Harper’s World: The Politicization of Canadian Foreign Policy, 2006-2015 9781487514587

Citation preview

HARPER’S WORLD The Politicization of Canadian Foreign Policy, 2006–2015 Edited by Peter McKenna

In examining the nuts and bolts of former prime minister Stephen Harper’s foreign policy universe between 2006 and 2015, Harper’s World turns to key foreign policy experts to break down and evaluate Harper’s international policies – from relations with China to his engagement with Canada’s Arctic region. In explaining both the what and the why of Harper’s foreign policy record, this book argues that the policy decisions of Harper’s Conservative government were primarily shaped and motivated by domestic, regional, and, most importantly, electoral calculations. Bringing together Canada’s leading foreign policy specialists, Harper’s World identifies the push and pull factors of Harper’s approach to various Canadian foreign policy issues. This collection offers original analyses, factual evidence, case studies, and supporting documentation to shed light on Harper’s foreign policy orientation during his almost ten years in power. PETER McKENNA is a professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.

This page intentionally left blank

HARPER’S WORLD The Politicization of Canadian Foreign Policy, 2006–2015

EDITED BY PETER McK ENNA

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London

© University of Toronto Press 2022 Toronto Buffalo London utorontopress.com Printed in the U.S.A. ISBN 978-1-4875-0210-2 (cloth) ISBN 978-1-4875-2178-3 (paper)

ISBN 978-1-4875-1459-4 (EPUB) ISBN 978-1-4875-1458-7 (PDF)

_____________________________________________________________________________ Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: Harper’s world : the politicization of Canadian foreign policy, 2006–2015 / edited by Peter McKenna. Names: McKenna, Peter, 1961– editor. Description: Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20210369019 | Canadiana (ebook) 2021036906X | ISBN 9781487502102 (cloth) | ISBN 9781487521783 (paper) | ISBN 9781487514594 (EPUB) | ISBN 9781487514587 (PDF) Subjects: LCSH: Harper, Stephen, 1959– | CSH: Canada – Foreign relations – 21st century. | CSH: Canada – Politics and government – 2006–2015. Classification: LCC FC650.H38 2022 | DDC 971.07/3 – dc23

_____________________________________________________________________ This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. We wish to acknowledge the land on which the University of Toronto Press operates. This land is the traditional territory of the Wendat, the Anishnaabeg, the Haudenosaunee, the Métis, and the Mississaugas of the Credit First Nation. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada and the Ontario Arts Council, an agency of the Government of Ontario, for its publishing activities.

Funded by the Financé par le Government gouvernement du Canada of Canada

For Mom

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

Preface  ix Acknowledgments  xiii Part I: Contextual Environment   1  Introduction: Stephen Harper and Canadian Foreign Policy  5 peter mckenna  2 Primat der Wahlurne: Ideology and Politicization in Harper’s Foreign Policy  24 kim richard nossal   3  Bullies, Busywork, and Bureaucrats: Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  41 peter mckenna Part II: Multilateral Perspectives   4  Stephen Harper’s Canada and the United Nations: A Tale Full of Sound and Fury?  77 alistair d. edgar   5  International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era  99 mark winfield and vanessa scanga   6  Learning the Hard Way: Harper, Canadian Defence Policy, and Combatting International Terror  124 jeffrey rice and stéfanie von hlatky

viii Contents

  7  Stephen Harper’s War in Afghanistan: Eagerly In, Cautiously Out 142 justin massie Part III: Bilateral and Regional Relationships   8  Stephen Harper and the Politics of Canada-US Relations  165 duane bratt   9  Trade in the Key of Blue: Canadian Economic Diplomacy in the Harper Years  189 asa mckercher 10  The Recasting of the Arctic Sovereignty Theme: Assessing Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy  211 andrea charron 11  Canada and the Americas: From Liberal to Conservative Internationalism 235 jean-philippe thérien, gordon mace, and hugo lavoie-deslongchamps 12  China Choices: The Harper Era and Its Legacy  256 paul evans 13  Stephen Harper: “To Russia with Love” 276 david carment with milana nikolko and katarina koleva 14  Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives: Interpreting a Radical Shift in Foreign Policy  295 shaun narine 15  The Harper Government and Sub-Saharan Africa: The End of Aspiration?  321 david r. black 16  Conclusion: Some Final Thoughts on Harper’s Politicized Foreign Policy  343 peter mckenna Contributors  363 Index  367

Preface

Former prime minister Stephen Harper, as a super-charged political animal, always intrigued me as an outside observer. For several years now, I have been wondering about the nexus between Harper’s foreign policy world and his obvious obsession with domestic political/electoral calculations and strategies. The more I thought about it, the more I started to think about the various connections and linkages between electoral politics and Harper’s specific foreign policy positions and actions. Was Harper crafting Canada’s international policy with an eye to how it played politically at home? Put another way: Was his foreign policy tantamount to domestic policy on steroids? And, more important, was he doing so to a degree that was qualitatively different from previous Canadian governments? This became the underlying analytical framework for this book – that is, identifying and explaining whether domestic political considerations were the overarching driver of Harper’s foreign policy outlook. As a student of mostly economics and fiscal matters, Stephen Harper was at a distinct disadvantage when it came to the intricacies of Canadian foreign policy. Having rarely travelled outside of Canada, he did not have a strong grasp of political geography, international diplomacy, and global security issues. As Canadian Press reporter Mike Blanchfield pointed out in his 2017 book on Harper and Justin Trudeau: “Prior to 2006, Harper showed little interest in international affairs. When he touched on the topic, his views were driven by one sacrosanct principle: creating a unified right wing that would unseat Liberals as the natural governing party of Canada.”1 For Harper, then, foreign policymaking was arguably less about the outside world and more about garnering domestic votes, winning federal elections, unifying his Conservative Party, and undercutting the federal Liberal Party of Canada. In a word or two, hard-nosed electoral politics – all the way, all the time. Now, Stephen Harper would not be the first Canadian prime minister to conduct foreign policy with a focus on electoral considerations and possible re-election prospects. Canadian political leaders, from Mackenzie King

x Preface

to Justin Trudeau, have all taken into account how a particular foreign policy decision might impact their electoral standing. But this book seeks to illustrate that political calculations were present in the Harper government’s formulation and implementation of Canadian foreign policy to an unprecedented degree. Indeed, it is my contention that the nature and scope of this “politicization” is what separates Harper’s foreign policy praxis from his prime ministerial predecessors. This book also examines what the impact of politicizing Canada’s external relations was, not only on the effectiveness and appropriateness of Canadian foreign policy, but on Canada’s actual standing in the world. The main purpose of this work, then, is to explore the nature and extent of domestic political calculations in the making of Stephen Harper’s overall foreign policy. To be fair, this book is also interested in examining the “nuts and bolts” of Harper’s panoply of foreign policy positions and actions. In fact, I asked each of the contributors to dissect one specific aspect of the Harper government’s foreign policy – such as his approach to multilateralism and the United Nations (UN), Africa, Latin America, China, and Israel – and to identify and explain the various policy drivers or “push and pull” factors that underpinned it. (Many of the authors, it is worth noting, challenged the effectiveness and outcomes of Harper’s foreign policy thinking and actions.) They were also asked to highlight the degree to which electoral politics factored into these specific foreign policy issue-areas and decisions. (It is true that political calculations were not always the principal driving force behind some of Harper’s foreign policy choices and actions, but they were clearly a factor in virtually every case.) There was, however, no request for contributors to embrace a particular theoretical model, an anti-Harper bias, or even a specific ideological framework of analysis. My overarching aim was simply to pull together a collection of essays by a group of experts – some relatively new and some not so new to the field of Canadian foreign policy – who could provide a comprehensive explanatory account of the “what” and “why” of Harper’s foreign policy world. With its emphasis on the politicization of Canada’s international policy, this book fits nicely into the growing literature on Harper’s foreign policy record.2 Having said that, it has a very different focus than its most obvious ­comparator  – the robust Chapnick and Kukucha collection, The Harper Era. That collection examined the extent to which the transition from a minority government to a majority one in May 2011 shaped Harper’s view of the world and his foreign policy posture.3 Put another way, it considered whether the possibility of a parliamentary defeat at any time would impact the contours and the compromises involved in Harper’s foreign policy outlook. Chapnick and Kukucha actually concluded that the tone and direction of Canadian foreign policy under Harper changed very little after he secured his parliamentary majority in 2011. There is no attempt in this book, however, to use the issue of minority



Preface xi

or majority government status as an analytical framework for grappling with Harper’s international policy. Instead, the analytical focus here is on dissecting Harper’s approach to foreign policy and determining whether or not electoral considerations were a major and consistent explanatory variable. The structuring of the book involved a more painful journey than I had initially anticipated. The ordering of the line-up for any edited collection is always subject to last minute changes and constant second-guessing. But the plan was to start with an introductory chapter that identified what the central foreign policy issues were for the Harper Conservatives through a culling and crystalizing of various political documents, speeches, and party statements, and to then include two other chapters that set the broader contextual environment of the work. Part II is intended to take a big picture approach to Harper’s foreign policy, concentrating on a wider multilateral focus – taking into account the UN, climate change, international security policy, and Harper’s involvement in the War in Afghanistan. The narrative then moves from the broader context to more specific bilateral and regional relationships (including Canada-US relations, relations with Russia, and Harper’s Arctic foreign policy) and the key question of Harper’s trade liberalization policies. Each of these individual chapters are meant to be analytically open-ended and not bound by any strict explanatory mandate  – other than to highlight whether and to what extent political factors played a role in defining the Harper government’s foreign policy direction. While it is near impossible to include every angle and aspect of Harper’s foreign policy posture given space constraints, Harper’s World seeks to concentrate on the most significant themes and issues that enveloped his governments (both minority and majority). The core aim here was for the contributors to be as analytically rigorous as possible. Lastly, the book concludes with a general discussion of what the implications were of Harper’s politicized foreign policy and how it impacted Canada’s place in the world. As one would expect from a diverse group of scholars, there is no one model or theoretical perspective that connects the various chapters into a single tapestry – which I view as an actual strength of the overall work. The objective, then, is not to break new theoretical ground in the study of Canadian foreign policy. Rather, the most important intellectual challenge was to provide greater insight and understanding into Harper’s foreign policy mindset; to identify key political actors, opinion-makers, and electoral factors; and to present an analysis, sometimes critical, of the major policy drivers or determinants of the Harper government’s foreign policy universe. The task for each of the contributors was to untangle the underlying rationale for Harper’s various foreign policy decisions, tendencies and choices. It is my hope that the resulting volume will provide readers with an analytically enriched way of grasping Harper’s view of the world and what specifically was shaping it.

xii Preface NOTES 1 Mike Blanchfield, Swingback: Getting Along in the World with Harper and Trudeau (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017), 31. Also see J.P. Lewis and Joanna Everitt, eds., The Blueprint: Conservative Parties and Their Impact on Canadian Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017). 2 See, for example, Blanchfield, Swingback; Jennifer Ditchburn and Graham Fox, eds., The Harper Factor: Assessing a Prime Minister’s Policy Legacy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016). 3 Adam Chapnick and Christopher Kukucha, eds., The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada’s Global Posture (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 3–21.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all those associated with this manuscript at the University of Toronto Press, particularly Daniel Quinlan, for championing this project from the very beginning. The copy editors also merit considerable credit for improving the overall style and presentation of the work. Of course, any errors of commission or omission rest entirely with myself. Each of the contributors deserves high praise and thanks for responding positively and patiently to my many follow-up emails. Both David Black and Kim Richard Nossal were especially generous with their time, support, and kind words of encouragement. A special note of gratitude to my colleagues, friends, and students at the University of Prince Edward Island (UPEI), who have provided me with a terrific working environment. Lastly, but certainly not least, I would like to acknowledge my family for their unwavering love and support. Without them, I would not be able to do the kind of work that I enjoy so much.

This page intentionally left blank

HARPER’S WORLD

This page intentionally left blank

PART I Contextual Environment

This page intentionally left blank

1 Introduction: Stephen Harper and Canadian Foreign Policy peter mckenna

By the time that he took over as leader of the united Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) in 2004, Stephen Harper’s weakest area of public policy was in the realm of international affairs.1 Harper really had only scant knowledge of Canada’s core foreign policy interests and issues, had very little understanding of the key drivers of Canada’s external policy, and was woefully unprepared to chart a radically new direction when it came to Canada’s place in the world. Still, we are able to glean from various Conservative Party platforms, Throne Speeches, Harper’s addresses to party policy conventions, and sundry foreign policy documents a sense of where (and why) the Harper Conservatives wanted to take Canada in terms of its external relations. There is no better source than hearing and seeing it in Harper’s own words – particularly given his unflinching control of both the party and governmental structures. He obviously had an enormous impact on determining the direction and details of Canadian foreign policy during his tenure in office. He was, in many ways, the Conservative government’s only real foreign affairs minister. By examining these highly politicized documents and statements in terms of their foreign policy content, the purpose of this introductory chapter  is essentially threefold: First, to highlight the fact that Harper and his government focused on a relatively small number of core ideas around international affairs – such as an interest-based foreign policy, a sceptical approach to the value of multilateralism, a beefed up Canadian military, expanding free trade, and strengthening relations with key Western allies like the US, the UK, and Australia. Second, to illustrate how all of these official and semi-official pronouncements confirmed the persistence of these foreign policy themes over Harper’s time in office (and, thus, why they are taken up as individual chapters in this collection). Third, and arguably more important, those utterings in clearly political documents are consistent with the “politicized” nature of Harper’s overall international policy thrust. Indeed, Harper’s many references to foreign policy oftentimes had a very specific political message for

6  Peter McKenna

Canadians, and especially for his core conservative base of partisans and fellow travellers. Duane Bratt argues that the roots of Harper’s foreign policy agenda can actually be traced back to the earlier Reform Party proposals (or so-called Blue Books) from the 1980s and 1990s.2 The legacy of the Reform Party, then, goes some way towards explaining the nature and extent of Harper’s foreign policy universe. Several, though certainly not all, of these Reform Party policy recommendations (as well as those from a bevy of high-ranking party members) would eventually influence the Harper government’s thinking on foreign relations or international policy. (The fact that Harper did not embrace enthusiastically all of the thirty-plus policy recommendations contained in the Blue Books does raise some questions about how influential these initial ideas were when Harper assumed office in 2006.) On much of the content in the early Blue Books, it is worth noting, it was Harper himself who held the pen. Over the years, the Reform Blue Books included a number of policy suggestions on a wide variety of foreign policy priorities and objectives – many of them on matters of immigration. From the beginning in 1988, the populist party raised concerns about Canadian values and interests being sacrificed on the altar of aligning Canada with the often wrong-headed views of other foreign governments. There was also a sharp focus on democracy, human rights (moral precepts), and free markets, reviewing Canada’s participation in international institutions, and the aggressive pursuit of free trade pacts and foreign investment protection agreements. Additionally, the Blue Books singled out increased spending for Canada’s military, support for both NORAD and NATO and the deployment of Canadian military personnel to international stabilization missions. In terms of Official Development Assistance (ODA), the Reform Party documents called for a reduction in foreign aid, a restructuring of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the tying of aid and the termination of development assistance to countries with poor human rights records.3 According to Bratt, the Harper Conservatives basically “implemented half of the Reform Party Blue Book recommendations on Canadian foreign policy.”4 Similarly, just prior to assuming the leadership of the Conservative Party, Stephen Harper spoke to the Civitas group (a private conservative-minded club) in April 2003 about his thoughts on what a decidedly conservative policy agenda should look like. More specifically, he talked about the need to rediscover the conservatism of Edmund Burke because he felt that the emerging debates around global affairs would be fought largely on moral grounds. In his Toronto speech entitled “Rediscovering the Right Agenda,” he highlighted the following: “I have written many times that the Reform Party and Canadian Alliance made gains in the past by taking principled conservative stands on the issues of the day.”5 He went on to say: “We understand that the great geopolitical

Introduction: Stephen Harper and Canadian Foreign Policy  7

battles against modern tyrants and threats are battles over values.” And as far as he was concerned, “Conservatives must take the moral stand, with our allies, in favour of the fundamental values of our society, including democracy, free enterprise and individual freedom.” In his concluding remarks, Harper stated pointedly: “This moral stand should not just give us the right to stand with our allies, but the duty to do so and the responsibility to put ‘hard power’ behind our international commitments.” Still, the Conservative Party’s 2004 federal election platform publication, Demanding Better, was noticeable for its lack of any overarching strategic vision or organizing principle for the conduct of Canadian foreign policy.6 In the section on “Demand Better Security,” which mostly focused on law and order and deportation issues, the party blueprint clearly noted: “With the threat of international terrorism, and with criminals and terrorists able to operate across borders with the click of a mouse, Canadians realize we may pay a high price for our lack of security and preparedness both at home and abroad.” It then moved on to call for building “a more constructive partnership with our major allies and trading partners and enhancing the North American trade relationship.” To that end, the critical Canada-US relationship was specifically singled out for special attention – especially the need to disagree with Washington on issues without being disagreeable at the same time. When it came to relations with our superpower neighbour, the platform pointed out: “We should have a stronger relationship with the US to deal with issues like the increasingly protectionist stance of US trade policy, border security, and the war on terrorism.” Accordingly, the Conservative Party plan was to develop a “strategic partnership” with the US to help resolve any outstanding trade and security issues between the two countries. In addition, the document called for the position of Canadian Ambassador to the United States to be elevated to cabinet-level rank, to establish a new Secretary of State for CanadaUS relations, and, lastly, to enhance “our NAFTA relationship with the United States by moving towards harmonized tariffs, eliminating rules of origin, and moving beyond trade to pursue enhanced common labour, environmental, and security standards.” Significantly, the Harper Conservatives would return to this theme of “perimeter security” and increased “harmonization” with the US in the 2008–11 period. The policy manifesto also reminded Canadians that our men and women in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) needed sufficient equipment and support (in places like Afghanistan) “to do the difficult and demanding work we ask of them.” Besides our inability to assert Canada’s sovereignty over the Far North, the document highlighted our responsibility to “contribute to our own defence and the defence of our allies,” to confront head-on the lack of proper defence spending in Canada and to provide the Canadian military with new equipment and increases in Regular Force and reserve personnel levels. In fact,

8  Peter McKenna

the Conservative Party’s plan clearly stipulated that, if it formed the government in 2004, it would inject “an immediate $1.2 billion per year into the military for equipment replacement, with a longer-term goal of moving toward the NATO European average as a percentage of GDP. ” Consequently, a Conservative government would also enhance the Army and “regenerate” the Air Force “through upgrades to the CF-18 fleet, new tactical and heavy-lift aircraft, and new maritime helicopters with enhanced multi-mission capabilities.” Backing members of the CAF (along with the monarchy), oftentimes with words rather than actual deeds, would be a very popular idea in Conservative Party circles during the Harper era. Curiously, the Demanding Better blueprint mentioned opaquely the need to implement “a made in Canada foreign policy.” Chastising the federal Liberals, and looking to clearly differentiate themselves from them, the document championed stronger Canadian leadership in global affairs and a changing world. It went on to explain: “We must clearly articulate our core values: democracy and the rule of law, individual freedom and human rights, free markets and free trade, and compassion for the less fortunate.” In terms of foreign aid, the platform recommended supporting “international development policies that will alleviate poverty, disease, and pollution and improve the status of women and children.” As for the Conservative Party’s action plan, it made two key pledges: “We will work closely with international organizations such as the United Nations and in concert with our most important allies, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and NATO countries, to address international security threats from terrorism or rogue states.” Second, it referenced the following: “We will build on key regional relationships: trade and investment within NAFTA, the Asia-Pacific, and the Americas; support for trade and development in Africa, emphasizing free markets and the rule of law.” This decidedly economic focus would become a defining characteristic of Stephen Harper’s foreign policy outlook through his entire time in office. Similarly, the party’s 2006 election platform publication, Stand up for Canada, talked about restoring pride in Canada and its place in the world. In what would become a common refrain among the Harper Conservatives after winning the federal election, the document argued that “Liberal foreign policy has compromised democratic principles to appease dictators, sometimes for the sake of narrow business interests.”7 It went on to add: “We need to ensure that Canada’s foreign policy reflects true Canadian values and advances Canada’s national interests.” Like its 2004 campaign booklet, the 2006 version committed a Conservative government to articulating Canada’s “core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, free markets, and free trade – and compassion for the less fortunate – on the international stage.” Also given pride of place was the party’s “Canada First” security-defence strategy, which called for strengthening “Canada’s independent capacity, at the national, continental,

Introduction: Stephen Harper and Canadian Foreign Policy  9

hemispheric and global levels.” And in another sign of what was to come from an empowered Harper government, the Conservative Party stressed the need to increase “the Canadian Forces’ capacity to protect Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and security.” Last, and certainly not least, the platform committed the party to explore free trade negotiations with Asia-Pacific countries, the Americas and India and “to strengthen rules-based trading arrangements, and expand free and fair markets access, at the national, continental, hemispheric and global levels.” The concept of free trade would thus be at the centre of any Harper government’s articulation of its core foreign policy interests and aims. When the new Conservative government delivered its first Throne Speech in April 2006, the Governor General stated unequivocally: “Canada’s voice in the world must be supported by action, both at home and abroad.”8 Advancing Canada’s interests and defending the country’s sovereignty, the speech highlighted, would require the government to work cooperatively with our friends and allies and constructively with the international community as a whole. At the top of that list, of course, was the United States – Canada’s closest friend, security partner, and best customer. And the Harper government let it be known that it wanted to carve out a more robust role for Canada on the world stage, a stronger Armed Forces and a more effective development assistance program. With respect to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, the Throne Speech was succinct: “The dedicated Canadians in Afghanistan deserve all of our support as they risk their lives to defend our national interests, combat global terrorism and help the Afghan people make a new start as a free, democratic and peaceful country.” The government’s support for the dangerous Afghan mission would remain steadfast until the late 2010 decision to gradually reduce to zero by 2014 Canada’s combat contribution to the operation. The Harperites followed up with another Speech from the Throne in October of 2007 – where foreign policy matters were given more prominence. Specifically, the speech referred to Canada as a northern nation and pledged to build a “world-class Arctic research station,” to complete the mapping of Canada’s Arctic seabed, to construct new Arctic patrol ships and to expand aerial surveillance (along with enhancing the capabilities of the Canadian Rangers) and to continue improving living conditions in the North.9 As the Throne Speech intoned: “Defending our sovereignty in the North also demands that we maintain the capacity to act.” Under the rubric of strengthening Canada’s sovereignty and place in the world, it went on to promise: “Our government will bring forward an integrated northern strategy focused on strengthening Canada’s sovereignty, protecting our environmental heritage, promoting economic and social development, and improving and devolving governance, so that northerners have greater control over their destinies.” Though a central foreign policy plank for the Conservatives, enthusiasm for the North would actually ebb and flow over its almost ten years in government.

10  Peter McKenna

Focusing on action rather than words, the speech also emphasized the importance of Canada making “common cause with those fighting for the values we uphold.” With respect to Afghanistan specifically, the Conservative government stood firmly: “Canada has joined the United Nations-sanctioned mission in Afghanistan because it is noble and necessary. Canadians understand that development and security go hand in hand. Without security, there can be no humanitarian aid, no reconstruction and no democratic development.” Another key foreign policy priority mentioned in the document was relations with Latin America and the Caribbean –particularly on the trade front. In terms of specific countries in the region, the speech set out a rather broad agenda: “The Canadian model of constitutional democracy and economic openness combined with social safety nets, equitable wealth creation and sharing across regions has much to offer those countries struggling to build a better future.” Additionally, the tiny and impoverished French-speaking country of Haiti was singled out in the speech for special attention from a security, developmental, democratic, and humanitarian standpoint. The warm embrace of Latin America in 2007 – as opposed to the traditional focus on Africa by the federal Liberals – would eventually manifest itself into an often criticized “Americas Strategy.” Not surprisingly, the 2008 federal election platform reconfirmed many of the Conservative Party’s core foreign policy priorities and goals. Under the banner of “A Strong, United, Independent and Free Canada,” the manifesto stated boldly: “We have started to rebuild our national defence and to play a bigger role on the world stage.”10 As for the country’s northern reaches, it went on to reconfirm: “A re-elected Conservative Government led by Stephen Harper will continue, as a major priority, to protect the sovereignty and promote the development of Canada’s Arctic and North.” In addition, mention was made of the Canada First Defence Strategy and investing somewhere between $45 billion and $50 billion in equipment purchases for Canada’s military over the next twenty years. On the sensitive topic of climate change, though, the platform simply reiterated its earlier commitment: “A re-elected Conservative Government led by Stephen Harper will implement our Turning the Corner action plan to reduce Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions in absolute terms by 20 per cent over 2006 levels by 2020.” As the evidence has shown, the Harper government’s commitment to combatting global climate change was less about action and more about meaningless plans and talking points. After the 2008 federal election, Prime Minister Harper addressed the midNovember 2008 party convention in Winnipeg, where he spoke only briefly to the gathered party faithful about his foreign policy agenda. Yet, he did go out of his way to reassert curtly: “A belief in a foreign policy that is both strong and independent.”11 And on the oft-heard topic of values and principles, Harper made it very clear: “We have revived our country’s reputation as not just believing in freedom and democracy, but having the will and capability of acting to

Introduction: Stephen Harper and Canadian Foreign Policy  11

defend these values on the world stage.” In addition, and amid an ominous global financial crisis, he once again spoke to his party’s embrace of free enterprise, free markets, and free trade, to strong support for rebuilding Canada’s “long-neglected” Armed Forces and to an unwavering commitment to asserting Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic. To loud applause, he said bluntly: “We put the world on notice that this country will vigorously assert its sovereignty over our Arctic.” Not surprisingly, this was a recurring theme for the Harper Conservatives up until 2015. The Harper Conservatives delivered another Throne Speech less than a week later, but this time with very little foreign policy content. The speech did make clear that Canada’s security was intimately connected to global security and emerging hot spots around the world. “Our government believes that Canada’s aspirations for a better and more secure world must be matched by vigorous and concrete actions on the world stage,” it said pointedly.12 As for trade enhancement in a financially turbulent world, the document shone a spotlight on the importance of free trade in particular. “Our government is committed to seeking out new opportunities for Canadians and to promoting global prosperity through free trade  … New trade agreements will be pursued in Asia and the Americas, as well as within the European Union, to open markets for Canadian firms.” Finally, there was also reference to Canada possibly ending its combat mission in Afghanistan in 2011, to the rebuilding and rearming of the Canadian military, to increased funding and efficiencies in Canada’s overseas aid budget, and to continuing “its realistic, responsible approach to addressing the challenge of climate change.” Similarly, and in the face of a challenging global economic climate in 2008–9, the Harper government’s fourth Speech from the Throne in early March 2010 accorded just a few paragraphs to matters of international affairs.13 But it did restate a favourite Conservative Party mantra: “We are a country that stands up for what is right in the world. Canadians want their government to do what is right, not what is popular.”14 In terms of its endorsement of rebuilding the Canadian military, upholding Arctic sovereignty and the controversial Afghan mission, the government was steadfast: “In Afghanistan, the Canadian forces prepare for the end of the military mission in 2011 with the knowledge that – through great sacrifice and with great distinction  – their efforts saved Kandahar province from falling back under Taliban control.” Furthermore, emphasis was placed once again on securing free trade pacts around the world: “Given the disappointing results of the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations and the rapidly evolving global marketplace, our Government will aggressively diversify opportunities for Canadian business through bilateral trade agreements.” And when it came to global warming, the speech carefully noted: “Nowhere is a commitment to principled policy, backed by action, needed more than in addressing climate

12  Peter McKenna

change … And it [the government] has pursued a balanced approach to emissions reduction that recognizes the importance of greening the economy for tomorrow and protecting jobs today.” Lastly, the Harper government raised the issue of health care in the developing world for the first time: “Through our leadership this year of the North American, G8 and G20 summits, our Government will advocate greater investment in maternal and child health in developing countries.” This central aim would be touted proudly by Harper himself and the Conservative government until the end of its days in office in late 2015. Interestingly, the Conservative Party platform publication, Here for Canada, for the May 2011 federal election contained a fair amount of material of a foreign policy nature. It started off by declaring forcefully: “We’re supporting our men and women in uniform by providing the equipment they need to do their jobs.”15 The document then went on to mention the party’s commitment to follow through with the F-35 fighter jet procurement, to concentrate on post-combat initiatives in Afghanistan, and to create a new Office of Religious Freedom in the Foreign Affairs Department. There were also references to negotiating free trade deals with the European Union (EU) and India, pressing world leaders to meet their commitments to improving the health of women and children in the developing world, and to investing in enhancing Canada-US border measures. Additionally, the Harper Conservatives recommitted themselves to constructing new Arctic patrol vessels, to begin planning for a new polar-class icebreaker (to be named John G. Diefenbaker), and to improving job opportunities in the North. As the platform itself stressed: “We’re defending our national sovereignty, and standing up for our history and its traditions.” Following his election victory (and a sizeable majority government), Prime Minister Harper delivered a Throne Speech in early June in which he returned to some familiar foreign policy themes around Canadian values and interests. “In an uncertain global environment, our Government will also continue to pursue a stable, principled foreign policy that advances Canada’s interests,” he stated plainly.16 The issue of trade promotion was also once again front and centre for the governing Conservatives: “Since 2006, we have signed free trade agreements covering eight countries, and negotiations covering some fifty more are underway.” In addition, the topic of border security with the US, regulatory cooperation, and the free flow of goods and citizens between the two countries was given prominence. As the speech explained: “Our Government will work with President Obama and his administration to deliver on the Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness.” Further mention was made of the Canadian military protecting citizens in Libya, the creation of an Office for Religious Freedom and the protection of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. There was no reference, however, to Canada meeting its international commitments to tackling anthropogenic climate change.

Introduction: Stephen Harper and Canadian Foreign Policy  13

A week later, Stephen Harper pulled no punches when he addressed a boisterous crowd at the Conservative Party’s policy convention in Ottawa. He told the assembled members that Canada will continue to make a meaningful contribution in the world, to defend our national sovereignty, and to protect the country’s interests abroad. He talked once again about defending the Arctic, looking after Canada’s veterans and the central role of the military in Afghanistan. To that end, he made particular reference to how his government had “reequipped the Canadian forces with the tools they need,” singled out the military as a “courageous warrior” and treated its members “with the respect that they deserve.”17 And in a series of lines that the Harperites would repeat often, the prime minister said proudly: “Canada won’t just go along to get along with everyone else’s agenda.” He then went on to add: “We know where our interests lie, and who are friends are” and, make no mistake, Canada’s purpose “is no longer to please every dictator at the United Nations.” That choice of phraseology would turn out to be a tremendous source of frustration and resentment for many professional diplomats within Canada’s Foreign Service. Similarly, in his forty-minute speech to the late October 2013 party policy convention in Calgary, Harper again boasted about the re-equipping of the Canadian military, the government’s Northern Strategy, and the recently concluded free trade deal with the European Union.18 “With the completion of this agreement, our government has expanded the number of countries with which Canada will have free trade agreements from five to forty-two. Canada will now have free trade access to over one billion consumers or over half of the global marketplace.”19 And in a restating of long-standing Harper policy, he remarked forcefully: “We will always put Canada first, whether that is supporting the men and women who wear the uniform of the Canadian Armed Forces today, or have done so in the past; whether that means asserting our sovereignty over our entire land mass of this vast, beautiful country. And that means standing up whether it is popular or not in foreign capitals; standing up for Canadian interests and Canadian values on the world stage.” With respect to the environment and climate change, though, Harper was careful to explain: “In this party we will not accept that environmental protection must stop economic development; we must have both.” In his last Speech from the Throne in mid-October 2013, Harper highlighted his government’s foreign policy successes in terms of free trade agreements, the “Beyond the Border” pact with the US, its Northern Strategy, and supporting Canada’s military. “After a decade of darkness, our Government has been living up to our promise to give the Canadian military the tools it needs to get the job done. Soldier for soldier, sailor for sailor, airman to airman, the Canadian Armed Forces are once again the best in the world.”20 In terms of Canadian values, the document did not mince words: “Canada stands for what is right and good in the world … Canada seeks a world where freedom – including freedom

14  Peter McKenna

of religion, the rule of law, democracy and human dignity are respected.” Added to that was the well-worn phrase: “Canada does not go along to get along. Our Government defends Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, the lone outpost of freedom and democracy in a dangerous region. And our Government stands opposed to those regimes that threaten their neighbours, slaughter their citizens, and imperil freedom.” His steadfast support for Israel (along with his entire Mid-East policy thrust) – even in the face of public criticism and pushback from within Foreign Affairs – was a policy position that Harper would rarely depart from. Lastly, and on one of his signature foreign policy initiatives, Harper was unwavering: “Canadians also know that free and healthy societies require the full participation of women. Canada has taken a leadership role in addressing the health challenges facing women, infants and children in the world’s poorest countries. These efforts are saving millions of lives.” In the October 2015 federal election, the Conservative Party campaign publication (totalling almost 160 pages), Protect Our Economy, returned to many of Harper’s long-standing foreign policy themes. It touted his government’s negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) trade agreement and a host of other free trade pacts, its Northern Strategy (and Arctic sovereignty), and anti-terrorism agenda (including against the Islamic State) and its heavy investment in re-equipping the Canadian Armed Forces. True to form, the campaign platform reiterated the centrality of a “principled foreign policy,” defending Canada’s core interests abroad and standing up for what is right (and not always politically popular in international forums). As the platform boasted: “Prime Minister Stephen Harper has been a leader on a wide range of global issues including standing up for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, defending Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state and to defend itself, and speaking out against the persecution of religious minorities and women and girls around the world.”21 The document then went on to say: “Canada has been a leader in improving maternal, newborn and child health, and protecting women and girls is a key component of our foreign development goals.” Lastly, on the pressing subject of climate change, the policy manifesto stated nonchalantly: “The solution to the climate change challenge must come from innovation, not ­deprivation  – through technology and Canadian ingenuity, not by closing down our vital natural resources industries or imposing job-killing carbon taxes.” Clearly, the Harper Conservatives were not about to radically change course on saving the environment and stabilizing the climate just because it was 2015. After his 2015 election loss, former prime minister Stephen Harper spoke, for the last time, at the party’s May 2016 policy convention in Vancouver. In terms of its foreign policy content, Harper stayed close to his former government’s familiar talking points. “We are the party that knows as well, friends, that this country, with all that it has, this bastion of freedom and human dignity, even

Introduction: Stephen Harper and Canadian Foreign Policy  15

if it means you cannot be all things to all people, this country must stand for something in the world,” he said pointedly.22 He also talked about his government’s efforts to rebuild the military and “to expand Canada’s global free trade access.” (Curiously, there was no mention of Arctic sovereignty and Northern development, maternal and child health in the developing world, global climate change, or words like “not going along to get along” in his speech.) Once again, though, Harper was steadfast in saying that we were able “to stand up as a country and take principled positions in a dangerous world.” In many ways, that reference to a principled approach – which had clear electoral undertones for the Conservative base – was a constant theme of the Harper government’s foreign policy discourse. When you look at the totality of these key political speeches, platforms, and formal documents, a number of recurring themes and generalizations become apparent. Of course, the first is the very politicized nature of the foreign policy issues that were consistently espoused by Harper – so as to strike a responsive chord among Canadians in general, to differentiate electorally the Conservatives from previous Liberal governments, to provide red meat to the party’s base of supporters, and to tailor a message that would attract key political constituencies (swing voters and soft Liberals) in various regions of the country. Second, it seems clear from the actual placement of content (typically towards the end of speeches) on Canada’s role in the world, the lack of intellectual grounding/evolution, and the repetitiveness of the issues that foreign policy matters were not at or near the core of Stephen Harper’s policy priorities – unless they had import for re-election purposes and undermining the federal Liberal Party brand. In some ways, this was all tantamount to a campaign strategy by foreign policy-making. Perhaps that goes some way towards explaining why the Harper Conservatives, unlike previous Canadian governments, did not conduct a formal, wide-ranging and publicly engaged foreign policy review over its almost ten years in office. (And because of a rather short list of core foreign policy aims that dominated the Conservative government thinking, a lot of other foreign policy business seemed to fall through the cracks or generate very little official interest.) Third, the one overarching theme was its constant referencing of principles, values, and core national interests. This, in turn, was frequently manifested in the phrasing that “Canada won’t just go along to get along” with every dictator at the United Nations. Obviously, this morally couched language was specifically chosen to target (and court) core conservative-minded supporters and partisans – and to ostensibly keep them firmly ensconced in the party fold. Fourth, the obvious consistency of the priorities over his tenure in office stands out: free trade (especially in the Americas, Europe, and Asia-Pacific), strengthening Canada’s Armed Forces, defending Arctic sovereignty, and maternal and child health. In light of these key foreign policy priorities, the contributors to this book will tackle each of them separately and thoughtfully. It is my hope

16  Peter McKenna

that, taken together, this collection will stand as a vital resource in better understanding and explaining the Harper government’s foreign policy universe and its politicized nature. What Lies Ahead Interestingly, notwithstanding their emphasis on ensuring values and principles, the Harper Conservatives’ approach to foreign policy while they were in opposition proved to be an entirely inaccurate guide to how the Conservative government would actually behave in foreign policy (as in other policy spheres)23 after it assumed office in February 2006. Even before he became prime minister, Harper had already changed his earlier support for the US-led invasion of Iraq. Likewise, within weeks of taking office, he quietly backed away from his promise to reopen the matter of participating in the controversial ballistic missile defence scheme.24 The ruling Conservatives, it turned out, were often less ideological than they appeared, more pragmatic, and more likely to privilege electoral calculations over ideological purity. These patterns are clearly reflected in the twelve detailed case studies presented in this book. Contextually speaking, there is one other factor that we must consider in seeking to account for the record of the Harper Conservatives in foreign policy: that is, the way that the government treated its foreign policy bureaucracy. Like all foreign ministries, Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Development (DFAID), as it was known from 2013–15, plays a crucial role in the shaping of foreign policy. Newly elected governments in Ottawa normally discover that the expertise and the institutional memory of the officers who serve in the Lester B. Pearson Building on Sussex Drive and in Canadian embassies, high commissions, and consulates around the world are a critical resource for pursuing Canadian global interests. Even prime ministers who might have come to power feeling sceptical about the foreign policy bureaucracy eventually came to appreciate how important the expertise in the foreign affairs department was for the crafting of thoughtful international policy for Canada. John G. Diefenbaker, the Progressive Conservative prime minister from 1957 to 1963; Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Liberal prime minister from 1968 to 1984; and Brian Mulroney, Progressive Conservative prime minister from 1984 to 1993, all came to the Prime Minister’s Office with deep reservations about the role and influence of the Department of External Affairs (as it was called before 1989). But in their years in power, Diefenbaker, Trudeau, and Mulroney all came to recognize the vital role of the foreign ministry. Stephen Harper took office in February 2006 as sceptical about the foreign affairs bureaucracy as Diefenbaker, Trudeau, and Mulroney had been. But over his nine years in office, that initial scepticism never really dissipated. On

Introduction: Stephen Harper and Canadian Foreign Policy  17

the contrary, as Peter McKenna demonstrates in chapter 3, the foreign affairs bureaucracy was openly denigrated by the prime minister and purposely distanced from the policy process. As he concludes, it was “a dark, nasty and mean-spirited period” in Canadian foreign policy, but one that had an important, enduring, and indeed negative, overall effect on policy-making. McKenna’s exploration of the way that the foreign affairs bureaucracy in Ottawa was treated by the Conservative government also captures nicely its politicized nature, the heavy influence of political staffers, and how many foreign policy officials were deeply uncomfortable with this politicization of Canadian foreign policy under Harper. Accordingly, Alistair Edgar in chapter 4, looking at the policies of the Harper government towards the United Nations, argues that the “principled” foreign policy pursued by the Conservatives reflected little more than an effort to advance a domestic political and economic agenda intended to consolidate the position of the federal Conservative Party. To be sure, the Harper government’s railing against international elites and multilateral institutions had a certain cache for one of its key constituencies – namely, rural voters in Canada. Likewise, in their examination of the Harper government’s approach to global climate change in chapter 5, Mark Winfield and Vanessa Scanga show that the Conservative policies were not so much driven by a consistent ideological approach as by considerations of domestic electoral gain. The fact that the Harper government simply hitched Canada’s policies on climate change to those of the administration of Barack Obama in the United States clearly revealed this: still, given Obama’s popularity in Canada, aligning carbon emission targets with US policy deftly enabled the Harper government to avoid widespread public criticism on this file. Of course, it also pleased the Canadian corporate community, a big financial contributor to political parties like the Conservatives, by not undermining its competitiveness vis-à-vis US firms. Similar dynamics are evident in the area of Canadian defence policy. Jeffrey Rice and Stéfanie von Hlatky in chapter 6 show that rather than pursue a principled approach to defence policy, the approach of the Harper Conservatives towards defence strategy, defence spending, and the war on international terror can be best understood as interest-based pragmatism that saw Harper move away from a broad commitment to multilateralism in favour of what Rice and von Hlatky call “conditional multilateralism.” You can also see this movement, in particular, in the case of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. As Justin Massie describes it in chapter 7, Harper’s enthusiasm for the mission progressively dissipated as the war dragged on, the casualties mounted and corresponding political pressures grew. With the assistance of a divided Liberal opposition, though, the Harper Conservatives were able to limit the electoral costs through their decision to abandon the mission in Afghanistan entirely by 2014.

18  Peter McKenna

One of Stephen Harper’s central concerns in opposition was the nature of the Canada-US relationship, and a clear desire to ensure good relations with Washington. But, as Duane Bratt argues in chapter 8, once in power Harper and his government were caught by domestic political realities in Canada that constrained the Conservative government’s approach to the US and, in the end, compromised the prime minister’s initial desire for robust bilateral relations. When Barack Obama became US president in January 2009, Harper’s defence of western Canadian interests – with an eye to the electoral prospects of the Conservatives in energy-rich Alberta and Saskatchewan – soured the bilateral relationship, demonstrating yet again the degree to which Conservative foreign policy was shaped by electoral considerations. By contrast, Asa McKercher in chapter 9 focuses on the evolution of Harper’s trade policy between 2006 and 2015 and paints a more mixed portrait of this dynamic. On the one hand, he notes that the Harper Conservative government did politicize Canada’s trade policy. For example, Harper claimed that free trade, historically speaking, was the creation of Conservative governments, conveniently choosing not to remind his listeners that Conservatives virulently opposed Liberal Party free trade initiatives in 1891 and 1911. On the other hand, McKercher shows that trade and economic diplomacy were the two areas in which the politicization that we see in other spheres of foreign policy was the least pernicious – in large measure, he suggests, because the Liberal opposition was also generally in favour of free and open markets. The Arctic was another policy area where we can see considerable bipartisan agreement, and thus less overt politicization. In chapter 10, Andrea Charron demonstrates the substantial continuity between the Harper Conservative initiatives in the North and those of previous governments, both Liberal and Progressive Conservative. As she argues, most Canadians conceive of the Arctic as occupying a central place in their view of the essence of Canada, and all Canadian governments have responded to that view. What differentiated Harper’s many Arctic initiatives in his nine years in power, Charron argues, is the fervour with which he pursued those initiatives – with a hope of stoking nationalist sentiments amongst Canadians for mostly electoral reasons. A similar pattern is detected by Jean-Philippe Thérien, Gordon Mace, and Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps in chapter 11. Their focus on the policy of the Harper Conservatives towards the Americas reveals the importance of pathdependent and inertial policies inherited from previous Canadian governments. And in assessing how different the Conservative policies were, Thérien, Mace and Lavoie-Deslongchamps encourage us to think counterfactually about how a different government in Ottawa would have treated Latin America and the Caribbean at this juncture in global politics. They conclude that there are some indications of what they call “conservative internationalism” – the selective replacement of some elements of liberal internationalism by partisan and

Introduction: Stephen Harper and Canadian Foreign Policy  19

ideological approaches linked to domestic political calculations. (Clearly, the Harper inner circle operated under the assumption that if the Liberals “did” Africa then the Conservatives needed to go somewhere different – hence the focus on Latin America.) However, the authors caution us that the domestic sources of Canadian foreign policy towards the Americas during this period did not operate in a systemic vacuum. On the contrary, we have to place the evolution of Canadian policy towards the region within the broader context of the deeply polarized ideological divisions between the left and the right that marked this period. By contrast, the policies pursued by the Harper Conservatives towards China and Russia were marked departures from the past. Paul Evans traces the evolution of Canadian policy towards China under the Conservatives in chapter 12, noting the degree to which China policy was determined largely by the prime minister himself. Evans is sceptical that we can attribute Harper’s evolving approach to China to a concern with largely electoral or domestic ­politics – although the growing Asian population in British Columbia was not lost on Conservative Party political operatives. (Prime Minister Harper did quietly meet with only some reporters from Chinese-language media outlets during a campaign visit to BC during the 2015 federal election campaign.) Rather, he argues that Harper’s approach was driven more by ideas of “principled engagement” that reflected a realistic assessment of China’s growing economic importance for Canadian prosperity on the one hand and, on the other, a commitment to Canadian values deemed to be universal in nature. A commitment to particular values was also evident in Harper’s approach to Russia. In chapter 13, David Carment (with Milana Nikolko and Katarina Koleva) surveys the growing willingness of the Harper government to confront the Russian Federation, over rival claims in the Arctic, over policy in Libya and Syria, and, most importantly, in Ukraine. Reflecting long-standing Canadian interests in Ukraine that were interwoven with anti-Russian sentiments of Canadians of Ukrainian origin, the Harper government moved early in its mandate to stake out a pro-Ukrainian position. For example, the Canadian Parliament in 2008 recognized the Holodomor as an act of genocide against Ukraine perpetrated by the Soviet Union. Likewise, Harper pressed to have Ukraine join NATO well before the political crisis in 2014 that would lead to Russian efforts to destabilize eastern Ukraine and its illegal seizure of Crimea. Carment and colleagues argue that Harper’s increasingly aggressive hard line against Russia – and the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, in particular – was not simply a reflection of Harper’s normative views but also a reflection of the political importance of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. The electoral connection here might not have been the primary driver in policy towards Russia, but it was a prominent example of how politicized Canadian foreign policy was during this period.

20  Peter McKenna

It is in the case of policies towards Israel that we see most clearly the contending drivers of Stephen Harper’s foreign policy. As Shaun Narine shows in chapter 14, the Conservative government markedly changed direction on Canada’s support for Israel, going to extraordinary lengths to protect Israel from international criticism. Given this radical change in Canadian policy during the Harper era, Narine concludes that there were a number of key drivers of this policy shift. One was a concern for electoral politics: a strong pro-Israeli policy would not only cater to the evangelical Christians in the Conservative base but also would draw Jewish voters away from their historical support for the federal Liberals. Another determinant of the change in policy was the Eurocentric world view and the “clash of civilizations” ideology that enjoys considerable support among right-wing political parties. But for Narine, a key explanation for this shift lay in the personal ideological commitments of the prime minister himself to the State of Israel and the Jewish people in general. The final case study in the collection is the Harper government’s policies towards Sub-Saharan Africa. According to David R. Black, what distinguished the Conservative approach to Africa was the indifference demonstrated by the Harper government, marking a signal departure from the engagement of previous governments, Liberal and Progressive Conservative. In chapter 15, Black argues that three key factors account for this indifference. The first is generational: the engagement with Africa in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s had been largely driven by leaders who came of age in the 1960s and 1970s, when Africa was rapidly decolonizing; in the early 2000s, they were replaced by a later generation who lacked that impetus for engagement. The second is linked to the first: when the new Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) was formed in 2003 from a merger of the Progressive Conservative Party and the Canadian Alliance, successor to the Reform Party, the progressive “red tory” (and Africafriendly) element was largely purged from the CPC. The third factor shaping Harper’s Africa policy was the personal beliefs, inspired by his particular faith perspective and his unenthusiastic view of the African continent, of the prime minister himself. And as one of the signature foreign policy planks of his government, Black does consider the various political implications of Harper’s oftcited Maternal and Newborn Child Health initiative. As this book contends, Stephen Harper took the politicization of Canadian foreign policy to new heights. He clearly used his government’s foreign policy (in regions like the Middle East and Eastern Europe) to secure the votes of right-leaning conservatives who were likely disappointed with Harper’s more moderate domestic policy agenda. And given the need to retain less than 40 per cent of the electorate in order to stay in power – as Harper himself understood so well – it was important for the Harper Conservatives to placate their political base. Indeed, it often appeared that the electoral ramifications of Harper’s foreign policy posture took precedence over narrowly conceived national interest

Introduction: Stephen Harper and Canadian Foreign Policy  21

considerations. In chapter 2 on the politics and ideology of Harper’s foreign policy, Kim Richard Nossal argues that domestic political calculations were never far from the Harper government’s formulation and implementation of its international policy. As he succinctly concludes: “Looking at Canadian foreign policy under the Harper Conservatives as driven by the primacy of the ballot box – and the longer-term strategic goal of replacing Liberal hegemony with Conservative hegemony – provides a more compelling explanation for foreign policy in the Conservative era.” To Nossal’s assessment of the politicized nature of Harper’s foreign policy universe we now turn. NOTES 1 And, as Professor Duane Bratt pointed out, “there was little foreign policy experience, knowledge or even interest within the CPC caucus.” See Duane Bratt, “Implementing the Reform Party Agenda: The Roots of Stephen Harper’s Foreign Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 24, no. 1 (2018): 5. 2 Ibid., 2–3. 3 Ibid., 10–14. 4 Ibid., 14. 5 Stephen Harper, “Rediscovering the Right Agenda,” Citizens Centre Report Magazine, 10 June 2003, 72. All of the other direct quotes contained in this paragraph are drawn from this same source. 6 Under the “Founding Principles” section at the back of the platform, it states that the Conservative Party will be guided by the following principle: “A belief that Canada should accept its obligations among the nations of the world.” See Demanding Better: Conservative Party of Canada, Platform 2004 (Ottawa: Conservative Party of Canada, April 2004), 46. All of the direct quotes contained in the next few paragraphs are drawn from this same document. 7 See Stand up for Canada: Conservative Party Platform 2006 (Ottawa: Conservative Party of Canada, December 2005), 44. All other quotes cited in this paragraph are drawn from the same source material. 8 See Government of Canada, Speech from the Throne, First Session of the 39th Parliament of Canada (4 April 2006), 6. All other quotes in this paragraph are drawn from this same document, https://www.openparliament.ca/debates /2006/4/4/. 9 See Speech from the Throne, Second Session of the 39th Parliament of Canada (16 October 2007), 1, https://www.openparliament.ca/debates/2007/10/16/. All other quotes contained in these two paragraphs come from this same source. This Arctic focus would be later codified in the government’s 2009 Northern Strategy. As the strategy itself noted: “We have a clear vision for the North and are working to ensure the region achieves its rightful place within a strong and sovereign Canada.” See Government of Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our

22  Peter McKenna

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Heritage, Our Future (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2009), 3. See The True North Strong and Free: Stephen Harper’s Plan for Canadians (Ottawa: Conservative Party of Canada, October 2008), 22. All other direct quotes contained in this paragraph are drawn from this same source. Quoted from “Prime Minister Stephen Harper Delivers Keynote Address at the 2008 Conservative Convention,” 15 November 2008, https://www.youtube.com /watch?v=_kJHRb9avQw. All additional quotes in this paragraph are drawn from that same YouTube video source. See also, Bruce Cheadle, “Delegates Tilt Right at First Tory Policy Convention,” Toronto Star, 15 November 2008, https://www .thestar.com/news/canada/2008/11/15/delegates_tilt_right_at_first_tory_policy _convention.html. See Speech from the Throne, First Session of the 40th Parliament of Canada (18 November 2008), 6, https://www.openparliament.ca/debates/2008/11/18 ?singlepage=1. All other direct quotes in this paragraph are drawn from that same document. Just weeks after Harper’s controversial prorogation of Parliament in late 2008, the Conservative government presented a comparatively short Throne Speech in late January 2009 that focused almost exclusively on the growing global financial crisis. See Speech from the Throne, Second Session of the 40th Parliament of Canada (26 January 2009), 1–3, https://www.openparliament.ca/debates/2009/1/26/. Though not mentioned specifically in the Throne Speech, the Harper government did eventually flesh out more of the details of its so-called Americas Strategy. It was contained in the document Canada and the Americas and it stated from the very beginning: “The Americas are and will remain a foreign policy priority for Canada. Canadians have much to gain by being involved in the region, and they also have much to contribute.” See Government of Canada, Canada and the Americas: Priorities and Progress (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2009), 3. Also see Peter McKenna, ed., Canada Looks South: In Search of an Americas Strategy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). See Speech from the Throne, Third Session of the 40th Parliament of Canada (3 March 2010), 4, https://www.openparliament.ca/debates/2010/3/3. All other quotes contained in this paragraph are drawn from this same document. See Here for Canada: The Conservative Party Platform 2011 (Ottawa: Conservative Party of Canada, 8 April 2011), 1. All other direct quotes in this paragraph are drawn from this same source. See Speech from the Throne, First Session of the 41st Parliament of Canada (3 June 2011), 3, https://www.openparliament.ca/debates/2011/6/3/. All other direct quotes in this paragraph are drawn from this same speech. Prime Minister Stephen Harper, “Speech to the Conservative Party Policy Convention in Ottawa” (9 June 2011). All other direct quotes contained in this paragraph are drawn from that same speech. Also see, Laura Payton, Harper

Introduction: Stephen Harper and Canadian Foreign Policy  23

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Speech Fires Up Convention Crowd,” CBC News, 10 June 2011, https://www.cbc.ca /news/politics/harper-speech-fires-up-convention-crowd-1.976268. In 2013, the Harper government released the controversial Global Markets Action Plan as a central guiding document going forward. On page one, the plan stated bluntly: “Under the Global Markets Action Plan, the Government of Canada will concentrate its efforts on the markets that hold the greatest promise for Canadian business … In short, the plan will play to our strengths and ensure that all Government of Canada diplomatic assets are harnessed to support the pursuit of commercial success by Canadian companies and investors.” The Action Plan document then went on to explain: “By concentrating on core objectives within our priority markets, the Global Markets Action Plan will also entrench the concept of `economic diplomacy’ as the driving force behind the Government of Canada’s trade promotion activities throughout the international diplomatic network.” See Government of Canada, Global Markets Action Plan (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, 2013), 1–125. See Nick Logan, “7 Things Stephen Harper Said at the Conservative Party Convention,” Globalnews.ca, 1 November 2013, https://globalnews.ca/news /941809/what-did-stephen-harper-say-at-the-conservative-convention/. All other direct quotes contained in this paragraph are drawn from this same source. See Speech from the Throne, Second Session of the 41st Parliament of Canada (16 October 2013), 3, https://www.openparliament.ca/debates/2013/10/16/. All other direct quotes contained in this paragraph are drawn from this same speech. See Protect Our Economy (Ottawa: Conservative Party of Canada, September 2015), 77. All other direct quotes contained in this paragraph are drawn from this same document. See “Transcript: What Stephen Harper Said in His Final Farewell,” Maclean’s.ca, 27 May 2016, 5. All other direct quotes contained in this paragraph are drawn from that same speech. Paul Wells, The Longer I’m Prime Minister: Stephen Harper and Canada, 2006 – (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2013), 409–10. On how Harper at age thirty might have regarded his time in office: “The result hardly looks like whatever dream of a conservative utopia a thirty-year-old Stephen Harper might once have cherished.” See James Fergusson, “The NORAD Conundrum: Canada, Missile Defence, and Military Space,” International Journal 70, no. 2 (June 2015): 196–214.

2 Primat der Wahlurne: Ideology and Politicization in Harper’s Foreign Policy kim richard nossal

Objects in the mirror, the standard automobile warning has it, are actually closer than they appear. But in the rear-view mirror of history, the opposite tends to occur: with the passage of time we tend to lose perspective, magnifying what we want to remember, overemphasizing factors that were actually less important than in our mind’s eye. This is what appears to have happened to our remembrance of the foreign policy of the Conservative government under Stephen Harper. That period in Canadian foreign policy is commonly remembered now as it was so often described while the Conservatives were still in power: as deeply ideological. As Shaun Narine put it in his exploration of Canadian foreign policy between 2006 and 2015, “the Conservative government of Stephen Harper pursued an ideologically driven foreign policy unprecedented in modern Canadian history.”1 That characterization nicely echoes for posterity the perspective that was so widespread during the Harper era that it assumed a certain taken-for-grantedness in analyses of foreign policy for the 2006–15  period. Often it was served up as normative shorthand to add weight to criticism that was being levelled at some foreign policy initiative of the Harper government. Indeed, the way in which the word was used in Canadian foreign policy discourse during the Conservative government’s time in office – and now in retrospect – confirms John Gerring’s observation that the word “ideology” suffers from “semantic promiscuity.”2 In particular, given the perpetuation of the pejorative connotation of “ideology” and “ideological” as descriptors of political thought, it is perhaps hardly surprising that the word tended to appear prominently in analyses of the commentariat that were critical of the Harper government, while it was rarely, if ever, used as an explanation in those analyses that were generally supportive of the Conservative government’s foreign policy.3 But the widespread use of the word muddies rather than clears the waters. For it is not clear what “ideology” supposedly drove the Harper government (much of it in a minority situation); nor is it clear whether we can understand

Ideology and Politicization in Harper’s Foreign Policy  25

Canadian foreign policy outcomes between 2006 and 2015 by reference to any particular ideological perspective. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a lens that permits readers to assess the twelve detailed case studies presented in this book. It re-examines the common claim that foreign policy under the Conservative government of Stephen Harper was shaped by a right-leaning or conservative ideology, and proposes instead that factors other than ideology provide a more compelling explanation for the Harper era in foreign policy. Conservativism and Ideology in Foreign Policy It is, seemingly, an article of faith among many of those who have analysed Stephen Harper’s foreign policy that he was “ideological,” and that ideology is crucial for a correct understanding of Canada’s international policy between 2006 and 2015. For example, the journalist Frances Russell claims that Harper was “driven” by ideology.4 Surveying a range of domestic and foreign policy initiatives under the Conservative government, Jordan Michael Smith concludes, “The consistent thread throughout all this is Harper’s fidelity to ideology,” particularly in the area of foreign policy, since “foreign policy is the only area in which Harper has been able to act on his ideals.”5 In his analysis of contemporary Canadian foreign policy, Paul Heinbecker, a former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, asserts that the “ideological proclivities” of the Harper government were clearly evident.6 And in the conclusion of their edited collection of essays on conservatism in Canada, James Farney and David Rayside note that there was a “clear ideological shift” in foreign policy under the Harper Conservatives.7 Speaking to the Canadian International Council in December 2013, Colin Robertson describes the Harper government’s foreign policy this way: “It is brash, it is bold, it is ideological.”8 Haroon Siddiqui has also written that Harper’s foreign policy was both “hobbled by ideology” and “tainted by ideology.”9 What is noteworthy about this discourse is the degree to which “ideology” tends to be used as shorthand, in at least two ways. First, the word tends to be widely used to paint the Conservative government in negative terms. It is thus often used in the abusive sense associated with the very origins of the term in the early nineteenth century, when Napoléon Bonaparte sneered at his political opponents as “ideologues.” In this pejorative usage, the word is normally never applied to those on the other side of politics in Canada, as though it was only Conservatives who were “ideological,” and as though critics of Conservative foreign policy were not operating with “ideologies” of their own. In a comparable sense, the word tends to be used to convey the equally pejorative intimation that those who are “ideological” are somehow inappropriately and overly committed to a particular set of political ideas that guide both their political thought and their political behaviour.

26  Kim Richard Nossal

A second way that “ideological” tends to be used is as a synonym for a particular brand of politics  – namely, right-wing and neoconservative thought and practice, emanating in particular from the group of academics centred at the University of Calgary, where Harper was a student.10 The neoconservative label was commonly applied to the various incarnations of political parties that evolved on the right after the fracturing of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1993: the Reform Party, the Canadian Alliance, and the Conservative Party of Canada that emerged from the “unite the right” movement in 2003. Certainly Heinbecker uses “ideology” to indicate right-wing politics. In Getting Back in the Game, he makes it clear that the ideological orientation of the Conservative government is derived from “the Canadian Right”  – which he always capitalizes, thereby attributing to it a putative formal unity and institutionalized existence  – and in particular “neo-cons” and “theo-cons,” the pejorative terms for neoconservatives and Christian evangelical conservatives, respectively. Indeed, Heinbecker has his own pejorative term for those in Canada who are “miniature replicas” of their American neoconservative counterparts: “Canadian mini-cons.”11 This perspective is echoed by some former members of the Progressive Conservative Party. For example, Joe Clark has argued that the rise of a particular kind of conservatism in the United States that sought to oppose “liberal elites” has its clear echo in the Conservative Party of Canada that resulted from the “unite the right” movement of the early 2000s. These American influences, in Clark’s view, “shape the thinking, prejudices and priorities of ministers and partisans who determine current Canadian international policy.”12 Likewise, Tom McMillan, a minister in the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, offers a similar characterization: “In a corrupted incarnation of its former self, the party ended up being led, in the person of Stephen Harper, by the chief talent scout for a farm system for right-wing political ideologues and activists hostile to the very bedrock of Canada’s social safety net.”13 In short, despite their very different political (and ideological) perspectives, Heinbecker, Clark, and McMillan all share a set of common assumptions about the ideological orientation of the Harper government’s foreign policy. But it can be argued that their assumptions were more widely shared: when the Conservative government’s foreign policy was characterized as “ideological,” invariably what was meant was that the policy was driven by conservative, neoconservative, or “right-wing” ideas. But if in Canadian foreign policy discourse “ideological” is merely synonymous with conservative, neoconservative, or “right-wing” ideas and practices, then that raises a further question: Was Stephen Harper’s foreign policy truly conservative? To answer this question, we need to ask what constitutes a conservative foreign policy. We could start with the exploration of foreign policy conservatism by Jennifer Welsh, who extrapolated from conservative writers in the British

Ideology and Politicization in Harper’s Foreign Policy  27

tradition  – David Hume, Edmund Burke, Michael Oakeshott, and Sir Roger Scruton.14 Welsh argues that a conservative foreign policy is characterized by three core concepts or “tendencies.” First, conservatives are attached to a particular global political order that is “assumed rather than accounted for,” but needs to be entrenched, legitimized, and given authority and longevity. This “duty to conserve,” Welsh reminds us, comes from a basic conservative belief “that we all belong to a continuing and pre-existing order.” The centrality of order focuses on the effects of disorder not only on the international system, but also on domestic politics. The second tendency of conservatives, Welsh argues, is a scepticism about progressivist assumptions about humankind’s perfectibility and an embrace of “prudential” politics. Conservatives are sceptical about the possibilities of radical change given the structural realities that create significant boundaries that hem us in, pushing us to embrace a prudential approach to world politics. Finally, Welsh argues that the third tendency was a veneration of tradition, including established institutions and practices. In foreign policy, this is most clearly manifested in the attachment to long-lived institutions, such as the principles of sovereignty or the privileged position given to the great powers on the United Nations Security Council.15 Alan Bloomfield and I have argued that a fourth “tendency” should be added to the three tendencies outlined by Welsh: that is, the pursuit of the “national interest.” From an international relations theory perspective, we have argued that conservative leaders tend towards a realist position, accepting that international politics is conducted in conditions of anarchy, and that leaders are less inclined to pursue multilateral solutions to foreign challenges or to promote or rely on international law and institutions.16 By contrast, American reflections on what constitutes a conservative foreign policy differed considerably from this formulation. For example, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, an American political scientist and diplomat, puts forward what is widely regarded as the iconic discussion of a “traditionalist” conservative foreign policy.17 In some respects, Kirkpatrick’s argument shares some similarities with the British view of a conservative foreign policy. She argues, for example, that a conservative expects the future to look not very different from the past, and is sceptical of utopian claims that humankind can rid itself of the scourge of war. But in other respects, Kirkpatrick’s definition of a conservative foreign policy is distinctly American: she claims that a conservative foreign policy should be characterized by a respect for history, a respect for individual freedoms, a suspicion of overly large government, and patriotism. In a similar vein, George F. Will, an American conservative commentator, offers a brief recipe for a conservative foreign policy for the United States: “Preserve U.S. sovereignty and freedom of action by marginalizing the United Nations. Reserve military interventions for reasons of U.S. national security, not altruism. Avoid peacekeeping operations that compromise the military’s war-fighting proficiencies. Beware of the political hubris inherent in the intensely unconservative project

28  Kim Richard Nossal

of ‘nation-building.’”18 But like the approach identified by Welsh, what was common to these American traditionalist conservative approaches to foreign policy was the emphasis on prudence in the exercise of US power. After the Cold War, however, a group of American conservatives emerged who rejected such prudence. These “new” conservatives, or neoconservatives, articulated a very different idea. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, for example, argue that the United States should capitalize on its enormous power by “resisting, and where possible, undermining dictators and hostile ideologies; … supporting American interests and liberal democratic principles; and … providing assistance to those struggling against the more extreme manifestations of human evil” – in other words, regime change.19 William’s father, Irving Kristol, expanded on these ideas by expounding four “theses” that supposedly encapsulated what a neoconservative foreign policy should look like. The first was patriotism, described as a “natural and healthy sentiment.” The second thesis argued that “international institutions … should be regarded with the deepest suspicion.” These two theses do not differ much from the traditional position described above. However, Kristol’s third thesis posited that leaders of states should “distinguish friends from enemies,” a view that Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke have argued equates in practice to an aggressive moralism “derived from the religious conviction that the human condition is defined as a choice between good and evil.”20 Kristol’s fourth thesis flowed naturally from his third: “large nations [like the United States] inevitably have ideological interests in addition to more material concerns,” which they should actively pursue.21 In effect, the neocons, John J. Mearsheimer argues, “divide the world into good and bad states … [in which] the democracies are the white hats.”22 Unsurprisingly, this neoconservative blueprint for foreign policy was widely criticized. Sir Roger Scruton, an English philosopher and writer, claimed that it was not “true” conservatism at all: “For me, the true conservative approach in international relations is … to do whatever is required by the national interest, but to leave others to their fate.”23 Ilan Peleg goes further, claiming, “Neoconservatism, despite its name, was one of the most revolutionary, nonconservative movements in the history of American foreign policy.”24 Jennifer Welsh, however, ultimately concludes that because the neoconservatives were acting to preserve the existing global order (that is, by reinforcing US hegemony), they remained essentially conservative in intent, despite their radical methods.25 Harper’s Conservative Ideology in Opposition To what extent did the Conservatives under Harper reflect these ideological attributes? Prior to winning a minority government in the January 2006 federal election, Stephen Harper was widely portrayed by his political opponents as

Ideology and Politicization in Harper’s Foreign Policy  29

a right-wing neoconservative, linked to George W. Bush, a US president who was deeply unpopular in Canada. The attack ads run by the Liberal Party of Canada during the 2005–6 election campaign were illustrative of this portrayal. One English-language social media ad reminded viewers of an article in the Washington Times that claimed that “Canada may elect the most pro-American leader in the Western world. Harper is pro-Iraq, anti-Kyoto and socially conservative. Bush’s best new friend is the poster boy for his ideal foreign leader. A Harper victory will put a smile on George W. Bush’s face.” The ad then concluded: “Well, at least somebody will be happy, eh?”26 A French-language ad contained even more pointed reminders of Harper’s conservative dispositions.27 Such a portrayal, of course, was not historically inaccurate. In the fifteen years prior to becoming prime minister, Harper had indeed accumulated many unambiguously conservative positions on a number of foreign policy issues, as Peter McKenna notes in the introduction. For example, writing in the Wall Street Journal in March 2003, he criticized Jean Chrétien, the Liberal prime minister, for keeping Canada out of the “coalition of the willing” that was being organized by the Bush administration to invade Iraq and overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein. This, Harper claimed, was “a serious mistake,” noting: “Disarming Iraq is necessary for the long-term security of the world, and for the collective interests of our historic allies and therefore manifestly in the national interest of Canada.”28 Harper waxed even more lyrical on this matter when he addressed a “Friends of America” rally held in Toronto in April 2003: “Thank you for saying to our friends in … America, you are our ally, our neighbour, and our best friend in the whole wide world. And when your brave men and women give their lives for freedom and democracy we are not neutral. We do not stand on the sidelines; we’re for the disarmament of Saddam and the liberation of the people of Iraq.”29 Likewise, after Paul Martin’s Liberal government announced in February 2005 that Canada would not take part in the US ballistic missile defence system, Harper intimated that the Conservatives favoured doing so.30 He also unambiguously opposed the Kyoto Protocol, claiming that the Liberal government could not implement the GHG emission targets that it had embraced.31 In 2003, he expressed scepticism about the United Nations, deriding the Liberal party attachment to UN-based multilateralism, and claiming that “the time has come to recognize that the US will continue to exercise unprecedented power in a world where international rules are still unreliable and where security and advancing of the free democratic order still depend significantly on the possession and use of military might.”32 In short, we can see a number of the elements of a neoconservative approach to foreign policy in Harper’s various positions prior to his coming to office in 2006. These include a preference for a particular kind of order (and support for the hegemonic role of the United States especially); a deep scepticism about international

30  Kim Richard Nossal

institutions, especially the United Nations; traditionalism, in that he emphasized that Canada shared values similar to those of Britain and the United States; and a determination to pursue the national interest (especially when it came to scrapping Kyoto). In his years in opposition, Harper left little doubt that his Weltanschauung was essentially binary: in his world, the hats were, just as Mearsheimer suggested, either white or black. (It should be noted, however, that Harper himself did not use that white hat/black hat analogy, preferring to frame his discussion in terms of right and wrong.33 It would be left to one of Harper’s future foreign ministers, John Baird, to articulate the black hat/white hat argument.34) But it is clear that the Conservative foreign policy agenda, as it emerged from the years in opposition, had little resemblance to the kind of positions that would have been articulated by a real neoconservative in the United States. The international policy mindset of the Conservatives is perhaps most clearly revealed in the party’s platform released for the 2005–6 federal election campaign. The forty-six-page platform had just three short sections on international affairs; its foreign policy section consisted of a mere 171 words, so short that it is possible to quote it in full: Canadians are rightly proud of our values of freedom, fairness, and compassion. But too often, Liberal foreign policy has compromised democratic principles to appease dictators, sometimes for the sake of narrow business interests. Foreign aid has been used for political purposes, not to ensure genuine development. We need to ensure that Canada’s foreign policy reflects true Canadian values and advances Canada’s national interests.

A Conservative government will: • Articulate Canada’s core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, free markets, and free trade – and compassion for the less fortunate – on the international stage. • Advance Canada’s interests through foreign aid, while at the same time holding those agencies involved in this area accountable for its distribution and results. • Increase spending on Overseas Development Assistance beyond the currently projected level and move towards the OECD average level. • Make Parliament responsible for exercising oversight over the conduct of Canadian foreign policy and the commitment of Canadian Forces to foreign operations. • Place international treaties before Parliament for ratification.35 Indeed, it would appear that those who crafted, and approved, this section of the 2006 platform had little knowledge or understanding of the nature of

Ideology and Politicization in Harper’s Foreign Policy  31

international politics or foreign policy. Embarrassingly, none of the many eyes, one presumes, in the Conservative Party brain trust who looked at the platform before it went to press appeared to know (or care) that “foreign aid” is a term that is decades out of fashion, or that it is “official development assistance,” not “overseas development assistance.” In addition, the partisan frame of the platform that focused on the supposed single sin of Liberal foreign policy – that is, having “compromised democratic principles to appease dictators, sometimes for the sake of narrow business interests” – reveals a highly limited understanding of what foreign policy is (or should be) all about. An Ideological Conservative in Power? If the Harper Conservatives were as ideologically conservative – or ­neoconservative – as is so often asserted, what should Canadian foreign policy have looked like once they had achieved power following the January 2006 federal election? First, we should expect a foreign policy marked by a whole-hearted commitment to the support of the United States on a range of global issues. A good American ally would have abandoned the Liberal policy of refusing to participate in the ballistic missile defence (BMD) program, particularly since Harper had promised while in opposition that a Conservative government would join the ballistic missile defence system. Likewise, a good American ally would have ramped up defence spending well beyond the increases in the defence budget initiated by the Liberal government of Paul Martin. We would also expect strong and consistent support for the NATO mission in Afghanistan, since that mission went to the core of Harper’s contention that a Conservative government in Ottawa would be a faithful ally of the United States, and would define Canadian national interests as deeply aligned with upholding and sustaining American global hegemony. Indeed, at the very outset of the deployment of a Canadian Armed Forces battle group to Kandahar in early 2006 – a move that coincided with the new Conservative government taking office – Harper did offer fulsome support for the new combat mission, asserting in a speech to Canadian troops at Kandahar Air Field that his government was in it for the long haul. “Canadians,” he said, do not “cut and run ... We don’t make a commitment and then run away at the first sign of trouble.”36 But we should have expected that Canada would have remained in Afghanistan in support of the United States for as long as the Americans and other Western allies were there. Likewise, we should have expected that a Harper Conservative government, as a good American ally, would have offered the administration of George W. Bush support for continuing US military efforts to stabilize Iraq as a new government took office in Baghdad shortly after the new Conservative government came to power in Ottawa. More broadly, a neoconservative government would

32  Kim Richard Nossal

have put a premium on maintaining a good relationship with the United States on a range of bilateral and global policy issues, and would have sought to work cooperatively and productively with whoever the US president was. Central to this cooperation would be what Justin Massie and Stéphane Roussel characterize as neocontinentalism, which seeks to intertwine purely continental relations between Canada and the United States, particularly trade global policy, and especially support for American global hegemony.37 If an integral part of a neoconservative foreign policy is taking moral (or moralizing) stands on other actors in global politics, we would expect to see a willingness to support “good” states in global politics (Mearsheimer’s “white hats”) – and call out the “black hats” that might be inimical to Western interests. We would thus expect that this would translate into strong and consistent support for “white hats” like Israel and strong opposition to “black hats.” At the time that the Conservatives were in power, this would have included Iran, North Korea, and the Russian Federation. Iran not only threatened friends like Israel and disrupted Western interests in the Middle East but also refused to acknowledge any responsibility for the death of Zahra Kazemi, a Canadian journalist who had been raped, tortured, and murdered while in an Iranian jail in 2003.38 During this period, North Korea, which had been declared part of an “axis of evil” by President George W. Bush in 2002, continued to play a game of cat and mouse with the international community, producing plutonium, test-firing long-range missiles, and testing nuclear weapons while receiving assistance packages in return for supposedly suspending its nuclear weapons program. During the time that the Harper Conservatives were in power, relations between the West and the Russian Federation also deteriorated, as Vladimir Putin, president from 2000 to 2008, premier from 2008 to 2012, and then elected president again in 2012, progressively abandoned the cooperation that had been forged with NATO and the West in the late 1990s. While the causality of the growing estrangement is complex – it was partially a function of the West’s continued expansion eastward, partially a function of Putin’s attempts to strengthen his political position within Russia39 – there can be little doubt that during this period the Russian Federation was increasingly seen as a “black hat” by the West. The arc from the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 to the dismemberment of Ukraine in 2014 that led to the de facto expulsion of the Russian Federation from the G8 almost exactly matched the Conservative period in office. In the case of each of these “black hats,” we would expect that a neoconservative government in Ottawa would take a strong, moralizing stance. In the case of China, we might even expect a comparably hard stand from a leader, and a party, that had a long record of expressed antipathy towards the government in Beijing for its human rights practices.40 Indeed, Paul Evans, at the time the co-CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, noted how struck he was in 2006 when two members of the new Harper Conservative

Ideology and Politicization in Harper’s Foreign Policy  33

cabinet described China as “a godless totalitarian country with nuclear weapons aimed at us,” a view of China that Evans said was “far removed from the main lines of Canadian thinking for two generations.”41 But such views would suggest that the Conservative government would, just as the Conservative platform promised, no longer be willing to “[compromise] democratic principles to appease dictators, sometimes for the sake of narrow business interests.” In other areas of policy, we would also expect to see manifestations of a neoconservative agenda. For example, in the case of the Arctic, Adam Chapnick has argued that we should not be surprised that patriotism was a key driver of policy, given that two of Harper’s predecessors, John Diefenbaker and Brian Mulroney, embraced “Canada’s northern heritage as a source of national pride.”42 Indeed, as Chapnick notes, Harper would quickly move to combine patriotic invocations of the North with a “rhetoric of fear” about “increasingly aggressive Russian actions around the globe and Russian intrusions into our airspace.”43 On climate change, we should have expected that a neoconservative government would have continued the opposition to the policies pursued by the Liberal governments of both Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin that had been expressed by Harper while he was in opposition. Harper had been keenly aware that the commitment to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 6 per cent below 1990 levels was a figure that had been pulled out of thin air by Chrétien.44 Prior to 2006, Harper regularly claimed that the Liberal position was at best fanciful and at worst disingenuous, and promised that he would renegotiate Canada’s Kyoto commitments.45 We should have expected that that opposition would have continued. Finally, in keeping with the neoconservative scepticism of multilateral institutions, we would anticipate that a Conservative government would maintain the negative attitudes towards multilateralism in general and the United Nations in particular that had been expressed by Harper while in opposition.46 Primat der Wahlurne: An Alternative Lens The case studies in this book demonstrate that the foreign policy pursued by the Harper Conservatives from 2006 to 2015 looked rather different from what we might expect of a conservative or neoconservative ideological foreign policy. First, “ideology” suggests consistency and coherence; that, after all, is one of its key attributes.47 However, as the chapters ahead make clear, Harper’s foreign policy lacked coherence. This was something that even conservatives (and Conservatives) themselves recognized: for example, a panel on foreign policy at the 2013 Manning Networking Conference concluded that the Harper government “and the broader conservative movement from which it springs, don’t so much have a foreign policy as a vague foreign-policy vision, dressed up with a mish-mash of policy ideas.”48

34  Kim Richard Nossal

A lack of consistency was one manifestation of this lack of coherence. Roland Paris has argued that part of the inconsistency in Conservative foreign policy stemmed from a distinct discomfort with diplomacy. As Harper himself admitted, he tends to see the world in Manichaean terms (Paris’s characterization, not Harper’s).49 As Paris correctly observed, because the “default orientation is to divide the world into friends and enemies – white hats and black hats,” the Conservatives ran into difficulty when they were faced with the realities of world politics. The result, according to Paris, was that during the Harper era Canada lurched around the world like a drunk, sometimes shouting and haranguing, and sometimes whispering conspiratorially. One day we praised the UN desertification convention; the next day we rejected it as worthless and stomped away. No one knew what to expect from Canada anymore – except unpredictability and tactlessness.50 In Paris’s view, to claim that the Conservatives were driven by ideology “almost gives too much credit for what is essentially a fairly incoherent foreign policy.”51 But if ideology is an imperfect guide for understanding foreign policy under the Harper Conservatives, what might provide a more compelling frame for explaining international policy during this era? I  suggest another possibility. Students of international relations and foreign policy analysis are well acquainted with the idea of Primat der Außenpolitik (primacy of foreign policy), Leopold von Ranke’s assertion that the structures of international politics shape a country’s foreign policy. Some may be familiar with its antithesis, Primat der Innenpolitik (primacy of domestic politics), associated most commonly with Hans-Ulrich Wehler, a German scholar who studied the Kaiserreich and argued that domestic structures, not global ones, explain foreign policy-­making. However, a third variant could be identified as well: Primat der Wahlurne  – and Peter McKenna’s underlying argument – the primacy of the ballot box. In this view, foreign policy is shaped not so much by “domestic politics” writ large but by much narrower electoral considerations, with politics shaped by a desire to maximize votes at the next election. In the case of the Conservatives, we know that Harper came to office in 2006 with the broader strategic goal of ensuring that the Conservative Party of Canada would replace the Liberals as Canada’s “natural governing party.”52 Harper himself made no secret of this objective. In 2008, he put it this way: “My long-term goal is to make the Conservatives the natural governing party of the country. And I’m a realist. You can do that two ways … One thing you do is pull the conservatives, to pull the party, to the centre of politics. But what you also have to do, if you’re really serious about making transformation, is you have to pull the centre of the political spectrum toward conservatism.”53 As Paul Wells has noted, Harper’s policies were always directed at “playing a longer game.”54 Foreign policy undoubtedly played an important role in this longer-term strategy. The case studies in this book demonstrate that rather than embrace a narrow

Ideology and Politicization in Harper’s Foreign Policy  35

ideologically-focused conservative foreign policy agenda, the Harper Conservatives tended to frame their foreign policy position with an eye on electoral outcomes. In the process, Harper pulled his government to the centre more than he pulled the centre to conservatism. It is true that he claimed that the majority won by the Conservatives in 2011 was because “Conservative values are Canadian values and that the Conservative party is Canada’s party.”55 But in Jeffrey Simpson’s view, Harper’s claim “stands reality on its head.” Rather, Simpson argued that another dynamic was at work here: “The Conservatives became more traditionally Canadian or, to put matters another way, have learned that Conservatives had to evolve from something much more ideological into something more malleable.” In his view, the Conservatives won the 2011 federal election “not so much because the country changed … but because the party changed to fit the country.”56 Conclusion The case studies in this book highlight the overweening importance of the prime minister’s own political views in the shaping of Canada’s international policy. In all these cases, we can see the impact of Harper’s personal perspectives, beliefs, policy preferences, and political ambitions. In some instances, these were longstanding views, as in the case of Israel. In other cases, they reflected personal enthusiasms, as in the case of the Arctic. In others, they reflected an evolving perspective, as in the case of the mission in Afghanistan or the case of Canadian relations with China. But not in all instances can we claim that the prime minister’s views on international affairs were always ideological, much less conservative. Rather, Harper’s personal impact on foreign policy reflected a broader historical tendency for prime ministers to be able to have an extraordinary impact on moulding Canadian foreign policy.57 His impact and motives, moreover, were also intensely political. Although the foreign policy of the Harper Conservatives is often explained by invoking ideology, particularly neoconservative, “right-wing” ideology, the cases explored here suggest that Canadian foreign policy during the Harper Conservative era was neither as ideological as is sometimes remembered, and certainly not as conservative as is often claimed. Instead, I  have argued, like McKenna, that we need to look elsewhere for a more convincing explanation for policy outcomes. In his study of Harper in power, Wells quotes a Conservative MP who told him that, “If you think of Harper as a conservative ideologue, you run into no end of confusion and contradiction. But if you think of him as a Conservative partisan, most of what he does makes sense.”58 Clearly, looking at Canadian foreign policy under the Harper Conservatives as driven by the primacy of the ballot box – and the longer-term strategic goal of replacing Liberal hegemony with Conservative hegemony – provides a more compelling explanation for foreign policy in the Conservative era.

36  Kim Richard Nossal NOTES 1 Shaun Narine, “Stephen Harper and the Radicalization of Canadian Foreign Policy,” in J.P. Lewis and Joanna Everitt, eds., The Blueprint: Conservative Parties and Their Impact on Canadian Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 314. 2 For a classic field analysis, see John Gerring, “Ideology: A Definitional Analysis,” Political Research Quarterly 50, no. 4 (December 1997): 957. 3 For example, Martin Goldfarb, “Stephen Harper Has Injected Moral Principle into Canadian Diplomacy,” National Post, 17 January 2014; Derek Burney and Fen Hampson, “For Canada Abroad, A Very Good Year,” iPolitics, 22 December 2013, http://www.ipolitics.ca/2013/12/22/for-canada-abroad-a-very-good-year/; John Kirton, “Harper’s ‘Made in Canada’ Global Leadership,” in Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, eds., Canada Among Nations 2006: Minorities and Priorities (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 34–57. 4 Frances Russell, “Harper Driven by Libertarian Ideology, Not Reality,” Winnipeg Free Press, 8 February 2012, A7. 5 Jordan Michael Smith, “Reinventing Canada: Stephen Harper’s Conservative Revolution,” World Affairs (March/April 2012), 27, http://www.worldaffairsjournal .org/article/reinventing-canada-stephen-harper’s-conservative-revolution. 6 Paul Heinbecker, Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Dundurn, 2011), 196–7. 7 David Rayside and James Farney, “Conclusion: The Distinctive Evolution of Canadian Conservatism,” in James Farney and David Rayside, eds., Conservatism in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 343. 8 Cited in Jennifer Campbell, “Whither Harper’s Foreign Policy?” Ottawa Citizen, 10 December 2013, C4; Canadian International Council, “Making Sense of Harper’s Foreign Policy,” CPAC, 9 December 2013, video, 0:04:05, https://www .cpac.ca/episode?id=731ee0c1-0ca1-4958-a9ca-5b91541993c5. 9 Haroon Siddiqui, “Prime Minister Harper’s Foreign Policy Hobbled by Ideology,” Toronto Star, 13 October 2012, A11. 10 See Frédéric Boily, “Le néoconservatisme au Canada: Faut-il craindre l’École de Calgary?” in Frédéric Boily, ed., Stephen Harper: de l’École de Calgary au Parti conservateur (Quebec City: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2007), 27–53. 11 See, for example, Heinbecker, Getting Back in the Game, 38. In a 2007 address, he called them “mini-Con Canadian wannabes.” See Paul Heinbecker, “Canada and Multilateralism in a New Era,” MPA Policy Forum, Queen’s University, 27 April 2007, 3, http://www.heinbecker.ca/Speeches/Queens2007MPApolicy Forum.pdf. 12 Joe Clark, How We Lead: Canada in a Century of Change (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2013), 103–4.

Ideology and Politicization in Harper’s Foreign Policy  37 13 Tom McMillan, Not My Party: The Rise and Fall of Canadian Tories, From Robert Stanfield to Stephen Harper (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing, 2016), 549. 14 Jennifer M. Welsh, “‘I’ Is for Ideology: Conservatism in International Affairs,” Global Society 17, no. 2 (2003): 181–3. See also Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1962). 15 Welsh, “‘I’ Is for Ideology,” 169–74. 16 Alan Bloomfield and Kim Richard Nossal, “A Conservative Foreign Policy? Canada and Australia Compared,” in James Farney and David Rayside, eds., Conservatism in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 139–64. Also, see the discussion of realism and neorealism in Welsh, “‘I’ Is for Ideology,” 175–8. For a counter-argument that suggests that the kind of internationalist policy pursued by Canada is, in fact, quite conservative, see Adam Chapnick, “Peace, Order, and Good Government: The ‘Conservative’ Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 60, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 635–50. 17 Jeane F. Kirkpatrick, “Defining a Conservative Foreign Policy,” Heritage Foundation, 25 February 1993, 1–4, http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207 /bitstreams/12661.pdf. 18 George F. Will, “A Questionable Kind of Conservatism,” Washington Post, 24 July 2003, A21. 19 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 (1996): 18–32. The explicit call for regime change was made in William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility,” in Kristol and Kagan, eds., Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000), 17–22. See also Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads (London: Profile Books, 2006), 40–2. 20 Irving Kristol, “The Neoconservative Persuasion,” Weekly Standard 8, no. 47 (2003), http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/000tzmlw .asp; Stefan A. Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 11. 21 Kristol, “Neoconservative Persuasion.” 22 John J. Mearsheimer, “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism versus Neoconservatism,” Open Democracy, 18 May 2005, 3, http://www.opendemocracy .net/democracy-americanpower/morgenthau_2522.jsp. 23 Roger Scruton, “An Englishman Looks at American Conservatism in the New Century,” Address to the Howard Center, Chicago, 1 May 2004, https://phillysoc .org/tps_meetings/the-conservative-movement-for-forty-years-achievements-and -prospects/, mirrored at http://libertycorner.blogspot.ca/2006/08/wisdom-from -roger-scruton.html. 24 Ilan Peleg, The Legacy of George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy: Moving beyond Neoconservatism (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), xi.

38  Kim Richard Nossal 25 Welsh, “‘I’ Is for Ideology,” 181–3. 26 Several Liberal attack ads have been posted to YouTube. For example, “Liberal Ads on Stephen Harper in 2005,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OE-JGcQ76yg. The English ads follow the French. 27 “Réussir le Canada,” YouTube, December 2005, https://www.youtube.com /watch?v=OE-JGcQ76yg. After noting that there would be pros and cons (“des pours and des contres”) if Harper won, the French-language ad claimed that Harper was “contre l’accord de Kyoto; pour le guerre en Irak; contre les droit des femmes au libre-choix; pour la présence de l’armée dans toute nos villes; contre les mariages entre conjoints de même sexe; pour le programme américain de bouclier antimissile; contre le bannissement des armes de poing.” (Translation: against the Kyoto Accord; for the Iraq war; against choice for women; for deploying the army in all our cities; against same-sex marriage; for ballistic missile defence; against banning handguns.) 28 Stephen Harper and Stockwell Day, “Canadians Stand With You,” Wall Street Journal, 28 March 2003. 29 “‘Friends of America’ Rally in Toronto,” CBC News, 4 April 2003, http://www.cbc.ca /news/canada/story/2003/04/04/usrally_030404.html. 30 Ann Denholm Crosby, “The New Conservative Government and Missile Defence,” in Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, eds., Canada Among Nations 2006: Minorities and Priorities (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 164. 31 “Conservative Government Would Scrap Kyoto: Harper,” CBC News, 9 June 2004, http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2004/06/09/elxnharpkyoto040609.html. 32 Stephen Harper, “A Departure from Neutrality,” National Post, 23 May 2003, A8. See also the discussion in Mike Blanchfield, Swingback: Getting Along in the World with Harper and Trudeau (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017), 39–40. 33 See, for example, “Rediscovering the Right Agenda,” Citizens Centre Report Magazine, 10 June 2003, 73–7, mirrored at http://post.queensu.ca/~nossalk /Harper_2003.pdf. 34 See Brooke Jeffrey, Dismantling Canada: Stephen Harper’s New Conservative Agenda (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 243. 35 Conservative Party of Canada, Stand up for Canada: Federal Election Platform (Ottawa: Conservative Party of Canada, 2006), 44–5. 36 Stephen Harper, “Address by the Prime Minister to the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan,” 13 March 2006, Government of Canada, https://www.canada .ca/en/news/archive/2006/03/address-prime-minister-canadian-armed-forces -afghanistan.html. 37 Justin Massie and Stéphane Roussel, “The Twilight of Internationalism? Neocontinentalism as an Emerging Dominant Idea in Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, eds., Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013), 36–52.

Ideology and Politicization in Harper’s Foreign Policy  39 38 On the Kazemi case, see the report compiled by the Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre, Impunity in Iran: The Death of Photojournalist Zahra Kazemi (New Haven, CT: Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006), https://iranhrdc.org/impunity-in-iran-the-death-of-photojournalist-zahra-kazemi/. 39 For an objective assessment of this complex causality, see Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). 40 See also Sonny Shui-Ling Lo, “The Politics of Soft Power in Sino-Canadian Relations: Stephen Harper’s Visit to China and the Neglected Hong Kong Factor,” in Huhua Cao and Vivienne Poy, eds., The China Challenge: Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2011), 66–80; and Kim Richard Nossal and Leah Sarson, “About Face: Explaining Changes in Canada’s China Policy, 2006–2012,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (2014): 146–62. 41 Paul Evans, Engaging China: Myth, Aspiration, and Strategy in Canadian Policy from Trudeau to Harper (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), xiv. 42 Adam Chapnick, “A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution, 2006–11,” International Journal 67, no. 1 (Winter 2011–12), 143. 43 Ibid., 143. Chapnick reminds us that Harper’s “rhetoric of fear” was sufficiently unfounded and that the commander of NORAD, Gen. Victor “Gene” Renuart Jr., went out of his way to stress that “the Russians have conducted themselves professionally; they have maintained compliance with the international rules of airspace and sovereignty.” Ibid., 143. 44 Jeffrey Simpson, Mark Jaccard, and Nic Rivers, Hot Air: Meeting Canada’s Climate Change Challenge (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007). 45 “Conservative Government Would Scrap Kyoto: Harper,” CBC News, 9 June 2004, http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2004/06/09/elxnharpkyoto040609.html. 46 For example, Louise Fréchette, “Canada at the United Nations: A Shadow of Its Former Self,” in Fen Osler Hampson and Paul Heinbecker, eds., Canada Among Nations: 2009–2010: As Others See Us (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 265–74; see also Kim Richard Nossal, “Canada and the General Assembly: A Global Bully Pulpit,” in Robert Teigrob and Colin McCullough, eds., Canada and the UN: Legacies, Limits and the Harper Shift (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 161–82. 47 Gerring, “Ideology,” 980. 48 Carlo Dade, “Moving toward a Conservative Foreign Policy,” National Post, 15 March 2013, https://nationalpost.com/opinion/carlo-dade-moving-toward-a-conservative -foreign-policy. 49 Roland Paris, “What Is Stephen Harper Afraid Of?” OpenCanada, 20 July 2011, https://www.opencanada.org/features/what-is-stephen-harper-afraid-of? On Harper’s assumptions about international relations, see his “Speech to the Conservative Party Policy Convention in Ottawa,” 9 June 2011, video, 0:18:07,

40  Kim Richard Nossal

50

51

52

53 54

55

56

57

58

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/harper-speech-fires-up-convention -crowd-1.976268; and Kenneth Whyte, “In Conversation: Stephen Harper,” Maclean’s, 5 July 2011, https://www.macleans.ca/general/how-he-sees-canadas -role-in-the-world-and-where-he-wants-to-take-the-country-2/. Roland Paris, “Baird’s Silence on Abuses in Bahrain Exposes Canada’s Inconsistency,” Globe and Mail, 5 April 2013, https://www.theglobeandmail.com /opinion/bairds-silence-on-abuses-in-bahrain-exposes-canadas-inconsistency /article10800026/. John Ibbitson, “How Harper Transformed Canadian Foreign Policy,” Globe and Mail, 31 January 2014; Canadian International Council, “Making Sense of Harper’s Foreign Policy,” video, 0:18:20, https://www.cpac.ca/episode?id=731ee0c1 -0ca1-4958-a9ca-5b91541993c5. For a discussion about hegemony in the Canadian party system, see Leon D. Epstein, “A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties,” American Political Science Review 58, no. 1 (1964): 46–59; Kenneth R. Carty, “Political Turbulence in a Dominant Party System,” Political Science and Politics 39, no. 4 (2006), 825–7; and Chapnick, “Peace, Order and Good Government,” 637. Stephen Harper, quoted in Paul Wells, “Harper’s Canadian Revolution,” Maclean’s, 17 September 2008, 18. Paul Wells, The Longer I’m Prime Minister: Stephen Harper and Canada, 2006 – (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2013), 53. Also see Darrell Bricker and John Ibbitson, The Big Shift: The Seismic Change in Canadian Politics, Business, and Culture and What It Means for Our Future (Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 2013). See News Staff, “Harper Introduces New MPS, Declares Conservatives ‘Canada’s Party,’” Toronto City News, 1 June 2011, https://toronto.citynews.ca/2011/06/01 /harper-introduces-new-mps-declares-conservatives-canadas-party/. Jeffrey Simpson, “It’s the Conservatives Who Changed to Fit Canada,” Globe and Mail, 25 July 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/its-conservatives -who-changed-to-fit-canada/article625882/. Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel, and Stéphane Paquin, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 4th ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 183–205. Wells, The Longer I’m Prime Minister, 33.

3 Bullies, Busywork, and Bureaucrats: Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years peter mckenna

From the moment the Stephen Harper Conservative government assumed power in February 2006, nervous public servants in Ottawa were bracing themselves for the worst.1 Late in the 2005–6 federal election campaign, Harper moved to mollify anxious Canadian voters by intimating that a potential Conservative Party majority government would be constrained by a L ­ iberal-appointed Supreme Court, Senate, and public sector bureaucracy.2 And in a 2007 interview with the CBC’s Rex Murphy, Harper responded to a query about what he had learned after one year in office by noting: “Probably the most difficult job, you know, practical difficult thing you have to learn as prime minister and ministers, our ministers as well, is dealing with the federal bureaucracy … It’s walking that fine line of, of being a positive leader of the federal public service, but at the same time pushing them and not becoming captive to them … I could write a book on that one.”3 None were probably more unsettled by Harper’s comments than the diplomats and foreign service officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). They were undoubtedly worried about the fact that Harper had travelled little outside the country before becoming prime minister; that he had expressed very little interest and curiosity about international affairs; and that he was known for his right-leaning ideological proclivities. One early indication that things would be difficult and challenging between Prime Minister Harper and officials in the Pearson Building in Ottawa came with Harper’s curt dismissal of a milquetoast statement from Foreign Affairs (now Global Affairs Canada under the Justin Trudeau Liberals) on the highly questionable March 2006 presidential elections in Belarus – which returned the thuggish and anti-democratic Alexander Lukashenko to power. Rather than single out Belarus’s Lukashenko for harsh criticism of his illiberal election practices and political intimidation, DFAIT issued a typical communiqué expressing “concern” about the election outcome and the treatment of political opponents. An angry Harper took one look at the press release, yelled

42  Peter McKenna

some expletives, and then sat down and crafted his own statement. In unusually harsh diplomatic language, Harper wrote that the elections were not democratic and that “I am shocked that a dictatorial and abusive regime such as this one can continue to exist in today’s Europe.”4 But the real kicker for Foreign Affairs was his off-hand comments to a staffer about departmental officials: “Just put it out. Don’t even tell Foreign Affairs. They can read it later. Maybe learn something.”5 It was a real wake-up call for Foreign Affairs and clearly set the tone of how the Harper government was going to conduct its foreign policy business. More to the point, it sent a potent signal about how the fashioning and implementation of Canadian foreign policy was changing, and, more ominously, what was likely to come. In a 2007 closed-door meeting with ethnic media in Toronto, Harper was quoted as saying: “Every government in every country  – all the leaders I’ve talked to  – complain to me that their foreign service wants to do what (it) believes is foreign policy, not what the government-of-the-day’s foreign policy is.”6 Part of this thinking stemmed from resistance in Foreign Affairs to Harper’s decision to recognize in April 2007 the estimated 1.5 million Armenians slaughtered in Turkey’s 1915 genocide. Harper apparently told that same June media roundtable that the “recognition of the Armenian genocide, frankly, was a major change in policy for the foreign service of Canada, not an easy one to understand. It has been difficult for some people. All I can say is this: The way we overcome this is to provide very strong direction.”7 Arguably, one of the tell-tale signs that relations between the Harper government and the foreign policy establishment were broken was the warm and enthusiastic cheering that greeted incoming Prime Minister Justin Trudeau when he convened a cabinet orientation session in the Pearson Building in early November 2015 (less than a month after the election). One long-time staffer, after viewing the swarming of Trudeau, a frenzy of hugs and selfies, and the booing of unwelcomed media questions about the lower salaries of female cabinet ministers, said that he had never seen anything like that in all of his years as a foreign service officer.8 In noticing the beaming faces of many relieved foreign service professionals, former ambassador to Egypt, Ferry de Kerckhove, remarked: “There’s no question that the victory of the Liberals (is) giving the department a second lease on life. And if (NDP leader Tom) Mulcair had won, it would probably be the same type of reaction.”9 Yet former diplomat Daryl Copeland was uneasy about Trudeau’s rock-star treatment and noted pointedly: “It was in poor taste and unfortunately provides grist to the mill for those who believe the public service has an agenda.”10 It was not surprising, then, that some former Canadian diplomats referred to the Harper years in power as the “the dark ages” or a “decade of darkness.”11 The purpose of this chapter is to explore in detail the relationship (or lack thereof)

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  43

between the Harper government (and the so-called centre) and officials within Canada’s foreign ministry during this dark period.12 It begins with a discussion of Harper’s initial foreign policy intentions and his (and his government’s) overall view of Canada’s foreign policy bureaucracy. It then moves on to analyze the perspective from inside the Pearson Building and what was underscoring its generally contemptuous assessment of the Harper centre (mainly the Prime Minister’s Office, the Privy Council Office, and the Foreign Affairs Minister’s Office). A careful examination of this prime ministerial-DFAIT (later changed to Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development or DFATD) disconnect and how that impacted the department itself and the conduct of Canadian foreign policy will also be undertaken. Lastly, the chapter concludes with a number of important observations about the Harper-Foreign Affairs chasm and what the implications of that difficult period have been for the initial Justin Trudeau Liberal government and Global Affairs. Stephen Harper’s Foreign Policy Mindset Although lacking in international experience, not unlike previous Canadian prime ministers, Stephen Harper was a quick learner and an inveterate reader of departmental briefing books.13 Prior to coming to power in February 2006, he already had some vague policy ideas  –  some were ideologically infused (reflecting Republican neo-conservative nostrums) and others were about the direction in which he would like to take Canada on the world stage.14 In a general sense, he wanted his government to move away from many of the liberal internationalist traditions and principles of Canadian foreign policy.15 There would also be a downgrading of nuanced diplomacy, of seeking balance, and of striving to get along with friend and foe and dispensing with any notion of Canada as a good international citizen.16 Accordingly, there would be much less emphasis on multilateralism and international organizations (especially the United Nations), honest brokering and helpful fixing through mediation (an idea often challenged by critics), bridge-building and international peacekeeping, and a retrenchment of foreign aid and working with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the international development community in Canada. And if the federal Liberals had concentrated historically on Africa, then the Harper government would emphasize Latin America and the Caribbean in its 2007 “Americas Strategy.”17 Harper, then, was intent on putting as much distance between previous Liberal government foreign policy traditions, ideas, goals, and myths and those of his own government.18 Instead, the Harper foreign policy ideas would mark a departure or “break” from the past; would be energetically and stubbornly applied; oftentimes be accompanied by an abrasive style and tone and a low tolerance for risk; and, from the very beginning, be fraught with inconsistencies and shortcomings.

