Hawaii's War Years: 1941–1945 9780824885014

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Hawaii's W a r Y e a r s 1941-1945

a w a ii'

19 4 1

War Years G V E N F R EAD ALLEN • U N I V E R S I T Y OF H A W A I I P R E S S HONOLULU, H A W A I I

19 4 5

COPYRIGHT,

1 9 5 0,

BY

THE

UNIVERSITY

UNIVERSITY

OF

OF

HAWAII

PRESS

HAWAII

H A W A I I WAR R E C O R D S

COMMITTEE

Executive Committee Thomas D. Murphy, Chairman Charles H. Hunter Ralph S. Kuykendall

Members Oscar N. Allen Fred E. Armstrong Janet Bell Harry Collins Roy A. Goff Bernhard L. Hórmann Thomas A. Jaggar Yukuo Uyehara

MANUFACTURED THE

IN

A D V E R T I S E R

THE

UNITED

P U B L I S H I N G

Laura Schwartz Korn Andrew W. Lind Harold S. Palmer Shunzo Sakamaki E. Vern Sayers Carl Stroven Cheuk-Woon Taam

STATES

OF

CO., L T D . ,

AMERICA

BY

H O N O L U L U

Foreword THE FIRST SESSION of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii to meet after America's entrance into World War II passed a joint resolution in the spring of 1943 providing for the collection and preservation of material relating to Hawaii's part in the war and designating the University of Hawaii as the depository for such material. As a result of this legislation, the Hawaii War Records Depository was established. During the six years of its existence, it has amassed a wide variety of important material from every conceivable source. In 1947 the legislature authorized the preparation and publication of a one-volume history of Hawaii's part in the war. Hawaii's War Years, 1941-1945, the result of that mandate, has been prepared under the direction of the Hawaii War Records Committee of the University of Hawaii. Hawaii's War Years is a straightforward, factual account of what Hawaii did in the war and the effect of the war upon Hawaii, with emphasis on civilian activities and problems. The most difficult tasks in its preparation have been the selection of material and the condensation of material selected to readable limits. Many interesting details have been omitted and many stories of achievement left untold, for each chapter in itself might well have been expanded into a separate book. Every effort has been made to insure both accuracy of statement and correctness of interpretation. Almost every statement rests on tangible documentary evidence. Suggestions have been sought from key persons in certain fields of war activity who have read chapters concerning which they had firsthand knowledge. However, despite all precautions, it is inevitable that some errors will be found. Some records are still "classified," some are unavailable in Hawaii, some prepared under wartime stress contain errors and contradictions. Documentation upon which the book is based, keyed to the text by page and line, may be obtained from the University of Hawaii Press. v

vi

FOREWORD

Many persons have contributed to this history. Hundreds have given or loaned materials to the War Records Depository; others have supplied information through personal interviews or letters. Members of the staffs of the Archives of Hawaii, the Library of Hawaii, and the University of Hawaii Library—especially the Hawaiiana Room and the Government Documents Collection—aided in finding information not available in the War Records Depository. Delegate Joseph R. Farrington and his secretary, Mrs. Margaret C. Turner, have been helpful in making Washington contacts. Catharine P. Field, the first director of the depository, the late Major Vivian M. Culver, Adele Culver, Ethel M. Prescott, and other former members of the depository staff, laid the groundwork for the study. Kathryn H. Stidham, archivist for several years, handled the task of collecting the enormous bulk of material. Lloyd L. Lee, research assistant at the depository, aided in preparing the chronology and bibliography and in checking the references, of which there are more than 3,000. Kasumi Murakami and Dorothy Caires also assisted in many details. Members of the staffs of the Office of Publications and Information of the University of Hawaii and the University of Hawaii Press have offered valuable editorial suggestions. The final selection of photographs from several thousand prints, the writing of captions, much of the preparation of the bibliography, and the compilation of the index was done by the press staff. Dr. Thomas D. Murphy, chairman of the depository committee, has given much assistance and advice throughout the entire project, and other members of the committee have been helpful. GWENFREAD ALLEN

Honolulu, Hawaii June, 1949

Table of Contents Chapter

Page

I. BOMBS FALL 1. December 7

1

2. Hawaii Springs to Action

29

3. Rumors Rampant

47

4. Tension-Ridden Days

57

II. A GLANCE BACK 5. War Clouds Gather

65

6. The Hour Before the Storm

73

I I I . GIRDED FOR A T T A C K 7. Ready for Invasion

87

8. Protecting the Public

107

9. Internal Security

131

10. Food Supply Problems

151

11. Government under Stress

166

IV. G A T E W A Y T O BATTLE 12. Headquarters for Attack

185

13. The Troops Take Over

219

14. Warriors in Dungarees

233

15. Off Duty in "Paradise"

246

V. B A C K I N G THE A T T A C K 16. Islanders to the Colors

263

17. Over the Top

274 vii

VLLL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

VI. EXIGENCIES OF WAR

Page

18. Business Not as Usual

281

19. 20. 21. 22.

305 327 336 342

Manpower Problems A Roof Overhead Keeping Fit for the Fray Travel Troubles

23. Social Upheaval

349

VII. DAWN OF A NEW ERA 24. War's Aftermath

363

25. Hawaii: Postwar

375

APPENDICES

I. Bibliography

379

II. Chronology

391

INDEX

403

L i s t of I l l u s t r a t i o n s FIGURES I. Approach Routes of Enemy Planes II. Battle Damage at Pearl Harbor

Page

3 27

III. Projectile Impact Areas in Honolulu IV. Map of Hawaiian Islands

28 42

V. "Interpreted" Ad from Honolulu Star-Bulletin VI. "We the Blitzed"

49 61

VII. Government of Hawaii under Martial Law VIII. Hawaii, Springboard of the Pacific War

168-169 184

(Figures I, I I I , IV, and VIII by Raymond E. Lanterman)

PHOTOGRAPHS 1. "Battleship row" in flames December 7, 1941

11

2. American battleships afire at Pearl Harbor

11

3. 4. 5. 6.

12 12 13 13

At the height of the attack The Arizona sinking The Nevada attempting a sortie The Shaw sinking

7. Remains of Cassin and Downes in drydock 8. Wheeler Field in flames 9. 10. 11. 12.

An oil tank explosion at Ford Island Wrecked Army hangar at Hickam Field Crumpled P-40 at Wheeler Field Remains of tent barracks at Wheeler Field IX

14 15 15 16 16 17

X

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Photo

Page

13. Bomb crater at Hickam Field 14. Enemy plane shot down over Oahu

17 18

15. Midget submarine aground 16. Japanese propaganda leaflet

18 19

17. Chart of Pearl Harbor found in captured Japanese submarine . 18. Fire damage at King and McCully Streets

19 20

19. 20. 21. 22.

Firemen fighting the McCully Street blaze Civilians surveying damage to home Lunalilo School on fire Damage to house at Lewers Street and Kuhio Avenue

20 21 21 22

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

Damaged automobile Injured civilians receiving first aid Civilian dead at the morgue Ceremonies for Pearl Harbor dead Covered bomb shelter Civilians digging trenches

22 23 23 23 24 24

29. 30. 31. 32.

Sentries and taped doors Sand-bag barricade at telephone building Civilians lining up for gas ration cards Housewives outside grocery stores

25 25 26 26

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

Capsized Oklahoma: a marine salvage problem Winches lifting the Oklahoma to her side The Oklahoma being rolled upright The Oklahoma floats again Menehune Minute Men laying barbed wire Dog and sentry guarding beach

99 99 100 100 101 101

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

Barbed wire at Iolani Palace gate The Kiawe Corps clearing jungle lands Maui's Mounted Patrol assembled The Hawaii Territorial Guard ready for duty Members of the BMTC manning an anti-tank gun Hawaii National Guard deactivation

101 102 102 103 103 104

45. Red Cross motor corps unit on Kauai

104

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

xi

Photo

Page

46. Nurses' aide assisting in hospital

105

47. Gray Ladies visiting the wounded

105

48. Civilian defense wardens on the job at Waipahu

106

49. WARDs charting plane movements

106

50. Lei women weaving camouflage materials

123

51. Camouflaged utilities building in Honolulu

123

52. Governor Poindexter being

124

fingerprinted

53- Civilians wearing gas masks

124

54. Zigzag open trenches on school grounds

124

55. Civilians seeking passage to the Mainland

125

56. Light lock in front of cable company

125

57. Downtown Honolulu in air raid maneuvers

126

58. Incidents being staged in cleared areas

126

59- Victory garden produce on display

127

60. Children harvesting potatoes

127

61. Children returning home after work in cane

fields

62. Donor at the Honolulu blood bank

127 128

63. First aid class at YWCA

128

64. Mainland relocation center at Poston, Arizona

129

65. Prisoner of war camp near Waipahu

129

66. Provost court in session

130

67. Temporary buildings in the Iolani Palace grounds

130

68. Tunnel leading to Red Hill's underground storage

203

69. Pipes and valves used to pump oil to ships in harbor

203

70. Taking inventory before a push

204

71. Preparing crankshaft for shipment

204

72. Stock pile of accumulated war materials

204

73. Plantation land converted to military post

205

74. Army training camp on leeward side of Oahu

205

75. Men learning to operate amphibious landing craft

206

76. Men rehearsing landing tactics on Hawaii's beaches

206

77. Army tanks rumbling through Honolulu streets

207

78. Men training to take enemy beaches

207

xii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Photo

Page

79. 80. 81. 82.

Training camp for jungle warfare Medical Corps practicing rescue work Wounded returning to Hawaii General Richardson awarding the Purple Heart

208 208 209 209

83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

Wounded arriving from I wo Jima President Roosevelt at his Hawaii conference War workers arriving from the Mainland Crowds of war workers at Pearl Harbor Industrial might of Pearl Harbor Diving crews salvaging the Arizona

209 210 211 211 212 212

89. Expert operating specialized machine 90. Men overhauling equipment

213 213

91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

Skilled artisans making new parts for damaged ships Servicemen converging on Honolulu USO Fun-hungry men invading honky-tonk sections of town Boys buying pin-ups for barracks walls Serviceman posing with synthetic hula girl Mobile USO unit and audience Servicemen studying Hawaiian customs Hawaiian soldiers preparing a native feast

213 214 214 215 215 215 216 216

Hawaiian-style USO Folk dances by American girls of Japanese ancestry Hawaiians entertaining service personnel St. Patrick's Day dance at Kauai USO Aloha ceremonies for 442nd Infantry Battalion AJA's volunteer as interpreters First group of Island-born WACs being sworn in VVV group on steps of University of Hawaii

217 217 218 218 291 292 292 293

99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106.

107. Barefoot "army" drilling at Ewa 108. People lined up to buy bonds

293 294

109. Red Cross volunteers preparing clothing for abroad 110. Women mending clothing for freed Filipinos 111. Japanese women knitting for the Red Cross

294 295 295

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

xiii

Photo

Pase

112. Scrap aluminum collected in drive

296

113. 114. 115. 116.

296 296 297 297

Scrap rubber collected in drive Sugar mill donations to the metal recovery program OPA official checking prices Outgoing V-mail being photographed

117. Incoming V-mail being checked 118. Outdoor public day care center

297 298

119. 120. 121. 122.

Company-operated day care center Island women helping with salvage work Island women loading ammunition onto feeder belts Woman butcher

298 315 315 316

123. 124. 125. 126.

Laborers repairing roads Women of fire-fighting crew Kalihi War Homes aerial view War on dengue-carrying mosquitoes

316 316 317 317

127. Honolulu celebrating as peace is declared 128. Returning veteran being welcomed by his brothers

318 319

129. Returning AJA being welcomed by his father 130. Survivor of Bataan arriving in Hawaii

319 319

131. 132. 133. 134. 135.

320 320 321 321 322

Temporary war memorial in Honolulu A mother receiving a posthumous award Ceremonies at National Memorial Cemetery of Pacific Flag-draped caskets of Ernie Pyle and four soldiers Hawaii saying farewell to war PHOTO CREDITS

Acme Telephoto: 24, 25. Baker, Ray Jerome: 51, 72, 73. Fern, Stewart Everson: 135. Holmes, W. J.: 56. Hoist & Cummings: 77, 100. Honolulu Advertiser: 28, 52, 79, 106, 109, 113. Honolulu Star-Bulletin: 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 42, 53, 54, 55, 59, 60, 62, 63, 66, 105, 108, 110, 112, 115, 119, 122, 129, 131. Lyman, Francis: 37. Maui News: 41. Oahu Sugar Co., Ltd.: 48, 61, 65. Photo Hawaii: 50. Senda Studios: 45. Stephenson, Earl J.: 127. Stoy, Werner: 46. U.S. Army: 8, 10, 13, 14, 39, 43, 44, 49, 57, 58, 67, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 95, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 107, 116, 117, 121, 125, 128, 130, 132, 133, 134. U.S. Navy: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 16, 17, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 68, 69, 70, 71, 81, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 120, 124, endpapers. War Relocation Authority: 64. Source unknown: 11, 12, 15, 22, 40, 47, 85, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 104, 111, 114, 118, 123, 126.

BOMBS FALL

I

CHAPTER

ONE

December 7 the minesweeper Condor sighted a submarine periscope off the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Since this was an area where no American submarine traveled submerged, the Condor immediately notified the destroyer Ward. Inshore waters were searched for an hour and a half but without success. At 6:30 the destroyer answered a similar alert from the target repair ship Antares and this time located the submarine, apparently trailing the Antares into Honolulu Harbor. The Ward fired on the intruder— the first American shots of World War II—and scored a hit. After the crippled submarine went down, a Navy patrol plane joined the destroyer in a depth charge attack. The Ward reported the action to 14th Naval District headquarters at 6:51 and two minutes later followed with a second message. The information made its way through channels, reaching Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, about 7:30. Since unverified submarine contacts were being reported several times a week—none, however, so close to American shores as this—the admiral asked for amplification of the message. Meanwhile, two Army privates were completing their three-hour training period at an isolated radar station in the hills between Waialua and Kahuku, one of six new mobile radar units which troops in Hawaii were learning to operate. While waiting for an Army truck to pick them up, the pair continued practice. Suddenly the radar screen was covered with markings unlike any they had ever seen before. They checked the set, found that it was functioning properly, and concluded that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu from three degrees East of North at a distance of 132 miles. Since the lookouts were officially off duty after 7:00, they debated whether or not to follow the usual routine of notifying the information A T 3:42 A.M. O N DECEMBER 7, 1941,

1

2

BOMBS FALL

center. At 7:20 they decided to phone, but by that time everyone had left the center except the telephone operator and a lieutenant who was serving his second morning of observation. He assumed that the planes were the B-17s which he knew were flying in from the Mainland and dismissed the matter. But no such swarm of American planes was in the air as had filled the radar scope that morning of December 7, 1941. As early as 6:30 A.M., two Japanese reconnaissance planes were over Oahu. They were followed by 360 planes which Japanese carriers 200 miles to the north had launched in three waves between 6:00 and 7:15 A.M. Most of the planes approached the Pearl Harbor area directly from the sea. A few crossed the Koolau Range, unrecognized above the fleecy clouds, after accomplishing their missions on Windward Oahu. At about 7:57* a score of fighters swooped down from the clouds to within 20 feet of the ground at the Marine Corps Air Station at Ewa, riddling the 49 planes closely lined up on the field. Thirty-three aircraft went up in smoke, and the remaining 16 were too badly damaged to fly. The marines, in desperation, emptied their pistols at the departing Japanese. At one minute before 8:00, as the preparatory signal for colors was being hoisted over the 94 vessels in Pearl Harbor, the real battle began. Japanese dive bombers droned down on Ford Island, in the center of Pearl Harbor, destroying 33 of the 70 planes on the field. Within seconds, torpedo planes and dive bombers swung in from' all sides to pummel the heavy vessels in "battleship row" adjacent to Ford I sland. Almost simultaneously, Hickam Field, next to Pearl Harbor, and Kaneohe Naval Air Station, on the Windward Side, were subjected to the Japanese onslaught. Seven minutes later enemy aircraft pounded Wheeler Field, which adjoins Schofield Barracks in central Oahu. The battleships in the harbor underwent a sustained assault. Within 30 minutes torpedo planes made four separate attacks and dive bombers eight. A lull from 8:25 to 8:40 was followed by a half-hour of dive bombing and horizontal bombing attacks which continued until 9:45. In the first half-hour, the major damage had been done. All seven battleships had been hit at least once. The West Virginia was sinking, the California was down by the stem, the Arizona was a flaming ruin. During the next half-hour attack, the Tennessee received slight addi* What happened during the next few hours became so interwoven with rumors, hearsay, assumptions, and inaccuracies that even the official reports contradict one another. The number of casualties, the amount of damage, the size of the attacking force, the time of the attack—these and other points differ between reports. The account given here is compiled from the sources which seem most accurate.

DECEMBER 7

3

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

APPROX ZOO MILES OFF OAHU

KAHUKl

H A I . K l WA '

¿VA1IIAWA;

mm

WMVAHVáfgfé

'AJEA

,B(1L0WS HtlO

KWA

Barbers Pf KokoHeodj

MtmAfO&h

FIGURE I.

APPROACH ROUTES OF ENEMY PLANES, DECEMBER 7, 1941 (Based on Item No. 19, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 21)

tional damage, the Pennsylvania took another hit, the Nevada, in a gallant effort to sortie, was beached to prevent her sinking in the channel, and the Oklahoma capsized with four torpedoes in her hull. As the attacks continued, damage increased. In all, six ships were sunk, 12 were severely damaged, and others suffered minor blows. Dead, wounded, or trapped in the ships were 2,500 men. Near-by Hickam Field sustained three 10-minute attacks, at approximately 7:55, 8:25, and 9:00. Bombs fell on some of the huge barracks, killing and wounding several hundred men. Bombs landed on the guardhouse, putting the air raid siren out of order, and on the ordnance building, delaying access to ammunition. Bombs also hit machine shops, hangars, the theater, the parade ground, and the post exchange. Bombs

4

BOMBS FALL

even pock-marked the baseball diamond which was in an area where the outdated maps carried by the Japanese showed gasoline storage. Planes, lined up with only 10 feet between wingtips, became a total loss. Luckily, the longest runways in the Islands were not damaged. Kaneohe NAS was first strafed, then strafed again and bombed 25 minutes later. The station had 36 planes prior to the attack, three of which were in the air on patrol. Of the remainder, 27 were destroyed and the other six damaged. One hangar burned down to its steel skeleton; another crumpled under a direct hit. At Wheeler Field, 25 enemy planes dive-bombed and machinegunned the hangar lines for a quarter hour, and seven fighters later strafed planes which were being taxied onto the field preparatory to taking off. Forty-two combat planes were totally destroyed and others damaged. Little Bellows Field, on the Windward Side near Waimanalo, was unmolested until 8:30 when a lone Japanese fighter opened fire at the tent area. Later, nine fighters machine-gunned the planes on the field, but totally destroyed only three. Damage here was lightest of any installation except the newly established emergency field at Haleiwa, which was not touched, evidently because the Japanese did not know it existed. At none of the Army fields were planes loaded with bombs or ammunition. Bellows did not get a plane into the air until 8:50; Hickam, not until afternoon. However, five planes took off from unbombed Haleiwa by 8:15 and engaged the enemy in furious dogfights. Six planes took off from Wheeler at 8:30, and eight more within the next 45 minutes. Army planes made a total of 81 take-offs during the day. The eleven B-17s which arrived from the Mainland between 8:00 and 9:00 unwittingly flew into the battle, without ammunition. One landed at Wheeler Field, one at Bellows, two at Haleiwa, one on a golf course at Kahuku, and the others dodged bombs and bullets to land at Hickam as scheduled. One was destroyed in landing and three others were badly damaged. Twenty-five Navy planes were in the air when the attack started. Seven were patrol flying boats which had taken off earlier in the morning from Kaneohe and Ford Island, and 18 were scout bombers which had been launched from the Enterprise 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor. Like the B-17s, they flew into the fight unawares, but they were armed and able to take part in the battle. About half landed on Oahu, one sped away to Kauai, and the others were lost. No Navy planes were able to take off after the attack started. Within seven to ten minutes after the first bomb fell, all anti-aircraft batteries on ships in Pearl Harbor were in action, even those on ships

DECEMBER 7

5

which had been hit. An Army anti-aircraft detachment at Sand Island shot down two planes about 8:15. Other Army anti-aircraft units needed time to move into position and obtain ammunition, and only three were ready to fire during the attack. The combined defense of anti-aircraft gunners and American pilots caused Japanese planes to crash at several points on Oahu and at sea. Twenty-nine Japanese planes failed to reach their carriers, a number comparable to the average then being shot down in European raids even when defenses were alerted. As soon as the Japanese planes accomplished their designated missions, most of them streaked back to their carriers and were taken aboard between 10:30 A.M. and 1:30 P.M. Some official reports say that all enemy planes had retired by 9:45, and certainly most of the action was over by that time. The few planes reportedly seen later in the morning may have been stragglers which failed to return to their carriers. Fivejapanese midget submarines, launched from mother submarines, participated in the attack. One was rammed and sunk inside Pearl Harbor during the action, three were lost at sea, and one was grounded off Bellows Field. The lone survivor of the latter swam ashore and became the only prisoner of war of the day. For a time it was believed that papers in the submarine indicated that it might have been in Pearl Harbor before the attack, but later investigations discredited that interpretation. The December 7 disaster took the lives of 2,008 Navy men, 109 marines, and 218 Army men. The injured included 710 sailors, 69 marines, and 364 soldiers, bringing the casualty total to 3,478. Japan lost less than 100 men. The United States lost outright 188 planes; Japan lost 29. The United States suffered severe damage to 18 ships and minor damage to others; Japan lost one full-size submarine and five midget submarines. While bombs were still falling, rescuers fought through fire and flooded compartments to reach the dead and wounded; sailors blown off their own vessels reported for duty on near-by ships; airmen struggled to reach their planes despite heavy strafing; repairmen toiled in heat, darkness, filth, and danger; telephone operators stuck to their posts to hasten urgent calls. HONOLULU POLICE RECEIVED THE FIRST REPORT o f damage in the city

at 8:05 A.M. when a resident of Damon Tract, near Hickam Field, telephoned that his kitchen had been hit. After 8:30, reports came in fast succession: from Pacific Heights, Advertiser Square, Fort and School Streets, the Spencer Street home of the Catholic bishop. At 8:45, Lewers and Cooke, a large building supply house in the heart of downtown

6

BOMBS FALL

Honolulu, suffered several thousand dollars damage from flooding when an anti-aircraft shell went through the roof, exploded on the third floor, and broke the fire prevention sprinkler system. In upper Nuuanu Valley, a woman was killed; at Kamehameha Schools on Kapalama Heights, a wall was knocked down; at a saimin stand at the corner of Nuuanu and Kukui Streets, several widely known amateur boxers were killed and others injured. Four Pearl Harbor workers answering a radio summons to report on the job were killed when their automobile was hit on Judd Street. At 9:30 A.M., a projectile exploded near the driveway of the governor's residence, at Beretania near Richards Street, sending splinters whistling through the shrubbery and across the street to kill a pedestrian. Later, after Governor Joseph B. Poindexter had gone to his office at Iolani Palace in downtown Honolulu, a shell burst in the corner of the grounds there. The Honolulu fire department answered 39 calls during the day. Three companies rushed to Hickam Field, where all military fire-fighting apparatus had been put out of action. Three Honolulu firemen were killed and seven injured while fighting disastrous blazes in the airfield's barracks and ordnance buildings. Dispatch of these men to Hickam handicapped the department in responding to calls which began to pour in from Honolulans. Fire damage to civilian property, resulting mostly from three fires in the McCully district of Honolulu, totaled in a few hours more than half the loss for the entire year. The three major fires caused $158,000 damage to a block of stores and dwellings occupied by 31 families at King and McCully Streets, $40,000 to several classrooms and the library of Lunalilo School on Pumehana Street, and several thousand dollars damage to three small houses at Hauoli and Algaroba Streets. First aid personnel were forced out of the school building and had to treat 18 casualties under coconut trees. It was generally believed at the time that the three McCully fires were caused by incendiary bombs; many persons even reported seeing such bombs fall. But Honolulu fire department officials reached the conclusion that no incendiaries were used in the raid. Evidence indicated that a projectile started the first blaze, sparks from which probably caused the other two. This contention is strengthened by the fact that the Lunalilo roof did not burst into flame until half an hour after the McCully Street fire was reported. Though most of the other fires in Honolulu on December 7 were comparatively minor, a few were spectacular. Particularly so was a blaze in the industrial district of Iwilei where a large gas tank flared for two and a half hours in the morning and then broke out in flames again at night.

DECEMBER 7

7

T h e Waipahu and Ewa sugar plantations, next to Pearl Harbor, and the town o f Wahiawa, adjoining Schofield Barracks, saw even more action than did Honolulu. At Waipahu, machine gun bullets, shrapnel, and shells started two cane fires, riddled the sugar mill, hit the plantation hospital in four places, went through the roof o f the company store, exploding in an electric supply warehouse, and narrowly missed many houses. I n nearly all o f the fields o f tall cane, many o f which concealed terrified women and children, shells buried themselves—dozens o f them in some concentrated areas—blasting holes in the ground the size o f barrels and flattening cane for several square yards. At Ewa, after b o m b i n g the near-by Marine airfield, enemy planes machine-gunned the plantation's main street, the mill and power plant and some 30 houses, and started two cane fires. At Wahiawa, low-flying planes strafed stores and cars, wounding several people. Patients overflowed from Dr. Merton H . M a c k ' s small private hospital into Red Cross headquarters in the rear o f the Wahiawa fire station. An enemy plane crash in a pineapple field near the town did little damage, but another started a fire which destroyed five small houses before the blaze could be brought under control by a handful o f firemen and a B o y Scout bucket brigade. Bodies o f the four crewmen o f the downed aircraft were buried in the Wahiawa cemetery. At Aiea, between Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, the plantation's fire department fought a house fire and two cane fires, one o f which was caused by the crash o f an enemy plane. Waialua and the north shore were quiet, although at about 1 0 : 0 0 A.M. soldiers from the 21st Infantry searched houses at Mokuleia for reported parachutists. Windward Oahu and the Waianae area suffered no civilian damage, despite reports o f bombing and machine-gunning. O f O a h u ' s civilian population, at least 57 are known to have been killed, nearly 50 required hospitalization, and about 230 were less seriously injured. An undetermined number later died o f injuries, and a few casualties were not listed in available records. Private property valued at $500,000 was destroyed. M o s t o f the civilian casualties occurred in Honolulu, but at Waipahu two persons were killed and 37 injured; at Ewa seven civilians were injured; at Wahiawa three were killed and nine injured. Waialua plantation hospital received two patients, both o f whom had been shot by bullets from enemy planes near Schofield Barracks. Islanders believed at first that all damage was caused by J a p a n e s e b o m b s , but it has been definitely established that American anti-aircraft action caused almost all the injuries and damage in civilian areas, es-

8

BOMBS FALL

pecially in Honolulu itself. Most civilian casualties in the city resulted from flying splinters from anti-aircraft projectiles, fragments of pavement or other objects thrown by explosions, or merely from concussion. A representative of the board of water supply examined 40 impact areas in Honolulu—25 where strong explosions occurred with heavy damage to buildings or injury to individuals, seven where explosions caused slight damage, and eight where unexploded projectiles merely made holes several feet deep in the ground. Though blast damage from explosions was very severe in any room receiving a direct hit, the second or third wall away from the explosion's epicenter was usually undamaged. Projectile splinters often did not pass entirely through a wooden wall only a few feet from an explosion. No civilians were strafed except in the vicinity of military installations: in Damon Tract near Hickam Field and in the areas near Pearl Harbor and Schofield Barracks. Japanese planes reserved their bombs for predetermined military targets, but a few airmen who failed to reach their objectives may have dropped their bombs indiscriminately. Much of the damage in Honolulu was done late in the morning, after all enemy planes must have left for their carriers. Neither the Army nor the Navy ever made an official announcement concerning the cause of civilian damage, but at least two Army officers testified that it had been due to Navy anti-aircraft shells. The first of these officers was the department ordnance officer, who told the Army board investigating the Pearl Harbor attack that on the afternoon of December 7 he organized a bomb squad of three civilian ammunition technicians and checked on every incident in Honolulu. He testified: We found what these things were. They were not Japanese; they were not Army ammunition . . . They were anti-aircraft ammunition of another service, sir, whose time fuses had failed to function in the air. This particular type of ammunition had a base fuse with a tracer which would function on impact, and it was those items which led to the belief that the Japanese had bombed the city.

The commander of the coast artillery in Hawaii on December 7 told the Army board a similar story: A great deal of it [the ammunition] was defective, and "duds." Unfortunately, the "duds" detonated on contact with the ground. They were not really "duds," so far as contact with any material object was concerned. However, they did not burst in the air. They burst all over town. They burst all over De Russy, where I was. I saw them burst, two of them, up in the crater on Diamond Head, knocking out one of my mortars. That 5-inch ammunition was falling all over the island. A great many people thought they were Japanese bombs, but only one bomb hit the town of Honolulu, and I think that was an accident. All the rest of them were Navy 5-inch shells. . . . I went out and dug up the fragments and looked at the markings on them. I know they were Navy shells; and so does the Navy.

DECEMBER 7

9

to Islanders distant from the scenes of terror and destruction. Remote explosions were muffled. The drone of planes was not unusual. The dark smoke from Pearl Harbor mingled with low-lying clouds. At 17 seconds past 8:04 A.M., KGMB interrupted a concert program to recall all Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel to duty. This order was repeated at 8:15 and 8:30, and police and firemen were called at 8:32. At 8:40 came the first reference to actual enemy attack: "A sporadic air attack has been made on Oahu . . . Enemy airplanes have been shot down . . . The rising sun has been sighted on the wingtips!" The word "sporadic" misled many listeners, who confused it with the common Army term "simulated." Simulated attacks were no new thing to maneuver-conscious Oahu residents, and they assumed this was just another Army and Navy exercise. Some telephoned radio stations to ask for details, to the harassment of announcers who were trying to convince listeners of the peril of the morning's events. "This is no maneuver," one announcer shouted into the microphone. "This is the real McCoy!" Announcements became more urgent. By noon, each Honolulu station had broadcast a dozen times the order recalling all service personnel; they summoned doctors, nurses, and volunteer aides, civilian workers of the Army and Navy, and employees of various firms. Trucks and motorcycles were called to first aid stations. Every few minutes, radios barked orders and warnings: R E A L I Z A T I O N OF THE ATTACK CAME SLOWLY

The United States Army Intelligence has ordered that all civilians stay off the streets. D o not use your telephone. The island is under enemy attack. Do not use your telephone. Stay off the streets. Keep calm. Keep your radio turned on for further news. Get your car off the street. Drive it on the lawn if necessary, just so you get it off the street. Fill water buckets and tubs with water, to be ready for a possible fire. Attach garden hoses. Prepare to take care of any emergency. Keep tuned to your radio for details of a blackout which will be announced later. Here is a warning to all people through the Territory of Hawaii and especially on the island of Oahu. In the event of an air raid, stay under cover. Many of the wounded have been hurt by falling shrapnel from anti-aircraft guns. If an air raid should begin, do not go out of doors. Stay under cover. You may be seriously injured or instantly killed by shrapnel falling from anti-aircraft shells.

Governor Poindexter spoke over KGU proclaiming a state of emergency. Then, at 11:41 A.M., the Army ordered the Honolulu commercial broadcasting stations off the air so that their beams could not be used to guide enemy planes. The ominous silence which resulted, even more nerve-shattering than the announcements, led nearly everyone on Oahu to twist radio

10

B O M B S FALL

dials in search of more information. They heard the police radio ordering patrolmen to investigate a steady stream of alarming reports. Thereafter, for days, many radio sets on Oahu were never turned off. Until commercial stations resumed their regular schedules a week later, residents kept their sets tuned to the police radio, except when it advised them to turn to the commercial stations for special announcements. K G U and K G M B returned to the air nine times that fateful Sunday for periods varying from 45 seconds to five minutes. A broadcast of major significance was the announcement at 4:25 P.M. that the Islands had been placed under martial law and that the office of Military Governor of Hawaii had been assumed by Major General Walter C. Short, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. General Short's statement was repeated twice in English and, for the benefit of aliens, once in Japanese. Later, blackout orders were announced over the air: Please turn out your lights . . . Hawaii is observing a complete blackout. Turn out your lights. This means the whole Territory. Turn out your lights and do not turn them on for any purpose whatsoever. Turn off your lights and keep them off.

The final December 7 broadcast, at 8:52 P.M., ordered the employees of all retail firms doing business with the Army Engineers to report for duty immediately. Islanders sat in their homes in the eerie dark, straining their ears for the expected return of enemy planes. At 7:14 P.M., they heard the police radio broadcast: "Pearl Harbor is being bombed again." They heard firing and saw tracer bullets, falling planes, and the resultant fires. Not until long afterward did they learn of the tragic error which had occurred when tense anti-aircraft gunners at Pearl Harbor were alerted by the roar of planes overhead. Although Pearl Harbor had been informed that some Enterprise planes which had been searching for Japanese carriers would land at Ford Island, the arrivals were not recognized on their approach. As the commanding officer of Ford Island testified later, "Somebody let fly and I never saw so many bullets in the air in my life and never expect to . . . all tracer bullets at night." Four of the six planes coming in for a landing were shot down. One fell on Palm Lodge, a residential hotel on the Pearl Harbor peninsula, killing the pilot and starting a fire which destroyed the building. Few Islanders went to bed that night. Some, fully clothed, dozed fitfully. Outdoors there was silence, broken only occasionally by the rumble of a vehicle on official business, the shot of a gun in the hands of a nervous sentry, the "Halt! Who goes there?" which Islanders were to hear often in the ensuing months. Shortly before midnight, the moon began to rise, and a vivid lunar rainbow, the old Hawaiian omen of victory, arched over the dark city.

1. Pearl Harbor's "battleship row" in flames, December 7, 1941, as Japan's surprise attack plunges the United States into W o r l d W a r II.

2. Bombed, strafed, torpedoed, and machine-gunned by enemy planes, America's powerful ships go down in an inferno of fire and smoke.

3. At the height of attack, two big battleships, the West Virginia and the Arizona, are down, and the Tennessee is heavily damaged.

4.

Blown in two, the Arizona

sinks with 900 men in her hold.

5. Strafed and pummeled by torpedo planes while attempting a gallant sortie, the sinking Nevada is beached to prevent blocking the channel.

6. Her fuel tanks ruptured by bomb hits, the Shaw explodes and sinks.

7. Shambles of splintered wood and twisted metal were all that remained of the Cassin and Dowries in Drydock No. 1. Hit by a fragmentation bomb, the Pennsylvania (rear) suffered heavy personnel losses.

8. Enemy fighters dive-bombed and machine-gunned Wheeler Field, setting fire to hangars housing the fastest pursuit planes in the world.

9. An oil tank explodes while wrecked bombers smoulder at Ford Island.

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10. Incendiaries and explosives wrecked big Army hangars at Hickam.

11. Rows of P-40s crumpled as dive bombers swooped down on Wheeler.

12. Strafers killed occupants and left Army tent barracks in flames.

13. A "near-miss" at Hickam Field damaged the new barracks building.

14. One of 29 enemy planes which failed to return to their carriers.

15. From midget submarine grounded near Bellows Field, the lone survivor swam ashore and became only prisoner of war of the attack.

16. Crude propaganda leaflet found in enemy plane shot down over Oahu.

17. Chart found in captured Jap submarine is now believed to show the projected rather than actual track of submarine in Pearl Harbor.

18. One of Honolulu's worst fires occurred at King and McCully Streets.

19. Volunteer and regular firemen fought the McCully Street blaze which burned stores and made homeless 31 families, mostly alien Japanese.

20. Dazed civilians survey splinter and blast damage to their home.

21. Fire causing $40,000 damage to Lunalilo School classrooms and library was probably started by sparks from the McCully Street fire.

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22. Shrapnel from an exploding projectile which landed in the street made holes in the stucco wall of a house at Lewers St. and Kuhio Ave.

23.

Blast-damaged cars had glass shattered and tires blown off.

;

24. Injured civilians were given treatment at first aid stations.

25. At the morgue civilian dead waited identification by friends.

26. Some Pearl Harbor dead were laid to final rest in N u u a n u Valley.

27. Civilians, fearing an early return of the enemy, hastily built covered bomb shelters in the backyard, of any available materials.

28. Air raid trenches began to crisscross public and private lawns.

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29. Glass windows and doors of downtown buildings were taped to prevent shattering, and armed sentries were placed on 24-hour guard.

30. Sand-filled sugar sacks barricaded the telephone company entrance.

31. Civilians lined up to get cards as gas rationing became necessary.

32. Fearing food shortages for their families as much as they feared bombs, housewives rushed to grocery stores the morning after the attack.

FIGURE II.

BATTLE DAMAGE AT PEARL HARBOR, DECEMBER 7, 1941 (Adapted from official U. S. Navy chart)

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CHAPTER

TWO

H a w a i i S p r i n g s to A c t i o n HARDLY HAD THE FIRST BOMB dropped on Pearl Harbor when hasty telephone calls to Honolulu officials set the well-planned civilian defense machinery in motion. The police switchboard officer was so skeptical of the first reports that he called the Pearl City police station by radio for verification. Assured that it was no hoax, he issued an alarm calling all police officers, police reserves, men with special badges, and even those on pension and retirement. They were desperately needed. Throughout the day, both true and erroneous reports in unprecedented volume swamped ten men in a dispatch room usually staffed by three. First of the volunteer agencies to get into action was the medical and ambulance service of the Major Disaster Council. (This council was an official organization of the City and County of Honolulu, formed in June, 1941, as the outgrowth of several years of increasing concern over the possibility of wartime bombardment.) By 8:30 A.M., the service had established its office and ordered litter frames installed in trucks which had been volunteered as emergency ambulances. By 9:05 A.M., doctors and nurses were on their way to Tripler General Hospital at Fort Shafter in response to an Army request; by 9:15, eight first aid stations had reported in readiness, and five minutes later 45 truck-ambulances were speeding to Hickam. The response of Honolulu surgeons to a call from Tripler was immediate and en masse, for, by a coincidence, many of them were assembled at the Mabel L. Smyth auditorium to hear Dr. John J . Moorhead, a visiting authority on wound surgery. He had barely started his third lecture with the scriptural quotation, "Be ye also ready, for in the hour that ye know not, the Son of Man cometh," when the door was thrown open and a doctor announced from the rear of the hall that surgeons were wanted at Tripler immediately. Dr. Moorhead and his entire audience answered the call. 29

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First aid stations kept the phone at council headquarters busy as they reported on duty. As the morning wore on, calls for more doctors, more nurses, and more ambulances were relayed by radio and telephone from hospitals, bombed areas, and first aid stations. The response was prompt; nearly all the doctors and nurses on Oahu were soon on duty and scores of trucks were carrying the wounded and supplies. Most of the injured men from Hickam Field and many other areas were taken to hospitals by these improvised ambulances. About 10 of the first aid stations treated war casualties, Palama being the busiest with about 30 patients, several of whom were in serious condition. The City-County Emergency Hospital received 104 patients between 8:36 A.M. and 8:17 P.M., and The Queen's Hospital emergency unit, 53Many attack victims were brought in dead or dying. About 40 of the more critically injured were hospitalized at Queen's, which, filled to capacity, hastily sent 100 of its 339 patients home to make room for the wounded. Leahi Home likewise discharged 105 of its 480 patients to provide beds for any further emergency. The Major Disaster Council had distributed two shipments of medical supplies to first aid stations before the war. A third allotment, which was still unpacked at the time of the attack, was distributed to hospitals and first aid stations by a hundred volunteers. Surgical instruments were sent to Tripler; the Red Cross rushed 17,000 surgical dressings to Navy hospitals and a similar number to Tripler; the City-County Emergency Hospital loaned sulfa drugs to the armed forces. Unfortunately, the council's supply of narcotics, stored in a safety deposit vault in compliance with federal laws, could not be obtained until December 8. The Chamber of Commerce-sponsored blood bank, which had been closed a few weeks before the attack after operating on a demonstration basis for four months, sprang into action. It sent 75 flasks of plasma to Tripler, 45 to the naval hospital, and 80 to The Queen's Hospital, exhausting its total supply within six hours. By mid-morning, calls for new blood donors were broadcast, and the Chamber of Commerce staff telephoned every previous donor. Convalescent patients at The Queen's Hospital were among the first volunteers, and within a short time the response was overwhelming. At the Honolulu morgue, relatives and friends identified mangled civilian victims. In some cases, when all members of a family were killed or wounded in the same explosion, bodies were not identified for several days. Most Army doctors rushed to the scenes of the bombings to provide field care for the wounded soldiers before sending them to Tripler. There, civilian doctors and nurses, Army nurses, and volunteer helpers

HAWAII SPRINGS TO ACTION

31

performed most of the operating-room and ward duties. Appalling shortages and tremendous confusion arose as the seriously wounded arrived at Tripler in a steady stream until early afternoon. The entrance stairs to the hospital became spattered with blood. Not until late afternoon were sufficient supplies obtained from the Major Disaster Council, the Red Cross, civilian doctors' offices, and from the Army itself, whose ample stocks were kept under lock and key and were delayed by red tape. Until then, doctors doing major surgery borrowed scissors back and forth from one table to another; they ran out of operating gowns and worked in pajamas and underwear; they tied rags about their faces as masks; and for two or three hours they had to operate without gloves. Some Honolulu doctors were extremely critical of the Army's lack of preparation. Others felt that confusion and shortages, which might have occurred anywhere in such an emergency, were augmented by the unfamiliarity of civilian doctors with Army procedures. One Honolulu doctor who was in the Tripler operating room before 9:30 A.M. described his experiences as follows: The operating rooms were on the second floor and they had one common entrance, and the passage-way and connecting halls quickly became cluttered with the seriously injured, and there was no place to put them except on the floor. There was no place to segregate the patients who needed surgery immediately from those who first needed treatment for shock or from those who were beyond hope of mortal help. There was an inadequate supply of materials available for treating shock, there were not enough instruments and suture material, and sterile supplies were soon exhausted. Patients were brought directly to surgery without having their clothing removed and without having had any preliminary cleaning up of their wounds. Thus it became necessary for surgical teams to waste much of their valuable time doing the work that should have been done by orderlies and nurses. Much of the transporting of patients from where they had been deposited on the floor on stretchers to the operating table had to be done by the surgeons, and this was a large factor in contributing to their near exhaustion by the time evening arrived. . . . The officers of the regular Army, who on our arrival were already attending the wounded, were gradually replaced at the operating tables as the civilian doctors arrived. They took up the equally important tasks of selecting cases for surgery, the evacuation of the wounded to, and their care in, the wards, arranging for X-rays, replacing supplies, and the multitudinous other duties for which their military training and familiarity with the hospital best suited them.

Most of the Navy casualties were treated at the Pearl Harbor hospital and on the hospital ship Solace. N o civilian physicians aided there, but Honolulu nurses gave many hours of volunteer service. Their aid was badly needed, as the wards were filled with critically burned men, each of whom might well have been attended by a full-time nurse. Kaneohe NAS sent 40 patients to the territorial hospital at Kaneohe. The plantation hospitals at Aiea, Ewa, and Waipahu received a total of more than 130 Navy casualties. Plantation women and Girl Scouts

32

BOMBS FALL

assisted the hospital staffs, especially at Aiea where the hospital's patients were nearly double the normal capacity. Most of these patients were removed to Navy hospitals within a few days. Army dead were buried in the cemetery at Schofield Barracks; the Navy buried 328 in its plot at Oahu Cemetery in Nuuanu Valley, 18 at Kaneohe Bay, and 204 in a new naval cemetery which it established at the time at Red Hill, near Aiea. many women and children rushed in automobiles from military posts to the comparative safety of Honolulu. Throughout the day and night, trucks and busses of the evacuation committee of the Major Disaster Council moved others from Army posts and from near-by civilian areas. Some evacuees moved in with friends, but about 4,000 were housed at Hemenway Hall at the University of Hawaii and at 10 public schools designated by the evacuation committee. At Waipahu, 100 were taken into private homes and 500 others crowded plantation clubhouses, the Hongwanji School, and the public schools. Twenty-one hundred volunteers, including many public health nurses, social workers, teachers, Red Cross aides, and recreation workers, assisted in the evacuation. While the medical and evacuation committees of the Major Disaster Council worked feverishly at their assigned missions, other committees of the council carried out prearranged plans which ranged from safeguarding public utilities to the evacuation of valuable works of art. All committees badly needed supplies: food, containers, office equipment, beds, mattresses and blankets, flashlights, blackout materials, and an unending list of other essential items. Although it was Sunday, and many employees were difficult to reach, warehouses and stores were opened in a short time to provide many of the needed supplies. Business firms released stocks without question, frequently merely on the basis of oral requests from persons whose official status was unknown to them, and without any apparent consideration as to whether or by whom payment was to be made. Because almost all delivery trucks were being used as ambulances, the Major Disaster Council transportation committee, aided by Boy Scouts, was kept busy picking up supplies. Within an hour after the first bombs fell, a Salvation Army mobile canteen was serving coffee and doughnuts at strategic points. Forty Red Cross motor corps members spent the day on hundreds of essential errands. They carried the wounded, helped with evacuations, delivered supplies, transported blood donors, drove stranded Navy men and civilian workers through the 10-mile melee of traffic to Pearl Harbor. EVEN BEFORE THE ATTACK WAS OVER,

HAWAII SPRINGS T O ACTION

33

The Red Cross canteen corps moved stoves and refrigerators and cases of supplies into a narrow hallway and alcove at Iolani Palace so that sandwiches and hot coffee could be served at noon to 300 workers, many of whom had rushed to their duties without breakfast. Honolulu school cafeterias served 10,000 meals December 7 and an equal number December 8, not only to the evacuees housed in the schools but to guards, first aid workers, and men who dug graves all night in the Nuuanu cemetery. Volunteers poured in everywhere—Army and Navy wives, resident civilians, tourists stranded in Hawaii. Members of the San Jose College and Willamette University football teams, in the Islands for postseason games, became volunteer policemen. (Some later joined the regular force; others worked for the Engineers for the duration.) In some places, work was even impeded by the avalanche of willing, but untrained, hands. The police department had offers of help during the day from about 1,000 volunteers; the fire department was deluged with offers from hundreds of would-be assistants; first aid stations and the Disaster Council headquarters on all islands were swamped with citizens wanting to help. Mobilization of a Territorial Guard was ordered about 10:00 A.M. Formation of such a body had been discussed ever since the National Guard was called to service in 1940, but there was some doubt whether the governor had the power to form one until he was given the authority by the legislature late in October, 1941. Now the University of Hawaii ROTC was called to duty, and its members became the nucleus of the new Hawaii Territorial Guard. Other youths, including many from high school ROTC units, were rapidly enlisted, and by nightfall, the guard numbered 35 officers and 370 men. Also summoned over the radio at about 11:00 A.M. were all American Legionnaires. Within an hour, 300 to 400 veterans of '98 and '18 had assembled at their clubhouse. One Legionnaire reported his early morning activities thus: Got out my Winchester rifle and 30 rounds of ammunition. Found to my dismay that I had forgotten how to load it. Started downtown, as I anticipated landing parties, parachutists and street rioting. Realized that I might be mistaken for a rioter or a guerilla myself, so went back home and got my old uniform out of the moth balls, on the theory that it would be helpful in reassuring some group of civilians, in case I should have to deal with any who were more excited and scared than I was myself. Couldn't find various items, and couldn't remember how to put on the insignia. Got mad and bawled out the members of the household. Was told to go on out and fight the Germans instead of the women folks at home. The dog spied my Sam Browne belt on the Ianai, and dragged it over into the guava bushes in the next lot to chew it at leisure. Recovered it and spanked the dog. Started downtown again and stopped in at the Legion to find out what was best to do. There were already about 75 of the comrades there and more arriving every few minutes.

34

BOMBS FALL

Some found that they were involved in the familiar Army maneuver of "hurry up and wait"; others found important work to do. Two truckloads of men were sent to police headquarters for assignment to various duties, and another group helped at fires near the Legion clubhouse. By 4:00 P.M. organization had been completed, with each man assigned to an eight-hour watch. Most of the veterans were assigned guard duty. One detachment answered SOS calls, cared for dud bombs, and, among other things, arrested an insane woman who was roaming the streets nude. Others helped the Engineers; some went to the waterfront. Even those who waited played a part, because, for more than a week, they provided an invaluable pool of trained men upon whom organizations could call day and night at an instant's notice for guards and assistants. Hawaii youths worked side by side with their elders in the emergency. Older Boy Scouts who had been trained in the Emergency Service Corps rescued people and furnishings at the McCully Street and Lunalilo School fires and helped fight the flames. They also served coffee and guarded the smoldering ruins. At Hickam Field, a 16-year-old patrol leader was slightly burned while helping to remove the wounded from a bombed barracks. Boy Scouts carried messages on bicycles, motorcycles, and on foot when telephone lines became clogged with calls. By 2:00 P.M. that hectic Sunday, Girl Scouts had established a canteen in the Central Union parish house to feed volunteers in that district. Other Girl Scouts worked at first aid stations and evacuation centers. At one school where evacuees were housed, six small Girl Scouts worked eight or nine hours a day, cooking, serving, washing dishes, scrubbing rooms and furniture, looking after babies, and running errands. In rural Oahu the well-planned civilian defense organization likewise moved into high gear immediately after the attack. By 8:30 A.M., hundreds of Provisional Police volunteers on Oahu plantations were handling traffic, directing residents to safer areas, and guarding utilities. They later confiscated explosives. Before noon, all Oahu plantations had sent large groups of workers, as well as bulldozers, tractors, cranes, and other heavy machinery, to military installations to start repair work. More than a million empty sugar bags were filled with sand for barricades around important buildings. Wahiawa defense headquarters sent out a call for trucks from the town and surrounding pineapple plantations, and soon long lines of trucks, from big flat-bottomed ones to small covered jalopies, were parked in solid ranks off the highway for blocks around. One after another, they were dispatched to Schofield to aid in moving the troops to the field. Wahiawa's soup kitchen served 600 workers during the day and night.

HAWAII SPRINGS TO ACTION

35

When coffee supplies ran low, fresh boiling water was poured over the old grounds twelve different times. THE M-DAY ACT, A FAR-REACHING MEASURE which had been passed by a special session of the territorial legislature barely two months before the attack, went into full effect at 11:15 A.M. when a defense period was proclaimed by Governor Poindexter over K G U . He was forced to cut his broadcast short because he was informed, erroneously, that Japanese planes were coming in on the beam. Immediately, he issued a defense act rule creating an Office of Civilian Defense* to exercise all the power conferred by the M-Day Act. Committees of the Major Disaster Council, already hard at work, were absorbed by the new OCD organization, and the M D C coordinator became the OCD director for Oahu. General Short visited the governor at 12:10 to ask for martial law. He told of the damage at Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field and his fears that the Japanese would attempt a landing the next morning, aided by local Japanese saboteurs. He assured the governor that martial law was "absolutely necessary" to implement the issuance of orders which the military could enforce. While the governor had wide powers under the M-Day Act, he could enforce them only through civil agencies, the facilities of which would have been inadequate in the face of invasion or uprisings. The governor was reluctant to relinquish control to the Army, but felt that conditions were so alarming that he must defer to the judgment of a military man. He promised the general an answer in an hour and placed a telephone call to President Roosevelt. The call came through at 12:40. Following instructions from the Navy censor already on the job, the operator asked the governor, "What are you going to talk to him about?" She refused to complete the connection until a superior finally told her it was all right to let the governor talk to the president. Secretary of the Territory Charles M . Hite, who listened in to all the governor's calls that day, noted in his diary: Operator most difficult to handle, persisted in cutting short the talk, kept interrupting. Gov. managed to inform President Japs had attacked and about fifty civilians killed. Badly needed food and planes. Roosevelt marvelous—said would send ships with food and planes already ordered. Gov. said Short had asked for martial law and he thought he should invoke it. President replied he approved. Gov. said main danger from local Japs.

When General Short returned, the diary continues: * The Hawaii Office of Civilian Defense was different from the federal office of the same name and also from the defense councils of the various states.

36

BOMBS FALL

He requested and urged Martial Law, saying for all he knew landing parties en route. . . . Said attack probably prelude to all out attack—said otherwise all government and business functions to continue as usual. Gov. said he would accede and asked Short how long in his opinion such status would continue. Short said he unable to say, but that if it developed this was a raid only and not the prelude to a landing, Martial Law could be lifted within a reasonably short time. Trouble was he didn't have complete reports, he himself in dark and could not afford take chances. Short obviously under great strain—Gov. calm and collected. Gov. signed Declaration. When Short left Gov. said never hated doing anything so much in all his life.

The governor assumed that the "reasonably short time" might be 30 days. It is probable that General Short himself did not at the time expect that martial law would continue for nearly three years. The governor and the general both issued proclamations which had been in an Army file as early as March, 1941. The governor's proclamation, in accordance with powers given him under the Organic Act, placed the territory under martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It went further, requesting the commanding general to "exercise the powers normally exercised by judicial officers"—a step the legality of which was to be debated for several years. The general's proclamation told the populace: The imminence of attack by the enemy and the possibility of invasion make necessary a stricter control of your actions than would be necessary or proper at other times. I shall therefore shortly publish ordinances governing the conduct of the people of the territory with respect to the showing of lights, circulation, meetings, censorship, possession of arms, ammunition, and explosives, the sale of intoxicating liquors, and other subjects.

The governor, in accordance with law, notified the president by radio that he had declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. President Roosevelt radioed his approval on December 9. (But the governor said nothing in his message about the Army assuming judicial functions, and copies of the controversial proclamations evidently were not sent to Washington until 1943. It is doubtful whether the president saw them, even then.) As soon as martial law was declared, Army Intelligence, assisted by the FBI and police, started immediate arrest of residents who were considered dangerous. Because one-third of the total population in the Islands was of Japanese ancestry, the matter of internal security in case of war with Japan had long been a matter of official concern. Cards already prepared with the names and addresses of Japanese suspects were divided among 13 squads of officers, and within three hours after the declaration of martial law, nearly every Oahu suspect was in custody at the Immigration Station. Similar arrests were made on the other islands. At noon the Japanese consulate in Honolulu was placed under guard. When breakfast had been served at about 8:30 A.M. at the consulate, the

HAWAII SPRINGS TO ACTION

37

consul-general and staff were still unaware of the attack. About 9:00 they became concerned over the noise, but the consul would not allow any of his staff to investigate. A newspaper reporter evidently brought the first news of the attack, but the consul-general insisted that the noise was merely maneuvers and remained unconvinced that bombing by Japanese planes had taken place. An FBI agent related: O n the morning of December 7 . . . about 10 or 11 o'clock, I found out that the J a p a n e s e consulate was not guarded. . . . I tried to find out who could properly take over that duty there and I could not find anybody who would d o it, s o I instructed the Chief of Police to place a guard around the consulate for the protection of the consul general and the members of his staff and the consular property. That was done about noon. When they arrived, the consul was burning his documents, which he had been doing for several days previously. H e was just walking out to play a g a m e of golf, and he had a document strapped to his leg which they found, but that document was of no importance.

Five burlap sacks of torn papers and an envelope of untorn papers were seized and turned over to Army and Navy authorities. The consul, finally convinced of the attack, gave his last newspaper interview in Hawaii just before the guards were posted, warning Japanese residents to be calm and law abiding. H U N D R E D S OF VOLUNTEERS WORKED steadily all day and through the

blacked-out night. Agencies commandeered additional office space, moved in office equipment, obtained additional telephones, and prepared for any eventuality. They blacked out windows and built light traps over door openings. They procured cots, blankets, sand buckets, axes, shovels, and fire extinguishers, and distributed steel helmets and gas masks to some personnel. The territorial government offices at Iolani Palace continued a beehive of activity all night. In the small senate chamber where OCD activities were centered, the hurriedly improvised blackout arrangements provided no ventilation, and workers were crowded at desks placed side by side in rows across the room. Loose telephone wires cluttered the floor. Across the hall, in the former throne room, weary workers napped on army cots. In the basement, the Red Cross canteen corps served food throughout the night. The Salvation Army stationed a worker on each side of the street near its divisional headquarters to invite every man who passed to have something to eat. Between 9:00 P.M. and midnight, 127 men were fed, most of them Pearl Harbor workers who had not eaten all day. Police damaged their cars in the darkness and could find no service stations open when they ran out of gas. They got little sleep and not enough food and had to find addresses in the dark.

38

B O M B S FALL

Red Cross motor corps women faced much the same problems. I n total blackout, supplies of the Red Cross production corps were packed and moved to private homes so that the centrally located Red Cross headquarters could be turned over to the motor corps, which set up a 24-hour service there. Nearly every block in the city was patrolled by air raid wardens, the ranks of the prewar group having been swollen by hundreds who had responded to radio appeals that morning. The youths of the Hawaii Territorial Guard stood lonely duty at 25 strategic locations through the long night, and Legionnaires guarded other points. The governor, the secretary of the territory, and the governor's private secretary snatched a short rest at Washington Place. Secretary Hite's diary noted: "Dinner in dark in pantry. Outside flares from PH plainly visible from lanai. During night machine guns on Punchbowl kept firing at planes." At evacuation centers, tense Army and Navy wives, most of them not knowing whether their husbands were alive or dead, tried to calm wailing babies. One of the few flaws in evacuation plans proved to be the lack of baby food of sufficient variety. A nurse at a plantation hospital crowded with civilian and service casualties wrote of the night of December 7: I t was a strange experience indeed working through long black hours with feeble assistance of a blue-covered flashlight which cast a weird shadow on the faces of the patients already unrecognizable by the charred flesh and violet purple coloring of Gentian violet. We spent the night stumbling up and down corridors, sneaking in doors to prevent the escape of dim light from the heat cradles, feeling for feeble pulsations in temples or wherever the flesh was intact. The only natural part of the strange night was the intermittent crying of babies in the nursery at times when they felt they were entitled to food regardless of bombings.

By the next day, martial law was well established and defense activities moved into high gear. The military governor's executive officer set up headquarters in Iolani Palace. The district commanders of troops on the other islands became deputies of the military governor. At noon, by direction of General Short, the chief justice of the territorial supreme court posted a notice closing the courts, which had functioned as usual in the morning. In accordance with plans made by the Army months before, a military judiciary was created to hear civilian cases. A telephone call came to Governor Poindexter from his immediate superior, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. I ekes. Hite recorded: Said gravely concerned over situation and wanted report, which he got, to be followed with details as they developed. Gov. said had declared Martial Law, which Ickes approved, saying had heard. Ickes then said he wanted to send a younger man down to take some of the burden off Poindexter's shoulders, but Gov. replied rather testily he didn't need.

HAWAII SPRINGS TO ACTION

39

Having completed the arrest of thosejapanese whom they considered most dangerous, the security agencies turned their attention to Caucasian suspects, and on December 8 picked up practically every German and Italian alien in Hawaii with the exception of the aged and infirm. By the end of the day, 482 persons were in custody on Oahu—370 Japanese, 98 Germans, and 14 Italians. Surveillance was established over several hundred persons on a second list, and some of these were picked up later. Legionnaires were called upon to form a dynamite detail to collect all explosives in the city. From 7:30 A.M. until nightfall, accompanied by a Japanese interpreter and a powder man from the Red Hill construction project, they made 250 separate calls. The hospitals continued their work of mercy. Each war casualty confined at Queen's was visited by the hospital's social service department, which was showered with requests: See whether other members of the family were killed or injured. Find out whether the house is still standing. Get in touch with relatives. Feed the dog. Notify employers. Suddenly imposed regulations caused confusion, delay, and repetition of work. For instance, at noon on December 8, a volunteer worker went to a cable office with an armful of messages from attack victims. After standing in line an hour with scores of other persons who were attempting to communicate with Mainland relatives and friends, the volunteer found that the messages were not prepared according to the new military requirements and had to be rewritten. Restaurant workers could not be abroad in the dark, so restaurants were unable to serve meals before 8:00 A.M. or after 5:00 P.M. This created a food problem for policemen, guards, and others who worked through the night, and for many defense workers who had no cooking facilities at rooming houses and could not get to restaurants when they were open. To help alleviate the food situation, the Red Cross canteen added hot soup, cocoa, cereal, and fruit juices to its menu on December 8, and a few days later started serving full dinners at noon and midnight for all workers in the capitol and city hall area. Early on the morning of December 8, the Salvation Army offered "coffee and a bite to eat" at its headquarters for all policemen and plainclothesmen on duty between 6:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. In addition, it planned blackout duty for its mobile canteen. Private individuals also helped. The police radio late on the evening of December 9 interspersed such broadcasts as the following with reports of blackout violations and suspicious characters: Addresses at 2460 Rooke Avenue, 1069 Ilima Drive, 133 Liliuokalani Avenue, 664 S. King Street, and Waialae and Kaimuki Avenue: thank you very much for your coffee, soup and sandwiches.

40

BOMBS FALL

Any car in Kaimuki, go to the end of Kaimuki catline as there is a hot pot of soup there to keep you warm.

School cafeterias served meals to first aid workers and others even after evacuees had left the schools. Within two days after the attack, the evacuation division moved all but 600 persons into private homes which had previously been listed with the division, and shortly thereafter other accommodations were found for the 600. Families which took in evacuees sometimes found themselves short of food because of a ruling that limited purchases to normal amounts. The Red Cross furnished supplies in emergency cases and within a few days evacuees were able to purchase food from commissaries and ships' stores to augment their hosts' supplies. Many of the evacuees returned to their own homes within two weeks after the attack, and most of them soon afterward went to the Mainland. I n response to a Red Cross appeal for women to help build up depleted supplies of rolled bandages, many volunteers appeared at hastily located centers early on December 8. Blood donors became too numerous to handle. Although only 253 persons had responded to the blood bank in all the months before the attack, now 400 and 500 a day clamored to give blood. The bank had been geared to taking two or three persons an hour; now it processed 50 donors an hour, ten hours a day, seven days a week. Short cuts consistent with safety were made. Equipment was improvised or borrowed from chemical laboratories of the University of Hawaii and industrial firms. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Pineapple Producers' Cooperative Association sterilized equipment and processed blood into plasma. An eye witness reported: Men and women waited in line for hours. Soldiers stood their guns with fixed bayonets in our surgery hallway and rolled up their sleeves and helped; sailors gave their few precious hours of liberty to wait their turn. Mothers asked strangers to hold small children and took their turns on the surgery tables. Civilian defense workers from Pearl Harbor and workers from Red Hill, red-eyed from long hours of welding, stopped by to donate before snatching a few hours rest. The whole crew and passengers from a Dutch ship came in a bodv to help their American allies, then hastened back to journey across a perilous sea. A crew of husky iron workers in their oily work clothes came en masse; whole crews from drydocks and inter-island ships. Dock workers and society folks waited in line to do their part. Sugar and pineapple plantation employees came direct from their work in the fields.

MOST FISHERMEN WHO HAD BEEN AT SEA for several days knew nothing of the Pearl Harbor attack. And, as a result of the suspension of commercial broadcasting, the neighbor islands knew little of what had happened at Oahu.

HAWAII SPRINGS TO ACTION

41

Some fishing sampans off Oahu and the other islands had been fired upon by both Japanese and American planes; and a man dead from a gunshot wound was found in a drifting rowboat off Fort Armstrong. Newspapers the morning of December 8 announced that all unidentified boats approaching Oahu would be fired upon. It was feared that they might be enemy craft or that the local fishing fleet, manned predominantly byjapanese aliens, might have had offshore rende2vous with ships from Japan. Incoming fishermen were, of course, unaware of the announcement. One fisherman who put in at Waianae Bay for the night of December 7 assumed that the darkness ashore was due to power failure. He was fired upon the following morning by an American plane as he rounded Barber's Point. On another boat in this vicinity, three men were killed and one was seriously injured. A third sampan in the area, after being fired at three times but not hit, was hailed by a Coast Guard vessel which then came alongside and threw aboard a package containing an American flag and instructions to raise it. The Coast Guard picked up some other fishermen and took them to Sand I sland for internment, leaving their sampan to drift ashore empty. Off the island of Hawaii on December 8 a Navy patrol plane fired on a sampan, setting it ablaze and burning all the crew, one seriously. On December 11 three Kohala emergency guards assigned to convoy a fishing sampan to Hilo had a narrow escape when shots from a Navy plane set the sampan afire, despite the fact that it was flying white flags in accordance with instructions. The guards and crew escaped injury only by diving overboard. After the plane departed they climbed back aboard and put out the fire. With a makeshift sail, they edged into a sheltered cove, where a gas tank exploded and threw them into the bay. Two other sampans with emergency guards aboard were fired on off Kona a few days later. I n all, at least six fishermen were killed. An undetermined number were treated at the first aid station at Kewalo Basin when they were brought ashore, and seven were treated at The Queen's Hospital where they were listed as "prisoners of war" and held under guard. (The War Department eventually paid for their medical care, but claims for damages were denied because they were aliens.) At Honolulu's sampan wharf at Kewalo Basin, many of the boats were decommissioned by the Engineers. Some were moved, with other small craft, into the Ala Wai, where they were improperly moored, and a heavy storm sank them a few days later. Some of the larger boats were taken over by the Army and Navy for patrol or landing craft use. I t was several weeks instead of the usual several days before mail and newspapers from Honolulu reached some of the more remote districts of

HAWAII SPRINGS TO ACTION

43

the neighbor islands. Their own lack of informational channels—only Hilo, Hawaii, had a daily newspaper and only Hilo and Lihue, Kauai, had broadcasting stations—contributed to their isolation. As a result, suspense and fear were probably even greater on neighbor islands than on Oahu. There was confusion; no one knew what to do; orders were contradictory; and invasion seemed certain. The first broadcasts from Honolulu, though meager in details, were sufficient to call defense workers into action. On Maui, an OCD meeting at 10:40 A.M. on December 7 received a request from the Army district commander for aid in watching for enemy planes and submarines. On Hawaii, the district commander was traveling between Kona and Kohala when the word was received. As he sped back to Hilo, he "found civilian guards at every crossroad and bridge, proud and diligent in their discharge of responsibility. Their arms consisted of war clubs, cane knives, and a miscellany of guns, some of which might well have been torn from museum walls. Their spirit was magnificent." The island of Hawaii had 3,800 of these guards on duty by midnight December 8, and the other islands had a total of several thousand also. On Kauai, some defense meetings were in session when the word of Pearl Harbor was received, and plans were put into effect immediately. On Molokai, American Legion members, war workers from the Mainland, and other volunteers were soon on duty as guards or in other posts. Many served for three days without relief or sufficient food. On Lanai, guards were also called to duty. On all islands, plantations furnished men and equipment for emergency military construction, sometimes on short notice. For instance, at 8:00 P.M., December 10, Olaa plantation was asked to send five trucks and a number of men to Morse Field for an indefinite period. By 10:30 P.M., the men had been selected, clothing packed, innumerable permits and passes obtained, and the trucks had been serviced and their lights painted for blackout work. As on Oahu, Boy Scouts played an important role. In the district of Kohala on the Big Island, and possibly in other areas, they constituted the only organized group at work except the regular and volunteer police. Near Hilo they went house to house in plantation camps to inform residents of the blackout, and the older boys stayed on the road to turn unauthorized cars homeward. On Molokai, Scouts started assembling 15 minutes after the order of mobilization. They patrolled the streets of Kaunakakai every night from 6:00 to 9:00 P.M. until the armed forces took over four months later. On Maui, 1,000 Scouts went on call by nightfall December 7, and remained at the disposal of the OCD constantly for three weeks.

