae—e.g., what is assumed in the definition of a genus in quid is not a quidditative differentia of that genus. Furthermore, also the addition of a species to a genus assumed in the definition of differentia is not quidditative. 2. In this treatise Porphyry defines differentia, and differentia cannot be defined, as is evident: if differentia were defined, it would follow that the differentiae would be endless; but it is commonly accepted that it is impossible and absurd that the differentiae be endless; therefore, differentia cannot be defined. The consequent is evident: since every definition is composed of genus and differentia, if differentia were defined, its definition would be composed of genus and differentia. Then, one should inquire whether the second differentia, included in the first one, is defined or not: if not,the first one is not defined either. In fact, why should the first differentia be more defined than the second? Therefore, since the second differentia is defined, it too has a definition, composed of genus and differentia. Then, one should inquire whether the third differentia is defined or not; but in this case the differentiae would be endless. But the opposite of this consequent is commonly accepted (An. Post.). 3. Porphyry says that differentia is predicated of many things different in species in quale. This definition is not true, and this is evident: every definition or true description is true for all the individuals of the defined thing; but the definition of differentia is not true for all the individuals of the defined thing; if so, it is neither a

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differentia nor a true description. The major premise is commonly accepted, while the minor one is evident, since the definition is not true for the differentia of the ultimate species, since they are not predicated of many things different in species. 4. Porphyry gives three definitions of differentia. Now, one thing can have only one definition; differentia is one thing; if so, it can have only one definition. The minor premise is commonly accepted, while the major one is evident: since a thing can have only one quiddity, it can have only one definition, because the definition signifies the quiddity of a thing. To defend the thesis that Porphyry’s words here are appropriate, I say: anyone who speaks of something according to the way it is treated in the appropriate art speaks of it appropriately; Porphyry speaks of the differentia as studied in the Isagoge; if so, he speaks of it appropriately. The major premise is commonly accepted, while the minor one is evident, since in the Isagoge Porphyry studies differentia as defined, identified and distinguished from the other predicables. Therefore, Porphyry’s words in this place are evidently correct. Now, in order to resolve the doubts about this, one has to know that the definition is either true or untrue. The true definition is composed of genus and differentia, while the untrue definition is not composed of genus and differentia, and it is called “description” or “explanation of a name” (i.e., what is signified by that name or that expression); the untrue definition is composed only of properties, or of a genus and some properties. For example, if we say that man’s definition is “mortal rational animal”, this definition is true and is composed of genus and differentia; but if we say that man is an animal that has two legs and a wide breast, that stands upright and laughs, this is an untrue definition, called “description”. 2. “Substantial” is said in three senses: (1) of the things that exist only in the category of substance. In this sense everything that exists in the other nine categories is not called “substantial”, be it assumed in reference to the substance or in reference to what is subordinated to the substance (e.g., if we assume a colour in reference to whiteness and blackness); (2) not of the things that exist only in the category of substance, but of every quidditative thing, in whichever category it may be (in this sense, e.g., the colour is called “quidditative” in reference to whiteness and blackness); (3) not of the quidditative thing or what is only in the category of substance, but also of the true

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property, since it is close to the substance and follows it immediately. In this sense, to say that man is “laughing” is a substantial predication. Let us turn to confute the syllogisms against our thesis. 1. To the first syllogism, we reply by denying the antecedent: when according to evidence one says that “substantial” is assumed here as the quidditative thing, in whichever category it be, and then he says that there are definitions which are not complete due to quidditative differentiae, I reply that they are not true definitions, but only descriptions; and Porphyry’s words are about true definitions. 2. To the second syllogism, I reply by accepting the whole syllogism, since differentia cannot be defined by a true definition; but it is false to say that Porphyry defines differentia, since Porphyry gives only descriptions, not true definitions of differentia. 3. To the third syllogism, I reply that in that definition Porphyry included only differentiae of intermediate species; I deny the minor premise, since here only differentiae of intermediate species are defined, and this definition is true for all of them. 4. To the fourth syllogism, I reply by accepting the major premise with the following addition, i.e., in a sense which is not in contrast with my opinion: each one of the three definitions of differentia given by Porphyry refers to a distinct sense of “differentia”. In fact, when differentia is assumed in reference to species, this happens either in the sense of predication (for this reason he defines it as “the thing predicated etc.”), or in the sense of separation (in this sense he says that “differentia is the thing which should separate etc.”), or in the sense that we assume that species as an addition or diminution of the genus (in this sense Porphyry says that “differentia is what adds etc.”). Now, it is evident that the definitions of differentia are assumed in distinct senses, and from this nothing absurd follows. Question 8. Whether property is a predicable that has nothing in common with the other predicables. First we suppose that this is false.81 1. What does not exist is not a predicable; property does not exist; if so, it is not a predicable. The major premise is commonly accepted, 81

Cf. Brito’s Quaestiones, ff. 31va, ll. 31–32 (Utrum proprium sit predicabile, et arguitur quod non) and 33ra, ll. 17–19 (Utrum proprium sit predicabile distinctum ab accidente, et arguitur quod non). However, Brito’s arguments are different from Messer Leon’s.