44  Peter McKenna

The focus would be on Canada as a “warrior nation” (with “hard power” assets), as a country that sides with its friends and shuns its enemies (with an eye on domestic electoral calculations), and that hectors and lectures the world on the basis of a moral or “principled” framing of Canadian foreign policy (in a veritable world of white hats and black hats).19 As Globe and Mail columnist and author John Ibbitson explained: “What was elitist became populist; what was multilateral became self-assertive; what was cooperative became confrontational; what was foreign affairs became an extension of domestic politics.”20 That, in turn, would translate in policy-making terms into aligning Canadian interests (such as economic, diplomatic, and security considerations) with Western democracies – especially the United States and Britain (and to a lesser extent Australia) – and less of an interest in continental Europe and Africa.21 After strengthening relations with the US, the second key priority was warfighting (which warranted increased defence spending), and most assuredly not peace support, in deadly Afghanistan. This was followed by prioritizing the negotiation of free trade deals and displaying unwavering and unquestioning support of Israel, which marked a definite departure from Canada’s traditionally more “balanced” approach to the Middle East.22 Lastly, there would be more emphasis, as has happened during the John Diefenbaker years, on Canada’s North, its military presence there, and Arctic sovereignty in particular. Many of the central foreign policy aims of the Harper government, guided by extreme central control, remained unflinchingly persistent throughout its first five years in power. They would only be cemented further after the Conservatives won re-election and a majority government in May of 2011. This was confirmed when an emboldened Prime Minister Harper spoke to the party’s national convention in June and said bluntly to the adoring crowd: “We know where our interests lie and who are friends are. And we take strong, principled positions in our dealings with other nations – whether popular or not … And that is what the world can count on from Canada!”23 He made a point of saying to loud applause that Canada had a distinct purpose in Foreign Affairs. “And that purpose is no longer just to go along to get along with everyone else’s agenda. It is no longer to please every dictator with a vote at the United Nations.”24 He then went on to add: “I confess that I don’t know why past attempts to do so were ever thought to be in Canada’s national interests.”25 In the wake of Canada’s failed 2010 attempt to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, the watchwords for the Harper Conservatives from 2011 until their electoral defeat in late 2015 were that “Canada no longer goes along to get along.” Additionally, it is fair to say that Prime Minister Harper held a dim perception of government itself, a deep scepticism about the bureaucracy, and a particularly negative view of Canada’s overly expensive foreign ministry. In his mind, the influential bureaucracy, especially those in Foreign Affairs, would be

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  45

resistant to change and pose a major problem in terms of blocking the implementation of a conservative-minded legislative and international agenda.26 In the words of one former Canadian diplomat who had a brief encounter with Harper in 2006, he said that the prime minister immediately told him: “You’re here to tell me things that won’t fit with our policy agenda.”27 (After all, it was chock full of Liberal Party sympathizers and “Liberal pinkos,” small “l” liberals in senior management positions, and, most important, “Pearson Liberals” in Foreign Affairs.28) For Harper, then, there was an abiding suspicion and distrust of Foreign Affairs (though he did trust certain individual officers), and the two never clicked from the outset.29 It was also the case that many around Harper, and perhaps Harper himself, were disappointed in Foreign Affairs. There was a feeling among some that the department had become comfortably complacent, slow in responding to requests and that they were not getting the advice that they wanted. This, in turn, merely reconfirmed for them their suspicions about a Foreign Affairs bias and the flimsy charge that it was deliberately hiding things from them.30 Others began wondering if the department was capable of actually coming up with some novel thinking on foreign policy, since the briefing books were supposedly devoid of new ideas and fresh policy innovation. As one former Canadian diplomat confided about the Harper attitude: “Foreign Affairs still didn’t get it. Where were the ideas? What are you hearing from ambassadors? There was nothing coming from the department.”31 Furthermore, there was more to Harper’s mistrust of Foreign Affairs than the typical concerns expressed about loyalties by previous incoming Progressive Conservative governments like John Diefenbaker and Brian Mulroney and his own minority government status. The department was, according to former Canadian diplomat Colin Robertson, seen as “whiny, leaky, barely competent and untrustworthy.”32 Harper was also worried about DFAIT’s obstructionist nature, its penchant for needless delays, and its irritating tactic of proffering a host of reasons why something should not or could not be done. He thought that foreign service officers were overly arrogant, that they felt that they should have the run of things in Ottawa and that they invested far too much stock in traditional “soft power” approaches to diplomacy.33 Moreover, there was a palpable sense of resentment among the Harperites towards Canadian diplomats because they were thought to be privileged elites, who spent too much time on the wine and cheese cocktail circuit, and were essentially the spoiled children of Canada’s public service.34 As Harper saw things, those in Foreign Affairs needed to be briskly put in their place, to be taken down a notch or two, and, according to one former diplomat, to “sock it to these guys.”35 Perhaps the most striking and damaging manifestation of the Harper government’s low regard for the Foreign Service was its lack of respect (some say hostility) for the institution. Like Parliament and the courts, Harper seemed

46  Peter McKenna

intent on running down Foreign Affairs, starving it of sufficient budgetary resources, and minimizing its role in the crafting of Canadian foreign policy. And this Conservative government  – unlike the one during the Mulroney years  – certainly was not inclined or even interested in getting professional advice from the Foreign Service. As one former Canadian diplomat quipped: “The attitude was: ‘Who elected you? We already know what we think.’”36 But it was the disrespect, poor treatment, and outright nastiness towards foreign service officers that really damaged relations between the Harper government and Foreign Affairs. One shell-shocked and senior diplomat recalled an incident in which he was raising legitimate questions about the efficacy of Canada siding with Britain over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas territorial dispute – especially given the government’s official intent to enhance relations with the Americas. In response, one junior staffer in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) turned and blurted out: “Are you some kind of fucking rogue diplomat out here?”37 Needless to say, that was the abrupt end of that conversation. While the tightly controlled Harper centre dismissed most of the advice coming from Foreign Affairs – or never asked for it in the first place – it definitely wanted officials to implement its policy initiatives and preferences fully. Officials knew full well that there was never any doubt about that. In the words of one former Canadian ambassador: “You just said, ‘Yes, Minister. How high do I  jump?’”38 The Harper people were not interested in hearing about ­evidence-based reasoning, counter-arguments, alternative options, or sermons about what the implications of a certain action would be.39 Another former foreign service officer was less than diplomatic in his characterization of this overly restrictive policy-making process: “We were told to shut up and do it … just implement it.”40 But that was largely the extent to which the department was actually utilized and tapped into by the Harper government. The View from inside “‘Fort Pearson” One of the most distinguishing and disturbing features of the Harper government was the manner in which political staffers from “the centre” or from the actual Foreign Affairs Minister’s Office – much more so than years passed – involved themselves directly in the policy-making process. It was not uncommon for deputy ministers (DMs) and assistant deputy ministers (ADMs), certainly in the beginning, to be completely frozen out, marginalized, and even circumvented. Additionally, members of the department who were asked to send their policy recommendations up the line often found themselves getting a dressing down from a junior political staffer for giving advice that went against the general thrust of the Harper government’s wishes.41 Political staffers, mostly twenty-somethings with very little experience, would routinely dispense policy direction to senior foreign service officers.42 As one former diplomat observed:

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  47

“They simply told us what they wanted from us. There would be no options going up from below. We would receive instructions from them. Staffers were basically telling us what they wanted to hear, what to write, and what to recommend.”43 And it was not out of the ordinary for these same staffers to upbraid or scold, sometimes publicly, Foreign Affairs officials from the ambassadoriallevel downward.44 In one instance, a Canadian diplomat operating in the Middle East was instructed by a staffer to have buses made available for Canadians so that they could travel safely to Lebanon in 2012. When the senior official demurred, the staffer replied: “Look, the political side thinks this should be done!”45 End of conversation. It was abundantly clear to many members of the department – particularly at the higher levels – that these young staffers had too much power and regularly overextended their authority. They would constantly throw their weight around when addressing departmental members and often say, especially under John Baird, that “they were acting in the minister’s name.”46 It was a total undermining of the Westminster model of public administration in which many of them had become accustomed. They had been schooled on the proper chain of command, the need for accountability, and the separation of foreign service officers from intermingling with the political side. For them, that was strictly the purview of the deputy minister or senior management. It thus came as a shock or a rude awakening when they got calls from junior staffers to implement this or that policy measure, instead of hearing about this change first from their immediate superior. But as one old Foreign Affairs hand remarked: “When I called headquarters for clarification, all I got was that this is how business is being done right now.”47 These officers were not only offended by this conduct, but they saw it as challenging or going against their values and personal ethics. Even though it was going on much of the time, they viewed these political staffers as clearly working outside of the public policy box or proper protocol. In one case on the trade side, a junior staffer had to be disciplined for rudely insisting on controlling the messaging around a very complicated trade dispute with the US. As it turned out, the political staffer was completely wrong and had little knowledge of the subject matter or the very technical nature of the issues at hand. Yet that person, who was eventually reined in, “was basically trying to tell a senior Canadian trade official how to do his job.”48 In fact, the departmental hierarchy was oftentimes never fully respected and these staffers were effectively seeking to do the jobs of senior Canadian diplomats. One former diplomat recalled how a zealous staffer overstepped when he issued a directive in 2011 about plans to evacuate Libya and to ensure the safety of all Canadians there. In his estimation: “I was already managing the situation effectively. It was my job to do that.”49 Although it is unclear how common and widespread this practice was across government, there were instances when junior staffers participated directly

48  Peter McKenna

in informal departmental policy discussions. They also sat in on interdepartmental meetings on a wide cross-section of issue areas involving Russia and the Middle East.50 Their direct involvement in the process of government was intended to send a message about how the Harper centre wanted things done or not done (that is, setting policy at the departmental level). The result of their attendance often placed a damper on what tended to be typically free-flowing and wide-ranging departmental policy meetings on possible responses.51 It was clear that those types of cost-benefit analysis discussions were to be discouraged under Harper. In fact, people felt uncomfortable and somewhat intimidated with political staffers actually sitting in the room, taking notes, and monitoring the proceedings, and then offering policy input. One former diplomat compared the involvement of ministerial staffers in the policy-making process as reminiscent of the commissar system in the former Soviet Union, where political officers insinuated themselves into many areas of the government to ensure political and ideological control.52 One other senior Canadian foreign service officer also talked about young political staffers “bombarding” the department with requests and specific demands for information. During one policy meeting held abroad, inexperienced political staffers participated on the session via teleconference and videoconference and were not shy about suggesting specific policy actions to be taken. In some instances, the advice offered made little practical sense – ­betraying an obvious lack of experience and maturity, knowledge and understanding, and even accountability.53 He had never seen this degree of direct engagement by staffers in the governmental policy process before. This did not happen with previous governments, he confided, because “we were allowed to lead from the field or someone in Ottawa (at headquarters) would make the call.”54 In addition, in many of the personal interviews conducted for this chapter, current and former foreign service officers spoke about a palpable “climate of fear” within the department.55 After seeing what had happened to other colleagues (or hearing about similar stories from others) who had been poorly treated by political staffers, foreign service officers were understandably nervous about sending up the line sound, non-partisan policy recommendations that the government did not want to see. And as one former Canadian official suggested: “They weren’t afraid to put their elbows out.”56 Foreign Affairs officials would be dressed down regularly for not realizing that there would be little need for any “upward bound information.” There would be a defined set of key policy issues, values, and approaches that would essentially be pushed or forced downward into the overall system.57 Deputy Minister Peter Boehm, a senior Canadian foreign policy official and Justin Trudeau’s G7 sherpa for the June 2018 Summit in Quebec, spoke about the difficult years under Harper at a United Nations Association of Canada panel in Ottawa on the barriers for women in the diplomatic corps in March 2018. In his unusually blunt words:

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  49

“I don’t want to get political, but I will for a moment. So for 10 years, anything that the foreign service was doing was suppressed in our country  … Part of what we need to do is provide fearless policy advice and loyal implementation and we had lost the capacity. Those muscles, those policy muscles had atrophied to a degree and now they’re active again and on gender equality this is but an example of that.”58 After a while, many officials had little choice – especially if they wanted to advance their careers forward in DFAIT – but to frame their policy advice in terms of what the centre wanted to hear, as opposed to what it needed to hear in terms of evidence-based reasoning.59 There would be less and less of “speaking truth to power” during the Harper years than in previous governments. Indeed, foreign service officers were basically afraid to do so. Many no doubt read about the harsh treatment meted out in the newspapers – expressed mostly by staffers in both the PMO and Minister Baird’s office  – about a senior Canadian diplomat allegedly “going rogue” over a North Korean diplomat in Geneva. The diplomat would eventually feel the wrath of political staffers in the Minister of Foreign Affair’s Office for going off message and saying something complimentary to one of the Harper government’s purported “enemies” (North Korea, in this case). Of course, it was normal diplomatic protocol from the department’s standpoint to occasionally articulate these types of congratulatory comments about a foreign diplomat leaving as head of an international body. Not anymore. It just happened to be the wrong country as far as the centre was concerned. Evidently, senior management at headquarters in Ottawa were ducking (from Harper’s anticipated ire), or promptly getting out of the way, and effectively hung the diplomat out to dry.60 Though he was not contacted directly by Baird’s people or the PMO, staffers from his office made an angry B-line to the Clerk of the Privy Council, who subsequently indicated the displeasure of the centre to the DM of Foreign Affairs. While the diplomat in question was not punished directly by the Conservative government, and the whole issue eventually died out, he still has the “scars” today to remind him of that rather nasty incident.61 Another element of the Harper government’s management style that perturbed foreign policy officials, though less out of fear than frustration, was its strict messaging control system. Many saw it as nothing short of muzzling, a gag order, or what one seasoned diplomat characterized as “taking the public microphone out of our hands.”62 The so-called Message Event Proposal (MEM) system, as extensively detailed by columnist and author Lawrence Martin, was a “straitjacket strategy” and system of oversight and message control.63 (The idea was to ensure that outspoken, and perhaps undisciplined, Canadian diplomats did not inflict media damage on a vulnerable Conservative minority government.) In the end, every single public pronouncement by a public servant, military official, or diplomat would need to be first approved by the PMO or Privy

50  Peter McKenna

Council Office (PCO).64 They would all have to fill out the copious MEM forms and submit them for proper vetting by the centre. “This form had sections with such titles as Desired Headline, Strategic Objective, Desired Sound Bite, and the like. It also had areas for supplying details on the speaking back drop, the ideal event photograph, and even the speaker’s wardrobe,” writes Martin.65 As far as Foreign Affairs was concerned, the communications strategy was overly cumbersome, impractical and – most of all – unworkable and damaging to Canada’s overall interests. All of those interviewed for this chapter had “horror stories” to speak of, difficult conversations with the centre over MEM-related incidents and getting approval for speeches at public events and lamented the severe downgrading of “public diplomacy.”66 Many of them were perplexed over not being able to explain Canada to whatever country they were posted to, about not being in a position to outline to the media what Canada’s interests were and about being constantly denied the opportunity to brand Canada in a highly media-savvy world. Besides being interpreted in some quarters as a lack of trust in Canada’s diplomatic corps, it was mostly criticized for its denying diplomats the chance to act in real time (out in the field) and the precious opportunities that were lost because of needless justifications and a time-­ consuming approval process.67 One diplomat spoke about a huge opportunity for Canada’s ambassador to the US, Michael Wilson, who was to appear on a very popular TV program in Washington and to explain Canada to Americans. “But you ended up spending more time on the bloody forms and paperwork and not doing what you were supposed to be doing,” he declared.68 In the end, Wilson never did make the TV appearance. There were also many complaints about the sense of resentment, hostility, and bullying style that Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird brought to the ministry.69 Needless to say, he did not make a whole lot of friends in the Pearson Building. One diplomat vividly recalled one time when Baird casually remarked: “The policy is what I say it is.”70 But a more troubling criticism, besides his frequent “nightmarish” staff interventions, was Baird’s general lack of interest in routine administrative responsibilities. Apparently, he did not handle the paperwork side of things very well – particularly when it came to signing off on spending items. In some cases, diplomatic appointments were delayed that impacted people’s lives (i.e., the placing of children in schools, the renting of a house, and finding spousal employment) and programs sometimes ran out of funds or were cancelled outright. According to many officials, his office was a huge mess administratively. In one specific example, Baird’s office took over a year to eventually approve funding for a roughly $500,000 Organization of American States (OAS)-­ supported project – the Mission in Support of the Peace Process (MAPP) – to assist Colombia’s delicate peace process. Canadian diplomats were anxious to restore the funding  – and Colombian diplomats had certainly made their

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  51

displeasure known – but they were not even allowed to ask about the project and it never seemed to get past Baird’s staffers. It just sat on Baird’s desk (as DMs and ADMs in the department were effectively frozen out of the process) and the ­standard reply would belatedly comeback: “Still under consideration.”71 (The delays had little to do with the matters of Canadian foreign policy or even Canada’s vaunted Americas Strategy and more to do with balancing the federal budget and fulfilling an election promise.) In another incident, serious questions had been raised about the safety of Canada’s embassy compound in Kabul, Afghanistan. (There were major security issues around the compound in terms of personnel being exposed to potentially dangerous threats and situations.) While there were plans to construct a more secure structure, Baird expressed no interest in the project and would not authorize any expenditure of additional funds.72 Most foreign service officers understand that there is a transition period between any incoming and outgoing government irrespective of party political stripe – and they are prepared and committed as good public servants to implement the policy wishes of a new administration. While officials at DFAIT accepted this, however reluctantly under Harper’s reign, they were privately concerned and disappointed about the shift away from Canada’s traditional liberal internationalism, nuanced diplomacy or Pearsonian middle powerism (or anything with Pearsonian attached to it).73 One diplomat described it as “painful to watch” and “un-Canadian” to see Ottawa move away from multilateralism and “a constructive role of looking for solutions, building bridges and engaging in discussions that were natural to us and valued by other foreign governments.”74 Another current officer lamented the fact that Canada would not even participate in World Trade Organization (WTO) discussions (and it was not uncommon for Canadian officials to go to meetings without any instructions to say anything because the Minister of Foreign Affair’s Office had not got around to approving it) and “feed into issues that a collection of countries were working on … and to effect change in our favour.”75 Canada’s former ambassador to the OAS, the late Paul Durand, was even less kind when he wrote in 2015: “Internationally, Harper reduced Canada from a position of respect and constructive engagement to international insignificance, unrecognized and then ignored by its former friends and allies.”76 Former ambassador to China, David Mulroney, writes in his 2015 book about the turn away from seeking accommodation and “a willingness to listen, build trust, find allies and show some ability to compromise. Instead, we came to take pride in being among the first to close embassies, cut off dialogue and impose sanctions in the face of clearly unacceptable international behaviour … We seemed in danger of replacing international activism with mere rhetoric.”77 Accordingly, it was not a surprise to hear frequently – certainly over time – that morale within the department during the Harper years was poorer than it had been under previous governments.78 In many ways, their “reason for being,”

52  Peter McKenna

that is, to provide non-partisan, thoughtful and professional advice to the government of the day, was no longer appreciated and – more significantly – was being undermined on a daily basis. Officials were left with little choice but to self-censure themselves and to provide their political masters with what they wanted to hear and to offer justification after-the-fact once the policy decision had already been taken without any meaningful consultation with the department.79 Foreign service officers obviously felt underused, underappreciated, and left few options but to content themselves with “busywork” (i.e., writing reports to themselves, sending off detailed memos to headquarters knowing that they would go nowhere, and being reduced to a cog in the wheel of what one official labelled “a giant briefing shop”) as they kept their heads down.80 As one current foreign service officer remarked: “Your confidence gets taken away when you have to stop doing the things that you‘ve done before and found rewarding.” Another former Canadian diplomat put the depressing and unsettling working environment in these terms: “It was not a happy shop. You saluted and said: ‘Tell us what to do’ … You write pieces for yourself and get on with it.”81 In late 2009, morale and anxiety levels took another hit in the department when foreign service officer Richard Colvin was given a rough going over by both the Harper Conservatives and DFAIT senior management. As an intelligence officer, Colvin informed a parliamentary committee – in which he was instructed to testify before and not as a willing whistle-blower – about his experiences surrounding suspected Taliban militants being handed over to Afghan security forces for interrogation and detention. Word broke in 2007–8 that several of those prisoners or detainees turned over by members of the Canadian Armed Forces were subsequently tortured by Afghan intelligence interrogators. After testifying about the prisoner transfer, Colvin was vilified by Defence Minister Peter MacKay as essentially a Taliban sympathizer and largely unreliable. As one former Canadian diplomat acknowledged: “They basically crucified him and shredded his credibility as an intelligence officer and his standing with US intelligence agencies.”82 Some former officers were particularly upset over the fact that Colvin, having been “kicked publicly” and had his reputation and credibility undermined, had to go back to Afghanistan to operate in that extremely dangerous environment.83 The impact of the Colvin affair highlighted once more the broken nature of the relationship between the Harper government and the Foreign Service. For one, it sent a powerful message or “chill” through the ranks of the department, including the stark realization that if you do your job properly, tell the truth and report honestly, your boss is not going to defend you. (Some of those interviewed for this chapter believed that “careerism” was at play, where superior officers did not want to stick their own necks out and possibly jeopardize any chance at future advancement by siding with or defending Colvin.84) Foreign

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  53

service officers could read the writing on the wall: namely, be careful about speaking truth to power and not “pulling your punches,” avoid taking any risks and provoking retribution, and do not count on your minister or immediate superiors to have your back.85 In the words of one former Canadian official: “They basically threw him under the bus for saying things that they didn’t want to hear from us.”86 And one former Canadian diplomat summed up the whole sordid incident by saying succinctly: “It just reinforced the point: why do you want to work for these guys.”87 Former Canadian ambassador John Graham, who had a distinguished career in the department, said the mood in DFAIT went well beyond “mutual contempt” to something more deeper and “even sinister.” The Harper way of doing business had led to an erosion of values and inflicted substantial damage on the culture of the Foreign Service. In his 2015 book, Whose Man in Havana? Graham talks about deputy ministers (DMs) being dissuaded from asking awkward questions of cabinet ministers or of outlining the strengths and weaknesses of new foreign policy initiatives and of engaging in a “don’t rock the boat,” “no questions asked,” and “top down only” messaging approach to foreign policy-making.88 He and others worried about senior officials, with an eye to climbing the bureaucratic ladder or getting moved somewhere else, realizing that they had to do what their Conservative government bosses wanted them to do or they would not be sticking around very long. The contagion also flowed downward; it was recognized quickly by those at lower levels that they needed to get along with the Harperites, and it had a demoralizing effect on the entire department. As Graham explained: “Contamination seeps down the chain. The worst part of this corrosive dynamic is that after a number of years, it becomes ‘the new normal.’ With each passing year, fewer people in the business remember the former culture and its values.”89 Not surprisingly, the list of grievances against the Harper government was a long one where Foreign Affairs was concerned. There are far too many to list within the space constraints of a book chapter. But they do range from the major and fundamental “shock to the system” to the smallest and mundane personal slights. There were, of course, the damaging budget cuts from the very beginning of the Harper government to a drastic $300 million gash in the 2013 federal budget, the shutting down of the popular and effective Canadian Studies program abroad in 2012, the slashing of funding to some of Canada’s leading development NGOs like KAIROS, and the winding down of government-supported bodies like Rights and Democracy in Montreal and the Canadian Foundation for the Americas in Ottawa.90 The “glorification of the Canadian military” and the reintroduction of the “royal’ to branches of the armed forces, the embrace of the monarchy, and the replacement of the two historic Canadian coastal landscapes by Quebec artist Alfred Pellan in the foyer of the Pearson Building with a picture of the Queen (subsequently taken down by the

54  Peter McKenna

incoming Liberal government in November 2015), and the seeming attraction of “anything Diefenbaker” left many Foreign Affairs officials bewildered and wondering whether Canada had gone back in time. Finally, moves to sell off cherished Canadian diplomatic properties abroad, the merger of DFAIT and CIDA without any prior consultation, the avoidable April-September 2013 strike and rotating work stoppages at Foreign Affairs and the shrill Twitter comments by then president of the Treasury Board Tony Clement about “well paid” Canadian diplomats with salary top-ups for exotic foreign postings, and, lastly, the introduction of a “political” foreign policy adviser for Harper (an erstwhile Conservative party staffer) were all poorly received by the Foreign Service.91 Implications for Canada’s Core Interests in the World Given the hostile and often contemptuous relationship between the Harper Conservatives and the Department of Foreign Affairs, it raises a critical question: How did all of this impact the conduct of Canadian foreign policy and Canada’s standing in the world? One obvious area in which problems would be readily detectable would be in the actual implementation of Conservative government policy directives by Canadian foreign service officers. No one, of course, is suggesting here that members of the department sought to undermine, derail, or deliberately torpedo those directives through improper bureaucratic shenanigans. But it does seem glaringly obvious that the Harper centre seemed to forget that it was asking the same alienated individuals with whom they had a poisoned relationship to execute the government’s primary foreign policy aims – and to do so with enthusiasm and conviction. To be sure, it was a tall order to ask. Instead of taking advantage of the talent and human capital in the department, Harper’s centre consistently downgraded and denigrated this capacity and capability and essentially reduced officers to glorified, though disgruntled, implementers. And they made the job even more difficult by disrespecting the institution and silencing diplomats, denying the department sufficient funding and not giving officers the proper tools to work with, thus rendering established programs unworkable and creating an unhealthy work environment.92 Part of the problem with treating the foreign service in this manner is that it leads inevitably to a deterioration in the department’s policy analysis capabilities. By enforcing a strict top-down approach, the Harper government undermined bureaucratic processes that would have enabled officers to play a larger role in decision-making, would have allowed for problems at the lower levels to be resolved more quickly, and, most important, would have led to the formulation of better foreign policy decisions and actions. In the case of China, as David Mulroney has pointed out, the Chinese ambassador to Canada was

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  55

listened to, respected, and given more face time with Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs than with officials from his own department.93 “It was as if it was more damning to be suspected of having liberal sympathies than it was to actually be a Communist, and as if the Canadian government was intent on conducting foreign policy without its public service,” he writes.94 The problem, of course, is that the Chinese ambassador is not exactly a neutral or unbiased source of information and advice. And that is precisely why you have a respected, dedicated, and professional Foreign Service, as Mulroney argues, so as to provide that expertise and experience, the best advice for dealing with the diplomats from other countries, and to prepare a minister for grappling with important bilateral issues. In the absence of that, policy mistakes and blunders on the world stage can and will occur. When asked about specific aspects of where Canadian foreign policy had gone astray under Harper, a number of former Canadian diplomats pointed immediately to our China policy. Because of the disconnect between the Foreign Service and the Harper centre, Mulroney argued that Canada’s approach to China was needlessly muddled and disjointed. Against the professional advice coming from the department, the Harper Conservatives initially moved away from a policy of mostly friendly engagement with China (under the Chrétien and Martin Liberals) towards something more critical and deeply infused with human rights considerations. In fact, the Harper government viewed those in Foreign Affairs who wanted to retain the pre-2006 China policy as “Pearsonalities” and essentially holdovers from the Liberal years in power.95 There was not much that the Foreign Service could do about the determination of the Harper centre to make human rights (and thus a predilection not “to chase the almighty dollar,” as Harper once said) one of the key drivers of its China policy. “The department was mainly seen by the new government as a collection of incompetent and politically unreliable people, useful only for carrying out very specific and carefully monitored tasks,” Mulroney explains.96 And one of those monitored tasks, against departmental importunities, was most assuredly not embracing a tougher stance towards Communist China – which only served, at least initially, to anger the Chinese leadership in Beijing, to delay Canada’s entry into the Chinese marketplace, and to set Canada’s relations with China on a backward trajectory. Canada’s failure in its October 2010 bid to get elected to a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council  – losing to an economically and socially troubled Portugal – was another illustration of a difficult Harper-Foreign Service relationship. According to Mulroney, Harper was not initially inclined to pursue this initiative, but he went against his better judgment and eventually came around. Once again, he was told by Canadian diplomats that securing the seat was important to Canada’s profile in the world and to the advancement of Canada’s core foreign policy interests. Still, Harper was decidedly unconvinced.

56  Peter McKenna

But  he was more perturbed by the fact that people in Foreign Affairs were advising him that being perceived by the international community as too proIsrael would undermine Canada’s UN bid. As Mulroney contends, “He was frustrated by persistent efforts by Foreign Affairs to discourage him from taking firm measures in support of Israel, an orientation that was at the heart of his and his party’s convictions, a core interest.”97 In the end, a large number of Muslin-dominated states – to say nothing of the Arab world – voted against the Canadian candidacy.98 Many current and former foreign service officers saw Canada’s defeat as a major embarrassment for Canada and an indictment of Harper’s flawed foreign policy posture. One former Canadian diplomat suggested that one of the main reasons why Canada’s UN Security Council effort failed was because the Harper government never really understood how to make full use of the Foreign Service to implement properly its foreign policy initiatives.99 Yet another argued that Harper actually blamed the Foreign Service afterwards for not doing its job in securing Canada’s seat, even though it was the prime minister himself who rejected much of the strategic advice on the UN file coming from the Pearson Building.100 Opting to go against Canada’s multilateralist impulses, its longstanding commitment to the UN and the urgings from DFAIT officials all damaged Canada’s standing with UN member states, which felt slighted by Harper’s critical remarks about the world body and his decision to avoid speaking at the UN during many of its fall opening sessions. In addition, Harper simply rejected advice from the Foreign Service on maintaining Canada’s development assistance spending in Africa, CIDA funding for the Palestinian Authority, and exhibiting more robust action on global climate change – which all contributed in some way to those affected countries and their friends deciding, in the end, to support Portugal over Canada. A number of those interviewed for this chapter identified a series of specific and less high profile foreign policy mishaps that damaged Canada’s presence on the world stage.101 But because of space constraints, only a few of them will be discussed in the following paragraphs. In one case, the minister then responsible for CIDA, Bev Oda (who eventually was forced to resign from cabinet with a dark cloud hanging over her) had been given orders from Harper’s PMO “to sort out the mess at CIDA.”102 Against the best professional advice coming from the development agency, which was frequently discouraged in many instances, Minister Oda gave instructions to incredulous CIDA officials in the late 2000s to terminate all of Canada’s bilateral aid programming to regional initiatives in the Caribbean (such as the regional training of judges) – much to the displeasure of a host of Caribbean micro states. From now on, the Harper government would view each one of them, for purposes of aid distribution, as strictly countries and not smaller members of a larger region. According to another former senior CIDA official, it turned out to be an extremely harmful policy decision,

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  57

and one that had very negative implications for Canada’s overall relations with the Caribbean, a region where Ottawa has historically had some influence to wield.103 As far as he was concerned, and in the absence of any consideration of the ramifications and options of such a program change, “Canada had no clout, had lost its regional identity, and is still paying the price today.”104 When it came to the Organization of American States (OAS), just like other multilateral forums, the Harper government considered it a useless “talk shop” that accomplished precious little. So rather than listen to Canada’s OAS mission in Washington, which has had a long and highly successful record in working through the OAS and its agencies to observe general elections throughout the Americas, the Harper government summarily dismissed their counsel. In the case of a democratically challenged Haiti, then, the Harper Conservatives chose to work outside of the OAS process, which had come to rely heavily on Canada’s assistance and support on electoral matters in Haiti since the early 1990s.105 But the decision ultimately came out of Baird’s office and with no request for any advice or input from Canada’s OAS delegation. Instead, the government was determined to have “independent” Canadian monitors instead, perhaps for domestic political purposes given the Haitian diaspora in Montreal, participate in electoral observation activities in Haiti – as it had done in Ukraine as well. Not only was it a questionable break with the past, inefficient, and financially wasteful but it also effectively side-lined already established OAS mechanisms. Canadian officials, when questioned about the change from past practices by senior OAS staffers, could only respond by saying: “The government wanted to go in a different direction.”106 Needless to say, the top leadership and many member states of the OAS were deeply disappointed in the Harper government’s actions and it hurt Canada’s place in the hemispheric body. “It was a dumb policy that had to be later explained to a less than amused OAS,” one former Canadian diplomat declared angrily.107 The tiny, impoverished country of Haiti was also the source of another foreign policy opportunity missed during the Harper years. In the wake of the 2010 earthquake that devastated Haiti, and the Harper government’s commendable initial response to the humanitarian crisis, it allowed its ideological predilections to get in the way of a promising joint proposal with the Cuban government to set up a health project in Haiti. Once again, the recommendation from Canadian officials in Havana, who had been first approached by the Cubans to see whether Canada might be interested, was to take full advantage of this opportunity. As far as the embassy in Havana was concerned, the rationale was simple: it would greatly assist the Haitians in a time of medical need, improve relations with Cuba and even open up the possibility of a further strengthening of bilateral relations, and it would bolster the Harper government’s strategy to enhance and deepen Canada’s linkages with the Americas. But the Harper centre was not interested, and the Cubans went ahead and implemented a hugely

58  Peter McKenna

successful health care project on their own. In the words of one former Canadian diplomat: “When word came back from CIDA, no was the answer. It never got off the ground because the Harper government did not want to cooperate with the Cubans.”108 In terms of Canada’s relations with its most important ally, the United States, many former diplomats argued that Harper dropped the ball badly on the Canada-US file. It was quite apparent that Harper did not listen to the advice coming from the department on how best to manage bilateral relations with Washington. Accordingly, relations with the US were damaged (and thus Canada’s influence in the world was also diminished), especially over the Keystone XL pipeline issue, and only served to annoy US President Barack Obama – as Bratt explains in his chapter. Here was a case where Prime Minister Harper, for largely domestic political reasons, allowed the single issue of an oil pipeline to dominate the relationship instead of compartmentalizing it and working with the Americans on a host of other issues important to Canada – like a thickening border, “Buy America” provisions, softwood lumber and the Windsor-Detroit bridge project. As one former diplomat observed, “Obama simply ended up cutting Harper out altogether.”109 This all raises another interesting question: Were opportunities lost or missed by Canada on the world stage during Harper’s almost ten years in office? Some former foreign service officers lamented the fact that Canada could have done so much more in international affairs. During the “Great Recession” of 2008–9, some former diplomats maintained that Canada could have been a role model and the one country that others could emulate. But the Harper government did not like internationalism and had trouble getting along with a number of world leaders (including US President Barack Obama). One former Canadian diplomat was particularly pointed: “De-emphasis and contempt for multilateralism doesn’t work well for a middle power like Canada.”110 Instead, Canada needed to invest in this type of diplomatic tool, to engage in multilateralism and to recognize that it serves Canadian interests. But as one current foreign service officer explained, by not doing so, and by devaluing our “soft power” assets, it made it difficult for Canada to make its voice and presence felt in the world.111 Several current and former members of the department said that it is hard for Canada to have influence globally when you are constantly annoying the diplomats from so many other countries in the world. (One former diplomat mentioned that ambassadors in Ottawa from a host of Middle East countries had requested a meeting with Prime Minister Harper, “but were essentially told to bugger off.”112) One current foreign service officer argued that Canada’s influence had been eroded because we had not bothered to show up at the table – or, if we did, had very little of value to add.113 For him and others interviewed, it was really an issue of credibility, and how Canada’s foreign policy capacity had

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  59

been gradually devalued over the years. As one current officer remarked: “Why would they (other diplomats) talk to us? Why would they waste their time? And so they just started to ignore us.”114 So our reputation internationally suffered, along with any influence or leverage that we might have had, as Canada came to be seen as an unreliable partner. “When Canada goes to ask for things from other countries,” one current official said, “the answer is not going to be yes and thus all this is ultimately damaging to Canadian interests.”115 The advice from the department was clear: To get things done and to advance Canada’s objectives, Canada needed to work with other like-minded countries, to stay away from trying to exert raw power and force and to adopt a reasonable and pragmatic approach. Simply put, the Harper approach of talking tough and practising obstructionism cost the country in terms of respectability and thus made it difficult for Canada to make any progress globally. To summarize, and from a big picture standpoint, the overwhelming consensus from the interviews of former Canadian diplomats was that Canada’s image and influence on the international stage had been severely diminished during the Harper period. Not utilizing Canada’s professional Foreign Service to its full extent certainly contributed to this decline. So, too, did sharp cuts to the Foreign Service and the development assistance budget, engaging in mean-spirited bullying of experienced foreign service officers, disrespecting their diplomatic craft, and denying them opportunities to practise valuable public diplomacy. Diminishing Canada’s diplomatic footprint abroad, working to obstruct the implementation of actions by various multilateral institutions (and siding with the “white hats” over the “black hats”), not approving funding for initiatives or cutting it outright from established programs abroad, and dispensing with nuanced diplomacy were all considered to be contributing factors. While not all of the explanatory variables are clear, there was a strong sense from Ottawa officialdom that Canada’s standing and status under Harper had slipped noticeably. Conclusion Amid the initial clamour from the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau that “Canada is back,” there were some signs that the government understood the damage that had been inflicted on the country’s Foreign Service during the Harper period.116 In a November 2015 letter sent to Canadian diplomats working abroad, Trudeau said this was a “new era” and that he would be relying heavily on their advice, judgment, and public engagement to help advance Canada’s interests in the world. As the letter emphasized: “I expect that you will be engaged energetically in public diplomacy with other diplomats, host government officials, civil society, and the media – in all manner of ways – through direct contact, the media, and social media.”117 It went on to say reassuringly: “My cabinet colleagues and I  will be relying on your judgment, insights,

60  Peter McKenna

discretion, and work ethic in advancing our interests. I have every confidence that your reporting and our interactions when I am abroad will provide a critical, factual basis for our policies.” In another section, the letter makes perfectly clear: “Most immediately, I will be engaging with my counterparts in the coming weeks on such critical issues as climate change, international security, and the global economy. As a Canadian Head of Mission, you have a critical role in explaining Canada’s renewed engagement on these issues.” Under the Trudeau Liberals, then, the message sent was unequivocal: “Today begins a new era in Canadian international engagement. You are experienced, skilled professionals, and some of Canada’s best assets internationally. Under my leadership, you will have a government that believes in you and will support you in your work around the world.” One relieved Canadian diplomat was quoted as saying: “It’s a breadth of fresh air and a completely new style – an inspiring expression of trust and confidence in us.”118 While the “shit-kicking” and personal nastiness by staffers has stopped under the Trudeau Liberals (and professional advice has been welcomed by most accounts), all is still not well within the Global Affairs Department. In fact, the controlling ways of the Minister of Foreign Affair’s Office – including the lack of information trickling down to foreign service officers and the centralization of the decision-making process within the office of former Global Affairs Ministers Chrystia Freeland and François-Philippe Champagne and now Marc Garneau – continues under the Liberal government.119 Indeed, the Global Affairs Minister’s Office is still very powerful; there is not a great deal of communication of decisions downward through the ranks and senior managers continue to pick and choose what advice is being forwarded upwards. Moreover, advice that is now bubbling up from the Foreign Service, as it was under the Harper government, is being phrased in a way that the Trudeau people and the Global Affairs Minister’s Office want to hear. As one mid-level foreign service officer remarked: “The animosity is not there and it’s not that they (the Liberals) don’t trust the advice that they are being given – that’s all gone. But the management style and culture remains the same, and it’s the fallout from the Harper years, when you had to present information in a certain way.”120 Still, the Trudeau management style is a far cry from the hardline and distrusting approach adopted by the incoming Harper government back in early 2006. Indeed, the Harperites had an obvious chip on their shoulders. Neither did the Trudeau letter resemble the disrespectful, dismissive, and berating mode of operation that was typically practised by the staffers from the Harper centre and the Foreign Affairs Minister’s Office. (One former Canadian diplomat uncharitably characterized them as the “non-thinking Praetorian Guard.”121) Upon reflection, it is hard to imagine how the Harper government approach of completely marginalizing, silencing, and bullying foreign service officers was supposed to serve any purpose other than fulfilling their own worst

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  61

fears upon entering office – namely, that those in DFAIT are not with us and they are not reliable. To be sure, the cumulative effect of continuously degrading and demoralizing Canadian foreign policy officials took a huge toll on the overall department. In the words of one former DFAIT official: “It was one thing after another. They were getting the shit kicked out of them.”122 Not surprisingly, there were few complimentary remarks from those interviewed for this chapter about much of the Harper government’s foreign policy record.123 One former departmental official said that the Harper government’s foreign policy posture was “seriously counterproductive and damaging to Canadian interests and priorities.”124 The three areas, though, where grudging kudos were forthcoming were in the promotion of free trade expansion, the Beyond the Border initiative with the US, and Harper‘s signature child and maternal health initiative for the Global South.125 In terms of Arctic sovereignty, human rights, Russia, and relations with the Americas, many commented that it was more rhetoric than substance – and very little implementation of concrete and lasting measures. As one former Canadian diplomat observed wryly: “When your Americas strategy is praised by Honduras – a government that came to power in a military coup in 2009 – you know that you’re in trouble.”126 Moreover, one of the most common criticisms directed at the Harper Conservatives’ foreign policy was that it was mostly about domestic politics and currying favour with the various diaspora in Canada.127 (Interestingly, the Harper government could be more ideological in matters of Foreign Affairs because it was less constrained by domestic electoral pressures to be more moderate and pragmatic in its thinking.) Others pointed to the constant moralizing, the preaching, and the hectoring of this and that group and organization, and how it undermined Canada’s overall diplomatic effectiveness abroad. One former member of the department put it this way: “I just couldn’t take it any longer hearing that credo about ‘we don’t go along to get along’ nonsense.”128 One is hard-pressed, then, to see how anything positive or redeeming could come out of what some have described in the interviews as a dark, nasty, and mean-spirited period.129 The hostility, contempt and “contamination” (and loss of institutional values) was hardly conducive to a healthy working environment. Though they undoubtedly served the Harper government loyally, it could not have been easy to implement (and that was mostly all they could do as foreign service officers) many of its foreign policy priorities and initiatives. Furthermore, as an overly self-righteous and “principled” government, coupled with a muzzled and hobbled Canadian Foreign Service, they had a challenging time doing their job of maintaining and cultivating friends in the community of states. Even traditional allies and partners could not recognize the country and kept wondering what was happening to Canada’s role in the world. And as was demonstrated in the interview material over and over again, much of this conduct actually undermined or damaged Canada’s core political-diplomatic,

62  Peter McKenna

economic, and security interests. In the end, Canada lost credibility and influence on the world stage, forgot who it was, repeatedly annoyed diplomats from other countries, and thus was often ignored itself on key international issues. Its reputation and image within multilateral fora was clearly tarnished. All in all, it was not exactly a stellar period for the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. Lastly, and arguably most important, the Harper government’s hostility towards the Foreign Service never seemed to waver over time or come to respect and appreciate the value of Foreign Affairs. After almost ten years in power, the Harper centre remained consistently distrustful, disdainful, and dismissive of most people in the department. In the penetrating words of one former departmental official: “The deep suspicions about the loyalties of the Foreign Service remained. It was congenital to some ministers. They didn’t get over it.”130 Former prime ministers Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Joe Clark, and Brian Mulroney all came into office highly suspicious of the foreign policy bureaucracy, but they eventually came to recognize that they needed it, came to value its advice and judgment, and actually came to rely on its talent, expertise, and diplomatic skills. As one former diplomat similarly explained: “It [the approach] changed with Mulroney over time, but it was more than that with Harper. It went much deeper. It was more ideological and right-leaning.”131 But Harper, according to another former foreign service officer, “simply refused to learn and never evolved.”132 And, in the end, Canada’s foreign policy and standing abroad suffered for it. NOTES 1 On the strained relationship between the public service and the Harper government, see David Zussman, “Stephen Harper and the Federal Public Service: An Uneasy and Unresolved Relationship,” in Jennifer Ditchburn and Graham Fox, eds., The Harper Factor: Assessing a Prime Minister’s Policy Legacy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 44–61. Also see, Kathryn May, “Harper’s Suspicions of PS Hint of Rocky Relations to Come,” Ottawa Citizen, 18 January 2006, A4; Ish Theilheimer, “Work Grinds to a Halt in Harper’s Civil Service,” Straight Goods News, 25 November 2010; and Jeffrey Simpson, “Civil Servants Can `Speak Truth to Power,’ but Will They Be Heard,” Globe and Mail, 13 July 2007, A15. For a contrasting view, see Taylor Blewett, “Harper’s Dissatisfied Public Servant More Myth than Reality, New Research Shows,” Ottawa Citizen, 2 January 2019, A1. The research cited was from then-doctoral candidate Jocelyn McGrandle, who examined job satisfaction within the federal public service. It is worth noting, though, that neither the newspaper article nor the journal piece referenced a single interview with any member of the Foreign Service or its union. See McGrandle, “Job Satisfaction in the Canadian Public Service: Mitigating Toxicity with Interests,” Public Personnel Management 48, no. 3 (September 2019): 369–91.

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  63 2 Seeking to reassure nervous voters, Harper made the following case: “The reality is that we will have, for some time to come, a Liberal Senate, a Liberal civil service – at least senior levels have been appointed by the Liberals – and courts that have been appointed by the Liberals. So these are obviously checks on the power of a Conservative government.” Quoted in Gloria Galloway, Campbell Clark, and Brian Laghi, “Harper: Don’t Fear a Majority,” Globe and Mail, 18 January 2006, A1. One could also argue that a Harper government would be constrained by its minority status and its need to maintain the legislative backing of the other opposition parties. For more on the impact of Harper’s minority government and its foreign policy posture, see Adam Chapnick and Christopher J. Kukucha, eds., The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada’s Global Posture (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016). 3 Quoted in Susan Delacourt, “Tory Government Takes Aim at Bureaucracy,” Toronto Star, 17 January 2008, A16. 4 Quoted in Paul Wells, “Harper’s First 100 Days: Taking Charge,” Policy Options 27, no. 9 (November 2006): 87. 5 Ibid. 6 Quoted in Allan Woods, “PM, Public Servants at Odds over Policy,” Toronto Star, 25 June 2007, A1. 7 Ibid. 8 Julie Van Dusen, “Justin Trudeau Joyfully Mobbed by Federal Civil Servants,” CBC News, 6 November 2015, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-dion -duncan-civil-servants-cheered-pearson-1.3308271. 9 Quoted in Lee Berthiaume and Kathryn May, “Public Servants Shed Cloak of Impartiality – at Least for the Day,” Ottawa Citizen, 7 November 2015, A11. 10 Several foreign service officers whom I interviewed were less than impressed with this wild cheering and clapping as a bevy of officials surrounded Trudeau. Part of their chagrin flowed from the fact that it would only confirm in the minds of the former Harper government – erroneously of course – that the Foreign Service was indeed more partisan than professional. But as one long-serving former diplomat explained: “Though it did not speak well of them … that was what they felt, obviously. A dark and stormy night had passed” (confidential interview with a former foreign service officer, 12 July 2016). One former official called the late September 2015 leak of a Foreign Affairs document outlining Canada’s declining influence in the world – less than a month before the 19 October vote – “highly unprofessional,” clearly designed to hurt the Harper Conservatives’ campaign, and undoubtedly approved at a senior management level (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 13 June 2016). See Steven Chase and Shawn McCarthy, “Canadian Clout on Wane, Analysis Warns,” Globe and Mail, 28 September 2015, A1. 11 See Patrick Martin, “Ottawa Brings a Fresh Vibe to Festering Age-Old Issues,” Globe and Mail, 23 January 2016, A12; and Colin Robertson, “Diplomats Feel as

64  Peter McKenna Though They Are Emerging from a Decade of Darkness,” Globe and Mail, 7 June 2016, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/globe-politics-insider /diplomats-feel-as-though-they-are-emerging-from-a-decade-of-darkness/article30. Of course, not every single foreign service officer or diplomat had hard feelings for the Harper government. One current officer said that it was not unusual for a government – as experience in office grew over time – to not take advice from Foreign Affairs (confidential interview with a current foreign service officer, 1 June 2016). The Harper centre obviously had its favourites and some on the inside learned how to play the system once they understood the rules of the Harper game. Others, who were abroad or of a senior rank, and held similar views to those of Harper’s Ottawa, were often left alone. Much of this chapter is based on extensive, though confidential, interviews with almost twenty current and former members of the department in the spring and summer of 2016 and 2017. 12 It is worth emphasizing here that the shifting or concentration of decision-making power in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) was not something unique to the Harper Conservatives. It goes back at least as far as Pierre Elliott Trudeau and has continued ever since – to various degrees of policy control – right up to the current occupant of the office of prime minister. See, for example, Donald Savoie, Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). 13 Make no mistake, Harper himself set the key aims, direction and tone of Canadian foreign policy during his tenure in office. He also had people in the Privy Council Office and the PMO, former diplomats, members of his cabinet and party, and even grass-root supporters who helped shape his thoughts on matters of foreign policy (correspondence with Globe and Mail columnist and Harper biographer John Ibbitson, 22 July 2016). Others have been less charitable. One former Canadian diplomat remarked: “By marginalizing the professional foreign service and relying heavily on intuition and political instinct for foreign policy advice, an unfamiliar Canada was presented to the world” (confidential email correspondence with a former Canadian diplomat, 21 July 2016). 14 This point about Harper’s neoconservative agenda is discussed in Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel, and Stéphane Paquin, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 180–2. One former diplomat had this to say: “They were ideologically driven. They knew what they wanted and they just did it” (confidential interview with a former foreign service officer, 15 July 2016). Another former diplomat similarly noted: “The government didn’t need to ask questions because it already knew what it thought” (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 21 June 2016). In David Mulroney’s book, the former Canadian diplomat and foreign policy adviser to Harper pointed out that one of his jobs “was fending off the more ideologically extreme agendas of my ‘political’ counterpart.” Mulroney, Middle Power, Middle Kingdom (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2015), 19.

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  65 15 For further discussion, see Joe Clark, How We Lead (Toronto: Porter Books, 2014), and Paul Heinbecker, Getting Back in the Game (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2010). 16 Brooke Jeffrey points out that “diplomacy is clearly seen as yet another morally bankrupt liberal construct, which they have replaced with `principled’ policy decisions” in Dismantling Canada: Stephen Harper’s New Conservative Agenda (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 241. 17 See Peter McKenna, ed., Canada Looks South: In Search of an Americas Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013). 18 According to one former diplomat, anything to do with the previous Liberal governments – such as “human security,” anti-personnel landmines, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – was basically “the kiss of death” (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 22 August 2016). After endorsing the OAS Indigenous Charter in the mid-2000s, the incoming Harper government made the decision to disown one of Canada’s own hemispheric initiatives. While no reason or justification was ever given for the abrupt policy shift, it was clear to some Canadian officials that Prime Minister Harper wanted to move away from former prime minister Paul Martin’s focus on Indigenous issues (confidential interview with a former member of the department, 29 June 2016). 19 Of course, there is considerable disagreement on what exactly constitutes “principled” foreign policy behaviour. See Peter McKenna, “There Is Nothing Principled about Harper’s Foreign Policy,” Winnipeg Free Press, 22 April 2014, A10. John Ibbitson argues that it was his father Joe who inculcated in Stephen Harper the view that “foreign policy should be guided by values.” See John Ibbitson, Stephen Harper (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2015), 323. 20 John Ibbitson, “The Big Break: The Conservative Transformation of Canada’s Foreign Policy,” CIGI Papers, No. 29 (Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2014), 5. 21 See Lawrence Martin, Harperland (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2008), 79. 22 On relations with Israel, see Donald Barry, “The Harper Conservatives and Support for Israel,” American Review of Canadian Studies 12, no. 3 (Winter 2010): 121–38, and Patrick Martin, “Harper and Israel,” in Maureen Molot and Daryl Copeland, eds., Canada Among Nations (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 2010), 127–38. 23 See Prime Minister Stephen Harper, “Speech to the Conservative Party Policy Convention in Ottawa” (9 June 2011), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/harper -speech-fires-up-convention-crowd-1.976268. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 See Colin Robertson, “Rising Power: Stephen Harper’s Makeover of Canadian International Policy and Its Institutions,” in Jennifer Ditchburn and Graham Fox, eds., The Harper Factor: Assessing a Prime Minister’s Legacy (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2016), 102–4. 27 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 13 June 2016.

66  Peter McKenna 28 Lawrence Martin suggests that Harper was initially troubled by how the senior layers of the bureaucracy were populated by Liberal party hacks and former staffers of Liberal cabinet ministers. Martin, Harperland, 22. 29 One former Canadian ambassador recalled a briefing that he offered to provide Prime Minister Harper before his first G8 Summit meeting in Europe. He was insulted by the fact that Harper showed no interest in the briefing and had a dismissive attitude towards him. He remembers vividly Harper saying as he entered the hotel room: “Are we having a meeting just for the sake of having a meeting” (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 21 June 2016). 30 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 13 June 2016. 31 Ibid. 32 Robertson, “Diplomats Feel as Though They Are Emerging from a Decade of Darkness.” 33 Martin, Harperland, 80. 34 One former diplomat mentioned the story of how shocked Harper and his wife Laureen were when they saw the palatial nature and environs of the Canadian ambassador’s residence in Paris. There was a feeling from both Harpers that diplomats should not be living the high life and should be mindful of struggling Canadian families at home who make do with much less. When informed that a Parti Québécois government, then in power in Quebec, would be very interested in purchasing the residence should it ever be put up for sale, Harper quickly changed the subject (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 20 July 2016). 35 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 13 July 2016. One should not underestimate how important it was for the Conservative base of the party to be told that pampered members of the diplomatic corps were being unceremoniously whipped into shape and given their marching orders. Indeed, there was criticism of the Harper government for having an anti-intellectual disposition and making public policy without proper evidence and factual analysis. In the words of one former foreign service officer: “So yes, there was a strong streak of anti-intellectualism (as they perceived intellectualism) and the clear perception that they did not need to take nuanced positions on the world stage (the Middle East, for example)” (confidential email correspondence with a former Canadian diplomat, 20 July 2016). 36 Confidential interview with a former foreign service officer, 21 June 2016. 37 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 15 July 2016. 38 Confidential interview with a former Canadian ambassador, 13 July 2016. 39 In the wake of Canada’s failure to secure a seat on the UN Security Council in 2010, Canada’s UN mission decided to cobble together – after three months of extensive consultations with staff and others – a five-year strategic plan and have it sent up to the minister’s office. Months went by without any response from Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird and his people. During a visit to New York, Baird was asked by an official from Canada’s UN delegation about the five-year plan. One of his

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  67

40 41

42

43 44

45

46 47 48 49 50 51

staffers responded curtly by saying: “We don’t need plans, we just act” (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 15 July 2016). Confidential interview with a former Canadian foreign service officer, 29 June 2016. According to one former Canadian diplomat, it got to the point where junior officers – after seeing or hearing about their director of the branch being rudely attacked and insulted by a political staffer – stopped putting their names and telephone numbers at the top of the brief. It was the proverbial case of not wanting to face the wrath of the dreaded “boys in short pants” (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 24 June 2016). One former Canadian diplomat spoke about the “awful stories” of Harper’s visits abroad, where PMO or ministerial staffers would disregard practical advice on the ground and run roughshod over local customs, protocols, and even cultural sensitivities. People in the host country resented this conduct, and Canadian diplomats were embarrassed by these actions, but there was nothing that they could do. “It was not a very sophisticated approach to international diplomacy,” he said (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 19 July 2016). David Mulroney recounts in his book the time when he was told by a PMO staffer to “fix” a sentence in a joint Canada-China statement hours before a high-level meeting between Harper and the Chinese premier in Beijing. This came after the document had already been thoroughly vetted and approved by both governments. Mulroney, Middle Power, Middle Kingdom, 94. Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 15 July 2016. Canada’s ambassador to Brazil was ripped by political staffers because thenBrazilian President Dilma Rousseff made Harper wait for thirty minutes – as the Brazilians are wont to do – before greeting him during a 2011 official visit to the country (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 29 June 2016). The word around the department was that the ministerial chiefs-of-staff, who could be especially hardnosed and prickly, were handpicked by Harper himself, including those for Foreign Affairs and International Trade (confidential interview with a current foreign service officer, 21 July 2016). In the end, it turned out that the buses were not needed – as the Canadian diplomat had advised – since not a single request for transport was forthcoming (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 19 July 2016). It was also quite evident that John Baird never reined them in either. Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 19 July 2016. Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 15 July 2016. Confidential interview with a current foreign service officer, 21 July 2016. Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 19 July 2016. Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 12 July 2016. One former diplomat said that he did experience interaction with policy advisers or a chief of staff in the minister’s office under earlier governments. “We used to have weekly planning sessions with the political staffers that included policy staff

68  Peter McKenna

52 53 54 55

56 57 58 59

60

61

from either policy planning or the functional or geographical sector. It all worked” (confidential email correspondence with a former Canadian diplomat, 29 July 2016). Ibid. Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 19 July 2016. Ibid. Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 25 July 2016. Given the imbalance in the relationship between the political and bureaucratic sides, there was not much in the way of push back. “People were punished for stepping out of line. You can’t stand up to these people. There was a fear of standing up. It was unfair and no one wanted to get their chain yanked,” said one former Canadian diplomat (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 29 June 2016). Confidential interview with a former foreign service officer, 7 July 2016. Ibid. Quoted in Mike Blanchfield, “Conservative Government ‘Suppressed’ Diplomats: PM’s Adviser,” Calgary Herald, 10 March 2018, N4. In his book, former public servant Andrew Griffiths describes this internalization of the Harper government’s orientation in terms of the “Stockholm Syndrome.” What that eventual compliance or capitulation brought with it was the loss of space for contrary points of view, a decline in the quality of public servant policy advice and a diminution of independent policy-making capacity and thinking. See Griffiths, Policy Arrogance or Innocent Bias: Resettling Citizenship and Multiculturalism (Ottawa: Anar Press, 2013). Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 24 June 2016. He told me that he was not even given the chance to explain himself to his immediate superiors about the North Korean diplomat issue. Ibid. It was, however, common knowledge in the department that others were punished or reprimanded for mostly doing their jobs and offering sound, professional advice. Speaking truth to power, though, would only get a foreign service officer into trouble. As one Canadian official observed, “They [headquarters] were just following orders. There was no point in pushing back. Careers were in the balance, especially if you wanted to get a promotion or an ambassadorship” (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 24 June 2016). One person’s name was taken off the list of candidates for an ambassadorship because he provided advice that was not welcomed. Another former Canadian diplomat confirmed that other senior and ambassadorial rank officers had been removed from their positions “because they said something that did not please their political masters” (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 22 August 2016). Appointments would be delayed for a long period, get caught up in a difficult situation, and senior officers would be uncomfortably left in limbo. In addition, many of the decisions had to come not through the departmental DM (as was often past practice) but through the PCO

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  69

62 63 64

65 66

67

68 69

and the minister’s office (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 13 June 2016). Confidential interview with a former foreign service officer, 19 July 2016. See Martin, Harperland, 57–71. An online survey conducted by the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada in 2013 showed that 90 per cent of scientists said that they were unable to speak freely about their research activities under the Harper government. See Ivan Semeniuk, “Federal Scientists Feel They Are Still Being Muzzled, Survey Finds,” Globe and Mail, 22 February 2018, A6. It was commonplace during the Harper years for the prime minister and political staffers to block routinely, or at the least to delay, communications between government scientists and the media. One celebrated case of political interference involved Dr. Kristi Miller, a molecular biologist in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, who was prevented from speaking to the press about her research on the decline of salmon stocks in the Fraser River. See Ivan Semeniuk, “Ottawa Unveils Scientific-Integrity Rules,” Globe and Mail, 30 July 2018, A4. Martin, Harperland, 58. One current foreign service officer, while serving abroad, mentioned that he spoke with the media on many occasions without seeking approval from the centre. Though he did admit that language and distance (he was located in Germany) may have played some role in that. He did caution, however, against assuming that what one reads in Canadian newspapers about the negative atmosphere under Harper is always accurate (confidential interview with a current foreign service officer, 1 June 2016). One Canadian diplomat spoke about how frustrating it was being overseas and not being able to get your message out. He just gave up and thought that it did not matter in the end. He concluded: “That’s what they wanted … no initiation on the ground from ambassadors. Strange” (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 29 June 2016). Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 24 June 2016. One former Canadian diplomat was especially blunt: “Under Baird, there was a vindictiveness, pettiness, and the department was emasculated. There was a deliberate policy of humiliation” (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 22 August 2016). It is worth pointing out that all of Harper’s foreign ministers – Peter MacKay, Maxime Bernier, David Emerson, Lawrence Cannon, John Baird, and Rob Nicolson – had no experience or expertise in matters of international diplomacy. Many officials in DFAIT were surprised that such an important portfolio would be assigned to such poor-quality cabinet material. But as one current foreign service officer cautioned, some of the carping and complaining was embellished somewhat and perhaps even “blown out of proportion” (confidential interview with a current Global Affairs Canada official, 26 July 2016).

70  Peter McKenna 70 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 19 July 2016. 71 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 15 July 2016. The delay angered Colombian diplomats in Washington, damaged Canada’s standing in the OAS, and harmed Ottawa’s reputation as a reliable partner in the hemisphere. 72 Confidential interview with a former foreign service officer, 15 July 2016. 73 As was the case with many of Canada’s friends in the world, they kept asking about what happened to Canada and where it had gone. 74 Confidential interview with a former foreign policy official, 15 July 2016. 75 Confidential interview with a current foreign service officer, 21 July 2016. 76 See Paul Durand, “Featured Q&A,” Latin America Advisor (Washington: InterAmerican Dialogue, 2015), 4. 77 Mulroney, Middle Power, Middle Kingdom, 21. 78 Poor morale among foreign service officers is a common refrain given the challenges of the job, the lack of opportunities for promotion, difficult postings abroad, and what one former diplomat described as “A-type personalities” (confidential interview with a former Canadian official, 18 July 2016). 79 There was some suggestion that a hollowing out of the department was occurring on Harper’s watch, as capable people did leave, moved to other departments, and often were replaced by contract desk officers with little foreign policy experience. There were also serious issues around recruitment, promotion, and especially retention of officers (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 13 June 2016). 80 As former Canadian foreign service officer, Daryl Copeland, explained: “Bureaucratic process and administrative busywork have overtaken international policy leadership, analysis and formulation; the administrative tail is wagging the policy dog.” Daryl Copeland, “Once Were Diplomats: Can Canadian Internationalism Be Rekindled?” in Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, eds., Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013), 136. 81 Confidential interview with a former foreign service officer, 7 July 2016. 82 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 26 July 2016. 83 In an open letter signed by more than 150 former diplomats, they pointed to the particularly egregious personal attacks on Colvin. “While criticism of his testimony was perfectly legitimate, aspersions cast on his personal integrity were not. A fundamental requirement of a Foreign Service Officer is that he or she report on a given situation as observed or understood … The Colvin affair risks creating a climate in which Officers may be more inclined to report what they believe headquarters wants to hear, rather than facts and perceptions deemed unpalatable.” “Open Letter from Ex-ambassadors,” Globe and Mail, 8 December 2009, A13. 84 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 13 June 2016. 85 Confidential interview with a former member of the department, 27 July 2016. 86 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 21 June 2016.

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  71 87 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 13 June 2016. Others interviewed were conflicted about their loyalty to the Harper government, and of representing the government of the day and implementing its policies, and issues about ethics, values, and personal integrity. As one former Canadian diplomat remarked: “I wrestled with it daily” (confidential interview with a former foreign service officer, 15 July 2016). 88 See John W. Graham, Whose Man in Havana? Adventures from the Far Side of Diplomacy (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2015), 286. 89 Ibid. 90 Tonda MacCharles, “Federal Budget 2013: Tories fold CIDA into Foreign Affairs Department,” Toronto Star, 22 March 2013, A20. It is worth mentioning that the Harper government did find $50 million to celebrate the 200th anniversary of the War of 1812. 91 See Tim Harper, “A Battle between Conservatives and Diplomats Is Costing This Country,” Toronto Star, 7 August 2013, A6. 92 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 19 July 2016. 93 Mulroney, Middle Power, Middle Kingdom, 267. Initially, the Harper government reacted very coldly to relations with China and then Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay actually refused to meet with the Chinese Ambassador for the first year. 94 Ibid., 268. 95 Ibid., 266. 96 Ibid., 267. 97 Ibid., 20. 98 For a fuller treatment of how the vote against Canada broke down and why, see Denis Stairs, “Being Rejected in the United Nations: The Causes and Implications of Canada’s Failure to Win a Seat in the UN Security Council,” Policy Update Paper (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2011), 1–16. 99 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 12 July 2016. 100 He argued that the loss was a “milestone event” for a number of reasons, including a worsening of relations between Harper and the Foreign Service. “We’ll teach them something,” was a common refrain directed at Foreign Affairs emanating from the Harper centre after the dust-up with the UN (confidential interview with a former DFAIT official, 15 July 2016). 101 While terms like “presence,” “credibility,” and “influence” in the context of Canadian foreign policy are obviously imprecise and contested, it refers to Canada’s ability or agency to shape or impact the international political system. 102 Confidential interview with a former senior CIDA official, 15 July 2016. 103 Canada’s actions also opened up the door for then oil-rich Venezuela (a country on the Harper government’s list of enemies) to move in and fund directly a number of regional development projects in the Caribbean (confidential interview with a former CIDA official, 16 July 2016).

72  Peter McKenna 104 Confidential interview with a former CIDA official, 18 July 2016. 105 See Peter McKenna, “Canada and the Crisis in Haiti,” Journal of Canadian Studies 32, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 77–97. 106 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 15 July 2016. 107 Ibid. 108 Confidential interview with a former Canadian foreign service officer, 18 July 2016. 109 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 13 June 2016. 110 Ibid. 111 Confidential interview with a current member of the department, 21 July 2016. 112 Confidential interview with a former foreign service officer, 7 July 2016. 113 Confidential interview with a current member of the department, 26 July 2016. According to one former Canadian diplomat, Canada’s image abroad suffered because other allies and friends, largely as a result of the Harper government’s Mid-East policy, “no longer saw us as like-minded and thus did not want to deal with us.” He went on to add: “It was quite staggering to be told this … that we were no longer part of the club. And, you know what, the government couldn’t care less about that” (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 22 August 2016). 114 Confidential interview with a current foreign service officer, 21 July 2016. 115 Confidential interview with a current member of the department, 26 July 2016. 116 In June 2015, Prime Minister Trudeau met with current, outgoing, and former Canadian ambassadors and, in a brief speech, thanked them for their service to the country and for working to promote Canada’s interests abroad. It is worth mentioning that this type of gathering happened every year and yet Stephen Harper never made one single appearance (confidential interview with a former member of the foreign service, 7 July 2016). 117 All quotes from the letter and this article are found in Mike Blanchfield, “Trudeau tells Canadian diplomats he relies on their judgment,” Toronto Star, 5 November 2015, https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/11/05/trudeau-tells-canadian -diplomats-he-relies-on-their-judgment.html. 118 Ibid. 119 It may be that this tight control, and the fact that decisions are being made at a very high level, is a function of the government’s initial sensitivity to the whole NAFTA file and its obsession with the mercurial Trump administration at that time. In the words of one foreign service officer: “Things are very political right now. They are deeply worried about leaks happening and how that would not make the Americans happy” (confidential interview with a current foreign service officer, 30 May 2017). 120 Confidential interview with a current foreign service officer, 6 June 2017. As one cynical departmental official intoned: “They (the Liberals) smile a lot and are more polite. But once you cede control initially to the political masters, a new

Inside “Fort Pearson” during the Harper Years  73 government won’t give that back” (confidential interview with a current member of Global Affairs Canada, 10 April 2018). 121 Confidential interview with a former member of the department, 24 June 2016. 122 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 13 June 2016. One former Canadian diplomat confessed that what kept him going most of the time during the Harper years was the constant asking by foreign diplomats about what was happening to Canada, why it was not working collaboratively in multilateral fora and the fact that they missed Canada’s traditional engagement and presence (confidential interview with a former foreign service officer, 15 July 2016). 123 Many were critical of the pro-Israeli bias, the neglect of the UN, “the tantrum-like foreign policy” towards Iran, the turn away from Africa, a narrowly conceived Ukrainian policy, to name just a few. Former Canadian ambassador to the UN, Paul Heinbecker, was critical of the Harper government’s mishandling of the controversial visa requirement for Mexicans, the loss of Camp Mirage over United Arab Emirates aircraft landing rights in Canada, and the 2013 focus on “economic diplomacy” that devalued foreign service officers by turning them into glorified travelling salespeople. See his comments in Michael Harris, Party of One (Toronto: Viking, 2014), 211–42. 124 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 12 July 2016. 125 As Globe and Mail columnist John Ibbitson pointed out to me, that was not always the case. Harper’s signature $7.3 billion child and maternal health program idea came out of advice from the foreign policy bureaucracy (email correspondence with the author, 25 July 2016). One former diplomat also maintained that Harper’s response to the war in Afghanistan was robust and that it was properly funded and supported up until about 2011 (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 19 July 2016). 126 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 12 July 2016. One former member of the department summed it up this way: “The Harper government’s foreign policy legacy is not a lasting one” (confidential email correspondence with a former Canadian diplomat, 21 July 2016). 127 For a fuller treatment of this point, see David Carment, “Diaspora Politics: Why Domestic Votes Trump Foreign Policy,” OpenCanada.org, 24 June 2015, 1–4. 128 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 15 July 2016. Harper, in throwing diplomatic tact to the side, seemed intent on lecturing the Europeans in 2012–13 about their high levels of public spending and half-hearted efforts at austerity and debt-reduction, much to the irritation of some of Europe’s leading countries. Jeffrey, Dismantling Canada, 250–1. 129 One former diplomat observed that it was hard to know how many opportunities for Canada on the world stage were lost or missed because we were essentially “out of the game.” He went on to add: “In the Americas, we might have taken the SG or ASG position in the OAS. We had an excellent candidate … but a campaign

74  Peter McKenna would have required heavy political backing which wasn’t forthcoming because the Conservatives ‘didn’t like’ the OAS” (confidential email correspondence with a former Canadian diplomat, 1 July 2016). For a differing perspective, and one that maintains that the Harper government actually delivered “results” in the foreign policy domain, see Ibbitson, Stephen Harper, 321–44. 130 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 12 July 2016. 131 Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 13 June 2016. 132 Confidential interview with a former member of the department, 21 June 2016.

4 Stephen Harper’s Canada and the United Nations: A Tale Full of Sound and Fury? alistair d. edgar

Introduction This chapter looks at Stephen Harper’s approach to the United Nations (UN) during his tenure as prime minister of Canada (2006–15). When the prime minister did offer any public pronouncements about the international organization, its work, or Canada’s relations with the world body, they tended to be at best dismissive or harshly critical and condescending. The UN, as Harper and his representatives repeated, was nothing more than a “talk shop” – as if the process of negotiation, and the need for compromise, in the world of diplomacy was anathema to the prime minister’s idea of how politics is conducted. The central case being made here is that the policies of the Harper government towards the UN were not the result of a wider commitment at the international level to “principles over pragmatism” in determining Canada’s foreign policy priorities and choices. Rather, these policies were informed and framed more narrowly and inwardly by Harper’s domestic political agenda and electoral ambitions. The analysis thus begins in this first introductory section with the puzzle of the Harper government’s half-hearted attempt in 2010 to seek election to the UN Security Council, the most powerful political and security entity of the organization. The second section situates Harper’s rejection of the UN into the context of the prime minister’s efforts to work through other international organizations to advance his political agenda abroad and also at home. The third section examines whether Harper’s Conservative government (or governments) was either unusual or unique in Canadian history in critiquing the UN or in pursuing other avenues for advancing Canadian foreign policy goals and interests. The fourth section focuses more closely on the domestic political agenda of the prime minister, and relates this to his criticism and rejection of the UN overall. The conclusion, then, offers some ideas about the “lessons” to be derived, both about this contentious period in Canada-UN relations and

78  Alistair D. Edgar

regarding the possibility – and potential value for Canada – of a return to more constructive future relations with the international body and with the disparate states that make up its nearly universal global membership. Between 1948 and 1949 under Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, and from 1999 to 2000 under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, Canada sat as an elected member of the United Nations Security Council on six occasions – one two-year term in each decade.1 That record made Canada one of the “top ten” UN Member States in number of years of service with the international organization’s most important body addressing matters of global peace and security. In each case, Ottawa’s bid for a seat was victorious on the first ballot, receiving the required two-thirds majority of votes in the General Assembly. Evaluating the last of these terms on the Security Council, 1999–2000, Michael Pearson observed that Canada had benefited in its campaign for a seat, and then in its ability to help shape the Security Council’s agenda, from being a well-regarded Member State with a strong track record of reliable and constructive engagement with (and within) the world body. Ottawa’s then-­ Permanent Representative, Ambassador Robert Fowler, was well known and widely respected in New York, having been Canada’s representative since 1995; and he was supported by an activist foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, who had held his ministerial role since early 1996. It was a combination of “fate and will”2 – being in the right place at the right time, with some of the right ideas and the right people – that was more than enough to have the Canadian bid for the Security Council be broadly supported once again, obtaining 131 positive votes on the first ballot, well ahead of competing bids from The Netherlands and Greece. That run of successful, successive election campaigns came to an abrupt end in October 2010, when Canada lost to Portugal, at that time a country and government facing a severe national financial crisis, in its attempt to win a seventh term for 2011–12. Germany obtained one of the two West European and Other Group (WEOG) seats in the first round of voting, and the Canadian bid was withdrawn in the second round after receiving only 78 votes compared to 113 for Portugal. Portugal then easily obtained the necessary support in a third round of voting. The real surprise and the puzzling question in this case was not Canada’s defeat in the UN General Assembly voting, but rather why the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Joseph Harper had wanted to contest for a Security Council seat in the first place, and who amongst his small cadre of trusted advisers had thought that they still might succeed in what many others saw as a late starting and half-hearted election campaign? Ambassador John McNee, Canada’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York from 2006 to 2011 and therefore the “face” of Canada’s Security Council election campaign, was a career diplomat with solid professional credentials. Over the previous four years since the election of the Conservative

Stephen Harper’s Canada and the United Nations  79

government in Ottawa, however, Prime Minister Harper had made abundantly clear both domestically to his Canadian audience and internationally to other world leaders and the diplomatic community at the UN his own (and therefore, his ministers’) disdain for the global body as an institution, as a meeting place for presenting and debating Member States’ diverse and divergent ideas and values, and as the primary source of new global agreements on contemporary issues of peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights. Part of the explanation for the prime minister’s disdain may be found in the flaws or failings of the world body itself – undoubtedly the UN had political and administrative deficiencies that needed to be addressed and that were blocked or delayed in the first instance by the many vested interests of Member States, and then secondly by individuals within the organization itself.3 Much more of the explanation, however, lay in the prime minister’s own ideological or political views – especially his immediate and his longer-term ambitions and goals for his party and himself in Canada’s federal political landscape – and in his personal leadership characteristics and, in turn, how these played out in his international institutional relationships and policy preferences. Although he and his key foreign policy spokespeople – most notably Foreign Minister John Baird  – repeated the mantra that their policies were based on principle and were not simply about “getting along” with every dictator or new cause at the UN in a search for diplomatic popularity, it is not difficult to scratch beneath that rhetorical surface to identify the more pragmatic and calculating sources of his policy choices. The notion of some broader, presumably ethical “principle” in foreign policy as a fundamental guide was a rhetorical public justification more than it was the real cause of the government’s policy preferences or choices. Harper himself had made clear the overriding nature of his domestic political goals in his own statements.4 In a 2011 paper written for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Denis Stairs summarized what he identified as three “schools” or groupings of explanation for the Harper government’s failed Security Council bid.5 The first set of explanations concentrates on the prime minister and his government’s handling  – or its mishandling  – of the Security Council’s election campaign and all of the domestic bureaucratic and international diplomatic processes around it; the second set focuses on the policies and pronouncements by the Harper government that either created active opposition by other governments to the Canadian bid or, at least, failed to build any interest in supporting it over competing candidacies; and the third set of explanations places greater weight on “externalities” falling beyond the control or influence of the Canadian government.6 Amongst the first set of explanations, Stairs notes the Harper government’s often-reported distrust of the professional Canadian foreign service and its ­officers – whose roles, independent voices, and material and financial resources

80  Alistair D. Edgar

for representing Canada overseas he had significantly reduced – and his reliance instead on receiving policy advice from only a few select individuals in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), whose expertise and focus tended to be on advancing his domestic political agenda and on managing Ottawa party politics. In the second grouping, Stairs usefully distinguishes between the substantive policy decisions that were made by the Harper government as well as the willingness of the PMO to “sacrifice diplomatic effectiveness” in favour of seeking domestic political constituency advantages (several examples of which are related later in this chapter), and a list of minor missteps such as poor management of the dispute with the United Arab Emirates over airline landing rights in Canada. The third grouping of explanations suggests that growing intra-European political cooperation had left Canada more isolated in the WEOG, the UN Member States grouping in which it stood as a candidate for Security Council election. While the latter may have had an independent effect, Canada’s reputation amongst the so-called WEOG also would not have been advanced by the policy choices (such as the climate change file) or the public anti-UN pronouncements made by the prime minister, which went against the views and policies prevalent amongst those same European states. Following Canada’s withdrawal from the Security Council candidacy after its weak result in the second round of elections (which take place in the General Assembly), and the election of Portugal as the second WEOG member alongside Germany, Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon and PMO spokesperson Dmitri Soudas tried to lay the blame for Canada’s defeat on comments from the leader of the Liberal opposition, Michael Ignatieff. If those comments from Ignatieff were even heard by the UN diplomatic missions in New York and by national capitals around the world, they simply would have reflected rather than shaped the views prevalent amongst many in the international diplomatic community, which were often expressed at private meetings and events. In those circles, even close friends and allies of Canada often observed its apparent hostility towards the UN and its withdrawal from multilateral agreements, and asked this author “where has Canada gone?” As David Malone noted in a 2016 review, nobody likes a scourge.7 International Institutions When It Suited It was not the case that Harper’s preference was for isolationism over internationalism or multilateralism, or that international organizations  per se were anathema to the Conservative leader. When such bodies advanced or reflected his own international or especially his domestic political and economic agendas, he would engage with them actively and vigorously, including in leadership roles. Indeed, Prime Minister Harper “embraced international financial institutions with great enthusiasm,”8 including the G8 and G20 summits, as

Stephen Harper’s Canada and the United Nations  81

he worked with other state leaders in responding to the global financial crisis of 2008–9 and the subsequent global recession; and he sought to advance Canadian security policy goals through NATO. When it suited his purposes, even the UN  – which Harper otherwise either derided or simply ignored  – was seen as a useful instrument, whether as the source of legal and political authorization for the US and NATO missions in Afghanistan or Libya, or as a vehicle for official development assistance with the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. The latter were used by Harper as the framework against which he could set out his Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (MNCH) initiative, although the MNCH funding was announced publicly in 2010 at the G8 summit in Muskoka, Ontario, and not at the UN in New York or through another UN agency. In the face of mounting financial crises and global economic recession in 2007–09, Prime Minister Harper was – mostly – amongst friends at the G8/ G7 summits: Germany in 2007, Japan in 2008, Italy in 2009, and then hosting the leaders in Huntsville, Ontario, in 2010 (the latter followed immediately by the G20 in Toronto). Especially in these early years with the challenge of steering through and managing the global economic turmoil, there was broad consensus on the need for stimulus spending even by the austerity-minded Conservative leader, although differences grew by 2010 as the crisis moved into the background and Europe and Japan sought to cut deficits while Washington continued to prefer fiscal stimulus. Later in 2015, following the end of the second summit (now the G7) since Russia’s membership was suspended in 2014 and that year’s planned St. Petersburg meeting was cancelled and moved instead to Belgium, Harper noted that “the G7 is not the United Nations. The G7 is not even the G20 – the G7 is a group of countries who share fundamental values and objectives in the world.”9 The smaller body met the prime minister’s “sniff test”: there was no scent of differences of priority or perspective, and thus it could be embraced warmly. The G7 (and G8) certainly was not the G20, since the latter included a more disparate group of states such as China, India, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, and Russia – with the latter remaining a G20 member even after being suspended from Harper’s preferred smaller club of like-minded governments.10 However, the prime minister was willing and ready to work with the larger body as well, when it evolved into a Heads of State meeting after 2008. At the G20 meeting in Toronto in 2010 – the first permanent summit of the G20 as a meeting of heads of government rather than finance ministers and central bank governors – he and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, a fellow conservative leader at least in economic outlook, together sought to press that grouping to improve its members’ accountability and transparency in coordinating and implementing national economic policies to reduce deficits while managing post-recession requirements for stimulus spending.11

82  Alistair D. Edgar

If Harper’s economic policies generally earned him praise during this period from leaders at this level and within these types of settings, he also announced new policy initiatives from these meetings which dampened others’ appreciation for the Canadian leader’s contribution to global affairs. At the 2007 meeting in Heiligendamm, Germany, while other G8 leaders reaffirmed their countries’ commitments to the G8-Africa development partnership, Prime Minister Harper announced that Canadian development assistance would be refocusing away from Africa and towards the Americas. Although the practical effects in changing aid levels were not immediate,12 this marked the start of a trend under Prime Minister Harper that would see low-income African countries, including Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Rwanda, being struck off the Canadian aid list and replaced with higherincome countries in the Americas such as Peru and Colombia. In February 2009, International Development Minister Bev Oda announced that 80  per cent of Canadian bilateral aid funding would now be directed to a new, smaller list of countries or regions of focus, reduced from twenty-five under the previous Liberal government. The criteria for choosing aid recipient countries now included their alignment with Canadian foreign policy interests  – more specifically, rather than addressing poverty-reduction through supporting the needs of the poorest African (and other) countries, it became clear that Ottawa’s new priority would be in using aid funding to support Canadian trade and private sector commercial interests. Both Peru and Colombia signed free trade agreements with Canada; and Canadian government development funding was given to a small number of favoured NGOs working with Canadian mining companies in Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Peru, while high-poverty-level Nicaragua was ignored and the Canadian High Commission in Malawi was withdrawn in what another diplomat termed a “stealth closure.”13 Dropping the poorest African countries from the list of aid recipients would have detrimental effects on their development programs and projects that had relied heavily on Canadian financial support; at the same time, the Conservative government adopted an adversarial approach to Canadian development NGOs, especially any that were critical of the change in focus away from poverty-reduction and towards supporting Canadian extractive industries. Hence in mid-2009, a delegation of nineteen African ambassadors visited Ottawa to express their concerns to the House Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development over cuts in Canadian aid to Africa. That their visit had no effect on Ottawa’s policy choices may have been prominent in the minds of those same countries’ diplomatic representatives in New York in 2010 during the Security Council vote.14 Prime Minister Harper’s determination to focus his government’s aid policy on advancing the cause of Canadian mining and other extractive industry

Stephen Harper’s Canada and the United Nations  83

companies around the world was repeated by his development ministers, including Bev Oda, who was forced to resign in 2012 after being found in contempt of Parliament; Julian Fantino, the controversial former Toronto police chief who presided over the end of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and its folding within the newly named Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development; and Christian Paradis, the former industry minister who led the development portfolio until the Conservative government was defeated in the October 2015 general election. In 2014, Minister Paradis announced a new Canadian government development initiative in Africa: a $25-million-per-year program to grow Canadian private industry’s involvement in extractive sector operations on the continent.15 Clearly, this focus on supporting and promoting extractive industries  – ­mining, oil, and gas – spoke directly to the prime minister’s economic, political, and electoral base. It at least reflected, if not directly arising from, his determination to reinforce the Conservative Party’s domestic political position as the governing party of the country. As this volume makes clear, to make that latter point is hardly novel, and certainly not unique to the Harper government. However, in the case of the Conservative leader, the limitations that came from seeking to appeal to narrow-base views led him to adopt policies that also damaged Canada’s reputation overseas – even when a new initiative seemed on its surface to be constructive and his interest perhaps more altruistic or personally genuine. In 2010, when he announced his MNCH initiative as a Canadian signature policy while hosting the G8 summit in Muskoka, the $1.1-billion pledge was a welcome new resource that would support the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals. In order to avoid potential criticisms from his domestic political and religious voter base, and instead to be seen as advocating their interests, the new funding initiative came with the explicit restriction that no money could be provided to support organizations or programs that offered or promoted the option of safe abortion as part of family planning – even including those countries where safe abortion was a legal right. While this regressive restriction, and the paternalistic policy vision it expressed, may have appealed to his ideologically conservative supporters at home, it was strongly criticized by others internationally who pointed out that “the Canadian Government does not deprive women living in Canada from access to safe abortions; it is therefore hypocritical and unjust that it tries to do so abroad.”16 Criticizing the UN: Unique to Harper’s Foreign Policy? The Harper government publicly, and repeatedly, criticized or snubbed the UN as a multilateral organization, and rejected international agreements that were negotiated under its auspices, while seeking to pursue its new foreign policy agenda through other more amenable international bodies. Even so, it is worth

84  Alistair D. Edgar

noting that previous Canadian governments  – Liberal governments, most recently – also had expressed strong criticisms of the UN and had engaged in significant, and highly controversial, initiatives outside of the framework of the Security Council and General Assembly. Lloyd Axworthy, while serving as foreign minister (1996–2000) under the Liberal government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, advocated for and helped to lead a number of multilateral initiatives outside of the UN and sought agreements that involved alliances of “like-minded” states and well-organized NGOs under the general rubric of the human security agenda.17 These included most notably the popularly titled “Ottawa process” that led to the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Treaty of December 1997, signed by 122 states meeting for that purpose in Ottawa, and conducted outside of the institutional framework and processes of the United Nations.18 Even as this treaty was signed and moved towards ratification, Axworthy was providing essential political support to the recently revived international campaign to establish a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). While the ICC would be negotiated at the UN General Assembly–convened conference in Rome in June–July 1998, its supporters had to do so despite the active political opposition and vocal criticism from the US government, and less vocal but still strong opposition by Russia, China, and India.19 This was not Canada “going along to get along,” either, with the UN as a body or its leading Member States; and it certainly was putting principle ahead of narrow business or other domestic electoral interests. Most controversial, both domestically and internationally, was Canada’s participation in the NATO air strikes against the Serbian regime of President Slobodan Milošević, as the latter appeared to be preparing a campaign of ethnic cleansing (and perhaps worse) against the predominantly Muslim and Albanian population in the troubled southern Serbian province of Kosovo, which Serbs consider as the historical and religious heartland of their nation.20 Prior to being elected to the UN Security Council, Foreign Minister Axworthy in 1998 had made several diplomatic efforts to engage the Security Council and persuade or cajole its members to take firm action to defuse the growing crisis in Kosovo, while making clear that Canada would support NATO air strikes should it fail to act.21 Then, serving as President of the Security Council in February 1999, Minister Axworthy and Ambassador Fowler sought to have the UN body explicitly support the proposed Rambouillet peace negotiations. Still, Axworthy’s and Fowler’s effort to have the Security Council provide authorization through a new resolution for international intervention in Kosovo was blocked by Russia’s veto power as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and a key political ally of Milošević. Faced with Russia’s intransigence, Canada made use of its role as Council President for the month, and issued a Security Council Presidential Statement on 23 February in support of the peace negotiations. In March, with China now

Stephen Harper’s Canada and the United Nations  85

serving as Council President  – taking its alphabetical turn in that role after Canada completed its term – and Russia maintaining its declared opposition to any potential resolution, NATO began its air campaign against Serbian military and other strategic targets. It did so without having brought forward to the table a draft resolution for authorization by the UN Security Council, which would have been promptly vetoed by Russia, and possibly China, leaving the Western powers with the prospect of acting against an existing veto – something that no Permanent Member of the Security Council ever wishes to establish as a precedent. As the Canadian foreign minister had promised in 1998, Canada took on a full range of responsibilities as the Canadian Forces’ CF-18 aircraft flew numerous missions in support of that “coalition of the willing” military action. Reflecting on this choice to act despite lacking Security Council authorization, Minister Axworthy noted that “certain members of the Council could not reconcile yesterday’s assumptions about sovereignty with today’s imperatives of human emergency.”22 Equally critically and more bluntly, Ambassador Fowler observed that “the fact that at the fault line between East and West the veto is still relevant and the Security Council is not relevant is absolutely unsurprising to me. The only thing that is surprising is why we would think anything else.”23 Indeed, the Canadian government chose to act as part of a military operation without the Security Council’s authorization.24 As these examples demonstrate, sidelining or bypassing the UN was not a new innovation of the Harper government. In Axworthy’s case, of course, it was more a question of pragmatic necessity rather than any deep personal antipathy towards the institution: he chose whichever path he saw as most likely helping him to accomplish his goals, while those goals reflected his “human security” framework. That framework, however, would be largely pushed aside in the first decade of the new millennium by the Harper Conservatives. To be clear: the governing Conservatives were not unique in being critical of the UN as an international institution but in the level of their rejectionist rhetoric (which also played into the party’s domestic political agenda). The publication of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report in December 2001 was overshadowed by the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States of America, and the beginning of the so-called War on Terror that US President George W. Bush Jr. declared on 20 September. Canada’s military participation in that “war” began under Prime Minister Chrétien,25 initially with the secretive deployment into Afghanistan of Joint Task Force (JTF) 2 soldiers in October 2001 as well as naval forces committed to the Bahrain-based Combined Task Force 150. Regular Canadian Forces were then deployed in January 2002, first to Kandahar, then Kabul, and finally in 2006 back to Kandahar where they would serve until 2011, when Prime Minister Harper withdrew most Canadian Forces from the country and left a smaller training mission in Kabul – approximately 950 specialized personnel, compared with the 2,500

86  Alistair D. Edgar

strong troop contingent that had been deployed in Kandahar. That mission, and Canada’s military presence in Afghanistan as discussed by Massie in chapter 7 of this volume, ended in March 2014 with the final, full withdrawal of the remaining Canadian soldiers from Kabul. For Harper, the ready and rapid Canadian engagement in the US-led, UNauthorized international intervention in Afghanistan stood in stark contrast with the refusal by Prime Minister Chrétien’s Liberal government in 2002–3 to join what would be the US-led and UK-supported invasion of Iraq. Harper openly criticized the Liberal leader and his government, saying that “we will not be with our government, this government,” which he argued had “betrayed Canada’s history and its values” by declining to join the US coalition. He and Stockwell Day then repeated his accusation in the Wall Street Journal, writing to an American audience that the Canadian Alliance Party, which Harper led at that time, “will be with our allies and our friends … But we will not be with the Canadian government.”26 The refusal by the UN Security Council to provide authorization for the 2003 US invasion also reinforced Harper’s disdain for the international organization and its multilateral framework. In both of these cases, one more notable and the other less noticed, the Conservative leader in the end would reverse his positions – suggesting that any broader commitment to enduring principles was secondary to political calculation and ambition or, perhaps most simply, that the underlying and core principle was achieving and maintaining governing power for himself and his party. In the case of Afghanistan, soon after winning the 2006 federal election, the new prime minister visited the Canadian Forces at their main base in Kandahar and proclaimed emphatically that Canada would not “cut and run” from its commitment to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda and would help to rebuild Afghanistan, “as long as I’m leading this country.”27 By 2008, just two years later, the prime minister was discussing 2011 as an end date for the mission; and by 2010, as Canadian casualties in Afghanistan continued to rise and public opinion increasingly was questioning the mission, he was arguing that “my preference would be, would have been, to see a complete end to the military mission.”28 Prime Minister Harper may have been expressing his genuine commitment to the Canadian troops’ efforts in 2006, if not to the war-torn nation and people of Afghanistan, but domestic political exigency ruled his policy choices and led to the eventual decision to withdraw. The change in policy was hard to camouflage, although the prime minister’s representatives made their best effort to do so by reference at home to a parliamentary resolution, and in Afghanistan by the systematic use of the Message Event Proposal in an effort to “persuade Canadians their country was primarily engaged in development work” in Afghanistan.29 Five years after his strident declaration that Canada would not cut and run, the military combat mission in Kandahar was

Stephen Harper’s Canada and the United Nations  87

replaced in 2011 by the smaller and safer (though by no means entirely safe) training mission in Kabul, and then by the complete withdrawal of Canadian forces in 2014. Less noticed was the prime minister’s change of view about the US- and UKled invasion of Iraq in 2003. In 2008, five years after his angry public denunciations of what he saw as the Liberal government’s failure to support the Republican Bush Administration’s elective war against Saddam Hussein, and with Canadian public opinion generally supportive of the Liberal government’s decision, especially given the disastrous path of that war and the obviously false assertions made by Washington to justify the invasion, Prime Minister Harper, albeit reluctantly and only after being pressed repeatedly, admitted in a televised leaders’ election debate that his earlier position “was absolutely an error” and that “the evaluation of weapons of mass destruction proved not to be correct.”30 The prime minister did not mention that those weapons inspection efforts in Iraq had been conducted by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) since December 1999, in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency. But as journalist Mike Blanchfield suggests, “that admission did not hurt Harper … the Conservatives went on to win their second minority government in 2008. Iraq had simply ceased to be an issue in Canadian politics.”31 Whether the prime minister really recognized and accepted that he had made an egregious error of judgment, one that could have taken Canadians into that illegal, illegitimate, and enormously costly war, was beside the point; in 2003, he had been able to craft his distinct narrative for the Conservative Party, and in 2008, it was wiser to cede the point in public than to try to defend it before the viewing electorate. Rejecting Internationalist Principles, Pursuing a Domestic Political Agenda In 2002, while the Liberal government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien was engaged with the ratification by Parliament of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, extending the earlier (1992) UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, Canadian Alliance party leader Stephen Harper was calling the agreement “essentially a socialist scheme to suck money out of wealth-producing nations” and “a fraud” as environmental policy, observing also that the scientific evidence linking carbon dioxide emissions and global warming was “tentative and contradictory.”32 As the prime minister, Harper would declare and seek to promote Canada’s economic status as an “emerging energy superpower,” portray the Conservative Party as the champion of the Canadian (and especially, Albertan) oil industry, and push hard to advance the controversial Keystone XL pipeline project that would export bitumen from Alberta-based producers to American refineries.33

88  Alistair D. Edgar

It was no surprise that in December 2007 at the UN Climate Change Conference in Bali, Indonesia, then-minister of the environment John Baird announced that Canada would not seek to meet its emissions reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol. Four years later in December 2011, Environment Minister Peter Kent announced that Canada would be the first signatory state formally to announce its withdrawal from the Protocol. The Conservative government, like its Liberal predecessors, recognized the difficulty that Canada would have in meeting its Kyoto emission reduction targets, and as Prime Minister Harper’s government championed Alberta oil sands development that was estimated as likely to triple its greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, the decision to abandon Kyoto was a foregone conclusion.34 One year later, in March 2013, Canada also became the only signatory state amongst 194 Member States and the European Union to withdraw from the Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD), a UN body based in Bonn, Germany, working to promote efforts to address the spread of desertification and drought especially in Africa but also throughout the world. It did so with minimal public notification in Canada, and initially even without first notifying the UN body itself.35 That withdrawal came just one month before the signatory states were due to meet in Bonn, Germany, where they would be expected to examine the scientific evidence connecting desertification and climate change, and to provide scientific data and discuss policy measures each government was taking in their own countries to address national problems of land degradation, drought, and desertification.36 Such open and comparative scientific exchange would have been difficult for Canadian government environmental scientists who felt, and reported, that their work was being systematically repressed for political reasons by the Harper government, with strict guidelines that effectively prevented open scientific communications with the media, the Canadian public, and with the international scientific community.37 In the case of the CCD, the public explanation eventually offered by Minister Baird was that the UN intergovernmental body was simply a “talkfest” – again, the criticism that international diplomacy could be a long and difficult process of discussion – that would cost Canada $315,000 and gave insufficient demonstrable value for money for Canadians, although it was not necessarily clear what constituted acceptable “value.” His stated concern for financial responsibility stood in stark contrast with the $850,000 that the Harper government spent in November 2011 as part of an unusual public ceremony – criticized by the Rideau Institute as being a “showpiece for the Conservative g­ overnment”38 – to celebrate the “successful” conclusion of Canada’s military engagement in Libya as part of the NATO-led coalition operation against the Gadhafi regime;39 or the approximately $28 million that the Harper government willingly had spent on its War of 1812 bicentennial commemoration programming, which many

Stephen Harper’s Canada and the United Nations  89

critics in Canada saw as an unnecessarily extravagant pet project by the Conservative government seeking to build its own political narrative of ­Canada’s history.40 Unlike those expenditures, however, the CCD was not a project whose narrative and purpose the government could set, and control, to serve its own purposes. If either of these examples of Prime Minister Harper’s government rejecting the UN and multilateral agreements for domestic political purposes – for narrow electoral ambitions, not any broader or higher notion of “principle” – were not enough to indicate a clear pattern, the most explicit case perhaps was its opposition to the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). In this instance, the Conservative government wanted to avoid alienating a core voter group with a vocal and active political lobby: rural gun owners and sport-shooting enthusiasts, represented by the National Firearms Association (NFA) and the Canadian Shooting Sports Association (CSSA).41 During the Conservatives’ first seven years in power, a period when it also fulfilled its 2006 electoral platform promise to abolish the federal long-gun registry, the importation of guns, ammunition, and accessories into Canada totalled $2.84 million compared with $1.56 million during the preceding seven years of the Liberal Party government. Blanchfield reported that the president of the NFA, which relied heavily on these imports, had observed the Conservative Party leadership in the period prior to the Treaty’s adoption by the UN General Assembly in early 2013 and entry into force in December 2014, and pointed out that “they also recognize there would be some significant ramifications in their voting base” if Canada supported the Treaty.42 Although the ATT did not seek to impose restrictions on the legitimate international transfer or sale – or domestic sale and individual ­ownership – of small arms, and instead was aimed at the illicit trade in arms while explicitly recognizing the “legitimate trade and lawful ownership” of weapons for recreational, historical, sporting, and cultural purposes, 43 The efforts of gun lobby groups to champion their particular goals and interests, and political parties’ pandering to their electoral base, are hardly new features of national politics in Canada or elsewhere. Both the NFA and CSSA had their own agendas, just as any group could be expected to have, and sought to support and defend them. At other times, the Harper government also could use its power to exert pressure on their erstwhile domestic political allies, to silence anticipated criticism of other government legislative initiatives, as was reported in 2015 around Bill C-51 and Bill C-42.44 The gun-owning, and generally pro-Harper voter base was not always happy with how it saw itself being treated by the Conservative leadership, and in 2015 the same NFA president, Sheldon Clare, who earlier had worked with Minister Baird to keep Canada out of the Arms Trade Treaty  – the only NATO and G7 country to do so  – was sufficiently frustrated to recall the response of his association’s membership to former Justice Minister Kim Campbell’s Bill C-17. Clare noted that “gun

90  Alistair D. Edgar

owners stayed home in droves” from the next general election, contributing to the Progressive Conservative government’s defeat in 1993.45 It is not the point here to be critical of the efforts of legitimate Canadian lobby groups functioning as part of the democratic national political landscape – nor for that matter, to be critical of a government listening to the views of legitimate lobby groups. The point is to observe that there were clear and widely recognized domestic political calculations feeding into the decisions of the Harper government as it considered its position on another major multilateral initiative under negotiation at the UN. That initiative was deemed unhelpful for the Canadian leader’s fundamental political objectives of assuring his and the Conservative Party’s domestic electoral victory over the opposition parties, and reconfiguring the Canadian political landscape to make the Conservatives the “natural” governing choice for Canadians. Against those objectives, and whatever its broader merits, the international initiative and the organization itself would be subject to the same treatment as his domestic political opponents, or even his allies when other interests took precedence. Political power – gaining it, and maintaining it – consistently took priority. If there was at least one subject on which Prime Minister Harper could be argued to have adopted a “principled” stance, broadly and especially in his dealings with the other Member States of the UN, it would be in his singular support for Israel. In March 2006, as he first took office, Prime Minister Harper sought to have Canada be the first UN Member State to cut its financial assistance and diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Authority after Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian elections. Later that summer, as Israeli military forces were fighting Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and other Western governments were calling for a ceasefire to help protect civilians (as Lebanese civilians were being killed or displaced in disproportionately large numbers), Prime Minister Harper proclaimed Israel’s right to defend itself and supported what he termed as Israel’s measured response to an initial cross-border attack by Hezbollah against Israel Defense Forces. Over the next several years, the Harper government took the position that Israeli actions and policies would be supported without question by Ottawa; Canada boycotted UN events at which Israel would be criticized, and when the prime minister did choose to send a representative to participate, it was his foreign minister who scolded the UN General Assembly for its Member States’ criticisms of Israel or their support for the recognition of Palestine as a state. At the G8 summit in Deauville, France, in May 2013, Harper rejected US President Barack Obama’s effort to have the final communiqué note a preference for recognizing Israel’s de facto pre-1967 borders as the basis for peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. And in 2012, as the Palestinian Authority brought its campaign forward to gain recognition of statehood at the UN General Assembly, Harper sent Minister Baird to New York to address

Stephen Harper’s Canada and the United Nations  91

the Assembly and to issue a blunt rejection of the Palestinian bid. Indeed, at the 29 November 2012 vote in the Assembly, Canada was one of only 9 states to vote against the recognition of Palestine as a new “non-member observer state,” while 138 voted in favour and 41 states abstained. The General Assembly vote came a little more than a year after Member States at UNESCO in October 2011 had voted to recognize Palestine, on that occasion by a vote of 106 in favour, 14 opposed, and 52 abstentions. In recognition of his unstinting support for Israel and its policies, Prime Minister Harper was awarded medals by various Jewish organizations.46 At the annual Negev fundraising dinner of the Jewish National Fund-Canada in December 2013, where he announced his upcoming (and first) official visit to Israel, Harper described Israel as “a light of freedom and democracy in what is otherwise a region of darkness” and pledged Canada’s continuing and unquestioning support, “including at the United Nations.”47 On the Middle East, and specifically on Israel, Blanchfield reflects the common view (see Narine, chapter 14 in this volume) that “ideology, not domestic politics, was the prime driver” of Harper’s foreign policy48 – and, in turn, a central element informing the prime minister’s attitude towards the United Nations where Israeli policies regularly were the focus of sharp criticism by other governments in the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council. That ideological commitment, it is suggested, was a personal one even before it was a political stance, being derived from the beliefs inculcated in a young Stephen Harper by his father, Joe Harper. The father raised his son in the United Church of Canada, and spoke convincingly about his views on the biblical status of the Jewish people as “chosen,” as well as relating to his three sons the horrors of the Holocaust.49 There is no reason to doubt the conviction fuelling Stephen Harper’s personal choice in offering unwavering support for Israel. However, this could not be credited solely or simply to the conservative evangelical Christian religious convictions learned in childhood and carried into later life, and which then shaped all of his policy choices and actions. In his role as party leader and prime minister, Harper was far less publicly outspoken within Canada when dealing with issues of abortion and homosexuality, on which “he has done next to nothing and prevented others, actually, from doing anything.”50 The political sensitivities of Canadian voters were such that any similar sort of outspoken and unwavering public support from the prime minister for a strongly conservative position  – which may well have been his personal conviction judging from earlier statements he made about “traditional” marriage values – would have had the potential to lose large segments of domestic electoral support. By contrast, while controversial with his political rivals and critics, his rigid stance on supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel was a commitment that helped Stephen Harper’s Conservatives at the ballot box: it was an important element in winning over Jewish voters in at least three key

92  Alistair D. Edgar

Toronto-area districts from an historically Liberal preference, giving election victories instead to Conservative candidates Joe Oliver, Peter Kent, and Mark Adler and contributing to the Harper Conservative Party’s first majority government in the May 2011 federal election.51 While his stance on Israel may have alienated some potential voters, it counted in energizing important base supporters with immediate and concrete electoral benefits. Legacies and Lessons Debating the domestic political legacy  – positive or negative, enduring or already rejected and erased – of Stephen Harper as prime minister can be left to others. In a 2014 article in the International Journal that examines Canadian public opinion surveys focusing on attitudes towards the UN, peacekeeping, and the Canadian military, University of Ottawa professor Roland Paris – who would later serve as a foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau – found “little evidence to indicate that Canadians have shifted away from liberal internationalism and toward the foreign policy values that the prime minister [Harper] has articulated.”52 The landslide loss by the Conservative Party in the October 2015 federal election saw the Conservative leader’s dismissive UN agenda quickly replaced by the Trudeau-led Liberal Party (with its clear governmental focus on mending fences with the UN and securing a Security Council seat for 2021–2) that Harper had worked so determinedly to divide and conquer. What Paris called “the Harper era” was certainly a deeply divisive period in Canadian politics, made so consciously and deliberately by the prime minister’s political goals or ambitions for his party and also by his personal governing style that insisted on highly centralized leadership power, conformity to command, and strict control over any form of public messaging (discussed by McKenna, chapter 3 in this volume). Under Stephen Harper, a nuanced domestic political agenda, and a nuanced foreign policy where the two intersected, were both derided as weak (or worse) and replaced increasingly by partisan slogans issued by the prime minister and his political spokespersons to audiences at home and abroad. Instead, the Conservative government pushed the promotion of “an agenda that saw disagreements as opposition,” with those who disagreed  – whether government scientists, researchers, and diplomats, civil society organizations, political opponents, or members of his own party – having to be “silenced or denigrated.”53 Considering the lessons to be learned from the experiences of the Harper era for ecological sustainability advocates, Simon Dalby warned that both activists and academics “ignore politics at their peril.”54 Within a governance context in which critical policy issues were used, or abused, for narrowly partisan purposes, evidence and expertise only mattered to those in power if they supported

Stephen Harper’s Canada and the United Nations  93

the official and predetermined position of the Conservative government. However, in the context of Canadian foreign policy and especially its multilateral relations conducted in the broad framework of the United Nations, it was the Canadian leader who sought to portray himself as going against “politics.” Stephen Harper’s government sought to hang its hat on the mantra that it pursued consistent and constant “principles,” in contrast to what it wanted Canadians to see as a weak – even an unpatriotic and dangerous appeasing – multilateralism. In particular, the government depicted the latter as being derived from a Liberal internationalist mythology that (according to this new tale) did not serve or even represent the country’s true values, interests, and needs. However, those new “principles” were narrowly conceived, usually stridently announced, and often focused on advancing a domestic political and economic agenda that was intended to serve the electoral interests and ambitions of the prime minister’s Conservative Party. There is, as Fen Osler Hampson rightly notes, “more than one way to secure international cooperation.”55 That said, the narrowly utilitarian calculations and focus on winning political power at home left the prime minister with little room, and no incentive, to offer or to adopt cooperative strategies  – that is, compromises taking into account other actors’ alternative views or interests – at the United Nations. This, in turn, created its own limitations for the Canadian government, since despite his vision that Canada would become an “energy superpower” – an ambitious goal serving the extractive industry sector, and a goal that eventually collapsed with the collapse of oil prices – Canada simply was not sufficiently powerful to dictate to others. In the politics of that multilateral arena, in New York, Geneva, and Vienna, and at global conferences, the Canadian prime minister’s ability – and his inclination, if it ever existed – to persuade other governments to adopt his policies or to agree to his terms faded in inverse relation to his growing rejection of internationally negotiated agreements or standards, and his loud and repeated condemnations of those other governments’ diverging views. Unlike domestic critics, or simply those whose expertise and evidence challenged the basis of the Harper agenda at home, the Member States of the UN could not be silenced or bullied – although they often were denigrated by Ottawa. Whether it came from Prime Minister Harper, Minister Baird, or others following their leader’s instructions, the ineluctable UN denigration was, in the end, mostly “sound and fury, Signifying nothing.”56 NOTES 1 See Adam Chapnick, Canada on the United Nations Security Council (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2020). 2 Michael Pearson, “Humanizing the UN Security Council,” in Fen Osler Hampsom, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot, eds., Canada Among Nations 2001:

94  Alistair D. Edgar The Axworthy Legacy (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press Canada, 2001), 127. Pearson notes that he takes the phrase from James Eayrs’s Fate and Will in Foreign Policy (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1967). 3 For an insightful but critical view on the need for UN reform written at that time (now updated in later editions), see Thomas G. Weiss, What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). 4 Mike Blanchfield, Swingback: Getting Along in the World with Harper and Trudeau (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017), 76–7. Scott Staring provides an interesting analysis of Stephen Harper’s ideological dislike for the United Nations. Staring accepts that Harper had materialistic goals, but argues that Harper’s antipathy toward the UN was “fuelled by deeper moral concerns” that Canada’s support for the international body was an expression of “weak-willed liberalism” and “dangerous relativism” in Canadian society and Canadian foreign policy. See, “Stephen Harper, Leo Strauss and the Politics of Fear,” CIPS Working Paper (May 2015), at http://www .cips-cepi.ca/publications/stephen-harper-leo-strauss-and-the-politics-of-fear-2/. The argument here, though, is that this ideological stance nonetheless was not one of any broader principle, but was still part of a narrow agenda of remaking Canadian politics to eliminate the Liberal Party and render Harper’s Conservative Party as the dominant ruling elite in Canada’s foreseeable future. 5 Denis Stairs, Being Rejected in the United Nations: The Causes and Implications of Canada’s Failure to Win a Seat in the UN Security Council (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2011). 6 Ibid., 8–11. 7 David M. Malone, “The Open Road,” Literary Review of Canada 24, no. 9 (November 2016): 26. 8 Blanchfield, Swingback, 67. 9 Quoted in Mike Blanchfield, “Harper Wanted Russia Out of the Old G8 Even before Ukraine Crisis,” Maclean’s, 8 June 2015, http://www.macleans.ca/news /canada/harper-wanted-russia-out-of-the-old-g8-even-before-ukraine-crisis/. 10 At the November 2014 G20 summit in Australia, of course, Harper bluntly told Russian President Vladimir Putin to end Russia’s interference in Ukraine. Earlier that year, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop had introduced a proposal to ban Russia from the November meeting, but the initiative was stopped by the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). 11 Blanchfield, Swingback, 89–96; for a critical evaluation of the 2010 G20 summit’s outcome, see Terence Corcoran, “National Sovereignty Stands Tall at the G20,” Financial Post, 27 June 2010, http://www.financialpost.com/personal-finance /national+sovereignty+stands+tall/3209162/story.html. 12 Stephen Brown, “Canadian Aid Policy during the Harper Years,” in Adam Chapnick and Christopher J. Kukucha, eds., The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 168–9; and Laura Macdonald, “Continental

Stephen Harper’s Canada and the United Nations  95

13 14

15

16 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Shift? Rethinking Canadian Aid to the Americas,” 16 September 2013, OpenCanada.org, https://www.opencanada.org/features/continental-shift-rethinking-canadian-aid -to-the-americas/. Geoffrey York, “Banned Aid,” Globe and Mail, 29 May 2009, https://www.theglobe andmail.com/opinion/munk-debates/banned-aid/article4261160/?arc404=true. Brian Laghi and Jane Taber, “CIDA Cuts to Africa Could Hamper UN Ambitions,” Globe and Mail, 16 March 2009, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics /cida-cuts-to-africa-could-hamper-un-ambitions/article1150262/. Brown, “Canadian Aid Policy”, 174–5; and David Ravensbergen, “Democracy in the Pits: How Canada Uses Foreign Aid as PR for Mining Companies,” DesmogCanada, 21 April 2014, https://www.desmog.ca/2014/04/17/democracy -pits-part-2-canada-uses-aid-pr-mining-companies. Editorial in the British medical journal, The Lancet, quoted in Blanchfield, Swingback, 119. On the different understandings of “human security” in the West and East, see Amitav Acharya, “Human Security: East versus West,” International Journal 56, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 442–60. The Human Security Partnership, or Network, began with an agreement between Minister Axworthy and his Norwegian counterpart, Knut Vollebaek, in 1998 that led to the Lysoen Declaration, a Canada-Norway cooperation agreement. See Lloyd Axworthy, Knut Vollebaek, Stein Kuhnle, and Sorpong Peou, “Introduction: Human Security at 20 – Lysoen Revisited,” Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 2, no. 2 (2014): 143–9. Alistair D. Edgar, “Peace, Justice and Politics: The International Criminal Court, ‘new diplomacy,’ and the UN system,” in Andrew F. Cooper, John English, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2002), 133–51. The Serbian perspective is given, for example, by Milovan Radovanović, Kosovo and Metohija: Serbian and Regional Context (Belgrade: Center for Protection of Natural and Cultural Heritage of Kosovo and Metohija, 2005). The Security Council did issue a Presidential Statement in August 1998 calling for a ceasefire, and then in September 1998 passed a formal resolution, SC Resolution 1199, calling for the cessation of hostilities and the opening of negotiations for a political solution. See Hevina S. Dashwood, “Canada’s Participation in the NATO-led Intervention in Kosovo,” in Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson, eds., Canada Among Nations 2000: Vanishing Borders (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press Canada, 2000), 299. Quoted in Paul Knox, “Canada at the UN: A Human Security Council,” in Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson, eds., Canada Among Nations 2000: Vanishing Borders (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press Canada, 2000), 312.