44

BOMBS FALL

In some cases, neighbor island regulations were more stringent than those of Oahu. On Hawaii, civilian movements were confined to travel between home and work. No taxis and few private cars were allowed on the roads for several days and then their number was strictly limited. With the exception of church services, no unofficial meetings of more than 10 persons were allowed on Maui and Hawaii. A shortage of cash developed in Hilo. Plantations paid with checks, which aliens found impossible to cash. Aliens were ordered to go to Hilo to execute affidavits, but they were not allowed to drive cars and the few busses available could not carry them all. THE ISOLATED ISLAND OF NLIHAU, whose only communication with the outside world was a sampan which made weekly trips from Kauai, went its own way December 7 ignorant of the Pearl Harbor attack, although it was well aware of the strained relations in the Pacific. At Army request, Niihau Ranch had plowed furrows across thousands of acres where planes might land. The first indications of real trouble came about 2:00 P.M., December 7, when a Japanese plane made a crash landing in a rocky field. Hawila Kaleohano, a Hawaiian who lived near-by, disarmed the pilot as he climbed from the plane, and took his papers. He then sent for the only two Japanese residents of the island—Ishimatsu Shintani, an alien, and Yoshio Harada, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry—to act as interpreters. The pilot reluctantly admitted that he had participated in bombing Oahu. The populace kept the pilot under guard in anticipation of the Monday arrival of the sampan from Kauai. When the sampan failed to arrive by Friday night—Army orders prevented it from sailing—the islanders built a fire, a prearranged signal of trouble. That afternoon, the pilot had sent Shintani with about $200 to bribe Kaleohano to burn the papers. Kaleohano had refused and warned Shintani that he would get into trouble. Shintani replied that the pilot would kill him if he did not do as he was told. Frightened, he left Kaleohano and went into hiding. Meanwhile, the pilot persuaded Harada to obtain firearms, and the two started a reign of terror which continued through Friday night. First, the two terrorists searched Kaleohano's house for the aviator's papers, but without success. Then in the village of Puuwai they set up two machine guns from the wrecked plane and threatened to kill everybody unless Kaleohano were produced. They captured a native named Kaahakila Kalimahuluhulu, tied his hands behind his back, and sent him with a message to Mrs. Harada. He started off dutifully, then doubled

HAWAII SPRINGS T O ACTION

45

back and persuaded 51-year-old Benehakaka Kanahele to join him in sneaking up behind the two Japanese and stealing the machine gun ammunition. At dusk, most of the natives fled the village, pausing only at the church to pray for guidance. The women and children spent the night in caves, in the kiawe thickets, and on distant beaches; the men watched the Japanese from afar. About 3:00 A.M. the Japanese captured Mrs. Kalimahuluhulu and sent her to look for her husband, but she, too, escaped to the koa forest. They then found an elderly woman, too old to go with the others, and threatened to kill her if she would not divulge the whereabouts of Kaleohano. She replied that only God had power over life and death, and calmly went on reading her Bible, whereupon the exasperated Japanese turned to other matters. After unsuccessfully searching Kaleohano's house again for the papers, they burned it down and then burned the plane. Early Saturday morning, the Japanese captured Kanahele and his wife. They then sent Kanahele off to look for Kaleohano, but since all the earlier messengers and searchers had failed to return, Mrs. Kanahele was held as hostage. Worried about his wife's safety, Kanahele returned after a perfunctory search. The aviator then threatened to kill the couple as an example. Kanahele appealed to Harada to take the aviator's gun, but Harada, evidently as afraid of the airman as Shintani had been, said that if he tried he would be killed. So Kanahele seized an opportunity when the aviator's back was turned and made the attempt himself. The aviator worked his arm free, whereupon Kanahele's wife grabbed it. Harada pulled her away, and the aviator shot Kanahele three times. "Then," Kanahele explained later, "I got mad." In spite of his wounds, the burly Hawaiian grabbed the hapless aviator by the leg and neck, as he was accustomed to pick up sheep, and dashed his brains out against a stone wall. One version of the story has Kanahele's wife administering the coup de grace by pounding the aviator's head with a boulder, but an official report states that she was busy fighting Harada at the time. When Harada managed to pull free from the enraged woman, he turned his gun on himself and fired, dying a few hours later. Meanwhile, Kaleohano and four other Niihau men had been rowing through rough seas toward Kauai. They had left about midnight Friday, and reached Kauai 16 hours later. An Army lieutenant (of Japanese ancestry), 13 enlisted men, and three civilians joined them on the return trip to Niihau on a lighthouse tender. They reached the landing at 7:30 A.M. Sunday and marched 14 miles to Puuwai where they learned that the "Battle of Niihau" had ended on the previous day. The military obtained the flier's papers, which Kaleohano had so carefully hidden,

46

BOMBS FALL

arrested Shintani and Mrs. Harada, and took Kanahele to the Waimea Hospital on Kauai, where he remained until December 31. No formal charges were brought against Shintani and Mrs. Harada. The latter was released after a short time and went to live on Kauai. Shintani, who was interned on the Mainland during the war, is again on Niihau with his Hawaiian wife. Nine months after the incident, two generals went to Niihau to present the American Legion heroism medal to Kanahele and Kaleohano. I n August, 1945, the Army brought Kanahele to Fort Shafter in Honolulu where he was presented the Purple Heart and Medal for Merit. Such award of the Purple Heart to a civilian was possible only with special authorization from Washington. There was a formal ceremony, and the Army band played "They Couldn't Take Niihau Nohow." I n May, 1946, there was another ceremony when Kaleohano was awarded the Medal of Freedom. The Niihau incident gave support to those who contended that the Japanese in Hawaii could not be trusted. Others regarded the episode as a special situation, wherein ignorance played a large part. It appears certain that both Shintani and Harada acted more in fear of the aviator than in loyalty to Japan. One Army investigation of the matter emphasized the Japanese tendency to follow authority, which would explain Shintani's and Harada's acceptance of the aviator's leadership. A Navy investigator commented: These facts indicate a strong possibility that other Japanese residents of the Territory of Hawaii, and Americans of Japanese descent, who previously have shown no antiAmerican tendencies and are apparently loyal to the United States, may give valuable aid to Japanese invaders in cases where the tide of battle is in favor of Japan and where it appears to the residents that control of the district may shift from the United States to Japan.

CHAPTER

THREE

Rumors Rampant P E R H A P S B E C A U S E T H E ALL T O O REAL Pearl Harbor attack itself was at first so unbelievable, I slanders were ready to accept an extraordinary crop of rumors which began to spring up within a few hours after the bombing. And the large number of Japanese in the Islands was also a major factor in lending credibility to seeds of doubt planted by rumor-mongers. Most of the rumors were based on actual events which were misinterpreted in the excitement of the times. During the first week of the war, while commercial radio stations were off the air, many people who listened to the police radio accepted as facts the exaggerated reports which policemen were instructed to check. "Suspicious characters" and "prowlers" proved to be block wardens checking on lights; "burglars" breaking into a furniture store were the U. S. Engineers in search of mattresses for emergency use; "a man on an electric pole signaling with red, green and white lights" was a Hawaiian Electric Co. repairman; and Japanese "holding a meeting" at a store in Wailuku, Maui, were merely purchasing groceries. Some of the rumors even had official credence early in the war. For example, on what seemed to be accurate information from the Army, the Honolulu Advertiser used its biggest headlines December 8 to report "Saboteurs Land Here." And Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, after a brief visit in Hawaii right after the Pearl Harbor attack, told a press conference that Hawaii had been subjected to "the most effective fifth column work that has come out of this war except in Norway." Typical of the many rumors rampant were these:

That Japanese spies had murdered a Navy officer who discovered their prewar activities while he was on a hike. An officer disappeared on a hike in July, 1941, and his body was never found. Similar rumors surrounded the disappearance of another Navy 47

48

BOMBS FAIL

officer in February, 1944. In neither case did searches by Navy, police, and the American Graves Registration Service uncover evidence to support any finding other than accidental death. That Japanese in Hawaii were informed in advance of the raid. One story was that a Japanese victim of the raid told a Queens Hospital nurse that she knew the attack was coming. Another was that Japanese came from other islands to Honolulu to assist in sabotage. Both the injured woman and the prospective saboteurs were supposed to have been informed that the raid was to take place on December 8, and they did not take into consideration the fact that December 7 in Hawaii was December 8, Japanese time. Still another story concerned Japanese maids who failed to go to work on the morning of December 7 because they knew the raid was coming. No fact whatever seems to support the first two stories. It is true that many maids and other workers failed to reach their places of employment on December 7, but probably because the raid caught them at home or on the way. Army, Navy, and FBI investigators all reached the conclusion that no one in Hawaii knew of the raid in advance. Rather, says the Army: The attack was such a surprise to the Japanese residents themselves that they were stunned and incoherent for a few days. . . . There was no individual act, even fanatical, to indicate the slightest suspicion of any plans to carry out further acts of confusion or sabotage.

An Army report, after expressing doubt that the Japanese consul in Honolulu had advance information concerning the attack, commented: If such were the case, with the highest ranking and most confidential agent of the Japanese government in Hawaii, stories of maids, garbage collectors, small merchants and laborers being aware of this fact can be dismissed as idle talk and the product of fantastic imagination on the part of individuals who knew nothing of all the facts involved.

These conclusions were strengthened when postwar investigations in Japan indicated that no Japanese officials in the United States— including ambassadors, embassy officials, and the consul in Honolulu —knew of the raid in advance and that the only informed persons in Japan were those connected with the Japanese Navy. That newspaper advertisements carried veiled warnings and instructions to Japanese in Hawaii. Most frequently cited was the advertisement of the Hawaii Importing Company, which appeared in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin on December 3 and in the Honolulu Advertiser on December 4. Interpretations were innumerable: its odd illustration was a cloud of smoke from flaming ships, or, turned upside down, it "looked like something"; its heading,

49

R U M O R S RAMPANT

"Fashions by the Yard," referred to the Navy Yard; its odd names of silks each referred to a ship. Another advertisement cited appeared in the StarBulletin January 30 and the Advertiser February 1. Featuring the PackardBell radio, it had an illustration of ships being attacked by planes; one of the dive bombers had a "rising sun" on its wing; one of the destroyers was numbered 211, which meant that Pearl Harbor would be bombed again on February 11. A full-page notice in the Hilo Tribune-Herald reportedly calling a mass meeting of alien Japanese for the afternoon of December 7, a furniture advertisement which supposedly appeared in the Star-Bulletin about the middle of December, the classified advertising columns, and radio announcements provided fertile grounds for rumors. Naval Intelligence, after careful study of the Hawaii Importing Company advertisement, dropped its suspicions with the discovery that a similar ad had appeared each December for several years previously. On December 2, 1940, the same illustration, same heading, and many of the same items had appeared. The gravely questioned names of silk turned out to be bona fide materials. The Star-Bulletin furniture advertisement and the Tribune-Herald fullpage ad existed only in imagination. A study of the several classified advertisements and radio announcements which reportedly carried information revealed nothing subversive. The Packard-Bell illustration was made on the Mainland many months before the outbreak of war. ACTIONS JO mit First Letter)

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RAIL TRANSPORTATION

A R M Y CARGOES

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MEDICAL & DRUG SUPPLIES ENGINEERING SUPPLIES BUILDING SUPPLIES

IMPORTATION

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EXECUTIVE SECTION

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DIRECTOR OF LAND TRANSPORTATION CONTROL

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GASOLINE RATIONING TIRE & TUBE RATIONING AUTO PARTS RATIONING PETROLEUM SUPPLIES

TERMINAL SUPERINTENDENTS

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FUELS (BULK) SUPPLIES

EXPORTATION DISTRIBUTION

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FIGURE V I I .

GOVERNMENT OF HAWAII UNDER MARTIAL LAW (Functional chart based on General Order 56, Section 3, January 26, 1942. Revised March 1, 1942)

170

GIRDED FOR ATTACK

expected o f the unemployed. Some information was given to newspapers or radio stations to be publicized as "orders," although no official covering orders were ever issued. Some offices were set up by orders, but were discontinued without them. Some general orders merely gave advice: residents were told how to behave in an air raid; they were assured that the vaccinations directed were safe and not likely to cause them much inconvenience. Other general orders dealt with such matters as minor governmental problems, one-way streets, clean-up week, and garbage disposal. O n Hawaii, every car was required to have at least one ash receiver, and sedans had to have one for both front and rear seats. I n lieu o f regular equipment, " a n empty can partially filled with sand" was deemed acceptable. Throwing o f cigar or cigarette stubs from cars was prohibited. A few general orders proved exceedingly annoying and seemed to have so little to do with winning the war that they were widely violated. Such were those requiring separate permits for each purchase o f many drugs and poisons c o m m o n in household or farm use. On Oahu a permit could be obtained only by personal application to the controller o f civilian medical supplies, whose Army duties much o f the time kept him away from his desk in the military governor's office. EXCEPT IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS and in matters having a direct bearing on the prosecution o f the war, Hawaii's territorial and county governments functioned almost as they did in peacetime. Early in the war, a drop in tax receipts was feared. Business prospects were doubtful, land taken over by the services was removed from the tax rolls, and property assessments were protested as values dropped, especially in the evacuation areas and in suburban localities not having public transportation. These financial worries were short-lived, however, for tax receipts soon skyrocketed. Elections took place at the customary time, and the legislature met in its usual biennial sessions in 1943 and 1945, although early in the war some consideration had been given to cancellation o f elections and legislative sessions and the maintenance o f status quo except as modified by military directives. The judiciary system, however, was severely affected by martial law. Constitutional guarantees o f civil liberties were brushed aside. Territorial courts were closed from December 8 to December 16, 1941, and then were opened only for certain civil cases. About a month later, they were allowed to function " a s agents o f the military governor" in holding nonjury trials o f certain matters which had been pending before December 7. Their activities were further extended in September, 1942, when certain jury trials were allowed. The general order warned

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that "this action is experimental in nature and the Military Governor reserves the right further to limit the jurisdiction of the courts or to close them entirely." A large number of civilian cases still were heard by the military court system. The Office of Civilian Defense functioned as a special department of the territorial government. It was manned almost entirely by volunteers at the outset of the war, but within ten days it started to build a fulltime paid staff. Until the end of January, territorial M-Day funds were used for the office, but then $17,800,000 in federal funds became available. Use of the federal money, which was administered by the territorial government and the Department of the Interior, was delayed until a representative of the department arrived in February. The island of Molokai, discouraged over the delay, conducted a drive for private funds early in 1942 to carry on its defense work. To the federal appropriation was added more than $1,000,000 turned over to the territorial government by the OMG from provost court fines and the sale of liquor permits. These funds proved more than sufficient, not only for the OCD, but for subsidies to the OMG, the public health service, public and private hospitals, and the police and fire departments. At the end of the war, nearly $2,000,000 remained unexpended. The OCD was set up with 17 divisions and subdivisions on Oahu to carry on three general phases of work: protective, medical, and informational. Organization on the other islands involved fewer divisions with wider responsibilities. There the OCD served also as the chief administrative agency of the military government and representative of numerous bureaus which had offices only in Honolulu. In February, 1942, the territorial OCD employed 3,013 persons, and the full-time staff was augmented by some 14,000 volunteers. In November, 1942, with danger of invasion no longer imminent, drastic cuts were made in OCD payrolls. Its construction projects were stopped, subsidies to other agencies were reduced or eliminated, and many paid full-time workers were replaced by volunteers, some of whom were only on call for emergencies. Meanwhile, the military governor's office had been organized with numerous sections to control such matters as food, liquor, labor, materials, supplies, and transportation. And the fundamental theory of the checks and balances of three separate branches of government—legislative, administrative, and judicial—was cast aside as Hawaii's military governor assumed control of all three. The Army contended that military control of the judiciary was needed so that the military governor "would be able to enforce

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his orders with speed and certainty, without interference from an independent judiciary with an unsympathetic view toward his actions. It was desirable that he should be able to instruct the courts as to methods and policies to be followed, and to change the court personnel if necessary in order to expedite and control the enforcement of his orders." The military judiciary which replaced the civil courts consisted of two types of bodies: a military commission, which tried cases where the punishment was more than a $5,000 fine and five years' imprisonment; and several provost courts, each with a single judge, which heard lesser offenses. One of the earliest general orders named a military commission made up of both Army officers and civilians. I n its first meeting, however, the civilian members questioned the legality of martial law and the authority of the military governor to appoint the commission. They were apprehensive of their personal liabilities should they function. The atmosphere of the meeting became quite tense. A few days later, a new general order appointed a new commission consisting entirely of Army officers. During the four years of war this commission tried only eight cases— three of murder and one each of attempted murder, manslaughter, espionage, robbery, and a sex offense. Two resulted in acquittals. The death sentence was imposed in one murder case but was later commuted to imprisonment. In a study of the trial by the United States Department of the Interior, it was asserted that while the prosecution was in the hands of a trained attorney, the defendant was represented by an officer who had no legal training. It also pointed out that the five officers of the commission were not lawyers and were not told the distinction between first and second degree murder although the evidence strongly suggested the lesser charge. During the first six months of the war, the three Honolulu provost courts disposed of nearly 19,000 cases. Trials were usually held on the same day as the arrest, a practice which gave no opportunity for careful preparation by either prosecution or defense. The "procedure of their own" developed by provost courts started with an oral statement of the charge by the prosecutor after he had examined the booking chart. After the defendant had made his plea, all witnesses stood in a semicircle before the judge and were each peremptorily questioned by him. When the judge felt that he had sufficient evidence, he rendered an immediate decision, imposed sentence, and proceeded to the next case. The defendant could make a statement on his own behalf, but his allotment of time was frequently limited. He had little opportunity to

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cross-examine witnesses. He could obtain a lawyer, although some judges indicated in open court that they did not desire attorneys to participate in the trials. Many lawyers felt they were helpless to assist their clients. The courts were instructed to be "guided by but not limited t o " penalties authorized by military and civil law. Stiff sentences were imposed, especially for such offenses as allowing light to escape from windows or doors, or being out after curfew. However, sentences were often reduced, early in the war by the court itself at a subsequent session. Later only the military governor's office could reduce a sentence. The usual penalty for drunkenness was $100 for the first offense, jail for repeated offenses. Persons holding currency in excess of the prescribed amount were sentenced to donate to a war fund or to buy war bonds. Such bonds were stamped "to be deposited with the territorial treasurer for the duration," or "not transferable and to be held for duration." A common sentence was an order to donate blood to the blood bank, a practice which was given official recognition in June, 1942, when the military governor authorized specific credit of one pint of blood in lieu of a $30 fine or 15 days in jail. In the first weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, Islanders were almost unanimous in their praise of martial law and the provost courts. At the Roberts Commission hearings in the month following Pearl Harbor, civic and business leaders expressed satisfaction with arrangements. The provost courts were pictured as administering swift, sure justice. In reporting the first provost court sessions, the Honolulu Advertiser was particularly emphatic in commenting on "the keen understanding of the presiding provost judge" and the manner in which the provost court was "showing Honolulans how justice can be dispensed without interruption by the technicalities of the civil courts." In an article for Collier's in March, 1942, Honolulu's Mayor Petrie asserted: "The military officers who serve as provost judges have won the confidence of the public by the sound common sense they apply to the law." It was not long, however, before lawyers and others were criticizing the provost courts on several counts: they were secret except in Honolulu; they furnished no copy of charges to the defendant; they convicted defendants of violating the "spirit" of a general order if the text was inadequate to cover the offense. Recognizing deficiencies in the courts, the military governor late in the summer of 1942 appointed a provost court commissioner to bring about a more orderly procedure and greater consistency among the courts on the various islands. Community criticism of the "blood" sentences led to their discontinuance in September, 1942. After objections from the United

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States Treasury Department, the military governor in January, 1943, prohibited provost court judges from sentencing a man to buy bonds which he could not cash. The military had also taken jurisdiction from the territorial juvenile court and it was not until January, 1944, that modifications were made in its procedures in cases involving minors. A survey of the detention home in 1943 showed juveniles were being held for such offenses as being out after curfew, showing a light, quitting a job, failing to register carrier pigeons, or trespassing on military or naval reservations. In some cases, juveniles had been sent to jail or prison. RISING CRITICISM OF THE MILITARY JUDICIARY SYSTEM was accompanied by questioning of the entire martial law procedure and of the need for its continuance after the original emergency had passed. The Republican party in 1942 was silent on the matter, but the Democratic territorial platform deplored unlawful searches and seizures, suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, arrest and detention of citizens without bail, and trial without jury in criminal cases. Meanwhile, Ingram M . Stainback had been appointed in the late summer of 1942 to succeed Governor Poindexter, whose second term had expired. It had become an open secret that Secretary of the Interior I ekes had disagreed with Governor Poindexter on martial law and felt that the Governor had not been aggressive enough in resisting the encroachments of the Army on civilian authority. He also resented not having been consulted more frequently. The new governor immediately appointed Garner Anthony, Hawaii's most vocal critic of martial law, as his attorney general. Then both men went to Washington in December, 1942, in an endeavor to force the revocation of martial law. General Emmons and his executive, Colonel Thomas H. Green, also went to the capital, and top officials of the Departments of War, Navy, Interior, and Justice participated in the conferences. Hawaii's newly elected delegate to Congress, J o s e p h R. Farrington, declared in his first post-election statement that continuance of military domination over civilians was not only "contrary to every tradition of America since the early days of this nation but, in fact, a positive detriment to the total war effort." News of the Washington conversations aroused mixed feelings in Honolulu. A Chamber of Commerce message to President Roosevelt urged continuance of martial law and praised General Emmons for his cooperation with civilian authorities. The commander of the American Legion also protested any change in martial law, although he did not have the unanimous support of his organization.

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The discussions led to an agreement under the terms of which the military governor returned 18 functions to civil authorities but maintained control of labor and of certain other matters. The civil courts were given jurisdiction over all violations of civil laws except in cases involving military personnel, but the provost courts continued to try civilians for violations of general orders. (The wording of the proclamations covering the much-debated privilege of the writ of habeas corpus later aroused legal questions as to whether the privilege had actually been restored. Governor Stainback himself did not expect the suspension to continue indefinitely.) Many general orders were replaced by equally strict defense act rules, but the latter were promulgated by the civil government and were enforced by civil rather than military courts. "Restoration Day" was observed March 10, 1943, at a ceremony held in the throne room of Iolani Palace which was attended by both houses of the legislature. Both the Office of Civilian Defense and the Office of the Military Governor were reorganized, several sections being transferred in toto from military to civilian direction. The Office of Civilian Defense continued thereafter to the end of the war with few major changes in organization but a gradual decrease in activity. By June, 1944, only 381 persons were on the payroll, a mere onetenth of the number employed two years earlier, but the roster of volunteers on part-time duty or on call for emergencies had increased to 29,816. Liquidation of the OCD was begun before the war ended and was completed by December, 1945. Buildings on public lands were turned over to the government. Some 85 buildings on private lands, including fire truck sheds, evacuation buildings, warden headquarters, and the like, were sold to the general public. The Office of the Military Governor continued to function without change until July 21, 1944, when its name was changed to the Office of Internal Security. General orders were few in number thereafter and were concerned only with strictly military matters. They were signed by the "Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas," with no further reference to the "military governor." Some observers saw significance in the fact that the change in nomenclature was made on the eve of the visit of President Roosevelt, who had never recognized or used the term "military governor." Indeed, the title had never been used officially by any civilian agencies, although it was in general use unofficially. The designation had actually been established long before the war, when the Army decided to call its executive in the Islands the "military governor" in case martial law were invoked, despite its "unwelcome

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sound in many an ear" and its previous use only to describe the military ruler of conquered territory. The Army explains: The term was not intended to indicate in any way that Hawaii was to be treated as occupied enemy territory. A new type of martial law would be instituted here, far stronger than any which had previously existed in the United States, and it was desired to give its administrator a title which would represent the strength and prestige of his position, and which would command the respect of the people.

In the territorial governor's proclamation calling upon the commanding general to establish martial law, the term did not appear, although the general announced that he had assumed "the Office of the Military Governor." Despite criticism of the term in the conferences leading to the partial restoration of civil rule early in 1943, the Army was not willing to drop it at the time. Opinion on the merits of martial law continued to be sharply divided, and Honolulu's two daily English language newspapers took opposing sides. Labor organizations grew increasingly critical, especially concerning the rigid controls on manpower. The Republican party platform in 1944, as in 1942, made no mention of martial law, but the Democratic territorial platform held: Hawaii is not a conquered nation but as a part of the United States is justly proud of its role in this war and is entitled to the kind of government prescribed by the constitution and laws of the Congress of the United States and that the imposition of a military government over this loyal American territory is contrary to every tradition of America from its very beginnings, is illegal and should end; that its termination will permit the military authorities and large numbers of service personnel to devote their efforts to the prosecution of the war, leaving to federal and territorial authorities the tasks of civil government.

Three months after the change in name to Office of Internal Security came the final change in Hawaii's wartime government. On October 24, 1944, martial law was terminated and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus restored. Hawaii was then designated a "military area" such as other strategic parts of the United States had been since early in the war. A series of security orders and special orders replaced general orders in matters concerning the civil population. But few or no changes were made in such matters as the 10:00 P.M. curfew, controls on the activities of enemy aliens, civilian conduct during air raids, entry to restricted areas, censorship, cargo and passenger control, and labor control. Thereafter all civilian violations of security orders or general orders were tried in the United States District Court. Despite the wide differences of opinion, arguments relative to the merits of martial law generally had remained on an academic level and had done little to impair cooperative relationships between military and civilians. When martial law was terminated, General Richardson deplored

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the impression that there had been a continuous controversy in the territory: I wish to emphasize that such was not the case and it is only fait to both civilian and military authorities that people of the mainland understand that fact. The differences were purely of legal conception and their discussion never descended into personalities or even strained relations. Solutions were sought in a judicial and friendly atmosphere.

His feeling was shared by many administrators of wartime agencies in Hawaii, who almost invariably felt that residents accepted the innumerable restrictions with good grace and with remarkably few attempts at evasion. Criticism had been voiced more frequently and vociferously than praise, partly in an endeavor to remedy undesirable situations and partly as an outlet for pent-up emotions. EARLY IN THE WAR, COURT PROCEEDINGS were launched to test the constitutionality of martial law as it was exercised in Hawaii. Martial law has been characterized, even by courts, as being "incapable of exact definition." In its previous application in the United States, the chief executives of states had called upon the military to aid temporarily in handling riots, labor disputes, catastrophies, or other unusual situations with which civil authorities could not cope. Never before had martial law attained such proportions, however. And never had it pervaded community life to such an extent, nor remained in effect over such a long period as in Hawaii. It became military government, rather than martial law, and many authorities consider military government as being lawful only in conquered foreign territory. Martial law had been instituted in Hawaii under Section 67 of the Organic Act of the territory, which provided that the governor of the territory may in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Territory, or any part thereof, under martial law until communication can be had with the president and his decision thereon made known.

While there was little question of the legality of martial law on December 7, critics felt that the curtailment of the civil courts and the establishment of a military judiciary had not been authorized. And soon they felt that "imminent danger" of rebellion or invasion had passed and that martial law of any kind was no longer legal. In endeavors to obtain writs of habeas corpus and test the validity of martial law, five significant test cases were filed, the first only two months after martial law went into effect. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed on behalf of Hans Zimmerman, on the grounds that he was illegally interned and was

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about to be removed to the Mainland. Judge Delbert E. Metzger, his courtroom crowded with armed soldiers, denied the writ, saying that he believed it should be issued but he was forbidden to do so by order of the military governor. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco upheld Judge Metzger in his opinion that he could not issue the writ, but declared that the suspension was valid. An appeal to the United States Supreme Court was prevented when Zimmerman was transferred to the Mainland and released. More than a year passed before the next test, which brought the attention of the entire nation to the situation in Hawaii. By this time attorneys felt that the partial restoration of civil rights gave them firmer ground upon which to base a suit. In July, 1943, a petition was filed for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Walter Glockner and Edwin R. Seifert, also interned without charges. Judge Metzger held that a writ could be legally issued for two reasons: first, because in his opinion the governor's proclamation of February 8, 1943, restored the right of the court to issue such writs as of March 10; and, second, because suspension of the writ was no longer required for public safety. Therefore, he issued a writ directing the military governor, Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, to produce the men in court at 10:00 A.M., August 18. United States marshals attempting to serve the writ were denied access to the general at both Fort Shafter and the military governor's office. A deputy who had been stationed so as to catch the general when he emerged, later told the court under oath: I stood on the veranda, leaning up against the post, the mauha post, which is near the steps going down and looking outside. I had only been there a few seconds when an M. P. came out and grabbed me by the shoulders and said to me, "You have to get up there," pointing to mauka on the veranda, where there was no outlet or anything, just a railing all the way down. I said, "See here! You cannot handle me like that. I am a United States deputy marshal. If I can't wait on the veranda I will get out in the yard." He said, "I have orders to tell you to get up there, so get up there." So while he was holding onto me I happened to turn around and look and General Richardson and two other officers ran down the steps. I thought, "Well, I will go over this banister and break this fellow's hold." So I leaped over the banister and he let go of his left hand, putting it in between my collar and held on to me by my right arm and dragging me up against that railing. General Richardson and the two officers got in the car and the car drove off. . . . In the meantime these papers was starting to blow all over the yard. I had to go pick them up.

Two days later the general accepted service of the court order. Numerous messages were exchanged between Washington and Honolulu, and General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, instructed General Richardson in no event to produce the prisoners. When the time limit within which

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the Army was to produce the prisoners passed, the judge found the general in contempt of court and levied a fine of $5,000. Scarcely 10 minutes earlier, however, in his office across King Street from the federal court, General Richardson had issued "General Order No. 31." This sweeping measure prohibited all courts in the territory from even accepting applications for writs of habeas corpus. It forbade any interference by the civil government with military personnel in the performance of their duties other than arrest of those committing traffic violations. And it ordered any proceedings of habeas corpus cases to cease at once, specifically mentioning Judge Metzger and the Glockner and Seifert case. A $5,000 fine or five years' imprisonment faced any judge or other official who "directly or indirectly, expressly or impliedly, in any manner, shape or form, shall violate, attempt to violate, evade or attempt to evade, or aid, assist or abet, in any violation" of the orders. Judge Metzger received so many threatening telephone calls that he wrote the general: "I request that while you have your hand in at general orders you enunciate an order forbidding your officers to further annoy me by threats and abuse." The general complied, and the judge, in thanking him, remarked that the threats had ceased. A special assistant to the United States Attorney General and a legal representative of the War Department hastened to Honolulu. Many suggestions were made. Finally, in a compromise, the general rescinded his order, and the judge reduced the general's fine to $100 but refused to set aside the contempt charge. General Richardson requested that the President of the United States remit the fine, not only for the sake of his prestige in the community but to confirm his mission of enforcing martial law. For, he stated, "As long as Judge Metzger remains on the bench here, I foresee further difficulty in the enforcement of martial law in this area." A few months later, the president granted the general a full pardon and remitted the fine. The two original defendants in the habeas corpus case—Glockner and Seifert—were almost forgotten in the battle between general and judge. In the midst of all the flurry, they were sent to the Mainland and released; this, despite the fact that the general had previously declared that they were "dangerous to the public peace and safety of the United States." Their release prevented the case from being carried to the supreme court for a final ruling. Judge Metzger's decision seemed to restore the privilege of the writ, but the War Department and the military governor's office insisted that it was not restored. Varying the lengthy and weighty editorials and news accounts of the proceedings, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin commented:

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This Battle of Habeas Corpus is getting us groggy. A lot of folks hereabouts, including some pretty fair lawyers, are more than a little puzzled now as to where martial law begins and where it ends, and where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus begins, if anywhere, and where it ends, if at all.

I n March, 1944, a writ of habeas corpus was asked for Lloyd C. Duncan. This was a test of the provost court system rather than of the internment procedures, as Duncan had been convicted in provost court of assault and battery on two sentries. I n the three earlier cases the men concerned had brought suit for having been interned without formal charges or trial. Duncan's attorneys held that military courts were not authorized to try purely civilian cases if the civil courts were able to function. Again attorneys came from Washington to represent the Departments of War and Justice. Admiral Nimitz and General Richardson were called to testify as to the possibility of "imminent invasion." J u d g e Metzger found that they "agreed that an invasion by enemy troops is now practically impossible." The writ was issued and the prisoner discharged in a decision which held that martial law did not lawfully exist in Hawaii, that the Office of the Military Governor was without lawful creation, and that the provost court possessed no lawful authority to try the petitioner. The government gave notice of appeal. Meanwhile, an even clearer test of martial law was pending in the petition for a writ of habeas corpus for Harry E. White. This case involved no possible suspicion of interference with the war effort, as White was a stockbroker who had been sentenced by a provost court to five years' imprisonment for embezzlement of a client's funds. White claimed that the military court had no jurisdiction over his case, and that he had been denied his constitutional rights to a trial by jury, to present witnesses in his favor, and to a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense. J u d g e J . Frank McLaughlin, who heard this case in district court, agreed in theory with J u d g e Metzger who had presided in the other cases. He held that White's provost court trial and the entire provost court system were unconstitutional and void, on the ground that the territorial governor, not having judicial powers, could not delegate such powers to the commanding general. As soon as the Duncan and White cases had been decided in Honolulu, a writ was sought by Fred Spurlock, who had been confined in Oahu Prison since early in 1942. He had been involved in a street fight even before the war started, but had not been tried until after December 7, when he was hailed before a provost court and placed on probation.

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For another affray in March, 1942, he was arrested on a charge of assault and battery with a deadly weapon, and his probation was revoked in a 10-minute trial in which he was not allowed to testify, produce witnesses, or employ counsel. J u d g e McLaughlin granted the writ, saying: There has never been any reason why the Territorial courts could not have operated efficiently within their own jurisdiction while the military confined the sphere of their activities to things which had real military rather than artificial significance. . . . Spurlock did not even receive a fair military trial. Surely the Constitution assures him that much.

The case was carried to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals and there the opinion of the Honolulu court was reversed. Again steps were taken to appeal to the United States Supreme Court; but again the Army prevented further action by remitting the unexpired portion of the sentence and freeing the man. Spurlock's counsel protested that it was "simply one more in a long list of similar cases which have been mooted, or attempted to be mooted, prior to submission of the issues" to the supreme court. While the Spurlock appeal was pending, in late 1944, the constitutionality of the M-Day Law was questioned in a territorial circuit court. For six months, the legality of nearly every civilian defense activity in Hawaii hung in the balance, but the court ruled that the law was properly enacted by the legislature under the police powers delegated to it by Congress. The Duncan and White cases meanwhile were making their way to higher judicial arenas. They were appealed together to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco, which reversed the judgment of the district court and ordered the writ quashed in three opinions on November 1, 1944. The defense had, by then, received support from both the Bar Association of Hawaii and the American Civil Liberties Union. The cases were appealed to the United States Supreme Court in Washington where they were heard in December, 1945, following the end of the war. Here, at last, was an opportunity for the highest court of the land to voice a final word on the constitutionality of Hawaii's long disputed martial law. In a six-to-two decision rendered on February 25, 1946, the supreme court held that martial law as exercised in Hawaii far surpassed the authority granted in the Hawaiian Organic Act. The opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Black, said: W e believe that when Congress passed the Hawaiian Organic Act and authorized the establishment of "martial law" it had in mind and did not wish to exceed the boundaries between military and civilian power, in which our people have always believed, which responsible military and executive officers had heeded, and which had become part of our political philosophy and institutions prior to the time Congress passed the

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Organic Act. The phrase "martial law" as employed in that Act, therefore, while intended to authorize the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the defense of the islands against actual or threatened rebellion or invasion, was not intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals. . . .

In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Murphy was more critical of the Army. He found that military trials such as those of White and Duncan were not only unjustified by the provisions of the Organic Act, but were forbidden by the first ten amendments to the Constitution. "Indeed, the unconstitutionality of the usurpation of civil power by the military is so great in this instance as to warrant this Court's complete and outright repudiation of the action." He continued: Abhorrence of military rule is ingrained in our form of government. Those who founded this nation knew full well that the arbitrary power of conviction and punishment for pretended offenses is the hallmark of despotism. . . . And in framing the Bill of Rights of the federal Constitution they were careful to make sure that the power to punish would rest primarily with the civil authorities at all times. . . . The Bill of Rights disappeared by military fiat rather than by military necessity.

He discussed, in turn, various arguments presented in defense of the military courts, making these replies and comments: The threat of invasion was real.—"It does not follow . . . that the military was free under the Constitution to close the civil courts or to strip them of their criminal jurisdiction. . . . From time immemorial despots have used real or imagined threats to the public welfare as an excuse for needlessly abrogating human rights. . . . Civil court procedure is slow.—"Experience has demonstrated that such time is well spent. It is the only method we have of insuring the protection of constitutional rights and of guarding against oppression. . . . We would be false to our trust if we allowed the time it takes to give effect to constitutional rights to be used as the very reason for taking away those rights. . . ." The issuance of military orders relating to civilians required that the military have at its disposal some sort of tribunal to enforce those regulations.—"This is the ultimate and most vicious of the arguments used to justify military trials. It assumes without proof that civil courts are incompetent and are prone to free those who are plainly guilty. . . ." The civil courts had no jurisdiction over violations of military orders.—"The federal court in Hawaii was open at all times in issue and was capable of exercising" such jurisdiction. Enforcement of military orders in civil courts would subject the military to "all sorts of influences, political and otherwise, as happened in the cases on the east coast in both Philadelphia and Boston."—"Merely a military criticism of the proposition that in this nation the military is subordinate to the civil authority . . . " Attendance of war workers as jurors would interrupt war work.—"Too unmetitorious to warrant serious or lengthy discussion. War workers could easily have been excused from jury duty by military order if necessary." Use of Japanese on juries might constitute a problem.—"The implication apparently is that persons of Japanese descent, including those of American background and training, are of such doubtful loyalty as a group as to constitute a menace justifying the denial of the procedural rights of all accused persons in Hawaii. It is also implied that persons of Japanese descent are unfit for jury duty in Hawaii and that the problems arising when they serve on juries are so great as to warrant dispensing with the entire jury system in Hawaii if the military so desires. The lack of any factual or logical basis for such implications is clear. It is a known fact that there have been no recorded acts of sabotage, espionage or fifth column activities by persons of Japanese descent in

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Hawaii either on or subsequent to December 7, 1941. There was thus no security reason for excluding them from juries, even making the false assumption that it was impossible to separate the loyal from the disloyal. And if there were problems arising from the use of racially mixed juries, elimination of all jury trials was hardly a reasonable or sensible answer to those problems. Especially deplorable, however, is this use of the iniquitous doctrine of racism to justify the imposition of military trials. Racism has no place whatever in our civilization. The Constitution as well as the conscience of mankind disclaims its use for any purpose, military or otherwise. It can only result, as it does in this instance, in striking down individual rights and in aggravating rather than solving the problems toward which it is directed. It renders impotent the ideal of the dignity of the human personality, destroying something of what is noble in our way of life. . . ."

The decision technically freed all provost court prisoners still in custody. But, as the last person to be sentenced under martial law had commenced serving his term some two years before, the decision affected only a few prisoners, all convicted of felonies and serving long terms. Charges against these were immediately filed in territorial courts and they remained in confinement. But more important, the decision threw doubt on the validity of all 37,000 civilian cases which had been tried in provost courts during the war. Conceivably, claims could have run to several million dollars, but few cases were filed before October 24, 1946, the deadline under the statute of limitations. Of those few, none had been decided by June, 1950. Some were dismissed, and others were still pending. Echoes of the fight over martial law in Hawaii may be heard for years to come. Some people have called Hawaii's wartime government the only true fascism which has ever existed on American soil. They see in its tenacity, long after the original emergency had passed, a warning to the American people never to let a dictatorial government gain a foothold which may be hard to dislodge. Moreover, they see in a complete return of civil rights, rather than in a progressively totalitarian regime, a tribute to the American form of government and way of life.

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IV

TWELVE

Headquarters F o r Attack HAWAII BECAME A SPRINGBOARD for the Pacific offensive as soon as the United States recovered from the initial shock of the Pearl Harbor attack. The Islands played a major role throughout the Pacific war as a training, staging and supply, and casualty evacuation area for all branches of the armed forces. In addition to top military commands, Hawaii housed branch offices of several federal agencies which worked closely with the services and the Pacific headquarters of construction firms doing government work in Hawaii and forward areas. The mission of the prewar Army organization on Oahu, known as the Hawaiian Department, was simply to protect the Islands and serve as a defensive outpost for the Pacific Coast. During the war, there were four major changes in the name of the command and the scope of its duties and geographical jurisdiction. The first change came in August, 1943, when Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, was established on Oahu. In July, 1944, it became the Central Pacific Base Command, and a month later, United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas. The jurisdiction then included everything in the Pacific except the Alaskan Command, the Southeast Pacific Command (a belt off Central and South America), and the Southwest Pacific Area (Australia, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines). O n j u l y 1, 1945, POA was succeeded by the United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific. Since American war plans at first put emphasis on the war in the Atlantic, Hawaii was considered a defensive rather than an offensive outpost. With the establishment of the Central Pacific Area, however, Hawaii became an important staging area, and the ebb and flow of service units suggested impending large-scale engagements westward. There had been a few hit-and-run strikes before this. As early as New Year's Day, 1942, Army photographic planes flew from Oahu to Mid185

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way, and then over Wake, which had been captured only a week before by Japan. This 4,000-mile flight was the first of countless photographic reconnaissance missions which provided data for invasion maps. The services' own lithograph presses rolled 24 hours a day, and their overflow of work kept the Honolulu Lithograph Company busy. About 100,000 maps were produced locally for the Gilbert and Marshall operations, and 1,700,000 for the Marianas invasion. The first offensive strike from Hawaii was a Navy carrier raid on January 31, 1942, against the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. Although this was only a token raid compared with later actions, it did much to boost morale in Hawaii as well as on the Mainland. In February, 1942, the prewar Hawaiian Air Forces became the Army's 7th Air Force, its first assignment the defense of Hawaii. One of the early bombing missions from Hawaii was an attempt made on June 6, 1942, against Japanese-held Wake, but the Liberators were unable to locate the island. Major General Clarence Tinker, the 7th Air Force commanding officer, was lost in one of the planes, though in the absence of any announcement of the Wake flight, it was publicly assumed that he had been killed in the Midway Battle. A second try at bombing Wake later in the month was more successful. In July, 1942, the Nautilus returned from the first submarine trip to Japanese home waters. On August 8, 1942, two submarines left Pearl Harbor with 222 marines who for weeks previously had been trained intensively in making night landings from submarines and handling rubber boats in the surf. These were Carlson's Raiders, whose swift attack on Makin in the Gilberts late in August thrilled a country eager for action. The process of rolling back the Japanese got well under way late in 1942 with the seizure of Guadalcanal. Troops of the 25th Division, some Navy vessels, and supplies staged from Oahu. Preparation for the first full-scale offensive in the Central Pacific started August 6, 1943, when Army and Navy authorities in the Islands were directed to form and train forces for an amphibious operation against the Ellice, Gilbert, and Nauru Islands. Admiral Ernest J . King, Commander of the United States Fleet, came to Hawaii for important conferences with Admirals Nimitz and Halsey. Final training took place in October in Hawaii and the New Hebrides, and by November 12 all forces were under way for the bloody battles of Tarawa and Makin. During the consolidation of the Gilberts, preparation for the Marshalls campaign began, and late in January, 1944, attack forces left Hawaii for the seizure of Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and near-by atolls. Hardly were these offensives launched than attention was turned to action against

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Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in the Marianas, which were seized in the summer of 1944. Even before the Marianas campaign was under way, planning started for the 1945 attacks. In May, 1944, headquarters in Hawaii received plans from Washington which called for use of 696,000 troops in an offensive which would carry almost straight westward across the Pacific, taking Formosa and the shores of China. Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner arrived in Hawaii J u n e 21, 1944, to organize the 10th Army for this offensive. The next month President Franklin D. Roosevelt visited Hawaii for a conference of great importance. Although his visit was not announced until he had returned to the Mainland, almost everyone on Oahu knew he was here and most saw him as he sped from one end of the island to another in a whirlwind inspection tour. His party moved only with heavy guards, and often between lines of armed soldiers. As the latter were sometimes at their posts for several hours before the visitors passed, near-by residents had ample time to gather in order to catch a glimpse of the celebrities as they whizzed by behind the sputtering motorcycles of MP's. When the president went to Schofield to review the 7th Infantry Division and around the island to inspect the jungle training centers, more than 75 miles of highways and lanes were under guard. The normally heavy traffic on Kalakaua Avenue through Kapiolani Park was rerouted away from his quarters at the Navy-occupied private estate which has since become the Queen's Surf. The visit gave birth to more rumors than had been heard in Hawaii since the day of the blitz: that Roosevelt was coming by plane, by submarine, on a new carrier (he actually came by cruiser); that Churchill, Stilwell, Chiang Kai-shek, Stalin, and Queen Wilhelmina were in the party; that a Navy alert at 2:30 A.M. the day of his arrival was caused by the approach of a Japanese submarine with a peace offer; that Tojo had committed suicide and Hitler was dead; that Roosevelt was coming to announce the end of the war at Pearl Harbor, where it had begun. The conference was called actually to map the Formosa and China offensive. Present were General Douglas MacArthur, Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Admirals William D. Leahy, Chester W. Nimitz, William F. Halsey, Vice Admiral Robert T. Ghormley, J u d g e Samuel I. Rosenman (the president's counsel), Elmer Davis (head of the OWI), and military and naval aides to the president. General MacArthur strenuously opposed by-passing the Philippines. He and others also pointed to the difficulty of obtaining the 696,000 troops necessary for the Formosa and China operation. Shortly after the

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president returned to Washington, orders canceled the proposed offensive. Buckner's 10th Army was scheduled instead for Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and MacArthur was ordered to proceed with the American return to the Philippines. In January, 1945, Admiral Nimitz, as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas, moved his headquarters from Pearl Harbor to Guam in order to be nearer the fields of action. Two months earlier, the Army's 7th Air Force had moved to Saipan, leaving the 7th Fighter Wing at Hickam to take over Hawaii's aerial defenses. Later, the 7th Air Force moved onward to Okinawa. Early in January, 1945, when the invasion force set out for Iwo Jima and Okinawa, preparations were already going ahead rapidly on the proposed attack on the Japanese homeland, and months of work had been completed when the end of the war came. Twelve Army divisions, three Marine divisions, and innumerable smaller units—all trained in Hawaii—participated in these Pacific battles. First to fight were the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions, units which had been stationed in the Islands for many years and had constituted almost the entire Army defensive strength in Hawaii when invasion seemed possible in the weeks after December 7. They acquired many Island men as replacements and reinforcements. The 25th left early in December, 1942, to help clear the Japanese from Guadalcanal jungle positions. After two years and two campaigns in the Solomons, it went on to the Philippines where it participated in the campaign to liberate Luzon. The 24th left for the Southwest Pacific at the end of July, 1943, to fight in the Hollandia section of New Guinea and at Leyte and Mindoro in the Philippines. Also trained in Hawaii for action in the South and Southwest Pacific were the 6th, 33rd, 38th, and 40th Infantry Divisions. The 40th was stationed on various islands for 21 months; the 33rd spent nearly a year on Kauai. The 6th and the 38th were in Hawaii for a shorter training period. Six Hawaii-trained divisions, supported by non-divisional regiments and other combat groups, became the main striking force of the Central Pacific campaign. The 27th Division, which had been so warmly received as defense troops on Kauai in March, 1942, participated in the assault on the Gilbert Islands, returned to Schofield, and then joined in the Marianas attack. The Chamber of Commerce on Kauai asked that it be returned from the Marianas to Kauai for rehabilitation, but it was needed for the Okinawa invasion. The 7th Infantry Division had been at Schofield for a period long before the war. In fact, one of its regiments, formed at Schofield in 1916,

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had received its flag from ex-Queen Liliuokalani and was known as "The Queen's Own Regiment." It first saw action in World War II at Attu and then came to Hawaii. It participated in the Kwajalein invasion, and then returned to Schofield before fighting for 110 days on Leyte. From there it went on to take part in the Okinawa invasion. Between March and July of 1944, three divisions arrived in Hawaii: the 77th (Statue of Liberty Division), which saw its first action on the beaches of Guam and later fought in the Philippines and Okinawa; the 81st, which was on Oahu briefly before distinguishing itself in the battles of Anguar and Peleliu; and the 96th, which went from Schofield to Palau, the Philippines, and Okinawa. Sixteen thousand troops of the 98th, with the familiar Indianhead insignia, garrisoned the Islands for 16 months while training for the planned invasion of Japan and ultimately served there as an occupation force. Nine engineer units were trained in Hawaii for the Gilbert and Marshall invasions; 20 for the Marianas, and 155 for Okinawa. Large numbers of Seabees also were trained in Hawaii. On newly taken western islands, these groups flocked ashore immediately behind invasion troops, to work under fire in building bridges, roads, bomb shelters, hospitals, and airstrips, and later to transform the islands into jumping-off places for assaults still farther westward. Servicemen stationed on Oahu dubbed the island "The Rock" and griped in usual GI fashion over crowded conditions and lack of hospitality, but the 2nd and 5th Marines on Hawaii and the 4th Marines on Maui found friendliness in the small towns near their camps. The 2nd Division had fought at Guadalcanal and Tarawa before it was sent to Waimea, Hawaii, in December, 1943, for five months of training for the Saipan-Tinian campaign. The 4th Marines had seen the Islands briefly in January, 1944, on their way to the Marshalls. Some of the command ships stopped at Pearl Harbor for conferences, but the main fleet anchored off Maui and Kauai. The division returned to Maui late in February after the Kwajalein and Roi-Namur battles. Its rear echelon was already there, but Camp Maui was still half finished and ankle-deep in mud when the battleweary troops arrived. I n May, they joined the 2nd Marines at Malaaea Bay in a detailed Marianas campaign rehearsal which involved a mock invasion of the island of Kahoolawe, with live ammunition used for naval gunfire and aircraft support. At Pearl Harbor, where they sailed just before departure for the Marianas, casualties were suffered in the explosion of LST's at West Loch. But men and materials were hastily replaced, and the division left the Islands without major delay.

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After the capture of the Marianas, the 2nd remained there and trained for operations against Okinawa. The 4th Division, minus 6,600 casualties, returned to Maui in August. At the same time, the 5th Marine Division was beginning to arrive on the island of Hawaii at the camp vacated by the 2nd Marines. The 4th and 5th trained at their separate camps and then joined for ship-to-shore rehearsals at Malaaea and Kahoolawe before shoving off for I wo Jima. There, about half their numbers were casualties, but the remaining 19,000 were back in the Islands for reinforcements by April, 1945. A petition from 1,191 Maui residents had asked that the 4th Division "make Maui its wartime home or base for future operations." The territorial senate passed resolutions welcoming the 4th and 5th back to Hawaii. When the 4th Division disembarked on Maui, school classes were dismissed, children and adults lined the streets to cheer, and Red Cross and U S O workers, WAVEs, and Girl Scouts passed cups of ice cream to the marines. On Hawaii, the beach where the 5th Division landed and the adjoining park were gay with colored lights, a Marine band and Hawaiian troupes entertained on a hastily erected stage, and doughnuts and coffee were free to all. Training was then resumed in earnest, for the divisions were scheduled for the invasion of the beaches of Japan. The war's end meant home for the 4th and occupation duty in Japan for the 5th. HAWAII SERVED AS AN INVALUABLE TRAINING GROUND for the am-

phibious and jungle warfare which characterized the Pacific fighting. Well removed from the combat zone, yet 2,000 miles nearer the battle front than the Mainland, there was sufficient area and enough equipment in the Islands to handle many thousands of troops and to embark them for large-scale operations. More important, some of the varied climates and terrains in Hawaii were like those of the target areas. The need for jungle training demonstrated by the Guadalcanal fighting had resulted in the opening of the Ranger Combat Training School at Schofield in December, 1942. Plans for an island-hopping campaign led six months later to the organization of the Waianae Amphibious Training Center on leeward Oahu. Training facilities continued to be opened and expanded to take advantage of the lessons each new campaign taught. Servicemen were taught to swim or to improve their technique at beaches and swimming pools throughout the Islands. After they could do 50 yards, they were eligible for amphibious training, in which they practiced going down landing nets with full pack and weapons, wrestling their equipment through surf, and digging in when they hit the

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beach. Then, at jungle training schools, they learned a new post-landing type of warfare. Honolulu's world-famed Bishop Museum had long done research on conditions of Pacific life, and in January, 1943, the museum and the Honolulu Academy of Arts sponsored a "castaway exhibit." This showed how "service castaways"—troops isolated in jungles, sailors forced to take to small boats, and fliers landing at sea or on isolated islands—could make the best of their situation. The Army and Navy became interested, and after the exhibit two volunteers from the museum devoted many hours a week to filling requests of unit commanders for lectures and demonstrations, which were attended by 12,000 men. On Kauai, the University of Hawaii agricultural extension service helped arrange a similar exhibit which was viewed by several thousand troops. In December, 1943, the two Bishop Museum men were hired by the Army. They not only continued some classes at the museum, but also gave a short course in jungle living at the Unit Jungle Training Center on Windward Oahu, set up a mobile unit to visit troops in remote spots, and established a branch at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides. They showed troops how to improvise shelter, clothing, and tools, how to recognize and use fish, plants, and animals of medicinal and food value, and how to avoid harmful plant and animal life. Of all the Navy training in the Islands, probably the most rigid and intense was that at the Combat Demolition Training Station at Kamaole, Maui, where, after the autumn of 1943, 40 teams of 100 men each were prepared for reconnaissance and demolition work. Such demolition workers were first organized by the U. S. Navy for the battle of Sicily in the summer of 1943. Their use in the Pacific came too late for Tarawa, where their operations might have lessened the high casuality rate. They played a small part at Kwajalein and RoiNamur, did their first important work against Japan at Eniwetok, and figured prominently in the Marianas, I wo Jima, and Okinawa campaigns. Before invasions, these reconnaissance teams surveyed and demolished undersea obstructions, operating from landing craft and rubber boats, usually under cover of darkness. The teams went as close to the obstructions as possible in rubber boats and then slipped into the water, each man usually carrying 40 pounds of explosives slung over his shoulders in two sacks. They quickly dismantled enemy booby traps and set their own time explosives to clear away mines, spikes, and other devices of the Japanese defense. Although the silhouettes of their boats were clear enough against the horizon for the swimmers to find them, they attracted comparatively little enemy fire.

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It seemed as though every soldier and sailor in the Islands spent all his time training at some sort of school or in some sort of maneuvers. Ships passing through Hawaii had extensive gunnery practice and other drills. Some local soldiers and also some Mainlanders sent here immediately after induction received basic training in the Islands. Radar technicians, flame throwers, clerks, stenographers, searchlight repairmen, and dozens of other specialists attended technical schools. There was even a horse-shoeing school in connection with the veterinarian station hospital at Schofield. Not only soldiers, sailors, and marines, but also dogs, pack mules, and pigeons had lessons to learn before they left for forward areas. One of the half-dozen centers in the country for the training of "Dogs for Defense" was established at Fort Armstrong, with branches on Maui and Kauai. From May, 1942, until far into the war, Island residents were urged to loan their dogs for service: "In the same manner as the boy enlists for defense of his country, your dog, if he is not actually required for the saftey of yourself or family, should be offered for war work." More than 3,000 Island dogs "volunteered," and 900 were accepted after tests. Some, after six weeks' training, served with sentries in Hawaii and forward areas; others, trained for three months, were used as scout dogs on the battlefields from Guadalcanal to Okinawa. Before final discharge, all went back to Fort Armstrong for a "deprocessing" course, where they were untaught everything vicious which they had learned. Pack mules were trained in Hawaii for duty further west, but they were used here also. Mules of the old Hawaiian Pack Train, later the 4339th and 4340th Pack Troops, carried supplies to remote mountain lookouts and gun emplacements in isolated areas which could be reached only by narrow, precipitous trails, and were used also in several spectacular rescues of aviators who crashed in almost inaccessible areas. Although some mules were used in Pacific forward areas as early as Guadalcanal, it was in the Philippines invasion that they showed their real worth. Then 900 tough mules were shipped from the Mainland to Hawaii to undergo rigid training for the invasion of Japan. Mule-skinners and their charges clambered up and down Oahu's mountains and sloshed through streams, each 1,200-pound mule carrying its own food, a 100pound pack saddle, and several hundred pounds of supplies. Schofield and Fort Shafter had pigeon training centers, and each island had mobile lofts where birds were trained for long flights at night and over water. Some of the birds were Army "regulars"; others were "drafted" from civilian life. When military orders prohibited civilians from racing carrier pigeons, some fanciers gave their birds to

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the Army. Birds from Hawaii were put to g o o d use in N e w Guinea jungles, in the Philippines, and on Okinawa, in areas beyond the reach o f visual signals or soldier messengers or where wires could not be laid or radios used. TRAINING WAS ONLY ONE OF M A N Y PHASES o f the preparation for invasion. A n Army history relates: Troops, both assault and garrison, had to be estimated; personnel requisitions to the War Department had to be submitted; plans had to be prepared for providing the proper types and quantities of equipment; training schedules had to be outlined to fit the terrain and to teach the type of fighting to be encountered; logistical plans had to be devised for the continuous supplies of food, ammunition, and other items needed by the forces for whose supply the headquarters was responsible; resupply and replacement of expected shipping losses had to be estimated and provided for; and logistical support for secured bases had to be determined. Base development and garrison [were] to be a constant Army task. Plans had to be prepared for the construction, maintenance, and manning of base defense installations, airfields, supply depots, hospitals, training areas, replacement depots, and other vital components of an advanced base.

T h e A r m y estimated that each man in an amphibious operation required nine tons o f supplies and equipment t o get him ashore and sustain him for 30 days, and thereafter he needed a ton a month. N a v y and Marine supply requirements were in proportion. These were problems inherent in any invasion. There were also many special problems; for instance, in the Gilberts: The territory to be invaded, though it had been seized by the Japanese, was legally British domain; claims from legitimate inhabitants, problems of civil affairs involving the rights of natives, even such matters as determining the kind of currency to be used, all had to be foreseen in the planning. A m o n g natives accustomed to the ministrations of religious teachers, problems of religion could be expected. Geography itself was one vast problem; it would be necessary to travel great distances, over ocean wastes, to tiny bases; the trip by air would require pin point navigation, with check-points few and scattered. . . . Our own and enemy dead would have to be dealt with in a hot, insectridden climate; wastes must be disposed of in a porous coral ground; drinking water must be provided on thirsty coral atolls. In short, the planners faced problems without precedent in the annals of strategy, tactics, geography, psychology, medicine, sociology —problems in almost every conceivable field.

Hawaii assisted in solving many o f these problems. Island girls by the hundreds typed and filed the plans; Island b o y s assembled materials and loaded ships. Island experts in many fields gave invaluable aid, based o n their specialized knowledge o f Pacific conditions. T h e pressure from military and war agencies for information and personnel s o overwhelmed some Island institutions that long-term programs o f research and public education were set aside for the duration. From scholars in the Oriental Institute to the natural scientists in the laboratories, the faculty o f the University o f Hawaii gave aid. T h e y studied fouling organisms in harbors, prepared relevant information on Pacific areas for the Board o f Economic Warfare, translated Japanese

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documents for military intelligence, and arranged lectures for chaplains and morale officers. The university library, with the largest collection of scientific books and magazines in the territory, supplied the armed forces with materials on the Pacific and the Orient. Requests for social, cultural, and racial information led the sociology department to set up a special War Research Laboratory, continued after the war as the Hawaii Social Research Laboratory. The Bishop Museum, with its highly specialized collection of photographs, books, maps, and pamphlets, proved a mine of rare information. In its library, for instance, was found one valuable issue of a Japanese periodical which had been sought in vain in Mainland libraries. The Institute of Pacific Relations, orginally organized in Honolulu, and numbering many Islanders among its members, helped not only in the planning of invasions but in recruiting Far Eastern experts for the Army of Occupation. The services used thousands of its pamphlets as texts. Public library books dealing with the Pacific islands were seldom on the shelves, and reference librarians were kept busy answering questions in regard to the Western Pacific. Many individual Hawaii residents furnished data to the military on the Pacific and the Orient. Public appeals were made for the loan of personal photographs, maps, or literature concerning Japan and its occupied areas. Much of value was obtained, although some material which would have been useful had been destroyed, unfortunately, by frightened Japanese owners at the start of the war. Military research in Hawaii continued constantly, based on the reports brought back by the observers who went forward with each offensive. The Quartermaster Corps developed clothing to meet the tropical fighting conditions, and they devised ways of packing and shipping supplies to prevent damage in the warm and wet islands of the far Pacific. The Chemical Warfare Service did important research in developing a new type of flame-throwing tank which was built in Hawaii by the Army and Navy, and became one of the major weapons of the Pacific war. In every campaign after Saipan, and especially on Okinawa, these tanks proved highly successful in liquidating enemy troops holed up in caves. The Chemical Warfare Service developed two other potent weapons in Hawaii. One was the " g o o p " gasoline bomb, which was dropped on Japanese industrial areas, and the other was a sea-going mortar, used to give direct cover to landing operations after the naval bombardment was lifted.

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AS THE PACIFIC OFFENSIVE MOUNTED, the Islands served in other diverse ways to further the war effort. For example: an extensive forward area victory garden project was directed from Honolulu with the assistance o f Island agricultural specialists; prisoners o f war were removed to Hawaii from forward areas, thereby relieving garrison commanders o f the responsibility for their care and security under difficult conditions; a psychological warfare campaign was launched from Hawaii to undermine Japanese morale on the home front and battle fronts. Hardly had a fertile island in the Pacific been secured than gardens were started to provide fresh vegetables for front-line hospitals and battle-weary soldiers, at the same time saving space on refrigerator ships from the Mainland. The Navy started the first o f these forward area victory gardens on Guadalcanal in the fall o f 1942, and later the Foreign Economic Administration took over. From headquarters in Honolulu, this agency directed the farming o f thousands o f acres in the western and southwestern Pacific. Several o f the F E A experts were on leave from the University o f Hawaii agricultural extension service. Their experience in working under similar soil and climatic conditions and with Japanese-speaking farmers made them better fitted to undertake this work than any other group in the United States. The Hawaii agricultural experiment station supplied seed o f Islanddeveloped vegetable varieties to the FEA's Pacific gardens. From an apiary at Fort Shafter, colonies o f bees were sent to devastated areas t o hasten plant rehabilitation through pollination. Ten prisoner o f war compounds were built on Oahu and three on the other islands as the war progressed, and in these 16,943 prisoners o f war and internees were held for varying periods. All were not from the Pacific, however; nearly a third o f the prisoners were Italians. The Army's first prison camp near Wahiawa had only 56 occupants during 1942 and 179 during 1943, and these were held only briefly pending transfer to the Mainland. Following the Marianas campaign, Japanese surrendered in increasing numbers, and many were brought to Hawaii. Although civilian laborers were kept here, most o f the combat troops were sent on to the Mainland. At the end o f the war, Hawaii's camps had 4,841 Italian prisoners, 2,643 Koreans, 320 Japanese, 23 Formosans, 7 Indo-Chinese, and 3 Chinese. Koreans, many o f whom had been serving in Japanese Army labor battalions against their will, were rated by officials as the best prisoners. Japanese usually followed orders; Italians caused the most trouble. Some o f the prisoners from the Pacific war fronts had relatives and friends in Hawaii and after the end o f the war relatives were allowed to

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visit them. On the first visiting day, 380 residents, mostly Okinawans, thronged to the compound gates before daylight. When the Okinawans were assigned to postwar rehabilitation work at Thomas Square, carloads of friends arrived, bringing cigarets, candy, fruit, and money. Many were seeking information concerning other relatives and friends in the Orient of whom they had heard nothing since before the war. So disruptive to the work and so full of potentialities for escape and other difficulties were these contacts that the Okinawans were withdrawn from Thomas Square. Thereafter, most work outside of military reservations was entrusted to the Italians because they had few countrymen in the Islands. All Italian and most Korean prisoners were repatriated early in 1946; Japanese and Okinawans in December, 1946. Closely in touch with the military was the Honolulu branch of the Office of Strategic Services, whose small expert staff studied islands to the westward, analyzed translations of broadcasts from Radio Tokyo, and made a detailed study of Okinawa. The study of Okinawa was of special importance because the archipelago had been conquered by Japan in 1894, and, although Westerners think of the Okinawans as Japanese, neither the Okinawans nor the Japanese hold that view. As a result of the OSS study, participation in the war effort was encouraged among the large group of Okinawans living in Hawaii, and during the invasion of Okinawa, native support was obtained for the American landing forces. When the "Honolulu Outpost" of the Office of War Information succeeded the Coordinator of Information in July, 1942, its primary function was to foster support of the war effort. Like its predecessor which had been established only three months earlier, it operated as an informational office, distributing posters, staging exhibits, and preparing news articles and radio programs for home front consumption. But with the establishment in September, 1944, of OWI, Central Pacific Operations, it shifted emphasis to psychological warfare in which it cooperated with the Navy. Through printed leaflets and short-wave radio, it directed a war of words against the Japanese home front, to foster distrust and defeatism, and also against enemy troops, to decrease their fighting spirit and induce surrenders. The OWI established headquarters and radio station KRHO in the former studios of KGMB on Kapiolani Boulevard. It erected a 100,000watt transmitter near Lualualei and a receiving station at Kailua to pick up San Francisco programs and feed them by telephone line to the Honolulu studios. Some programs sent west from Honolulu were transmissions from San Francisco; some originated locally. KRHO was the most powerful radio station in the Pacific, but few Islanders even

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knew of its existence. The day after Christmas, 1944, a new station, KSAI, went on the air from Saipan under Honolulu direction. (After the dissolution of the OWI at the end of the war, both stations continued in operation for a time under the State Department.) The battle of the leaflets grew in intensity as the war neared its end. During the last few months 1,000,000 were turned out each day. Of the total of 110,000,000, most were dropped by plane over Japan, but some were dropped over by-passed islands or the Marianas and Okinawa. One of the most striking sheets appeared to be a Japanese ten yen note on one side, and on the other side was the suggestion that if the militarists continued their hopeless war, all Japanese money would soon be as worthless as the leaflet itself. Although Japanese people were forbidden to touch the propaganda leaflets, at least half of these bogus ten yen notes were picked up byjapanese who thought they were money. The OWI was assisted in its work by foreign broadcast summaries in English made by the Federal Broadcast Intelligence Service, which set up a Honolulu station in 1944. The FBIS took over the work of monitoring Japanese and other foreign broadcasts which had been done previously by other agencies and provided English summaries for Washington authorities and the OSS in Honolulu as well as the OWI. Technical difficulties caused the station to be moved to the plantation clubhouse at Kekaha, Kauai, in November, 1944. As MORE AND MORE TROOPS left Hawaii for Pacific war fronts, an increasing number of casualties returned to the Islands for medical treatment. I n fact, nearly all the hospitalized casualties of Pacific battle fronts received treatment on Oahu. I n addition to battle casualties, Army and Navy hospitals on Oahu and the other islands also had a steady stream of patients with everything from measles to broken legs. Red Cross volunteers spent countless hours in their service, and many individuals and organizations sent books, flowers, and other gifts. The U. S. Naval Hospital at Hospital Point, Pearl Harbor, was the only naval hospital in Hawaii at the start of the war. Later it was incorporated into Base 128 Hospital, which occupied several hundred quonset huts and other temporary buildings outside the yard along Kamehameha Highway, and had a peak capacity of 2,500 beds. The Aiea Naval Hospital, under construction on December 17, 1941, was commissioned the following November with 1,500 beds. It later quadrupled in size to become the largest American military hospital outside the continental United States. With 60 large buildings on 222 acres atop Aiea Heights, it formed a community in itself. It boasted its own stadium, library, studio, theater, and farm. The hospital treated

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100,000 Navy men and marines during the war period, about half of them battle casualties. Beginning with the Tarawa assault, Aiea played a major role in a system of air and sea evacuation which began with the battle front first aid stations and ended at Mainland hospitals. Navy men said—and believed—"If a casualty reaches Aiea, he will live." Of 3,000 casualties received from the Marianas, only three died at Aiea; among 7,000 from Iwo, there was not a single death. The Iwo Jima campaign taxed the hospital's facilities to the limit, with 1,200 men arriving in a single day. Ambulances waiting to unload made a line two blocks long. Various Navy installations in Hawaii had limited hospital and dispensary facilities, and there were several mobile hospitals, including Base 8 Hospital at McGrew Point. The Army's two main hospitals on December 7—Triplet General Hospital at Fort Shafter and the station hospital at Schofield—were far too small for that day's influx of patients, but long before December 7 plans had been made to take over civilian buildings for expansion in the event of war. Immediately after the attack, part of Farrington High School was transformed into an annex of Tripler. By noon, first aid workers had made up 324 beds, and by 4:30 Tripler had transferred its headquarters and some 200 casualties there. Throughout the war, the high school and the hospital shared the school facilities and temporary buildings erected by the Army. This annex treated mainly orthopedic cases. At Kamehameha School for Boys, the infirmary and Iolani Hall were taken over, first as Provisional Hospital No. 1 and later as an annex to Tripler, to care for women and children dependents, certain medical cases, and the slightly wounded. Plans were made to use both boys' and girls' schools as a hospital in event of further emergency, but this never became necessary. In the fall of 1942 the Kamehameha School for Girls was moved to the boys' school campus and the entire girls' school thereafter was used as the Army hospital, housing 750 patients at a time. As early as April, 1941, the Army had asked Saint Louis College for its campus in event of war, and a lease was ready for signature when Pearl Harbor was bombed. At midnight, December 7, the brothers learned that the Army would take possession of the buildings early in the morning, and at 2 A.M. they received written confirmation. Brothers and students worked three days clearing buildings of desks and materials. As school properties were moved out, truckloads of hospital equipment arrived and workmen ran in extra pipes and power lines. The chapel became a surgical ward; the science rooms became the general research and testing laboratories of the entire Mid-Pacific area.