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since what does not exist is not predicated of an existing thing; the minor one is evident: every existing thing (i.e., every being) is either substance or accident; property is neither substance nor accident; if so, property does not exist. The minor premise of this latter syllogism is evident: if property were a substance, it should be either genus or species or differentia—and this is absurd, since, if so, it could not be a predicable per se ; if property were an accident, it should have something in common with the accident, so that there would be only four predicables—and this cannot be. 2. If property were a predicable, its predication should be convertible with that of species; but the species of something is such because its predication cannot be converted with another species; if so, property is not a predicable. The consequent is commonly accepted, since in this sense property is one of the five predicables; but also the opposite of the consequent is evident, since it is not true that every species is a property, and every property is a species. 3. The opposite of the above thesis is true; if so, the thesis is false. The conclusion is per absurdum, while the antecedent is evident since the noun “property” is not a predicable. 4. Anything that is not separate from species is not a predicable that has nothing in common with it; property is not separate from species; if so, it is not a predicable that has nothing in common with it. From this it follows that property is not a predicable per se. To defend the thesis that property is a predicable that has nothing in common with the other predicables, I say: anything that creates a mode of predication that is different from the other modes is predicated differently than the other predicables; property creates a mode of predication different from the others; if so, it is a predicable per se different from the others. The major premise is commonly accepted, since, as we have explained above, the multiplicity of predicables corresponds to the multiplicity of modes of predication. The minor premise is evident, since property is predicated in the way of quale, but it does not signify a quiddity, and this mode of predication is different from the others. Therefore, property is a predicable that has nothing in common with the other predicables. In order to resolve the doubts about this, one should know that: 1. accident is said in two senses: generally and specifically. In the former sense, everything subordinated to one of the nine categories

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other than substance is called “accident”; in this sense, also property is an accident; 2. but we can assume this name as a specific accident, i.e. insofar as it signifies the thing predicated of many things only in the way of quale, without signifying the quiddity. Now, property is assumed by Porphyry in this sense, so that it is one of the five predicables, and is not an accident. 3. In one sense, property is separate from species, while in another sense it is not. If we assume property and species insofar as they are in a substrate which is one in number, they are not separate, since the property is found wherever the species is found; but if we assume them according to their definitions, property is separate from species, since their definitions are distinct. Let us turn to the above syllogisms. 1. To the first syllogism, I reply by denying the minor premise: it is shown by a syllogism that the accident assumed in that syllogism is either general or specific. If it is assumed generally, I deny the minor premise, since property is also included in the accident assumed in this sense; if it is assumed specifically, I deny the major premise, since according to it there would exist a being which is neither substance nor accident, i.e., property. This confutes also the explanation of the minor premise, where it is affirmed that, if property were an accident, there should be only four predicables: in fact, nothing absurd follows by assuming accident generally and not insofar as it is one of the five predicables. 2. To the second syllogism, I reply by denying the opposite of the consequent: when you affirm that it is evident, since it is not true that every species is a property and every property is a species, I reply that this happens when we assume species and property insofar as they are presented according to a material presentation (has..sa‘ah h.omrit); but this does not make any problem to our reasoning, since, when we say that the predication of property should be convertible with that of species, property and species are assumed according to a formal presentation (has..sa‘ah .surit). 3. To the third syllogism, I reply by denying the antecedent; moreover, the affirmation that the opposite of the above hypothesis is true is valid insofar as species and predicable are presented according to a material presentation; but, if they are assumed according to a formal presentation, that affirmation is not valid.

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4. To the fourth syllogism, I reply by accepting the major premise, if that separation is assumed as a separation in definition (gidri); but, when it is said in the minor premise that property is not separate82 from species, I affirm that, in this sense, this is absurd, since the definitions of species and property are distinct. Question 9. Whether the definition of accident as “the thing whose generation and destruction can be imagined (without the generation and destruction of its substrate)” is true. First, we deny it.83 The opposite is true; if so, this thesis is false. The conclusion is per absurdum; the antecedent is evident per absurdum: death, destruction, extermination and so on are accidents, but this definition is not valid for them, since they are followed by the destruction of the substrate84 —and this is evident per se. To defend the truth of the thesis, I say: every description by means of which the described thing is distinguished from the other beings, and which is truly predicated of everything of which the described thing is truly predicated, is a true description; this is valid for the above description of accident; if so, it is a true description. Therefore, this description is valid. In order to resolve the doubts about it, one should know that some of the accidents have a permanent existence in the substrate (e.g., whiteness, blackness, etc.), while others are transitory and do not have a permanent and continuous existence in the substrate (e.g., death, murder, etc.). According to this division, I reply to the above syllogism by denying the antecedent: Porphyry wanted to include in this definition only the accidents that have a permanent and continuous existence in the substrate; therefore, what has been said about death, destruction, and so on, has no relevance in this case, since Porphyry did not want to include such things in his definition. Moreover, in this definition Porphyry did not mean that the destruction of the substrate cannot result from the generation of the 82

I adopt the reading mitparedet, “separate”, rather than mithappeket, “convertible”, as in the Paris manuscript. 83 Cf. Brito’s Quaestiones, f. 35vb, ll. 1–4: Utrum diffinitio accidentis qua dicitur accidens est quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem sit bene data, et arguitur quod non. 84 Cf. Brito’s Quaestiones, f. 35vb, ll. 12–16: Mors est accidens homini, et combustio domui, et nigredo in corno, et tamen illa non possunt adesse et abesse praeter subiecti corruptionem.

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accident: the definition does not imply that from both the generation and the destruction of the accident (i.e., from each of them) neither the generation nor the destruction of the substrate results; he means that the generation of the substrate does not result from the generation of the accident, and the destruction of the substrate does not result from the destruction of the accident, as if he said that the accident is the thing whose generation can be imagined without imagining the generation of its substrate, and whose destruction can be imagined without imagining the destruction of its substrate. According to this reply, the definition of accident includes all accidental things regardless of whether or not they have a permanent and continuous existence in the substrate.