96  Alistair D. Edgar 24 David Chandler offers a critical analysis of these views in From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention, new ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2006), esp. 127–39. 25 Sean Maloney, “`Was It Worth It’? Canadian Intervention in Afghanistan and Perceptions of Success and Failure,” Canadian Military Journal 14, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 19–31. 26 Blanchfield, Swingback, 39–40. 27 “Canada Committed to Afghan Mission, Harper Tells Troops,” CBC News, 13 March 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canada-committed-to-afghan -mission-harper-tells-troops-1.573722. 28 Aaron Wherry, “A Short History of the Harper Government Changing Its Mind on the Mission in Afghanistan,” Maclean’s, 25 April 2012, http://www.macleans.ca /politics/ottawa/a-short-history-of-the-harper-government-changing-its-mind-on -the-mission-in-afghanistan/. 29 Blanchfield, Swingback, 53–6. 30 The Canadian Press, “Iraq War a Mistake, Harper Admits,” CTV News, 3 October 2008, http://www.ctvnews.ca/iraq-war-a-mistake-harper-admits-1.330207. 31 Blanchfield, Swingback, 43. 32 Climate Action Network Canada, “Prime Minister Harper and Minister Prentice on the Kyoto Protocol,” available at http://climateactionnetwork.ca/wp-content /uploads/2011/06/can-harper-prentice-on-kyoto.pdf. 33 “Beyond Petroleum,” The Economist, 29 January 2015, https://www.economist.com /news/americas/21641288-growth-shifting-oil-producing-west-back-traditional -economic-heartland. 34 Bryan Walsh, “Bienvenue au Canada: Welcome to Your Friendly Neighborhood Petro-State,” Time, 14 December 2011, http://science.time.com/2011/12/14 /bienvenue-au-canada-welcome-to-your-friendly-neighborhood-petrostate/. 35 Blanchfield, Swingback, 80. 36 Stephen Leahy, “Canada Pulls Out of U.N. Body to Fight Desertification,” Inter Press Service, 28 March 2013, www.ipsisnews.net/2013/03-canada-pulls-out-of-u-n -body-to-fight-desertification/. 37 Carol Linnitt, “Harper’s Attack on Science: No Science, No Evidence, No Truth, No Democracy,” Academic Matters, May 2013, http://academicmatters.ca/2013/05 /harpers-attack-on-science-no-science-no-evidence-no-truth-no-democracy/. 38 See Meagan Fitzpatrick, “Honours for Mission to End ‘Brutal’ Libyan Regime,” CBC News, 24 November 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/honours-for -mission-to-end-brutal-libyan-regime-1.996278. 39 Blanchfield, Swingback, 60. 40 For an example of the criticism at both the cost and the attempt by the Harper government to promote its “warrior nation” narrative, see Jamie Swift and Ian McKay, “False Memories of the War of 1812 or Glorifying War … Then and Now,” Peace Magazine (January-March 2013), http://peacemagazine.org/archive

Stephen Harper’s Canada and the United Nations  97

41 42 43 44

45

46

47

48 49

50 51

52

/v29n1p16.htm. John Geddes noted that Harper’s costly celebration of the War of 1812 was “supported by 28.6 per cent of Canadians, far below the 41.1 per cent who would have favoured a celebration” of the 30th anniversary of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a Pierre Trudeau Liberal government achievement that the prime minister largely ignored. Geddes, “How Stephen Harper Is Rewriting History,” Maclean’s, 29 July 2013, http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/written -by-the-victors/. Blanchfield, Swingback, 78–9. Ibid., 78. United Nations, The Arms Trade Treaty, accessed 22 July 2021, https://unoda-web .s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf. It was suggested that NFA President Sheldon Clare withdrew from his planned critical testimony before the Public Safety Committee hearing on Bill C-51, the Harper government’s anti-terror legislation, due to pressure from the Prime Minister’s Office over a separate item of legislation, Bill C-42 dealing with regulations for owning, storing, and transporting guns within Canada. See Justin Ling, ‘The Harper Government May Have Bullied a Pro-Gun Group into Dropping Its C-51 Criticism,” Vice.com, 25 March 2015, https://www.vice.com/en_ca /article/4w5bkn/the-harper-government-may-have-bullied-a-pro-gun-group-into -dropping-its-c-51-criticism-193. See Evan Dyer, “Conservatives’ Gun Bill, C-42, Fails to Impress Gun Owners,” CBC News, 23 November 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/conservatives -gun-bill-c-42-fails-to-impress-gun-owners-1.2837842. See, for example, Jordan Michael Smith, “Reinventing Canada: Stephen Harper’s Conservative Revolution,” World Affairs, March/April 2012, http://www .worldaffairsjournal.org/article/reinventing-canada-stephen-harper’s-conservative -revolution, and Blanchfield, Swingback, 142–63. Ron Csillag, “Harper Announces First Trip to Israel,” The Canadian Jewish News, 2 December 2013, http://www.cjnews.com/news/harper-announces-first-trip-to -israel. Blanchfield, Swingback, 155. Ibid., 156, and Ron Csillag, “Stephen Harper Is One of Israel’s Staunchest Supporters – But Why?” Ottawa Jewish Bulletin, 17 January 2014, http://www .ottawajewishbulletin.com/2014/01/3863/. Csillag quotes John Stackhouse, then-professor of theology at Regent College, Vancouver, in ibid. Henry Srebrnik, “Harper, Israel and Canada’s Jewish Community,” The (Charlottetown) Guardian, 8 January 2014, http://www.theguardian.pe.ca /opinion/letter-to-the-editor/2014/1/8/harper-israel-and-canadas-jewish-commu -3568078.html. Roland Paris, “Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era,” International Journal 69, no. 3 (2014): 301–2.

98  Alistair D. Edgar 53 Simon Dalby, “Geopolitics, Ecology and Stephen Harper’s Reinvention of Canada,” in Hans Günter Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, John Grin, and Jürgen Scheffran, eds., Sustainability Transition and Sustainable Peace Handbook (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2016), 496. 54 Ibid., 501. 55 Fen Osler Hampson, “Deconstructing Multilateral Cooperation,” in I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, eds., International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 77. 56 The phrase, of course, comes from William Shakespeare’s Macbeth.

5 International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era mark winfield and vanessa scanga

Introduction Canada has been deeply involved in international discussions around climate change from their outset. Canada’s specific contributions to these processes have, however, varied widely. At times, Ottawa has played prominent and constructive leadership roles, contributing significantly, for example, to the ozoneprotecting Montreal Protocol of the 1980s, the conclusion of the original 1992 United National Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the subsequent 1997 Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, in 2013 Canada received a “Lifetime Unachievement Fossil Award” from the international NGO, the Climate Action Network, for its failure to make meaningful contributions to the United Nations climate negotiations and attempts to stall progress over the preceding five years. Since late 2015, the government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau signalled a strong intention to re-engage constructively in the international climate change effort and has signed and ratified the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement. This chapter focuses specifically on the Canadian government’s approach to the international dimensions of the climate change issue during the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, from its coming into office in early February 2006 to its defeat in the October 2015 federal election. As a case study, the Harper period provides an opportunity to examine the extent to which international obligations and considerations constrained and shaped the behaviour of a government that was fundamentally disinclined to take the climate change issue seriously, and that eventually came to regard it as a threat to its core economic agenda and its domestic political re-election chances. The narrative that emerges suggests that the multilateral regime established through the UNFCCC around climate change ultimately provided little or no constraint on the Harper government’s abandonment of Canada’s commitments under the UNFCCC framework. Rather, the only significant constraints

100  Mark Winfield and Vanessa Scanga

actually emerge through Canada’s bilateral relationship with the United States. At the federal level, the Barack Obama administration’s refusal to approve the Keystone XL pipeline project, which was seen by Harper and his inner circle as essential to their oil sands development strategy, was fundamentally tied to the Conservative government’s approach to the climate change question. At the subnational level, state and provincial initiatives like the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) would provide the structure for the emergence of a national climate change regime in Canada without significant federal involvement. After providing a brief discussion of the evolution of Canada’s role in international climate change policy during the governments of Prime Ministers Brian Mulroney (1984–93), Jean Chrétien (1993–2003), and Paul Martin (2003–6), this chapter  examines the Harper government’s approach to the issue through three distinct phases. During the initial period (2006–8), the minority Conservative government, with aspirations to be a global “energy superpower,” found itself compelled by domestic and international considerations to engage with the climate change issue. Similarly, the second period (2008–11) is marked by continued minority government status for the Conservatives and the arrival of the Obama administration in the United States. The new US administration brought with it a strong focus on the environment and climate change. The third and final phase encompasses the period from the Harper Conservative’s achievement of a majority government in May 2011 to its defeat in the October 2015 federal election. Clearly, this was a period defined by major retrenchments on Canadian climate change policy domestically and internationally. This chapter also includes a discussion of important transnational initiatives that emerged around climate change policy among subnational (provincial and state) governments in North America during the Harper period. Background 1990–2006: International Leadership and Federal-Provincial Conflict Canadian climate change policy formulation and implementation were defined, through the governments of Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Liberal Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin, by the combination of relatively strong leadership roles at the international level and increasing domestic federal-provincial conflict over the implementation of Canada’s international environmental commitments. Internationally, Canada was in the forefront of developing a legal and policy framework in response to the emerging scientific consensus around the significance of the problem of anthropogenic climate change from the outset. The Progressive Conservative government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney adopted a national goal of stabilizing Canadian greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in

International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era  101

1990. Two years later, Canada played a major role in the establishment of the stabilization of emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000 as the central goal of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted at the Rio Conference in 1992. Canada was among the first countries to sign the UNFCCC, which provided the structure for all subsequent international climate change negotiations and agreements. Prime Minister Mulroney was also seen to have played an important personal role in persuading the US administration of President George H.W. Bush to participate in the negotiations and to sign the Convention.1 The pattern of relatively strong Canadian international leadership on climate change continued under the subsequent Liberal government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (1993–2003). Like Mulroney, Chrétien played, at times, a major role in the multilateral discussions over climate change. Following discussions with other G7 leaders, for example, he intervened personally to establish Canada’s commitment to the UNFCCC to a 6 per cent reduction in its GHG emissions relative to 1990 by the first commitment period (2008–12) of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.2 The Canadian commitment was among the most ambitious of the individual national targets of the non-European Union, as noted in Annex B (i.e., developed) countries under the protocol. Despite the 2001 decision of the administration of US President George W. Bush to withdraw the United States’ signature from the Kyoto Protocol, the practice of strong Canadian international leadership continued. Then environment minister Stéphane Dion, for example, played a major role as chair of the 2005 Conference of the Parties in Montreal, under the government of Prime Minister Paul Martin, who succeeded Chrétien in late 2003. The situation on the domestic front was more complicated, though. Efforts to formulate a national strategy to implement Canada’s obligations under the UNFCCC, and particularly the Kyoto Protocol, were defined by rising levels of political conflict. Tensions became increasingly acute between fossil fuelproducing provinces – particularly Alberta and Saskatchewan, which saw the Kyoto obligations as potentially significant constraints on the development of its oil sands resources – and the federal government as well as less carbon export-dependent provinces, led by Quebec. Efforts at a multilateral domestic consensus around Kyoto implementation collapsed with Alberta’s withdrawal from the process in 2002, leading to the unilateral federal ratification of the Kyoto Protocol at the end of that year.3 The Liberal minority government of Prime Minister Martin that emerged from the 2004 federal election continued with a strategy of bilateral engagement with those individual provinces willing to negotiate over Kyoto implementation. These efforts were backed by proposals for a federal cap-and-trade system for large industrial sources of GHG emissions. The final draft of regulations to implement the system under the Canadian Environmental Protection

102  Mark Winfield and Vanessa Scanga

Act were published in the Canada Gazette in December 2005, just prior to the January 2006 federal election.4 While the Liberal governments of Chrétien and Martin, and New Democratic, Bloc Québécois, and Green opposition parties remained at least rhetorically committed to attempting to fulfil Canada’s Kyoto obligations, the Progressive Conservative and Reform parties, with their strong political bases in Western Canada, emerged as deeply opposed to the ratification of the Protocol and the implementation of measures to fulfil Canada’s obligations under it. The political impact of that opposition was initially limited by the effects of vote-splitting among conservative voters between the Reform and Progressive Conservative parties. But the merger of the two parties in 2003 under the leadership of Stephen Harper would set the stage for a very different approach in Canadian climate change policy both domestically and internationally. 2006–2008: Energy Superpower Aspirations Meet Climate Change Realities The fall of Paul Martin’s minority government in November 2005, and the subsequent January 2006 federal election, would be a crucial watershed in the evolution of Canadian climate change policy. The election resulted in a Conservative minority government, led by climate sceptic Stephen Harper. Harper’s personal and political hostility to climate change issues was well known. As leader of the Canadian Alliance Party, he had once described the Kyoto Protocol as “a socialist scheme to suck money out of wealth-producing nations” and something that would “cripple the oil and gas industry.”5 The new government was clear from the outset that its primary focus was to be on the development and export of Canada’s energy resources, particularly Alberta’s oil sands, with the intention of making Canada an “energy superpower.”6 Its initial approach to the climate change issue seemed to be one of neglect, both at home and abroad. At the time, international discussions on a successor agreement to cover the second commitment period (2012–20) under the Kyoto Protocol seemed stalled, given the United States’ withdrawal of its signature from the protocol and subsequent non-engagement under the Bush administration. Domestically, there seemed little to be gained by antagonizing the new government’s Western Canadian political base over the issue. Still, a number of factors combined to quickly render such an approach both politically and practically unviable. Domestic and international public concerns over the climate change issue began to rise dramatically. These concerns were reinforced by perceived increases in extreme weather events and underlined by the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the scientific body established under the UNFCCC. In its report, the panel concluded that “warming of the climate system is

International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era  103

unequivocal,” and that “most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.”7 Concerns about climate change had been further reinforced by the release of the 2006 film An Inconvenient Truth, featuring environmentalist and former US Vice President Al Gore. By the end of 2006, the environment was being identified consistently as a top issue by McAllister Opinion Research, with a specific focus on climate change.8 The issue became a major focus for all four opposition parties (Liberal, NDP, BQ, and Green) facing the Harper government. The government’s initial response was, however, to attempt to refocus public concerns on air quality issues, rather than climate change, through the introduction of a federal Clean Air Act.9 These efforts were largely unsuccessful, ultimately compelling the government to introduce a domestic climate change strategy, entitled Turning the Corner.10 The plan included proposals for an emissions intensity-based regulatory framework for industrial emissions of GHGs and other air pollutants, improvements in vehicle fuel economy standards, and new energy efficiency standards for other consumer and commercial products. Perhaps most importantly, the plan introduced a new GHG emission target of a 20 per cent reduction in emissions relative to 2006 by 2020. By changing the baseline for future Canadian GHG emission reductions from 1990 to 2006, the plan implicitly abandoned the Kyoto Protocol commitment to a 6 per cent reduction relative to 1990 levels.11 Indeed, the 1990 to 2006 time frame had been a period of significant growth in Canada’s GHG emissions, driven very strongly by the expansion of production from the Alberta oil sands.12 The shift to a 2006 baseline, then, effectively wrote off that growth in carbon emissions. The government’s proposed Clean Air Act would never be fully adopted, in the face of stiff objections from all three major opposition parties. Rather, the opposition would combine to adopt, in June 2007, a Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act,13 over the strong objections of the Harper Conservatives. The legislation required the government to table a plan for meeting Canada’s commitments under the Kyoto Protocol every two years. The legislation also required that these plans be reviewed by the National Round Table on the Environment and Economy (NRTEE)14 and the Commissioner for the Environment and Sustainable Development (a branch of the Office of the Auditor General of Canada) to determine whether they were sufficient to meet Canada’s Kyoto obligations. Unsurprisingly, the government’s approach to the climate change issue emerged as a major focus in the federal election, called by Prime Minister Harper, for October 2008. During the election campaign, the Liberal Party, now led by former environment minister Stéphane Dion, proposed a “Green Shift,” focused on the implementation of a national carbon tax. The 2008 election subsequently resulted in a continuation of the Conservative minority government. The outcome was attributed, in part, to a collapse of the Liberal vote

104  Mark Winfield and Vanessa Scanga

under Dion’s leadership and the four-way splitting of post-materialist voters among the Liberal, NDP, BQ, and Green parties. Post-materialist voters are the most likely to be concerned about social and environmental issues like climate change, and potentially constitute a majority of the Canadian electorate. Materialist voters, in contrast, who tend to form the base for the Conservative Party, are more focused on economic issues, employment, security, and law and order issues.15 2008–2011: Managing Obama Prime Minister Harper’s apparent and partial vindication of his management of the climate change issue in the 2008 federal election became vastly more complicated the following month. Although the aftermath of the 2008 election left the Liberal Party in disarray and unwilling to force another election on Harper’s minority government, the November 2008 US presidential election resulted in the election of Democratic candidate Barack Obama as president. Obama was backed by Democratic Party majorities in the US House of Representatives and the Senate. President Obama’s campaign had included a strong focus on US reengagement with the climate change issue domestically and on the global stage following the years of neglect under the prior Bush administration. President Obama’s administration arrived with a strong ecological modernist16 perspective on energy and environmental issues, emphasizing the integration of energy, the environment, and economic strategies.17 This approach stood in stark contrast to the zero-sum framing that defined the Harper government’s conceptualization of energy and environmental issues. Within that framework, environmental protection was only seen to be able to come at the expense of economic development, and vice versa. The government’s own environment minister, Jim Prentice, had highlighted that point, stating that, “There is a need for balancing of our responsibility as stewards of the environment and on the other hand, as creators of wealth and builders of industry and economic opportunity.”18 The arrival of the Obama administration was also accompanied by the introduction of a series of legislative proposals around climate change and carbon pricing in the US Congress. Importantly, from a Canadian perspective, virtually all of these proposals incorporated some form of trade-related measures. Reflecting US concerns that American industry would be disadvantaged if some form of carbon-pricing system were introduced in the US but not in other major competing economies, like those of China and India, the proposed legislation included some form of restriction on access to the US market for countries that did not introduce a carbon-pricing scheme similar to that adopted in the US. Congressional legislative efforts around climate change reached their zenith in June 2009, with the adoption of the American Clean Energy and Security Act

International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era  105

(a.k.a. the Waxman-Markey Bill) by the US House of Representatives. Consistent with other proposals introduced at the same time, legislation would have required exporters to the US to obtain carbon permits from the US government. Emerging economies like China were the primary targets of these measures, but they had major implications for Canada as well given its huge trading relationship with the US. Although the legislation would never be adopted, it signalled the seriousness of the potential risks for Canada of inaction on the climate change file. The international climate change discussions were, however, reinvigorated as the US re-engaged in UNFCCC processes following the arrival of the Obama administration. Major attention was focused on the December 2009 Copenhagen Conference of the Parties, which was intended to establish a successor agreement and commitments to the Kyoto Protocol. The Harper government’s response to the situation, at least initially, was to tie its international approach to the climate change issue to that of the new US administration. Specifically, Canada committed to the same climate change targets as the US under the accords that emerged from the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties of a 17 per cent reduction relative to 2005 by 2020. Environment Minister Prentice emphasized Canada’s “complete alignment” with the US targets and that Canada’s goals were “subject to adjustment to remain consistent” with the US approach.19 The federal government was also critical of efforts by Canadian provinces or businesses to pursue even more ambitious targets, with Prentice stating: “It is absolutely counter-productive and utterly pointless for Canada and Canadian businesses to strike out on their own, to set and to pursue targets that will ultimately create barriers to trade and put us at a competitive disadvantage.”20 Besides avoiding additional costs on Canadian businesses, the alignment approach offered a number of potential advantages to the Harper government. On the surface, it offered a defence against trade-related climate change measures by the US, as Canadian policy would be the same as US policy and therefore provide no grounds for restrictions on trade access to the US market. At the same time, the strategy seemed grounded in an assumption that significant US action to actually reduce GHG emissions was unlikely given the ongoing inability of the administration or the Democratic congressional leadership to complete the passage of climate change legislation. The situation, in other words, enabled the federal government to say that it was following the lead of the Obama administration, without actually having to implement meaningful measures to reduce GHG emissions. The one significant exception in this regard was the April 2010 adoption of new vehicle fuel economy standards in conjunction with those implemented by the Obama administration under existing provisions of the US Clean Air Act.21 Put simply, the level of integration in the North American automobile

106  Mark Winfield and Vanessa Scanga

industry left the Harper government with little choice but to follow the US lead on this issue. Steps to reduce emissions from the Canadian energy sector, including oil and gas extraction, were conveniently deferred, pending US legislative action. The apparent success of the Harper government’s strategy was reinforced by the outcome of the November 2010 US midterm elections. The elections resulted in the Republican Party, which was generally hostile to taking significant action on climate change, taking control of the US House of Representatives. That outcome essentially meant that the chance of climate change legislation being adopted by Congress was virtually nil. From the Harper government’s perspective, though, this offered several major advantages. It removed the direct threat of US legislation incorporating trade restrictions on countries that did not take similar action on climate change. It also greatly reduced the possibility that the Obama administration would take further substantive domestic actions to reduce GHG emissions. Indeed, such actions could have reinforced pressures for introducing similar measures by the Canadian federal government. Lastly, the existing provisions of the US Clean Air Act were written with conventional air pollutants in mind and thus did not lend themselves easily to the regulation of emissions of GHGs. The second assumption on the part of the Harper government, however, proved less robust than the first. Almost immediately following the midterm elections, the Obama administration announced its intention to proceed with the regulation of industrial GHG emissions on a sector-by-sector basis under the existing provisions of the Clean Air Act. The US government’s actions were propelled, in part, by litigation dating back to the time of the previous Bush administration. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) had been compelled to make a determination of whether GHGs “endangered” public health and welfare in the settlement of litigation between the administration of former president George W. Bush and twelve states, several cities, and several non-governmental organizations. The critical endangerment finding was ultimately issued in 2009. The Clean Air Act required that once such a finding is made, regulatory action must be undertaken to reduce emissions.22 The electric power generation and oil and gas sectors, then, were identified as early priorities for action by the USEPA. The Harper government’s response to the US administration’s initiatives was to state that it “will not follow [the USEPA’s] course,” but “we are harmonizing in terms of the outcome. We will reach the same outcome.”23 In other words, the policy of “complete alignment” with the US only lasted as long as the US did not take substantive regulatory action on industrial sources of GHGs. That said, the Canadian government stated that it would follow the US lead and focus on regulating GHG emissions sector-by-sector rather than pursuing a general carbon tax or national cap-and-trade system for large final emitters. The electric

International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era  107

power generation and oil and gas sectors were, like in the US, also identified as priorities for regulation by Canada. The Harper government generally assumed that no trade-related climate change measures were possible under existing US legislation. This again turned out to be only partially true. Although the Clean Air Act does not allow traderelated actions against countries that fail to adopt emissions standards similar to those put in place by the US, it would emerge that there were other ways in which market access could be constrained. Several of the US congressional legislative proposals had included provisions for low-carbon fuel standards. Such standards would prohibit the sale of some types of fossil fuels based on the amount of GHGs released in their production. Such standards could significantly affect fuels produced from oil extracted from Alberta’s oil sands. The production of oil sands bitumen is highly carbon-intensive relative to conventionally (e.g., drilled) extracted oil.24 Although the federal proposals were not adopted, low-carbon fuel standards were eventually adopted by some US states, led by California, as well as the province of British Columbia. The low-carbon fuel standards, which were seen to specifically target oil sands bitumen, were also considered by the European Union (EU).25 A second unforeseen issue was related to the pipeline infrastructure needed to facilitate the planned expansion of production from the Alberta oil sands. The oil sands strategy set in motion in the mid-1990s had anticipated major increases in production, reaching one  million barrels  per day by 2004, and potentially increasing to five million barrels per day by 2030.26 These levels of production would exceed the existing pipeline capacity to move oil sands oil to markets in the US by a substantial margin. At the time, the expansion of North American pipeline capacity to accommodate this growth was taken as a given. After all, pipeline expansions had rarely attracted substantial public attention or controversy. The possibility of significant local or even national-level objections to such projects on the basis of environmental and, even more specifically, climate change considerations were not anticipated. Those assumptions began to unravel, however, with the arrival of the Obama administration. The most significant of the proposed pipeline expansions, the multi-billion dollar Keystone XL project, first proposed in 2008, would run from Hardisty, Alberta, to a pipeline hub in Steele City, Nebraska. The Canadian National Energy Board approved the pipeline in 2010. However, the pipeline became the target of significant advocacy campaigns on the part of environmental non-governmental organizations in the US and Canada. The NGOs identified the pipeline capacity issue as a potential choke point for oil sands expansion and the associated projected growth in GHG emissions.27 There were also strong local objections (around land and water supply) to the pipeline in South Dakota and especially Nebraska.

108  Mark Winfield and Vanessa Scanga

The extension of the pipeline became a major political controversy in the US, particularly over its potential to induce further growth in oil-sands-related GHG emissions. The USEPA rejected the initial environmental impact assessment for the pipeline in 2010, on the basis that it had failed to address oil-spill response and safety issues and overall GHG emission concerns.28 Specifically, the Obama administration began to make increasingly explicit linkages between its reluctance to approve the Keystone XL project and Canada’s poor performance on climate change issues.29 The Obama administration’s unexpected determination to continue to act on climate change without congressional support, and to link decisions on issues of importance to the Conservative government to its record on the question of climate change, were not the only unexpected developments during the Harper minority governments. The emergence of the low-carbon fuel standard issue signalled another unanticipated development, this time at the subnational level. Given the apparent unwillingness of the Bush administration in the US and the Harper government in Canada to act at the national level on climate change, a number of state and provincial governments began to collaborate on climate change policies of their own. The most significant of these initiatives was the WCI, launched in February 2007 under the leadership of then California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, with the participation of New Mexico, Arizona, Oregon, and Washington. Montana and Utah would also join the following year, along with the provinces of British Columbia, Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba. Several other states and provinces would participate as observers as well. The WCI was intended to establish common GHG emission reduction targets, a cap-and-trade system among the participating jurisdictions for GHG emissions, and common standards for vehicle fuel efficiency and low-carbon fuels. Participation in the cap-and-trade system would ultimately be limited to California, Quebec, and Ontario, but it did represent an unprecedented level of formal, transnational, subnational cooperation around climate change policy. Not surprisingly, the Harper government was at times outright critical of these initiatives30 but could do little to stop them. But given the non-participation of the key fossil fuel-producing provinces, particularly Alberta and Saskatchewan, the initiative was not seen to directly threaten the government’s energy policy agenda. Some of the participating provincial governments, though, were directly critical of the federal government’s performance on the climate change file the 2009 UNFCCC Conference of the Parties.31 2011–2015: Withdrawal from the International Climate Change Regime and Responsible Resource Development Stephen Harper’s minority Conservative government was defeated on a motion of non-confidence in March 2011, over budgetary matters and the behaviour of

International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era  109

a cabinet minister (and Canada’s treatment of Afghan detainees). Despite a relatively small gain (less than 2 per cent) in the popular vote relative to the 2008 federal election, the Conservatives continued to benefit from vote-splitting among the four opposition parties (along with the decline of the federal Liberal Party) and gained a majority government in the May 2011 federal election.32 The Harper government now found itself with the constraints of minority government and the threat of US legislative action, including trade-related measures on climate change, now removed. The consequences for Canadian climate change policy would turn out to be dire. The directions of the Harper majority government on energy, environment, and climate change issues were defined at the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012. On 11 December 2011, on the eve of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Durban, South Africa, Canada’s Environment Minister Peter Kent announced Canada’s intention to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, stating that “Kyoto for Canada is in the past.”33 The principal justification offered by the government at the time was the possibility of being subjected to increased obligations in the protocol’s second (2012–20) commitment time frame due to Canada’s failure to meet its first commitment period obligations.34 The government appeared to anticipate that other countries would join it in formally withdrawing from the protocol, potentially setting in motion a chain of events that could undermine much of the international framework for addressing climate change. However, that did not occur, and Canada was left as the only country to formally withdraw from the protocol after ratifying it. The effect of the withdrawal was largely to marginalize Canada’s role in international climate change discussions from 2011 until the defeat of the Harper government in 2015. Canada’s limited contributions were actually acknowledged by the international NGO, Climate Action Network, with the granting of a “Lifetime Unachievement Fossil Award,” at the 2013 Warsaw Conference of the Parties, for being named the “Fossil of the Year” as the country making the least constructive contribution to international climate change negotiations for the preceding five years.35 The second international development took place in January 2012 and had a much more direct impact on Canadian climate change, energy, and environmental policy. In November 2011, the Obama administration had deferred a final decision on the Keystone XL pipeline, prompting the Republican majorities in the US Congress to pass legislation requiring a final decision within sixty days. President Obama responded by rejecting the pipeline application, arguing that the legislation prevented a “full assessment of the pipeline’s impact.”36 The deferral and then eventual rejection seemed to incense Prime Minister Harper, who had once described approval of the US pipeline as a “complete no-brainer.”37 Obama would ultimately veto legislation adopted by Congress in February 2015 to approve the Keystone pipeline.38

110  Mark Winfield and Vanessa Scanga

The Harper government’s response to the US decision was not to strengthen its climate change policies to address the Obama administration’s concerns. Rather, the government began refocusing its energy superpower strategy away from the US market for oil exports. With expanded US market access potentially blocked by the Obama administration’s concerns over climate change impacts of oil sands expansion precipitated by the Keystone XL and other pipeline capacity expansion projects, the government attempted to move towards facilitating access to non-US markets. The focus on markets beyond the US was further reinforced by the weakening of US demand for oil imports given the dramatic growth in unconventional (“fracked” and “light tight”) oil production in the US from 2008 onwards.39 Instead, the government focused on securing approval for a series of pipeline projects within Canada intended to move oil sands oil to tidewater on Canada’s east and west coasts, and from there to wider international markets. The Alberta to British Columbia Northern Gateway and Trans Mountain expansion projects, as well as the Alberta to New Brunswick Energy East project, were all identified as major components of Harper’s energy strategy. Frustrated by community, municipal, Indigenous, and provincial government objections to these projects,40 the Conservative government introduced a Responsible Resource Development strategy specifically to facilitate the approval of these and other energy resource-export infrastructure projects. The key legislative elements of the strategy were incorporated into the 2012 Federal Budget implementation legislation, Bill C-38. The legislation made major changes to the federal Fisheries and National Energy Board Acts, repealed and replaced the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act with new “streamlined” legislation, and repealed the Navigable Waters Protection Act, replacing it with a new Navigation Protection Act, all with the intention of advancing and accelerating the approval of energy-export infrastructure. The National Round Table  on the Environment and Economy was also disbanded, and the 2007 Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act was repealed for good measure.41 In a final gesture towards the alignment of Canadian and US climate change policy, regulations controlling emissions from coal-fired electricity plants were adopted in September 2012.42 The rules effectively required the phase-out of conventional coal-fired electricity in Canada, but on timelines aligned with the normal end-of-life for existing coal plants in Canada, and they allowed for the construction of new plants with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies.43 The November 2012 US presidential election produced a situation similar to that after the 2010 midterm elections: a renewed mandate for President Obama, but also continued Republican control of the House of Representatives, with the implication that no new climate change legislation would likely be adopted. In this context, both the Harper government and the Obama administration – as Duane Bratt makes clear in chapter 8 of this volume  – continued on the

International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era  111

divergent pathways that had emerged in 2011. The Harper government, for its part, continued its pursuit of oil pipelines to Canadian tidewater, with the intention of bypassing the Obama administration’s objections to the Keystone XL expansion, and in the face of a weakening US export market. The first of the pipelines, the Northern Gateway pipeline from Bruderheim, Alberta, to Kitimat, BC, was approved in cabinet in June 2014 under the revised C-38 approval process.44 The approval was met with a total of eighteen legal challenges by affected First Nations and environmental and community organizations. The approval would ultimately be overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal in June 2016 on the basis of inadequate consultation with the affected First Nations.45 Despite the outcome of the 2014 US midterm elections, which now left the Republicans in control of both houses of Congress, the Obama administration continued to move forward on its plans to regulate GHG emissions under the existing provisions of the Clean Air Act. The centrepiece of these efforts, a Clean Power Plan focused on reducing emissions from the electricity sector by 32 per cent by 2030 relative to 2005, was announced in August 2015.46 The plan was the subject of immediate challenges by twenty-seven states, although eighteen others intervened in support of the plan. The US Supreme Court would subsequently order a halt to the implementation of the plan in February 2016, pending consideration of the plan by the lower courts.47 Additionally, President Obama would play a major role in the run-up to the December 2015 UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Paris, at which successor agreements to the Kyoto Protocol and the 2009 Copenhagen Accords were to be negotiated. A November 2014 US-China Agreement to limit emissions was seen as a major breakthrough.48 Obama would ultimately sign and ratify, without congressional approval, the Paris Agreement committing the US to a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) of achieving an economy-wide target “to reduce our emissions by 26%–28% below 2005 levels by 2025, and to make best efforts to reduce [them] by 28%.”49 Canada, for its part, now very much at the margins of the Paris discussions, announced an intended Nationally Determined Contribution of a 30  per cent reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 relative to 2005 in May 2015.50 But given its obsession with economic growth, there was very little chance of these targets actually being met in the waning Harper years. 2015–2021: Trudeau, the US, and Climate Change The Harper government ended with the October 2015 federal election in Canada. Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party won a majority government, in part on the basis of a platform that made substantial commitments to action on international climate change and to reverse the Bill C-38 changes to federal

112  Mark Winfield and Vanessa Scanga

environmental legislation.51 In stark contrast to the Conservative government’s zero-sum framing of energy and environmental issues, the platform reflected a strongly ecological modernist vision of the integration of energy, environment, and climate change policy similar to that pursued by the Obama administration. Through the campaign, the Liberals achieved the consolidation of the post-materialist vote that had evaded the opposition parties throughout the Harper period. The arrival of the Trudeau government in Ottawa coincided with the final year of President Obama’s presidency and led to a brief period of co-operative Canada-US relations around energy, the environment, and climate change issues. In March 2016, a US-Canada joint statement on climate, energy and Arctic leadership, for example, emphasized their commitment to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, a reduction in GHG emissions, the integration of renewable energy sources into electricity grids, improved energy efficiency, accelerated development of clean energy sources, and the protection of the Arctic environment and communities, while building a sustainable Arctic economy.52 The Trudeau government announced a plan for a federal minimum carbon price53 as part of its overall strategy and in compliance with its October 2016 ratification of the Paris Agreement. This was followed by the announcement of the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change on carbon pricing (which it increased considerably in late 2020),54 with the participation of all of the provinces except Saskatchewan.55 (The Supreme Court of Canada – after considering provincial legal and constitutional challenges to Trudeau’s carbon pricing scheme – ruled in favour of the federal government in early 2021.56) The agreement largely rested on actions already being undertaking by the provinces but did signal a renewed effort at federal-provincial engagement around climate change. The NDC initially committed to under the Paris Agreement remained the same as that proposed by the previous Conservative government (and then increased by 40 to 45 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030 in April 2021).57 The period of Canada-US co-operation around energy, environment, and climate change issues would end with the November 2016 election of Republican candidate Donald Trump as president of the United States. Backed by continued Republican majorities in the US House of Representatives and the Senate, Trump ordered a review of the Clean Power Plan, the centrepiece of the Obama administration’s domestic climate change strategy,58 and announced the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Agreement and a rollback of Obama’s vehicle fuel economy standards in 2020.59 The Trudeau government, while stating that it was “deeply disappointed” in Trump’s decision, affirmed that “Canada is unwavering in our commitment to fight climate change and support clean economic growth” and that it would “continue to work with the US at the state level,

International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era  113

and with other US stakeholders, to address climate change and promote clean growth.”60 Of course, only time will tell. Early indications are that the Joe Biden administration is prepared to wholeheartedly embrace a climate change mitigation strategy.61 Though there are signs of renewed bilateral collaboration on the climate change front, it remains to be seen whether that can be sustained over the long term.62 Analysis and Discussion The Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s approach to the question of climate change was defined by a combination of political/ electoral necessity and perceptions of national economic interest, not a commitment to respond to the problem of climate change per se or a desire to fulfil Canada’s international obligations around that issue. When the risk of US trade-related action on climate change, expressed through a series of congressional proposals in the late stages of the Bush administration and the first years of the Obama administration, seemed a real possibility, the Harper Conservatives responded by tying its policy approach to that of the US strategy of “complete alignment” around issues like emission reduction targets in the Copenhagen Accord and vehicle fuel economy standards. It also provided a means of maintaining access to the lucrative US market for Canadian exports, while furnishing a political defence against doing more than the US federal government was actually able to undertake (and thus putting Canadian businesses in an uncompetitive commercial position). Once the threat of trade-related action around climate change receded with the Republicans gaining control of the US House of Representatives in 2010, and the constraints of minority government removed in 2011, the Harper government returned to its core economic focus of working in concert with energy companies and fostering Canada’s development as an energy-exporting “superpower.” Although now qualified by the need to bypass the US market due to the combination of objections from the Obama administration to pipeline expansions and a weakening US market for oil, this focus was expressed through the eventual decisions to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, the 2012 Bill-38 Responsible Resource Development initiative, and the elimination of NRTEE. Furthermore, Canada’s role in international climate change negotiations, never particularly constructive during the Harper period, became increasingly marginalized. The Harper government seemed unconcerned by this or even the potential for its approach to climate change discussions to have adverse effects on Canada’s wider international relations. This strategy was, in some ways, borne out in the sense that Canada’s approach to the climate change file did not seem to interfere seriously with other economic or political goals the government wished to pursue. Major new trade agreements were successfully

114  Mark Winfield and Vanessa Scanga

concluded, for example, with China (2013), the EU (2015), and other nations. Aggressive and, largely successful, defences of oil sands oil from US and EU lowcarbon fuel standards were mounted without serious collateral consequences.63 Still, the UNFCCC regime provided an overall structure and focus for discussions and international policy-making around climate change. The international regime established, for example, core minimum obligations around climate change, and the Conference of the Parties functioned as the focal points for decision-making around global climate change policy. The existence of international commitments around climate change was an important touchstone for legislative opposition and civil society critics of the Liberal and then Conservative governments’ performance on the issue. The delivery of IPCC assessment reports in 2007 and 2013 played important roles in focusing global public, media, and political attention on the climate change issue. However, in the end, the multilateral international regime around climate change did not significantly constrain the behaviour of the Harper government in any direct way.64 In fact, the UNFCCC regime’s overall enforcement mechanisms were weak, relying principally on nation-state reporting requirements. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol attempted to incorporate a stronger enforcement regime, with the potential for the imposition of more aggressive emission reduction targets during the protocol’s second commitment period (2012–20), especially for Annex B parties who failed to meet the first commitment period (2008–12) obligations. The Harper government escaped this possibility by simply withdrawing from the protocol altogether. The primary international constraint on the Harper government’s approach to the climate change issue that did emerge came through the bilateral relationship with the United States. Although the US Congress was ultimately unwilling to adopt legislation incorporating trade-related measures against nations that failed, from the perspective of the US, to adopt adequate climate change policies, the Obama administration found other means of affecting economic interests important to the Harper government. The need for Canada to harmonize its vehicle fuel economy standards with those adopted by the Obama administration – in line with the integrated nature of the North American vehicle market – provided one example of such influence. The other, and perhaps most significant example, was the Obama administration’s delays in decision-making and ultimate rejection of the proposed Keystone XL pipeline project. These decisions were made, in large part, because of concerns over the climate change impacts of the expansion of oil sands production that the pipeline would enable, particularly given the absence of an effective framework for managing and reducing GHG emissions in Canada. But the Conservative government’s response to these constraints was not to develop an effective climate change policy. Rather, it chose to try to work

International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era  115

around the blockage through the development of pipelines, such as the Northern Gateway, the $7.4-billion Trans Mountain pipeline expansion (TMX), and Energy East projects, to move oil sands oil to tidewater within Canada. In effect, responses of the Obama administration were seen and treated as tactical rather than strategic threats to the government’s overall approach to energy issues. The NRTEE, in particular, tried on numerous occasions to make arguments for a more strategic approach. Following the lead of the 2009 Stern report to the UK government,65 the round table attempted to lay out the economic case for carbon pricing, arguing that the costs of reducing emissions would be far less than those of dealing with the negative impacts of climate change.66 It also advanced arguments for a modest carbon pricing regime as a hedge against the possibility of US action to embed trade-related measures into climate change legislation in the future.67 But the round table, in the end, was marginalized and summarily disbanded for these efforts through Bill C-38. More broadly, the larger ecological modernist vision of the integration of energy, environment, and climate change policy, as articulated by the Obama administration, seemed completely lost on the Harper government. Instead, the Conservatives’ Responsible Resource Development strategy seemed embedded in a zero-sum framing of the environment-economy relationship. Following the lead of Obama, those of many EU governments, and, at least rhetorically, those of some provinces, including Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia, the theme of the economic opportunities associated with low-carbon transitions would later be successfully picked up by the Trudeau Liberals in their 2015 and 2019 election platforms. Subnational Activity Nonetheless, an important development during the Harper period was the role of subnational governments acting both individually and collectively on climate change in the context of blockages at the federal level in both Canada and the United States. The transnational collaborations among provinces and states around climate change policy, most prominently through the WCI, opened new dimensions in the Canada-US relationship.68 While the collapse, except for California, of the US side of the WCI demonstrated the limitations of subnational cross-border initiatives, the WCI process provided a forum within which intergovernmental discussions of the details of cap-and-trade systems and other elements of a regulatory regime to reduce GHG emissions could take place. The cap-and-trade system for GHG emissions involving California, Ontario, and Quebec that has emerged from the remnants of the WCI represents the most extensive cross-border regulatory collaboration seen to date among provinces and US states. The cap-and-trade regime, along with the British Columbia carbon tax developed in the context of

116  Mark Winfield and Vanessa Scanga

British Columbia’s participation in the WCI, has ultimately provided the foundation for the Trudeau government’s 2016 Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change. Still, Canada is now (in late 2021) the only Group of Seven country that has seen its carbon emissions increase since the 2015 Paris Agreement. The Path Forward? The combination of the arrival of the Trump administration in the United States, the preoccupation of the EU with the British exit from the Union, and the weak, reporting-based enforcement regime of the Paris Agreement, means that there are few external drivers of Canadian climate change policy other than the physical reality of climate change itself and its domestic political and economic consequences. The possibility of an international climate change regime incorporating substantial enforcement measures, such as trade-related penalties for countries that fail to undertake serious efforts to reduce their GHG emissions, seems remote at best. In Canada’s case, the primary short-term drivers of Canadian climate change policy will be domestic. The climate change issue offers the Liberal government a strong wedge against the Conservatives, whose opposition to action led them to be associated with the Trump White House. (Under the new leadership of Erin O’Toole, the Conservative Party is grudgingly moving towards a credible climate change plan.69) Action on climate change also offers a defence against the NDP, Greens, and BQ drawing post-materialist voters away from the Liberal government. And after the lacklustre Harper years, the Trudeau government appears to be genuinely motivated by a desire to restore Canada’s reputation as a constructive member of the international community via global engagement on climate issues. That said, it is unclear exactly what the ruling Liberals have learned from the Harperites on the climate change file. Indeed, the government’s current domestic carbon pricing proposal seems unlikely to push the major provinces, including British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec, which collectively account for 80 per cent of Canada’s total GHG emissions, much beyond what they have committed to do already.70 Not unlike the Harper Conservatives, those efforts are widely recognized as being inadequate to meet Canada’s Paris commitments  – a problem now complicated by resistance to carbon pricing from Conservative governments in Ontario (2018) and Alberta (2019).71 Nor has the government been clear on how it will reconcile its international climate change commitments with its own approvals of major fossil fuel export infrastructure, including the Trans Mountain expansion and Line 3 pipeline projects,72 as well as possible liquid natural gas export projects in British Columbia.73 Only time will tell whether President Biden will have a significant

International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era  117

impact on shaping Canada’s own climate change policy posture. One thing is for certain: Harper’s climate change policy decisions were driven less by external influences and more by raw domestic political or electoral calculations. In the end, though, Canada’s path for avoiding what the UNFCCC terms “dangerous” climate change (along with the dire predictions of the sixth assessment report of the IPCC in early August of 2021) – whether charted by Harper or Trudeau – remains uncertain and incomplete going forward. NOTES 1 Elizabeth May, “When Canada Led the Way: A Short History of Climate Change,” Policy Options, 1 October 2006, 1–6, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines /climate-change/when-canada-led-the-way-a-short-history-of-climate-change/. 2 Steven Berstein and Benjamin Cashore, “Globalization, Internationalization, and Liberal Environmentalism: Exploring Non-Domestic Sources of Influence on Canadian Environmental Policy,” in Debora L. VanNaijnatten and R. Boardman, eds., Canadian Environmental Policy: Context and Cases, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 212–30. 3 D. Macdonald, “Climate Change Policy,” in Debora L. VanNaijnatten, ed., Canadian Environmental Policy and Politics, 4th ed. (Toronto: Oxford, 2015), 220–34. 4 M. Winfield and D. Macdonald, “Federalism and Canadian Climate Change Policy,” in H. Bakvis and G. Skogstad, eds., Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness and Legitimacy, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2012), 241–60. Also, Mark Winfield and Douglas Macdonald, “Federalism and Canadian Climate Change Policy,” in Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad, eds., Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy, 4th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020), 363–92. 5 “Harper Letter Called Kyoto ‘Socialist Scheme,’” Toronto Star, 30 January 2007, https://www.thestar.com/news/2007/01/30/harper_letter_called_kyoto_socialist _scheme.html. 6 Jane Taber, “PM Brands Canada an ‘Energy Superpower,’” Globe and Mail, 15 July 2006, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/pm-brands-canada-an -energy-superpower/article1105875/. 7 “IPCC 4th Assessment Report, Summary For Policymakers,” Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 17 November 2007, https://www.c2es.org/science-impacts /ipcc-summaries/fourth-assessment-report-summary. 8 See M. Winfield, Blue-Green Province: The Environment and the Political Economy of Ontario (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012), figure 1.3 and appendix 2. 9 Bill C-30, An Act to Amend the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, the Energy Efficiency Act and the Motor Vehicle Fuel Consumption Standards Act (Canada’s Clean Air Act), 1st Session, 39th Parliament, 1999, given first reading on

118  Mark Winfield and Vanessa Scanga

10

11 12 13 14

15

16 17

18

19

20 21

22

23

19 October 2006, https://www.parl.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=2397040 &Language=E. Government of Canada, Turning the Corner Plan: Taking Action To Fight Climate Change, March 2008, https://publications.gc.ca/site/archivee-archived.html?url =http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2009/ec/En88-2-2008E.pdf. Matthew Bramley, “Far From Turning the Corner,” Pembina Institute, 20 June 2008,  https://www.pembina.org/op-ed/1661. Matthew Bramley, “Canada’s Main Source of Gas Emissions 2009,” Pembina Institute, 3 June 2011, https://www.pembina.org/pub/2223. Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, Statutes of Canada, 2007, c. 30, https://laws -lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/K-9.5.pdf. The NRTEE was a multi-stakeholder body established in 1988 by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to provide advice on the integration of environmental and economic policy and implementation of the principle of sustainable development in Canada. Steven D. Brown, “The Green Vote in Canada,” in Debora L. VanNijnatten and R. Boardman, eds., Canadian Environmental Policy and Politics, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2009), 14–28. J. Drysek, “Ecological Modernism,” in The Politics of Earth: Environmental Discourses (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 162–80. See, for example, Barack Obama, “Remarks in Chicago Announcing Energy and Environment Team,” Chicago, IL, 15 December 2008, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85080. Jim Prentice, “Jim Prentice, The Hon. Minister of Environment. 2009. Notes for an address by the Honourable Jim Prentice, P.C., Q.C., M.P. Minister of the Environment on Canada’s climate change plan,” 4 June 2009, 5. Lakes Environmental, “Emissions, Air Pollution, GIS and Risk Assessment,” Lakes Environmental e-Newsletter (February 2010), https://www.weblakes.com /Newsletter/2010/Feb2010.html. Tyson Dyck, “Climate for Cooperation,” Toronto Star, 9 May 2010, https://www .thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2010/05/09/climate_for_cooperation.html. Shawn McCarthy, “Canada to Copy Obama’s Fuel Efficiency Rules,” Globe and Mail, 30 August 2012, https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry -news/energy-and-resources/canada-to-copy-obamas-fuel-efficiency-rules /article4508608/. US Government, “Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Proposed Rule” (Washington, DC: Environmental Protection Agency, 2009), 1–26. P.J. Partington, “A ‘Harmonization of Outcomes’ Far Off as US Prepares to Regulate More Sources of Climate Pollution,” Pembina Institute, 10 January 2011, https:// www.pembina.org/blog/459.

International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era  119 24 Greg Cunningham, “Analysis Shows Increased Carbon Intensity from Canadian Oil Sands,” Phys.org, 26 June 2015, https://phys.org/news/2015-06-analysis -carbon-intensity-canadian-oil.html. 25 Ian Hodgson, “Proposed EU Low Carbon Fuel Standard” (Brussels: European Commission, 2008), 1–6. 26 Dan Woynillowicz, Marlo Raynolds, and Chris Severson-Bake, “Oilsands Fever: The Environmental Implications of Canada’s Oilsands Rush,” Pembina Institute, 23 November 2005, 1–86, https://www.pembina.org/pub/203. 27 Natural Resource Defense Council, “Climate Impacts of the Keystone XL Tar Sands Pipeline,” NRDC Issue Brief, October 2013, https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default /files/tar-sands-climate-impacts-IB.pdf. 28 Maria Sudekum Fisher, “EPA: Keystone XL Impact Statement Needs Revising,” Boston.com, 21 July 2010, https://archive.boston.com/business/articles/2010/07/21 /epa_keystone_xl_impact_statement_needs_revising/. 29 Heather Scoffield and Mike Blanchfield, “Obama’s Climate Change Challenge Meant for Canada’s Ears: U.S. Ambassador,” CTV News, 13 February 2012, https:// www.ctvnews.ca/politics/obama-s-climate-change-challenge-meant-for-canada -s-ears-u-s-ambassador-1.1155347. 30 Prentice, “Notes for an Address by the Honourable Jim Prentice,” 6–7. 31 Eric Reguly, “Ontario, Quebec Assail Federal Emissions Targets,” Globe and Mail, 14 December 2009, A1. 32 C.D. Anderson and L.B. Stephenson, “Environmentalism and Austerity in Canada: Electoral Effects,” in Debora L. VanNijnatten, ed., Canadian Environmental Policy and Politics, 4th ed. (Toronto: Oxford, 2015), 4–19. 33 “Canada Pulls Out of Kyoto Protocol,” CBC News, 12 December 2011, https://www .cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-pulls-out-of-kyoto-protocol-1.999072/. 34 Ibid. 35 “Canada Wins ‘Lifetime Unachievement’ Fossil Award at Warsaw Climate Talks,” Canada Climate Action Network, 22 November 2013, https://climateactionnetwork .ca/2013/11/22/canada-wins-lifetime-unachievement-fossil-award-at-warsaw -climate-talks/. 36 Suzanne Goldenberg, “Keystone XL Pipeline: Obama Rejects Controversial Project,” The Guardian, 20 January 2012, https://www.theguardian.com /environment/2012/jan/18/obama-administration-rejects-keystone-xl-pipeline. 37 Shawn McCarthy, “Keystone Pipeline Approval ‘Complete No-Brainer,’ Harper Says,” Globe and Mail, 21 September 2011, https://beta.theglobeandmail.com /news/politics/keystone-pipeline-approval-complete-no-brainer-harper-says /article4203332/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&. 38 Juliet Eilperin and Katie Zezima, “Obama Vetoes Keystone XL Bill,” Washington Post 24 February 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics /wp/2015/02/24/keystone-xl-bill-a-k-a-veto-bait-heads-to-presidents-desk/.

120  Mark Winfield and Vanessa Scanga

39

40

41

42

43

44

45 46 47

48

Congressional Republicans were, however, unable to muster sufficient votes to override the veto. G. Erhach, Unconventional Oil and Gas in North America (Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Bureau, 2014), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData /bibliotheque/briefing/2014/140815/LDM_BRI(2014)140815_REV1_EN.pdf, Figure 4. See also, Energy Information Administration, “Hydraulic Fracturing Accounts for about Half of Current U.S. Crude Oil Production,” Today in Energy, 16 March 2016, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=25372. Joe Oliver, “An Open Letter from the Honourable Joe Oliver, Minister of Natural Resources, on Canada’s Commitment to Diversify Our Energy Markets and the Need to Further Streamline the Regulatory Process in Order to Advance Canada’s National Economic Interest,” Government of Canada, news release, 9 January 2012, https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2012/01/an-open-letter-honourable-joe -oliver-minister-natural-resources-canada-commitment-diversify-our-energy -markets-need-further-streamline-regulatory-process-order-advance-canada -national-economic-interest.html. On the details of the C-38 reforms, see M. Winfield, “The Environment, ‘Responsible Resource Development’ and Evidence Based Policy-Making in Canada,” in Shaun Young, ed., Evidence Based Policy-Making in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013), 207–13. Canada, Environment and Climate Change, “Harper Government Moves Forward on Tough Rules for Coal-Fired Electricity Sector,” news release, 5 September 2012, https://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=714D9AAE-1&news=4D34AE9B -1768-415D-A546-8CCF09010A23. P.J. Partington, “Pembina Reacts to Federal Climate Change Regulations for CoalFired Power,” Pembina Institute, 5 September 2012, https://www.pembina.org /media-release/2372. Shawn McCarthy, Steve Chase, and Brent Jang, “Canadian Government Approves Enbridge’s Controversial Northern Gateway Pipeline,” Globe and Mail, 17 June 2014, https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news /energy-and-resources/northern-gateway-decision/article19180594/?ref=http:// www.theglobeandmail.com&. Gitxaala Nation v. Canada [2016] FCA 187, https://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/fca-caf /decisions/en/item/145744/index.do?r=AAAAAQAIZ2l0eGFhbGEB. “Climate Change: Obama Unveils Clean Power Plan,” BBC News, 3 August 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33753067. Richard Wolf, “Supreme Court Blocks President Obama’s Climate Change Plan,” USA Today, 9 February 2016, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics /2016/02/09/supreme-court-halts-obamas-emissions-rule/80085182/. M. Nicolas Firzli, “Climate: Renewed Sense of Urgency in Washington and Beijing,” Analyse Financière, July/August/September 2015, https://redlinevoting .org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Analyse-Financiere-July-2015.pdf.

International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era  121 49 White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Reports its 2025 Emissions Target to the UNFCCC,” 31 March 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03 /31fact-sheet-us-reports-its-2025-emissions-target-unfccc. 50 Margo McDiarmid, “Canada Sets Carbon Emissions Reduction Target of 30% by 2030,” CBC News, 15 May 2015, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-sets -carbon-emissions-reduction-target-of-30-by-2030-1.3075759. 51 See, for example, Anderson and Stephenson, “Environmentalism and Austerity in Canada”; Liberal Party of Canada, A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class (Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada, 2015), https://www.liberal.ca/files/2015/10/New-plan-for -a-strong-middle-class.pdf, 38–44. 52 Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “U.S.-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and Arctic Leadership,” Office of the Prime Minister, Ottawa, 10 March 2016, https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/03/10/us-canada-joint-statement-climate -energy-and-arctic-leadership. 53 Justin Trudeau, “Prime Minister Trudeau Delivers a Speech on Pricing Carbon Pollution,” Office of the Prime Minister, Ottawa, 3 October 2016, https://pm.gc.ca /eng/news/2016/10/03/prime-minister-trudeau-delivers-speech-pricing-carbon -pollution. See also, Susan Lunn and Margo McDiarmid, “Liberals Provide Details of Plan for National Carbon Tax,” CBC News, 17 May 2017, https://www.cbc.ca /news/politics/carbon-price-tax-discussion-paper-1.4120135. 54 Adam Radwanski, “Plan Aimed at Exceeding Emissions Targets by 2030 Will Test the Seriousness of the Liberals’ Climate Policy,” Globe and Mail, 11 December 2020, A1. 55 Government of Canada, “The Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change,” Environment and Natural Resources, December 2016, https:// www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/pan-canadian -framework.html. 56 Sean Fine, Ian Bailey, and Emma Graney, “Carbon Tax Constitutional, Supreme Court Rules,” Globe and Mail, 26 March 2021, A1. 57 Marieke Walsh and Emma Graney, “Ottawa Sets New Target for Emissions,” Globe and Mail, 23 April 2021, A4. 58 Coral Davenport and Alissa J. Rubin, “Trump Signs Executive Order Unwinding Obama Climate Policies,” New York Times, 28 March 2017, https://www.nytimes .com/2017/03/28/climate/trump-executive-order-climate-change.html?mcubz=1. 59 “Paris Climate Agreement: World Reacts as Trump Pulls Out of Global Accord – As It Happened,” The Guardian, 14 July 2017, https://www.theguardian.com /environment/live/2017/jun/01/donald-trump-paris-climate-agreement-live-news. 60 Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada in Response to the United States’ Decision to Withdraw from the Paris Agreement,” Office of the Prime Minister, Ottawa, 1 June 2017, https://pm.gc.ca /eng/news/2017/06/01/statement-prime-minister-canada-response-united-states -decision-withdraw-paris.

122  Mark Winfield and Vanessa Scanga 61 Jeffrey Jones, “Biden’s Plan to OPEC Reveals How Short-Term Political Risks Slow Down the Green Transition,” Globe and Mail, 14 August 2021, B1; David Shepardson and Jeff Mason, “‘The Future of the American Auto Industry Is Electric’: In Move Backed by Carmakers, Biden Targets Emissions,” Globe and Mail, 6 August 2021, B1; and Andrew Hammond, “Change at COP26 Will Be Led by the U.S., Not Britain,” Globe and Mail, 10 August 2021, A15. 62 Adam Radwanski, “Global Crisis, Continental Strategy: Canada Eyes Climate Deals with U.S.,” Globe and Mail, 13 February 2021, B1. It is worth noting that US President Biden ruffled some feathers in Ottawa (and Alberta) by cancelling the permit for the Keystone XL pipeline on his first day in office on 20 January 2021. 63 Barbara Lewis, “How Canada Blocked Europe’s Dirty Oil Label,” Globe and Mail, 28 October 2014, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business /rob-magazine/how-canada-blocked-europes-dirty-oil-label/article21326008/. 64 There was, of course, the loss of Canada’s 2010 bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. That embarrassing defeat was, in part, a function of the Harper government’s obstructionist ways and lackadaisical approach to the international climate change file. 65 Sir Nicholas Stern, Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, Office of Climate Change, HM Treasury, 30 October 2006, The National Archives, https:// webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk /sternreview_index.htm. 66 National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, “Climate Prosperity Paying the Price: The Economic Impacts of Climate Change for Canada,” Government of Canada, 2011, report 04, https://collectionscanada.gc.ca /webarchives2/20130322143132/http://nrtee-trnee.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011 /09/paying-the-price.pdf. 67 National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy, “Climate Prosperity – Parallel Paths? Canada-U.S. Climate Policy Choices,” Government of Canada, 2011, report 03, https://neia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/canada-us-report-eng.pdf. 68 Debora L. VanNijnatten and Neil Craik, “Environment and Energy: Prospects for New Forms of Continental Governance,” in Jeffrey Ayres and Laura Macdonald, eds., North America in Question: Regional Integration in an Era of Political Economic Turbulence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 171–95. 69 Kristy Kirkup, “Conservatives Unveil Loyalty-Card Style of Carbon Pricing,” Globe and Mail, 16 April 2021, A1. 70 Marc Lee, “A Critical Guide to the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change,” Policy Note (blog), 14 December 2016, https://www .policynote.ca/a-critical-guide-to-the-pan-canadian-framework-on-clean-growth -and-climate-change/. 71 Mark Jaccard, Mikela Hein, and Tiffany Vass, “Is Win-Win Possible? Can Canada’s Government Achieve Its Paris Commitment … and Get Re-Elected?” School of

International Climate Change Policy in the Harper Era  123 Resource and Environmental Management, Simon Fraser University, 20 September 2016, https://rem-main.rem.sfu.ca/papers/jaccard/Jaccard-Hein-Vass %20CdnClimatePol%20EMRG-REM-SFU%20Sep%2020%202016.pdf. 72 Paul Tasker, “Trudeau Cabinet Approves Trans Mountain, Line 3 Pipelines, Rejects Northern Gateway,” CBC News, 29 November 2016, https://www.cbc.ca/news /politics/federal-cabinet-trudeau-pipeline-decisions-1.3872828. Just one day after passing a motion in the House of Commons declaring that Canada is facing a “national climate emergency,” the Trudeau government gave the green light (for a second time) to the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion project in June of 2019. See Shawn McCarthy, Justin Giovannetti, and Justine Hunter, “Ottawa Reapproves Expansion of Trans Mountain Pipeline,” Globe and Mail, 19 June 2019, A1. 73 Brent Jang and Shawn McCarthy, “Liberals Approve Pacific NorthWest LNG Project with Environmental Conditions,” Globe and Mail, 27 September 2016, https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy -and-resources/pacific-northwest-lng-decision/article32092033/?ref=http://www .theglobeandmail.com&.

6 Learning the Hard Way: Harper, Canadian Defence Policy, and Combatting International Terror jeffrey rice and stéfanie von hlatky

In the lead-up to the 2006 Canadian federal election, Stephen Harper’s Conservatives had set as one of their core tasks the transformation of the Canadian defence landscape. At its centre, the Conservatives set forth to remedy what they saw as the consistent undermining and underfunding of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) that had resulted from “decades of neglect by successive Liberal governments.”1 One of the primary justifications offered by the Conservatives was a value-based promise to advance Canada’s interests and values overseas. After all, much of the Conservatives’ 2005–6 election campaign was a clear attempt to distinguish the Conservatives from previous Liberal governments.2 The Conservatives had as their strategy the idea of returning Canada to a more prominent role on the international stage.3 To this end, references to previous Conservative government accomplishments, such as the 1960 Bill of Rights, introduced by former prime minister John Diefenbaker, were frequently made.4 Implicit within the 2006 campaign platform was the idea of not only promoting Canada’s interests abroad but returning Canada to a time when it was an active and prominent international player. Fast forward nearly a decade later to the October 2015 Canadian federal election. When Justin Trudeau won the fall election, he had a message for Canada’s allies: “Many of you have worried that Canada has lost its compassionate and constructive voice in the world over the past 10 years  … Well, I  have a simple message for you: on behalf of 35  million Canadians, we’re back.”5 In claiming that Canada was “back,” Trudeau was signalling a return to a more multilateral or internationalist way of conducting foreign and defence policy, one which would have Ottawa invest more energy into international organizations like the United Nations (UN) and solidify its place in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Of course, when criticizing Canada’s supposed retrenchment from principled diplomacy “over the past 10 years,” Trudeau was taking direct aim at his predecessor, Stephen Harper. Were Trudeau’s attacks on Harper’s foreign policy legacy warranted? Did Harper really break sharply with

Harper, Canadian Defence Policy, and Combatting International Terror  125

tradition and usher in a distinct strategic culture, with a distinct Conservative edge? These are all key questions to be examined in the following pages. This chapter, then, explores Stephen Harper’s approach to foreign and defence policy by looking at the evolution of Canada’s approach to combatting international terrorism. We argue that Harper’s approach towards multilateral institutions was highly conditional, what we have termed conditional multilateralism. If it is indeed the case that Harper took steps to free himself from multilateral constraints, then we should expect his decision-making style during that period to be short term and pragmatic. (That is, pragmatic in the sense that his focus was more on domestic political interests and less on appeasing Canada’s traditional allies or promoting international institutions.) To analyse Harper’s approach, we need to understand key decisions during this period through the lens of alliance politics, international organizations, and Canada-US relations. We further develop our argument by investigating the following claims: Harper’s modest retreat from multilateral organizations is due in part to what we describe as “learning the hard way.” In the early years of his first term as prime minister, Harper encountered disagreements over burden-sharing with allies and difficult operational realities in Afghanistan that tempered his desire to be perceived as a staunch and reliable ally. In making this argument, we examine Canada’s contributions to counterterrorism under Stephen Harper to see if there is a consistent strategic culture during the Harper decade (2006–15). We argue that the conditionality with which Harper approached multilateralism, whether through NATO, the UN, or multinational coalitions, reveals profoundly interest-based calculations (including electoral ambitions) rather than a consistent principled approach to foreign and defence policy decision-making. Previous research has documented the rhetorical transformations that occurred under Stephen Harper’s Conservatives. Marie-Eve Desrosiers and Philippe Lagassé, for example, note that a significant rhetorical and narrative transformation was not an immediate consequence of their election but took place over time.6 Ian McKay and Jamie Swift also argue that a significant branding effort – the notion of Canada as a “warrior nation” – took place under Harper’s leadership.7 Rather than looking specifically at the rhetorical and framing devices employed by the Harper government, we focus our analytical efforts on some of Harper’s key foreign and defence policy decisions linked to combatting international terrorism. Background: Harper and the Revitalization of the Canadian Armed Forces? Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, combatting terrorism became a central focus of Canadian defence policy. Following the so-called decade of

126  Jeffrey Rice and Stéfanie von Hlatky

darkness of the 1990s, the CAF saw an almost immediate increase in defence spending. With a commitment in Afghanistan, the need to reinvest in the Canadian military had strong support within the Conservative base of partisans. Although increasing defence spending was one of Harper’s campaign promises in the 2006 federal election, national defence spending saw only modest increases during Harper’s tenure. From 2006 until 2015, defence spending – under a highly touted “Canada First” strategy – rose from $15.7 billion to $23.7 billion. The biggest jump in national defence spending actually occurred two years earlier under a Liberal government, with an increase from $10.4 billion to $15.0 billion between 2001 and 2005. While restoring the stature of the CAF was a central fixation of Harper’s, the trend was already being reversed in the several years prior to his election. Indeed, the revitalization of the Canadian military was a high priority for General Rick Hillier, appointed under the Paul Martin government, while he was serving as the chief of the defence staff.8 Of course, this increase was largely a matter of circumstance as the increase in national defence spending starting in 2001 was entirely connected to the attacks on 9/11 and Canada’s increasing role in the Global War on Terror. Therefore, one can posit rather confidently that Harper was merely continuing an approach to defence spending that had been started by the Liberals some years earlier, especially given Canada’s continued involvement in war-torn Afghanistan.9 Despite the rhetoric, then, defence spending did not radically change under the Harper Conservatives. And later, following the 2011 federal election of a majority Conservative government, defence spending actually stagnated, leading to a decrease in defence spending in 2013 for the first time since 1999. Harper’s Conservatives followed a much longer historical trend of sacrificing defence spending in favour of a balanced budget. This dip also corresponded to the CAF returning home. By this point, the Canadian forces had ended warfighting operations in Afghanistan and Canada was no longer involved in any sustained combat operations overseas. Indeed, the air operation against the Islamic State had not yet started and Canada’s role in the Libya air campaign in 2011 had been relatively limited. The most notable changes, then, can perhaps be found in Canada’s defence strategy under the Conservatives. One of the most significant outcomes we see is a redefining of Canada’s position within international organizations and multilateralism more broadly. In September 2006, for example, Stephen Harper gave his first address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as the newly elected prime minister of Canada. Harper emphasized the important role that the UN was playing in combatting terrorism and in addressing international security threats. The UN-mandated mission in Afghanistan, he declared, was Canada’s mission,

Harper, Canadian Defence Policy, and Combatting International Terror  127

too. In highlighting the important development and reconstruction efforts of the UN in Afghanistan, he also made clear that challenges lay ahead, and not only in tackling international security threats but for the UN itself. By the end of his speech, Harper had signalled to the UN (in not-so-subtle terms) that a fundamental shift was about to take place when it came to the nature of Canada’s international involvement. Harper’s support for the UN, unlike his predecessors, was no longer unconditional. Instead, the qualified nature with which Harper now spoke of the UN was directly tied to its utility, particularly in terms of helping Canada meet its own foreign and defence policy goals. It soon became clear that when those goals conflicted, support would not be forthcoming. Previously, a cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy had been its emphasis on working through the UN for its overseas and foreign operations. For example, when the issue of participating in the US-led invasion of Iraq arose in the House of Commons in March 2003, then prime minister Jean Chrétien cited the absence of a UN mandate as a key reason for not participating. Stephen Harper, as leader of the opposition, had openly criticized Chrétien for this decision by questioning why, with Canadian soldiers already in Iraq, Canada would not be among thirty other nations taking part in the invasion: “In the past we have seen nations support military action without sending forces, but this is the first time we have ever seen a country not support a military action and send forces anyway. What a bizarre position.”10 Citing both Canada’s 1999 participation in Kosovo, where a UN mandate did not materialize, as well as the failure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the past to stymy Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Harper remained unconvinced by Chrétien’s justification. The UN, for Harper, was no longer seen as the main source of legitimacy in international politics, a conviction that would mark his time as prime minister. In 2010, for example, when Harper’s support for Israel jeopardized Canada’s efforts to secure a non-permanent seat on the UNSC, the bid was placed in a very difficult situation. Following the loss of Canada’s quest for a temporary seat, Harper himself would not make another appearance in front of the UN General Assembly until 2014. His minister of foreign affairs would instead be filling his place.11 The loss of Canada’s bid for a non-permanent seat on the UNSC should not necessarily be taken as an isolated or anomalous event. The eschewing of a multilateral organization hints at a broader trend in Canadian defence policy during Harper’s tenure: conditional multilateralism. The UN, in this case, was not the only organization to come into the crosshairs of the Conservative government. In 2012, for example, rumours were swirling in Ottawa that Canada was seriously considering leaving the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), citing its irrelevance as an organization. Although vigorously denied by Minister John Baird at the time, the plan, which

128  Jeffrey Rice and Stéfanie von Hlatky

never came to fruition, was confirmed by Conservative MP Tony Clement.12 Beyond the UN and the OSCE, Harper’s enthusiasm for NATO also weakened over time as burden-sharing squabbles increased when the going got tough in Afghanistan. Conditionality, therefore, would become a defining feature of Harper’s approach to multilateral organizations, as a mechanism to realize Canada’s foreign and defence policy interests.13 Active participation within international organizations would no longer be seen as an end in itself, but as more of a means to an end. This tendency is also apparent when examining specific files, such as Harper’s strategy to combat international terrorism. To help structure the analysis, we use a framework drawing from the literature on strategic culture to see whether there were enduring foreign policy principles guiding Canada’s fight against international terrorism between 2006 and 2015 or whether Harper’s decisions were more interest-based and pragmatic. A Shift in Canada’s Strategic Culture? At the heart of our inquiry is an interrogation about the nature of Canada’s strategic culture under the Harper government.14 The literature on Canadian foreign and defence policy has provided a rich assessment of trends in Canadian strategic culture, noting a tension between Canadian tendencies towards Atlanticism, internationalism, and continentalism.15 These three orientations in strategic culture are not mutually exclusive, however. Justin Massie, for example, notes that while Canada’s “away game,” namely its expeditionary operations abroad, is driven by an Atlanticist logic, its “home game” is better defined by continentalism.16 Our analysis takes the points about non-exclusivity a bit further by arguing that conditional multilateralism is a strategy by which a leader will consider these three broad options pragmatically. It counter-intuitively combines the culturalist/constructivist work on strategic culture but puts a realist spin on it by suggesting that these choices can be interest-driven and therefore seemingly inconsistent with any single strategic culture logic.17 This approach is more flexible and lets the data speak for itself rather than forcing a decade’s worth of foreign policy decisions into the straitjacket of the popular strategic culture typology. If strategic culture is to be understood in this sense, then, it is important to consider the material benefits that underpin the adoption of an institutionalized model of cooperation, whether it is Atlanticist or internationalist. To elaborate on the decision-making calculus, international organizations, including a military alliance like NATO, offer a number of benefits to states: they provide an institutionalized form of burden-sharing, enhanced security through collective defence arrangements, information and intelligence-sharing, as well as

Harper, Canadian Defence Policy, and Combatting International Terror  129

capability pooling that evolves over a long-term horizon.18 Along with these benefits, however, there are associated costs that a state must pay in order to continue to reap the benefits of these military arrangements. Among these costs is a loss of foreign policy autonomy as alliance pressures begin to weigh on defence spending and international policy priorities, but there are also internal squabbles linked to financial contributions and the associated risks of free-riding from other alliance members. Moreover, the large bureaucracies of international security organizations add another layer of complexity in the pursuit of a country’s specific foreign and defence policy goals. Put simply, collective decision-making in organizational settings can be slow. Beyond the material benefits that these organizations offer, there have also been a number of strong ideational incentives to participate in these organizations and these are primarily linked to legitimacy. To varying degrees, successive Canadian governments have all accepted and professed the value of liberal internationalism, embodied by the UN, as the only truly universal organization, despite the strong decision-making powers invested in the Security Council. Unlike Atlanticism and internationalism, the continentalist option is different in that it would represent a US-led coalition (read non-institutionalized arrangements), because it satisfies the condition of maintaining good relations with the US as the primary consideration in Canadian foreign policy. This option means there is a clear preference for US leadership and command arrangements rather than NATO’s force generation process and consensusbased decision-making rules, or in a UN setting, the burden of securing a resolution under Chapter VII, which could authorize the use of military force. As a final comment to this section, it is vis-à-vis the UN that the Harper Conservatives did meet some of their fiercest criticisms – criticisms which, at times, seemed somewhat misplaced. Although the apparent turn away from multilateral organizations signalled a modest rejection of liberal internationalism, it would be erroneous to conclude that internationalism was rejected outright by Harper – and hence the dangers of a strict application of the strategic culture typology.19 Rather, as Jean-Christophe Boucher notes, internationalism remained a core consideration for Harper, but the meaning of internationalism shifted under Harper as it did not always include a substantial UN role.20 In order to further elucidate our “realist” spin on the strategic culture/­ constructivist typology, we identify a set of associated interests and foreign policy goals as they relate to each of the strategic culture typologies. The Atlanticist strategic culture, for example, is informed by pragmatism in terms of burdensharing and being seen as a reliable ally and is pursued through a multilateral setting. Continentalism, on the other hand, is pragmatic but is more concerned with outcomes in terms of Canada-US relations and is pursued through bilateral or multinational, but not necessarily multilateral, efforts.

130  Jeffrey Rice and Stéfanie von Hlatky Table 6.1.  Strategic culture interests Strategic culture

Interests/strategy

Goals

Atlanticism

Pragmatic/Multilateralism

Reliable ally/Burden-sharing (material)

Internationalism

Political/Multilateralism

Normative/Legitimacy/ International standing (political)

Continentalism

Pragmatic/Bilateralism/ Multinationalism

Canada-US relations (material/ political)

Conditionality under Harper Going back to Harper’s 2006 inaugural speech at the UN General Assembly, we would argue that it served as a caution to other multilateral organizations. In many respects, “going it alone” is what Harper’s Conservative government would do when it needed to, not out of principle, but out of the careful calculation of Canada’s interests and considering past experience.21 In spite of the important role that alliances and multilateral organizations have had in the fight against terrorism, Canada’s foreign policy became much more limited and state-centric under Harper after being burned when pursuing more institutionalized avenues with NATO and the UN. The transformation of Canadian defence policy, rhetorically and financially, under Harper has been explained from a number of perspectives, including Canada’s push for status beyond that of a middle-power,22 an interest in demonstrating greater relevance,23 and the elevation of a specific set of core Conservative values onto the foreign policy agenda.24 A  specific configuration of domestic interests, namely elite consensus and a relatively complacent Canadian public, also acted as enablers for Harper and his Conservative government to pursue defence policy goals without fear of political costs at home, though the most tumultuous years of Canada’s involvement in Kandahar certainly complicated that picture.25 Drawing from these important insights on the transformation of Canadian foreign policy, we examine the impact that a more assertive Canada had on its relationship with multilateral organizations in the fight against international terrorism. We find that Harper’s approach was, on the surface, somewhat paradoxical: a more pronounced and assertive international presence also coincided with the marginalization of the same multilateral organizations through which Canada had traditionally expressed its power. Experience, not conviction, seemed to drive these changes. In making this claim, we argue that the transformation under Harper was less about goals and more about means: it was about

Harper, Canadian Defence Policy, and Combatting International Terror  131

choosing the option that offered the best result for Canada, rather than applying a dominant lens or principle to guide decision-making. In a sense, there was a bit of trial and error involved here. As Brian Bow and David R. Black write, for instance, “even where there is broad agreement on foreign policy goals, there can still be important disagreements of how to pursue them.”26 The case analysis of the Harper government revealed that the overall objectives of Canada’s efforts to combat international terrorism, for the most part, remained the same, but the means by which to achieve them changed over time. The consequence of this was envisioning a greater role for Canada in international security outside of the constraints of the multilateral forums that it traditionally relied upon to achieve Canada’s foreign and defence policy goals. Harper’s Fight against International Terrorism: 2006–2015 Given the important benefits that states incur from membership in military alliances and multilateral organizations, coupled with the relatively limited military and civilian capabilities that Canada has, why did the Harper government turn away from many of the security organizations tasked with combatting terrorism during his tenure? Going back to the literature, we would find that, within international security organizations, there are competing pressures between international-level and domestic-level interests. International pressures may act on, and influence, a state’s decision-making process, but domestic factors will, in most cases, trump those pressures. Member states remain sovereign and there is plenty of evidence to show that individual states will not bow to the pressures of stronger powers, as perhaps best exemplified by many states’ refusal to support or participate alongside the US in the wars of Vietnam and Iraq. Yet international organizations provide strong institutional channels to express disagreements, without necessarily undermining their ability to function. To examine Canada’s counter-terrorism operations from 2006 to 2015, we focus on Canadian efforts to destroy major international terrorist organizations, which were targeted against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and against the Islamic States (IS) in Iraq and Syria (table 6.2). Our analysis highlights that each phase had a distinct orientation when it came to strategic culture, as Harper incorporated some hard lessons learned about multinational operations. Since this section will proceed chronologically, we will begin with a discussion of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. ISAF: Kandahar: Historically, NATO has been the multilateral organization through which Canada has made some of its most significant contributions to international security and, more recently, to countering international terrorism. Canada, which was under Liberal leadership during the 9/11 attacks,

132  Jeffrey Rice and Stéfanie von Hlatky Table 6.2.  Canada’s major military operations to combat international terrorism Year

Operations

Strategic culture and goals

2006–11

ISAF: Kandahar

Atlanticist: Support NATO

2011–14

NTM-A: NATO Training Mission

Internationalist: Nation-building

2014–15

Withdrawal from Afghanistan and start of global coalition against Daesh

Continentalist: Support US

was also among the first countries to use military force against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, alongside American, British, and Australian special forces. Perhaps more than any other organization, Canada applied its counterterrorism strategies through NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) contributions. Following the handover of ISAF to NATO in 2003, it was a Canadian general, Rick Hillier, who commanded and oversaw the first NATO troops in combat. By the time of Stephen Harper’s election in January 2006, Canada had now been at war for nearly five years. The Canadian mission in Afghanistan, by this point, had already undergone three extensions, with the fourth and longest extension being voted on in Parliament shortly after Harper assumed office – an extension of two years. Harper’s commitment to the ISAF mission was consistent with his interest in seeing Canada act as a more influential and assertive ally in international operations. The initial decision to send the CAF to Kandahar, however, was made by Harper’s predecessor, Paul Martin. The situation that Harper thus inherited was one of escalating conflict, but that was not immediately apparent when Harper took office and decided in favour of an extended commitment in the Afghan province. It is telling that of the 162 Canadians killed in Afghanistan (military personnel, one diplomat, and two contractors), 80 per cent of those casualties occurred between 2006 and 2009, as the Taliban launched a massive insurgency in the south of the country.27 In spite of (or, more accurately, as a result of) the significant contributions that Canada was making to the ISAF mission, tensions in the alliance began to appear in 2006 as the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated. With combat deaths rising significantly and NATO soldiers, especially the British and Canadians, facing an increasingly fierce and sophisticated Taliban enemy, it would become clear that soliciting more NATO commitments in the region would be exceedingly difficult. Indeed, it was not until the 2009 surge, one of US President Barack Obama’s first decisions about the Afghanistan war, which saw the massive arrival of US troops in the south, that Harper could envision the CAF commitment being reduced.

Harper, Canadian Defence Policy, and Combatting International Terror  133

Because Canada had volunteered to assume responsibility for one of Afghanistan’s most hostile provinces – Kandahar – a disproportionate number of its soldiers were experiencing heavy combat in Afghanistan. In large part, Canada’s commitments in Afghanistan were directly tied to alliance pressures.28 The Canadian experience within NATO’s ISAF mission, especially the significant number of casualties that it sustained in contrast to the severe restrictions and caveats that other states placed on their armed forces, soured Harper’s perception of the alliance. The turn away from NATO that was witnessed at the time, like Canada’s refusal to contribute to collective defence projects like the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) or the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, was due to the perception held by Harper that Canada was not reaping the benefits of its participation in NATO. In other words, the burden was not being shared fairly from Harper’s perspective. Aside from the Australians, the British, and the Dutch, few other states had committed soldiers to the war in Afghanistan. And when they did, there were often notorious restrictions and caveats placed upon them.29 Harper’s early enthusiasm for Atlanticism and being seen as a top-tier NATO ally faded correspondingly. Before moving onto the next phase of Canada’s deployment in Afghanistan, we should acknowledge the importance of another explanatory factor. Indeed, Canada’s significant role in ISAF was made possible, in part, by an increase in defence spending beginning in 2006. Elected to a minority government, Harper campaigned under the promise of bringing the CAF up to standard. Within the 2006–7 federal budget, this meant an increase of $1.1 billion in defence spending per year. By 2011, however, the pressures of the 2008–9 financial crisis were beginning to weigh on the Department of National Defence. Facing a significant fiscal deficit, the Harper government opted in 2011 to cut defence spending by 8  per cent  – a trend that would continue until the final Conservative budget in 2015. By 2014, cuts to defence spending were beginning to impact Canada’s relationship with NATO. Following the 2014 Wales Summit, Canada, alongside Germany, refused to recommit to the 2 per cent NATO t­ arget – a fact that would remain under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, despite the alliance’s pledge to increase spending to reach this target by 2024. NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A): ISAF was not a UN force but operated under the banner of eighteen Security Council resolutions (UNSCR 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1817, 1833, 1890, 1917, 1943, 2011, 2069, 2096, 2120, and 2145).30 NTM-A, launched in 2009, was focused on training, advising, and assisting the Afghan National Forces (military and police). While NTM-A’s commander reported to the ISAF commander, their respective activities were implemented in parallel. We argue that this phase of Canada’s deployment reflected a more internationalist stance. The size of the CAF contingent was halved and mostly operated in Kabul. The tasks that would focus the attention of the CAF would be in more direct support of the

134  Jeffrey Rice and Stéfanie von Hlatky

UN’s political goals (as described in the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan [UNAMA]) and concentrated on consolidating Afghanistan’s security institutions, thereby fitting under the broader internationalist banner of nation-building (see Massie, chapter 7 in this volume for a more detailed discussion). This Canadian operation, codenamed Operation ATTENTION, would also focus on the provision of non-military tasks, which contrasted sharply with the combat mission the CAF had performed between 2006 and 2011. Operation ATTENTION focused on four core tasks: “investing in the future of Afghan children and youth through development programming in education and health; advancing security, the rule of law and human rights, including through the provision of up to 950 training advisors for Afghan national security forces; promoting regional diplomacy; and helping deliver humanitarian assistance.”31 NTM-A thus represented an opportunity for Canada to decrease its military footprint in Afghanistan and to ramp down activities without completely withdrawing. It was a good compromise option, which resisted NATO demands for more but which was less costly and less dangerous in addition to playing well domestically given support from the federal Liberals, who had initially suggested a greater focus on training.32 This mission is best described as internationalist (though different from the UN’s mission in Afghanistan) in that NTM-A had a closer relationship with other international organizations and non-­ governmental organizations and the immediate pay-offs in terms of impressing NATO or the US were much less clear than in the previous phase (2006–11). In spite of the fact that much of Canada’s brand as an international actor has been made through the UN, Harper’s internationalist pursuits were not realized through the UN (as highlighted in Edgar, chapter 4 in this volume). The vital role that peacekeeping had in helping to build Canada’s national image did not make an impression on Harper as he decreased the country’s involvement in UN peace support operations. Canada’s foreign policy was shaped by a combination of US, NATO, and more broadly internationalist interests, but Harper’s preferences for Canadian foreign and defence policy did not include the UN as a key focal point.33 For instance, in 2010, Harper adopted an uncharacteristically supportive position of Israel – one that mirrored, in a sense, the position of the Americans. Although Canada remained active in the UN system, the loss of a non-permanent seat on the UNSC in 2010 had the effect of souring Harper’s disposition towards the world body. Thus, if support for ISAF and NATO remained strong throughout Harper’s early tenure, the UN did not fare so well. (This contrasts sharply with former prime minister Chrétien, who often insisted publicly that, the war in Kosovo notwithstanding, Canada would only commit forces to UN-sanctioned operations.)34 Although the public relationship between Harper and the UN was tense, Canadian financial contributions to the UN’s general budget during Harper’s tenure

Harper, Canadian Defence Policy, and Combatting International Terror  135 Table 6.3.  Canada’s financial contributions to the United Nations (in Canadian dollars) Year

Per cent of UN Budget

Net contribution

2015

2.984

80,972,767

2014

2.984

76,150,510

2013

2.984

76,040,734

2012

3.207

75,786,707

2011

3.207

75,322,499

2010

3.207

67,815,245

2009

2.977

72,529,132

2008

2.977

54,449,820

2007

2.977

59,562,469

2006

2.813

48,006,605

did not necessarily reflect this. Canada’s financial contributions to the UN’s peacekeeping budget did, however, decline dramatically. Although peacekeeping has long played an important role in Canada’s national image, the reinvention of Canadian foreign policy under Harper (partly for electoral reasons) demanded of it the constructing of a more assertive, if not also aggressive, identity. This discussion of the UN is intended to emphasize the ability of Canada to make internationalist contributions despite Harper’s lack of enthusiasm for the organization. A  penchant towards internationalism should not automatically be equated with the UN, but rather, reflect the pursuit of goals such as humanitarianism, nation-building, and so on. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Rather than conforming with NATO demands to stay in Afghanistan in support of a new training mission, Resolute Support, Harper’s foreign and defence policy in 2014–15 was shaped by its relationship with the US and focused on the threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Indeed, one of Harper’s main focal points upon being elected was to improve Canada-US relations which had become, as Kim Nossal wrote, “frosty” in previous years.35 With the decision to stay out of Iraq in 2003 still casting a large shadow over the Canada-US relationship, coupled with the decision to not commit troops to NATO’s Resolute Support Mission, this new opportunity for Canadian military involvement was attractive because it had a clear legal justification (the Iraqi prime minister’s explicit invitation), strong public support at home, and it was not Afghanistan, a war that Canadians had long grown weary of.36 This complete break with NATO’s Resolute Support Mission (RSM) was interesting because, as of November 2017, twenty-seven NATO allies out of

136  Jeffrey Rice and Stéfanie von Hlatky

twenty-nine had made contributions to the effort (with only Canada and France demurring).37 Given the proximity and importance of the Canada-US relationship, Harper’s quick commitment in support of the US-led Coalition against Daesh should not necessarily come as a surprise. The Afghanistan mission had been controversial up until the withdrawal of the last Canadian soldiers in 2014. The decision to finally withdraw had been relatively uncontroversial, evidenced by the fact that there was no discussion within the House of Commons over contributing Canadian military personnel to RSM. Military action against ISIS could, therefore, be treated as an opportunity to repair Canada-US relations while remaining free of the constraints that formal multilateralism sometimes imposes. At the same time, Canada could participate in a relatively low-risk yet highly visible campaign against a “near universal enemy.” But a general aversion to deploying boots on the ground does not fully account for Harper’s decision to opt out of RSM, given that only a year later he agreed to deploy Special Forces personnel to a training mission in Iraq in order to assist Kurdish forces in their efforts to retake Mosul. Harper’s reluctance to participate in the multilateral Afghan mission, privileging instead the Canada-US relationship, is also consistent with broader trends in Canadian foreign policy at the time. Efforts to repatriate Canadian foreign policy decisions and to insulate Canadian military commitments from external alliance pressures – that is, minimizing the influence of allied states in terms of commitment levels and duration, for example – were visible near the end of Harper’s time as prime minister and can be seen as an attempt to shield Canadian decision-making procedures from multilateral pressures.38 This helps to explain why Harper was willing to commit Canadian forces to a combat zone in a multinational milieu, but not necessarily a multilateral setting. Given the absence of a multilateral framework, bilateral engagement with the US would prove more feasible as decisions and agreements could be reached outside of NATO’s slower, consensus-based decision-making framework. A  growing weariness about multilateral approaches, and the cumbersome decision-making process that they often entail, as well as the unpopularity of the Afghanistan mission likely informed Harper’s thinking about the decision to engage the US bilaterally, but through a multinational coalition, in the campaign against ISIS. Conclusion Given the complex security environment states now face, coupled with lingering fiscal constraints stemming from the 2008–9 financial crisis and the associated demands to reduce overall spending, world leaders have to make a compelling case domestically for bigger defence budgets. In Canada, the Department of National Defence has often been the primary target of cuts when budgets are

Harper, Canadian Defence Policy, and Combatting International Terror  137

tight, evidenced by the quick reversal of defence spending following the election of a majority Conservative government in May 2011.39 Some of the most significant changes to occur under Harper in his approach to combatting international terrorism, as we have argued, occurred in the reframing of multilateral organizations as a means to an end, rather than as ends to themselves. But this turn towards interest-based pragmatism, when it means the loss of influence in international forums, is problematic for a middle power like Canada. Indeed, even Canada’s great power allies are rarely willing (or able) to go it alone and they frequently rely on multilateral, or at the very least multinational, frameworks to maximize their influence – recall the US attempts to secure UN approval in the lead-up to the Iraq War in 2003. Indeed, although the outcome of the Iraq War was far from what the Americans had intended, the Bush administration, often castigated for its rejection of multilateralism, demonstrated greater deference to the UN than did Harper’s Conservatives. For a middle-power like Canada, multilateral organizations have historically formed a cornerstone of its foreign and defence policy. Canada was, after all, an original signatory to the UN in 1945, to NATO in 1949, and to the OSCE in 1973. Due to its modest size and limited military capabilities, Canada has historically secured its relevance on the international stage through the prism of multilateral organizations and military alliances.40 Thus, the loss of Canada’s 2010 bid for a temporary seat on the UNSC had the effect of reducing, if not damaging, the idealist sources of Canada’s foreign policy influence.41 This chapter asked whether Primer Minister Stephen Harper broke with this tradition. We provided an assessment based on an examination of Harper’s foreign and defence policies to combat international terrorism. The goal of the analysis was to determine the extent to which Canada’s commitment to multilateralism decreased during Harper’s decade as prime minister, looking at the evolution of Canada’s international commitments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. We argued that, indeed, there is truth to the claim that Canada was much less enthusiastic about collaborating with or through NATO and the UN, a foreign policy stance we have dubbed conditional multilateralism. This conditionality manifested itself primarily through a desire to disentangle Canadian commitments from institutional settings, both in terms of the operations pursued and the financial contributions made to international organizations. We show that, between 2006 and 2015, Harper hedged his bets when it came to the Afghanistan mission, Canada’s primary effort to combat international terrorism since the attacks on 9/11, and progressively disengaged the CAF from ISAF. Instead, Harper was quick to join the coalition to combat the Islamic State, a fight which was better suited to his preference for multilateralism under the right conditions: working closely with the US, the inclusion of more symmetric contributions from allied partners, and the fact that it was outside

138  Jeffrey Rice and Stéfanie von Hlatky

the institutional constraints of NATO and more politically palatable. At least when it comes to (unconditional) multilateralism, then, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau may have been onto something when he declared that Canada was indeed “back” – at least rhetorically speaking. NOTES 1 Conservative Party of Canada, Stand up for Canada (Ottawa: Conservative Party of Canada, 2006), 45. 2 Kim Richard Nossal, “The Liberal Past in the Conservative Present: Internationalism in the Harper Era,” in Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, eds., Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 21–34. 3 In a mid-March 2006 speech to Canadian troops in Kandahar, Prime Minister Harper was adamant: “You can’t lead from the bleachers. I want Canada to be a leader … A country that really leads, not a country that just follows.” Quoted in Mike Blanchfield, Swingback: Coming Along in the World with Harper and Trudeau (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017), 48. 4 Conservative Party of Canada, Stand up for Canada, 42–6. 5 The Canadian Press, “‘We’re Back,’ Justin Trudeau Says in Message to Canada’s Allies Abroad,” National Post, 20 October 2015, https://nationalpost.com/news /politics/were-back-justin-trudeau-says-in-message-to-canadas-allies-abroad. 6 Marie-Eve Desrosiers and Philippe Legassé, “Military Frames and Canada’s Conservative Government: From Extending to Transforming Perceptions of Canadian Identity,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 54, no. 3 (2016): 288–311. 7 Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada’s Image in an Age of Anxiety (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2012). 8 Philippe Lagassé, “A Mixed Legacy: General Rick Hillier and Canadian Defence, 2005–08,” International Journal 64, no. 3 (2009): 622. 9 Desrosiers and Lagassé, “Military Frames and Canada’s Conservative Government.” 10 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates (Hansard), 37th Parliament, 2nd Sess., Vol. 138, No. 71 (17 March 2003) at 4243 (Stephen Harper, CPC), https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/House/372/Debates/071/HAN071-E.PDF. 11 John Ibbitson, “Canada Gives Cold Shoulder to UN,” Globe and Mail, 1 October 2012, https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-gives-cold-shoulder -to-the-un/article4581231/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&. 12 Mike Blanchfield, “Harper Wanted to Pull out of European Security Organization, Diplomats Say,” CBC News, 1 February 2016, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics /harper-europe-security-agency-1.3428747. 13 The element of conditionality is part of our broader argument about the nature and value of multilateralism to the Harper Conservatives. In the past, multilateralism

Harper, Canadian Defence Policy, and Combatting International Terror  139

14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21 22 23

was treated, in large part though not exclusively, as an end in itself rather than a means to an end. That changed during the Harper years. Additionally, the principle of conditionality in multilateral institutions has been discussed in other contexts as caveats, domestic constraints, and time-bound commitments. See Olivier Schmitt, Allies that Count (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019); Aaron Ettinger and Jeffrey Rice, “Hell Is Other People’s Schedules: Canada’s Limited-Term Military Commitments, 2001–2015,” International Journal 71, no. 3 (2016): 371–92; and David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). For an introduction to theorizing about strategic culture, see Alastair Iain Johnson, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 32–64. Justin Massie, “Public Contestation and Policy Resistance: Canada’s Oversized Military Commitment to Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 1 (January 2016): 47–65; Jonathan Paquin, “Canadian Foreign and Security Policy: Reading a Balance between Autonomy and North American Harmony in the Twenty-First Century,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 15, no. 12 (2009): 99–108. Justin Massie, “Making Sense of Canada’s ‘Irrational’ International Security Policy: A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures,” International Journal 64, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 625–45. For the purposes of this chapter, we utilize constructivism with a realist bent to underscore the normative underpinnings of a Harper foreign policy position that accepted realist principles. For a fuller treatment of melding realist theory with constructivism, see J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), and Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” International Studies Review 5, no. 3 (September 2003): 325–42. Stéfanie von Hlatky, American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). While the strategic culture typology is instructive and useful for understanding general trends in decision-making patterns, there may be exceptions to these patterns – as was the case during the Harper period. Jean-Christophe Boucher, “The Responsibility to Think about Interests: Stephen Harper’s Realist Internationalism, 2006–2011,” in Heather Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, eds., Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2013), 128–56. Roland Paris, “Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era,” International Journal 69, no. 3 (2014): 275–307. Adam Chapnick, “Middle Power No-More – Canada in World Affairs since 2006,” Journal of Diplomacy and International Affairs 101, no. 110 (2013): 101–11. Justin Massie, “Canada’s War for Prestige in Afghanistan: A Realist Paradox,” International Journal 68, no. 2 (2012): 274–88.

140  Jeffrey Rice and Stéfanie von Hlatky 24 Karolina Maclachlan and Zachary Wolfraim, “Diplomacy Disturbed: NATO, Conservative Morality and the Unfixing of a Middle Power,” British Journal of Canadian Studies 28, no. 1 (2015): 43–69. 25 Massie, “Public Contestation and Policy Resistance,” 54–61. 26 Brian Bow and David R. Black, “Does Politics Stop at the Water’s Edge in Canada?” International Journal 64, no.1 (Winter 2008–9): 9. 27 Statistics on Canadian military casualties can be found here: http://www.canada .ca/en/news/archive/2013/06/canadian-armed-forces-casualty-statistics -afghanistan.html. 28 Ettinger and Rice, “Hell Is Other People’s Schedules,” 371–92. 29 David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). 30 NATO, “ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan (2001–2014) (Archived),” NATO, https:// www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_69366.htm. 31 For an official description of Operation ATTENTION’s mandate, see Department of National Defence, “Operation ATTENTION,” Government of Canada, 18 November 2014, https://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current /op-attention.page. 32 Allan Woods, “We Can’t Eliminate the Danger in Afghanistan: Harper,” Toronto Star, 16 April 2011, https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2011/04/16/we_cant _eliminate_the_danger_in_afghanistan_harper.html. 33 Clearly, the January 2008 release of the Manley Report was a pivotal moment for Canada in the Afghanistan campaign. It served to depoliticize Canada’s controversial involvement in Afghanistan, but the report itself did not have a transformative effect on Harper’s approach to the counter-insurgency operation. Rather, it had the effect of legitimizing a path that was already being pursued, and not necessarily establishing a new one for the government. 34 This stance is referred to as the Chrétien Doctrine. See John J. Noble, “Canada-US Relations in the Post-Iraq-War Era: Stop the Drift toward Irrelevance,” Policy Options 24, no. 5 (May 2003): 19–24. 35 Kim Richard Nossal, “Defence Policy and the Atmospherics of Canada-US Relations: The Case of the Harper Conservatives,” American Review of Canadian Studies, 37, no. 1 (2007): 23–34. 36 Stéfanie von Hlatky and H. Christian Breede, eds., Going to War? Trends in Military Interventions (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016). 37 Jean-Christophe Boucher and Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of War: Canada’s Afghanistan Mission, 2001–14 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 42. For a breakdown of troop contributing countries, see NATO, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures,” NATO, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf /pdf_2017_03/20170313_2017-03-RSM-Placemat.pdf. 38 Ettinger and Rice, “Hell Is Other People’s Schedules,” 390.