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Science teachers served as laboratory technicians and pharmacists, and commercial teachers kept records and supervised offices. Even after Saint Louis College resumed academic work afternoons in the buildings o f other schools, seven faculty members remained on full-time duty at the hospital, and many others gave part-time service. The hospital, with a capacity o f 500 patients, was originally known as Provisional Hospital N o . 2, but after J u n e , 1942, it was called the 147th General Hospital and was expanded to care for 2,500. I n all, it received 33,000 patients, including veterans o f former wars, dependents o f servicemen, soldiers who became ill while stationed in the Pacific, and some war casualties. On December 19, part o f the Japanese Hospital in Honolulu became Provisional General Hospital N o . 3 for the care o f contagious diseases among Army personnel. Provisional Hospital N o . 4 was established on December 26, in the territorial hospital for the mentally ill at Kaneohe on Windward Oahu. I n May, 1942, it became General Hospital 204, with a bed capacity o f 500. Some o f Kaneohe's regular patients were moved to temporary buildings put up on the grounds by the Engineers, and Benjamin Parker School was readied to house an overflow o f patients in case o f further attack. The Army built two rambling hospitals, each with nearly 100 buildings and 1,000 beds, on former pineapple land in Waipio and Ekahanui gulches on Oahu. I t also built small hospitals at numerous new posts and set up a tent hospital at K o k o Head to train field hospital units before their departure to forward areas. On Hawaii, Army hospitals were established in a school and plantation buildings at Mountain View, in a school and hotel at Waimea, and in a part o f the plantation hospital at Pahala. The Makawao and Waikapu Hospitals were used by the Army on Maui; Kalaheo School and buildings at Kekaha and Makaweli, on Kauai. O n Molokai, the Army used some facilities o f the Shingle Memorial Hospital, and on Lanai, some facilities o f the plantation hospital. By the end o f 1942, there were 19 Army hospitals in the territory; by the end o f 1944 there were 29, with a total capacity o f about 15,000 beds. Dental clinics were established on all islands in such places as community halls, gymnasiums, and Japanese temples. A new 14-story building for Triplet General Hospital, situated, like the Navy's Aiea, high on a hill overlooking Honolulu, was started in the fall o f 1944. Much criticism was aroused by use o f scarce materials and manpower for this huge project when it seemed obvious that peace would come before the construction job could possibly be finished. The building was only 13 per cent completed when the war ended. Though scheduled to be finished January 31, 1947, it did not receive its first

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patient until September, 1948, because of numerous delays. Its cost grew from the original estimate of $16,000,000 to $40,000,000. Several rest camps were maintained for convalescents. One of these, for marines, used the buildings of the YWCA beach camp at Kaneohe and of the adjoining community camp at Kokokahi. The Army selected 15 sites in Hawaii for cemeteries. These varied in size from 1,000 to 4,000 graves, but the only plots used were those shared with other services at Homelani Cemetery in Hilo and at Makawao, Maui, and Waipouli, Kauai. The Navy used its prewar plot at the Nuuanu cemetery and established a small temporary cemetery at Kaneohe and a large one at Halawa. The Army made all Oahu burials in its permanent cemetery at Schofield Barracks. A conspicuous sign at the entrance to the University of Hawaii pointed to a temporary Army cemetery on the campus, but no graves were ever dug. O N EVERY ISLAND, BOTH IN CITIES and on remote plantations as well,

Red Cross volunteers made surgical dressings for Hawaii service hospitals and for Pacific hospital ships. In the year before the war, Hawaii's units turned out a total of 268,000 dressings. After December 7, the production grew month by month until 1,153,000 dressings were made in June, 1945, alone. The surgical dressing units also made plaster of paris bandages for Army amputation cases, and face masks for use by surgical teams. They once departed from routine work to fill a rush order for 5,000 face masks for marines who were being choked by the volcanic dust of Iwo Jima. The Red Cross sewing corps made hospital garments of all kinds. They also made ditty bags—bags eight inches square, with drawstrings— and sometimes filled them with small necessities. They sewed stiff, heavy canvas bags for first aid equipment to be placed at gun stations on Navy vessels. Even more difficult to work on were the mosquito nets used to screen battle front operating tents. Before a seamstress was halfway across the 24 yards of netting, she was hidden behind mountains of net and muslin. Knitting corps needles fashioned hospital garments, afghans for hospital ships, and cold-weather garments for personnel in the Aleutians, submarine crews, and guards in the Hawaiian uplands. Navy wives who had been trained on the Mainland were the first Gray Ladies of the Red Cross hospital and recreation corps to work in Island hospitals in World War II. But within six months local women were being trained, and eventually 450 on the five main islands finished the course. Many were older women whose serenity and mature judgment proved of great value. From March to August, 1945, when their

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work was most in demand, the 241 Gray Ladies on active duty gave 32,998 hours of service. Gray Ladies worked in hospital recreation rooms and sometimes in the wards. They wrote letters for patients; they read aloud and took books and magazines to bedsides; they organized games and parties and taught Hawaiian crafts; they arranged flowers and planted miniature tray gardens. Often they just sat and talked to homesick boys. At a touching ceremony in September, 1942, Gray Ladies acted as proxies for the next of kin in receiving posthumous awards made for the Midway battle. The Gray Ladies were aided by Red Cross staff assistants in shopping for the patients. The wounded men particularly wanted string for making belts, purses, and bath mats; they wanted fountain pens and gaudy souvenir pillow tops. During 1945 alone 3,500 orders were filled, many for articles which had become increasingly scarce in Honolulu stores. Nurses' aides worked primarily in civilian hospitals, but they began service in Army hospitals on Maui early in the war, and after February, 1945, on Oahu. The Red Cross motor corps took convalescents on drives and to picnics planned by the canteen service. At the peak of activities, these outings were held for 200 men at a time, five days a week, at the Kuliouou home of Mr. and Mrs. George R. Carter. Smaller parties were held at regular intervals at other lovely homes in the Islands where spacious lanais overlooked spreading lawns, hills, or blue ocean, affording a welcome relief from bleak hospital walls. Among the many activities of the Junior Red Cross was the making of furniture, games, paper and flower leis, tray favors, and innumerable other articles for service hospitals. They turned out 85,000 pairs of hospital slippers and millions of surgical dressings. The thousands of volunteers were augmented by professional Red Cross workers who began to come from the Mainland in 1943 and were arriving in greater numbers by the latter part of 1944. By the end of the war some 500 Red Cross workers were on Oahu, and 1,000 in other parts of the Pacific, including men who accompanied troops and women who worked as secretaries and recreation aides in hospitals. There were usually about 200 transient Red Cross workers on Oahu who were trained to teach local handcraft work as well as to dig foxholes, pitch tents, and climb cargo nets in preparation for their work in forward areas. The most famous Red Cross volunteer to visit Hawaii was Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who stopped in Honolulu for a few days in September, 1943, on her return from the Southwest Pacific. Despite her usual crowded schedule, she managed to talk with the wounded in

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service hospitals, inspect OCD and U S O activities, and meet large numbers of military men and civilians. The Occupational Therapy Association of Hawaii sponsored a year's training course for some 40 volunteers for service hospitals. Equipment and materials from civilian groups supplemented that available from the services. The therapists taught weaving, wood carving, metal work, leather work, toy making, and other arts and crafts. Aiea Naval Hospital had a well-equipped studio for painting and sculpturing. The production of penicillin by the experiment station of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association in cooperation with Navy hospitals was one of the greatest contributions of civilian Hawaii to hospital work. Since the new drug was not generally available to the public, the HSPA undertook to grow it for use in plantation hospitals and developed a new technique which produced penicillin solution in quantity in half the time required by the complex 10-day process used for preparing pure penicillin. The Navy adopted the technique, which involved growing the mold on two-inch gauze pads for direct application to a wound, and the HSPA taught the method to a large number of men from Navy hospitals, hospital ships, and troop transport dispensaries. The six surgical dressing units in Hawaii which made the gauze pads for this use were the only Red Cross branches in the world to make such dressings.

68. Tunnel to Red Hill's underground oil storage, where tanks taller than a 20-story building hold a total of 5,000,000,000 gallons.

69.

Pipes carry oil direct f r o m storage tanks to ships in the harbor.

70. Hawaii, Pacific stock room, takes inventory before a push.

71. Men prepare crankshaft for shipment to forward battle areas.

72. Accumulated war materials were constant reminders that this was war.

73. Plantation lands and scenic spots became military posts as barracks were hastily erected to house hundreds of thousands of men.

74. Week-end vacation spots were converted into Army training camps.

75. In preparation for an island-hopping campaign, training centers along the shoreline taught men to operate amphibious landing craft.

76. Island beaches provided ideal training ground for landing tactics.

p p

77. So often did Army tanks, guns, and other mechanized equipment rumble through Honolulu that special traffic rules were passed for them.

78. Men training to take enemy beaches wrestled with heavy equipment.

79. With climate and terrain similar to those of target areas, Hawaii became a training ground for post-landing types of jungle warfare. 80. Ingenious methods of rescuing injured men from inaccessible regions were evolved by the Medical Corps in Hawaii's mountain areas.

81. Hawaii became the casualty evacuation area for the Pacific.

82. General Richardson awards Purple Heart to wounded private.

83. Wounded marines and Navy personnel from the Iwo Jima operation are lifted gently from giant Skymasters which rushed them to Hawaii.

85. Bursting with patriotism and eager for new experiences, skilled and unskilled workers converged on Hawaii from every state in the U.S.

86. Mainland workers in Hawaii at one time numbered more than 82,000.

87. The industrial might of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard became one of the greatest single forces in the inevitable defeat of the enemy.

88. Diving crews descended into the water-filled compartments of the Arizona to salvage valuable equipment and a million gallons of oil.

89- Experts were required to operate highly specialized machines.

90. Overhaul and repair were important navy yard functions.

91. As the tempo of the war in the Pacific increased, skilled artisans worked day and night making new parts to repair damaged warships.

92. From ships and from military installations all over the island, offduty servicemen converged on this Army and Navy USO in Honolulu.

93. Fun-hungry men "on pass" invaded the honky-tonk sections of town.

94. Men without women selected pin-ups for the barracks walls.

95. The photo to "knock the folks' eyes out back home" cost a dollar.

96. Mobile USO units took shows to war workers and service personnel.

97. Islanders always encouraged those servicemen who found Hawaiian lore and customs a fascinating study with which to fill off-duty hours.

98. As a treat for their Mainland buddies, Hawaiian soldiers prepared native feasts of pig and sweet potatoes roasted in underground imus.

99. Music boys and hula girls entertained service personnel at this thatched Hawaiian beach house given to the USO by an Island senator.

100. The entertainment offered by another rural USO included Oriental singing and dancing by doll-like American girls of Japanese ancestry.

101. For Hawaiians, natural-born musicians, impromptu shows were easy.

102. Island girls of all nationalities were always ready to act as hostesses for events like this St. Patrick's Day dance at a Kauai. USO.

C H A P T E R

T H I R T E E N

The Troops Take Over H U N D R E D S OF THOUSANDS OF TROOPS arrived in t h e I s l a n d s

to

receive advanced training before leaving for forward areas. As they were equipped, provisioned, trained, transported, and housed, practically every square mile of the Islands underwent some measure of physical change. Parks, plantation fields, and vacant lots were taken over as sites for barracks, office buildings, and supply dumps. Runways were extended, roads were constructed, and miles of piers, wharves, and warehouses were built. Channels were dredged, swamps drained, and land reclaimed. Tunnels were bored into mountainsides to provide refuge for personnel and storage space for ammunition. New radio installations dotted the Islands. A bewildering variety of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard units came and went, their movements cloaked in secrecy. There were specialized fighting units and service troops whose duties reflected all the complexity of modern warfare. Some men stayed in Hawaii most of the war; others were here only in transit. Some merely saw the waving palmr of Hawaii from offshore. There were 43,000 soldiers on Oahu on December 7, 1941, plus a handful on the other islands. In the first six months of the war, the total swelled to 135,000. By June of 1945, when plans were mounting for an offensive against the homeland of Japan, troops on Oahu alone numbered 253,000; in the Central Pacific area they totaled 553,000. There were 5,800 Navy men in the 14th Naval District when war broke; 20,000 by the end of 1942; 62,000 by the end of 1943; and 137,200 at the peak in December, 1944. The removal of headquarters to Guam brought a decrease of nearly 25 per cent in Navy personnel in Hawaii during 1945. As many as 35,000 men from Navy ships came ashore at one time on Oahu, and smaller numbers on the other islands. The number of 219

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men afloat in the Central Pacific area grew sharply as the war progressed: in October, 1943, there were 60,000; in October, 1944, 350,000; in the late spring of 1945, at the time of the Okinawa assault, 550,000. Nearly all of these men went ashore on Oahu a number of times. Marine Corps strength fluctuated sharply. Until November, 1943, marines in the Islands never totaled more than 7,400, and often only half that. The number increased to more than 60,000 in March, April, and May of 1944, and then 40,000 left for the Marianas invasion. The number built up to 79,000 in January, 1945; then dropped to 22,000 in February. By March it had climbed to 62,000, and it soared to a peak of 116,000 in August. The total personnel of the Coast Guard in the 14th Naval District increased from about 250 officers and men to 3,200, in addition to about 700 in training at the former naval radio station in Wailupe. During the last year of the war, Island streets were crowded with uniformed women—WACs, WAVEs, SPARs, and women marines, as well as Army and Navy nurses, Red Cross girls, OCD and USO workers, and the Island-created WARDs, WASPs, and WAVCs. The first company of WACs arrived in Hawaii in March, 1944, to do administrative and motor transport work at Army air bases. In October and November, 1944, a handful of WAVEs, women marines, and SPARs arrived to make surveys for their organizations. In January, 1945, about 200 WAVEs arrived for assignment at the naval air stations at Honolulu, Puunene, and Kahului. They were followed later in the month by 165 women marines, many of whom went to the Ewa Marine Corps Air Station, and by a small group of SPARs. Their numbers grew until there were several thousand WACs in the Islands, 3,000 WAVEs, about half of them at Pearl Harbor, 1,000 women marines, and 200 SPARs. Most of the servicewomen were office workers, but there were also mechanics, as well as all the housekeeping troops needed to make the feminine contingents self-sufficient. Even beauty operators were included. The uniformed women, in contrast to many of their service brothers, liked the Islands. They had more date opportunities than they could possibly accept. Allied servicemen from many nations occasionally appeared on Honolulu streets. Most frequent visitors were the British, since Hickam Field was a stop-over point on the round trips which the Royal Air Force Transport Command made twice each week from San Diego to Canton, Fiji, Auckland, and Sydney. Late in the war, a few Canadian veterans were sent to Hawaii's jungle training school so that they might later act as instructors in jungle warfare for their Pacific-bound comrades.

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The war also brought many prominent Americans and foreigners to Hawaii—generals, admirals, government executives, congressional committeemen, businessmen engaged in war work, press and radio correspondents, and USO and Red Cross leaders. So numerous were they that the Army created its own visitors' bureau. MILITARY AND NAVAL INSTALLATIONS were everywhere in the Islands.

Some dated back almost forty-odd years to the Annexation, but most were created during the war or in the immediate prewar period. By the end of the war, the Army and Navy owned 62,058 acres on all the islands, double the area held in 1940, when their only sizable holdings were on Oahu. In addition, the Army held temporary possession of 210,000 acres, and the Navy and Marine Corps, 118,000. Nearly 90 per cent of the territory's 4,118,000 acres is classed as forest reserve, pasture, or waste. Although the services occupied some such areas, they took much cultivated land as well. They also took some residential property and leased many schools, offices, shops, warehouses, and other facilities. Months passed before legal papers were signed for some property which the Army took over at the outbreak of war. By the end of 1943, formalities for 2,000 cases of occupancies were pending, and Army units were still making 40 requests a day for permission to occupy private holdings. Army operations by the end of the war involved 1,660 leases, 1,702 licenses, and 375 permits, with more than $4,000,000 annual rentals. Payments for crop damage on lands taken over before harvest were approximately $1,000,000. The Navy took much land as late as the summer and fall of 1944, when it condemned 1,189 acres at Iroquois Point, Pearl Harbor, for extension of an important staging area, and nearly as much more at Manana, Waiawa, Halawa, and Aiea. The Army at one time occupied one-third of Oahu and some land on other islands. The Navy held thousands of acres around Pearl Harbor, and all the 29,000 acres of the uninhabited island of Kahoolawe. Five civilian airports—Hilo and Upolu on Hawaii, John Rodgers Field at Honolulu, and Maui and Molokai airports—were taken over and expanded. The other three—Hana on Maui, Kalaupapa at the leper settlement on Molokai, and Port Allen on Kauai—all too small for efficient military use, were plowed to prevent the landing of enemy planes. Later, Hana and Kalaupapa were repaired and returned to the Territory. A network of new roads developed to meet military needs. The Army constructed or greatly improved approximately 240 miles of roads,

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and built 48 miles of railroad connecting with plantation or other lines. In addition, federal aid, allotted on Army and Navy approval, provided 82 per cent of the $17,000,000 expended by the local government from 1941 through 1946 to build 47 miles of new roads and to restore the surface of highways which had been ruined by heavy military traffic. The Army built the Saddle Road on Hawaii, following an old-time trail in the "saddle" between the mountains of Mauna Kea and Mauna Loa. It shortened the distance across the island and afforded an alternate route to the extremely vulnerable belt road along the coastline. On Maui, the Engineers rebuilt 50 miles of roads near Makena Point; on Molokai, they built roads to Homestead Field and Kiawe Grove; and on Kauai, they improved the Barking Sands Road from Mana to Kekaha and a road to the Napalikona forest reserve. On Oahu, the military built many roads to remote gun outposts and radio and radar installations in upland plantation areas and forest reserves. Forty miles of road gave access to the top of the Koolau Range, and 22 miles of trails and roads opened new areas on the south end of the Waianae Range. Most important of the roads built with federal funds was Nimitz Highway, which helped to relieve the tremendous traffic burden on the old Pearl Harbor Road. Some $6,500,000 were spent on this highway during and after the war. O A H U HAD 50 SIZABLE A R M Y RESERVATIONS and 26 Navy stations. The Army Engineers established 18 baseyards on Oahu early in the war and many more as the war progressed. Four prewar Army posts—Shafter, Ruger, Armstrong, and De Russy— were within the city limits of Honolulu. Fort Shafter, long the second largest post in the Islands, continued as the headquarters area. Fort De Russy, with its Waikiki beach frontage, functioned as a rest and recreation center. Fort Ruger conducted a Ill-acre amphibious training camp near Koko Head. The Engineers used a Honolulu church for storing nails and construction materials, part of Kapiolani Park for office and refrigeration supplies, a fruit company warehouse for cement, and a vacant lot at Punchbowl and Queen Streets, near the center of the city, for explosives. The services took over the entire Honolulu waterfront, entrusting its security to the Coast Guard. Because of the fire hazard from the crowded harbor, wooden piers, and enormous tonnages of dangerous cargoes, the Coast Guard built seven fire-boats and installed additional fire-fighting equipment on trailers. The 600 Coast Guardsmen of the captain-of-the-port detail were first billeted at Pier 4 and an adjacent tent area and later moved to Pier 11.

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The Army developed Kapalama Basin, adjoining the main Honolulu harbor, by widening the channel and dredging the bottom. Piers 39 and 40 and a score of warehouses were built. The immigration station at Sand Island, which was used early in the war as an alien internment center, became headquarters of the Army Port and Service Command in the summer of 1943. Millions of dollars were spent to more than double the size of the 250-acre island with coral fill pumped from near-by Kapalama Basin, and to build a 3,600-foot wharf and several large permanent buildings. Dredging had been started early in 1941 at Keehi Lagoon on the far side of the causeway to Sand Island. When completed in October, 1944, at a cost of $6,650,000, the lagoon provided a seaplane mooring basin 400 by 800 feet and three runways, each two to three miles long. With adjacent J o h n Rodgers Field, the Honolulu commercial airport, it became the Honolulu Naval Air Station, the far borders of which touched the Army's big air headquarters, Hickam Field. Together the air station and Hickam were the center of the gigantic network of the Air Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service, which kept the runways busy day and night with planes carrying mail, cargo, passengers, and casualties. The stations provided advanced training for squadrons on their way to Pacific war fronts and prompt mechanical overhaul for aircraft returning from operations. Hickam Field had been started in 1935 with an initial expenditure of $7,000,000, when the little village of Watertown and many cane fields gave way before runways, barracks, hangars, and housing areas. Before the war was over, the installations had cost $90,000,000, and Hickam was the home of both the 7th Air Force and the Hawaiian Air Depot, a huge supply and maintenance station. I n the last few months of the war, 16 per cent of Hickam's shop time was devoted to modifying planes to meet Pacific conditions. Below Hickam Field, along the shore, is Fort Kamehameha. This, with its near-by sub-posts at Fort Weaver and Fort Barrette, is a permanent Pearl Harbor defense. "Fort Kam's" personnel increased from 4,500 to 25,000 when seven Army divisions readied for combat at its staging areas. Many thousands of men left Fort Kamehameha for battle, and later came back through the same center for furlough, rotation, or discharge. Not far away was the Navy's staging area, Aiea Receiving Barracks, housing 16,000 men. Marines staged from a 10,000-man tent city, Moanalua Ridge, adjoining a Seabee encampment quartering 25,000 men. Pearl Harbor was the Navy's chief Pacific headquarters, supply center, and repair base. The navy yard expanded at least six or seven

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times in terms of shops, storehouses, new equipment, and productive capacity. Its three and a half miles of piers and wharves more than doubled at a cost of $35,000,000; extensive dredging was done, and many installations were added. Outside the yard, barracks, warehouses, storage areas, parking lots, and ammunition dumps overflowed in every direction. The Naval Supply Depot at Pearl Harbor had occupied only a few small warehouses in the navy yard area before the war. By 1945, it had increased many times in size and its innumerable warehouses and sheds dotted the whole south side of Oahu. Its open storage alone covered more than 600 acres. An enterprising statistician figured that during the year ending June, 1944, the Naval Supply Depot issued enough ice cream to provide a cone a day for 15 months for every man, woman, and child in San Francisco; enough trousers for every man and boy in the New England states, with Indiana thrown in for good measure; enough food to provide a big meal for every person in North America, Europe, and the whole Soviet Union; and enough wire rope to extend from New York to Berlin and back to Paris. Its dollar volume was more than the combined wholesale business of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, and New Hampshire. The year 1945 was even bigger, but apparently no one had time to compile comparative figures. More than 7,000 ships, large and small, received repairs at Pearl Harbor. The first battle casualty to limp in was the carrier Saratoga, which had been hit in January west of Wake. Soon afterwards came the carrier Yorktown, which had been damaged in the Coral Sea. The Yorktown was urgently needed, for America had few carriers then, and the Navy knew that the Japanese were approaching Midway. Workmen swarmed over her before she was completely moored, and in less than a week the damage was temporarily patched. Another early race against time was won when the carrier Enterprise, which had been damaged in the Eastern Solomons in October, 1942, was repaired in time to take part in the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands. As the war progressed, battle-damaged ships returned to Pearl Harbor in greater numbers. Damage from accidents also had to be repaired and ships had to be overhauled. After January, 1944, one of the biggest tasks of the yard was the conversion of more than 100 ships for new types of warfare. Up to October 1, 1943, Pearl Harbor worked on an average of 70 ships a month; thereafter, 252. Ships in drydock increased from 25 a month to 95. Ships in the harbor averaged 74 in the early days of the war, and 450 in June, July, and August, 1945. At one time, 528 ships were berthed at Pearl. The busiest month was January, 1945, when 342 vessels were

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being repaired, overhauled, or reconverted in preparation for the I wo Jima and Okinawa offensives. Many of the same ships returned in April and May, 1945, to repair damage from shore batteries, bombs, torpedoes, or suicide planes. Besides repair work, Pearl Harbor was busy fabricating special materials for both Army and Navy use. One job was the assembly of air-strip landing mats, which were used to get rolling stock ashore over I wo Jima's shifting volcanic ash. Ford Island, in the middle of Pearl Harbor, became the Pearl Harbor Naval Air Station in 1939 when Army aircraft moved to newly completed Hickam Field. It was headquarters for the Commander of Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, and an important overhaul and repair base. The Naval Aviation Supply Depot, originally confined to Ford Island, by 1944 was also using 20 warehouses in Honolulu and some warehouses at a new 1,000-acre tract in Waiawa Gulch to store its 150,000 different items. The Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, established in 1919, became the point from which the Pacific underseas war was staged. An average of some 200 undersea craft made Pearl Harbor their home base for forays into Japanese waters. Camps, storage areas, and housing for war workers replaced cane fields almost overnight along Kamehameha Highway and the Pearl Harbor Road, from Honolulu to Pearl City and beyond. As late as the summer of 1945, hundreds of acres were still being taken over. The largest camp in this district was Catlin, near Salt Lake, covering 265 acres just outside the city limits. The Marine Corps Air Station at Ewa—a great modern airfieldwas developed from what had been for 15 years merely a dirigible mooring mast. As the headquarters base of Marine aviation in the Pacific, it served as the springboard into forward areas. Every Leatherneck air unit going to or returning from Pacific action went through Ewa. NAS, Barber's Point, situated at the southwest corner of Oahu, was little more than a coral waste, covered in places with shallowrooted brush, scrubby trees, and occasional cane pockets, when it was commissioned on April 15, 1942. It soon became an important air center, technical training school, and fortification manned by 12,000 sailors. The Army had a training area near Barber's Point with three sectors: a beach section, an area of pillboxes and wire entanglements, and a combined infantry-tank training ground. Beyond Barber's Point on the west, or leeward, shore of Oahu was Camp Malakole, officially established January 9, 1941. It was immediately dubbed "Camp Melancholy" by the first occupants, who found it

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a lonely ¿¿zwi-covered waste 25 miles from Honolulu. Its original function was to maintain gun and fifing positions for the coast artillery and anti-aircraft guns, but it later served also as a staging area. After the battle of Saipan emphasized the importance of anti-aircraft weapons in a field artillery role, it was enlarged to serve as an anti-aircraft training center. Under its supervision also were the near-by Waianae amphibious training center and the Kahe Point and Makua training areas. Eight divisions, totaling 201,000 men, were trained at Waianae, largest of several amphibious training centers. Troops embarked at Waianae to go up the coast to Makua, where they carried out realistic assaults upon replicas of the Japanese beach defenses at Tarawa. The valley of Lualualei housed a permanent naval ammunition depot covering 8,000 acres, as well as a naval communications station established in the early 1930's. On Mount Kaala, highest point on Oahu, was one of the several score radar stations which were established in remote areas. All of these required new access roads which presented major construction problems. At Kaala, as well as at Kaena Point and Ulupau Head, the extreme inaccessibility of the sites required the installation of steel cableways to carry men and materials to the stations. During the big Pacific offensive, more than a million men from every state in the Union passed through Schofield Barracks, one of Uncle Sam's greatest military posts in peace as well as war. Several specialized training areas were built on the 21 square miles of central Oahu covered by the post. Many Island inductees received their basic training at the Hawaiian Department Replacement Depot at Schofield, one of the largest overseas training centers in the Army. Wheeler Field, adjoining Schofield Barracks, was the Army's first airport in Hawaii, having been started early in 1922. It sheltered bombers and fighter planes, and seven satellite fields were under its jurisdiction. Between Schofield and Pearl Harbor lay Kipapa Airfield, planned before the war, then dropped in favor of Kahuku Air Base, and eventually rushed to completion in 1942 as a fighter plane base. Not far from Schofield was the naval communications station at Wahiawa, the main radio receiving unit for the Pacific fleet. Commissioned December 21, 1941, it grew to be one of the largest naval radio installations in the world, and like many other Oahu posts, it constituted a small city in itself. The Army had three major and many minor radio installations on Oahu, some also in this area. On the far side of Schofield from Honolulu, in the Waialua region, were a half-dozen training areas. There was also the Mokuleia Airfield, later rechristened Dillingham Air Force Base, which was in use seven

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days after the Pearl Harbor attack. By April, 1942, its small grass and sand landing strip had become an 8,000-foot runway which later grew to 9,500 feet, the longest in the Islands. I t expanded so rapidly that it was considered a good example in speedy construction of airfields of this type; Windward Oahu, from Kahuku to Waimanalo, had two Army airfields, a big naval air station, eight training centers, two carefully concealed navy communication bases, and an emergency airfield with a steel landing mat which crossed the main highway at Kualoa. In prewar days, 1,500 acres of sand dunes and cane fields at Waimanalo had been converted into an auxiliary landing field and gunnery range manned by personnel from Wheeler and Hickam Fields. I n July, 1941, it became a permanent post known as Bellows Field, and with the outbreak of war it grew to a sizable plane base, staging area, and subdepot. Kahuku Field, surveyed late in 1941 and rushed to completion in 1942, saw heavy service as a pursuit plane and bomber field. I t was abandoned at the end of the war because of unsuitable soil conditions. Kaneohe Naval Air Station, on Mokapu Peninsula, was intended only as a small seaplane base when work was started on it in the late '30's. Civilian contractors started dredging and filling in September, 1939, but when the first hundred Navy men arrived just a year to the day before the Japanese attack, it was still muddy, wild, and devoid of comforts. With the outbreak of the war it became one of the Pacific's major naval air stations, eventually housing 18,000 officers and men. It was an important link in the supply line, a host to visiting air units, a training base, and an assembly and repair station. About one-sixth of its final area was new land built up of dredged coral. Kaneohe was defended by Fort Hase, established in March, 1942, on the tip of Mokapu. It was originally intended to garrison one or two battalions only, but it grew in size as its mission changed to headquarters command of the Windward Oahu training centers. The Waimanalo Amphibious Training Center near Bellows Field, which opened in July, 1943, trained 73,000 men in island warfare. Manana (Rabbit) Island, a short distance offshore, was a part of this center. On its near shore were constructed beach positions of logs, concrete, and sandbags, which troops stormed after crossing the short channel in landing craft. The large Unit Jungle Training Center—later known as the Unit Combat Training Center and then the Pacific Combat Training Center— was opened at Kahana Valley in September, 1943, and became the bestknown training area in the Pacific theater. Kaaawa Park, on the seashore near the mouth of the valley, provided a large flat area for camp headquarters and housing. Behind was the deep valley, broken by sharp

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ridges and mountain streams, and covered with rank vegetation. It was hot and steamy, in many ways more like the jungle battle grounds of the Solomons and New Guinea than like near-by areas on Oahu. Three hundred thousand men received training there. Training camps were opened late in 1943 at Kahuku, Waiahole, Heeia, Iolekaa, Fort Hase, and at the base of Oahu's famous Pali. All provided rugged terrain for jungle and ranger training. In the first months of the war, it was proposed to build on Oahu a naval radio station with sufficient range to reach ships off Australia and in the Indian Ocean and submarines off Japan. After a search for adjacent peaks to stretch a high antenna between, it was decided to use the 2,000-foot cliffs rearing up from the wild, horseshoe-shaped Haiku Valley, just to one side of the great Nuuanu Pali. One cliff was reached from the far side by hacking a trail from Red Hill. The other was accessible only by going straight up from Haiku. It took two experienced high scalers 21 days to cut footholes in the cliff and reach the top, a level piece of land no more than 12 feet wide, enveloped in mist and lashed by cold winds. They helped to place ladders, and then wooden stairs, over which workmen had to climb for three and a half hours before arriving at the summit. Later, aerial cars swept men and equipment up from the valley in only eight minutes. Meanwhile, in the valley itself, a tangle of hau trees was cleared for the station proper. The first messages were sent in August, 1943, about a year and a half after construction of the station had been proposed. The construction of the neighboring Naval communications station at Heeia was routine by comparison. BOTH THE ARMY AND THE NAVY burrowed far underground to build

some of their most important installations. Ten years before the Pearl Harbor attack, some tunnels were dug experimentally. In 1936, the Army started 18 ammunition storage tunnels at a cost of $1,500,000 and later $2,490,000 more was appropriated for such work, but this was only a forerunner of the underground work which later developed. In 1940, the Navy decided to bury its oil storage facilities, and in December ground was broken at Red Hill for a $4,000,000 underground fuel storage plant. It grew into a $42,000,000 project, and helped to make the Pearl Harbor area one of the great gasoline and oil storage centers of the world. Many of the defense workers who thronged to Hawaii early in 1941 worked at Red Hill. Among the 3,900 individuals who toiled in "Underground's" heat and darkness were hardrock miners from Colorado, expert tunnel men from Montana, Idaho, and Nevada, coal miners from Pennsylvania and West Virginia, and many local men, including hundreds of Japanese ancestry.

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Work was only well begun when war struck. Because of the vulnerability and inadequacy of existing facilities—one of the most critical situations the Navy command faced—Underground was given No. 1 priority over all construction jobs on Oahu. During the construction, dozens of men were injured and 16 killed —two by drowning in water which leaked into the cavern. By October, 1943, Underground offered sufficient oil storage space for Navy and Marine needs. Each of the 20 vertical tanks, its top 200 feet below the surface, was taller than a 20story building and held 250,000,000 gallons. In the cavern was a threemile narrow gauge railway. "The Hole," a $23,000,000 excavation beneath pineapple fields near Schofield, was even more secret than Underground. The entrance appeared to lead only to a small dugout in a rolling hill, but at the end of a quarter-mile tunnel two elevators—one big enough for 20 passengers and the other able to carry four 2 Vi-ton trucks—gave access to a threefloor structure, self-sufficient even to a cafeteria which could serve 6,000 meals a day. "The Hole" was intended for plane assembly, but since it was not needed for such use, it proved ideal for the reproduction of maps and charts. Its huge air conditioning and ventilating systems provided easy control of temperature and humidity, and its fluorescent lighting furnished a flood of shadowless illumination. The Army had major underground gas storage areas at Wahiawa and Kipapa. The Wahiawa area consisted of nine 40,000-barrel tanks, with pipe lines running nine and a half miles to Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field. At Kipapa Gulch four 62,000-barrel tanks were sunk in the earth. Most of the Army's underground ammunition storage was at Waikakalaua and Kipapa Gulches, but there were tunnels also at Bellows, Wheeler, Diamond Head, and Fort Hase. These were supplemented by 11 above-ground ammunition dumps, the largest at Kunia, where there were 59 metal igloos. The Navy built 120 tunnels, each 240 feet long, in the banks of Waikele Gulch in response to a 1942 directive to build "underground ammunition storage of major proportions" in a location that would be "both readily defended by and accessible to Pearl Harbor." An ordnance storage tunnel in the rim of Aliamanu Crater three miles west of Fort Shafter was converted into an Army-Navy command post. The remodeling, started in October, 1941, was far from complete when the tunnel was occupied on December 7 by the forward echelon of Island defense forces. Protected by 200 feet of rock and earth, top Army and Navy officials maintained their headquarters here for some months. Opening off a main tunnel big enough for a truck to pass through were

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20 rooms, including a large communications room 115 feet long. There were more rooms on a lower level. Five other bomb-proof and gas-proof shelters were built early in 1941 near permanent military posts to house the principal military telephone exchanges and radio receiving and transmitting stations, and to provide headquarters for commanding officers, Currency prepared for the projected Japanese, Korean, and Formosan invasions was stored by the Navy in a vault in Punchbowl reached by an 80-foot tunnel from the crater floor. This had been built early in 1942 by the Bishop National Bank for the storage o f valuable securities. ON THE NEIGHBOR ISLANDS, most Army camps were small, since men were scattered widely in defensive detachments. Navy stations and Marine camps, however, had to be large to accommodate concentrations of personnel. Maui had the Navy Demolition Training Station, a large Marine camp, and two naval air stations. NAS, Puunene, was the second oldest naval air station in the Islands, having begun operations in 1939 on a field known as Maui Airport. Throughout 1940, planes from Puunene had flown mail and passengers to Pearl Harbor daily, and the station had also provided the fleet with targets for anti-aircraft firing. There was some gradual expansion during 1941, but after December 7, barracks, warehouses, hangars, revetments, recreation centers, and mess halls mushroomed over large areas o f the wind-swept Puunene plain. Many air groups which won fame in the South and Central Pacific received final training there. A large service department kept planes in condition, and a dispensary cared for Navy men from all over the island. NAS, Kahului, established in March, 1943, as a maintenance station for fleet units, was host to a continual influx o f carrier planes. I t was also a training and staging station and served as the central fuel storage and supply depot for all naval activities on Maui. The home o f the 4th Marine Division was Camp Maui, two miles above the town o f Haiku. There were also 47 Marine training areas on the island, some as far as 25 miles away from the home camp. The 16,000 to 19,000 men o f the division maneuvered through bamboo forests, in deep gulches, and across rolling hills; they practiced amphibious landings at Malaaea Bay. Off duty, they swamped the towns o f Wailuku, Kahului, and Lahaina, as well as the smaller villages. Many more activities centered at Malaaea Bay. The Navy had a Combat Demolition Training Station at Kamaole and carried on important research work at Kihei. As early as 1940 it had constructed a building and installed equipment at Kihei Bay t o test anti-mine cables

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on warships. Later the building was used by the Carnegie Institute as an ionospheric station for radio research. Uninhabited Kahoolawe, six and three-fourths miles southwest of Maui, became "the most shot-at island in the Pacific." The Navy, which leased the island for a dollar a year, set out a dummy runway with fake aircraft, and painted rocks and revetments as targets for ships, planes, and landing forces. Kahoolawe was the largest and most isolated of three Navy target areas in the Islands, the other two being Ilio Point, on the northern end of Molokai, and Mokuhooniki Rock, off Molokai's eastern tip. Molokai also had a small naval air station at Homestead Field. Lanai had only small defense detachments. The island of Hawaii's biggest camp, called Camp Tarawa by the 2nd and 5th Marines, was at Parker Ranch, Kamuela. From here, the Marines maneuvered in dry, sandy terrain similar to that which the 5th was to find at Iwo Jima; they practiced amphibious attacks on near-by beaches; and they underwent jungle training in Pololu and Honokane Valleys. Navy activities on the Big Island centered at the Hilo Naval Air Station, opened in August, 1943, but not completed until July, 1944. Its jurisdiction in 1945 included a naval air station on the site of a small commercial field at Upolu Point in Kohala. One of the Coast Guard's two Loran (long range navigation) stations in the territory was at Upolu Point, the other being on Kauai at Port Allen. Coast Guard headquarters on Hawaii were established at the Hilo Customs House. On Kauai, the Army established headquarters first at Kukuiolono Park and then in the McBryde plantation manager's home at Kalaheo. Mana Airport was built by the Army on the long hard surface of the famous Barking Sands. The Navy and Coast Guard took over the whole Nawiliwili waterfront. The Marines, in addition to their normal complement, occasionally housed large numbers of men at Wailua Park for brief recreational stays. The upper lands of Anahola held a small jungle training center. Amphibious training was given for a short time at Hanalei Bay, and later along the western shore at Waimea, Port Allen, and Hanapepe. The William Hyde Rice home at Lihue, first a headquarters for the WARDs, later provided overnight accommodations for GI's on leave. On isolated Niihau, a small Army communications post was set up about two weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack. Residents patrolled the the island until more troops arrived just before the battle of Midway. The reinforcements brought with them four jeeps, the first motor vehicles ever used on the island. Since only a few visitors had been previously permitted on Niihau, the haole servicemen were strange to the almost

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exclusively Hawaiian population, and there was little fraternization. But despite stories to the contrary, the services were not hindered in their activities. The Niihau Ranch sampan carried Army supplies and personnel, and ranch boats helped Navy ships at the landing. The ranch furnished camp sites and buildings, loaned saddle horses, and organized wild pig hunts so that the troops might have fresh pork. After the Midway battle, the soldiers from the Mainland were replaced, though in lesser numbers, by Island troops. Later in the war, a Coast Guard station was established on the island. Stretching off northwest from Niihau lie the nearly submerged reefs of French Frigate Shoal, some 500 miles nearer Midway than any of the rest of the Hawaiian Islands. Because the fighter planes of 1942 were unable to cover the distance from Hawaii to Midway in a single hop, an intermediate landing and refueling field was planned for the shoal. This strange operation involved not only building an airfield; it meant first creating permanently dry land by dredging fill from the bottom of the ocean. Workers lived on the Inter-Island steamer Mauna Loa, anchored off the reef, until there was enough dry land to pitch tents on. Just as the project was nearing completion late in 1942, expendable wing tanks increased flying range of planes to such an extent that the airfield was not needed.

CHAPTER

FOURTEEN

W a r r i o r s in D u n g a r e e s SIDE BY SIDE WITH UNIFORMED PERSONNEL in H a w a i i toiled war

workers from every state in the union. At one time they numbered 82,000, a quarter of all the employed persons in the Islands. Nearly half of them worked directly for the Army and Navy, an equal number for Army and Navy contractors, and 6,000 for federal agencies. At times thousands more stopped on Oahu while on their way to or from other Pacific islands. There were administrators and professional men, clerical workers to handle the endless paper work, and thousands upon thousands of skilled and unskilled laborers—welders, mechanics, miners, and truck drivers. The latter, the first large group of Caucasians to do manual labor in Hawaii, added a new element to the social scene. They were the hard-working American men whose skill, endurance, and courage had contributed much to the country's industrial greatness. Many, however, were rough individuals who enjoyed their gambling, liquor, and loose women. Contractors found, indeed, that the quiet steady family man with strong home ties was a poorer risk as a Pacific war worker than the tough independent man who was accustomed to construction camp life in remote parts of the world. Men who had knocked around in Alaska, Arabia, South America, and Africa converged on Hawaii for a new experience. So did teenagers who had never before been more than a few miles from home. Few women came to the Islands as war workers until 1944, when the Army brought in many for the air depots or other installations. The services had gradually added to their civilian forces during the late 1930's. On November 5, 1940, the first large group of defense workers from the Mainland was brought in by the Navy, 895 to work in Hawaii and 100 to continue later to other Pacific islands. The Army brought its first group from the Coast in January, 1941. 233

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O n December 7 there were about 30,000 defense workers on O a h u — 6,300 working for the Army, 3,000 for Army contractors, 8,800 for the Navy, and 12,000 for Navy contractors. Within a few months, many more persons were hired both locally and on the Mainland, and 1,500 civilian mechanics were transferred from Patterson Field, Dayton, Ohio. The peak o f Army employment came late in 1942, when 17,000 persons were working for the Army Engineers, 7,400 for the Hawaiian Constructors, 3,700 for the Army air depots, mostly at Hickam Field, 1,500 at ground force depots, and 1,200 in administrative offices. About 75 per cent o f the total force were in construction work, and 15 per cent in mechanical, assembly, machine shop, and related activities. Gradually, Army employment declined about 10 per cent. Except for some 2,000 or 3,000, all the Army workers were on Oahu. Employment in the 14th Naval District, which included certain other Pacific islands as well as Hawaii, increased to about 37,000 persons in 1 9 4 3 — 2 5 , 0 0 0 o f them at Pearl Harbor—and remained more or less steady until the end o f the war. Another 25,000 were employed by Navy contractors when their work was at its height. Local workers for the Army outnumbered those from the Mainland about three to one, while the Navy ratio was almost exactly reversed. THE UNITED STATES ENGINEER DEPARTMENT played a tremendous role, both in furthering the Pacific offensive and in bloating Island economy. Its total wartime expenditures in Hawaii, exclusive o f the payment o f troops, exceeded $400,000,000. For several years, it was Hawaii's biggest employer, and in the fall o f 1943 had on its payroll some 2 0 , 0 0 0 men hired locally and 5,200 brought from the Mainland. Since Army construction was then rapidly nearing completion, the number was cut in half by J u n e o f 1944. Signs sprouted everywhere to mark " U S E D C A R P A R K I N G " or " U S E D B A S E Y A R D . " T h e Engineers took over so much property and material in the Islands that the joke arose: "Lucky the J a p s took Wake before the Engineers got it; it will be easier to get it back." The Engineers and their contractors were constantly the subjects o f news stories and word-of-mouth rumors. They had a faculty for treading on civilian toes, and stories o f grotesque inefficiency and even o f connivance with German aliens grew in the telling. Official investigations revealed many instances o f inefficiencies, official indiscretions, defaulted agreements, and notorious delays. But the Engineers were working against severe hardships, despite which they achieved outstanding results in all the main Hawaiian Islands and on countless bits o f important land to the south and west. As one Engineer worker told an investigating committee:

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We had airfields to build, we had ammunition storage to build, war storage for gasoline on five different islands. Every damn thing was important, and one job would be hot today and probably another job hotter tomorrow, depending upon the using agency putting pressure on a certain job. Consequently, there was a certain amount of . . . fumbling of the ball. . . . We were trying to do three years' work in one year, under difficult circumstances, and I think everybody did their darndest.

During 1941, the most important undertakings were airfields in Hawaii and on the ferry routes to the Philippines, and air raid warning stations and underground installations on Oahu. With the coming of war, the work centered on repair of damage, lengthening Island fields to accommodate larger planes, and construction of stepping stones for planes going south to Australia. Then followed new defenses, military posts, pillboxes, roads, bridges, trails, pier facilities, recreation centers, hospitals, and all the multitudinous installations needed to support the offensive. Just to provide materials, the Engineers had to set up eight mills for fabricating lumber, furniture, sheet metal, cement products, and other goods. The Engineer story is intricately interwoven with that of the contractors who worked for them, and especially the Hawaiian Constructors. This group of coadventurers was comprised of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Gunther and Shirley Company, and Rohl-Connolly Company, later joined by the Honolulu firms of Ralph E. Woolley and Hawaiian Contracting Company, Limited. The original contract with the Engineers for $1,097,000, signed December 20, 1940, expanded by 52 supplements to a total of $112,000,000 before it was completed in January, 1943- When the contract was terminated, all the employees of the Constructors were absorbed by the Engineers, who continued construction with their own troops and civilian workers, and under lumpsum contracts let to local bidders. These local contracts during the war period numbered 120 and aggregated almost $8,500,000. Another large contractor for the Engineers was Territorial Airport Constructors, composed of the firms of Callahan, Gunther and Shirley, and Paul Grafe. Together with the Hawaiian Constructors, this group early in 1941 signed an airport development contract with the Engineers for $1,800,000. By the time this work ended in 1944, $7,170,000 had been spent. The St. Louis consulting firm of Sverdrup and Parcel, which also worked for the Engineers, opened an office in Honolulu to direct design and supervision of seven phases of Army work. Many Island men worked on this firm's projects, which included airfields and other installations on two aircraft ferry routes from Honolulu to Australia. The Engineers took over one of Honolulu's favorite night spots, the Young Hotel roof garden, for their offices. They commandeered

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the Pleasanton Hotel and gave the guests, including an admiral and other high naval officers, peremptory orders to move. According to the hotel's manager, they literally threw chairs and tables out the windows to make way for furniture transferred from the more lavish Royal Hawaiian Hotel. They stacked unsightly material in grassy parks. They established "that noisy motor pool" in a residential area, where ponderous caterpillars, steam shovels, and other heavy equipment thundered in and out at all hours of the day and night. And, worst of all, they and the Hawaiian Constructors "occupied" Honolulu's most exclusive school, centuryold Punahou. The story still occasionally appears in print in Honolulu that the Engineers were bound for either the University of Hawaii or McKinley High School and stumbled onto the big Punahou campus by mistake. At any rate, Punahou had no notice of their coming until the quiet and darkness of the early hours of December 8 were broken by the roar and bright lights of Engineers' equipment. Punahou's president writes: The keys not coming forth fast enough, the doors in the various buildings were broken open and the United States Engineers entered. . . . Trucks, automobiles and buses came rolling into the campus amid confusion. Buildings were ordered cleared of their contents. . . . At 5 o'clock the director of the cafeteria and dining room was called in order to provide breakfast for 750 men and was told that the facilities of her department were being taken over, including school supplies. . . . The telephone operator was called from her home to take charge of the switchboard. The director of the boys' dormitory was told to get his boys out and to make his place ready for occupancy of officers. The director of Castle Hall received similar orders with respect to the girls. . . . The occupancy of Punahou School aroused a tremendous protest from graduates, parents and friends. . . . O n e prominent alumnus asserted loudly at the Pacific Club at luncheon that if he had been a trustee the Engineers would have entered Punahou only over his dead body. Unfortunately, no one thought to point out to him at the time that that was just exactly what the Engineers would have done had he been there to prevent their entrance.

Two days after the Engineers had taken the Punahou property, the trustees received a three-sentence letter informing them that "The forces of the United States District Engineers have occupied the grounds" for an indefinite period. Honolulans heard, and many still believe, that doors were chopped down, windows were broken, valuable pianos in the music school were placed out in the rain, and a statue of Venus de Milo was discarded because "it was already broken; its arms were off." But the school itself says that while wear and tear was considerable, actual losses were negligible. Some books were handed out the windows to workers who carried them to near-by trucks to save a longer trip through the front door—and so the rumor began that irreplaceable volumes were being dumped out the windows onto the rain-swept lawn. In placing a barbed-

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wire fence around the grounds, workmen mutilated the night-blooming cereus hedge which is the pride and joy of Punahou, and of all Honolulu as well. Said Punahou's president: "For two or three days it seemed as if the Pacific war were a small event in comparison to the partial destruction of the cereus hedge." Punahou faculty members hastened to help the war workers, and some found themselves on the payroll of the Hawaiian Constructors as typists, bus boys, and cook's helpers for a few weeks until school reopened. An English teacher did such a good job that his boss offered to get him a headwaiter's post in San Franciso at $300 or $400 a month. In May the Engineers formally leased the campus for a monthly rental of $20,000, later reduced to $12,500. It was not until the fall of 1944 that two classes of Punahou returned to their quarters and another year before all the grades were again in session on their own campus. NAVY

PROJECTS ALSO WERE

HANDLED

by

a combination

of

big-

time construction firms which banded together under the title of Contractors, Pacific Naval Air Bases, popularly known as "The Eight Companies" or as "CPNAB." The first contract was signed in August, 1939, by the Hawaiian-Turner-Raymond combination—the Hawaiian Dredging Company of Honolulu, the Turner Construction Company of New York, and the Raymond Concrete Pile Company of New York, all veteran Navy contractors. In July, 1940, a new contract was signed, with two companies added to the group—Morrison-Knudson Company of Idaho, which had worked on the Boulder Dam and which was to be assigned the Midway work, and J . H. Pomeroy and Company, Inc., of San Francisco, specialists in steel. Before the end of 1940, work had started on a score of projects — tremendous undertakings in the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, Maui and Molokai naval air stations, housing for officers at Makalapa, the Red Hill Underground, and facilities on Western Pacific islands. In 1941 CPNAB became the world's largest construction venture. The final accessions to the syndicate's membership came with the addition of the Utah Construction Company of Ogden, which was assigned to work in Samoa, the W. A. Bechtel Company of San Francisco, which took over the Philippines job, and the Byrne Organization of Dallas, which started with the Aiea Hospital job and later did much housing construction. Wake was assigned to Morrison-Knudson, and Guam to Pomeroy. Many of their construction men who had passed through Honolulu briefly or had been transferred from jobs here, and 50 or more Island men, became prisoners of the Japanese when Wake, Guam, and the Philippines fell.

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CPNAB assumed scores of additional Navy projects during the next year and doubled its personnel to about 25,000. Innumerable subcontractors and some other local contractors, particularly E. E. Black, Ltd., James W. Glover, and Ralph E. Woolley, gave aid on certain jobs. When the syndicate was closed out at the end of December, 1943, total construction and procurement costs had exceeded $692,000,000. Some of its members, as separate companies, continued to work under individual contracts. Hawaiian Dredging undertook much of the harbor improvement work, and Byrne Organization handled many large building contracts. The Construction Battalions, which were being rapidly developed by the Navy, worked in cooperation with the CPNAB during the latter part of 1943 and finally relieved it of naval construction. Known first as CB's and then as Seabees, these specialized sailors were men who had been trained in civilian life for construction work. They poured into Hawaii in increasing numbers after 1943, some pushing forward local construction and others training here for their work on western islands. Many middle-aged Seabees met their own sons stationed in combat units on Oahu. The Kaiser-owned Permanente Cement Company opened a Honolulu office in September, 1941, after it had begun to supply all the cement used in Navy construction projects in the Pacific area. The firm built pipe lines and railway tracks, storage warehouses, and facilities for docking vessels carrying bulk cement. Honolulu became the distributing point for millions of bags of cement which poured into pillboxes, drydocks, bombshelters, airfields, underground storage tanks, and fortifications throughout the Pacific. Eventually more than a quarter of the production of Permanente—the largest cement-producing unit in the world—was handled through the Honolulu depot. The company chartered two vessels, the Permanente and Phillippa, to the CPNAB to haul cement, materials, and men. After the construction peak was over, these ships carried civilian travelers. Many Islanders who crossed the Pacific in the latter years of the war have memories of the crowded Permanente. The Pacific Bridge Company, one of the world's largest construction companies, rushed Pearl Harbor drydocks No. 2 and 3 during 1941. Later they built drydock No. 4 and worked on a marine railway project with CPNAB. During the last few months of the war, it was planned that the Missouri Valley Bridge and Iron Company replace Navy personnel in some ship repair work. The firm transferred some civilian workers from its Mainland jobs, but these were just beginning to arrive in substantial numbers when peace came.

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THE STORY OF THE WAR WORKERS and the community is not a happy one. The importees came with high expectations. They found chaotic conditions, and complained about Hawaii. Many from the South brought concepts of white superiority. Islanders sometimes ignored and sometimes resented the war workers. Many lived in barracks in isolated camps; others found their own quarters in crowded residential areas; but most lived in housing projects provided by the Army and Navy. Locally hired employees of the Engineers were not provided with housing, but 2,000 of the Engineers' workers from the Mainland were housed in six main camps: at Punahou, old Kamehameha School, Fort Hase, Waikakalaua, Camp Barrette, and Mokuleia. Many CPNAB workers lived in camps near their work. Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor employees lived in the big housing projects which had been started early in 1940 and now sprouted like mushrooms in former cane fields between the Damon Tract of Honolulu and the Pearl Harbor gate. Largest of such projects were Hickam Housing, built by the Army for workers at the air depot, and Civilian Housing Area 3 of the Navy, popularly called CHA-3. The latter, a city of single men, became the third largest community in the territory, with a population larger than that of Las Vegas, Nevada, or Montpelier, Vermont. Naval Housing 1 and 2 had been built for Navy families, but when the families were evacuated early in the war, the quarters were used for married defense workers, as well as for single men, four or six to a room. Area 4 on Moanalua Ridge housed Seabees until July, 1944, when it was turned over to war workers. The fifth area, Makalapa, was occupied by officers. The first defense workers to arrive in the territory had been housed in old Kamehameha School buildings, which later became a part of the Farrington High School campus. The remodeling of the former classrooms was only partially completed when the 895 men arrived. Furniture and beds were scattered about, and bedlam reigned. Workers were moved from these buildings to the Navy's Civilian Housing in June, 1941, but confusion continued. At the outbreak of war the projects were only partly completed and wholly inadequate, and accommodations never did catch up with the influx of workers. The housing areas were dusty in dry weather and incredibly muddy in wet weather. Dormitories were overcrowded with double-decker bunks, and the mess was poor. There was a shifting population: CHA-3 sometimes had 3,000 to 5,000 arrivals and departures a week. Until the war was well along, there were no stores, few recreation facilities, few comforts. Blackout and curfew prevented men from leaving the area after work. Some men told USO entertainers who visited the area that they hadn't seen a woman for months.

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Chief complaints concerned undesirable roommates and nightly orgies by habitual drinkers and gamblers. The best solution authorities could find was to house the undesirables in separate barracks and, in extreme cases, to evict them from the area. Those evicted found housing in Honolulu and did their bit there to add to the poor reputation of the war workers. Newer barracks provided lounges, writing rooms, and recreation halls, but these rooms often had to be transformed into dormitories to care for more arrivals. As accommodations were completed, and occupants shifted from one to another, grumbling resulted. This came to a head in 1946 after most of the single men had returned to the Mainland. Married civilian workers were moved from Naval Housing Areas 1 and 2 to CHA-3 to make way for the families of uniformed personnel for whom the areas were originally intended. Civilian families then protested that they had moved as many as eleven times in five years "at the will and pleasure of every new officer assigned to administer housing," that the CHA-3 quarters were smeared and stained with several years' accumulation o f mud, and that stoves and refrigerators were badly damaged by past abuse. POOR HOUSING CONDITIONS—coupled with wartime pressures, limited community and recreational facilities, martial law controls, and shifting personnel policies—erupted in complaints, slowdowns, inefficiency, excessive absenteeism, and high turnover. Even before the war, early in December, 1941, it had been estimated that two out of five defense workers had changed jobs since arriving in the I slands and that one of every five had already returned home. Many war workers came to the Islands bursting with a patriotism which later turned to cynicism. Conscientious workers complained o f days spent doing nothing. Some men who had come to escape from domestic difficulties or the police found that distance only added to their problems. Some were attracted by high wages, which disappeared in the attempt to maintain themselves here and their families on the Mainland. Others came in search of peacetime tourist glamor and instead found blackout, congestion, and liquor control. There were also those who came to escape the draft, only to find themselves in almost as unenviable a position as many servicemen but without the advantages o f the uniform. Many workers had come in poor physical or mental health. Three hundred of the 1,200 brought to Hawaii by the Hawaiian Constructors in January, 1942, were sent back to the Mainland within 60 days because of physical defects. But other ailing workers stayed, and both service

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and civilian medical facilities were strained by the increased load. One worker in his 60's, for example, had false teeth, a glass eye, arthritis, arteriosclerosis, and a leg ulcer. At one time, Army and Navy civilian employees occupied 25 per cent of the beds in civilian hospitals, and constituted 30 per cent of the patients of one of the city's large medical clinics. In 1943 they comprised 43 per cent of the male admissions to the Honolulu tuberculosis hospital. What the board of health president called "a rather notable number of unstable alcoholic, psychoneurotic or psychopathic individuals" further taxed the overcrowded facilities for the mentally ill. Medical social service workers were alarmed, for defense workers usually had no friends or relatives here and no financial resources. The attitude of the employers was often one of indifference, usually because of pressure of other worries. Recruiters often made extravagant promises in their efforts to meet ever-increasing quotas. Frequently workers hired as common laborers complained that the promise of upgrading upon arrival had not been fulfilled. Others expected unlimited overtime, but after April, 1942, a general order required that there be one day off in seven and no more than 48 hours of work a week except in emergencies. When emergencies did occur, it was not unusual for men to work 11 hours a day, with no time off for a month or more. Then there were complaints of excessive overtime. Although the territorial department of labor and industrial relations had no jurisdiction over the matter, it received hundreds of protesting callers a month: Most of these men had signed contracts on the mainland—apparently without reading the fine print—and afterwards repented of their bargain. They complained of being paid wages lower than they had been promised, of being put to work on jobs far beneath their capabilities, of being put to work at jobs beyond their physical capacity. They complained bitterly of personnel policies, of discrimination because of union membership, of deductions from their wages which they branded as illegal, of poor housing conditions and of unsavory and unpalatable food, of lack of laundry and bathing facilities, of unjust and cruel treatment of foremen; they complained of chest pains and back pains, and flat feet; they complained because they were discharged with prejudice and therefore couldn't find work with another government agency, nor could they obtain transportation out of the Territory.

They complained to the newspapers, wrote letters to the governor and military governor, and used their own news sheets to voice their woes. Deploring the difficulty in getting to Honolulu before bank closing hours, the Red Hill Weekly said, "You can't deposit your money in a bank or send it away but there is a law that makes it a penal offense to carry or keep over $200 in cash." Workers appealed many points to the OMG section of labor control, but few obtained any relief. On their return to the Mainland, hundreds brought successful civil suits against

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their former employers. Intensifying the difficulties was homesickness: single men lacked feminine companionship, and married men were lonely for their wives and families at home. In the fall of 1942 the Chamber of Commerce looked into the situation and conducted a series of meetings. It heard pleas for good food well served, time enough to eat in comfort, reasonable shopping opportunities, a greater variety of recreation, better transportation from the housing areas to Honolulu, personal services such as laundry at reasonable rates, and dependable mail. "The situation in Honolulu is no trivial matter exaggerated by "war nerves'," said the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. "[it needs] immediate, vigorous, determined and sympathetic attention." It was felt that easing of the blackout would solve many problems, so a committee called on the military governor to discuss this and other possible remedies. The committee was told that the problem was not so serious as presented and that there could be no change. Stores were urged to stay open until 6:00 P.M. on Thursdays and until noon on Sundays. Some complied, but others pointed to the problems of their own employees, who needed time to shop, get dinner, and finish their home duties before blackout time. As a result of the Chamber of Commerce meetings, a War Workers' Coordinating Council was formed, representing six areas: Barber's Point, Ewa, and Waipahu; Kaneohe, Kailua, and Bellows Field; Red Hill; Pearl Harbor; Hickam Field; and Wahiawa. Though it gave an opportunity for the voicing of complaints, the council found it could accomplish little. War controls made it impossible to remedy most of the factors which caused complaints. The War Workers Service Bureau* was established to deal with problems on an individual basis. After about four months, most of its work was transferred to the department of public welfare, which was already handling many similar cases. Other phases of its work were taken over by a welfare office opened by the Red Cross at CHA-3, which was later continued as a joint project of the Red Cross and the Child and Family Service. After the end of the war, it was developed into a separate social agency known as Community Services, CHA-3. For some months in 1943, a War Workers Food Clinic, manned each afternoon by volunteers at the board of health building, answered questions of men who for the first time in their lives had to prepare their * Sponsors of this bureau were the War Workers' Coordinating Council, Honolulu Council of Social Agencies, USO War Workers' Committee, YMCA, American Red Cross, United Welfare Fund, Board of Health, Department of Public Welfare, Child and Family Service, Hospital Social Service Association, U. S. Employment Service, and the Police Department.

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own meals. Typical questions were: "What can I take in my lunch kit besides dry sandwiches and coffee?" "Fried foods get mighty tiresome; what can I cook besides chops and hamburgers?" A high civil service official who came from the Mainland to investigate working and living conditions was critical of the community. While he admitted that some war workers were "professional hell raisers" and others were "griping about inconveniences which they should be willing to endure in wartime," he pointed out that the complaints were too general to be merely the wails of malcontents. He said that too many war workers were treated as "Okies," interlopers, and draft dodgers, and were gypped by get-rich-quick merchants. He warned that unless the dissatisfaction decreased rapidly, Hawaii might not have sufficient manpower to complete its military construction and operate its huge repair bases. He also added, as an afterthought, that the greatest single step which could be taken to raise morale would be establishment of better grievance procedures in each operating agency. His announcement evoked a roar of protest from newspapers and government officials, best summarized in the comment that he was "passing the buck for his agency's recruiting failure." In some ways conditions grew better, despite increasing congestion. Roads at housing sites were improved, stores and recreational facilities were opened, and wives were allowed to join their husbands in Hawaii if they, too, would take defense jobs. Some of the contractors improved their personnel policies. During the last two years of the war, the Army and the Navy took definite steps to improve recruitment procedures, physical examinations, working conditions, and grievance machinery. Originally, each Army agency was responsible for its own administration of civilian employment, but in March, 1943, a consolidation was effected and gradual changes led to the establishment of the Army Office of Civilian Personnel. J o b descriptions were written, wage rates adjusted, and standardized procedures established. The Navy also expanded its personnel activities, in cognizance of the frequent complaint that employees with grievances were buffeted about from one authority to another, and that "the less intelligent you are at the navy yard, the better you get along." Both Army and Navy literature, issued for distribution on the Mainland to prospective workers, warned that "the Paradise of the Pacific is closed for the duration" and "the ever-present line may not have originated in Hawaii, but it has grown to man-size in the islands." Complaints still continued. A high Navy official sent from Washington to make a new investigation heard the same old stories, but believed that the "No. 1 gripe" among the civilian workers was Hawaii's two

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per cent income tax. Workers claimed that they paid taxes in their own states and received no benefits from the territorial taxes because they lived and worked in military areas. I n 1942, following protests by federal employees over payment of the territorial welfare tax, the territorial supreme court and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Territory had the right to tax federal employees. The wails grew again after the 1943 legislature replaced the welfare tax with a two per cent tax on compensation and dividends. Newspaper "Letters from the People" columns bulged with protests. A few workers, arrested for nonpayment, were given suspended sentences when they did pay up. But thousands bragged that they would not pay, and enforcement was impossible. Workers wrote to their representatives in Congress, and a Missouri congressman asked the governor of Hawaii to have the law changed. A committee of Pearl Harbor and Hickam workers took the issue of the two per cent tax to the courts, but the validity of the assessment was upheld by territorial courts and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. I n May, 1949, the United States Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal. Workers were given transportation to their Mainland homes after completion of their agreements, but those quitting or discharged "with prejudice" forfeited their return transportation and, prevented by labor controls from obtaining other war work, often became a community problem. Social workers urged a more liberal policy of granting releases in cases of personal emergencies. The director of the department of public welfare wrote to the Navy, pointing out the growing burden placed on the community by stranded war workers, and suggesting that relaxation of employment practices in individual instances might eliminate many cases of distress. The commandant of the 14th Naval District replied that "wide divergence from the contracts would result in conditions beyond the legal financial responsibility of the Navy and produce an unstable labor situation." Moreover, he said, the problem was a community responsibility in view of the Territory's levy of the public welfare tax on the payrolls of war workers and the liberal contribution of the workers themselves to the USO and United Welfare Fund. He asserted that the tax payments amply covered the cost incurred due to "problems introduced by a small percentage of war workers." Byrne Organization also suggested to the Territory that it use the two per cent tax money to care for discharged workers. Federal funds of the civilian war assistance program were made available in October, 1942, to send stranded war workers back to the Mainland. About $35,000 was expended in this manner, mostly in 1945.

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A department of public welfare study showed the following about the average applicant for such assistance: he had been an employee of the Navy; he was age 40 to 49; he had a wife and two children on the Mainland; he was physically or mentally unqualified for his job; he had been unable to save enough for emergencies; he had been in Honolulu about three months before applying for passage home. One-third had been earning between $1.50 and $1.67 an hour. Despite their difficulties, Hawaii's war workers turned in a magnificent job. The civilian workers shared responsibility with uniformed personnel in building defenses, repairing damaged ships and planes in record time, and generally speeding the offensive. In contrast to some other commentators, an assistant secretary of the Navy said that he had never seen better spirit and finer work than he found at Pearl Harbor. The volume of work at Pearl Harbor more than doubled between 1943 and 1945, but the number of workers remained about the same. The coveted Army and Navy " E , " awarded to commercial and government plants which contributed in an outstanding manner to the national effort, came to Hawaii 17 times. It was first conferred on the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard by James V. Forrestal, Under-Secretary of the Navy, at a ceremony at 8:30 A.M., Sunday, September 6, 1942. For the first time since the war began, a half-hour layoff was allowed. The " E " pennant was raised over the yard, and each Pearl Harbor worker was given the right to wear the blue and gold lapel button. Subsequently the navy yard received four stars signifying renewals of the award. The United States Naval Ammunition Depot on Oahu was given the " E " with five stars, the Hawaiian Air Depot the " E " with three stars, and the CPNAB and the Pacific Bridge Company each won it once. The Hawaiian Constructors won Army commendations and even the muchcriticized District Engineer in charge of the USED at the start of the war received the Distinguished Service Medal.

CHAPTER

FIFTEEN

Off Duty in " P a r a d i s e " THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SERVICEMEN and defense workers

arrived in Hawaii expecting soft moonlight, waving palms, sunny beaches, and beautiful girls. The moonlight and palms were there, but the beaches were crowded with humanity and strung with barbed wire. As for the girls—there was one to each hundred men, or one to a thousand, according to which story you heard. Hawaiian hospitality was so overtaxed that thousands of men thought it a myth. Islanders did entertain friends, sons of friends, friends of friends, and even chance acquaintances. I n fact, one Maui hostess estimated 20,000 servicemen enjoyed her hospitality during the war. But many men stayed in the Islands for months without making any civilian contacts, so they griped and moped, or drowned their woes in drink. They called Oahu "The R o c k " and said that if they never saw "Ha-way-yah" again it would be too soon. There is no doubt that they saw the Islands at a most unfortunate time. Not only were there too many men for individual hospitality, but lack of servants and pressure of war duties limited home entertainment, and blackout and curfew practically eliminated night life. Scarcity of manpower and materials gave Honolulu streets, buildings, and gardens a down-at-the-heel appearance. Wartime pressures made salesgirls careless and bus drivers rude. Some Islanders, and promoters from the Mainland, too, saw a chance to "get rich quick" at the expense of servicemen and defense workers. Hotel Street became one of the most famous thoroughfares in the Pacific, and River Street was its close second. Along one mile of Hotel Street and its intersecting streets was a honky-tonk town of cheap attractions for the hordes of fun-hungry visitors. Hawaiian souvenirs made on the Mainland could be bought for three times their value. Pictures could be taken with synthetic hula girls in any pose desired.

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Beer and hard liquor flowed freely. Houses of prostitution flourished even after they were officially closed. The owner of one entertainment gallery boasted that it was among the largest in the world, with more than 100 employees. While its swing band competed with the guns of the shooting gallery, the customers played pinball machines, drank cokes, or had their pictures taken. Tattoo shops etched anchors, American eagles, and pretty girls on 200 to 300 sailors and 100 or so soldiers and defense workers a day. Most of the goods sold and the amusements offered were cheap and shoddy. Even had they wanted to, the purveyors often could not have obtained better quality in the quantities they needed, but some of the proprietors took advantage of the situation. By 1945, the Army and Navy Joint Disciplinary Board was placing certain establishments out of bounds to servicemen, usually for such reasons as exorbitant prices, unethical or dishonest methods, unsanitary conditions, frequent fights, or the presence of questionable women. Some amusement centers were put off limits for offering games of chance in which the customers competed with skilled racketeers, others for encouraging servicemen to make phonograph records "to send the folks" despite the fact that regulations prohibited their shipment out of Hawaii, and still others for renting cameras to servicemen when film was not available. In marked contrast to the profiteering of the comparatively few get-rich-quick artists was the lavish hospitality of old Hawaii typified in the so-called "Tired Fliers Program." This began in May, 1942, with the invitation to private homes of small groups of pilots who needed relaxation after many hours on stand-by and patrol duty. Later, the guests also included submarine crews, pale and fatigued from long and arduous journeys, and airmen back in Hawaii from forward areas after 15 combat missions. Starting in a small way on Oahu with all-day parties, the program reached its greatest development in the spacious ranch and plantation homes of Maui, Molokai, Kauai, and Hawaii, some of which could accommodate 15 house guests at a time. Several of the 200 hosts had servicemen staying with them almost continuously. The homes which were opened for service guests were among the most beautiful in Hawaii. Some were in cool, green valleys; some at high altitudes where the brisk air was a welcome change; some even had private beaches. The men were fed, housed, and entertained for a minimum of five days at the hosts' expense. They had comfortable guest rooms and all the sleep they wanted; they were served the finest of fresh fruits and vegetables from private gardens and tender steaks from the ranches. There was usually a choice of activities which included picnics,

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bridge parties, dances, swimming in private pools, golf, tennis, fishing, horseback riding, deer and pheasant hunting, sight-seeing, visits to sugar mills, or participation in the exciting routine of ranch work. The hostesses spent many days planning menus and activities. They also met planes and wrote cheery letters to their guests' wives, mothers, or sweethearts. Some men returned to the same home again and again, and made many close friendships. With strain and fatigue relieved and morale built up, men returned to duty physically and mentally fit. SERVICEMEN HAVING HOBBIES or special interests were more fortunate than many who longed only for home and the girl they left behind. Service artists painted war scenes on their return from battle or roamed the Islands painting landscapes, and the best of their work was exhibited in art stores and at the Honolulu Academy of Arts. Those who could not paint used cameras, but they often had to tramp from store to store in search of scarce film. The Honolulu Academy of Arts was one of the country's most active museums in its work with men of the service. Attendance at the Academy skyrocketed as a result of visits by service personnel, who were provided educational programs, exhibits, and studios which they could use at will. A lanai, furnished with books, easels, and a phonograph, was placed at their disposal. Early in the war, the Academy found "a curious reluctance on the part of the artists in the armed forces to expose their talents. It is almost as if they want to forget the pleasures of their professional life until after their job of soldiering has been finished." But that attitude changed later in the war. Service artists entered their work in Academy shows, and several one-man exhibitions were held. Sixteen of the Academy's 26 musical programs in 1944 were given by servicemen, many of them outstanding musicians in their respective fields. Service bands, including among their members men from top name bands, played for the civilian public as well as on their own posts. The Royal Hawaiian Band, no longer permitted to play for the arrival and departure of ships, gave innumerable concerts at defense areas, service posts, and hospitals. It also gave occasional noon-hour concerts in the palace grounds and, after the most severe blackout conditions were lifted, early evening concerts in the parks. The Honolulu Symphony Orchestra brought overflow audiences to the McKinley High School auditorium for its five or six concerts each year. Sixty per cent of its members were from the services, some with experience with large symphony orchestras on the Mainland. From June, 1943, to May, 1946, the Library of Hawaii gave part of its space for a Musicians' Center which served as a liaison between civilian

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musicians and those in the service. Here servicemen had an opportunity to meet fellow musicians, to practice, and to obtain criticism of compositions. More than 250 public performances were arranged by the center, which supplied musicians for service and community organizations, and on one occasion even met a hurried request for a soloist for a WAVE'S wedding. The Library of Hawaii also opened a listening room in May, 1943, where visitors could play records or use a piano. Some 25,000 persons enjoyed the use of this room. The libraries of the territory adjusted their work to military needs, which more than made up for the loss of their regular patronage because of evacuations to the Mainland and preoccupation with war work. Reference librarians were kept exceedingly busy answering official inquiries, aiding men in technical studies, and seeking obscure information needed to win GI bets. The reading rooms were full most of the time, especially with men seeking their hometown papers. Although libraries subscribed to more and more papers, many soldiers looking for the Central Valley Gazette had to settle for the New York Times. Book trucks, which had been used to visit schools and rural districts, were sent to service units in remote areas. The Kauai librarian reported that the men were delighted to see outsiders and got as much pleasure from talking to librarians as they did from reading the books. On the islands other than Oahu, the public libraries worked closely with the services, as the Army and Navy did not extend their own library systems to those islands until midway in the war. By 1945, the Army Library Service had 500 portable libraries in the Central Pacific area, plus 57 in permanent or semi-permanent quarters. Most were on Oahu, some were elsewhere in Hawaii, and a few were on islands to the westward. Some soldiers in isolated spots in Hawaii or on far-distant islands found their chief recreation in studying the local flora and fauna, so different from those they had known at home. Bishop Museum answered innumerable letters and personal inquiries, sent instructions for building aquaria, and helped Red Cross workers organize nature study clubs. Commercial motion picture houses played almost continuously to capacity audiences. Until after the Battle of Midway, only daytime shows were allowed, but even when permission was granted to open during the early evening, congestion was not relieved because of the continual influx of newcomers. Not until July, 1945, when theaters were allowed to be open after 9:15 P.M., were two full evening shows possible. The 950-seat Kuhio Theater at Waikiki, finally opened in June, 1945, provided for an additional 3,800 theatergoers daily. The building had been almost ready for use when the war started, but before it could be opened as a theater it had been leased by the Navy for storage.