INDEX OF AUTHORS OF ANTIQUITY, MIDDLE AGES AND EARLY MODERN (UP TO 1600)1

Aboab, Isaac: s. Isaac Aboab Abraham Avigdor, 9, 28 Abraham Bibago, 14, 16, 22–23, 33–107, 114, 122, 166–168, 177, 214 Abraham Farissol, 28, 209–210, 212, 216 Abraham Ibn ‘Ezra, 24, 109 Abraham Ibn Nahmias, 19–20, 23, 114–115 Abraham of Benevento, 114 Abraham Shalom, 14, 18, 21, 23, 165–167, 169, 178, 201–202, 204–208 Abravanel, Isaac: s. Isaac Abravanel Albalag, Isaac: s. Isaac Albalag Albert of Orlam¨unde, 21; Philosophia pauperum, 165 Albert of Saxony, 207; Quaestiones de generatione et corruptione, 44, 58–59 Albert the Great, 1, 3, 12, 91, 110, 126–127, 165, 180, 230, 232; De anima, 3, 111; De causis et processu universitatis, 3; De intellectu et intelligibili, 3; De spiritu et respiratione, 3; Ethica, 118, 126; Physica, 27, 217, 232, 268, 270–272; Summa de bono, 3; Summa de creaturis, 3 Albo, Joseph: s. Joseph Albo Alemanno, Yohanan: s. Yohanan Alemanno Alexander Bonini of Alexandria (Alessandria), 42; In duodecim Metaphysicae libros expositio, 4, 44, 61 1

Alexander of Aphrodisias, 243 Alexander of Hales, 42, 61 Al-F¯ar¯ab¯ı, Ab¯u Nas.r, 35, 252; Compendium of the Metaphysics, 170 Al-Ghaz¯al¯ı, Ab¯u H . a¯ mid: Intentions of the Philosophers, 169–170, 227–228 Alguadez, Meir: s. Meir Alguadez Almoli, Samuel: s. Samuel Almoli Almosnino, Moses: s. Moses Almosnino Anatoli, Jacob: s. Jacob Anatoli Anaxagoras, 63, 88 Angel of Camerino: commentaries on the Categories and on the De interpretatione, 4 Antiphon, 73. Antoni Ginebreda, 21 Antonius Andreas, 43, 77, 177, 179, 183–184, 198, 268; De tribus principiis rerum naturalium, 55, 64, 69, 76–77, 82, 86, 173, 177, 183, 208; Quaestiones super XII libros Metaphysicorum, 19, 52, 173, 175, 177, 183, 197–198; Tractatus de modis distinctionum, 52, 177, 186–187, 190, 192, 194, 196–197, 199 Aquinas, Thomas: s. Thomas Aquinas Arama, Isaac: s. Isaac Arama Argyropoulos, John: s. John Argyropoulos Aristotle, 1, 7, 16, 18, 20, 37, 42–44, 53, 57–58, 61, 63–64, 68–70, 72–74, 76–78, 82–83, 85, 87–89, 91, 104, 110, 117, 120, 123–124, 133–135, 137, 139–151, 154,

Ancient authors are indexed under their most known names (e.g. Boethius, Cicero); Medieval and Early Modern authors are indexed under their first names, with cross-references where surnames exist.

306

index of authors of antiquity

Aristotle (cont.) 157–161, 165, 175, 178, 180, 182, 200–202, 207–210, 214, 231, 237–238, 285; Categories, 166, 208, 212, 227, 284, 286, 293; De anima, 58, 66–67, 72, 74–76, 103, 111, 113–114, 131–133, 155–163, 165, 185–186, 197, 236–237, 259; De animalibus (zoological writings), 47, 157–158, 237; De caelo et mundo, 53, 62, 65, 68, 70, 93, 110, 157, 235; De generatione et corruptione, 47–48, 53, 57, 59, 63–64, 73, 103, 157, 206, 235; De interpretatione, 166, 284; De sensu et sensato (Parva naturalia), 236–237; Metaphysics, 19–20, 44, 48, 50–51, 53, 55, 59-60, 62, 65, 69, 71–76, 78–79, 81–83, 86–87, 92–94, 99, 101, 103–104, 110, 113, 115, 121, 168, 174, 181, 184–185, 198, 218, 225–226, 231–232, 240, 261; Meteorologica, 65, 157, 236; Nicomachean Ethics, 15, 17–18, 58, 67, 111–112, 114–116, 118–156; Physics, 35, 46, 48–51, 53, 55–56, 62–65, 69–73, 76, 79, 82, 85–88, 91, 94, 97, 103, 105–107, 112, 114, 121–122, 124, 208, 211–217, 219–222, 225, 229, 235, 237–239, 241–247, 250, 254–256, 266–267, 277–278, 281, 284; Politics, 14, 110, 124; Posterior Analytics, 35, 63, 69, 71, 77, 79, 81, 84, 152, 160, 184, 193, 219, 221, 224, 231, 235, 242–243, 257–258, 260, 267, 283-284, 298; Prior Analytics, 284; Rhetorics, 238; Sophistici Elenchus, 284; Topics, 55, 80, 105, 284 Arnald of Villeneuve, 110 Arondi, Isaac: s. Isaac Arondi; -, Moses: s. Moses Arondi Ashkenazi, Saul ha-Kohen: s. Saul ha-Kohen Ashkenazi Augustine of Hippo, 28 Aureol, Peter: s. Peter Aureol Averroes (Ab¯u l-Wall¯ıd Ibn Rushd), 1, 16, 18, 27, 41, 43–44, 46, 49, 52–53, 63, 68, 76–77, 81–82, 84,