Harper, Canadian Defence Policy, and Combatting International Terror  141 39 Defence spending as a percentage of Canada’s GDP dropped from 2011 onwards and then levelled off from 2013–16. For more precise figures, see David Perry, “Following the Funding in Strong, Secure, Engaged” (Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2018), 1–18, https://www.cgai.ca/following_the_funding_in _strong_secure_engaged. Also see, David Perry, “The Growing Gap between Defence Ends and Means: The Disconnect between the Canada First Defence Strategy and the Current Defence Budget” (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2004), 1–15; Jeffrey Simpson, “The Harper Government Loves the Military – in Theory,” Globe and Mail, 28 June 2014, A11. On Harper’s “do-anything military on the cheap” penchant, see Doug Saunders, “Canada’s Military Policy Doesn’t Add Up,” Globe and Mail, 1 March 2014, F2. 40 von Hlatky, American Allies in Times of War. 41 The shift away from idealism – as manifested in a lack of governmental enthusiasm for engagement in the international sphere through multilateral partnerships and international institutions – undoubtedly contributed to Canada’s lost bid at the UN in 2010. The rejected UN gambit, the overall retrenchment internationally and the conditionality (casting multilateralism as a means to an end) with which Harper approached international institutions was evidence that historically idealist sources of Canadian foreign policy were clearly viewed as less important.

7 Stephen Harper’s War in Afghanistan: Eagerly In, Cautiously Out justin massie

Canada’s military participation in the US-led multinational mission in Afghanistan has become synonymous with Stephen Harper’s prime ministership. Harper was sworn into office at the same time as Canada’s battalion group was beginning its counter-insurgency operations in Kandahar in February 2006, some four and a half years after Canada’s initial commitment to Afghanistan in October 2001. Nevertheless, Canada’s war in Afghanistan quickly became known as Harper’s war.1 That the new prime minister’s first foreign trip was to visit Canadian troops in Kandahar was emblematic of his owning of the conflict. At that point, he enthusiastically embraced the war and promised to stay the course. In his remarks to Canadian soldiers, Harper famously declared his unwavering support for the war: “Your work is important because it is in our national interest to see Afghanistan become a free, democratic, and peaceful country ... And there may be some who want to cut and run. But cutting and running is not your way. It’s not my way. And it’s not the Canadian way. We don’t make a commitment and then run away at the first sign of trouble. We don’t and we won’t.”2 In the end, Canada did gradually cut and run from the war in Afghanistan under Harper’s leadership. It was the second US ally to withdraw its combat troops from the still ongoing Afghanistan mission when it put an end to its commitment in Kandahar in 2011.3 A non-combat training mission in Kabul and another in Mazar-i-Sharif followed, until the withdrawal in March 2014 of all remaining Canadian forces deployed to Afghanistan, thus ending Canada’s twelve-year military presence in the Southern Asian country.4 This chapter  seeks to understand why Harper put an end to his Afghan military operation. Accordingly, it assesses the extent to which domestic and international constraints curbed Harper’s initial pro-war preferences. For analytical purposes, the chapter is divided into four main parts. The first examines Harper’s initial enthusiasm for Canada’s involvement in the war. The second and third sections look at the decisions to extend Canada’s combat engagement

Stephen Harper’s War in Afghanistan  143

in Kandahar, first to 2008 and then to 2011. The fourth section focuses on explaining the decision to withdraw from combat operations in Kandahar  – and eventually from Afghanistan altogether. The chapter ends with a number of observations about Harper’s controversial Afghan war and its overarching push-and-pull explanatory factors. Harper and the Afghan “Revolution” There has been no shortage of analysis of Canada’s military involvement in the war in Afghanistan. Several scholars have argued that the Harper government made the war its own by employing a new military-focused narrative and making Afghanistan the centrepiece of its foreign and defence policy.5 For Alexander Moens, this amounted to no less than a “revolution.”6 With its emphasis on national interests, a sizable military commitment, a leadership role within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and a reinvestment in the Canadian military, the Harper government is said to have marked the return of high politics in Canadian foreign and defence policy.7 This shift has been argued to be the product of the distinctively pro-military ideological preferences of the Harper Conservatives.8 For Duane Bratt, for instance, Harper’s enthusiasm for Afghanistan reflected an interest in making the war “a partisan wedge issue to demonstrate his leadership abilities to the Canadian public and to divide the Liberal party.”9 Others have, on the contrary, argued that Harper’s Conservatives had no preconceived foreign policy agenda.10 According to John Ibbitson, the Conservatives came to office without a “carefully considered foreign policy tailored to appeal to the Conservative coalition.”11 This, he contends, was evident by the scarce attention paid to foreign policy in the party’s 2006 election platform. But Ibbitson, nonetheless, stresses that the Harper government’s actions were grounded in a set of principles, which became evident only after Harper came into office. Yet prominent members of the CPC expressed a consistent and distinct set of beliefs regarding the war prior to attaining power, which can be summarized thusly: to profoundly reshape Canadian foreign and defence policy away from the passive, morally relative, unequivocal, soft power of the (Liberal) past, which had, according to Conservatives, diminished Canada’s standing and relevance in the world.12 These beliefs were clearly asserted during the first phases of the war in Afghanistan, when allied forces toppled the Taliban regime in 2001, conducted anti-terrorist operations against al-Qaeda and remnants of the Taliban in 2002, and helped establish a democratically elected government in Kabul in 2003–4. Throughout this period, and prior to seeking office during the 2004 and 2006 federal elections, the Conservative Party voiced a moralistic conception of Canada’s national interest combined with a strong emphasis on the superiority

144  Justin Massie

of Western values. The first expression of these beliefs was given by Stockwell Day, then leader of the Canadian Alliance and official leader of the Opposition on 15 October 2001. Day expressed his party’s “strong support” for Jean Chrétien’s decision to commit the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to the war against global terrorism and emphasized two motivations, which would be frequently repeated in the following years: Canada had both a national security and moral duty to fight terror in Afghanistan. “Canada is fighting for freedom alongside its American ally,” stressed Day, while noting that “if we do not take military action against the Taliban we will leave intact the greatest support network and training ground for global terrorism.”13 In his first major foreign policy speech as newly elected leader of the Canadian Alliance, Stephen Harper denounced the Liberal government for putting its ideological agenda “ahead of real Canadian interests” by prematurely withdrawing CAF from anti-terrorist operations in Kandahar in the summer of 2002 – ostensibly due to a systematic neglect of the Armed Forces.14 This decision, he argued, damaged Canada’s relationship with the United States, the cornerstone of Canadian foreign and defence policy, as well as Canada’s self-interests and moral imperatives.15 Harper most clearly laid out his foreign policy philosophy in a speech delivered to Civitas, a Conservative organization, in April 2003. He began by asserting: “Current challenges in dealing with terrorism and its sponsors, as well as the emerging debate on the goals of the U.S. as the sole superpower, will be well served by conservative insights on preserving historic values and moral insights on right and wrong.”16 Liberals, in contrast, “are trapped in their framework of moral neutrality, moral relativism and moral equivalence,” which was evident in their approach to international terrorism. “There is no doubt about the technical capacity of our society to fight this war. What is evident is the lack of desire of the modern liberals to fight, and even more, the striking hope on the Left that we actually lose.” Consequently, Harper revealed his distinctively conservative international security agenda: “Conservatives must take the moral stand, with our allies, in favour of the fundamental values of society, including democracy, free enterprise, and individual freedom. This moral stand should not just give us the right to stand with our allies, but the duty to do so and the responsibility to put ‘hard power’ behind our international commitments.” In his election night victory address on 23 January 2006, Harper emphasized his support for Canada’s mission in Kandahar and framed it in terms of the promotion of democracy: “We will continue to help defend our values and democratic ideals around the globe, as so courageously demonstrated by those young Canadian soldiers who are serving, and who have sacrificed, in Afghanistan.”17 Demonstrating his personal commitment to the war, Harper’s first trip abroad as prime minister was a visit to Canadian troops in Kandahar, where he expressed Canada’s moral duty in Afghanistan.18 This echoed his long-standing

Stephen Harper’s War in Afghanistan  145

view that Canada’s national interests involved playing a major frontline combat role in the war against terrorism. In sum, and in contrast with his predecessors, Harper was genuinely enthusiastic about the war in Afghanistan because it fit with his party’s ideological preferences and with his own view of Canada as a “warrior nation.”19 Canada’s national interests were conceived in both narrow (self-defence) and morally expansive (fighting for democracy and freedom) ways, justifying the need to militarily support the United States in the war against terrorism and to make this fight a priority for Canadian foreign policy. Making Afghanistan Harper’s War: Extending the Mission to 2009 In May 2006, the newly elected Conservative government extended Canada’s combat mission in Kandahar to February 2009. This extension was Harper’s first major decision concerning the Afghan war. It represented the Conservatives’ intent to make the war their own. Yet the prime minister decided to put his desire to extend the mission to a vote in Parliament, despite having no constitutional obligation to do so. While this decision was consistent with his ­party’s long-standing promise to bring the matter before Parliament, it resulted in three noteworthy political benefits for the Conservatives: it deferred the political responsibility of a contentious decision to Parliament; it exposed divisions within the Liberal opposition party amid a leadership campaign; and it pleased the conservative core electorate and soft supporters while avoiding a potentially divisive election issue for the Conservative minority government.20 To be sure, there was little substantive domestic opposition to the implementation of Harper’s preference for extending the war in Afghanistan. During the take-note debate that preceded the vote, all Canadian political parties save the NDP expressed support for the continuation of Canada’s war in Afghanistan. Leader of the Opposition Bill Graham expressed his support for the mission, claiming that while “they are able to fight when they have to fight,” Canadian troops “are there primarily to help the Afghan people.”21 The Bloc Québécois’s (BQ) Rémi Bachand also expressed his support for the mission, noting, “It is wrong to say that we should leave now.”22 For the NDP, in contrast, the government should have answered the UN’s call for peacekeepers in Darfur rather than commit to “a counter-insurgency mission” in Kandahar.23 Still, the motion to extend the mission passed only by a slim majority of 149 MPs in favour with 145 against. A third of the Liberals supported the motion of the minority Conservative government, with the rest joining the NDP and BQ’s opposition. Parliamentary opposition was grounded more on procedural concerns rather than principles. Opposition parties criticized the mere thirtysix-hour notice of the vote and the meagre six-hour long debate on the issue.

146  Justin Massie

Liberal Leader Stéphane Dion argued that the Harper Conservatives should have imitated the Dutch government by allowing a respectable timeframe to debate the issue (the Dutch parliamentary debate lasted several months), and suggested that the suddenness of the vote indicated that the Harper government “has already decided and is determined to prolong the mission however the House votes – and so the vote means nothing.”24 Indeed, Harper had made the decision to extend the mission to 2009 with his close staff and Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier days prior to the parliamentary vote.25 Moreover, Harper stated that in the event of a vote against the extension, he would nevertheless proceed with at least a one-year extension, to February 2008.26 This signalled that Harper did not intend to give the House a veto over his exercise of the executive’s constitutional prerogative to deploy the Canadian military abroad. Parliamentary opposition also pertained to the lack of precision regarding the government’s commitment to aid, the absence of clear benchmarks for success, the desire to retain military capacity to make a contribution to Haiti or Darfur, as well as the lack of rationale for a two-year extension as opposed to a one-year renewal. Leader of the Opposition Bill Graham conveyed these concerns, while noting that “the Liberal caucus strongly supported our mission in Afghanistan.”27 BQ leader Gilles Duceppe echoed these concerns. He first stated that “[t]he intervention is justified, if for no other reason than to ensure the security of Afghans, those who have lived in insecurity for such a long time, and to rebuild this ravaged country and rebuild its government.” However, he asked plainly, “Do we have enough answers to support an additional two-year extension? Definitely not.”28 Duceppe voiced his concern that he did not have the information needed to make a wise decision, such as the duration of the NATO mission, the costs of Canada’s commitment, the criteria for success, and the peacebuilding strategy. He urged the government to allow the Standing Committee on National Defence to thoroughly assess the situation before putting the extension to a parliamentary vote. Given the Harper government’s refusal, he admonished the prime minister “to use Parliament to endorse a decision about which the public has very serious reservations.”29 Indeed, most Canadians opposed the two-year extension of the mission, with only 41  per cent in favour. The strongest opposition came from BQ voters (72  per cent), followed by New Democrats (69  per cent) and Liberals (54  per cent). However, Conservative voters expressed considerable support for the mission extension (61 per cent), distantly followed by Liberal supporters (41 per cent).30 There was thus minimal expected electoral costs for the Harper Conservatives to extend the mission, as it was well-received within its partisan base and relatively well-received amongst Liberals. Such levels of popular support may explain why the Harper government chose to put the combat mission to a vote in Parliament. Since there was a relative consensus among political

Stephen Harper’s War in Afghanistan  147

elites on the need to maintain a combat presence in Kandahar, Harper sought to pre-empt the potential mobilization of a divided electorate by extending the responsibility to prolong the mission to Parliament.31 Defusing a Political Bomb: Extending the Mission to 2011 Harper’s second major decision, to further extend Canada’s mission to 2011, came amid a much more constrained domestic political setting. Public support for the mission was souring. This was partly the result of the mounting casualties suffered in Kandahar,32 and, more importantly, of divergent public perceptions regarding the appropriate role of the Canadian Armed Forces abroad. Those who believed Canada’s international military role should be one of peacekeeping consolidated their opposition to the combat mission, while support splintered amongst those who saw Canada’s military role as peace-enforcement and defending people under the attack of terrorists.33 In other words, support for the mission eroded among soft conservatives. This mattered politically, since observers expected an election in the spring of 2007, with Afghanistan as a potential electoral liability for the Harper government.34 In response to the downward trend in support for the mission, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) commissioned a polling firm, the Strategic Counsel, to ascertain in detail Canadians’ attitudes and beliefs about the combat mission. Released in November 2006, the report confirmed the following: “Over the past 12 months public support for the mission in Afghanistan has fluctuated, reflecting Canadians’ growing concerns over the continuing risky nature of the engagement as well as lingering questions, and certainly some misperceptions, about the rationale for Canada’s initial involvement.”35 Support for the decision to send troops to Afghanistan declined sharply from 55 per cent in March 2006 to 36 per cent by December 2006. Despite the decline in public support towards the mission, the majority view of Canadians, according to the Strategic Counsel report, was that pulling out immediately from Afghanistan “would have disastrous consequences both for Afghanistan and for Canada’s reputation within the international community and among its NATO allies.”36 A majority thus favoured either withdrawal over the course of twelve to eighteen months, or maintaining the commitment through to the 2009 deadline.37 With those poll numbers in mind, a second extension was simply out of the question. But things quickly changed on the ground. To help overcome the surge in public dissent, the Harper government followed most of the Strategic Counsel report’s recommendations, incorporating key themes such as reconstruction (for example, building new schools), NATO, and human rights into its press releases on Afghanistan.38 This new communication strategy did not, however, help quell public disapproval. The Harper government faced a potentially mobilized public opposition, especially

148  Justin Massie

in Quebec, where the Conservatives still had hopes of winning a larger number of constituencies in the upcoming federal election.39 The political fallout from the war was particularly sensitive in the context of the upcoming deployment of troops from the Quebec-based Royal 22e Régiment to Kandahar in August 2007. Indeed, after having denounced the NDP motion for unilateral withdrawal from Afghanistan for its “irresponsibility,” BQ leader Gilles Duceppe threatened to introduce a motion of non-confidence in the House of Commons – in other words, to bring down the government – on the mission in Afghanistan in December 2006. The Conservatives, he urged, should “rebalance the mission” towards putting more emphasis on “reconstruction” instead of “combat.” While Prime Minister Harper rejected the BQ’s threat as “playing politics on the backs of Canadian soldiers,”40 observers regarded the appointment of Maxime Bernier as Minister of Foreign Affairs in August 2007 as a clear attempt at selling the controversial Afghanistan mission to a sceptical Quebec audience.41 The Harper Conservatives also faced initial hostility from the official leader of the Opposition, but after having called for an “honourable” pull-out from Kandahar, Stéphane Dion softened his stance once elected Liberal Party leader. He tabled a motion in the House of Commons, calling for withdrawal at the end of the ongoing mission’s mandate in 2009.42 The Harper government’s response was twofold. First, the prime minister and his cabinet avoided the debate, leaving backbenchers to dispute the issue with the Liberals’ shadow cabinet. Second, despite Harper’s suggestion that he would not back away from an election on the Afghan mission, the Conservatives refused to consider it a motion of confidence.43 The motion was, nevertheless, defeated 150–134, as the left-oriented NDP voted with the Conservative government to prevent an election from happening.44 The Harper government’s more substantive strategy came in the form of another attempt at defusing the potential electoral backlash of the war by shifting political responsibility to the federal Liberal Party. Throughout the summer of 2007, the Harper Conservatives remained non-committal on the renewal of the mission, reiterating the government’s 2006 promise to seek parliamentary support for a second extension.45 Prime Minister Harper did open the door to accommodating opposition parties’ concerns regarding the specific nature of the extended mission.46 With Dion favouring a non-combat training role beyond 2009,47 Harper emphasized his preference for a bipartisan accord, but also the need to “continue with what we are working on now, which is an increased focus on training of Afghan security forces so they can take care of their country’s own security problems.”48 Harper later stipulated that his minority government believed that the training of the Afghan army and police would be completed by 2011 and thus sought to secure parliamentary support for a further two-year extension of Canada’s war.49 With this extension, Canada

Stephen Harper’s War in Afghanistan  149

would abide by NATO’s operational plan based on UN-sponsored benchmarks established in the Afghanistan Compact. To help foster the conditions for a bipartisan agreement on these terms, Harper commissioned a blue-ribbon, five-person bipartisan panel headed by former Liberal cabinet minister John Manley to propose recommendations on the future of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan (the “Manley panel”). This was clearly an attempt to help secure the support of the Liberal Party in order to minimize any political fallout from a possible extension of the contentious mission. Liberal support for an additional two-year extension would indeed pre-empt Afghanistan from becoming an electoral wedge issue. Clearly, Harper’s political strategy put the Liberal Party in a difficult political position. Stéphane Dion’s response was cautious. He criticized the government for not waiting for the results of the Manley panel before deciding to extend the mission to 2011, called upon the government to put an end to Canada’s combat role in 2009, and opened the door to supporting a non-combat training mission post-2009.50 Following the Manley panel’s recommendation to maintain Canada’s combat mission in Kandahar beyond February 2009,51 Dion was quick to reframe his party’s stance. He argued that the Manley Report supported the Liberal Party’s position on the need to move away from combat operations towards greater training of the Afghan National Security Forces, although the report cautioned against such a false dichotomy.52 Dion eventually caved and supported Harper’s preference for a two-year extension of the combat mission in an agreement reached in February 2008, eight months before the federal election.53 Though the Conservatives made some compromises in the negotiation of a bipartisan accord, notably in terms of revamping development assistance efforts and clarifying the mission’s end date, the bulk of the concessions came from the Liberals, who had advocated for the end of Canada’s combat mission in February 2009.54 Dion claimed that the bipartisan agreement represented “a shift from what our troops in Kandahar have been doing since the beginning of 2006. We are no longer talking about a proactive counter-insurgency mission to seek out and destroy insurgents.”55 In the end, however, Dion accepted the government’s intentions, announced in the Speech from the Throne, to extend Canada’s commitment in Kandahar, including its combat battle group, and to refocus the mission on training the Afghan army and police, with the help of new aerial support and an additional 1,000 NATO combat troops. Dion’s decision to support the Conservative government’s extension was clearly the result of the political pressure the Manley Report had put on the new Liberal leader. Much to the delight of the Harper Conservatives, the Liberal Party was still divided over the mission and, according to deputy leader Michael Ignatieff, Canadians did not want an election on the war.56 So the Liberals put aside their reservations and agreed to a deal with the Conservatives to extend the Canadian mission for two years.

150  Justin Massie

The two main parties supported the extension by a vote of 197 to 77 on 13 March 2008. An early election was prevented and Afghanistan all but disappeared from Canadian partisan politics. Indeed, after the Liberals voted in favour of the extension, Afghanistan literally dropped from the political agenda. As Defence Minister Peter MacKay commented, “it silenced people like Jack Layton because I think Jack was gearing up at that point to say let’s make this a defining issue” for the NDP’s electoral strategy.57 Harper’s political strategy was thus successful in defusing a political bomb by pre-empting a potential electoral punishment in the fall 2008 federal election. The growing public opposition was effectively quelled by the Liberals’ inability to criticize the mission.58 The bipartisan accord also blurred political accountability by masking the government’s constitutional responsibility for the decision and helped achieve Harper’s original intention to maintain Canada’s military mission in Kandahar (and divide the federal Liberal Party). In fact, the 2008 federal election led to a second Conservative minority government, with the CPC winning 37.6  per cent of the popular vote, a gain of 1.3 percentage points from the 2006 election. The Conservatives succeeded in broadening their core support base by making gains in Ontario and amongst urban voters and new Canadians.59 Of course, the government’s decision to prolong Canada’s commitment in Kandahar was well-received amongst its core conservative electorate. In March 2008, an overwhelming majority of Conservative Party voters (72 per cent) supported Harper’s extension of the mission in Afghanistan, while Liberal (63 per cent), NDP (74 per cent), and BQ (78 per cent) partisans strongly opposed the extension.60 This trend endured to the fall 2008 federal election, where a clear, though slightly reduced, majority of Conservative Party voters (64 per cent) expressed support for the extension of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan until 2011, compared with minimal support amongst Liberal (26 per cent), NDP (23 per cent), and BQ (8 per cent) backers.61 Cutting and Running: Pulling Out of Kandahar Prime Minister Harper faced an even more constrained domestic environment following his re-election in 2008. Growing public dissent towards the war in Afghanistan extended to the Conservatives’ core electorate. From January 2008 to August 2010, support for bringing all Canadian troops home rose from 37  per cent to 57  per cent throughout the country, and from 25  per cent to 60 per cent in Alberta, the most pro-war province in Canada.62 The comfortable majority of Conservative voters who supported the Afghan combat mission in 2006 (60  per cent) and 2008 (64  per cent) progressively declined in 2009 (56 per cent) to a low of 48 per cent in 2010. A similar trend was registered among Liberal voters, from 55 per cent supporting the mission in 2006 to only 39 per cent in support in 2010.63 This translated into the party’s evaluation of

Stephen Harper’s War in Afghanistan  151

the future of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. Support among Conservative voters to withdraw all Canadian combat troops in 2011 rose from 46 per cent in May 2009 to 55 per cent in November 2010, compared to a rise from 41 per cent to 45 per cent among Liberal voters. Support for extending Canada’s combat mission beyond 2011, however, received the support of only about 11 per cent of Conservatives and just 6  per cent of Liberals.64 In short, the appetite for Canada’s combat role in Afghanistan eroded considerably, even within the Conservatives’ core electoral base. There was little attempt from the Harper Conservatives to generate public support for a continued combat presence in Afghanistan. In fact, there was a substantial drop in the number of official statements by the Harper government to promote the mission, from a peak of seventeen statements made in 2007, to nine in 2009, to only three made in 2011.65 In other words, the Harper government basically gave up on mobilizing public support for the mission, even within its partisan base.66 The issue thus largely disappeared from the governing party’s political agenda. Harper invoked three reasons for ending Canada’s combat mission in Kandahar: public opinion, military capabilities, and a sentiment of Canada having done its duty in Afghanistan.67 “I  don’t think the Canadian public will want to continue after that,” he explained. “I  don’t think the Canadian military  – although they wouldn’t admit it – would want to continue after that. I think we have to say to the government of Afghanistan, ‘We have an expectation you are going to be responsible for your own security.’”68 The first reason, low public support, is quite straightforward. As noted above, there was no appetite for a prolonged combat engagement beyond 2011, even among Conservative voters. Indeed, Prime Minister Harper would not compromise his chances for ­re-election over the costly war in Afghanistan. There was, therefore, no question that he would push for a third extension of the Kandahar mission in the face of such widespread public disapproval. As Terry Breese, deputy chief of the US mission in Canada, indicated: “As long as Canada’s two main parties remain in a political stalemate with the public and neither likely to form a majority government after the next election, it will be virtually impossible for any government to commit to a combat role for the CF [Canadian Forces] in Afghanistan after 2011 and difficult even to make firm decisions about other assistance beyond that date.”69 The second reason invoked pertained to Canada’s limited military capabilities. In April 2008, strategic assessments from the CF’s three branches, leaked to the media, painted a disquieting picture of the Canadian military. All three services noted that they were plagued by shortfalls tied to a high operational tempo and a lack of funds. The Air Force, for instance, reported that it had to ground several aircraft due to a budget shortfall of over $500 million. The Royal Canadian Navy noted that operational readiness was being undermined by the

152  Justin Massie

mounting cost of the mission in Afghanistan. The Canadian Army, for its part, noted that, despite the military’s vigorous three-year recruitment campaign, the land force was short of 250 officers and 1,000 non-commissioned members. “The Army,” the report bleakly stated, “is now stretched almost to the breaking point.”70 Put simply, Canada’s sustained military operations in Kandahar badly overstretched the Canadian Forces. Chief of Land Forces General Andrew Leslie thus called for an operational pause following the withdrawal of Canada’s battle group from Kandahar.71 This pause would allow for a post-2011 training and mentoring mission, to be decided by cabinet no later than fall 2010.72 Moreover, the massive surge of 33,000 US troops in Afghanistan expected by the fall of 2010 would allow the withdrawal of Canadian soldiers in Kandahar to have little impact on the overall success of the mission – nor would it raise any critical voices in Washington. Harper’s third reason for withdrawal from Kandahar had more to do with his own disenchantment than the military’s limited capabilities. Following his reelection, Harper seemed to lack the requisite motivation to pursue the Afghan mission. Not only did he make far fewer public statements about the war, but when he did, his tone towards the mission turned noticeably pessimistic on the prospects for its success. “We’re not going to win this war just by staying,” Harper told a US television network. “Quite frankly, we are not going to ever defeat the insurgency.”73 To explain Harper’s willingness to withdraw from the ongoing NATO mission, his close advisors explained that he had become “disillusioned with the allies, especially some of the larger European powers that wanted ‘a big say, but weren’t willing to step up.’ He felt betrayed by their refusal to come south (in the war-torn country) at a time when Canada had ‘trusted them to a certain extent’ to be there.”74 Indeed, the Harper government had lobbied considerably for greater European burden-sharing in NATO circles, but with disappointing results.75 Harper lamented NATO’s “inadequate” troop levels in Afghanistan, saying “there’s a handful of countries (that) are carrying the load … And this is the tragedy.”76 According to US Ambassador David Jacobson, the prime minister thus gradually came to the belief that Canada had “done more than its share” and could withdraw its combat troops in 2011 without fear for its reputation as a reliable ally.77 That said, Prime Minister Harper seems to have abandoned his preference for a sustained Canadian combat role in Afghanistan following the agreement with Dion in the winter of 2008. In fact, the Harper-Dion deal was based on an “unspoken assumption” that the 2011 date was firm and would put an end to Canada’s combat mission.78 Prime Minister Harper’s office plainly stated to reporters in August 2008: “We just want to be absolutely clear that Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan ends in 2011.”79 Harper argued strongly during the fall 2008 federal election campaign that he would not renew Canada’s military commitment in Afghanistan once the mission expired in 2011. “We’re planning for the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Afghanistan in 2011,” he declared.

Stephen Harper’s War in Afghanistan  153

He committed to maintaining “some presence” in Afghanistan after 2011, probably “in some technical capacities,” but asserted that his party would put an end to “the mission as we’ve known it.”80 Defence Minister Peter MacKay reiterated his government’s stance following its re-election. “There are many ways in which we can make contributions beyond 2011,” he stated. “What we’ve said is the current combat mission, the current configuration, will end in 2011. That’s a firm date.”81 Despite pressures by NATO allies to reconsider, Prime Minister Harper restated his position to withdraw in early 2010.82 Nevertheless, the Harper government remained open to a non-combat, post2011 commitment in Afghanistan. During a meeting with US Defence Secretary Robert Gates in March 2009, Defence Minister Peter MacKay signalled Canada’s readiness to remain involved. “Canada, post-2011, will play a role. We will absolutely be in Afghanistan performing important tasks … 2011 is a fixed date to the end of combat. There is much more that can be done in Afghanistan beyond combat.”83 A  few days later, Harper’s cabinet agreed that “all options are back on the table” with respect to Canada’s military role in Afghanistan after 2011, but decided not to make this public given the political sensitivity of the issue and the difficulty to sell a new extension to a dubious Canadian public.84 And the prospect of an election within the coming year obviously weighed on Prime Minister Harper’s decision to determine whether, when, and how to reconsider the planned withdrawal and limited his options.85 In December 2009, the Department of National Defence had not yet “developed contingencies for the extension of the Canadian military mission in Afghanistan beyond 2011,” according to Defence Minister MacKay.86 Indeed, in February 2010, Harper’s cabinet examined three options  – small, medium, and large  – for a post-2011 military mission and opted for a small role, in which training the Afghan National Security Forces might be a part.87 The domestic political landscape became more permissive to a post-2011 non-combat military mission in Afghanistan with the Liberals’ willingness to consider a post-2011 non-combat commitment. Liberal Leader Michael Ignatieff and Liberal foreign affairs critic Bob Rae both began to publicly promote a training mission in the fall of 2009. Rae argued that Canada’s commitment to Afghanistan should not end in 2011, given that NATO’s exit strategy from Afghanistan was set for 2014. “There is a tremendously important role for us with respect to making sure that the Afghan army and the Afghan police are in a position to do the job, which simply has to be done.”88 This was followed by the publication of a Senate defence committee report, which recommended that Canada take part in the “training and mentoring of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police … beyond 2011.”89 The report thus created an opportunity for yet another bipartisan consensus, this time on a noncombat mission in Afghanistan. Prime Minister Harper seized the opportunity afforded by the Liberals’ suggestion of a post-2011 training mission, which would commit the CF until the

154  Justin Massie

official end of NATO’s mandate in Afghanistan. He announced in November 2010 that Canada would commit up to 950 troops to NATO’s training mission in Afghanistan in a non-combat capacity. As the Prime Minister explained, “we are not proposing a combat mission. I took note of the Liberal Party’s advice in that regard, and I can assure the Liberal Party leader that the mission until 2014 will be a non-combat mission.”90 The fact that Harper seized upon the Liberals’ openness to a training mission illustrated his preoccupation with the potential electoral costs of a third extension of Canada’s war in Afghanistan. The new training mission would prevent the Conservatives from being electorally punished for remaining committed to the deadly war, as well as for refraining from any kind of hard military presence post-2011. Indeed, though just over one-third of Canadians supported the country’s military mission in Afghanistan, 48 per cent approved of the new training role for their military, including 62 per cent of Conservative partisans and 50 per cent of Liberal supporters.91 The bipartisan accord not only spurred public support for the new training mission, but it also kept Afghanistan out of the public limelight. After an election where Afghanistan was barely mentioned, the Conservative Party won a majority government in May 2011 by consolidating and expanding its electoral base.92 But there would be no return to a war-fighting capacity for Canada in Afghanistan. Conclusion It is worth emphasizing that Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s reasons for supporting Canada’s military engagement in the Afghan war remained largely unchanged from 2006 to 2014. But Harper’s desire to make Afghanistan the flagship of his Conservative government’s foreign and defence policy progressively diminished as the war persisted. His yearning to export democracy and freedom through a combat role on the frontline of the war against terrorism and to enhance Canada’s reputation as a reliable ally of the United States faced diminishing returns and increasing costs. The Harper government quickly succeeded in taking ownership of the war by renewing Canada’s sizable military commitment in one of the most volatile regions of Afghanistan until 2009. Ever present in the minds of staffers in Harper’s Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) were the seemingly never-ending political and electoral considerations of Canadian soldiers at war. Still, Harper managed to minimize his political liability by garnering the support of the federal Liberals, thus preventing the contentious war from having any significant electoral consequences. The Conservative government’s second extension to 2011 was also relatively easy, though Ottawa had to readjust its communication strategy. Again, with the help of a divided Liberal caucus, the Conservatives managed to implement their preferred policy choice while limiting their electoral vulnerability.

Stephen Harper’s War in Afghanistan  155

The third and final extension to 2014 of Canada’s forces in Afghanistan, in a non-combat capacity, was comparatively much more arduous. Support for a continued combat role eroded even among core Conservative voters. Clearly, the CAF’s ability to sustain a combat role beyond 2011 was uncertain. And, most importantly, Prime Minister Harper’s own preference for a sustained combat engagement waned noticeably. The reluctance with which he reversed his decision to end Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan attests to a re-evaluation of the costs and merits of his initial beliefs regarding the war. Harper felt he had succeeded in buttressing Canada’s military prestige and grew frustrated about Europe’s unwillingness to take on a greater share of NATO’s military burden. But the support by the Liberals and Canada’s allies for a noncombat role led Harper to opt for a small-scale training role for Canada’s military until the end of NATO’s mission in 2014. Finally, the Harper government sought to buttress Canada’s reputation as a faithful and dependable ally of the United States by maintaining its sizable commitment in Kandahar. This was consistent with the government’s foreign policy beliefs, which emphasized the need to redress Canada’s international standing by defending moral values and national security interests with hard power. But the Harper government’s enthusiasm quickly faded. The prime minister grew increasingly disillusioned with the benefits of the war and faced increasing electoral costs for maintaining Canada’s dangerous combat effort.93 Under his government, then, Canada would continue to take part in highprofile expeditionary military operations, such as those in Libya and against the Islamic State, but it shied away from military commitments that could involve casualties at the level experienced in Kandahar.94 Harper understood vividly that those types of missions were, over time, vote losers and election killers. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Laura B. Pelletier with this chapter and thank Philippe Lagassé for his helpful comments on earlier drafts. NOTES 1 Michael Valpy, “This is Stephen Harper’s War,” Globe and Mail, 18 August 2007, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/this-is-stephen-harpers-war /article20400623/. 2 Stephen Harper, “Address by the Prime Minister to the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan,” Office of the Prime Minister, Ottawa, 13 March 2006, https://www .canada.ca/en/news/archive/2006/03/address-prime-minister-canadian-armed -forces-afghanistan.html.

156  Justin Massie 3 Justin Massie, “Why Democratic Allies Defect Prematurely: Canadian and Dutch Unilateral Pullouts from the War in Afghanistan,” Democracy and Security 12, no. 2 (2016): 85–113. 4 It is important to note that more than 40,000 Canadian soldiers served as part of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. Over time, 158 members of the Canadian Forces, four aid workers, one diplomat (one journalist), and one government contractor died there. Additionally, some 2,000 Canadians were wounded in the Afghan theatre. See Barbara Martin, a former Canadian diplomat, in a letter to the editor, “Decoding NATO,” Globe and Mail, 14 July 2018, O10. The total financial cost of the Afghan war is invariably a moving target. But as a March 2014 Globe and Mail editorial explains: “The war cost Ottawa at least $18 billion – and much more if the cost of caring for veterans and their families is included.” Editorial, “What Canada Did – and Did Not – Achieve in Afghanistan,” Globe and Mail, 14 March 2014, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials /now-that-our-war-in-afghanistan-is-over/article17501889/. 5 See, among others, Marie-Eve Desrosiers and Philippe Lagassé, “Military Frames and Canada’s Conservative Government: From Extending to Transforming Perceptions of Canadian Identity,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 54, no. 3 (2016): 288–311. 6 Alexander Moens, “Afghanistan and the Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 63, no. 3 (2008): 569–86. 7 This argument is made by Duane Bratt, “Mr. Harper Goes to War: Canada, Afghanistan, and the Return of ‘High Politics’ in Canadian Foreign Policy” (paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association 79th Annual Conference, Saskatoon, SK, 31 May 2007). 8 Murray Brewster, “The Strange Voyage: Stephen Harper on Defence,” in Jennifer Ditchburn and Graham Fox, eds., The Harper Factor: Assessing a Prime Minister’s Policy Legacy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 117; Eugene Lang, “All War, No Diplomacy,” Toronto Star, 25 February 2015, A21, and Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (Toronto: Viking, 2007). 9 Duane Bratt, “Afghanistan: Why Did We Go? Why Did We Stay? Will We Leave?” in Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, eds., Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas, 2nd ed. (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2007), 322. 10 For a differing point of view, see Duane Bratt, “Implementing the Reform Party Agenda: The Roots of Stephen Harper’s Foreign Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 24, no. 1 (2018): 1–17. 11 John Ibbitson, “The Big Break: The Conservative Transformation of Canada’s Foreign Policy,” CIGI Papers 29 (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, April 2014), 9. 12 Ken Boessenkool and Sean Speer, “Ordered Liberty: How Harper’s Philosophy Transformed Canada for the Better,” Policy Options, 1 December 2015, https:// policyoptions.irpp.org/2015/12/01/harper/.

Stephen Harper’s War in Afghanistan  157 13 Canada, Parliament House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 37th Parliament, 1st Session, Number 094, 15 October 2001, 6114. 14 In November 2002, when a Senate committee recommended the withdrawal of all Canadian troops from overseas deployment with the wish to pull the structure of the Canadian Forces back into shape, Harper replied that the recommendation was “just unacceptable.” He went on to add: “I think it would drastically hurt our credibility in the world to pull out of everything.” Sheldon Alberts, “Pull Troops Back from Abroad, Say Senators: Report Urges Retreat until Military Rebuilt,” National Post, 13 November 2002, A1. 15 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 37th Parliament, 1st Session, Number 193, 28 May 2002, 11826. 16 The 25 April 2003 speech was later printed in Stephen Harper, “Rediscovering the Right Agenda,” Citizens Centre Report Magazine 10, no. 3 (June 2003): 72–7. All subsequent quotes in this paragraph are drawn from these same pages. 17 Stephen Harper, “Our Great Country Has Voted for Change,” National Post, 25 January 2006, A17. 18 Andrew Coyne, “Harper’s Mission Statement,” National Post, 15 March 2006, A18. 19 Jean-Christophe Boucher and Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of War: Canada’s Afghanistan Mission, 2001–2014 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 18, 23. 20 Claire Turenne Sjolander, “A Funny Thing Happened on the Road to Kandahar: The Competing Faces of Canadian Internationalism?” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 15, no. 2 (2009): 88. 21 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Number 006, 10 April 2006, 276. 22 Ibid., 281. 23 Ibid. 24 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Number 156, 17 May 2006, 1487. 25 Justin Massie, “Canada’s War for Prestige in Afghanistan: A Realist Paradox?” International Journal 68, no. 2 (July 2013): 28. 26 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Number 156, 17 May 2006, 1504. 27 Ibid., 1505. 28 Ibid., 1508. 29 Ibid., 1509. Shortly after, Duceppe unambiguously expressed his support for the war, claiming that “a sovereign Quebec would have participated in the international intervention in Afghanistan” (my translation). Gilles Duceppe, “Notes pour une allocution du Chef du Bloc Québécois,” Vidéothèque (Montreal: Centre d’études et de recherches internationales de l’Université de Montréal, 25 January 2007), 1–15. 30 See John Kirton and Jenilee Guebert, “Two Solitudes, One War: Public Opinion, National Unity and Canada’s War in Afghanistan” (paper prepared for a conference

158  Justin Massie

31 32

33

34

35

36 37

38

39 40 41

42

43 44

on “Quebec and War” at the Université de Québec à Montréal, Montreal, 5–6 October 2007), 16–17. Philippe Lagassé, “Accountability for National Defence: Ministerial Responsibility, Military Command and Parliamentary Oversight,” IRPP Studies 4 (March 2010): 16. Jean-Christophe Boucher, “Evaluating the ‘Trenton Effect’: Canadian Public Opinion and Military Casualties in Afghanistan (2006–2010),” American Review of Canadian Studies 40, no. 2 (2010): 237–58; Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, “Implications of the Sunk Cost Effect and Regional Proximity for Public Support for Canada’s Mission in Kandahar,” International Journal 68, no. 2 (June 2013): 346–58. Joseph F. Fletcher, Heather Bastedo, and Jennifer Hove, “Losing Heart: Declining Support and the Political Marketing of the Afghanistan Mission,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (December 2009): 911–37. See also Stuart Soroka et al., “The Impact of News Photos on Support for Military Action,” Political Communication 33, no. 4 (2016): 563–82. David Wilkins, “Canada Seeks Afghanistan Success at Riga, GOC with US on NATO Enlargement,” Ottawa, US Embassy in Canada, 30 October 2006, https:// www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06OTTAWA3264_a.html. The Strategic Counsel, “Public Perceptions of Canada’s Role in Afghanistan,” prepared for Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, POR#243–06 (Ottawa, 1 November 2006), 3. Ibid., 16. The Strategic Counsel, “A Report to the Globe and Mail and CTV: Economy, Leader Positives/Negatives, Afghanistan, Carbon Tax” (Ottawa, 14 January 2008), 22–3; and Brian Laghi, “Anxiety Grows about Economy, Jobs, Poll Finds,” Globe and Mail, 15 January 2008, A4. Fletcher, Bastedo, and Hove, “Losing Heart,” 915. See also Kim Richard Nossal, “No Exit: Canada and the ‘War without End’ in Afghanistan,” in H.G. Ehrhart and Charles C. Pentland, eds., The Afghanistan Challenge: Hard Realities and Strategic Choices (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 157–73. Chantal Hébert, French Kiss: Stephen Harper’s Blind Date with Quebec (Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2007). Mike Blanchfield, “Bloc Plays Politics with Soldiers, Harper Charges,” Ottawa Citizen, 13 December 2006, A6. David Wilkins, “Canada’s New Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Bernier,” Ottawa, US Embassy in Canada, 17 August 2007, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd /cables/07OTTAWA1587_a.html. Ann Carroll, “Dion Now Supports Afghan Mission until 2009,” National Post, 23 February 2007, A4; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Number 136, 19 April 2007, 8412. Tim Naumetz, “Tories Won’t Risk Power on Motion to Exit Afghanistan,” Ottawa Citizen, 19 April 2007, A4. Bruce Campion-Smith, “Tories Reject Calls to Set Withdrawal Deadline,” Toronto Star, 20 April 2007, A2.

Stephen Harper’s War in Afghanistan  159 45 Jason Fekete, “Tories Soften Stance on Prolonging Afghan Mission,” The Gazette, 8 July 2007, A6. 46 Mike Blanchfield and Don Martin, “Consensus Needed for Afghan Extension,” Calgary Herald, 23 June 2007, A8. 47 Norma Greenaway, “PM Must Clarify Canada’s New Role in Afghanistan: Dion,” Star-Phoenix, 18 August 2007, B8. 48 Gloria Galloway, “Harper to Delay Troop Vote until Assured of Result,” Globe and Mail, 10 September 2007, A6. 49 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session, Number 001, 16 October 2007, 5. 50 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session, Number 002, 17 October 2007, 33. 51 John Manley et al., Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, January 2008), https:// publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf. 52 Sjolander, “A Funny Thing Happened,” 92. 53 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session, Number 053, 25 February 2008, 3192. 54 The Liberals had opposed a post-2009 combat role in Afghanistan, whereas the Conservatives were open to increasing the development assistance aspects of the mission, but not to end Canada’s combat presence in 2009. See David Wilkins, “Canada: Making the Case for the Afghan Mission,” Ottawa, US Embassy in Canada, 17 October 2007, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07OTTAWA 1922_a.html. 55 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session, Number 053, 25 February 2008, 3201. 56 Fletcher, Bastedo, and Hove, “Losing Heart,” 930. 57 Brewster, “The Strange Voyage,” 306. 58 Lagassé, “Accountability for National Defence,” 14–17. 59 Elisabeth Gidengil, Neil Nevitte, André Blais, Joanna Everitt, and Patrick Fournier, Dominance and Decline: Making Sense of Recent Canadian Elections (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 22, 29. 60 See Boucher, “Evaluating the ‘Trenton Effect’,” 244–5. 61 Ibid. 62 Ipsos-Reid, “Despite New End Date to Afghan War, Most (77%) Canadians Say Canada Should Still End Its Combat Mission in 2011,” 5 August 2010, https:// www.ipsos.com/en-ca/despite-new-end-date-afghan-war-most-77-canadians -say-canada-should-still-end-its-combat-mission; Ipsos-Reid, “Canadians Receive Manley Plan Cautiously,” 26 January 2008, https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default /files/publication/2008-01/mr080125-4.pdf. 63 See Kirton and Guebert, “Two Solitudes, One War”; Boucher, “Evaluating the ‘Trenton Effect’,” 244–5; Murray Brewster, “One in Two Canadians OK with Civilian Afghan Mission Post-2011: Poll,” CP24, 23 October 2009, https://cp24 .com/one-in-two-canadians-ok-with-civilian-afghan-mission-post-poll-1.446475;

160  Justin Massie

64

65 66

67 68 69 70 71 72

73 74 75

76 77 78

EKOS Politics, “Political Landscape Frozen: Canadians Continue to Oppose Both the Afghanistan Mission and an Extension,” 8 April 2010, https://www.ekospolitics .com/wp-content/uploads/full_report_april_8.pdf. Boucher, “Evaluating the ‘Trenton Effect’,” 243–6; Mike Blanchfield, “Canada to Keep Up to 950 Troops and Support Staff in Afghanistan until 2014,” CP24, 16 November 2010, https://www.cp24.com/canada-to-keep-up-to-950-troops-and -support-staff-in-afghanistan-until-2014-1.575124. Steve Saideman, Adapting in the Dust: Lessons Learned from Canada’s War in Afghanistan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 50. Justin Massie, “Elite Consensus and Ineffective Strategic Narratives: The Domestic Politics behind Canada’s Commitment to Afghanistan,” in Beatrice De Graaf, George Dimitriu, and Jens Ringsmose, eds., Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion, and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War (London: Routledge, 2015), 107. Brewster, “The Strange Voyage,” 309–10. Robert Sibley, “Afghan Mission Enters Election Fray,” Ottawa Citizen, 11 September 2008, A1. Terry Breese, “Canadians against Future Afghan Role,” Ottawa, US Embassy in Canada, 16 July 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09OTTAWA544_a.html. David Pugliese, “Army ‘Stretched Almost to Breaking Point,’” Ottawa Citizen, 19 April 2008, A1. Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, Proceedings, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, No. 2 (9 March 2009), 10. Terry Breese, “Canada: Re-considering All Options for Its Future Military Role in Kandahar?” Ottawa, US Embassy in Canada, 17 March 2009, https://wikileaks .org/plusd/cables/09OTTAWA218_a.html. Steve Rennie, “Opposition Accuses Harper of Afghanistan About-face,” New Brunswick Telegraph-Journal, 3 March 2009, A7. Brewster, “The Strange Voyage,” 307–10. John Dickson, “Afghanistan: A/S Boucher’s December 14–15 Visit to Canada,” Ottawa, US Embassy in Canada, 8 December 2006, https://wikileaks.org/plusd /cables/06OTTAWA3564_a.html; David Wilkins, “Canada to Press Europeans on Afghanistan at NATO Foreign Ministerial,” Ottawa, US Embassy in Canada, 24 January 2007, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07OTTAWA130_a.html; David Wilkins, “Canada, US to Carry Same Message to NATO Informal Defense Ministerial in Seville,” Ottawa, US Embassy in Canada, 7 February 2007, https:// wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07OTTAWA234_a.html. Tonda MacCharles, “Harper Dodges Question on Afghan Extension,” Toronto Star, 20 December 2008, A28. David Jacobson, “Canada: Top Five Policy Priorities in 2010,” Ottawa, 4 January 2010, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10OTTAWA1.html. Nossal, “No Exit,” 162.

Stephen Harper’s War in Afghanistan  161 79 Paul Wells, The Longer I’m Prime Minister: Stephen Harper and Canada, 2006 – (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2014), 276–7. 80 Robert Sibley, “Afghan Mission Enters Election Fray,” Ottawa Citizen, 11 September 2008, A1. 81 Quoted in Mike Blanchfield, “Forces Will `Go Where Needed,’” National Post, 24 November 2008, A4. 82 David Akin, “Troops Will Be Home by the End of 2011,” Vancouver Sun, 7 January 2010, B1. 83 Mike Blanchfield, Sheldon Alberts, and Peter O’Neil, “Envoy to Afghanistan Back in Play,” Ottawa Citizen, 6 March 2009, A4. 84 Breese, “Canada: Re-considering.” 85 Terry Breese, “Canada’s Initial Reaction to Specific Requests to Afghanistan,” Ottawa, US Embassy in Canada, 3 April 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables /09OTTAWA266_a.html. 86 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, Number 125, 7 December 2009, 7682. 87 David Jacobson, “Canada’s Plans in Afghanistan Post-2011,” Ottawa, US Embassy in Canada, 18 February 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10OTTAWA67 _a.html. 88 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, Number 090, 5 October 2009, 5574. 89 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Where We Go from Here: Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, June 2010), 21. 90 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 40th Parliament, 3rd Session, Number 097, 16 November 2010, 6012. 91 Angus Reid Strategies, “Majority of Canadians Still Oppose Military Mission in Afghanistan,” 10 August 2010, https://angusreid.org/majority-of-canadians-still -oppose-military-mission-in-afghanistan/print. 92 Patrick Fournier et al., “Riding the Orange Wave: Leadership, Values, Issues, and the 2011 Canadian Election,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (December 2013): 863–97. 93 According to a story published in the Globe and Mail in late 2017, more than 70 Canadian soldiers who served in Afghanistan have taken their own lives since 2014. As the article makes clear, many Canadian soldiers “had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other mental-health issues related to their military work, along with personal problems such as relationship breakdowns and financial stress.” Renato D’Aliesio, “Veterans Face Much Higher Suicide Rates than Civilians,” Globe and Mail, 8 December 2017, A1. 94 As the Taliban tightened their often violent grip on Afghanistan in late 2021, and after the deployment of Special Forces to evacuate Canadian diplomats in Kabul, local Afghan embassy staff and “fixers,” and former military interpreters, some former Canadian soldiers lamented the rapid collapse of the war-torn country. In

162  Justin Massie the words of one former soldier, who completed two tours in Afghanistan, “I’m sick to my stomach watching this. It was a nightmare over there. To look back now and to feel like it was all for nothing, it just makes my stomach turn.” Quoted in Greg Mercer and Eric Andrew-Gee, “Canadian Military Veterans Ask, Was It Worth It?” Globe and Mail, 14 August 2021, A15; Patrick White, “Canadian Veterans Concerned for Afghan Allies,” Globe and Mail, 18 August 2021, A8.

8 Stephen Harper and the Politics of Canada-US Relations duane bratt

Before Stephen Harper became Prime Minister of Canada in early 2006, he was not known for his thoughts about Canadian foreign policy. In fact, he appeared to have given little thought to Canada’s overall place in the world.1 Instead, his focus was mostly on domestic issues. As one of the founders of the Reform Party in the late 1980s, Harper shared the party’s interest in constitutional, fiscal, and law and order matters, although he distanced himself from their direct democracy and social conservatism aspects. Even his successful election campaign of 2005–6 was focused on five domestic priorities: government accountability, cutting the GST, imposing mandatory minimum sentencing for gun-related crime, creating a child care tax credit, and reducing health care wait times. Foreign policy, like in most Canadian elections, was nowhere to be found. However, there was one aspect of Canadian foreign policy that was consistent in Harper’s public life before becoming prime minister. In short, he wanted robust relations with the United States. The main thesis of this chapter  is that Harper wanted close relations with the United States – but what he really meant was with the ideologically conservative parts of the US government. When confronted with a liberal Democratic president in Barack Obama, he had trouble achieving his policy goals. However, even when he faced off with the conservative Republican President George W. Bush, Harper was constrained by Canadian public opinion. One sees an unusual pattern of strong support for the United States before and after becoming prime minister, but not always during his tenure. In other words, despite being in office for a decade, Harper was unable to closely align Canada with the United States as occurred during other periods over the last 150 years. Ideology and events, one could argue, conspired to frustrate Harper’s vision of closer bilateral relations. This chapter  has four parts in chronological order. The first part explains Harper’s thinking on Canada-US relations prior to becoming prime minister (roughly the late 1980s to 2005). The second section examines Canada’s

166  Duane Bratt

relations with the US during the time of US President George W. Bush (2006–8). Part three analyses Canada’s relations with the US during the years of US President Barack Obama (2009–15). And the fourth component describes Harper’s few public statements regarding the policies of US President Donald Trump (2015–20). This is followed by a short summary of my major findings and observations. Origins of Harper’s Thinking about Canada-US Relations Stephen Harper’s political origins were initially with the Reform Party and then the Canadian Alliance. His first time on the public stage was when he gave a stirring speech at the founding convention of the Reform Party in 1987. Following this, he ran for the House of Commons in the 1988 federal election, served as a young director of policy within the Reform Party, and finally sat as an influential MP from 1993–7. Harper had a temporary retirement from partisan politics when he left Parliament in 1997 to lead the National Citizens Coalition, but returned to become the leader of the Canadian Alliance in 2002. Most importantly, he was instrumental in the merger of the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada to form the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) in 2003. In his first federal election as party leader in 2004, he helped hold the Paul Martin-led Liberals to a minority government. And then, in the campaign of 2005–6, Harper led the CPC to victory by forming a minority government. Therefore, the period of 1987–2005, and the role of the Reform Party/Canadian Alliance, is critical to understanding the roots of Harper’s foreign policy thinking in general and Canadian-American relations in particular. When the Reform Party was founded as a breakaway party from the Progressive Conservatives, it was focused largely on domestic matters, not foreign policy. As a populist party, it wanted more direct democracy (parliamentary free votes, referendums, citizen initiatives, recall of MPs, etc.). As a westernbased party, it wanted to see changes to the Senate upper house to make it elected, equal, and effective (or a Triple-E Senate). Constitutionally, the Reform Party was firmly opposed to granting special status for the province of Quebec, which had been a central piece of the Brian Mulroney government’s efforts at constitutional change through the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. Fiscally, Reform Party members wanted to eliminate the government’s fiscal deficit and start paying down the national debt. They also wanted to reduce the size and scope of government, largely through cuts to social welfare programs and cultural support policies by ending official bilingualism and multiculturalism. The Reform Party also pledged to cut taxes and campaigned against the goods and services sales tax (GST) that was introduced by Mulroney in 1991. As a social conservative party, the Reform Party wanted to end affirmative

Stephen Harper and the Politics of Canada-US Relations  167

action programs, protect the nuclear family, prevent same-sex marriage, and have MPs vote their conscience on what they viewed as moral issues such as abortion. The Reform Party also pledged to be tough on crime through assisting victims of crime, establishing mandatory minimum sentencing requirements, toughening parole eligibility, reducing the age of young offenders to between ten and fifteen, protecting the rights of law-abiding firearms users, and holding a referendum on capital punishment. Stephen Harper, for his part, personally shared this sharp focus on domestic policy-making and political strategizing. The party platforms of the Reform Party, the Canadian Alliance, and the merged Conservative Party, were noticeably weak on foreign policy, though.2 Nevertheless, upon its formation in 1987, the Reform Party was clear on two key foreign policy principles or aims: namely, better relations with the United States and a stronger Canadian military. These two themes cropped up over and over again in the party’s attacks on the federal Liberals. An example of the intertwining of these two key issues can be seen in a major speech delivered by Harper soon after he became leader of the Canadian Alliance in 2002: “For nine years the government has systematically neglected the Canadian forces and undermined our ability to contribute to peace enforcement and even peacekeeping operations, including recently our premature withdrawal from Afghanistan. Most recently we have been inclined to offer knee-jerk resistance to the United States on national missile defence despite the fact that Canada is confronted by the same threats from rogue nations equipped with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction as is the United States.”3 Additionally, Stephen Harper had been very critical of the domestic policies of the Mulroney government (e.g.,  Meech Lake Accord, Charlottetown Accord, deficit/debt growth), but he praised Mulroney’s overall foreign policy. In particular, his ability to manage and strengthen Canada-US relations was singled out for praise. Mulroney’s role in achieving the Canada-US free trade agreement was an obvious reference point, but Harper also wanted to show that Mulroney (and implicitly, Harper too) could stand up to the Americans, if need be. Therefore, Harper would frequently invoke Mulroney’s leadership (later acknowledged by Nelson Mandela) in the global fight against apartheid South Africa. Harper would make it clear that Mulroney was capable of “disagreeing with the United States without being disagreeable, without in any way jeopardizing our bilateral relationship.”4 This was in direct contrast to some insulting statements by some members of the Liberal government towards the Bush administration during the debate over participation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. What Harper was saying was that a Conservative government would follow the practice of the Mulroney government in its handling of Canada-US relations. Mulroney, according to Harper, “understood a fundamental truth. He understood that mature and intelligent Canadian leaders must share the

168  Duane Bratt

following perspective: the United States is our closest neighbour, our best ally, our biggest customer, and our most consistent friend.”5 Harper’s foreign policy ideas started to crystallize further during the debate about Canadian participation in the Iraq War. Many of his comments on Iraq would foreshadow his eventual actions in both Afghanistan and Libya. Harper devoted his maiden House of Commons speech as leader of the Canadian Alliance in October 2002 to discussing the build-up to war in Iraq: “The time has come for Canada to pledge support to the developing coalition of nations, including Britain, Australia, and the United States, determined to send a clear signal to Saddam Hussein that failure to comply with an unconditional program of inspection, as spelled out in either new or existing UN resolutions, would justify action to ensure the safety of millions of people in the region from Iraq’s suspected weapons of mass destruction.”6 Harper then went on to add that if the Liberal government did not support military action against Iraq, it would be undermining “Canada’s reputation with its allies and [doing] nothing to uphold the credibility of the United Nations by not joining in sending a clear message to Hussein that failure to comply will bring consequences.”7 A few months later, when war was looking more and more imminent, Harper reminded the House of Commons of Canada’s previous participation in wars and criticized the Liberals for making decisions on war and peace via public opinion polls and focus groups. In contrast, a Harper government would “take our position the way real leaders and great nations make decisions at such moments in history.”8 Finally, in a speech on 25 April 2003, one month after the start of the US-led war against Iraq, Harper stated the following: The emerging debates on foreign affairs should be fought on moral grounds. Current challenges in dealing with terrorism and its sponsors, as well as the emerging debate on the goals of the United States as the sole superpower, will be well served by conservative insights on preserving historic values and moral insights on right and wrong … Conservatives must take the moral stand, with our allies, in favour of the fundamental values of society, including democracy, free enterprise, and individual freedom. This moral stand should not just give us the right to stand with our allies, but the duty to do so and the responsibility to put “hard power” behind our international commitments.9

When Harper became prime minister in February 2006, it was expected that he would work closely with the United States – especially given the rough patches during the Chrétien and Martin years. He intrinsically understood how important the US was to Canada in terms of economic and investment matters, continental security, international peace and stability, and even Canada’s place in the world. This would especially be the case since the US was currently led by

Stephen Harper and the Politics of Canada-US Relations  169

a conservative Republican in George W. Bush. But an examination of the three years that the two men overlapped in power actually shows that Harper faced internal constraints that militated against cultivating close cooperation with the US government. Harper and Bush 43 Despite personally supporting George W. Bush’s war in Iraq, the overall “war on terror,” and wanting good relations with the Bush administration, Harper knew that he was constrained domestically.10 The Iraq War was hugely unpopular among Canadians and so was President Bush himself. Ian Brodie, Harper’s first chief of staff, has written that “[o]ur internal polls showed we ran a political risk if we were seen as too close to President Bush.”11 This had an obvious effect on many cross-border initiatives. Space limitations prevent a full examination of all of the developments in Canadian-American relations in the three years that Harper and Bush overlapped. Instead, this analysis will focus on the most important military (Afghanistan), trade (softwood lumber), and border (Beyond the Border initiative) issues. Stephen Harper inherited the war in Afghanistan when he became prime minister in February 2006. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien had initially deployed troops to Afghanistan in fall 2001 in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States. Successive governments then took further actions that brought Canada deeper into the conflict. In particular, the Paul Martin government decided to send the Canadian Forces (CF) to form a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Deployed, as they were, to one of the most dangerous regions in the country, the CF were also given significantly enhanced combat responsibilities to help root out the remaining Taliban/al-Qaeda elements. But Prime Minister Harper decided, in the midst of heavy fighting in Kandahar, to both extend and expand Canada’s mission in war-torn Afghanistan (as the Massie chapter in this volume explains in detail). On 17 May 2006, Harper pushed a motion through the House of Commons to extend Canada’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was due to expire in February 2007, until 2009. A second resolution, in March 2008, would extend the mission until 2011. In both cases, he was risking his minority government with a confidence vote in Parliament. In response to the sustained fighting, the Harper government also increased Canada’s military commitment to Afghanistan in September 2006 by (1) increasing the size and strength of the CF to 2,500; (2) adding an additional infantry company (250 soldiers); (3) deploying a Leopard tank squadron; (4)  adding a counter-mortar capability; and (5) including military engineers (and an armoured engineering vehicle) to enhance the PRT’s capability to manage quick impact reconstruction and development projects.12 So while Harper

170  Duane Bratt

did inherit the Afghanistan mission, as Boucher and Nossal have written, “it was an inheritance that the Conservatives eagerly embraced.”13 The Afghanistan mission would become Canada’s longest war, starting in September 2001 and lasting until its military withdrawal in March 2014. Why was this remote country with which Canada had few ties the location for this lengthy military, diplomatic, and foreign aid engagement? There were a number of reasons why Canada went, and stayed, in Afghanistan including a desire to pursue the war on terror, a desire to help build a stable and peaceful Afghanistan, and a desire to support international organizations such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But the main reason why Canada, under three different prime ministers, went and stayed in Afghanistan, spending billions of dollars and losing over 150 soldiers’ lives, was a desire to support our American allies in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attack that destroyed the World Trade Center and killed over 3,000 Americans. Gordon O’Connor, defence minister in the Harper government (2006–8), acknowledged that Canada was in Afghanistan because of “retribution” for the 9/11 attacks.14 For the Harper government, which regretted not participating in the Iraq War or ballistic missile defence, it was an opportunity to support the Americans in a significant military operation. In the case of trade, softwood lumber has been the most contentious and ongoing dispute between Canada and the US going back well into the nineteenth century. It is also a very important economic sector in Canada – p ­ articularly in British Columbia and Quebec. Over 200,000 Canadians work in forestry and the industry contributes over $20 billion to Canada’s gross domestic product. The United States is, moreover, Canada’s largest export market for lumber, with almost 70 per cent market share. At the core of the dispute is the fact that there are different stumpage fees (i.e., the cost of harvesting the lumber) depending on whether the logging occurs on private property (owned by the United States) or public land (owned by Canada). The Americans, and especially their lumber firms, claim that Canada unfairly subsidizes its forestry sector through low stumpage fees on crown land. In more recent years, there have been four major disputes between Canada and the US over softwood lumber: Lumber I (1982), Lumber II (1986–8), Lumber III (1991–6), and Lumber IV (2002–6). Each of these disputes included provinces (especially British Columbia), industry groups, unions, the United States International Trade Commission, the World Trade Organization dispute settlement mechanisms, and North American Free Trade Agreement panels. Canada often won at these international trade tribunals, but the constant legal harassments by the US lumber coalition and its powerful allies in Washington cost substantial time and money for Canadian lumber firms, the provinces, and Ottawa. David Emerson, the Conservative international trade minister who negotiated the 2006 lumber deal, and was formerly a senior forestry executive,

Stephen Harper and the Politics of Canada-US Relations  171

compared the softwood lumber dispute to “a mutating form of bacteria that has become all but antibiotic resistant.”15 Still, the Harper government took power in the midst of Lumber IV and successfully negotiated a settlement with the Bush administration. In April 2006, the Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) was signed and it came into effect in October 2006. (It effectively expired in October 2015.) The SLA saw the US lifting countervailing and anti-dumping duties as long as Canadian lumber prices stayed above a certain range. Below that range, a complex mix of export taxes and quotas was implemented on exports of Canadian lumber. In exchange, 80  per cent of the $5  billion in duties collected by the US were returned to Canadian companies. The US was also prohibited from launching new trade actions over the course of the agreement. In addition, the SLA created a joint dispute settlement mechanism solely for lumber.16 While some claimed that Canada gave too many concessions to the US, the SLA did temporarily keep the peace in what had been an intractable trade dispute for decades. Harper succeeded in making a major economic agreement (the SLA) with the Bush administration, but he was thwarted in other areas. In particular, Harper was unable to increase economic interaction with the Americans or remove many of the border restrictions that had built up in the US post-9/11 period. A  good illustration of this was the trilateral Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) and the Beyond the Border initiatives. Following the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, there were regular summits between the US president, the Canadian prime minister, and the Mexican president (nicknamed the “Three Amigos” summits). The purpose of these summits was to build upon NAFTA and further increase trade and investment, harmonize regulations, and reduce border irritants. They were also a way of balancing security and economic considerations. This was particularly relevant because the US had temporarily shut down its borders following the 9/11 attacks, causing economic hardship for all three countries. Even when the borders were eventually reopened, there was still more security then had occurred previously. For the Americans, the border was about homeland security; for the Canadians and Mexicans, the border was about economics and open trade flows. At the founding 2005 summit in Waco, Texas, George W. Bush, Paul Martin, and Vicente Fox negotiated the Security and Prosperity Partnership. The SPP established a framework for trilateral cooperation between the US, Canada, and Mexico in security, transportation, environment, and public health. Efforts to expand and deepen the SPP would continue at subsequent summits that were attended by Harper. Despite the high goals of the SPP, the partnership was ultimately disappointing. As Greg Anderson has noted, “[t]he partnership looked ambitious, but it generated no new institutional mechanisms, involved no legislative oversight, placed responsibility for most of its work in the bureaucracies,

172  Duane Bratt

and did not formally incorporate private sector or civil society input.”17 But in the ashes of the SPP emerged the Beyond the Border initiative in 2011 under Harper’s watch.18 Unlike the trilateral SPP, the Beyond the Border initiative was strictly bilateral between Canada and the United States. While there were some improvements in the ease with which people and goods could move between Canada and the United States, it did not fundamentally address American security anxieties or even Canadian economic and commercial concerns about a “thickening” border.19 Harper and Obama Despite the issues between Harper and Bush, typically Canadian prime ministers and US presidents get along better when they share the same partisanship and ideology. For example, Reagan and Mulroney (Republican and Progressive Conservative) or Clinton and Chrétien (Democrat and Liberal), versus Nixon and Trudeau (Republican and Liberal) or Bush and Chrétien (Republican and Liberal). So it was reasonable to think that there could be challenges with Canadian-American relations after the election of Barack Obama in 2008. Unfortunately, a couple of early missteps by the Harper government during the 2008 US presidential election compounded this ideological challenge. First, it was clear that Ottawa was preparing for a future President Hillary Clinton in 2007–8; they underestimated Barack Obama.20 Secondly, the issue of “NAFTA-gate” complicated matters further. During the US Democratic primary in winterspring 2008, candidates Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton were discussing the negative economic impact of NAFTA while campaigning in Ohio. Ottawa was clearly concerned about whether this meant trouble for the future of NAFTA. Both campaign teams confidentially assured Michael Wilson, Canada’s ambassador to the United States, that it was just talk and that NAFTA was not in jeopardy. This reassurance was also provided to Ian Brodie, Harper’s chief of staff, while he was in Washington. When Brodie returned to Ottawa, however, he inadvertently mentioned it to a Canadian journalist. The result was an embarrassing scandal in both Canada and the United States.21 Nevertheless, Canadian-American relations were mostly solid in the initial period after Obama’s election. Harper worked closely with Obama to try and mitigate the damage caused by the global financial crisis which had broken out in the fall of 2008. This included the joint multi-billion dollar bailout of the highly integrated automotive sector. And on a more positive note, Obama even came to Ottawa in February 2009 in his first official visit to a foreign country. Moreover, Canadian-American military cooperation in Afghanistan continued and it would be expanded to include Libya and Iraq (and even Syria). These initial positive moves, however, would soon be overshadowed by clashing views on a host of issues including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks,

Stephen Harper and the Politics of Canada-US Relations  173

Israel, Iran, Ukraine, and climate change. Harper pushed hard for Canada’s inclusion in the twelve-country TPP trade discussions in late 2011, but there was some initial reluctance on the part of the Obama administration in 2012 to allow Canada to join the negotiating process. It seemed that Washington wanted some concessions from the Harper government before Canada could secure a seat at the table, such as a promise not to open any of the chapters where agreement among the other partners had already been reached. Secondly, Ottawa had to agree not to have “veto authority” over any chapter on which all the other countries had come to terms. It also signalled its flexibility on contentious issue areas like intellectual property rights, agricultural supply management, and drug pricing.22 There were differences as well between Ottawa and the Obama White House over Ukraine – particularly Washington’s serious concerns about the level of corruption in Kiev and the questionable human rights record of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (and thus its reluctance to arm further this same military institution). There was also some bilateral tension around the thorny issue of “Buy America” provisions and Canadian provincial access to large governmentfunded infrastructure projects in the United States, which eventually led to the signing of the 2010 US-Canada Agreement on Government Procurement. And at the 2011 G7 summit in France, Harper also annoyed the Obama administration by refusing to approve a US-sponsored resolution calling on Israel to implement UN resolutions on the occupied territories in the Middle East.23 Lastly, the cancellation of the North American Leaders’ Summit in Ottawa in February 2015 was a clear sign of how bad things had deteriorated between Obama and Harper. Much of this tension would come to a head over the Canada-US energyenvironment nexus and specifically the multi-billion dollar Keystone XL pipeline. The Keystone XL pipeline is a 1,900 km route that would transport 830,000 barrels of crude oil a day from the Alberta oil sands and the shale fields in North Dakota to US refineries along the Gulf Coast. Part of the pipeline, from Cushing, Oklahoma, to the Gulf of Mexico had already been built in 2013. TransCanada, based in Calgary, had proposed building this extension at an estimated cost of $5.3 billion. The company subsequently submitted its permit application to the US State Department in September 2008. The issue would be increasingly problematic throughout the joint tenure of Harper and Obama, leading to some tough language on the Canadian side. Advocates of the Keystone XL pipeline emphasized the economic benefits that would accrue to both Canada and the United States. In Canada, the project would create 3,500 jobs and generate an additional $617 billion in GDP.24 In the US, construction of the pipeline would directly create 9,000 American jobs and another 7,000 spin-off jobs. The operation of the pipeline would create an additional 1.8 million person-year jobs over a twenty-two-year period

174  Duane Bratt

and would add $172 billion to the US’s GDP by 2035.25 An additional benefit was that it would deliver new sources of heavy oil from the Canadian oil sands and the North Dakota Bakken fields to the refineries along the US Gulf Coast. Those refineries were operating well below capacity and needed new sources of crude oil. Obviously, the Canadian energy industry, the Alberta provincial government, and the federal government were all enthusiastic supporters of the Keystone XL pipeline. But there was also support for the pipeline inside the US. The energy sector was obviously in favour, but so were labour unions and elected members of the US Republican Party. Public opinion polling also showed strong support for the Keystone XL pipeline in the US. Princeton University did a survey in July 2013 and found that more than two-thirds of Americans wanted the project approved.26 Environmentalists were the strongest critics of the Keystone XL pipeline project. There were two primary environmental objections to the pipeline from a US standpoint. The first was pipeline safety and the fear of damaging oil spills. The second was the environmental destruction associated with further development of Canada’s oil sands. In particular, it was noted that the oil sands – in both the extraction and production phases – released high rates of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Environment Canada predicted that GHG emissions from the oil sands would have increased from 48 Mt in 2010 to 104 Mt in 2020.27 Environmentalists in both countries hoped that if they could reduce the transportation of oil sands products, such as by refusing to build the Keystone XL pipeline, it would simultaneously reduce the development of the oil sands. Canada had previously withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011, and even though Canada was not close to meeting its commitments under the protocol, the withdrawal was seen by environmentalists, many of them in the US, as the Harper government essentially endorsing the “dirty oil” from the oil sands. This was despite the fact that the Bush White House had never signed on to the Kyoto Protocol. Initially, the Harper government underestimated the extent of opposition to the Keystone XL pipeline in the United States. Jim Prentice, a senior cabinet minister from 2006–10, wrote, “[w]e viewed the requirements for a presidential permit as something of a formality since no U.S. president had ever rejected a continental interconnection.” 28 Moreover, “[i]t was also hard to imagine in the face of the effort Canada was then mounting alongside the United States in Afghanistan that the United States would not welcome Keystone XL’s additional 830,000 barrels per day, on top of the (then) 2.2 million barrels per day of Alberta crude already making its way into the American marketplace.”29 While visiting New York in September 2011, Harper claimed ill-advisedly that the decision to approve the Keystone XL pipeline was a complete “no brainer.” Harper explained: “It’s hard for me to imagine that the eventual decision would

Stephen Harper and the Politics of Canada-US Relations  175

be not to build that. The economic case is so overwhelming. The number of jobs that would be created on both sides of the border is simply enormous. The need for the energy in the United States is enormous.”30 When the Harper Conservatives started to realize that there was significant political opposition in the US to the Keystone XL pipeline, they responded by using more forceful rhetoric. In particular, the government adopted the “ethical oil” rhetoric that had been popularized by conservative provocateur Ezra Levant.31 The ethical oil thesis argues that the oil sands’ environmental degradation has been greatly exaggerated by environmentalists. During a March 2013 speech in Chicago, Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver pointed out that “total GHG emissions for oil sands production represent 0.1 per cent of global emissions,” which is “just one-fortieth of coal emissions in the United States.”32 Oliver also mentioned that “between 1990 and 2010, oil sands emissions per barrel have dropped by 26 per cent.”33 More importantly, if Americans do not want oil sands products, as the argument went, the alternative was to import oil from unstable and/or undemocratic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Sudan, Nigeria, or Russia. Not only are these countries substantially less environmentally responsible than Canada, but they also have questionable commitments to basic human rights. Levant’s polemic was designed to counteract anti-oil sands discourses,34 but it took on more significance when political leaders, such as Oliver and Environment Minister Peter Kent, started to use the same language to defend the Keystone XL pipeline. In a speech in Washington in April 2013, Oliver said that “the U.S. can choose Canada – a friend, neighbour and ally – as its source. Or it can choose to continue to import oil from less friendly, less stable countries with weaker – perhaps no – environmental standards.”35 Oliver was even more explicit when he stated: “Strengthening our bilateral energy collaboration would displace oil from Venezuela and the Middle East with a stable continental supply and thereby enhance the energy security of North America.”36 Stephen Harper went even further when, during an event in New York sponsored by the Canadian American Business Council, he warned that Canada would not “take no for an answer. We haven’t had that [from the U.S.], but if we were to get that, that won’t be final. This won’t be final until it’s approved and we will keep pushing forward.”37 The Harper government did try, belatedly, to address some of the environmental concerns that the Americans had about the Keystone XL pipeline in order to secure its approval. In September 2013, Harper promised, in a private letter to President Obama, to work with the US on reducing oil sands emissions in return for the approval.38 US President Barack Obama delayed making a decision in early 2012 because of the potential impact that a decision, whether to approve or deny, would have on the 2012 presidential election. Obama knew that he had a very tough political decision to make because his Democratic Party was deeply

176  Duane Bratt

divided on the Keystone XL pipeline with two of its base groups on opposite sides. US environmentalists opposed the pipeline, but labour unions supported it. Obama admitted, “the politics” of the Keystone XL pipeline “are tough.”39 Keystone XL had become not just another pipeline, but also the symbol of the fossil fuel industry and Obama’s commitment to fighting climate change. As a former TransCanada executive would later lament, “KXL’s rejection was unfair and disproportionate, a major blow to Canada’s economy – and worse because in itself its cancellation was a purely symbolic act, without real consequence for seriously dealing with the risk of climate change.”40 A month after Justin Trudeau defeated Harper in the 2015 federal election, Obama, on 6 November, formally announced that he would not approve the Keystone XL pipeline. Both he and Secretary of State John Kerry agreed that it was not in the US’s “national interest.” Both men acknowledged that Keystone XL would have a negligible impact on global GHG emissions, but its approval would have “undermine[d] our ability to continue to lead the world in combating climate change.”41 In particular, Obama did not want Keystone XL to jeopardize the international climate change negotiations to take place in Paris in December 2015. Clearly, Obama’s rejection of the Keystone XL pipeline was the low point in Canada-US relations while Stephen Harper was prime minister. It was due to an ideological clash, an initial failure to recognize that Keystone XL may be in jeopardy, and an inability to establish a better personal relationship between the two men. It highlighted the fact that despite Harper’s sincere desire to maintain positive relations with the United States, he was unprepared to deal with an administration made up of liberal Democrats. This is why the federal Liberals argued in the 2015 election campaign that Harper had damaged relations with the US. Emblematic of an increasingly frosty Canada-US relationship was a cooling of personal relations between Harper and Obama. Harper’s “no-brainer” comment (and not taking “no” for an answer) did not go down well within the Obama White House. One former aide commented that Obama himself had felt that the remark had crossed a line.42 Paul Koring, the Globe and Mail’s longtime Washington correspondent, said that the call-out list produced by the White House Press Office for Obama’s telephone calls to various world leaders rarely contained the name of Stephen Harper.43 On the Canadian side, it was common knowledge around Ottawa that US ambassador to Canada Bruce Heyman, Obama’s one-time campaign fundraiser from Chicago, was effectively persona non grata (and mostly because of the Keystone XL dispute). Members of Harper’s cabinet were told by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) not to have any dealings with Heyman or to involve themselves in any consultations or discussions on bilateral issues with him.44 With both sides barely talking to one another, it was unlikely that any ongoing bilateral disputes would see any major breakthroughs.

Stephen Harper and the Politics of Canada-US Relations  177

Unlike the relationship between Harper and Obama, Trudeau and Obama got along very well.45 Emblematic of this friendly relationship was Trudeau’s invitation to a state dinner in Washington in March 2016, an honour that Harper, despite serving as prime minister for almost a decade, never received. In the year that the Trudeau and Obama governments overlapped, they worked together on trade matters and the climate change file, especially the Paris Agreement in November 2015. According to Ben Rhodes, a senior foreign policy advisor to Obama, when Obama was leaving office, he asked Trudeau to be more vocal in promoting their shared progressive values.46 This reflected the traditional view that party ideology (Conservative and Republican, and Liberal and Democratic) is a good predicator for how well the Canadian prime minister and US president will get along on a personal level. Harper and Trump After Stephen Harper lost the October 2015 federal election, he gradually retired from public life. He resigned his position as Conservative leader and, within a few months, stepped down as an MP for Calgary. After his retirement, there were few public appearances and even fewer comments about current events.47 However, several of his public comments were about Canada-US relations. These included criticism of how the Trudeau government was pursuing NAFTA renegotiations, and support for several of US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy decisions (e.g., pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and moving the US embassy there). This indicated that Harper did not feel comfortable discussing (sensitive) domestic politics, but was not as constrained in speaking out on matters of foreign affairs.48 Additionally, without the constraints of political office, Harper was reverting back to what he had been prior to 2006; namely, a strong supporter of US policies. The first major foreign policy crisis that Justin Trudeau had to deal with was the election of Republican Donald J. Trump as US president. Trump’s unexpected victory resulted in massive volatility in the bilateral relationship between Canada and the US. Trump was not just a Republican; he was the most unique individual ever elected as US president. He was the first president with no government or military experience (which undoubtedly puts the devastating events of 6 January 2021 in some context). He also, at least initially, surrounded himself with advisors who similarly lacked political experience and knowledge of governing. Moreover, he campaigned on an explicitly “America First” agenda that disparaged Mexicans, Muslims, international organizations, free trade (especially NAFTA), climate change advocates, and many more. All of which directly challenged Canada’s policy positions – especially in the area of trade and commerce.

178  Duane Bratt

A centrepiece of the Trump 2016 presidential campaign was his opposition to free trade. Trump argued that he was in favour of free trade, but that it had to be fair or “reciprocal” to the United States. But Trump’s definition of “fair trade” was that the US needed to have a trade surplus with every country in the world. He argued that previous agreements had been poorly negotiated, reflecting his mercantilist view that trade only produced winners and losers as opposed to benefits to all sides. Particular attention was placed on the recently negotiated, but not ratified, TPP and, especially, NAFTA. Trump often referred to NAFTA as the “worst trade deal in history.” During the campaign, much of his anti-NAFTA sentiments were aimed at Mexico, but after becoming president, Trump also assailed Canada’s dairy supply management system and softwood lumber. Immediately after becoming president, Trump pulled the US out of TPP and announced that it would be renegotiating NAFTA (with the explicit threat of also pulling out of that deal too). NAFTA renegotiation meetings started in Washington in August 2017 (and concluded with a signed trilateral agreement in November 2018) and rotated intermittently between Washington, Mexico City, and Ottawa. Each country identified its priorities in advance. The US focused on reducing its trade deficit (largely with Mexico), repealing the tri-national trade dispute settlement panels that would allow national courts to resolve trade disputes (meaning that US courts would determine if the US had violated a trade provision), and increasing the rules of origin surrounding the amounts of North American content (especially in the auto sector) for goods to travel tariff-free. Canada wanted greater access to US government procurement to fight the “Buy American” provisions that national, state, and local governments often use.49 Trump also frequently evoked the “Buy American, Hire American” mantra. Washington also wanted greater labour mobility, allowing higher-skilled workers to go seamlessly between the three countries. Then foreign minister Chrystia Freeland, who led the Canadian negotiation team, also pledged to get greater environmental protection, gender equality, and Indigenous rights embedded in the agreement.50 Nevertheless, Canada’s position was largely defensive: that is, to keep NAFTA in place. If there was one non-negotiable item for Canada it would have been maintaining the existing Chapter 19 trade dispute settlement system. After all, Canada walked away from the negotiating table in the mid-1980s when the US would not agree to this, although Washington did reluctantly concede to add the provision to the original Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. Essentially, Mexico’s objectives were similar to Canada’s, which made for an interesting negotiating dynamic. In one sense, it was two countries versus one, but with the one being by far the largest of the three trade partners. Given the importance of NAFTA to the Canadian economy, it was not surprising that this was the issue that ended Stephen Harper’s silence on foreign policy. In October 2017, a memo that Harper had written for the clients of his

Stephen Harper and the Politics of Canada-US Relations  179

consulting company was leaked to the media. The memo basically criticized how the Trudeau government had handled the NAFTA renegotiations. It identified several major areas for disagreement. First, Harper believed that Canada had too quickly rejected the US proposals. Harper wrote that following a visit to Washington in early October 2017, he realized that “the NAFTA r­ e-negotiation is going very badly. I also believe that President (Donald) Trump’s threat to terminate NAFTA is not a bluff … I believe this threat is real. Therefore, Canada’s government needs to get its head around this reality: it does not matter whether current American proposals are worse than what we have now. What matters in evaluating them is whether it is worth having a trade agreement with the Americans or not.”51 Harper’s second critique concerned negotiating alongside Mexico instead of Canada reaching a separate bilateral agreement with the Americans. Harper correctly pointed out that Trump’s anger about NAFTA during the 2016 presidential campaign was aimed squarely at Mexico and not Canada. Harper argued, “[t]he elephant is Mexico … In fact, the U.S. is both irked and mystified by the Liberals’ unwavering devotion to Mexico.” Thirdly, he was disturbed by the Trudeau government’s insistence on promoting progressive priorities like labour, gender, Indigenous, and environmental issues. “Did anyone really think that the Liberals could somehow force the Trump administration into enacting their agenda – union power, climate change, aboriginal claims, gender issues? But while the Canadian government was doing that, the Americans have been laying down their real demands.” Harper was also critical of how the Trudeau Liberals had handled the ongoing disputes on softwood lumber and subsidies to business jets manufacturer Bombardier. Notwithstanding Harper’s unease with the negotiating tactics of the Trudeau government, when Trump went too far with arbitrary steel and aluminum tariffs and personally attacked Trudeau in the aftermath of the June 2018 G7 summit in Canada, Harper intervened to support the Trudeau government. Harper went on Fox News, Trump’s favourite television station, to tell conservative viewers that “[n]ot only is the trade deficit with Canada small, the United States runs a current account surplus with Canada. Canada is the biggest single purchaser of U.S. goods and services in the world – it’s not China, it’s not Mexico, it’s not Britain, it’s not Germany. It’s Canada. So it just seems to me this is the wrong target.”52 Harper’s defence of Canada against Trump’s “tweet-storm” showed him putting country ahead of partisan ideology.53 One of the significant aspects of the Harper government’s foreign policy was the shift from acting as an impartial mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the adoption of a strongly pro-Israeli stance. For decades, Canada was regarded as an impartial “helpful fixer” (though a contested concept by some) in the Middle East, participating in peacekeeping missions to resolve conflicts between Egypt and Israel (1956 and 1967) and between Israel and Syria (1973). However, under Harper, this all changed rather dramatically. In a December

180  Duane Bratt

2012 interview, Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird stated: “Some people see Canada as being a great even-handed referee … well, we’re not a referee. We have a side. The side is freedom. The side is human rights. The side is open economies.”54 In the Middle East, this approach also clearly meant supporting Israel. Harper delivered a speech to the Israeli Knesset (parliament) in January 2014 in which he said: “Canada supports Israel because it is right to do so.”55 He also condemned some of Israel’s critics abroad and at home in Canada as exemplifying “‘the new anti-Semitism … what else can we call criticism that selectively condemns only the Jewish state and effectively denies its right to defend itself, while systematically ignoring  – or excusing  – the violence and oppression all around it.”56 Despite the debacle of Joe Clark’s 1979 promise to move Canada’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem,57 it is likely that if Stephen Harper was still prime minister he would have followed Trump’s lead and moved Canada’s embassy to Jerusalem. At a May 2018 speech to a synagogue audience in Westmount, Quebec, Harper said that “President Trump deserves immense credit for finally recognizing Jerusalem is indeed the capital of Israel.”58 He added that it would now be “easy” for Canada to move its embassy to Jerusalem because the US had taken the lead.59 Similarly, the Harper government had taken a hard line with Iran. This culminated in Canada closing its embassy in the Iranian capital of Tehran and expelling the Iranian diplomats from Canada in September 2012. Foreign Minister Baird justified this decision on the grounds that Iran was “the most significant threat to global peace and security in the world,” whose leaders “routinely threaten the existence of Israel, engage in racist anti-Semitic rhetoric and incite genocide.”60 When the Obama administration, working with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (the so-called P5 + 1 group), reached an agreement on Iran’s nuclear weapons program in July 2015, Canada distanced itself. Instead, Ottawa stated that it would continue to impose economic sanctions on Iran (much to the dislike of the Obama White House). When Trump, who had long criticized the agreement, finally abandoned the Iran deal in May 2018, Harper, former foreign minister Baird, and several other former world leaders, including Australian prime minister John Howard, took out a full-page ad in the New York Times congratulating Trump. The ad read, in part, “Iran is a danger to us, to our allies, to freedom. An Islamist and revolutionary regime, such as the one that controls Tehran today, must never be allowed to possess a nuclear option, not a bomb, not a path to a bomb, not a nuclear program with the slightest doubt of its extent and military applications.”61 Harper would later say, “The deal is a roadmap to Iran’s acquiring nuclear arms in less than a decade. President Trump has made a correct and courageous decision and he deserves full marks.”62 This was in stark contrast to the position of the federal Liberal government of the day. Prime Minister

Stephen Harper and the Politics of Canada-US Relations  181

Trudeau remarked: “Mr. Harper is a private citizen and allowed his own opinions. As for the government of Canada, we take a firm position that the [Iran deal], while not a perfect accord, certainly is a very positive step, holding Iran to account and preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, which would be a threat not just to the region but to global stability.”63 One might argue that, based on the above analysis, Canada-US relations would have been better if Stephen Harper, as opposed to Justin Trudeau, was the prime minister to deal with former President Trump. This argument is further supported by the fact that one of Trump’s first acts as president was to reverse Obama’s decision on Keystone XL. However, Trump was personally more unpopular in Canada, substantially so, than even Bush was during the Iraq War. Therefore, it is much more likely that, once again, Harper would have been constrained from pursuing better relations with a Trump White House because of Canadian public opinion and its intense dislike of the former US president.64 Conclusion The central thesis of this chapter is that Stephen Harper – irrespective of the party in power in official Washington – wanted very close relations with the United States. This is evident in how his foreign policy thinking evolved prior to becoming prime minister. As the introductory section showed, Harper’s belief in strong Canada-US relations goes right back to his formative political period; Harper’s foreign policy interest and knowledge was low throughout these years, but he was guided by a clear set of first principles. However, there is the key question of why Harper desired closer relations between Canada and the United States. Part of it is the simple realization that Canada’s most important foreign relationship is with the United States. More to the point, Canada’s security and economy is dependent upon close bilateral relations with its largest trading partner and best customer. When relations were at their closest (in the 1980s between Mulroney and Reagan or in the 1990s between Chrétien and Clinton), Canada prospered. When relations were more distant (in the early 1970s between Pierre Trudeau and Nixon), Canada suffered. In addition, the two countries share similar values of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. The amount of cross-border activity – for business, tourism, or family ties – is also extremely high. The cultural influence of American television, books, movies, and sports teams penetrates Canada more intensely than any other country in the world. But it is even more than this. Harper also highly respected the strength of the American economy and its military prowess. To be sure, two of the themes that Harper focused on as prime minister were the management of the Canadian economy (cutting taxes and pursuing international trade agreements) and rebuilding the Canadian

182  Duane Bratt

military.65 There was also a bit of envy towards the Americans and playing in the global big leagues. This could be seen in Harper’s pronouncements about Canada being an “emerging energy superpower,”66 “a warrior nation,” or that it was deployed in Afghanistan to assert “an international leadership role” for Canada.67 Having good relations with the United States in both the economic sphere (hence Harper’s support of the original Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and subsequently NAFTA) and the security sphere (hence his criticism of Chrétien for not supporting the Iraq War and of Martin for not participating directly in ballistic missile defence) was a top priority for Harper. Interestingly, he was not able to pursue completely this goal of ballistic missile defence while in office. Although there were successes  – military cooperation in Afghanistan, the 2006 softwood lumber agreement, and mitigating the full effects of the 2008–9 financial crisis – Harper was largely constrained by domestic political realities. Indeed, he was limited in what he could do by both public opinion and minority governments during the Bush administration. Even when the majority of Canadians held positive views of the Obama administration, Harper was nonetheless constrained by different ideological views on the energy-environment nexus during the Obama years. But Harper could not jeopardize his western base of supporters by not talking tough on the issue of the Keystone XL pipeline and holding the feet of the Obama White House to the fire. Had he not done so, it probably would have been political suicide for the federal Conservative Party in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Still, one could argue that Harper, who came into power seeking to improve Canada’s bilateral relationship with the US, actually left Canada-US relations in worse shape than when he departed the political stage in late 2015. Once freed from the constraints of office, Harper was able to advocate similar policies to the ones he espoused prior to becoming prime minister. You can see this in his comments about Israel, the Iran nuclear deal, the NAFTA renegotiations, and Trump’s sundry Twitter attacks of Canada and Justin Trudeau. It is quite likely, given the hostility to US President Trump that many Canadians held, that Harper would have been even more constrained in Canadian-­ American bilateral relations if he had been prime minister during Trump’s time in the White House. Put simply, openly striving for closer relations with Trump’s Washington would have been a recipe for electoral disaster in Canada. The case study of Stephen Harper highlights what James Rosenau described as the differences between “role” and “individual.”68 The “role” refers to the impact of such things as the nature of the office on the behaviour of its occupant. A decision-maker, such as Harper, is influenced/constrained significantly by the roles he or she performs, by the socially prescribed behaviours and legally sanctioned norms attached to a given position. In the case of Harper, being the prime minister of Canada and working hard to manage Canada-US

Stephen Harper and the Politics of Canada-US Relations  183

relations, keep the country unified, and get re-elected. In contrast, the “individual” characteristics of decision-makers include “all those aspects of a decisionmaker – his [or her] values, talents, and prior experiences – that distinguish his [or her] foreign policy choices or behaviour from those of every other decisionmaker.”69 From an “individual” perspective, Harper wanted very close relations with the United States, but from a “role” perspective he needed to show some distance for electoral reasons. NOTES 1 The importance of foreign policy would shock him when he became prime minister. During an interview with CTV News at the end of 2006, Harper noted that he was surprised by how much time international affairs actually consumed. 2 For an analysis of the influence of the Reform Party on the Harper government’s foreign policy, see Duane Bratt, “Implementing the Reform Party Agenda: The Roots of Stephen Harper’s Foreign Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 24, no. 1 (March 2018), 1–17. 3 Quoted in William Johnson, Stephen Harper and the Future of Canada (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2005), 316. 4 Quoted in Lloyd Mackey, The Pilgrimage of Stephen Harper (Toronto: ECW Press, 2005), 173–4. 5 Quoted in Johnson, Stephen Harper and the Future of Canada, 316. 6 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, Number 002, 1 October 2002. 7 Ibid. 8 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, Number 048, 29 January 2003. 9 Quoted in Mackey, The Pilgrimage of Stephen Harper, 169–70. 10 Perhaps this explains, in part, why Harper surprised the Bush White House during the 2005–6 federal election campaign by talking openly about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and cautioning Washington about challenging Canada’s control over its northern expanse. He was quoted as saying: “There are new and disturbing reports of American nuclear submarines passing through Canadian waters without obtaining the permission of – or even notifying – the Canadian government. You don’t defend national sovereignty with flags, cheap election rhetoric, and advertising campaigns. You need forces on the ground, ships in the sea, and proper surveillance.” “Harper Pledges Larger Arctic Military Presence,” CTV News, 22 December 2005, https://www.ctv.ca/servelet/ArticleNews/story /CTVNews/20051222/harper_north051222/20051222?s_name=election2006. Also see Robert Huebert, “Walking and Talking Independence in the Canadian North,” in Brian Bow and Patrick Lennox, eds., An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Changes and Choices for the Future (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008),

184  Duane Bratt

11 12

13 14 15

16 17

18

19

20 21 22

126. In January 2006, Harper would rebuke David Wilkins, the US ambassador to Canada, over his comments on the legal status of the Northwest Passage bilateral dispute; see Colin Robertson, “Rising Power: Stephen Harper’s Makeover of Canadian International Policy and Its Institutions,” in Jennifer Ditchburn and Graham Fox, eds., The Harper Factor: Assessing a Prime Minister’s Policy Legacy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 110. Ian Brodie, At the Centre of Government: The Prime Minister and the Limits on Political Power (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2018), 34. Department of National Defence, “Military Strengthens Its Reconstruction and Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan,” news release, 15 September 2006, https:// www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2006/09/military-strengthens-reconstruction -stabilization-efforts-afghanistan.html. Jean-Christophe Boucher and Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of War: Canada’s Afghanistan Mission 2001–14 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 23. “Fighting Blamed on ‘Retribution,’” Toronto Star, 22 January 2007, A3. Quoted in John Geddes, “Is History Repeating Itself in the Softwood Lumber Dispute?” Maclean’s, 25 April 2017, https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/is -history-repeating-itself-in-the-softwood-lumber-dispute/. Global Affairs Canada, Softwood Lumber Agreement (2017), https://www.treaty -accord.gc.ca/text-texte?id=105072&lang=eng. Greg Anderson, “Canada and the United States in the Harper Years: Still ‘Special, ’ but Not Especially Important,” in Adam Chapnick and Christopher J. Kukucha, eds., The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada’s Global Posture (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 143. Public Safety Canada, “Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness,” last modified 15 February 2018, https://www .publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/brdr-strtgs/bynd-th-brdr/index-en.aspx. The Harper government would repeatedly raise concerns about the slow pace of progress on “thinning” the Canada-US border, which was often caught up in administrative roadblocks and US Department of Homeland Security resistance. Canada was also displeased at the fact that the Obama administration refused to pay for the construction of an Immigration and Customs Protection plaza on the US side of the future Gordie Howe International Bridge across the WindsorDetroit corridor. Brodie, At the Centre of Government, 39. Ibid., 182–5. See Scott Sinclair, “Canada’s Humiliating Entry into TPP Trade Deal,” The Tyee, 26 June 2012, https://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2012/06/26/TTP-Trade-Deal/; Michael Geist, “What’s Behind Canada’s Entry to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks?” Toronto Star, 24 June 2012, https://www.thestar.com/business/2012 /06/24/whats_behind_canadas_entry_to_the_transpacific_partnership _talks.html.

Stephen Harper and the Politics of Canada-US Relations  185 23 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also expressed her public disapproval of the June 2010 Muskoka Initiative’s failure to include the full menu of reproductive health issues. 24 Canadian Energy Pipeline Association, “What Are the Economic Benefits of Pipelines in Canada?” accessed 22 September 2021, https://www.aboutpipelines .com/en/pipelines-in-our-lives/economic-benefits/. 25 “Debate Renewed over Economic Benefits of Keystone XL Pipeline,” CTV News, 24 March 2017, https://www.ctvnews.ca/business/debate-renewed-over-economic -benefits-of-keystone-xl-pipeline-1.3339886; Irina Ivanova, “Who Benefits from Revived Keystone XL and Dakota Access?” CBS News, 24 January 2017, https:// www.cbsnews.com/news/who-benefits-from-the-keystone-xl-pipeline-and-dakota -access-pipeline-pros-cons/. 26 Paul Koring, “Keystone XL Support Grows in U.S., Poll Finds,” Globe and Mail, 18 July 2013, B5. 27 Environment Canada, “Canada’s Emission Trends 2012” (August 2012), https:// www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change /greenhouse-gas-emissions/projections/trends-2012.html. 28 Jim Prentice and Jean-Sébastien Rioux, Triple Crown: Winning Canada’s Energy Future (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2017), 102. 29 Ibid. 30 Quoted in Shawn McCarthy, “Keystone Pipeline Approval ‘Complete No-Brainer,’ Harper Says,” Globe and Mail, 21 September 2011, A1. 31 Ezra Levant, Ethical Oil: The Case for Canada’s Oil Sands (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2010). 32 Claudia Cattaneo, “Canada’s Future Is Not Tied to Keystone XL, Oliver Tells Americans,” Financial Post, 5 March 2013, https://financialpost.com/commodities /energy/canadas-future-is-not-tied-to-one-pipeline-oliver-tells-americans. 33 Ibid. 34 For example, see Andrew Nikiforuk, Tar Sands: Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent (Vancouver: Greystone, 2008); William Marsden, Stupid to the Last Drop: How Alberta Is Bringing Environmental Armageddon to Canada (and Doesn’t Seem to Care) (Toronto: Knopf, 2007). 35 Quoted in Paul Koring, “Canada Best Source for Oil for U.S., Oliver Says,” Globe and Mail, 25 April 2013, A10. 36 Natural Resources Canada, “Minister Oliver Reinforces Importance of Canada-U.S. Energy Relationship,” news release, 24 April 2013, https://www.canada.ca /en/news/archive/2013/04/minister-oliver-reinforces-importance-canada-energy -relationship.html. 37 Quoted in Joanna Slater, “Harper Stands Firm on Keystone,” Globe and Mail, 27 September 2013, A1. 38 Shawn McCarthy and Jeff Jones, “Harper Asks Obama for Joint Oil Strategy,” Globe and Mail, 7 September 2013, A3. In the spring of 2012, US ambassador to

186  Duane Bratt

39

40 41 42 43 44

45

46

47

48

49

Canada David Jacobson was saying to anyone who would listen in the Harper government that some movement on reducing carbon emissions and on climate change would go some way towards making a “yes” on Keystone more likely, but the signalling from the Obama White House went unheeded. See Jeffrey Simpson, “Carbon Emissions: Harper Drags Canada toward a Third-Best Solution,” Globe and Mail, 12 July 2013, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/dragged -toward-a-third-best-emissions-solution/article13151259/. Quoted in Michael D. Shear, “Obama Tells Donors of Tough Politics of Keystone Pipeline,” New York Times, 4 April 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/us /politics/obama-donors-keystone-pipeline.html. Dennis McConaghy, Dysfunction: Canada after Keystone XL (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2017), 11. “Transcript of John Kerry’s Statement on Keystone XL Pipeline,” Globe and Mail, 7 November 2015, A4. Adrian Morrow, “The President Aimed His Fire at Canada with War of 1812 Remark,” Globe and Mail, 7 June 2018, A4. Paul Koring in discussion with the book’s editor, 23 February 2015. See Bruce Heyman and Vicki Heyman, The Art of Diplomacy: Strengthening the Canada-U.S. Relationship in Times of Uncertainty (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019); Mike Blanchfield, Swingback: Getting Along in the World with Harper and Trudeau (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017), 220–7. Obama’s lending of 2012 campaign aides to assist Justin Trudeau in the October 2015 federal election was another sign of just how poor the personal relations at the top were between Harper and Obama. Peter Baker, “How Trump’s Election Shook Obama: ‘What if We Were Wrong?’” New York Times, 30 May 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/us/politics /obama-reaction-trump-election-benjamin-rhodes.html. Nick Boisvert, “Stephen Harper Says Canada’s Pandemic Spending Has Been ‘Overkill’ in Podcast Appearance,” CBC News, 27 July 2021, https://www.cbc.ca /news/politics/stephen-harper-podcast-interview-pandemic-1.6120113. Harper’s 2018 book on populism is, at times, critical of Donald Trump, but its essential argument is that “a large proportion of Americans, including American conservatives, voted for Trump because they are really not doing very well.” Stephen Harper, Right Here, Right Now: Politics and Leadership in the Age of Disruption (Toronto: Signal, 2018), 2. Most of the book, however, praises how Trump had channelled the votes of Americans who were adversely impacted by the 2008 Great Recession and international globalization. Global Affairs Canada, “Address by Foreign Affairs Minister on the Modernization of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),” Ottawa, 14 August 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/08/address_by _foreignaffairs ministeronthemodernizationofthenorthame.html.

Stephen Harper and the Politics of Canada-US Relations  187 50 Global Affairs Canada, “Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s Foreign Policy Priorities,” Ottawa, 6 June 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news /2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html. 51 Alexander Panetta, “‘Napping on NAFTA’: Harper Blasts Trudeau Government for its Handling of Negotiations,” Globe and Mail, 27 October 2017, https://www .theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/stephen-harper-blasts-trudeau-government -for-napping-on-nafta/article36756336/. All other Harper quotes in this paragraph are drawn from this same source. 52 Matthew Kazin, “Trump Trade Beef with Canada: Former Canadian Prime Minister Weighs In,” Fox Business, 10 June 2018, https://www.foxbusiness.com /politics/trump-trade-beef-with-canada-former-canadian-prime-minister -weighs-in. 53 Speaking at a Five Eyes panel in London in late June 2018, Harper expressed his concerns about some aspects of Trump’s “America First” approach. “I think it would be a mistake for the United States to believe that it doesn’t need partners around the world.” He then went on to add: “The idea that you are just going to pursue your best interests by simply acting unilaterally or without regard even to your closest allies, that would be a very big mistake over a long period of time.” Quoted in Ben Cousins, “‘America First’ Approach Will Outlive Trump: Harper,” CTV News, 27 June 2018, https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/america-first-approach -will-outlive-trump-harper-1.3991176. 54 Lee Berthiaume, “Canada Takes Sides, Not a World Referee, Baird Says,” Ottawa Citizen, 22 December 2012, A4. 55 “Read the Full Text of Harper’s Historic Speech to Israel’s Knesset,” Globe and Mail, 20 January 2014, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/read-the-full -text-of-harpers-historic-speech-to-israels-knesset/article16406371/. 56 Ibid. 57 Charles Flicker, “Next Year in Jerusalem: Joe Clark and the Jerusalem Embassy Affair,” International Journal 58, no. 1 (Winter 2002–03), 115–38. 58 Janice Arnold, “Stephen Harper Endorses U.S. Decision on Iran Deal and Jerusalem,” Canadian Jewish News, 15 May 2018. 59 Ibid. 60 Laura Payton, “Canada Closes Embassy in Iran, Expels Iranian Diplomats,” CBC News, last updated 21 September 2012, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada -closes-embassy-in-iran-expels-iranian-diplomats-1.1166509. 61 “Mr. President, You Are Right about Iran,” New York Times, 10 May 2018. 62 Janice Arnold, “Stephen Harper Endorses U.S. Decisions on Iran Deal and Jerusalem,” Canadian Jewish News, 15 May 2018, https://www.cjnews.com/news /canada/stephen-harper-endorses-u-s-decisions-on-iran-deal-and-jerusalem. 63 Robert Fife and Adrian Morrow, “Harper among Former World Leaders to Voice Support for U.S. Withdrawal from Iran Deal,” Globe and Mail, 11 May 2018, A4.