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Many commercial motion pictures were sent to service posts, and the Hawaiian branch of the Overseas Motion Picture Service of the Army was inaugurated in May, 1942, to distribute 16 mm. entertainment features and training films. As soon as regulations against large gatherings were lifted, sports boomed in sports-minded Hawaii. The extensive programs on the various posts did not begin to meet the demands, and the long lines waiting for admission to civilian events consisted largely of Navy whites and Army khaki. Receipts soared, often quadrupling prewar tops, especially for football, baseball, boxing, and wrestling events. Also popular were golf, tennis, swimming, bowling, and every other sport. Service teams sometimes played before civilian crowds, sometimes against community teams, and some servicemen played on civilian teams. Many nationally known sports stars performed in the Islands. For example, the baseball nine of the 7th Air Force had a star-studded roster, including S/Sgt. J o e DiMaggio, Yankee outfielder, and other major league talent. The churches of Hawaii furnished social contacts as well as spiritual guidance. Although regular services were conducted by chaplains wherever there were large groups of servicemen, many men preferred on occasion to join civilians in worship. It is estimated that 50 to 75 per cent of the attendance at civilian churches consisted of servicemen, and at some churches it was as high as 95 per cent. Servicemen and war workers belonged to choirs, took part in young people's gatherings, taught Sunday school, and made generous financial contributions. Servicemen attending Sunday lunches at some churches frequently numbered more than the civilians in the congregation. Some of the racial churches, especially those on the other islands, welcomed servicemen. These contacts were especially important in giving Mainland men an opportunity to know persons of the Pacific races. "Don't it beat hell, Jack?" a soldier was heard saying as he left a church service. "Here we are sent over to shoot t h e j a p s and about the first thing that happens we go to church with them." The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints purchased the former A. J . Campbell residence adjoining its Honolulu tabernacle. Renovated as Malamakoa Servicemen's Home, it provided overnight accommodations for 20 to 45 men at $1 a night. The Lutheran Service Center, in the former F. J . Lowrey home, offered accommodations for 25 men a night, and during 1944 served 20,000 men in various ways. The Hawaiian Mission, Seventh Day Adventists, rounded up a supply of almost unobtainable bicycles, which they rented to servicemen. St. Andrew's Cathedral had a "drop in" center which was open daily.

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The number of chaplains in the Hawaiian Department grew from 27 on December 7 to 150. They participated in many civilian gatherings, and there was frequent interchange of pulpits between civilian ministers and chaplains, and especially in the rural districts Jewish chaplains ministered to civilian congregations, since there were no synagogues in the Islands despite an increased number of Jewish civilians. Christian chaplains were called upon on a number of occasions to assist in Buddhist memorial services for AJA's killed in Italy. THOUGH SERVICEMEN WERE WELCOMED into the homes and beach houses of Island residents, and though Hawaii's peacetime facilities were thrown open to the service throngs, organized large-scale recreation programs were also required to meet entertainment needs. Faced with this overwhelming task were the USO—assisted by other community organizations—and the recreation branches of the services themselves. At the outbreak of the war, Hawaii already had a well-equipped and well-functioning Army and Navy YMCA, and for a half-century had been host to moderate numbers of servicemen. After the fleet arrived in 1940, the community intensified its entertainment efforts. Early in 1941, private funds were subscribed for Sunday afternoon "open houses" at the Library of Hawaii; in February a "Hospitality Week" for servicemen provided seven days of varied events; and in March the Mayor's Entertainment Committee started an extensive program. By August, Army, Navy, and civilian agencies were busy with an ever-increasing program of activities for the estimated 140,000 servicemen and defense workers then in the Islands. In October the work begun by the Mayor's Committee was taken over by the United Service Organizations which had been formed nationally that spring.* At first tours, dances, home parties, and entertainment were provided—chiefly in Honolulu—by civic and fraternal groups, churches, schools, and recreational agencies. The start of the war brought tremendous expansion, and the work took entirely new direction with the establishment of remote posts throughout the Islands. By the end of 1942, the U S O in Hawaii had extended operations to five islands, and had 80 professional employees, 400 camp show enter* The U S O nationally was composed of the Y o u n g Men's Christian Association, the Y o u n g Women's Christian Association, the National Catholic Community Service, the Jewish Welfare Board, the Salvation Army, and the National Travelers Aid Association. As the Travelers Aid was not established in the Islands, the sixth place on the local executive council was taken by the Army and Navy Y M C A . In Hawaii all clubs were operated by the overseas department of the U S O and staffed with persons affiliated with one or more of the participating agencies, whereas on the Mainland one agency usually had full operation of a club.

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tainers, and 2,000 volunteers in 51 clubs and units. By the end of the war, most of these figures had doubled with nearly 8,000 Island residents serving as USO volunteers, and 740 others on the paid staff. During the first year, 6,900,000 servicemen and war workers were entertained; in 1945, the number was 2,500,000 a month. During the four war years, total attendance in Hawaii was no less than 66,084,000. USO activities blanketed the Islands. The most comprehensive program went on at the Army and Navy YMCA in Honolulu, rechristened the USO Army and Navy Club. It was a terminus for busses from a number of posts and generally a scene of milling confusion. Rooms were available for overnight use, and in emergencies men slept on cots in the gymnasium and blankets on the floor. The 1944 program, with 649 events a month, scheduled everything from very popular classes in ballroom dancing to old-time silent movies and an auction of unclaimed articles left in the check room. The Information Hut on the grounds answered an average of 675 questions a day, kept registration books for men from each state, maintained a list of college and fraternity men, and ran a checking service for men not allowed to have cameras on their posts. The House of Mitsukoshi, a Japanese department store patterned after the 300-year-old Tokyo Mitsukoshi, was remodeled with $110,000 of Lanham Act funds and opened in November, 1943, as the USO Victory Club. In its first month, its attendance was greater than that at all other clubs in the city combined, with the exception of the Army and Navy USO. This club featured lunchtime dances with girls employed in the downtown business district serving as partners. It also produced several spectacular racial programs. A cavorting Chinese dragon was the main attraction in a parade held as a part of a Chinese program in February, 1944, the largest parade in Honolulu since the blitz. Fourteen Negro military units cooperated in a Pacific Jubilee which brought 28,000 persons to the center in a single day; 30,000 persons came to a Korean pageant. The Fort Street USO opened in the Columbus Welfare clubroom in February, 1942, as a small, intimate club. Its regular staff was augmented by volunteer Catholic hostesses, equally ready to sew on a chevron or admire a picture of a new baby. In April, 1945, the USO Rainbow Club, one of the most attractive units in Honolulu, started in quarters which had been converted from an auto showroom. Although designated for no particular group, it was regarded essentially as a club for Negro men. Yet it served thousands of other servicemen as well and proved an interesting development in interracial harmony. It attracted more than 186,000 men to a program featuring sports, music, and sight-seeing tours.

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Although planned before the end of the war, the Beretania USO was not opened until February 2, 1946, in the John P. Erdman residence, which had been purchased by the National Jewish Welfare Board for use as a peacetime J WB Army-Navy center. The USO was given the use of the beautiful beach homes of Princess David Kawananakoa at Kahuku, and of her sister, Senator Kamokila Campbell, at Nanakuli. Other USO clubs outside Honolulu were in the Kailua beach park pavilion, the Waialua plantation gymnasium, the Waipahu plantation recreation center, the Kahuku plantation bachelors' quarters, former Japanese language schools at Waimanalo, Waianae, Kaneohe, and elsewhere, and in numerous private homes and clubs. Some were lavishly furnished and set in beautiful grounds; some were crude and barren. Many provided the only recreation facilities in remote parts of the island. The only quarters especially built on Oahu for the USO were not completed until September, 1945, when Kamehameha and Halekoa were opened in Wahiawa. These brought the number of rural Oahu clubs to 19. There were always many servicemen on Oahu, but on the other islands, the rise and fall in the number of troops caused wide fluctuations in USO activities. Kauai's five clubs in 1942 served 150,000 men; in 1944, eight clubs entertained more than 2,000,000. In 1945, the USO called Kauai "the isle of uncertainty." One day early in January of that year, dawn revealed Nawiliwili harbor choked with LST's, starting Kauai's greatest wartime influx of servicemen. In April, they disappeared almost overnight. The USO rushed plans for new clubs and expanded activities expecting that Kauai would be used as a recuperation area for marines after the battle of Iwojima, but plans were changed, and the marines returned to Hawaii and Maui instead. So construction of the new USO clubs was halted and half of those in operation were closed. The island was quiet until August, when LCI's sailed into Nawiliwili and overflowed into Hanalei Bay, and again the USO's were filled to bursting. By September, the men were gone, and by the end of the year, only one USO was still open. The Isenberg USO was in the Lihue plantation recreation center; the Kapaa USO, which became famous for its waffle breakfasts, was in a village store remodeled and enlarged to care for the thousands of men from the near-by Fleet Marine Force camp. There were also USO's at Kalaheo, Hanapepe, Waimea, Koloa, and Hanalei. The Waterfront USO at Nawiliwili was housed in a former skating rink which the USO candidly described as a "dump." Even partial renovation midway in the war failed to overcome its physical deficiencies, but the program was reputed tops, nonetheless.

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USO activities on the Big Island began January 19, 1942, when an office was opened in Hilo, and soon two clubs in Hilo and ten in rural districts were established to serve throughout the war. A Chinese community hall became a servicemen's hostel, with 200 beds; a Catholic parish hall became the Haili Street USO. Hard luck struck the Hawaii USO's twice: in September, 1943, a fire damaged the Haili Street club, and the year-old downtown club was swept completely away in the 1946 tidal wave. Some rural clubs were principally rest and "chow" stops, which operated as full-time program centers when necessary. Big Island attendance swept from an all-time low of 49,000 in February, 1945, to an alltime high only three months later, when 391,000 crowded the buildings. Total attendance in 1945 was 2,300,000—four times that in 1943. The Honokaa USO started in the recreation room of a church; then moved to a two-story store. Its attendance of 43,000 in April, 1945, was seven times the average monthly attendance of 1944. Hawaii's busiest center, little Kamuela on the Parker Ranch, was visited by more than 3,000,000 men. Started in Barbara Hall in March, 1942, it later moved into a small store, which was renovated and enlarged by the addition of two wings. Five of every nine men going to a Big Island USO in 1944 went to Kamuela. Maui, with fewer clubs than Hawaii and Kauai, had a larger attendance, topping 2,600,000 in both 1944 and 1945. The extensive facilities of Alexander House Settlement at Wailuku were used by residents, war workers, and servicemen. The Crossroads USO at Makawao, formerly a dilapidated Chinese store, was renovated at the expense of a Maui woman, with a ranch and cowboy motif, into one of the most attractive clubs in the territory. The beautiful Haiku club was only ten months old when it burned to the ground early in 1945 after serving 158,000 men; it was later rebuilt. There were also Maui clubs in a former store at Kahului, a movie theater at Paia, a school library at Hamakuapoko, and miscellaneous buildings at Haleakala, Wailuku, Kahului, Lahaina, and other points. But figures tell only part of the Maui story. "The [Maui] USO wasn't confined to buildings marked United Service Organizations," says a report. "It was all over the island: in volunteers' homes, gardens, beach cottages . . . and in their hearts." The USO's task on Molokai was smaller, but it was big in proportion to the size of the island, especially at the peak of the program in 1943. The Molokai Community Center, turned over without rental to the USO in May, 1942, served as the heart of activities. Molokai's hunting and fishing resources were exploited to the full. There was USO activity on Lanai, too, when troops on the island were sufficient to require it.

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who paid informal visits at isolated posts—and groups of girls, such as the Flying Squadron, Hui Menehune, Varsity Menehunes, and a YWCA group, who served as dance partners at posts, camps, and hospitals. On some of the islands the Flying Squadron was composed of girls of many races, but on Oahu it was a Caucasian group, while the others were interracial. The groups averaged four or five dances a week each. Finding girls enough was a real problem. At one Kauai dance, for example, there were 64 girls and 600 GTs, and similar ratios were common on all the islands. The USO camp shows unit, started a month after the outbreak of war, produced 25 variety shows and collaborated with the Army Special Services on an additional five. These gave a total of 12,228 performances for 6,171,000 persons. In January, 1943, there were more than 400 performances on Oahu alone. After that, the load was lightened because the creation of an entertainment section by the Army Special Services department enabled the USO camp shows to concentrate on entertainment for Navy men and war workers. USO camp shows enrolled 400 professional and amateur entertainers locally; no performers arrived from the Mainland until June, 1943. To present their shows USO performers traveled in jeeps, trucks, station wagons, ships, and planes. Small groups of hula dancers went on pack mules to entertain men at isolated posts. One such group required two hours to travel 12 miles over a rocky and narrow trail to a small outpost at a 1,700-foot elevation. Another group went in GI reconnaissance cars to a ranch house where they donned riding outfits and rode three hours on horseback to a mountain camp. Some USO troupers, with full-time jobs during the day, played night after night on Oahu and used their vacations for jaunts to other islands. The larger posts had excellent stage accommodations. At smaller camps, performers changed costumes in tents, barracks, or hangars, and gave shows on improvised stages with trees or sand or sea as back-drops. The Honolulu Community Theatre worked closely with the USO and with the entertainment section of the Army Special Services. Less than three weeks after the start of the war, the Community Theatre's Ten Nights in a Bar Room provided welcome relief from tension. The groups produced 14 plays during the war, and profits from the public performances made possible approximately 250 free presentations before a total of 150,000 soldiers. The Doughgirls played 64 times, and other plays were repeated on Oahu and sometimes on the other islands as often as possible with casts whose volunteer acting supplemented daytime war jobs. The Community Theatre, always successful in obtaining rights to new plays

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still on Broadway, presented such New York hits as Junior Miss, Over 21, A Bell for Adano, and I Remember Mama. Racial groups gave programs to show their songs, dances, costumes, and folk tales to Mainland servicemen and defense workers, many of whom were totally unfamiliar with the Pacific area. Some of these were given in cooperation with the USO or other organized agencies; some were sponsored by private groups in their homes or at service hospitals. An active small group was the Hana Like club, organized October 1, 1944, by YWCA girls of Chinese ancestry, to furnish recreation for American-Chinese servicemen and servicewomen from the Mainland stationed in Hawaii. On the Big Island, the Hilo Community Players gave several one-act plays and a few more-ambitious productions, but had to struggle to obtain casts from a small population already dedicated to other war work. A representative of the organization showed sound motion pictures at Army camps six nights a week for more than a year, and three nights a week for many months after that. The USO-Salvation Army mobile canteen made its nightly rounds, carrying on its activities in the feeble light of blue-masked flashlights. It distributed newspapers and other articles, poured hot coffee and served doughnuts, and took cakes to servicemen celebrating birthdays. Servicemen, BMTC members, policemen, fire wardens, and other guards looked forward to cheery greeting and steaming coffee. Early in the war, entertainment groups sometimes accompanied the canteen. The Oahu canteen traveled more than 100,000 miles and served nearly 1,500,000 men before it made its last trip on September 30, 1945. Recreational activities were aided at times by the Red Cross motor corps and the Red Cross canteen, both of which had numerous other responsibilities as well. The canteen extended a Hawaiian aloha to servicemen arriving and departing at the Hickam air strip after March, 1944, and at the NATS airport after November of that year. For 24 hours a day, seven days a week, the canteen served pineapple juice and cookies and made thousands of box lunches to be carried on the planes. Much of the work was done by Island volunteers, although professional workers from the national Red Cross eventually took over the "graveyard" shift. Red Cross women also equipped and operated the Air Force Cottage at Hickam, a club where fliers were invited to "make themselves at home." The motor corps, besides furnishing transportation to recreational affairs for convalescents and occasionally for others, gathered and distributed more than a million magazines. Because shipping conditions limited the amount of current reading matter available, used periodicals were in great demand.

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A U S O PROGRAM FOR NURSES AND WOMEN war workers b e g a n o n

Oahu in February, 1942, with the YWCA as headquarters. A program of tours, teas, and classes was expanded when the forward push in the Pacific brought more nurses into the area in 1944, and again when WACs, WAVEs, SPARs, and women marines came to the Islands in 1945. In April, 1945, part of the large lobby of the Honolulu YWCA was converted into a servicewomen's lounge and was staffed by members of the Pan-Hellenic Association. The following month, the home of Princess David Kawananakoa in the Honolulu residential district was opened as Hui Welina, the first separate club for enlisted women in the Pacific. The kitchen and private dining room were made available to girls wishing to don aprons and cook "home-made" dinners for friends. A beach cottage at Kailua, across the Pali from Honolulu, was christened Pohala and made available to nurses. The Kappa Kappa Gamma Alumnae Association of Honolulu supplemented the USO's efforts on behalf of the servicewomen by sponsoring a commissioned women's lounge and meeting place in a downtown store building. The Army provided two rest houses, known as Hale Nani, at Fort De Russy for nurses from local hospitals as well as forward areas, and maintained a recreation center at the M. B. Cooke estate at Laie for WAC officers and Army nurses. The United Seamen's Service provided a program for thousands of merchant seamen similar to that which the USO gave the men of the armed forces, and in addition carried on welfare and housing services. The Honolulu branch of the USS, established in October, 1943, in the former building of the Seamen's Institute, became the second largest of all its overseas units. An attendance of about 500 seamen a week was expected, but soon that many a day were using its facilities, and nearly 100 were housed there each night. Some seamen came to USS jittery from memories of dangerous trips to Murmansk, Bombay, or Sydney, others battered by the Okinawa typhoon, and still others recently released from prison camps where they had been held after their ships were captured or torpedoed. A recreational program for war workers was begun on a small scale in June, 1941, by a YMCA-sponsored committee. The Nuuanu YMCA, concerned about the thousands of young defense workers from neighbor islands who were crowded into an unwholesome area near River Street, undertook a short time later to organize them into clubs and interest them generally in the " Y " program. Neither these efforts nor those of any other public or commercial agency could meet the growing need, so the USO undertook to provide recreation for war workers, contrary to its usual policy elsewhere. Al-

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though its services were free to the armed forces, its war workers program was on a self-supporting basis, for the workers were able and willing to pay. The USO provided entertainment once a week at 18 war workers' camps. Like servicemen, the war workers wanted live shows with girls, costumes, dancing, music, and laughs. They liked dances best of all, but lack of partners made these hard to arrange. Local talent shows were popular. In the Garter and Bustle, miners and riveters portrayed "gay nineties" characters, with bustles and curls on the "girls," and flowered vests and handle-bar mustaches on the men. This show was so successful that it was repeated several times. For men from the various camps, weekly dances were held by the USO at Saint Clement's parish house for about a year and at Central Union parish house for two years. Camp managers issued invitations for these. Weekly dances were held also at the Church of the Epiphany and Liholiho School in Kaimuki for the estimated 5,000 war workers living in the area. A USO War Workers' Club was opened in January, 1943, at the Central YMCA, Honolulu. The building, previously noisy with its attendance of 5,000 boys and young men a month, became a madhouse when 152,000 men entered its doors in a four-week period. It had a social and education program and attempted also to solve housing and other personal problems. When it sponsored a "formal" dance on Lei Day, May 1,1943, the war workers attended in their best bibs and tuckers. It was the first time in two years that some had worn a tie. Toward the end of the war the USO program included tours, picnics, and parties, as well as classes at Hickam Housing and CHA-3—even a popular hula class for men. In 1945, to meet the demand for advice, counsel, and education, the USO introduced courses in beginners' sewing and preparation for marriage, and sponsored formation of a dormitory council to help lessen friction. The USO cooperated with the housing areas in organizing state clubs, which had meetings, outings, inter-club competitions, and sightseeing tours. These clubs furnished their state banners for the CHA-3 community theater, and the building became known as the Hall of Flags. Minnesota and Ohio were the first two groups to organize, but the Texans topped all the states when they staged the Texas Barbecue at Ala Moana Park, claimed to be the biggest single meal ever set out in Hawaii. Seven to ten thousand servicemen and war workers attended, and Admiral Nimitz, of Waco, Texas, stopped in. Carnivals, shows, and public dances were sponsored by the Civilian Recreation Commission, mostly at Aala Park and Beretania Playground,

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and these were attended by 2,000,000 persons, about 40 per cent of them war workers. This commission was originally the Recreation and Amusements Committee of the Major Disaster Council, formed with the intention of approximating for civilians what the USO did for servicemen. Before it adopted its final name, it was the Recreation and Morale Committee of the OCD, and then the Civilian Defense Recreation Committee. T H E A R M Y SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION and t h e N a v y R e c r e a t i o n a n d

Morale Office set up numerous recreation centers, both on and off military posts. Among the most famous was the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, the beautiful "pink palace" on the beach at Waikiki. Less than two weeks after the start of the war, guests were turned out to make way for sailors, mainly submarine men. The magnificent gardens remained, but, inside, the luxurious Coconut Grove cocktail bar became a soda fountain, and cots were crowded in once spacious suites. Two hundred thousand men averaged a 10-day stay at the famous hotel, officers paying only $1.00 a day, and enlisted men nothing. The Navy footed the bill, leasing the hotel for $17,500 a month. Other Honolulu luxury spots became recreation and rest centers. Part of Doris Duke's home and gardens, often called the most beautiful in the Pacific, became a club where some 100 to 150 staff officers paid $1.00 a month dues, and the Wallace Alexander residence at Diamond Head became a home for Navy and Marine aviation officers on leave. Chris R. Holmes' fabulous hideaway on Coconut I sland in Kaneohe Bay accommodated 300 Army fliers at a time, and his residence at Waikiki became Navy property. Facilities of the Waialae Golf Club were made available to the services. At Waikiki also, part of Lalani Hawaiian Village and the government facilities at Kuhio Beach were incorporated into the Army Bath Houses for enlisted men, and the residence of the Steiner family near the Moana Hotel became the Halekai Officers' Club for junior officers. Willard Inn became Willard Inn for Officers, providing swimming facilities, a bar, and restaurant and hotel accommodations. Fort De Russy, with its clubs, a dance floor, and swimming beach, was the biggest recreation center of the Mid-Pacific Command. Maluhia opened there on April 27, 1943, offering several dances a week in a huge ballroom, entertainment on a fully equipped stage, and beer and other refreshments in an area seating 1,200 men. I t even boasted a checking room for gas masks. The two streamlined wings extending from the central patio were decorated in restful pastels, and bright blue tables and chairs dotted the broad green lawn. General Marshall spent a half-hour at Maluhia, and many other high ranking officials were on the guest list,

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but its guests, often 10,000 at a time, were usually Army enlisted men, with a sprinkling of sailors. Only four brave girls attended Maluhia's first dance; but within two months, 90 appeared at one dance, and eventually there were as many as 350 on an average evening. One highspot at Maluhia was the formal ball on Thanksgiving Day, 1943, attended by 4,000 persons; another was a Bob Hope show given before a crowd of 24,000. At the other end of Waikiki Beach was The Breakers, opened by the Navy December 2, 1942. Like Maluhia, it was open to men of all services, and soldiers numbered about a quarter of the 50,000 men a month who visited the center. It offered afternoon dancing, club activities, swimming, and refreshments. Moonlight supper dances were held there twice a month for civilian Pearl Harbor workers. Several famous bandsmen serving in the Navy—notably those in Artie Shaw's Navy Band—helped to make The Breakers known from San Diego to Okinawa. On the opposite side of the island from Honolulu, the Haleiwa Hotel became the Haleiwa Army Officers' Club, with overnight accommodations and a popular honeymoon cottage. The Fleet Recreation Office took over the near-by YMCA Camp Erdman in January, 1944, for officers of the fleet. Nimitz Beach, between Ewa and Nanakuli, Bagley Beach, between Makapuu Point and Waimanalo, and the big Richardson Center at Pearl Harbor, served both officers and men of the fleet. The latter center, named after Rear Admiral J . O. Richardson, former Commander-inChief of the Pacific Fleet, had the largest fresh-water swimming pool in the Islands. Camp Andrews at Nanakuli, an overnight rest and recreation center with homey cabins, picnic benches under the trees, and a good swimming beach, served enlisted men only. To meet the increasing demands of servicemen on overnight pass, Holiday House was opened by the Army Special Services in May, 1944, in a former Japanese language school on Honolulu's Fort Street. Many men had been forced to return to camp at the last minute because they could not find accommodations in Honolulu. After about a year, Fort De Russy facilities were enlarged, and Holiday House was turned over to the Army Air Force for use by enlisted personnel on leave from combat duty. The Kilauea Military Camp on Hawaii, continued as a vacation and rest spot. The Tradewinds, an $86,000 recreation building, was built on Maui. Despite their number and variety, these centers met only a small part of the need, especially in Honolulu. On a typical Sunday early in 1944, an Army Special Services survey found 6,000 men at Maluhia, a line a block long waiting to get lockers and swim suits at the Army Bath House, 800 men at the Waialae Recreation Center which could comfortably ac-

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commodate 300, and equally crowded conditions at other spots. Knowing that thousands of men would yet come to Oahu, the Special Services considered expanding its activities, but found that no buildings could be obtained and that the staffing problem would be insurmountable. Maintaining recreation centers was only a part of the activities of the Army Special Services and the Navy Recreation and Morale Office. They also booked movies, provided library service, scheduled sports events, operated the United States Armed Forces Institute* and sponsored service newspapers. The latter activity itself grew into a big business, for there were finally 29 Navy publications and 165 papers published by Army units, posts, camps, and stations, besides Midpacifican, Stars and Stripes, and Yank. Many were mimeographed, but others were printed, and those sent to commercial printing plants, added to other wartime jobs, strained the Islands' printing facilities to the limit. Midpacifican, published from February, 1942, to May, 1945, reached a circulation of 50,000 before it was replaced by the Mid-Pacific edition of Stars and Stripes, which averaged 90,000 circulation in the fall of 1945 and a VJ-Day circulation of 140,000. Its staff worked in a temporary building in the parking area of the Honolulu Advertiser and lived in a camp on Ward Street. It boasted the largest paper route in the world— from the Aleutians to New Zealand, from the Mainland to Tokyo. Yank, published in Honolulu from the summer of 1943 to January, 1945, had a top circulation of 123,000. After February, 1944, 12,500 copies of a "pony" Yank two-thirds the regular weight, were regularly flown to subscribers. The Armed Forces Radio Service presented programs for many hours a week over local stations, primarily to entertain servicemen in isolated areas. But there was nothing to prevent civilians from listening—and listen they did, in large numbers. Some of the transcribed or short-wave programs, such as "Command Performance" and others featuring topflight actors, were planned especially for overseas servicemen and were not released over Mainland stations. Others, such as "The Army Hour," were Special Services programs. Another type—the dream of radio listeners everywhere in the United States—were de-commercialized programs, produced by eliminating the commercials from the top shows of all the major networks. Many of these programs had never been heard in Hawaii before. One of the most important divisions of the Army Special Services was the entertainment section, organized in February, 1943, under Captain (later Major) Maurice Evans, noted Shakespearean actor. It shared with * The Navy Pacific University was operated by the Navy's Educational Services Section.

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the USO the Fatrington Hall facilities of the University of Hawaii, which discontinued its theatrical activities for the duration. Within a few weeks, it presented Five Jerks in a Jeep, a five-man variety show completely selfcontained and able to play any outpost, no matter how isolated. Next, Hey, Mac!, an original musical revue, opened in March and played more than 100 performances in five months on five islands. Shows followed one another at a rapid rate, including original productions, old-time melodramas, and some popular Broadway hits. Special Services attempted to stage entertainment by as well as for servicemen, and it called upon civilians only for female roles. It discovered some excellent amateur actresses, but Honolulu women were already being called upon for so many other activities that the number was limited. Sometimes the section was successful in bringing noted talent to Hawaii for its plays. Boris Karloff came from Hollywood to play in some performances of Arsenic and Old Lace and Gertrude Lawrence, returning from a Pacific tour, starred in Blithe Spirit. Judith Anderson, who had played with Maurice Evans on Broadway, joined him in the fall of 1943 in Macbeth, which, on opening night in a recreation building in the North Sector of Oahu, took seven curtain calls from cheering servicemen. The following year, the GI version of Hamlet, later presented on Broadway, ran for 344 performances, only three of them open to civilians. One of the last of the Army Special Services presentations, Irving Berlin's This is the Army, drew a capacity crowd to Honolulu Stadium, and raised $16,000 for the Honolulu Community Chest and the Army Emergency Relief. Besides the shows which it produced, the Special Services brought Bob Hope, Jack Benny, Betty Hutton, and many other performers for tours of the Pacific, and handled the Pacific tours of USO camp shows from the Mainland. Despite all that was done by individuals, organizations, commercial amusements, and the services themselves, men still roamed Island streets and wished they were home. They agreed heartily with the newspaper commentator who said, in discussing the blackout and curfew: "I've always known that Honolulu was a 9 o'clock town, but it took a war to make it legal."

BACKING THE ATTAGK

CHAPTER

V

SIXTEEN

I s l a n d e r s to the Golors M E N FROM H A W A I I SERVED I N ALL BRANCHES of the service in every theater of action. They represented all Islands, all races, and every walk of life. A total of 806 I sland men gave their lives in the war; more than 2,200 were permanently disabled. A Maui boy was a flight surgeon with Doolittle's bombers which raided Tokyo; another commanded a platoon during the historic assault on Hill 609 in North Africa. A Molokai lad won the Distinguished Flying Cross as navigator in a B-17 over Germany. A Kauai boy fought in Austria. A private from the Big Island won honors on Saipan with the 27th Infantry; another Big Island youth entered Czechoslovakia with the 8th Armored Division. An I sland boy of Korean ancestry was one of the first soldiers to land on Attu. One of Chinese ancestry served as an aide to Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell in Burma. A Hawaiian lad was a platoon sergeant in New Guinea. An Island haole took command of a Filipino guerrilla force in the battle for liberation. A former delegate to Congress won the Legion of Merit as commanding officer of an advanced service force base in the Marianas, and another former delegate served as district security officer in Hawaii. Three Island men—two of them part-Hawaiians—wore general's stars: Albert K. B. Lyman, Charles B. Lyman, and Wilhelm A. Anderson. Island men, always at home on the sea, served in the Merchant Marine throughout the world. One was 3rd officer of the Liberty ship Samuel Parker in the Mediterranean. Another, a fireman on the Edward T. Meredith, won the second highest award given merchant seamen, for heroism in rescuing men from an Army transport sunk by enemy action. More than 40,000 men of Hawaii joined the services, predominantly the Army. An undetermined number were Navy officers, and 1,744 were Navy enlisted men; 96 were in the Coast Guard, and only 47 in the Marine

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Corps. Since the naval services did not accept enlistments in Hawaii, most Islanders joining them were on the Mainland at the outbreak of war. Both enlistments and Selective Service inductions from the territory were discontinued during the early part of the war because of the mixed racial ancestry of the population, the need for men in Island defense work, and the desire to have a large group of young, able-bodied men in the Islands in case of invasion. As a result, the percentage of Islanders in the armed forces was lower than that of some states. More than twothirds of them entered the service after the latter part of 1944. The only racial breakdown of Hawaii's men in the service is of the 32,197 inducted by Selective Service boards. Of these, 49 9 per cent were Japanese by ancestry; 14.8 per cent, Caucasian; 10.5, Chinese; 11.9, Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian; 8.7, Filipino; and 2.1, Korean. The remaining 1.7 was divided among 11 other racial classifications. Oahu provided 71 per cent of the inductees; Hawaii, 12 per cent; Maui, 10; and Kauai, 6. Of the women's branches of the services, only the WACs sought Island enlistments, and not until October, 1944. By that time, most of the potential candidates were engaged in essential work, release from which was difficult to obtain. The Army and the War Manpower Commission refused to clear women already engaged at their maximum skill in essential civilian jobs, and the Hawaii Employers Council advised its members not to issue releases, saying, "We are opposed to taking women needed in essential employment in Hawaii for shipment to the mainland when they will have to be replaced by other women shipped from the mainland." Fifty-nine Island women were accepted during the recruitment period and 26—or 44 per cent—were of Japanese ancestry. They left Honolulu in January, 1945, for Mainland training. A number of girls from Hawaii, in college or visiting on the Mainland when the war broke, had enlisted in 1942 soon after the women's services were organized. Some served near the front lines. Like the girls who volunteered in Hawaii, they served with credit on the Mainland, in Africa, Europe, and Asia. 6,000 MEN 21 TO 36 YEARS OF AGE signed the rolls in the first Selective Service registration October 26, 1940. A special territorial lottery was held at Iolani Palace on November 15 about two weeks after numbers were drawn on the Mainland, and the first inductions took place December 9. About 2,600 who had reached 21 by next July 1 registered then. During 1942, four mass registrations were held for various age groups, and thereafter boys registered upon reaching their eighteenth birthdays. NEARLY

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By March, 1947, when Selective Service was discontinued, Island registrants numbered 167,964, plus 33,315 Mainland registrants listed with the board of transfers as living in Hawaii. Although registrations continued, regular draft calls were abandoned in February, 1942. Somewhat more than 3,350 men had been inducted and probably 3,000 more had entered the service through other channels. More than a year later, in June, 1943, the next induction took about 1,000 men, but Americans of Japanese ancestry were still excluded. Local boards were swamped with requests for deferment from employers who claimed that the manpower shortage made replacements unavailable. Again there was a long pause before monthly inductions of all races began in April, 1944. Only about 6,000 men had been called by Selective Service by June, 1944, but 11,500 men were drafted during the next year, and 9,500 the following year. Many of these were men who lost their earlier exemptions as their war work ended. During 1946-47, in two final calls, 938 men were enrolled. Inductees who re-entered basic training in the Islands either were assigned to duty here, especially with the Engineers, or were sent to the Orient with occupation units. Those who went to the Mainland for training were assigned to widely scattered outfits throughout the United States and Europe. Beginning in May, 1944, many of the Army and Navy workers inducted were immediately transferred to the enlisted reserve corps in order to continue their civilian work. After the war, many were discharged from inactive service and again taken through Selective Service into the Army. ISLAND MEN COMPOSED A LARGE PERCENTAGE o f the 298th and 299th

Infantry Regiments—originally National Guard groups. The 1399th Engineer Construction Battalion, the 100th Infantry Battalion, and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team were made up almost entirely of AJA's. Many Islanders were interpreters, and another large group served in various capacities in the China-Burma-India theater. Hawaii's National Guard was called into federal service October 15, 1940. Its strength numbered 126 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 1,616 enlisted men. Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians were most numerous with 662 members, followed by Portuguese with 322 and Chinese with 207. Since men of Japanese ancestry had been discouraged from joining, there were only 40 in the Guard at induction. But as the two regiments were built up by the addition of draftees, many men of Japanese ancestry were added. After six months of training, units of the 299th were returned to their own islands to help in military construction, especially at Barking Sands

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on Kauai, Hilo airport on Hawaii, and Homestead Field on Molokai. Following December 7, men of both regiments were dispersed to beach defenses. For many months they lived in tents and fought—not invading troops—but heavy rains and mosquitoes. Men of Japanese ancestry were taken from the two National Guard regiments in late spring to form a separate group which later became the 100th Infantry Battalion. This so depleted the Guard regiments that the 299th was inactivated and its men transferred to the 298th. Later, 13 officers and 296 enlisted men were sent to Camp Cooke, California, as a nucleus for a new infantry regiment. But plans were changed and some of the men went to officer candidates' school, some were discharged, some returned to service in Hawaii, and many were assigned to other units destined for the European or Pacific theaters. These and numerous smaller transfers so changed the composition of the 298th that men of the original Hawaii National Guard comprised only 15 per cent of its strength at the end of 1943 when it was sent to Espiritu Santo and Guadalcanal as a service force to handle port facilities. The rest of its personnel was made up of Selective Service inductees from Hawaii and the Mainland in about equal numbers. All elements returned to Oahu late in 1944, except the unit's popular band, which was redesignated the 111th Army Ground Forces Band and did not return until 1945. Some of the returned men were sent to Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai as garrison troops, but within a few weeks they were brought back to Oahu for a brief period of combat training. All battalions but one were inactivated on April 10, 1945, and their members assigned to other units. The battalion remaining intact did garrison duty on the outer islands and then served at the Jungle Training Center. Not until separation papers arrived at Hawaii National Guard headquarters after the war was there full realization of the distinguished service of the men who had made up the Guard at the outbreak of the war. They had been longest in federal service of any group from the Islands, had the highest numbers of service points of any Island men, and had many decorations and citations. ALL A J A ' S I N ENGINEER UNITS I N H A W A I I in t h e first m o n t h s of t h e

war became members of an Engineer provisional battalion, which underwent several changes of name, finally being designated as the 1399th Engineer Construction Battalion. The "Chowhounds," as the members were popularly known, eventually totaled 900 officers and men. Little was heard of the achievements of these hard-working soldiers, although they handled every kind of construction—highways, bridges, airfields, ammunition handling facilities, and camp buildings, sewage,

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drainage, and water supply systems. They built and maintained the three courses for the Pacific Combat Training Center at Kaaawa, which consisted of reproductions of Japanese villages, pillboxes, and obstacles. As the 1399th, they received the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque for carrying out 54 major projects, which cost $2,500,000, and completing every one on or before the deadline. Nearly all the soldiers of Japanese ancestry in the Island? except those in Engineer battalions were gathered together to form the Hawaiian Provisional Battalion (Separate). The group numbered 1,406 men, mostly inductees of the first four Selective Service calls, but also some former members of the National Guard and some pre-Pearl Harbor volunteers. On June 5, 1942, the battalion was sent to the Mainland, where it became the 100th Infantry Battalion. It trained at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, and then at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. In top form, it left Shelby August 11, 1943, for staging at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, and then sailed from New York for action in the Mediterranean and European theaters. After less than a month in North Africa, it went on to Italy late in September. It landed at Salerno with the 34th Division and fought in bitter weather over difficult terrain up the Salerno Valley and through the first siege of Cassino, crossing the winding Volturno River four times in the process. By the time it was withdrawn on February 22, it had lost nearly 600 men, killed, wounded, or suffering so severely from trench foot that long hospitalization was necessary. But the battalion had established a reputation for "out-marching and out-working most troops." After a month's rest, the 100th, strengthened by replacements, landed at Anzio beach March 26 to join in another push up the Italian peninsula. The troops skirted the edge of Rome and reached the town of Civitavecchia, where the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, fresh from the United States, caught up with it. This new AJA unit included many friends and younger brothers of the men in the 100th. While the 100th had been training and fighting, the AJA's in the Islands had been chafing because of the closing of enlistments and inductions, which prevented them from taking up arms in defense of their country. Their opportunity came early in 1943, when the Army called for combat volunteers. In announcing the call in Hawaii, General Emmons said of the AJA's: Open to distrust because of their racial origin, and discriminated against in certain fields of the defense effort, they nevertheless have borne their burdens without complaint and have added materially to the strength of the Hawaii area. They have behaved themselves admirably under the most trying conditions, have bought great quantities of war bonds, and by the labor of their hands have added to the common defense.

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Their representatives in the 100th infantry battalion, a combat unit now in training on the mainland; the Varsity Victory Volunteers, and other men of Japanese extraction in our armed forces have also established a fine record. In view of these facts, and by war department authority, I have been designated to offer the Americans of Japanese ancestry an additional opportunity to serve their country. This opportunity is in the form of voluntary combat service in the armed forces. I have been directed to induct 1,500 of them as volunteers into the army of the United States. . . . This call for volunteers affords an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the faith that the army has in their loyalty and fighting qualities. I believe that the response to this call will be sincere and generous and that it will have the hearty support of the parents concerned and of the community as a whole. The manner of response and the record these men will establish as fighting soldiers will be one of the best answers to those who question the loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii.

The Emergency Service Committee, composed of AJA's, led a campaign to induce a large response to the call. The high-pressure campaign was criticized as tending to question the loyalty of those who did not volunteer. Typical of the comments was that of the Hilo Tribune-Herald: [The idea] was drummed into them by solicitors making the rounds, by speakers at mass meetings, by radio plugs, and, yes, by the newspapers. The whole thing has been whooped up like a war bond drive . . . [by! well meaning enthusiasts who go around virtually clubbing their neighbors into joining the unit.

Such pressure was not needed, however, since 40 per cent of the AJA's between the ages of 18 and 35 flocked to the registration centers. Many who were rejected were bitterly disappointed and made other efforts to enlist. One wrote a 10-page letter to the recruiting officer, begging for reconsideration of his physical disability. Another, re-applying at a later enlistment, wrote: . . being offered another opportunity at this time, would like to enter service with the United States Army, and with your kind aid get into the army this time. Please get me into the army this time." Hawaii's original quota of 1,500 was boosted when 9,507 men signified their desire to bear arms. Of these, 2,645 men were inducted on March 28, after aloha ceremonies in many parts of the territory and one at Iolani Palace in Honolulu before one of the city's largest crowds in years. Held at this time were the first of many "induction parties" which characterized AJA inductions later in the war. In the newspapers appeared the first of many "Cards of Thanks" inserted by families of inductees, thanking friends for gifts and courtesies. The recruits arrived at Camp Shelby in April, 1943, joining 1,200 Mainland volunteers for training and maneuvers. For a brief period they also guarded German prisoners working on peanut farms in Alabama. Like the 100th, which was at Shelby with them for a short time, they shivered in the late spring and sang nostalgic Island songs. They took

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advantage of furloughs to travel all over the country, especially to New York and Washington, which they had long dreamed of seeing. The 100th had met warm hospitality at Camp McCoy in Wisconsin and had received so many courtesies from the people of that state that the Honolulu Emergency Service Committee, to reciprocate, gave a luau for all soldiers from Wisconsin stationed on Oahu. But in Mississippi they saw Southern racial prejudice for the first time and experienced some of it themselves. Stories of racial strife which filtered back to Hawaii proved to be exaggeration of a few isolated instances of a minor nature. Some soldiers from Hawaii, of all races except Japanese, engaged in a brawl at Charlotte, North Carolina, which spread to a street fight reportedly involving some 1,000 soldiers and 500 civilians. Reports which reached Hawaii of the need for strict discipline to keep the AJA's in line were totally unfounded. Caucasian officers in command of the AJA's had nothing but the highest praise for their conduct and performance, both in training and action. While at Camp Shelby, the AJA's met Earl M. Finch, whose casual invitation to a lonely member of the 100th led him to devote the next several years to work on behalf of the AJA's. He helped with the formation of the only Japanese-American USO and sent busses to war relocation centers for Nisei dance hostesses. He entertained the boys at their first "watermelon bust," he took groups on trips to New Orleans, and in June, 1943, he brought broncos and cowboys from Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas for a rodeo in their honor. When the boys went overseas, he received 200 letters a week and was named executor of thousands of wills. When the wounded returned he traveled 65,000 miles to arrange programs in hospitals in 26 states. The 442nd was at Shelby for about a year; then the combat team (less one battalion)—including the 442nd Infantry Regiment, the 522nd Artillery Battalion, and the 232nd Combat Engineers Company—left April 22 and 23, 1944, for Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia. They sailed from Hampton Roads May 1. The missing battalion had been drawn upon for replacements for the 100th earlier in the year, and most of its other men remained at Shelby as a cadre for the 171st Infantry Battalion (Separate) which trained replacements for the combat team. Reaching Civitavecchia, Italy, in June, the 442nd absorbed the 100th Battalion as its 1st Battalion, and they fought across the Arno River into Leghorn and Pisa before being withdrawn for a month's rest. Upon their return to action, they took up positions for a brief time along the Arno River and then left in September, 1944, for six months in France. This period opened with a month of bitter combat, during which—as the only fresh troops in the 7th Army—they participated in

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battles near Bruyeres and Biffontaine and helped rescue the "Lost Battalion," probably the most glorious chapter in the history of the AJA's. The "Lost Battalion," the 1st Battalion of the 141 st Infantry Regiment, a Texas unit, was isolated behind enemy lines for seven days. The 3rd and 100th Battalions of the 442nd were ordered to the rescue. Major E. L. O'Connor, commanding the 3rd, in a personal letter describing the rescue, wrote: Jerry was doing a methodical job of cutting them to ribbons. For five days and nights the 3rd spearheaded the attack and finally reached the outfit on the late afternoon of the 5th day. Never has the outfit been subjected to such stubborn and determined resistance or to the terrific artillery and mortar fire that Jerry handed out. The enemy was determined no one would interfere with his job of mopping up the cut-o£F battalion. Our casualties were terrific—about 6 0 % . W e operated in dense forests, so you can imagine the toll that was taken by tree bursts. During our push we were continually facing Jerry machine gun outfits armed with captured Army heavies and lights. They also had a lot of BAR'S and ammunition to throw away. W e took very few prisoners—8 in five days, I think. Jerry was there to fight and he sure did. The hills and ridges we worked up and over were literally covered with dead Jerries and equipment but Jerry kept throwing in more and more fresh men. That's what took us so long. The Combat Team fought well, but the 3rd fought, superbly. They were always out front leading the attack. K Company for a while had no officers at all, but the NCOs took over and carried on the scrap.

During the month the regiment lost more men than in any month before or after. Normal company strength of 200 men was down to an average of 35; one company had only 17 riflemen able to fight, another had only four. The remainder of the period in France was, comparatively speaking, a vacation. The troops spent four months in front lines in the mountains north of Nice, but the absence of strong opposition gave opportunity for leaves at once-fashionable rest centers along the Riviera. The 442nd left France late in March, the more optimistic members thinking they were homeward bound. Their hopes were soon dashed, for they landed April 1 in Italy and completed the Italian campaign, fighting with the 92nd Division from La Spezia to Genoa, on to Turin and Casale. On V-J Day they led the parade of the Allied Forces in Italy. Officially, the 442nd returned to the United States July 2, 1946, but many of the original team had returned earlier on hospital ships or remained behind in Italian cemeteries. The arrival in New York was marked by the blowing of whistles, presentation of lets, and a welcoming talk by Hawaii's delegate to Congress. Two weeks later the unit proudly marched in Washington before President Truman, who stood in a drenching rain to pin the Presidential Distinguished Unit Citation banners to the colors of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. I t was the second time in World War I I that the president had personally welcomed a returning unit. The 442nd Combat Team was unofficially dubbed "The Army's Most Decorated Unit," and the 100th was called "The Purple Heart

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Battalion." The two units won seven Presidential Distinguished Unit Citations; the medical detachment and service company each received the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque, and individual members of the combat team won nearly 6,000 awards, including about 20 from the French and Italian governments. Officers who commanded the units were unanimous in their praise: "They had more than a good record; it was magnificent." Killed in battle were 36 officers and 614 men of the combat team; wounded, 4,500 others. A large percentage of these were Island men. The Presidential Unit Citations were awarded as follows: 1. The 100th Battalion, for outstanding operations June 26 and 27, 1944, in the vicinity of Belvedere and Sassetta. 2. The 2nd Battalion, for "a brilliant tactical operation" near Bruyeres, France, October 19, 1944, seizure of Hill 617 near Biffontaine, France, in freezing weather October 28 and 29, 1944, and opening the way for entry into the important communications centers of Massa and Carrara, Italy, April 6 to 10, 1945. 3. Companies F and L of the 442nd Infantry, for destroying the German main line of resistance in the rugged Vosges Mountains of northeastern France, October 21,1944, opening the way to Belmont and Biffontaine, key towns leading into Germany through Alsace. 4. 100th Battalion, for a series of actions, October 15 to 30, 1944, which spearheaded a divisional attack against strongly fortified enemy positions near Bruyeres and Biffontaine, and in the Foret Domainiale de Champ, France. 5. 3rd Battalion, for the courageous rescue of the "Lost Battalion" of the 36th (Texas) Division at Biffontaine, October 27 to 30, 1944. 6. 232nd Combat Engineer Company and the 111th Engineer Battalion (36th Division) for heroic achievement, November 8 to 11, 1944, in keeping open the supply lines of the 36th Division despite tremendous natural obstacles and heavy enemy fire. 7. 442nd Regimental Combat Team, for action April 5 to 14, 1945, in the vicinity of Serravezza, Carrara, and Fosdinovo, Italy, turning a diversionary action into a full-scale and victorious offensive which played an important part in the final destruction of the German Armies in Italy. Although many men fought without even their relatives knowing of their achievements, no such secrecy surrounded the activities of the 100th and 442nd. From the beginning, the Army followed a policy of wide publicity of the units, with a view to building up their morale and presenting them to the world as examples of America's assimilative capacity. While the 100th was on the way to the Mainland, the com-

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mantling general of the Second Army, in whose area they were to train, directed that every effort be made to maintain morale: "Officers and men must be made to feel that their unit is an honored element of the Army and that it is being trained with a view to its ultimate employment in combat." Publicity concerning the 100th and 442nd flowed from Army public relations offices in such volume that it aroused much resentment in Hawaii, especially among relatives of men of other races who were serving without such recognition in other units. An Advertiser editorial was headed, "Less Limelight, Please!" In reply, the Star-Bulletin pointed out that the news was not only of interest to friends and families of the men but was "of vital usefulness in the national policy of World War I I . " Word of the community comment reached the men in Italy, and one of them wrote a friend, "I am writing to you in hope that you will understand that we have no control over the front line publicity. . . . If those beyond our control feel that we deserve such publicity, we feel cheered by the recognition." AS LANGUAGE EXPERTS, ISLAND-BORN JAPANESE made a special contribution, both before and after V-J Day. About half of the 5,000 interpreters and translators trained by the Army were from Hawaii. Becoming aware of its acute shortage ofJapanese-speaking personnel, the Army opened a small language school in San Francisco just before the start of the war. In May, 1942, it was moved to Fort Savage, Minnesota, and in August, 1944, to near-by Fort Snelling. Island boys were not sought as interpreters until May, 1943, when an appeal brought 773 applicants, of whom about 250 were accepted. In November five returned to aid in a second call for interpreters. Response then was slower than expected, probably because the earlier enlistments for interpreters and for the 442nd had taken many of the most likely candidates. However, 300 men volunteered and about 200 were inducted. Besides the men who volunteered as language experts, hundreds of AJA's were transferred from other Army units. Army authorities had expected that only a few weeks' review of general vocabulary and instruction in military terminology would be required, but most American-born Japanese needed six to nine months of concentrated language study. Some of the graduates stayed at the school as instructors, and the others were rushed to duty to meet the growing demand, often from officials who had at first opposed the use of AJA's in the Pacific combat zone. Interpreters and translators went with every major unit in every Pacific engagement from Guadalcanal and Attu to Okinawa and on the

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march into Tokyo. They were in the North Burma jungles with Merrill's Marauders, and elsewhere in the China-India-Burma operations. A few were in the European theater to obtain information of Japanese liaison with the Germans. A few were loaned to the Navy and a small group was attached to the Australian Army. Some language experts worked at headquarters; others were at the front, sometimes crawling up close enough during battles to hear the commands of Japanese officers. Some even worked behind enemy lines, a few being trained at the Army parachute school for the purpose. They interrogated Japanese prisoners and searched newly taken positions to collect every scrap of information in documents, letters, diaries, maps, and files. They sometimes persuaded scattered remnants of troops in Japanese pillboxes or caves to give themselves up. Five interpreters from Hawaii were instrumental in the peaceful surrender of 7,000 Japanese troops and civilians on Yap. Much of their work was veiled in secrecy. Japan was long unaware that the Americans had important advance information for many Pacific battles or that quick work by the interpreters and translators enabled readjustment of plans during the height of combat. As the American military forces advanced toward Japan, the interpreters were called upon for many nonmilitary jobs in handlingjapanesespeaking civilians. They were active in the mandated islands, and at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. When Japanese envoys reached Nichols Field in the Philippines to arrange for the formal surrender of their country, an interpreter from Hawaii was with the American delegation. Other Island interpreters were in Japan for the surrender. After the war, large numbers of interpreters, as well as men and women civilian employees from Hawaii, served with the Army of Occupation.

C H A P T E R

S E V E N T E E N

O v e r the T o p BECAUSE OF THE COMBINATION of wartime boom conditions and a curtailed supply of luxury goods, Hawaii's usually liberal response to fund-raising drives was even more generous during the war years. Islanders invested many millions of dollars in war bonds, contributed several million dollars to war relief, and made other donations of many kinds. Tons of scrap were collected. The territory's record in war bond sales was classed by the United States Treasury as the best in the country. Only Hawaii, of all the states and territories, exceeded every monthly quota and drive quota. Hawaii consistently ranked first during drives in per capita sales of Series E bonds (designed for the small investor), and its regular monthly sales per capita were two to four times higher than the national average. I n Hawaii the average per capita purchase was $531.12 by September, 1945, the highest in the country. Sales of all series in Hawaii from their issuance May, 1941, through December, 1945, were $415,507,000. Nearly half this sum represented sales of the Series E issue. Hawaii's record in war loan drives ran as follows: First, D e c . 1942 Second, Apr. 1943 Third, Sept. 1943 Fourth, Jan. 1944 Fifth, June-July 1944 Sixth, N o v . - D e c . 1944 Seventh, May-June 1945 Eighth, O c t . - D e c . 1945

QUOTA

SALES

PER CENT

$ 4,250,000 16,700,000 17,988,000 19,000,000 22,000,000 20,000,000 27,000,000 20,000,000

$ 8,314,000 18,648,649 20,253,867 32,453,959 31,041,424 41,100,418 50,014,395 35,006,000

195 111 113 171 141 205 186 175

Sales were boosted by theater parties, admission to which was through purchase of bonds, by street dances, and by auctions of captured Japanese equipment and hard-to-get appliances. One man bought $80,000 worth of bonds to be sure of getting one of the first postwar refrigerators. 274

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In the year before the start of the war, Islanders invested $2,933,000 in bonds and stamps. The upsurge of buying immediately after Pearl Harbor exhausted the supply on hand. During the next few months there were many complaints about insufficient supply, long lines of buyers, the inconvenient location of some sales offices, and the impossibility of purchasing after working hours. These difficulties were soon alleviated by the appointment of agents in stores, offices, and war installations, and by the payroll deduction plan. Islanders were urged to "Back the Attack," not only during official war loan drives, but on Lei Day (May l ) , Kamehameha Day (June 11), the anniversary of Pearl Harbor, and other special occasions. Sales on these occasions were as much as five times the goals set. Kau-Tom Post of the American Legion and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce conducted sales in celebration of the Chinese "Double Ten" anniversary and in appreciation of the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act. I n 1943, the Bataan War Bond Committee, composed of Filipinos, sponsored a sale from April 9, the anniversary of the fall of Bataan, to May 7, the anniversary of the fall of Corregidor. On Labor Day, 1942, pickets marched in front of issuing offices with signs reading, "Cross the Picket Line and Buy War Bonds." The " I Own a Bond Club" sponsored a "Buy War Bonds" essay contest, in which prizes went to a woman war worker at Pearl Harbor, an Army Air Corps private, and an Oahu Prison convict. The Life Underwriters Association of Hawaii set aside one day a month exclusively for bond sales and by August, 1942, had topped the million-dollar mark. Members of the Vegetable Peddlers' Association, 60 per cent of whom were alien Japanese, sold bonds along with vegetables until gasoline shortages curtailed house-to-house selling. In a 30-day drive by the Retailers for Defense Committee less than three months before the start of the war, merchants in Honolulu alone sold more than one per cent of all defense stamps purchased in the United States. In a special campaign from J u n e 29 to July 4, 1942, retail establishments sold nearly $2,700,000 worth of bonds. More than half of the 3,000 retail establishments in Honolulu observed "Uncle Sam's Quarter Hour" from 11:45 A.M. to noon on July 1 when they sold nothing but bonds. One Honolulu jewelry store, which used the slogan "Buy bonds first and fine jewelry afterwards," sold more than $5,000,000 worth of bonds during the war. Florists gave gardenias and orchids to bond purchasers. During one drive a Marine private, who formerly fashioned corsages for the movie greats of Hollywood, made orchid corsages for all who purchased at least $300 worth of bonds. Business concerns contributed pages of newspaper advertising and hours of radio time. Pub-

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lishers and radio stations were generous in giving publicity. On the basis of dollar volume per capita, the 14th Naval District was always near the top in monthly competition with all naval establishments in the country and often won first place. Month after month, nearly 95 per cent of its civilian employees bought on the payroll deduction plan, and in some months the sales reached nearly 15 per cent of the payroll. Army personnel, too, bought regularly. During the sixth war loan, a mobile troop laundry, scarred by Japanese shell fragments in the Makin operation, carried bonds to Oahu military installations. It was later used in the sale of V-E bonds on Honolulu streets. At first bonds purchased in Hawaii had to be sent to the Mainland for redemption, but on October 1, 1944, local banks were authorized to cash them. For a few days, long lines of persons appeared at the banks, but thereafter the rate of conversion against total sales remained comparable to the rate in Mainland areas with similar living costs. BEFORE THE UNITED STATES ENTERED THE WAR, several relief groups

had been formed in Honolulu. "Bundles for Britain" raised nearly $4,000 by parties and sales, and school children belonging to "Young America Wants to Help" raised a small amount for refugees in Britain and China through carnivals and plays. The British War Relief Society grew out of meetings held at the British consulate in 1939 by women who sewed and knitted for British hospitals, servicemen, and civilians. I t did not disband until 1945, after it had made thousands of surgical dressings for the American Red Cross and had sent to England $45,000 in cash contributions, thousands of new garments, and 4,360 pounds of used clothing. The William Allen White Committee gave $17,700 to England for 13 mobile kitchens; $4,500 to the Red Cross, Honolulu hospitals, and other American funds; and divided $29,400 among the "Save the Children Foundation," nursery shelters, and trailer ambulances in England and general relief funds in Belgium and China. It merged its efforts with other groups when the United States entered the war. The Army and Navy Relief Societies received funds from both civilian and service personnel, and used most of the money raised locally for families of Hawaii servicemen. Both societies were favorite beneficiaries of Japanese individuals and business firms who chose this manner of making known their American allegiance and sympathies. It was announced in June, 1942, that Islanders had given almost $30,000 during the preceding few months to the Hawaiian auxiliary of the Navy Relief Society. In August, 1942, a "United Nations Review" held by the Civilian Defense Recreation Committee raised $11,250 for the Army

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Relief Fund. In October, 1943, a sum of nearly $19,000 raised from two public performances of Macbeth by the Army Special Services was divided between the Army Relief Fund and the National War Relief. The Greek War Relief raised $10,000 in 1941, and again in 1943 it raised more money. The American-Korean Victory Fund Drive in 1943, culminating at a mass meeting on August 29 (Korean National Humiliation Day, anniversary of the forced annexation of Korea to Japan), raised $26,200 which was forwarded to President Roosevelt for use in the Pacific war. A spectacular "Bombs on Tokyo" campaign was sponsored by the Emergency Service Committee (composed of AJA's) to protest the execution of several of the Doolittle fliers, and Japanese donors gave $10,300 which was sent to the Treasurer of the United States. Voluntary subscriptions of a dollar a month from Filipino laborers on two Big Island plantations developed into the territory-wide Philippine Islands War Relief Fund in August, 1943, and became a national organization the following May. In 1943, $47,800 was raised for this fund as a part of the Community Chest campaign. Oahu raised nearly $50,000 for the USO in 1941 and double that in 1942. The other islands also contributed generously to the fund. By June, 1943, the multiplicity of unconnected financial appeals being made throughout the country had led to the organization of the National War Fund and its extension to Hawaii. It consolidated the fund-raising activities of USO, United Seamen's Service, War Prisoners' Aid, and nearly a score of foreign relief groups, including British War Relief and Philippine War Relief. From July, 1943, until its dissolution December 31, 1946, the National War Fund received $1,097,847 from Hawaii. Its quotas were consistently oversubscribed: in 1945, Molokai raised 321 per cent of its assessment, and other islands ranged from 106 to 120 per cent. Such generosity was not confined to war drives. The Community Chest and March of Dimes campaigns raised the biggest totals in their histories, and Christmas seal sales and poppy sales likewise broke all records. Service personnel and war workers gave liberally. For example, they accounted for 22 per cent of the contributions to the Oahu Chest and War Fund campaign in 1944. Donations to the Red Cross roll calls totaled $1,857,000. Another $100,000 was collected by the Red Cross in 1940 and 1941 for European war relief and local production activities. Some of this money was donated, and the rest was raised by special projects such as a water lily sales, a fashion show, a ball, a concert, and an auction. As the war progressed, several drives were staged to collect clothing for people in liberated Pacific areas. Probably the largest drive was that

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held from February to May, 1945, under auspices of the Philippine War Relief, aided by Boy Scouts, the Salvation Army, YMCA, and other groups. Workers at hundreds of receiving stations throughout the territory were overwhelmed with the contributions to be sorted, mended, and packed. Piles of clothing overflowed receiving rooms. At one school where boxes of donations filled every available space, packers narrowly missed shipping a boxful of Martha Washington costumes and kingly robes, properties of the school's dramatic club, to the needy Filipinos. A total of 576,295 separate articles was packed in 1,835 cases weighing 328,741 pounds. The chairman called the drive "one of the most remarkable demonstrations of cooperative action . . . to render assistance to a stricken people." The Red Cross sent clothing for 22,000 persons to Guam, and smaller amounts to Saipan, Tinian, Okinawa, and Korea, using up its reserve which had been stored on Oahu at the start of the war. It also provided garments for 3,000 American and British women and children released from internment in Japan. The Elks gathered clothing for people on Guam; the Honolulu Council of Churches, with Navy cooperation, conducted a clothing drive for Okinawans; several organizations sponsored drives for the Chinese; and the Friends Society collected clothing for people in many parts of the world. Islanders now gave generously for Okinawa and Japan, although back in 1943 there had been some opposition when Central Union Church, the Church of the Crossroads, the Friends Society, and the World Fellowship Committee had raised a little over $100 for a scholarship fund for American-born Japanese in relocation centers on the Mainland. The American Legion and its auxiliary had then called the contribution "a public disgrace." Islanders made gifts of many kinds to men of the armed forces stationed in Hawaii. At the beginning of the war, when service units were in scattered areas and supplies were scarce, there were constant appeals in the newspapers: Soldiers wanted a radio for their camp in a cane field. Games, reading matter, and phonograph records were needed for new recreation rooms at Fort Shafter. Some Hickam men wanted a card table and chairs. Other outfits needed a few more radios and a piano. Lonely GI's wanted dogs. The Navy asked for the loan or gift of binoculars and of small boats. The Army asked for carrier pigeons. Islanders also gave electric fans, washing machines, coffee percolators, and many other articles then impossible to buy. The Junior Chamber of Commerce raised funds to send a million newspapers to servicemen. It also sponsored a gift fund for the USS

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Hawaii toward which each school child was asked to give one cent. The Junior Civilian Defense Corps and the High School Victory Corps collected many gifts for servicemen. Among their activities was a "Read a Book—Give a Book" campaign late in 1943, when each child was asked to read a book and then write his name and a comment on the flyleaf before donating it. Each Christmas, Islanders gave presents to special units, and the soldiers and sailors often reciprocated by entertaining children in their neighborhood. In 1943, the OCD gave 6,500 pounds of candy to troops and used $1,800 left in the special fund for later gifts of sweets. Through the Emergency Service Committee and other groups, nearly $50,000 was spent on Christmas gifts for AJA units. Later, Hawaiian phonograph records and other items were sent to Island boys in Mainland hospitals. As a farewell gift for Admiral Nimitz, several thousand Islanders contributed $1.00 each for a painting of Waianae Bay by the Island artist, Lionel Walden. Long after the war, Islanders still donated for war relief, chiefly through the Foster Parents' Plan for War Children and the Cooperative for American Remittances for Europe, Incorporated, popularly known as CARE. Late in 1947 Hawaii contributed two carloads of sugar as part of the Friendship Train sent to France and in return received a share of the art objects and other gifts sent on the French Merci Train. scrap collections, but did not participate in many later drives because of difficulty in shipping scrap to the Mainland. Much that was collected was never used. Nevertheless, the scrap drives were considered valuable from the civilian morale standpoint. They also reduced fire hazards and eliminated breeding spots for rats and mosquitoes. From May to September, 1942, the Honolulu Junior Chamber of Commerce collected waste paper, rags, rubber, scrap iron, whisky bottles, and numerous other articles, and gave the $1,582 sales proceeds to various war agencies. The Junior Chamber's bottle-collecting campaigns in 1943 and 1944 yielded $16,000. In April, 1942, the military governor appointed a special salvage committee to handle Hawaii's share of a scrap rubber drive. Plantations contributed huge quantities of rubber, some giving as much as 40 tons. Honolulu city hall employees gave up soft chair cushions, removed floor mats, and cleared their desks of rubber blotter bases. Even a dog participated, donating his rubber mouse. By July when the drive ended, Hawaii had collected 1,464 tons of rubber, or 6.76 pounds per resident, and Army transports carried it to the Mainland. HAWAII J O I N E D I N THE EARLY NATIONAL

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Hawaii harvested some 50,000 pounds of rubber from abandoned rubber plantations at Maunawili on Oahu, and Nahiku on Maui. When rubber became a critical war item, Oahu Prison inmates cleared the overgrown areas, rebuilt trails, and tapped the trees. Production continued from early in 1943 to the end of the war, and the high price of rubber, coupled with low labor costs, resulted in a slight profit. A general order on J u n e 30, 1942, provided that no dental or shaving preparations in tubes could be sold unless a purchaser turned in a used tube. But there were shipping difficulties, and stores soon complained that large quantities of tubes had accumulated and nobody wanted them. The military governor appointed a territorial salvage committee in September, 1942. One of its first announcements was that no further drives would be held until there was proper organization for both collection and disposal. It worked closely with War Materials, Incorporated, a federal agency which set up a local office in January, 1943, to purchase scrap metals from large sources of supply such as the plantations and industrial companies. Soon a large scrap metal drive was launched under the direction of OCD precinct wardens. When hundreds of tons of metal piled up at schools, churches, and other collection points, wardens were faced with the tremendous problem of moving it to the baseyard of War Materials, Incorporated. Complaints that all the rusting metal had not been removed were reaching OCD headquarters two years after the drive ended. Transportation from the other islands to Honolulu was never obtained for large quantities of scrap iron, although soon after the drive the Navy had offered to pick it up at Hilo, Kahului, and Nawiliwili for use by the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard foundry. Much salvage material from the services was handled by the Industrial Reclaimers, a company formed in February, 1942, to dispose of scrap. This firm obtained contracts with the Army and Navy to salvage certain material and ship it to the Mainland for re-use. The American Legion auxiliary, assisted by Girl Scouts and grocery stores, conducted a "Salvage the Grease" campaign in October, 1943. The grease collected was sold to local soap manufacturers.

EXIGENCIES OF WAR

CHAPTER

VI

EIGHTEEN

B u s i n e s s N o t as U s u a l HAWAII'S FINANCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND COMMERCIAL STRUCTURE,

though less diversified than that in many Mainland communities, had reached a mature stage in its development long before the outbreak of the war. Otherwise it could not have withstood so successfully the staggering impact of December 7. Instantly, more of everything was needed to meet the mounting demands of a rapidly expanding community— more men and machinery to make repairs, more water, more electric power, more transportation, more telephones, more services of every sort. The task of meeting these new demands was complicated by the imposition of controls, by the disruptive effect of blackout regulations, and by the state of general confusion which prevailed. Retail business slowed down but slightly. On December 8, s t o r e s except food stores—did only 25 per cent of their normal business, in contrast to the 136 per cent which had been characteristic of the last prewar days. But the rebound was rapid—to 40 per cent by the end of the week, to 85 per cent by December 20, and to 125 per cent for the three days before Christmas. There was an immediate run on flashlights, blue cellophane paper, blankets, and first aid supplies. The U. S. Engineers froze merchandise which they might need, including nearly all building, construction, electrical, and automotive materials. As General Short testified: "The situation was so changed that we could take over anything that was in the Islands, no matter whether the man wanted to give it up or not." It was more than a month before the freeze was lifted. Meanwhile, many small specialized firms from whom the military did not buy had practically no sales. Various officials called for inventories from plantations and business houses in order to determine the amount of essential materials and equipment on hand. Businessmen supplied them willingly at first, but they 281

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later complained that requests were being duplicated unnecessarily and that no use was being made of the inventories. Nearly all delivery trucks were loaned for Army and Navy work during the first few weeks of the war. By the end of December, however, most stores resumed deliveries on a reduced basis. Later, gasoline and tire rationing sharply cut delivery service and often eliminated it entirely. In the uncertain weeks after December 7, articles which had been purchased on time payments overflowed the return desks of retail stores. Several million dollars' worth of bills and installment accounts remained unpaid as service dependents were hurriedly evacuated to the Mainland and war workers were transferred to distant jobs. Security regulations prevented collectors from entering military areas in search of delinquents and even from finding out whether they were still in the Islands. Some debts were eventually cleared, with the cooperation of the Army and Navy, after a consolidated list of the larger accounts was compiled by the Chamber of Commerce. In January, 1942, executives of the largest business organizations on Oahu formed a Citizens' Council which was active for some months in solving business problems occasioned by the war. Some 8,000 firms went out of business in 1942. A few converted to war work, but most found their usual markets tremendously expanded. Within two months after the attack, it was reported: People are still staggering under bundles; shopgirls wail about aching feet and floorwalkers answer close to a thousand questions a day. . . . L o n g lines wind down the block by all the movie houses, and the dime store is a beehive. People are concentrating more now on sturdy materials and sensible shoes than on party wear, but they're buying, and buying in g r o s s lots.