91, 93, 110, 114, 151, 165, 178, 180, 182, 185, 200, 202, 207, 209, 214, 265; Colliget, 36; Compendium of the De anima, 133; Compendium of the Metaphysics, 44; Compendium of the Organon, 13; Destruction of the Destruction of Philosophers, 182; De substantia orbis, 4, 29, 57, 61, 182, 276; Long Commentary on the De anima, 27, 55, 58, 68, 113–114, 133, 157; Long Commentary on the De caelo, 87–88; Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, 47, 57, 70–72, 76, 82, 97, 244; Long Commentary on the Physics, 47–48, 50, 57, 75–76, 87, 89, 211, 214, 216–217, 238–252, 254–256, 275–276, 280; Long Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, 35; Middle Commentaries on the Categories and the De interpretatione, 170, 211; Middle Commentary on the De anima, 18, 40; Middle Commentary (“Compendium”) on the De animalibus (De partibus and De generatione animalium), 90–91; Middle Commentary on the De generatione, 18, 49; Middle Commentary on the Isagoge, 170, 211, 281–283; Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics, 36, 170, 174, 181; Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, 17, 111, 118, 132; Middle Commentary on the Physics, 18, 35, 211, 214–216, 222, 228, 239, 250–252, 254–256; Middle Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, 35–36, 211, 212; Middle Commentary on the Prior Analytics, 170, 211; The Possibility of Conjunction of Agent Intellect to Man, 152 Avicenna (Ab¯u ‘Al¯ı Ibn S¯ın¯a), 49, 57, 80–82, 90, 182; Canon, 27, 109; Cardiac Drugs, 110 Avigdor, Abraham: s. Abraham Avigdor Avner of Burgos (Alphonso of Valladolid), 10

index of authors of antiquity Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish, 15, 18–20, 24, 34, 42, 76, 109–163, 175 Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish (16th century), 110 Bedershi, Yedayah: s. Yedayah Bedershi ha-Penini Benveniste, Samuel: s. Samuel Benveniste Bernat Metge, 10 Bibago, Abraham: s. Abraham Bibago Bibago, Shem Tov: s. Shem Tov Bibago Boethius of Dacia, 6 Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus, 3, 99; De consolatione philosophiae, 21, 27 Bonafed, Solomon: s. Solomon Bonafed Bonafous Bonfil Astruc, 27 Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, 7, 12 Bonet, Nicholas: s. Nicholas Bonet Bricot, Thomas: s. Thomas Bricot Bruni, Leonardo: s. Leonardo Bruni Bryson: Economics, 110 Buridan, John: s. John Buridan Burley, Walter: s. Walter Burley Cicero, Marcus Tullius: De inventione, 26 Crescas, Hasdai: s. Hasdai Crescas David ben Solomon Ibn Ya’ish, 109 David ha-Sefardi, 211 David Ibn Shoshan, 20 David Messer Leon, 28, 210 David of Tivoli, 210 Del Medigo, Elijah: s. Elijah del Medigo De Osma, Pedro Martinez: s. Pedro Martinez De Osma Democritus, 162 Domenico Grimani, 36 Domingo Gundisalvi: De anima, 3; De uno et unitate, 3, 99 Duns Scotus, John: s. John Duns Scotus Duran, Profiat: s. Profiat Duran Durandus of Saint-Pour¸cain, 8

307

Eli Habillo, 15, 18–24, 31, 34, 40, 45, 52, 67, 110–111, 118, 156, 165–208, 214 Elijah del Medigo, 27, 29–30 Elijah Nolano, 21 Eusebius of Caesarea: Praeparatio Evangelica, 34 Farissol, Abraham: s. Abraham Farissol Ferrer, Vincent: s. Vincent Ferrer Francis of Marchia, 183 Francis of Meyronnes, 43, 45, 84, 97, 102, 183, 189; Tractatus formalitatum secundum doctrinam Francisci Mayronis, 45, 84, 97, 177, 186–196, 198 Frederick III, emperor of the H.R.E., 209 Gaetano de Thiene, 27, 210; Recollectae super octo libros Physicorum, 213–214, 217–222, 230–233, 256–258, 260–266, 272–277 Gar¸con, Joseph: s. Joseph Gar¸con George of Trebizond, 34 Gerald Odonis, 11, 43, 45, 98–100, 183 Gerard of Cremona, 173 Gersonides: s. Levi ben Gershom Giles of Rome, 4; commentary on the De anima, 4; commentary on the Posterior Analytics, 4; commentary on the Rhetoric, 4; De plurificatione intellectus possibilis, 4; De regimine principum, 4, 21; Quaestiones metaphysicales, 4; Quodlibeta, 4; Sententia super librum Physicorum, 4, 27, 217, 237, 252–253, 268–272; Theoremata de esse et essentia, 4 Ginebreda, Antoni: s. Antoni Ginebreda Godfrey of Fontaines, 104 Grimani, Domenico: s. Domenico Grimani Grosseteste, Robert: s. Robert Grosseteste