188  Duane Bratt 64 In the wake of the early June 2018 G7 summit in Quebec, and a series of harsh comments and tweets by President Trump and members of his staff, there was an outpouring of anti-Trump sentiments (#BoycottTrump, #Trump-free, #VacationCanada, and #BuyCanadian) in Canada. See Salman Farooqui, “Immigration, Trade Concerns May Constrict U.S. Visits,” Globe and Mail, 25 June 2018, B5; Andrea Hopkins, “Majority of Canadians Say They Will Avoid U.S. Goods, Poll Finds,” Globe and Mail, 16 June 2018, A19. Kelly Craft, Trump’s former US ambassador to Canada, tried to put a more positive spin on bilateral relations. In an op-ed piece in the Globe and Mail, she noted: “My message is that, in ways large and small, our relationship continues to thrive. Americans and Canadians are working together, as we always have, and we must also listen to each other.” She went on to write: “Even when we disagree, we Americans appreciate and respect our Canadian friends and neighbours. We know we need each other. We know we are two strong countries together. Let’s make sure we keep talking with, and not past, each other.” Kelly Craft, “The Canada-U.S. Trade Relationship Will Always Thrive,” Globe and Mail, 27 June 2018, B4. 65 Harper basically reiterated this view at a late June 2018 Five Eyes panel in London, where he firmly explained: “The truth of the matter is when it comes to security … prosperity and value systems, there really is no other alternative in the world for us, but a strong partnership with the United States of America.” Quoted in Ben Cousins, “‘America First’ Approach.” 66 Jane Taber, “PM Brands Canada an ‘Energy Superpower’,” Globe and Mail, 15 July 2006, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/pm-brands-canada-an -energy-superpower/article110575/. 67 Stephen Harper, “Address by the Prime Minister to the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan,” Ottawa, 13 March 2006, https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive /2006/03/address-prime-minister-canadian-armed-forces-afghanistan.html. 68 James N. Rosenau, “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 27–92. 69 Ibid., 42–3.

9 Trade in the Key of Blue: Canadian Economic Diplomacy in the Harper Years asa mckercher

In October 2017, former prime minister Stephen Harper spoke at a panel discussion in Washington, coincidentally just blocks away from where his successor, Justin Trudeau, was meeting with officials to review the future of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In his remarks, Harper expressed worry that NAFTA’s future was very much in doubt as US President Donald Trump was not bluffing in threatening to cancel the deal. As the former prime minister noted, “very powerful political currents” had formed against free trade agreements, the result of anger at the offshoring of jobs, which meant that many workers had been “left behind” by the globalized economy.1 Although Harper’s fellow panelist Newt Gingrich – past Republican speaker of the US House of Representatives and a Trump confidante – played down the threat to NAFTA, Harper left the American capital unsettled by his discussions with political insiders. So, upon returning to Canada, he penned a memorandum to clients of his consulting firm titled “Napping on NAFTA.” Leaked to the press, Harper’s memorandum criticized Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government on three points: for working with Mexico in the renegotiation process rather than pursuing bilateral talks with the Americans; for too quickly rejecting several proposals put forward by the Trump administration; and for proposing its own slate of progressive changes to the trade deal on Indigenous, gender, environmental, and labour issues. Given Trump’s statements on NAFTA, and the protectionist mood of certain American voters, the former prime minister warned that “Canada’s government needs to get its head around this reality: it does not matter whether current American proposals are worse than what we have now. What matters in evaluating them is whether it is worth having a trade agreement with the Americans or not.”2 While the leak of Harper’s memorandum was perhaps ill-timed given the ongoing difficulties facing Canadian negotiators and the Trudeau government’s efforts to present a united front – several former Conservative ministers sat on a board advising the government on the trade talks and current Tory MPs had

190  Asa McKercher

been lobbying their American counterparts to support the deal – his analysis, at least in terms of highlighting NAFTA’s doubtful future, was sound. (After eighteen months of very challenging trilateral negotiations, a NAFTA 2.0 – the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement – was eventually cobbled together in late November 2018.) During his time as prime minister, Harper had often confronted protectionist sentiments and policies emanating from Canada’s largest trading partner. But whereas then Democratic candidate Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign-trail musing about renegotiating NAFTA had been empty political rhetoric, Donald Trump seemed firmly committed to protectionism, having pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in one of his first official acts in office. Moreover, Congress was replete with protectionists pushing “Buy American” legislation, and free trade was unpopular with both Trump’s nativist right and the anti-globalist left that seemed to be gaining strength within the Democratic Party. In any event, Stephen Harper’s dire warnings about threats to Canada’s trading prospects were not new. While in office, Harper was a vigorous promoter of Canadian trade and investment, and not only with the United States, with his aggressive trade agenda driven largely by ill-winds from abroad that buffeted Canada’s economy. Additionally, that Harper would criticize the Trudeau government’s pursuit of progressive trade agenda items is no surprise given that his Conservative government was often criticized for pursuing trade to the exclusion of much else. The Tories themselves characterized their prioritization of international trade and investment as “economic diplomacy,” and on reflection, the Harper years were ones in which this narrow outlook was indeed given pride of place in Conservative foreign policy. Given Liberal support for free trade, it is this emphasis on economic diplomacy that distinguishes Harper-era foreign policy from that of other Canadian governments, both past and present. That Stephen Harper and his Conservative government were big boosters of international trade is no secret. In 2009, Embassy magazine dubbed the then prime minister “Free Trade Steve” and intoned, “it increasingly seems free trade is Mr. Harper’s only interest in foreign policy.”3 Likewise, other commentators have stressed the Conservatives’ overriding interest in promoting trade and investment-protection agreements. Former diplomat Colin Robertson observed that Harper’s “guiding principle in conducting international relations was to support Canada’s economic growth,” while the Globe and Mail’s John Ibbitson, in characterizing Conservative foreign policy as a “big break” from past governments, wrote: “What was peacekeeping, foreign aid, collective ­security – you name it – became a relentless focus on trade agreements.”4 Agreeing that the Tories’ handling of foreign affairs broke with the status quo, the University of Ottawa’s Roland Paris pointed out that the Harper government’s pursuit of trade agreements was the sole “fragment” of the liberal internationalist tradition in Canadian foreign policy that reached back to the end of

Canadian Economic Diplomacy in the Harper Years  191

the Second World War and one, he contended, that Conservatives otherwise scorned.5 This chapter does not dissent from this prevailing viewpoint regarding Conservative enthusiasm for international trade. Indeed, several recent retrospectives have offered helpful overviews of Harper-era trade policy and of the Conservatives’ efforts to expand Canada’s economic presence abroad.6 So rather than simply pour old wine into new bottles, this chapter contextualizes Canadian trade policy during the Harper years, both historically and in terms of the prime minister’s world view, political priorities, and overall record in office.7 Many of the chapters in this volume attest to the politicization of Canadian foreign policy under Harper; with trade, this trend was less pernicious than in other areas and, because the Liberals were in support of liberalization, the Conservatives simply crowed about their very real successes on the trade front all in an effort to burnish their economic record and appeal to Canadian voters. The Harper government’s pursuit both of free trade and trade in general was not unprecedented, even if the Tories under Harper’s leadership negotiated and concluded a record number of free trade agreements. As the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Laura Dawson has pointed out, Prime Minister Harper “refined and improved on the liberalizing, outward-oriented trade agenda that he inherited” from his immediate predecessors, Paul Martin, Jean Chrétien, and Brian Mulroney, all of whom had sought to liberalize Canadian trade policy.8 Furthermore, Harper’s promotion of trade with a variety of countries across the globe reflected long-standing efforts to diversify Canada’s economy away from the United States. In looking for economic opportunities beyond his country’s southern neighbour, Harper pursued a foresighted policy that sought to place Canada on a better footing for a globalist, post-American world. Given the relative decline in US power capabilities, that country’s protectionist twitches, and the rise of other economic powers, Harper underscored the need to expand Canada’s trading horizons and seek investment from other sources. Even so, he sought to strengthen economic ties with the United States by working against a thickening Canada-US border, a frustrating process that underscored the need to pursue other foreign markets and investors. Overall, his government’s trade policy was responsive to global trends, many of them worrying for a “trading nation” such as Canada.9 So, if there is any area of Stephen Harper’s foreign policy deserving of praise, it certainly lies in his pursuit of international trade and investment. Of course, it may be that, as Roland Paris had observed in late 2013, “there is more to foreign policy than trade,” but that is a matter that readers of this volume may judge for themselves.10 Certainly, the Conservatives’ inattention to several policy files – human rights, environmental protection, and aid and economic development – was the result of the narrow focus of economic diplomacy that characterized Canadian foreign policy in the Harper era.11 Both ideologically and politically, there was little that was surprising about Stephen Harper’s push for trade. Trade and market capitalism were important

192  Asa McKercher

elements of his own personal conservative outlook, while a commitment to free markets was central to the western brand of conservatism that drove the nascent Conservative Party that took form under his leadership. More specifically, liberalizing trade was an issue of long-standing importance to the Reform Party (and to supporters in Ontario and Quebec), as was the pursuit of trade pacts with Pacific Rim countries, no doubt a reflection of Reform’s geographic orientation in Western Canada.12 Further, it was the Progressive Conservative Party under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney that had discarded over a century of Red Tory protectionism – Sir John A. Macdonald’s National Policy – in pursuit of a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States in the 1980s. Thus, with both major elements within the conservative coalition in agreement, promoting free trade became a central plank of the new party’s economic platform, and subsequently a major policy plank once the Conservatives took power in 2006. In one of his first major foreign policy speeches as prime minister, Harper told the Canada-United Kingdom Chamber of Commerce that he was intent on reviving Canadians’ “entrepreneurial spirit,” with trade an important element of this goal.13 A  business-like and business-friendly outlook was key to Tory campaigning throughout the Harper years, especially as a means of differentiating the Conservatives from the Liberals, even though the Liberals’ themselves were hardly unfriendly towards Bay Street nor hesitant about championing international trade. Hence the constant emphasis that Harper placed on trade as a major element of his government’s economic platform and electoral strategy, as he boasted, for instance, to the party faithful at the Calgary Stampede in July 2014 by stressing that, “under our Government, we have trade expanding, employment growing, our finances solid, Canada never stronger in the global economy.”14 What Hath Globalization Wrought? For Harper, trade expansion and liberalization, beyond their importance for the Conservatives’ political success at home, were key elements of Canadian foreign policy because he very much saw Canada firmly enmeshed in a globalist world. While much has been made of the Conservatives’ disdain for multilateral institutions, as Alistair Edgar’s chapter  in this volume explains, Prime Minister Harper did not see Canada in isolation from the wider world. “Canadians are not like Americans,” he stated in late 2014. “We’ve never had bouts of isolationism in our history. Canadians for reasons that are unique to this country [are] very different than the United States, in spite of our distance from so many other places. We’ve always understood that our prosperity and our security in the world is in fact influenced by events a long way from our shores.”15 While overlooking the isolationism prominent in Canada during the first half of the twentieth century, decades marked, too, by trade protectionism,

Canadian Economic Diplomacy in the Harper Years  193

Harper saw the country as one with a long history of engagement abroad, with trade a major element of this outward focus. Similarly, looking back to Canada’s history in a speech to the UN General Assembly, he highlighted “the growth of trade between nations and the delivery of effective development assistance to ordinary people” as “the signatures of our Government’s outreach in the world.” “Trade,” he then emphasized, “means jobs, growth and opportunities. It has made great nations out of small ones. The story of my own country, Canada, is a case in point. Historically, trade has built our country, just as today, it is reshaping our world.”16 While having touted his country as an energy superpower in other fora, here Harper was portraying Canada as a major power in trade terms because its economy was outwardly focused and thoroughly enmeshed in the wider global economy. He himself admitted to being surprised by the international dimension to Canada’s economic health. In an interview given just after he won his majority mandate in May 2011, Harper revealed that since becoming prime minister, “the thing that’s probably struck me the most in terms of my previous expectations – I don’t even know what my expectations were – is not just how important foreign affairs/foreign relations is, but in fact that it’s become almost everything.” In this regard, he noted that, “we have a strong economy, but we really have a stronger Canadian economy within a world economy.”17 Given the extent of Canadian links to the globalized world, a problem, then, was the country’s exposure to global economic and financial trends. Canada, Harper underlined in 2013, is “a land of hope in a sea of uncertainty.”18 One of the major problems that Harper faced during his time as prime minister was the near collapse of the global economy in 2008–9, particularly the economic downturn in the United States. Like the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Great Recession underlined the external vulnerabilities confronting a trading nation such as Canada. Not only did it have a negative impact on Canadian exports, but the recession also upset the Tories’ economic plans and record, plunging the federal budget into deficit. While government finances slowly recovered, for the prime minister it was the trade picture that proved particularly worrisome. In 2013, Harper confided to the Council on Foreign Relations that “what keeps [him] up at night” was the global economy, because for Canada “the real significant risks are all external.”19 Trade, then, appeared to be both a necessity and a panacea capable of expanding the economy and lessening risk. Certainly, the Tories invested it with considerable political importance: together trade and investment appeared as a central pillar of Canada’s Economic Action Plan, the government’s economic blueprint launched in 2009 as a means of combatting the effects of the global recession. As International Trade Minister Ed Fast explained in 2013, the Tories had rejected calls for a Keynesian boost to the economy in favour of pursuing “the oldest stimulus of them all: nations trading with nations.”20 In effect, then, global considerations were viewed as a key factor in Canadian economic success, which was tied to

194  Asa McKercher

Conservative political success – a nexus of domestic politics and foreign policy objectives. Thus, trade was a vital goal for the government politically and for Canada in terms of its overall foreign policy. In touting the Economic Action Plan in the 2015 federal election, the Tories emphasized their concern with “the external risks” to Canada’s economy and the fact that only the Conservatives could be trusted to actually pursue free trade pacts and critical trade infrastructure. As Harper himself noted: “Unlike the other parties, we’re not going to walk away from a trade negotiation at the first sign of worry.”21 Responsive not only to political needs but to global trends and to the nature of the Canadian economy, Conservative trade policy was premised around expanding into new markets and gaining new sources of investment while at the same time maintaining access to the all-important US market. In November 2013, Fast introduced the controversial Global Markets Action Plan (GMAP), a policy guideline that the prime minister had tasked him with developing upon his appointment as international trade minister. Explaining that the policy was meant to “ensure that all diplomatic assets of the Government of Canada are harnessed to support the pursuit of commercial success by Canadian companies and investors,” Fast characterized the GMAP as marking a “sea change in the way Canada’s diplomatic assets are deployed around the world,” or what he termed “economic diplomacy.”22 This emphasis on change alarmed critics, though. Paul Heinbecker, a former Canadian ambassador to the UN remarked soon after this announcement, “The world will not let us focus on economics and trade even if it were a good idea for us to do so”23 An unnamed official explained to a reporter that the Conservatives had, in effect, issued a directive to Canadian diplomats: “take off your tweed jacket, buy a business suit and land us a deal.”24 This missive and the indignation it caused were typical of the mutual loathing between Harper and Canada’s foreign service officers (as highlighted in McKenna’s chapter in this volume), but the wider issue was the emphasis placed on trade as the keystone of Canadian foreign policy and the concern that trade promotion meant the diminution of political diplomacy. The Conservatives’ move was not unprecedented in that Pierre Trudeau had merged Canada’s trade and foreign affairs departments to create External Affairs and International Trade Canada in 1982. Furthermore, Harper himself had outlined a view of foreign policy that went beyond just economic issues. “We think it’s pretty important,” he stated in 2011, “that our long-run interests are tied somewhat to our trade, but that they’re more fundamentally tied to the kind of values we have in the world: freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law.”25 In spite of such disavowals, the branding of Prime Minister Harper as “Free Trade Steve” was widely accepted and, in practice, the Conservative push for expanded trade seemed to be confirmation enough that economic diplomacy was paramount, though the GMAP did make the point explicit.

Canadian Economic Diplomacy in the Harper Years  195

In terms of new trade opportunities, the Harper government oversaw the conclusion of more bilateral deals than any previous Canadian government, signing pacts with the European Union (2015), Ukraine (2015), South Korea (2015), Honduras (2014), Panama (2013), Jordan (2012), Colombia (2011), Peru (2009), and the European Free Trade Area (2009). There were also updates to Canada’s 1997 trade agreements with Israel and Chile, and an interim TransPacific Partnership (TPP) deal in 2015. Furthermore, when the Harper government left office, free trade talks were also ongoing with more than a dozen other countries. The Conservatives also doubled the number of Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements (FIPAs) from seventeen to thirty-five. Signed between Canada and other countries, primarily in the Global South, these FIPAs provided basic assurances that Canadian firms have a right to legal recourse if expropriated, as well as provided investors with the option of using international arbitration panels, thereby circumventing potentially corrupt local courts. Perhaps the most famous of these Harper-era agreements was the 2014 FIPA with China. If judged by the number of agreements signed, then at first blush Harper appears to rank well above other prime ministers as a booster of unfettered trade liberalization. Bilateralism versus Multilateralism In many respects, Harper-era trade policy represented a continuation of efforts undertaken by Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin. The agreements with South Korea, Honduras, and the European Free Trade Association were the result of negotiations begun under Chrétien, whose government had also initiated free trade talks – currently still ongoing – with Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Singapore, the Caribbean Community, and MERCOSUR (consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). The continuity between the Liberals and Conservatives on trade is perhaps best personified by David Emerson, who served as industry minister in Paul Martin’s Liberal government before crossing the aisle to join the Conservatives as minister of international trade and minister for the Pacific Gateway, and, briefly, as minister of foreign affairs. Ostensibly, then, Harper’s pursuit of liberalized trade differed little from the pro-free trade agendas of his immediate Liberal predecessors even as he brought their plans to fruition. Yet Prime Minister Harper and his team were criticized for concluding bilateral deals, which, in the view of former trade negotiator Robert Wolfe, had “little commercial importance and no systemic significance.” Rather, Wolfe and other experts preferred efforts to expand the multilateral international trade system centred on the World Trade Organization (WTO).26 Certainly the pursuit of bilateral free trade agreements represented a relatively new trend in terms of Canada’s involvement with the post-1945 global trade regime centred

196  Asa McKercher

around, first, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and then the WTO. Given the Canadian penchant for multilateralism, the turn towards bilateralism might appear to be another Conservative repudiation of the postwar foreign policy consensus. However, this trend towards smaller-scale trade deals began prior to Harper becoming prime minister and represented a wider, international drift away from the multilateral trade regime. In this regard, Canada played a pioneering role, beginning with the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1988 and then NAFTA in 1994. In the Americas, the Chrétien government concluded bilateral agreements with Chile (1997) and Costa Rica (2002) and launched further talks with regional governments, a process that accelerated following the collapse of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) process, which had sought to create a hemispheric trade bloc. The trend away from multilateralism in trade policy only accelerated with the bogging down of the Doha Development Agenda, the latest round of WTO trade talks. Ongoing since 2001, the Doha Round has failed to produce a multilateral agreement, which has led many countries to pursue bilateral deals rather than focus substantial time and effort on reforming the wider international trade system. A major benefit of this bilateral approach is that actual agreements can be more easily or at least more quickly reached than with a wide-ranging multilateral initiative such as Doha. The plethora of agreements reached by Canada is testament to this fact. In addition, and quite apart from any economic benefits that might accrue, several of the Harper-era bilateral trade pacts served to supplement other foreign policy initiatives. Thus, the agreement with Ukraine came as Ottawa sought to help Kiev resist Russian imperialism, while the renegotiated deal with Israel and the agreement with Jordan both complemented efforts to assist friendly governments in a fraught region. No doubt domestic calculations – appeals to Ukrainian and Jewish voters – were also at play (as described by Narine on Israel in chapter 14 and Carment et al. on Russia and Ukraine in chapter 13 of this volume). In any event, bilateral trade agreements can serve varied political purposes beyond their economic value. As Harper noted with regard to the deal with Ukraine – concluded by his government in 2015 but signed by Trudeau in 2016 – not only would it result in “increasing economic opportunity” for both countries but it was also “a step towards helping Ukrainians realize the future that they want.”27 Yet, there are drawbacks to the bilateral approach. First, the number and range of bilateral deals being negotiated by countries means that there can be a huge variation in trade and investment rules in a given country, creating inconsistencies and therefore difficulties for businesses operating abroad. In contrast, a multilateral deal creates uniform rules and regulations. Second, in terms of enforcement mechanisms, bilateral deals have less weight than multilateral pacts, a situation of which, thanks to experiences with “Buy American”

Canadian Economic Diplomacy in the Harper Years  197

provisions and NAFTA, Canadian officials have long been well aware. Despite these potential problems, the Harper government, like Chrétien’s Liberals, showed few hesitations about entering into bilateral trade deals. Perhaps some diplomatic heavy lifting might have led to success in the Doha Round or the launch of another multilateral reform initiative. Yet, given the global trend away from such systemic agreements, the Canadian approach under Harper was prudent if perhaps uninspiring. Furthermore, the TPP agreement, concluded in interim form just as the Harper government lost power in 2015, was a multilateral deal of a sort, binding together over a dozen countries of the AsiaPacific region that account for 40 per cent of annual global economic output. TPP signatories included existing Canadian free trade partners Chile, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, South Korea, and – at that time – the United States, but also Vietnam, New Zealand, Australia, and notably Japan, the world’s third largest economy. Thus, a deal such as TPP would serve to supplement, or rather supersede, Canadian bilateral trade agreements, just as CUSFTA was supplanted by NAFTA. In terms of content, TPP was also an advanced multi-nation agreement, covering government procurement, financial services, and intellectual property, issues not addressed in many of Canada’s other trade pacts. In 2015, Prime Minister Harper described the Trans-Pacific Partnership as being “essential” for Canada.28 When the TPP talks began earlier that decade, Canada was initially excluded, and many party to the negotiations were hesitant about accepting the Canadians given Ottawa’s supply management system, which, in effect, subsidizes the country’s agricultural industries. Automobile manufacturing also proved to be a later sticking point between Canada and other countries during the TPP talks.29 In any event, the Conservatives continued to support supply management – a policy important to the rural voters among the party’s base – but entered the talks for what promised to be a major agreement. The opportunities presented by the agreement, especially access to new, booming markets in East Asia, were certainly a draw for Canada. Hence, in April 2015, International Trade Minister Ed Fast undertook a two-day visit to Thailand and the Philippines, his thirteenth trip to the region since becoming minister in 2011. “We will go, and then we will go back – again and again – to let them know we are serious,” Fast said prior to leaving for a business summit in Bangkok. “It’s a huge opportunity, and it is one that has just started.”30 The prime minister, likewise, touted the importance of joining what he foresaw as “the fundamental trading network of the entire Asia-Pacific region.” Hence, he affirmed that Canada would continue to take part in the tense, final round of negotiations even as the 2015 federal election campaign began that August.31 Although there have been several Canadian federal elections – 1891, 1911, and 1988 – fought on the sensitive issue of completed trade pacts, an interesting situation emerged as high-level trade talks occurred in the midst of an electoral campaign, during which the TPP became a point of sharp debate, with the New

198  Asa McKercher

Democratic Party sceptical of the agreement, the Conservatives for it, and the Liberals characteristically between these two positions. Another major agreement, which, like the TPP, was negotiated under Harper but left for his successor to ratify, was the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union. When an agreement in principle was announced in October 2013, Harper praised the nascent deal as “an historic win for Canada.”32 While some sectors of the Canadian economy stood to lose – notably dairy farmers – CETA offered much promise, principally access to a market consisting of half a  billion European customers.33 Prime Minister Harper rightly observed that the agreement would go far towards making Europe an economic counterweight to the United States, a role that Asia also seemed ready to play thanks to TPP. The goal behind the Canada-EU deal, he explained, was “of course to broaden our trade beyond the U.S.”34 The “Third Option” Redux? To a considerable extent, Harper pursued a trade policy that promised to meet a long-standing aim laid out by successive Canadian governments: that is, to lessen the economic reliance on US trade and investment that had accelerated during and after the Second World War. This goal, difficult to achieve given the geographic pull of the American economy, stretched back at least to John Diefenbaker, who in 1957 launched a quixotic attempt to shift 15 per cent of Canadian trade from the United States to Britain. While the Harper government valorized Diefenbaker, a fellow Tory, this pursuit of an economic counterweight was not a partisan matter. After all, efforts at diversification peaked in the 1970s when Pierre Trudeau’s government announced the controversial “Third Option” strategy, an effort to seek out new, non-American markets and sources of investment and lessen reliance on the United States. The Third Option was launched not simply because of nationalist sentiments, but in response to a slumping US economy, to nascent economic globalization, and to the rise of emerging markets abroad – factors paralleling the economic picture during the Harper era. It is no surprise, then, that one analyst would note, “The Harper government’s trade policy is the Third Option on steroids.”35 Trade diversification was also the major focus of the Global Markets Action Plan. Based on consultations with the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, the Canadian Agri-Food Trade Alliance, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, and Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters, the GMAP aimed primarily to expand the international presence of small- and medium-sized Canadian businesses and penetrate new, emerging markets such as China, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and – despite Conservative opprobrium – Russia. The aim, in turn, was to create up to 10,000 new companies and 40,000 new jobs.36 These goals were

Canadian Economic Diplomacy in the Harper Years  199

laudable. So, too, were the objectives outlined in the GMAP’s precursor, the 2007 Global Commerce Strategy. Also having emphasized reaching out to new markets, the Global Commerce Strategy drove the expansion of air transport agreements; the development of trade infrastructure, chiefly the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Atlantic Gateway projects, which saw investment in updating ports and railways; and the creation of more than a dozen new trade offices, as well as an increase in the presence of Canadian trade commissioners in Asia and improved trade commissioner services within Canada. In addition, the Conservative government launched a program to double, by 2022, the number of foreign students attending Canadian universities.37 Taken together, these efforts boosted Canada’s presence in the globalized world. Speaking before the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in 2012, Fast underscored the government’s intent to seek out “new markets and opportunities for Canadian businesses and investors far beyond North America,” for, as he reasoned, “we cannot rely on one market alone for our goods, service, products and expertise.”38 As industry involvement with the genesis of the GMAP indicated, the Harper government’s trade expansion and diversification efforts were backed by corporate stakeholders. These initiatives were also championed by rightleaning foreign policy experts (one suspects that simple partisanship prevented Liberal experts from applauding developments that hardly clashed with basic tenets of liberal internationalism) such as Derek Burney and Fen Hampson, who encouraged the process of “recalibrat[ing] our bilateral relationship and counterbalance[ing] it with global priorities that give greater emphasis to economic and security ties with Asia/Pacific partners.”39 Less partisan commentators also outlined support for the broad contours of government policy, at least in a contextual sense. For instance, in 2012, Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney had warned that Canada was “overexposed to the United States and underexposed to faster-growing emerging markets,” while two years earlier, the Canadian International Council had recommended that “we must deepen our U.S. connections while we broaden our economic portfolio away from reliance on a single market.”40 The latter appeal especially mirrored the Harper government’s own outlook, and so whatever else might be said about Conservative foreign policy being a break with the status quo, its trade policy was hardly outside the norm. Signing trade agreements is only a small step towards actually expanding trade, hence the emphasis that the GMAP placed on building trade infrastructure and expanding the trade commissioner service. Yet it is still up to businesses to act. The Canadian experience with Latin America is instructive in this regard. Building on Chrétien-era initiatives, the Harper government launched a flurry of trade agreements and negotiations with Latin American countries. These trade initiatives were a central element of the Tories’ “Americas Strategy,” which was launched in 2009 and affirmed the following: “The Americas

200  Asa McKercher

are and will remain a foreign policy priority for Canada.”41 Two years earlier, while visiting Chile, where Canada has had a free trade agreement in effect since 1997, Harper had explained that, for his government, “re-engagement in its hemisphere is a critical international priority,” with trade a major focus.42 If the proof is in the pudding, Harper was a poor chef as the Canadian government’s own audit of the Americas Strategy made clear.43 One needs to build personal relationships with the people and governments of Latin America over time before cashing in on any trade pacts. And once Latin American officials realized that the Harper government was more interested in deal-making over friendship-building, trade expansion was always going to be a challenge.44 Of course, trade does not develop overnight, and so while much enthusiasm is invested in the signing of trade agreements, in reality such agreements tend to lay out a path for the growth of economic interchange over the long term. Conservative-minded, Harper was realistic about what can be achieved by his efforts, admitting to the Wall Street Journal in 2011 that “we don’t want to see a diminishing of trade with the United States. It will always be – look, we’re under no illusion – even with our best-case scenario of diversification, Canada’s most important trading partner will always be the United States, by far.”45 Not only was Conservative trade policy focused on seeking out new trade and investment opportunities with a diverse array of countries but it also aimed to keep open access to the US market. While Duane Bratt’s chapter in this volume goes into far more detail on Canada-US relations during the Harper years, suffice to say here that trade with the Americans held a place of prominence in Conservative trade policy. The importance of the United States for Canada’s economy is obvious and overwhelming, hence, on the one hand, the need to ensure access to the US market, and on the other, the desire for trade diversification. Though it is doubtful that he needed any reminders, these points were brought home to Harper by the global recession of 2008–9, which made clear Canada’s startling reliance on an open and healthy American economy. A  motivating factor, too, was Canadian frustration with protectionist sentiments in the US Congress, progressive policies emerging from the Obama White House, and the American government’s wider post-9/11 concern with homeland security. Beyond these relatively short-term concerns, Harper seemed to have been mindful of a long-term trajectory in which American and western economic power would wane relative to new power centres, especially those in Asia. In 2011, the prime minister mused about this: “The ability of our most important allies, and most importantly the United States, to single-handedly shape outcomes and protect our interests, has been diminishing, and so I’m saying we have to be prepared to contribute more, and that is what this government’s been doing.”46 While dealing with geopolitical matters and the need for Canadian global engagement, the comment is revealing of Harper’s sense that the

Canadian Economic Diplomacy in the Harper Years  201

globalized world was becoming a post-American world. Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in 2013, he warned that the West was “at a crossroads” given the “unprecedented shift of power and wealth away from the Western world.”47 Typical of Harper’s rather negative worldview and his sense that threats to the Canadian economy lay abroad, his observation was prescient, and is revealing of his reasoning as to why Canada needed to seek out new markets and sources of foreign investment, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. If a long-term diffusion in world power lay behind the Harper government’s diversification efforts, short-term frustrations with US trade policy were also a driving factor in these efforts, as well as in Canadian initiatives to ensure access to the United States. In 2008, Prime Minister Harper himself offered a deft analysis of the Canadian-US economic relationship, charting two axes along which problems developed. First, he saw difficulties emerging along the “environment-energy axis,” where efforts to curb climate change hampered Canadian exports of oil and gas. Unfortunately for the Conservatives, the Keystone XL Pipeline saga bore out this analysis  – as Bratt clearly argues in his chapter (see chapter 8 in this volume). Second, he traced problems along the “trade-security axis,” where there was “an increasing thickening of the border for security reasons or justified by security criteria, sometimes, not always, disguising protectionist sentiment that we think is very worrisome.”48 This assessment was well founded. As Derek Burney, the doyen of conservative foreign policy in Canada and a former ambassador to the United States, had warned in 2011, “U.S. mindsets have been rigidly shaped by the horror of 9/11. Among these officials, interest in smoother access to boost the benefits of free trade or the advantages of economic integration is miniscule. The overriding objective for the U.S. will be to strengthen border security whereas Canada’s priority will be easier access for goods and services.”49 Prime Minister Harper’s response to this shift in American mindsets was a two-fold investment of time and effort in pursuing expanded trade with the United States, or at least in maintaining the status quo. Again, as with various free trade initiatives, Harper inherited from his Liberal predecessor a program meant to harmonize Washington’s security concerns with NAFTA. However, the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), a joint Canadian-American-Mexican initiative, soon fizzled out, and so the Harper government looked for new means of ensuring a smooth flow of goods and people across the Canada-US border. The resulting Beyond the Border initiative, for which Prime Minister Harper proved a strong advocate, included harmonizing certain customs (at ports, border crossings, and airports), law enforcement, and security procedures, with some successes, though the process has been slow and often challenging. Beyond the thickening border, a worrisome development was the uptick in protectionist sentiments seen in a variety of disputes between Ottawa and

202  Asa McKercher

Washington over “Buy American” provisions. There was also an unprecedented development symbolizing Canadian frustration with US inattention to the border’s importance: the fate of the Detroit-Windsor crossing. After much wrangling with the local potentate who owned the Ambassador Bridge, the sole means of crossing the Detroit River beyond an underground tunnel, the Canadian government in 2015 agreed to pay for a second bridge as well as infrastructure on both sides of the crossing, all for an estimated $4 billion.50 That Ottawa was willing to assume the whole cost – to be recouped via tolls – ­indicated concern at keeping open the vital trade and tourist links with Canada’s foremost trading partner. That the US government was unwilling to pay the costs associated with the project, including a customs facility to be built on US soil, said something about the level of gridlock and partisanship in Washington. “I think,” Harper noted sagely to an American audience in 2013, “the real barrier to making some of these arrangements broader and more systemic in terms of the integration are actually on this side of the border [i.e., the United States].”51 The result of Ottawa’s frustrating experiences with Washington since 2009 – if not since the thickening of the border began in 2001 – was that Harper extended his gaze past the forty-ninth parallel. In 2012, the prime minister explained with regard to oil and gas: “We will make it a national priority to ensure we have the capacity to export our energy products beyond the United States, and specifically to Asia.”52 Economic Diplomacy’s Legacy The search for new markets outlined by the Conservatives in the GMAP and elsewhere was sensible enough, but as many detractors of the Harper government pointed out, the seemingly singular focus on international trade and investment – economic diplomacy – saw a diminution in Canada’s role in the world. Take, for instance, official development assistance. Chapter 15 in this volume by David R. Black goes into more detail on the Conservative government’s aid policies in Africa, so the point emphasized here is that during the latter half of the Harper years, that is during the last years of majority government, there seemed to be an alignment between aid disbursement and the pursuit of new markets. Certainly, Conservative cabinet ministers were not shy in making the connection. Commenting on aid and trade, then minister for international cooperation Bev Oda affirmed in early 2012: “I really don’t separate them.”53 Julian Fantino, her successor, was equally blunt about where the Conservatives’ priorities lay, declaring that he found it “very strange that people would not expect Canadian investments to also promote Canadian values, Canadian business, the Canadian economy.”54 He subsequently equated development assistance outlays with “investments,” noting, “This is Canadian money … And Canadians are entitled to derive a benefit. And at the very same time … we’re helping elevate these countries out of poverty.”55 While perhaps missing the

Canadian Economic Diplomacy in the Harper Years  203

point of development spending – or, rather, being surprisingly frank about its intent – this thinking and subsequent spending made clear that the Conservative government saw aid and economic development through the lens of trade promotion. The June 2013 merger of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to create the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development seemed to symbolize this symbiosis. In Reviewing CIDA’s Bilateral Engagement, a policy document produced in March 2013, less than two weeks before the government announced CIDA’s elimination as a stand-alone agency, the government emphasized that Canada’s commercial interests would be a key consideration in determining how much aid a developing country would receive. While the government had promised that Canada’s development work would retain CIDA’s poverty-­alleviation ­mandate  – a legal requirement  – a majority of the three-dozen countries included in the foreign aid report were promoted as destinations for Canadian aid in part because of the commercial benefits they could offer to Canada. For the Conservatives, the emphasis here reflected a desire to accrue some benefits from spending money abroad as well as a profound faith in the power of the private sector. The GMAP spelled out the need to “leverage development programming to advance Canada’s trade interests,” and as Christian Paradis, Fantino’s successor as international development minister, explained, “By stimulating the economy in these countries and helping them create an environment conducive to investment, we are contributing to the well-being of people living in poverty.”56 If aid and economic development seemed to take a backseat to trade and investment, then so too did the environment and human rights considerations. Much of the Conservatives’ economic diplomacy involved promoting Canada’s extractive industries, whose record of corporate social responsibility is highly questionable. In Latin America, especially, support for mining interests undermined the Americas Strategy’s call for wide-ranging Canadian engagement with the region, but so too did the conclusion of free trade agreements with countries with dubious rights records, most notably Colombia and Honduras.57 In prioritizing economic interests over human rights, the Conservatives followed a well-worn path on the part of Canadian governments. Nor was their use of development assistance to further Canadian economic goals new.58 More generally, free trade agreements have long been subject to criticism for promoting the rights of foreign investors over those of citizens and for minimizing environmental and labour standards.59 Yet while the Chrétien and Martin governments supported globalization and liberalized trade alongside a more expansive foreign policy agenda, the Harper Conservatives, by their own admission, were focused mostly on economic diplomacy. Although Conservatives share with Liberals a desire to expand Canada’s global economic presence and reduce mercantilism, one might consider Stephen Harper’s 2017 criticism

204  Asa McKercher

of Justin Trudeau’s progressive trade platform as a showcase of differences over respective trade policy if not foreign policy writ large. Indeed, these divergences between the two parties were made clear during the 2015 federal election leaders’ debate on foreign policy. Commenting on trade, Harper took a broad view, stating that in the future, “the creation and retention of good-paying jobs are going to depend vitally on having privileged trade access to the major economies of the world,” and he boasted of his government’s effort to build a trade network encompassing North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific region. Trudeau’s response was to criticize the Conservatives’ narrow foreign policy by emphasizing that “our diplomacy, our cultural exchanges, our engagement in humanitarian efforts, our climate change responsibilities all feed into how we’re able to engage in the kinds of trade deals that are going to bring good jobs to Canadians.” Firing back, Harper took ownership of the trade file and framed it in more partisan terms: “99 percent of the free trade access of this country has been created by Conservative governments. What we always get from the Liberal Party is platitudes on trade, but you don’t have the vision and you don’t have the determination to actually sit at the table, make the tough decisions and get the deal.”60 Harper’s somewhat ahistorical obfuscation of his party’s past support for free trade gives an indication of his desire to promote the Conservatives as strong supporters of an outward-facing economy in contrast to Canada’s other federal political parties. Like much of his foreign policy, then, Harper politicized trade, though the federal elections of 1891, 1911, and 1988 serve as a reminder that trade has often been viewed in highly political terms. “A  robust trade environment is the legacy we leave our children,” Ed Fast declared in his November 2013 speech announcing the shift to economic diplomacy. “It is as much a part of the Canadian essence as our national game of hockey.”61 Certainly, economic diplomacy was part of the Harper government’s foreign policy legacy, with the push into new markets a welcome development and a sensible move on the part of the Conservative government. Indeed, viewed from 2021, with protectionist sentiments still on the rise in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, it is hard to escape viewing Stephen Harper’s efforts to diversify Canada’s trade portfolio as anything other than prescient.62 It remains to be seen whether the flurry of trade deals will actually result in long-term trade growth. But the effort was certainly made to insulate the Canadian economy from unexpected global shocks by seeking alternative trade markets, bilateral free trade pacts, and even larger multi-nation trade partnerships. Economic diplomacy aligned with Stephen Harper’s core philosophical and conservative outlook, with his party’s political or electoral message, and with Canada’s status as a trading nation. As for whether the intense focus on trade served to advance other interests, readers should judge for themselves and, in doing so, might keep in mind Harper’s own declaration (in reference to

Canadian Economic Diplomacy in the Harper Years  205

China) made in 2006: “I think Canadians want us to promote our trade relations worldwide, and we do that, but I don’t think Canadians want us to sell out important Canadian values. They don’t want us to sell that out to the almighty dollar.”63 NOTES 1 Quoted in Alexander Panetta, “Stephen Harper Offers a Gloomy Take on the State of NAFTA,” CTV News, 11 October 2017, https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics /stephen-harper-offers-gloomy-take-on-the-state-of-nafta-1.3627735. 2 Quoted in Alexander Panetta, “Stephen Harper Blasts Trudeau Government for ‘Napping on NAFTA’,” Globe and Mail, 27 October 2017, https://www .theglobeand mail.com/news/politics/stephen-harper-blasts-trudeau-government -for-napping-on-nafta/article36756336/. 3 “Free Trade Steve – A Polarizing Force,” Embassy, 22 April 2009, 6. 4 Colin Robertson, “Rising Power: Stephen Harper’s Makeover of Canadian International Policy and Its Institutions,” in Jennifer Ditchburn and Graham Fox, eds., The Harper Factor (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 98; John Ibbitson, The Big Break: The Conservative Transformation of Canada’s Foreign Policy (Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2014), 5. 5 Roland Paris, “Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era,” International Journal 69, no. 3 (2014): 275. 6 Christopher J. Kukucha, “Canada’s Incremental Trade Policy,” in Adam Chapnick and Christopher J. Kukucha, eds., The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada’s Global Posture (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 195–209; Laura Dawson, “Canadian Trade and Investment Policy under the Harper Government,” in Ditchburn and Fox, eds., The Harper Factor, 160–76. 7 For a fuller treatment of Harper’s own views on free trade, globalized markets, and trade/investment liberalization, see Stephen J. Harper, Right Here, Right Now (Toronto: Signal Books, 2018). 8 Dawson, “Canadian Trade and Investment Policy,” 161. 9 Michael Hart, A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002); Geoffrey E. Hale, “In Pursuit of Leverage: The Evolution of Canadian Trade and Investment Policies in an Increasingly Multipolar World,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 18, no. 1 (2012): 106–19. 10 Roland Paris, “There Is More to Foreign Policy than Trade,” CIPS Blog, 28 November 2013, https://www.cips-cepi.ca/2013/11/28/there-is-more-to -foreign-policy-than-trade/. 11 See Asa McKercher and Leah Sarson, “Dollars and Sense? The Harper Government, Economic Diplomacy, and Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 71, no. 3 (2016): 351–70.

206  Asa McKercher 12 John Ibbitson, Stephen Harper (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2015), 118–19; Duane Bratt, “Implementing the Reform Party Agenda: The Roots of Stephen Harper’s Foreign Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 24, no. 1 (2018): 11–12. 13 Jane Taber, “PM Brands Canada an ‘Energy Superpower’,” Globe and Mail, 15 July 2006, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/pm-brands-canada-an -energy-superpower/article1105875/. 14 “Stephen Harper Targets Trudeau in Speech to Supporters in Calgary,” CTV News, 10 July 2014, https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/stephen-harper-targets-trudeau-in -speech-to-supporters-in-calgary-1.1900910/. 15 Quoted in Steven Chase, “Transcript: Harper Explains Why He Still Wants to be Prime Minister,” Globe and Mail, 17 December 2014, https://www.theglobeandmail .com/news/politics/transcript-harper-explains-why-he-still-wants-to-be-prime -minister/article22129003/. 16 Star Staff, “Read Stephen Harper’s Address to the UN General Assembly,” Toronto Star, 25 September 2014, https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/09/25/read -stephen-harpers-address-to-the-un-general-assembly.html. 17 Quoted in Kenneth Whyte, “In Conversation: Stephen Harper,” Maclean’s, 5 July 2011, https://www.macleans.ca/general/how-he-sees-canadas-role-in-the-world -and-where-he-wants-to-take-the-country-2/. 18 Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Delivers Remarks on Canada Day,” Ottawa, 1 July 2013, https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2013/07/pm-delivers-remarks -canada-day.html. 19 Quoted in Robert E. Rubin, “A Conversation with Stephen Harper,” Council on Foreign Relations, 16 May 2013, https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-stephen -harper-prime-minister-canada. 20 Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD), “Address by Minister Fast to the Economic Club of Canada,” Ottawa, 27 November 2013, https://www .canada.ca/en/news/archive/2013/12/address-minister-fast-economic-club-canada .html. See also Government of Canada, Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 2013 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, March 2013), 129–35. 21 Quoted in Ira Basen, “Spin Cycle: Only the Conservatives Are Free Traders, Right?” CBC News, 6 October 2015, https://www.cbc.ca.news/politics/canada -election-2015-free-trade-conservatives-tpp-1.3255305. 22 DFATD, “Address by Minister Fast.” 23 Quoted in Globe Staff, “Six Diplomats Differ on Canada’s New ‘Dollar Diplomacy’,” Globe and Mail, 27 November 2013, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion /the-globe-debate-dollar-diplomacy/article15626719/. Also see Campbell Clark, “Ottawa’s Dollar Diplomacy: It’s the End of the World as We Knew It,” Globe and Mail, 27 November 2013, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/globe -politics-insider/ottawas-dollar-diplomacy-its-the-end-of-the-world-as-we-knew -it/article15621712/. 24 Quoted in John Ibbitson, “Tories’ New Foreign-Affairs Vision Shifts Focus to ‘Economic Diplomacy’,” Globe and Mail, 27 November 2013, https://www.theglobeandmail.com

Canadian Economic Diplomacy in the Harper Years  207

25 26

27

28

29

30 31 32

33

34

35 36

37

38

/news/politics/tories-new-foreign-affairs-vision-shifts-focus-to-economic-diplomacy /article15624653/. Quoted in Whyte, “In Conversation.” Robert Wolfe, “Trade Policy Is (Still) Foreign Policy, but It’s Not Sexy,” in Paul Heinbecker and Fen Osler Hampson, eds., As Others See Us: Canada Among Nations 2010 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 294. Quoted in Terry Pedwell, “Canada-Ukraine Trade Deal Will Strengthen Ties, Stephen Harper Says,” Toronto Star, 14 July 2015, https://www.thestar.com/news /canada/2015/07/14/trade-deal-between-canada-ukraine-said-pending.html. “Canada Can Pursue Trade Deal While Protecting Supply Management: Harper,” CBC News, 25 June 2015, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-can-pursue -trade-deal-while-protecting-supply-management-harper-1.3127674. Barrie McKenna, “Canada Bounced from Trans-Pacific Trade Talks,” Globe and Mail, 26 October 2010, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business /economy/economy-lab/canada-bounced-from-trans-pacific-trade-talks /article1370649/. Quoted in Chuck Chiang, “Canada Ramps Up Focus on Southeast Asian Trade,” Vancouver Sun, 16 March 2015, A16. John Ibbitson and Steven Chase, “With NDP and Tories at Odds, Trade Pact Emerges as Flashpoint,” Globe and Mail, 4 August 2015, A1. Quoted in Jason Fekete, “EU, Canada Trade Deal Reached in Brussels after 4 Years of Negotiations,” Financial Post, 18 October 2013, https://financialpost.com/news /economy/eu-canada-trade-deal-finalized-in-brussels-after-4-years-of -negotiations. Konrad Yakabuski, “CETA’s Nice. But NAFTA Is Essential,” Globe and Mail, 28 October 2013, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/cetas-nice-but -nafta-is-essential/article15086957/. Quoted in Janyce McGregor, “Stephen Harper Confident as Final EU Trade Deal Released,” CBC News, 26 September 2014, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics /stephen-harper-confident-as-final-eu-trade-deal-released-1.2778715. John Hancock, “The Third Option: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Come?” International Journal 70, no. 2 (2015): 324. DFATD, Global Markets Action Plan: A Blueprint for Creating Jobs and Opportunities for Canadians Through Trade (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2013), https://international.gc.ca/global-markets-marches -mondiaux/assets/pdfs/plan-eng.pdf. James Bradshaw, “As Ottawa Pushes for Foreign Students, Universities Worry about Spaces for Canadians,” Globe and Mail, 16 January 2014, https://www .theglobeandmail.com/news/national/education/as-ottawa-pushes-for-foreign -students-critics-worry-about-how-schools-will-handle-them/article16378000/. Quoted in Jason Fekete, “Government Looks to Craft New Global Commerce Strategy,” Vancouver Sun, 28 May 2012, https://vancouversun.com/news /government-looks-to-craft-new-global-commerce-strategy.

208  Asa McKercher 39 Derek Burney and Fen Hampson, “Canada-US Drifting Apart? Blame America,” Globe and Mail, 13 October 2014, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion /canada-us-drifting-apart-blame-america/article21051788/. See also Derek Burney, Thomas d’Aquino, Leonard Edwards, and Fen Osler Hampson, Winning in a Changing World: Canada and Emerging Markets (Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2012), 1–28. 40 Mark Carney, “Globalisation, Financial Stability and Employment” (speech, Toronto, ON, 22 August 2012), Canadian Auto Workers, https://www .bankofcanada.ca/2012/08/globalisation-financial-stability-employment/; Edward Greenspon, ed., Open Canada: A Global Positioning Strategy for a Networked Age (Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2010), 20. See also Conference Board of Canada, “What Might Canada’s Future Exports Look Like?” Briefing (Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada, November 2012), 1–20; Brian Bow, “Defying Gravity: Canada’s Search for Counterweights to the United States,” in Janice Gross Stein, ed., Diplomacy in the Digital Age: Essays in Honour of Ambassador Allan Gotlieb (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2011), 70–83. 41 Government of Canada, Canada and the Americas: Priorities and Progress (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2009), 3. 42 Stephen Harper, “Prime Minister Harper Signals Canada’s Renewed Engagement in the Americas,” Santiago, Chile, 17 July 2007, https://www.canada.ca/en/news /archive/2007/07/prime-minister-harper-signals-canadas-renewed-engagement -americas.html. 43 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Evaluation of the Americas Strategy,” January 2011, https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc /publications/evaluation/2011/tas_lsa11.aspx?lang=eng. 44 Peter McKenna, ed., Canada Looks South: In Search of an Americas Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). 45 Stephen Harper, “Evidence Still Points to Growth in Canada,” Wall Street Journal, 26 August 2011, https://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904875404576 531031446794702. 46 Quoted in Whyte, “In Conversation.” And see the report by a former Harper chief of staff: Ian Brodie, After America, Canada’s Moment? (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2015). 47 Quoted in Rubin, “A Conversation with Stephen Harper.” 48 Stephen Harper, “A Conversation with the Prime Minister,” interview by L. Ian MacDonald, Policy Options, 1 February 2008, https://policyoptions.irpp.org /magazines/the-dollar/a-conversation-with-the-prime-minister-interview/. 49 Derek Burney, “A Fresh Start on Improving Economic Competitiveness and Perimeter Security,” University of Calgary, School of Public Policy Publications 4, no. 8 (August 2011). 50 Luiza Ch. Savage, “Land of the Freeloaders: The Battle for a New Cross-Border Bridge,” Maclean’s, 21 May 2015, https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/land-of -the-freeloaders-the-battle-for-a-new-cross-border-bridge/.

Canadian Economic Diplomacy in the Harper Years  209 51 Quoted in Rubin, “A Conversation with Stephen Harper.” 52 PMO “Full Transcript: Statement Made by Prime Minister Stephen Harper at the World Economic Forum,” Global News, 26 January 2012, https://globalnews.ca /news/204186/full-transcript-statement-made-by-prime-minister-stephen-harper -at-the-world-economic-forum/. 53 Quoted in Elizabeth Payne, “Foreign Aid Gets Down to Business,” Ottawa Citizen, 27 January 2012, A3. See also Stephen Brown, “Canadian Aid Policy during the Harper Years,” in Adam Chapnick and Christopher J. Kukucha, eds., The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada’s Global Posture (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 167–80. 54 Quoted in Kim Mackrael, “Canada’s Foreign Aid Doesn’t Exist to Keep NGOs Afloat, Fantino Says,” Globe and Mail, 28 November 2012, https://www.theglobeandmail.com /news/politics/canadas-foreign-aid-doesnt-exist-to-keep-ngos-afloat-fantino-says /article5751774/. 55 Quoted in Kim Mackrael, “Fantino Defends CIDA’s Corporate Shift,” Globe and Mail, 3 December 2012, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/fantino -defends-cidas-corporate-shift/article5950443/. 56 DFATD, “Statement by Minister Paradis: Development as an Integral Part of Canadian Foreign and Trade Policy,” 5 December 2013, https://www.canada.ca /en/news/archive/2013/12/statement-minister-paradis-development-an-integral -part-canadian-foreign-trade-policy.html; Kim Mackrael, “Commercial Motives Driving Canada’s Foreign Aid, Documents Reveal,” Globe and Mail, 8 January 2014, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/commercial-interests -taking-focus-in-canadas-aid-to-developing-world/article16240406/. 57 Maria Teresa Aya Smitmans, “Canada and Colombia: A Rhetorical Relationship?” in McKenna, ed., Canada Looks South, 265–87; Kalowatie Deonandan and Michael L. Dougherty, eds., Mining in Latin America: Critical Approaches to the New Extraction (New York: Routledge, 2016). 58 Daniel Webster, “Canada and Bilateral Human Rights Dialogues,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 16, no. 3 (2010): 43–63; Kim Richard Nossal, “Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada’s Interest in Development Assistance,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 21, no. 1 (1988): 35–56. 59 A voluminous literature on this issue exists. For an early criticism of free trade agreements, see Bruce W. Wilkinson, “Trade Liberalization, the Market Ideology, and Morality: Have We a Sustainable System?” in Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell Cameron, eds., Political Economy of North American Free Trade (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), 27–43. 60 “Tale of the Tape: Transcript of the Munk Debate,” Maclean’s, 28 September 2015, https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/tale-of-the-tape-transcript-of-the-munk -debate-on-the-refugee-crisis/. 61 DFATD, “Address by Minister Fast.” 62 Interestingly, current Conservative Party Leader Erin O’Toole – once a member of Harper’s cabinet – seems to have charted a different trade course. See Bianca

210  Asa McKercher Bharti, “‘It’s Redundant’: Economists Puzzled Over O’Toole’s Pledged Trade Strategy,” Financial Post, 23 August 2021, https://financialpost.com/news/economy /its-redundant-economists-puzzled-over-otooles-pledged-trade-strategy; David Parkinson, “O’Toole’s Anti-trade, Anti-business Stand Is at Odds with His Own Party’s History,” Globe and Mail, 9 August 2021, B4. 63 Quoted in “Won’t ‘Sell Out’ on Rights Despite China Snub: PM,” CBC News, 15 November 2006, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/won-t-sell-out-on-rights -despite-china-snub-pm-1.570708.

10 The Recasting of the Arctic Sovereignty Theme: Assessing Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy andrea charron

When one reflects on the prime ministership of Stephen Harper, the Arctic obviously looms large. It is easy to forget that several prime ministers have featured the Arctic as part of national and international policy decisions. The key question here is whether or not the Arctic policies adopted under Harper were fundamentally different in terms of their end goals from previous Arctic governmental approaches. The answer is a qualified “no,” because it is difficult to control for international events that require, invariably, shifts in policy. What has not changed for successive prime ministers is the now ingrained southern Canadian public acceptance of the Canadian Arctic as something special and something that requires defending in some form or other. It is this Canadian assumption that the Harper Conservatives were able to exploit with great success (even for electoral purposes), coupled with a number of Arctic-related international events that corresponded to his almost ten years in office, that makes the Harper Arctic policy starker in comparison to the policies of his predecessors. This preference for policies that call for the protection of the Arctic (which the Harper government happily obliged) obfuscates the shift that was made post-2009 to focus on the development of the North to support the business-dominant Conservative Party platform. Harper is credited rarely for his government’s support to Indigenous Permanent Participants, or for keeping the Arctic Council together at a time when there were calls for the Russians to be kicked out. In some ways, he was a victim of his own success in capitalizing on a popular Canadian theme – that is, of the Arctic as vulnerable to the rest of the world. This crucial idea is now cemented in the collective psyche of Canadians, even if their attention to Canada’s Northern issues waxes and wanes. This chapter  is broken into seven sections. First, the “southern” Canadian view of the Arctic will be reviewed to show that the Canadian public was, by and large, primed for the Arctic sovereignty theme. Next, Harper’s main Arctic policies will be reviewed to set the stage for sections three, four, and five, corresponding to specific policies as they related to Russia; the Danes, the US,

212  Andrea Charron

and the Arctic Council; and new foci – especially the discovery of Franklin’s doomed ships. Section six asks “why” Harper focused attention particularly on the Arctic, and section seven provides a “lessons learned” of sorts. While the focus is on Harper’s Arctic foreign policies, especially as they relate to Canada’s relationship with the seven other Arctic states and various international organizations, it is very difficult to completely separate out domestic policies and electoral considerations given the federal government’s relationship to and responsibility for Canada’s three Northern territories. The Southern Canadian View of the Arctic Samantha Arnold captures best the cooption of the Inuit as “quintessentially Canadian folk” that has come to serve as the foundation of Canada’s Arctic narrative of an area to be saved and protected from outside threats.1 The logic is as follows: Southern Canadians construct their identity and narrative via comparison. If we imagine and embrace Inuit as simple, pure folk, then Southerners,2 in contrast, are portrayed as their strong, industrious protectors, reinforced in comic books like Nelvana of the Northern Lights.3 This dichotomy is reflected in the English version of the national anthem, “the true North strong and free,” which is more accurately “the true North is protected and stronger because of southern Canada at great cost,” at least from the coopted perspective. Canadians overlook the fact that Inuit are the largest non-crown landholders in Canada, and that many of the “threats” facing Northerners are challenges related to domestic policies (like the lack of infrastructure and employment opportunities) and a lack of financial resources. The 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic symbol of the inuksuk, for example, was described as “a uniquely Canadian symbol of friendship, hospitality, strength, teamwork and the vast Canadian landscape.”4 Canadians and their governments have often used the Arctic, its peoples, and their symbols as a way to distinguish Canada from the rest of the world, and especially from its powerful southern Arctic neighbour, the United States. This view of the Arctic as pristine, vulnerable, and in need of defending is not new but has in fact developed over 150 years. In parallel, successive Canadian governments have sought to manage and clarify the Arctic space and their relationship with Indigenous peoples. The three most common tools used by the Canadian government have been laws/treaties/agreements, infrastructure, and presence – both civilian and military in all three cases. Before and after the First World War, the focus of the Canadian government was on clarifying the land boundaries of the Arctic.5 Once that was achieved in 1930, attention turned to the defence of the Arctic during the Second World War, the building of the Alaska Highway to support the lend-lease program, and, immediately after the war, the installation and monitoring of radar lines. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was said to be “gripped by a polar passion” and encouraged the development of the North. His subsequent “Roads to

Assessing Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy  213

Resources” element of the National Development Policy of the late 1950s that called for millions of dollars of infrastructure was not only aimed at defeating communism by accessing valuable resources in the Arctic via newly planned roads like the Dempster Highway but would also complete the vision of Sir John A. Macdonald of a connected Canada;6 while Macdonald had opened the West, it was up to Diefenbaker to connect the North.7 Diefenbaker’s government not only created the Canadian Coast Guard but even proposed legislation in 1963 to split the Northwest Territories into two so as to spur responsible government by Indigenous peoples, but that proposal subsequently died on the order paper.8 During the Cold War and in response to voyages by the SS Manhattan (in 1969 and 1970) and the USCGC Polar Sea in 1985, Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Brian Mulroney created the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and the Canada-US 1988 Arctic Agreement, respectively, to respond to these perceived US incursions into Canada’s Arctic. Furthermore, under Mulroney, Canada enclosed its Arctic archipelago in straight baselines, putting to rest any doubts regarding Canada’s Arctic maritime territory,9 and saw the upgrading of the Distant Early Warning Line to the North Warning System. Development was also pursued by both governments via negotiations towards land claims agreements; Mulroney’s 1986 decision to adopt a Comprehensive Land Claims Policy helped set the stage for the eventual establishment of Nunavut under the Jean Chrétien government. Chrétien also supported and signed the 1996 Ottawa Declaration that transformed the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy into the Arctic Council – a major feature and impetus for Jean Chrétien to launch the Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy strategy in 2000.10 This was followed by Paul Martin’s 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS), which singled out the Arctic as one of three geographical areas of the world that needed increased attention and action. Both the defence and diplomacy chapters of the IPS referenced the need to protect and defend Canadian sovereignty and security in the Arctic. This very brief overview of just some of the actions of past Canadian governments reveals that (1) the Arctic has remained a feature of importance for successive governments; (2) laws/treaties/agreements, infrastructure, and presence have been common go-to policy options for said governments; and (3) Canadians have been primed to think of the Arctic as requiring its protection/ guidance/assistance for generations to come. Harper’s Arctic Policies Nearly ten years after Canada had formed and championed the Arctic Council – the premier intergovernmental forum to deal with environmental protection issues and sustainable development on the world stage with seven other Arctic state neighbours and the Indigenous Permanent Participants – Harper launched his 2005–6 federal election campaign with a call for more to be done by Canada

214  Andrea Charron Figure 10.1.  The four pillars of the Harper Northern Strategy

in the Arctic. Harper promised that he would provide the necessary military infrastructure needed to defend Canada’s Arctic sovereignty.11 Three years later, as a minority government, and with the UN’s international Polar Year in the background (2007–8),12 the first “explicit” Arctic policy document that the Conservative government published was Canada’s Northern Strategy in 2009.13 Echoing the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy, the first of four priority areas was “exercising … Arctic sovereignty” through a stronger military presence in the Arctic in the form of personnel and new equipment. While many focus on this first pillar, the other three are often overlooked (see Figure 10.1). The other three pillars of Canada’s Northern Strategy included encouraging social and economic development, including the creation of the widely criticized Nutrition North Canada program;14 adapting to climate change; and devolution. Harper appointed an Inuk, Minister of Health Leona Aglukkaq, as Canada’s Arctic Council minister in 2008. Aglukkaq was not the first Indigenous woman to serve as chair of the Arctic Council – Mary Simon (now Canada’s Governor-General) held that honour between 1996 and 1998 under Chrétien – but Aglukkaq was the first Indigenous cabinet minister ever, and her position as minister of health and later minister of the environment and minister of Northern Development did fit logically with the mandates of the Arctic Council and Harper’s overall Northern Strategy. Unlike past Northern government documents, though, the Northern Strategy was written in English, French, and Inuktitut, a very important and significant symbolic change that set an important precedent for all future Arctic policy statements. The Strategy begins with the usual Canadian platitude: “Canada’s far North is a fundamental part of Canada – it is part of our heritage, our future and our identity as a country.”15 But while sovereignty might be the first pillar, the Arctic vision of the Strategy reverses the order and puts references to sovereignty last. The vision of the Arctic is one in which: • Self-reliant individuals live in healthy, vital communities, manage their own affairs and shape their own destinies; • The Northern tradition of respect for the land and the environment is paramount and the principles of responsible and sustainable development anchor all decision-making and action;

Assessing Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy  215

• Strong, responsible, accountable governments work together for a vibrant, prosperous future for all – a place whose people and governments are significant contributing partners to a dynamic, secure Canadian federation; and • We patrol and protect our territory through an enhanced presence on the land, in the sea and over the skies of the Arctic.16 Indeed, the first three goals of the vision are reminiscent of the spirit of the Liberal Party’s human security paradigm that Harper tried so hard to avoid repeating. Two years later in 2010, the Harper government released a Canadian Arctic Foreign Policy to complement the Northern Strategy. It too begins with the familiar trope  – “[t]he Arctic is fundamental to Canada’s national ­identity”17 – and then outlines the same four pillars as the Northern Strategy. Its overall vision, too, was little changed from that outlined in the initial Strategy: Our vision for the Arctic is a stable, rules-based region with clearly defined boundaries, dynamic economic growth and trade, vibrant Northern communities, and healthy and productive ecosystems. This Arctic foreign policy statement articulates how the Government of Canada will promote this vision, using leadership and stewardship. It elaborates on Canadian interests in the Arctic and how Canada is pursuing these.18

No government to date had both a national strategy and a foreign policy statement specifically for the Arctic, and the first pillar  – sovereignty  – was viewed with scepticism among the other Arctic states; no other Arctic state discussed “sovereignty” as a concern let alone as a pillar of their Arctic policies, which seemed a particularly Canadian fascination. Petra Dolata, having weighed the commentary of the time, notes that Harper’s Arctic policy “shift” was not paradigmatic but one of degrees; “the theme of Arctic sovereignty was merely used in an ‘inflationary’ manner by the Conservative government.”19 The sovereignty theme did, however, serve as justification for the Conservative government’s planned military expenditures, namely (1) building six to eight armed Polar Class 5 Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS); (2) the establishment of a multi-purpose Arctic training centre in Resolute Bay, Nunavut; (3) the creation of a berthing and refuelling facility at the existing deep water port of Nanisivik, Nunavut, to serve as a staging area for naval vessels in the High Arctic and for use by Canadian Coast Guard vessels; (4) the establishment of a permanent army reserve unit based in Yellowknife; (5) plans to enhance the ability of the Canadian Forces to conduct surveillance through the modernization and replacement of the Aurora patrol aircraft; (6) the Polar Epsilon Project, which would provide space-based surveillance using information from Canada’s RADARSAT-2 satellite to produce imagery for military commanders

216  Andrea Charron

during the conduct of operations; and (7) the replacement of the aged CF18s, which some commentators viewed as critical to Arctic sovereign control and vital for search and rescue scenarios, even though fighter aircraft are not normally used in this capacity.20 In addition to these defence-oriented projects, there were others aimed at improving maritime safety in the Arctic given anticipated increased activity. The policy changes included (1) a new polarclass icebreaker for the Canadian Coast Guard (to be named the Diefenbaker)21 to replace the aging flagship, CCGS Louis St-Laurent, which was scheduled to be decommissioned in 2017 but now has a planned refit;22 (2) a change to the maritime Northern Canada vessel traffic services zone (NORDREG) to be mandatory for vessels of a certain size to register as well as to extend it to 200 nautical miles (M);23 and (3) controversially, a change to Canada’s Arctic Waters Pollution Prevent Act to extend its geographic application from 100 to 200 M to match the extent of Canada’s exclusive economic maritime zone and the now extended NORDREG zone. Improving and devolving governance raised several eyebrows with the other Arctic states, each of which has a different relationship and governance framework with Indigenous peoples (including Canada). Add to this the fact that the Harper government had been one of only four states to reject the UN General Assembly’s resolution to adopt the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), and Canada found itself having lost some international credibility.24 In the end, what the Harper government essentially meant by devolving governance via a foreign policy was to invite the other Arctic states to support their Permanent Participant Indigenous groups as Ottawa had done for the Canadian representatives on the Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, and the Arctic Athabaskan Council, and to send Indigenous youth to Arctic Council-sponsored events. With these three policy documents in place – the Canada First Defence Strategy (2008), the Northern Strategy (2009), and the Statement on Arctic Foreign Policy (2010) – Canadians and the world should have been clear about how the Harper government viewed the Arctic and its role; yes, “sovereignty protection” via the military was a central feature, but so too was programing to improve the health and economic status of Northerners (albeit with inadequate programing and funding support). Political rhetoric and speeches, however, muddied these key goals. As well, geopolitical events that occurred both before and after the release of these documents, coupled with a singularly popular communication message of being tough on X (and then fill in the blank with crime, terrorism, or sovereignty), helped to solidify the Harper = sovereignty theme. Enter Russia Peter MacKay will probably forever be remembered for his passionate outburst when one of two Russian Mir submersibles planted a Russian flag on the

Assessing Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy  217

bottom of the sea floor directly below the North Pole on 2 August 2007. The reaction of the then defence minister was to exclaim: “You can’t go around the world these days dropping a flag somewhere, this isn’t the 14th or 15th century.”25 While many Canadians were equally shocked, engineers and scientists from around the world charged with collecting evidence for submissions to recognize extended continental shelves were in awe. The best evidence to provide to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is physical soil samples from the outer limits of the proposed extended shelf. If the arm on the mini sub that planted the flag could do so beneath the North Pole, then it could collect evidence of flora and fauna as well (which it did). It was an incredible feat of engineering regardless of perceived hidden agendas. At the time, there were wildly inaccurate statements about the UN process for applying to have a state’s extended continental shelf recognized beyond the 200 M exclusive economic zone – when an initial map of potential and liberal competing claims created by Durham University was read by pundits to portend imminent armed conflict.26 Given this background and Harper’s strident calls to defend the Arctic, the “sovereignty” pillar – and its electoral importance – dominated subsequent discussions on the Arctic. At roughly the same time, in early August 2007, the Canadian military launched a series of exercises in the Canadian Arctic. The biggest and most well-known was dubbed Operation Nanook, which took place across different locations within the three Canadian territories.27 Harper made it a point to be present for at least part of the operations every year until 2015 – his final election campaigning year. Dubbed as “sovereignty” exercises, they were more accurately defined as interoperability exercises. Other government departments, like the RCMP, the Canadian Coast Guard, Parks Canada, Transport Canada, and Environment Canada, in addition to the Canadian (now referenced as Armed under Harper) Forces, practised working together in various search and rescue and other aid of the civil powers’ scenarios as well as some combat situations. In 2010, the US Navy, the US Coast Guard, and the Royal Danish Navy were invited to participate as well, but not as NATO partners, simply as Arctic allies and neighbours. Each year during Harper’s tenure, Operation Nanook grew larger in terms of the number of personnel involved, the territory covered, and the scope of the exercises. That Operation Nanook was launched and created was necessary; Canadian Armed Forces capabilities in the Arctic had atrophied after the end of the Cold War, and Russian Arctic air patrols using long-range bombers resumed in 2007 after years of quiet.28 However, the cost of the exercises, especially after the 2008–09 global economic recession, was always a concern, and the level of involvement with local, especially Indigenous, communities was uneven (except for the participation of the Canadian Rangers, who were important partners in the execution of the exercises). Despite continued references by the Harper government that Arctic sovereignty needed to be defended, the 2010 House of Commons Standing

218  Andrea Charron

Committee on National Defence underlined that “there [was] no immediate military threat to Canadian territories either in or ‘through’ the Arctic.”29 For the Harper government and for Conservative branding, the photo opportunities that were available during these exercises were politically priceless; there are few more iconic pictures than Harper in his Ranger red hoodie as an honourary Canadian Ranger on an Operation Nanook exercise. The optics were obviously electorally charged. And yet, at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), Canada and Russia were among the most fervent supporters of a mandatory Polar Code to ensure adequate vessel safety standards, and a mandatory and comprehensive regulatory framework, which came into effect on 1 January 2017.30 On the domestic Arctic front, Harper portrayed Russia as the problem. But on the international Arctic front, Russia was actually a solid partner for Canada. Enter the Danes, the Americans, and the Arctic Council While most Canadians could understand the need to defend against a former Cold War enemy, how to defend against conflicts with the Danes and the Americans – two stalwart allies – was harder to articulate. Canada has had a longstanding disagreement with the Danes on two fronts: the maritime boundary in the Lincoln Sea and the ownership of Hans Island – the 1.3 square kilometres of rock in the middle of the Nares Strait. Both have been written about at length and both are considered as “managed” diplomatically; memoranda of understanding have been penned and are ready for final signatures for both issues. However, it was the media frenzy over Hans Island and the resulting back and forth trips to the island by Canadian and Danish forces that fascinated many; the Canadians would erect a Canadian flag, make an inuksuk, and leave, jokingly, a Tim Hortons cup, Canadian rye, and, in 2005, a brass plaque, while the Danes would raise the Danish flag and leave a bottle of aquavit (akvavit).31 The ongoing diplomatic “disputes” with the US have been more difficult to minimize. The US has never agreed, on principle, to the use of straight baselines to calculate maritime boundaries by any state. Add to that the need to defend the freedom of navigation around the world, especially through international straits like the Strait of Hormuz, and one can appreciate why the US is unlikely to agree to Canada’s characterization of the Northwest Passage as “historic internal” waters (partly by virtue of Canada’s use of straight baselines) as opposed to an international strait connecting two high seas (like the Atlantic to the Beaufort). The Harper government walked a fine line between pressing the issue, which was the logical conclusion of a “sovereignty first” theme, and letting the bilateral situation remain as a diplomatically “managed disagreement.” The other conflict with the US has been the long-standing maritime delimitation issue in the Beaufort Sea. While Canada uses the 141st meridian line

Assessing Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy  219

extending from the boundary between the Yukon and Alaska as the natural prolongation into the Beaufort Sea, the US supports an extended sea boundary into the Canadian portion of the Beaufort Sea. Neither side seemed keen to resolve this disagreement – especially since there were other, more pressing issues on the horizon.32 The then named Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) was slow to unveil Canada’s agenda for its second term as the chair of the Arctic Council set for 2013–15 for a variety of reasons. First, to be fair to the federal public service, the federal cuts (under the Deficit Reduction Action Plan) were in full swing and resources were scarce for the Canadian chairship, undercutting strong linkages between existing federal program funding and Canada’s chairship. Second, Conservative Minister Aglukkaq was now minister of the environment (and minister of the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency) representing a Harper government resistant to the Kyoto Protocol to combat climate change, which created challenges for bureaucrats in terms of message consistency  – after all, the Arctic Council’s two mandates are environmental protection and sustainable development. Third, many government departments needed to be consulted, although Foreign Affairs and the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency remained the lead organizations. Fourth, public messaging was tightly controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office – as discussed in the McKenna chapter in this volume – which slowed down communications considerably. Finally, Minister Aglukkaq had some very specific ideas about her goals for the Arctic Council chairship that were not always aligned with the Council’s international priorities; often constituent-specific issues were highlighted rather than more common and general Arctic-­wide issues.33 All of these factors slowed the unveiling of Canada’s Arctic Council agenda for 2013–15, which proclaimed very ambitious and connected Nordic terms that focused on a cooperative future vision of the Arctic. In the end, Canada chose the motto “development for the people of the North” for its two year chairship, with many commentators cringing at the use of the word “for” rather than “with.”34 The three goals of Canada’s term included (1) responsible resource development, (2) safe Arctic shipping, and (3) sustainable circumpolar communities. No mention was made of the need to protect or defend Canadian sovereignty – nor what exactly that would entail. At the handover in Kiruna of the chairship from Sweden to Canada, a crucial decision had to be made to recognize a growing list of potential Observers (which is open to non-Arctic states, inter-parliamentary and inter-governmental organizations as well as non-governmental organizations). Applications from eight non-governmental organizations (the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists, Greenpeace, the International Hydrographic Organization, Oceana, the OSPAR Commission,

220  Andrea Charron

the World Meteorological Organization, and the European Union) and six non-Arctic states (China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, India, and Italy) were received in 2013. So many were the numbers of interested potential Observers that the Arctic Council, pressed by Canada, drafted rules of engagement for Observers.35 In the end, only the six states were granted Observer status. The decision to recognize Observers was made by consensus among the eight Arctic states in consultation with the Permanent Participants – meaning that each of the Arctic states had a “veto” of sorts. Despite Harper’s reluctance to allow states like China to gain Observer status, the decision was made to admit China, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. When in 2015 Canada handed over the chairship to the US, Greece, Turkey, Mongolia, and Switzerland were among the Observer applicants for that year, together with the eight non-state entities (including the EU and Greenpeace) that were left out at the last Ministerial Meeting in May 2013 in Kiruna. This time, no new Observers were invited to join: the ratio of member states and Permanent Participants to Observers was already one to two, or sixteen decision-makers/Participants to thirty-two Observers.36 Canada’s chairship of the Arctic Council was, however, noteworthy for four reasons. First, the Harper government had to continually dodge the fact that it had decided not to meet its Kyoto Protocol targets but was still chairing the Arctic Council with a mandate to protect the environment, and that Canada was the second largest Arctic state – a region dubbed as climate change’s veritable canary in the coal mine. Compounding this disconnect of Canadian foreign policy was US President Barack Obama, who was Harper’s foil in many ways: charismatic and a staunch supporter of international efforts to combat climate change. Despite this awkwardness, Canada was an engaged member of the Arctic Council and signed on to two binding agreements: the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011) and the Agreement on Cooperation in Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2011). The second event of note, while not directly related to the Arctic Council, more rightly should have been conducted within an Arctic Council framework. In 2010, Canada convened a meeting of the Arctic Five (formally called the Arctic Ocean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, attended by the five littoral Arctic states) in Chelsea, Quebec, to discuss issues of mutual concern including maritime boundary delimitations. This was not the first time that the five states had met together; in 2008, in Ilulissat, Greenland, the five Arctic states produced a non-binding declaration promising to solve any conflicts between them pertaining to the Arctic using the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as the ultimate guide.37 The Chelsea meeting, in contrast, resulted in a chair’s summary released by then Canadian foreign minister Lawrence Cannon highlighting areas of importance to the Arctic Five, which, upon inspection, could have

Assessing Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy  221

been discussed with and benefitted from the input of the other members of the Arctic Council. The statement notes that the five states agree that 1. Any overlapping continental shelf application will be resolved in an orderly fashion (i.e., as per the Ilulissat Declaration); 2. The states should continue to work towards a binding Search and Rescue Agreement; 3. Scientific research, especially as it relates to natural resource development and fisheries, was important (note that traditional knowledge was not mentioned); 4. The Arctic Council’s Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines need to be implemented to ensure the protection of the Arctic marine environment; and 5. The creation of an Arctic regional hydrographic commission to enhance understanding of the features of oceans and for safe navigation was a good idea.38 The meeting backfired badly and drew negative headlines. Canada was even chastised by then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the first US secretary of state to attend an Arctic gathering, for convening a meeting of just the five states and marginalizing the other members of the Arctic Council.39 The “Arctic Five” was, for a short while, a pejorative term. While the Arctic Ocean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting may have initially been viewed in a negative light, especially by the Arctic Council, it has since established itself as an important forum for discussions on marine issues, especially with respect to fisheries. The third thing of note during Canada’s tenure as chair of the Arctic Council was its drive to create an Arctic Economic Council (AEC) that would take the intergovernmental forum in a new direction. The AEC was roundly criticized by many as being merely a lobby group for big oil corporations.40 But the AEC is an independent organization with a governance structure that includes three business representatives from each Arctic state, from each of the Permanent Participants (Legacy and Northern partners), and from what are referred to as “Southern” partners (i.e., non-Arctic state-based businesses and “permafrost” partners), and very small Arctic-based businesses. Still, a cursory look at the executive council of the AEC suggests that big businesses are indeed overrepresented.41 The fourth noteworthy event received little press but is probably the single most important foreign policy decision that Canada took vis-à-vis the Arctic since its decision to launch the Arctic Council in 1996. Despite calls for biting sanctions and an end to all cooperation with Russia after its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Canada, as chair, did not call for Russia’s removal from the Arctic Council. To do so, given that Russia is the largest and most powerful Arctic state, would have effectively meant the end of the Arctic Council.

222  Andrea Charron

Moreover, it would have stymied the considerable progress made, including two binding agreements among the eight Arctic states on search and rescue and oil spill preparedness, and the half-hearted efforts to include Arctic Indigenous peoples in decision-making processes. In the end, Canada’s chairship between 2013 and 2015, despite the eleven initiatives that it carried forward from past chairships, can best be described as “place holding” – neither ambitious nor disappointing. While no groundbreaking agreements were concluded, Canada did continue to make progress in the ongoing work of the Council and began, for example, a task force which led to the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation signed in Fairbanks, Alaska, on 11 May 2017. John Higginbotham, former assistant deputy minister of foreign affairs and then senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation,42 organized a series of workshops, with DFAIT’s funding and backing, to raise awareness about the United States’ upcoming term. Partnering with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, a “Passing the Torch” workshop with all of the key players was convened to take stock of Canada’s chairship, the upcoming US term, and the priorities of the US under their motto “One Arctic: Shared Opportunities, Challenges and Responsibilities,” already chosen a year in advance.43 The Arctic Council meeting in Iqaluit on 24 April 2015 to handover the chairship from Canada to the US was a major logistical challenge given the limited capacity of the town to host so many delegates, but especially given the background geopolitics involving Russia in Eastern Europe and Syria, which ultimately required that a showcase event for the Arctic Council Working Groups be cancelled because of the political difficulty around travel for Russian delegates. Instead, Canada hosted a parallel event at the Canadian Museum of Nature in Ottawa to increase the visibility of the Arctic Council among the Canadian public. In the final analysis, credit has to be given to Canada for holding the Arctic Council together, especially after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and especially given that Harper had been a very vocal critic of President Vladimir Putin, famously rebuking him by saying “get out of Ukraine” at a G20 meeting in Australia in 2014.44 New Foci? When it ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 2003 under Chrétien, Canada knew that it would have until 2013 to put together submissions to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to recognize extended continental shelves off its three coasts. As the 7 December 2013 deadline drew nearer, the Department of Natural Resources’ Polar Continental staff were confident they had the necessary evidence to make submissions for extended Atlantic and Arctic shelves, having consulted with Canadian

Assessing Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy  223

Dr.  Richard Haworth, a highly qualified marine geophysicist and one of the Commission’s twenty-one experts charged with reviewing state applications.45 (A submission was not made for the Pacific shelf as it drops off too sharply to claim beyond the already provided for 200 M.) Polar Continental staff and scientists, based at the Roy M. “Fritz” Koerner Laboratory in Resolute and elsewhere, had worked long and hard, and often with Danish and US partners, to collect the necessary data. In 2011, the crash of First Air Flight 6560 in Resolute on 20 August, took the life of Martin Bergmann, the director of Canada’s Polar Continental Shelf Program and eleven other staff and local community members. Despite the losses, which were keenly felt by all, including the tiny community of Resolute, the 7 December 2013 deadline was to be, in part, a celebration of lost colleagues and a testament to the skill of Canadian public servants and scientists. But at the very last moment, on 4 December 2013, Stephen Harper intervened personally, and put a halt to the Arctic submission, suggesting that scientists had more work to do to probe the outer limits to the North Pole. While the Atlantic submission proceeded to the Commission, the Arctic submission consisted of only a letter of intent and the promise of corroborating evidence in the fullness of time.46 The feeling of betrayal among scientists and bureaucrats was palpable – here again was evidence of Harper stifling a scientific process. It did not help that on 28 February 2013, the Russian Federation submitted a revised application to the Commission concerning its Arctic continental shelf position while Canada had yet to submit anything of substance.47 Harper was accused of substituting process for political rhetoric. It also did not help that Minister Aglukkaq suggested the delay was necessary, stating that “we are defining Canada’s last frontier”48 – a way of thinking about the Arctic against which Inuit have long railed. For them, the Arctic is a homeland, not a frontier to be conquered, defended, and expropriated. While Harper was banking that this “defence” of Canada’s Arctic would be met with wide domestic and political support, most of the public was not tracking the intricacies of the process and instead the Harper government was accused of amateurism by scientists and academics alike.49 To be fair, even had the full submission been sent in on 7 December 2013, it would be years before the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf could get around to reviewing it. (Every state in the world that borders an ocean is engaged in the same process and there are only a select few commissioners in the world with the requisite skills to review the submissions.) As well, it never hurts to probe as far as possible when it comes to delimiting a continental shelf. However, the last minute decision taken by Harper – a known sceptic of science – was viewed by many as a betrayal of the scientists for political purposes. The sparse communication indicating that the Arctic submission would be delayed only compounded the frustration of many.

224  Andrea Charron

By 2014, then, Harper’s popularity was reaching a nadir, but a new Arctic focus was poised to reinvigorate his reputation. A breakthrough was made in September 2014 when an expedition led by Parks Canada and a number of other government departments discovered the wreck of HMS Erebus, one of Franklin’s doomed ships, to the south of Victoria Island in Nunavut.50 Harper was an enthusiastic supporter of the expedition, which was funded in large part by Jim Balsillie, of the famed but troubled BlackBerry company, and his Arctic Research Foundation. Here were two of Harper’s passions rolled into one: Canadian history and business. As Prime Minister Harper remarked: “This is truly a historic moment for Canada. Franklin’s ships are an important part of Canadian history given that his expeditions, which took place nearly 200 years ago, laid the foundations of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty.”51 Of course, the Erebus and Terror (the latter found in the summer of 2016 and precisely where Inuit had long maintained it to be) are British ships that have absolutely no bearing whatsoever on Canada’s maritime territory and/or the status of the Northwest Passage in which they were found; Harper’s statements were once again pure hyperbole. Rather than bolstering his reputation, the discovery of the Erebus, which was an archaeological, scientific, and Inuit traditional knowledge wonder, created further fault lines along Harper’s supporters and detractors.52 Harper was now widely criticized for being all talk (read, using politically charged rhetoric to his advantage) but little action because few of the promised infrastructure and defence-related acquisitions (including new fighter jets, Arctic patrol vessels, a fuel depot, etc.) had materialized and the North was still woefully underdeveloped economically.53 The “Why” of Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy While Harper is readily identified with the Arctic, the question one must ask is why? Was it a personal passion for the Arctic, as was the case for Pierre Trudeau? Was there a military imperative, as was the case during the Cold War? Could it be all about domestic politics? Was it by necessity, pushed by the US as prior to the Second World War? Indeed, none of these explanations fully account for the enthusiasm (albeit sporadic) with which Prime Minister Harper seized on the Arctic as one of the ways to define his legacy in office. Once could posit that Harper needed to choose an area that had been neglected by the Chrétien and Martin Liberal governments to serve as a foil to his government, but this is not supported by the facts either. And the biography of Stephen Harper by John Ibbitson offers just a few pages of coverage to the Arctic,54 suggesting that for Harper, the Arctic was not a priority area of focus. So we are left to wonder: Why might the federal Conservatives have seized upon the Arctic as a defining foreign policy issue area?

Assessing Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy  225

One explanation is that the Harper government was quick to capitalize on unfolding events at the time. As outlined throughout the chapter, there were a number of deadlines and geopolitical events and circumstances related to the Arctic that were coincidental with the Harper terms of office to which he could either respond or ignore. Furthermore, the Harper government was better attuned to what struck a chord with the majority of Canadians than past Canadian governments, and the Arctic was one such issue. Match circumstances and a politically salient issue with the majority of voters in the south and the Harper government was wise to make the Arctic a cause célèbre. But does this explain the whole sovereignty angle? Canada’s Arctic population north of 60˚ is approximately 120,000, of which roughly 77,000 are registered to vote in one of the three territories.55 Similar to the federal voting preferences of Canada as a whole, Nunavut in the east has tended to vote Liberal, the Northwest Territories tends to vote Conservative, and the Yukon seems to match, more often than not, the ruling party of the day.56 The Arctic, therefore, is not a bellwether of voting success for any of the federal political parties. Nor are those who live in the Arctic more concerned about “sovereignty”; climate change, housing, unemployment, food security, and health services are usually the election issues of note for them.57 The connection of protection/sovereignty of the Arctic and the Harper government, therefore, is most likely a product of what is left after one sifts out the main foreign policy issue of concern to the Arctic for which the Conservatives were not prepared to support (i.e., climate change). This leaves clarifying territorial and maritime boundaries, a growing concern for Russia’s general behaviour in the world and its attitude towards the Arctic in particular, and international economic opportunities for all Northerners. And all of these concerns were addressed by the Harper government with varying levels of success – often via the Arctic Council. Secondly, those concerns were also issue areas that spoke to his voters and Conservative base; playing to national identity sentiments, support of the Canadian Armed Forces and law enforcement agencies as well as a focus on natural resource trade (read, iron ore and diamond mining in the Arctic and the export of these resources to international markets around the world) are core Conservative priorities. The domestic issues of concern (including health, housing, education, employment culture, infrastructure, and resource governance issues)58 have also remained constants for past governments, and the Harper government, while addressing many of these in its Northern Strategy, ultimately produced results as disappointing as past governments had. Canada’s Northern population still ranks as being poorer and less healthy than those living in southern Canada.59 Indeed, no Canadian government has committed the billions of dollars that would be required to develop the Canadian Arctic to the same standards expected in the

226  Andrea Charron

south. When it comes to development of the Arctic, then, the Liberals and Conservatives fair equally poorly and likely this will not change in the near future. A third reason for the emphasis on the defence of the Arctic was its political fungibility as an issue area. By this I mean one could substitute potential infrastructure and capabilities for the Arctic that also apply in other less politically fruitful areas. For example, the Arctic and Offshore Patrol vessels (which will spend more time on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts than in the Arctic), or the replacement of the Aurora patrol aircraft to defend the Arctic resonate widely, but not if argued that the AOPS and replacement patrol aircraft are necessary for mostly maritime domain awareness and surveillance.60 In other words, defending the Arctic was another way of rebranding Canada from the (Liberal) land of peacekeepers to (Conservative) war-fighters.61 What Can We Infer from the Results? There is much to praise about the Harper government’s Arctic foreign policy record. Canada, for example, continued to support and defend the role of Indigenous peoples represented by the Permanent Participants at the Arctic Council vigorously. Harper’s Northern Strategy was also the first ever to be translated into Inuktitut and Harper was the first prime minister to have separate domestic and foreign Arctic policies. Finally, and probably most importantly, Canada refrained from calling for Russia to be kicked out of the Arctic Council after its illegal annexation of Crimea – a decision that did cost Harper domestically among his supporters. Additionally, the Northern Strategy and Arctic Foreign Policy did have more than a sovereignty focus and, although not finalized under Harper, development in the Arctic did eventually begin to materialize. The Nanisivik refuelling facility was operational in the fall of 2018, construction of the promised six Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships is underway and the HMCS Harry DeWolf was launched in the summer of 2021, Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk are now connected by an all-weather road, the Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) in Cambridge Bay opened in 2019, Iqaluit’s airport has been expanded, and Canada’s Arctic full or completed submission for its extended continental shelf will likely be filed in the 2021–22 period (though a partial submission was made on 23 May 2019).62 These milestones are now coming to fruition because of initial steps taken under the Harper government. Harper also gave support to the University of the Arctic and many initiatives like the Northern Development Fund, Northern Infrastructure Funds, and the Circumpolar Young Leaders Program, which is not normally what one thinks of when one mentions Harper and the Arctic in the same breath. Unfortunately, these commitments were never resourced appropriately; infrastructure funding was particularly sparse and projects like the Inuvik to Tuktoyaktuk

Assessing Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy  227

Highway were often framed as legacy projects rather than important and badly needed infrastructure for Northern communities. So to return to the main question posed at the beginning of this chapter: Are the Arctic policies adopted under Harper fundamentally different in terms of their end goals compared to previous Arctic policies? The answer is a qualified “no.” Most prime ministers have had very similar ends in mind: defence of the land and maritime space, progress in and improvement of government/­ Indigenous relations, and responsible development of the Arctic. What is different, however, is the fervour with which Harper clung to the rhetoric that the Arctic was a – if not the – defining characteristic of Canada and needed, therefore, to be defended vigorously. On the one hand, the constant linking of the Arctic to sovereignty, the military, and security was a communication wonder; Harper, the Arctic, and its safeguarding were inseparable in the minds of Canadians; they began to emphasize the “true North strong and free” verse when singing the English version of the national anthem at sporting events and many right-leaning op-ed pieces supported the defence of the Arctic as they did the need to be “tough on crime” and “tough on terrorism.” Harper was synonymous with defence of just about everything including Canada’s history – be it the War of 1812 or the Franklin expedition. On the other, this sovereignty theme created awkward moments for federal civil servants dealing with allies (who often wondered, against whom, exactly, did Canada need to defend its Arctic?), resentment by Indigenous peoples (the Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada released statements on what “sovereignty” meant for them63 and launched a poster campaign that included an Inuit holding a spear with the statement “sovereignty includes us”), and frustration for those trying to implement the other three pillars of the Northern Strategy and Arctic Foreign Policy, which focused more on improving the lives of Northerners, especially by way of business opportunities (hardly surprising for a Conservative government). The Trudeau government’s June 2017 defence policy (and its own northern strategy) is telling of the Harper legacy in many ways.64 First, the Arctic is still important to the Liberals going forward and arguably commands the same priority as it was accorded by Harper: The Arctic must be surveilled, in partnership with the US, from foreign would-be aggressors – though an attack via the Arctic remains only a remote possibility. Interestingly, the language of the Trudeau defence policy focuses on “defence” rather than “sovereignty” and emphasizes the military as a supporting agency of other government departments rather than the other way around. Ironically, with NATO and the Arctic remaining prominent in his 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure Engaged,65 it could be Trudeau who will finally fulfill the Harper promise of a “sovereign” Arctic: the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships are being readied to launch; the port of Churchill, closed

228  Andrea Charron

under Harper and subsequently bought out by a US firm (OmniTRAX), seems poised to be bought again by a Canadian Indigenous group (the Missinippi Rail consortium);66 a reimagined North Warning System will eventually come to fruition; a finalized Arctic extended continental shelf submission could be made; and more and more infrastructure is evident in the Arctic, such as Canada’s High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) in Cambridge Bay. Timing in politics is everything it seems. Indeed, Harper’s earlier statement – that “the first and highest priority of our northern strategy is the protection of our Arctic sovereignty … [and] the first principle of sovereignty is to use it or lose it”67 – is correct in ends but not necessarily in means; it is people living in sustainable communities “using it” who will ultimately affirm Canada’s sovereignty. But achieving these sustainable communities is still a goal that no Canadian prime minister to date, whether Liberal or Conservative, has seen come to fruition. NOTES 1 Samantha Arnold, “‘The Men of the North’ Redux: Nanook and Canadian National Unity,” American Review of Canadian Studies 40, no. 1 (2010): 452–63; Samantha Arnold, “Constructing an Indigenous Nordicity: The New Partnership and Canada’s Northern Agenda,” International Studies Perspective 13, no. 1 (2012): 105–20. 2 Southerners, in this context, are Canadians who live below 60° north – Canada’s official designation of its Arctic border – but especially policy-makers based in Ottawa. 3 Nelvana of the Northern Lights was a Canadian comic book series that debuted in 1941. There was a successful crowdsourcing push in 2013 to republish this firstever Canadian superhero and one of the first female heroines of a comic book series. See Samantha Arnold, “Nelvana of the North, Traditional Knowledge and the Northern Dimensions of Canada’s Foreign Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 14, no. 2 (2008): 95–107. 4 “Introducing ILANAAQ: Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games Emblem Celebrates Canada,” Speed Skating Canada, 24 April 2005, https://www .speedskating.ca/news-and-info/news/introducing-ilanaaq-vancouver-2010 -olympic-winter-games-emblem-celebrates-canada. 5 Much has been written about this. The most authoritative and comprehensive in terms of primary documents is Jane Cavell, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations: The Arctic, 1874–1949 (Ottawa: Global Affairs Canada, 2016). 6 Government of Canada, “New National Development Policy, 13 May 1958,” Diefenbaker Canada Centre Archive, Series VII, Vol. 165, National Development – 1960–1962, 101892–101903.

Assessing Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy  229 7 Geoff Norquay, “Nation Building on Permafrost: Three Prime Ministers,” Policy Magazine 2, no. 4 (July/August 2014): 22, https://policymagazine.ca/pdf/8 /PolicyMagazineJuly-August-14-Norquay.pdf. 8 Ibid. 9 See Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 33rd Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 128, 10 September 1985, 6462–4. 10 The 2000 Northern Dimension was the result of extensive public and intrabureaucratic consultations following a 1997 House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade report entitled Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Co-operation into the 21st Century. See Government of Canada, The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2000), https://library.arcticportal.org/1255/1/The_Northern_Dimension _Canada.pdf. 11 See Petra Dolata, “A New Canada in the Arctic? Arctic Policies under Harper,” Études Canadiennes 78 (2015): 136–42. 12 See Government of Canada, “Key Findings from International Polar Year 2007– 2008 at Fisheries and Oceans Canada: Bringing Science to Policy and Programs” (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2011), 1–28. 13 Dolata, “A New Canada in the Arctic?” 131–54. 14 This program, started in April 2011, replaced the Food Mail Program and subsidized food retailers directly in both Northern and remote communities. The point of these policy initiatives was to then pass on the savings to consumers. But the fall 2014 auditor general’s report of the program was scathing. See “Nutrition North Canada – Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada,” in Report of the Auditor General of Canada (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2014), https://foodsecurecanada.org/sites/foodsecurecanada.org/files /auditor_general_report_2014_0.pdf. In 2019, the program once again came under heavy criticism for its lack of accountability and its failure to actually fix the problem of food insecurity in the North. See Ann Hui, “Food Insecurity in Nunavut Increased after Introduction of Federal Program, Report Says,” Globe and Mail, 21 May 2019, A7. 15 Government of Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2009), 1, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2009/ainc-inac/R3-72 -2008.pdf. 16 Ibid., 1–2. 17 Government of Canada, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2010), 3, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection _2017/amc-gac/FR5-111-2010-eng.pdf.

230  Andrea Charron 18 Ibid. 19 Dolata, “A New Canada,” 138. For a similiar argument, see Philippe Genest and Frédéric Laserre, “Souveraineté, sécurité, identité: Éléments-clés du discours du gouvernement canadien sur l’Arctique,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 21, no. 1 (2015): 64. 20 Parliament of Canada, Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty: Report of the Standing Committee of National Defence (Ottawa: House of Commons Canada, 2010), 12, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2010/parl/XC34-403-1-1-01 -eng.pdf. 21 Department of Finance Canada, The Budget Plan 2008 (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2008), chap. 4, https://www.budget.gc.ca/2008/pdf /plan-eng.pdf. 22 See “Davie Gets $7.1m Contract from Feds to Refit 53-Year-Old Coast Guard Icebreaker,” CTV News, 30 April 2019, https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/davie-gets -7-1m-contract-from-feds-to-refit-53-year-old-coast-guard-icebreaker-1.4401867. 23 Note that according to the International Hydrographic Organization, M is the correct acronym for nautical miles, which is often noted as nm or nmi. Both nm (nanometers and also Notice to Mariners) and nmi (with a variety of meanings) continue to cause a bit of confusion. See Government of Canada, “Chart 1 Symbols, Abbreviations and Terms Used on Charts” (Ottawa: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2021), https://charts.gc.ca/publications/chart1-carte1/sections/intro -eng.html. 24 UN General Assembly 61/296 (13 September 2007) was adopted by a majority of 143 states in favour, with 4 against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa, and Ukraine). See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations, 2008), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. 25 Quoted in “Russia Plants Flag Staking Claim to Arctic Region,” CBC News, 2 August 2012, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-plants-flag-staking-claim -to-arctic-region-1.679445. 26 The map can be found at Durham University, “Maritime Jurisdiction and Boundaries in the Arctic,” https://www.durham-ac-uk/media/durham-university /research-/research-centres/ibru-centre-for-borders-research/maps-and-databases /arctic-maps-2021/updated-maps-and-notes/. It is now ubiquitous for the number of times it has been used. Note the original map released in 2008 has been updated several times, but the original is still widely circulated. 27 For a summary of exercises since 2007, see Government of Canada, “Operation Nanook,” National Defence, accessed 6 June 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en /department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current -operations/operation-nanook.html.

Assessing Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy  231 28 Frédéric Lasserre and Pierre Louis Têtu, “Russian Air Patrols in the Arctic: Are Long-Range Bomber Patrols a Challenge to Canadian Security and Sovereignty?” Arctic Yearbook (2016): 305–27, https://corpus.ulaval.ca/jspui/bitstream/20.500 .11794/11968/1/Russian%20air%20patrols%20AY2016-Lasserre-and-Tetu.pdf. 29 Parliament of Canada, Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty, 5 (especially point 2). 30 See International Maritime Organization, International Polar Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) (London: International Maritime Organization, 2019), 1–6. 31 See “Hans Island Dispute Heats Up,” CBC News, 25 July 2005, https://www.cbc .ca/news/Canada/north/hans-island-dispute-heats-up-1.561669; and Dan Levin, “Canada and Denmark Fight Over Island with Whisky and Schnapps,” New York Times, 7 November 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/world/what-in -the-world/canada-denmark-hans-island-whisky-schnapps.html. 32 For a fuller treatment of these disputes, see Rob Huebert, “Walking and Talking Independence in the Canadian North,” in Brian Bow and Patrick Lennox, eds., An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Changes and Choices for the Future (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 118–34. 33 Shaun Malley, “Canada’s Leadership of the Arctic Council – A Look Back,” CBC News, 23 April 2015, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/canada-s-leadership -of-the-arctic-council-a-look-back-1.3046225. 34 For the official pamphlet, see Government of Canada, Canada’s Arctic Council Chairmanship, 2013–2015 (Ottawa: Global Affairs Canada, 2013), http://www .international.gc.ca/arctic-arctique/assets/pdfs/Canada_Chairmanship-ENG.pdf. The official French version reads: “Le développement au service de la population du Nord.” “De” is translated as “of ” and not “for” (which would be “pour”). The French version suggests that input from Northerners will be sought whereas the English translation suggests their exclusion. See Andrea Charron, “Canada, the Arctic Council, and Rough Seas,” Thin Ice Blog, 24 March 2015, https://arctic.blogs .panda.org/default/ac-rough-seas/. 35 See the criteria at Arctic Council, “Observers,” accessed 11 August 2021, https:// arctic-council.org/en/about/observers/. 36 Note that in the May 2017 handover of the chairship of the Arctic Council from the US to Finland at the Fairbanks Ministerial Meeting, Switzerland, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, the World Meteorological Organization, the West Nordic Council, Oceana, the Oslo-Paris Commission (OSPAR), and the National Geographic Society were added as new Observers. 37 See “Ilulissat Declaration,” Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland, 27–29 May 2008, https://arcticportal.org/images/stories/pdf/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf. 38 Government of Canada, “Minister Cannon Highlights Canada’s Arctic Leadership at Arctic Ocean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” news release, 29 March 2010, https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2010/03/minister-cannon-highlights

232  Andrea Charron

39

40

41 42

43 44 45

46

47

48 49

50

-canada-arctic-leadership-arctic-ocean-foreign-ministers-meeting.html ?=undefined&. Mike Blanchfield, “Clinton Rebukes Canada on Arctic Meeting,” Globe and Mail, 29 March 2010, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/clinton -rebukes-canada-on-arctic-meeting/article1210187/. Alex Speers-Roesh, “Looking Back: Canada’s Arctic Council Chairmanship,” The Environmentalist (blog), Greenpeace, 20 April 2015, https://www.greenpeace.org /usa/looking-back-canadas-arctic-council-chairmanship/. Arctic Economic Council, “About,” accessed 11 August 2021, https:// arcticeconomiccouncil.com/about-us/. See Centre for International Governance Innovation, “John Higginbotham,” accessed 5 September 2018, https://www.cigionline.org/person/johnhigginbotham. Higginbotham single-handedly organized a number of workshops on everything from shipping to Canada-Russia relations to the only event that marked, in Canada, the twenty-year anniversary of the Arctic Council – a forum that Canada created. Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Passing the Arctic Council Torch,” 30 September 2014, https://www.csis.org/events/passing-arctic-council-torch. Steven Chase and Bill Curry, “Harper, Leaders Target Putin as Ukraine Takes Centre Stage,” Globe and Mail, 17 November 2014, A1. See Government of Canada, “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,” https://www.international.gc.ca/arctic-arctique/continental/commission .aspx?lang=eng. Government of Canada, Partial Submission of Canada to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Regarding Its Continental Shelf in the Atlantic Ocean (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2013) https://publications .gc.ca/collections/collection_2015/maecd-dfatd/FR5-82-1-2013-eng.pdf. For an excellent account of the process and the work of the Canadian scientists, see Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Breaking the Ice: Canada, Sovereignty and the Arctic Extended Continental Shelf (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2017). For the Russian revised submission, see United Nations, “Partial Revised Submission by the Russian Federation,” Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, lasted updated 1 May 2014, https://www.un.org/depts/los /clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus_rev.htm. Bruce Cheadle, “Canada Makes Territorial Claim for North Pole,” Toronto Star, 9 December 2013, A14. Adrian Wild, “Canada’s Sudden North Pole Claim Surprised Government Officials, Internal Emails Suggest,” National Post, 10 November 2014, https://nationalpost .com/news/canada/canadas-sudden-north-pole-claim-surprised-government -officials-internal-emails-suggest. Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), “PM Announces HMS Erebus as the Discovered Franklin Expedition Ship,” news release, 1 October 2014, https://www.canada.ca

Assessing Harper’s Arctic Foreign Policy  233

51

52

53 54 55

56

57

58

59

60

61 62

/en/news/archive/2014/10/pm-announces-hms-erebus-as-discovered-franklin -expedition-ship.html. PMO, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada Announcing the Discovery of One of the Ill-Fated Franklin Expedition Ships Lost in 1846,” news release, 9 September 2014, https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2014/09/statement -prime-minister-canada-announcing-discovery-one-ill-fated-franklin-expedition -ships-lost-1846.html. At an event hosted by The Walrus magazine at the Winnipeg Art Gallery on 26 March 2015 entitled “The Walrus Talks Arctic,” more than a few of the speakers commented on Harper’s lack of follow through vis-à-vis the Arctic. See “The Walrus Talks Arctic (Winnipeg 2015),” The Walrus, accessed 11 August 2021, https://thewalrus.ca/tag/the-walrus-talks-arctic-winnipeg-2015/. Michael Byers, “Seven Years of Empty Promises in the Arctic,” National Post, 21 August 2013, A12. John Ibbitson, Stephen Harper (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2015). Note that Canada’s Arctic territory also includes Northern Quebec (Nunavik) and Labrador (Nunatsiavut). The exact figure in the three territories as of 13 August 2021 is 127,123 (39,536 in Nunavut; 44,991 in the Northwest Territories; and 42,596 in the Yukon). Based on a review of Elections Canada’s official results under “Voter Information System” by territories found at https://www.elections.ca/scripts/vis/FindED ?L=e&PAGEID=20. Greg Poelzer, “Governance in the Arctic: Political Systems and Geopolitics,” in Joan Nymand Larsen and Gail Fondahl, eds., Arctic Human Development Report: Regional Process and Global Linkages (Copenhagen: Nordic Councils of Ministers, 2015), 185–215, https://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:788965 /FULLTEXT03.pdf. For the Arctic Human Development Index, see Arja Rautio, Birger Poppel, and Kue Young, “Human Health and Well-Being,” in Larsen and Fondahl, eds., Arctic Human Development Report (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 2014), 318–21. Tonina Simeone, The Arctic: Northern Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 24 October 2008), 1–8, https://web.archive.org/web/20180908144006 /https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/ResearchPublications/prb0810-e.pdf. See David Pugliese, “Modernization of Military Surveillance Aircraft Fleet Delayed as $52 Million More Needed for Project,” Ottawa Citizen, 10 August 2021, https:// www.ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/modernization-of-military -surveillance-aircraft-fleet-delayed-as-52-million-more-needed-for-project. Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2012). With respect to the Arctic patrol vessels, see Stephen Cooke, “A Huge Milestone, HMCS Harry DeWolf Begins Official Duties,” Halifax Chronicle Herald, 28 June 2021, A1.