Necessary haste in military purchases early in the war meant much work to untangle red tape later, and delays in Army and Navy payments caused some companies which were doing a booming business to be embarrassingly short of cash. Finally, the Chamber of Commerce employed a man for several months to help straighten out the situation, and later he was taken into the Army to continue in a liaison capacity. The U. S. Engineers were so slow in payments that some businessmen planned a protest to Washington, and others threatened to refuse further sales unless outstanding obligations were paid in full and kept current. The inspector general of the Hawaiian Department of the Army found the complaints justified. In March, 1942, the total unpaid bills of the Engineers, mostly incurred in December, were more than $3,000,000. In September, one company with a capital of only $300,000 complained that the Engineers owed it $45,000, of which 66 per cent had been due more than three months and 11 per cent since before the war. New claims constantly replaced those which had been cleared. At the end of 1943,

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payment of more than $1,000,000 to Island businesses was delayed as a result of Engineer staff differences. During the next six months, $300,000 of the sum was paid, but the war was over before settlement was made on the entire amount. Frequent changes in Army purchasing policies caused confusion throughout the war and resulted in numerous conferences and voluminous correspondence with the Chamber of Commerce and other business spokesmen. Early in 1942, a report that the Army would place orders with local suppliers "only when goods were immediately available for delivery" was followed by a statement that the Army would buy locally "when consistent with the military situation." In July, 1943, the Engineers were directed from Washington to order from existing national stock piles rather than from local business houses. Over a period of a year, efforts to have this order rescinded were without avail, although some exceptions appear to have been made. In March, 1945, the Navy ordered that its procurement program be switched to Mainland firms except for materials already in local stock and available for immediate delivery. Two representatives of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce who hastened to Washington were successful in obtaining withdrawal of the order. Many businesses shared their office space with Army and Navy groups until construction caught up with service needs, and in some cases offices and warehouses were leased for the duration. Early in the war, the Army Transport Service rented the center section of the ground floor office space of Castle & Cooke, Ltd.; the Maritime Commission and the Civilian Evacuation Committee used other parts of the first floor; the Navy occupied some offices on the third floor; and the Army personnel division used a large portion of the basement for tabulating work. The Navy considered taking over the Sears, Roebuck & Co. building in Honolulu, opened just a few months previously, but negotiations were dropped. However, Sears' service station and part of its parking lot were used by the Engineers, the basement stock room was rented to the Army Signal Corps, 7,000 square feet in the furniture department was turned over to the Red Cross, and the lanai was used for OCD vegetable seedling sales. The hordes of servicemen and war workers gave each restaurant, bar, laundry, hotel, barber shop, and store more business than it could handle. Service people accounted for 70 to 90 per cent of retail and restaurant sales during most of the war. Total expenditures in Hawaii by the services in 1945 alone are estimated to have been $584,000,000. New businesses took the places of those which closed their doors, until in 1945 there were 37,000 establishments as compared with 30,000

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in 1942. Total business volume was just short of a billion-dollar record in the last year of the war. Every index of business conditions told the same story of phenomenal expansion: bank clearings were up from $470,000,000 to $1,710,000,000; bank deposits from $109,000,000 to $546,000,000; federal income taxes from $14,000,000 to $150,000,000. Private construction work, after dropping 77 per cent from 1941 to 1942, was almost back to normal by 1944. Because of the large amount of construction work for federal agencies, the annual volume of contracting business increased 428 per cent from $25,000,000 to $132,000,000. The boom was greatest on Oahu. In some localities on the other islands, population decreases caused business to stagnate, but in other places a sudden influx of troops would multiply the population manyfold and cause a temporary boom. The little town of Kapaa, Kauai, was a typical example of wartime growth. It had, for instance, 4 restaurants in 1941, and 23 in 1944. There, and in other localities, eating places and stores were opened in private yards and homes. Hot-dog wagons sometimes netted $100 a day, and such haunts as "Paul's Place" and "Do Drive Inn" had to turn away customers even when they made them bring their own mess gear. effort by an expansion of their ordinary work, but there were several instances of total conversion to war tasks. Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd., canned no tuna during the war, for the government took over the entire fleet of tuna boats for patrol duty. The company's shipyard division performed repair, conversion, and construction work for the Navy, Army, and Coast Guard; its cannery was converted into an assembly plant for aircraft equipment; and most of its cold storage warehouse was leased to the Army. The dry dock and ship repair plants of the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., were devoted almost entirely to Navy repairs. During 1944 a total of 267 units of floating equipment of various types was drydocked. After V-J Day, all Navy vessels were repaired at Pearl Harbor, but Inter-Island continued to do work for the War Shipping Administration and the War Department. The Navy also used drydock facilities at Young Brothers, Ltd. Early in the war the Continental Trailer and Equipment Co., Ltd., turned its entire facilities to the repair of damaged equipment. Later it built 842 separate units for the armed forces, ranging from 10-ton semitrailers for the Army to 55-passenger semi-trailer busses for the Navy. The company designed and built hydraulic jack dollies for unloading Navy planes and bomb carts for the Marine Corps. The Continental deM O S T ISLAND BUSINESSES CONTRIBUTED TO THE WAR

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sign for these bomb carts was later followed by manufacturers on the Mainland. Territorial Motors, Ltd., operated one of the five plants in the country which recapped Navy airplane tires. In addition, the company did more than double its prewar amount of recapping automobile tires for civilian and military needs. The Honolulu Iron Works Co. manufactured dredges and other heavy machinery and equipment for Pacific naval installations, 85 per cent of its output going to the government. Hawaiian Gas Products, Ltd., supplied oxygen, nitrous oxide, and carbon dioxide for anaesthetic and medical uses; carbon dioxide for fire extinguishers, life preservers, and rubber rafts; nitrogen and hydrogen for flame throwers, and hydrogen for barrage balloons. It produced dry ice for preserving food and penicillin; and manufactured building brick for bomb shelters, barricades, and other protective devices. In a secluded site camouflaged by trees, it secretly built a portable oxygen liquefaction plant which was in full production for more than three years. Chloride of lime, in urgent demand for gas defense, was produced by the Pacific Guano and Fertilizer Co. (now Pacific Chemical and Fertilizer Co.) in a plant erected in six weeks. Later the plant was expanded to produce sodium hypochlorite for sanitary purposes. In February, 1943, at the request of the military, the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Ltd., opened a candy factory to pack assault ration packages containing candy, chewing gum, cigarets, and matches. Besides packing 1,768,944 of these packages, it also produced, mostly for sale to the armed forces, about 100,000,000 individual candy bars bearing such trade names as Midway, Coral Sea, Ack-Ack, and B-17. Canned pineapple intended for the armed forces was packed in cases built to stand heavy wear in shipping. Cans were sprayed with olive-green paint to make them less noticeable to enemy planes when discarded in forward areas. At Kodak Hawaii, Ltd., one of the country's few V-mail stations was established. It microfilmed letters from servicemen in the Pacific and restored to readable size letters being sent from the folks at home. Outgoing letters alone numbered 77,000,000 during the little more than three years of the station's operation. The process made possible much more frequent communication between the Pacific and the Mainland than limited cargo facilities could possibly have allowed otherwise. The Navy used one-third of Kodak Hawaii's plant for photo reconnaissance and related work. The company duplicated thousands of feet of film for training purposes and in its kodachrome processing plant, the only one in

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the Pacific, it processed color films for the services, including the muchshown Navy production, "Fighting Lady." Kilns used by the Hawaiian Potters' Guild for making Hawaiian figurines turned out insulators for submarine batteries, chemical jars, and other military materials. Lauhala products mushroomed into a million-dollar industry as servicemen clamored for souvenirs to send home. Hawaii's forest reserve areas, commercially unexploited since the days of the sandalwood trade, yielded 2,800,000 board feet of timber for military use. Almost without exception, ships plying the West Coast-Honolulu trade went into national service, and many ended long and useful careers as battle casualties. Ships of the Matson Navigation Co., almost unrecognizable in wartime gray paint and otherwise transformed, occasionally slipped into Honolulu harbor unannounced. Their peacetime capacities were increased sixfold when luxurious accommodations were ripped out to provide the greatest possible space for troops. The line's four passenger ships traveled 1,500,000 miles and carried 750,000 wartime passengerstroops, high-priority civilian officials, USO performers, Red Cross workers, war brides and their babies, battle casualties, and prisoners of war. Just before the start of the war, the Matsonia and Monterey were chartered by the U. S. Maritime Commission, and on December 10 the Lurline arrived in San Francisco to join them in governmental service. All three sailed in convoy December 16, carrying troops and large cargoes of ammunition to Hawaii. They returned together to San Francisco, the Lurline with Navy casualties and dependents; the Monterey with Army casualties; and the Matsonia with civilian evacuees. Thereafter, the Lurline and Matsonia carried personnel and supplies to every base of military importance in the Pacific. Most of their trips were made without escorts, since their speed was sufficient under most circumstances to enable them to outrun submarines. The Monterey sailed both the Pacific and the Atlantic. She carried troops to Casablanca ten days after the invasion of North Africa; under fire in the Mediterranean, she took aboard 1,675 survivors from sunken ships of a convoy, one of the largest sea rescues in history. The Mariposa, in Sydney at the outbreak of war, returned to San Francisco on December 31 for delivery to the Maritime Commission. After two round trips to Australia, she served mostly in the Atlantic and made several trips to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. She sailed more miles and carried more passengers than any other Matson ship. Eleven Matson freighters and four Matson-operated Liberty ships were sunk during the war. The Mauna Ala went aground on the Oregon

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coast in a sudden blackout three days after the start of the war. Within a week, the Lahaina and Manini were sunk by submarines. The Malama was sunk January 1, 1942, and its crew members were held in Japanese prison camps until the end of the war. The Mauna Loa was bombed while lying at anchor in Darwin, Australia; the Lihue and Kahuku were torpedoed in the Caribbean; the Honomu and Olopana were sunk in the frigid waters near Murmansk, Russia; the Kaimoku was torpedoed near Scotland; and the Mapele ran aground on Cape Divine, Alaska, during a gale-driven snowstorm. Ships of the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., had been chartered even before the war for special missions to the "line islands," toward the equator, and some of the company's towboats and barges had also been used. When the war started, the U. S. Engineers, and later the War Shipping Administration, took control of all Inter-Island ships. They made blacked-out emergency voyages to Palmyra, Midway, Johnston, and numerous other isolated islands of the Pacific, carrying capacity cargoes of food, guns, munitions, and medical supplies. Inter-Island vessels were especially suited for such duty because their crews were accustomed to working at small ports where freight had to be taken ashore in lighters. Built to withstand the strong currents and heavy seas in Island channels, the ships were sufficiently seaworthy. But since they were not equipped for long voyages, they were forced to carry drums of drinking water and fuel oil on deck until permanent equipment could be installed. Several Inter-Island ships saw action, but none suffered damage. The Humuula was only a short distance from a ship sunk by a submarine near Canton Island, and the Hualalai was once trailed by a submarine most of the way from Midway to Hawaii. After the first busy months, four of the Inter-Island ships—the Waialeale, Hualalai, Humuula, and Hawaii—were employed principally between Hawaiian ports, but their schedules continued uncertain because they were sometimes diverted on short notice for trips to distant islands. The Haleakala, the Kilauea, the motor vessel Kalae, and the tug Eleu were taken over for sole government use. Several tugs and steel barges belonging to Young Brothers, Ltd., were chartered by the Engineers for service to Pacific islands. The two steamships owned by the Commercial Pacific Cable Co. were also chartered to the government. The cableship Restorer established and maintained communications for the Army Signal Corps in the far Aleutians and in the Guam-Saipan area. The cable supply ship Dickenson, operated by the Navy as the Kailua, was sunk by a submarine torpedo in a practice operation after the end of the war.

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SUGAR AND PINEAPPLE PLANTATIONS were especially affected by the war, not only because they were Hawaii's economic mainstay, but also because they were virtually self-sustaining communities. Their usual routine was now entirely disrupted. They loaned men and materials to the armed forces and provided housing for troops. They grew vegetables and encouraged home gardening to make the plantation communities more nearly self-sustaining. They issued gas and liquor rations and headed civilian defense activities. And they struggled to maintain sugar and pineapple production in the face of a dwindling labor supply. Because of the multiplicity of Army and Navy requests for men and equipment immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, plantation coordinators were named for each island to arrange loans of men and materials. During 1942, plantation workmen performed 390,000 man-days of labor for the services. Even in succeeding years, when the need was less urgent, they continued to help in emergencies, devoting 54,000 mandays to military work in 1943, and 3,500 in 1944. Sugar and pineapple machine shops repaired Army and Navy equipment and made portable huts, gun mounts, bunks, and numerous other military items. Shop crews of the Ewa Plantation Co. spent 37 per cent of their time on Army work between January and September, 1942. Plantation power plants carried the electrical load for both civilian and service activities in their localities during emergencies. The Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co., Ltd., which supplied the electric power for military establishments on Maui, had to shut down its irrigation pumps at times in order to meet all other requirements. Sugar companies also supplied some military installations with water until they were able to develop their own supplies. All plantations swarmed with troops. Especially during the early days of feverish defense preparations, many materials were taken without so much as a. "by your leave." The services dismantled houses without prior permission and they bulldozed roads through fields of growing cane. Although plantation practice is to stop harvesting during heavy downpours to protect the dirt roads, Army trucks continued to churn up plantation roads to such an extent that they sometimes became impassable for several days. The number of unskilled male laborers on sugar plantations dropped from 37,000 in 1939 to 30,000 in 1941, and, despite controls designed to stabilize field labor, there were only 20,000 in 1945. The number of pineapple workers likewise declined. Men who remained on the plantations were restless, especially when workers who had taken war jobs returned home for visits and boasted of their new wealth. Even the work-

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ers who wished to remain on the plantations complained of many wartime conditions. Those in the outlying camps wanted to move to more central areas because gas rationing and the blackout gave them little opportunity to shop, go to the movies, or visit friends elsewhere on the plantation. The government urged all-out expansion of sugar and pineapple production. Hawaiian sugar was badly needed to make up for supplies lost when the Japanese seized Java, the Philippines, and other cane areas. The Army and Navy wanted huge quantities of Hawaiian pineapple; twothirds of all the solid pack and three-quarters of the canned juice went to the armed forces. To meet these needs, plantations made every effort to maintain a high wartime output, even at the risk of impairing future production. They concentrated manpower on the most urgent tasks and curtailed research activities, discontinuing some research records which had been kept for a quarter of a century. Because of the stepped-up efforts of plantation labor and management and the millions of man-hours worked by school children, the percentage decline in production of both sugar and pineapple was less than the percentage loss of labor. Sugar production went down from 947,000 tons in 1940 to 821,000 tons in 1945; pineapple rose from 18,750,000 cases to 20,000,000 and then dropped to just below 18,000,000. Though loss of land to the military was another factor in decreased production, the full story cannot be told in mere numbers of acres. When the services took over plantation lands or constructed a new road through the fields, extensive changes in the irrigation layout or reorganization of a complicated production schedule were often required. Sometimes the cane on land needed for war purposes was sufficiently near maturity to justify harvesting, but often such areas were too small to lend themselves to mechanical harvesting and had to be cut by hand, a much more expensive and time-consuming method. The blackout proved disrupting to sugar plantations accustomed to working around-the-clock at harvest time. It was necessary to devise ways of working with shielded lights in the fields and at the mills. The burning of cane, a method used to strip the cane stalks of leaves before harvesting, had to be controlled so that no smoldering embers would remain after blackout time. The large, ungainly sugar mills had to be blacked out so that no crack of light would be visible. Though all plantations were affected by the war, the three nearest Pearl Harbor were hardest hit. The Honolulu Plantation Co. at Aiea, which had 6,000 acres in cane before the war, lost 2,800 to the government. Although the plantation was compensated for loss of crops, roads,

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and irrigation ditches, that land which remained could not produce enough cane to keep the mill running at more than half-capacity. Unable to continue profitable operation with its reduced acreage, the plantation eventually was absorbed by the Oahu Plantation Co., Ltd., of Waipahu. The Honolulu Plantation Co. filed a claim for $3,250,000 capital loss arising from the land condemnations, and the matter is still pending. Areas were taken over from Oahu Plantation for camps, balloon barrage stations, searchlight stations, airfields, roads, ammunition dumps, and prisoner of war camps. Airport construction put the plantation's irrigation system temporarily out of commission, and the dynamiting of ammunition-storage tunnels sent large boulders crashing onto irrigation ditches, resulting in the loss of several million gallons of water. The 135 parcels of Ewa Plantation Co. land taken by the military comprised 570 acres of waste or pasture land, 151 acres of cane land, and 25 acres of parks and villages. In addition, the services used 48,000 square feet of Ewa buildings. All recreation areas were used except a baseball lot and a swimming pool, and the plantation shared even these with the services. Ewa carried out numerous assignments for the services, one of the largest being the construction of an eight-and-a-half-mile road in hazardous terrain. ISLAND UTILITIES FELT THE IMPACT OF WAR immediately and the

effects lasted throughout the war. Mutual Telephone Co. was one of the first to learn of the December 7 attack. Within minutes of the bombing it received a call from a Navy officer: " W e want some through trunking connections as fast as you can make them." Then General Short called the War Department; Admiral Kimmel called the Navy Department; and Governor Poindexter called President Roosevelt. At 10:44 A.M., a Japanese resident placed a call for Tokyo, merely wanting to tell relatives that he was all right. Instead of talking to Tokyo, he talked to the FBI. Traffic surged to capacity, but after radio stations asked the public not to use telephones, 30 per cent reduction in the calling rate followed. Rush orders for additional phone facilities kept installation crews on the job day and night through early morning of December 9- Demands for phone service grew. The exchange, with 300 locals, installed at Punahou for the Engineers was the largest manual office in the Islands, larger even than the Wahiawa substation had been two years previously. On December 9, Mutual was placed under control of the Army, which then got first call on all services and equipment needed to supplement its own communications. The company was left to set its own policies and priorities for civilian requirements. Army control remained in effect until October 24, 1944.

103. Volunteer AJA's of the 442nd Infantry Battalion, about to make military history, assemble for aloha ceremonies at Iolani Palace.

104. Big Island A J A ' s , along with other Hawaii-born Japanese, responded readily to the Army's call for volunteers to serve as interpreters.

105. W o m e n of five races comprised the first group of Island-born W A C s , being administered the oath by General Robert C. Richardson, Jr.

106. Barred at first from military service, AJA's formed the Varsity Victory Volunteers, insisting on their right to help with the war effort.

107. Even the youngsters volunteered. A barefoot "army" made up of plantation children drills under the direction of friendly servicemen.

108. With bond purchases exceeding monthly allotments and drive quotas, Hawaii had the highest average per capita record in entire country.

109. Red Cross volunteers worked with various relief groups collecting thousands of pounds of clothing to be sent to war-stricken countries.

110. As part of a territory-wide Philippine Islands War Relief Drive, Island women collected, sorted, and mended clothing for freed Filipinos.

111. Japanese women of three generations—some wearing dresses instead of kimonos for the first time—met regularly to knit for Red Cross.

112. Scrap aluminum drives got everything but the kitchen sink.

113. Old boots, tires, and girdles went into the scrap rubber drive.

114. As part of the metal recovery program, plantation sugar mills contributed tons of steel as well as broken parts and obsolete machinery.

115. Price ceilings were imposed by OPA to curb inflation as merchandise shortages plus the Islands' bloated economy sent prices soaring.

116. Stacks of out-going V-mail were photographed on microfilm.

117. Incoming V-mail was carefully checked for faulty printing.

118. As part of the governor's Work to W i n campaign, day care centers were opened for preschool children to free mothers for war work.

119. Large companies provided day care for children of their employees.

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Transpacific calls doubled in number in 1942 and continued to climb. For the first time in history, men returning from battle could talk with their families from points halfway across the globe. Calls on special days mounted: on Mother's Day, 1942, there were 325 transpacific calls; at Christmastime, 1944, there were 2,400. The two generating plants of the Hawaiian Electric Co., Ltd., were both in danger areas. One was on the Honolulu waterfront. The other, at Waiau near Pearl Harbor, was directly in line of fire from ships attempting to bring down the Japanese planes on December 7. The Waiau plant was shut down three times during that day to minimize danger to equipment and personnel, and the building itself suffered damage from shrapnel and machine gun bullets. Guards patrolled both power plants until five days after V-J Day. Until the summer of 1943, two machine gun nests were manned on the roof of the main plant. Despite loss of business due to blackouts, the needs of war industries and the armed services were so great that energy output of the company, which had been 174,000,000 kilowatt hours in 1938, rose to 526,000,000 in 1944. Capacity was increased 60 per cent in 1944, when priorities were granted for installation of a new $4,000,000 generator. A partial shutdown for overhaul the next spring was made possible only when the Army and Navy energy consumption was cut down by 20 per cent, and the public was urged to reduce its consumption by a similar amount. Honolulu Gas Co., Ltd., produced 250 per cent more gas in 1945 than in 1939, despite a steep drop in the labor force and a scarcity of satisfactory grades of oil from which to manufacture gas. The company was unable to expand facilities sufficiently and could not black out its buildings so that work could continue at night. T H E WARTIME PROBLEMS OF ALL ISLAND BUSINESSES fell generally i n t o

four categories: general controls, supply, prices, and manpower. Untangling the red tape of controls required much time and effort, and businessmen even had difficulty finding out what was required of them. One prominent businessman entered a complaint that his representative, asking at the military governor's office for copies of regulations, was shunted from one section to another. He was first given an incomplete set o f regulations which proved full of omissions, discrepancies, typographical errors, and misspelled words. He was then told that the supply of the missing forms was exhausted and that no file copy was available for reference. Finally, he was told that he was "supposed to watch the papers for these orders."

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Early in the war there were two sets of controls: local controls emanating from the Office of the Military Governor and those issued at Washington for application nationally. One of Honolulu's biggest corporations commented that it seemed at times "as though the winning of the war had become a secondary matter in the welter of questionnaires, regulations, rulings, and interpretations hurled at us. It is utterly impossible to keep pace with all of them." After martial law was lifted, the federal agencies which came to Hawaii brought new types of rulings. Some of these bureaus were hampered by limited authority and the difficulty of applying regulations emanating from Washington to Hawaii's special conditions. The corporation previously quoted remarked in its 1944 annual report: One of the greatest difficulties in the sugar business today is the inordinate number of Federal agencies which mess around seeking information. Much of the information sought is merely another version of similar information already in the hands of some other agency. [There is a] confusing mass of instructions and decrees which often admit of no intelligent application. The almost complete indifference of one governmental agency to the rules and regulations issued by another agency is as difficult to cope with as is their indifference to the fundamental problems of production.

Shipping controls vitally affected the Islands because of their dependence upon the Mainland for a large proportion of their needs. Honolulu had been a bustling port even before the war. During 1940 some 1,370,000 tons of civilian cargo were discharged; 1,740,000 tons up to October, 1941. But by July, 1944, when the peak of activities was reached, 538,000 tons of Army cargo, 150,000 tons of Navy cargo, and 100,000 tons of commercial cargo crossed Honolulu piers monthly. The military's Cargo and Passenger Control Section* had charge of Island harbors from the outbreak of war until 1946. This office allotted cargo to specific vessels, supervised dockage and stevedoring, and controlled all cargo until it was removed from the wharf. When a convoy arrived, work was rushed to speed turnaround of the greatly needed ships. Because it was feared that the ships might be prey for submarines if anchored outside the harbor, as many as possible were brought inside. * The Cargo and Passenger Control Section was a division of the Office of the Military Governor, and, after 1944, of the Office of Internal Security. When the Army Port and Service Command was created in the late summer of 1943, its commanding officer was named Executive to the Military Governor for Cargo and Passenger Control. In November, 1945, the Army Port and Service Command took over completely and continued control of all Island harbors until April, 1946, and of Kahului, Hilo, and Port Allen until a short time later. The name "Cargo and Passenger Control" caused much confusion because control of cargo and passengers was actually vested in other offices. Priorities for the shipment of cargo were issued by the Section of Materials and Supplies. Passenger priorities for inter-island travel were issued during most of the war by the Travel Control Bureau, and for travel outside the Islands, by the Army Transport Service or the Trans-Pacific Travel Bureau.

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However, so far as is known, no shot was fired at any ship in Island waters or Honolulu-bound after the first few weeks of the war. I n October, 1943, Honolulu was rated first port in the world for operating efficiency, and for the succeeding 15 months it ranked among the top three. Early in 1945, when the Okinawa invasion was pending, the port handled a volume of work 49 per cent heavier than the average Mainland harbor, with only 22 per cent of the personnel. For months, stevedores worked 10-hour shifts, seven days a week. Honolulu importers had to contend not only with manufacturing and supply controls common to the rest of the country, but also with special shipping regulations. For 15 months after December 7, both types of controls were centered in the Materials and Supplies Section,* which also served as the local representative of the War Production Board. I n this dual capacity, it exerted tremendous influence over business. Early in the war all applications for priorities for manufactured goods needed in Hawaii were submitted to the "M&S" office for recommendation to the Army and Navy Munitions Board. After April, 1943, when the War Production Board established its own office in Honolulu, the procedure for handling supply priorities followed the national pattern, although Mainland regulations could be modified to meet local conditions. The Honolulu office handled priorities for goods already in the Islands, while San Francisco handled priorities for Mainland procurement of critical materials. About 1,000 applications were processed each month. Even when goods were obtainable on the Mainland, businessmen in Hawaii had still to meet the hurdle of shipping controls. A joint military transportation committee in Washington assigned ships to Hawaii in an attempt to provide for monthly importation of 35,000 tons of food and 50,000 tons of other civilian cargo. Although the tonnage assigned to civilians averaged slightly under the allotted 85,000 tons monthly, it varied from a low of 50,000 to a high of 124,000 tons. Shipments for Christmas, 1942, were so limited that some stores put dummy packages on shelves to appear well-stocked. Plans to reduce the tonnage allotment in June, 1944, were protested successfully by the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, which felt that the allotment was already "wholly inadequate." The M&S office set up separate systems to handle priorities for freight, express, parcel post, and air shipments. The major problem was that of freight shipments, all of which were at first rated on the basis of four * This section was originally under the Office of the Military Governor and then under the Office of Civilian Defense.

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priorities. After a specified period, goods were automatically moved into the next higher priority group, since space limitations seldom permitted lower priority groups to be loaded. In the first two and a half years of the war, the section issued more than 200,000 permits. The difficulty of considering these individually caused chaos in the San Francisco office, so in July, 1944, a new system was devised. Under the new plan, the M&S office set up 69 general classifications of goods. Each month, when probable shipping space was determined, a master priority list was prepared, stating the amount of each commodity to be shipped. Permits were then issued to merchants who wished to bring in a specific commodity on the list. With the aid of local businessmen, the section set up its priority list by estimating the amounts of various items needed. Factors considered were prewar imports, reports from major wholesalers, essentiality of items, inventories in the Islands, availability of the items on the Mainland, seasonal demands, and special community conditions. Merchants then complained that storage charges and taxes piled up on goods warehoused in San Francisco awaiting shipment; they demanded to know why a competitor's goods arrived before theirs. Frequent queries were raised as to why juke boxes, slot machines, pianos, and novelties were allotted space. Officials explained that additional space which sometimes became available on short notice had to be filled with whatever was on hand even if its priority rating was low. They produced statistics to show that during a typical six-month period only .002 per cent of the available cargo transport space had been devoted to sporting goods of all kinds, including much-disputed pool tables. PRICE CONTROL WAS OF GREATER IMPORTANCE IN HAWAII than in

most Mainland areas. Inflationary potentialities were probably more serious in the Islands than elsewhere because of huge military and civilian payrolls, lavish expenditures by servicemen and defense workers, and severe limitations of supply imposed by shipping conditions. Early in January, 1942, the military governor instituted control on food prices,* and in May froze prices on all other commodities at the highest selling price during the month of April. It was a bad choice of * The director of food control in the Office of the Military Governor was authorized to control sales and prices of food from January until October, when control was transferred to the Price Control Section. This section had been established in May in the Office of the Military Governor, its director also being the Hawaii representative of the national Office of Price Administration. For islands other than Oahu, price control was delegated to the Army district commanders, and procedures differed considerably during the early months of the war. On March 10, 1943, the military government relinquished price controls to the Office of Price Administration.

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base month, for a serious shortage of merchandise had existed then and increased costs due to wartime conditions had not been included in the prices of commodities still on the shelves. As new supplies were received, the April markups often proved inadequate for a fair profit. The Price Control Section soon was deluged with applications for breaks in the April ceilings. By November it had received 783 appeals requesting higher prices on 4,479 items, and by the following March an adjustment committee had heard some 500 cases. There were so many difficulties that even official reports admit decisions were not consistent. When the Office of Price Administration assumed control on March 10, 1943, it appointed industry advisory committees, price panel assistants, and 14 war price and rationing boards, all in accordance with the pattern which had been developed on the Mainland. The advisory committees, composed of business leaders and representatives of various industries, assisted in the compilation of regulations and their enforcement. The price panel assistants checked prices at stores in their neighborhoods to discourage violations. The price and rationing boards dealt chiefly with gasoline rationing problems and, to a lesser extent, with tire rationing and priorities for bicycles, refrigerators, stoves, water heaters, and typewriters. Contrary to Mainland practice, food and shoes were not rationed, and rent control was in the hands of local authorities. Nevertheless, the price and rationing boards were kept exceedingly busy, some members giving as many as 1,000 hours of volunteer service. The OPA gradually replaced the ceiling prices based on April, 1942, figures with specific price schedules. These differed from island to island and from time to time as conditions required, the general policy being to allow a reasonable percentage of markup over landed costs. Attention was first directed to food costs, and the schedules developed were satisfactory enough to form the basis for prices throughout the rest of the war. Next, the OPA considered jewelry, and found markups as high as 370 per cent over wholesale costs. Some high jewelry prices had resulted from poor buying practices, but they were mostly due to unusual demand and "easy money." Startlingly lower prices prevailed after the jewelry regulations went into effect. Schedules flowed from the OPA office in increasing numbers, covering not only the usual goods brought from the Mainland, but also such items as Hawaiian standard blackout bulbs, lauhala products, Niihau shell lets, and photographs taken with or without a hula girl. The OPA struggled to bring order out of chaos in the hot-dog and hamburger world, where vendors of "jumbo franks" demanded higher selling prices than their neighbors who sold "wee wienies." It tried to price taro and pot, work shirts, and tattoo designs. A special problem was provided by

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the unknown makes and odd sizes of shoes which were dumped on the Hawaiian market as a result of shoe rationing on the Mainland. During 1942, only 14 violations of the regulations of the Price Control Section were prosecuted, all in the provost courts, but several heavy sentences resulted. A wholesaler of dairy products arrested for overcharging was fined $2,500, with $1,000 suspended. Investigations early in 1943 revealed hundreds of violations. Many, however, were due to confusion or misunderstanding, and since prosecution would have been practically impossible, only the most flagrant violators were hailed into court to serve as examples for the rest. After March, 1943, the OPA depended chiefly on compliance drives and frequent checking to keep prices in line, but some violators were brought to court. Under the "triple-damage" provisions, either the OPA or an overcharged consumer could bring suit for three times the actual overcharge, or $50, whichever was greater. During 1944, violators of price regulations paid $88,000 in fines and claims; in 1945, penalties rose to $258,500. In the latter year, $192,300 of the total was paid on consumer triple-damage claims. Some jail sentences were imposed, also. However, the OPA considered compliance with regulations in Hawaii to be above the United States average. In the Islands, as elsewhere, there was the usual grumbling about the OPA. Some thought its prices were too high; others, too low. In January, 1944, the holdover committee of the territorial legislature invited the OPA director to appear before it to discuss "widespread dissatisfaction" over OPA operations. Some 570 complaints had been lodged with the committee, most of them dealing with alleged improper administration of the law in Hawaii, discourteous conduct or indifference in relations with the public, and inequitable decisions. The director appeared at the hearings, although the propriety of an "investigation" of the federal agency by a territorial body appeared questionable. There was considerable blowing off of steam, but the committee made no report. Unquestionably, the OPA was successful in holding the price line. When price controls were removed in June, 1946, the over-all cost of goods and services in Honolulu was only 6 per cent above that of March, 1943, and food had increased less than 3 per cent. In the six months following, the price of food increased 39 per cent and the over-all costs increased 19 per cent. Towering over all wartime business problems was the shortage of manpower. Businesses carried on with small and often inexperienced work forces; many thousands of individuals put in long, exhausting hours; and the government imposed stringent manpower controls in an endeavor to channel workers into jobs most important to the war effort.

C H A P T E R

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before the war, spread throughout all fields of endeavor in 1942, and became increasingly worse as the war tempo increased. There was unemployment only for a brief period early in 1942 when personnel were discharged en masse by businesses which were curtailed or discontinued. On Oahu almost immediate re-employment could be found in war work, but the pickup was slower on the other islands where fewer opportunities existed outside of the plantations. By the fall of 1942, the labor famine had grown acute. The Hilo Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution condemning "labor pirating." Honolulu's biggest dime store had fewer employees in all departments combined than it had the preceding Christmas in the toy department alone. Another retail store dropped from 662 employees to 215, and many of the latter worked only part time. But labor shortages had barely begun. The War Manpower Commission estimated that throughout 1944 and 1945 there were from 10,000 to 15,000 unfilled positions on Oahu, and the demand for workers at the United States Employment Service in Honolulu was eight times the number of applicants. Early in 1945, service facilities, such as stevedoring, trucking, transportation, construction, repair shops, laundries, restaurants, and hospitals, were especially in dire need of help. Although manpower shortages lessened in most Mainland areas toward the end of the war, they became increasingly worse in Honolulu due to the stepped-up emphasis on the Pacific campaigns. T o remedy the manpower shortage thousands of workers were brought to the Islands despite the housing shortage. Every able Island resident was urged to take a job. Efforts were made to increase the efficiency of workers. And, most important of all, manpower controls of a severity unknown elsewhere in the United States were instituted. 305

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At its peak, the labor force in Hawaii numbered 220,000 civilians, 160,000 of whom were on Oahu. Two-thirds of the total were in essential or locally needed work. "Essential" activities, as defined by labor controls, included 35 categories of work considered necessary in the war effort or in the maintenance of the community. "Locally needed" activities on Oahu included laundries, restaurants, hotels, trucking, and gasoline and oil distribution, but not such concerns as clothing stores, banks, theaters, and many others which struggled to operate with depleted labor forces. Hawaii had an abnormal number of self-employed workers, for the boom encouraged the ambitious to go into business for themselves. And, because labor controls were difficult to apply to self-employment, such establishments as amusement centers and bars often took all employees, including the janitor, into a partnership to remove them from the status of employees. A larger percentage of the total population was at work in Hawaii than in most other parts of the United States. Many persons held one or more part-time jobs in addition to a full-time job. Such "supplemental" work was encouraged by excluding it from most labor controls. Some less essential businesses operated entirely with "supplementary employees," many of whom were night-shift war workers who could do other work during the day. Soldiers and sailors took off-duty jobs such as driving busses, doing yardwork, and working in restaurants and fountains. During the last 11 months of the war, when the Army had a permit system in operation, it issued 2,945 permits, three-fourths of them in Honolulu. The Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. employed 320 soldiers, the University of Hawaii and the schools hired 44 as teachers, and some 190 other employers used Army men. The Navy prohibited outside employment of its men in January, 1945. The governor, the War Manpower Commission, the Chamber of Commerce, and private employers protested that the move severely crippled many businesses, but their appeals failed to change the ruling. At about the same time, the Army limited off-duty work of its men to essential work only. The scarcity of women, intensified by the evacuations, meant acute shortages of domestic and laundry workers, waitresses, clerical workers, teachers, and nurses. Because of the need in classifications traditionally occupied by women, "Rosie the Riveter" had few counterparts in civilian Hawaii. The services, however, used women in shops and supply depots; 1,400 women in 1942 were holding federal civil service jobs normally filled by men, mainly as chauffeurs, mechanics, and storekeepers. Following a registration of all women in the territory in November, 1942, many took positions because of the fear that those unemployed

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might be required to evacuate. The survey showed 52 per cent of all Honolulu women were working, and percentages were nearly as high elsewhere in the territory. Most of those not gainfully employed were unable to take a position because of small children or physical inability. Some women found the pace too strenuous and dropped out when the defense pressure lessened. Many women working 48 hours a week had to arise long before daylight to take care of the needs of husband, children, and household. They had to shop under trying wartime conditions during a half-hour lunch period. After a tiring day they had to hasten home to finish dinner and household chores before blackout. Shortages and gas rationing made marketing difficult. Domestic help was almost nonexistent, and many housewives accustomed to having the laundry done by a maid found commercial laundries closed to all but prewar customers. A survey by the Honolulu Council of Social Agencies early in the war showed that 30 per cent of Honolulu children under 12 years of age had inadequate supervision during the hours both parents were working. Five day care centers were opened and later 13 public centers in Honolulu cared for several hundred children. Further expansion was prevented by insurmountable difficulties in obtaining trained teachers, convenient locations, and sufficient finances. Opened originally with a Community Chest grant, the centers obtained funds successively from the federal government under provisions of the Lanham Act, from the department of public instruction, from the Territory under provisions of the M-Day Act, and from the Free Kindergarten and Children's Aid Association. The latter assumed permanent responsibility during the postwar period. Several times the centers were saved from closing when, at the last moment, a small sum was made available to keep them going a few weeks longer. When the Philippines were liberated, it was suggested that Filipinos be brought to Hawaii to replace workers who had left the plantations for defense jobs. In midsummer of 1945, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Pineapple Growers Association requested permission to bring in 9,100 Filipinos. Despite objections from labor unions, mild at the time but more strenuous after V-J Day, some 6,000 arrived in 1946. The importation did not wholly achieve its purpose, for within a year about 35 per cent of the imported Filipinos left the plantations for other work. Beginning injuly, 1944, the Army brought in Italian prisoners of war to do work permitted under the Geneva convention. By the end of the war, nearly 5,000 had been imported. Most of these men were considered politically dangerous or were otherwise unacceptable for the Italian

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service units on the Mainland which their comrades were allowed to join after the Italian surrender. Many did laundry work, landscaping, and carpentry work. Some helped replant 5,000 acres of burned and damaged forest land which had been used as firing ranges or maneuver grounds. Others removed bomb shelters and replanted the grounds of Iolani Palace. Some of the prisoners were good workers; others indulged in frequent slowdowns or took advantage of opportunities to commit minor sabotage; but their total work was valued at millions of dollars. Island youths worked during week ends, vacations, and after school hours, and also during a part of the regular school session. Work by minors was especially important in three fields: in defense construction for the Army and Navy, in plantation and other agricultural work, and in retail stores, restaurants, and similar consumer service activities. A general order permitted children as young as 12 to be hired under certain regulations. Striplings weighing as little as 80 pounds wrestled with loads heavier than themselves, and children of Japanese ancestry sometimes worked under the watchful eyes of MP's armed with machine guns. The board of health reported that a third of the crippled minors 14 years or over were employed, many in well-paid positions. As many as 18,000 child labor certificates a year were issued, and children were employed in many jobs in which they did not need certificates. Late in the war the employment of minors was restricted in certain amusement centers where large numbers were being employed. A survey made by the University of Hawaii showed that 79 per cent of the men students and 63 per cent of the women were doing either paid or volunteer war work, and that 56 per cent of the men students and 14 per cent of the women were in jobs involving 40 hours a week or more. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, many older pupils took war jobs, and when schools reopened the military governor urged students 16 years of age and over to remain at work. More than 2,800 already were working for war agencies. The Advertiser said editorially: Standards of the past might fail to see wisdom in such action, but in face of the realities of the day, the youth of this age can serve his country and himself by performing useful tasks.

During the spring of 1942, several rural schools arranged to have their pupils spend one week a month in sugar and pineapple fields. Students 12 years old and over were urged to take summer jobs. They responded in lines a block long at the United States Employment Service. The Hawaiian Air Depot oifered 40-hour-week jobs at $125 a month plus overtime rearranging stock in aircraft supply warehouses or loading and unloading aircraft supplies. The Engineers offered boys

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$4.00 a day for cutting kiawe trees, and $1.00 a day had previously been considered good pay. The PTA executive committee vigorously opposed a suggested extension of the vacation period for elementry and intermediate schools. It would approve an extended vacation for high school only in the event of military necessity, but not because of a "need of industry for child labor." Nevertheless, all territorial public schools except Honolulu's elementary and intermediate schools delayed opening from September 1 to September 28. Then all intermediate and high schools held classes only four days a week to allow students over 12 years of age to work in sugar, pineapple, or vegetable fields. Despite the protests of a small number of antagonistic parents and the apathy of a larger group, student turnout was high throughout 1943 and 1944. After V-J Day the plantations were still short of labor and wished to continue student employment, but the turnout dropped 50 per cent. Mounting opposition from labor unions, PTA groups, and others culminated in an evening session of the school board October 24, 1945, following which the board announced that the program would be ended January 15, 1946. Students had put in more than 8,000,000 hours of plantation work and had saved much sugar and pineapple from going to waste. Improved personnel policies, training courses, and a communitywide "Work to Win" campaign helped increase worker efficiency. The War Manpower Commission's "Training Within Industry" program awarded more than 20,000 TWI certificates. The department of public instruction emphasized its in-school vocational education, and offered numerous part-time and evening classes and extensive foreman and supervisory training conferences. It enrolled 30,000 trainees in its special war production classes, financed partly by the federal government. These were held at naval installations on Oahu and to some extent on Maui, Hawaii, and Kauai. The Pearl Harbor Training School was one of the biggest in any navy yard in the country. Another agency which contributed to the training of workers was an apprenticeship council created by the special session of the legislature in the fall of 1941, just in time to play a part in the expanded apprentice program following the outbreak of war. The governor's Work to Win program opened in May, 1943, with a "Cavalcade to Victory" at Honolulu Stadium, in which top military and civil authorities participated. A campaign of almost daily publicity ensued, supported by $150,000 in contributions from business. A committee which studied absenteeism found that some Island workers took frequent days off to get liquor permits, to buy liquor when a shipment arrived, to be vaccinated, to get identification cards, to get CIB passes, and to

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purchase necessities. Their absence from work made it more difficult for other workers t o get a meal, to reach work, to have their cars repaired, to obtain milk and groceries, to have laundry done. M o s t successful o f the W o r k t o Win activities was the Victory Worker Plan, under which 8 0 , 0 0 0 stars for perfect work attendance were awarded with fanfare to workers in 125 firms. MANPOWER CONTROLS PRESENTED A CONFUSED PICTURE due t o frequent changes and divided authority between the military and civilians. At the beginning o f the war, Army, Navy, and civilian employers bid frantically for the limited manpower available. On December 20, a farreaching general order froze many classes o f essential workers to their jobs at December 7 wages. It provided that any workers who had left their jobs since December 7 were to return and that workers hired in the future must take employment at the order o f the military. It also set aside certain labor contracts. In January the next in the series o f orders established the section o f labor control in the Office o f the Military Governor, provided for a registration o f all unemployed men, and required employers to notify the United States Employment Service o f all separations thereafter. About 5,000 men registered and were assigned to jobs on five priority levels: Army and Navy, contractors, civilian defense, public utilities, and nondefense industry. District commanders on the outer islands issued a variety o f rules. Some, for example, froze all plantation workers to their jobs, ordered persons to work at least 2 0 days each month, and required travel permits from military authorities for movement from the island. Varying standards were set up for the issuance o f travel permits, but plantation workers generally could not obtain them. On Kauai, a field laborer was required to obtain a formal release from his plantation manager before a travel permit would be issued. O n Oahu, plantation labor was not frozen, but the military services and their contractors informally agreed, in return for the loan o f plantation workers, not to hire anyone known to be a plantation employee. Terms o f the worker-loan arranged between the U . S. Engineers and the plantations provided that the plantations were t o be reimbursed for the wages which they paid the workmen—a minimum o f 41 cents an hour—plus 9 cents an hour for perquisites furnished the employees by the plantations, and further payments for general overhead and administrative costs, taxes, and expenses o f the coordinator's office. The plantations received about 62 cents per worker-hour, but the employee himself received his usual 41 cents and perquisites. Often he worked side by side

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with Engineer employees who were earning much more but were directed by the Engineers not to discuss with unauthorized persons "work projects or labor conditions, including hours o f work and rates o f pay; and particularly with plantation laborers." Criticism arose, but the plantations insisted that the plan was not o f their making or to their advantage. They held, with some justification, that the additional payments above the basic wage were completely legitimate reimbursements for their cash expenditures, and did not even make up losses from curtailment o f sugar production. When the plantations were first asked to contract for the loan o f labor, materials, supplies, and equipment, they had declined. Their attorneys pointed out that they were not in the business o f supplying labor or renting equipment, and that doing so, and consequently suffering financial loss, might result in litigation. An order from the O M G followed, making the agreement mandatory. Under terms o f the contract, the Engineers ultimately paid plantations approximately $6,000,000 for labor and equipment. The hurriedly written stopgap labor control order o f December 2 0 caused such confusion and apprehension that in March a new order was issued, defining its coverage more clearly. The new order also set up a uniform wage-and-hour schedule for war work and controlled shifting between war jobs. These policies remained in effect until martial law was ended late in 1944. They were the target o f more bitter criticism than any other wartime controls and were open to considerable abuse by employers. Although employees leaving a job to which they were frozen were subject t o punishment, no penalties were provided for employers who hired in violation o f the regulations. T h e December 2 0 order affected 9 0 , 0 0 0 workers in the employ o f hospitals, utilities, stevedoring firms, dairies, and laundries, as well as the Army and Navy and their contractors and sources o f supply. I t provided that no one in such work could quit without a release from his employer. There was no appeal; if the employer refused, there was nothing the worker could do. Quitting without a release subjected the worker to prosecution in provost court for absenteeism. Employees discharged "with prejudice" could not be hired by any o f the companies covered by the order. A worker could appeal to the section o f labor control for clearance o f the "prejudice" dismissal, but no standards were set up for granting such clearance. However, 9 0 per cent o f the 1,345 cases appealed were cleared. Many prejudicial releases were found to result from poor personnel relations and the inability o f supervisors from the Mainland t o understand the various races which make up Hawaii's population. Though the December 20 order permitted prosecution for absenteeism, it set up no specific penalties. Jail sentences were imposed—

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something unparalleled in American history. The new order established a maximum penalty of $200 fine, or imprisonment for not more than two months, or both, for absenteeism—including unauthorized changing of jobs. In practice, absenteeism sometimes was reported to the Office of the Military Governor, which sent a letter of warning. I f it continued, the offender was hailed into provost court. During 1942, a total of 286 jail sentences were imposed, but in many cases they were suspended if the offender agreed to work regularly. Many absentees were jailed during 1943, and early in 1944 more jail sentences were being imposed by provost courts for absenteeism than for any other reason. But in April, 1944, the rising tide of criticism from local citizens, labor unions, the Department of the Interior, and even the War Department led the military governor to remit most of the unexpired sentences and to establish a maximum penalty of $150, abolishing jail terms. Even so, many persons convicted were jailed because of inability to pay the fine. I N THE FALL OF 1942, when the national War Manpower Commission was created, the Office of the Military Governor requested that it be named the sole representative of the commission in Hawaii. Instead, the W M C announced that its national policies would be applied to the maximum extent consistent with the O M G labor program. A territorial director of the W M C was named who, at the same time, became war manpower adviser to the military governor. It was soon evident, however, that the real power remained in the hands of the director of the section of labor control of the O M G . In negotiations then in progress leading to the partial relinquishment of martial law in March, 1943, the Manpower Commission and other groups, including even the Interior and Justice Departments, urged the military to relinquish all labor control. The military governor insisted, however, that it was one of the most important reasons for continuing martial law. A compromise was reached, by which certain workers remained under O M G control while others were regulated by W M C policies and by defense act rules. Thus March 10, 1943, inaugurated a period of even more confusion. The territorial director of the W M C and war manpower adviser to the military governor now assumed a third role. He became also Hawaii manpower director, in which capacity he administered defense act rules. General Order N o . 10, issued by the military governor, covered only dock workers, public utilities, and the Army and Navy and their contractors. But because of the increased employment, the new order affected about as many individuals as had the order of the early war days. This dropped the number of agencies and firms affected by military labor controls from 171 to 41.

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Employees of laundries, dairies, and hospitals, formerly frozen to their jobs by the military, came under civilian control. They now could change employers within their field, but could not leave the field unless released by the Manpower Commission. Industry committees, composed of representatives of employers, employees, and the public, were named to recommend standards of wages, hours, and working conditions. Another rule, in effect only a few weeks, gave the Manpower Commission transitional control over employees of 32 firms regarded as military sources of supply. While these rules continued stringent controls, they contained one important change: they now offered an appeal from the employer's decision. To replace the strict military control of inter-island travel, a screening procedure was instituted under which travel permits were issued by the Hawaii manpower director or his representatives. Permits were based on the worker's potential contribution to the war program on his home island as compared with Honolulu. Usually it was decided that plantation workers would contribute more where they were. In October the national War Manpower Commission extended its employment stabilization program to Hawaii, and thus placed all Island workers not controlled by the military's "G. O. 10" under rules similar to those in Mainland areas of critical manpower shortages. Workers in essential activities were unable to change jobs without a statement of availability (commonly called a "release"), and they were unable to take a less essential job without both a statement of availability and a referral from the United States Employment Service. Agricultural workers could not leave agriculture without USES permission. Workers under G. O. 10 control could obtain a statement of availability only from their employers, as formerly, but, those under the new WMC rules could appeal to a committee on the grounds of compelling personal reasons, low wages, poor working conditions, or under-utilization of skills. An amendment to G. O. 10 soon afterward confined that order to Oahu only and thus ended military labor controls on the outside islands. In November, 1943, a 48-hour week for production workers and a 44-hour week for administrative, sales, and office workers was made mandatory by the War Manpower Commission. War workers for months had been toiling 48 hours and sometimes much more, but many permanent Honolulu businesses not in direct war work had been continuing their usual short hours. Exemptions were requested for 70 per cent of the Honolulu employees of these firms, as contrasted to an average of 20 to 25 per cent on the Mainland, and many of them were granted. Some of the nearly 100,000 workers still under military control continued to press for changes, aided by some government officials and by

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labor unions, which were becoming more vocal. Business in general was passive, but employers who did express themselves varied in their opinions. Some liked the controls, others preferred military control to that by federal agencies, and others disliked controls but felt that they were necessary. The Central Labor Council, AFL, in the summer of 1943 asked that all military control of labor be relinquished, but the military governor replied that "the opinion of the Army and Navy as to labor needs must govern controls." In March, 1944, a Memorandum, on Military Control of Hawaiian Labor, issued over the signatures of three prominent unionists, was sent to many national and local officials. It asserted that "competent and constitutional civilian control over labor must be established." It charged that the section of labor control of the O M G had no policy for dealing with labor other than on a problem-to-problem basis, postponed action whenever possible, and that it had an anti-union bias. I t maintained that from the military point of view civilian workers were in the same position as soldiers and sailors in labor units: that they were in Hawaii "to take orders and get the work done as directed from above no matter how bungling and arbitrary the orders of management may happen to be and regardless of the effect on their morale." The unions charged, in this document and others, that military commanders, especially on the neighbor islands, were antagonistic to organized labor. As proof, they claimed that the president of an ILWU local was arrested after distributing union newspapers and held for six months without charges; that Kauai military authorities forbade union officers to collect dues or carry on union activities for about 10 months; that five union men were expelled from Maui by the provost marshal; and that a civilian employee of the Army on Hawaii attempted to intimidate union members. They alleged that employers on Oahu were spreading the idea that union contracts were void under martial law and the military had done nothing to contradict the stories. Further, they claimed that because of security restrictions union leaders were unable to get in touch with Mainland members living and working on government property. The unions urged that the military give up all control over labor, that the War Manpower Commission take over all manpower matters, and that the War Labor Board's jurisdiction be extended to Hawaii to handle wage controls and labor disputes. One of the chief objections of the military to full introduction of the national W M C program in Hawaii was the power which the commission would have to investigate reports of under-utilization of civilian manpower on military projects and to order release of excess personnel to

120. Cutting steel with torches, these Island women workers, along with many others, played an important part in the salvaging of sunken ships.

121. Others loaded ammunition onto feeder belts for automatic weapons.

122. Women became butchers to relieve manpower shortages.

123. Plantation labor helped repair roads used by the military.

124. Husky women workers made excellent volunteer fire-fighting crews.

125. Of the federal projects planned to relieve "shocking housing conditions," only the 250-unit Kalihi War Homes was ready when war ended.

126. Mosquitoes carrying dengue germs threatened to sabotage war effort.

127. Soldiers, sailors, and civilians went wild as planes roared overhead and air raid sirens proclaimed—not war this time—but peace!

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128. A returning vet receives a warm welcome from his brothers.

129. While Hawaii pays official tribute, a Japanese father weeps.

130. A survivor of the famous Bataan Death March arrives in Honolulu.

131. A gift enabled the Territory to erect a temporary memorial " I n honor of all Americans of Hawaii who died in this world war that the beauty and freedom of our land might be preserved for all humanity."

132. Christmas, 1945. A Honolulu mother receives a posthumous award.

133. With full military honors, some of Hawaii's war dead are laid to final rest in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, appropriately located in the volcanic Punchbowl crater overlooking Pearl Harbor.

134. Soldiers stand guard as Ernie Pyle and four others await burial.

135. The struggle over, Hawaii welcomes peace and bids farewell to war.

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civilian employers. Complaints of waste of manpower were beginning to come from both business and the Manpower Commission. All the stories, previously whispered, that some Army, Navy, and contractor employees did little more work than cash their well-padded pay checks were being repeated more openly by responsible persons. Publicly, the services ignored the rising chorus. Privately, they admitted that on some jobs the government was receiving no more than ten cents worth of work for each dollar expended, but blamed it on the lack of top quality labor and supervision. Furthermore, they felt that no civilian agency was familiar enough with military matters and pending battle campaigns to judge labor needs of the services. They justified their retention of excess workers because of the need to keep a reserve to meet any possible emergency. They refused to lend their idle workers for rush civilian projects, except in a few isolated cases, on the grounds that recalling such workers would indicate too openly to the public when a new push westward was in the making. The W M C continued its attempt to obtain better utilization of labor by the Army and Navy. At the end of 1944, it addressed a letter to the commandant of the 14th Naval District citing the "widespread opinion among employers, workers, and the general public that there is a gross waste of civilian manpower among naval activities," and listing criticisms which had reached the W M C office. A Navy commander replied that "your informants have arrived at several erroneous conclusions." Groups of high-ranking officers and top civilian personnel experts were sent from Washington to make manpower-utilization studies at service installations in Hawaii, but no specific action resulted from them. Previous to this, however, those seeking a change in controls won a partial victory when, on August 21, 1944, a War Manpower Commission program replaced G. O. 10. The change was not as great in practice as it appeared in theory, for the Army and Navy continued to exert a preponderance of influence through their membership on W M C committees, which in other areas of the country were made up only of representatives of management, labor, and civilian government. The W M C program which developed during the next year continued the employment stabilization program of October, 1943, and the 48-hour week program. I t also added two new features: referral and employment ceilings. The referral program, effective August 21, 1944, provided that new employees, with the exception of a few special groups, could be hired only on referral by the USES. These referrals were made to priority jobs determined by a three-man priorities committee, composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, and WMC. I n effect, persons seeking work were restricted to jobs directly concerned with the war effort.

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Early in 1945, with manpower needs increased, all exemptions from the 48-hour work week rule were canceled. Again a chorus of protests arose, in many cases from working housewives who felt that they must stop working rather than put in longer hours away from home. Some new exemptions were granted, but during most of the remainder of the war period about 75 per cent of all workers were on the job eight hours a day, six days a week. At the same time an employment ceiling program provided that an employer in an essential business could not increase his staff above the January 1, 1945, level without permission. It also prohibited employers in less essential businesses from even hiring replacements without justification. The unified program did not end argument and confusion. Military and civilian authorities disagreed as to which were essential jobs. The Army felt that the WMC program was inefficient; the WMC criticized the Army program, which was backed by provost court enforcement, as being punitive and arbitrary in approach. The WMC insisted that compliance was equally good under its program and that morale was better. I t charged also that the military program led to labor hoarding and rank inefficiencies. Three times during the last year of the war, efforts to remove the Army and Navy from control of the manpower priorities committee reached the cabinet level in Washington. Only the end of the war with Japan settled the war between the civilians and the military agencies. THE EARLY FREEZE OF ESSENTIAL WORKERS had included a freeze o f

wages. The Army and Navy contractors, however, complained that they could not recruit workers on the Mainland at these wages, so an upward revision was made in May, 1942. In the fall federal civil service workers received a raise, and later most of them received a 25 per cent monthly bonus for "foreign" work. Meanwhile wages soared for many other workers, especially in Honolulu, many persons receiving as much in a week as they previously earned in a month. Commissions and tips were generous. A waitress, especially in a liquor-serving establishment, might receive from $20 to $50 a day in tips. Advertisements for "hula girls" to pose with servicemen and war workers in photographic studios offered a standard wage of $100 a week plus a bonus and tips. The tips were liberal, and hula girls posed with as many as 150 men a day. One of Honolulu's largest stores reported that sales commissions to an inexperienced girl totaled $543 a month. In 1943 the average family income in Honolulu was $415 monthly, but food, recreation, liquor, and tobacco took an unusually large share

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o f the budget. T h e O P A reported that there was probably no population in the world with s o much money per capita, and whose sole object seemed to be to get rid o f it quickly. Free spending, lack of a wage freeze, and shortage of labor sent wages spiraling and threatened the success o f the O P A . W a g e controls effective on the Mainland since October, 1942, were finally extended to Hawaii in J u n e , 1944. T h e salary stabilization unit o f the Bureau of Internal Revenue was given control over salaries of $5,000 or more annually. Increases could be authorized principally on the grounds that new responsibilities had been added to a position. Control of wages under $5,000 was in the hands of the War Labor Board, which opened its Honolulu office J u l y 6, 1944. I n general accordance with Mainland procedure, its six-man board—representing industry, labor, and the public—held hearings to determine fair wage standards and heard requests of employers to be allowed to raise wages. During its first year in the territory, 1,550 such requests were filed. Some were granted, but the board's work put brakes on the upward trend. War Labor Board controls, like War Manpower controls, were dropped immediately after V-J Day. A second phase of the War Labor Board responsibilities was to adjudicate labor disputes not settled in collective bargaining. Until W L B ' s entry into the territory, such disputes had been handled by the military governor, a situation evidently not relished by him and vehemently opp o s e d by labor. N o labor disputes reached the military governor in 1942, but in February, 1943, the International Brotherhood o f Electrical Workers notified him that an i m p a s s e had been reached in negotiations with utility companies. The military governor turned the problem over to the civilian government, and a settlement was reached in M a y through a conciliation board. T h e section of labor control of the O M G acted as mediator in the next dispute, which was between the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., and drydock workers belonging to the American Federation o f Labor. An agreement was reached concerning wages, and the issue o f union security was dropped. Meanwhile, an i m p a s s e had been reached in negotiations between the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. and its union. I n J u l y the operators protested against what they considered undue severity of rules by observing each regulation with literal exactitude, leading to traffic delay and eventual disruption. T h e military governor's office issued a statement that it expected the union and company to avail themselves of its machinery for ending grievances, and a truce was eventually reached.

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About this time, a dispute between Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., and a trucking union was decided in favor of the union by an arbitrator, and a board of arbitration upheld the Honolulu Construction & Draying Co., Ltd., in a dispute arising from its discharge of six employees. The most potentially serious threat to the war effort was between the Marine Engineering and Dry Dock Workers Union of Hawaii, and the management of the shipyard division of the Hawaiian Tuna Packers. This dispute dragged through several months to a final decision by a panel of three men representing labor, industry, and the military governor. The panel held that the military governor's jurisdiction over all employee-employer relationships was "complete and unlimited." It decided two major points in favor of the company and four minor points in favor of the union. Labor was loud in its criticism of the decision, and renewed its demand for the transfer of such disputes from military to civilian control. The military acceded, the transfer being made to the WLB in June, 1944. Labor matters during the remainder of the war were less troublesome than the discussions indicated. Only 13 disputes went to the WLB for settlement in its first year of operation, and of these, three were withdrawn, four were negotiated, and only six had a formal hearing. These cases involved a total of only 739 workers. Between V-E Day and V-J Day, a short strike halted milk deliveries of Dairymen's Association, Ltd. The end of the war brought work stoppages at Dairymen's again, and at the Honolulu Gas Co., Ltd., the Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Honolulu, Ltd., and Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd. The next few years were unsettled ones, with lengthy strikes in shipping and the basic industries of sugar and pineapple. Many of these disputes had their roots in wartime labor unrest. They were to mark a new era in Hawaii's labor relations.

C H A P T E R

T W E N T Y

A Roof Overhead 16

Wanted to Rent I'VE GOT

A LOVIN' W I F E A B0UNC1N' B A B Y A SHINY L I T T L E CAB AND A P R E T T Y P I L E O F BONDS but if I don't find shelter for these treasures soon, I'm liable to lose them all. I f you can save me from this cruel fate Phone 4422 bet. 8 & 4. (Signed) F r a n k

I F FRANK WERE SAVED, HE WAS MORE FORTUNATE than the other

score or so persons whose ads on the same page of the Honolulu Advertiser early in 1944 were unanswered. Frank was typical of thousands who were desperately looking for four walls and a roof during the war years. Where he depended upon the ingenuity of his ad to find housing, others pleaded, promised, resorted to subterfuge and influential friends, or just gave up. On the other islands the situation was less serious, except in Hilo, where people were attracted from the country districts to work for the Engineers and other departments of the armed forces. There was a shortage even when defense workers started to crowd into Honolulu in 1941 before the outbreak of war. Land was scarce, building costs were high, and rents were increasing so rapidly that a local rent control administration was instituted. Immediately after the start of the war, the conditions eased somewhat by the evacuation of some families and doubling up of others when the men went off to war. There was a period of uncertainty during which rents and real estate prices dropped sharply, especially at beach fronts where shelling was feared. However, arriving defense workers far outnumbered evacuees, and the surplus of housing proved only temporary. Lack of materials brought home building to a virtual stop: in 1942 only 137 building permits were issued for homes, most of which had already been planned before the 327

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war started. In November, 1942, the Rent Control Administration recommended that steps be taken to care for the large number of persons who were being evicted because owners needed the homes for themselves or because the government had condemned the property for military purposes. Within the next few months, it was decided that the need for immediate housing, even of a crude nature, was more urgent than retention of buildings for evacuation use. The evacuation camps which had been built by the Office of Civilian Defense in Palolo and Kalihi Valleys and the emergency units at Palolo and Kalihi-uka Schools were then made available to several hundred families. The buildings were unpainted, there were wide cracks between the floor boards in some, sanitary facilities were scant, roads and sidewalks were nonexistent, and the grass had grown so high that walking was difficult even for adults. The housing situation grew more acute in 1943, as workers continued to arrive and evacuees came home, and in 1944, as veterans began to return and families were permitted to join war workers. The Islands teemed with stories of housing hardship, of divided families living with in-laws, of many families crowded into one house, of families living in garages, in shacks made out of packing boxes, even in parked cars, or out-of-doors. The crowding was so serious in the slum areas that twice as many people were living in Honolulu's 126 tenements in 1945 as lived in the 142 tenements standing in 1941. The housing shortage affected the war effort in many ways. Vital positions went unfilled. Absenteeism was high because workers were tired or ill or took days off to go house-hunting. Turnover increased because dissatisfied workers broke their contracts and went back to the Mainland. Many of those who remained were disgruntled and unhappy. Numerous conferences were held; a variety of reasons for housing conditions were given, and an equal number of suggestions for relief were offered. Persons in official life contradicted one another—Washington authorities said no priorities could be given for lumber because there was no shipping space available; San Francisco authorities said shipping space was not allotted because no lumber was available. Only about half of a year's normal lumber supply arrived in the Islands during the first two years of the war, and half of that was used by the OCD, U. S. Engineers, and service contractors. It was estimated late in 1943 that the territory urgently required about 2,500,000 board feet of lumber a month for the following 12 months to catch up with pressing needs, but less than half that amount was then arriving. Some groups studying the housing problem urged large-scale public developments, feeling that private capital would not undertake home

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building, even if materials were made available, because of high wartime costs and fear of a shrinking population after the war. Though these groups agreed as to the need for public housing, they differed as to whether it should be temporary or permanent. Some persons urged that more renting of rooms be encouraged by relaxation of zoning regulations and changes in tax laws and rent control restrictions. Many Islanders felt that the Army, Navy, federal agencies, government contractors, Red Cross, USO, and other groups which brought large numbers of workers to the territory, had not made sufficient efforts to provide accommodations without displacing permanent residents. When many of these workers arrived in the Islands, they found no housing arranged for them and were forced to join the throngs already in crowded or substandard housing. It was estimated in June, 1944, that of 58,000 dwelling units on Oahu, the Army had taken over 136 and the Navy, 315; Army and Navy personnel were renting 1,448. USO workers were occupying 28 residences in the Islands. The Red Cross workers were housed in the former Japanese consulate, several private homes, and in a large residential hotel. The Army and Navy compiled figures to show that they were providing housing on the posts for most of their civilian and uniformed personnel. However, many servicemen and war workers assigned official billets maintained apartments in the city also. These would be kept in the name of the original tenant and turned over to one group after another, the landlord often unaware of the changes. One random survey of 145 units at Waikiki showed war workers in 99. Late in 1944 all Navy personnel except those living with their families were ordered to vacate civilian property. Much criticism was directed at procrastination of officials and the multiplicity of agencies "giving Hawaii the run-around." The Honolulu Advertiser raised a fund of $2,500 to "Wake Up Washington." The money paid for a message in the 'Washington Post and Washington Star addressed "To Members of the House and Senate." It said that, although thousands of workers had been brought to Hawaii . . . right after Pearl Harbor, no adequate plan or provision for housing that civilian war power was included in the urge to get them on the scene and at work. There has been no such plan since. Mainland cities were accorded priorities of every kind to permit them to let their housing capacities catch up with their demand. Emergency funds were granted, lands were provided, materials speeded to the sites, labor allocated. But Hawaii, with an identical need and an even more intensified problem directly affecting the armed forces because of its limited area and long haul of materials in extremely limited shipping, was given no such consideration.

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The assumption seems to have been that the war worker could be dumped on the far-off shores of the Pacific Paradise and fend for himself. What became of him no one, except himself and the civilians of Hawaii, seemed to care. The ship that brought the man failed to bring the materials to house him.

As a result of these advertisements and other agitation, a House of Representatives subcommittee on congested areas came to Hawaii in March, 1945, for an on-the-spot investigation. It heard dozens of witnesses, visited "hot bed apartments" where 18 men in three shifts occupied one room, and inspected the comparatively few territorial and federal housing projects which had been built. It estimated that housing had not been provided for 60,000 of the 107,679 newcomers to the I slands, who had "obtained shelter only through overcrowding and living in shacks." It issued a report which attributed the "shocking housing conditions" to innumerable crosscurrents of opinion which had made it impossible to use the "available land, materials, labor, and brains of the area." It felt that the Army and Navy, so completely dominating the community, had failed to recognize or accept responsibility for matters of health, transportation, housing, and general living conditions. It found particularly that "the confusion, duplication, waste, irritation, and misunderstanding created by the individual effort of the several territorial, city and county, and military authorities frustrate, rather than expedite, attainment of the common objective—adequate living conditions." It found it "incomprehensible . . . how in the face of repeated representations . . . the national housing agency officials in Washington could be so ignorant of, or indifferent to, the housing situation as to neglect this most important outpost of the Pacific." Two NEW TERRITORIAL PROJECTS WERE OPENED near the Palolo evacuation camp, where duplex units had been used by the Hawaii Housing Authority since 1942 as emergency housing for 170 families. One of the new projects was Palolo Emergency Homes, 70 buildings which housed 362 families. The other, stopgap housing demanded by the critical conditions early in 1945, consisted of 34 portable voting booths. Although they were furnished with gas and electricity, their tenants had to depend upon a former golf course clubhouse for running water and sanitary facilities. Early in 1944, $260,000 from the M-Day fund was allotted for Kapalama Housing, an HHA project of 50 two-bedroom cottages. The land, near the Kapalama Canal, was leased from the Bernice P. Bishop Estate for $1.00 a year during the war, and later at $3,000 a year. A third territorial development under the HHA was Lanakila Emergency Homes,

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which consisted of 12 new three-bedroom units and 88 units converted from a former hospital building and Army barracks. Federal housing projects, other than those built on military lands, were not undertaken in Hawaii until near the end of the war, although efforts had been made by Islanders to obtain federal assistance since early in 1943. When the projects were built, tenancy was restricted to war workers, distressed families of servicemen, and veterans. The first federal units were opened in February, 1945, at Kalihi War Homes, a development on School Street which eventually consisted of some 250 dwelling units covering 28 acres. After the congressional committee hearings in March, 1945, high officials of the Federal Public Housing Authority and the National Housing Administration came to Hawaii to speed the work of their agencies. Much controversy raged around the location of proposed developments. The Honolulu Advertiser columnist, Sol Pluvius, commented, "Everybody wants more housing for Honolulu right away—right away from where they live." A site in the Halawa district of Aiea selected for the second federal project was abandoned when the Navy disapproved it. The project was then shifted to Manoa, one of Honolulu's better residential districts, but a storm of criticism, both official and unofficial, broke loose. FPHA replied that Manoa was the best of 23 sites studied and went ahead with the construction of some 1,000 dwelling units on an area of 91 acres. Also in the face of protests, the FPHA proceeded with plans for using 87 acres of Kapiolani Park and many acres in the Ala Wai Golf Course and Ala Moana Park. Difficulties in obtaining material and manpower, as well as delays in selecting sites, caused the projects to lag. Except for Kalihi War Homes, none was finished when the war ended. Work was continued on Manoa Housing, but at an even slower pace after labor controls were lifted, and some of its units were not ready until well into 1946. The Kapiolani, Ala Wai, and Ala Moana projects, hardly beyond the planning stage, were abandoned; also, a much-criticized plan to convert Army huts in Thomas Square into housing for bachelor war workers. Interest in private construction revived toward the end of the war, but during four war years Honolulans built scarcely 2,000 new homes, the normal construction of a single prewar year. This, however, provided more housing than all the public projects constructed during the same period. The Federal Housing Administration issued priorities and attempted to guide prospective builders through the maze of regulations. Priorities were only the first of many obstacles private builders faced. Lumber was hard to obtain; soil pipe, window glass, and plumbing and

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electrical fixtures sometimes were even more difficult to obtain. Houses often stood partly finished for months when materials ran short. Lack of material and manpower for repairs or alterations added to the difficulties. Leaks appeared in roofs and walls; floors and steps became rickety; and Honolulans sardonically remarked that termites were joining hands to hold their houses up. The pressure for housing raised the values of building lots and houses, especially the latter, to three or four times the prewar level. Despite the high prices, people continued to buy, boosting real estate sales in the territory in 1945 to $40,000,000, and in 1946 to $60,000,000. In 1939, "a good normal year," sales had totaled $11,000,000. The transition from wartime to peacetime living brought new housing problems. The demand for family dwellings increased as the need for single rooms decreased. During the war there already had been a special effort to provide housing for veterans, and they had shared priorities for government units with families of servicemen and war workers. After the end of the war, Navy buildings were obtained for special veterans' housing, and in December, 1947, the HHA was operating nearly 1,000 units for veterans, with 1,500 more being converted or under consideration. Veterans' housing flourished around the perimeter of Pearl Harbor. Former Navy barracks were converted at John Rodgers Airport adjoining CHA-3, at Halawa, Manana, and the big Aiea Naval Receiving Barracks. Waiawa and Red Hill Camps were held in reserve. Eleven cottages were moved from Damon Tract to Kamehameha IV Road for veterans' housing, and a building intended for the evacuation of leprosy patients from Kalihi Hospital was converted into five units. The HHA obtained barracks for both veterans and nonveterans at the Kahului Naval Air Station on Maui and the Hilo Naval Air Station on Hawaii. When the 1946 tidal wave aggravated the Hilo housing situation, the Territory made 70 more units available at Hoolulu Park. Despite all attempts to meet housing needs, crowding continued. The Hawaii Housing Authority in 1946 told the same story it had been repeating for several years: The overcrowding is terrific with, in some cases, as many as 15 to 18 persons living in a single room with terribly inadequate toilet and kitchen facilities. Then, again, there are frequent cases where four or more families are living together in a 2-bedroom house.