308

index of authors of antiquity

Gundisalvi, Domingo: s. Domingo Gundisalvi Habillo, Eli: s. Eli Habillo; -, Jacob ben Joseph: s. Jacob ben Joseph Habillo Hasdai Crescas, 10–12, 16, 165, 168 Henry of Ghent, 11, 101 Hezekiah bar Halafta, 9 Hillel of Verona, 3 Hyppocrates, 72 Ibn ‘Ezra, Abraham: s. Abraham Ibn ‘Ezra Ibn Caspi, Joseph: s. Joseph Ibn Caspi Ibn Habib, Moses: s. Moses Ibn Habib Ibn Nahmias, Abraham: s. Abraham Ibn Nahmias Ibn Shem Tov, Joseph: s. Joseph Ibn Shem Tov; -, Shem Tov ben Joseph: s. Shem Tov ben Joseph Ibn Shem Tov Ibn Shoshan, David: s. David Ibn Shoshan Ibn Shu‘eib, Joel: s. Joel Ibn Shu‘eib Ibn Ya‘ish, Baruch: s. Baruch Ibn Ya‘ish; -, David ben Solomon: s. David ben Solomon Ibn Ya‘ish; -, Shem Tov: s. Shem Tov Ibn Ya‘ish; -, Solomon ben Abraham: s. Solomon ben Abraham Ibn Ya‘ish; -, Solomon ben Meir: s. Solomon ben Meir Ibn Ya‘ish Isaac Aboab, 16, 20 Isaac Abravanel, 14, 20, 40 Isaac Albalag, 6 Isaac Arama, 14 Isaac Arondi, 15 Jacob Anatoli, 35, 170 Jacob ben Joseph Habillo, 167 Jandun, John: s. John of Jandun Joel Ibn Shu‘eib, 16 Johannes Versor (Jean Letourneur), 20, 167, 169, 171, 176, 180, 201; Quaestiones super libros De anima, 156, 172, 181, 201; Quaestiones super libros De caelo et mundo, 169, 172, 181, 201; Quaestiones super

librum De ente et essentia, 111, 172, 181; Quaestiones super libros De generatione et corruptione, 172, 175, 181, 201; Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, 173; Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, 44, 71; Quaestiones super libros Parvorum Naturalium, 172, 181; Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, 168, 171–172, 175–176, 181, 199, 201 John Argyropoulos, 111, 120 John Buridan, 5, 7–8, 202, 207 John Duns Scotus, 5–8, 10–11, 37–38, 40–49, 51, 59–60, 63–64, 71–72, 75–76, 78, 80, 82, 86, 92, 95, 100–101, 105, 107, 176–186, 197; commentary on the Sententiae (different from the Ordinatio), 44, 66; Ordinatio, 48–49, 66, 84, 92; Quaestiones in libros Metaphysicorum, 75–76, 82, 85, 100–101, 103–105; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 7; Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis, 268 John II, king of Aragon, 33, 40 John of Jandun, 7, 27, 29, 114; Quaestiones in De anima, 27, 113–114; Quaestiones in libros Physicorum, 217–218, 233, 270 John of Tornamira, 13 John the Canon, 41, 43, 45, 99, 177, 182–183, 185–186; Quaestiones super VIII libros Physicorum, 19, 45, 50–52, 77, 98–107, 173, 177, 182, 184, 186 Joseph Albo, 13, 165 Joseph ben Hayyim Sarfati, 112 Joseph Gar¸con, 15 Joseph Ibn Caspi, 8–9 Joseph Ibn Shem Tov, 12, 17–18 Joseph Taitazak, 30 Judah Messer Leon, 25–28, 209–304 Judah Romano, 3–5, 23 Judah Shalom, 26–27 Leon Joseph of Carcassonne, 13 Leonardo Bruni, 18, 111–112, 119–120

index of authors of antiquity Letourneur, Jean: s. Johannes Versor Levi ben Gershorn (Gersonides), 6–10, 35, 170 Lull, Raymond: s. Raymond Lull Maimonides, Moses: s. Moses Ibn Maymun Marsilius of Inghen, 166, 204–205; Quaestiones de generatione et corruptione, 59, 202, 206–207; Quaestiones in Veterem artem, 166, 207; Quaestiones in octo libros Physicorum (maybe to be ascribed to him), 6–7 Meir Alguadez, 15, 18–19, 111–112, 119 Messer Leon, David: s. David Messer Leon; -, Judah: s. Judah Messer Leon Metge, Bernat: s. Bernat Metge Michael Scot, 113 Mordecai Natan, 13 Moses Almosnino, 20, 30, 111 Moses Arondi, 35, 40, 167 Moses ben Nahman (Nahmanides), 39, 167 Moses Ibn Habib, 28 Moses Ibn Maymun (Maimonides), 3, 39, 165, 181–182 Moses Narboni, 13, 169 Moses of Salerno, 3 Nahmanides: s. Moses ben Nahman Narboni, Moses: s. Moses Narboni Nicholas Bonet, 11, 37, 43, 95, 189; Formalitates, 189; Metaphysica, 37, 44, 95–96 Nicholas of Giovinazzo, 3 Nicholas of Lyra: Postillae, 12 Nicholas Oresme, 11 Nicholas Trevet: commentary on the De consolatione philosophiae, 27 Nissim of Gerona, 8–10 Nolano, Elijah: s. Elijah Nolano Ockham, William: s. William Ockham Odonis, Gerald: s. Gerald Odonis Olivi, Peter John: s. Peter John Olivi