234  Andrea Charron 63 Inuit Circumpolar Council, “Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic,” January 2016, https://www.itk.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/07 /Declaration_12x18_Vice-Chairs_Signed.pdf. 64 Department of National Defence Canada, Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2017), https://dgpaapp .forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf. 65 Ibid. 66 Sean Kavanagh, “Northern Group Signs Deal to Buy the Port of Churchill and Rail Line,” CBC News, 5 June 2017, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba /churchill-rail-port-omnitrax-dumas-1.4143982. 67 Bruce Campion-Smith, “Arctic Sovereignty First Priority for North,” Toronto Star, 24 August 2010, A6.

11 Canada and the Americas: From Liberal to Conservative Internationalism jean-philippe thérien, gordon mace, and hugo lavoie-deslongchamps

In April 2015, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper took part in the seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama City. Though he could not have known it at the time, the summit turned out to be particularly significant as the prime minister’s last appearance at this inter-American leaders’ forum. In his speech at the plenary session, the prime minister argued that although the country was “a relatively new member” in hemispheric politics, “Canada [was] proud to be a part of the family of nations that makes up the Americas.”1 Recalling his government’s priorities in the region, he added that “Canada is committed … to build[ing] a hemisphere that is prosperous and secure, and that is rooted in core values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.” The prime minister’s speech in Panama City provides a useful summary of the Harper government’s official policy towards the Americas during the quasi-decade 2006–15.2 A  big question remains open, however: How do we make sense of that hemispheric policy and what were its key drivers? This chapter seeks to answer that very question. We argue that Stephen Harper’s Americas policy can best be described as an illustration of “conservative internationalism.” Our central argument suggests that while Conservative policy towards the Americas shared a number of similarities with Canada’s post-war liberal internationalist tradition, it departed from that tradition on several key points – such as the state-market nexus, the role of multilateral institutions, and the objectives of international cooperation.3 More specifically, this ideological shift was visible in the signing of free trade agreements (as Asa McKercher in chapter 9 of this volume covers extensively) with a number of market-friendly governments, a noticeably lower profile at the Organization of American States (OAS) and at the Summits of the Americas, and various measures to reinforce strictly police and military capabilities in the region. In other words, under the Harper government, liberal internationalism was gradually replaced by conservative internationalism as the guiding principle of Canada’s relations with the rest of the Americas.

236  Jean-Philippe Thérien, Gordon Mace, and Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps

Like most foreign policy studies, this one faces the challenge of clarifying the balance between systemic and domestic factors of explanation. Our analysis emphasizes domestic variables since these variables appear more helpful to understanding how the policy choices of the Harper Conservatives compare to those of preceding Canadian governments.4 Among the domestic factors that shaped the Americas policy of the Harper government, we maintain that the most influential related to conservative partisan ideology and values. These ideational elements were systematically reflected in the prime minister’s personal worldview as well as throughout the top foreign policy leadership. At the same time, it is essential to note that the internal sources of Canadian foreign policy towards the Americas did not operate in a vacuum. Rather, they materialized in a regional context that was characterized by deep divisions between right-wing and left-wing political forces. Clearly, Canada’s relations with the Americas under Stephen Harper cannot be deciphered without also taking into account the specific dynamics of hemispheric politics and developments. The chapter is divided into three main sections. First, we outline and review the Americas Strategy that was adopted as a policy framework by the Harper government in 2007. Second, we highlight how the hemispheric diplomacy of the Conservatives was characterized by new and more polarizing attitudes. And third, we analyze the evolution and the underpinnings of Canada’s relationship with the countries of the Americas from 2006 to 2015 in four specific policy areas: the economy, democracy promotion, security, and development assistance. The conclusion of the chapter offers a balance sheet of the Harper government’s foreign policy towards a region that is often designated as ­Canada’s “neighbourhood.” The Americas Strategy In July 2007, Stephen Harper’s high-profile visit to South America and the Caribbean signalled Canada’s “re-engagement” with the Western hemisphere. While celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Canada-Chile free trade agreement in Santiago, the prime minister officially kicked off what was called the Americas Strategy by declaring that Canada’s re-engagement in the region was “a critical international priority” for the country. He also made clear that “Canada [was] committed to playing a bigger role in the Americas and to doing so for the long term.”5 From that moment onwards, references to the region became a standard component of the government’s foreign policy discourse. Nevertheless, in the absence of a policy document detailing its rationale and objectives, the precise content of the new policy remained “opaque” for nearly two more years.6 When Canada and the Americas: Priorities and Progress finally came out in 2009, the strategy’s rationale became somewhat more precise. Building on the

Canada and the Americas: From Liberal to Conservative Internationalism  237

notion that “Canada is a country of the Americas,” the document described the Americas as “a region of strategic domestic and international interest for Canada.”7 It also stressed the wide array of relationships between the countries of the hemisphere “in terms of trade, immigration and cultural and social exchanges.”8 More specifically, the policy document clarified objectives which had until then been only generally defined. Overall, the new Conservative approach seemed largely consistent with the policy orientations adopted by Canada since its entry into the inter-American system at the end of the 1980s. Following the positions of previous governments, the Americas Strategy emphasized the democracy/economic prosperity/security triad, making clear that “Canada’s foreign policy approach to the region is based on [these] three interconnected and mutually reinforcing objectives.”9 Revealingly, the Conservatives’ policy was inspired by bureaucratic discussions that had actually taken place at the Department of Foreign Affairs before the Harper government’s 2006 election victory.10 One of the rare distinctive features of the new Conservative policy was the elimination of the notion of “human security,” a trademark of preceding Liberal governments, and its replacement by the notion of “personal security.” After noting that “neither sustainable prosperity and growth nor equitable development and strong democratic governance can flourish in an environment of insecurity,” the Americas Strategy argued that “clearly, democracy is at risk when personal security and the possibility to improve living standards are compromised.”11 Beyond this conceptual innovation, the priorities defined in the Americas Strategy had “an air of déjà-vu,”12 exhibiting continuity rather than a dramatic change with respect to Canada’s traditional internationalist culture. The motives behind the Harper government’s decision to make the Americas a focus of its international activities mostly remain shrouded in mystery. Despite many insights into the matter, prominent diplomat John Graham was unable to formulate a “conclusive answer” about the origin of the policy.13 Some observers have invoked the influence of a “corporate constituency” interested in making commercial inroads into Latin American trade and investment ­markets – particularly in the mining or extractive industry sector.14 Others have underlined a desire for partisan differentiation: While the Liberals had prioritized Africa after 2002, the Conservatives sought to distinguish their approach by privileging the Americas. Another theory, based on a cable sent from the US embassy in Ottawa in 2009 and revealed in 2011 by WikiLeaks, held that Canada’s re-engagement with the Americas was motivated by discussions between Stephen Harper and the conservative Prime Minister of Australia John Howard. Impressed by the influence wielded by Canberra in Washington thanks to its role in Asia, Prime Minister Harper apparently believed that Canada could enjoy a similar advantage by being more active in Latin America and the Caribbean.15 Of course, all of these explanations could be simultaneously true.

238  Jean-Philippe Thérien, Gordon Mace, and Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps

What they demonstrate above all is the degree to which the Harper government’s adoption of the Americas Strategy was seen as a surprising decision, and one never well explained from the outset. The simple fact, however, is that the ultimate foundation of the strategy is probably to be found in Canada’s enduring concern for reducing its overall economic dependence on the US market.16 In January 2011, the Office of the Inspector General published a detailed evaluation of the Harper government’s Americas Strategy. On the bright side, the report noted progress towards each objective and acknowledged their continued relevance. It also found that “Canada’s influence in the Region has grown considerably as a result of the increased diplomatic presence and strengthened bilateral and multilateral relations with key countries and partners.”17 However, the inspector general identified a number of fundamental problems with the strategy, most notably regarding administrative ownership, non-governmental organization (NGO) participation, resources, and evaluation. With respect to ownership, the inspector general deplored the fact that, because of a lack of details, “only a few people within government, partner countries or organizations have a clear sense of what the priorities of the Strategy and its intended results are.”18 In addition to highlighting such bureaucratic confusion, the inspector general identified in unequivocal terms the lack of civil society involvement in the strategy, noting that it “was perceived as a government agenda with no role for outside groups to support it.”19 Ironically, Canada’s only think tank exclusively dedicated to promoting Canadian relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, FOCAL, was forced to close in 2011 due to the interruption of federal governmental funding.20 The inspector general also established a link between the low level of governmental ownership and the low level of funding for the policy. The government did not think it necessary to grant dedicated funds for the realization of the strategy, given that the whole-of-government approach was expected to enable the mobilization of existing resources.21 Yet, with the exception of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the inspector general’s report deplored the fact that this expectation was never realized. Predictably, the lack of financial resources made tracking the implementation of the policy difficult. In fact, the policy faced no serious measures of accountability, and “no consistent reporting against agreed results … was established.”22 Reacting to this critical evaluation, the Department of Foreign Affairs produced an amended version of the strategy in 2012. Canada’s policy towards the Americas was thus reorganized around three new objectives: increasing Canadian and hemispheric economic opportunity; addressing insecurity and advancing freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; and fostering lasting relationships.23 In comparison with the first version of the Americas Strategy, the second iteration thus put more emphasis on the economy, a reformulation entirely in keeping with the Conservative government’s domestic

Canada and the Americas: From Liberal to Conservative Internationalism  239

political agenda. While the Department of Foreign Affairs went on to produce a few activity reports, it remains difficult today to know to what extent the inspector general’s recommendations were taken into account. The drafting of the Americas Strategy was one of Stephen Harper’s main foreign policy initiatives, and the subsequent debate sparked by this document animated many both inside and outside of government. In the history of Canada’s international relations, few governments have defined regional objectives as explicitly as the Harper government did. What was obvious from the beginning was that Harper’s Americas gambit was largely underpinned or motivated by domestic political, economic, and security considerations. However, considering that a relatively widespread consensus holds that the Americas policy lacked leadership, proper funding, and showed signs of improvisation, the degree to which the Americas Strategy marked a turning point in Canadian foreign policy remains a matter of debate. On the whole, the Conservative approach emphasized economic growth and free trade more than any preceding Canadian governments. But this was arguably a matter of nuance. In fact, the key points of the Americas Strategy were largely in keeping with Ottawa’s traditional priorities in the region and thus reflected the long-standing internationalist inclinations of Canada’s international policy. The Conservatives’ Polarizing Attitudes Numerous observers have underlined the general change of orientation introduced by the Harper government in Canadian foreign policy. This change, which was associated with “American style neo-conservatism,”24 was particularly visible in Canada’s relations with the Americas. The Harper government consistently described its regional policy as being motivated by strong principles, in tune with the general interests of the country. Notwithstanding the balanced language of the Americas Strategy, Canada under the Harper Conservatives defended its core values and views more forcefully than before. In doing so, the government adopted positions marked by a divisive logic at odds with the old (and contested) Canadian habit of international mediation and bridge-building, and often acted as if it faced a “Manichean struggle between the forces of good and evil.”25 Clearly, if Stephen Harper occasionally described the countries of the Americas as a “family,” he certainly did not consider all of its members as equals. In an address to the Council on Foreign Relations in 2007, the prime minister summarized his dualistic view of the region. “While many nations are pursuing market reform and democratic development,” Harper stated, “others are falling back to economic nationalism and protectionism, to political populism and authoritarianism.”26 In choosing between these two groups, the Conservative government’s political and ideological sympathies were never in doubt.

240  Jean-Philippe Thérien, Gordon Mace, and Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps

While evidently favouring states inclined towards market democracy, Stephen Harper also advocated a balanced “third way,” which he dubbed “the Canadian model.” In that 2007 speech in New York, he defined the distinctive characteristics of this model as “constitutional democracy and economic openness combined with the social safety nets, equitable wealth creation, and regional sharing arrangements that prevent the sort of exploitation still seen far too often in the Americas.”27 In sum, the prime minister proposed a middle ground approach to the region that was doubly polarizing. On the one hand, the hemisphere was already divided into two basic socio-economic categories, largely ignoring the uniqueness and diversity of national political experiences. On the other hand, by presenting Canadian governance as a system to imitate, Harper exhibited a paternalistic self-righteousness more characteristic of American foreign policy habitus than of the Canadian one. In reality, Canada’s policy towards the “Americas” was systematically subordinated to its policy towards “America.”28 As a result, the Harper government’s hemispheric policy was, in most circumstances, congruent with positions adopted by Washington. Beyond the Rio Grande, Canada’s relations were thus particularly warm with countries whose economies were open to trade and foreign investment. Chile, Colombia, Panama, and Peru figured prominently among Canada’s privileged partners. By contrast, Canada’s attitude towards countries with leftist governments – notably the member states of the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA) – oscillated between lack of enthusiasm and open hostility. Of the ALBA countries, Canada’s relations with Venezuela were the most strained by far, with the Canadian government going so far as to denounce Venezuela for its drift towards authoritarianism and its connections to Iran and Cuba. During the Conservatives’ decade in power, Canada’s foreign policy in the Americas was also characterized by a new balance between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. In the Western hemisphere, as elsewhere, the Harper administration showed less trust in international institutions than its predecessors had. Multilateralism was conceived of in instrumental terms – as a means to an end – rather than as something inherently valuable.29 Of course, this new doctrine did not prevent the Harper government from proclaiming its attachment to inter-American institutions, nor from describing the OAS as “a key, central and indispensable venue” for hemispheric cooperation.30 But it did not, in practice, hold the hemispheric body in very high regard. During the Harper years, the Canadian presence within the inter-American system was markedly more discrete than it had been under Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin. The Honduran crisis, which began with a coup d’état in Tegucigalpa in 2009, marked one of the Conservative government’s rare attempts to play a regional leadership role.31 But as will be seen in more detail below, Canadian policy throughout this crisis was widely criticized for its inability to generate a hemispheric consensus.

Canada and the Americas: From Liberal to Conservative Internationalism  241

The Harper government’s conception of multilateralism also permeated its approach to North American cooperation. In this regard, two episodes involving the marginalization of Mexico contributed to a weakening of North American integration. The first resulted from the decision to require travel visas for Mexican nationals wanting to enter Canada. Due to its highly symbolic significance, this issue quickly became a damaging irritant in Canadian-Mexican relations.32 The second episode concerned the Beyond the Border initiative announced by Canada and the United States in 2011.33 While the Canadian government justified this new policy by pointing out that agreement was easier to achieve among two parties than among three amigos, its rationalization could hardly hide the fact that the accord marked “the first official departure from a trilateral structure for regional governance.”34 In any event, the two episodes clearly demonstrated that Canada did not put its two NAFTA partners on an equal footing. Canada’s attitude towards Cuba offered another illustration of the values guiding Conservative diplomacy in the Americas. It is worth remembering that Canada’s traditionally good relations with Cuba have often been seen as one of the best examples of the country’s political independence. This dynamic changed significantly under the Harper government as Canada’s position increasingly echoed the George W. Bush administration’s hardline Cuba policy (gradually normalized under the Obama White House). Often described as “antagonistic,”35 the new approach consistently emphasized the undemocratic nature of the Cuban government. At the 2012 Summit of the Americas, for instance, Canada was the only country to support the US opposition to Cuba’s participation in the forum, leading many to characterize the summit as a failure. Canada’s firm ideological position became untenable once Washington decided to end its policy of isolating Cuba in favour of engagement. At the 2015 summit in Panama City, Prime Minister Harper finally had little choice but to claim to be “pleased” by Cuba’s return to the hemispheric community.36 Revealingly, however, the Canadian media were not invited to cover the historic meeting that was organized between Harper and Cuban President Raúl Castro during the summit. Like Mexico and Cuba, Brazil also had reason to believe that the Conservatives’ diplomacy lacked finesse. Granted, Canada-Brazil relations have always been distant.37 In particular, during the decade before the election of Stephen Harper, they were deeply affected by a long trade dispute between aircraft manufacturers Bombardier and Brazil’s Embraer. That said, as a big emerging market, Brazil could legitimately have expected to have a special status in Canada’s Americas Strategy. Yet that was never the case. Prime Minister Harper waited until 2011 to go to Brazil, and various sources suggest that his official visit was marked by diplomatic friction. Whatever the case, the invitation extended to Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff to visit Canada was not followed through.

242  Jean-Philippe Thérien, Gordon Mace, and Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps

Already strained, Canada’s relations with Brazil suffered another blow in 2013 when Canada was accused of industrial espionage by the Brazilian authorities.38 In short, Stephen Harper’s diplomacy with respect to Brazil hardly met standards of mutual respect and dignity. The Harper government’s regional diplomacy in the Americas was set apart from prior Canadian foreign policy by a change in attitude that was not discernible in the Americas Strategy. Praised by some for its clarity and criticized by others for its polarizing tone, Canadian policy from 2006 to 2015 proved to be closer to US preferences, and more favourable to the neo-liberal development model, than Canadian policies in previous decades. It was also more selective and less inclusive ideologically. For all these reasons, the Americas offers a particularly useful case for understanding the way in which conservative values guided the Harper government’s behaviour on the world stage. Canadian Policies in Practice This section examines Stephen Harper’s foreign policy towards the Americas in four broad policy areas: economic relations, democracy promotion, security, and development assistance. As we will see, the practice of Canadian diplomacy during the Harper years often mirrored the ambiguities of conservative internationalism. While there were some notable successes (e.g., the 2010 humanitarian relief effort in earthquake-torn Haiti), the Conservative government had its fair share of miscues and miscalculations in terms of hemispheric affairs. Economic Relations The pursuit of economic prosperity has long been a central objective of Canadian foreign policy in the Americas. As such, the strong emphasis Stephen Harper’s government put on the promotion of trade and investment with the region was far from being a major policy shift. General trends indicate that from 2006 to 2015 – the quasi-decade of the governing Harper Conservatives – Canadian merchandise exports to Latin American and Caribbean countries increased from $7.5 billion to $11.1 billion.39 Over the same period, the relative importance of the region in Canada’s world exports rose only slightly, from 1.8 per cent to 2.1 per cent. In 2005, the five main regional markets for Canadian goods were Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, and Chile, whereas in 2015 they were Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Chile. This ranking suggests that Canadian trade within the Americas was relatively stable, and that it largely depended on two key factors: market size and trade preferences resulting from negotiated free trade agreements.40 Reliable figures on Canadian foreign investment in the region are notoriously hard to obtain, largely because of the hidden yet key role played by tax

Canada and the Americas: From Liberal to Conservative Internationalism  243

havens such as the Bahamas, Barbados, and the Cayman Islands. According to one estimate, Canada has now become one of the top three investors in the region.41 Although fragmentary, official statistics report that, in 2005, the countries with the largest stock of Canadian investment were Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Argentina, and Peru. Ten years later, Chile occupied the first place followed by Mexico, Brazil, Peru, and Colombia. One of the few certainties about Canadian investment in the region relates to the growing role of the resource sector, which includes mining, oil, and gas.42 Indeed, the share of Canadian mining assets in Latin America increased from 36 per cent in 2005 to 52 per cent in 2015.43 In 2005, top locations for Canadian mining assets were Chile and Peru; in 2015, they were Chile and Mexico. Canadian governments have traditionally used two major policy instruments in order to protect and enhance trade and investment in the hemisphere: free trade agreements (FTAs) and foreign investment protection agreements (FIPAs). The Harper government did not proceed differently as it signed FTAs with Peru (2009), Colombia (2011), Honduras (2011), and Panama (2013). Trade negotiations were also conducted with Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries, other Central American nations, and the Dominican Republic.44 While all the FTAs that were concluded by the governing Conservatives were complemented by agreements on labour cooperation and the environment, critics systematically emphasized their lack of strong provisions concerning human rights and corporate social responsibility.45 The Harper government also signed a FIPA with Peru in 2007, which brought the total number of FIPAs concluded by Canada with countries of the region to nine. Like other similar agreements, the main provisions of the FIPA with Peru concerned profit repatriation, equal treatment with local investors, minimum labour protection standards, international arbitration, and guaranteed compensation in case of expropriation.46 How then can we assess the Conservatives’ economic diplomacy with the Western hemisphere from 2006 to 2015? Overall, it appears that there was more continuity than change in Canada’s economic relations with the region under Stephen Harper. The Harper government was arguably more vocal than its predecessors in its emphasis on commercial interactions, but its strong support of a capitalist world system driven by the opening of markets was similar to that of previous Canadian governments. Remarkably, there were no major shifts in Canada’s trading partners either. In terms of government initiatives, there were very few changes in the use of FTAs and FIPAs. While it is true that the signing of FTAs with Peru, Colombia, Honduras, and Panama was a vivid illustration of governmental trade activism, one must keep in mind that, with the exception of Panama, the decision to enter into these trade negotiations was taken before the Conservative government actually came into power in 2006.47 To a large extent, the single most distinctive trait of Canada’s economic relations with countries of the Americas during the Harper years was the

244  Jean-Philippe Thérien, Gordon Mace, and Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps

increasing role played by Canada’s mining industry. While this evolution was primarily the result of private investors’ decisions, it was undoubtedly facilitated by the Conservative government. Several observers have thus criticized the benevolent attitude of the Harper government towards Canadian mining firms that have been accused of serious environmental damages and human rights violations in the region. This issue became so salient that it was brought before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which deplored the fact that “despite Canada’s assurance, the IACHR continues to receive information on a number of very serious human rights abuses related to Canadian mining in the region.”48 The low level of attention devoted by the Harper government to such abuses, and to the need for effective corporate social responsibility policies, clearly aligned the country’s foreign policy in a more conservative direction.49 This overview of the Harper government’s economic diplomacy in the Americas, then, suggests a nuanced conclusion. Simply put, Harper essentially moved the expansion of trade markets in the region nearer to the top of his list of priorities. While the Conservative government clearly promoted market and investment liberalization in the region more vigorously than had its predecessors, its major choices in economic policy, constrained as they were by the complexities of regional geopolitics and developmental issues, nonetheless remained largely faithful to the basic tenets of Canadian foreign policy. Democracy Promotion Stephen Harper repeatedly emphasized his government’s determination to promote democracy and human rights in the region. Echoing a narrative promoted by all Canadian governments of the post–Cold War period, this determination was based on the conviction that democracy and the rule of law had become the new norm of governance in the Americas. Conservative officials regularly expressed pride in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, a document adopted in part thanks to the efforts of the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien. In accordance with the Charter, the Harper government regularly insisted on the importance of free elections and political freedoms, as well as on the independence of the judiciary, political parties, and the media. Despite its apparently progressive rhetoric, however, the Conservative government was frequently criticized, at home and abroad, for its lack of coherence and follow through. Critics highlighted, in particular, Canada’s tendency to practise a politics of double standards. On the one hand, the governing Conservatives vigorously denounced the democratic shortcomings of governments critical of neoliberalism; on the other hand, their attitude towards friendly countries was tolerant and cooperative. Thus, Canada’s confrontational approach to Cuba and Venezuela was contrasted starkly with its conciliatory

Canada and the Americas: From Liberal to Conservative Internationalism  245

behaviour towards the conservative-minded governments of Colombia, Peru, and Honduras. The case of Honduras offers a telling illustration of the ambiguities of Canadian policy under Harper. On 28 June 2009, when the leftist President Manuel Zelaya was overthrown by Roberto Micheletti and the military, Canada’s initial response was to join the inter-American consensus demanding Zelaya’s return to power and the suspension of Honduras from the OAS.50 However, mindful of protecting Canadian commercial interests in the country, the Canadian government subsequently adopted a remarkably soft approach towards the coupmakers. In contrast to the majority of states in the Americas, Canada refused to impose sanctions on the Micheletti government. Moreover, Canada was among the few countries, alongside the United States, to recognize the legitimacy of the highly suspect November 2009 election, which brought to power Zelaya’s longtime political opponent Porfirio Lobo. This stance was at odds with that of most governments in the region, which denounced the election, organized, as it was, in a context of grave violations of human rights, without any international monitoring. Honduras’ return to the OAS in June 2011 marked, for Canada, a happy ending to the crisis, and it was followed within a few weeks by the signing of the Canada-Honduras Free Trade Agreement. Yet the Honduran crisis effectively “isolated Canada along with the U.S. and a handful of nations,”51 with numerous observers concluding that Canadian diplomacy had actually weakened the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Clearly, the promotion of democracy and human rights in Canadian foreign policy has always been the subject of debate. Under Stephen Harper, such debates became increasingly bitter as Canada’s positions seemed more and more defined by partisan and political considerations. Remarkably, Canadian policies were also contested abroad by countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, which favoured “more direct and participatory forms of democracy.”52 By hanging on to a rhetoric of representative democracy, the Harper government actually cast into stark relief the ideological divisions between right and left in the region. The Security Agenda In his 2015 speech to the dignitaries assembled in Panama for the Summit of the Americas, Stephen Harper described the world as “increasingly dangerous.”53 This characterization of contemporary international affairs by the prime minister arguably influenced the security agenda associated with his government’s Americas policy – an agenda that was considered highly successful by the inspector general in 2011.54 Canada’s involvement in regional security, it should be recalled, had not always been very strong. According to Hal Klepak, not only did the country have limited interests in hemispheric security when it

246  Jean-Philippe Thérien, Gordon Mace, and Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps

joined the OAS in 1989 but “few in Ottawa understood the complexity of inter-­ American security” at the time.55 In spite of this general context, Canada’s engagement in regional security grew stronger under all governments in the last few decades. In the 1990s, this engagement notably took the form of active Canadian participation in peacekeeping missions in Central America and Haiti, and in the consolidation of a hemispheric security architecture. Even before the Conservatives came to power in 2006, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the expansion of organized crime in the region, and serious US migration concerns had prompted an increased focus on security in Canada’s Americas policy.56 This tendency was essentially highlighted and reinforced under the Harper government. Under the governing Conservatives, Canadian security policy in the hemisphere took various forms.57 For example, the Canadian Armed Forces regularly participated in regional military exercises, the goal of which was to increase the interoperability of defence systems and to fight the illicit drug trade. Through the Canadian Initiative for Security in Central America, Canada committed $25  million over 2011–16 to fight against criminal violence and corruption in the sub-region. In addition, as one of the main funders of the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, the Canadian government took a leadership role in the country’s disarmament and demobilization efforts. Particularly notable was Canada’s continued attention to both military and civilian training. Hundreds of soldiers from the region participated in Canada’s Military Training and Cooperation Program. The RCMP, in partnership with the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, also offered training programs geared towards the control of drug trafficking in airports. Finally, capacity-building of local police forces by Canadian police officers formed an important element of Canada’s cooperation with impoverished Haiti. None of these initiatives, however, clearly distinguished the Conservative government from its predecessors. With regard to regional security, the Harper government’s foreign policy remained broadly in line with the practices of previous Canadian governments. The conservative ideology nonetheless left its mark in the hemisphere by generating a security agenda that was more oriented towards basic law and order.58 Breaking with the Liberals’ human security doctrine, the Harper government focused much more on fighting crime and violence than on expanding the security of vulnerable groups or improving judicial systems. One of the major effects of the Conservatives’ law and order approach was to move Canada away from the consensus that gradually emerged in the region on the key issue of drugs. At the Summit of the Americas in 2012, Canada thus found itself isolated, along with the United States, not only because of its stand on Cuba, but also because of its unwillingness to consider alternative policies for dealing with narcotics.59

Canada and the Americas: From Liberal to Conservative Internationalism  247

In the realm of security, then, the Harper government’s policy in the Americas generally followed the internationalist reflexes of traditional Canadian diplomacy. Albeit constrained somewhat, the influence of conservative values in that area was nonetheless noticeable as the human security agenda of former foreign affairs minister Lloyd Axworthy and the federal Liberal party was abandoned altogether. A preoccupation with law and order and backing rightleaning governments in the Americas would now take on greater significance. Development Assistance One aspect of the Americas Strategy taken very seriously by the Harper government was official development assistance. Throughout the period from 2006 to 2015, international development programs helped reinforce Canada’s presence in the region, and did so in a manner consistent with a conservative internationalist approach to regional relations. It is worth noting that during the Harper era, aid to the Americas grew considerably – as did Canadian aid in general – peaking at $1 billion in 2012. This increase clearly shows that the Conservative government continued in the Canadian tradition of maintaining a strong and credible development assistance policy. Moreover, the fact that Haiti, the poorest country in the Americas, remained the number one recipient of Canadian assistance in the region, and that aid to the country was increased further in the wake of its devastating 2010 earthquake, suggests that Canadian aid policy under the Conservatives continued to be motivated, in part, by humanitarian (and political) concerns. On the whole, then, there are good reasons to argue that, with respect to development assistance, the Harper government shared the internationalist values of its predecessors. At the same time, however, other elements gave Canadian policy in the Americas a definite conservative slant. In this regard, it should first be noted that aid to the Americas grew not only in absolute terms, but also as a proportion of overall Canadian aid flows, as aid to Africa (typically a Liberal government region of focus) declined in relative terms. In other words, Canadian aid was redirected from the world’s poorest region towards a wealthier one in which the prospects for economic growth and bilateral trade deals were more promising. As a recent analysis of Canadian aid policy summarized: “Canada has prioritized Latin America because of its extensive economic interests in the hemisphere.”60 This logic became particularly visible after 2009 when the Harper government revised its list of priority countries to include Peru and Colombia – two middle-income Latin American countries with which Ottawa had negotiated free trade agreements – while downgrading seven African countries. Moreover, Canadian assistance in the Americas was often linked to commercial interests in the extractive sector. Important projects like the Andean

248  Jean-Philippe Thérien, Gordon Mace, and Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps

Regional Initiative also assisted Canadian mining companies in establishing corporate social responsibility programs. While these programs were justified in the name of sustainable development, numerous experts have argued that such initiatives often served the interest of mining companies by helping “to put a positive spin on their negative environmental and human rights records.”61 Finally, the focus on commercial benefits (and fragile states like Haiti) and public-private partnerships confirmed that Canadian aid policy in the Americas was imbued with conservative principles and values.62 Conclusion Throughout the Harper era, the Canadian government demonstrated an interest in the Americas, as evidenced by its Americas Strategy discussed above, as well as its appointment of a minister of state for the overall region. To make sense of the Conservatives’ hemispheric policy, though, it is useful to recall, by way of summary, the principal elements of continuity and change that characterized the government’s behaviour in comparison to those of its predecessors. With respect to continuity, as Jean-Christophe Boucher has explained, “under Stephen Harper, Canada’s foreign policy has remained internationalist in nature.”63 Significantly, throughout the Conservative decade, Canada continued to be one of the world’s most globalized nations. At the same time, however, Heather Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander are right when they hint that Stephen Harper opened “a new chapter in the evolution of Canadian internationalism.”64 In our view, this new chapter is best characterized as the result of a shift from a liberal to a more conservative form of internationalism, which clearly manifested itself in Harper’s Americas policy. Understandably, the Harper government’s regional policy was shaped by the historical background and experience of Canadian diplomacy. In particular, it bears repeating that the negotiation of free trade agreements with numerous Latin American countries – often viewed as the signature legacy of the Harper Conservatives in the Americas – was initiated by previous Liberal governments. Such continuity with the past is explained by both political and geographic factors. In terms of politics, the Conservative government was subject to a logic of path-dependency requiring it to respect Canada’s existing international engagements and to compromise with a well-established Canadian foreign policy bureaucracy. It should also be noted that a good part of Canadian activities in the Americas are conducted by private actors largely beyond the purview of governmental decision-making. Even if Canadian relations with Cuba cooled considerably under the Conservatives, Canadian tourists continued to be the most numerous on Cuban beaches! In terms of geography, it is difficult to forget that Canada and the other states of the region share a c­ ontinent – one possessing an “historic mission,” according to the OAS Charter. As Jorge Heine

Canada and the Americas: From Liberal to Conservative Internationalism  249

notes, geography suggests that the Americas is the region where Ottawa can best exert its limited influence.65 Yet in spite of these forces pushing towards continuity, the Harper government left a distinct partisan mark on Canadian foreign policy. It is for future historians to determine whether Conservative diplomacy under Harper may be qualified as a “big break” or a “diplomatic counter-revolution.”66 Whatever the case, the Conservative Party imprint on Canada’s external relations cannot be ignored. In brief, the Harper government distanced itself from the cosmopolitan ideals of a traditional Canadian foreign policy culture in order to promote a vision of the world more centred on self-interest and “material gain.”67 In the Americas as elsewhere, economic growth and market ­expansion  – or “­prosperity” – thus became a priority that often eclipsed all others. “Trade led all agendas,” according to one informed observer.68 This emphasis on commercial relations in regional diplomacy  – which also dove-tailed nicely with Harper’s electoral ambitions and playing to his political base – is hardly surprising given the dominance of economic matters in domestic policy during the Harper era. Of course, it might be suggested that another government would not have acted very differently in its hemispheric policy. Counter-factual thinking thus dictates caution regarding the magnitude of the real differences between the conservative internationalism of Stephen Harper and the liberal internationalism of previous Liberal governments. What seems relatively clear, however, is that conservative values had a greater influence on the low politics of democracy promotion and development assistance than on the high politics of economic and security affairs. The Harper government’s conservative leanings in the Americas were thus best illustrated by its lack of interest in issues such as women’s rights or the rights of Indigenous peoples, and by the commercialization of development assistance. With his catchy slogan, “Canada is back,” proclaimed soon after his electoral victory in October 2015, Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau signalled an intention to break with the Harper years and return to the dynamism of Canada’s internationalist foreign policy. At the end of 2021, however, the precise meaning of this slogan still remained unclear, at least in Latin America and the Caribbean. To be sure, on certain issues, the Liberals have implemented notable changes. For example, visa requirements for Mexican citizens were lifted in 2016, Trudeau visited Cuba in November of 2016, and there has been an unusual preoccupation with beleaguered Venezuela.69 In addition, the Trudeau government has also shown more interest in women’s rights and the rights of Indigenous peoples, but these concerns have yet to transform Canada’s development assistance programs in the region.70 But on the trade front, the new Liberal government has faithfully followed in the footsteps of the preceding Conservative government. In particular, the Trudeau Liberals have continued the free trade talks that had been conducted by the Harper Conservatives with

250  Jean-Philippe Thérien, Gordon Mace, and Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps

potential regional partners. In addition, they have consolidated Canada’s rapprochement with the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) initiated under Stephen Harper, and signed a joint partnership declaration with this group of free-trading countries.71 More broadly, and given that the Harper government’s Americas Strategy has now been set aside, there is little indication that Justin Trudeau has made the Americas a key priority of his foreign policy orientation. It still remains an open question as to whether there is a great deal of difference between liberal and conservative internationalism when it comes to Canada’s overall relations with the Americas. NOTES 1 Summit of the Americas Secretariat, “Remarks by the Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper, during the Plenary Session of the Seventh Summit of the Americas,” Panama City, 10–11 April 2015 (Washington, DC: Organization of American States, April 2015). 2 Following common usage, this chapter refers to the Americas as including the countries of North America, Central America and the Caribbean, and South America. 3 This argument is also made in Philippe Lagassé, Justin Massie, and Stéphane Roussel, “Le néo-conservatisme en politiques étrangère et de défense canadiennes,” in Julian Castro-Rea and Frédéric Boily, eds., Le fédéralisme selon Harper: La place du Québec dans le Canada conservateur (Quebec: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2014), 49–81. Our notion of conservative internationalism is close to the concept of realist internationalism used by other authors. See Jean-Christophe Boucher, “The Responsibility to Think Clearly about Interests: Stephen Harper’s Realist Internationalism, 2006–2011,” in Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, eds., Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2013), 53–70; Marc-André Anzueto, “De Trudeau à Harper: L’internationalisme réaliste en Amérique latine?” La Politique étrangère du Canada 20, no. 1 (2014): 54. Of course, one should not forget that, as Smith and Turenne Sjolander have noted, internationalism is “a slippery analytic concept.” See Smith and Turenne Sjolander, “Introduction: Conversations without Consensus – Internationalism under the Harper Government,” in Smith and Turenne Sjolander, eds., Canada in the World, xvii. 4 For a recent overview of Canadian-Latin American relations, see Peter McKenna, “Canada and Latin America: 150 Years Later,’’ Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 24, no. 1 (2018): 18–33. 5 Government of Canada, “Prime Minister Harper Signals Canada’s Renewed Engagement in the Americas,” news release, 17 July 2007, https://www.canada .ca/en/news/archive/2007/07/prime-minister-harper-signals-canada-renewed -engagement-americas.html.

Canada and the Americas: From Liberal to Conservative Internationalism  251 6 Laura Macdonald, “Canada in the Posthegemonic Hemisphere: Evaluating the Harper Government’s Americas Strategy,” Studies in Political Economy 97, no. 1 (2016): 6. 7 Government of Canada, Canada and the Americas: Priorities and Progress (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2009), 4. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., 5. 10 Peter McKenna, “Preface,” in Peter McKenna, ed., Canada Looks South: In Search of an Americas Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), xiv. It is worth mentioning that Stephen Harper appointed Alexandra Bugailiskis as assistant deputy minister for Latin America and the Caribbean from 2007–10. She was chiefly responsible for ensuring the implementation of the Americas Strategy. See also John M. Kirk and Peter McKenna, “Canada and Latin America: Assessing the Harper Government’s Americas Strategy,” in Dorval Brunelle, ed., Communautés Atlantiques, Atlantic Communities: Asymétries et Convergences (Montreal: Éditions IEIM, 2012), 133–58. 11 Government of Canada, Canada and the Americas, 5. 12 Anzueto, “De Trudeau à Harper,” 54. 13 John Graham, “Canadian Policy in the Americas: Between Rhetoric and Reality – A Needless Distance,” in Fen Osler Hampson and Paul Heinbecker, eds., Canada Among Nations, 2009–2010: As Others See Us (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 103. 14 Yasmine Shamsie and Ricardo Grinspun, “Missed Opportunity: Canada’s Reengagement with Latin America and the Caribbean,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 35, no. 69 (2010): 186. 15 Thomas Legler, “Wishful Thinking: Democracy Promotion in the Americas under Harper,” International Journal 67, no. 3 (2012): 597. See also McKenna, “Preface,” xiv–xv. 16 McKenna, “Preface,” xiii. 17 Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation of the Americas Strategy: Final Report (Ottawa: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2011), 28. 18 Ibid., vii. 19 Ibid., 34. 20 FOCAL, “Canada’s Only Americas Think-Tank to Wrap Up Projects and Close at End of September,” news release, 14 June 2011, https://focal.ca/es/publications /focalpoint/469-media-release-june-14-2011-canadas-only-americas-think-tank -to-wrap-up-projects-and-close-at-end-of-september. 21 Graham, “Canadian Policy in the Americas,” 104. 22 Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation of the Americas Strategy, 38. 23 Government of Canada, Canada’s Strategy for Engagement in the Americas: A Whole-of-Government Approach to a More Prosperous, Secure, and Democratic Hemisphere (Ottawa: Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, 2015).

252  Jean-Philippe Thérien, Gordon Mace, and Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps 24 Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel, and Stéphane Paquin, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 4th ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 168. 25 Roland Paris, “Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era,” International Journal 69, no. 3 (2014): 282. 26 Marie-Josee Kravis, “A Conversation with Stephen Harper” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 25 September 2007), https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation -stephen-harper. 27 Ibid. 28 Carlo Dade, “Canada at Home in the Hemisphere?” FOCAL policy brief, December 2009, 1, https://www.focal.ca/pdf/OAS_Dade-FOCAL_Canada%20 Hemisphere_December%2016%202009_brief.pdf. 29 Tom Keating, “The Twilight of Multilateralism in Canadian Foreign Policy?” in Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, eds., Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas, 3rd ed. (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2015), 60; Nossal, Roussel, and Paquin, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 170. 30 Diane Ablonczy, “Canada and the OAS: A Lasting Relationship for Growth and Security” (speech, Washington, DC, 10 April 2013), OAS, https://www .international.gc.ca/media/state-etat/speeches-discours/2013/04/10a .aspx?lang=eng&pedisable=true. 31 Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), Honduras: Democracy Denied. A Report from the CCIC’s Americas Policy Group with Recommendations to the Government of Canada (Ottawa: CCIC, 2010), 5. See also Maxwell A. Cameron and Jason Tockman, “Canada and the Democratic Charter: Lessons from the Coup in Honduras,” in McKenna, ed., Canada Looks South, 87–116; Maxwell A. Cameron and Jason Tockman, “A Diplomatic Theater of the Absurd: Canada, the OAS, and the Honduran Coup,” NACLA Report on the Americas 43, no. 3 (May 2010): 18–22. 32 Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, North American Neighbours: Maximizing Opportunities and Strengthening Cooperation for a More Prosperous Future (Ottawa: Senate, 2015), 19. 33 Public Safety Canada, “Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness,” 4 February 2011, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca /cnt/brdr-strtgs/bynd-th-brdr/ctn-pln-en.aspx. 34 Jeffrey Ayres and Laura Macdonald, “A Community of Fate: Non-Polarity and North American Security Interdependence,” in Michael K. Hawes and Christopher J. Kirkey, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2017), 126. 35 Lana Wylie, “The Special Case of Cuba,” International Journal 67, no. 3 (2012): 677. 36 OAS, “Remarks by the Prime Minister of Canada.” 37 W.E. Hewitt, “The Current Paradox in Brazil-Canada Relations and the Path Forward,” in McKenna, ed., Canada Looks South, 315.

Canada and the Americas: From Liberal to Conservative Internationalism  253 38 Stephanie Nolen, Colin Freeze and Steven Chase, “‘Cyberwar’ Allegations Threaten Rift between Brazil and Canada,” Globe and Mail, 7 October 2013, https:// www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/cyberwar-revelations-threaten-rift -between-brazil-and-canada/article14738848/. 39 See Statistics Canada International Trade Division, Canadian International Merchandise Trade (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2006), https://publications.gc.ca /collections/Collection-R/Statcan/65-001-XIB/0120565-001-XIB.pdf; Office of the Chief Economist, Canada’s State of Trade: Trade and Investment Update – 2016 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2016), 25, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/amc-gac/FR2-8-2016-eng .pdf. With $37.1 billion of merchandise imports from Latin America and the Caribbean in 2015, Canada then ran a trade deficit of $26 billion with the region. 40 Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA) Permanent Secretariat, Economic Relations between Canada and Latin America and the Caribbean (Caracas: SELA, 2013), 35, https://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/11 /2013-Economic-Relations-Between-Canada-ALC.pdf. 41 Ricardo Grinspun and Jennifer Mills, “Canada’s Trade Engagement with the Americas: Swimming with or against the Tide?” in McKenna, ed., Canada Looks South, 62. 42 Personal and confidential interview with a Quebec-based mining executive, 29 May 2017. 43 See Natural Resources Canada, “Canadian Mining Assets: The Global Presence of Canadian Mining Companies,” Information Bulletin (December 2016): 1; Natural Resources Canada, Canadian Minerals Yearbook: 2006 Review and Outlook (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2008), 128. 44 SELA Permanent Secretariat, Economic Relations, 42. 45 Grinspun and Mills, “Canada’s Trade Engagement with the Americas,” 67. 46 Ibid., 72. 47 See, for example, Government of Canada, “Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement,” last updated 14 June 2021, https://international.gc.ca/trade -commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/colombia-colombie /fta-ale/info.aspx?lang=eng; Government of Canada, “Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement,” last updated 13 December 2016, https://international.gc.ca/trade -commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/peru-perou/fta-ale /info.aspx?lanf=eng; Government of Canada, “Canada-Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador Free Trade Agreement Negotiations,” last updated 10 February 2017, https://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords -commerciaux/agr-acc/ca4/fta-ale/info.aspx?lang-eng. It should be noted that the Chrétien government had initially sought to negotiate an agreement with the Andean Community as a whole. It was only after the implosion of the Andean Community that the Harper government decided to pursue negotiations with Colombia and Peru separately.

254  Jean-Philippe Thérien, Gordon Mace, and Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps 48 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Report on the 153rd Session of the IACHR (Washington, DC: Organization of American States, 2014), 10, https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/docs/Report-153.pdf. 49 See, for example, Jan Boon, “The Role of Governments in CSR,” in Julia Sagebien and Nicole Marie Lindsay, eds., Governance Ecosystems: CSR in the Latin American Mining Sector (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 82–3; Karyn Keenan, “Commentary. Desperately Seeking Sanction: Canadian Extractive Companies and their Public Partners,” Canadian Journal of Development Studies 34, no. 1 (2013): 111–21. 50 See Cameron and Tockman, “A Diplomatic Theater,” 18–22; Legler, “Wishful Thinking,” 593. 51 CCIC, Honduras: Democracy Denied, 5. 52 Legler, “Wishful Thinking,” 600. 53 See OAS, “Remarks by the Prime Minister of Canada.” 54 Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation of the Americas Strategy, 23. 55 Hal Klepak, “The Most Challenging of Links? Canada and Inter-American Security,” in McKenna, ed., Canada Looks South, 27. 56 Gordon Mace, Jean-Philippe Thérien, and Stefan Gagné, “Canada and the Security of the Americas: Between Old Threats and New Challenges,” International Journal 67, no. 3 (2012): 610–13. 57 Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, Sharing Successes 2013–14: Canada’s Engagement in the Americas (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2014), 15–17. 58 Confidential personal interview with a Canadian government official, 22 June 2017. 59 Jennifer Ditchburn, “Canada, U.S. Chided over Stances on Cuba,” Toronto Star, 16 April 2012, A3. 60 Philip Oxhorn, “Canadian Development Policies in a Unipolar World,” in Hawes and Kirkey, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy, 88. 61 Laura Macdonald and Arne Ruckert, “Continental Shift? Rethinking Canadian Aid to the Americas,” in Stephen Brown, Molly den Heyer, and David R. Black, eds., Rethinking Canadian Aid, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2016), 142. 62 See Laura Macdonald, “Canadian Development Assistance to Latin America,” in Greg Donaghy and David Webster, eds., A Samaritan State Revisited: Historical Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Aid (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2019), 284–7. 63 Boucher, “The Responsibility to Think,” 60. 64 Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, “Canada, the World, and the Inside/Outside of Internationalism,” in Smith and Turenne Sjolander, eds., Canada in the World, 262. 65 Jorge Heine, “Canada and the Hemisphere: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea,” in Fen Osler Hampson and Paul Heinbecker, eds., Canada Among Nations 2009–2010, 101.

Canada and the Americas: From Liberal to Conservative Internationalism  255 66 Adam Chapnick and Christopher J. Kukucha, “Introduction,” in Adam Chapnick and Christopher J. Kukucha, eds., The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada’s Global Posture (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 5. 67 Michael K. Hawes and Christopher J. Kirkey, “System and Structure: Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World,” in Hawes and Kirkey, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy, 311. 68 Norman Hillmer, “Concluding Thoughts: The Prime Minister of the Few,” in Chapnick and Kukucha, eds., The Harper Era, 267. 69 On Canada-Cuba relations, see Peter McKenna, “Engagement with Cuba Is Best Plan,” Winnipeg Free Press, 16 August 2021, A7. 70 See Global Affairs Canada, Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2017), https://www .international.gc.ca/world-monde/assets/pdfs/iap2-eng.pdf?_ga=2.228090525 .1205201821.1627396802-1682065159.1626899809; Global Affairs Canada, “Address by the Senior Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs on Behalf of Minister Dion to the OAS General Assembly,” Santo Domingo, 14 June 2016, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2016/06/address-by-the-senior -associate-deputy-minister-of-foreign-affairs-on-behalf-of-minister-dion-to-the -organization-of-american-states-general-assembly.html. 71 Global Affairs Canada, “Joint Declaration on a Partnership between Canada and the Members of the Pacific Alliance,” last updated 10 August 2017, https://www .international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations _internationales/pacific_alliance-alliance_pacifique/declaration.aspx?lang=eng.

12 China Choices: The Harper Era and Its Legacy1 paul evans

Introduction During the nine years or so that Stephen Harper served as prime minister, foreign policy was not his overriding concern and Asia and China rarely topped his international agenda. Most observers see his China policy as characterized by an initial period of ideology in command and raw negativity morphing into a second phase of pragmatic advance and uneasy, cautious, and occasionally inconsistent incrementalism. Some have praised his Middle Kingdom strategy for what one analyst called “striking the right balance between promotion of trade and investment with China against security and human rights concerns.”2 Many others have criticized it for that rough early and counter-productive beginning and then missed opportunities later on.3 As visceral as Harper’s partisan disdain was for the approaches of previous governments, and as strong as some of his philosophic and ideological inclinations were in evidence during his early Reform/Alliance experience, the first surprise was not his occasional departures from the spirit and practices of earlier Canadian government engagement strategies. Rather, it was the eventual, if unspoken and mostly unexplained, convergence with them. More surprising yet was that long after Harper’s departure, it still remains to be seen if the China policy of his successor will be substantially different from his own – though certainly the illegal detention of the “two Michaels” in late 2018 (and the other Canadians sitting on death row in China) has dramatically altered the political and diplomatic landscape. Because Asia is much bigger than China, a full rendering of the Harper legacy in the Asia-Pacific region will need a bigger canvas than this chapter. Yet China is central to Asia’s past and future. It became by far the most discussed, praised, and derided element of Harper’s approach to any country across the Pacific. And it turned out to be the element that was most closely managed by the prime minister himself.

China Choices: The Harper Era and Its Legacy  257

Stephen Harper was the first Canadian prime minister to face a China that was not just an important country in the world, but a multi-dimensional global presence and rising power. The engagement strategies of previous governments had a commercial objective as well as a geostrategic one in which China was encouraged to become a responsible member of the international community. For Pierre Elliott Trudeau, this entailed ending China’s diplomatic isolation; for Jean Chrétien, a kind of principled pragmatism that involved widening the net of economic connections through instruments such as the Team Canada trade missions; and for Paul Martin Jr., creating a new “strategic partnership” with China plus innovative multilateral institutions, especially the G20, that reflected the power shift underway and had China as a founding member. For Stephen Harper, the economic crisis of 2008–9 revealed China’s expanding economic clout and meant dealing with a China that was not simply a restive rule-taker in an US-led world order but also a country on the verge of being a rule-maker itself – including in institutions of its own making. Building a deeper relationship with China, while navigating a shifting balance of power and staying true to a deeply held set of Canadian values, took the form of what the Harper Conservatives called “principled engagement.” But principled engagement contained its own contradictions as well. We can draw from it both cautionary tales and occasional accomplishments that underscore the limits and possibilities that continue to shape contemporary Canadian policy towards China. In an era of xenophobic nationalism, Brexit, Donald Trump’s populist protectionism, and Joe Biden’s aggressive China posture – along with an even bigger Chinese presence and a struggling liberal world order – a reexamination of Stephen Harper’s choices and legacy still give important clues about an appropriate and domestically acceptable Canadian policy response to China. This chapter turns first to the Harper record before assessing the factors that actually shaped it. It then delves into the enduring challenges in getting China right in the face of pressing economic and security necessities grating against political and institutional differences and a complex set of Canadian domestic opinions and interests. The Conservative Record Prior to coming into office, Stephen Harper had never been to Asia and was leading a federal political party that had virtually no experience with or in China. The 2005–6 Conservative electoral platform barely mentioned China (as did the Liberal Party campaign document) or included it on the list of “democratic and economic partners” in Asia with whom Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) should be negotiated. Its criticism of Liberal policies “that compromised democratic principles to appease dictators, sometimes for the sake of

258  Paul Evans

narrow business interests,” made clear that a new approach was brewing that focused on core Canadian values of freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, free markets, and free trade.4 Conservative government policy in 2006 thus started down a rather distinctive path. The basic approach was actually a form of “cool politics, warm economics.” Indeed, “warm economics” echoed the emphasis of previous Canadian governments on trade and investment promotion. The Harper government embraced most of the federal Liberal Party’s Gateway strategy and transformed it into the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative. It basically resisted protectionist pressures to limit Chinese exports. It also encouraged Chinese investment, though without setting clear guidelines and rules. New trade offices were opened in China as part of its global commerce strategy. Over time, two-way trade expanded as did Chinese investment in Canada, even if in relative terms the Canadian share of both steadily declined. “Cool politics” was clearly the innovation. The first public comments about China in April 2006 focused on criticisms of Chinese industrial espionage. Official meetings with the Chinese took months to arrange, and ministerial visits did not begin for some sixteen months. In October 2006, the Harper government publicly responded to a long-standing request from several human rights organizations by postponing the bilateral human rights dialogue with China and tasking the parliamentary Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development to hold hearings on China – to be chaired by Jason Kenney. Parliament also agreed, unanimously in fact, to confer honourary citizenship on the Dalai Lama. To the chagrin of Beijing, the prime minister received the Dalai Lama in his Centre Block office with a Tibetan flag prominently displayed on his desk. Individual MPs spoke about the virtues of Taiwanese independence and selfdetermination for Tibet. In 2006, four cabinet ministers attended Taiwan’s 10 October celebration for the first time. In addition, the prime minister became publicly involved in the Huseyin Celil consular case. And en route to an AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Hanoi in November 2006, he told reporters that confronting China on human rights issues was both right and popular in “not selling out to the almighty dollar.” The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) was effectively removed from any policy-making role. Earlier plans for the creation of bilateral Strategic Working Groups (SWGs) were also shelved. The “whole-of-government” and relationship-building approach of the Chrétien and Martin periods was effectively frozen. But cool never actually meant cold. The government maintained a “One China” policy, did not make any dramatic overtures to Taiwan, and continued its aid program (until 2013). Ministers slowly began visiting China in the fall of 2006, though they did not use the key words “strategic partnership” or

China Choices: The Harper Era and Its Legacy  259

“friendship” in their public statements and speeches. It was essentially a lukewarm China policy at best. In response to increasingly sharp reactions from Beijing and mounting media and expert criticism, the elements of a reset were visible by late 2007. Meetings with senior Chinese officials were more frequent and positive. A new foreign minister, Maxime Bernier, had his department try to resuscitate the SWGs. A  series of two-way ministerial visits were then set in place, capped by the prime minister’s first visit to China in December 2009 – and a dressing down from Beijing. Harper came away from that visit impressed by the complexity and dynamism of a booming China and with an agreement in principle on Approved Destination Status (ADS), intended to boost tourism, concessions on beef and pork exports, and the re-start of SWGs on a variety of sectoral and international issues. One journalist travelling with the prime minister astutely called the visit “a tipping point” that included a “Damascene conversion to the importance of Asia” and a “subtle sidestep” that, without disavowing earlier sentiments, moved the Conservative government into “a new and revitalized relationship with China, while not acknowledging its earlier misdirection, and counting on no one to notice.”5 It seemed to work for the most part. Six months later in June 2010, during President Hu Jintao’s formal visit to Ottawa, China ratified the ADS agreement. Harper used the term “strategic partnership” for the first time and initiated a frank, if private, dialogue about human rights. In Beijing, Canada’s ambassador David Mulroney told an academic audience that “if ever there was a golden period in Canada-China relations it is now.”6 Shortly after the election of a majority Conservative government in May 2011, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Baird, emphasized that China is “a clear priority for our government and economy” and that Canada is committed to “continued and sustained high-level engagement with China.” As outlined further in his speech to the Canada China Business Council (CCBC), there had been forty ministerial visits to China since 2006 that had addressed issues related to law enforcement, legal cooperation, impediments to business, air transport, tourism, education, people-to-people engagement, and commercial relations.7 Harper’s second visit to China in February 2012 was the high-water mark of the warmer side of “principled engagement.” It produced a host of agreements and protocols for functional cooperation and the dispatch of the longawaited panda bears. It was obvious that bilateral relations were warming up considerably. However, functional cooperation and the government’s own prosperity agenda were running into headwinds at home, even in the Conservative’s own backyard. The most controversial decision Harper faced was the approval of

260  Paul Evans

the $12.5 billion sale of Nexen Energy, a Calgary-based energy company deeply involved in the oil sands development, to the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC). Polls at the time indicated that almost three-quarters of Canadians opposed the takeover even as it was strongly supported by the Alberta government, the Nexen board and shareholders, and the majority of investment experts. Arguments against the sale, though, focused on the risks associated with dealing with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, the specifics of the deal, the need to protect Canadian champions in the energy sector, the enforceability and scope of the undertakings promised by CNOOC, the desire for reciprocity in opening doors for Canadian business opportunities in China, anxiety about perceived connections between Chinese SOEs and intelligence gathering, industrial espionage, and the Chinese military. Some predicted a domino effect with the CNOOC investment as the first wave in what would be a series of Chinese investments that would amount to a veritable takeover of the Canadian energy sector. Similar arguments and sentiments surfaced in sharp public reactions to the signing of the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPPA) that was concluded in October 2012 after fourteen years of on-again, off-again negotiations. They also surfaced around a potential Huawei investment in a Canadian technology company and the import of Chinese workers in the mining sector. Undergirding the opposition were broad anxieties about the environmental risks of direct exports of Canadian energy to Asia from West Coast ports. The approval of both the Nexen sale and the FIPPA by the Harper government produced internal criticism within caucus, cabinet, and the Conservative base, as well as in the wider public. Nevertheless, on 7 December 2012, the Harper government approved the Nexen sale subject to undertakings privately agreed with CNOOC and with new guidelines that would substantially restrict the capacity of any SOE to make any future majority-ownership purchases in the oil sands except under “exceptional circumstances.” Harper’s statement emphasized that investments by SOEs would be looked at differently because their “larger purposes may well go beyond the commercial objectives of privately owned companies,” while Canada was committed to a “free market economy.”8 Though it was a decision made by Harper personally, it was a defining moment in economic policy from a government that had formerly eschewed economic nationalism and in a country that had a long and continuing experience with a variety of its own home-grown SOEs, otherwise known as Crown corporations. At least one, the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan, had been spared from purchase by an Australian private sector corporation three years earlier. The limits and boundaries of “principled engagement” were starting to become clearer. Public anxieties do not determine policy, though they can

China Choices: The Harper Era and Its Legacy  261

constrain it politically. Free market ideology, economic nationalism, environmentalism, anti-communism, worries about Chinese espionage, and Chinese policies in the South China Sea were just part of a rising set of worries that conjoined in potent combination. David Mulroney, just after departing his ambassadorship in Beijing, described the “difficult choices that come with engaging a country that is fundamentally unlike ours and whose objectives and policy directions are hard to follow … in managing our engagement with a dynamic, perplexing and increasingly important partner.”9 In the final three years of the Harper government, China and Canada’s China policy rarely emerged as key foreign policy concerns. After 2012, according to David Mulroney, “we downed tools” and the government turned to other priorities, a “flavour of the month diplomacy,” leaving the Chinese surprised and puzzled why key initiatives like an FTA were inexplicably left in limbo. He surmised that the political calculation was that “our effort to engage China was taking us beyond the comfort zone of many Canadians.” The Chinese certainly noticed the diplomatic cold shoulder.10 Nevertheless, during the Harper period, the level of trade, investment, flows of Chinese tourists, businesspeople, investors, immigrants, and tourists all steadily increased. A variety of bilateral agreements and protocols were put in place and the pace of official bilateral visits by ministers and leaders increased substantially. Quietly, Ottawa had put in place the diplomatic infrastructure for a deeper and wider set of interactions between the two countries. The transactional side of the relationship, then, was positive, if not spectacular. What Harper did not draw from was the earlier Liberal Party playbook of Chrétien and Martin that advocated engaging China in the context of multilateral institutions and collaborative action for addressing key global issues including climate change and terrorism, as well as defence and security issues including the weaponization of space. For the Conservatives, track-two processes encouraged and funded by earlier federal governments effectively withered. The official development assistance program was also phased out, which was not a wrong choice, considering the level of Chinese economic development. But it was not replaced by mechanisms for encouraging deeper partnerships in areas of mutual interest. Here the limitation was not public anxiety but rather a distrust of multilateralism and the Pearsonian middle power roles of the past. At the same time, Harper’s government did not heed the neo-conservative nostrums of voices in the US. It did not label China a strategic competitor, rival, or economic enemy. It did not increase defence spending to contain or counterbalance a rising China. And it stayed away from suggestions from conservative pundits in Australia, Japan, India, and the US who advocated a coalition or league of democracies intended to counterbalance growing Chinese power. Still, individual Conservative MPs did not shirk from openly criticizing China’s human rights

262  Paul Evans

record, but the government quickly stopped raising sensitive consular cases in public and did not repeat parliamentary hearings on the subject. Furthermore, it did not use inflammatory language in describing Chinese motives or actions, though nor did Harper or his ministers go out of their way to empathize with Chinese aspirations. He was, for the most part, hard on Chinese domestic institutions but not a China hawk in geopolitical matters. The Drivers of Conservative Policy It is easier to describe Harper’s China policy than it is to actually explain it. That it was Harper’s China policy is acknowledged by those who worked with him. Rarely has foreign policy decision-making been so centralized in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the hands of one leader with minimal involvement of Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) officials – as the McKenna chapter in this volume highlights. Several efforts by ministries to get a China policy through cabinet all failed. There was little consultation with foreign policy officials and virtually none with China experts in business and academic circles. Harper did, however, read briefs diligently and was invariably well-prepared for meetings with Chinese leaders. While he did form warm personal relations with some Western leaders, including John Howard, Angela Merkel, and Barack Obama (at least initially), he did not establish them with any Asian leaders, the Chinese included. Experiencing China and Chinese leaders on a personal basis was undoubtedly part of the China policy U-turn after the Harper 2009 visit. Several of his ministers shifted from China critics to China boosters after their own experiences in China, awed by the scale and speed of developments inside the country and in some cases soon after leaving government to establish their own commercial relations with Chinese firms. It may be as Irving Kristol once said that “a conservative is a liberal who has been mugged by reality.” With reference to China, however, a conservative in Canada is a liberal who gets mugged by the complexity, scale, civilizational weight, and seductive inducements of China. After retiring from active political life in August 2016, China has become for Harper, like several other Canadian politicians, an important part of their business and consulting activities.11 Looked at in retrospect, “principled engagement” was the meeting point of conflicting impulses and a compromise between economic interest and advancing and protecting what Harper perceived as Canadian values. The conflicting impulses for him were informed by a world view of intense partisanship, anticommunism, a binary division between friends and enemies, a reflexive distrust of China, and a fundamentalist faith in the universality of the values and institutions of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

China Choices: The Harper Era and Its Legacy  263

The link between Harper’s China policy and electoral calculations is less obvious to discern. It is unlikely that China policy affected outcomes in many, if any, ridings – though BC could have come into play. The fact of the matter is that it was never a domestic political issue at the national level. Having said that, issues around China and trade relations and China and human rights do have electoral significance. There are anecdotal stories of an early surprise that the “cool politics, warm economics” approach advocated most vocally by Jason Kenney during the first minority government did not produce tangible results in the fifteen or so swing ridings in Toronto and Vancouver (specifically in the 2008 and 2011 federal elections) that had significant numbers of voters of Chinese descent. And there were clear divisions within Conservative Party ranks about the economic agenda with China relating to the wisdom of a bilateral FTA and Chinese foreign direct investment in Canada, including by major SOEs. In the latter Harper years, though, some Conservatives in Alberta were scathing in their criticism of Harper’s cold shoulder directed towards the Chinese, even as they were evenly split on the efficacy of the Nexen decision. Clearly, there were (still are) fractions of the Conservative base – of which Harper was keenly aware  – that were partial to a narrative that is anti-communist, anti-China, pro-US alliance, pro-Canadian values (typically defined as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law), pro-Anglosphere, and who preferred to trade with and trust the ideologically like-minded. (This continues to be seen in occasional statements by Conservative MPs and conservative-minded journalists.) Conservatives, like liberals and socialists, were not of a single mind about how exactly to react to China. But in a China policy that was personally controlled by Harper, it is hard to argue that domestic political considerations alone were central to his thinking. He was able to muzzle, for the most part, Kenney and most of the anti-communists and seemed to be mildly influenced by people like Preston Manning, Stockwell Day, and John Reynolds  – all of whom became more nuanced and positive about the engagement side of principled engagement after they got to know China better. It is indeed interesting that neither Trudeau nor Harper decided to politicize the China file during the 2015 federal election campaign. Virtually nothing was said throughout the election period. That perhaps highlighted an implicit grand bargain reached on the grounds that it could harm national priorities. It may also be true that neither side saw any huge electoral advantage or was able to benefit politically from a fully fleshed out China policy debate. Equally possible is that neither leader wanted to put off any voters from the Chinese or Asian community by taking a hard or soft line towards Beijing. For the Harper Conservatives, “principled engagement” was always a form of conditional engagement. Its limits were defined by the difference in political institutions and social systems. It was conditional in that it expected and

264  Paul Evans

encouraged fundamental change in China before trust and deep partnership could be possible. Its necessity was defined by a realistic assessment of China’s growing economic importance for Canadian prosperity, its salience in international organizations as a rule-maker and potential global stabilizer. It was based on a belief in advancing fundamental change in China but not premised on a calculation that the Chinese economy or political system would implode or that that change would happen any time soon. Harper’s encounter with China, then, was during a period of its rapid emergence as a global player, a core participant in the world order that had been long anchored by the US and from which China and Canada had both benefited. He did not deal with a China or a world that had to address the acute uncertainty unleashed by a series of events and forces that former US president Donald Trump had wrought. But Harper did have to contend with finding that delicate balance, and electoral sweet spot, between Canadian values and Canadian commercial interests. After Principled Engagement It is worth examining or contemplating Stephen Harper’s China policy in the context of the approach and policy adopted by his successor. Justin Trudeau’s election victory in October 2015 brought to power a party and leader with extensive China connections and experience, with decidedly liberal internationalist instincts and inclinations, and a “sunny ways” optimism in the face of deepening global gloom. Expectations were high that the new prime minister, like his father before him in 1968, would open a bold new chapter in ­Canada-China relations. The early signals indicated Canada was coming back into multilateral institutions, including operational involvement in on-the-ground peacekeeping and peace support operations that the Harper government had eschewed. The briefing books prepared for the incoming cabinet emphasized the growing importance of China to Canada as a bilateral partner but also as a rising global presence and player.12 Unlike the Harper years, the first set of official visits in August and September 2016 set a warm mood in personal relations between Trudeau and his Chinese counterpart, Premier Li Keqiang, opening what Trudeau described as a “new era in the Canada-China strategic partnership.”13 In fact, Trudeau reversed a Harper decision and announced Canada would join the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The two governments successfully completed a complementarity study that normally precedes comprehensive free trade talks and signalled a desire to begin negotiations fairly soon (those would be officially terminated in 2020). Ottawa subsequently loosened restrictions on Chinese foreign direct investment, mooted the possibility of an extradition treaty, and set up a special deputy minister’s committee to get

China Choices: The Harper Era and Its Legacy  265

back to the idea of a whole-of-government coordination of the China file. It also accepted the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling on the South China Sea but avoided supporting freedom of navigation operations or offering any broader comment on the geostrategic implications of Beijing’s more assertive regional behaviour. The second visit in December 2017 produced an important agreement on cooperation on the environment and climate change, new access for Canadian beef, and lively exchanges focused on business opportunities, especially in the IT and clean tech sectors, as well as new people-to-people exchanges. Contrary to advance speculation in the media, though, it did not produce an agreement to proceed with an FTA negotiation. It proved particularly difficult to meld Chinese desires for an arrangement similar to that already negotiated with countries like Australia with the Canadian desire to frame the future talks around a progressive agenda including gender, the environment, and labour issues. Four years into its mandate, the Trudeau government had not set a distinctive stamp on the substance of bilateral relations or offered an adjective to precede engagement. And much like the previous Conservatives, it had not announced a major statement on China or Asia, conducted a broad public consultation, or issued an Australian-like study on why and how to advance Asia from the periphery of Canadian concerns to centre stage. Nor had it identified Asia or China as a major priority deserving of significant new resources. Moreover, its defence and developmental assistance reviews have scarcely mentioned China.14 Would Harper have proceeded any differently? Are the Liberal and Conservative comfort zones and policy agendas as different as so many had expected? What are the forces that constrain and shape Canadian decision-making about China – irrespective of party stripe – in a strategic context of more tumult and uncertainty than at any point in the last seventy years? Strategic Setting Like Stephen Harper, Justin Trudeau has not delivered a major China speech, but the sentiments underlying his government’s approach were outlined in the statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland in her June 2017 statement in the House of Commons. Forceful and clear in outlining the new strategic challenge confronting Canada, the postwar world order that has been so important to Canada is unravelling. Long-standing pacts and international relationships that have been the foundation of Canadian prosperity and security are in question. America’s repositioning under Donald Trump was paramount. “Indeed, many of the voters in last year’s presidential election cast their ballots, animated in part by a desire to shrug off the burden of world leadership … The fact that our friend and ally has come to question the very worth

266  Paul Evans

of its mantle of global leadership, puts into sharper focus the need for the rest of us to set our own clear and sovereign course.”15 The words echoed those of Germany’s Angela Merkel’s a week earlier when she stated: “The times when we could completely rely on others are, to an extent, over.”16 Trudeau’s prescription for that clear and sovereign course focused on a renewed commitment to multilateral institutions, stepping up with others to safeguard a rules-based international order. China was mentioned only once by Freeland in the context of a shifting global balance of power and the rapid emergence of Asia and the Global South requiring “the need to integrate these countries into the world’s economic and political system in a way that is additive, that preserves the best of the old order that preceded their rise, and that addresses the existential threat of climate change.”17 How this was to be achieved, however, was not clearly spelled out – and there is obviously no political will do so at the end of 2021. The acute uncertainty and disruption generated by Donald Trump and the social forces behind him in a divided American society and in an often dysfunctional political system are difficult to overstate. The former Trump administration’s “America First” instincts, its economic nationalism, its emphasis on unilateral and bilateral rather than multilateral instruments, its transactional rather than relational and institutional approach to international affairs, and the abandonment of democracy-promotion abroad all ran across the grain of Canadian interests and commitments. Governments around the world were scrambling to preserve their bilateral relationships with an America that was universally and nervously read as unpredictable and untrustworthy. In the global tumult of the Trump era, the matters of concern extended beyond NAFTA and trade to the very core of the postwar order – including its principal institutions. For Canada, the logic of strengthening existing multilateral institutions, working with like-minded nations on key global issues, and diversifying trade and investment links remains powerful today. But at the same time, the urgency of protecting what we can in our privileged relationship with the US, the still lingering protectionist sentiment in the US, and the relief that the Biden administration has embraced international leadership again (however timidly), all lead to cautious optimism on a number of files. The additional complication is that US-China relations are becoming more competitive and confrontational. The Biden White House, borrowing from the National Security Strategy released in December 2017, has singled out areas of cooperation but reframed China as a strategic competitor, revisionist power, and rival. This is “a geo-political competition between free and repressive visions of world order taking place in the Indo-Pacific region” in which China uses “technology, propaganda and coercion to shape a world antithetical to [US] interests and values.”18 This is not far from the mark of what the Biden perspective is turning out to be.

China Choices: The Harper Era and Its Legacy  267

Washington has rarely intervened directly in Canadian policy towards China. Over the years, it expressed occasional concerns at earlier moments about the wisdom of Canada’s plan to recognize the People’s Republic of China in the Pierre Trudeau period and the opening to Chinese investment in sectors including energy and high tech in the Harper period. Yet the real constraint comes in the form of US policy shifts that would create new abrasions should Canada ever push on with an FTA (very unlikely at this time of writing) with China or open sectors including telecommunications or infrastructure that Washington feels to be a threat to its own national security or, in the case of Huawei and 5G technology, its long-term economic dominance.19 The moment calls for strategic rethinking even as strategic thinking is more complicated and riskier today. If the Trudeau government moves beyond the “strategic silence” of all our recent governments and moves to explicate a strategic rationale and agenda, it must address a number of difficult questions.20 Do we agree with the Biden assessment of Chinese intentions and practices? Is China an irreconcilable opponent that really wants to destroy a US-anchored world system? If China is neither an ally nor an enemy, what is it precisely? How much room do we have for manoeuvre in the face of this new American approach? What is the meaning of a “rules-based order” when the US is only tepidly courting the rules-based international order that it long anchored?21 In an era of a divided America, how far can Canada go to strike new agreements to safeguard our access to other markets? What, if anything, can Canada do to help maintain the long peace in Asia? Does it demand a greater military and diplomatic mobilization? Trying to step up to a middle power role at a time when the US is at the early stages of assuming global leadership and China is stepping forward ever more aggressively (with its “wolf warrior” diplomacy) is a policy conundrum of the first order. As China shifts from rule-taker to rulemaker, as it shifts from being a selectively responsible stakeholder in existing institutions to creating its own partially overlapping, occasionally parallel or competing institutions, what can we expect and how and where, if at all, can Canada help shape Chinese participation and leadership the way Canadians tried to influence the United States through postwar multilateralism? Developments in China Recent developments in China make Canadian engagement, both commercially and diplomatically, even more complicated (if not impossible in the medium term). After assuming leadership in 2012, Xi Jinping has led a more active role for China on the world stage, giving it an even greater outward economic thrust, and altered its position on key global issues by embracing leadership roles on climate change and peacekeeping in particular. His speech at the World Economic Forum in January 2017 gave a ringing endorsement

268  Paul Evans

of globalization, free trade, global economic governance, and a commitment to providing public goods to make the system operate more effectively. It was widely appreciated as the speech that in past would have been expected from an American, not a Chinese, president.22 At the same time, Xi has directly challenged US primacy in maritime Asia and been assertive in defending China’s territorial and sovereignty claims in its Asian neighbourhood. At home, in addition to the anti-corruption campaign, he has been more repressive in dealing with political dissent and is tightening Party control over the Internet and at every level of society – including in foreign organizations and businesses operating in China. The Nineteenth Party Congress in October 2017 consolidated Xi’s authority as the most important leader since Deng Xiaoping. Xi’s China is actively promoting the colossal Belt and Road Initiative that is now rooted in the Party’s Constitution. It will embrace a bigger global role going forward. It will also protect China’s core interests, in part through expanded military spending and modernization. It will be a “great power” in the coming years. Moreover, it will certainly advance “the Chinese nation” that includes people of Chinese descent around the world. And it will pursue a path towards socialism with Chinese characteristics that is not only different from that of the Western world but that is a model for others to admire and follow.23 This all raises the prospect of a more assertive China confronting US dominance and extending its influence globally, especially in Asia but also with a rising presence in Canada. And it makes it even more difficult to make the case that China is heading to a liberal democratic future (as we see with the attack on democratic freedoms in Hong Kong). Economic openness and more societal contact are not likely to grease the path to eventual political liberalization or the disappearance of its distinctive form of authoritarian capitalism. And the notion of China becoming more like us in basic institutions and outlooks is a false dream. So, the rationale for engagement – either of a Harper or a Trudeau form – will need to be recast. This is especially so in the context of the dramatic downturn in CanadaChina relations in the wake of the detention of Huawei’s chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, in December 2018, the subsequent detention of two Canadians in China, and a series of diplomatic moves on both sides that have only raised tensions and escalated the bilateral situation. Significantly, the impact on public thinking and media opinion – mostly negative in orientation – has been most conspicuous.24 And Canada has been pulled into a geopolitical and technological confrontation between the US and China of Cold War proportions.25 Public Attitudes A recurrent refrain in Canadian policy circles is that ambitions to expand relations with China are constrained by a public worried about deeper involvement

China Choices: The Harper Era and Its Legacy  269

with a country that has a very different political and economic system, very different civilizational roots and values, and often behaves very badly abroad. The early Conservative government view that China was “a godless totalitarian country with nuclear weapons aimed at us” was a simplistic way of framing these concerns.26 The avalanche of negativity in editorials and media commentary today about China speaks to the values gap, misgivings, risks, and threats that come with a more powerful China on the global stage and more present on Canadian doorsteps.27 Andrew Scheer, Harper’s successor as leader of the Conservative Party (and who resigned from the post in December 2019), took a harder and narrower stance on even the economic agenda with China. He opposed free trade negotiations on the grounds that China is not compatible with Canada’s free-market economy and also questioned several potential investments in Canada by Chinese SOEs. Instead, he advocated closer trade and strategic relations with “likeminded democracies in the Asia-Pacific region” and negotiated agreements on a multilateral basis. The resonance here with the underlying instincts and calculations of Harper at the time he took power in 2006 is striking (current Conservative Party leader Erin O’Toole has also been hawkish about China).28 In fact, in a May 2019 foreign policy speech in Montreal, he sharpened his criticism of China and called for a complete “reset” in bilateral relations.29 Canadians are not enamoured of the Chinese political system and the general favourability index for China has been declining over the last decade, precipitously so in the wake of the fallout from the Meng detention and imprisonment of the two Michaels (what Trudeau labelled “hostage diplomacy”). Polling indicates, though, that the Canadian public is more pragmatic about China than media representations portray. A comprehensive national survey poll of views on China and Canada-China relations conducted in September 2017 found that Canadians were decidedly cool about China’s political system and military modernization, but more than two-thirds support an FTA with China. All of this has likely shifted, though, in a more negative direction given the actions of the Chinese government since 2017. Indeed, a subsequent poll in late 2020 saw the downward slide in favourable views accelerate.30 Canadians strongly defend human rights, the rule of law, and democratic governance at home but rank advancing human rights in China as a fourth priority for the Canadian government well behind expanding commercial relations, partnering with China in addressing global issues (like climate change), and protecting Canadian values and institutions at home from a rising Chinese presence. Instead of accepting the old narrative that there is a trade-off between deeper commercial interactions and promoting and protecting our values, they support the idea that human rights can be advanced through trade and more extensive economic contact. And they recognize the complexity of a situation in which political rights in China are getting worse, while personal freedoms are increasing.31

270  Paul Evans

Here the moral compasses of conservatives and liberals tend to point in different directions with major implications for what is in the range of the acceptable for dealing with a country as different and as important as China. Canadians reel at abhorrent practices (like Chinese actions against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang) but they disagree on the grounds for judgment, the appropriate responses, and how far they limit other forms of interaction.32 The Harper starting point was that human rights are universal and rooted in natural law. They apply everywhere and at all times. China is a category defined by its distinctive civilization and history as well as a communist or socialist system that rejects the fundamental elements of a universal order understood in liberal democratic terms. Canada can cooperate with China today but ultimately this cooperation, like during the Harper years, is limited to immediate mutual interests and is incapable of producing long-term trust and respect of the kind that is found with like-minded liberal democracies. For other Canadians, rights and expectations are contextual. While Pierre Trudeau gave Canadians a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, he was also open to wide interactions with a China that did not conform to Western values that he himself held dear. Universals are defined not on the basis of one set of standards, but on the basis of shared or overlapping understandings rooted in different civilizations, value systems, and traditions. Beyond philosophy, the debate also spills into the limits and possibilities of what can be done with China. Harper emphasized a limited and conditional form of cooperation and little commitment to engaging China in international institutions beyond advancing the immediate national interests of both countries. Harper treated China as mostly a matter of necessity and economic opportunity. Trudeau at least still hints at looking at China from the perspective of long-term possibilities. A new factor, though, is the growing concern about the challenge that China poses to Canadian values, institutions, and way of life at home. The list of concerns is enormous, ranging from housing affordability, job dislocations, and food safety through to cyber intrusions, espionage, political interference, and harassment of political opponents. Of special concern in Ottawa are the sophisticated strategies of Chinese businesses, SOEs, and private firms, in the purchase of Canadian companies in sectors including artificial intelligence, electronic vehicles, and financial technology. In the coming years, if Canada-China relations can recover from the very damaging 2019–21 period, a future Canadian government may be able to reset relations with China. The fact that it has not happened yet speaks to the deep uncertainty about how to manage relations with Beijing in what some characterize as a new Cold War between the US and China. It may also speak to a hesitation borne of a deep internal ambivalence in our political elites  – as was witnessed in the Harper government – about dealing with a country that

China Choices: The Harper Era and Its Legacy  271

may not migrate in the direction of the liberalism some of our leaders prefer to embrace. Conclusion The key elements of the Harper approach to China were a pragmatism about expanding commercial relations, a consistent and unswerving commitment to the primacy of a set of Canadian values understood to be universal, an ambivalence about China that led to intermittent rather than consistent activity, and a calculation that taking sharply negative approaches to China would not boost its electoral prospects in any significant way. But Harper was always mindful of the electoral importance of diaspora communities and thus was careful in how he couched or targeted his responses to those of Chinese descent in Canada. It remains to be seen if the policy choices made by the Trudeau government will depart substantially from what Harper would have done. Liberal Party impulses are decidedly different from those of Conservatives, but the hesitation to make China a core part of a foreign policy agenda and the abandonment of sharp ideological predilections  – mostly in the face of material interests and public/political attitudes  – are strikingly similar. But the gap between initial inclinations and policy execution appears to be growing everwider. Looking into the future, it goes without saying that building a national consensus around support for a comprehensive China policy will require at least two critical requirements. The first is a deeper knowledge of China at several levels ranging from tertiary and post-secondary institutions to our political representatives. It will also necessitate a deeper analytical capability to discern developments within China so as to assist with sharper screening of Chinese investments and influences in Canada. This will no doubt involve upgrading both our diplomatic and intelligence skills on the ground. Indeed, the importance of knowledge and personal experience was evident in the evolution in thinking of Harper and several of his key ministerial colleagues towards China. The second is a more open public discussion about the risks as well as the benefits presented by deeper economic and societal connections with China.33 This requires leadership from the prime minister in opening a national discussion on China. Unfortunately, Harper did not do so, steadfastly signalling an ambivalence about China while downplaying open and high-profile public debate. The challenge, however, will be to do this in a way that avoids sensationalizing and singularizing the threats at a time when China’s soft power, public diplomacy and efforts to shape views in foreign lands is ubiquitous and ­growing – and for some in a very ominous fashion . A major challenge, then, is how to address the very real activities of the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party in extending its influence in countries

272  Paul Evans

around the world, including Canada, without stigmatizing Chinese-Canadians or undercutting the multiculturalism that we cherish. In the Harper and Trudeau eras alike, engagement with China was constrained by public ambivalence, governmental division and political c­ rises  – along with differences in political systems and values. Add to that the limitations placed on Ottawa by the vicissitudes of US policy, the absence of a national consensus, and the lack of a deep understanding of Asia or Canada’s place in an Asia-Pacific world. It remains to be seen, then, if Harper’s (or even Trudeau’s) successors, however different in their inclinations, political aspirations, and personal chemistry with Chinese leaders, can eventually turn the page and open the next chapter in a constructive Canada-China relationship. But in light of recent developments, the rough draft of that next chapter is unlikely to happen any time soon. NOTES 1 The first half of this chapter draws heavily on my sources and central argument in Paul Evans, Engaging China: Myth, Aspiration and Strategy in Canadian Policy from Harper to Trudeau (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), and on an earlier essay, Paul Evans, “Engagement with Conservative Characteristics: Policy and Public Attitudes, 2006–2011,” in Pitman Potter and Thomas Adams, eds., Issues in Canada-China Relations (Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2012), 19–30. I have also relied in several places on David Mulroney, Middle Power and Middle Kingdom: What Canadians Need to Know about China in the 21st Century (Toronto: Allen Lane Press, 2015). I have not interviewed Mr. Harper himself in-depth, but I have had the opportunity for extended conversations with several of the cabinet ministers and senior officials who served under him. A fuller account awaits the personal biographies and memoirs that eventually will emerge in due course. 2 Charles Burton, “Canada’s China Policy under the Harper Government,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 21, no. 1 (2015): 45–63. 3 See Postmedia News, “Stephen Harper’s Approach to China Is Inadequate and Inconsistent, PM’s Former Foreign Policy Adviser Says,” National Post, 4 March 2015, https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/china-canada-foreign-policy -critique-david-mulroney; and Kim Nossal and Leah Sarson, “About Face: Explaining Changes in Canada’s China Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (2014): 146–62. 4 Conservative Party of Canada, Stand up for Canada: Federal Election Platform (Ottawa: Conservative Party of Canada, January 2006), 44. 5 See John Ibbitson, “A New Era for Canada Rises in the East,” Globe and Mail, 8 December 2009, A4; John Ibbitson, “For Harper, Canada’s Future Is Asian,” Globe and Mail, 7 December 2009, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics /for-harper-canadas-future-is-asian/article1390903/; and John Ibbitson, “CanadaChina Relations: Healing the Rift,” Globe and Mail, 4 December 2009, A1.

China Choices: The Harper Era and Its Legacy  273 6 Evans, Engaging China, 72. 7 John Baird, “Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister Calls Strengthened Ties with China a ‘Key Priority’” (speech, Toronto, ON, 29 June 2011), Canada China Business Council, https://ccbc.com/fr/press-releases/minister-baird-luncheon-2/. 8 Quoted in Les Whittington, “Prime Minister Stephen Harper Vows Chinese Takeover of Oil firm Nexen ‘the end of a trend,’” Toronto Star, 7 December 2012, https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/12/07/prime_minister_stephen _harper_vows_chinese_takeover_of_oil_firm_nexen_the_end_of_a_trend.html. 9 David Mulroney, “There’s No Shortcut to China,” Globe and Mail, 6 November 2012, A15. 10 Mulroney, Middle Power, Middle Kingdom, 283–4. 11 Since leaving public office, Stephen Harper has been busy using the personal connections that he made with key Chinese players while he was prime minister. Not only has he visited Beijing more often but he has also been facilitating business transactions with various Chinese entities and has looked to do so into the future. The author had a brief conversation with Harper on one of those visits to Beijing. 12 Examples indicative of the advice that the new government was receiving can be found in Wendy Dobson and Paul Evans, The Future of Canada’s Relationship with China (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, November 2015), 1–36. 13 Canada, Prime Minister’s Office, “Joint Press Release between Canada and the People’s Republic of China,” Government of Canada, 1 September 2016, 1. 14 Of course, the bilateral relationship has been ostensibly placed in a diplomatic deep freeze ever since Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor were detained, charged with espionage, and subsequently convicted. See James Griffiths, “Spavor Verdict Provides Hope while Showing Canada’s Powerlessness in the Face of Injustice,” Globe and Mail, 14 August 2021, A4; Steven Chase, “Canada Condemns China’s ‘Sham Trial’ of Spavor,” Globe and Mail, 12 August 2021, A1. With the release of the “two Michaels” in late September 2021, however, there is a possibility that the Canada-China relationship could be placed on a more positive footing going forward. But I wouldn’t expect any dramatic changes in bilateral relations to happen in the short to medium term – especially given the negative public attitudes towards the Chinese government amongst a majority of Canadians. See Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “Kovrig, Spavor Returning to Canada after U.S. Strikes Plea Deal to Free Meng,” Globe and Mail, 25 September 2021, A3. 15 Chrystia Freeland, “Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s Foreign Policy Priorities” (speech, Ottawa, 6 June 2017), Global Affairs Canada, https://www .canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandon canadasforeignpolicypriorities.html. 16 Quoted in Eli Walkins, “While Campaigning, Merkel Says Europeans Can’t Rely ‘Completely’ on US, Others,” CNN.com, 29 May 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017 /05/29/politics/merkel-trump-europe/index.html. 17 Freeland, “Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s Foreign Policy Priorities,” 2.

274  Paul Evans 18 US Government, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017), 45, https:// trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS -Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 19 On the trade issue, Article 32:10 of the 2018 USMCA pact prohibits an FTA with “non-market countries” like China. 20 On this point, see David B. Dewitt and David A. Welch, “Canada and the South China Sea,” in Asif B. Farooq and Scott McKnight, eds., Moving Forward: Issues in Canada-China Relations (Toronto: Asian Institute at the Munk School, 2016), 37–45. 21 The Biden administration’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in AugustSeptember 2021 has raised questions about its genuine commitment to international engagement. See Timothy Garton Ash, “Can the U.S. Become a Global Leader Again?” Globe and Mail, 21 August 2021, O5; Richard Fadden, “America’s Disastrous Exit Sends a Dire Signal to Liberal Allies,” Globe and Mail, 21 August 2021, O5. 22 Xi Jinping, “Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global Growth” (keynote address, Davos, Switzerland, 17 January 2017), Opening Session of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, https://america.cgtn .com/2017/01/17/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum. 23 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (speech, Beijing, China, 18 October 2017), Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, https://www .xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National _Congress.pdf.  24 See Michele Zilio, “Trudeau Toughens Tone against China as Delegation Seeks Release of Kovrig, Spavor,” Globe and Mail, 22 May 2019, A1. On the increasing politicization of the Meng dispute, see Campbell Clark, “PM’s Tougher Talk on Relations with Beijing Hints at New Normal,” Globe and Mail, 22 May 2019, A4. 25 On the frigid nature of Canada-China relations in 2021, see Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “Ottawa to Assess Security Risks of Research Grants,” Globe and Mail, 13 July 2021, A1; Editorial, “China Is Teaching Us a Lesson,” Globe and Mail, 22 March 2021, A10. 26 See Paul Evans, “Wanted: A Coherent China Policy,” Open Canada, 7 May 2014, 1–4. 27 See, for example, Roger Garside, “A Changing of the Guard,” Globe and Mail, 1 May 2021, O3. 28 See, for example, Andrew Scheer, “Free Trade with China Doesn’t Put Canadian Interests First,” Globe and Mail, 6 July 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com /opinion/free-trade-with-china-doesnt-put-canadian-interests-first /article35571538/. 29 See Andrew Scheer, “Foreign Policy and Defence: A Stronger Canada in a Turbulent World” (speech, Montreal, QC, 7 May 2019), Montreal Council on

China Choices: The Harper Era and Its Legacy  275

30

31

32 33

Foreign Relations, 2–4; Adam Radwanski, “Scheer Shows It’s Still Harper’s Party,” Globe and Mail, 8 July 2017, A10; Scheer, “Free Trade with China Doesn’t Put Canadian Interests First.” See the polling numbers in “Canada-China at 50” (Vancouver: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, October 2020), https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication /canada-china-50. Paul Evans and Xiaojun Li, “Canadian Public Attitudes on China and CanadaChina Relations” (Vancouver: Institute of Asian Research, 17 October 2017), 1–48, https://iar2015.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2017/04/Full-Report-17oct.pdf; Paul Evans and Xiaojun Li, “Pragmatism Amidst Anxiety: Canadian Opinions on China and Canada-China Relations,” Institute of Asian Research, 1–9, https://iar2015.sites .olt.ubc.ca/files/2017/10/Key-Findings-17oct.pdf. A March 2018 poll of Quebec residents found the level of support at 72 per cent. See “Partners: Institute of Asian Research (IAR),” University of British Columbia School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, accessed 19 July 2021, https://sppga.ubc.ca/about/partners/#IARca /reports. Nathan Vanderklippe, “China Removes Uyghurs to Destroy Culture,” Globe and Mail, 3 March 2021, A1. See Guy Saint-Jacques, “Canada Needs a New Engagement Strategy That Opposes China’s Thuggery,” Globe and Mail, 19 August 2021, A11.

13 Stephen Harper: “To Russia with Love” david carment with milana nikolko and katarina koleva

Look, let me give you the two big threats of the 20th century. First, fascism. Canada, next to its big-three allies, played one of the largest roles in the world in the defeat of fascism, which purged the world of one evil, and obviously the most robust military engagement anyone’s ever been involved in. And then through a different kind of engagement, the long, sustained state of alert of the Cold War against Communism, the other great threat to the world and to our civilization. In spite of, quite frankly, the ambivalence of some Liberal governments toward that, Canada, in fact, remained engaged in that from the beginning to the very end … The real defining moments for the country and for the world are those big conflicts where everything’s at stake and where you take a side and show you can contribute to the right side. – Stephen Harper, speaking in Toronto, Ontario, 30 May 20141

Introduction Stephen Harper became prime minister of Canada following the January 2006 federal election when the Conservative Party of Canada won a plurality of seats in the Canadian House of Commons, which led to the defeat of Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin. In the May 2011 federal election, Harper won his only majority government. Between 2006 and 2015, during which Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party led both minority and majority governments, Canada’s policy towards Russia was driven by an ideological fervour coupled with a desire to reinvigorate Canada’s Arctic presence, strengthen the Canadian military, and establish stronger relations with Ukraine.2 Though some pundits consider Stephen Harper to be one of the most transformative figures in Canadian political history, arguably one of his main accomplishments was how he moved Canada into a more confrontational relationship with Vladimir Putin’s Russia.3 Whereas previous governments did not stray too far from the time-honoured liberal institutionalist playbook, the

Stephen Harper: “To Russia with Love” 277

Harper Conservatives demonstrated an unprecedented willingness to couple foreign policy with ideology and domestic political interests. To substantiate this point, this chapter will review crucial policies taken by the Conservatives during almost ten years in power. These include engagement with Russia in multilateral forums and confrontation with Putin over Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and the Arctic. Each of these issues is examined separately before we conclude with a number of insights on how the Harper legacy overall has affected Canadian foreign policy. A Conservative or a Reform Legacy? Beyond the anti-communist rhetoric espoused in the quote above, how different was the Conservatives’ approach from previous Canadian governments? For an answer to that, we need to look back at a point in history where tensions between East and West were at their highest. Consider that in 1987 the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney released a Defence White Paper identifying the Soviet Union as the single largest security threat facing the West. Pitching the Soviet Union as an expansionist power and persistent violator of human rights helped to justify the subsequent purchase of several British-made submarines in response to the presumed threat from the Soviet adversary lurking beneath Canada’s coastal waters. Even Mulroney’s predecessor Pierre Elliott Trudeau made the decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a country it would not leave for another full nine years. But when the Soviet Union began its collapse in 1989, unleashing a torrent of ethnic nationalist violence from the Balkans to Central Asia, Conservative and Liberal governments alike were swept up in a wave of change that would bring Russia and its former satellite states into closer and more constructive contact. Dialogue, not confrontation, would be the order of the day. For example, in 1991 the two Germanys reunited and, in a cooperative gesture, it was agreed that no nuclear missiles would be stationed in the former East Germany. The Visegrad Group and eventually the Vilnius Group would subsequently obtain full membership in NATO, ensuring that Canada and its Western allies would provide security guarantees for those Central and East European countries that were previously a part of the Soviet Union. Canada would also have a seat at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – an organization that provided a window on the unstable security situation in Russia’s near abroad. Looking back, we see clearly that the Conservatives under Brian Mulroney, and the Liberals under Jean Chrétien, were caught off guard by this monumental shift in geopolitics, forced to quickly recalibrate their government’s security posture and rethink how Canada would engage with the world and with Russia

278  David Carment with Milana Nikolko and Katarina Koleva

in particular. While Canada’s NATO contributions would witness a net decline in troops permanently deployed in Western Europe, many soldiers would see action in NATO’s out-of-area operations: first in the Balkans and then eventually in other regions left stranded in the wake of the Soviet collapse. UN peacekeepers would be deployed in a variety of failed states from West Africa to the Horn of Africa, from the Middle East to Central Asia  – many of which were former Soviet satellites. Brian Mulroney’s commitments to cooperative security, fashioned clearly in the mould of international liberalism, also sought to strengthen dialogue in the North Pacific in the face of an increasing China presence and a weak and disengaged North Korea. Jean Chrétien would continue this form of cooperative engagement, working hard to strengthen both the G8 and the G20, in which the Soviet Union’s primary successor state, Russia, along with Canada would participate as equals. By the time Paul Martin came to power as prime minister in late 2003, Canada’s commitments to UN peacekeeping were clearly on the decline. Indeed, for the next fifteen years, the bulk of Canadian forces abroad would almost exclusively be tasked under NATO command with more of a focus on war-fighting than preventing conflict. This was particularly important when Canada decided to engage Afghanistan (as clearly elucidated by Massie, chapter 7 in this volume), in its efforts to launch a comprehensive state-building project right in Russia’s veritable backyard.4 Multilateralism under Harper Under Stephen Harper, that cooperative Canadian mood would change, in part, because of the Reform Party’s anti-communist stance that helped propel it to majority government status by generating political support from those Canadians who had fled Eastern bloc nations before the collapse of the Soviet Union.5 In the speech quoted at the outset of this chapter, echoing those speeches that Harper gave before becoming prime minster, there are clearly distinguishable Reform-oriented elements that would pervade his government’s policies towards Russia. First, there is the constant refrain of previous Liberal policy failure, in this case being too soft on Russia and communism (even though Liberal governments had stationed Canadian Forces in Europe over several decades). Then there is reference to a Canadian diaspora who fled communism and who could, in turn, look to the Conservatives for political leadership. This particular speech was actually presented to a group seeking federal funds for a controversial Victims of Communism memorial in Ottawa.6 Finally, there is the oft-repeated mantra of taking a “principled stand” in a world divided by “good and evil” and “black and white.”7 The idea of taking a principled stand would play out in many ways for the Harper government, but chief among those was

Stephen Harper: “To Russia with Love” 279

aligning the party more closely with those voters who shared a similar world view; a world believed to be clearly divided between victims and perpetrators.8 Each of these elements is significant. They reveal how Harper’s Conservatives would engage Russia and why the government would disengage from international institutions. If there is a truism in Canadian foreign policy it would be that it is through multilateralism and membership in various multilateral organizations that Canada has typically addressed questions of international peace and security through the rule of law (as a member of the UN, NATO, and the OSCE, for example), and economic prosperity and competitiveness in trade and investment (as part of the World Trade Organization and NAFTA), as well as national unity and Canadian sovereignty (as a member of the Commonwealth and la Francophonie).9 That orientation, largely associated with past Liberal Party policy, would shift under Stephen Harper’s government.10 And there is a clear timeline associated with these shifts. The first begins with the 2006 election of the Harper minority government amid suggestions that the country was poised to become an “energy superpower,” where Arctic exploration became a new policy domain under the rubric of expanding Russian interests in the North.11 The second shift predates the 2014 Ukraine crisis and starts with the conflict in Libya in 2011, in which Canada opposed Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi by assigning Canadian Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard to lead the NATO air campaign against Libya’s armed forces. It is during this conflict (and subsequently in Syria) that we most clearly observed the Conservatives recalcitrance towards Liberal policies and a willingness to seek out like-minded allies in lieu of working collaboratively within the United Nations. Within this legacy, we also witnessed the slow dismantling of the Pearsonian-internationalist agenda deeply embedded in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD; now Global Affairs Canada).12 The third shift begins with the onset of the crisis in Ukraine and continues with the decision to deploy Canadian trainers to Ukraine and NATO forces to the Baltics, coupled with sanctions against the Russian government for its role in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine conflict.13 By the time the Ukraine crisis was in full swing in early 2015, the Conservatives had clearly staked out their position, which opposed diplomatic engagement with Russia and seized every opportunity to portray Russia as an aggressor bent on territorial expansion.14 No opportunity to discredit Russia was overlooked. For example, in August 2015, Canada’s Defence Minister Jason Kenney claimed that Russian warships confronted ships of the Royal Canadian Navy. Russian fighters, he tweeted, had buzzed the HMCS Fredericton at low altitude while it participated in a NATO maritime task force off the coast of Ukraine in the Black Sea. NATO officials later stated that Russian ships could be seen on the horizon, but never

280  David Carment with Milana Nikolko and Katarina Koleva

approached the NATO fleet, and that all flyovers of the fleet by Russian planes had been at high altitudes and were not out of the ordinary.15 “Alternative facts” such as Kenney’s never put the Harper government in real political danger, since the opposition did not want to be seen as being soft on Russia. The anti-Russian rhetoric also strengthened support for the Conservatives in key swing ridings where many voters clung to similar sentiments.16 To be sure, towards the very end of Harper’s tenure there was clearly more material with which to criticize Harper and his government on the foreign policy front. In the final days, for instance, the Conservatives were targets of a barrage of increasingly frank, sharp, and clear-cut criticisms focused on their presumed abandonment of the UN, climate change, and human rights. But little of the invective focused on Russia. Canadians, it seemed, enjoyed hearing about Harper’s confrontations with Vladimir Putin.17 Such support and complicity even among the media, which gleefully abandoned its claims to objectivity, ensured that confrontation with Russia would be a sure-fire political winner for Harper and the Conservatives.18 The Arctic A key component of the Harper government’s foreign policy was the stress the ruling Conservatives placed on Canadian self-interests and values.19 This was where Russia played a significant role as a counterpoint, as a threatening “other” with different values whose behaviour would help define Canada’s policy objectives and build electoral support for the Conservatives simultaneously.20 Harper’s foreign policy towards the Arctic region illustrates this point clearly. As noted by Joel Plouffe, the narrative shaping Harper’s approach is characterized by two notable features: a fear of external threats to Canada’s sovereignty that produced ideologically driven policies and objectives, and aspirations to break with Canadian multilateralism, sometimes paradoxically colliding with US goals in the process.21 Under the Conservatives, Canada looked at other members of the Arctic Council as potential adversaries (such as Denmark). Those perceptions of threat and fear in the Conservative narrative can be traced back to Russia’s flag-planting mission on the North Pole in 2007, followed by an even stronger narrative and strategy in the wake of the 2008 war in Georgia.22 Russia’s flag-planting renewed debates in Canada regarding the Arctic’s strategic value. As Doug Saunders reported in the Globe and Mail: “The North needs new attention,” the Prime Minister said. “Defending our sovereignty in the North also demands that we maintain the capacity to act.” “New Arctic patrol ships and expanded aerial surveillance will guard Canada’s Far North and the Northwest Passage,” Mr. Harper said. “As well, the size and capabilities of the Arctic Rangers will be expanded to better patrol our vast Arctic territory.” 23

Stephen Harper: “To Russia with Love” 281

But beyond the security rhetoric (as recounted by Andrea Charron in chapter 10 of this volume), little was done to engage Russia on other fronts such as diplomacy or dialogue.24 Perhaps, because of the media’s portrayals of Russia as a threat to Canada’s Arctic, the Harper government ignored the fact that Russia was the only Arctic state sympathetic to Canada’s characterization of the Northwest Passage. Nor was Russia, like Canada, enthusiastic about expanding membership of the Arctic Council to other non-Arctic states.25 Often, as Kari Roberts observes, Russia acted more as a “team player” in the Arctic than the United States and was, for the most part, far ahead of Canada in developing a comprehensive Arctic policy (with the assistance of the Russian Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North).26 The roots of the Harper government’s fear of Russia in the Arctic were consistent with its ideological stance; overlooking some realities which were not consistent with that world view. For example, just after coming to power in 2006, the Canadian government declared that Arctic waters located between the Canadian islands of Nunavut and the Northwest Territories belonged to Canada. US officials, including newly named US Ambassador to Canada David Wilkins, reacted by saying that those waters were in neutral territory.27 To make their case, the Harper government went beyond North America and launched an aggressive campaign across Europe to brand Canada as an “Arctic power” and the owner of a third of the contested land and resources of the Far North. Ministers and ambassadors were instructed to deliver a strong message: Canada owns it; hands off.28 Russia, however, released its own report arguing that squabbling over Arctic resources could spark military confrontations.29 By the time Canada assumed the chair of the Arctic Council in May 2013, the Harper government’s position on Russia was so imbued with ideology that the country’s ability to show impartial leadership on the global stage was severely constrained. 30 For example, Conservative efforts to link the conflict in Ukraine with Arctic Council policy only provoked open criticism from the United States.31 Libya and Syria The Harper government’s amplified militarization and a more assertive tone continued with the early 2011 conflict in Libya (and later Syria). In the lead up to NATO’s intervention, Resolution 1973 was put to the United Nations Security Council. But like China, Russia went only so far as to abstain – and not support – the resolution allowing it to pass with the understanding that NATO’s role in the war would be extremely limited.32 Russia’s Ambassador at the UN, the late Vitaly Churkin, criticized the resolution nevertheless. He justified his country’s abstention on the perceived need to protect the civilian population, as well as the fact that the Arab League had asked the Security Council to establish a

282  David Carment with Milana Nikolko and Katarina Koleva

no-fly zone. In other words, Russia’s position was influenced primarily by the position of the Arab countries, which had demanded action from the Security Council, fearful that inaction would destabilize further their own shaky regimes.33 At the same time, Ambassador Churkin stated that the resolution departed from the Arab League’s chief concerns by allowing for wide-ranging and open-ended military intervention. He also criticized the lack of response to Russia’s concerns, including how the resolution itself would be implemented.34 After the resolution passed, Canada was one of the first countries to commit forces to the Libyan intervention. The Canadian mission began with the deployment of the frigate HMCS Charlottetown, to help evacuate Canadians from Libya. In March 2011, Canada joined Britain, France, Italy, and the US with six CF-18s to enforce a no-fly zone. The mission itself, dubbed Operation Unified Protector (OUP), later included Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain. By August 2011, the Libyan National Transitional Council, with NATO support, had taken over most of the country and forcibly removed Muammar Gaddafi from power. In essence, NATO used the UN resolution to attack and destroy Gaddafi’s forces on the ground, establish a no-fly zone, enforce an arms embargo, and impose economic sanctions against Gaddafi’s crumbling government.35 Those actions infuriated Russia (and China), and were seen as the main reasons for why they refused to allow UN intervention later in Syria.36 At the time, the OUP mission was presented as a success and ended in October 2011. It was said to be the first time that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine was invoked to protect innocent civilians caught up in a humanitarian crisis.37 However, Harper’s government was careful to not openly identify R2P as the justification for Canada’s actions in Libya for three reasons. First, the Conservatives wanted to distance their party from what was seen as a policy initiative of previous Liberal governments. Second, neither the Russians nor the Chinese were likely to abstain from voting on UNSCR 1973 had the war been framed in such terms; and third because Canada’s lead role in the conflict might be construed as interventionist if not belligerent.38 While Foreign Minister John Baird portrayed the destruction of Gaddafi’s forces as a duty to act, others saw it as premeditated intervention, precipitating a wave of destruction across the Western Sahel, rendering it and several of its neighbours too weak to function.39 Going to great lengths to defend what was clearly a pyrrhic victory, Harper noted, “History shows us this: that freedom seldom flowers in undisturbed ground. And so, while few nations exceed our home and native land in its passion for peace, a generous spirit will not blind us to injustice. Still less shall ‘modest stillness and humility’ make us indifferent toward oppressors.”40 By late 2015, Libya was seriously divided and in a state of complete chaos. Largely unsupported by Russia, China, and Brazil, as well as many of NATO’s Eastern European members, the mission failed to bring, even today, a measure of lasting peace to Libya.