In 1948, an evicted family, unable to find quarters, camped out on the Iolani Palace grounds for several days. Not until 1949, when war workers were going home in increasing numbers and new buildings dotted the I sland landscape, did construction begin to catch up with the need. Even then it provided mostly for those persons able to pay a substantial rent.

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Late in 1945, evacuation units at Kalihi-uka and Palolo Schools and 40 units comprising the Kalihi evacuation camp were closed because of unsanitary conditions. The converted voting booths were restored to their original use for the 1946 elections, and the Palolo evacuation camp was absorbed by the Palolo Emergency Homes. Plumbing was installed in all units, the appearance of the project was improved by painting, and the temporary homes gained a semblance of permanency. Although the emergency housing had been intended only for the war period, most of it promises to be used well into the 1950's. RENT CONTROL PROVIDED A STABILIZING INFLUENCE in Hawaii,

despite its general unpopularity. One of the first war controls to go into effect, it had been under consideration even before bombs fell at Pearl Harbor. In November, 1941, the territorial legislature delegated to the counties the power to regulate rentals, and the Honolulu board of supervisors passed a rent control ordinance December 13, establishing a rent control commission. Some minor changes were made in the ordinance by the military governor, but control was retained by local authorities. The ordinance rolled back rents to the level of May 27, 1941, and prevented evictions except for specified reasons. Landlords claimed that the freeze date resulted in unfairly low rents, as it was the low point of the prewar tourist season. They sought higher rents in 60 per cent of the 4,000 cases heard by the rent control commission in its first year and a half of operation. But it was difficult to obtain adjustments even on the basis of higher operating expenses. The rent control ordinance was criticized on the grounds that it discouraged private rental construction. It required that rents on new units be based on prevailing rates on comparable housing, despite higher building costs brought on by the war. Even more criticism was directed against the eviction provisions of the ordinance. It was often impossible to obtain evidence proving that a tenant was creating a nuisance, and some unscrupulous tenants, protected by the law, treated premises with the utmost disregard. On the other hand, it was generally acknowledged that some equally unscrupulous landlords found ways of evading the regulations. Deposits were required but not returned; tenants were asked to purchase furniture at exorbitant prices; "rewards" were accepted for "finding" accommodations for home seekers. Often the rental ceiling was openly violated, the landlord depending upon the probability that the tenant would be so happy to have housing at any cost that he would pay the excess price without complaining to the rent control commission. Officials admitted a black market in rentals, but claimed inability to take action.

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The rent control office struggled against the triple handicaps of an ordinance which was extremely difficult to administer, a staff which was too small, and the lack of attorneys and trained investigators. In other parts of the country, rent control was handled by the Office of Price Administration. So in July, 1943, after it had set up its office in Honolulu to handle other phases of OPA work, Governor Stainback asked it to take over rent control as well, because local authorities had failed to cope with the problem. The OPA responded by declaring Oahu a defense rental area and announcing that it would take over rent control at the end of 60 days if the local authorities had not by then stabilized rents at the level of two years earlier. The board of supervisors hastily drew up new legislation which met with OPA approval. It appointed a new administrator, appropriated more funds, set up more clearly defined rules of eligibility for rent adjustment, and, most important in the eyes of the OPA, required the registration of rental data by all landlords. The following March an upset in the rent control office again drew OPA criticism. A change in personnel of the five-man commission was followed by a month in which the commission reversed 20 of the 23 decisions of the rent control administrator which were appealed to it. There were several heated meetings of the commission, the administrator was dismissed, and one of the commissioners resigned. The OPA issued a public statement upholding the administrator and declaring that the rent control proceedings were completely dominated by a former president of the Landlords' Association and had developed into a "community scandal." The OPA statement said: A reading of the record of these proceedings reveals that the determinations were made on ridiculous criteria, such as whether the tenant had received an increase in salary or had agreed, voluntarily or otherwise, to an illegal increase in rent. The rent control ordinance and its provisions were completely lost in the stampede.

The furore soon died down, however, and a new administrator carried on the work, which was made ever more complicated by rising costs and increasing congestion. In 1944, the commission received a total of 9,613 petitions; in 1945 the number of petitions a month increased from more than 1,000 in January to a high of 1,900 in August. Early in 1945, the congressional subcommittee on congested areas revived the earlier suggestion that the OPA take responsibility for rent control unless weakness in the Honolulu administration could be corrected. The committee found that . . . exorbitant rents are being obtained under suspicious use of rooms and houses. On the other hand, there are cases of landlords being unable to charge enough rent to meet costs. Impractical rent control regulations have discouraged the investment of private capital in housing.

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No action was taken on the suggestion by the end of the war, and it was intended to discontinue rent control soon afterward. However, the housing situation continued so critical that, with the exception of hotels, controls remained in effect. In 1949, the board of supervisors voted to continue local rent control to the indefinite date of one year after the end of federal rent control. Although dwelling-unit rentals had been controlled since 1941, commercial rentals soared completely unregulated until the spring of 1944. Increasing complaints of high rentals and a report by the OPA convinced the governor that control was necessary. The OPA, finding rental increases as high as 900 per cent, reported: Commercial rentals have gotten completely out of hand. Stores with a rental of $75 per month have suddenly been increased to $400 or $500 per month. . . . OPA is being asked to do the impossible when told to hold the price line with, nevertheless, the two most important items of overhead—labor costs and commercial rents—running wild. . . . The effect upon the economy of the territory is obvious from other angles. Grocery stores are being evicted to make way for pin-ball machines. More and more, essential services are being discontinued for types of businesses which are wholly temporary and have no part in the long-run economy.

Commercial rent control was established on Oahu on March 29, 1944, by executive order of the governor. Rents were similarly controlled in Hilo, Wailuku, and Kahului a few months later. The administration of commercial rent control was more liberal than dwelling rent control, inasmuch as complete freezing was not intended. Increases were permitted when they were sought on the basis that the landlord should be allowed to share in the unusual prosperity of a business. They were denied or modified when they appeared excessive in the light of the earning power of the tenant or where it appeared the demands were being used as a subterfuge to force an occupant to move. The rule provided that occupancy should, in general, continue at the option of the tenant, except when a prospective occupant proposed a use for the premises which offered a considerably more important service in the light of community needs. For example, a curio store could be ousted to make room for a barber shop or restaurant; but a restaurant could not be forced to make way for a curio store. Commercial rent control was discontinued on Oahu and Maui in the summer of 1946, and on Hawaii a short time later.

C H A P T E R

T W E N T Y - O N E

Keeping F i t for the F r a y HAWAII EMERGED FROM THE WAR with a healthier population despite the health hazards o f overwork, nervous strain, lack o f proper recreation, enforced changes in food habits, poor housing conditions, and inadequate ventilation in blacked-out rooms. Problems o f sanitation were multiplied. Rats and mosquitoes bred in air raid shelters and in yards neglected because o f pressure o f war work and scarcity o f yardmen. As the amount o f garbage increased, the number o f refuse collectors decreased. The sewage system was overtaxed, resulting in breakdowns. Immediately after the war began, the biggest compulsory vaccination program in history was undertaken. All civilians in the Islands, except infants and the aged, were immunized against typhoid, paratyphoid, and smallpox. Immunization against tetanus was recommended but not required. Vaccinating teams composed o f service and civilian doctors, nurses, clerks, and assistants, immunized 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 persons at the registration centers; and private physicians immunized 163,000 others. I n 1944, when booster shots were required, the process was repeated. I n J u n e , 1943, diphtheria immunization for all children became mandatory. As a result o f the vaccination program, the incidence o f typhoid fever and diphtheria fell to an all-time low in the territory. Typhoid fever dropped from 56 cases and 10 deaths in the 1940 fiscal year to 7 cases and 1 death in 1944; diphtheria from 95 cases and 6 deaths to 24 cases and no deaths. Territorial board o f health laboratories analyzed drinking water samples frequently after the outbreak o f war. I n November, 1942, a military order required the chlorination o f all principal water supplies, partly because o f fear o f sabotage and partly because of the danger o f contamination from military personnel entering watershed areas. Chlorination o f the Oahu supply was started in January, 1943, but chlorinators could not be obtained for the other islands until much later.

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Military authorities, fearing an increase in venereal disease because of the unbalanced sex ratio in Hawaii, strengthened control measures. The steps taken helped achieve the lowest civilian venereal disease rates in the history of the territorial board of health, and an all-time low for service personnel in any large military area in the United States. The rate was further cut after 1944 when houses of prostitution were closed. The introduction of new diseases by servicemen returning from tropical areas was a constant threat. Federal and territorial health officials and plant and animal quarantine inspectors were denied access to military planes and ships. Although Army and Navy officers carried on inspection work, there was danger that diseased animals and insect pests might gain entry into Hawaii. Servicemen returning from Tarawa brought back pets which they did not take through quarantine. This led to regulations prohibiting the entry of any animals or birds from the Western Pacific. The rule was effective in keeping out animal diseases, despite the fact that sympathetic officers often closed their eyes to pets smuggled back in duffel bags. Later, animal quarantine orders were relaxed to permit return of war dogs. Authorities were alarmed at the prospect of an epidemic in July, 1943, when the illness of two fliers who had just returned from the Southwest Pacific was diagnosed as dengue fever. Easily spread by the bite of the common "tiger" mosquito, the fever had a history of affecting 50 to 75 per cent of the population when it was introduced into a new area. While it seldom left permanent effects or caused fatalities, it incapacitated its victims for a fortnight or more. Its potential effect on the working population was feared, particularly in view of the accelerated war offensive. Immediately, a widespread campaign was begun to destroy breeding places of the mosquito. The Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu appropriated $16,500 for the fight, and in Wahiawa the Community Association raised nearly $1,000. Board of health inspectors, augmented by civilian workers and nearly 300 servicemen, visited every house and office at 10-day intervals for months, and soon Islanders were familiar with cryptic chalk marks on sidewalks indicating which houses had been inspected. In areas where the disease was concentrated, a chemical warfare decontamination company poured disinfectant over every possible mosquito-breeding spot. Work crews removed whole gardens of lilies and other tropical plants, filled thousands of holes in trees and rocks with cement, and sprayed much of the Island foliage. Volunteers helped gather 3,600 truckloads of cans, bottles, and other stray containers. Five Army nurses assisted public health nurses in making the rounds of patients and seeing that they were isolated under mosquito nets. Areas where the disease was most prevalent were declared off limits to service-

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men, in some cases until the end of the year. Waikiki, usually crowded with servicemen, was off limits from August 8 to September 13, 1943. Planes leaving Oahu for the neighbor islands were sprayed, and strenuous mosquito control campaigns were conducted on those islands. As a result of the precautions, dengue was confined chiefly to Oahu, and on that island only 1,500 were afflicted by the disease. Bubonic plague, absent from Hawaii since 1939, reappeared in the spring of 1943, causing four deaths in the Hamakua district of Hawaii. The area had seven fatal cases during the next year and two in 1944-45, after which the disease was again stamped out. After the first outbreaks of the disease, which is carried by plagueinfested rats, most of the residents of Hamakua received injections of a newly developed antiplague vaccine. Rodent control efforts, increased throughout the Islands, were particularly intensified in Hamakua. During the fiscal year 1944, the board of health spent $300,000 on the work, and cooperated with the Army in establishing a bacteriological laboratory in the plague area. During the war years, the territorial board of health destroyed more than a million rats, and the Army killed probably as many. The Army considered its insect and rodent control unit in Hawaii the country's largest and best-equipped pest control organization. When a polio epidemic broke out in early 1943, an OCD building in the grounds of the Shriners' Hospital for Crippled Children was used as an emergency hospital. It was staffed by the Army and operated with $195,000 contributed by the community. Before it was closed in June, 1944, it had treated a peak load of 92 patients. Typhus fever, which is traceable to rat-borne fleas, increased from a prewar high of 88 cases to 189 in 1943-44. In the same period, bacillary dysentery, resulting from unsanitary restaurant conditions, rose from a previous high of 233 cases to 693. Tuberculosis, which before the war had been on a downward trend, started upward again. ISLAND MEDICAL FACILITIES WERE STRAINED, n o t only b e c a u s e of

the rapid growth of population and the disproportionate needs of war workers for medical treatment, but also because of the higher financial status of the permanent population, crowded living conditions, and fulltime employment of housewives. Many patients were hospitalized who would normally have been kept at home. The territory's birth rate soared, and nearly 90 per cent of the births took place in hospitals because the blackout made it difficult for doctors and impossible for alien midwives to be abroad at night. Hospitals were faced with a multitude of problems: maintaining an emergency reserve of beds, safeguarding patients and personnel, training

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for evacuation of patients in case of emergency, and keeping an adequate working force in the face of wartime wage demands. A special problem was created by the Japanese Hospital, which had been operated mainly by and for aliens. Immediately after the attack, the Army took charge, occupying some of the hospital and exercising a large degree of control over its policies and activities. When this control was relaxed, the hospital, continuing on an interracial basis, was reorganized under the name of Kuakini Hospital, and a program was launched to bring up its standards and strengthen its nursing school. To keep the necessary reserve of beds, the Office of Civilian Defense opened new hospitals, and existing hospitals provided additional accommodations. Hospitals put beds on lanais, in attics, basements, and corridors, sometimes crowding them so closely together that the danger of infection was greatly increased. Patients not acutely in need of hospitalization were urged to stay home. The Office of the Military Governor established a civilian hospital control office, with authority to regulate and control the admission of patients to all civilian hopitals on Oahu. Even before the war, hospitals were crowded, but the outbreak of hostilities prevented them from completing planned additions. St. Francis was expanded by use of a temporary building and two quonset huts. At Queen's the OCD built a one-story frame building with 30 beds for communicable diseases, and it aided in expansion of other hospitals. Efforts to obtain Lanham Act funds for new facilities at Leahi Home, a tuberculosis hospital, were unsuccessful. But during 1942 the Army made 101 beds available at Tripler General Hospital for cases transferred from Leahi, and the OCD later made 100 beds available at Wahiawa. At the end of 1943, Leahi had 439 cases and 400 more beds were needed. In 1944 Kapiolani Maternity Hospital finished construction which doubled its capacity. In February, 1945, Queen's opened a four-story wing built with $250,000 from Lanham Act funds. St. Francis Hospital, also planning expansion in 1941, did not open its $600,000 addition, partly financed by Lanham funds, until 1946, when it also let a contract for an additional $200,000 wing. A variety of emergency equipment was installed and detailed plans were made for rapid evacuation of patients. Since Queen's was the largest hospital in Honolulu and also in a possible danger zone, plans were worked out in amazing detail for each staff member and the evacuation of each patient. Ramps, chutes, and an emergency hoist were installed for use in case of elevator failure. Probably the only civilian hospital to evacuate its patients was the Pioneer Mill Hospital, near the sea at Lahaina, Maui. For a year and a half, it used Lahainaluna High School buildings on the hill overlooking Lahaina.

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HOSPITALS SUFFERED SERIOUSLY FROM A SHORTAGE o f nurses and

other personnel. Immediately after the start of the war, Red Cross first reserve nurses were called to the colors, Queen's hospital alone losing 23. Thereafter, Hawaii was not called upon to fill quotas for the nurses corps of the Army and Navy because of the acute nursing situation in the Islands. Recruitment of local nurses for the Army was resumed May 1, 1945, but discontinued a month later because of the victory in Europe. In March, 1942, general orders prohibited hospital nurses from leaving their positions without the approval of the OCD supervisor of nursing activities and the O M G director of labor control. It required other hospital employees to obtain releases from their employers before quitting. These orders were replaced on March 10,1943, by a defense act rule which declared hospitals, dairies, and laundries to be essential industries. Under its terms, employees could move from hospital to hospital or could stop working, but they could not take paid work outside the hospital field if the hospitals met the increased wage scale set up in the edict. During 1942 the Army loaned nurses to Queen's for a total of 412 nursing-days, and it helped in other ways at Queen's and at other hospitals. During the first two years of the war, the medical office of the OCD brought from the Mainland 186 nurses recruited by the Red Cross to staff the OCD hospitals and 240 for other civilian hospitals. Strenuous efforts to entice inactive nurses back to the profession were made by the OCD, the nurses' associations, the nursing school alumnae associations, and the procurement and assignment service for nurses of the War Manpower Commission. However, a compulsory registration of the 397 graduate nurses in the territory in 1942 showed that most of those inactive were unavailable for duty because of other employment, household responsibilities, illness, or age. The nursing situation continued critical, and in December, 1943, the OCD medical director described the regulations concerning employment of nurses as being "in a distinctly chaotic state." Nearly half the nurses brought to the territory since the start of the war had returned home or married and left the profession. Even more desperate was the shortage of attendants, orderlies, and service workers, whose exodus to high-paying defense positions was not entirely halted by the "freeze." The Queen's graduate nursing staff, which averaged 154 in 1941, hit a low of 110 in May, 1944; this, despite a greater patient load. By the summer of 1945, Queen's, Leahi, Kapiolani, and St. Francis had not yet opened some new facilities because of staff shortages; Kapiolani and Wahiawa had closed badly needed obstetrical wards, and Kuakini was considering such action; Children's had closed its isolation unit. Hospitals elsewhere in the territory were carrying on with depleted staffs,

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augmented by partly trained aides and even school children working for the summer. Hawaii had one public health nurse per 8,500 population, as contrasted with a national wartime standard of one to 5,000. To help alleviate the critical situation, a new recruitment drive was begun on the Mainland. Hospitals severely limited visiting hours, refused to receive flowers for patients, eliminated nonessential care, and took other steps to reduce work. Even surgery was "rationed." Private duty nurses could be obtained only for the most serious cases and sometimes not even then. For months, those who were available worked an 84-hour week. The end of the war brought some relief in the nursing shortage but conditions were not fully normal for several years. Volunteers gave valuable service throughout the war, at The Queen's Hospital alone working nearly 80,000 hours. After the first year, nearly all the volunteers were employed at other full-time jobs and worked in the hospitals on Sundays and during the early evening hours. The first class of Red Cross nurses' aides was graduated on Oahu in April, 1942. The first classes on Kauai and Maui were graduated in the fall, and on Hawaii, in June, 1943. They were required to give 150 hours of service within a year after completing their course, but many gave far more time. They made beds, cared for linens, received visitors, kept records, and handled countless routine tasks in caring for patients. Classes in first aid gave way to home nursing classes, designed to minimize the number of calls for professional medical and nursing services. In 1944, the Red Cross prepared two classes of dietitians' aides for work in civilian hospitals. F O O D SHORTAGES BROUGHT AN INCREASED INTEREST in nutrition.

Among the most active and successful of voluntary groups during the war were the home economists, who were active on all the islands in teaching the use of substitute foods and surplus produce. They conducted "Save the Guava" campaigns, showing women how to gather and preserve wild guavas, high in vitamin C, and use them in place of scarce citrus fruit. Their aid was especially helpful to people in the rural areas, where stocks of basic commodities were occasionally depleted, and to Oriental families who depended on some foods imported from the Orient. They also helped solve wartime housekeeping problems. On Oahu, the home economists formed the Home Defense Committee to write for the newspapers, present weekly radio talks, and give demonstrations and lectures. The editor of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin wrote, " I know of no civic or community project in connection with the war which has been carried through with more steadfast purpose, conscientious workmanship and admirable regularity."

CHAPTER

TWENTY-TWO

Travel Troubles H o w T O GET FROM ONE P O I N T T O ANOTHER o n a n y o f t h e i s l a n d s

was a problem of concern to every resident and transient from the beginning of the war to its end.* How to get from island to island or from the Islands to the Mainland was a problem of less concern only because most persons did not even try to go. At first, all automobiles, parts, and tires were frozen, but eventually the parts and tires and about 130 expensive cars not needed by the Army were released for sale under OMG regulations, and shipping space was provided for about 50 cars which had been on order. After February, 1942, even tire-recapping required a permit. In the fall, motorists with extra tires were urged to sell all but the four tires on their cars and one spare. Chiefly for defense needs, 1,817 commercial vehicles were released in the territory during the war years, less than the number sold in the single year of 1941. Almost no new or used cars were brought to the Islands for civilian use. The few used cars which found their way to the market were in heavy demand, especially by war workers unable to find housing near convenient mass transportation. Since they were willing to pay high prices * Several agencies dealt with transportation. The U. S. Engineers issued regulations briefly until the Office of the Military Governor established the Office of Land Transportation Control, which had two sections, one which controlled gasoline rationing and the other tire rationing. In July, 1942, a third section, defense transportation, was added. To this section were referred many matters which on the Mainland would have been handled by the federal Office of Defense Transportation. In 1943, the Office of Land Transportation was transferred to the Office of Civilian Defense, and thereafter confined itself to general transportation problems, while the rationing of tires and gasoline was placed under the federal Office of Price Administration. When the federal Office of Defense Transportation was extended to Hawaii, its regional director was made territorial director of the Office of Defense Transportation. All petroleum products, with the exception of motor gasoline, were controlled by the Navy, with the assistance of a petroleum products committee.

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for almost anything on wheels, two-year-old cars were selling at a third above their original cost by 1943. Price control was then instituted on a complex schedule, setting maximum dollar prices for 23 makes of cars and 3,000 body types and year models. In August, 1944, permits were required for the purchase of used cars of model 1938 and later so that late model cars would be channeled to persons in essential war work. During the next year, the OPA issued nearly 2,000 such permits. GASOLINE POSED THE BIGGEST R A T I O N I N G PROBLEM

throughout

the war. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack there was only a 47-day normal supply on hand in Hawaii. Fearing rationing, most Islanders rushed to service stations December 8 and ordered attendants to "fill 'er up." The next day, service stations were ordered to fill tanks no more than half full for any civilians except doctors and defense workers, and oil companies were ordered to deliver only two-thirds the usual amount to dealers. Later, service stations were required to fill their tanks at every delivery by the oil companies in order to increase storage and to bring about more thorough dispersion of the available gasoline supply, thereby reducing the danger from attack. All service stations were closed on December 14 to prepare for gasoline rationing the following day. Probably the longest of all the long lines of the war formed at the city hall to obtain gas ration cards. At times it extended a half mile to Thomas Square. The OCD recreation and morale committee sponsored musical troupes which entertained the throngs while they were waiting. For the first month, the petroleum fuel products control section of the U. S. Engineers allowed all drivers 10 gallons of gas, and essential drivers as much more as they declared they needed. When the Office of the Military Governor took over after the next month, rationing was handled on a stricter basis. All drivers were given a basic ration through their nearest OCD first aid station, county agricultural extension office, or plantation office; those engaged in essential work could obtain more gas through application by their employers. Until near the end of the war, the basic monthly ration was usually 10 gallons—although one happy month it was increased to 15 gallons. It was three gallons a week on Kauai, where an individual was required to buy his gasoline always from the same service station. For a time there was no fixed minimum on the island of Hawaii, and immediately after the outbreak of the war use of private automobiles for any nonauthorized transportation was prohibited on that island. Following the establishment of the OPA price control and rationing boards, a modification of the Mainland "A-B-C" rationing plan was

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tried on Kauai in July, 1943, and was extended to all the Islands by early 1944. The change was made despite many protests from persons who were well satisfied with the existing system. The new plan, however, did away with the time-consuming practice of issuing ration permits every month and placed in the hands of the rationing boards many administrative functions formerly handled by nearly 800 issuing stations. The board also became responsible for many decisions formerly made by employers. Every private passenger car was automatically entitled to an " A " book, good for 10 gallons a month. " B " books provided an additional amount for those who used their cars in "nonpreferred occupations" and those who shared rides to and from work. " C " books provided still more gas for those whose work was important to community life or the war effort. Commercial rationing for trucks and taxis was handled by a separate board. Control was especially important in Hawaii not only because of the world-wide shortage of gasoline but also because of shipping difficulties. The Islands never did completely run out of gas, although in March, 1942, there was only a five-day supply on Oahu, including the Army's reserve. Gasoline consumption in Hawaii was reduced 45 per cent from January, 1942, through April, 1943, and continued thereafter at a low level. This reduction, almost double that recorded in some places on the Mainland, was achieved despite geographic, military, and social factors which occasioned high demand. Islanders depend much more upon private automobiles than do many Mainlanders, and the normal need was increased by the growth in population and the amount of defense work. On Hawaii, where ports other than Hilo were closed for a considerable period, more than 100,000 tons of sugar and molasses usually shipped from nearer ports had to be trucked from Kau to Hilo and from Kohala to the end of the railroad at Paauilo; 40,000 tons of coffee a year were trucked from Kona to Hilo; and the Mainland staples used by the outlying areas had to be trucked back. Trucks of Kohala plantation alone increased their mileage 114,303 miles between 1941 and 1942 because of the closing of the ports of Kawaihae and Mahukona. To conserve manpower as well as gasoline and tires, taxi regulation was begun in the fall of 1942, and thereafter no new operator was allowed to enter the business. Later an order prohibited the use of taxis for sightseeing purposes. Special regulations were enforced on various islands, such as on Hawaii where no taxi was allowed to travel more than 15 miles from its call station. The taxi problem was difficult, with never enough cabs to answer all calls. Taxi men claimed they were "squeezed out of business" by gas-

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oline allotments so low that they could operate only 10 days or two weeks a month. Servicemen and defense workers complained of overcharges, and Midpacifican, an Army newspaper, claimed that "Honolulu taxicab racketeers are gouging unsuspecting Army and Navy men out of the staggering amount of approximately $200,000 a year." It was one of many minor battles waged on Oahu during the war years. The territorial public utilities commission continued its usual control over bus and rail transportation on Oahu, but bus operation on the other islands became the direct concern of the Office of Defense Transportation. Regulation was difficult, especially on the island of Hawaii, where there were more than 50 bus operators, never previously subject to regulation as to routes, fares, or other matters. All the bus companies had tremendous increases in business. One of the greatest was that of the Windward Transit, Ltd., which after the establishment of large military and naval activities from Waimanalo to Kahuku, increased the number of its busses from 5 to 22 to accommodate the monthly passenger increase from 3,000 to 75,000. The Oahu Railway & Land Co. expanded its bus service and revived its recently discontinued rail passenger service with 64 passenger coaches, half of them reconverted freight cars. The passenger load of the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., the public transportation system for Honolulu proper, increased from a monthly average of 1,200,000 in 1939 to 11,500,000 in June, 1945, and this despite manpower and vehicle shortages. Through purchases allowed by the ODT and lease of busses from the Navy, the number of busses operated by the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. increased from 215 in 1941 to a peak of 316, a relatively small increase in view of the growth of demand. At times, many were laid up for repairs, since the blackout made proper night servicing impossible, and the demand for busses on the road prevented daytime cleaning and overhaul. An even more serious problem was the shortage of manpower. After March, 1943, bus drivers were no longer frozen to their jobs, and, despite War Manpower Commission controls, the company lost 138 bus drivers and many maintenance workers between January, 1944, and the middle of 1945. Because part of the labor turnover had been due to low pay, the Office of Defense Transportation and War Manpower Commission certified to the War Labor Board that an increase of 10 cents an hour should be granted. This was one of the few "rare and unusual cases" in which official sanction was given to pay raises during that period of the war. Beginning in June, 1944, part-time drivers were employed, most of them putting in about four hours a night, six nights a week, after an

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eight-hour workday elsewhere. A large proportion of these part-time workers were from Pearl Harbor or other service areas. In October, after as many as 50 runs had been canceled because of lack of drivers, soldiers were hired. From then until the end of the war, they drove more than 90 per cent of all HRT busses on the roads after 6:00 P.M. The Army transported many of its workers to and from work and ran shuttle busses between various Army installations and from the installations to certain recreation districts and shopping centers. At the beginning of 1945, all unfilled military vehicles not on urgent business were ordered to offer rides to servicemen, and ten loading zones were set up where soldiers could wait for rides. Honolulu busses were so crowded in early morning and late afternoon and the streets were so clogged with both private and military vehicles that a staggered workday plan was ordered in October, 1942. Some businesses started at 7:15 A.M. and others, including many retail establishments, at 9:30 A.M. As Honolulu had always been an earlyrising city, with nearly all stores and offices open by 8:00 A.M., the order made a decided change in business life. on December 7 when ships and planes were diverted to war work. Ships never returned to their prewar schedules, although some air passage shortly became available. Planes could carry only a fraction of the persons who wished to travel, and enemy aliens were forbidden to use them except in cases of serious illness. During 1941,162,000 persons traveled between the islands by ship, and 49,000 by plane. This total was not reached again until 1946. In 1942, only 83,000 persons obtained commercial passage between the islands—1,200 by ship—and a large percentage were war workers or others on government business. Army and Navy planes made many flights daily between the islands, but seldom carried civilians. Priorities were issued informally until the end of April, 1942, when a travel control bureau was established in each county. All passengers were then required to show proof of citizenship and necessity for travel. A definite priority system set up in September gave preference to persons traveling on military business, other government business, and private business. Even after the first rush of evacuees from the Islands early in the war, transportation facilities to the Mainland were crowded, while return passage was even more difficult to obtain. Although transportation to Hawaii was theoretically limited to persons needed in the war effort, others did obtain passage, and some who INTER-ISLAND TRAVEL CAME TO A BRIEF HALT

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left the Islands early in the war soon began making efforts to return. In November, 1942, when requests for passage totaled 60 to 100 a day, five priority classifications were set up, favoring men and defense workers. A shipload of residents returned on Christmas Eve, but the hundreds of strandees and evacuees who could not obtain passage started to appeal to every official who might have any influence. In March, 1943, authorities said that they did not object to the return of Island residents, but did not consider that most ships, altered to provide only troop class accommodations, were suitable for women and children. In any case, these ships were needed for troops and war workers. More and more of the evacuees wanted to return home. Rising costs made it increasingly difficult for a divided family to maintain two households. Many children were not enrolled in California schools because their parents anticipated an early return to the Islands. Some evacuees believed that failure to answer the telephone call of notification would move them to the bottom of the list. Consequently, they hesitated even to venture forth from hotel rooms or apartments for fear of missing the long-anticipated call. The waiting list in San Francisco grew to 1,367 names in June, 1943. Although 5,300 civilians were given passage between that date and October, the waiting list in the meantime had grown to 3,185. In November holders of low priorities were advised not to expect transportation before March, 1944, and were urged to move away from the crowded San Francisco area. This brought into the open all the muttered complaints—which had been voiced privately for some time—of travel discrimination, of "civilians traveling back and forth who are not on missions of particular importance to the war effort," and of Mainlanders brought to Hawaii for positions which evacuees could fill. Hawaii's delegate to Congress wrote to the Secretary of the Navy that the dissatisfaction arose "not so much from the absence of any transportation at all, but from the feeling that what transportation was available has not been allocated fairly." In order to obtain priority, many housewives signed up for war jobs in Hawaii. On arrival, some were found incapable of holding the jobs, some quit when they found the work not to their liking, and others did not show up on the job at all. Women who did make the best of their jobs soon regretted their decision to take war work in order to get home, for evacuees' protests finally resulted in the assignment of two hospital ships. Each made two round trips, entirely clearing the list by the middle of April, 1944. Trips on the hospital ships were not pleasant, however. Tired, fretful two-year-olds comprised a large part of the passenger list; some 10 mothers and 25 children were in each ward, and bedlam pre-

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vailed. Some of the children developed measles and chicken pox midway in the voyage. To prevent repeated accumulations of large waiting lists, provision was made in May, 1944, for 150 passengers a month, later 200 a month, and then 250. In the spring of 1945, boys and girls who had been studying on the Mainland were allowed to return. Many of them had not been home during their four years of college. After V-E Day, some Islanders, despite warnings that passage eastbound was easier to obtain than return space, went to the Mainland on vacation trips. A new backlog of 3,000 persons then accumulated, but shortly after V-J Day two passenger vessels were assigned to bring these travelers home. Air travel played a minor role in civilian transportation to and from the Coast until after the end of the war. The Navy maintained complete control of air traffic to the Islands from December 7, 1941, until the latter part of 1944, after which time the Office of Internal Security assigned priorities. The priority schedules were liberalized as the war progressed, but civilians could never be sure of a seat, for travelers with low priority were frequently "bumped" for official passengers or even for high-priority cargo.

CHAPTER

TWENTY-THREE

Social Upheaval WAR'S SOCIAL UPHEAVAL TOUCHED EVERY AGE GROUP from the

baby who was popped into a "bunny" mask at the first wail of an air raid siren to the retired septuagenarian who now went back to work. Oahu's civilian population rose from 258,000 in 1940 to 348,000 in 1945, though in many areas of the neighbor islands population dropped 10 per cent or more. Young people, especially, sought Oahu's wellpaid war jobs. The haole (Caucasian) population of the territory increased 33 per cent in the year ending June, 1941, and continued to rise. For the first time there was a considerable body of haoles of the working class. There were also some 30,000 Negro servicemen and war workers. Prior to the war, local residents saw few Negroes. The first to arrive were mistaken by some for South Sea Islanders. The general tendency, especially among the Japanese, was to welcome them on an equal footing, but soon other newcomers implanted their ideas of racial consciousness, and the Negroes were not as well received as they otherwise might have been. There was for a time some fear that the Negroes would add to the difficulty of postwar racial adjustments, but comparatively few remained after the war and these tended to fit into the picture in accordance with their individual qualifications. When war broke, racial feeling against the Japanese expressed itself more openly and bitterly than ever before, although Hawaii's long program of community cooperation proved adequate to prevent any serious overt acts. Servicemen and war workers were sometimes vocal in venting their antagonism toward the Japanese. Letters appearing in the newspapers criticized young American-Japanese for arrogance, lack of courtesy, indifference to the war. In reply, Japanese criticized war workers and "snobbish haole women." Before the war and immediately after its start, authorities worried about possible friction between local Filipinos and Japanese. One 349

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reason for the formation of the Provisional Police and Defense Volunteers was the feeling that such an organization would channel seething Filipino resentment into the comparatively safe grooves of disciplined service. In some cases, Filipinos commissioned to search Japanese homes for arms and ammunition were unduly rude, and plantation personnel workers often sensed an undercurrent of animosity between the two races. On Hawaii the fear was so real that the district commander went on the air on December 11 with an appeal to the Filipinos. Some, he said, were contemplating reprisals against Japanese nationals because of the invasion of the Philippines. He urged them to express their loyalty to the United States by helping rather than hindering the defense, and promised to deal swiftly and severely with any civil disturbance. Japanese and some other racial groups were criticized for nonparticipation in war activities, although few statistics broken down according to racial background were ever available. Many persons of Japanese ancestry were hesitant at first to offer their services. The Office of Civilian Defense did not use persons of Oriental appearance where work out of doors or travel through the streets would be necessary in an emergency, and certain of its more confidential activities were closed to Japanese early in the war. On Kauai the Japanese were dropped from the Provisional Police, and they were barred from the new Organized Defense Volunteers on all the islands. The Emergency Morale Committees, the Friends, the International Institute of the YWCA, plantation officials, representatives of the University of Hawaii agricultural extension service, and other agencies which had won the confidence of the Japanese through years of contacts, undertook a determined campaign to enlist them in the war effort. Soon Japanese women were rolling bandages and knitting, Japanese men were stringing barbed wire and cutting kiawe. The director of the OCD said that "the best response we received" was from Japanese. For two years after July, 1944, wives, mothers, and sisters of AJA servicemen, banded together in the Women's War Service Association, visited hospitals, rolled bandages, aided in clothing drives, and did other war work. The criticism that Japanese maids and yardmen were unpatriotically "ganging up" on their employers by demanding higher pay or not working at all became so intense that on two occasions investigations were undertaken. One was made by the Friends and the other by the Emergency Service Committee in cooperation with the Office of Civilian Defense and the United States Employment Service. Both investigations found that the situation was primarily one of supply and demand. Moreover, manpower controls encouraged workers to take other jobs more closely related to the war effort, and for a considerable period actually

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prevented most job seekers from taking domestic work. The Friends, pointing out that workers could choose among employers, commented: The employer who is most likely to be vocally aggrieved at his inability to get a yardman is the employer who may be difficult to work for, and by whom, consequently, a yardman does not wish to be employed.

Because of the great desire of many Japanese to show their loyalty to the United States by being as "American" as possible, kimonos and geta disappeared from the streets, and old-country wedding and funeral customs were revolutionized. This led to such complete destruction of everything Japanese in the home that the OWI and other research and propaganda units later could find but few documents, photographs, and phonograph records to use in their work. Many Japanese had difficulty providing information needed for employment because they had burned family records, passports, and even proof of Island birth and expatriation from Japan. The younger generation refused to speak Japanese, often the only effective medium of communication with their parents. The old pattern of filial allegiance and ancestor worship showed signs of dissolving. Three of the most influential Japanese institutions—the Buddhist temples, the Shinto shrines, and the language schools—became inactive at the start of the war. Efforts had been made for years to control their nationalistic teachings, but the schools and temples had continued to strengthen Japanese cultural ties. The language schools, which 84 per cent of all the Japanese children in public schools attended for an hour or so after the regular school day, closed because their teachers were interned. Chinese language schools were also discontinued early in the war, and no attempt to re-establish either of these school systems was made until after the war, when some of them, both Japanese and Chinese, were reopened. The internment of most of the Shinto and Buddhist priests left many of the older Japanese without the advisors to whom they might have turned for consolation and advice. It was estimated that the Shinto shrines had about 50,000 members in Hawaii on December 7, and the Buddhist temples had at least twice as many. N o orders were issued to close the shrines and temples; on the contrary, the OCD on Kauai officially urged all Buddhists to attend their services and to see that their children attended Buddhist Sunday schools wherever possible. However, Shinto shrines remained closed. With most Buddhist priests and lay leaders interned, activities of Buddhist temples were greatly curtailed. Christian churches attempted to fill the gap with but little success. Leadership in the Japanese community passed immediately to the group holding American citizenship, only a few of whom were more than

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40 years of age. Always before, they had deferred to their elders, but now complicated business and social responsibilities were thrust upon them overnight. The older generation was bewildered and frightened by all these changes, as well as by the war itself, the countless military restrictions, and rumors of dire events about to befall them. In many households, the father was in an internment camp, the sons in the U. S. Army, and the mother was torn between two loyalties. Sometimes a great cleavage between older and younger generation developed; but at other times misfortune brought members of large families closer together. In the main, however, both generations accepted their plight with the Oriental philosophy of shikata ga nai—"what must be, must be." As the war progressed, the Japanese regained assurance. Both their participation in the war effort and the lack of proved sabotage bolstered public confidence in them. As the records of the AJA's in uniform received more acclaim, people in the Japanese community began to feel that they could hold up their heads again. COMBINED WITH EASY MONEY AND GENERAL UNCERTAINTY, t h e

unbalanced sex ratio, always present in Hawaii but tremendously intensified during the war, undermined a proper sense of values, both socially and economically. Welfare workers noted a breakdown of family solidarity, neglect of children, and a demand for more parties and a gayer life. Many Oriental girls, unaccustomed to the flattery and impulsiveness of the Mainland men, took seriously what the newcomers considered merely transient flirtations. The girls worried about broken love affairs and the silence of boys who sailed away and forgot. They worried about their reception by prospective Mainland in-laws. Parents worried over their daughters' newly seized freedom and independence. Some of the friction which developed between Island and Mainland young men arose because many Island girls deserted boy friends of long standing for the glamor offered by the haole strangers. Island girls were sensible indeed whose heads were not turned by the attention they received. Even school girls in their earliest teens and career women crowding middle age were deluged with dates from generals and admirals down. Women living alone often listed their telephones by initials rather than given names in order to prevent calls by strangers who resorted to ingenious approaches to open acquaintanceships. Interracial marriages zoomed, despite Army and Navy efforts to apply the brakes by requiring servicemen to obtain official permission before marrying. From 1943 to 1945, 40 per cent of all Caucasian bridegrooms married non-Caucasian girls; half of these married Hawaiians and part-

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Hawaiians, and a fifth, Japanese. Such marriages, though not entirely unknown before the war, had been much less common. In 1942 there were 4,147 persons in the territory of Caucasian-Oriental blood, but births during the next four years increased this number by 50 per cent. Divorces zoomed upward, until in 1943, 1944, and 1945, they were nearly twice as high in Honolulu as in 1939- On neighbor islands the percentage of increase was smaller. These higher rates were attributed not so much to racial differences as to wartime strains, hasty marriages, the financial independence of working wives, and separation of families. Illegitimate births were actually fewer in 1941, 1942, and 1943 than the 59 per thousand average for the previous five years. Then they climbed to 68 in 1944, to 73 in 1945, and to 76 in 1946, after which they dropped toward prewar levels. Although Hawaii gained the impression that "partJapanese, part-soldier" illegitimate babies were numerous—the number of illegitimate births per thousand to Japanese mothers doubled between 1942 and 1945—they remained low in comparison with the ratio for other races. In 1945, for instance, the peak of 56 illegitimate births per thousand to Japanese mothers compared with 250 to Hawaiians, 152 to Puerto Ricans, 105 to part-Hawaiians, about 70 to Filipinos and Koreans, 44 to Caucasians, and 27 to Chinese. THE COMBINATION OF LARGER POPULATION and unsettled family life focused attention on juvenile delinquency, adult crime, prostitution, and drunkenness, but despite concern over a possible increase in delinquency and crime, there was not an abnormal growth in the more serious offenses. In handling the many additional problems which the war brought, the Honolulu Police Reserves were of great assistance to the understaffed police force. Although organized originally for disaster duty, for several years 403 of these volunteers did a tour of regular police duty once a week from 3:30 to 11:00 P.M. and an additional tour each sixth Sunday. They handled one out of every six police cases during the war years. So efficient were these hard-working "society cops" in pounding beats, directing traffic, and settling family squabbles that the organization has been continued after the war. In May, 1944, the Under-Secretary of the Interior asked the governor for comment on reports then reaching Washington of excessive crime in the Islands. The governor replied that law enforcement officials were almost unanimous in the opinion ( l ) that there was no undue leniency or delay in the civil courts, (2) that there was no undue friction between soldiers and civilians, and particularly that persons of Oriental parentage had not been involved to any substantial extent in whatever friction there might have been, and (3) that while minor violence and hoodlumism

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might have become more frequent, such increase was only what could be expected in the light of a tremendously swollen population, overcrowding, wartime tensions, and other unfavorable circumstances. For adults as for juveniles, there was a marked decrease in major offenses in the first year of the war, and only a small increase thereafter. This was attributable to the severity of provost court procedure, long hours of work, the financial well-being of the community, and, especially, the blackout and curfew, which shifted the peak hours of crime from nighttime to midafternoon. Rural Hawaii never did have a serious juvenile delinquency problem, even during the war. In the cities the problem was greater, but Honolulu was one of the few communities of its size in the country where the upward trend was not pronounced in the early 1940's. During the war, arrests of juveniles for major offenses actually decreased, and the increase in minor offenses was due partly to such wartime violations as failure to carry identification cards and being out after curfew. The most pronounced changes were in lowered rates of arrest of older boys and the upward trend in the case of girls of all ages and of boys under 10 years. From 1943 until early in 1946, hoodlumism was a problem at sports events, on busses, and on the streets and beaches. One newspaper headline reported: "Servicemen and Civilians Involved in Assaults and Fights All Over Town." The fights usually followed familiar patterns: A halfdozen barefooted, long-haired, aloha-shirted adolescents would suddenly surround a lone serviceman, possibly because they hoped to "roll" him for his money or were just pining for a fight. A boy jilted by his girl would accost a serviceman and his girl. Civilian bystanders would attack soldiers who made passes at local girls. Inebriated servicemen, refused admittance at beer parlors, would assault the doorman. Non-haole boys would challenge servicemen who aroused their ire by calling them " g o o k s " and questioning their loyalty. In an attempt to reduce hoodlumism, police in plain clothes rode certain busses, and their number was increased wherever trouble might start. During the early years of the war, houses of prostitution enjoyed the most flourishing trade in their history. Uniformed men and civilians stood in long lines on the streets waiting the opportunity to enter. I n Honolulu, twenty houses, with 250 "girls," were registered with the police, fifteen of them in the small area bounded by River, Nuuanu, Kukui, and Hotel Streets. An undetermined number of unregistered houses were scattered throughout the city. It was estimated that their gross take was $10,000,000 to $15,000,000 a year; that the girls averaged $25,000 annually and the madames about $150,000. Maui closed its houses in 1942, and the following year a movement started on the other

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islands to repress the trade, culminating in the closing of houses on Hawaii and Kauai in the spring of 1944 and on Oahu six months later. Six months after the Honolulu houses were closed, a sharp decrease in venereal disease and sex crimes was reported. However, clandestine prostitution was on the upswing, some of it in the best residential areas, and taxi drivers in increasing numbers were acting as procurers. In the final years of the war and immediately after its close, attention was focused on a series of irregularities involving war workers, Navy officers, and Honolulans. Black marketing, misappropriation and destruction of supplies, and illegal gambling were charged in three major cases and several score smaller cases. Some ended in conviction, some in acquittal, but all revealed a background of confusion, laxity, and poor business procedures which had encouraged the irregularities. In the first important case, a commander was acquitted by courtmartial of applying to his own use 1,441 pounds of Navy meat and 520 pounds of butter, which he presumably sold to civilian dealers. Admiral Nimitz, deploring the "miscarriage of justice," wrote: I t is the subject of regret that there is no appropriate recourse open . . . to take disciplinary action against the members of the court responsible for the acquittal of this officer for so flagrant a violation of the law and the standards of the service whose uniform he wears.

Investigation of this case led to further probes into the way materials had been handled, and culminated in a postwar investigation of charges of gross waste at the Makalapa dump. It was alleged that good material had been discarded and burned, and that officers, enlisted men, and civilians had appropriated articles from the dump for their own use. A second important scandal concerned the diversion of "ships service" goods to civilian markets and the use of Navy ships to bring a half-million dollars' worth of slot machines, phonograph records, and other supplies to be sold by civilians. The 10 persons involved included a Navy captain, prominent Honolulu merchants, and some war workers. One received a prison sentence, others were fined up to $7,500, and some received suspended sentences. The third major case charged mismanagement in the civilian housing areas. The officer-in-charge of CHA-3, together with two other officers and two civilian employees, were acquitted in federal court of charges that they had used their positions to influence housing area purchases from a company in which they were financially interested. Later, a courtmartial found the officer-in-charge guilty of culpable inefficiency in the performance of his duty, especially in permitting illegal gambling. Despite his conviction, many persons felt that his policies were justified. The former navy yard commandant, who returned from the

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Mainland to testify, stated that he had informally authorized gambling as the "best solution I could see." He maintained that open gambling tended to limit stakes, kept outside card sharks from participating, and lessened the use of marked cards. The Pearl Harbor Banner commented: If these regulations, most of them geated for peacetime operations, had not been by-passed, many more battles and thousands of more lives might have been lost as a consequence. . . . In performing the great (and absolutely necessary) good of keeping thousands of men on the job at Pearl Harbor, the comparatively minor evils of furnishing them with a gambling hall to keep them happy, or getting their food and shaving cream and petty luxuries from the mainland in ways now questioned as legal, can be explained, and perhaps even excused.

THE SECOND MILITARY GOVERNMENT ORDER issued on December 7 closed saloons and stopped the sale of liquor, and no liquor was sold except under doctor's permit until February 23, 1942. Most doctors issued from three to ten permits each during this period, but three who issued more than 400 were fined $500, $1,000, and $1,500, respectively. Two other violators of the order received five-year prison sentences, and one was fined $5,000 as well, but both were released on parole within a year. Late in February, bars reopened during the afternoon, and a rationing system was set up for sales of bottled liquor.* With the exception of enemy aliens, every adult could obtain a liquor permit, good for three quarts of wine, one case of beer, or one quart of other liquor a week. The first liquor permit line wound from the liquor commission's office on the third floor of Honolulu's city hall, down the stairs, through the city hall patio, and up the street. Hundreds of people, even women with babies in arms, stood from two to nine hours to obtain the precious slips. At first liquor permits had to be renewed at stated intervals, but later they were good for 15 purchases. They were issued at OCD first aid stations, schools, plantation offices, and other outlets. Some slight changes were made from time to time in the quantity of purchases allowed, depending upon the amount of liquor in the territory. Authorities were concerned over the irregularity of liquor shipments; "it kept the people stirred up and caused some people to miss work in order to purchase a bottle before dealers were sold out." A reporter noted, "Hawaii has gone dry and wet probably more times than * The order placed the issuance of permits under the county liquor commissions, but the task was gradually t;iken over by the Liaison Office between the Military Governor and the Liquor Commission, later known as the Office of Liquor Control of the Military Governor. On March 10, 1943, the distribution was turned over to the newly created Office of Liquor Control in the Office of Civilian Defense. At about the same time, the control of importation of liquor was transferred from the Office of Materials and Supplies Control to the Office of Food Control. Prices were set by the OPA.

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any other spot in the country. The dry and wet spells have come and gone with the convoys." After the territory ran dry in September, 1942, the Office of the Military Governor tried to stimulate local production. This involved priorities for materials and equipment, federal permission to use secondhand bottles, drives for the return of used bottles, and a never-ending importation of bottle caps. Soon beer was being produced in such quantity that for months at a time it was not necessary to import beer from the Mainland, although two to three times as much would have been consumed had it been available. Since most of the distilleries had been owned by aliens, production of stronger liquor was delayed by legal complications. Production of soft drinks also was encouraged, and sales of Coca-Cola alone increased from 57,000 cases in 1939 to 6,000,000 in 1944. As in prohibition times, party guests were often asked to "bring their own." The liquor control office was deluged with requests for special dispensation for parties or picnics, but refused to relax the rules. When liquor control was discontinued at the end of the war, some 150,000 permits were outstanding, more than one for every two eligible civilians in the Islands. Twenty thousand dollars from the sale of permits was used in 1943 to erect a liquor control building of Canec on the Iolani Palace grounds. The licensing of liquor dispensers was left in the hands of the county liquor commission. Despite tremendous pressure for new licenses due to the fortunes being made in the business, the number of dispensers was kept well below prewar levels. Although civilian arrests for drunkenness did not exceed the 1941 figure until 1945, many additional arrests by military police and shore patrol and innumerable other cases did not reach police booking desks. Because of limited bar hours, drunkenness was concentrated in a short period when it was most noticeable to the general public. By 1943 one rarely walked along a downtown street or rode a public bus without seeing intoxicated men during the hours saloons were open. A member of the Honolulu liquor commission reported that he counted 17 drunks in a half block and three fist fights in the course of 15 minutes. The liquor commission, liquor control office, dispensers, Army, Navy, and civilian law enforcement officers took cognizance of what the newspapers called a "scandalous situation." Late in 1943, bars were allowed to stay open an hour longer, to 7 P.M., in hope of decreasing drunkenness by allowing more leisurely refreshment after working hours. Not all dispensers, however, took advantage of the additional hour, and many remained open only three or four hours a day because of scarcity of both liquor and bar help. In general, however, it

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was felt that little could be done to remedy the situation since the basic cause was the large number o f single men in the Islands—defense workers who were living under difficult conditions and servicemen on their way to or from front line combat. Many people took the attitude: "Let them have their drink; they deserve i t ! " Recreation facilities were also severely curtailed. Many beaches were closed to civilians, and all were lined with barbed wire. Many plantation clubhouses were taken over by the services; others were shared by servicemen and civilians. At Palama Settlement, Honolulu's largest community center, the services used the swimming pool for first aid and water safety classes; a first aid station was established in the medical department; the Army leased the gymnasium and vacation camps; and athletic fields were covered with bomb shelters. Palama shared all remaining facilities with servicemen and war workers. O f Honolulu's 110 parks, 45 were taken for barracks, defense installations, and storage areas, and two were converted into victory gardens. Much of Ala Moana Park was covered for a time with temporary shacks, barbed wire, and gun emplacements. After these were removed, the city denied a request for the park's exclusive use for Army recreation. In many o f the parks, everything was destroyed except the trees, and even these suffered great neglect. T h e Army did some restoration work, but lack o f materials and labor for rehabilitation prevented the city from making much o f a start until 1947. The parks board estimated that several years would be required to repair the war's neglect and destruction. N o GROUP OF ISLANDERS WAS AFFECTED MORE by the war than the school children. Not only was their school work disrupted, but their assistance was sought by scores o f organizations. On December 7, public schools were ordered closed by both a defense act rule and a general order. In some outlying districts they remained open for a few days because word of the order did not reach them immediately. Nearly all schools were closed for one to two months, and none o f the public schools on Oahu reopened until February 2. Teachers meanwhile spent long hours registering and fingerprinting the population and working at other emergency tasks, and all through the war they were continually called upon. The schools were centers for distribution o f everything from gas masks to liquor permits. When schools reopened, they were in session only 80 to 90 per cent o f their usual scheduled time. They had lost nearly 25 per cent o f their teaching staff, most o f the high school seniors and some underclassmen, and a large percentage o f their physical facilities. They were hampered at first by numerous regulations. In Hilo, not more than 50 pupils were

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allowed to assemble under one roof; in rural parts of the Big Island, not more than 250. On Kauai, despite the great distances, no students were allowed to ride to school in a private motor vehicle unless they were accompanying adults on their way to work; classes were staggered so that groups of children would not hinder traffic or be targets for planes; and flags were not flown for fear that they might attract bombs. The yearly turnover of teachers averaged 400 per cent over prewar figures. They entered war work, the armed forces, or better-paying civilian jobs; many women teachers returned to their homes on other islands or on the Mainland. The school department managed to provide a teacher for every classroom only by persuading retired teachers to return to service and by relaxing qualifications to permit hiring of partially trained instructors. War agencies and the armed forces used 878 public school units, including classrooms, cafeterias, laboratories, storerooms, garages, dispensaries, restrooms, gymnasiums, auditoriums, and lavatories. Konawaena School on Hawaii had a real problem when the Army took a third of its precious water supply. All, or most, of 26 public schools and three private schools were used: Kaahumanu School, for instance, for the territorial OCD headquarters; Maemae School for the Army finance office; Stevenson Intermediate School for the Army quartermaster depot; and Punahou School for the Engineers. More than a dozen schools became hospitals, and many classrooms on outside islands became barracks. Records, supplies, books, furniture, equipment, and personal belongings, moved to teachers' homes or any other available storage place, were sometimes so scattered that weeks or months were required to sort them for use. Often schools were given less than 24 hours to vacate, and one school had to make three moves within a few days. Classes were conducted in discontinued Japanese language schools, private homes, churches, temples, social halls, and storerooms. At Makawao, Maui, two primary grades used a pool hall and a barber shop. During class hours, distractions were continuous; at recess, streets and roads were thronged with children. In some cases, one school held sessions only in the morning and another used the same building in the afternoon. To help solve transportation problems, some schools were decentralized. Kauai High School, for instance, had classes in nine different communities of the Garden Island; Punahou had an annex at Waipahu, as well as some classes in private homes in Honolulu, but carried on most of its work in buildings it leased on the University of Hawaii campus. Leilehua High School at Wahiawa held its classes in units scattered over several miles. Students paid inflated prices for lunch in restaurants

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crowded with soldiers and war workers. The girls changed to gym clothes at evacuation centers and, much to the delight of soldiers on leave, walked eight blocks through the Wahiawa business section to a public park where gym classes were held. To people of many isolated areas, sharing quarters with the Army meant a valuable widening of horizons. A Christmas party given by Kekaha School on Kauai was attended by soldiers from 19 states. Haaheo School in Hilo, which was taken over by an observation and communication outfit and had a watchtower installed on its roof, made this typical report: Our dispensary was taken for radio telephone, our rest room for officers' quarters, our music room and all available space for sleeping quarters for soldiers. They watched at night and slept during school hours, so there was considerable shushing on our part. Our garage became an Army kitchen where teachers and soldiers struggled together to get meals for the men. . . . W e had many parties for the boys, steak frys and parties for 200 or 300 men with troops of entertainers and refreshments. . . . We made use of many things the Army had to offer us, such as lectures, moving pictures, souvenirs, musical talent, and an ice house. They borrowed our piano, lawnmower, and ovens.

Many of the facilities were returned by fall of 1942 when Army construction began to catch up with needs, and by fall of 1944 all public school buildings had been relinquished except Leilehua High School, which had been incorporated into the Schofield military area and was never returned. The following schools were used as hospitals for some time longer: Farrington, Wahiawa, Kalaheo, Huleia, Makawao, Mountain View, and Waimea (Kamuela). Three and a half years after the war ended, Leilehua was still using makeshift quarters; Wahiawa Elementary School was occupying only a part of its original buildings and was conducting other classes in former Japanese school buildings and an evacuation center. Except for inevitable breakages and losses, school facilities were returned in good condition. Schools were closed one day a week during 1942-43, and one day in every ten during 1943-44 in order that students might work in the sugar and pineapple fields where labor was scarce. In order to minimize interruption to the academic program, it was decided that, beginning with the 1944-45 schools year, students of each school work five days in succession. Those who could not do plantation labor were assigned war work at their schools on the usual field days. Sometimes students were called on for special work, as on Kauai when boys over 16 were excused from school from November, 1942, to February, 1943, to string barbed wire on the beaches. Many subjects pertaining to the war were introduced into the school curriculum. The schools taught children how to behave when an air raid sounded; how to care for their gas masks, save supplies and materials,

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and live healthfully under war conditions. The schools became an important stabilizing force in the community, for the children of alien Japanese parents took home lessons in Americanism and information concerning military orders and defense regulations. In October, 1942, the Honolulu OCD launched the Junior Civilian Defense Corps to spread information about civilian defense. Four months later, the department of public instruction incorporated the corps' program into its curriculum and made it territory-wide. Its work was coordinated with that of the High School Victory Corps, formed in December, 1942, to stimulate food production work and volunteer service. A Junior Civilian Defense Corps handbook became a textbook, and service activities were expanded. A statistical report of the work of 61 per cent of the schools in the 1943-44 academic year tells of sales of more than $4,000,000 worth of war bonds and stamps, donations to 34 funds, the making of 150 different items, ranging from an altar robe for a chaplain to 18,160 cookies; the collection of 10 tons of kiawe beans for livestock feed, 71,589 pounds of newspapers and magazines, and 42 other items; sponsoring of 115 patriotic movies; participation in 23 projects ranging from dengue fever control to decorating the graves of Pearl Harbor dead; and several hundred thousand hours in other volunteer work. Almost every school belonged to the Junior Red Cross, which undertook an ambitious program similar to that of the senior Red Cross. At Kapaa High and Elementary School on Kauai, the girls knitted with the slogan, "Remember, Purl Harder." The homemaking departments of the schools guided much of this work, planned for emergency feeding, conducted adult classes on home repair, and sponsored a refresher course for Army mess sergeants. Four vocational schools undertook production of war materials. They manufactured 8,000 machine gun mounts, 4,500 land mines, and 1,500 stretchers, and did $250,000 worth of repair work on trucks and other equipment. The school department was not adequately equipped for such work, but what equipment it had represented practically all the reserve in many communities. Hawaii's school children placed second among all states and territories in per capita purchases of war bonds and stamps, and many schools were presented with the Minute Man flag. In one of many school campaigns, Punahou students sold $169,000 worth of bonds, thus winning the right to christen a P-47 Thunderbolt "The Redhead" in memory of a recent graduate killed in a bomber accident. Children in the Scouts, YMCA, YWCA, and Young Buddhist clubs continued war work during out-of-school hours. When long lines of

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families formed—for gas mask distribution, fingerprinting, or vaccination —Girl Scouts helped care for small children. They typed, filed, rolled bandages, made cookies, and served as junior aides at hospitals. Girl Scouts at Kamehameha Schools, where wounded soldiers were treated, washed the hospital linen. B o y Scouts tilled victory gardens, collected scrap, helped at the blood banks, draft boards, and R e d Cross headquarters, and distributed posters and leaflets. Honolulu Scouts designed and painted 800 signs for first aid stations, and, when a renumbering o f H o n o lulu homes was ordered, offered their services to put up numbers for those ill or infirm who could not do the work themselves. B i g Island B o y Scouts collected 12 truckloads o f rags for use by the Engineers, and dried 140 bags o f grass for mattresses in first aid stations. M a u i Scouts manned observation posts early in the war, and later aided the Army in its jungle training program. Kauai B o y Scouts and H i - Y members did K P duty at Army camps to relieve servicemen for more urgent tasks. THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII underwent drastic changes. There was some question right after the attack as to whether it should continue to function, and when it reopened in February, its registration had dropped 64 per cent. Soon, however, its campus, curriculum, and research were almost entirely devoted to the war effort. A prewar peak enrollment o f 2,700 in credit courses dropped to a low o f 800, but by J u n e , 1945, had rebounded to more than 3,500, about one half o f whom were servicemen or war workers. There were 2,500 uniformed men and women in non-credit courses, the total enrollment in which had increased from 1,078 before the war to about 4,000. Registration o f J a p a n e s e and Filipinos in the university's "Speak E n g l i s h " classes at 100 centers on Oahu, Maui, Hawaii, and Kauai was at times higher than undergraduate enrollment on the campus. Hawaii Hall was for a time headquarters o f the United States Armed Forces Institute. T h e university, in cooperation with the institute, corrected more than 100,000 lessons turned in by serviceman students. Hemenway Hall was made available as an evacuation center, the gymnasium became Territorial Guard barracks, and Farrington Hall was used by the entertainment division o f the Army Special Services. That agency erected 14 temporary Army buildings on the campus, some o f which have been retained as living quarters for veterans attending the University. T h e university provided instructors, classrooms, and laboratory facilities for an Army Radio Technicians School which taught the fundamentals o f radar to servicemen who lived at Atherton House, a Y M C A dormitory on the campus, and ate at the university cafeteria.

DAWN OF A N E W E R A

C H A P T E R

VII

T W E N T Y - F O U R

W a r ' s Aftermath T o THE PEOPLE OF HAWAII, the German surrender in M a y , 1945, seemed only one more milestone in World War I I . They received word o f the Nazi collapse with great delight, but also with the realization that it would speed up the tempo o f the Pacific war. V - E Day was observed soberly, with people at work, stores open, and downtown streets more quiet than usual. Several churches held services. There was criticism in Honolulu o f Mainland celebrations which savored o f the feeling that " t h e war's all over." B u t victory over J a p a n brought real jubilation. Before daybreak on August 10, Hawaii received word o f a Japanese offer to surrender. M o mentarily throughout that day and the next, Islanders waited for more news. At 4 : 0 4 P.M., August 12, radios flashed word o f surrender based on premature Mainland radio reports. T h o u g h two minutes later the report was corrected, it was two hours before all celebrations ceased. A T o k y o broadcast set off a second outburst the next evening. Pearl Harbor got the news first, and led off with a chorus o f ships' whistles and a searchlight display. But no official report had yet been made. Finally at 1:42 P.M., Tuesday, August 14, the air raid sirens wailed— no longer warning o f b o m b threats, but shrieking definite word o f peace. Church bells joined the wild paean; gas alarms clanged; anything was used that would make a noise. By 2 : 0 0 P.M., 54,000 Honolulans had telephoned friends to talk about the good news. Offices closed for the rest o f the day and all the next day. Jalopies, jeeps, command cars, and sedans, loaded to the running boards, formed impromptu parades. Soldiers, sailors, marines, and civilians snake-danced through the streets. Traffic snarled to a standstill and men and women shouted, sang, wept, and were again silent. Paper p o m p o m s waved, and wartime forms, torn to bits, fell from office windows to blanket the sidewalks. Prohibited firecrackers appeared as if by

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magic, and a half-hour after the official news was received, they caused a fire for the first time since the outbreak of war. By midnight the Honolulu fire department had responded to 38 alarms, 27 of them false, and police were kept busy with minor arrests. It was the greatest celebration in all Hawaii's history. Officially V-J Day came Saturday, September 1, 1945, the day of the formal Japanese surrender aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. On the following Monday, Labor Day, 30,000 persons participating in the Honolulu Victory Parade were viewed by 135,000 spectators. Military organizations, veterans of World War II and other wars, representatives of civilian organizations, war workers organized into state groups, and each of Hawaii's racial groups—except the Japanese— marched or rode on floats, while 400 planes roared overhead. There were Filipinos with bolo knives, Samoan sword dancers, and Chinese dragons. At a dozen other areas in the territory, smaller celebrations were staged. Among some old-time Japanese, a queer rumor circulated that the war was indeed over, but that Japan had won. Scores of alien Japanese climbed Aiea Heights to watch the Japanese fleet sail into Pearl Harbor. Faith in Japan's invincibility persisted among a small percentage of the population, and three years after the war a Honolulu Japanese collected money from the gullible for the entertainment of the Japanese Emperor in Hawaii and claimed a membership of 4,000 persons in his Hawaii Hisso Kai (Absolute Victory Club). Younger Japanese joined with one of the Japanese language newspapers in a determined "Drive for Awakening" to discredit the club, and succeeded in breaking its hold upon many members. Investigative agencies in 1949, however, estimated that probably 500 elderly Japanese in Hawaii still believed in Japan's invincibility. The victory celebration had hardly ceased when all security orders were rescinded, thus bringing a complete termination to the military rule. Many federal and territorial controls toppled in quick succession, and in 1946 only a few wartime agencies were still in existence. However, nearly a year after the war, 25 defense act rules were still in effect, although most of them were of such a nature that they would expire automatically when they were no longer needed. Even after the end of the war, the governor used his M-Day powers to proclaim three defense act rules to aid in relief and rehabilitation after the disastrous tidal wave of April 1,1946. On June 16,1946, he again used this authority to seize control of the strikebound Matsonia in order that perishables might be unloaded. The 1947 legislature repealed the M-Day Act as of July 1 of that year, but continued at least 10 of the defense act rules as legislative acts or resolutions.

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A R M Y MEN IN THE PACIFIC HAD FOUR SLOGANS early in 1 9 4 5 w h i c h

reflected their varying hopes:

Home alive by '45 Out of the sticks in '46 From hell to heaven in '47 Golden Gate by '48 V-E Day brought discharge to some men and V-J Day to still more, but it was '46 before most servicemen got "out of the sticks" of Hawaii. The Army opened a separation center at Fort Kamehameha in July, 1944, and the Navy centralized its demobilization procedure in September, 1945, at Moanalua Ridge. Fear that local discharge of Mainland men would swamp employment opportunities led to an agreement between the services and the Territory under which men inducted on the Mainland could be discharged in Hawaii only when they had already married an Island girl or obtained an Island job. Applicants for local discharge, however, were neither numerous nor undesirable and few, if any, requests were denied. Crowded with 3,800 men, the carrier Saratoga pulled out of Pearl Harbor September 9, 1945, in the first big postwar sailing of men to be discharged. For the first time in nearly four years, a pier had the holiday atmosphere of a Honolulu steamer day. On Maui, tremendous crowds bid aloha to the 4th Marines as they sailed from Kahului in October and November. Children of 12 schools made flower lets, under direction of the USO, for each of the many thousands of marines. Most of the WAVEs, SPARs, and women marines left before the end of 1945. The ships returned to Hawaii with service wives and children who were again allowed to join the men stationed here. However, arrangements for returning home were not fast enough to suit the servicemen or war workers, and they were vocal in their criticisms of delay. This restlessness was reflected in the increase in number and intensity of street fights, which culminated in the "Damon Tract Riot" in November, 1945, an outbreak which was widely publicized in Hawaii and on the Mainland. About 500 sailors from the Honolulu Naval Air Station stormed through the streets of Damon Tract one evening, throwing stones and shouting that they were going to avenge the murder of two of their comrades earlier that day. When peace was restored, one window and seven screens were broken, one automobile and one motorcycle were damaged, and an onlooker had died of a heart attack. The report of the murders was proved entirely false. Despite public concern, authorities minimized the situation. Army and Navy officials told a committee at the end of 1945 that the difficulties

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were " n o t at all alarming." The head o f the military police said that, although fights involving soldiers in November and December were double the number for the preceding two months, the increase was surprisingly small considering that liquor bans had been lifted. T h e senior Navy shore patrol officer said that enlisted men often used supposed affrays as excuses for being late and that the average o f verified sailor fights was less than one a day. Early in 1946, soldier mass meetings, in Hawaii as at other overseas points, protested the "slow-down" in demobilization. Hickam Field men addressed a resolution " T o the People, President and Congress o f the United States"; an Oahu Servicemen's Committee for Speedier Demobilization came into being; and a committee appointed to go to Washington failed to make the trip only because permission was refused. Marine officers forbade similar demonstrations. War workers were in a hurry to get home and get peacetime employment while manpower was still scarce. Many quit their jobs in Hawaii even before V - J Day and attempted, usually unsuccessfully, to obtain passage to the Mainland. Even after the war, most o f them were refused releases, and by quitting without a release they forfeited return passage home. They claimed that the Navy was keeping excess workers at Pearl Harbor, and the grievance committee o f their All-States Club wrote Washington officials that there were three or four men on every job. T h e Secretary o f the Navy replied that men were being held to their agreements in order to prevent hardship while awaiting ships to take them home. Transportation became available quickly, however. Servicemen left in large numbers in the spring o f 1946. The number o f civilian employees o f the services and service contractors was cut back to prewar levels by the start o f 1947 and was sharply cut again in 1949Some veterans and war workers went home but later returned to Hawaii. Estimates in 1947 and 1948 o f the number o f e x - G I ' s who had adopted Hawaii as their postwar home varied from 3,000 to 7,000. They helped to swell Hawaii's civilian population from the 1940 level o f 423,000 to nearly 500,000 in 1949- T h e increase was confined almost entirely to Oahu. T H E SERVICES BEGAN R E T U R N I N G LAND w h i c h t h e y h a d r e q u i s i t i o n e d

for war purposes. Sometimes the Territory and private owners accepted buildings constructed by the services in lieu of restoration o f premises to their original state. As a result they gained title to quonset huts and many hard-to-get materials. In other cases, Hawaii suffered a serious loss in the agricultural value o f some land which had been used for landing strips and barracks.