309

Oresme, Nicholas: s. Nicholas Oresme Ovadiah Sforno, 30 Paul of Venice, 14, 26, 210, 212–213; Conclusiones Posteriorum, 212; Expositio in libros Posteriorum, 212, 271; Expositio super octo libros Physicorum necnon super commentum Averrois, 216; Expositio super Praedicabilia et Praedicamenta, 213, 292; Logica parva, 211; Summa naturalium, 214, 217, 220–221, 228, 234–235, 237, 245, 247, 268; philosophical definitions (ascribed to him), 213, 280 Pedro Martinez De Osma: Super VI libros Ethicorum, 118–119, 123–124, 127–129, 132 Pere Saplana, 21 Peter Aureol, 8, 11, 43, 45, 50, 98–99, 106 Peter John Olivi, 11 Peter Lombard: Sententiae, 12, 18 Peter of Hibernia, 3 Peter of Spain: Tractatus or Summulae logicales, 9, 26–28 Pietro Pomponazzi, 29 Pinhas ben Judah Marcaria, 280 Pinhas Tzvi ben Natanael Mozon, 28 Plato, 72–74, 185 Pomponazzi, Pietro: s. Pietro Pomponazzi Porphyry: Isagoge, 49, 69, 80, 85, 101, 106, 166, 212–213, 280–288, 290–291, 294–295, 297–300, 303 Profiat Duran, 12, 18 Pseudo-Albert the Great: Quaestiones, 28 Pseudo-Aristotle: De causis, 167, 173; De mineralibus, 236; De plantis, 236; Economics, 15, 19, 112, 124 Pseudo-Cicero: Rhetorica ad Herennium, 26 Pseudo-Denis the Aeropagite: De divinis nominibus, 119

310

index of authors of antiquity

Pseudo-Giles of Rome: short writings on the faculties of the human soul and on the generation of syllogisms, 4 Pseudo-John Duns Scotus, Questions on the Physics: s. Marsilius of Inghen, Questions on the Physics Pseudo-Marsilius of Inghen: logical questions, 21, 166, 202, 207–208 Pseudo-Robert Grosshead: De anima, 21 Pseudo-Siger of Brabant: Quaestiones in octo libros Physicorum, 6 Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas: commentary on the De consolatione philosophiae, 27; De fallaciis ad quosdam nobiles artistas, 4, 28; De potentiis animae, 20, 44, 67, 171; De universalibus (inc.: “Circa universalia”), 20, 171, 201; On the Difference of the Soul’s Faculties, 4 Qalonymos ben Qalonymos, 35–36, 170, 216 Quintilian (Marcus Fabius Quintilianus): Institutio oratoria, 26 Radulphus Brito: Quaestiones in Veterem artem, 213, 283, 287–290, 294–295, 297, 300, 303 Raymond Lull, 18; Ars brevis, 28 Reginald of Piperno, 156 Robert Grosseteste, 119; Physics, 20, 217, 268, 270 Robert of Anjou, 3 Samuel Almoli, 112 Samuel ben Solomon Altortos, 115, 120–121, 127, 148 Samuel Benveniste, 21 Samuel of Marseilles, 8 Samuel Sarfati, 110 Saplana, Pere: s. Pere Saplana Saul ha-Kohen Ashkenazi, 40 Sforno, Ovadiah: s. Ovadiah Sforno Shalom, Abraham: s. Abraham Shalom; -, Judah: s. Judah Shalom

Shem Tov ben Joseph Ibn Shem Tov, 18, 167, 169 Shem Tov Bibago, 33 Shem Tov Ibn Ya‘ish, 112 Shemariah the Cretan (al-Ikriti), 9 Siger of Brabant, 6–7 Solomon ben Abraham Ibn Ya‘ish (ben Gais, Aben Yaez?), 109 Solomon ben Meir Ibn Ya‘ish, 109–110 Solomon Bonafed, 15 Solomon ha-Qatan, 28 Taitazak, Joseph: s. Joseph Taitazak Thomas Aquinas, 1, 3–4, 7, 11, 14, 17–18, 20, 24, 27, 38–41, 43–44, 46, 53, 61, 67, 76, 82, 93, 110, 114–115, 117–119, 125–127, 131, 148, 150–151, 154–156, 170, 172, 175–176, 178–181, 185, 200, 208; commentary on the De causis, 4; De ente et essentia, 4, 20, 38, 111, 171, 176, 201; De unitate intellectus contra Averroim, 3; De veritate, 150; Quaestio de spiritualibus creaturis, 20; Quaestiones disputatae de anima, 20, 168, 170, 181, 201; Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, 4, 119; Sententia libri De anima, 4–5, 20, 38, 156, 158, 160–163, 270; Sententia libri Ethicorum, 13, 16–17, 20, 117–118, 120–121, 123, 125–126, 129–155; Sententia libri Metaphysicorum, 19, 23, 27, 93, 96, 114; Sententia libri Physicorum, 6, 27, 44, 76, 82, 121–122, 217, 253–254, 268–270, 272; Summa contra Gentiles, 4, 12, 17, 27; Summa theologica, 4, 12–14, 30, 39, 119, 150 Thomas Bricot: Textus abbreviatus philosophiae naturalis, 20 Trevet, Nicholas: s. Nicholas Trevet Versor, Johannes (Jean Letourneur): s. Johannes Versor Victorinus, Marius, 26 Vincent Ferrer, 21; Tractatus de unitate universalis, 118, 173–174

index of authors of antiquity Vincent of Beauvais: Speculum Historiale, 12 Walter Burley, 6, 27, 166, 204, 208, 261; Expositio in octo libros Physicorum, 202, 204, 212–213, 217, 235–237, 240–241, 244–248, 254, 268–273, 275–278, 280; Super Artem veterem expositio, 213 William Ockham, 5–8, 11, 18, 37–38, 42, 54, 68, 89, 175–176, 179–180; Expositio in libros Physicorum, 54–56, 89, 92, 217, 271; Summa logicae, 44,