Stephen Harper: “To Russia with Love” 283

Vladimir Putin, then Russia’s prime minster, defined Resolution 1973 as “defective and flawed,” resembling “a medieval call for the Crusades.”41 Both Russia’s Parliament and the defence minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, made repeated calls for a ceasefire. A  survey of Russians by the VTsIOM polling agency found that 62 per cent of respondents were against foreign intervention in Libya. Dmitry Babich, an analyst with the state-owned RIA Novosti news agency, summed up a common view when he wrote that “liberal-optimists” in the West were obsessed with toppling tyrants while giving little thought to the actual consequences of their actions.42 Despite much-deserved criticism for failing to follow through on Libya, the Harper government took a similar “humanitarian” stand while justifying Canada’s involvement in the Syrian civil war. Russia had long supported the government of Bashar al-Assad: politically and with military aid, and since September 2015, through direct military involvement. In 2012, Harper called on Russia to stop blocking efforts to impose sanctions on the “murderous” Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. The prime minister even singled out Russia by name during Question Period in the House of Commons, calling on Putin to contribute to binding sanctions on the Assad regime.43 Later, the possibility of military engagement in the conflict was alluded to by the prime minister after the sarin gas attack in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta, in August 2013. Foreign Minister John Baird asserted that if the world did not respond to the Ghouta attack, this would constitute “a green light to hit again,” and evil forces elsewhere might be convinced that they could “get away with using these weapons of mass destruction.”44 With the shoe on the other foot, it was now Harper’s turn to question the utility of the UN Charter (and Russia’s veto power). Not surprisingly, arguments from Russian representatives were rebuffed. “When we see developments that we think in the long term are dangerous for the planet, and therefore us as well, we are simply not prepared to accept the idea that there is a Russian veto over all of our actions.”45 Few seriously believed that the West was prepared to intervene in this conflict militarily. The best that Canada and its allies could hope for was to support nominally friendly insurgent forces on the ground, such as the Kurds, and grind away at Assad’s forces indirectly by providing training and non-lethal humanitarian assistance to victims of the conflict. But Canada did eventually participate in the US-led coalition bombing of Islamic State militant positions inside Syria. These were missions that the Harper government insisted did not directly target the Assad regime’s air defences. Rhetorically at least, the Harper government was consistent in its condemnation of Russia for its support of the murderous Syrian government. But there was no appetite to follow through and confront Russia directly. On the eve of the G20 summit in St. Petersburg, the Conservatives insisted that it was unnecessary to recall Parliament to debate the crisis in Syria because Canada was

284  David Carment with Milana Nikolko and Katarina Koleva

not contemplating a military mission. Instead, the government would take “a strong moral stand” against the use of chemical weapons. In 2015, at a campaign stop in Victoriaville, Quebec, Harper stated, “The Russian government (and Putin) remains a government that complicates, in dangerous and unhelpful ways, security situations all over the world.”46 The comments were made just as Moscow urged Washington to avoid “unintended incidents” by restarting direct military dialogue, suspended in the wake of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.47 Domestic Politics and the Ukraine Crisis If the crises in Libya and Syria demonstrated a high level of rhetoric in Canada’s confrontations with Russia, Ukraine posed a new set of problems and opportunities for the governing Conservatives. Even before the Harper government came to power in 2006, the promotion of democracy in Ukraine was a long-standing area of focus for Ottawa. With the onset of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, Canada-Russia relations permeated many aspects of Canadian defence policy, including a decision to deploy Canadian trainers to Ukraine and NATO forces to the Baltics (coupled with sanctions against the Russian government for its role in the Crimea and the Eastern Ukraine conflict).48 The most prominent players in this policy gambit were Canadians of Ukrainian background. To be sure, such populism transcended the Harper era as many Canadians of East European heritage were long prominent in Canadian politics. But as we have argued elsewhere,49 this particular diaspora relationship resonated politically more so than ever before. Certainly Canada’s position towards Russia under Harper provides ample evidence to support that claim. By the time the Ukraine crisis was in full swing, the Conservatives had clearly staked out their position domestically, as a government opposed to diplomatic engagement with Putin. Indeed, the Conservatives seized every opportunity to portray Russia as expansionist and unpredictable. Ukraine, in contrast, was viewed as the perpetual victim, first under the Soviets and then under Russia.50 For years, successive Canadian governments, including federal and provincial Progressive Conservative parties, worked with and supported the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) in organizing events, promoting research, and seeking international support in recognition of the 1932 Holodomor or “death by starvation.”51 In 2008, the Harper government brought to conclusion the passage of a private member’s bill defining the Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people perpetrated by the Soviet Union. The UCC played a key role in coordinating that effort and in promoting awareness of the Holodomor.52 The subsequent victimization narrative quickly became a central part of Canadian-Ukrainian discourse and ultimately a core part of Harper’s

Stephen Harper: “To Russia with Love” 285

hardline policy towards Russia. He spoke of it each time he visited Kiev or when dignitaries from Ukraine came to Ottawa on official business. The Holodomor, though, was also not without controversy. For example, in an open letter to the UCC, a group of international scholars accused them and the Ukrainian Civil Liberties Association of “distorting historical accounts of the Holodomor,” while at the same time refusing to “acknowledge” the role Ukrainian nationalist movements played in the Holocaust.53 If there was a public debate to be had regarding these different historical viewpoints, the Conservatives were certainly not interested in hearing it. In retrospect, it is not hard to see how the UCC and the federal Conservative Party found common ground in anti-communist and anti-Russian rhetoric. That collaboration would certainly solidify support for the Harper Conservatives in Western Canada. A noteworthy beneficiary would also be Jason Kenney, who went to great lengths as Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, to ingratiate himself and his party with Ukrainian Canadians.54 Armed with the belief that a strong independent Ukraine, free of Russian shackles, was in Canada’s best interests, the Conservatives pursued policies well beyond mere symbolism and rhetoric. Harper was, for example, the first Canadian prime minister to suggest that Ukraine become a member of NATO. Under Harper, Canada sent an excessive and unneeded 500 observers to assist with Ukraine’s parliamentary elections in the 2012 national vote.55 And despite very small trade and investment flows between the two countries (around $3 million annually), the Canadian-Ukrainian Free Trade Agreement was initiated under Harper in 2010. Over the course of ten years, the prime minister would travel to Kiev three times. During his first visit in 2011, Harper was accompanied by Canadian MPs of Ukrainian descent, prominent Ukrainian activists, and the president of the UCC, Paul Grod, who would eventually be marked persona non grata by the Russian government in a tit-for-tat response to sanctions targeting prominent Russian politicians and businessmen. This first visit was seminal in shaping hostile Canada-Russian relations as it highlighted the Holodomor and stressed meetings with opposition leaders such as Yulia Tymoshenko, who at the time was seen as Ukraine’s best hope for steering the country away from its Russianinfluenced government under President Viktor Yanukovych.56 It is interesting to note that the Harper government never spoke publicly about Canadian diplomatic efforts to help draft the 2015 Minsk Agreement, which would be the basis for a still unrealized negotiated settlement to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Still, those efforts focused mostly on Canada’s mission to the OSCE’s contribution to a package of measures for the initial Minsk Agreement. (Canada also provided fifty monitors to the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine in 2014.) Perhaps such efforts conducted by Canada’s diplomatic corps and permanent staff at the OSCE, of which Canada is a

286  David Carment with Milana Nikolko and Katarina Koleva

member, were at odds with Harper’s confrontational posturing. Indeed, it was a posturing that would see Minister John Baird rely heavily on historical analogies to describe Putin’s behaviour as equivalent to Adolf Hitler demanding the annexation of the Sudetenland. As the situation deteriorated first in Crimea and then in Eastern Ukraine, it was clear that the Harper government had no interest in finding a diplomatic solution to the conflict. On the question of who would bear responsibility for mediating the conflict, one had to look beyond North America. For it was (and still is) clear that Kiev had no long-term diplomatic strategy for the Donbass or even for Crimea.57 The humanitarian disaster visited upon Eastern Ukraine remained an unmet challenge that few Western governments, including the Government of Canada, took seriously. If there were atrocities in the conflict, the Harper government (and the media) appeared uninterested. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of victims in this conflict have been Ukrainian citizens about which the Harper government spoke little. Clearly, both sides to this conflict are accountable for the estimated 14,000 deaths (in 2021) and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. Both sides stand accused of indiscriminately shelling towns and cities and for their purported use of cluster and phosphorous bombs. The decision to arm and strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself might at face value seem to be the right choice under the circumstances. But was it one that Harper’s Canada could live with, knowing that any realistic hope of a cessation of hostilities would be lost and with it a substantial increase in civilian deaths? We will never know the answer to that question as the Conservatives were removed from power in October 2015. In reality, the Harper government seemed more comfortable talking about punishing Russia than it did about presenting solutions to the more pressing issue of saving Ukraine from economic and political failure. Conclusion In reviewing Harper’s record on Canada-Russian relations, we observe two dominant themes: ideologically driven policies and objectives, and narrowly defined perceptions of a security threat – coupled with foreign policy decisions based on moral statements, notions of duty, and electoral considerations. In statements from Harper and his colleagues we see a visceral, even personal, aversion towards Russia and its leader Vladimir Putin.58 Some might argue that Harper’s attitudes were shaped by the crisis in Ukraine. But what we observe is that Harper’s position towards Russia actually hardened even more over time. In fact, the Harper government maintained a harsh view of Russia, and was an adamant critic of Vladimir Putin much earlier than other political leaders.59 Throughout the Conservatives’ almost ten years in power, Russia served as the bad “other,” as a counterpoint to the “rightness” of the Canadian government’s actions in the Arctic, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe.60

Stephen Harper: “To Russia with Love” 287

Such policies clearly resonate with many Canadians from former Soviet satellite states. But they carry both costs and benefits. While the Conservative government’s more aggressive tone clearly antagonized and hampered Canada’s strategic relations with Russia, domestically Harper’s anti-Russia stance put his party on firmer ground in each of its successive election wins – propelling him from minority to majority status in May 2011.61 The strategic imperative for the Canadian government was to recognize that regional solutions to the Ukraine crisis were the primary way forward. Germany’s Angela Merkel manifestly understood that. But Harper and Baird clearly did not. As a regional power, Russia would continue to solve problems on its periphery with or without Western sanction, so ultimately a confrontational posture by Harper and his foreign ministers was unproductive and only served to put Canada in a tight diplomatic corner. The long-term political costs can only be determined once we have a clear sense of how the Conservatives fare in forthcoming federal election campaigns. After all, the Conservative Party of Canada was not trounced in October 2015 or the October 2019 election and still enjoys strong support in Western Canada. If there was a domestic political cost, it came largely in the form of championing a more narrowly defined form of civic nationalism of those Canadians who come from Eastern Europe.62 In short, a narrowly defined ethnic nationalism playing up echoes of Soviet mistreatment and Russian expansionism found a perfect home in the ideology that infused Conservative foreign policy under Stephen Harper. But while it likely served Harper’s political ambitions, it is hard to argue that it actually advanced Canada’s core foreign policy interests in the world. NOTES 1 Quoted in Paul Wells, “Harper, Communism and the Lessons of Memory,” Maclean’s, 2 June 2014, https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/harper -communism-and-the-lessons-of-memory/. 2 Through all this, the Harper government moved away from the multilateralist policies of the Liberal Party and reinforced cooperation with the US; continued and expanded Canada’s participation in the US-led anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan; sought a seat on the UN Security Council and lost; recognized the independence of Kosovo, which separated from Serbia in February 2008; and took a strong stance in favour of Israel in the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 3 Among those who believe Harper was transformative, see John Ibbitson, Stephen Harper (Toronto: Random House of Canada Limited, 2015). 4 For example, shortly after assuming office, Harper publicly committed to demonstrating “an international leadership role” for Canada. See Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “Address by the Prime Minister to the Canadian

288  David Carment with Milana Nikolko and Katarina Koleva

5

6

7 8

9

10

Armed Forces in Afghanistan,” 13 March 2006, https://www.canada.ca/en/news /archive/2006/03/address-prime-minister-canadian-armed-forces-afghanistan .html. This refrain was used throughout the Harper era, including its last mention in the Conservatives’ 2015 campaign platform, which touted their “significant investments in Canada’s military following the Liberal ‘Decade of Darkness’.” See Conservative Party, Protect Our Economy (Ottawa: Conservative Party of Canada, 2015), 77. The Canada First Defence Strategy, released in May 2008, emphasized continental security, coastal defence, and northern sovereignty. However, it gravitated towards spending plans rather than actual defence policy commitments. See David Perry, “The Evolution of the Harper Government’s Defence Policy,” in Adam Chapnick and Christopher Kukucha, eds., The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada’s Global Posture (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 92. For details on the Reform Party’s foreign policy agenda, see Duane Bratt, “Implementing the Reform Party Agenda: The Roots of Stephen Harper’s Foreign Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 24, no. 1 (2018): 1–17. The Harper government announced it would support the construction of not one but two victims’ memorials in Ottawa. The first, a memorial to the victims of the Holocaust, was to be built across from the War Museum and, the second, a memorial to victims of communism, would be located in a small park across from the Supreme Court of Canada building. While the former was developed mostly unopposed, there was a great deal of controversy over the exact purpose and merits of the second. See David Carment and Joseph Landry, “The Conservatives and Diasporas,” in Adam Chapnick and Christopher Kukucha, eds., The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada’s Global Posture (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 210–27. David Carment and Ariane Sadjed, “Old Enemies, New Technology,” Open Canada, 12 December 2014, https://opencanada.org/old-enemies-new-technology/. David Carment, “Diaspora Politics: When Domestic Votes Trump Foreign Policy,” Open Canada, 24 June 2015, https://opencanada.org/diaspora-politics-when -domestic-votes-trump-foreign-policy/; and Milana Nikolko, “Political Narratives of Victimization in the Ukrainian-Canadian Diaspora,” in David Carment and Ariane Sadjed, eds., Diaspora as Cultures of Cooperation (London: PalgraveMacmillan, 2017), 131–47. David Carment and Joseph Landry, “Claiming the 21st Century,” in Philippe Tortell, ed., Reflections of Canada: Illuminating Our Opportunities and Challenges at 150+ Years (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 230–6. Between 2006 and 2015, the Conservative government of Stephen Harper made significant contributions to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and embraced the pursuit of free trade agreements with a number of bilateral and regional partners, including the European Union and South Korea.

Stephen Harper: “To Russia with Love” 289 11 About a year and a half after assuming office, these perceptions were shaped by Russia’s flag-planting mission on the North Pole following a claim made by a team of Russian scientists that the Lomonosov Ridge – an underwater mountain chain that runs across the Arctic Ocean between Russia and Canada – is geologically linked to Russia. See Randy Boswell, “Russian Flag-Waving Stirs Arctic Sovereignty Debate,” Vancouver Sun, 26 July 2007, A6. 12 John Baird’s failure to win a Security Council seat was indicative of this indifference. But there was also a targeting of individuals and policies at DFATD that were deemed hostile or superfluous to the Conservative agenda, a termination from or open criticism of international bodies to which previous Liberal governments had made long-standing commitments, and withdrawal of support for civil society organizations. See David Carment and Joseph Landry, “Civil Society and Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha, eds., Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2015), 277–89. 13 Evidence was later brought to light that the annexation of Crimea was partly a sham orchestrated to appear as if Ukrainian forces resisted when in reality some switched and joined the Russian side. See Pavel Polityuk and Anton Zverev, “This Is Why NATO Is Worried about Baltic Troops Defecting to Russia,” Insider, 25 July 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com/this-why-nato-worried-about -baltic-troops-defecting-russia-2017-7?r=US&IR=T&IR=T. 14 An Ottawa Citizen analysis in 2014 identified twelve ridings where antiPutin voters could help sway the outcome of an election. In six of the ridings, Conservative candidates won victories in 2011 of less than 1,000 votes and in some cases just several hundred votes. David Pugliese, “Putin Responsible for Ukraine Violence Caused by anti-Putin Forces, Nicholson Says,” Ottawa Citizen, 2 September 2015, B3, http://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/putin-responsible -for-ukraine-violence-caused-by-anti-putin-forces-nicholson-says. 15 See David Pugliese, “Russian ‘Confrontations’ a PR Goldmine for Harper,” Ottawa Citizen, 22 August 2015, C2, http://ottawacitizen.com/storyline/russian -confrontations-a-pr-gold-mine-for-tories-even-if-there-isnt-much-behind-them. 16 Carment and Landry, “The Conservatives and Diasporas.” 17 This is best expressed in his statement at the G20 meeting in the fall of 2014 when he challenged Putin with the infamous “get out of Ukraine” handshake. While most observers of Canadian foreign policy understood that Canada had little recourse with regard to Russian actions in Crimea specifically and Eastern Ukraine more broadly, most Canadians, including many current and potential Conservative voters, relied on bold headlines proclaiming Harper’s repeated rebukes of Russian president Vladimir Putin. Such actions played well politically in a climate of fear but had little impact internationally. See Carment and Landry, “The Conservatives and Diasporas.”

290  David Carment with Milana Nikolko and Katarina Koleva 18 Most criticisms were directed at key problems in the government’s fiscal policy, its obvious lack of interest in multilateralism and to some extent the pursuit of international development through private sector solutions. But on Russia, however, the government fared better with little effort from the mainstream media to provide balanced perspectives. The Globe and Mail, for example, was more than happy to consistently portray Putin in a negative light in editorials and news stories from well before the Ukraine crisis. Its coverage of the Sochi Olympics spared no effort in criticizing the games and the Russian government for organizing them. The newspaper’s portrait of Ukraine, on the other hand, was eminently more positive. Despite serious problems of corruption and poor governance, Canada would still engage Ukraine on three fronts through a bilateral free trade deal, ongoing development assistance and loans, and by way of a military training program. See Oksana Huss, “Anti-Corruption Reform in Ukraine: Prospects and Challenges,” in David Carment and Milana Nikolko, eds., Engaging Crimea and Beyond: Perspectives on Conflict, Cooperation and Civil Society Development (Duisburg, Germany: University of Duisburg Essen, 2015), 34–57. 19 We maintain that Canada’s foreign policy has been captivated by three central priorities that are essentially a combination of interests and values: (1) the establishment of international peace and security through the rule of law, (2) maintaining a harmonious and productive relationship with the US, and (3) ensuring economic prosperity and competitiveness through our trade and investment policies. To these three core elements, we might add enhancing national unity and its corollary – the strengthening of Canadian sovereignty. While these goals remain largely unchanged, where we would find a great deal of variation over time is how various Canadian governments have envisioned achieving them. Matching means to ends is no simple task. But no foreign policy should purposely divide a country. Indeed, policies should speak to a combination of Canada’s collective interests and its capabilities. 20 Nikolko, “Political Narratives of Victimization in the Ukrainian-Canadian Diaspora.” 21 Joel Plouffe, “Stephen Harper’s Arctic Paradox,” Policy Update (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, December 2014), 1–11, https:// d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/448/attachments/original /1418790337/Stephen_Harpers_Arctic_Paradox.pdf?1418790337. 22 On 10 August 2007, Harper announced that a new Army training centre would be built in Resolute Bay and there would be an increase in military personnel with a new military port in Nanisivik. CTV News Staff, “Harper Bolsters Military Strength in Arctic,” CTV News, 10 August 2007, https://www.ctvnews.ca/harper -bolsters-military-strength-in-arctic-1.252155. In April 2008, Moscow and NATO reached a deal to allow the alliance to transport important military supplies across Russian territory into Afghanistan. The Russian-Georgian war, following Russia’s intervention in Georgia in August 2008, however, became the turning

Stephen Harper: “To Russia with Love” 291

23 24 25

26

27

28

29

30

point in worsening Canada-Russia relations. At a news conference, Harper said that an LNG deal with a Russian company could be at risk: “We’re examining obviously all aspects of our relationship [with Russia]. We’re obviously focusing on aspects that have to do with the strategic and military situation, but we will of course review everything.” See “Russian-Canadian Energy Deals Possibly at Risk,” Reuters, 19 August 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/georgia-ossetia-canada -idUSN1925802720080819. The project was seen as the first major entry into the Canadian energy industry by a Russian firm, scheduled to go ahead in 2014. Doug Saunders, “Treading on Thin Ice,” Globe and Mail, 20 October 2007, https:// www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/treading-on-thin-ice/article22502664/. Trade and investment talks between the two countries also stalled as noted above. Most focused on the production and export of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG). Andrea Charron, Joel Plouffe, and Stéphane Roussel, “The Russian Arctic Hegemon: Foreign Policy Implications for Canada,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 18, no. 1 (2012): 38–50. Kari Roberts, “Why Russia Will Play by the Rules in the Arctic,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 21, no. 2 (2015): 112–28. See also the Russian Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), https://arctic-council.org/index.php /en/about-us/permanent-participants/raipon. These messages were reiterated in the government’s “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy,” released in August 2010. See W. Lackenbauer and R. Huebert, “Premier Partners: Canada, the United States and Arctic Security,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 3 (2014): 320–33. Doug Saunders, “Canada to World: Hands Off,” Globe and Mail, 16 May 2009, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canada-to-world-hands-off /article1197945/. “Canada is an Arctic nation and an Arctic power,” Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon told European leaders in Tromso, Norway, while directing his diplomats to adopt an assertive new language around Canada’s Arctic possessions. Under his instructions, the new phrase “Arctic power” appeared in communiqués and speeches. See Saunders, “Canada to World.” Prior to the G8 summit in 2010, Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon invited to Ottawa the five Arctic Ocean coastal states “to set the agenda for responsible management in the region.” See Government of Canada, “Canada to Host Ministerial Meeting of Arctic Ocean Coastal States,” news release, 3 February 2010, https://www.canada.ca/en /news/archive/2010/02/canada-host-ministerial-meeting-arctic-ocean-coastal -states.html. While Canada attempted to take a lead in the Arctic, it got a “cold shoulder” from its closest ally, the US, but the anti-Russian rhetoric continued unabated and often at odds with reality. See Allan Woods, “Canada Gets Cold Shoulder on Arctic,” Toronto Star, 30 March 2010, 3. For example, according to a briefing document prepared for Defence Minister Peter MacKay based on a 2008 Russian Security Council policy statement, Russia’s

292  David Carment with Milana Nikolko and Katarina Koleva

31 32 33

34

35 36 37

38

39

policy in the Arctic was similar to Canada’s. “While media reports have portrayed the policy as aggressive and inflammatory, the document is quite moderate in tone and makes it clear that Russia will pursue its interests in the Arctic in accordance with international law and in a co-operative manner.” CTV News Staff, “Tory Spin Hurting Relations with Russia: Liberals,” CTV News, 25 August 2010, https://www .ctvnews.ca/tory-spin-hurting-relations-with-russia-liberals-1.546104. Heather Exner-Pirot, “Canada’s Arctic Council Chairmanship (2013–2015): A Post-mortem,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 22, no. 1 (2016): 38–50. Robert W. Murray, ed., Seeking Order in Anarchy: Multilateralism as State Strategy (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2016). Marcin Kaczmarski, “Russia on the Military Intervention in Libya,” Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), 23 March 2011, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje /analyses/2011-03-23/russia-military-intervention-libya. The resolution was approved by the UK, US, France, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, and South Africa; five countries abstained from voting, including Russia, Brazil, China, Germany, and India. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), 3, https://www.undocs .org/S/RES/1973%20(2011). Murray, Seeking Order in Anarchy, 204. The Responsibility to Protect is an international norm that strives to ensure that the world community does not stand idly by in the face of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and mass atrocities. See “The Responsibility to Protect: A Background Briefing,” Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, January 2021, https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/the-responsibility-to-protect -a-background-briefing/. Paul Koring, “Canada’s Role in Libya Its Biggest Military Gambit in Decades,” Globe and Mail, 20 June 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics /canadas-role-in-libya-its-biggest-military-gambit-in-decades/article583888/. Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird is quoted as follows during a House of Commons debate, “The government understands the genuine concerns of Canadians who oppose the use of lethal force and of turning to military action to resolve the problems of the international community. I believe this is an instinct that all Canadians share, and is a credit to us all. At the same time, we have a responsibility to act when we can, when our objectives are right, when our objectives are clear, to protect and assist those who share the values and would share the institutions for which many of our ancestors gave up their lives so that we could enjoy the benefits.” Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, No. 008, 14 June 2011, 1025. See also Sid Rashid, “Preventive Diplomacy, Mediation and the Responsibility to Protect in Libya: A Missed Opportunity for Canada?” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 19, no. 1 (2013): 39–52, and Scott Shaw, “Fallout in the Sahel: The Geographic Spread of Conflict from Libya to Mali,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 19, no. 2 (2012): 199–210.

Stephen Harper: “To Russia with Love” 293 40 Quoted in Kate Adams, “Harper Salutes Operation Mobile Troops,” BayToday.ca, 24 November 2011, https://www.baytoday.ca/local-news/harper-salutes-operation -mobile-troops-32676. 41 Gleb Bryanski, “Putin Likens U.N. Libya Resolution to Crusades,” Reuters, 20 March 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-russia-idUSTRE72 K3JR20110321. 42 Guardian Staff, “Libyan Conflict: Reactions around the World,” The Guardian, 30 March 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/30/ libya-conflict-reactions-world. 43 Elizabeth A. Kennedy “Syrian Forces Retake Village,” Victoria Times Colonist, 14 June 2012, B11. 44 See Jason Fekete, “Canada Takes Aim at Russian Support for Assad Regime,” Calgary Herald, 5 September 2013, B6. 45 Bruce Campion-Smith, “Stephen Harper Urges Military Action against Syria,” Toronto Star, 6 September 2013, https://www.thestar.com/news/canada /2013/09/06/stephen_harper_urges_military_action_against_syria.html. 46 Murray Brewster, “Canada Won’t Send Troops to Syria: Harper,” Toronto Sun, 11 September 2015, https://torontosun.com/2015/09/11/canada-wont-send -troops-to-syria-harper. 47 By summer 2017, the US and Russia had agreed on establishing a deconfliction zone along the Euphrates River. Canada was not party to any negotiations that preceded the decision and nor was it actively engaged in ongoing peace talks. 48 In March 2014, Canada imposed restrictive measures against Russia, including an asset freeze on designated individuals and entities, and financial prohibitions targeting specific sectors, such as Russia’s financial, energy, and defence industries. 49 See, for example, Carment and Landry, “Civil Society and Canadian Foreign Policy”; Carment, “Diaspora Politics”; and Nikolko, “Political Narratives of Victimization in the Ukrainian-Canadian Diaspora.” 50 David. R. Maples, Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine (Plymouth, UK: Central European University Press, 2008). 51 Since at least Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, the collaboration between the federal Conservatives and the UCC has been prominent. By the early 1960s, many Ukrainians became important figures at both provincial and federal levels of government. A good example is Senator Paul Yuzyk, appointed by Diefenbaker, who was a key advocate of multiculturalism in Canada. 52 Nikolko, “Political Narratives of Victimization in the Ukrainian-Canadian Diaspora.” 53 James Adams, “Ukrainian Association Tells Foreign Scholars to Stay Out of Museum Debate,” Globe and Mail, 20 April 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail .com/news/national/ukrainian-association-tells-foreign-scholars-to-stay-out-of -museum-debate/article577199/.

294  David Carment with Milana Nikolko and Katarina Koleva 54 The Ukrainian diaspora population numbers over 1.2 million, while there are only 180,000 ethnic Russians in Canada (from a total of about 500,000 who claim Russian-speaking descent). 55 Canadian Press, “Canada Sent Too Many Observers to 2012 Ukraine Elections: Report,” CBC News, 25 April 2014, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-sent -too-many-observers-to-2012-ukraine-elections-report-1.2621694. These observers were deployed in addition to the OSCE’s estimated 600 short-term observers. 56 Former Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko claimed in a speech to the United States Congress that the Holodomor cost 20 million lives, while Harper gave the death toll at about 10 million. Both numbers have been open to fierce debate. See “Harper Accused of Exaggerating Ukrainian Genocide’s Death Toll,” Montreal Gazette, 30 October 2010, https://news.kievukraine.info/2010/10/harper-accused -of-exaggerating.html. For his part, when President Viktor Yanukovych came to power, references to the Holodomor were removed from the presidential website. 57 Pavel Kazarin, “Three Myths for Crimea: Does Ukraine’s Version Have a Chance?” in David Carment and Milana Nikolko, eds., Engaging Crimea and Beyond: Perspectives on Conflict, Cooperation and Civil Society Development (Duisburg, Germany: University of Duisburg Essen, 2015), 21–4. 58 For example, when a Malaysian airline was shot down over disputed territory in July 2014, Harper exclaimed: “There is no credible evidence to suggest that the crime involved, and I use the term crime, in shooting down that civilian Malaysian airliner – no doubt, based on everything we know – that it was perpetrated by the agents that Russia has armed.” Canadian Press, “Hawkish Harper Continues to Take Hard Line on World Conflicts,” Hamilton Spectator, 30 July 2014, https://www .thespec.com/news/canada/2014/07/30/hawkish-harper-continues-to-take-hard -line-on-world-conflicts.html. 59 Even before the Ukraine crisis, Stephen Harper was one of the first Western leaders to suggest that Russia be dropped from the G8 summit. 60 Nikolko, “Political Narratives of Victimization in the Ukrainian-Canadian Diaspora.” There was the option, however challenging, for Canada to engage in dialogue, sharing of information and negotiation with Moscow to find common interests around such issues as climate change, trade expansion, the Arctic, and Indigenous peoples. 61 What would have happened if Putin’s forces had not scrambled across Crimea? There is little doubt that Crimea would have sought independence anyway and that the situation would be far more unstable than it is now. Baird, like others in the Harper cabinet, misread the importance of Crimea for Russia. Putin’s efforts were clearly pre-emptive in nature, anticipating the possibility that he might lose the peninsula to a pro-Western government, along with a long-standing leasing arrangement for a naval base in Sevastopol. 62 Carment and Landry, “The Conservatives and Diasporas.”

14 Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives: Interpreting a Radical Shift in Foreign Policy shaun narine

Under the Harper government, Canadian foreign policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict shifted dramatically, in practice if not on paper. At the international level, Canada did all it could to protect Israel from criticism while attacking the Palestinian cause. At the domestic level, the Harper government intimidated and attacked civil society critics of Israel, going so far as to defund Canadian charities that opposed Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians as a warning to other groups. At the time of its 2015 federal election loss, the Harper government was considering using Canada’s hate speech laws to stifle criticism of Israel. In short, the Harper government’s Israel policy damaged Canada’s international standing and its civil society sector. Strikingly, the Justin Trudeau government has maintained many of the previous government’s policies towards Israel, though it has altered the tone of its approach and professionalized Canada’s diplomatic dealings with the country. Why did the Harper Conservatives make such an extraordinary effort to “defend” Israel?1 This chapter  argues that a number of factors motivated the federal party, including electoral politics (catering to the Conservatives’ Christian Zionist base) and the desire to pry Jewish Canadian voters (and their political/economic support) away from the federal Liberal Party. However, the most critical influences were the personal prejudices and ideological commitments of leading Conservative figures, especially Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Foreign Minister John Baird. The government’s support for Israel and dismissal of the Palestinians also fit into the Conservative Party’s strong rejection and even demonization of Muslims. These attitudes drew on a particular set of ethnic prejudices and perspectives that reflect a “Eurocentric world view” that implicitly devalues non-European peoples, their histories and perspectives. Thus, ethnic/religious solidarity informed the Conservative Party’s pro-Israel policy. The Conservatives embraced – and continue to embrace – a “clash of civilizations” ideology that is common to most right-wing political parties in the Western world.

296  Shaun Narine

A key argument of this chapter is that Canada’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict has been, and continues to be, profoundly “Eurocentric.” Canadian policy-makers have largely understood the conflict through the lens of Jewish experience. They tend to see the Jewish people primarily as victims, based on the history of European discrimination and genocide against the Jews. Thus, despite Israel’s significant military power, its numerous violations of international law, and its willingness and ability to inflict terrible damage on the Palestinians, Canadian leaders often accede to an unrealistic picture of Israel as the victim of the far weaker Palestinians. In taking this Eurocentric perspective, Canadian political leaders dismiss the historical experiences and perspectives of the Palestinians and, by extension, most of the non-European world, as well as Canada’s history with its own Indigenous population. This imbalance may have been understandable at a time when Canada was predominantly a state of people descended from Europeans who assumed that non-European peoples were inferior and expendable. Today, however, Canada is an ethnically and religiously diverse liberal democratic state that is contending with the dangers of diaspora politics. Creating a larger Canadian identity requires a commitment to liberal values that transcend narrow ethnic and religious identities. Adopting an unequivocal pro-Israel position, however, is inconsistent with this direction. Canada in the Middle East: Background For most of its history with the Middle East conflict, Canada has tilted decisively towards Israel in its foreign policy.2 This bias was found across the political spectrum. As a diplomat for external affairs and at the United Nations (UN), Lester Pearson pushed for the creation of Israel on the world stage, over the objections of some in the Canadian delegation in New York. Elizabeth MacCallum, a Middle East expert and Canadian foreign affairs officer, objected to the plan as a blow to Arab self-determination and possibly a violation of the UN Charter. She questioned Canada’s right to insist on a partition of Palestine against the wishes of its native inhabitants, and pointed out the dangerous precedent: “If [a] strong desire to settle in another community, to develop its land, and to take over the government of all or part of it, is now recognized by the United Nations as a valid cause for partitioning (a) country, a precedent will be set whose consequences may be easily foreseen.”3 Pearson and successive Canadian leaders had an affinity for the Jewish people that was nurtured and reinforced by their Christian faith and European cultural background.4 The fact that the Palestinians were mostly Muslim played a significant role in the willingness of Canadian leaders to overlook the effects of Israel’s creation on the Indigenous people of Palestine.5 Moreover, Canada was engaged, at the time, in systematic discrimination against, and forced

Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives  297

assimilation of, its own Indigenous people – a reality that reflected the country’s general disposition towards non-Europeans. Canada’s historical position on Israel also reflected the political clout, organization, and integration into the larger society of the Canadian Jewish community. Canada saw itself as following an even-handed or balanced approach to the Arab-Israeli dispute. But the Arab states saw Canada as strongly biased in favour of Israel. In 1973, Egypt objected to Canada’s presence in UN peacekeeping missions in the region. In fact, Canada participated only after the UN Secretary General intervened on its behalf.6 Changes in Canada’s immigration policies in the 1960s opened the country to immigration from the developing world and the new and growing Muslim population slowly began to emerge as a counterweight to the political influence of Jewish Canadians. The economic weight of the Arab world also began to make a difference. In the late 1970s and into the 1980s, Canada adopted a more balanced approach to the conflict, one that better appreciated the position of the Palestinians, their historical arguments, and the real violations of international law exemplified by many Israeli policies, such as building illegal settlements on occupied Palestinian land. In 1980, the Stanfield Report called for Canada to deepen its ties with the Arab world and to recognize the importance of the Palestinian issue in the region.7 Even so, Canada was ranked in 1987 by observers, including some of its own UN delegation, as second only to the US in its support of Israel.8 During the Jean Chrétien years, 1993–2003, Canada began to vote at the UN with the European and developing world majority, or abstaining, on issues related to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land, its attacks on civilians, and nuclear weapons program. Canadian governments recognized that some of these votes unfairly singled out Israel for criticism, but Canada also recognized that the Palestinians had few other venues in which to have their voice heard. In late 2003, when Paul Martin came to power, Canada began to lean more noticeably towards the Israeli position at the UN once again. In many of these cases, Canada was either isolated at the UN or part of a tiny group of countries that habitually sided with Israel. Donald Barry explained this shift by arguing that a number of influential pro-Israel MPs and cabinet ministers pushed for the changes in policy.9 Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained this change in Canada’s UN voting behaviour by arguing that the resolutions were unbalanced against Israel and that Israel was being unfairly singled out for condemnation at the UN.10 If the reconfiguration towards a stronger pro-Israel position began with Martin, then, Harper carried it to an unprecedented level. Under the Conservative government, Canada voted against or abstained on every UN resolution that held Israel to account for its violent actions or that supported the rights of the Palestinians. This was indicative of the dramatic shift in ­Canada’s policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under Harper.

298  Shaun Narine

The Harper Government and Israel Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party came to power in 2006 with an extraordinary commitment to supporting and defending Israel. The party made support for Israel one of its most prominent and controversial signature policies. According to David Mulroney, Harper’s former foreign policy adviser, every Conservative staffer in Ottawa had three symbols in their office: something idolizing Ronald Reagan, a picture of Margaret Thatcher, and an Israeli flag.11 This underlined the link between Israel and the “modern Conservatism that Harper embodies.”12 On paper, the Harper government did not change Canada’s stated policy towards the conflict. Canada regarded Israeli settlements as illegal under international law, opposed Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem, and supported the creation of a Palestinian state. In practice, however, the Harper government largely abandoned these policies, doing nothing to support them, and often eager to undermine them. The following is a selection of key examples of this noticeable shift in policy.13 During Israel’s summer 2006 bombardment and invasion of Lebanon, Stephen Harper told reporters that Israel’s actions were a “measured response” to Hezbollah incursions. The assault left more than 1,100 Lebanese (mostly civilians) dead, including a Lebanese Canadian family. Three months after the war, Harper vetoed a statement from la Francophonie which “deplored” the effects of the conflict on Lebanese civilians. Harper claimed that the statement was too one-sided, even though more than ten times as many Lebanese died as Israelis (and the vast majority of the Israeli dead were soldiers).14 During the invasion itself, an Israeli bomb destroyed a UN observation post, killing four UN peacekeepers. These included soldiers from Austria, Canada, China, and Finland. The Canadian killed was Major Paeta Hess-von Kruedener. The UN claimed that Israel had deliberately targeted the post: the outpost was attacked over the course of many hours and Israel was continually warned that it was shelling a UN station. Initially, Harper claimed to want answers for the death of a Canadian soldier. But the Canadian government did not pursue the case at any high official level. Ultimately, the Canadian military board of inquiry that looked into the event accepted the Israeli explanation that its forces destroyed the outpost because they were using an old map. However, the committee also held Israel responsible, calling the deaths “tragic and preventable.”15 The military report, initially posted on the Department of Defence website in 2008, disappeared in 2009 and is now unavailable on the Internet.16 Later, a UN report concluded that Hezbollah fighters were nowhere near the outpost, as Israel had claimed. The Canadian government still ignored the report. According to an editorial in Embassy newspaper: “In refusing to demand justice and accountability – especially from a close ally – this government has abandoned its principles and made clear where its true interests lie. The message: good relations

Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives  299

with our ally Israel are more important than any one of us, even a Canadian who was just doing his job.”17 In January 2006, Hamas won free and fair elections in Palestine.18 Canada became the first country in the world to impose sanctions against the Palestinians, though other Western states soon followed. It attributed the aid cutoff to Hamas’s refusal to recognize Israel.19 In 2007, after the Palestinian Legislative Council established a unity government that included Hamas, Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay refused to meet Mustafa Barghouti, the new Palestinian government’s information minister.20 The only other government that had adopted this hardline approach was Israel itself; still, Barghouti met with numerous other foreign ministers. At the same time, Canada contributed significant funds to the Palestinian Authority security forces, in order to train them to maintain order and to prepare them for possible military action against Hamas. Canada voted against various UN resolutions condemning the ongoing Israeli siege of Gaza, well before the massive Israeli incursion into Gaza in December 2008 (“Operation Cast Lead”). Ostensibly, that Israeli action was in response to rockets coming out of the territory. Canada wholeheartedly supported the Israeli twenty-two-day campaign against Gaza, which left more than 1,391 Palestinians dead, including 344 children.21 By contrast, three Israeli civilians were killed; ten soldiers lost their lives, four of them by friendly fire.22 According to the Conservative government, every death caused by Israeli military action in Gaza was the fault of Hamas. Most of the rest of the world, however, was appalled by the Israeli assault and roundly condemned it. Canada’s willingness to support Israel unconditionally attracted a great deal of attention around the world, most of it negative. A 2008 Senate committee report noted that Canada’s stance on Israel had undermined Canada’s ability to influence other international matters of concern to Canada.23 In 2009, Canada quietly cut its funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the organization most responsible for providing relief and emergency aid to the Palestinian refugees created by the 1948 war. Canada’s most ardent supporters of Israel had frequently accused UNRWA of indirectly supporting terrorism. The Canadian government’s decision may have been made at the behest of Jewish Canadian political lobbies.24 Interestingly, Israel itself asked Canada to restore funding, arguing that UNRWA did necessary work in stabilizing occupied Palestine. But the Harper government did not comply with the request.25 It is likely that the government’s decision not to comply with the Israeli government request to restore funding to UNRWA indicated the importance of electoral considerations as a driver of Harper’s Israeli policy. On 19 May 2011, US President Barack Obama delivered a speech on the Middle East that expressed Washington’s desire for a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders of Israel, and involving some kind of exchange of territory

300  Shaun Narine

in order to move some of the larger settlement blocs within Israel. Obama’s speech made explicit what most observers of the region believed must be the final arrangement if the two-state solution is to work. Nonetheless, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu directly attacked Obama, claiming in a speech in the US that an effort to return Israel to its 1967 borders would subject the state to intolerable security risks. Netanyahu made it sound as though the US president was presenting a radical solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that would be at the expense of Israel.26 Shortly after his encounter with Netanyahu, Obama attended a summit meeting of the G8 and asked his fellow leaders for their backing for his position on the Middle East. The other leaders offered him strong support. The one exception was Canada’s Stephen Harper. In fact, Harper claimed that he supported the Obama vision, but he actually blocked any mention of 1967 borders from the final G8 communiqué on the subject.27 The Israeli newspaper Haaretz claimed that Harper had done this at the behest of Netanyahu. 28 Harper’s office denied this report, but did so in a way that left room for interpretation.29 In effect, Harper undermined President Obama at a time when Obama was already reeling from the political attack from Netanyahu within the US. It was remarkable that a Canadian prime minister would go so far as to deny the support that a US president wanted from his G8 colleagues over a particularly sensitive political issue. Moreover, Harper’s unwillingness to support a position that reflected official Canadian policy raised questions over what position Canada actually took on the Occupied Territories. In 2011, Foreign Minister Baird lobbied hard against the Palestinian decision to seek recognition as an observer state at the UN. It was not surprising that Canada opposed the Palestinian move, but Baird went far beyond ordinary opposition. He contacted the foreign ministers of eight states, including Australia and New Zealand, with carefully prepared talking points designed to convince them to oppose the Palestinian effort. Underlining the ethnic and racial nature of the international division over Israel and Palestine, the Canadian effort was designed to get “democracies”  – that is, primarily European states  – to “side” with Israel, thereby mitigating the effect of any UN vote.30 The Palestinians took their appeal to the UN General Assembly anyway. In November 2012, the UNGA voted overwhelmingly to recognize Palestine as a “non-member observer state,” thereby giving it access to various international bodies, including the International Criminal Court (ICC).31 The vote was 138 in favour versus 9 against (including Canada)  – with 41 abstentions.32 Still, Ottawa launched a campaign to deny Palestine admission to numerous UN bodies, emphasizing the Canadian refusal to accept Palestine as a state.33 On 9 April 2013, Foreign Minister Baird met Israeli cabinet minister Tzipi Livni in occupied East Jerusalem, something no Canadian minister had done before. The Palestinians interpreted the act as a “deliberate attempt to change the international consensus” on Jerusalem.34 The same year, Harper appointed Vivian Bercovici, a pro-Israel political commentator, as Canada’s Ambassador to

Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives  301

Israel. During the Gaza War of 2014, which caused massive Palestinian civilian deaths, Bercovici and the Canadian government expressed no concern about those deaths and moved in lockstep with the Israeli government.35 On 18 January 2015, Baird visited the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. His car was pelted with eggs by an angry crowd. Baird later demanded that Palestinian spokesperson Saeb Erekat apologize for equating violent Jewish settlers with the Islamic State (IS). This prompted Erekat to demand an apology to the Palestinian people from Baird for his unequivocal support of illegal Israeli policies.36 Most tellingly, the Conservative government denounced the Palestinian effort to take Israel to the International Criminal Court (ICC), with Baird going so far as to threaten the Palestinians with “dire consequences” for their decision.37 Canada was instrumental in creating the international court and, as former Canadian diplomat Paul Heinbecker noted, the government’s aversion to using the instruments of international law to address the Arab-Israeli dispute undermined Canada’s traditional commitment to international law and deprived the disempowered Palestinians of peaceful means through which to advance their rights.38 In January 2014, Harper made his first visit to Israel. He took with him the largest ever delegation of Canadians on a government-sponsored visit.39 Harper’s speech to the Knesset emphasized his personal commitment to Israel and essentially claimed that almost any criticism of Israel was anti-Semitic. He emphasized that “Canada supports Israel because it is right to do so.” Harper also expressed his admiration for Israel, his sympathy for the Jewish people and their suffering, and his conviction that Israel stands at the frontlines of a civilizational struggle against fundamentalist Islam that is intolerant and hateful of anything different than itself. He related the Arab-Israeli conflict directly to 9/11 and, in his few comments about the Palestinians, implied that the failure to make peace in the region was attributable to them. Harper insisted that he would never criticize Israel in public. He also claimed that “Israel is the only country in the Middle East which has long anchored itself in the ideals of freedom, democracy and the rule of law.”40 Of course, all of this is highly debatable. However, this is the clearest expression of how Harper’s personal prejudices, selective (perhaps uninformed) understanding of history, and ethnocentricity underpinned his attitude towards the Israelis and Palestinians. Finally, by taking a stridently “pro-Israel” position, Canada rendered itself mostly irrelevant in the Middle East. Harper apparently felt that Canada was already irrelevant in the region, so there was nothing to lose in choosing a side in the conflict.41 Intimidation at Home: The Harper Government Tries to Silence Domestic Critics of Israel The Harper government aggressively attacked and attempted to silence any criticism of Israel from within Canada. As soon as it took power in early 2006, the Harper Conservatives cut funding to a number of Canadian non-governmental

302  Shaun Narine

organizations that had enjoyed relationships with the Canadian government for decades. Some of these organizations promoted women’s rights in the international community, but many others had worked on issues related to Israel and Palestine and had been critical of Israeli human rights abuses. The Canadian Arab Federation was accused by Jason Kenney, the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, of promoting anti-Semitism. Yet Kenney never provided any credible information to back up these claims. In 2009, the Canadian Arab Federation’s (CAF’s) government contracts were not renewed, apparently in response to the organization’s criticism of Israel’s 2008–9 war on Gaza. The scandal around KAIROS, a Canadian Christian international activist group, was particularly instructive. Nearly all of the major Christian denominations in Canada are members in KAIROS. For thirty-five years, KAIROS received funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for its activities promoting social and economic justice in the international community. In November 2009, KAIROS received word that its funding for overseas projects was being terminated. The NGO had been expecting a $7-million grant for the next five years. Initially, supporters of KAIROS suspected that the funding cut was a result of its criticism of the Alberta oil sands. But Minister of International Development Bev Oda denied any political motivations for the decision. She claimed that KAIROS’s programs no longer fit within CIDA’s new priorities, and maintained this position into 2010.42 On 16 December 2009, two weeks after the KAIROS funding cut, Minister of Immigration Jason Kenney delivered a speech to the Global Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism in Jerusalem. Kenney claimed that KAIROS was defunded because it was anti-Semitic and anti-Israel.43 KAIROS immediately denied these charges and proved that it was not involved in any Israeli boycott campaigns. In October 2010, an access to information request revealed documentation that showed CIDA’s senior officials had recommended that Minister Oda approve and actually increase KAIROS’s funding.44 Minister Oda’s signature was on the document but inserted into the document, in handwriting, was the word “not.” Minister Oda told the parliamentary committee investigating the matter that she did not know how the word came to be in the document. The Speaker of the House, Peter Milliken, investigated and found that the document had been “doctored,” raising “disturbing questions.” A procedural technicality, though, prevented Milliken from ruling on whether Minister Oda had misled the House of Commons and breached the rules of Parliament. The minister subsequently changed her story and said that the document was indeed changed at her direction, though she did not know who made the actual change. Opposition members of the committee charged that the minister had lied to the committee when she said she did not know how the word “not” appeared.45

Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives  303

The scandal around Rights and Democracy was another disturbing example of how far the government was willing to take its pro-Israel campaign. Rights and Democracy was an arm’s-length, government-funded body created by former prime minister Brian Mulroney to promote human rights, civil society, and democratic development around the world. The organization enjoyed a strong international reputation. The Harper government, however, stacked its governing board with pro-Israeli hardliners who objected, in particular, to small grants that the organization awarded to two Palestinian and one Israeli human rights organizations. Aurel Braun, a University of Toronto political science professor and the new chair of the board, claimed that the two Palestinian organizations, Al Haq and Al Mezan, had links to terrorism. B’Tselem, the wellknown Israeli organization was, according to Braun, “biased and undeserving of funding.”46 The new board members launched a campaign of intimidation and harassment against the president of Rights and Democracy, Remy Beauregard. Beauregard subsequently died of a heart attack after a board meeting in January 2010. Almost all of the forty-seven staff members of the organization signed a letter demanding that the government remove the new board appointees. One person’s name was added to the letter by mistake. Braun argued that this meant the letter had no credibility. Other board members resigned, feeling that Rights and Democracy had suffered a hostile takeover. The new board implied that Beauregard had somehow misappropriated the organization’s funds. The board hired the accounting firm Deloitte to undertake a forensic audit. After much delay from the new board, it finally released the audit to the public. The audit completely exonerated Beauregard, but could not restore the reputation and credibility of the organization.47 The government eventually disbanded Rights and Democracy; the organization was essentially too discredited and demoralized to continue. In June 2009, Gary Goodyear, the Minister of State for Science and Technology, asked the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) to review federal funding for a conference at York University called “Israel-Palestine: Mapping Models of Statehood and Paths to Peace.” Goodyear claimed to have received hundreds of emails from citizens objecting to the conference. The United Jewish Appeal Federation of Greater Toronto (UJA) objected to some of the speakers and argued that the conference had an anti-Israel tilt and some of the presenters were not “strictly considered academics.” The UJA seemed particularly upset that the conference would be considering the “one-state solution” to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Under pressure from Goodyear, SSHRC asked the conference organizers to provide details about changes to the conference since the grant was made. The Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) demanded that Goodyear resign, claiming that his decision to contact the president of SSHRC “to express political concerns is not something we have seen in this country since the McCarthy period” and

304  Shaun Narine

“sets a very dangerous precedent.”48 CAUT also admonished SSHRC for not rejecting the minister’s request outright. In March 2009, a group of Canadian parliamentarians from all parties formed the Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to Combat Anti-Semitism (CPCCA). The committee was not a standing committee of Parliament, though it did receive in-kind donations from Parliament to use rooms and other resources. The CPCCA was mostly funded by private donations amounting to $100,000. It released a report in July 2011, which concluded that anti-Semitism was a growing threat in Canada and recommended that the country establish a national definition of what constitutes an anti-Semitic crime, along with standards for reporting data. The committee was, however, plagued with controversy. It refused to hear from many groups and individuals interested in the Middle East who are critical of Israel, including the CAF and Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (CJPME). One of the Liberal Party members refused to have her name added to the final report. And Bloc Québécois MPs left the panel much earlier, claiming that it had a pro-Israel bias. The report ended up using an unofficial European Union definition of “anti-Semitism,” which may be expressed as hatred towards Jews that could target individual Jews or their property but “such manifestations could also target the state of Israel conceived as a Jewish collectivity.” Supporters of the report argued that it did not claim that criticism of Israel was anti-Semitic, but critics replied that the report blurred these distinctions. The report argued that anti-Semitism was a problem in Canada, particularly on university campuses. It recommended that Canada establish a national definition of anti-Semitism and a common standard for reporting data. It also recommended withholding government funding for NGOs “that preach hatred or anti-Semitism.” Additionally, it recommended that Citizenship and Immigration Canada “take into account international anti-Semitism when designating source countries and targeting specific countries/people for resettlement.” Finally, it attacked the “equity of the United Nations Human Rights Council,” in particular its “overemphasis of alleged human rights abuses by Israel while ignoring flagrant human rights abuses of other member states.”49 In March of 2009, the Harper government banned the entry of British MP George Galloway to Canada. Galloway was an outspoken supporter of the Palestinians; his accusers claimed he provided donations to Hamas. Many of Galloway’s beliefs were not very different from those of many other international figures, such as Bishop Desmond Tutu, former US president Jimmy Carter, and former South African president Nelson Mandela, all of whom criticized the 2008–9 siege of Gaza and compared Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians to apartheid in South Africa. On 27 September 2010, the Federal Court of Canada issued a ruling that severely criticized the actions of Minister Kenney and his office for political bias and interference in the normal

Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives  305

operations of the Immigration Department’s handling of Galloway’s entry into Canada.50 In 2014, the Harper government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Israeli government that committed Canada to an all-out diplomatic war against the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, a Palestinian-organized effort to use peaceful means to penalize Israel for its aggressive policies. The MoU described the BDS movement, which is widely supported by many liberal Christian and Jewish groups in Canada, as “the new face of anti-Semitism.” Stephen Blaney, the public security minister, informed the UN that Canada had adopted a “zero tolerance” policy towards BDS. Blaney later implied that the government was considering using Canada’s hate speech laws against advocates of BDS, a “remarkably aggressive” tactic that seemed to directly contradict Canadian cultural commitments to freedom of speech.51 Such a move would almost certainly not survive a Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms challenge, but it was illustrative of the effort by the Harper government to create a climate of fear and intimidation in Canada around the criticism of Israel. Explaining the Harper Government’s Israel Policy The previous discussion demonstrated that the Harper Conservatives took the defence of Israel to an extraordinary level. The Conservatives were willing to risk contempt of Parliament; paper over the death of a Canadian military officer; intimidate and undermine Canadian civil society; destroy an arm’s-length governmental institution (and some of the people working there); damage numerous Canadian foreign policy initiatives; and undermine international law and institutions all in the name of Israel. Why did they do this? The CPC and the Harper government were motivated, in part, by electoral politics. However, most observers agree that the personal history, prejudices, and ideological commitments of Stephen Harper were the biggest forces driving Conservative policy on Israel.52 Before examining these explanations, it is important to consider the critical role of “Eurocentrism” in defining and distorting how Canadian politicians tend to view the Arab-Israeli conflict. Canada’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict has always been characterized as “Eurocentric”: Eurocentrism has been variously defined as an attitude, conceptual apparatus, or set of empirical beliefs that frame Europe as the primary engine and architect of world history, the bearer of universal values and reason, and the pinnacle and there­fore model of progress and development. In Eurocentric narratives, the superiority of Europe is evident in its achievements in economic and political systems, technologies, and the high quality of life enjoyed by its societies. Eurocentrism

306  Shaun Narine is more than banal ethnocentric prejudice, however, as it is intimately tied to and indeed constituted in the violence and asymmetry of colonial and imperial encounters. Eurocentrism is what makes this violence not only possible but also acceptable or justifiable. As such, Eurocentrism is the condition of possibility for Orientalism, the discursive and institutional grid of power/knowledge integral to the production and domination of the Orient as Other.53

Applying the concept of “Eurocentrism” to Canada’s approach to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is complicated by the fact that the Holocaust and the two world wars were the abject failure of European ideals. Even so, it is clear that Eurocentrism and ideas of European superiority persist in the modern world. Eurocentrism affects how Canada relates to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in many ways. One is how Canadian governments understand the Israel-­Palestinian conflict almost entirely through the lens of European history; that is, the Holocaust and the image of the Jewish people as victims of European hatred. This focus negates the experience of the Palestinians, at least in the eyes of the West. Canadian leaders give Judaism special consideration as one of the founding cultural pillars of Western society. Accordingly, Westerners view the Palestinians as the primitive “Other,” the inferior group that is standing in the way of its betters.54 Winston Churchill clearly articulated this sentiment when speaking about the Palestinians to the Palestine Royal Commission (Peel Commission), in 1937: I do not agree that the dog in the manger has the final right to the manger, even though he may have lain there for a very long time. I do not admit that right. I do not admit, for instance, that a great wrong has been done to the Red Indians of America, or the black people of Australia. I do not admit that a wrong has been done to these people by the fact that a stronger race, a higher grade race, a more worldly-wise race, to put it that way, has come in and taken their place.55

Churchill’s attitudes bluntly express how many Westerners regarded Indigenous peoples in general, and how they justified the Palestinians’ displacement. These attitudes informed Canadian attitudes through to the 1970s and 1980s and continue to shape – albeit less blatantly and maybe even unconsciously – the attitudes of most Canadian political parties today. As a complement to Eurocentrism, the Harper government exhibited a powerful commitment to the idea of the “Anglosphere” – that is, a community of English-speaking British colonial states that consisted of Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. Israel was often included as part of this “Anglosphere,” because of Britain’s strong initial support for its creation.56 As part of this ethnocentric world view, the Conservative government was actively hostile to Canadian Muslims. Early in his mandate, Harper identified

Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives  307

radical Islam as the single greatest threat to Canada.57 Indeed, the Conservative government made it clear that it regarded members of mainstream Islam to be alien to Canadian society.58 Moreover, the government made its efforts to deny Muslim women the right to wear hijabs during citizenship ceremonies and to establish a “hotline” for Canadians to report the “barbaric cultural practices” of their (implicitly Muslim) neighbours major planks in its 2015 federal election platform. The Harper government also participated in and exacerbated the unconstitutional abuse of Omar Khadr, Abousfian Abdelrazik, and others.59 (Court decisions excoriating the Conservative government for its willingness to ignore its obligations to these men resulted in Abdelrazik being allowed back into the country and eventually getting a settlement as well as the Justin Trudeau government settling with Khadr for a $10.5-million compensation package.)60 Jason Kenney led the Conservative outreach to socially conservative “new Canadian” communities and Muslims would seem to be a primary target for such a campaign. However, they were deliberately excluded from the outreach. Tellingly, the post-Harper CPC strived to make the Omar Khadr settlement a major political wedge issue, doing all it could to exacerbate some Canadians’ uncertainties about Muslims for political and financial gain. Electoral factors played a role in the Conservatives’ unequivocal support for Israel. The CPC calculated that full-throated support for Israel, combined with antagonism towards Palestinians and their supporters everywhere, would win support within the Canadian Jewish community that, historically, tended to vote Liberal. In this, they were correct: Jewish voters and organizations were enamoured of Harper’s position on Israel and, by the 2011 federal election, about 52 per cent of Jewish voters voted Conservative.61 However, Baird argued that his government’s commitment to Israel was not about electoral politics, pointing out that there were far more Arabs and Muslims in his riding than Jews.62 But this tells only part of the political story. Evangelical Christians are a major part of the Conservative base and a large number of Conservative Members of Parliament identified as such. There are about 3.5 million Evangelical Christians in Canada, and most of them are also “Christian Zionists” who believe that the defence of Israel is a religious duty.63 Lawrence Martin also notes that in 2006 the Canwest media empire, the largest in the country, was controlled by the Asper family, who “made no secret of their allegiance to Jewish causes and became enthusiastic backers of Harper on all related questions.”64 It is worth recalling that Canadian politicians, of various political stripes, have rushed to rallies to show their solidarity with Israel. But the federal Conservative Party made its “stand with Israel” an opportunity to raise money for the party and, at the same time, push all Canadian political parties into a competition to see which one could be most effusive in its support of Israel. The real goal was to displace the federal Liberals with the Harper Conservatives as the favourite electoral choice of the Jewish community in Canada.

308  Shaun Narine

These factors aside, Stephen Harper’s personal views are paramount to understanding the Conservative government’s position on Israel. Harper’s father, Joe, was friends with a Polish Jewish immigrant named Harvey Gellman. Gellman had lost many relatives in the Holocaust and convinced the elder Harper of the Jews’ right to their own homeland. The elder Harper “who had always hated intolerance,” impressed on his sons “the enormous accomplishments of the Jewish people in science and art and business and how they had suffered at the hands of others.”65 Joe Harper made his sons swear to do all in their power to help Jews, should they ever have the opportunity. Harper obviously took this admonition seriously. This story also fits well into the Eurocentric mindset; the Palestinians do not register at all in this story of “intolerance”; the accomplishments of the Jewish people are particularly impressive to Harper, implicitly juxtaposed with the lack of accomplishments by Palestinians. In Churchill’s formulation, a better people supplanted a lesser people. Harper’s personal religious beliefs as an Evangelical Christian may also have influenced his perspective. Foreign Minister John Baird was, similarly, deeply committed to Israel because of his own personal beliefs. Baird even travelled to Israel with his personal rabbi. In their speeches and comments around Israel, Harper and Baird emphasized the idea that Jews were perpetual targets of hate and bigotry. They strongly indicated, through their actions and words, that criticism of Israel was inherently anti-Semitic and indicative of the same kind of historical forces that had led to the Holocaust. Harper made it clear to any members of the federal government (and party caucus) who may have wanted to temper the Conservative government’s commitment to Israel that his approach was the only acceptable position.66 What is most striking about the Harper government’s position is the complete absence of empathy or concern that it showed towards the Palestinian people. The government gave minimal lip-service to the idea that the Palestinians had legitimate rights in their dealings with Israel; in practice, it rejected the legitimacy of the Palestinian cause. Harper declared past Canadian government efforts at a “balanced approach” to be “weak and wrong.”67 In his 2014 speech in the Knesset, he blamed the Palestinians for the lack of peace in the region, declaring that when “the Palestinian people and their leaders … choose a viable, democratic, Palestinian state, committed to living peacefully alongside the Jewish state of Israel” that Israel would welcome them with open arms.68 This suggested that the “choice” for peace lay entirely with the Palestinians, a position that completely ignored the many ways in which Israel exacerbated tensions with the Palestinians and obstructed peace negotiations through its conduct. The Harper government clearly took a side in the conflict, finding Israel to be in the right and the Palestinians to be entirely in the wrong. But why it took this position was never something that the government tried to defend

Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives  309

in any serious way, except to declare Israel as “right,” and imply that criticisms of Israel were likely driven by anti-Semitism. It is true that the Harper Conservatives came to power with very little background in foreign affairs.69 The party’s positions were shaped by mostly ideology, not extensive knowledge. The government showed little interest in mitigating its ignorance by consulting with Canadian experts in civil society or the Foreign Service.70 Former Canadian prime minister Joe Clark noted Harper’s personal lack of desire to learn about the world, especially the developing world, from his interactions with other leaders in multilateral meetings.71 A truncated, black-and-white view of the world was one of the trademarks of Harper’s foreign policy.72 His government subscribed to a vision of Israel that asserted Israel was a liberal democratic state, created to protect the Jewish people, which wanted nothing but peace from its neighbours, who were intent on destroying it. As such, the Arabs became part of the long line of various peoples, through the centuries, who tried to destroy the Jews. This characterization of the conflict is extremely simplistic, when it is not factually incorrect. Clark noted how Harper seemed almost “pre-Nixonian” in his initial attitude towards China; a similar observation also applied to Harper’s vision of Israel.73 The Trudeau Government: A Continuation of Harper’s Approach The Liberal government of Justin Trudeau came to power in November 2015 with the promise of returning Canada to a position of respect on the world stage. The new government moved quickly to differentiate itself from the Harper government. However, in the area of Israel policy, the Trudeau government has differed very little from the previous government’s unqualified support for Israel. Former foreign minister Stéphane Dion announced that Canada would return to its “honest broker” role in the Middle East.74 Dion indicated that the Liberals would stop making Israel a partisan issue. In practice, however, Canada has, according to many critics, basically continued Harper’s policies towards Israel.75 Under Trudeau, Canada has continued to vote the same as the Harper government on the series of non-binding resolutions at the UN, discussed previously. Like the Conservatives, the Liberal government defended its votes by adopting the familiar argument that Israel was unfairly singled out for criticism at the UN. In February 2016, the Conservatives put forward a motion in the House of Commons that condemned Canadians who supported the BDS movement against Israel. Dion argued that Canadians who supported BDS were incorrect, but that they should be reasoned with, and not condemned by any parliamentary measure. He spoke in favour of the need for Canada to respect freedom

310  Shaun Narine

of speech. In the end, however, the Liberals “reluctantly” supported the CPC motion, claiming to being bullied into doing so by the federal Conservatives. Tellingly, forty-three Liberal MPs abstained or were absent from the vote, including ten Muslim MPs; and three Liberal MPs voted against the motion. Not surprisingly, the NDP voted against the motion as an unprecedented assault on Canadians’ freedom of speech.76 The MoU that the Conservative government had signed with Israel declaring Canada’s full diplomatic opposition to BDS was initially removed from the Foreign Affairs website after the Liberals took power. But it later reappeared, and the government indicated that it remained Canadian government policy. In a speech commemorating Israel’s 2017 Independence Day, Trudeau stated the government of Canada would oppose antiSemitic and anti-Zionist movements. Pro-Palestinian groups immediately condemned the speech as they drew a strong distinction between opposition to Israel and discrimination against Jews.77 In March 2016, Dion criticized the appointment of international law expert Dr. Stanley Michael Lynk, of the University of Western Ontario Law School, to the position of “Special Rapporteur” on the situation of the Palestinians to the UN Human Rights Council. Dion made his criticisms before Lynk had an opportunity to defend himself against the attacks of pro-Israel organizations and explain that many of the charges levelled against him were taken out of context or misrepresented his views. Moreover, given Israel’s many ongoing violations of international law, it would be difficult to find any professor of international law who has not been critical of Israel’s actions.78 The problems facing Trudeau and all the centre-left parties on this issue are two-fold. First, Trudeau’s support for Israel is at odds with his other expressed liberal democratic goals and values. Indeed, Trudeau has declared his desire to make Canada a post-nationalist state; he has gone out of his way to welcome Syrian and Afghan refugees to Canada; he has tried to make inclusiveness a defining quality of Canadian society and endorsed it as the strongest protection against Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.79 Trudeau has also tried to reestablish Canada as a state that respects and promotes multilateral institutions and international law and sees itself as a part of the larger world community, not just part of an ethnic/cultural bloc. Yet Israel is an ethnocratic state that is increasingly illiberal and that routinely violates international law. The main motivation for the Liberal position on Israel is political; the Liberals wish to regain (from the Conservatives) the political and economic support of the Canadian Jewish community. Trudeau’s decision to make Stephen Bronfman the Liberal Party’s chief fundraiser spoke directly to that economic priority; Bronfman was chosen specifically because of his ties in the Jewish community establishment.80 However, the disconnect between support for Israel and the values of the Liberal Party are impossible to miss. As noted, several Liberal MPs abstained from voting in support of the BDS motion in the

Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives  311

House, or voted against it. And unlike the Conservatives, most core Liberal constituencies are not supportive of Israel, and Israel itself is not popular in Canada. A 2017 EKOS Research poll, commissioned by Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, reported that 46  per cent of Canadians have a negative view of Israel versus 28  per cent who have a more positive view; among Liberal supporters, 55 per cent have a negative view. About 61 per cent of Canadians believe that the Canadian government is biased towards Israel and against Palestine; 91 per cent of respondents supported the use of sanctions against Israel as a legitimate political strategy.81 The federal Greens and the NDP have run into significant pushback from their own supporters for their efforts to be far more accommodating of Israel than many of their supporters want.82 The problem is exacerbated by the changing ethnic and religious makeup of Canada. New Canadians of non-European background will bring different historical and cultural perspectives to the milieu that shapes Canada’s cultural background. The predominantly Christian/European world view that has shaped Canada’s approach to the Middle East will need to accommodate other, more anti-colonial world views and historical experience. It may also be affected by the animosities and prejudices from other parts of the world. For example, there is some evidence that hostility between Hindus and Muslims has been transferred to Canada.83 Secondly, building a Canadian identity around a non-nationalist ethos is the only way to counter the real danger that Canadian foreign policy will be crippled by the political demands of different diaspora communities. The federal Liberals may be particularly sensitive to the demands of the Canadian Jewish community now, but this encourages the emergence of counteracting Muslim political action. While Muslims may be politically disengaged today, that will likely change with time.84 Trudeau’s dream of a post-nationalist state will suffer as it becomes clear that some aspects of Canada’s foreign policy are shaped by ethnocentric biases rather than a strong sense of the country’s overall interests. A final, but critically important, consideration is that Canada is a European colonial state, founded through the dispossession, displacement and, at times, genocide of its Indigenous population. It is difficult for Canada to credibly claim – as it does – that it is accepting responsibility for its mistreatment and abuse of its Indigenous population if, at the same time, it is one of the few countries in the world willing to run interference for Israel as that state violently subjugates its own Indigenous people. The parallels between Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians and Canada’s treatment of Indigenous people are difficult to miss.85 Of course, Israel is not committing physical genocide against the Palestinians, but in every other way it is depriving them of their ability to function as a healthy society. The Trudeau government has done much to overcome the extremely negative impression of Canada left by the Harper government on the international

312  Shaun Narine

stage. Canada’s re-engagement with the world on issues such as climate change, maternal health (including support for abortion), and other issues may counteract the deleterious effect of its largely unchanged position on Israel. Many observers expect that a new intifada is all but inevitable, born of desperation.86 If this happens before 2023, Canada will be on the international stage loudly failing to support its own policies or international law in respect to Israel as Israel engages in extreme violence against a subjugated population.87 If the governing Liberals do not properly take into account the painful lessons of the Harper government’s ill-conceived Israel policy, it could undermine Canada’s standing in the world and any future bid for a rotating seat on the UN Security Council. Conclusion This chapter has reviewed the manner in which the Harper government altered Canada’s approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict and the reasons for that shift. Harper and the Conservatives were driven by personal, electoral and a deeply held Eurocentric view that, in their most extreme forms, dismissed the value of the lives and perspectives of non-European peoples.88 The Trudeau Liberals came to power with a more inclusive understanding of Canadian citizenship and Canada’s role in the world. However, the strong support for Israel that the Trudeau government has exhibited so far is at odds with its expressed liberal and cosmopolitan views. If the Liberals wish to be more consistent in their approach to this issue, they should learn from the Harper experience and to consider a new policy direction. It is worth remembering that Canada’s unqualified support for Israel was a major factor in the country’s 2010 UN Security Council humiliation. The Arab and Islamic countries of the world voted against Canada as a bloc for a reason – namely, its one-sided position on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Most commentators (both inside and outside Canada) felt Canada’s Israel policy may have been the single most decisive element working against the Canadian bid. In its coverage of “Canada’s Fall from Grace,” GlobalPost focused most of its commentary on Harper’s Israel policy, his defence of Israel’s bombing of Lebanon and Gaza, and the Conservative government’s efforts to stifle criticism of Israel at home.89 Most observers focused on what the government had done to alienate so much of the world community. According to the Globe and Mail’s John Ibbitson and Joanne Slater: “The humiliating rejection of Canada’s bid to win a seat at the United Nations Security Council  … presents Stephen Harper with a choice: acknowledge this rebuke from the global community and rethink how his government presents Canada to the world, or ignore it and accept an outsider status unique in this country’s history.”90 Whatever the role that his Middle East policy played in the loss, Harper decided to single it out as the main reason for Canada’s rejection on the world

Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives  313

stage. He swore that Canada would pay any cost in order to maintain its principled support of Israel. Harper even acknowledged that his position was not popular at the United Nations or la Francophonie: And I know, by the way, because I have the bruises to show for it, that whether it is at the United Nations or any other international forum, the easiest thing to do is simply just get along and go along with this anti-Israel rhetoric, to pretend it’s just about being evenhanded, and to excuse oneself with the label of honest broker … There are, after all, a lot more votes – a lot more – in being anti-Israeli than in taking a stand. But as long as I  am Prime Minister, whether it is at the United Nations, the Francophonie, or anywhere else, Canada will take that stand, whatever the cost.91

That being said, Canada has a clear interest in upholding international law, promoting multilateral institutions, and building an inclusive, liberal society that inculcates respect for all Canadians. And it clearly has an interest in showing respect for the rights of Indigenous people. As things now stand, Israel is systematically violating international law and its actions negate the rights of its Indigenous Arab population. Many of Israel’s actions and policies violate Canadian values and interests. Canada’s ability to have any influence in the Middle East depends on both sides being able to see Canada as an honest broker. And it is possible for Canada to return to a more even-handed approach to the ArabIsraeli conflict. But unlike the Harper Conservatives, this means condemning either or both sides in the conflict depending on the circumstances, and it also means recognizing that Israel has used its status as the far more powerful actor in the conflict to consolidate its hold on Palestinian land and to pursue policies that have greatly reduced the chances of a diplomatic solution to the problem. Acting as though Israel and the Palestinians are equal parties to the conflict is, ultimately, to favour Israel and to be complicit in its systematic oppression of the Palestinian people. NOTES 1 There is a strong argument to be made that the governing Conservatives were defending the right-wing government of Israel, but that their own policies took no account of the views of the many Israelis who oppose and question their own government’s actions. For the sake of practicality, this chapter will use “pro-Israel” to refer to support for the Israeli government. 2 The view within Canada’s foreign ministry was generally less favourably disposed towards Israel. The mindset reflected more of a moderate, middle-of-the-road approach by foreign policy officials so as to maintain a semblance of neutrality and even-handedness. See Peyton Lyon, “The Canada Israel Committee and Canada’s

314  Shaun Narine Middle East Policy,” Journal of Canadian Studies 24, no. 4 (Winter 1992–3): 5–25; and George Takach, “Moving the Embassy to Jerusalem, 1979,” in Don Munton and John Kirton, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1992), 273–85. 3 Cited in Linda McQuaig, Holding the Bully’s Coat: Canada and the US Empire (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2010), 137. 4 Tareq Ismael, Canada and the Middle East (Calgary: Temeron Books, 1994), 9–24; Rex Brynen, “Canada’s Role in the Israeli-Palestine Peace Process,” in Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani, eds., Canada and the Middle East (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 73–4; and Mike Blanchfield, Swingback (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017), 147. 5 McQuaig points out that Pearson did seek safeguards for the Palestinian population, but they failed utterly to protect them. She also indicates that members of the Canadian UN delegation did not like the UN partition plan but feared even greater violence from Jewish extremists if it was not approved. McQuaig, Holding the Bully’s Coat, 136–9. 6 Ismael, Canada and the Middle East, 19–31. 7 Brynen, “Canada’s Role,” 73–5; Robert Stanfield, “Final Report of the Special Representative of the Government of Canada Respecting the Middle East and North Africa,” reproduced in Tareq Ismael, ed., Canada and the Arab World (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1985), 182–206. 8 McQuaig, Holding the Bully’s Coat, 140. 9 Donald Barry, “Canada and the Middle East Today: Electoral Politics and Foreign Policy,” Arab Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 196. 10 For more on Canada’s changed voting record on Israel at the UN under Harper and Justin Trudeau, see Konrad Yakabuski, “On Israel, Trudeau Is Harper’s Pupil,” Globe and Mail, 12 May 2018, O11; and Steven Seligman, “Canada’s Israel Policy under Justin Trudeau: Rejecting or Reinforcing the Legacy of Stephen Harper,” American Review of Canadian Studies 48, no. 1 (2018): 80–95. 11 Personal interview with David Mulroney on 5 May 2017, which corresponded with what Mulroney told Mike Blanchfield for his 2017 book, Swingback. 12 Blanchfield, Swingback, 158. 13 The chapter does not discuss the Harper government’s decision to cut Canada’s diplomatic ties with Iran. However, this decision is widely believed to have been done as part of Canada’s pro-Israel agenda. But its effect was to further isolate Canada in the region. Doug Saunders, “By Cutting Ties with Iran, We just Shot Ourselves in the Foot,” Globe and Mail, 8 September 2012, F9. 14 Lawrence Martin, Harperland (Toronto: Penguin Books, 2011), 80. 15 Lee Berthiaume, “Inquiry Fingers Israel for Peacekeeper’s Death,” Embassy, 6 February 2008, https://www.embassynews.ca/news/2008/02/06/inquiry-fingers -israel-for-peacekeepers-death/35858. 16 Blanchfield, Swingback, 145; and Adam Day, “One Martyr Down: The Untold Story of a Canadian Peacekeeper Killed at War,” Legion Magazine, 2 January 2013,

Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives  315

17

18

19

20 21

22 23

24

25

26 27 28

29

https://legionmagazine.com/en/2013/01/one-martyr-down-the-untold-story-of -a-canadian-peacekeeper-killed-at-war/. Editorial, “Supporting the Troops When It’s Convenient,” Embassy, 6 February 2008, https://www.embassynews.ca/editorial/2008/02/06/supporting-the-troops -when-its-convenient/35850. On the issue of election transparency, see Michelle Pace and Polly PallisterWilkins, “EU-Hamas Actors in a State of Permanent Liminality,” Journal of International Relations and Development 21, no.1 (2018): 223–46. Note that Likud, the political party that has most often governed Israel since the 1970s, has as part of its political platform its absolute rejection of a Palestinian state, a stance that former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated in several recent Israeli election campaigns, repudiating his earlier “support” for the idea. Carolyne Wheeler and Gloria Galloway, “Palestinians Warn Canada of Necessity for Dialogue,” Globe and Mail, 30 March 2007, A15. “Gaza Crisis: Toll of Operations in Gaza,” BBC News, 1 September 2014, https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28439404. These figures for Israeli deaths are taken from B’Tselem, the Israeli human rights organization. B’Tselem also estimated that 759 Palestinian civilians were killed by Israel forces, and not the UN’s number of over 1,300. B’Tselem, “Fatalities during Operation Cast Lead,” accessed 27 July 2017, https:// www.btselem.org/statistics/fatalities/during-cast-lead/by-date-of-event. Raynell Andreychuk, Canada and the United Nations Human Rights Council: A Time for Serious Re-Evaluation, Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, 13 June 2008, https://sencanada/Content/SEN/Committee/392/huma/rep /rep13jun08-e.pdf. See Michelle Collins, “How the Jewish Vote Swung from Red to Blue,” Embassy, 11 February 2009, https://www.hilltimes.com/global.2012/09/16/how-the-jewish -vote-swung-from-red-to-blue/27244. Adam Chapnick, “Stephen Harper’s Israel Policy,” in Adam Chapnick and Christopher J. Kukucha, eds., The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 106; and Lee Berthiaume, “Israel Asked Canada to Reverse Decision on Funding for UN Palestinian Refugee Agency,” Embassy, 6 July 2011, https://www.embassynews.ca/news/2011/07/06/israel-asked-canada -to-reverse-decision-on-funding-for-un-palestinian-refugee-agency/40460. John Heileman, “The Tsuris,” New York Magazine, 18 September 2011, https:// nymag.com/news/politics/israel-2011-9/. Joe Clark, How We Lead: Canada in a Century of Change (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2014), 85. Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu Asked Canada PM to Thwart G8 Support for 1967 Borders,” Haaretz, 29 May 2011, https://www.haaretz.com/netanyahu-asked -canada-pm-to-thwart-g8-support-for-1967-borders-1.364635. Campbell Clark and Patrick Martin, “Harper, Netanyahu Did Not Discuss G8 Statement, Officials Say,” Globe and Mail, 30 May 2011, A8.

316  Shaun Narine 30 Campbell Clark and Justin Ling, “Baird Lobbied Hard against Palestinian Bid for Statehood,” Globe and Mail, 10 April 2012, A1. 31 Jodi Rudoren, “Year after Effort at UN, New Aim for Palestinians,” New York Times, 20 September 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/world/middleeast /palestinians-aim-for-nonmember-state-status-at-united-nations-general -assembly.html. 32 United Nations, “General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer Status’ in United Nations,” press release, 29 November 2012, https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11317.doc.htm. 33 Blanchfield, Swingback, 160. 34 Hanan Ashrawi quoted in Clark, How We Lead, 84. 35 Campbell Clark, “Conservatives Opt for Twitter Diplomacy in the Gaza Conflict,” Globe and Mail, 24 July 2014, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics /globe-politics-insider/conservatives-opt-for-twitter-diplomacy-in-the-gaza -conflict/article19735604/. 36 Saeb Erekat, “It Is John Baird Who Needs to Apologize to the Palestinian People,” Globe and Mail, 16 January 2015, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion /it-is-john-baird-who-needs-to-apologize-to-the-palestinian-people/article 22488148/?arc404=true. 37 Mike Blanchfield, “Palestinians Will Face ‘Consequences’ if They Pursue Israel at the ICC, Says Baird,” Globe and Mail, 5 March 2013, https://www.theglobeandmail .com/news/politics/palestinians-will-face-consequences-if-they-pursue-israel -at-the-icc-says-baird/article9324145/. 38 Paul Heinbecker, “Canada’s Bluster over Palestine’s ICC Bid Betrays Its Principles,” Globe and Mail, 28 January 2015, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canadas -bluster-over-palestines-icc-bid-betrays-its-principles/article22672289 /?arc404=true. 39 Lee Anne Goodman, “Harper and His Sizable Entourage Head to the Middle East,” Globe and Mail, 18 January 2014, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news /politics/harper-and-his-sizable-entourage-head-to-middle-east/article16398522 /#dashboard/follows/. 40 Stephen Harper, “Read the Full Text of Harper’s Historic Speech to Israel’s Knesset,” Globe and Mail, 20 January 2014, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics /read-the-full-text-of-harpers-historic-speech-to-israels-knesset/article16406371/. 41 Barry, “Canada and the Middle East Today,” 204. 42 “Timeline: Oda and the KAIROS Funding,” CBC News, 5 February 2011, https:// www.cbc.ca/news/politics/timeline-oda-and-the-kairos-funding-1.1027221. 43 Gerald Caplan, “Is the Harper Government Playing the Anti-Semitic Card?” Globe and Mail, 22 December 2009, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics /is-the-harper-government-playing-the-anti-semitic-card/article4296503/. 44 Kim Mackrael, “Ottawa Ignored CIDA Green Light when It Halted Aid Group’s Funding,” Globe and Mail, 28 October 2010, A4.

Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives  317 45 Elizabeth May, “Bev Oda Deserves a Defence,” The Green Party of Canada (blog), 3 July 2012, https://www.greenparty.ca/en/blogs/7/2012-07-04/bev-oda-deserves -defence. 46 “Rights and Democracy Torn by Dissent,” CBC News, 3 February 2010, https:// www.cbc.ca/news/canada/rights-and-democracy-torn-by-dissent-1.885478. 47 Paul Wells, “Rights and Democracy: Rest in Peace, Remy Beauregard,” Maclean’s, 16 December 2010, https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/rights-and -democracy-rest-in-peace-remy-beauregard/. 48 Karen Pinchin, “Israel-Palestine Brouhaha at York Rages On,” Maclean’s, 16 June 2009, https://www.macleans.ca/education/uniandcollege/israel-palestine -brouhaha-at-york-rages-on/. 49 Kristen Shane, “Liberal’s Refusal to Sign Off on Final Report Highlights Continuing Controversy over Anti-Semitism Group,” Embassy, 13 July 2011, https://www.embassynews.ca/news/2011/07/13/liberals-refusal-to-sign-off-on -final-report-highlights-continuing-controversy-over/40484. 50 Federal Court Decision, The Toronto Coalition to Stop the War vs. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 27 September 2010, https://www.decisions .fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/item/58519/index.do. 51 Neil MacDonald, “Ottawa Cites Hate Crime Laws When Asked about Its ‘Zero Tolerance’ for Israel Boycotters,” CBC News, 11 May 2015, https://www.cbc.ca /news/politics/ottawa-cites-hate-crime-laws-when-asked-about-its-zero-tolerance -for-israel-boycotters-1.3067497. 52 Blanchfield, Swingback, 155–6, Chapnick, The Harper Era, 107–8; and John Ibbitson, Stephen Harper (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2015), 12. 53 Juanita Sundberg, “Eurocentrism,” in Nigel Thrift and Rob Kitchen, eds., International Encyclopedia of Human Geography (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 638. 54 Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Abigail B. Bakan, “The Racial Contract: Israel/Palestine and Canada,” Social Identities, 14 (2008): 637–60; and T. Van Teeffelen, “Racism and Metaphor: The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Popular Literature,” Discourse and Society 5 (1994): 381–405. 55 Quoted in Martin Gilbert, Churchill and the Jews: A Lifelong Friendship (London: Henry Holt and Company, 2008), 118. 56 John Ibbitson, “Empire Strikes Back in Harper’s Rhetoric,” Globe and Mail, 27 July 2006, A10; and Scott Staring, “Harper’s History,” Policy Options 42, no. 2 (February 2013): 42–8. 57 “Harper Says ‘Islamicism’ Biggest Threat to Canada,” CBC News, 6 September 2011, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/harper-says-islamicism-biggest-threat-to -canada-1.1048280. 58 Barry, “Canada and the Middle East Today,” 207; and Haroon Siddiqui, “How Harper Systematically Mined Anti-Muslim Prejudices,” Toronto Star, 10 April 2016, https://www.thestar.com/news/insight/2016/04/10/how-harper-systematically -mined-anti-muslim-prejudices.html.

318  Shaun Narine 59 Daryl Greer, “Sudanese Refugee Sues Canadian Government over Terror Allegations,” Maclean’s, 15 August 2013, https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada /former-sudanese-refugee-sues-canadian-government-over-terrorism -accusations/; and Mike Blanchfield, “SCC Rejects Argument Omar Khadr Was Adult Offender,” CTV News, 14 May 2015, https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/scc -rejects-argument-omar-khadr-was-adult-offender-1.2373406. 60 Paul Waldie, “Trudeau Defends Apology and $10.5 million Payment to Omar Khadr,” Globe and Mail, 8 July 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news /national/trudeau-defends-apology-and-10.5-million-payment-to-omar-khadr /article35623594/. 61 Jeffrey Simpson, “How the Political Shift among Jewish Voters Plays in Canada,” Globe and Mail, 28 September 2011, A15; and Barry, “Canada and the Middle East Today,” 191–217. On the politicized nature of Harper’s high-profile January 2014 visit to Israel, see Margaret Wente, “Harper and the Jewish Vote,” Globe and Mail, 28 January 2014, A13. 62 Chapnick, “Stephen Harper’s Israel Policy,” 108. Baird said that his own constituency contained only 2,800 Jews but 11,500 Muslims and Arabs as proof that his support for Israel was not motivated by political considerations. See David Horovitz, “We’ve Got to Stand for What Is Right … We Don’t Worship at the Altar of Consensus,” Times of Israel, 25 June 2013, https://www.timesofisrael .com/weve-got-to-stand-for-what-is-right-we-dont-worship-at-the-altar-of -consensus/. 63 Marci McDonald, The Armageddon Factor (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2011). McDonald provides a detailed overview of the importance of far-right Evangelical Christians as a key voting bloc and having significant influence on the federal Conservative Party. See also Barry, “Canada and the Middle East Today,” 193–5. 64 Martin, Harperland, 81. Most of Canada’s media is fairly right-wing and strongly supportive, or at least fairly uncritical, of Israel. 65 Ibbitson, Stephen Harper, 12. 66 Chapnick, The Harper Era, 107. 67 Blanchfield, Swingback, 137. 68 Harper, Full Text, 2014. 69 John Ibbitson, “The Big Break: The Conservative Transformation of Canada’s Foreign Policy,” CIGI Working Paper no. 29 (2014): 7–9. 70 Gerald Schmitz, “The Harper Government and the De-democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (2014): 224–8. 71 Clark, How We Lead, 97–8. 72 Alan Bloomfield and Kim Richard Nossal, “A Conservative Foreign Policy? Canada and Australia Compared,” in James Farney and David Rayside, eds., Conservatism in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 139–64. 73 Clark, How We Lead, 77.

Canada and Israel under the Harper Conservatives  319 74 “Canada Vows to Return to ‘Honest Broker’ Role on Israel,” The Forward, 5 November 2015, https://www.forward.com/news/breaking-news/324149 /canada-vows-to-return-to-honest-broker-role-on-israel/. 75 Gerald Caplan, “Trudeau Continues Harper’s Policies on Israel,” Globe and Mail, 13 December 2016, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/trudeau -continues-harpers-policies-on-israel/article33314027/. 76 Antonio Zerbisias, “Canada Jumps on the anti-BDS Bandwagon,” Al-Jazeera, 28 February 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2016/2/28/canada -jumps-on-the-anti-bds-bandwagon. 77 “In an Unexpected Move, Trudeau Commits Canada to Defending Zionism,” Canada Talks Israel Palestine, 11 May 2017, https://canadatalksisraelpalestine.ca /2017/05/11/in-unexpected-move-trudeau-commits-canada-to-defending -zionism/. 78 Patrick Martin and Michelle Zilio, “UN Appointment of Canadian Academic Creates Controversy,” Globe and Mail, 31 March 2016, A9. 79 Guy Lawson, “Trudeau’s Canada Again,” New York Times Magazine, 8 December 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/magazine/trudeaus-canada -again.html?_r=0. On Trudeau’s post-nationalism, see Charles Foran, “The Canada Experiment: Is This the World’s First ‘Post-National’ Country?” The Guardian, 4 January 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/04/the-canada -experiment-is-this-the-worlds-first-postnational-country. 80 Jane Taber, “Trudeau Taps Millionaire Stephen Bronfman to Help Fill Liberals’ War Chest,” Globe and Mail, 29 August 2013, A4. 81 “2017 Survey: On Israel-Palestine, Canadian Gov’t is Out of Touch,” CJPME, February-March 2017, https://www.cjpme.org/survey; Thomas Woodley, “ProIsrael Government Policies Don’t Speak for Most Canadians,” The Huffington Post, 17 February 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/thomas-woodley/canada-israel -relations_b_14793538.html. 82 See Konrad Yakabuski, “Canada’s Greens Self-Destruct over Israel,” Globe and Mail, 17 June 2021, A13. 83 Dakshana Bascaramurty and Caroline Alphonso, “A Community Divided,” Globe and Mail, 28 April 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto /a-community-divided-the-fight-over-canadian-values-threatens-to-boil-over-inpeel /article34852452/. 84 L.R. Ross, “Canadian Muslims and Foreign Policy,” International Journal 63, no. 1 (2007–2008): 187–205. 85 See Drew Hayden Taylor, “Memories of Oka Are Driving Indigenous Solidarity with Palestinians,” Globe and Mail, 24 May 2021, A11. 86 Nathan Thrall and Robert Blecher, “The Next War in Gaza Is Brewing. Here’s How to Stop It,” New York Times, 30 July 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/30 /opinion/gaza-violence-conflict-prevention.html. Also see, Mark MacKinnon,

320  Shaun Narine

87 88

89 90

91

“Israel, Hamas Agree to Ceasefire After 11 Days of Conflict in Gaza,” Globe and Mail, 21 May 2021, A1. Linda McQuaig, “Israeli Stance Hinders Trudeau’s Chances of Getting Seat on UN Security Council,” Toronto Star, 16 February 2017, A17. In May 2018, Harper said that he stood in “complete support” of US President Donald Trump’s decision to terminate the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement. Israel’s ambassador to Canada was quick to indicate that he was “happy” that Harper was backing the “wise decision” of the Trump administration. See Robert Fife and Adrian Morrow, “Harper among Former World Leaders to Voice Support for U.S. Withdrawal from Iran Deal,” Globe and Mail, 11 May 2018, A4; and Yakabuski, “On Israel, Trudeau Is Harper’s Pupil.” Sandro Contenta, “Canada’s Fall from Grace,” GlobalPost, 2 November 2010, https://www.pri.org/stories/2010-11-02/canadas-fall-grace. John Ibbitson and Joanna Slater, “Security Council Rejection a Deep Embarrassment for Harper,” Globe and Mail, 12 October 2010, https://www .globeandmail.com/news/politics/security-council-rejection-a-deep -embarrassment-for-harper/article1370239/. “Harper Will Defend Israel ‘Whatever the Cost,’” CTV News, 8 November 2010, https://www.ctvnews.ca/harper-will-defend-israel-whatever-the-cost-1.572202.

15 The Harper Government and Sub-Saharan Africa: The End of Aspiration? david r. black

Over the course of the postcolonial era in Sub-Saharan Africa, beginning with the independence of Ghana in 1957, a succession of Canadian governments found themselves, intermittently, playing surprisingly prominent roles in the continent’s diplomatic and developmental affairs. On the face of it, these moments of prominence were at odds with the economic and geostrategic marginality of Africa to core Canadian interests, as understood in conventional realist terms. I have argued elsewhere that to understand this pattern of intermittent activism one needs to combine three theoretical frames: an English School emphasis on Canada as a “good international citizen”; a neo-Gramscian emphasis on Canada as the benign face of Western hegemonic interests towards the continent; and a postcolonial emphasis on a de-historicized “Africa” as the basis for a self-referential narrative of Canadian “moral leadership.”1 By the mid1980s, this pattern had generated a widespread public and political expectation that Canadian governments would respond to continental crises in an almost reflexive manner, even when the material and diplomatic foundations for doing so remained chronically shallow and inconstant. This pattern was particularly prominent under the Brian Mulroney Progressive Conservative government (e.g., the 2003 Ethiopian famine, the endgame of apartheid in South Africa, the trauma of the Somalia Affair in 1993) and the Jean Chrétien Liberal government (e.g., Roméo Dallaire’s role in Rwanda, the Human Security Agenda in a succession of African crises,2 the G7’s Africa Action Plan). While there is much that can and has been interrogated regarding these roles and expectations, the point I  wish to make in this chapter  is that they were decisively disrupted by the Harper Conservatives, who lacked the African impulse of their predecessors. But this point needs to be made with care: As we will see, on several key empirical measures (notably the volume of Canadian aid to Africa as well as the decline in Canadian contributions to the continent’s proliferating peace operations), the Conservatives’ performance was no worse than its predecessors, and in some respects better. What distinguished

322  David R. Black

the Harper government, however, was their apparent conviction that African issues were firmly at the margins of Canadian international interests (and Canadian electoral politics), and their willingness to act on this conviction. Indeed, the government’s approach to African “partners” and issues became a prominent means through which it set about recasting the dominant narrative of Canada’s role in the world. This approach was closely connected with, and reinforced by, an often disdainful disposition towards the inclusive multilateral ­organizations – notably the United Nations and the Commonwealth – that had been historically instrumental in both prompting and enabling Canadian engagement with African issues. I develop this argument by briefly addressing four dimensions of Canadian involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa: (1) Canada’s diplomatic role(s) vis-à-vis the continent; (2) development assistance; (3) peace support operations; and (4) trade and investment links. The chapter will conclude by addressing some of the factors underpinning this historic reorientation and offer some key lessons for the Justin Trudeau government arising from the Harper era in Africa. Diplomatic Roles and Linkages Historically, it is inconceivable that the Canadian government would have developed the level of interest and involvement in African affairs that it did in the absence of a firm commitment to the vitality of a series of more or less inclusive multilateral institutions. These included, of course, the United Nations, which was particularly (though not solely) instrumental in triggering Canadian involvement in African “peacekeeping” operations including in the Congo, Namibia, Somalia, Rwanda, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and (South) Sudan, among others.3 But at least as important, especially in the early years of decolonization as well as during the long struggle against minority rule in Southern Africa, was the “new” post-imperial Commonwealth. Canadian development assistance, military training assistance, and diplomatic engagements in various phases of the “apartheid issue” were decisively shaped by Canada’s Commonwealth connection.4 While Canada’s escalating involvement in francophone Africa was initially a response primarily to rising Québécois nationalism, it was amplified and enabled by the emergence of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie as a loose analogue to the Commonwealth.5 Underpinning all of these linkages was Canada’s role as a charter member of the Western alliance, formalized in its NATO membership, which was a key stimulus to Canadian involvement in Africa. Finally, at a more rarefied level, the G7 and G8 summits offered key opportunities for Canadian initiatives on Africa, including the Mulroney government’s well-intentioned but largely unsuccessful advocacy of a stronger collective effort to promote substantial change in apartheid South

The Harper Government and Sub-Saharan Africa  323

Africa, and the Chrétien government’s pivotal role in promoting the Africa Action Plan before and after the summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, in 2002. These multilateral linkages, in turn, fuelled the emergence of some relatively durable bilateral relationships between Canada and various African countries including several of the Frontline States of Southern Africa, the governments of key bilateral development partners such as Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, and Ghana and, following the demise of apartheid, the majority-ruled South African government led by President Nelson Mandela. Compared to its predecessors, the Harper government took a much more sceptical and instrumental view of its multilateral attachments. This was at least loosely coupled with its lack of interest in pursuing strong relationships with African governments, which together form the largest regional blocs in each of the UN, the Commonwealth, and la Francophonie. Simply put, to be a committed and active member of these multilateral forums was perforce to take an interest in the various challenges confronting the continent, and vice versa. Though the Harper government was prepared to “do its share” (minimally understood) in relation to multilateral forums and African issues, it had little political interest or investment in either. As former Harper chief of staff Ian Brodie has argued, though, this should not be confused with a “disengagement” from multilateral arenas altogether.6 Rather, it was an approach that focused on concertation with a (small) circle of trusted friends and allies7 to achieve specific purposes defined by the government as serving both Canadian interests and values (in line with its oft-repeated mantra of a “principled foreign policy”). As Foreign Minister John Baird put it in a speech to the Montreal Council on Foreign Relations in 2012, “by working with our friends and allies, by building ad hoc coalitions with those who share our end goals and by using multilateral connections, we amplify our values exponentially.”8 The upshot was a deeply wary attitude towards much of what these multilateral organizations, the UN in particular, did in Africa. Most strikingly, the Harper government largely disengaged from UN peace operations in Africa and parallel efforts to support peacekeeping capacity-building in the African Union and African sub-regional organizations. This trend will be discussed further below. Similarly, its decision to withdraw from the UN Convention on Desertification in 2013 – still the only government to have done so – was hard not to read as reflecting a disregard for the devastating impacts of desertification on the continent, and the situation of recurrent food insecurity for tens of millions of people that resulted from it.9 A major exception to this UN trajectory was the Harper government’s sustained interest in Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (MNCH) beginning in 2010, as well as its related and vociferous opposition to early and forced marriage. This too will be discussed further below, but in general reflected the government’s targeted and instrumental approach to multilateral engagements.