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Within a few months, many camps were almost deserted except for demolition squads combing ranges for unexploded bombs and shells. The winds whistled through empty buildings, and weeds grew and cattle grazed where tent cities once stood. A few near-by stores continued in business and were still receiving goods ordered before the last troops left. A year after the war, the Navy and Marines held less than 3,000 of the 118,000 acres they had leased from civilians, but the Army had about a quarter of the 210,000 acres it had taken over. Early in 1949 the Army was still ironing out details for the return of the last 26,000 acres. Meanwhile, however, the services were acquiring more land for permanent use, over the protests of Island residents that the economy of the Islands was adversely affected by the removal of such great areas from civilian use and from tax rolls. Navy plans in 1946 to acquire 1,200 additional acres on the Pearl Harbor perimeter gave rise to charges of "land grabbing" and " g o i n g on a spending spree." Smoldering wartime opposition to the seizure of land burst into the open in newspaper articles describing the plight of individual owners who were made homeless in crowded Hawaii and who felt that they were insufficiently recompensed for their property. The matter was carried to Washington and repercussions were heard in the 1948 territorial political campaign. The services kept their fee simple land, despite the efforts of a committee appointed by the governor in June, 1946, to seek return of some of the military land not needed by the services and despite a Washington directive that the services consider returning as much land as possible to civilians. A special effort was made by civilians for the release of the Army's long-held Fort D e Russy, and possibly other areas within the Honolulu city limits, on the grounds that modern warfare made them antiquated and that the land was badly needed for the growth of the city. Early in 1949, severe cutbacks placed many installations on a stand-by status, but it appeared that few would be definitely abandoned. The cutbacks confined Army activities chiefly to seven major posts on Oahu and the Navy mainly to Pearl Harbor and Barber's Point. Many uncontested claims were settled promptly, but years may elapse before final payment is made in all cases for lands taken, crops destroyed, and war damage incurred. Claims for damage to real and personal property of American citizens suffered between December 6, 1941, and July 1, 1942, were handled by the federal government's War Damage Corporation, which was organized by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation soon after the war started. In 1943, two government agents spent two months in Hawaii receiving claims which ranged from one for $10 for shrapnel holes in the walls of a residence to $51,000 for damages to privately owned post exchanges

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at Hickam and Wheeler Fields. M o s t of the damage had been incurred on December 7, but there were also small claims for the shellings o f Kahului, Nawiliwili, and Hilo, for the burning o f Howard Kaleohano's home on Niihau by the Japanese aviator, and for accidental firing on buildings at Nanakuli when defense troops thought they sighted a submarine in the bay. The War Damage Corporation awarded $219,000 on these claims. The corporation refused claims for indirect damage, such as loss o f cattle when a ranch fence was cut and death o f mullet in a fish pond which had been flooded with oil from sinking ships. Some types of claims were paid by the Army. During the first year o f the war, the Army Department judge advocate heard nearly 200 claims, most o f them for crop damage caused by troop occupation o f arable lands, construction of fortifications, or clearing of fields o f fire around military installations. Claims during the rest of the war mounted far above the 1,000 mark, many for property damage from accidents involving military vehicles. Some claims which were not otherwise covered were submitted to Congress as individual bills by Hawaii's delegate, and late in 1945 a congressional subcommittee on war damage claims held hearings in Honolulu and Hilo. Ewa Plantation asked $60,000 for 91 accidental cane fires. A laundry asked $22,000 for losses suffered as a result o f destruction of its accounting records ordered by the Navy for security reasons at the outset of the war. A Navy widow asked $100,000 for business losses due to her enforced evacuation from the Islands. Two breweries asked a total of $176,000 for losses sustained as a result of what they called "unjustifiable and discriminatory price control operations of the O P A . " A liquor establishment asked for $49,000 for losses suffered when the military governor seized its stock. Fishermen asked damages for injuries to themselves and sampans when they were fired upon at the outbreak of the war. Others asked to be recompensed for the loss o f pigeons loaned to the Army Signal Corps and never returned, the removal of soil, use or occupation o f their lands, and injuries resulting from automobile and airplane accidents, fights with service personnel, and explosions of duds. A dozen claims by Honolulu business firms, the Territory of Hawaii, and the County of Maui asked a total of $500,000 for damage done to building surfaces by camouflaging. Some of these were passed, some were denied, and some were never acted upon. The War Damage Corporation did not reimburse aliens, although they suffered much o f the damage on December 7 . Consequently, private bills were introduced into Congress on their behalf. Congress, however, took the attitude that settlement o f claims of non-

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citizens for death, injury, or property loss due to combat activity should await decision on the question of reparations from Japan. In July, 1948, two congressional laws offered compensation for certain special losses. The War Claims Act of 1948 provided benefits for war workers injured, killed, or taken prisoner, and for other internees and prisoners of war of Japan. Money for the benefits was to be made available from sale of property seized under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The law affected a comparatively small group of Hawaii residents who were in the Philippines, Wake, or Guam at the outset of the war. The second law provided payment for claims filed before the end of 1949 for loss of property as a consequence of evacuation or exclusion from Hawaii. Bills introduced into Congress to permit persons "unlawfully interned" to sue for $1.00 a day for such internment failed to pass. AT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, mountains of supplies crowded every Army and Navy warehouse in the Islands and points westward. Equipment brought back from forward areas in various stages of wear and disorder contributed to the confusion; much material was uncounted and some even unsorted. In Hawaii, as elsewhere, the slow pace in sales of articles scarce in the civilian community caused impatience. Stories of destruction of materials at Makalapa and Schofield brought an investigation by a senate subcommittee on surpluses, but results were rather inconclusive. The services and surplus officials explained that covered storage space for surplus material was not adequate, that goods were packaged lightly and deteriorated with holding, that casual observers frequently reported destruction of what was really useless, and that often it had been a question of destroying $500 worth of material or spending $1,000 to move it where it might be sold. Surplus sales started in October, 1945, under the Surplus Property Office, and continued under the War Assets Administration until December, 1948. Some 400 sales on Oahu and on the other islands realized about 20 per cent of the original value of $360,000,000. Buyers from the Mainland, South America, and other distant points bought much of the heavy construction equipment—booms, derricks, concrete mixers, and steam rollers. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration purchased large quantities of these for relief work in China. Construction materials were in special demand in Hawaii after the 1946 tidal wave. At least 25,000 vehicles were declared surplus in Hawaii—trucks by the thousands, but relatively few passenger cars and so few jeeps that they were all taken by veterans on priorities. Hundreds of planes found buyers, but others were broken up and disposed of

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as junk. Hundreds o f thousands o f plane parts proved more o f a disposal problem than the planes themselves. Food, office supplies, kitchenware, oils, chemicals, tents, and hospital equipment were much in demand. Astronomical quantities o f barbed wire, helmets, nets, and new and used uniforms had little demand, and useless things such as flame throwers were returned to the services or disposed of as scrap. Ski suits, evidently intended for use in a Japanese invasion, were sent back to the Mainland. I n 1943, FARSIGHTED BUSINESS INTERESTS began postwar planning in hopes o f averting a depression which, it was feared, might come about 1950 after pent-up buyer demands were met. Study groups, church committees, public forums, and committees o f various island chambers o f commerce surveyed the field and drew detailed blueprints.. Private industry on Oahu alone made plans for construction projects totaling $113,000,000. Early in 1945 the American Engineering Society called Hawaii's studies the farthest advanced in the nation. The territorial legislature o f 1943 appointed a holdover committee on postwar planning which recommended a program of territorial projects totaling $124,664,000 over a period o f 10 years. This committee worked closely with two other committees, each o f which also submitted reports. One was the postwar planning division o f the territorial department o f public works, which was concerned with the orderly planning o f public buildings and highways to cost from $5,000,000 to $10,000,000 a year over a period o f 10 years; the other was a territorial postwar planning advisory board appointed by the governor. T h e latter board studied 380 territorial and 540 county projects. It recommended 137 specific territorial projects to cost $35,500,000 for the first three postwar years, the setting aside of $21,000,000 for projects to be selected by the counties, and the deferment until later years o f projects amounting to $162,178,000. The transition to a peacetime labor market was accompanied by less sudden and severe dislocation than in Mainland centers of war activities. Labor demand continued much greater than the supply. Removal o f controls enabled businesses to expand; shortening o f the work week prevented displacement o f workers and in some cases necessitated more employees. Army and Navy employment was reduced mostly by the voluntary return of thousands o f workers to their Mainland homes, and other employees were placed in jobs which, because o f manpower shortages, had been filled by uniformed personnel. In June, 1946, Honolulu remained the only place in the country still classified as a labor shortage area. The territorial bureau o f unemployment compensation had received very little call upon its services during the war years. On Oahu, not one

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person collected unemployment benefits between December, 1942, and October, 1945. On Hawaii, some stevedores drew compensation for brief periods of unemployment due to shipping irregularities or the occasional closing of ports to commercial shipping because of large military movements. During 1945, only 316 weekly unemployment checks were issued in the territory, but in 1946 the number grew to 8,831, primarily because of the effects of the devastating tidal wave and the sugar and maritime strikes. Postwar readjustments began to make themselves felt in 1948, and in the spring of 1949 large military and naval shutdowns brought full realization to business that the war boom was over. Unemployment rose to 17,500. Veterans in Hawaii had fewer difficulties in making employment readjustments than ex-GI's almost anywhere on the Mainland. The national veterans' readjustment allowance, which paid $20 to unemployed veterans for a maximum of 52 weeks, went into effect in September, 1944, but was not drawn upon substantially in Hawaii until 1946, when 8,000 checks were issued in the Islands. The trend of payments continued upward through 1947 and 1948, but by the end of 1947 less than twotenths of one per cent of those discharged had exhausted their allowance, in comparison to much larger percentages in some parts of the country. Because the draft was suspended in Hawaii early in the war, veterans did not return to the Islands in large numbers until well after the end of hostilities. A few with medical discharges returned from the Italian front as early as 1944, and the first 48 discharged under the point system received their release in April, 1945. Most of the men returned in small groups, after waiting dreary weeks for transportation in California or on far Pacific islands, and many expressed bitter disappointment over the lack of the anticipated pierside aloha. Two groups of about 500 men each from the 442nd arrived in December, 1945, and two other groups in January, 1946. The formal reception for the 442nd and 100th was held August 9, 1946, when the last 241 members of those units arrived and were borne in a 60-car motor cavalcade from the dock to ceremonies at Iolani Palace. The Red Cross now expanded the work of its home service department, which had been established in September, 1941, to assist dependents of servicemen and veterans. Beginning in 1943, each session of the territorial legislature had received bills for miscellaneous benefits to veterans, and in the 1947 legislature more than 50 proposals were offered. Those passed granted $300 to each disabled veteran, gave territorial civil service preference to veterans, and provided certain burial expenses, vocational rehabilitation aid, and other minor benefits.

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In September, 1944, an agency known as the Veterans' Advisors was formed at the suggestion of the governor to coordinate the activities of more than 20 organizations. It was financed by the Honolulu Community Chest until the following July, when its work was taken over by the Territorial Council on Veterans Affairs. Several local veterans' organizations were formed. While the men of the 100th were still at Camp McCoy in 1942, they started saving money for a postwar clubhouse. Club 100 was organized late in 1945 for the mutual assistance of its members and their families, and the promotion of the "unity and welfare of all the people of the territory." Later, the 442nd Veterans Club, the 1399th Engineers Club, and the Military Intelligence Service Linguist Associates were formed. One of the early activities of Club 100 and the 442nd Veterans Club was the entertainment of Earl Finch, their friend from Camp Shelby days, who visited Hawaii six months after the war ended. In Honolulu, he was welcomed by the governor and mayor and serenaded by the Royal Hawaiian Band. His progress from town to town was a triumphal march, and as many as 2,000 persons were present at the meetings, luaus, and other entertainment activities which filled his visit. in the service had been small until the latter half of 1943, but then, with the 100th in heavy action in Italy and Island men in other units coming under fire, news of wounded and dead arrived with increasing frequency. Ceremonies honoring the war dead were held at five places in Honolulu on the afternoons of March 11 and 12, 1944, when high Army officials representing the commanding general presented the Purple Heart medal to the next of kin of the men killed. Many similar presentations were made in the next two years, some at large gatherings, others with only the immediate family present. From 1943 onward, individuals, art societies, architects' groups, and others came forward with numerous suggestions for war memorials. Various groups urged a combination civic auditorium, athletic arena, and war museum; a Waikiki Beach expansion project; memorials at Pearl Harbor, Red Hill, or the entrance to Honolulu Harbor. A Pearl Harbor worker was active in proposing erection on Punchbowl of a shrine of Pearl Harbor, with many halls, each telling the story of a Pacific battle. The Women's National Patriotic Organization, formed to decorate the graves of war dead, organized the Pearl Harbor Memorial Trust, which obtained a territorial charter and announced a goal of $5,000,000 for a memorial. The Pacific Memorial Foundation, formed early in 1946, was designated by the legislature as the official war memorial agency of the terCASUALTY LISTS OF ISLAND MEN

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ritory. It planned to cooperate with the large Mainland organization known as the Pacific War Memorial, Incorporated, and urge the selection of Hawaii as an operating base for that organization's proposed Pacific scientific studies. Private funds were given to the Territory for a temporary war memorial which was dedicated on the third anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, on the grounds of the territorial office building. An American eagle perched on an olive branch decorates an 18-foot wooden shaft which bears the words, "In honor of all Americans of Hawaii who died in this world war that the beauty and freedom of our land might be preserved for all humanity." On the concrete base extending on each side are inscribed the names of Hawaii men killed in the war. In memory of island of Hawaii war dead, the Hilo Chamber of Commerce, with the financial assistance of several other groups, erected a white marble and lava rock memorial at the edge of a reflecting pool in Kalakaua Park in Hilo. A park at Kaunakakai, Molokai, temporary plaques on Maui and Kauai, and a memorial tablet at the Kaneohe community center in Windward Oahu honor Hawaii's men in uniform. Communities, schools, churches, and other groups have erected memorials or started funds for them. A memorial volume, In Freedom's Cause, was published in 1949 by the University of Hawaii Press, under authorization of the territorial legislature. It contains biographical information and photographs of Hawaii's 806 war dead. The legislature also set up at the university a War Records Depository to gather material relating to Hawaii's part in World War II. Many of the next of kin of Island war dead requested that the bodies be returned to Hawaii. When the first bodies from Europe arrived on the third anniversary of V-J Day, the caskets of two soldiers were taken to lie in state in the lobby of Iolani Palace while memorial ceremonies were held. Thereafter, brief services were held at shipside when bodies arrived. The American Graves Registration Service established its Pacific zone headquarters in Honolulu to conduct a far-flung search for missing dead in the Central and Southwest Pacific, exhume bodies in wartime cemeteries in Hawaii, and arrange for final burial of the war dead who were to lie at rest in Hawaii. Some of Hawaii's war dead were given final burial in veteran cemeteries on Kauai, Maui, and Hawaii; others were held for interment in the new National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific at Punchbowl. Establishment of this cemetery climaxed many years of hope by veterans' organizations which had long worked toward an Island burying ground

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for veterans of all wars. The site was selected and work begun in August, 1948, and an unidentified victim of the Pearl Harbor attack was reburied, January 4, 1949, in grave No. 1. Dedication was held on the fourth anniversary of V-J Day. The cemetery is located in a vast volcanic crater amphitheater back of Honolulu and overlooking Pearl Harbor where the first bombs fell. Here lie several hundred Hawaii men who gave their lives on far-flung battle fronts, and approximately 12,000 Mainland men whose next of kin have asked that they be buried in the Pacific where they gave their lives.

CHAPTER

TWENTY-FIVE

Hawaii, Postwar AFTER V-J DAY, THE BARBED WIRE, gas alarms, and first aid signs

vanished almost overnight. But three and a half years later, temporary war housing remained in Manoa and Palolo Valleys, and dull barrackslike emergency offices still cluttered the once beautiful grounds of Iolani Palace. These, too, would disappear some day, but other more permanent effects of the war were to remain. Social changes which had been slowly developing for many years before the war were pushed ahead a generation. Racial, cultural, and economic barriers were lowered, and a middle class emerged. As the war progressed, Islanders with no previous Mainland contacts became conscious for the first time of the vastness of the United States. The influx of service personnel and war workers gave many Orientals, especially in the rural districts, their first opportunity to meet Caucasians socially. Men from many states became frequent visitors and close friends of Island families. In a Kauai kindergarten, where the children probably previously knew of no places beyond their own island, one little girl drew a "map of the world" consisting of a dot for Kauai, a small circle for Honolulu, and a giant circle for Texas. Soldiers from Hawaii, stationed on the Mainland, eagerly used time on leave to visit Mount Vernon, Bunker Hill, and Independence Hall. They sent back detailed descriptions of many places on the Mainland and, later, in foreign countries. In the early postwar years, their warbrides, from the Mainland, Italy, Germany, France, Austria, and the Orient— 1,000 or more of them—introduced a new element in the community and captured attention disproportionate to their number. War's aviation expansion brought Hawaii closer to the Mainland and the Islands closer to one another. By 1948, a total of 74 transpacific flights weekly were arriving in Honolulu as compared with six a week before the war. Islanders so completely accepted inter-island air 375

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travel that surface passenger service was practically discontinued in 1947. In that year, 350,000 persons traveled between the islands by plane; only 13,000 by ship. THE LEVEL OF WARTIME WAGES brought economic ease to many families, while heavy taxes reduced long-established fortunes. Far more than ever before, the sons and daughters of alien laborers were able to afford American luxuries and to move to more comfortable homes in every residential district, often from slum areas of non-haole concentration. Small farmers and tradesmen paid off long-standing debts. The improvement in financial position gave confidence to non-haole groups and accelerated the already rapid breakdown of the paternalistic system on the plantations. Bolstered with new capital, Chinese and Japanese businesses competed with older Caucasian enterprises. The vast industry of warmaking had only temporarily replaced sugar and pineapple as Hawaii's chief economic factors, but it appeared that never again would they gain complete dominance in the Island scene. Several sugar plantations went out of business as a result of land lost to the services, or high production costs, or both. Widespread mechanization reduced their long cry for labor and more labor. New industries were explored to provide opportunities for capital and manpower. The prewar Tourist Bureau, revived as the Hawaii Visitors Bureau, laid plans for unprecedented publicity of the Islands as a vacation resort. During 1941, the peak prewar tourist year, 31,000 tourists visited the Islands; in 1948, a total of 42,000. The publicity highlighted tourist attractions on islands other than Oahu. Airlines stimulated travel to and from other island ports by quoting them the same rates as from Honolulu to the Mainland. Hawaii capitalists also looked to the surrounding seas and considered the possibility of a greatly expanded tuna canning industry. Air transportation and improvements in packing and preserving methods awakened a latent interest in shipment of out-of-season flowers and vegetables to Mainland markets. During the war, servicemen sent thousands of orchids monthly to the girls back home and laid the basis for a great expansion of the orchid industry. However, the war also brought a serious threat to the flower and produce export business. The destructive Oriental fruit fly was introduced, probably carried to Hawaii in the baggage of troops returning from Saipan in 1944 or 1945. The fly spread rapidly throughout all the Islands and has been found on more than 100 crops. Fortunately, it does not attack sugar or pineapples. By all odds, it is the most serious of more than a score of insects which reached Hawaii as stowaways during the war and it is likely to prove, indeed, the greatest deferred cost of the war.

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The trend towards unionism, under way before the war, was given impetus by the unrest of many workers under the controls of the military government. When these controls were released, union organizers found a fertile field. They were aided, too, by the pro-union attitude of the large number of card-carrying war workers from the Mainland. As a result, in the two years after 1944 Hawaii changed from one of the least organized to one of the most highly organized areas in the United States. A few unions had existed in Hawaii for many years, mainly in the shipping, printing, and utility fields, but union membership in 1935 totaled only about 500. It grew to 10,000 shortly before Pearl Harbor and then dropped to 4,000 or less during the first years of the war, although it was estimated that between 25,000 and 35,000 temporary workers on Oahu were members of Mainland locals. The locals recovered slowly, but by late 1943 and early 1944 union leaders characterized labor activities as constituting a "mild revolution" and made plans to "organize every wage-earner in Hawaii." They showed their first strength in Island politics in 1944 when they registered their voters, announced a legislative program, and endorsed candidates. Two prominent union leaders were named to the Democratic central committee. This political activity became even stronger two years later. The International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union played a leading role in organizing not only longshoremen and warehousemen but also sugar and pineapple workers. Its powers were strengthened in the spring of 1945, when the legislature passed the Hawaii Employment Relations Act, popularly known as the "Little Wagner Act," making Hawaii the only state or territory except Wisconsin to extend collective bargaining to agricultural labor. Under its provisions, the first agricultural labor contract ever negotiated in Hawaii by free collective bargaining was signed in the fall by representatives of the sugar industry and the ILWU. It gave a seven-cents-an-hour increase to 20,000 sugar workers, specified hours and working conditions, and provided for collective bargaining. The National Labor Relations Board had certified the organization of only 21 unions in Hawaii from 1938 to 1943, but it certified 34 new unions in 1944, 61 in 1945, 95 in 1946, and 18 in 1947. Union leaders estimated their membership at 40,000 in 1947, most of them in the ILWU, the principal CIO union in Hawaii. Other CIO members were mainly in the National Union of Maritime Cooks and Stewards and the American Communications Association; American Federation of Labor members were in the building construction and metal trades, teamsters, utilities, and service trades. In contrast to the 12 labor contracts in force in 1943, 156 were in effect in June, 1947, in 116 separate business enterprises.

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Meanwhile, important changes were taking place in management policies and organization. Many large companies added industrial relations departments and instituted definite employee policies. The Hawaii Employers Council was organized in July, 1943, to secure collective action by all employers. Its nucleus of 24 firms grew in four years to more than 250, representing employers of more than 65,000 wage earners. The council provided experts in collective bargaining and offered advice and assistance on personnel and public relations problems. Pent-up grievances of the war period erupted in a series of strikes in sugar, pineapple, shipping, and other industries, repercussions of which were felt throughout Island life. More unsettling than the immediate financial effects were the fear of economic insecurity and charges of Communist-domination of some sectors of the labor movement. which could not easily be proved or disproved, became the new weapon of opponents to statehood for Hawaii. It replaced the old-time bogey of the disloyalty of residents of Japanese blood, a fear which melted into insignificance in the light of their record and achievements in World War II. Communism was an issue not only in Hawaii, but in all the United States and the rest of the Western World. The fear of it locally was only another indication that Hawaii was no longer an isolated Pacific paradise, but rather a group of islands touched by all the currents of the postwar world. The statehood movement, which had marked time during the war, took on new vigor. In 1946, 1947, and again in 1948, congressional committees held hearings in the Islands. A parade of witnesses spoke for statehood and only a handful appeared in opposition. A resolution to admit Hawaii into the union as a state passed the United States House of Representatives in June, 1947, but died when it reached a Senate committee. A similar bill introduced into the 81st Congress was blocked, at least temporarily, by charges of Communist domination in Hawaii. However, newspaper polls throughout the nation showed that the public, as well as many Congressmen, favored the step, and that many persons who had barely heard of Hawaii until a few years before were now becoming aware of its problems and aspirations. Hawaii had served as a convenient coaling station in the war with Spain and had stood shoulder to shoulder with the rest of the nation in World War I. But from the moment bombs fell on Pearl Harbor in World War II, these isolated islands became an integral part of the fabric of the nation at large. This once remote mid-Pacific island group has taken its place in the modern world and with the rest of the nation has turned to meet the new era. THE CHARGES OF COMMUNISM,

A P P E N D I X

I

Bibliography This partial bibliography contains those materials most extensively used in the preparation of this work and, in general, those most available to the public. In addition to the items listed, use was made of many Utters, reports, diaries, personal accounts, and other miscellaneous material filed, either in the original or on microfilm, in the War Records Depository of the University of Hawaii. (Government Printing Office is abbreviated GPO.)

1. BOOKS AMERICAN RED CROSS, HAWAII CHAPTER. War

Record of

Volunteer

Special Services (Honolulu, 1947), 122 pp. BAKER, RAY JEROME. Men of Our Armed Forces (Honolulu: privately printed, n.d.), 8 pp. + 152 portraits. BEARD, CHARLES AUSTIN. President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War,

1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 598 pp. Building the Navy's Bases in World War II. History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940-1946 (Washington: GPO, 1947), 2 vols. CANT, GILBERT. Americas Navy in World War II (New York: John Day Co., 1943), 432 pp. CASEY, ROBERT J. Torpedo Junction (Garden City, N.Y.: Halcyon House, 1944), 434 pp. CLARK, BLAKE. Hawaii, the 49th State (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1947), 271 pp. COALE, GRIFFITH BAILY. Victory at Midway (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1944), 178 pp. COX, F. M., ed. One Hundred and Thirtieth United States Naval Construction Battalion (Baton Rouge: Army and Navy Publishing Co., 1945), 300 pp. CRAVEN, WESLEY FRANK, a n d CATE, JAMES LEA, eds. The Army

Air

Forces in World War II. Vol. 1, "Plans and Early Operations, January, 1939, to August, 1942" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 788 pp. HILL, HAROLD CHARLES. A History of the American Legion, Department of Hawaii (Honolulu: The American Legion, 1947), 237 pp. HOWARD, CLIVE, and WHITLEY, JOE. One Damned Island After Another (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1946), 403 pp. 379

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KARIG, WALTER, and KELLEY, WELBOURN. Battle Report. Vol. 1, "Pearl

Harbor to Coral Sea" (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1944), 498 pp. , and PURDON, ERIC. Battle Report. Vol. 3, "Pacific War: Middle Phase" (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1947), 326 pp. KUYKENDALL, RALPH S., and DAY, A. GROVE. Hawaii-. A

History.

From Polynesian Kingdom to American Commonwealth (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948), 331 pp. LEE, LLOYD L., ed. In Freedoms Cause (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1949), 176 pp. Military Intelligence Service Language School Album, 1946. MILLIS, WALTER. This Is Pearl (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1947), 384 pp. MORISON, SAMUEL ELIOT. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, "The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April, 1942" (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1948), 411 pp. 90th U. S. Naval Construction Battalion. Its History and Accomplishments, 1943-1945 (Baton Rouge: Army and Navy Pictorial Publishers, 1946). OAHU SUGAR COMPANY. Waipahu at War. The War Record of a Hawaii

Sugar Plantation Community [1946], 72 pp. PORTEUS, STANLEY D. And Blow Not the Trumpet (Palo Alto, California: Pacific Books, 1947), 304 pp. PROEHL, CARL W., ed. The Fourth Marine Division in World War II (ist ed.; Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 237 pp. SAKAMOTO, LAWRENCE H., ed. Hawaii's Own. Picture Story of 442d Regiment, "100th Battalion," and Interpreters (Honolulu: privately printed, c. 1946), 103 pp. SHIREY, ORVILLE C. Americans: The Story of the 442nd Combat Team (1st ed.; Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 151 pp. SINGER, KURT. Spies and Traitors of World War II (New York: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1945), 295 pp. SMITH, BRADFORD. Americans from Japan (ist ed.; Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1948), 409 pp. U.S. NAVY DEPARTMENT. U.S. Navy at War, 1941-1945 (Washington, 1946), 305 pp. WOODBURY, DAVID O. Builders for Battle (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1946), 415 pp. ZACHARIAS, ELLIS M. Secret Missions (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), 433 pp. 2. ARTICLES ANTHONY, GARNER. "Martial Law in Hawaii," California Law Review, X X X (May, 1942), 371-396. "Martial Law, Military Government and the Writ of Habeas Corpus in Hawaii," ibid., X X X I (December, 1943), 477-514. "Hawaiian Martial Law in the Supreme Court," Yale Law Review (November, 1947), 27-54.

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382

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MCCOLLOCH, CLAUDE. "NOW It Can Be Told: Judge Metzger and the Military," American Bar Association Journal, XXXV (May, 1949), 365-368, 444-448. NAKAHATA, YUTAKA, and TOYOTA, RALPH. "Varsity Victory Volunteers: A Social Movement," Social Process in Hawaii, VIII (November, 1943), 29-35. RADEMAKER, JOHN A. "Race Relations in Hawaii, 1946," Social Process in Hawaii, XI (May, 1947), 29-46. RANKIN, ROBERT S. "Hawaii Under Martial Law," Journal of Politics, V (August, 1943), 270-290. SHOEMAKER, JAMES H. "Economic and Labor Conditions in Hawaii," Monthly Labor Review (May, 1948), 488-492. "Labor Trends in Hawaii," ibid. (June, 1948), 609-612. WALLIN, HOMER N. "Rejuvenation at Pearl Harbor," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXII (December, 1946), 1521-1547. WILLIAMS, MARY, and OTHERS. "Nursing in Hawaii since December 7, 1941," The American Journal of Nursing, XLII, No. 4 (April, 1942), 349-351. WILSON, CORY. "Some Social Aspects of Mainland Defense Workers in Honolulu," Social Process in Hawaii, VIII (November, 1943), 60-65. YAP, PHYLLIS. "Some Effects of the War on the Sugar Plantations," Social Process in Hawaii, VIII (November, 1943), 54-60. 3. PAMPHLETS BALCH, J. A. Shall the Japanese be Allowed to Dominate Hawaii? (Honolulu: privately printed, 1942), 38 pp. CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICE. The Child and Family Service, 1941-1946 (Honolulu, 1946), 14 pp. EWING, WILLIAM. Good Evening. A Collection of Radio Broadcasts (Honolulu, 1943). 15th New Americans Conference, July 15 to 21, 1941 (Honolulu, 1941), 77 pp. FLYNN, JOHN T. The Truth About Pearl Harbor (New York: privately printed, 1944), 32 pp. The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor (2nd ed. rev.; New York: privately printed, 1945), 15 pp. KRAEMER, E. O. Recent Developments in Hawaiian Land Utilization (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1949), 23 pp. LIND, ANDREW W. The Japanese in Hawaii Under War Conditions (Honolulu: American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), 41 pp. MATSON NAVIGATION COMPANY. Ships in Gray (Honolulu, 1946), 48 pp. NAKAHATA, YUTAKA, ed. The Varsity Victory Volunteers (Honolulu: Tongg Publishing Co., 1943), 40 pp.

383

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384

APPENDIX I

1946), 8 sheets. Series F, "Road Construction, Military and Federal Aid Roads" (mimeo.; Honolulu, 1946), 10 sheets. Series H, "Recreation and Culture" (mimeo.; Honolulu, 1947), 19 sheets. Brief History of the Seventh Air Force (mimeo.; n.d.), 15 sheets. The Chaplains Section (mimeo.; Honolulu, n.d.), n.p. Historical Review, Covering Activities of Construction Service, 1 July 1944 through 15 September 1945, under Supervision of Corps of Engineers (mimeo.; Honolulu, 1945), 200 sheets. History of the Army Port and Service Command (mimeo.; Honolulu, n.d.), 186 sheets. History of Engineer Section, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945 (mimeo.; Honolulu, n.d.), 1053 sheets. History of Judge Advocates Office, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945 (mimeo.; Honolulu, n.d.), 293 sheets. History of Office of the Surgeon, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945 (typed; Honolulu, n.d.), 25 sheets. History of Organized Defense Volunteers in the Territory of Hawaii (mimeo.; Honolulu, n.d.), 35 sheets. History of Public Relations Section, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945 (typed; Honolulu, n.d.), 77 sheets. History of Special Services Section, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945 (typed; Honolulu, n.d.), 30 sheets. Military Engineer Activities in the Hawaiian Area, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945 (typed; 1947), 6 sheets. U.S. ARMY, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, a n d U.S. NAVY, FOURTEENTH

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of

the Office of Price Administration in the Territories and Island Possessions, 1942-1945 (mimeo.; Honolulu, 1945), 33 sheets. Price Control and Rationing in Hawaii (mimeo.; Honolulu, 1944), 144 sheets. Summary. Operations of the Office of Price Administration in the Territories and Island Possessions (mimeo.; Washington, 1947), 181 sheets. U . S . OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES. Okinawan

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Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington: GPO, 1946), 389 pp. Interrogation of Japanese Officials (Washington: GPO, 1946), 2 vols., 576 pp. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT. Foreign Funds Control. Administration of the Wartime Financial and Property Controls of the United States Government (Washington: GPO, 1942), 50 pp. U.S. SUPREME COURT. October Term, 1944. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Lloyd C. Duncan vs. Duke Paoa Kahanamoku (San Francisco: Pernau Walsh Printing Co.), 11 pp.

386

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October Term, 1945. Brief of American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, Lloyd C. Duncan against Duke Paoa Kahanamoku (San Francisco: Pemau Walsh Printing Co.), 11 pp. U . S . CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE N I N T H CIRCUIT.

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of the Bar Association of Hawaii, Amicus Curiae. In the Matter of the Application [no. 10763] of Lloyd C. Duncan for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (San Francisco: Pemau Walsh Printing Co.), 27 pp. Brief for Lloyd C. Duncan, Petitioner-Appellee, on Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Territory of Hawaii, in the Matter of the Application [no. 10763] of Lloyd C. Duncan, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (San Francisco: Pernau Walsh Printing Co.), 54 pp. Transcript of Record [no. 10763] of Duke Paoa Kahanamoku, Sheriff of the City and County of Honolulu, Appellant, vs. Lloyd C. Duncan, Appellee (San Francisco: Rotary Colorprint), 3 vols., 1185 pp. [U.S.] WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY. Quarterly

Report, October l to

December 31, 1942 (mimeo.; Washington, 1943), 71 sheets. B. TERRITORIAL

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION. Biennial reports for 1 9 4 1 - 4 2 ( H o n o l u l u , 1943), 67 p p . ; a n d 1943-44 ( H o n o l u l u , 1945), 64 p p .

Also reports of public schools on wartime activities. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE. Annual report to the Governor for

the period ]anuary 1,1944, through December 31, 1944 (mimeo.; Honolulu, 1945), 27 sheets. Report for the period January 1,1945, to June 30, 1946 (Honolulu, 1946), 46 pp. War Record of the Department of Public Welfare, Hawaii County, December 7, 1941-June 20, 1944 (typed; 1944), 12 sheets. GOVERNOR (CIVIL). Annual Reports of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior, for the fiscal years ended: June 30, 1941 (83 pp.); June 30, 1942 (28 pp.); June 30, 1943 (9 pp.); June 30, 1944 (11 pp.); and June 30, 1946 (49 pp.) (Washington: GPO). Defense Act Rules, Nos. 1 to 151, December 7, 1941, through June 14, 1946 (mimeo.; Honolulu). HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY. Annual reports for the calendar years 1945 (22 pp.) and 1946 (34 pp.). HAWAII, UNIVERSITY OF. Reports of the President for the years ended: June 30,1942 (19 pp.); June 30,1943 (48 pp.); June 30,1944 (37 pp.). Department of Sociology and Anthropology, War Research Laboratory. What People in Hawaii are Saying and Doing: Report No. 4 (mimeo.; 1944), 12 sheets; Progress Report (mimeo.; 1945), 6 sheets; Report No. 7, re Importation of Filipino Labor to Hawaii (mimeo.; 1945), 8 sheets; Report No. 8, re Revivalistic Movements Now Stirring Among the Older Generation Japanese in Hawaii (mimeo.; 1946), 6 sheets; Report No. 10, Recent Trends in Race Relations

BIBLIOGRAPHY

387

(mimeo.; 1946), 9 sheets; and Report No. 13, Racial Complexion of Hawaii's Future Population (mimeo.; 1948), 6 sheets. MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL. Miscellaneous papers and records. OFFICE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE. Policies and Activities of the Office of Civilian Defense. Report for the Department of the Interior War Records Project, by T. A. S. Walker (typed; Honolulu, July, 1944), 74 sheets. Food Control Office. Final Report of the Office of Food Control for the Territory of Hawaii {Dec. 8, 1941 to Oct. 31, 1945), by H. E. Raber (typed; Honolulu, 1945), 9 sheets, exhibits. Food Production Office. Summary of Activities of the Food Production Office since Nov., 1942, by Walter F. Dillingham (mimeo.; Honolulu), 13 sheets. Materials and Supplies Control Office. Final Report of the Office of Materials and Supplies Control for the Territory of Hawaii, December 7, 1941 to September 30, 1945, by H. E. Raber (typed; Honolulu, 1945), 4 sheets, exhibits. Women's Division. Junior Civilian Defense Corps, Organization and Growth, by Marion P. Goddard (typed; Honolulu, 1943), 6 sheets. OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNOR. (After July 21, 1944, known as OFFICE OF INTERNAL SECURITY.) General Orders (old series), Nos. 1 to 181, Dec. 7, 1941, through Jan. 30, 1943; (new series), Nos. 1 to 62, Mar. 10, 1943, through July 19, 1944. Report of the Emergency Service Committee, Honolulu, T.H., March 25, 1944 (Honolulu, 1944), 10 pp. Report of the Second Territorial Conference Morale and Emergency Service Committees, Kahului, Maui, July 21-23, 1944 (Maui, T. H., 1944), 75 pp. Security Orders, Nos. 1 to 12, Oct. 24, 1944, through Aug. 16, 1945. Special Orders, Nos. 1 to 12, Oct. 24, 1944, through April 1, 1945. Morale Section. Final Report of the Emergency Service Committee (mimeo.; Honolulu, 1946), 23 sheets. Morale Section. Report of Second Oahu Conference of Americans of Japanese Ancestry, Honolulu, T.H., January 28, 1945 (mimeo.; Honolulu, 1945), 41 sheets. Morale Section. Summary of Proceedings, Third Territorial Conference of Morale and Emergency Service Committees, Honolulu, T.H., March 24-26, 1945 (mimeo.; Honolulu, 1945), 61 sheets. Price Control Section. Report on Organization and Operation of the Price Control Section, by Karl Borders (typed; Honolulu, 1943), 10 sheets. PUBLIC LIBRARIES. Reports for the periods: July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1943 (Honolulu, 1944), 40 pp.; and July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945 (Honolulu, 1946), 32 pp.

388

APPENDIX I

TERRITORIAL GUARD. The Hawaii Home Guard in World War II, by Col. P. M. Smoot (mimeo.; Honolulu), 43 sheets. TERRITORIAL POSTWAR PLANNING ADVISORY BOARD. Report to the

Governor of the Territory of Hawaii (mimeo.; Honolulu, n.d.), 33 sheets + charts. C. COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL

HONOLULU. FIRE DEPARTMENT. Ninety-first

Annual

Report of the

Honolulu Fire Department, for the Year Ending December 31, 1941 (mimeo.; Honolulu, 1942), 19 sheets. HONOLULU. MAYOR. Honolulu's First Year in Global War (Honolulu, 1942), 28 pp. Honolulu Marches on in 1943 (Honolulu, 1944), 32 pp. KAUAI. County of Kauai and National Defense, by William Ellis (mimeo.; Lihue, Kauai, 1942), 18 sheets. County of Kauai in World War II, by William Ellis (mimeo.; Lihue, Kauai, 1944), 14 sheets. 5. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS Hawaii Farm & Home. (Monthly), December, 1941-June, 1949. Hilo Tribune-Herald. 1941-1946. Honolulu Advertiser. 1941-1946. Honolulu Star-Bulletin. 1941-1946. Maui News. 1941-1946. Paradise of the Pacific. (Monthly), December, 1941-June, 1949. The Garden Island. 1941-1946. Welfare News in Wartime (formerly Defense Welfare News Letter), Vols. 1 and 2. 6. MICROFILM BICKNELL, GEORGE W. Security Measures in Hawaii During World War II (Reel 54, item 5; typed unpublished MS, n.d.). ELMORE, HELEN TROY. Dust Before the Wind. The Story of the Island of Maui During the War (Reel 23, item 1). SUGAR PLANTATION RECORDS:

Hawaiian Agricultural Company. A Diary of Wartime Activity from December 7, 1941 to November 23, 1942 (Reel 18, item 3g-(l); typed; Pahala, Hawaii, n.d.). Hilo Sugar Company. Factual History of Our Plantation War Activity, by A. T. Spaulding (Reel 18, item 3a; typed; Hilo, Hawaii, 1943). Honomu Sugar Company. Report of War Activity of Honomu Sugar Company from December 7, 1941, to November, 1942 (Reel 18, item 3d; typed; Honomu, Hawaii, n.d.). Kilauea Sugar Plantation Company. War Diary (Reel 18, item 3g-(2); typed; Kilauea, Kauai, 1942).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

389

Olaa Sugar Company, Ltd. War Measures. Manager's daily and weekly reports from December 8, 1941, to December 26, 1942 (Reel 5, item 2; typed, Olaa, Hawaii, 1942). Olokele Sugar Company. Diary of Happenings Since December 7, 1941 (Reel 18, item 3-1; typed; Makaweli, Kauai, n.d.). Onomea Sugar Company. Log of Events from December 7, 1941 (Reel 18, item 3b; typed; Papaikou, Hawaii, n.d.). [U.S.] FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY. Social Security Board. Locality Reports, Basic Reports, and Progress Reports, covering the period from December, 1941, through November, 1944 (Reel 29, items 4 and 5). [U.S.] OFFICE OF PRICE ADMINISTRATION, REGION I X . Activities

of

the Office of Price Administration in the Territory of Hawaii (Reel 38, item 1; mimeo.; Honolulu, 1944). U.S. SUPREME COURT. October Term, 1944. Memorandum for the United States on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Lloyd C. Duncan v. Duke Paoa Kahanamoku (Reel 15, item 9). Reply Memorandum for Petitioner, on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Fred Spurlock v. Wm. P. Steer. Filed by Francis M. Brooks, March 3, 1945 (Reel 16, item I d ) . U . S . CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE N I N T H CIRCUIT.

Tran-

script of Record [10744] Upon Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Territory of Hawaii, Wm. F. Steer vs. Harry E. White (Reel 15, item 10a). Transcript of Record [10827] Upon Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Territory of Hawaii, Wm. F. Steer vs. Fred Spurlock (Reel 16, item la). U . S . DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII. Ruling

on

Motion to Dismiss and on Applications for Writ, in the Matter of the Applications of Erwin R. Seifert [296], and Walter Glockner [295], for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Reel 29, item 13). Transcript in the Matter of the Application of Erwin R. Seifert [296], and Walter Glockner [295], for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Reel 29, item 13). 7. MISCELLANEOUS Affidavits submitted to the Tolan Committee of Congress for the purpose of refuting charges that acts of sabotage had been committed in Hawaii on December 7, 1941: Hans L'Orange, J . D. Bond, Stafford L. Austin, James N. Orrick, Robert Fricke, and John H. Midkiff, plantation managers; Frederick C. Denison of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association; and W. A. Gabrielson, Dewey O. Mookini, Edward Joseph Burns, J o h n Anthony Burns, and Hung Chin Ching of the Honolulu Police Department.

390

APPENDIX I

AMERICAN RED CROSS, HAWAII CHAPTER. Reports for the fiscal years

ended: June 30, 1941 (Honolulu, 1941), 4 pp.; June 30, 1942 (Honolulu, 1942), 24 pp.; February 28, 1943 (Honolulu, 1943), 34 pp.; February 29,1944 (Honolulu, 1944), 48 pp.; February 28, 1945 (Honolulu, 1945), 40 pp.; February 28, 1946 (Honolulu, 1946), 37 pp. BRENEMAN, LUCILLE. A History of the Theatre in Honolulu During the Second World War (1941-1946) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Hawaii, 1949), 174 sheets. CADES, J. RUSSELL. Constitutional Limitations on Wartime Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in Hawaii (typed; Honolulu, 1944), 21 sheets. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF HONOLULU. Annual Reports: 1941 (16

pp.); 1942 (27 pp.); 1943 (31 pp.); 1944 (31 pp.); and 1945 (33 pp.). Postwar Planning Committee. Hawaii's Postwar Plans (Honolulu, 1946), 16 pp.

HAWAII SUGAR PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION. The War Record of

Civilian

and Industrial Hawaii. A documentary history of the assistance extended to the armed forces by the civilian community and the sugar plantations. Prepared for the Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack (mimeo.; Honolulu, n.d.), 127 pp. HAYES, CASEY. Food Administration in Hawaii During Wartime (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Hawaii, 1942), n.p. KLMURA, YUKIKO. A Sociological Analysis of Alien Japanese in Hawaii Since the War (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Hawaii, 1947), 248 sheets. MAUI DEFENSE VOLUNTEERS. Partial Account of Lahaina's Part in World War 11 (typed; Lahaina, Maui), 188 sheets. Miscellaneous papers of Lawrence M. Judd, former governor; Samuel W. King, former delegate to Congress; and H. H. Warner, chairman, Governor's Emergency Food Commission. OAHU SUGAR COMPANY. A Factual History of Oahu Sugar Company's Participation in the War (mimeo.; 1948) 60 sheets. UNITED SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS. Annual Reports for Hawaii: 1942

(Honolulu, 1943), 31 pp.; 1943 (Honolulu, n.d.), 31 pp.; 1944 (Honolulu, n.d.), 32 pp.; and 1945 (Honolulu, n.d.), 44 pp. Report of the Director to the Territorial USO Council, Honolulu, T.H., January 1, 1945 to November 15, 1945 (typed; Honolulu, 1946), 9 sheets. SCHLAYER, MARY ELIZABETH. A Study of the WAVE Personnel Management in Pearl Harbor (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Hawaii, 1946), 93 pp. Thrum s Hawaiian Annual and Standard Guide, editions for 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946-47, 1948-49 (Honolulu: Honolulu StarBulletin Ltd.).

A P P E N D I X

II

G h r o n o l o ^ y 1939 April: Navy holds biggest war games to date. May 18: Honolulu's first blackout lasts 20 minutes. July 17-23:13th annual conference of New Americans, group of AJA's, urges expatriation of AJA's in Hawaii. August 1: Honolulu office of FBI is reopened to work with Army and Navy on information concerning possible sabotage and espionage. August 5: Contract N0y-3550 signed by Navy and Hawaiian-Raymond-Turner marks beginning of Contractors, Pacific Naval Air Bases. December: Home economics division of DPI presents to Army emergency plan for feeding public at school cafeterias. 1940 February 20: Navy reports plans to triple capacity of Pearl Harbor naval station. March 14: Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, visits Hawaii; forecasts early expansion of Army units in territory. April: 130 ships of U.S. Fleet arrive at Honolulu. April 15: Secretary of Navy Charles Edison says inspection of Army and Navy facilities in Hawaii "completely reassuring." May 21: Honolulu supervisors provide for appointment of committee to draft major disaster plan for earthquake, flood, tidal wave, conflagration, or epidemic. May 23: Entire territory participates in blackout drill.

June: Medical profession appoints territorial committee on preparedness. Hawaii chapter, American Red Cross, begins production of surgical dressings and other items for European war zones. June 17: Navy establishes base on Maui. War Dept. directs commanding general in Hawaii to alert complete defensive organization of 25,000 troops on Oahu to deal with any possible transpacific raid. (Alert gradually lessened until its end August 4.) July: Naval reserve officers in Hawaii receive call to volunteer for active service. DPI starts classes for special training in defense work. July 2: Supervisors ask mayor to appoint committee to find ways of meeting Honolulu's needs in event of strikes or other contingencies. July 8: Maj. Gen. Charles D. Herron, Commanding General, Hawaiian Dept. of Army, asks mayor, chief of police, and managers of sugar plantations and utilities to plan for civilian participation in defending Hawaii against attack. (As result, Provisional Police are organized, and later training in guard duty is given plantation, utility, and city-county employees to release soldiers for other duties in case of emergency.) August: Fingerprinting and registering of aliens are begun under provisions of federal Alien Registration Act. August 9: Navy announces plans for largest air base in Pacific, to be built on 2,700 acres at Barber's Point. August 13: Navy plans to expand Kaneohe NAS by acquiring all of Mokapu Peninsula. August 26: Mayor's food survey committee

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392 reports Oahu could survive only 45 days without hardship should outside food sources be cut off. September 10: Pineapple Producers' Cooperative Assoc. appoints emergency food committee to work with Army on schedule of pineapple lands usable for truck crops. October: River and Harbors Authorization Bill, passed by Congress, includes $3,300,000 for seaplane base at Keehi Lagoon. Monterey and Mariposa make special trips to evacuate Americans from danger zones in Orient. Army gives plantation managers secret plan for close control over production, storage, and distribution of food in event of war. October 15: National Guard starts active duty, scheduled to last one year. October 27: 60,136 men register for Selective Service. November 1: FCC establishes 24-hour radio listening post in Honolulu. November 5: USS Washington arrives from Mainland with first big group of defense workers for Pearl Harbor and Midway, and 750 members of the 251st California National Guard Coast Artillery (antiaircraft) Regiment for service in Hawaii; ship continues to Orient to evacuate Americans. Hawaii votes in favor of statehood by a two-to-one majority. November 12: Governor Poindexter draws first number in territory's draft lottery. December 7: Navy moves into new Kaneohe NAS. December 20: Hawaiian Constructors sign contract with Army Engineers to build ammunition storage magazines, radar warning stations, railway trackage, fixed fortifications, and radio stations. (Contract for $1,097,000 later expanded to about $112,000,000.) December 30: Adm. Claude C. Bloch, Commandant, 14th Naval District, advises Adm. Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, of "inability to meet hostile attack with the equipment and forces at hand." Deficiencies cited by Bloch: no planes for long-range reconnaissance; Army's serious lack of fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns; incompleted antiaircraft warning system. December 31: Five-man espionage bureau established by Honolulu police department.

APPENDIX II 1941 January 24: Secretary of Navy Frank Knox writes Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson: " I f war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack on the Fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor. . . . The dangers envisioned in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) air-bombing attack, (2) air torpedo-plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire. Defense for all but the first two appears to have been provided for satisfactorily." January 29: Director of Hawaii agricultural extension service proposes to governor that Federal Surplus Commodities Corp., experienced in food distribution, be asked to handle food storage in Islands. January 30: HSPA diversified crops committee appoints first of more than dozen subcommittees to go into every phase of food and feed production. February 1: Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel becomes Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. February 3: Hawaii Sugar Technologists' convention hears talk by Army representative on importance of maintaining calmness in Islands "despite any eventualities." February 7: Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short becomes Commanding General, Hawaiian Dept. of Army. February 13: In first organized effort to entertain increasing number of servicemen on Oahu, Episcopalian women hold tea at Bishop's house. February 28: Entire tuna fleet, alien-owned, is impounded by Dept. of Justice on grounds that boats were falsely registered. March: Governor names committee to investigate food storage. (Following month chairman goes to Washington to ask for $3,500,000 for warehouses and six-month reserve supply of basic foods for Oahu.) Hawaii Red Cross is placed on virtual wartime basis. Outside islands facing serious situation due to exodus of workers to Oahu defense jobs. March 1: Mayor of Honolulu appoints en-

CHRONOLOGY teitainment committee to arrange recreation for growing numberlof servicemen. April: Civilian volunteers for medicalsurgical first aid work are sought. April 7: In Army Day address General Short urges: (1) production and storage of food; (2) organization for care of injured; (3) organization of a police auxiliary to prevent sabotage; (4) preparation for evacuation of Honolulu in case of emergency. April 11: New preparedness committee is named by Honolulu County Medical Society. April 30: Legislature adjourns without passing M-Day Bill, which would have given governor extensive emergency powers. May: Army plans $500,000 additions to Triplet and Schofield hospitals; Navy acquires 222 acres at Halawa for 1,000bed naval hospital. May 8: Army completes organization of military districts on main outside islands. May 14: Sending of 21 Army Flying Fortresses to Hawaii gives rise to belief U.S. expects critical diplomatic developments in Far East. May 20: Second territory-wide blackout is part of extensive Army maneuvers. June: Honolulu Major Disaster Council representative, sent to Washington, is unsucessful in obtaining funds. Night hauling, night warehousing, and weekend work urged to alleviate port congestion due to increased volume of defense materials coming to Hawaii. June 13: Oahu Citizens Committee sponsors patriotic rally in Honolulu for 2,000 Japanese at which official Army attitude toward Japanese in Hawaii in event of war is stated publicly for first time. June 16: Army plans $750,000 food storage tunnel near Ft. Shafter. June 18: Major Disaster Council begins to function as such. (Work had been going on, however, since passage of ordinance on April 26, 1941—month before establishment of national Office of Civilian Defense in Office of Emergency Management.) First work of MDC is implementation of Army plan of March 25, 1941, "for protective measures for the civilian population of Oahu in case of bombardment."

393 June 20: Governor appoints emergency food commission to act in advisory capacity under World War I food act of 1918. June 27: Honolulu blood bank receives first donor. July 14: General Short completes tentative plans for three types of alerts in Hawaii: (1) defense against sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities; (2) defense against air, submarine, and surface attacks; (3) defense against all-out attack, including enemy landing. July 15-21: New Americans hold annual conference in Honolulu with theme "Our Present Patriotic Responsibilities." July 18: Territorial Advisory Defense Council meets with Army and Navy officials and moves to advise acting governor it feels there is definite emergency and that special session of legislature should be called. July 21: Red Cross women's volunteer motors corps starts first regular duty after several months of training. July 26: Many persons in Hawaii are affected as U.S. "freezes" Japanese and Chinese assets. Japan retaliates by freezing U.S. funds in Japan. August 1: Six mobile radar stations are received in Hawaii, supplementing three permanent radars received in June. August9: Because of complaints over rising rents, Mayor Lester Petrie announces he will appoint rent control committee to arbitrate grievances. August 21: Police Reserves, integral part of Honolulu police system, begin training. September 1: Between 7,000 and 8,000 unionists march in Honolulu's Labor Day parade, greatest mass display of organized labor's strength in history of territory. September 5: Major Disaster Council estimates $5,000,000 should be appropriated be legislature for use "in event of actual emergency." September 14: Board of supervisors appropriates $60,000 for emergency medicine supply. September 15: On opening of special session of legislature, Governor Poindexter asks prompt enactment of M-Day Bill. September 15-20: Honolulu merchants sell defense savings stamps during "Retailers for Defense Week."

394 September 18: Admiral Kimmel, in talk before Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, calls on Hawaii to "face the realities," criticizes inadequate highways and rent gougers. General Short urges legislature to pass M-Day Bill. September,24: Tokyo asks Japanese consul general in Honolulu for more detailed reports on ships in Pearl Harbor. September 30: Male job seekers registered at Honolulu office of territorial employment service at all-time low of 650. October 4: M-Day Bill, passed by special session of legislature, is signed by governor and becomes law. October 21: Navy files suit to condemn 117 acres near Pearl City peninsula for enlargement of Pearl Harbor naval station. October 23: HSPA diversified crops committee plan is submitted in final form. October 24: Federal Bureau of Budget disapproves appropriation to provide Oahu with warehouses and six-month supply of food. October 29: Governor Poindexter signs territorial Home Guard Act. Hawaii USO established as outgrowth of mayor's entertainment committee. November 5: Although Japanese government has suspended ship sailings to U.S., Taiyo Maru makes special trip to Honolulu so that persons stranded in Japan or Hawaii can return home. November 13: Saburo Kurusu, en route to Washington as special envoy of Japanese government, tells Honolulu reporters he has high hopes for success of mission. November 26: Secretary of State Cordell Hull hands President Roosevelt's ten points of settlement to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, who verbally reject them at once. November 27: Both Army and Navy receive "war warning" dispatch from Washington saying hostile action can be expected at any moment. Japanese task force which is to attack Hawaii moves out of rendezvous in Tankan Bay, in northern Japan. December 3: FBI intercepts phone conversation from Japanese consulate saying Japanese had been instructed to burn papers. Admiral Kimmel is informed by Naval Intelligence that it is unable to locate four of Japan's ten aircraft car-

APPENDIX II riers; also, that Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at H o n g Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington, and London have been instructed to destroy most codes and ciphers at once and burn secret documents. December 4: Governor Poindexter asks Delegate Sam W. King to prepare, with Dept. of Interior, second application for $3,500,000 federal grant to purchase emergency food stores for Hawaii. December 6: FBI suspects possible code in telephone conversation between a Honolulu Japanese and a Tokyo newspaperman. All Navy commanders in Pacific are authorized to destroy confidential papers. December 7: Pearl Harbor attacked; Hawaii Defense Act invoked; martial law proclaimed by governor; General Short proclaims himself "military governor of Hawaii"; blackout ordered. December 8: U.S. declares war on Japan. Public and private schools used for emergency evacuation centers, hospitals, first aid stations, and military defense purposes. Civil court functions superseded by military law; court powers transferred to military governor. December 9: Grocery stores on Oahu are closed for inventory. Special "freeze control" regulations ordered for Japanese nationals, covering financial transactions; three Japanese banks in Honolulu closed. Ban placed on all liquor sales. December 11: Secretary of Navy K n o x arrives to investigate Pearl Harbor attack. December 14: All gasoline stations close to prepare for rationing December 15. December 15: Kahului, Maui, shelled briefly at 5:45 P.M. by Japanese submarine. December 16: Federal government requisitions Matson liner Lurline. Territorial circuit courts, supreme court, and the U.S. district courts are reopened for some civil cases. December 17: Admiral Kimmel is succeeded as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, by Rear Adm. Chester W. Nimitz; General Short, as Commanding General, Hawaiian Dept. of Army, by Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons; Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Martin, commanding Army Air Force in Hawaii, by Maj. Gen. Clarence L. Tinker. Mayor Petrie names rent con-

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CHRONOLOGY trol commission for Honolulu. Survivors from Matson freighter Martini, torpedoed and sunk about 270 miles from Honolulu, reach Honolulu safely. First of several groups of survivors of sunken ships to reach Hawaii in latter part of December. December 18: Military orders evacuation of farmers near West Loch, Pearl Harbor. December 19: All residents ordered out of Iwilei section (largely an industrial district). December 20: In San Francisco, FSCC starts loading first emergency shipment of food for Hawaii. Military governor freezes wages and terms of employment of Oahu war workers as of December 7. December 21: Air raid sirens wail for Honolulu's first alarm of the war. December 22: Commission headed by Associate Justice Owen J . Roberts arrives in Hawaii to investigate Pearl Harbor disaster. December 27: Registration and fingerprinting of all civilians in territory ordered. December 30-31: Hilo, Hawaii, Nawiliwili, Kauai, and Kahului, Maui, each shelled by submarine during night and early morning. 1942 January: Guy J . Swope, director of division of territories and island possessions, Dept. of Interior, arrives from Washington to administer $15,000,000 federal civilian defense fund granted Hawaii. January 7: Plans announced for "Kiawe Corps" of 1,000 Oahu civilian volunteers pledged to spend several Sundays clearing tracts of kiawe trees as defense measure. January 12: Military governor forbids holding more than $200 in currency. January 14: Honolulu has second air raid warning as unidentified planes are heard approaching Islands. January 17: Sacred Hearts Convent turned over to OCD for use as hospital. January 20: Distribution of gas masks begun in Honolulu. January 24: Report of Roberts Commission blames U.S. losses in December 7 attack on lack of alertness of military and naval commanders.

January 26: Shichiro Watanabe, official of Hawaii Kyoiku Kai (Japanese Education Association), announces all association's Japanese language schools will remain closed for the duration. January 27: Further reopening of civilian courts allowed under new general order. Among restrictions still in effect are no jury trials, no grand jury sessions, and no writs of habeas corpus. January 28: Army transport Royal T. Frank sunk by Japanese submarine between Hawaii and Maui with loss of 29 persons. Thirty-three survivors reach Hana, Maui. January 29: Hawaii defenses placed under unified command with Admiral Nimitz as chief. January 31: First offensive strike from Hawaii is carrier raid against Gilbert and Marshall Islands. February 2: Bomb shelters "must be constructed by residents even if materials are not available," says press release from O M G , which advises civilians to use "substitutes and ingenuity." Public schools on Oahu, closed since December 7, are reopened. February: Parents of children attending public schools asked to volunteer to dig air raid shelters at schools. February 3: Pedestrians, except enemy aliens, permitted on streets up to 8 P.M. February 4: Military order advises all women and children in evacuation areas to prepare evacuation kit. February 6: System of gas attack warning, using metal triangles and gongs, established on Oahu. February 9: Persons living in northern Oahu ordered by O M G to receive smallpox vaccination and typhoid and paratyphoid inoculations. February 12: Priorities for evacuation of civilians from territory are set up by OMG. February 16: Benjamin W. Thoron of Dept. of Interior arrives in Hawaii to help develop local civilian defense program. February 17: Japanese banks in Hawaii ordered liquidated. First of Islanders stranded on Mainland at outbreak of war return to Hawaii. February 19: Petition for writ of habeas

396 corpus filed on behalf of Hans Zimmerman on grounds he was illegally interned. February 20: Army begins registering in Businessmen's Military Training Corps male residents of Oahu between 18 and 60 available for defense of island in event of extreme emergency. February 21: All citizens of Japanese, German, and Italian ancestry, except members of armed forces or law-enforcing agencies, ordered to turn in firearms, explosives, ammunition, and weapons. February 24: Bars allowed to reopen and rationing system for purchase of packaged liquor established. February 25: Army accepts services as labor battalion of Varsity Victory Volunteers, organization of 155 AJA's, mostly students or former students of University of Hawaii. March 1: Third air raid alarm in Honolulu starts at 9:39 P.M. and lasts 42 minutes. March 4: Three medium-sized bombs dropped on lower slopes of Tantalus at 2:15 A.M. awaken Honolulans in nearly all parts of city. March 7: Honolulu has fourth air raid alarm, lasting 66 minutes. Saturday morning shopping crowds quickly cleared from streets, with no disorder, confusion, or apparent panic. March 10: OCD authorizes construction of 22 gas decontamination stations in Honolulu. March 11: Swedish vice-consul, Gustaf W. Olson, opens department of Japanese interests at former Japanese consulate. OCD announces evacuation plan for removal in emergency of women and children from areas on waterfront side of Honolulu's evacuation line. March 14: Honolulu's fifth air raid alarm, also territory-wide, starts at 9:40 on Saturday morning, lasts 53 minutes. March 18: Eighteen survivors of two ships torpedoed near Hawaii by Japanese submarines December 9 reach Suva, Fiji, after long voyage in open boats. Fiftyeight missing are presumed dead. March 26: Registration of all residents of "outside islands" ordered. March 30: 6,000 persons vaccinated during first day of mass immunization program in Honolulu. March-April: Mainland soldiers arrive on

APPENDIX II outside islands to reinforce local National Guard troops. April 2: O M G establishes 48-hour work week as standard on all war projects; overtime to be paid for hours in excess of 44. April 7: "Cuffless trousers" order enforced by OMG. April 13: Hawaiian Islands best-protected place on earth from standpoint of gas attack, says Army chemical warfare officer, announcing more than 400,000 gas masks issued for adult population of Islands. April 14: City-county fire protection increased nearly 300 per cent since December 7, OCD announces. April 21: Honolulu waterfront designated restricted area by military governor and barred to public. April 22: Honolulu businessmen protest new postal ruling limiting shipments of packages from Mainland to one weekly from any one party to any other party and restricting packages to 11 pounds and not more than 42 inches in length and girth. (Ruling placed in effect because of tremendous volume of goods ordered by parcel post by businessmen refused freight priorities.) April 24: Twenty-three women graduated at Queen's Hospital from first nurses' aide course sponsored by Hawaii Red Cross. April 25: Selective Service registration extended to men between 45 and 64 years. April 28: About 10,000 appeals against 1942 real property tax valuations filed by Oahu property owners, many claiming war conditions decreased value of property in evacuation areas and areas dependent upon rationed transportation or adjacent to new installations. May: First detailed criticism of legality of martial law in Hawaii appears in University of California Law Review in article by J . Garner Anthony, Honolulu attorney. May 1: Few persons wear leis but many buy war bonds and stamps as Honolulu holds Lei Day bond drive; sales total about $1,000,000. Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce suspends activities for duration. May 2: "Unless the military situation requires otherwise," General Emmons sees no reason why elections should not

CHRONOLOGY be held in fall of 1942. Priority system for allocation of telephone service in Hawaii is placed in effect. May 18: Retail stores may charge no more than highest April price for any item. Announcement that Mauna Loa erupted 4:30 P.M., April 26, reveals "military secret." Lava flow has stopped. May 21: Military appeals to dog owners to enlist pets for sentry and patrol work with armed forces. June 1: Alert sends civilian volunteer groups to duty. June 3: As precaution against threatened air attack, O M G urges women and children to leave area between Punchbowl and Liliha Sts. immediately if arrangements already made with friends in upper areas. June 4: Japanese aircraft launch attack on Midway. Pacific Fleet communique No. 1 says one Japanese battleship and one carrier damaged, others believed to have been hit and "attacks on the enemy are continuing." June 5: Pacific Fleet communique No. 2 reports, "It appears that the enemy's damage is very heavy indeed, involving several ships in each of their carrier, battleship, cruiser and transport classes." Most Island soldiers of Japanese ancestry, later to be designated 100th Infantry Battalion, leave Hawaii for Camp McCoy, Wise. June 6: Women and children who had been requested June 3 to seek shelter "in safe areas" are given permission to return to homes. June 17: Scrap rubber salvage drive starts throughout territory, to continue until end of June. Ninety bombproof shelters for 5,000 persons to be built on Ala Wai Blvd. in Waikiki section. June 25: Plans announced for withdrawal of regular U.S. currency in territory and replacement by currency bearing overprint "Hawaii." June 27: V-mail service set up for armed forces in Hawaiian area. June 30: Hawaii Tourist Bureau closes its doors for duration. July 20: To ease blackout, O M G allows approved dimout lights. July 23: Selective Service announces 138,551 men, approximately one-third entire population, registered in territory.

397 August 11: Governor Poindexter, returning from month's visit to Mainland, says "differences of opinion in the administration of national defense policies" in territory caused him to tell Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of Interior, he "could have the job." August 12: Congestion and delay in mails between Mainland and Hawaii causes protest at Washington by Delegate Sam W. King. August 24: Ingram M. Stainback takes oath of office as ninth governor of Hawaii in brief ceremonies at executive mansion. August 25: First party of Island Japanese, numbering about 40 family units, leaves Hawaii in exchange for Americans in Japan. September 2: Civil courts in Hawaii authorized to resume most normal functions; privilege of writ of habeas corpus, however, remains suspended. September 8: U.S. Ninth Circuit Court holds Territory has right to tax salaries of federal civilian employees in Hawaii. October 1: Junior Civilian Defense Corps formally mobilized among Hawaii's school children. October 2: Democratic territorial platform contains strongly worded plank deploring unlawful searches and seizures, suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus, arrest and holding of citizens without bail, and trial of criminal cases without jury. October 3: Voting relatively light in Hawaii's first wartime election. Hula girls and musicians of former years absent. Most voters appeared at polls in working clothes and carried gas masks. October 7: Many Hawaii families, separated at time of attack, reunited following arrival from Coast of several hundred passengers. October 12: "Speak American" campaign launched on Oahu by Emergency Service Committee. October 16: Rep. Wallace Otsuka, Republican, Kauai, withdraws from house election; last of four AJA's to withdraw as candidates for public office following nomination in primary. October 23: O M G officials suggest Honolulu business firms stagger lunch hours to relieve congestion in restaurants; follows success of staggered opening

APPENDIX II

398 hour plan fot business houses and schools placed in effect earlier in month. October 31: DPI adopts policy of permitting high schools to operate four days a week so students can work one day a week in fields to help relieve labor shortage. November 1: With danger of invasion decreased, drastic cuts made in OCD payrolls and construction projects. November 5: General Emmons announces no mass evacuation of Japanese from territory but some Japanese not essential to war effort will be sent to Mainland relocation centers. November 11: Aiea Naval Hospital, destined to grow to largest American military hospital outside continental U.S., is commissioned. November 1J: Reporting of unidentified aircraft in Central Pacific area causes special alert in Hawaiian area. November 16: All women in territory over 16 are registered to determine number available for work. November 23: First contingent of Japanese evacuees from Hawaii, 107 in number, arrive at Jerome Relocation Center in Arkansas to join interned relatives. December: 25th Infantry Division leaves Hawaii for action in Solomons. December 7: Hawaii observes first anniversary of Pearl Harbor with special war bond sale. No flowers for sale in Honolulu, as 175 florists, mostly Japanese, decorate graves of Pearl Harbor dead in Nuuanu cemetery. December 10: Secretary of Interior Ickes announces that civilian rule will be restored to Hawaii as soon as possible. December 14: Parks board removes Japanese fountain in Kapiolani Park which had been gift from Japanese community commemorating coronation of Emperor Yoshihito in 1915. December 21: Governor Stainback and newly appointed attorney-general, J . Garner Anthony, in Washington making strong plea for restoration of civil rights to territory—backed by Attorney-General Francis Biddle and Secretary of Interior Ickes. Newly elected Delegate Joseph R. Farrington emphasizes that residents of Islands have had more than year of military rule. Military governor of Hawaii also present. December 22: O M G permits motor vehicles

on streets or highways until 10 P.M., provided headlights are equipped with ted-and-black paint and beam shields. December 29: Plan for restoration of civil rights approved by President Roosevelt. 1943 January 1: "Hawaii, safe today under the protecting guns of one of the greatest fortresses on earth against any invasion the Japanese currently may be able to organize, is being steadily strengthened against a possible climactic battle within the next few years," says General Emmons. January 16: Proposal that "at least 100,000 Japanese" should be removed from Hawaii to Mainland is made in pamphlet privately printed and distributed by John A. Balch, prominent Honolulu businessman. Pamphlet is entitled Shall the Japanese Be Allowed to Dominate Hawaii? January 18: O M G orders chlorination of Honolulu's water supply as wartime precautionary measure. January 19: Oahu experiences first night air raid alarm; sirens sound from 12:48 to 1:05 A.M. due to approach of "unidentified elements at sea which later proved to be friendly." January 20: White House announces agreement between Depts. of War, Justice, and Interior and territorial governor will result in return to civil authorities certain government functions in Hawaii now controlled by Army. Martial law will remain in effect, however, and writ of habeas corpus continue suspended. January 21: Because of Honolulu's acute housing shortage, 85 duplex houses of Palolo evacuation center are turned over by OCD to Hawaii Housing Authority for renting to Oahu families. January 28: Plans announced for induction of 1,500 Island volunteers of Japanese ancestry for training on Mainland and service in active theaters of operation. January 29: Tests of dimout lights on Kapiolani Blvd. called success. January 30: Varsity Victory Volunteers inactivated at own request as majority want to volunteer for combat duty in Army.