311

68, 173, 207; Summula philosophiae naturalis, 44 William of Auvergne, 12 William of Moerbeke, 18, 110, 113, 119, 157, 174, 216 Yedayah Bedershi ha-Penini, 7–8, 44, 75 Yohanan Alemanno, 28, 209 Zerahyah Hen (Gracian), 173 Zimara, Marco Antonio, 238

INDEX OF MODERN AUTHORS

Ackerman, A., 2, 16, 22–23 Aertsen, J.A., 2 Altmann, A., 26 Bakker, P.J.J., 77 Baracchi, P., vii Bar-On, A.Z., 4 Bates, T., 196 Beit-Ari´e, M., 17, 35, 109–110, 112, 167, 169–172, 176, 201, 210 Benedicto Gracia, E., 33 Berman, L.V., 15, 17, 118–119 Bernheimer, C., 215 Birnbaum, E., 109 Bland, K.P., 29 Boehner, P., 68 Bonfil, R., 25–26, 30, 210–212 Bottin, F., 211, 214 Boyarin, D., 16 Briquet, C.M., 215 Brown, S.F., 54, 68, 92 Carreras y Artau, T. and J., 19, 166, 176 Cathala, M.R., 93 Contamine, G., 172 Conti, A.D., 213 Cooperman, B.D., 2, 16, 23, 25–26, 28 Crawford, F.S., 114 Craig, E., 29, 210 Cropsey, J., 13 Cross, R., 45, 48–49, 51, 59, 63–64 David, A., 28 Davidson, H.A., 23, 165 Dekker, D.-J., 77 de Rijk, L.M., 19, 99–100 De Rossi, G.B., 176 Diago Hernando, M., 167 Ebbesen, S., 283 Eckert, W.P., 168 Emery, K. jr., 19

Engel, E., 209 Ersch, J.S., 210 Feldman, S., 29 Fioravanti, G., 27 Fontaine, R., vii Fraenkel-Goldschmidt, H., 39 Frank, D.H., 2, 15, 29 Freudenthal, G., 9–10 Gabriel, A., 168 G´al, G., 68 Gampel, B.R., 30, 109, 115 Gargan, L., 168 Geffen, D.M., 29 Gensler, M., 77, 82, 177 Geoffroy, M., 40 Gilson, E., 45, 80, 84, 86, 105 Glasner, R., 6–7 Gruber, J.G., 210 Hacker, J., 15 Hamesse, J., 15, 24 Harvey, S., 6 Harvey, W.Z., 5–6, 8, 10–11 Heller-Wilensky, S., 14 Holtz, L., 19 Hossfeld, P., 232, 268 Husik, 1., 211, 213, 280 Idel, M., 6, 28, 209 Israel, F., 21 Ivry, A.L., 6, 25, 29 Jacquart, D., 15, 24 Jellinek, A., 166, 171 Jolivet, J., 17 Joseph, M., 33 King, P., 45–47, 49, 63–64, 78, 80, 82, 84, 95, 180, 197 Klatzkin, J., 199 Klein-Braslavy, S., 6, 9

314

index of modern authors

Langermann, Y.T., 109, 155, 166 Lasker, D.J., 2, 12–14, 22 Lazaroff, A., 33–36, 39–40, 44 Leaman, O., 2, 15, 29 Leibold, G., 89, 217 Leonardi, C., 27 Lerner, R., 13 Limone, O., 168 Maggio` lo, M., 76, 121, 268 Maieru, ` A., 168, 213 Malter, H., 210 Mancha, J.L., 6 Manekin, Ch.H., 2, 9, 13, 15, 18, 22–23, 26–28, 166, 171, 174, 211–212, 214 Marenbon, J., 77 Margoliouth, G., 167–169, 172 Marx, A., 210 May, R., 17, 110, 112, 169–170, 172 Melamed, A., 14, 21 M¨obuss, S., 7 Munk, R., vii Nahon, G., 4 Netanyahu, B.Z., 14, 20 Neubauer, A., 17, 110, 169–170, 172 Noone, T.B., 60, 75, 100–101, 104–105, 179 Nuriel, A., 33–41, 44, 114 Padgen, A.R.D., 17 Perfetti, S., 27 Perreau, P., 109 Peyron, B., 175 Pickav´e, M., 2 Pines, S., 5–8, 10–12, 168, 181 Pirotta, A.M., 158 Plessner, M., 110 Poppi, A., 211, 214 Rabello, A.M., 21 Rabinowitz, 1., 209–210 Ravitzky, A., 11 Reif, S.C., 215 Richler, B., vii, 35, 109, 112, 167, 171, 176, 201, 210 Richter, V., 89, 217 Riesco Terrero, J., 168 Rigo, C., 3–5, 171

Rosenberg, Sh., 15, 18, 28, 170, 173 Ross, J., 196 Ross, J.J., 29 Roth, ´ E., 111 Rothschild, J.-P., 4, 15–17, 22, 24, 31, 33, 109, 116, 119, 167–175, 201–202, 204, 208 Rudavsky, T.M., 2, 8, 10–11, 25 Ruderman, D.B., 28, 209 Sachs, S., 19, 23, 115 Santiago Otero, H., 2 Saperstein, M., 15–16, 20, 25, 34 Sassoon, D.S., 40 Schabel, Ch., 98–100 Schmelzer, M., 109 Schwartz, D., 33 Sed-Rajna, G., 116 Sermoneta, G. (J.B.), 3–5, 23, 30, 177 Shatzmiller, J., 13, 25 Sierra, S., 27 Sirat, C., 6, 9, 14–15, 25, 33, 40, 165, 209 Somekh, A.M., 21 Soto Rabanos, J.M., 16 Spiazzi, R.M., 93, 131 Spruyt, J., 99 Steel, C., 24 Steinschneider, M., 3, 14, 18–21, 23, 27–28, 33–41, 44, 109–114, 117–118, 166, 168, 170–173, 175, 210–212, 215, 281 Striedl, H., 111 Talmage, F., 12 Tamani, G., 36, 171, 173, 175–176, 201, 210, 212–213, 215, 280 Tirosh-Rothschild (now Tirosh-Samuelson), H., 2, 14, 16–17, 22, 25–26, 29–30, 111, 115, 165, 209–210 Touati, Ch., 4 Vajda, G., 5–6 Valperga di Caluso, T., 176 Vattioni, F., 171 Verbeke, G., 5 Verhelst, D., 5

index of modern authors Weijers, O., 6, 9, 19 Williams, T., 45, 66 Wilpert, P., 168 Wirszubski, Ch., 34 Wolfson, H.A., 16, 113–114 Ziino, F., 21 Zimmels, H.J., 109–110, 114

315

Zobel, M., 199 Zonta, M., 2, 5, 8, 15, 18–21, 24–27, 36, 109–115, 120, 156, 167–168, 170–171, 173–177, 184, 201, 210, 212–213, 215–216, 218, 280 Zotenberg, H., 41, 115–116, 170, 280

INDEX OF MANUSCRIPTS

Assisi, Biblioteca Conventuale: no. 970, 177 Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College: no. 368/590, 77 Cambridge, University Library: Add. 631, 215, 217, 276–278 Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University, Houghton Library: hebrew 38, 166 Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana: Pluteo I no. 26, 212–213; Pluteo III no. 5, 286–287; Pluteo LXXXVIII no. 12, 210, 215; Pluteo LXXXVIII no. 26, 27, 280, 283–304 Hamburg, Staats- und Universit¨ats-bibliothek: Hebr. 265, 166, 170–171; L´evy 114, 111 Leiden, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit: Or. 4782, 118, 147; Or. 4786, 17; Or. 4796, 19–20 London, British Library: Or. 2538, 169; Or. 6365, 167–168 Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional: no. 4229, 99 Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria: no. 65, 99 Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana: Q 24 sup., 215, 279–280; S 38 sup., 215, 217–276 Modena, Biblioteca Estense: α. J. 6. 23 (or. 13), 40 Moscow, Rossiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Bibliotheka: G¨unzburg 139, 174; Gunzburg ¨ 264, 15 Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek: Hebr. 32, 35; Hebr. 57, 36; Hebr. 357, 36–37

Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale: III. F. 5, 113 New York, Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary: microfilm 2312, 28; microfilm 2315, 112; microfilm 2341, 18, 170–171; microfilm 2371, 169, 174 Oxford, Bodleian Library: Hunt. 293, 110; Hunt. 519, 170; Hunt. 613, 166, 169; Michael 168, 112; Michael 288, 20–21; Michael 409, 111; Mich. Add. 16, 110–111; Opp. 591, 132–133; Opp. Add. 4◦ 10, 28; Reggio 44, 20 Oxford, Christ Church College Library: no. 187, 172; no. 200, 170 Padua, Biblioteca Universitaria: no. 1580, 177 Paris, Biblioth`eque Nationale de France: h´ebreu 907, 169–170, 172; h´ebreu 909, 170; h´ebreu 929, 28; h´ebreu 959, 35; h´ebreu 967, 18; h´ebreu 984, 8; h´ebreu 991, 166; h´ebreu 994, 212–213, 280, 283–304; h´ebreu 995, 34; h´ebreu 1000, 172, 199–201; h´ebreu 1001, 115–116; h´ebreu 1002, 115–117, 119–155; h´ebreu 1003, 115–116, 120–131; h´ebreu 1004, 20, 37, 40–107 Parma, Biblioteca Palatina: Lettere autografe di uomini illustri, cassetti 109–123, letter of Tomaso Valperga di Caluso to Giovanni Bernardo De Rossi, dated 7/10/1795, 176; parmense 1957, 210, 216; parmense 2196, 110; parmense 2261, 172, 176, 178–199; parmense 2348, 109; parmense 2627, 112; parmense 2631, 35, 166–167, 169, 171, 173–174, 201–208; parmense 2978, 167, 172, 201

318

index of manuscripts

Patmos, St. John Monastery’s Library: no. 324, 36 Rome, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana: vat. ebr. 556, 17 Rome, Biblioteca Casanatense: no. 3083, 174 Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria: no. 2604, 118, 123–124, 128–129, 132

St. Petersburg, Library of the St. Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science: B 182, 155, 157–163 Turin, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria: A. VI. 25, 172, 175, 178–199 ˇ Warsaw, Zydowsky Instytut Historyczny: no. 255, 24