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February 8: General E m m o n s and Governor Stainback in joint proclamations announce military rule over m o s t civil agencies and bureaus in Hawaii will be lifted March 10. February 15: A b o u t 2,400 persons o f J a p anese descent in territory filed petitions to Anglicize names in p a s t year. Record number o f decrees in 1942 totaled m o r e than all name changes in p a s t eight years. February 17: Hawaii's first legislature o f World War I I o p e n s . March 10: In simple and brief ceremony in Iolani Palace, restoration is m a d e to Hawaii's civil government o f numerous functions taken over by military government since December 7, 1941. March 20: Secretary of N a v y K n o x informs Delegate Farrington that N a v y has n o objections to b o n a fide residents o f Hawaii, evacuated to Mainland shortly after outbreak of war, returning to territory. March 28: 15,000 persons attend send-off program in Iolani Palace g r o u n d s for 2,600 A J A soldiers—volunteer Army inductees—before they leave for training at C a m p Shelby, M i s s . April 1: Exportation o f f o o d , tobacco, chewing g u m , and s h o e s from territory prohibited by D e f e n s e R u l e 56. R u l e prevents Island b o y s in service outside territory from receiving gifts o f homem a d e candy and cake. April 2: O P A sets u p at Lihue, K a u a i , territory's first local price control and rationing board. (Later extended throughout territory to take over such work formerly handled by O M G . ) April 19: O C D building at Shriners' H o s pital for Crippled Children is opened a s emergency hospital during poliomyelitis epidemic. May 10: " C a v a l c a d e to V i c t o r y " at H o n o lulu Stadium opens governor's " W o r k to W i n " program, designed to c o m b a t absenteeism and bring other relief to labor shortage. May 14: Postwar planning is launched by H o n o l u l u Chamber o f C o m m e r c e at well-attended meeting. May 18: Petition o n behalf o f 5,000 K o r e a n s in Hawaii seeking to have status changed from enemy to friendly aliens is filed with General E m m o n s .

399 June 1: Lt. G e n . Robert C. Richardson, J r . , succeeds Lt. G e n . E m m o n s as military governor and C o m m a n d i n g General, Hawaiian D e p t . o f Army. June 5: M o r e than 1,700 Island residents o f J a p a n e s e ancestry present check to U . S . government with request money b e used for " b o m b s on T o k y o " as expression o f horror and condemnation o f J a p a n ' s murder o f American fliers w h o were prisoners of war. June 12: Induction completed o f 243 Island volunteers for interpreter training. June 21: Selective Service inductions res u m e d in territory after l a p s e o f m o r e than year. June 28: First shipment o f wine received in territory since blitz is placed on sale, with ration limit of one gallon per week per consumer until consignment runs out. July 3: M e m b e r s o f Hawaii's first territorial war labor board announced. July: 24th Infantry D i v i s i o n leaves Hawaii for action in N e w Guinea. July 13: Blackout regulations are relaxed to allow lights in h o m e s u p to 10 P . M . , except in r o o m s facing sea. July 19: Territorial O C D director's announcement o f 40 per cent reduction in O C D ' s monthly b u d g e t infers danger o f attack has lessened. July 30: In second test case o f martial law, petition filed to seek writs o f habeas corp u s for Walter Glockner and Edwin R . Seifert. August: First major change in Army organization c o m e s with establishment o f U . S . Army Forces, Central Pacific Area. August 8: Preparation for first full-scale offensive in Central Pacific is b e g u n with receipt by Army and N a v y o f directive to plan for assault against Ellice, Gilbert, and N a u r u I s l a n d s . Waikiki area is declared off-limits to servicemen because o f d e n g u e fever epidemic. (Ban is lifted September 13.) August 16: J u d g e Delbert E. M e t z g e r grants habeas corpus writs to Glockner and Seifert, and directs General Richardson to produce men in court within 48 hours in order to determine whether men shall continue to be interned. August 21: Persons seeking new j o b s hereafter may take only t h o s e to which referred by U . S . Employment Service.

400 August 25: Found guilty of contempt for failing to produce Glockner and Seifert in court, General Richardson is sentenced by Judge Metzger to pay fine of $5,000. General Richardson issues General Order 31 forbidding issuance of habeas corpus writs by courts in Hawaii and specifically restraining Judge Metzger from further action in internee cases. September 12: First death in Hawaii attributed to dengue fever reported. September 20: Joint Army-OCD maneuvers testing defenses against possible bombing and gas attacks begin in Honolulu, to continue nightly for week. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, returning from Antipodes visit, arrives to spend several days on Oahu visiting American Red Cross and other organizations connected with war effort. September 22: 100th Battalion lands at Salerno to begin action in Italy. September 24: First lot of locally produced and processed Hawaiian rubber, totaling 2,000 to 2,500 pounds, prepared for shipment to Mainland. October 17: Only Japanese plane to reach Hawaiian area after opening day of war reconnoiters Pearl Harbor. October 25: Order holding General Richardson guilty of contempt of court and fining him $100 is signed by Judge Metzger. November: About 200 Island men inducted into Army following second call for interpreter volunteers. November 4: Honolulu downtown streets cleared of all except key personnel within 15 minutes of sounding of air raid sirens in city-wide test alert starting at 10 A.M. November 12: All forces under way from New Hebrides and Hawaii for Tarawa and Makin battles. November 15: 48-hour week made mandatory in many Island occupations. December: 2nd Marine Division, after fighting on Guadalcanal and Tarawa, reaches Hawaii for recuperation and further training in preparation for Marianas campaign. December 6: O M G issues General Order 45, removing Koreans from status of enemy aliens. December 13: Honolulu has air raid alarm two minutes after blackout time.

APPENDIX II 1944 January: Attack forces leave Hawaii for invasion of Marshalls. February: 4th Marines arrive on Maui after invasion of Kwajalein and Roi-Namur in Marshalls. February 22: 100th Battalion, in Italy, taken out of front lines for rest after 40 days of bitter fighting against fortress of Cassino. March: First company of WACs arrives in Hawaii. March 14: In third test case of martial law, writ of habeas corpus asked for Lloyd C. Duncan. March 21: OWI establishes Central Pacific headquarters in Honolulu to wage psychological warfare against Japan. March 29: Commercial rent control established on Oahu by executive order of governor. March 31: In fourth test case of martial law, Harry E. White petitions district court for writ of habeas corpus. April 11: General Richardson testifies, during habeas corpus case in federal court, Japanese still capable of attacking Hawaii either from air or from sea. May 3: Hawaii's blackout restrictions— except for motor vehicles—lifted. May 14: In fifth test case of martial law, writ of habeas corpus granted Fred Spurlock who had been confined to prison by provost court since March, 1942. May 21: Explosion of LST's in Pearl Harbor kills 127 men and injures 380. May 23: Second manuevers within six months to clear Honolulu's downtown district begin at 3:35 P.M. and last for 70 minutes. May-June: Troops leave Hawaii for Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in Marianas. June 8: Ten civilians and four Army men killed and 15 civilians injured when two Army planes collide and crash in Kalihi-kai district of Honolulu. June 26: 442nd Combat Team enters action near Grosetto, Italy. July 1: Army establishes Central Pacific Base Command. July 21: General Richardson announces he has voluntarily dropped title of military governor. Office of Military Governor to be known as Office of Internal Security.

401

CHRONOLOGY July 27-28: President Roosevelt, General MacArthur, and other top Army and Navy officials hold conference in Hawaii. August: 4th Marines return to Camp Maui after Marianas campaign. Third reorganization of Army in Hawaii comes with setting up of U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas. August-October: 5th Marines arrive at Camp Tarawa on Hawaii to train for Iwo Jima, their first action. September 21: Governor Stainback orders closing of houses of prostitution in Honolulu. September 30: Oahu experiences eighth air raid alarm at 2:15 A.M. as unidentified planes detected off Hawaiian Islands. "All clear" sounds at 3:05 A.M. when planes prove friendly. October 21: July, 1942, regulations relating to currency and securities revoked. October 24: Martial law in Hawaii formally abolished. Hawaii becomes "military area," following pattern in strategic areas of Mainland. October 30: "Lost Battalion" rescue is effected by 442nd Combat Team at Biffontaine, France, after several days of such bitter fighting that number of men lost by 442nd in killed and wounded was four times number of those rescued. November 17—18: In last and longest air raid alarm of war, anti-aircraft guns fire at unidentified planes. Alarm sounds at 10:57 P.M., "all clear" at 12:36 A.M. December: Navy reaches peak strength in Hawaii with 137,000 officers and men in 14th Naval District. December 7: Territory's temporary war memorial is dedicated. December 30: Hawaii WACs, numbering 59, given honorary review before leaving for basic training on Mainland. 1945 January: Invasion force leaves Hawaii for Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Headquarters of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas moved from Pearl Harbor to Guam. January 5: Territorial circuit court rules M-Day Act was properly enacted by legislature under police powers delegated to it by Congress. January 6: Vanguard of WAVEs arrives for

assignment at naval air stations, to be followed in few weeks by women marines and SPARS. January 20: City-county refuses Army's request for lease on Ala Moana Park as recreational area because laws prohibit transfer for such purposes. January 29: Territory to build 800 emergency housing units; 300 on Palolo golf course. Federal project scheduled for Halawa delayed for lack of shipping to bring materials. February 18: First of many groups of American prisoners of war to reach Honolulu after release in Philippines and Japan pause briefly on way to Mainland. February 19: First emergency federal housing units to become available in Hawaii, Kalihi War Homes, occupied. March 26: Among 59 recommendations of House of Representatives subcommittee on congested areas which visited Hawaii this month: immediate construction of 11,000 emergency housing units for Hawaii; release of materials by Army and Navy; allotment of one ship a month to bring in critical building materials; manpower assistance by Army and Navy; appointment of local coordinator between civilians and armed services. April: 4th and 5th Marines return to Hawaii and Maui after Iwo Jima campaign. April 7: Japanese Central Institute, oldest Japanese language school in Hawaii, dissolved and $125,000 turned over to war memorial fund. May 8: Hawaii receives word at 3:30 A.M. of end of hostilities in Europe. May 11: Federal government takes over 83-acre Manoa Valley site for emergency housing. June: Peak of Army strength in Hawaii is reached, with 253.000 troops on Oahu alone. June 6-10: Strike of employees of Dairymen's Association, Ltd., in Honolulu begins series of small strikes which occur sporadically throughout Islands during rest of year. June 16: Punahou campus and buildings returned to school by Army Engineers. June 23: Civilians instructed to turn in gas masks. July: Estimated 3,000 Islanders on Mainland awaiting transportation home.

402

APPENDIX II

September 9: Carrier Saratoga leaves Pearl July 4: General Richardson, in ceremonies Harbor in first large postwar sailing of officially inactivating Hawaii's Organservicemen for Mainland discharge. ized Defense Volunteers, says: "You, as few other American civilians, have September 18: Governor rescinds defense known the fear of living in a group of act rules governing food, feed, tobacco, Islands once in the path of an aggresand other items. sor." September 20: First large group of RAMPs (Recovered Allied Military Prisoners) July 1: Fourth and last wartime reorganizaarrives in Honolulu to be guests of Hotion of Army in Hawaii comes with esnolulu Chamber of Commerce and other tablishment of U.S. Army Forces, Midorganizations for five days of receptions, dle Pacific. luaus, and sightseeing. July 7: Curfew is lifted. July 11: First group of internees removed November 12: Rioting sailors and civilians from Hawaii allowed to come home. at Damon Tract draw official investigaAugust: Marine strength in Hawaii reaches tions and arouse city to curb growing 116,000 men in preparation for proposed hoodlumism. invasion of Japan. November 14: 450 Island Japanese interned on Mainland during war return to HaAugust 3: First negotiated labor contract in waii. (First large group to return; some Island agriculture signed between sugar small groups arrived few months plantations and representatives of ILWU earlier.) (CIO). Over-all increase of seven cents an hour given workers. 1946 August 14: Japanese accept surrender terms. February 25: By six-to-two decision, U.S. Celebration in Honolulu is biggest in Supreme Court holds martial law in Haits history. waii was illegal. August 13: Gas rationing, manpower controls, and censorship end. 1947 August 31: Governor rescinds 23 defense act rules. . April 28: Governor signs bill repealing September: Territory makes bid to have M-Day Act as of July 1, 1947. United Nations headquarters established at Waimanalo. 1949 September 1-3: Territory celebrates Japanese surrender, signed in Tokyo Bay, with June 30: Large Army and Navy cutbacks three-day holiday ending with gigantic return military establishments in Hawaii parade. to level below that of late prewar years.

Index

A absenteeism, 309-312, 328 Academy of Sacred Hearts, 118 accidents, wartime, 122 Advertiser, newspaper, see Honolulu Advertiser Advisory Defense Council, 81 Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 159 agricultural workers, 310, 311, 313 Aiea, Oahu, 7, 31 Aiea Naval Hospital, 197, 198, 202, 237 Aiea Naval Receiving Barracks, 223, 332 Aiea plantation, 55 hospital, 31, 32, 122 sugar mill, 192 Air Force Cottage, 256 airfields, Army, see U.S. Army air raid protection alarms, 60-62 shelters, 81, 115, 116; see also bomb shelters sirens, 57, 60, 76 wardens, see wardens, defense Air Transport Command, 223 AJA's, see Americans of Japanese ancestry Ala Moana Housing Project, 331 Ala Moana Park used by services, 358 Ala Wai Housing Project, 331 Alewa Heights, 77 Alexander, Wallace, residence, 259 Alexander House, 254 Aliamanu Crater, 229 alien Japanese shot, 59-60 alien property custodian, 142, 143 aliens distillery owners, 357 economic conditions improved, 376 German, 39 Italian, 39 Japanese, 10, 38, 41, 44, 71, 82, 91, 95, 361, 364

assets frozen, 82 economic activities curtailed, 143 fishing fleet owners, 41, 132 truck farmers, 158 property of, 142-143 restrictions on, 44, 141, 346, 356 war damage claims of, 368 in work battalions, 110 Aliiolani School, 77 All-States Club, 366 American Civil Liberties Union, 135, 181 American Engineering Society, 370 American Federation of Labor, 325, 377 American Friends Service Committee, 138 American Graves Registration Service, 48, 373 American-Korean Victory Fund drive, 277 American Legion, 33, 34, 38, 39, 46, 68, 79, 97, 174, 275, 278 auxiliary, 280 American Red Cross, 30, 31, 32, 40, 69, 76, 78, 108, 112, 118, 120, 138, 190, 197, 201, 242, 249, 277, 278, 283, 329 aides, 32 call for volunteers, 40 canteen, 33, 37, 39, 78, 256 first aid training, 78 home service department, 371 knitting corps, 200 motor corps, 38, 78, 108, 201, 256 nurses, 118, 340 production corps, 38 sewing corps, 200 surgical dressing unit, 200 Americans of Japanese ancestry, 46, 71, 82-83, 141, 150, 265-273, 350, 351; see also 442nd Regimental Combat Team and 100th Infantry Battalion amphibious training, see training Anderson, Judith, 262 Anderson, Wilhelm A., 263 Antares, target repair ship, 1 Anthony, J . Garner, 174 apprenticeship council, 309

404

INDEX

Arizona, battleship, 2, 88, 89 art objects, evacuation of, 93 Artie Shaw's Navy Band, 260 Asama Maru, Japanese ship, 84 Atherton House, 362 automobiles, freezing of, 342

B B-17S, 2, 4, 50, 62, 89 Bagley Beach, recreation center, 260 bank clearings and deposits, 284 Bar Association of Hawaii, 181 barbed wire, 57, 90, 358 Barber's Point Naval Air Station, 41, 52, 62, 225, 242 bars under security controls, 356 Bataan War Bond Committee, 275 Battle of Midway, 57, 63 "Battle of Niihau," 45—46 "battleship row," Ford Island, 2, 4 beef production, 162 beer, shortage of, 357 bees sent to forward areas, 195 Bellows Field, 2, 4, 5, 89, 227, 229, 242 Benjamin Parker School, 199 Benny, Jack, 262 Beretania USO, 252 Berlin, Irving, 262 birth rate increase, 338 births, illegitimate, 353 Bishop Estate, 330 Bishop Museum, 191, 194, 249 Bishop National Bank, 230 Black, E. E., Ltd., 238 Black, Justice Hugo L., 181 black market, 333, 355 blackout, 10, 112-113, 163, 167, 289, 354 "blitz surgery," 118 block wardens, see wardens, defense blood bank, 30, 40, 68, 69, 119 blood fines in provost courts, 173 BMTC, Businessmen's Military Training Corps, 96, 97, 122 Board of Economic Warfare, federal, 193 board of health, territorial, 338 board of water supply, Honolulu, 8, 68 bomb shelters, 57, 73, 77, 114, 115, 230; see also air raid shelters "Bombs on Tokyo" campaign, 277 Boy Scouts, 7, 32, 34, 43, 59, 278, 362 Breakers, The, 260 British War Relief Society, 276 bubonic plague, 338 Buckner, Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar, 187, 188 Buddhism, 134, 136, 351 "Bundles for Britain," 276 Bureau of the Budget, federal, 67, 74 bureau of conveyances, territorial, 93 Bureau of Internal Revenue, federal, 325 bureau of unemployment compensation, territorial, 370, 371

business under wartime conditions, 57, 71, 281-304 Byrne Organization, 237, 238, 244

G California, battleship, 2, 88, 89 California Packing Corporation, 160 Callahan, W. E. Construction Co., 235 camouflage, 57-59, 91, 92 Camp Andrews, Nanakuli, Oahu, 260 Camp Erdman, Oahu, YMCA, 260 Camp Malakole ("Melancholy"), Oahu, 225, 226 Camp Maui, 230 camp shows, USO, 255 Campbell, A. J., estate, 250 Campbell, Senator Kamokila, 253 CARE, Cooperative for American Remittances for Europe, 279 Cargo and Passenger Control Section, OMG, 300 Carlson's Raiders, 186 Carnegie Institute ionospheric station, 231 carrier pigeons, 192-193 Carter, Mr. & Mrs. George R., 201 Cassin, destroyer, 88 "castaway exhibit," 191 Castle & Cooke, Ltd., 283 casualties ammunition explosion, 122 December 7 care of, 30-32, 38, 39 civilian, 6-7 Japanese, 5 military, 5 forward area, 120, 197-198 442nd RCT, 271 100th Battalion, 271 plane crash, 122 cemeteries, 32, 121, 200 censorship, 35, 36, 146-148 central identification bureau, 148 Central Pacific Base Command, 185 Central Union Church, 34, 159, 258, 278 cereus hedge at Punahou, 237 CHA-3, Civilian Housing Area 3, 239, 240, 242, 355 Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, 30, 69, 143, 174, 282, 283, 301, 306, 337 Chemical Warfare Service, 116, 194 Child and Family Service 242 child labor, 308 children, neglect of, 352 Children's Aid Association, 307 Children's Hospital, 340 China Relief, 369 Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Honolulu, 275 Chinese language schools, 351 Church of the Crossroads, 278 Church of the Epiphany, 258

INDEX Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 250 churches welcome servicemen, 250-251 citations, 46, 245, 26}, 267, 270-271, 372 Citizens' Council, 282 citizenship renounced by Japanese, 145146 City-County Emergency Hospital, 30 Civil Service Commission, federal, 243 civilian defense, see government, wartime civilian evacuation commission, 283 civilian recreation commission, 258 civilian war service division, 117 claims, war damage, 367-369 clothing drives, 277, 278 Club 100, 372 Coast Guard, 41, 90, 222, 231 SPARs, 220, 365 Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 326 Coconut Island, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, 259 Colliers, 173 Combat Demolition Training Station, Kamaole, Maui, 191 county liquor commission, 356, 357 Commercial Pacific Cable Co., 287 Committee for Inter-Racial Unity, 83, 144 Commodity Credit Corporation, 152 Communism, 378 Condor, minesweeper, 1 Congress, 181, 368 congressional investigations congested areas, 330, 334 Pearl Harbor attack, 87-88 statehood, 378 war damage claims, 368 CB's, see U.S. Navy Continental Trailer and Equipment Co., Ltd., 284 controls, 364 currency, 92-93 labor, 310-326 liquor, 356 price, 302-304 security, 131-146 shipping, 300-302 travel, 346-348 conversion to war work, 284-290 Cooke, M. B., estate, 257 Coordinator of Information, 196 Corps of Engineers Auxiliary, 150; see Varsity Victory Volunteers courts, 170-183 civil, 38, 170, 171, 173, 175, 179, 353 military, 172, 174, 180, 183, 304, 312, 354 CPNAB, Contractors, Pacific Naval Air Bases, 237-239 crime, 353-356 critical materials, priorities for, 301 crop damage claims, 368 Cross Roads USO, 254 curfew, 112-113, 114, 354 currency controls, 92-93

405 Curtiss, seaplane tender, 88 cut backs civilian employees of services, 366 military personnel, 367, 371 Cynthia Olsen, steam schooner, 58

D dairies, 163, 311, 313 Dairymen's Association, 326 damage, see war damage Damon Tract, 5, 6, 365 Davis, Elmer, 187 day care centers, 307 defense act rules, 56, 151, 167, 358, 364 defense plans civilian, 29-44 military 89-98 defense workers, 72; see also war workers demobilization, 365-366 Democratic party, 174, 176 demolition squads, 367 dengue fever, 337-338 dental clinics, 199 department of public instruction, territorial, 67, 77, 159, 307, 309; see also schools department of public welfare, territorial, 138, 242, 244, 245 department of public works, territorial, 370 detention home, 174 Di Maggio, S/Sgt. Joe, 250 Diamond Head, 8, 229 Dickenson, cable supply ship, 287 dieticians' aides, 341 dim-out, 113 distilleries, owned by aliens, 357 diversified crops committee, 66, 67, 73, 75 divorce rate increase, 353 doctors, December 7, 9, 29, 30, 31 Dogs for Defense, 192 domestic help, shortage of, 307, 350 Doolittle planes, 63 Downes, destroyer, 88 draft, selective service, 264, 265 "Drive for Awakening," 364 drunkenness, 173, 353, 357-358 dual citizens, 71, 82, 132 Duke, Doris, residence, 259 Duncan, Lloyd C„ 180-181

E Edward T. Meredith, ship, 263 81st Division, 189 elections, 170 Eleu, tug, 287 Elks, 278 Ellice Islands, 186 emergency corps of doctors and nurses, 73

406

INDEX

emergency feeding, planned by schools, 361 emergency feeding section, OCD, 111 emergency food committee, 67 emergency housing units, 111 emergency livestock feed committee, 162 emergency medical service, OCD, 117 Emergency Service Committee, 91, 144, 268, 269, 277, 279, 350 Emergency Service Corps, 34 Emmons, Gen. Delos C., 63,134,139,154, 174, 267 employment controls, 141; see also War Manpower Commission Engineers, see U.S. Army English classes, 145, 362 Eniwetok, 186 enlistment of Islanders, 263-273 Enterprise, carrier, 4, 10, 224 Erdman, John P., residence, 253 espionage, 131-133, 143 espionage bureau, 82 European war relief, 277 evacuation of art objects, 32, 77 of battle casualties to Hawaii, 197-198 booklet, 111 camps, 328 centers, 32, 38, 63, 362 of hospital patients, 77 of Japanese, 139 kits, 111 from local areas, 109-111 to Mainland, 107-108 plans in event of bombardment, 73, 77 units, 110, 111, 333 evacuation committee, MDC, 32, 38, 77 evacuation division, OCD, 40 evacuees December 7, 32, 38, 40 feeding of, 111 return of, 347, 348 unpaid accounts of, 282 Evans, Maurice, 262 Ewa, 242 Ewa Marine Corps Air Station, 2, 220, 225 Ewa plantation, 7, 109, 288, 290 hospital, 31, 119, 122

F family ties, breakdown of, 352 Farm Produce Coordinator, 158 Farm Security Administration, 109 farmers evacuated from West Loch area, 109-110 under wartime controls, 158 Farming for Defense Week, 74 Farrington, Joseph R., 174 Farrington Hall, 362 Farrington High School, 198, 360

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 36, 37, 48, 52, 70, 83, 108, 135, 144 Federal Broadcast Intelligence Service, 197 Federal Communications Commission, 54, 146 Federal Defense Fund, 149 Federal Housing Administration, 331 federal housing projects, 331; see also housing Federal Office of Censorship, 146 Federal Public Housing Authority, 331 Federal Social Security Board, 108 Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation, 152, 153, 164, 165 feed shortages, 162, 163 fifth column, 47 5th Marines, 189, 190 Filipinos, 95 attitude toward Japanese, 349-350 imported as laborers, 307 Finch, Earl M „ 269, 372 fingerprinting of civilians, 68, 80, 120, 358 fires, December 7, 6—7 first aid, 29, 30, 76, 78, 117, 118, 119 fishing fleet at sea December 7, 40—41 impounded, 74 owned by Japanese aliens, 132 fishing grounds, 132 fishing regulations relaxed, 162, 163, 164 552nd Artillery Battalion, 269 food commission, MDC, 74 food prices, 302-304 food stores, 56, 280-281 food supply problems, 65-67, 151-165 Ford Island, 2, 4, 10, 225 Foreign Economic Administration, 195 Foreign Funds Control Office, 142 foreign language radio broadcasts, 141 Forrestal, James V., 245 Fort Armstrong, Honolulu, 192, 222 Fort Barrette, Oahu, 223 Fort De Russy, Honolulu, 8, 257, 259, 367 Fort Hase, Oahu, 227, 228, 229 Fort Kamehameha, Oahu, 223 Fort Ruger, Honolulu, 222 Fort Shafter, Honolulu, 29, 195, 222 Fort Street USO, 252 Fort Weaver, Oahu, 223 40th Infantry Division, 188 48-hour work week, 324 Foster Parents' Plan for War Children, 279 442nd Regimental Combat Team, 150, 265, 267, 269-272, 371, 372 4339th Pack Troops, 192 4340th Pack Troops, 192 4th Marines, 122, 189, 190, 365 14th Naval District, 219, 276 I Free Kindergarten and Children's Aid Association, 307 freeze orders automobiles and parts, 342 automotive materials, 281

407

INDEX building materials, 281 electrical materials, 281 enemy alien assets, 142-143 Japanese assets, 81-82 labor, 324 prices, 302-303 rent, 333 French Frigate Shoals, 232 Friends Society, 141, 278, 350, 351 fund-raising drives, 274-279

G gardens, 67, 115, 159-195, 358 gas attack protection, 116-117 gas decontamination centers, 116 gas defense division, OCD, 116 gas masks, 57, 116 gas-proof shelters, 230 gasoline consumption of, 344 rationing of, 167, 303, 342-344 storage of, 229 General Electric Company, 89 general orders, OMG, 141-148, 166-170, 172, 176, 179, 280, 310-313, 323, 340, 356, 358 "General Order No. 10," 312-314, 323324 "General Order No. 31," 179 Geneva Convention, 120 Ghormley, Vice Adm. Robert T., 187 Gilbert Islands, 62, 186, 188 Girl Scouts, 31, 34, 190, 280, 362 Glockner, Walter, 178-179 government, wartime, 166-183 lines of authority confused, 166 Office of Civilian Defense, territorial, 166-169, 171, 279, 280, 283, 343, 350, 351 activities December 7, 37 bomb reconnaissance, 98 canteen, 112 directives, 166-167 evacuation division, 40 functions of, 171 hospitals, 119, 339-341 liquidation of, 175 maneuvers, 121 mortuary committee, 120 Rumor Clinic, 50 Office of Internal Security, OIS, 166, 176 Office of Military Governor, O M G assists internees, 138 central identification bureau, 148 controls courts, 172-183 food, 151-153, 161, 163, 166, 302 gasoline, 343 hospitals, 339 labor, 310-314, 323-324 liquor, 343, 356-358

materials and supply, 300 enforces martial law, 171-183 general orders, see general orders, OMG morale section, 144 name changed, 175 organization chart, 168-169 see also Major Disaster Council and martial law Gray Ladies, 200, 201 Greek War Relief, 277 Green, Brig. Gen. Thomas H., 174 Guadalcanal, 186, 188, 190, 192, 195 Guam, 187, 188, 237, 278

H Haaheo School, 360 habeas corpus controversy 177-183 Haiku USO, 254 Haiku Valley, naval radio station, 228 Haili Street USO, 254 Halawa Cemetery, 200 Halawa Housing, 331-332 Hale Nani, rest home for nurses, 257 Haleakala USO, 254 Haleakala, ship, 287 Haleiwa Army Officers' Club, 260 Haleiwa emergency air field, 4 Halekai Officers' Club, 259 Halekoa USO, 253 Halekulani Hotel, 50 Halsey, Admiral William F„ 186, 187 Hamakua Coast, 91, 338 Hamakuapoko USO, 254 Hana Hospital, 58 Hana Like Club, 256 Hanalei USO, 253 Hanapepe USO, 253 Harada, Yoshio, 44, 45 Hawaii, island of, 4, 43, 55, 58, 59, 79, 85, 91, 95, 119, 144, 160, 190, 191, 231, 247, 254, 266, 309, 338, 339, 344, 350, 355, 359, 360, 361, 362, 373 Hawaii, ship, 287 Hawaii AJA Morale Committee, 144 Hawaii Air Depot Volunteer Corps, 96 Hawaii Defense Volunteers, 96, 97, 122 Hawaii Employers Council, 264, 378 Hawaii Employment Relations Act, 377 Hawaii Housing Authority, 330, 332 Hawaii Importing Co., 48 Hawaii Kyoiku Kai, 76 Hawaii Medical Journal, 77 Hawaii "mounties," 95 Hawaii National Guard, 71, 265-266 Hawaii Produce Market, 158 Hawaii Rifles, 95, 98, 121 Hawaii Scouts, 95 Hawaii Social Research Laboratory, 194 Hawaii Territorial Guard, 33, 38, 149

408

INDEX

Hawaii, University of, see University of Hawaii Hawaii Veterans Memorial Fund, 145 Hawaii Visitors Bureau, 376 Hawaiian Academy of Science, 67 Hawaiian Air Depot, 62, 223, 308 Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co., 288 Hawaiian Constructors, 240, 245 Hawaiian Department Replacement Depot, 226 Hawaiian Dredging Co., Ltd., 238 Hawaiian Electric Co., Ltd., 299 Hawaiian Gas Products, Ltd., 285 Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, 142 Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Ltd., 153, 285 Hawaiian Potters' Guild, 286 Hawaiian Provisional Battalion (Separate), 267; see also 100th Infantry Battalion Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, 40, 66, 72, 202, 307 Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd., 284, 326 health during wartime, 336-341 hearing boards for internees, 135 Heeia, Oahu, training camp, 228 Helena, cruiser, 88 Hemenway Hall, 32, 362 Heough, motorship, 58 Herron, Maj. Gen. Charles D., 82 Hi-Y Club, 362 Hickam Field, 2, 6, 8, 29, 34, 51, 52, 223, 242, 366 High School Victory Corps, 279, 361 Hilo, Hawaii, 59, 110, 149 Hilo Chamber of Commerce, 305 Hilo Community Players, 256 Hilo Naval Air Station, 231 Hilo Tribune-Herald, newspaper, 49, 268 Hisso Kai, Absolute Victory Club, 364 Hite, Charles M., 35, 38 "Hole, The," 229 Holiday House, 260 Holmes, Chris R., 259 Home Defense Committee, 341 home economists, 341 home nursing classes, 341 home repair classes, 361 "home rule," 79, 80 Homelani Cemetery, 200 Homestead Field Naval Air Station, 231,

Honolulu Council of Social Agencies, 117, 307 Honolulu fire department, 6, 117 Honolulu Gas Co., Ltd., 299 Honolulu Iron Works, 285 Honolulu Japanese Contractors' Association, 84 Honolulu Medical Society, 68, 69 Honolulu morgue, 30 Honolulu Naval Air Station, 223, 365 Honolulu Peacetime Blood Plasma Bank, 120; see also blood bank Honolulu Plantation Co., 289, 290; see also Aiea plantation Honolulu police department, 5, 37, 82, 91 Honolulu Police Reserves, 78, 353 Honolulu Pork Center, 163 Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 306, 325, 345 Honolulu Star-Bulletin, newspaper, 49, 114, 165, 179, 242, 272, 341 Honolulu Symphony Orchestra, 248 Honolulu waterfront, 222 Honomu, ship, 287 hoodlumism, 353-354 Hope, Bob, 260 Hospitality Week, 251 hospitals, 338-341 Army, 197 civilian, 118 emergency, 118 mobile, 198 Navy, 197 OCD, 119, 339 on outside islands, 119 "stand-by," 119 under labor controls, 311 House of Mitsukoshi, 252 House of Representatives, 330, 378 housing, 72, 327-335 Army, 239 emergency, 330 Navy, 239 shortage of, 327-332 war workers', 239, 240 Hualalai, ship, 287 Hui Welina, enlisted women's club, 257 Huleia School, 360 Humuula, ship, 287

Hongwanji School, 32 Honokaa USO, 254 Honokane Valley, Hawaii, jungle training center, 231 Honolulu, cruiser, 88 Honolulu Academy of Arts, 112, 191, 248 Honolulu Advertiser, newspaper, 47, 48, 49 113, 114, 116, 173, 272, 327, 329 Honolulu Community Chest, 262, 277, 307 Honolulu Community Theatre, 255-256 Honolulu Construction and Draying Co., Ltd., 326 Honolulu Council of Churches, 278

I

266

Ickes, Harold L., 38, 174 identification cards, 120 Ilio Point, navy target area, 231 Immigration Station, 36, 135 immunization, 80, 336 In Freedom's Cause, book, 373 incendiary raids, protection against, 116117 income, family, average in 1943, 324-325 income taxes, federal, 284 Industrial Reclaimers, 280

409

INDEX industry committees, 313 Institute of Pacific Relations, 194 Inter-Island Steam Navigation, Co., Ltd., 284, 287, 325 internal security, 36, 131-151 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 International Institute, 350 International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 377 internee property controller, 142 internment December 7, 36 local, 134-138 Mainland, 138-141 prewar plans for, 83 procedure tested, 176-180 interpreters, 265, 272, 273 investigations of congested areas, 330, 334 of delays in payment by Army and Navy, 282 of fishing fleet, 132 of loyalty of Japanese, 83 of Pearl Harbor attack, 87 of rumors, 50, 54 of sabotage, 134-135 of subversive activity, 82 of war damage claims, 368 of war workers' complaints, 242-244 Iolani Palace, 6, 37, 38, 93, 175, 264, 308 Iolekaa, Oahu, training camp, 228 Isenberg U S O , 253 Italian campaign 100th Battalion in, 267, 271 442nd R C T in, 269-271 Iwilei, 6, 109 I w o j i m a , 188, 191, 198, 225

J Japanese, enemy Army, 81, 132 attack on Pearl Harbor, 1-10, 63, 86 Navy, 48, 132 planes, 1, 2, 5, 8, 44, 62 ship sailings to U. S. canceled, 84 submarines, 1, 5, 57, 58-59, 60 surrender, 363-364 Japanese in Hawaii assets frozen, 80, 81, 82, 84 attitude of other races toward, 349 belief in invincibility of Japan, 364 culture, effect of war on, 351-352 dual citizenship of, 71, 82, 132 espionage of, 131 evacuation to Mainland, 139-140 fishermen, 40-41, 132-134 internment of, 134-138 on juries, 182-183 loyalty of, 81-84, 194, 350, 351 population, 65, 71

property under War Claims Act, 143 repatriation of, 141 in R O T C , 149 rumors re, 47-56 societies liquidated, 145 suspects arrested Dec. 7, 36 in Territorial Guard, 150 in WACs, 264 Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Honolulu, 82 Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, 36, 37, 48, 82, 84, 86, 118, 131-134, 138 Japanese language newspapers, 141 Japanese language schools, 76, 119, 134, 145, 351, 359 Jewish Welfare Board, 251, 253 J o h n Rodgers Field, 223 Johnston Island, 287 jungle training, see training Junior Chamber of Commerce, Honolulu, 278-279 Junior Civilian Defense Corps, 279, 361 Junior Red Cross, 201, 361 juvenile delinquency, 353, 354

K Kaaawa Park, Oahu, jungle training center, 227 Kaahumanu School, 112, 359 Kaeleku Sugar Co., 58 Kahana Valley, Oahu, jungle training center, 227 Kahoolawe, island, 189, 190, 231 Kahuku, Oahu, 1, 4, 228 Kahuku, ship, 287 Kahuku Air Base, 226, 227 Kahuku plantation U S O , 253 Kahului, Maui, shelled, 59 Kahului Naval Air Station, 230 Kahului U S O , 254 Kailua, Oahu, 161, 196, 242 Kailua, ship, 287 Kailua U S O , 253 Kaimoku, ship, 287 Kaiulani School, 110 Kalae, motorship, 58, 287 Kalaheo School, 199, 360 Kalaheo U S O , 253 Kalakaua Homes, 110 Kaleohano, Hawila, 44-46, 368 Kalihi Valley, 111, 328 Kalihi War Homes, 331 Kalihi-uka School, 328 Kalimahuluhulu, Mr. & Mrs. Kaahakila, 44-45 Kamaole, Maui, 191 Kamehameha School, 6, 77, 198 Kamehameha statue, 93 Kamehameha U S O , 253 Kamuela U S O , 254 Kanehele, Mr. & Mrs. Benehakaka, 45—46

410

INDEX

Kaneohe, Oahu, 200, 242 Kaneohe Bay, 32 Kaneohe Naval Air Station, 2, 4, 31, 164 Kaneohe USO, 253 Kapaa, Kauai, 284 Kapaa High & Elementary School, 361 Kapaa USO, 253 Kapalama Basin, 223 Kapalama Housing, 330 Kapiolani Hospital, 119, 339, 340 Kapiolani Housing, 331 Kapiolani Park, 92 Kappa Kappa Gamma Alumnae Association, 257 Karloff, Boris, 262 Kauai, island of, 4, 23, 43, 44, 52, 58, 59, 79, 85, 90, 91, 95, 110, 119, 136, 144, 145, 160, 167, 192, 249, 254, 266, 277, 309, 310, 350, 361, 362 Kauai Chamber of Commerce, 188 Kauai High School, 359 Kauai Kiawe Corps, 91 Kauai Morale Committee, 144 Kauai "mounties," 95 Kauai Volunteers, 95 Kawaihae, Hawaii, 161 Kawananakoa, Princess David, 253, 257 Keehi Lagoon, 223 Kekaha, Kauai, 197, 199 Kekaha School, 360 KGMB, 9, 10, 196 K G U , 9, 10 Kiawe Corps, 91 Kilauea, Kauai, 119 Kilauea Military Camp, Hawaii, 260 Kimmel, Admiral Husband E., 1, 50, 51, 81, 88, 290 King, Admiral Ernest J., 186 Kipapa Airfield, 157, 226 Kipapa Gulch, 229 Kipapa School, 118 Knox, Frank, 47, 54 kodachrome processing plant, 285-286 Kodak Hawaii, Ltd., 285 Kokokahi, Oahu, rest camp, 200 Koloa USO, 253 Konawaena School, 359 Koolau Range, 2, 121 Koreans, status after December 7, 141 KRHO, 196 KSAI, 197 Kuakini Hospital, 119, 340 Kuehn, Otto, 133 Kuhio Theatre building, 249 Kunia, ammunition storage at, 229 Kunia School, 118 Kwajalein, 186, 191 L labor child, 307, 308, 309

controls, 310-326 disputes, 325-326, 345, 378 famine, 305-310 Filipino, 307 organizations, 176, 314, 377-378 plantation, 309, 310-311, 313 under "G.O. 10", 313-314, 323-324 Labaina, freighter, 58, 287 Lahaina, Maui, 94, 132 Lahaina USO, 254 Lalani Hawaiian Village, recreation center, 259 Lanai Emergency Service Committee, 144 Lanai, island of, 43, 79, 85, 95, 119, 144 Lanai plantation hospital, 199 Lanakila Emergency Homes, 330-331 land used by military, 221, 360, 366-369 Landlords' Association, 334 Lanham Act Funds, 76, 252, 307, 339 laundries under labor controls, 311-313 Lawrence, Gertrude, 262 Leahi Home, 30, 119, 340 Leahy, Admiral William D„ 187 legislature, territorial, 35, 80, 170, 175, 339, 371, 372 /«'-sellers, 91 Leilehua High School, 359, 360 Lewers & Cooke, Ltd., 5, 6 Liberators, 186 Libby, McNeill & Libby, 160 libraries, 194, 248 Library of Hawaii, 248, 251 Life Underwriters Association of Hawaii, 275 Liholiho School, 258 Lihue, Kauai, 231 Lihue, ship, 287 Liliuokalani, Queen, 189 liquor, wartime control of, 36, 356-358 "Lost Battalion," 270, 271 Lowrey, F. J., home, 250 loyalty program, 83 Lualualei, 196, 226 luaus restricted, 163 Lunalilo School, 6, 34 Lurline, ship, 58, 286 Lutheran Service Center, 250 Lyman, Albert K. B„ 263 Lyman, Charles B., 263

M MacArthur, General Douglas, 187-188 Mack, Dr. Merton H., 7 Maemae School, 359 Major Disaster Council, 29, 30, 31, 68, 69, 75, 81 absorbed by OCD, 35 committees disaster wardens, 76 emergency feeding, 77 engineering, 76

411

INDEX evacuation, 32, 77 food commission, 74 medical preparedness, 77, 78 mortuary, 76 recreation and morale, 259 transportation, 76 Makalapa, 355, 369 Makawao Cemetery, 200 Makawao Hospital, 199, 360 Makaweli, Kauai, 119, 199 Makin Island, 97, 186 Malaaea Bay, Maui, 189 Malama, ship, 287 Maluhia, recreation center, 259 Mauna Ala, freighter, 286 Manana (Rabbit) Island, 227 Manana Veterans Housing, 332 maneuvers, military, 57, 71, 85, 121, 122, 190-193 Martini, freighter, 58, 287 manpower controls, 80, 305-326, 370 shortages, 163, 265, 304-306, 345 Mapele, ship, 287 maps invasion, 186 Japanese, 3 March of Dimes, 277 Marianas, 186, 187, 191, 198 Marine Corps Air Station, Ewa, 2, 225 Marine Engineering and Dry Dock Workers Union of Hawaii, 326 Mariposa, ship, 286 marriages, interracial, 352-353 Marshall, General George C., 71, 259 Marshall Islands, carrier raid against, 186 martial law, 38, 79-80 approved by President Roosevelt, 35-36 courts under, 170-183 invoked, 10 legality of, 177-183 Maryland, battleship, 88 materials and supply section, OMG, 300302 Matson Navigation Co. ships converted to war effort, 286-287 Matsonia, ship, 286, 364 Maui, "civil regulations," 167 Maui, county of, 79 Maui, island of, 43, 44, 52, 53, 55, 58, 59, 79, 85, 90, 95, 119, 136, 144, 160, 163, 190, 192, 230, 237, 254, 266, 309, 362, 368 Maui Emergency Committee, 144 Maui "mounties," 95 Maui News, newspaper, 165 "Maui Onion Week," 165 Maui Pineapple Company, 59 Maui police, 52, 55, 59 Maui Volunteers, 94, 95 Mauna Loa, inter-island steamer, 232, 287 Mayor's Entertainment Committee, 251 McCully School, 145

McLaughlin, J u d g e J . Frank, 180 M-Day Act (Bill), 35, 69, 79-80, 166, 171, 181, 307, 364 memorials to war dead, 372-374 Menehune Minute Men, 91 merchant seamen, 257 Merci Train, 279 Meritorious Service Unit Plaque to 1399th, 267 Metzger, J u d g e Delbert E., 178-180 Mid-Pacific Institute, 77 Mid Pacifican, service newspaper, 261, 345 Midway, Battle of, 57, 63, 186 Midway, island of, 62, 186, 287 military governor, see government, wartime Military Intelligence Service Linguists Associates, 372 minors in war work, 307-309 Minnesota State Club, 258 Missouri, battleship, 364 Missouri Valley Bridge and Iron Co., 238 Moanalua Gardens, 77 Moanalua Ridge, Marine Corps staging area, 223 Moiliili Community Association, 145 Mokuleia, 7 Molokai Community Center, 254 Molokai, island of, 43, 79, 85, 110, 143, 160, 163, 171, 231, 237, 254, 277 Molokai "mounties," 95 Molokai Ranch, 160 Molokai-Lanai Volunteers, 95 Monterey, ship, 286 Moorhead, Dr. J o h n J . , 29 Morrison-Knudsen Co., 237 mosquito control, 337-338 Mount Kaala, radar station at, 226 Mountain View School, 360 "mounties," 95 Murphy, Justice Frank, 182-183 Musicians' Center, Library of Hawaii, 248 Mutual Telephone Co., 115, 290

N Nanakuli, Oahu, 59 National Catholic Community Service, 251 National Guard, 33, 85, 265 National Housing Administration, 330, 331 National Labor Relations Board, 377 National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, 373-374 National Travelers Aid Association, 251 National War Fund, 277 National War Relief, 277 Nauru Island, 186 Nautilus, submarine, 186 Nawiliwili, Kauai, shelled, 59 Negroes, 349 Nevada, battleship, 3, 88 New York Daily News, 145

412

INDEX

newspapers, 41, 43, 146 Niihau, 44-46, 85, 231-232 Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 50, 180, 186, 187, 188, 258, 279, 355 Nimitz Beach, 260 Nimitz Highway, 222 92nd Division, 270 96th Division, 189 98th Division, 189 North Sector General Hospital, 62 nurses, 9, 29, 30, 31 Red Cross, 118, 340 shortage of, 340-341 nurses' aides, 201, 341 Nuuanu cemetery, see Oahu Cemetery Nuuanu Valley, 6, 32

o Oahu, island of, 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 39, 52, 54, 60, 62, 68, 81, 85, 136, 362 Oahu Cemetery, 32, 200 Oahu Citizens Committee for Home Defense, 83 Oahu Plantation Co., 290 Oahu Railway and Land Co., 89, 345 Oahu Scouts, 95 Oahu Servicemen's Committee for Speedier Demobilization, 366 Oahu Volunteer Infantry, 95 Occupational Therapy Association, 202 OCD, Office of Civilian Defense, see government, wartime off-duty employment by service personnel, 306 off-limits areas for servicemen, 337, 338 Office of Civilian Defense, OCD, see government, wartime Office of Defense Transportation, ODT, federal, 166, 167, 342, 345 office of food control, territorial, 151-153, 161, 163, 166 office of food production, territorial, 151, 158, 163 Office of Internal Security, OIS, see government, wartime office of land transportation control, territorial, 342 office of liquor control, territorial, 356 Office of Military Governor, OMG, see government, wartime Office of Military Intelligence, 108, 194 Office of Naval Intelligence, 49, 108 Office of Price Administration, OPA, federal, 302-304, 325, 334 Office of Strategic Services, OSS, federal, 196 Office of War Information, OWI, federal, 196, 197, 351 Oglala, auxiliary ship, 88 Ohio State Club, 258 Olaa, Hawaii, 119

Okinawa, 188, 191, 196, 225, 278 Okinawans, 196 Oklahoma, battleship, 3, 88, 89 Olopana, ship, 287 OMG, Office of Military Governor, see government, wartime 100th Infantry Battalion, 150, 265-272, 371 111th Army Ground Forces Band, 266 111th Engineer Battalion, 271 147th General Hospital, 199 171st Infantry Battalion, 269 1399th Engineers Club, 372 1399th Engineer Construction Battalion, 265, 266, 267 "Onion fiasco," 165 OPA, see Office of Price Administration orchids, Mainland market for, 376 Organic Act, 36, 177, 181 Organized Defense Reserve, 96 Organized Defense Volunteers, 95-98, 149 Oriental fruit fly, 376 Oriental girls, effect of war upon, 352 Oriental Institute, 193 oxygen liquefaction plant, 285

P Pacific Bridge Company, 245 Pacific Combat Training Center, 227, 267 Pacific Fleet, ships of, 62, 63, 70, 71 Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas headquarters, 188, 223 Pacific Guano (Chemical) and Fertilizer Co., 285 Pacific Memorial Foundation, 372 Pacific War Memorial, Inc., 373 pack mules, training of, 192 Packard-Bell advertisement, 49 Paia USO, 254 Palama First Aid Station, 30 Palama Settlement, 358 Palm Lodge, 10 Palmyra, island, 287 Palolo evacuation camp, 111, 328, 330, 333 Palolo Emergency Homes, 330, 333 Palolo emergency housing units, 111, 328, 333 Palolo School, 77 Pan-Hellenic Association, 257 parks used by military, 358 peace declared, 363 Pearl Harbor, Oahu, 1, 2, 6, 8, 35, 40, 71, 242 Pearl Harbor attack, 1-10 expected in Washington, 86 investigations of, 87-88 object of, 63 responsibility for, 87 sabotage, absence of during, 134 unifies America, 87 Pearl Harbor hospital, 31 Pearl Harbor Memorial Trust, 372

413

INDEX Pearl Harbor Naval Air Station, 225 Pearl Harbor Naval Supply Center, 223 Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, 224, 280 Pearl Harbor Submarine Base, 225 Pearl Harbor Training School, 309 penicillin dressings, 202 Pennsylvania, battleship, 3, 88 Permanente, ship, 238 Permanente Cement Co., 238 Petrie, Mayor Lester, 173 petroleum products controlled by Navy, 342 pets, quarantine regulations for, 337 Philippine Island War Relief Fund, 277 Philippine War Relief, 277, 278 Phillippa, ship, 238 pigeon training centers, 192 Pineapple Growers' Association, 307 pineapple plantations, see plantations Pineapple Producers' Cooperative Association, 40, 67 pineapple products for armed forces, 285, 289 Pioneer Mill, Maui, 94 hospital, 339 plantations assist military, 34, 43, 90 assist with food production, 67, 155-156 effect of war on, 288, 300, 376 enlist Japanese in war effort, 350 give funds for defense, 78-79, 97 lend land, men, and equipment to military, 72, 85, 288 receive reimbursement from U.S. Engineers, 311 turn facilities over to military, 31, 358 Pohala beach cottage for service nurses, 257 Poindexter, Governor Joseph B., 6, 9, 35, 36, 38, 174, 290 Police Contact Group, 144 polio epidemic, 119, 338 Pomeroy, J . H., and Co., 237 population of Hawaii Caucasian, 349 changes as result of war, 284 increase in, 349, 366 Japanese, 71 Negro, 349 postwar planning, 370 potato shortages, 165 preparedness committee of Honolulu Medical Society, 69 preparedness program, 65—86 civilian defense plans, 75-79 construction projects, 71-72 espionage bureau organized, 82 food supply plans, 65-67, 73-74 freeze of Japanese assets, 81-82 internment plans, 82-84 M-Day Act, 79-81 Major Disaster Council organized, 68 military defenses, 84-86

military maneuvers, 70-71 Presidential Unit Citations, 270-271 price control, 158 under M-Day Bill, 80 under OPA, 302-304 under Price Control Section, O M G , 302304 see also Office of Price Administration priorities, 72 for community shelters, 115 for construction materials, 331 for evacuation to Mainland, 139 for food, 158 for manufactured goods, 301, 302, 303 for travel, 300, 346, 347 prisoners of war, 5, 41, 195-196, 307, 369 propaganda leaflets, 197 prostitution, 247, 337, 353-354 protection of public, 107-122 blackout, 10,112-113,163,167, 289, 354 bomb shelters, 114-116 evacuation in case of attack, 110-111 from danger zones, 109-110 to Mainland, 107-109 fingerprinting, 68, 80, 120, 358 fire protection, 117 gas attack protection, 116-117 maneuvers to test defenses, 121—122 medical protection, 117-120 registration, 120 provisional hospitals, 198-199 Provisional Police, 34, 68, 69, 79, 86, 95, 350 Provost Court Commission, 173 Prusa, freighter, 58 psychological warfare, 195, 196, 197 public utilities, see utilities publicity re AJA'S in service, 271-272 Puerto Ricans, 353 Punahou School, 92, 359, 361 Punchbowl, 38, 91, 230, 374 Purple Heart award, 46, 270-271, 372 "Purple Heart Battalion," 270-271 Puu Kolea, Molokai, hospital, 119

Q quarantine regulations, 337 Queen's Hospital, The, 30, 39, 41, 48, 63, 119, 339, 340 Queen's Own Regiment, The, 189 Oueen's Surf, 187

R racial unity, campaigns to promote, 143146 radar stations, 226 radar warning, December 7, 1-2

414 radio stations, 196-197 broadcast air raid alarms, 60 December 7, 9 - 1 0 illegal, 54 installations on Oahu, 226 programs for servicemen, 261 short wave, 142 see also, K G M B , K G U , K R H O , KSAI radio Tokyo, 196 Rainbow Club USO, 252 Raleigh, cruiser, 88 Ranger Combat Training School, 190 rationing, 303 agricultural machinery, 159 food, 151, 160-161 gas, 343-344 surgery, 341 rationing boards appointed, 303 Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 237 "Read a Book—Give a B o o k " campaign, 279 real estate boom, 332 records microfilmed, 93 reconnaissance American, 85, 89, 186 Japanese, 2, 60, 62 reconnaissance and demolition training, 191 Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 367 recreation centers, 259-262, 358 recruitment, 263-273 of nurses, 118 of WACs, 264 of warworkers, 243 Red Hill, 32, 39, 242 graves at, 121 underground fuel storage at, 228-229 workers, 40 Red Hill Camp, Veterans Housing, 332 Red Hill Weekly, newspaper, 241 red tape, 282 "Redhead, T h e , " pursuit plane, 361 referral program under labor controls, 313, 323 registration of civilians, 120, 358 Selective Service, 264-265 of unemployed, 310 of women, 306 rent control, 333-335 Rent Control Administration, 327-328 repairs after December 7 Army, 88 Navy, salvage, 88-89 Republican party, 174, 176 rescue work, December 7, 5 research by military in Hawaii, 193-194 rest camps, 200 restaurants, 39 under labor controls, 306 "Restoration Day," 175 Restorer, cableship, 287

INDEX Retailers for Defense Committee, 275 Rice, William Hyde, home, 231 Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., Jr., 97, 176, 178-180, 187 Richardson, Rear Adm. J . O., 260 Richardson Center, 260 roads, construction by military, 221-222 Roberts, Justice Owen J . , 87 Roberts Commission, 87, 173 "Rock, T h e " , 189, 246 rodent control, 338 Roi-Namur battle, 189, 191 Roosevelt, Mrs. Franklin D., 201 Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 35, 81, 146, 174, 187, 290 Rosenman, Samuel I., 187 Royal Hawaiian Band, 248 Royal Hawaiian Hotel, 259 Royal T. Frank, Army transport, 58 rubber drive, 279-280 rumors, 47-56 advance information to Japanese, 48 advertisements, 48 among aged Japanese, 364 ammunition possessed by Japanese, 53-54 arrows in canefields as signals, 51 beer garden party, 55 blockades in traffic, 51 canefires as signals, 55 commando troops, 53 enemy ships offshore, 53 epidemic among evacuees, 53 fifth column, 47 intoxication of military personnel, 50 Japanese fliers, 53 Japanese plantation workers, 52 Kimmel, Admiral Husband E., 50, 51 Midway Battle, 62 milk truck, 52 Navy officer murdered, 47 paratroops, 52, 60 radio sending sets, 54 Roosevelt visit, 187 saboteurs, 47-48 Short, General Walter C., 50, 51 water supply poisoned, 53 R u m o r Clinic, 50

s sabotage, 35, 39, 41, 47, 48, 85, 86, 97, 134, 135, 143 Sacred Hearts Convent emergency hospital, 118

Saddle Road, 222 Saint Clement's Church, 258 Saint Francis Hospital, 119, 339, 340 Saint Louis College, 198, 199 Saipan, 122, 187, 188, 189, 194, 197, 278, 376 salvage of ships, 88-89

INDEX Salvation Army, 37, 39, 57, 251, 278 girls' home, 77 mobile canteen, 32 sampans, Japanese, impounded by Navy, 132 Samuel Parker, ship, 263 San J o s e College football team, 33 Sand Island, 5, 41, 135, 223 Saratoga, carrier, 224, 365 "Save the Guava" campaigns, 341 Schofield Barracks, 2, 7, 8, 34, 50, 150, 369 cemetery, 32, 200 Schofield Hawaiian Department Replacement Depot, 226 Schofield training centers, 226 Schofield Station hospital, 198 schools, 40 affected by war, 358-362 cafeterias used, 33 evacuation centers, 32 first aid stations, 118 "scorched earth" plan, 93, 94 scrap drives, 279-280 Seabees, see U.S. Navy Construction Battalions Sears, Roebuck & Co., 283 2nd Marines, 122, 189, 190 securities safeguarded, 92-93 security controls, 131—146 censorship, 146-149 espionage, 131—133 internment, 134-141 protection of strategic installations, 149150 restriction of aliens, 141-146 security orders, OIS, 176 seeds, shortage of, 155 Seifert, Edwin R., 178-179 Selective Service, 71, 264, 265 self-employment under labor controls, 306 sentries, 7, 149 servicemen in Hawaii anxious to get home, 365 attitude toward Hawaii, 220 British, 220 Canadian, 220 hobbies of, 248-251 off-duty, 246-262 recreation, 251-262 servicewomen in Hawaii attitude toward Hawaii, 220 recreation, 257 7th Air Force, 62, 89, 223 77th Infantry (Statue of Liberty Division), 189 Seventh Day Adventists, Hawaiian Mission, 250 sex crimes, decrease in, 355 Shaw, destroyer, 88 Shingle Memorial Hospital, 199 Shintani, Mr. & Mrs. Ishimatsu, 44-46 Shintoism, 134, 351 shipping under wartime controls, 300-301

415 ships conversion to war effort, 286 damaged December 7, 2, 3, 5 repaired at Pearl Harbor, 224-225 salvage of, 88-89 sunk at sea, 58—59 Short, General Walter C„ 10, 38, 85, 86, 133, 149, 155, 281, 290 asks for martial law, 35, 36 assumes office of military governor, 10 on loyalty of Japanese, 83 opposes arrest of Japanese consular agents, 84 receives war warning, 85, 86 relieved of command, 88 urges passage of M-Day Bill, 80 urges preparedness, 73 "Should the Japanese be Allowed to Dominate Hawaii?" pamphlet, 140 Signal Corps, 142, 265, 283, 368 6th Infantry Division, 188 social changes after war, 375-378 social service agencies assist internees, 138, 140 Solace, hospital ship, 31 Solomons, 188 SPARs, 220, 365 "Speak English" campaign, 145, 362 Spreckelsville Beach, 58 Spurlock, Fred, 180 Stainback, Governor Ingram M., 174, 175 staggered work day, 346 staging areas, 63, 185-190, 223, 225, 226 Star-Bulletin, newspaper, see Honolulu StarBulletin Stars & Stripes, service newspaper, 261 state clubs, 258 statehood for Hawaii, 378 Statue of Liberty Division, 189 stevedoring under labor controls, 311, 313 Stevenson Intermediate School, 359 storage ammunition, 225, 229 currency, 230 food, 151-154 gas, 229 oil, 228-229 strikes, labor, 325-326, 378 Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, 225 submarines, Japanese, 1, 3, 5, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62 subsidy for food production, 67 subversive activity investigation of, 82 prevented by curfew and blackout, 112 see also rumors sugar, need for, 289 sugar plantations, see plantations sulfa drugs, 30 "supplemental" work, 306 surgery rationed, 341 surgical dressings, 200, 202 Surplus Property Office, 369

416

INDEX

surplus supplies, 355, 369-370 Swedish vice-consul, 138

T Taiyo Mara, ship, 84 Tantalus, Oahu, 62, 77 Tarawa, island, 186, 191, 198 Tatsuta Maru, ship, 84 taxes receipts from, 170 reduce fortunes, 376 territorial 2%, 243, 244 taxi regulations, 344, 345 teachers in war work, 359 Temperance League of Hawaii, 50 Tennessee, battleship, 2, 88 10th Army, 187, 188 Territorial Advisory Defense Council, 78, 79 territorial board of agriculture and forestry, 92, 151 Territorial Council on Veterans Affairs, 372 territorial emergency meat control, 164 Territorial Guard, 79, 89, 362 Territorial Hospital at Kaneohe, 31, 119, 199 Territorial Medical Association, 68 Territorial Motors, Ltd., 285 territorial public utilities commission, 345 territorial supreme court, 38, 244 Texas State Club, 258 Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., 55, 326 33rd Infantry Division, 188 38th Infantry Division, 188 tidal wave, 332, 364 Tinian, 187, 278 Tinker, Maj. Gen. Clarence, 186 Tired Fliers Program, 247, 248 Tokyo, 62, 63 Tokyo Rose, 55 Tradewinds, The, recreation center, 260 Trading with the Enemy Act, 143, 369 training amphibious, 190, 231 areas for, 185-190 of dogs, 192 jungle, 190-191, 220 of land troops, 185-190 of pack mules, 192 of pigeons, 192-193 reconnaissance and demolition, 191, 230 Red Cross, 78 of Seabees, 189 Trans-Pacific Travel Bureau, 300 trans-pacific travel control bureau, 108 transportation bus and rail, 345 for war workers, 366 inter-island, 66, 313, 346 to Mainland, 66, 346-348 Travel Control Bureau, 300, 346

Tripler General Hospital, 29, 30, 31, 198, 199, 339 Truman, President Harry S., 271 Turner Construction Co., 237 25th Infantry Division, 186, 188 24th Infantry Division, 188 27th Infantry Division, 188 232nd Combat Engineers Company, 269, 271 251st Coast Artillery (anti-aircraft) Regiment, 71 298th Infantry Regiment, 265-266 299th Infantry Regiment, 265-266 typhus fever, 338

u "Uncle Sam's Quarter H o u r , " 275 " U n d e r g r o u n d , " oil storage, 71, 228-229, 237 unemployed, registration of, 310 unions, 377-378 Unit Combat Training Center, 227 Unit J u n g l e Training Center, 191, 227 United Japanese Society, 76 United Nations Relief & Rehabilitation Administration, 369 "United Nations Review," 276 United Seamans Service, 257, 277 U.S. Armed Forces Institute, 261, 362 U.S. Army, 310, 311, 323, 324, 329, 330, 332, 346, 365, 368, 370 airfields Haleiwa emergency field, 4 Hickam Field, 2, 6, 8, 29, 34, 51, 52, 223, 242, 366 Kahuku Air Base, 226, 227 Kipapa Airfield, 157, 226 Mokuleia Airfield (Dillingham Air Force Base), 226 Schofield, 226 Wheeler Field, 1, 2, 4, 226, 229 air force 7th Air Force, 62, 89, 223 7th Fighter Wing, 188 Air Transport Command, 223 artillery 251st Coast Artillery (anti-aircraft) Regiment, 71 552nd Artillery Battalion, 269 Central Pacific Base Command, 185 Chemical Warfare Service, 116, 194 Engineers, 47, 91, 99,234-237, 281-283, 287, 310, 342-343 111th Engineer Battalion, 271 232nd Combat Engineers Company, 269, 271 1399th Engineer Construction Battalion, 265, 266, 267 hospitals North Sector, 62 147th General Hospital, 199

417

INDEX provisional hospitals, 198-199 Schofield, 198 Tripler General, 29, 30, 31, 198, 199, 339 installations on Oahu, 221-230 on other islands, 230-232 infantry 7th Army, 269 10th Army, 187, 188 6th Division, 188 24th Division, 188 25th Division, 186, 188 27th Division, 188 33rd Division, 188 38th Division, 188 40th Division, 188 77th Division, 189 81st Division, 189 92nd Division, 270 96th Division, 189 98th Division, 189 100th Battalion, 150, 265-272, 371 111th Army Ground Forces Band, 266 171st Battalion, 269 298th Regiment, 265-266 299th Regiment, 265-266 442nd Regimental Combat Team, 150, 265, 267, 269, 270, 371, 372 4339th Pack Troops, 192 4340th Pack Troops, 192 Library Service, 249 Medical Corps, 120 Ordnance Corps, 98 Port and Service Command, 92 Quartermaster Corps, 194 Signal Corps, 142, 265, 283, 368 Special Services, 255, 259-262 Transport Service, 108, 283 WACs, 96, 220, 264 U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 178, 181, 244 U.S. Department of Agriculture, 159 U.S. Department of Interior, 156,171,174, 312

U.S. Department of Justice, 74, 135, 180 U.S. District Court, 176 U.S. Employment Service, 305, 308, 323, 350, 351 U.S. Marine Corps, 122, 220, 221, 225, 231 air station, Ewa, 2, 21, 220, 225 Divisions 2nd, 122, 189, 190 4th, 122, 189, 190, 365 5th, 189, 190 women marines, 220, 365 U.S. Maritime Commission, 286 U.S. Navy, 70, 84, 87, 122, 131, 132, 146,191, 219, 222, 223, 228, 233, 243, 244, 261, 283, 306, 310, 311, 324, 329, 330, 332, 346, 348, 355,

174, 310, 223,

140, 234, 323, 365,

367, 370 air stations Barber's Point, 41, 52, 62, 225, 242 Ford Island, 2, 4, 10, 225, 365 Honolulu, 223 Kaneohe, 2, 4, 31, 164 Puunene, 230 Air Transport Service, 223 aviation supply depot, 225 Construction Battalions, CB's, Seabees, 189, 223, 238 demolition training station, 230 14th Naval District, 219, 276 hospitals, 197, 198, 202, 237 installations, 221 receiving barracks, 223, 332 Recreation and Morale Office, 259, 261 separation center, 365 supply center, 224 WAVEs, 190, 220, 365 U.S. State Department, 83, 197 U.S. Supreme Court, 178, 181, 244 U.S. War Department, 65, 85, 135, 139, 141, 174, 179, 180, 312 University of Hawaii, 32, 40, 193-194, 200, 306, 362 agricultural extension service, 73, 159, 191 experiment station, 67 Oriental Institute, 193 Press, 373 ROTC, 33 "Speak English" classes, 362 survey of working students, 308 War Research Laboratory, 194 USO, United Service Organizations, 145, 190, 202, 251-259, 277, 329, 365 USO Victory Club, 252 Utah, battleship, 88 utilities, public, 32, 68, 290, 299, 311

V vaccination of civilians, 336 Varsity Victory Volunteers, 150, 268 V-E Day, 363 Vegetable Peddlers Association, 275 venereal disease, 337, 354-355 Vestal, repair ship, 88 veterans, 332, 366, 371-373 Veterans' Advisors, 372 victory garden committee, 159 victory gardens, 115, 159, 195, 358 victory over Japan, 363-364 Victory Worker Plan, 310 V-J Day, 270, 364 V-mail stations, 285 vocational schools, 361 voting booths used as emergency housing, 330, 333

418

INDEX

w WACs, W o m e n ' s Army Corps, 96, 220, 264 Wahiawa, Oahu, 7, 34, 89, 229, 242 Wahiawa Community Association, 337 Wahiawa Elementary School, 118 Wahiawa General Hospital, 149, 340 Wahiawa Hospital Association, 119 Waiahole, Oahu, training camps, 228 Waialae Golf Club, recreation center, 259 Wat ale ale, ship, 287 Waialua, Oahu, 1, 7, 89, 157 Waialua hospital, 119 Waialua plantation USO, 253 Waianae, 7, 59 Waianae Amphibious Training Center, 190, 226 Waianae USO, 253 Waiawa Camp, veterans' housing, 332 Waiawa Gulch, aviation storage depot, 225 Waikakalaua Gulch, underground ammunition storage, 229 Waikapu, Maui, 119 Waikapu Hospital, 199 Wailua Park, Kauai, 231 Wailuku USO, 254 Waimanalo, Oahu, 4 Waimanalo Amphibious Training Center, 227 Waimanalo USO, 253 Waimano Home, 119 Waimea, Kauai, O C D hospital, 119 Waimea School, Kamuela, 360 Waimea USO, 253 Waipahu, Oahu, 7, 55, 242 Waipahu cemetery, 200 Waipahu plantation hospital, 31, 122 Wake Island, 186 " W a k e U p Washington" campaign, 329 War Assets Administration, 369 War Assistance Program, 138, 140 war bond sales in Hawaii, 274—276 War Claims Act, 143, 369 war damage civilian, 5-9, 10, 59 claims for, 367-368 military, 1 - 5 , 57-60 War Damage Corporation, 367, 368 War Food Administration, 152 War Labor Board, 314, 325 War Manpower Commission, 159, 264, 305, 306, 309, 312-314, 323-326, 340 War Materials Incorporated, 280 war memorials, 372-373

War Prisoners' Aid, 277 war production classes, 309 war relief groups, 276-279 War Relocation Authority, 139 War Shipping Administration, 284, 287 war workers, 233-245, 257-259, 306-307 War Workers' Coordinating Council, 242 War Workers Food Clinic, 242, 243 War Workers Service Bureau, 242 Ward, destroyer, 1 wardens, defense, 38, 63, 117 WARDS, W o m e n ' s Air Raid Defense group, 90, 220, 231 WASPs, W o m e n ' s Ambulance Service Patrol, 120, 220 water supply, 53, 336 waterfronts closed, 148 WAVCs, Women's Army Volunteer Corps, 96, 220 WAVEs, 190, 220, 365 Weaver Field, Oahu, 51 West Virginia, battleship, 2, 88, 89 Wheeler Field, 1, 2, 4, 226, 229 White, Harry E., 180, 181 Willamette University football team, 33 Willard Inn for officers, 259 William Allen White Committee, 276 Windward Oahu military installations, 227 Windward Transit, Ltd., 345 women marines, 220, 365 women's division, O C D , 117 Women's National Patriotic Organization, 372 Women's War Service Association, 350 " W o r k to W i n " campaign, 309-310 worker-loan plan, 310-311 World Fellowship Committee, 278

Y Yank, service newspaper, 261 Y M B A , Y o u n g M e n ' s Buddhist Association, 76, 142, 361 Y M C A , Y o u n g M e n ' s Christian Association, 145, 251, 258, 278, 361 Yorktown, carrier, 224 Y o u n g Brothers, Ltd., 284, 287 YWCA, Y o u n g W o m e n ' s Christian Association, 200, 251, 256, 257, 361

z Zimmerman, Hans, 177-178