324  David R. Black

In the G7 context, a succession of summits had sustained a high-level focus among this club of the world’s richest governments towards African issues and challenges. This was, in turn, a response to the leading African governments’ proposal for a New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). As noted above, the Chrétien government, in particular, had been instrumental in locking in this sustained preoccupation with Africa at the Kananaskis summit in 2002.10 While the “hegemonic consensus” among G8 governments on their approach to Africa had become increasingly difficult to sustain in the interim, it was still a significant blow to this collective focus when Stephen Harper, at his second G8 summit in 2007 in Heiligendamm, Germany, clearly signaled his government’s diminished interest in African issues, and its parallel “tilt” towards an increased emphasis on Latin America.11 In effect, Canada was diplomatically repositioned from a leading proponent of engagement with Africa to a half-hearted also-ran. These multilateral retreats were paralleled at the level of bilateral diplomatic engagements and relationships. In November 2007, nearly two years into the Harper government’s first mandate, former foreign minister Joe Clark noted in an address to the Canadian International Council some “simple tests” of governmental interest in Africa.12 These included what a government says and where it travels. On the former, he noted that there had been “not one word” about Africa in the press releases, statements, and speeches posted on the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) website. On the latter, he contrasted the pattern of ministerial visits under the Paul Martin Liberal government in 2004–5 to Afghanistan/Pakistan (three) and various countries in Africa (twelve), with the pattern in the first twenty-one months of the Harper government of visits to Afghanistan/Pakistan (twelve) and Africa (three, none by the prime minister or foreign minister). While the tempo of official travel increased somewhat after 2009,13 the focus remained narrowly trained on exploiting what were perceived as significantly improved economic opportunities on the continent, rather than building robust and diversified bilateral relationships. Similarly, the Harper government presided over a significant decline in Canada’s already limited diplomatic representation on the continent, with the number of countries where Canada had a diplomatic presence dropping from 45 per cent in 2005 to 37 per cent in 2013. This can be compared with the level of representation by, for example, France (89 per cent), the UK (65 per cent), and Brazil (63 per cent).14 It can also be contrasted with the government’s expanded representation in “emerging markets” of particular commercial interest, as seen in the fifteen new Trade Commissioner Service offices it had opened by June 2013 in countries such as Brazil, China, India, and Mongolia.15 To be sure, most of the mission closures were in relatively small countries with limited economic potential and political influence including Guinea (shuttered under the Martin government in 2005), Gabon (2006), and Malawi

The Harper Government and Sub-Saharan Africa  325

and Niger (2009). But the Harper government showed little inclination to pursue strong bilateral relationships, or “strategic partnerships,” with even the continent’s cluster of sub-regional powerhouses. A striking case in point was South Africa  – one of the two largest economies on the continent, with excellent infrastructure, strong institutions, and a long (if fraught) history of strong bilateral and trans-societal linkages, reinforced by the goodwill generated during the years surrounding the transition from apartheid. Notwithstanding these promising foundations, the Canada-South Africa relationship drifted aimlessly while other external “partners” beat a path to South Africa’s door, leading David Hornsby, in 2013, to characterize these relations as “disconnected and difficult.”16 The Harper government’s disinterest in Africa was made apparent in a number of other ways, as will be discussed further in the sections to follow. It would be a mistake, of course, to overstate the degree to which previous Canadian governments had been significantly more interested in forging and sustaining robust diplomatic relationships, whether bilateral or multilateral. Nevertheless, African governments and organizations rightly perceived a significant difference, and the difference came with a cost. While there were many factors that contributed to Canada’s embarrassing failure to win a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2010,17 a significant element was surely the failure to secure the African votes on which a succession of previously successful campaigns had depended. Development Assistance Development assistance, or foreign aid, has long been the most prominent and persistent foundation for Canadian relationships with African governments and people. It has also been notoriously fraught, marked by inconsistent and often self-serving priorities alongside a self-referential moral narrative that has stressed Canadian generosity while effectively “othering” African recipients.18 Notwithstanding these familiar critiques and limitations, however, it has also reflected the possibility, at least, of a more “enlightened internationalist” orientation that seeks to foster more secure, prosperous, and sustainable communities where poverty and insecurity are most acute. The Harper government’s approach to development assistance generally, and to the case of Africa specifically, was marked by some striking contradictions. In general, like economic conservatives elsewhere, the members and supporters of the Harper government tended to be deeply sceptical about the utility of aid and suspicious of the organizations (both governmental and nongovernmental) that were its most prominent purveyors.19 In Canada, these included the former Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA),20 the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), and the various

326  David R. Black

non-governmental organizations networked through the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC).21 Yet the government took a long time to sort out its approach and priorities on aid policy – in part, it can be argued, because its members and advisors had thought so little about the issue prior to their 2006 election victory.22 Contrary to some charges that the Conservatives had deliberately “walked away from Africa,”23 principally through cuts to their development efforts, the Harper government’s overall pattern of aid spending in Africa was no worse than, and in some respects superior to, that of its immediate predecessors. It is important to recall that the Chrétien Liberals, who successfully fostered an eleventh-hour image makeover on Africa through their G8 advocacy of the Africa Action Plan, presided over the deepest cuts in the history of Canadian aid. Moreover, these cuts fell most heavily on African “partners,” where developmental needs were greatest. Total aid spending fell from 0.45 per cent of gross national income (GNI) in 1991 to 0.25 per cent in 2000, while the percentage of aid allocated to Africa fell from 36 to 32 per cent between 1985 and 1993, to 24 per cent in 2001.24 The Harper Conservatives, by contrast, fulfilled the G8 commitment made by the Martin Liberals in 2005 to double aid to Africa between 2003–4 and 2008–9, while aid to Africa hovered between 38 per cent and 42 per cent of Canadian development assistance spending throughout their tenure. Similarly, overall aid spending increased to 0.34  per cent of GNI by 2010 – again in line with the commitment of the Conservatives’ predecessors to increase aid by 8 per cent annually from 2002 to 2010. To be sure, aid began to drop again from 2010 onwards in the wake of the global financial crisis, falling back to 0.26 per cent of GNI by 2016. But in contrast to the austerity years under the Liberals, aid to Africa did not decline sharply as a percentage of total development assistance spending. How, then, did the Harper government come to be widely tagged with having “walked away from” Africa? In large measure, this impression (not least among African governments themselves25) was self-inflicted – a result of abrupt political decisions by the government itself that, deliberately or otherwise, signaled a de-prioritization of erstwhile African “partners.” The most striking of these was the announcement in February 2009 of a new list of twenty bilateral “Countries of Focus.” Without prior consultation or warning, eight of fourteen African countries that had been on the 2005 priority list were summarily dropped, while middle-income countries from the Americas that were of particular commercial interest to Canada (notably Peru and Colombia, with whom bilateral free trade agreements were being negotiated) were added. The impact of this shift was, at best, insensitive and unhelpful as the Canadian government geared up to host both the G8 and G20 summits the following year, while also campaigning for a seat on the UN Security Council. That the government either

The Harper Government and Sub-Saharan Africa  327

did not anticipate the negative reaction, or did not care about it, reinforced the impression of indifference towards African issues and actors. Similarly, the government persistently signaled its intent to use aid more instrumentally, in support of what it saw as Canadian political and commercial interests. Many of these did not incorporate Africa. For example, in addition to the designation of new, middle-income Countries of Focus with particularly strong commercial potential (such as Colombia and Peru, and later Mongolia and the Philippines), the Harper government rapidly transformed its Afghanistan program into the largest in CIDA history. By 2007–8, the bilateral program had reached over CA$270 million and was supported by a dedicated task force and vice-president.26 Of course, this unprecedented program approach had to be seen, above all, as an adjunct to the Canadian Armed Forces’ long and costly deployment in Afghanistan, and thus as clear evidence of the “securitization” of Canadian development assistance. Later, a similarly self-interested calculation seemed to be applied in a series of initiatives designed to foster collaboration (and corporate image enhancement) between Canada’s powerful extractive sector and Canadian civil society organizations.27 First, the government fast-tracked a 2011 decision to fund three pilot projects between three major Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and three of the country’s largest extractive companies (IAMGOLD, Rio Tinto Alcan, and Barrick Gold) in Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Peru. CIDA supplied the lion’s share of the nearly CA$10 million allocated for the projects, prompting critics to point out that public funds were being used to subsidize the corporate social responsibility activities of some of the country’s richest corporations.28 While the funds involved were small in relation to the overall aid budget, Minister for International Cooperation Julian Fantino subsequently signalled the government’s resolve to expand and deepen this integrated strategy.29 This approach was further underscored by the announcement of nearly CA$25 million in funding over five years for what became the Canadian International Resources and Development Institute (CIRDI), in collaboration with the University of British Columbia, Simon Fraser University, and the Polytechnique Montréal.30 While, again, the amounts involved were not large, the fact that now-diminishing development assistance funds were being so clearly tethered to an initiative that sought (indirectly at least) to burnish the image of the Canadian extractive sector, while other long-standing and highly respected development research institutes such as the North-South Institute, Rights and Democracy, and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre had been defunded, seemed to reinforce the more transparently self-interested approach adopted by the Harper government. Alongside these signs of increasing instrumentalization, the Harper government’s flagship development effort  – and clearest indication of its continued

328  David R. Black

interest in “doing good” through its aid program – was the Muskoka Initiative (MI) on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (MNCH). Launched in the runup to the G8 summit in 2010 as the meeting’s hallmark initiative, it involved a commitment of CA$1.1 billion in new funding, and a total of CA$2.8 billion that included funds already committed, to support the effort. To the government’s credit, the MI was renewed for 2015–20, with a total commitment of CA$3.5 billion for this next phase, having been recast but largely retained by the Trudeau Liberals  – albeit under the very different rubric of the Liberals’ Feminist International Assistance Policy.31 Though the MI initially bore the signs of hasty adoption and improvisation, it was nevertheless a well-chosen focus, particularly given the fact that the UN’s Millennium Development Goals for maternal and child health (MDGs 4 and 5) were furthest from being achieved and therefore most in need of an infusion of high-level commitment and resources. It bore the imprint of the Harper government’s obsessive preoccupation with “focus” and “results” (and implicitly, its critique of most foreign aid as ostensibly unfocused and lacking in beneficial results). Coming in the wake of the negative fallout from the Harper government’s 2009 Countries of Focus list, and with an eye to the 2010 UN Security Council vote, the MI provided an indirect means of signalling a partial course correction, with seven of ten MI priority countries being African.32 Nevertheless, the MI had features and limitations that made it a target for criticism and diminished its impact, along with the credit the government gained from it. First, it was launched just as the Harper government initiated a prolonged period of aid budget austerity. The upshot was that “new” funding for MNCH came at the expense of cutting funding for existing programs, and thus wider efforts to support poverty alleviation. Yet one of the strongest correlations with poor maternal and neonatal outcomes was poverty. Thus, without broader and deeper efforts to address these underlying conditions, there was a high probability that MNCH achievements would be unsustainable. Second, critics noted that the initiative had virtually nothing to say about sexual and reproductive health and rights, paternalistically portraying women as, in effect, “walking wombs.”33 It explicitly ruled out support for safe and legal abortions, apparently for ideological and political reasons. Obviously, these were highly sensitive issues in many of the countries where programming was to occur; yet failure to support and advocate for reproductive and abortion rights created a huge gap in the policy, since deaths due to unsafe abortions were one of the three leading causes of maternal morbidity and mortality, accounting for 13 per cent of maternal deaths worldwide in 2008.34 The Conservatives’ approach, therefore, appealed to the party’s predominantly “pro-life” caucus and base of supporters, while imposing on women in developing countries a policy approach that the party was unwilling to risk implementing in its own country. This led Carrier-Sabourin and Tiessen to label it as a manifestation of

The Harper Government and Sub-Saharan Africa  329

“hypocritical internationalism.”35 In taking this approach, moreover, the government drew opposition from other Western governments and from gender and development advocates globally. Thus, the Harper government’s aid policy in Africa can be seen to have narrowed and instrumentalized the design and implementation of Canadian development assistance to more firmly support its own political, economic, and ideological predispositions, while displaying increased insensitivity to longstanding development “partnerships” with African counterparts. Even where the Conservatives’ performance was most credit-worthy, on the MNCH file, it effectively devalued the credit it received, particularly in Africa. Peace Operations Alongside development assistance, the most visible manifestation of “official” Canadian engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa was the country’s role in multilateral peace operations, as well as (more unobtrusively) military training assistance.36 During the 1990s, the former became much more prominent, for obvious reasons. One needs only list the names of Canada’s (and the UN’s) post–Cold War deployments on the continent  – Somalia, Rwanda, eastern DRC, Central African Republic, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sudan/Darfur – to conjure a sense of the changing face of international peacekeeping, with the rise of increasingly complex, conflictual, protracted, and dangerous missions that became, and have remained, the continental norm. Canada’s own UN/multilateral peacekeeping trajectory is well and widely known. “Peacekeeping” was, and remains, a deeply held (if shallowly understood) dimension of Canada’s international identity.37 At the height of Canada’s post-Cold War peacekeeping deployments in the early 1990s, upwards of 3,000 Canadian troops were deployed  – second only to France. By the mid-2000s, in contrast, UN deployments had settled at around twenty military personnel annually, with Canada ranking as the seventy-sixth largest contributor in 2015 (declining further in the 2020–2 period).38 At the same time, the size and tempo of UN operations surged from around 60,000 in 2004 to over 100,000 forces deployed in 2014–15.39 Since major European troop contributors had, like Canada, largely pulled back from UN deployments by the late 1990s after collective traumas such as those in Rwanda and the Balkans,40 this meant that the vast majority of the increase in UN peacekeepers came from the Global South, including many African troop-contributing countries (TCCs). These countries (and their regional organizations) clearly had a more immediate interest in the conflicts they were seeking to ameliorate, but lacked the level of training, resources, and specialized capabilities that Western militaries could provide – creating a paradoxical situation in which operational demands were escalating, while force capabilities were, in some key respects, eroding.

330  David R. Black

As Joshua Libben makes clear, the decline in Canadian military deployments to UN peace operations was a bipartisan process, with the trend already wellestablished under both the Chrétien and Martin Liberals.41 In this sense, like foreign aid, the differences in policy practice between the Harper government and its predecessors should not be overstated: The former merely carried forward a trajectory that was already firmly established. Libben has interpreted this as reflecting the steady ascendance of a “strategic sub-culture” situating Canada as a “robust western ally,” which can be contrasted with the “Pearsonian internationalist” sub-culture that was prevalent through much of the post-Second World War era (as discussed earlier in the Rice and von Hlatky chapter in this volume). The former underpins a defence policy orientation that is sceptical of UN missions and mandates and much more comfortable with combat roles in the company of this country’s closest Western allies, while the latter adheres to convictions on the appropriate goals and uses of force, preferred modes of cooperation, and thresholds for the use of force that together constituted a “peacekeeping sweet spot.”42 It is important to note that these competing “strategic sub-cultures” have long coexisted within the Canadian defence establishment, and to some extent between the Department of Defence and the Department of External/Foreign Affairs  – with the former traditionally inclined towards a more sceptical view of UN operations and more focused on sustaining its ability to operate seamlessly with its key allies in combat roles.43 Yet in highlighting these longer-term trends and dynamics, straddling the transition from the Chrétien/Martin years to the Harper era, we should not overlook the real differences between them – differences that reflected the significantly diminished interest of the Harper government in African issues and relationships. Two examples will suffice. First, under the auspices of the Africa Action Plan and the Chrétien government’s parallel CA$500  million Canada Fund for Africa, the Liberal government became an enthusiastic supporter of efforts to build African regional capacity to undertake “African solutions to African problems” in the peacekeeping domain. Programmatically, there were two main instances of this support. The first was a CA$4 million commitment to the African Union (AU) to help build the capacity of the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The second, more substantial, effort was a CA$15 million contribution to a West Africa Peace and Security Initiative (PSI).44 The Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), it should be noted, was the African Regional Economic Community (REC) that had gone furthest in developing its collective capacity for multilateral peace operations, in part because it had been confronted with some of the most deadly civil conflicts of the 1990s in countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia. Both Canadian initiatives were launched and elaborated in the two years following the 2002 summit in Kananaskis. Neither was large in dollar terms, and both bore the unseemly limitations

The Harper Government and Sub-Saharan Africa  331

of the new emphasis on leaving to Africans the hard and dangerous work of stabilization under the “African solutions” rubric. Yet both, and particularly the latter, were of considerable significance to the African “partners” involved. For example, the PSI enabled ECOWAS to significantly enhance and sustain its headquarters’ capacity for strategic direction of regional peace operations, while its support for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) was pivotal in the development of programming capacity at the Centre.45 Yet under the Harper Conservatives, neither was maintained. Indeed, support for the KAIPTC was abruptly cut in 2009, not long after renewed funding had been committed under the government’s Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). Unsurprisingly, this was taken by those affected as emblematic of the Conservative government’s lack of concern for the interests and priorities of African “partners.” Second, under the previous Liberal government(s), the “international community” was confronted by the escalating humanitarian and political crisis in Darfur, which for many evoked the genocidal spectre of Rwanda.46 The international response was, initially, shockingly slow, as was Canada’s. Kim Nossal characterized the Canadian approach as “ear candy,” combining expansive rhetorical professions of intent with “conservative, limited, and symbolic” actions.47 By May 2005, however, the Martin government’s response had been substantially elevated. Among other measures, it appointed a high-level advisory team composed of then senator Roméo Dallaire, former UN ambassador Robert Fowler, and Senator Mobina Jaffer, Canada’s special envoy for peace in Darfur. Perhaps most concretely, the Canadian government became one of the three largest donors to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and provided important logistical and capacity support through the provision of mediumlift helicopters, fixed-wing airlift capacity, and the loan of 105 armoured personnel carriers, among other forms of assistance.48 These contributions were inadequate, given the magnitude of the crisis, but nevertheless meaningfully enhanced the limited capacity of AMIS and reflected a serious level of governmental engagement with the crisis. By way of comparison, the international community faced a deep and escalating political and security crisis in Mali in 2012 and 2013. This prompted the UN Security Council to urgently sanction an AU mission for the country (the African-led International Support Mission to Mali), and set the stage for the French-led intervention (Operation Serval) in the first part of 2013. In this context, the Harper government faced strong pressure, not least from the highest reaches of the French government, to make a significant contribution. There were many good reasons for it to respond positively, partly because Mali was a long-standing country of focus for Canadian development assistance with substantial trans-societal links, and Canada also had substantial extractive sector investments in the country.49 Ultimately, the government did commit a CC-177

332  David R. Black

Globemaster aircraft and a forty-member RCAF flight and maintenance crew to provide airlift support – though, remarkably, the initial commitment was for one week only (with repeated renewals). What was striking, however, was the government’s confused and deeply reticent messaging. As the Globe and Mail’s Campbell Clark wrote: “The Harper government is so obsessed with stressing what it’s not going to do in Mali – combat – that it fumbles whenever it talks about what it will do … What [Prime Minister Harper] hasn’t set out is a clear idea of what the Canadian role should be. His government has hesitated and delayed.”50 In short, the government seemed to have no overarching rationale for what it could and should be doing in relation to the crisis, and seemed at pains to disavow any intent to develop one.51 What these examples underscore is that, while the peace operation roles of both the Harper Conservatives and their Liberal predecessors were hampered by often improvised and inadequate resource commitments,52 the Liberals regularly took the view that Canada could and should play a role in supporting the capacity of these operations, while the Conservatives were at pains to minimize their continental exposure in the security domain. In this sense, these examples illustrate that the Harper Conservatives were firm adherents of the “robust western ally” strategic sub-culture noted by Libben, which reinforced their wariness of African entanglements. Their Liberal predecessors, by contrast, were more inclined towards the “Pearsonian internationalist” tradition, even if their practical support for peace operations in Africa was materially limited. Trade and Investment The preoccupation with Canadian aid and peacekeeping in Africa fed into a shallow but powerful dominant narrative that portrayed the continent, above all, as a place of extraordinary deprivation and danger. This was always a distorted and misleading portrayal, and had become even more so by the time the Harper government took office in 2006. Trans-societal linkages were growing rapidly. Among them, the diverse and vibrant African diaspora was becoming increasingly embedded in Canada, serving as a robust trans-societal bridge. And, after two “lost decades” of economic development in the 1980s and 1990s, the continent was experiencing world-leading rates of economic growth, prompting The Economist to reverse its dismal view of a decade previous to declare Africa “the hopeful continent” in 2011.53 Canadian foreign direct investment in the continent  – only one-quarter of its official development assistance (ODA) in 1987 – was double Canadian ODA by 2004–5 and continued to grow.54 To be sure, there were serious concerns about the forms and distribution of Africa’s rapid economic growth, which was heavily dependent on an inherently unstable commodities boom and largely failed to foster significant diversification, being linked to growing social inequalities and displacement.55 In the case

The Harper Government and Sub-Saharan Africa  333

of Canada, investment was heavily concentrated in the extractive sector, which, despite exceptional opportunities for wealth generation, was closely associated with destructive social, ecological, and security ramifications (hence the Harper government’s efforts to promote corporate social responsibility and the promise of “responsible resource development,” in part through its aid program).56 Nevertheless, the growth of new commercial opportunities in Africa had led many “established” and “rising” powers to pursue sustained strategies of engagement – including China, of course, but also countries like India, Brazil, Turkey, and South Korea, among others. If Africa was a continent of exceptional economic potential, however, the Harper government seemed largely oblivious, at least during its first four years in power. In the Harper government’s hierarchy of bilateral relationship priorities, there was a privileged inner circle of trusted and “like-minded” countries – almost all Western and liberal democratic (pointedly including Israel) – with whom comprehensive relationships were pursued. Then there were “emerging markets” that were deemed to be particularly promising targets for Canadian trade and investment. This was concretely signalled in two ways: through the pursuit of bilateral free trade agreements and, with the issuing of the Global Markets Action Plan (GMAP) in November 2013 (the closest the Harper government came to a foreign policy White Paper and undoubtedly viewed as a sop to its political base), through the designation of twenty “Emerging Markets with Broad Canadian Interests.” In terms of Free Trade Agreements, negotiations were either completed or underway with at least fifteen Latin American countries; with Africa, negotiations were underway with only one (Morocco – then the only non-member of the African Union!). In terms of GMAP “emerging markets with broad Canadian interests,” the government identified four in Latin America, three in the Middle East, ten in Asia, and only one (South Africa) in Africa.57 Initially, as noted by Joe Clark in 2007, the government had almost nothing to say about Africa – whether positive or otherwise. From 2011 onwards, it seemed to “discover” the continent’s economic potential and embrace the “Africa rising” narrative. For example, in 2011, International Trade Minister Peter Van Loan opined to a Toronto conference on “Africa Rising” that, “I’ve seen first-hand the opportunities and potential in Africa’s economy. Like many Canadian companies, I recognize the potential of this market and I believe that Canada can be a great partner in helping to build the ‘new Africa’.”58 A belated, concrete manifestation of this “discovery” was the 2015 opening of Export Development Canada’s first African office in Johannesburg. (It is worth mentioning that Export Development Canada’s presence in Johannesburg followed on the heels of its expansive support for Bombardier’s efforts to cement jet and rail sales in South Africa – efforts that led to both becoming enmeshed with highly suspect allies of then president Jacob Zuma.59) Yet the “Africa rising”

334  David R. Black

narrative deployed by the government was just as shallow and one-dimensional as the heretofore dominant narrative of Africa as a locus of deprivation and danger. Neither reflected an adequately historicized and contextualized understanding of the continent equipped to deal with its diverse connections, challenges, and opportunities. Moreover, compared to the exceptional efforts made by a host of other extra-continental countries to pursue new economic linkages and opportunities, as well as the Harper government’s efforts in other parts of the world, the government’s overall trade and investment-promotion efforts in Africa remained half-hearted at best. Explaining the Harper Government’s African Indifference How do we explain the Harper government’s relative lack of political interest in a continent with which previous Canadian governments had enjoyed surprisingly positive relationships? In the limited space available, I will propose three closely related explanatory factors.60 A first explanation is generational. The generation of Canadian elites who came of age in the 1960s and 1970s were disproportionately affected by encounters with and images of a rapidly decolonizing Africa. Stephen Lewis has articulated this dynamic: “It must be understood, without any hint of heady romanticism, that Africa in the 1950s and 1960s … was a continent of vitality, growth, and boundless expectation. It got into your blood, your viscera, your heart.”61 Many young Canadians had encounters through their role as volunteers with new NGOs like CUSO International; others were involved (directly or indirectly) in faith-based organizations and educational institutions; still others in solidarity work supporting liberation struggles in southern Africa. While we tend to think of these engagements as feeding principally into the left/liberal parties (i.e., the NDP and Liberals), they had a firm foothold in the Progressive Conservative Party as well. As noted by Joe Clark, “Ron Atkey, Flora Macdonald, David Macdonald, Ged Baldwin, Gordon Fairweather, Ray Hnatyshyn, Doug Roche, Mr. Stanfield, Mr. Diefenbaker, others, had all been active in international or human rights issues.”62 By the time the “new” Conservative Party was elected, however, there were few of this Africa-affected generation left in the party, leaving it relatively unmoved by African issues. This is closely related to a second, partisan explanation. This explanation has two dimensions. The first is that, while the “new” Conservative Party formed in 2003 was ostensibly a merger between the Reform and Progressive Conservative Parties, the Reform element was clearly dominant. More to the point, the long-standing “Red Tory” tradition (reflected in Joe Clark’s above roll call) was largely purged from the new party. Insofar as this was the tradition that had been most energetic in its support of an active internationalist foreign policy towards Africa (and elsewhere), there were few left in the caucus or cabinet

The Harper Government and Sub-Saharan Africa  335

who knew or cared much about the continent and its affairs. The second is that the new Conservative government was, from the outset, determined to shift the party-political centre of gravity in Canadian politics, in part by clearly distinguishing itself from its Liberal predecessors. Since Canada had few substantial geostrategic or economic interests in Africa, reframing the narrative of Canadian foreign policy by discounting the continent’s place in it was a relatively low-cost means of “brand differentiation” (and playing to its base), reflecting the long tradition of using Africa to tell a story about ourselves to ourselves.63 The third explanation concerns the values the Harper government sought to highlight in differentiating itself. Here, Paul Gecelovsky usefully interrogates the prime minister’s own value system, emphasizing “faith, family, and freedom.”64 More to the point, Gecelovsky focuses on two distinct faith traditions that compete for influence on foreign policy, contrasting the message of “personal responsibility” and individual initiative emphasized in the biblical Parable of the Talents with the “cosmopolitan” and compassionate message in the Parable of the Good Samaritan. Whereas the latter was an important influence on the long-standing social gospel tradition in mainstream Canadian public life and, in foreign policy, the humane internationalist tradition highlighted in the work of Cranford Pratt,65 the former was predominant among contemporary evangelicals, including the prime minister and much of the Conservative caucus and its electoral base. In this value system, the case for prioritizing the poorest and most insecure continent was significantly diminished. Indeed, adopting a more “rational” and less romantic approach to Africa could be used to underscore the “realist internationalism” favoured by the Harper Conservatives and its electoral supporters.66 Lessons for the Trudeau Liberals What lessons can be taken from the Harper government’s political departure on Canadian relations with Sub-Saharan Africa? The following points are based on the assumption that the Justin Trudeau Liberals are sincere in their professed intent to rebuild relations with Africa as well as reinvigorate the broader multilateralist tradition  – though at the time of writing, this is increasingly questionable.67 First, contrary to what the Harper Conservatives appeared to believe, Africa matters in international relations, and increasingly so – both directly and indirectly. Its governments and representatives have become increasingly assertive in diplomatic terms, while its economic attractiveness and clout – though still relatively small – are rapidly growing. Most obviously for Canada, this manifested itself in the costly loss of diplomatic support during Canada’s humbling failure to secure a rotating seat on the UN Security Council in 2010 (a feat that the federal Liberals repeated in 2020). In short, an image of “enlightened

336  David R. Black

internationalism” in relation to the exceptional challenges and opportunities of Africa is a significant diplomatic asset. Moreover, African governments can and should be valued partners in the pursuit of broader multilateral objectives. Second, there is a need to move beyond the shallow and cyclical narratives and engagements of the past. In point of fact, while the Conservatives were more transparent in their relative lack of concern with African affairs, it has been shown that their resource commitments were in many respects little different from those of their predecessors. More to the point, no Canadian government has successfully sustained a depth of interest and expertise on African issues, even in important relationships such as that with South Africa. The Harper government’s Liberal predecessors were rhetorically expansive in their professions of interest, but only towards the very end of their time in office did they actually begin to move towards (re)building the capacities required to support their rhetoric. These disparities between profession and performance have been widespread in Canadian foreign policy, but I would argue that they have been particularly stark vis-à-vis Africa. This gap needs to be narrowed, on both sides: the federal government needs to be measured in its commitments and credible in its delivery. This will require, in turn, a sustained reinvestment in deep understanding through the rebuilding of the policy research “ecosystem,” which used to be embodied in organizations like the North-South Institute, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, and Rights and Democracy. It still remains to be seen, after six years in power, whether the Trudeau government is willing and able to do this. Third, Canada (somewhat surprisingly) still enjoys a reservoir of goodwill amongst many governments and groups in Africa, but it has fallen behind in what is now a much more crowded diplomatic “marketplace” on the continent, and is, in effect, on diplomatic probation. It must demonstrate through deeds as well as words that it deserves to be treated as a serious “partner.” A key test in this regard will be the substance and sustainment of its “re-engagement” in African peace operations – a test which, to date, it is largely failing.68 Another will be the ways in which the Trudeau government gives effect to its vigorously promoted Feminist International Assistance Policy. To what extent will this be undertaken in ways that reflect the interests and priorities of African interlocutors versus Canadian domestic audiences? In general, there is clearly an opportunity to chart a new course in Canada’s relations with Africa, but it remains an open question as to whether the interruption in high-level interest manifested under the Harper Conservatives has durably altered the calculus of interests that underpinned the activist impulses of the past. NOTES 1 See David R. Black, Canada and Africa in the New Millennium: The Politics of Consistent Inconsistency (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2015).

The Harper Government and Sub-Saharan Africa  337 2 See Rob McRae and Don Hubert, eds., Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001). 3 See, for example, Black, Canada and Africa, chap. 6. 4 Robert O. Matthews, “Canada and Anglophone Africa,” in Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael, eds., Canada and the Third World (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), 60–132; Peter Henshaw, “Canada and the ‘South African Disputes’ at the United Nations, 1946–61,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 33, no. 1 (1999): 1–52; David R. Black and David J. Hornsby, “Multilateralism as Motive and Opportunity: The Case of Canada-South Africa Relations,” in Robert W. Murray, ed., Seeking Order in Anarchy: Multilateralism as State Strategy (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2016), 219–38. 5 Louis Sabourin, “Canada and Francophone Africa,” in Lyon and Ismael, eds., Canada and the Third World, 133–61. 6 Ian Brodie, “Canada Disengaging from NATO, the UN and Multilateralism? Not a Chance,” Open Canada, 25 September 2014, https://opencanada.org/canada -disengaging-from-nato-the-un-and-multilateralism-not-a-chance/. 7 Pointedly including Israel, and thereby complicating relations with much of the Global South. 8 John Baird, “Address by Minister Baird at Montreal Council on Foreign Relations Luncheon,” Montreal, 14 September 2012, https://www.canada.ca/en/news /archive/2012/09/address-minister-baird-montreal-council-foreign-relations -luncheon.html. 9 Lee Berthiaume, “Canada’s Withdrawal from UN Drought Convention Prompted Anger,” Ottawa Citizen, 23 June 2015, https://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics /canadas-withdrawal-from-un-drought-convention-prompted-anger. Of course, it also reflected the Harper government’s relative lack of concern with climate change. 10 For an insider’s account, see Robert Fowler, “Canadian Leadership and the Kananaskis G-8 Summit: Toward a Less Self-Centred Foreign Policy,” in David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson, and Norman Hillmer, eds., Canada Among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2003), 219–41. 11 Alan Freeman, “Harper Signals Shift from Africa to Americas,” Globe and Mail, 8 June 2007, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/harper-signals-shift -from-africa-to-americas/article687498/. See also Black, Canada and Africa, chap. 2. 12 Joe Clark, “Is Africa Falling Off Canada’s Map? Remarks to the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs,” Ottawa, 6 November 2007, 1–7, https://www.mcgill.ca/isid/files/isid/OfftheMap.pdf. 13 Black, Canada and Africa, 195–9. 14 Michelle Zilio, “Dwindling Canadian Diplomatic Presence in Africa a Concern: Experts,” iPolitics, 26 February 2013, https://ipolitics.ca/2013/02/26/dwindling -canadian-diplomatic-presence-in-africa-a-concern-experts/; David C. Elder,

338  David R. Black

15

16 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

“Canada’s Diplomacy in Africa,” in Rohinton Medhora and Yiagadeesen Samy, eds., Canada Among Nations 2013: Canada-Africa Relations – Looking Back, Looking Ahead (Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2013), 23–41. See Government of Canada, “Harper Government Continues to Open New Markets to Help Small Businesses Expand and Succeed Abroad,” news release, 6 June 2013, https://www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/comm/news -communiques/2013/06/06a.aspx?lang=eng. David Hornsby, “Canada’s (Dis)Engagement with South Africa,” in Medhora and Samy, eds., Canada Among Nations 2013, 44. See Denis Stairs, Being Rejected in the United Nations: The Causes and Implications of Canada’s Failure to Win a Seat in the UN Security Council (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2011), 1–13, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx .cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/43/attachments/original/1413677044/Being_Rejected _in_the_United_Nations.pdf?1413677044. See, for example, Edward Akuffo, Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa: Regional Approaches to Peace, Security, and Development (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), 49–55. See Alain Noël, Jean-Philippe Thérien, and Sébastien Dallaire, “Divided over Internationalism: The Canadian Public and Development Assistance,” Canadian Public Policy 30, no. 1 (2004): 29–46. The March 2013 federal budget announced the “merger” of CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to form the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) – now Global Affairs Canada. Though it is important to note that the government was much more positively disposed towards some larger, often faith-based non-governmental development organizations with an emphasis on program delivery versus policy advocacy. It was not until May of 2009 that the then minister for international cooperation, Bev Oda, made a key speech outlining the government’s aid policy priorities. See Beverley Oda, “Speaking Notes for the Honourable Beverley J. Oda Minister of International Cooperation at the Munk Centre for International Studies,” Toronto, 20 May 2009. See Mark Blumberg, “Canada Announces ‘New Effective Approach to its International Assistance’,” Canadian Charity Law (blog), 20 May 2009, https:// www.canadiancharitylaw.ca/blog/canada-announces-new-effective-approach-to-its -international-assistance/. Michael Ignatieff, “Rebuilding Canada’s Leadership on the World Stage” (speech, Montreal, QC, 2 November 2010), Montreal Council on Foreign Relations, https:// www.corim.qc.ca/en/event/107/2010-11-02-michael-ignatieff. See John Serieux, “Statistics 2000,” in Michelle Hibler and Anne Chevalier, eds., Canadian Development Report 2000 (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 2000), 52–3 and 60–1; Canadian International Development Platform, “Canada’s Foreign Aid,” accessed 8 November 2019, https://cidpnsi.ca/canadas-foreign-aid-2012-2/; Clark, “Is Africa Falling Off Canada’s Map?” 3. It is worth noting that the cuts to

The Harper Government and Sub-Saharan Africa  339 Canadian development assistance began in the early 1990s under the Mulroney Progressive Conservatives. 25 For the testimony of nineteen African ambassadors to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, see Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, Evidence, 40th Parl., 2nd Sess. (27 May 2009), http://www .ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/40-2/FAAE/meeting-21/evidence. 26 Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), “Statistical Report on International Assistance – By Country Spending,” 2014, https://open .canada.ca/data/en/dataset/460ff7f1-b326-43b7-9394-0cbb24117d83. 27 By “self-interested,” I mean the narrow use of aid policy to directly serve Canadian strategic and commercial interests. Of course, development cooperation can always be seen (in de Tocqueville’s phrase) as reflecting “self-interest, rightly understood,” but in this latter sense it refers to broader efforts to foster the foundations for global security and prosperity. 28 See Stephen Brown, “Undermining Foreign Aid: The Extractive Sector and the Recommercialization of Canadian Development Assistance,” in Stephen Brown, Molly den Heyer, and David R. Black, eds., Rethinking Canadian Aid, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2016), 273–94. 29 See Kim Mackrael, “Fantino Defends CIDA’s Corporate Shift,” Globe and Mail, 3 December 2012, https://theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/fantino-defends -cidas-corporate-shift/article5950443/; Julian Fantino and Jorge Humberto Merino Tafur, “Sustainable, Ethical Management of Extractives Can Help Reduce Poverty,” Inside Policy (Ottawa: Macdonald-Laurier Institute, April-May 2013), 17. 30 See Canadian International Resources and Development Institute (CIRDI), “Who We Are,” accessed 19 August 2021, https://cirdi.ca/about/who-we-are/. 31 See Global Affairs Canada, Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2017), https://www .international.gc.ca/world-monde/assets/pdfs/iap2-eng.pdf?_ga=2.198233775 .1205201821.1627396802-1682065159.1626899809. 32 See David R. Black, “The Muskoka Initiative and the Politics of Fence-Mending with Africa,” in Medhora and Samy, eds., Canada Among Nations 2013, 239–51. 33 See Rebecca Tiessen, “‘Walking Wombs’: Making Sense of the Muskoka Initiative and the Emphasis on Motherhood in Canadian Foreign Policy,” Global Justice: Theory, Practice, Rhetoric 8, no. 1 (2015): 74–93. 34 World Health Organization, “Sexual and Reproductive Health and Research,” Human Reproduction Program, accessed 19 August 2021, https://www.who.int /teams/sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-research. 35 Krystel Carrier-Sabourin and Rebecca Tiessen, “Women and Children First: Maternal Health and the Silencing of Gender in Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Heather Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, eds., Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy (Don Mills: Oxford University Press

340  David R. Black

36

37

38

39

40

41 42 43

44 45 46

47 48

49

Canada, 2012), 183–200. See also Melissa Haussman and Lisa Mills, “Doing the North American Two-Step on the Global Stage: Canada, Its G8 Muskoka Initiative and Safe Abortion Spending,” in G. Bruce Doern and Christopher Stoney, eds., How Ottawa Spends 2012/2013: The Harper Majority, Budget Cuts, and the New Opposition (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), 242–60. On the latter, see, for example, Greg Donaghy, “The Rise and Fall of Canadian Military Assistance in the Developing World, 1952–1971,” Canadian Military History 4, no. 1 (1995): 75–84. Notwithstanding the title of this article, various forms of military training assistance were a recurring form of Canadian engagement with African governments. See, for example, Roland Paris, “Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era,” International Journal 69, no. 3 (2014): 274–307. See Joshua Libben, “Am I My Brother’s Peacekeeper? Strategic Cultures and Change among Major Troop Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 23, no. 3 (2017): 330–1. See also Walter Dorn and Peggy Mason, “Harjit Sajjan Has Defaulted on Canada’s Peacekeeping Promises,” Globe and Mail, 9 August 2021, A13. See International Peace Institute (IPI), “Providing for Peacekeeping,” IPI Peacekeeping Database Graphs, accessed 10 November 2017, https://www .providingforpeacekeeping.org/peacekeeping-data-graphs/. See, for example, Joachim A. Koops and Giulia Tercovich, “A European Return to United Nations Peacekeeping? Opportunities, Challenges and Ways Ahead,” International Peacekeeping 23, no. 5 (2016): 597–609. Libben, “Am I My Brother’s Peacekeeper?” 330. Ibid., 331–7. See Black, Canada and Africa, chap. 6; Grant Dawson, “Who Wants a Mission? Canadian Forces’ Resistance to a Role in the UN Transition Assistance Group for Namibia, 1978,” International Peacekeeping 19, no. 1 (2012): 114–27. Akuffo, Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa, 128–30, 167–85. Confidential personal communications between author and a local government official, Accra, Ghana, May and October 2017. The literature and debates on the Darfur crisis are voluminous. For one excellent example, see Gérard Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide, 3rd ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). Kim Nossal,“Ear Candy: Canadian Policy toward Humanitarian Intervention and Atrocity Crimes in Darfur,” International Journal 60, no. 4 (2005): 1025. See David R. Black, “Canada,” in David R. Black and Paul D. Williams, eds., The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur (London: Routledge, 2010), 238–42. See Black, Canada and Africa, 193–5. See also Robert Fowler, “Robert Fowler: Why Canada Must Intervene in Mali,” Globe and Mail, 8 January 2013, https://www .theglobeandmail.com/opinion/robert-fowler-why-canada-must-intervene

The Harper Government and Sub-Saharan Africa  341

50

51

52 53

54 55 56

57

58 59

60

-in-mali/article7015466/; Bruno Charbonneau and Jonathan Sears, “Fighting for Liberal Peace in Mali? The Limits of International Military Intervention,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 8, no. 2–3 (2014): 192–213. Cambell Clark, “From Odd to Surreal, Ottawa’s Mali Message,” Globe and Mail, 30 January 2013, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawas -botched-mali-message/article8028479/. Mali, of course, was a leading candidate for a long-anticipated Canadian peace operation deployment by the Justin Trudeau Liberal government. These expectations were, at best, further delayed by the government’s underwhelming announcement at the Vancouver Peacekeeping Ministerial in mid-November 2017. See Bruno Charbonneau, “Do You Believe in Peacekeeping?” Policy Options, 29 November 2017, https://policyoptions.irpp.org /magazines/november-2017/do-you-believe-in-peacekeeping/. This approach can be contrasted with the Harper government’s eager and robust contribution to the NATO-led mission in Libya in 2011, headed by Canadian Air Force General Charlie Bouchard. Ironically, the unanticipated consequences of the conflict in Libya, including an “influx of cheap weapons and willing fighters,” greatly strengthened the Tuareg and Islamist groups that rebelled against the Malian government. See Marina Henke, “Why Did France Intervene in Mali in 2013? Examining the Role of Intervention Entrepreneurs,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 23, no. 3 (2017): 314. Rwanda and the eastern DRC come to mind as striking instances in the case of the Chrétien Liberals. “Africa Rising: The Hopeful Continent,” The Economist, 3 December 2011, https:// www.economist.com/node/21541015. In 2000, the same magazine had declared Africa “the hopeless continent.” Clark, “Is Africa Falling Off Canada’s Map?” 3. See Ian Taylor, “Dependency Redux: Why Africa Is Not Rising,” Review of African Political Economy 43, no. 147 (2016): 8–25. For a critical, postcolonial reading of the role of the Canadian extractive sector in Africa, see Paula Butler, Colonial Extractions: Race and Canadian Mining in Contemporary Africa (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015). See Government of Canada, Global Markets Action Plan: The Blueprint for Creating Jobs and Opportunities for Canadians Through Trade (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2013), https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud .org/documents/842777/dfatd-global-plan-for-markets-and-jobs.pdf. Quoted in Black, Canada and Africa, 198. See Geoffrey York and Matthew McClearn, “How Export Development Canada Overlooked Red Flags about South Africa’s Notorious Gupta Family,” Globe and Mail, 11 June 2019, A10–A11. For one earlier effort to make sense of the Harper government’s Africa policy changes, see David R. Black, “The Harper Government, Africa Policy, and the Relative Decline of Humane Internationalism,” in Smith and Turenne Sjolander, eds., Canada in the World, 217–38.

342  David R. Black 61 Stephen Lewis, Race Against Time: Searching for Hope in AIDS Ravaged Africa (Toronto: House of Anansi, 2005), 44. See also Black, Canada and Africa, chap. 4. 62 Clark, “Is Africa Falling off Canada’s Map?” 2. 63 This is a core theme in Black, Canada and Africa. See also Taylor Owen and David Eaves, “Africa Is Not a Liberal Idea,” Embassy, 3 October 2007. Replicated at https:// www.eaves.ca/2007/10/03/africa-is-not-a-liberal-idea/. 64 Paul Gecelovsky, “The Prime Minister and the Parable: Stephen Harper and Personal Responsibility Internationalism,” in Smith and Turenne Sjolander, eds., Canada in the World, 108–24. 65 Cranford Pratt, “Canada: A Limited and Eroding Internationalism,” in Cranford Pratt, ed., Internationalism under Strain: The North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 24–69. 66 See Jean-Christophe Boucher, “The Responsibility to Think Clearly about Interests: Stephen Harper’s Realist Internationalism, 2006–2011,” in Smith and Turenne Sjolander, eds., Canada in the World, 53–70. 67 For a forthright statement of the government’s intent to “return to” Africa, see Global Affairs Canada, “Address by Minister Bibeau on the Occasion of the Annual Review of Canada’s Bilateral Cooperation Program with Senegal,” Dakar, Senegal, 30 August 2016, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2016/08/address -by-minister-bibeau-on-the-occasion-of-the-annual-review-of-canada-s-bilateral -cooperation-program-with-senegal.html. According to Konrad Yakabuski, the current Liberal government – notwithstanding its touted Feminist International Assistance Policy – has essentially left Harper’s MNCH initiative largely intact. Konrad Yakabuski, “Canada’s Foreign Aid Policy Branding,” Globe and Mail, 26 May 2018, O11. Stephen Brown was quoted in the same article as explaining that “[t]hough branded differently, projects announced since the Trudeau government came to power – including those specifically targeting women and girls – do not have particularly different underlying approaches from those under the Conservatives.” In early June of 2019, the Trudeau government announced a tenyear investment of CA$14 billion (or CA$1.4 billion annually) to improve global health for women and girls in the world. See Rachel Pulfer, “When We Improve the Lives of Women and Girls, We All Benefit,” Globe and Mail, 7 June 2019, A13; Michelle Zilio and Andrea Woo, “Ottawa Announces Funding for Global Women’s Health,” Globe and Mail, 5 June 2019, A6. 68 Canada’s modest deployment to Mali in 2018, including approximately 250 personnel to support three Chinook and five Griffon helicopters for a strictly limited one-year period, can be generously assessed as a conditional pass, at best. Government of Canada, “Operation PRESENCE,” last updated 23 April 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations /military-operations/current-operations/op-presence.html. Also see Charbonneau, “Do You Believe in Peacekeeping?”

16 Conclusion: Some Final Thoughts on Harper’s Politicized Foreign Policy peter mckenna

The “domestication” of Canadian foreign policy, which has an extensive literature, has been part of the discussion around the crafting of Canada’s external relations posture for decades.1 Simply put, it refers to foreign policy decisions, debates, and issues being determined or shaped by a host of domestic sources or influences – public opinion, the media, corporate Canada, civil society groups like churches and unions, and even academics and think tanks. Various Canadian prime ministers have, over the years, sought to use foreign policy actions and initiatives to boost their, and their party’s, electoral fortunes.2 To be sure, promoting Canadian peacekeepers and international peace support missions in general have been used by a number of Canadian governments to attract domestic political support.3 So looking for votes and federal electoral districts by way of Canada’s involvement in the international arena is not something foreign to successive Canadian prime ministers. But former prime minister Stephen Harper, as this book has amply demonstrated, took the “politicization” of Canadian foreign policy to a level never before seen in Canada.4 In the words of one former Canadian ambassador: “Harper was about Canada first. He had no interest in foreign policy unless it impacted domestic politics.” In short, his foreign policy universe revolved around mastering the idea of foreign policymaking by calculated domestic vote-getting.5 If you dissect many of Harper’s core foreign policy aims, as many of the contributors to this volume have expertly done, you see that they were motivated in large part by how he could extract political advantage or how they would play into his Conservative Party’s re-election efforts.6 Electoral considerations, then, were first and foremost in the minds of the Harper centre when it came to formulating Canadian foreign policy. It is worth remembering here that Stephen Harper was essentially in permanent campaign mode and getting re-elected; that was how his mind worked when he was in public office.7 And that would necessarily have important political implications and spill-over effects for matters of foreign policy. Moreover, Harper’s foreign policy forays were really about

344  Peter McKenna

playing to the Conservative base, obsessively calculating the political risks and rewards, carving out blocs of specific voters or “voter slices” and, ultimately, winning federal elections.8 It was also about broadening the party’s political tent and attracting swing voters (or even business and soft Liberals), those who may have had sympathy for Harper’s vision of Canada’s place in the world and thus could be persuaded to vote Conservative, as well as using foreign policy as a possible wedge issue.9 According to one former Canadian diplomat, “whether it was free trade, the Middle East or Ukraine-Russia, political issues were strong with these people.”10 To be sure, it was not the only part of their calculus, but it was the most important component of their foreign policy outlook and analytical lens. In many ways, it looked as if the Harper government was making foreign policy on the basis of public opinion polling and electoral strategizing. It certainly seemed like the only prism through which the Harper Conservatives viewed foreign policy was a decidedly electoral (and sometimes an ideological) one.11 In other words, it was less about national interests, coalitions, and alliances within the community of states, institution-building and exercising international influence and global stability and world order, and more about supplanting the foreign policy record of the federal Liberal Party – even discrediting and mocking that record – so as to replace the Liberals as Canada’s natural governing party (which ultimately fizzled in the October 2015 federal election). Harper wanted to conduct a foreign policy that clearly differentiated his Conservative Party from that of previous Liberal governments. In other words, it was about replacing a Liberal Party-infused past foreign policy with a noticeably different Conservative Party-moulded one in the minds of Canadians. He saw foreign policy, in large part, as a means of weakening or undermining the federal Liberal Party brand. It was all done with a keen eye to how it would impact voter intentions in a positive way. Indeed, there was no Harper-inspired intellectual or theoretical construct (such as “liberal internationalism,” “Canada as a middle power,” or “human security”), well thought out organizing principle, and certainly no grand strategy in mind. It was pure politics all the way – all the time – in a quest to connect with the largest number of Canadian voters.12 One of the distinguishing features of Harper’s politicizing of the foreign policy-making process was the interference of twenty-something political staffers throwing their weight around. They frequently inserted themselves, particularly in a political way, into what were strictly foreign policy matters under Foreign Affairs’ departmental purview  – essentially disrespecting the departmental hierarchy and being deeply resented by professional foreign service officers. As one former Canadian diplomat put it: “There was a remarkable empowerment of junior ministerial and PMO staffers who often over-extended their authority.”13 As Peter McKenna depicts in chapter 3 in this volume on the Harper-Pearson Building interface, the heavy-handed involvement of

Conclusion: Some Final Thoughts on Harper’s Politicized Foreign Policy  345

partisan staffers – whether from the centre or from the Foreign Affairs Minister’s Office – sought to influence or even set departmental policy, put forward policy suggestions as if they were an order from on high, and brought to bear an exceedingly political dimension to the foreign policy-making process.14 Many foreign service officers had never seen anything like that in their long careers and would be taken aback when junior staffers would give them irregular policy instructions, sit in on policy-related departmental deliberations, and dress them down harshly – sometimes publicly – for basically doing their jobs. From a policy implementation standpoint, it is hard to imagine how this political interference could be seen in anything other than a negative light by departmental officials in both headquarters and in the field, eventually taking its toll on the departmental morale and work environment. It is worth highlighting the fact that there was a pervasive “climate of fear” within the Department of Foreign Affairs during Harper’s years in power. And I lost count of how many Canadian government officials refused to talk to me about those years for fear of reprisal or bureaucratic backlash. To be sure, there was an obvious political motive for engendering such a climate in the first place. When you look at some of Harper’s core foreign policy objectives, then, it is difficult to understand them fully without seeing them through a largely domestic political lens. Many of those former foreign service officers interviewed for this book spoke about how the Harper government sought to emulate how the former John Diefenbaker government conducted itself – right down to Diefenbaker’s focus on the North. Indeed, the Harper government never missed an opportunity to tout its Arctic embrace (with Harper himself making an annual trek to the North every August with the media in tow) and its Northern Strategy (and pledged to name a new polar-class icebreaker after “the Chief ”), knowing full well that it resonated well with many Canadians. As Andrea Charron noted in chapter 10, invoking themes like northern development and governance, resource riches and a military footprint, and, of course, protecting Arctic sovereignty (and simultaneously tweaking the nose of the Americans) were clearly designed to score political points at home.15 But when it actually came to meaningful follow-up and substantive action, especially on the expenditure side, it was hard not to see Harper’s Arctic foreign policy as more rhetorical and political in nature. As one former Canadian ambassador quipped: “When it came to the North, the Russians didn’t even take us seriously.”16 But as Mathieu Landriault and Paul Minard have posited: “The Arctic tours and operations, conceptualized as public displays to showcase how the Canadian government stands up for its Arctic territory, produce political gains.”17 That was the overarching point of the whole exercise as far as Harper was concerned. On the issue of strengthening (and re-equipping) the Canadian Armed Forces, the Harper Conservatives were keenly aware of the political angle here.

346  Peter McKenna

While spouting out words like “warrior nation,” “not cutting and running,” and “respecting our men and women in the Armed Forces,” they knew that there was a constituency in Canada that reacted positively and enthusiastically to tough talk about the Canadian military and a patriotic tradition of war-­ fighting. Clearly, the 2008 “Canada First” defence strategy was less about military posture and more about election posturing. One retired military officer confided that “the real purpose of the strategy was to arm the prime minister with military plans for the election campaign battle.”18 With respect to matters of defence and military spending, it was certainly intended to draw a sharp political (and symbolic) distinction between a Conservative government and the oft-repeated “decade of darkness” under the previous Chrétien-Martin Liberal governments. The emphasis on war-fighting (and not international peacekeeping), the displays of military prowess (e.g., the November flyover of CF-18s in Ottawa marking the end of the 2011 Libyan mission) and substantial sums of money earmarked for celebrating the 200th anniversary of the War of 1812 (and scarcely a mention of commemorating Pierre Trudeau’s Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) were all intended to pull the nationalist heartstrings of Canadians and to engender popular support for the Conservatives (and their carefully crafted foreign policy narrative of Canada as a “courageous warrior” in Afghanistan).19 But here again, the Harper government failed in the followthrough, cutting  billions in the name of deficit-reduction from the defence spending envelope in its final few budgets. In the words of one former Canadian foreign service officer: “The glorification of the military was one of those rhetorical things and a serious deception. We actually had a weaker military under Harper.”20 Yes, but the point was to create the perception of a political change – and to hope that the new narrative of a war-fighting Canada would translate into votes over time. His preference to allow the provinces to play a larger role in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy was also politically motivated. Harper’s approach to “open federalism” permitted far more leeway for provinces to carve out a larger presence for themselves on the international stage, to participate directly in trade negotiations with the Europeans and to engage vigorously in the discussions around international climate change.21 Harper knew that maintaining national unity and placating provincial premiers would minimize any potential political trouble and thus increase his likelihood of re-election. The last thing that the Harper Conservatives wanted  – especially during their years as a minority government  – was to have an angry group of outspoken premiers constantly complaining to the press about a heavy-handed and unilateralist prime minister. To strengthen his political standing, then, he purposely sought an intergovernmental truce with the provinces and even moved to assuage many of them. Indeed, Quebec was granted full participating status within the Canadian delegation to the Paris-based UNESCO, Alberta

Conclusion: Some Final Thoughts on Harper’s Politicized Foreign Policy  347

was encouraged to lobby heavily in Washington for the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, and British Colombia was given near veto status in the softwood lumber negotiations with the United States. The strategy was simple: do not let the provinces rock the political boat and damage the Harper government’s electoral fortunes. In addition, when crafting his foreign policy decisions, the Harper government made sure that the Conservative base was well looked after. The conspicuous break with the liberal internationalism and multilateralism of the United Nations  – long-standing Liberal Party foreign policy precepts  – was clearly intended to satisfy its right-wing, conservative-minded party supporters. Sharply breaking with liberal internationalism, as Alistair Edgar has highlighted in chapter 4, was also an important component of not so subtly urging Canadians to embrace a more morally grounded Conservative Party brand.22 According to one former Canadian official: “They [party leaders and members] hated any mention of Pearsonianism. They wanted to move away from small ‘l’ and large ‘L’ Liberal policies.”23 While it did not make any sense from a Canadian foreign policy standpoint, it certainly was ideological red meat for the party’s grassroots. To be sure, the Harper rhetoric about “corrupt dictators” at the UN, its anti-Israeli bias, its incredible ineffectiveness, and its standing as little more than a “talk shop” all meshed well with its sceptical conservative and hard-right followers. Simply put, discrediting and bashing the UN was less about foreign policy analysis and more about domestic politics, stoking the party’s base and distancing the party from the wrong-headed federal Liberals. Pleasing the Conservative Party base goes some way towards explaining Harper’s unusually hardline and ideologically infused approach towards Iran and Cuba.24 Notwithstanding the fact that Iran is a key regional player and a leader of the Islamic world, the Conservative government was determined to punish the country, to sever diplomatic relations, and to impose punitive economic sanctions and to single out the regime as the most significant threat to international security. Admittedly, Iran’s actions oftentimes made it an easy target, but Canada was often alone amongst the Western alliance (taking a tougher stand than even the Americans on nuclear proliferation) in isolating Iran internationally. “I shuddered at Baird’s hectoring of Iran. Talk loudly and carry a small stick. It was not coherent and largely improvised,” said one sceptical former Canadian diplomat.25 This harsh line, of course, was music to the ears of right-leaning ideologues within the party. But it was underscored by another key political or ideological calculation – namely, to secure the votes of the Jewish community and Christian evangelicals in Canada (and perhaps even the tens of thousands of Iranian nationals who had fled the country out of fear or exasperation). Similarly, the Harper government’s cold diplomatic shoulder towards “communist” Cuba, even as the tiny Caribbean country was significantly changing

348  Peter McKenna

its economic model, bordered on the irrational.26 It resonated extremely well, however, with the Conservative crowd and core party activists. There was just no way that Prime Minister Harper could bring himself, ideologically speaking, to break bread with the godless Cubans. Countless opportunities were missed to cooperate jointly on initiatives and to strengthen bilateral relations with Havana and, in the process, enhance the Harper government’s vaunted Americas strategy.27 As one former Canadian official remarked: “Harper [and his top officials were] decidedly anti-Cuba. They couldn’t get past their ideology with respect to Cuba and it didn’t make sense with the Americas strategy.”28 But there was too much of an ideological or philosophical divide for the rightleaning Conservatives to bridge – or for their conservative fellow travellers to back. It just made no sense to them from a political standpoint to curry favour with Havana.29 As for Harper’s China policy, it initially took a hardline ideological position towards communist China – criticizing the Chinese for possible industrial espionage in Canada, for its aggressive crack down on political dissent and religious freedoms, and for Canada’s past policy of chasing the “almighty dollar” at the expense of human rights concerns. But as Paul Evans in chapter 12 of this volume cogently points out, that all changed by 2009–10 or so, when the governing Conservatives sought to strengthen and expand economic linkages with the Middle Kingdom. Harper himself was obviously critical to that shift, but there was also the recognition of the potential electoral points that could be scored by attenuating Ottawa’s previously tougher line towards China.30 To be sure, unfriendly relations with China could undercut Harper’s political support in the West, especially in oil-rich Alberta and British Columbia, and in what was heretofore fertile Conservative Party territory. In addition, he risked alienating other western premiers (and thus potential voters), eager to enhance trade ties and to attract Chinese direct investment to their provinces, by reflexively shunning Beijing. Lastly, Evans points out that ministerial heavyweight Jason Kenney was a key proponent of a more engaging China policy – no doubt recognizing the political significance of a voting bloc of some 1.5 million Canadians of Chinese descent.31 One could also argue that Harper’s centrepiece development assistance initiative – his Maternal, Newborn and Children’s Health (MNCH) program – was partly motivated by potential electoral gain. This is not to suggest in any way that Harper himself did not have a personal interest in this area or that he did not see it as important and unjust – as David R. Black contends in chapter 15. But there is little doubt that the Harper Conservatives were, for ideological reasons, pandering to the grassroots of the party by denying funds within this multi-billion envelope for reproductive health, family planning, and access to safe and legal abortion services (even though tens of thousands of women in the Global South die annually from a lack of access to such services). Moreover,

Conclusion: Some Final Thoughts on Harper’s Politicized Foreign Policy  349

the Conservatives were seeking to utilize this initiative to put a more human face on the party so that voters would be more receptive – particularly those outside their normal base of support (like female voters). As one former Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) official noted: “I think there’s a recognition that if you’re going to get beyond a certain percentage of the population, they needed to show another side of the government. MNCH was one area that allowed them to do that.”32 Of course, the strong backing of free trade by the Harper Conservatives, intimately connected to their reputation as sound managers of the national economy, can also be placed in a domestic political context. Survey after survey of Canadians has shown that respondents overwhelmingly favour free trade in general and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in particular.33 Put another way, it would be hard to go wrong from an electoral standpoint by aggressively promoting freer markets and comprehensive trade deals. (The issue of trade agreements had the added political bonus of keeping the NDP off balance and forcing the Liberals to back the Harper Conservatives.) As Asa McKercher observes in chapter 9, negotiating free trade pacts with a host of Latin American countries – such as Panama, Peru, and Colombia – were partly intended to benefit numerous Canadian mining operations in the region (many of them viewed negatively by the local residents and communities in which they operated), which would obviously play well for Conservative supporters and corporate interests located in the West. Not only was a trade-first agenda a political winner for the Harperites, but it was also ideologically palatable to the larger Conservative base.34 Arguably, the politics of Canadian foreign policy under the Harper government was most prevalent in the form of its diaspora-pleasing bent.35 As one former Canadian ambassador explained: “We have a largely diaspora-driven foreign policy. We don’t have a Sri Lanka policy; we have a Tamil policy. We don’t have an Indian policy, we have a Sikh policy. We don’t have a Eurasian policy, we have a Ukrainian policy. And we have a Likud policy, not an Israeli policy.”36 In other words, the country’s foreign policy positions were a function of each diaspora’s particular demands – with a reasonable belief that each community would eventually park their votes with the federal Conservative Party. For example, Ottawa agreed to send some 350 independent Canadian monitors and officials to observe the 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine – instead of the normal practice of working through the Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (which was more systematized and better qualified)  – because the chief representatives of the one-million-strong Ukrainian community in Canada wanted it that way. One observer quoted in a newspaper story put it this way: “You’ve got the gold standard with the OSCE and we’re sending the maximum contribution we can send anyway. On top of that, for domestic political reasons, we’re sending another

350  Peter McKenna

however-many-Canadians for no reason at all.”37 Clearly, electoral considerations and peeling away ethnic votes from the federal Liberals won the day instead of Canada doing what was practical, pragmatic, and proficient. The most obvious example of a diaspora-driven Harper foreign policy was the case of Israel, which Shaun Narine has carefully dissected in chapter 14 of this volume. The “Netanyahu can do no wrong approach,” as one former Canadian official said, was politically sensitive, a central preoccupation of Harper himself, and an overriding issue for the Conservative government. “Anything to do with Israel policy came out of the PMO. They really paid close attention to domestic politics,” said another former Canadian ambassador.38 One part of this equation was securing the vote of the Jewish community (and the handful of seats where that mattered) and placating the religious right and the evangelical wing of the Conservative Party. (It is worth noting that the Toronto-based Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs pointed out that there are roughly twentythree electoral districts with a substantial Jewish population, but that there are only twelve seats where it could actually impact a riding’s outcome.39) Indeed, key ministers in Harper’s cabinet – including Stockwell Day, Jason Kenney, and John Baird – were unquestioning in their support and praise of Israel. It was also not unusual for Canadian diplomats in the field who said something even remotely critical of Israel to get a call from the Foreign Affairs Minister’s Office, the Prime Minister’s Office, or their immediate supervisor in Ottawa. As one former Canadian diplomat, who had run afoul of the centre for being offside with Israel, confided: “I had a high-profile Conservative cabinet minister visit me in Geneva to explain to me what my job was.”40 It is worth emphasizing here that this collection of essays is not suggesting that political or electoral motivations were the only factor in driving Harper’s foreign policy universe, but it is positing that it was arguably the most important “push” variable. So, what is wrong with crafting a Canadian foreign policy with votes and electoral seats in mind rather than core interests and policy coherence? First, it gives a great deal of decisional power to domestic political groups, party supporters and activists, and segments of the general public. Setting to one side the simple fact that the “attentive public” is not the most knowledgeable, reliable or far-sighted when it comes to matters of Canadian foreign policy, it also has a very narrow, self-interested and short-term scope. That means that Canada’s broader foreign policy aims and overarching national interests are often lost in translation – and are not of primary concern to these domestic sources of policy-making. In fact, Canada’s wider and long-term foreign policy interests could easily be adversely affected by this single-issue or limited focus (e.g., Canada’s client-like policy towards Israel and its off-putting effect on Arab and Muslim countries in the world). When the principal aim of a government is to score political points at home via its external relations, Canada’s international policy necessarily lacks proper analysis, vigour and nuance,

Conclusion: Some Final Thoughts on Harper’s Politicized Foreign Policy  351

coherence and relevancy, and tact and compatibility with many of our likeminded Western friends and allies. In short, it just makes for a rather poor foreign policy-making environment. In addition, the Harper government’s predominant focus on political and ideological considerations went hand in hand with the diminishment or freezing out of foreign policy expertise and professional diplomatic advice. Indeed, the department largely responsible for crafting, guiding, and implementing Canadian foreign policy was, for all intents and purposes, significantly sidelined and beaten into submission by the Harperites. Their deep distrust of liberal “elites” in Foreign Affairs and sharp ideological bent – mostly as a sop to right-leaning members within the Conservative Party movement – left little room for both “outside” advice (from academics, think tanks, and media pundits) and “inside” guidance when it came to policy-centred foreign policy-making. As one former Canadian diplomat quipped: “There was such ideological certitude at the top. It was, ‘I don’t have questions because I know all the answers.’”41 To be sure, you cannot have an effective and responsive foreign policy when it is based, in large part, on simply differentiating it from previous Liberal governments (and looking to decimate the Liberal Party brand), on how various political groups will respond electorally or on how best to arouse Canadian nationalistic sentiment and pride (like this notion of Canada as a “warrior nation”).42 That is a recipe for a more disjointed and incoherent Canadian foreign policy rather than any hard-nosed sense of how international politics and diplomacy works or how best to leverage Canada’s limited influence on the global stage. In the words of scholar Peter Jones: “In making foreign policy a reflection of their domestic approach to governance – finding wedge issues with which to detach segments of the population and play to their fears and angers – the Conservatives have given us a bitter, small-minded foreign policy.”43 And clearly one that was not firmly anchored around any organizing principle or construct other than votegetting and re-election. One of the obvious weaknesses of a mostly domestic politics-driven foreign policy was the fashioning of poor international policy decisions and choices. A  big part of the problem was a failure to realize that foreign policy should flow from a global understanding and a clear set of national interests and aims, finite financial and military resources, limited capabilities and raw power and a recognition of international political constraints – and not from whether it will appeal to a certain ethnic voter living in Western or Central Canada. According to David Carment and colleagues in chapter 13, that kind of ill-considered thinking resulted in a badly conceived Ukrainian policy that was intended to secure the Ukrainian vote in Canada at the expense of a well thought out and nuanced international policy response. According to one former diplomat with experience in Europe, the Harper Conservatives “should have listened less to the diaspora and more to the advice from foreign service officers from Eastern

352  Peter McKenna

Europe and Russia.”44 By urging a more Ukrainian nationalist posture, Canada’s policy actually harmed Ukraine’s future prospects, set it back in terms of democratic freedoms and governance, and effectively divided the country internally (setting the stage for more civil strife). And by taking an implacable hardline towards Putin’s Russia, Ottawa was actually jeopardizing Canada’s interests in the Arctic, trade and investment opportunities in Russia and Eastern Europe, and the likelihood of a more amenable Moscow on the world stage.45 Second, Harper’s highly politicized foreign policy would inevitably compromise a host of valuable bilateral relationships. To be sure, other countries will not look fondly upon another country whose foreign relations are mostly shaped by internal political considerations instead of a shared sense of mutual benefit. Erstwhile friendly governments will be completely turned off by the thought of crass politicking masquerading as intelligent foreign policy; the bilateral diplomatic well will be necessarily poisoned and very little will move forward at the political level (as was the case eventually with the Obama White House). Countries simply grew annoyed with the Harper government, looked angrily at its relentless political posturing (and incessant hectoring), and refrained from entering into serious bilateral discussions with it.46 Simply put, Harper’s penchant for a foreign policy by polls and data analytics/metrics proved counter-productive in terms of advancing Canada’s bilateral relationships and in securing its central foreign policy aims in the world. Third, Harper’s largely electorally driven foreign policy had the deleterious effect of undermining Canada’s standing on the world stage – encapsulated most obviously in the failure of Canada to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2010. Foreign governments around the world knew that the Harper Conservatives were locked into their positions for electoral and ideological reasons and thus did not even bother to try to get them to rethink or revise their thinking on certain global issues.47 They knew that it would be a complete and utter waste of time. The politicization of Harper’s foreign relations, then, left Canada on the outside of many global challenges and issues (like the climate emergency), our international voice was diminished, and our reputation as a good international citizen was severely tarnished. As one former Canadian diplomat remarked: “Our allies would no longer deal with us because they no longer viewed us as like-minded or part of the club. And the government couldn’t care less about that.”48 Of course, not caring was a big part of the problem for the governing Conservatives and it helped to explain Canada’s side-lining internationally. An argument could certainly be made that it was hard to have a politicized Harper foreign policy as well as a “principled” one. Set to one side the discussion of whether having a principled foreign policy is appropriate or even sustainable over time for a country, and one set on seriously advancing its offensive and defensive interests. In the case of the Harper Conservatives, can you actually have firm principles if re-election is your principal aim? Notwithstanding

Conclusion: Some Final Thoughts on Harper’s Politicized Foreign Policy  353

the rhetoric of the Conservative government about values and morals, it is difficult to espouse principles when your foreign policy is subject to change according to diaspora and wedge politics.49 Principles are supposed to be tightly held, not subject to whimsical change and shifting political winds, and unwavering beacons in the face of stormy seas. But it is hard to argue that Harper’s international policy was principled when those same principles were invariably overshadowed by political and electoral considerations and subject to pleasing his Conservative Party base. A principled foreign policy, moreover, suggests a policy and outlook that puts human rights, humanitarian concerns, and the global commons first and foremost. But the evidence examined and displayed in this collection does not bear that out during the Harper years. Many of his foreign policy initiatives were in direct contradistinction to these altruistic considerations, though they appealed wholeheartedly to the party’s core supporters. Take, for example, the Conservative government position on selling arms to Saudi Arabia, placing restrictions on the number of Syrian refugees permitted to enter Canada, and its implacable opposition to climate change. Simply put, principles crumbled away when the Harper centre checked the electoral map and crushed the numbers on its re-election chances. And all of this is yet another reason for why the politicization of Canada’s foreign policy was a recipe for a troubled and uneasy engagement with the community of states. Accordingly, it is not surprising, given its electorally infused nature, that there is less emphasis today on Harper’s heavily politicized foreign policy legacy. That is the likely outcome with a foreign-policy-for-votes underpinning; it necessarily changes when the politics at the federal level also changes. So with the Liberals back in power, led by an internationalist prime minister, it was not long before the major elements of Harper’s foreign policy edifice were being dismantled piece by piece. Not all of it, mind you. The Justin Trudeau Liberals, since their first mandate in 2015, brought only tonal changes or tweaks to Canada’s relationship with Israel, Ukraine, Russia, and Iran and actually intensified the Conservatives’ engagement approach towards the Chinese (up until the “two Michaels” were detained in China in late 2018).50 Besides withdrawing the “six-pack” of CF-18 fighter jets from Iraq and Syria in 2016, it still maintains a military presence on the ground in Iraq against the Islamic State (and earmarked sizeable defence expenditures).51 Not much has changed on the trade front either – with the Liberals enthusiastically supporting both the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Europe (CETA) and the eleven-member Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) deal. In addition, the Liberal government, like its predecessor, talks positively about enhancing Canada’s role in the Arctic, strengthening its involvement in women and maternal health in Africa (with a greater focus on reproductive services), and increasing defence spending over the long

354  Peter McKenna

term, but has remained mostly quiet about the Arms Trade Treaty and arms sales abroad to places like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Belarus.52 Where the federal Liberals have instituted substantive changes, in conjunction with repairing some of the damage to the Foreign Service and re-emphasizing evidence-based foreign policy-making, they are in a return to liberal internationalism as the guiding framework of Canada’s international policy.53 The government has moved quickly to renew Canada’s embrace of multilateralism, re-establish closer linkages with the United Nations, and has even agreed to return to the peace support or peacekeeping (counter-terrorism or peace enforcement more accurately) game in Mali (however fleeting). It has also taken up more of a leadership position on international climate change and enthusiastically signed on to the December 2015 Paris Agreement. Additionally, there appears to be a shift in emphasis back to the African continent and, though obviously not a complete break, away from the Americas. Indeed, there has certainly been some warming of relations with Cuba and a return to a strategy of dialogue, engagement, and enhanced commercial ties – though it is not a dramatic break from the Harper approach. (And the Mexican government was pleased that the ill-advised travel visa for Mexicans was removed.) But there is not much else to speak of, besides an oversized focus on Venezuela, when it comes to relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. Most significantly, relations between Ottawa and Washington – especially in the topsy-turvy years of Donald Trump  – were handled adroitly, though not without significant challenges and unease. But in a Trumpian world, as Duane Bratt points out in chapter 8, not even that was enough to keep bilateral turbulence under control – as Trump’s tirade at the June 2018 G7 summit in Quebec demonstrated.54 It remains to be seen whether Trudeau’s critical relationship with the Biden administration will be placed on a stronger personal and diplomatic footing. In closing, there are obviously important lessons here that the current Trudeau government has taken into account, as should any future Canadian government.55 Indeed, Canada’s international policy and global reputation was seriously damaged by Stephen Harper’s hyper-politicized approach and posture.56 That has changed under the Trudeau Liberals, but the powerful tentacles of the PMO and PCO have certainly made their presence felt within the government’s decision-making processes. Significantly, staffing a centre or PMO with novice, partisan, and heavyhanded aides with a fixation on electoral calculations, like Harper did, will not only stifle the formulation of innovative Canadian foreign policy initiatives and proposals but will also significantly erode the effective implementation of a government’s international agenda. Put another way, concentrating on domestic politics, vote-getting and diaspora analytics is a poor substitute for an intelligent and thoughtful Canadian foreign policy. The fact of the matter is that expert advice from the Foreign Service is already couched in politically sensitive terms.

Conclusion: Some Final Thoughts on Harper’s Politicized Foreign Policy  355

But it needs, more than anything else, to be thoroughly policy-grounded and not offered – as it often was under Harper’s watch – by someone who was playing politics bureaucratically, for Conservative Party electoral purposes, or for personal career advancement. In the insightful words of one current Canadian ambassador: “The Conservative government brought a domestic-lens approach to Canada’s foreign policy that was unprecedented. Every foreign policy or policy initiative was seen through the lens of how it would be perceived by the Conservative ‘base voters’ back home. Whether such a foreign policy issue or initiative made sense or not was beside the point. The only criteria that really mattered was how it would resonate back home.”57 Always viewing Canada’s response to international relations or politics “beyond the water’s edge” from a re-election standpoint was a surefire way of the Harper centre crafting an illconsidered foreign policy, of effectively degrading Canada’s professional foreign service, and of ultimately undermining our standing in the world. And all of those things surely happened over time on Harper’s highly politicized watch. NOTES 1 See Brian Bow and David Black, “Does Politics Stop at the Water’s Edge in Canada? Party and Partisanship in Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 64, no. 1 (2008): 7–27; W.E. Burton, W.C. Soderlund, and T.A. Keenleyside, “The Press and Canadian Foreign Policy: A Re-examination Ten Years On,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 3, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 51–69; Kim Richard Nossal, “Analyzing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 39, no.1 (Summer 1983/1984): 1–22; and Denis Stairs, “Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on the Domestication of Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 33, no. 1 (Winter 1977/1978): 128–49. 2 These concluding paragraphs are not in any way suggesting that the Harper government’s foreign policy was solely guided – all the time and in every instance – by domestic political considerations. The making of a country’s international policy is obviously a combination of internal and external factors or push and pull variables. But what this collection has argued is that electoral concerns were always first and foremost in the minds of the Conservative political leadership and the all-controlling Harper centre, irrespective of whether they were in a minority or majority government situation. Gerald J. Schmitz argues that the fashioning of Canadian foreign policy during the Harper years was mostly an internal affair with limited outreach to other democratic constituents. “In that regard, the record of the Harper government, which signals that it only cares about the views of its core supporters, represents a disturbing departure from a concern with the degree of democratic inclusion.” Schmitz, “The Harper Government and the De-democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (2014): 226.

356  Peter McKenna 3 See Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, “Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World,” International Journal 50, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 370–400. 4 For a fuller treatment of this point, see some recent works by Kim Richard Nossal. He makes the point starkly that Harper’s foreign policy outlook had “little to do with global politics and everything to do with electoral politics” in “Old Habits and New Directions Indeed,” International Journal 69, no. 2 (2014): 257. Also see Nossal, “Primat der Wahlurne: Explaining Stephen Harper’s Foreign Policy” (Unpublished paper), March 2014, 1–17. Harper’s populist leanings compelled him to utilize his foreign policy as a means of energizing the party’s base or, even better, expanding the party’s political tent. 5 It is also worth mentioning that the Harper Conservatives consistently attracted more money through party contributions than both the federal Liberals and the NDP over their almost ten years in office; many contributions came in the form of small donations from the highly motivated Conservative base. 6 The Harper Conservatives could also take an ideological stand because it played well politically with the Conservative Party base. And there were those in the centre who did not want senior diplomats and officials speaking at public forums for fear that they might say something that would create a media stir. One retired foreign service officer talked about how he was “disinvited” from making a presentation on China-North Korea relations at the University of Alberta’s China Institute because the Institute did not want to “get in trouble with the political side if he spoke” (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 24 June 2016). 7 On this point of campaigning, see Tom Flanagan, Winning Power: Canadian Campaigning in the Twenty-First Century (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014), 125–42. An interesting point to contemplate is what the Conservative government may have wanted to do in the realm of foreign policy, but pulled back because it was seen as too politically risky. Still, to please party supporters and activists, Harper argued that he was taking more common sense positions on foreign affairs that went against what the Ottawa elites, liberal academics, and a biased media were advocating. 8 One of the distinguishing features of Harper’s foreign policy – in addition to its heavy trade focus – was how it was geared towards the micro-targeting of certain voters (confidential interview with a current foreign service officer, 29 June 2017). 9 On foreign policy and public support for Harper, see Timothy B. Gravelle, Thomas J. Scotto, Jason Reifler, and Harold D. Clarke, “Foreign Policy Beliefs and Support for Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (2014): 111–30. Also see Peter Jones, “Canada’s Bitter, Small-Minded Foreign Policy,” Globe and Mail, 2 January 2014, A11. For a slightly differing view on this, see Mathieu Landriault, “Does Voting end at the Water’s Edge? Canadian Public Opinion and Voter Intentions, 2006–2015,” Canadian Foreign

Conclusion: Some Final Thoughts on Harper’s Politicized Foreign Policy  357

10 11

12

13 14

15

16 17

18

19

Policy Journal 22, no. 3 (2016): 249–61; and Roland Paris, “Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era,” International Journal 69, no. 3 (2014): 300–1. Confidential interview with a former Canadian ambassador, 12 July 2016. In his 2015 book, former Canadian Ambassador to China David Mulroney talked about his unease with Harper’s desire to have a “bureaucratic” foreign policy adviser (that is, Mulroney) and a “political” adviser as well (a Conservative Party staffer). While he operated mostly at an arm’s-length from the prime minister, one of his primary tasks “was fending off the more ideologically extreme agendas of my ‘political’ counterpart.” Mulroney, Middle Power, Middle Kingdom (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2015), 19. Nossal’s 2014 unpublished paper singles out “the primacy of the ballot box” as a key driver of Harper’s foreign policy mindset. He goes on to declare: “The way in which the Conservative government framed virtually all major foreign policy issues suggests that electoral considerations were always paramount.” Nossal, “Primat der Wahlurne,” 14. Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 19 July 2016. According to one former Canadian ambassador, “they basically told us what to write and what to recommend” (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 15 July 2016). For further elaboration of this point, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, Canada’s Northern Strategy under the Harper Government: Key Speeches and Documents on Sovereignty, Security, and Governance, 2005–2015 (Calgary: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, 2016). One former Harper aide admitted that much of the motivation for the Arctic strategy was political in nature and based on the idea of fashioning a conservative nationalism in Canada to rival the Liberal Party’s claim to designing the Canadian flag. See Steven Chase, “Myth versus Reality in Stephen Harper’s Northern Strategy,” Globe and Mail, 17 January 2014, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/the-north /myth-versus-reality-in-stephen-harpers-northern-strategy/article16397458/. Confidential interview with a former Canadian ambassador, 12 July 2016. Mathieu Landriault and Paul Minard, “Does Standing Up for Sovereignty Pay Off Politically? Arctic Military Announcements and Governing Party Support in Canada from 2006 to 2014,” International Journal 71, no. 1 (2016): 53–4. Using public opinion surveys over several years, the authors argue that defending Arctic sovereignty does pay off politically in terms of Conservative Party support. See Don Martin, “Election the Real Battlefront of Harper’s Military Plan,” National Post, 12 May 2008, https://nationalpost.com/full-comment/don-martin-election -the-real-battleground-of-Harper’s-military-plan. This is not to suggest that the Canadian military was not important to the governing Conservatives. But it did, in the name of budget balancing, slash defence spending in its final few years in office. One former diplomat also mentioned

358  Peter McKenna

20 21

22

23 24

25 26

27

28

that the lack of care and attention to those troops returning from war-torn Afghanistan was a “dark mark on Harper’s legacy” (confidential interview with a former Canadian ambassador, 19 July 2016). On Harper seeking to alter Canadian public attitudes about foreign policy, Canada’s role in the world, and its underlying historical narrative, see Roland Paris, “Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era,” 274–307. Also see Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2012). Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 12 July 2016. See Andrew Coyne, “Dismembering Canada,” Ottawa Citizen, 30 May 2006, A14. For a differing position, see Christopher J. Kukucha, “Dismembering Canada? Stephen Harper and the Foreign Relations of Canadian Provinces,” Review of Constitutional Studies 14, no. 1 (2009): 21–52. See also Peter McKenna, “Should Provinces Have a Say in Global Trade Talks?” Winnipeg Free Press, 30 June 2021, A7. Kim Richard Nossal makes this point in his chapter, “The Liberal Past in the Conservative Present: Internationalism in the Harper Era,” in Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, eds., Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013), 32. Confidential interview with a former Canadian ambassador, 29 June 2016. The Russians under President Vladimir Putin also fell into this same category and were singled out by the Harperites for harsh treatment. Of particular offence was Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine, its illegal annexation of Crimea and meddling in Syria, and its incursions into Canada’s northern region. Standing up to the Russians – even if it might actually jeopardize Canada’s interests in the Arctic and Western Europe – was obviously seen by the Harper inner circle as a political winner at home. Confidential interview with a former Canadian ambassador, 19 July 2016. See John M. Kirk and Peter McKenna, “Stephen Harper’s Cuba Policy: From Autonomy to Americanization?” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 15, no.1 (2009): 21–39. According to one former Canadian diplomat in Havana, the Harper government was often petty in its dealings with the Cubans. On one occasion, some of Fidel Castro’s children wanted to come to Toronto for a visit and to watch a baseball game. But it took an unusually long three weeks to get the proper travel visas prepared – arriving just six days before the trip to Canada was scheduled. And it actually required the direct intervention from the Canadian embassy in Havana to finally expedite the process (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 18 July 2016). Confidential interview with a former Canadian ambassador, 18 July 2016. Nossal argues that the Harper government’s decision in 2009 to impose a travel visa on Mexicans seeking to visit Canada – ostensibly to reduce the number of bogus

Conclusion: Some Final Thoughts on Harper’s Politicized Foreign Policy  359

29

30

31 32 33

34

35 36 37 38

asylum claimants – was actually motivated by domestic political considerations. According to Nossal, “it is clear that the policy was driven primarily by electoral considerations, since recent immigrants to Canada are the most supportive of efforts to crack down on fraudulent asylum seekers” (“Old Habits and New Directions Indeed,” 256–7). In addition, as Jean-Philippe Thérien, Gordon Mace, and Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps discuss in chapter 11, Harper’s focus on hemispheric security – especially Conservative Party bread and butter issues around law and order – was viewed as music to the ears of the party’s base. The Harper Conservatives did, of course, understand the potential political costs of aggressively punishing or isolating Cuba entirely. They knew full-well that adopting a US-styled Cuba policy would be deeply unpopular in Canada. On this point, see Kim Richard Nossal and Leah Sarson, “About Face: Explaining Changes in Canada’s China policy, 2006–2012,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (2014): 146–62. The authors also reference the importance of the Harper Conservatives trying to capitalize on the large influx (almost 700,000 for the years 2006–11) of Chinese immigrants to Canada (especially in British Columbia). See Statistics Canada, Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity in Canada (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, 2013), 7. Nossal and Sarson, “About Face,” 156. Quoted in Mike Blanchfield, Swingback, 118. In a June 2017 Canadian Press/EKOS Politics poll, 81 per cent of those Canadians surveyed supported trilateral trade between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. See Stephanie Levitz, “The Populism Project: New Poll Suggests ‘Northern Populism’ Brewing in Canada,” National Post, 26 June 2017, A6. And according to an Angus Reid Institute poll in early 2017, 44 per cent of respondents believed that NAFTA has benefited Canada – a striking turnaround from the 58 per cent of Canadians who opposed the deal in 1993. See Sunny Freeman, “Canadians Rally around NAFTA as Trump Threatens to Rip It Up, Poll Shows,” National Post, 13 February 2017, FP1. Asa McKercher and Leah Sarson briefly discuss the Harper government’s “preoccupation with electoral prospects” in terms of its heavy trade focus in “Dollars and Sense? The Harper Government, Economic Diplomacy, and Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 71, no. 3 (September 2016): 351–70. See Kathryn Blaze Carlson, “Canada Makes Strong Commitment to Ukraine,” Globe and Mail, 28 February 2014, A9. Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 21 June 2016. Quoted in Mike Blanchfield, “Canada Chooses Groups with Little Experience for Selection of Ukraine Election Observers,” Globe and Mail, 19 April 2014, A10. Confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 24 June 2016. This same official recalled being told by someone on the political side that one of the reasons why the Harper government was taking such a tough line towards North Korea was to get Korean Canadians to vote for them.

360  Peter McKenna 39 See Althia Raj, “Harper Israel Trip Comes amid Change Back Home,” HuffPost Canada, 15 January 2014, https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/01/15/stephen -harper-israel-jewish-support_n_4598535.html. 40 Confidential interview with a former high-ranking Canadian official, 24 June 2016. Another former diplomat spoke about Susan Cartwright, a one-time foreign policy adviser to Stephen Harper, calling someone in the Canadian delegation to the UN and instructing them to stop talking about the need for Canada to adjust its position on Israel and the Mid-East peace process in order for Canada to secure a seat on the UN Security Council in 2010. “Cartwright called to say that the PM wasn’t happy hearing that and that if he [the Canadian diplomat] wanted to keep his job, he had better stop talking like that,” he recalled (confidential interview with a former Canadian diplomat, 22 August 2016). 41 Confidential interview with a former Canadian ambassador, 21 June 2016. 42 It is plausible that the Harper Conservatives were seeking to stay in office for as long as possible by appealing to the party’s base, converting swing and undecided voters, locking up various ethnic constituencies and even by changing Canada’s dominant narrative from “helpful fixer” and “honest broker” to “valiant warrior” and a “war-fighting past.” 43 Jones, “Canada’s Bitter, Small-Minded Foreign Policy,” A11. 44 Confidential interview with a former senior Canadian diplomat, 21 June 2016. 45 There are other examples where Canadian diplomatic, military, and economic interests were damaged by politically motivated foreign policy decisions – namely, the refusal to grant airline landing rights in Canada to two United Arab Emirates (UAE) carriers, the boycotting of the 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and the refusal to repatriate child soldier Omar Khadr from the Guantanamo military prison in Cuba. On how Khadr was used as a wedge issue for the Harper Conservatives, see Konrad Yakabuski, “Conservatives Must Move on from Demonizing Omar Khadr,” Globe and Mail, 6 July 2017, A11; John Ibbitson, “Conservatives Will Ride the Outrage over Khadr Settlement,” Globe and Mail, 6 July 2017, A4; and Colin Perkel, “Word that Feds Set to Pay Omar Khadr $10.5 Million, Apologize, Sparks Anger,” The Guardian (Charlottetown), 5 July 2017, A7. 46 The Brazilians, under the leadership of both Luiz “Lula” da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, were very lukewarm to Harper’s overtures, resisted the idea of having Canada as part of the Mercosur trade bloc, and even worked against Canada securing a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2010. By 2014, the Obama administration had pretty well grown tired of the Harper government and its electoral antics, especially around the whole politically sensitive Keystone XL pipeline issue. 47 On the Arms Trade Treaty, for instance, Canada refused to sign on because of the strategic and potent interventions of the gun lobby in Canada and the potential loss of a key voting constituency. There were similar ill-feelings about

Conclusion: Some Final Thoughts on Harper’s Politicized Foreign Policy  361

48 49

50

51

52

53

54

55

Canadian obstructionism when Canada pulled out of the Convention to Combat Desertification in 2013, making Canada the only country to pull out of a treaty intended to fight the global threat of drought and disappearing farmland. See Blanchfield, Swingback, 78–81. Confidential interview with a former Canadian ambassador, 22 August 2016. In his 2014 International Studies Association conference paper, Nossal argues that the Harper Conservatives were principled as long as they did not alienate important slices of the Canadian electorate. Nossal, “Primat der Wahlurne,” 14. I am not sure that Professor Nossal would like me saying it, but that sounds a lot like the immortal words of one Groucho Marx. “These are my principles, and if you don’t like them … well I have others,” the American comedian once joked. See Konrad Yakabuski, “On Israel, Trudeau Is Harper’s Pupil,” Globe and Mail, 12 May 2018, O11; and John Ibbitson, “Trudeau Taking Foreign-Policy Cues from Tory Playbook,” Globe and Mail, 9 March 2017, A5. According to Chris Selley, the Trudeau Liberals, when it comes to the military, most assuredly outspent the Harper government during its time in office. See Selley, “Conservative or Liberal, Foreign Policy Ambitions Clash with Canadians’ Utter Apathy,” National Post, 16 May 2019, A5. Also see Doug Saunders, “How the Liberals Got Trapped without a Policy in the Middle East,” Globe and Mail, 11 May 2019, O11. Harper’s vaunted maternal, newborn, and child health initiative was folded into the Liberals’ Feminist International Assistance Policy, but it remained largely the same in terms of the approaches adopted by the federal Conservatives. See Konrad Yakabuski, “Canada’s Foreign Aid Policy Branding,” Globe and Mail, 26 May 2018, O11. On arms sales under the Trudeau government, see Steven Chase, “CanadianMade Tech Used in Nagorno-Karabackh Clash,” Globe and Mail, 17 March 2021, A4, and Mark MacKinnon and Steven Chase, “Canada’s Link to Riot Suppression in Belarus,” Globe and Mail, 24 September 2020, A3. On Trudeau’s shift away from Harper, see Blanchfield, Swingback, 192–216, 234–47, and Campbell Clark, Nathan VanderKlippe, and Mark MacKinnon, “A Delicate Balance,” Globe and Mail, 14 January 2017, A9–10. Interestingly, Stephen Harper accused Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of playing politics – mostly by adopting a tougher line towards the Trump administration on the trade file – with the difficult NAFTA negotiations in July 2018. As Harper remarked to a business audience in Montreal: “The reality is the Government of Canada believes today that it is doing very well, the fight with Trump is good for it politically.” In dismissing that suggestion outright, Trudeau explained: “The issue of trade with the United States and our relationship with the United States is far too important to play partisan politics with.” Quoted in Laura Stone, “PM Rejects Harper Claim He’s Stalling on NAFTA Deal,” Globe and Mail, 21 July 2018, A6. This is not to suggest that the Trudeau Liberals have completely partitioned off foreign policy from domestic political considerations. For instance, some have

362  Peter McKenna argued that its focus on women and gender, including its foreign policy and feminist development assistance funding, has a decidedly political motivation. See Campbell Clark, “The Liberals Keep Talking About Women, and That Will Change Ottawa,” Globe and Mail, 26 June 2017, A4. 56 But as Nossal highlights, there was no widespread negative pushback by the Canadian public against Harper’s foreign policy decisions that would have prompted the governing Conservatives to sharply reverse course. Nossal, “The Liberal Past in the Conservative Present,” 32. It is also worth noting that Canadians generally do not pay much attention to the finer points of Canada’s international policy when determining their voting preference. 57 Confidential correspondence with a current Canadian ambassador, 21 July 2017.

Contributors

David R. Black is a professor of political science at Dalhousie University in Halifax. His research interests focus on Canada’s role in “development cooperation” in Sub-Saharan Africa, human rights and identity in Canadian and South African foreign policies, and post-apartheid South Africa. His most recent book is Canada and Africa in the New Millennium: The Politics of Consistent Inconsistency (2015). Duane Bratt is a professor of political science at Mount Royal University in Calgary. His primary research is in the areas of Canadian nuclear policy, Canadian public policy, and Canada-US relations. His most recent co-edited collection is entitled Orange Chinook: Politics in the New Alberta (2019). David Carment is a professor in the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and the editor of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal. His research interests include Canadian foreign policy, mediation and negotiation, fragile states, and diaspora politics. His most recent co-authored article is “Mobilizing Diaspora during Crisis: Ukrainian Diaspora in Canada and the Intergenerational Sweet Spot,” Diaspora Studies (2021). Andrea Charron is an associate professor at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg. Her research interests focus on Canada’s Arctic, the UN Security Council and sanctions, and Canadian foreign aid and defence policy. Her most recent publication is a book chapter, “Justin Trudeau’s Quest for a United Nations Security Council Seat,” in the Canada Among Nations series (2017). Alistair D. Edgar is an associate professor of political science at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo. He is also the executive director of the Academic Council of the UN System (ACUNS). The central focus of his research is on

364 Contributors

post-conflict transitional justice, Canada and US security and defence policy, and NATO. His most recent publication is a book chapter, “The Rule of Law, Peacebuilding and Agenda 2030: Lessons from the Western Balkans,” in the edited collection, Crime Prevention and Justice in 2030 (2021). Paul Evans is a professor and HSBC Chair of Asian Research at the University of British Columbia. His current writings and media commentaries focus on Canada-China relations, Asian security dynamics, and the emergence of technonationalism as a defining force in regional affairs. His most recent book is Engaging China: Myth, Aspiration and Strategy in Canadian Policy from Trudeau to Harper (2014). Stéfanie von Hlatky is an associate professor in the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University in Kingston. Her core research interests are military cooperation, alliances and deterrence, and gender dynamics in the Canadian Armed Forces. Her most recent publication is a co-edited collection entitled Transhumanizing War: Performance Enhancement and the Implications for Policy, Society, and the Soldier (2020). Katarina Koleva is a PhD candidate in the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs in Ottawa. Her most recent publication was a book chapter, “Comrades to the Rescue: Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Ukraine in 2014 Through the Lens of Izvestia,” in the edited collection entitled Media in Process (2016). Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps has a graduate degree in political science from the Université de Montréal. His most recent publication is “L’émergence du néo-continentalisme dans la politique du Canada à l’égard des Amériques,” Études internationals (2019). Gordon Mace is professor emeritus in the Department of Political Science at the University of Laval. His research interests focus on Latin America, Canada, and Quebec politics in the international arena and regionalism. He recently published “Dynamics of Legitimation in Regional Organizations: The OAS and Non-State Actors,” Global Society (2020). Justin Massie is a professor of political science at the Université du Québec à Montréal. While presently working on a book on Canada’s involvement in the Afghan War, his research interests also focus on multinational military coalitions, ideologies, and Canadian foreign policy and democratic allies in a multipolar world. His most recent co-edited collection is America’s Allies and the Decline of U.S. Hegemony (2019).



Contributors 365

Peter McKenna is a professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island in Charlottetown. He has written extensively on Canada-Cuba relations, Canadian-Latin American affairs, and Canada-US relations. His most recent publication is “Canada and Latin America: 150 Years Later,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (2018). Asa McKercher is an assistant professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston. His main areas of research are North American political history, Canadian international history, and the United States and the world. His most recent co-edited collection is Undiplomatic History: Rethinking Canada in the World (2019). Shaun Narine is a professor of political science at St. Thomas University in Fredericton. He has written extensively on Canadian foreign policy in the Middle East, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and humanitarian intervention and normative change in the international system. He recently published (with Jamie Gillies) “The Trudeau Government and the Case of Multilateralism in an Uncertain World,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (2020). Milana Nikolko is an adjunct professor in the EURUS Institute at Carleton University in Ottawa. Her central areas of research are trauma and victimization in diasporas, post-Soviet diasporas and trauma, and collective memories of ethnic groups. Her most recent publication is a co-authored chapter, “The Impact of Ukraine’s Informal Economy on Women: Mobilizing Canada’s Diaspora for Growth and Opportunity during Crisis,” in the Canada Among Nations series (2020). Kim Richard Nossal is professor emeritus in the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University in Kingston. His research interests are Canadian foreign and defence policy, Australian foreign and defence policy, and Canadian-American relations. His most recent book with Jean-Christophe Boucher is The Politics of War: Canada’s Afghanistan Mission, 2001–2014 (2017). Jeffrey Rice is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at MacEwan University in Edmonton. His major areas of research are global security, Canada’s international military engagement, and Canadian defence policy. His most recent publication is a co-authored article, “Striking a Deal on the F-35: Multinational Politics and U.S. Defence Acquisition,” Defence Studies (2018). Vanessa Scanga is a PhD candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto and a current member of the SPIN Project. Her areas of research include open

366 Contributors

science, health policy, and the intellectual property aspects of genetics/genomics research and innovation. Jean-Philippe Thérien is a professor of political science at the Université de Montréal. His main research areas are North-South relations, international organizations, and peace and security. His most recent work is a co-authored article, “Global Governance as Patchwork: The Making of the Sustainable Development Goals,” Review of International Political Economy (2020). Mark S. Winfield is a professor in the Faculty of Environmental and Urban Change at York University in Toronto. His core areas of research are international climate change, the environment and energy efficiency, and energy law and public policy. His most recent publication is a co-authored article, “Enabling Community Energy Planning? Polycentricity, Governance Frameworks, and Community Energy Planning in Canada,” Canadian Planning and Policy Journal (2021).

Index

Abdelrazik, Abousfian, 307 ADS (Approved Destination Status), 259 AEC (Arctic Economic Council), 221 Afghan National Army, 153 Afghan National Police, 153 Afghan National Security Forces, 149 Afghanistan: and Canadian military, 85–7, 126; and Chrétien government, 169–70; and CIDA, 327; and Conservative Government, 10, 11; cost of war, 156n4; and counterterrorism, 131–2; embassy compound in, 51; extension of stay/withdrawal from, 142, 145–7, 148–55, 157n14, 169–70; intelligence operations in, 52; Joint Task Force (JTF) 2 soldiers in, 85; Manley Report, 140n33; and Martin government, 132, 169; and NTM-A, 133–4, 156n4; and Obama, 132; Operation ATTENTION, 134; relations with US, 135–6, 155, 170; scholarly work on, 143; support for Canada’s involvement in, 146–8, 154–5. See also Harper, Stephen: and Afghanistan Africa: and bilateralism, 324, 333; Canadian relations with/interests in, 20, 83, 336; characterizations of, 332–3; diaspora in Canada, 332;

diplomatic roles for Canadians in, 322–5; economic growth of, 332–3; G8 governments approach to, 324; and Mulroney government, 321; and post-imperial Commonwealth, 322; and Trudeau government, 335–6. See also Africa Action Plan; Harper, Stephen, government of: Africa; New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Africa Action Plan, 323, 330 African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 331 aggressive moralism, 28 Aglukkaq, Leona, 214, 219, 223 Agreement on Cooperation in Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, 220 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, 220 AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), 264 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 133 Al Haq, 303 Al Mezan, 303 Alaska Highway, 212

368 Index al-Assad, Bashar, 283 Alberta: and China, 263; Keystone XL pipeline project, 173–4, 346–7; and Kyoto obligations, 101; oil sands, 102, 107; resistance to carbon pricing, 116 Alberta to New Brunswick Energy East project, 110 Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA), 240 Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, 133 al-Qaeda, 131, 132, 143. See also Afghanistan America (Canadian relations with). See Canada-US relations “America First” agenda, 177, 187n53 American Clean Energy and Security Act, 104–5 Americas Strategy, 10, 22n13, 43, 238–9, 240–1 AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan), 331 Anderson, Greg, 171–2 anti-communist rhetoric, 277, 278 Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Treaty, 84 anti-Semitism, 180, 302, 303–4 anti-Trump sentiment in Canada, 188n64 apartheid, 322–3 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) forum, 258 Approved Destination Status (ADS), 259 Arab League, 281–2 Arab people, 296 Arab-Israeli conflict: and Baird, 300–1, 307, 308, 318n62; and Canada, 297, 312; and electoral politics, 310–11; Eurocentric approaches to, 296–7, 305–7; “Israel-Palestine: Mapping Models of Statehood and Paths to Peace” (conference), 303; Obama on,

299–300; one-state solution, 303; shifts in foreign policy on, 295. See also Israel Arctic, the: bipartisan agreement over, 18; and Canada-US relations, 218; and Canadian Armed Forces, 9, 215–16; Canadian demographics in, 225; characterizations of, 212; and Foreign Affairs Department, 219; and foreign policy, 211, 280; Harper’s focus on, 21n9; land boundaries of, 212–13; military presence/expenditures in, 9, 215–16, 217; Mulroney government on, 33, 213; and patriotism, 33; Polar Continental Shelf Program, 223; research station in, 9; and Russia, 221–2, 223, 280–1, 289n11, 291n30; Southern Canadian view of, 212–13, 223, 291n29; sovereignty in, 11, 214–17, 225, 227–8, 291n29; territorial boundaries of, 281; and Trudeau, 227. See also anti-communist rhetoric; Arctic Council Arctic, the, Harper and: analysis of, 224–6, 345; and the Danes, 218, 280; defence policy, 227; election campaigns, 213–14; foreign policy, 280; Polar Continental Shelf Program, 223, 226; and Russia, 216–18, 223, 281; territorial boundaries, 281; tours, 345. See also Arctic Council Arctic Athabaskan Council, 216 Arctic Council, 213–16, 219–20, 225, 280–1 Arctic Economic Council (AEC), 221 Arctic Five, the, 220–1 Arctic Research Foundation, 224 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 213, 216 Armenian genocide, 42 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), 89, 360n47 Arnold, Samantha, 212

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 264 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, 258 Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative, 258 Asia-Pacific Gateway project, 199 Atlantic Gateway project, 199 Atlanticism, 128, 129–30, 132, 133 ATT (UN Arms Trade Treaty), 89 automobile industry, 105–6 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), 133 Axworthy, Lloyd, 78, 84, 85 Bachand, Rémi, 145 Baird, John: and Arab-Israeli conflict, 90–1, 300–1, 307, 308, 318n62; on China, 259; displeasure with, 50–1, 69n69; on Gaddafi, 282; and Iran, 180; on Kyoto Protocol, 88; management style of, 49; on multilateralism, 323; and OSCE, 127; and peacekeeping, 180; on policies, 79; on Syria, 283; and UN Security Council, 66n39, 289n12; on use of lethal force, 292n39 ballistic missile defence (BMD) program, 31 Balsillie, Jim, 224 Barghouti, Mustafa, 299 Barry, Donald, 297 BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movement, 305, 309–10 Beaufort Sea, 218–19 Beauregard, Remy, 303 Belarus, 41–2 Belt and Road Initiative, 268 Bercovici, Vivian, 300–1 Bernier, Maxime, 148, 259 Beyond the Border initiatives, 172, 201

Index 369 Biden, Joe, 266 bilateralism: and Africa, 324, 333; and China, 261, 265, 273n14; countries of focus, 326–7; and diplomacy, 240; free trade agreements, 196; and Harper government, 195, 324–5, 352; versus multilateralism, 195–8 Bill C-17, 89 Bill C-38, 110, 111, 115 Bill C-42, 89 Bill C-51, 89 Bill of Rights, 124 Black, David R., 20 Blanchfield, Mike, 87, 89, 91 Blaney, Stephen, 305 Bloomfield, Alan, 27 BMD (ballistic missile defence) program, 31 Boehm, Peter, 48 Bouchard, Charles, 279 Boucher, Jean-Christophe, 129, 170, 248 Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, 305, 309–10 Bratt, Duane, 6, 18, 21n21, 110–11, 143 Braun, Aurel, 303 Brazil, 241–2, 360n46 Breese, Terry, 151 Brodie, Ian, 169, 172, 323 B’Tselem, 303. See also Arab-Israeli conflict; Israel budget cuts, 53 Bugailiskis, Alexandra, 251n10 Burke, Edmund, 6, 27 Burkina Faso, 82 Burney, Derek, 199, 201 Bush, George W., administration of, 169, 171–2, 241 CAF. See Canadian Armed Forces California, 108 Campbell, Kim, 89–90

370 Index Canada and the Americas: Priorities and Progress. See Americas Strategy Canada China Business Council (CCBC), 259 Canada First Defence Strategy, 10, 126, 216, 287n4, 346 Canada Fund for Africa, 330 Canada’s Northern Strategy, 213–15, 216, 226 Canada-US 1988 Arctic Agreement, 213 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), 178, 196 Canada-US relations: and Afghanistan, 155, 170, 172; and Americas Policy, 240; analysis of, 181–3; and the Arctic, 218; and China, 266–7; and climate change, 111–12, 115–16; and Conservative Government, 9, 58; election platforms on, 7; Harper on, 168–9, 177, 200–1; importance of trade to, 200; and Keystone XL pipeline project, 111, 173–6, 201, 346–7; and Mulroney government, 167; and Obama administration, 172; and pipelines, 108; and Trump, 266; and Ukraine, 173 Canadian Alliance, 166, 167 Canadian Ambassador to the United States, 7 Canadian Arab Federation, 302, 304 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF): and Canadian Arctic, 9, 215–16; and Chrétien, 144; deaths of members, 161n93, 298; funding/spending, 124, 126, 133, 151, 357n19; and ISAF, 137; re-equipping of, 6, 7–8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 345–6. See also Afghanistan Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT), 303–4 Canadian Coast Guard, 213 Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), 326

Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 101–2 Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), 238 Canadian identity, 295–6, 311, 329 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 6, 83, 203, 302, 325, 327 Canadian International Resources and Development Institute (CIRDI), 327 Canadian national anthem, 212, 227 Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to Combat Anti-Semitism (CPCCA), 304 Canadian trade and trade policy, 10, 191–2 Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (CJPME), 304, 311 Cannon, Lawrence, 291n29 carbon pricing, 116 Caribbean, 10, 56. See also Americas Strategy Carment, David, 19 Carney, Mark, 199 Carrier-Sabourin, Krystel, 328–9 Castro, Raúl, 241 CCBC (Canada China Business Council), 259 CCD (Convention to Combat Desertification), 88 Celil, Huseyin, 258 CETA (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement), 198, 353 Champagne, Francois-Philippe, 60 Chapnick, Adam, 33, 39n43 Charron, Andrea, 18 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 270 Chile, 196, 200, 236 China: and Alberta, 263; Baird on, 259; and Biden administration, 266; and bilateralism, 261, 265, 273n14; and Canada-US relations, 266–7; Canadians’ perceptions of,

263, 269–70; criticisms of, 258; and developmental assistance, 261; and elections, 263; foreign policy and, 19, 55; Kenney on, 258, 348; and MacKay, 71n93; and oil/gas, 260; and relations with various prime ministers, 32–3, 257, 259–60, 261, 264–5, 269; shifting political status of, 267–8. See also Harper, Stephen, and China Chinese Communist Party, 260, 271–2 Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), 260 Chrétien, Jean, government of: and Afghanistan, 169–70; and Africa, 321, 323, 330; and Arab-Israeli conflict, 297; and the Arctic, 213; and bilateral free trade agreements, 196; and CAF, 144; and China, 257, 261; and climate change, 101; and foreign aid, 326; and G8/G20 summits, 278; Harper’s criticism of, 29; and Iraq, 127; and Kyoto Protocol, 87; and Nunavut, 213; and terrorism, 144; and United Nations, 78, 223 Christian Zionism, 307 Christians, 307, 318n63 Churchill, Winston, 306, 308 Churkin, Vitaly, 281, 282 CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), 6, 83, 203, 302, 325, 327 CIRDI (Canadian International Resources and Development Institute), 327 Civitas (club), 6, 144 CJPME (Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East), 304, 311 Clare, Sheldon, 89, 97n44 Clark, Campbell, 332 Clark, Joe, 26, 180, 309, 333 Clarke, Jonathan, 28 Clean Air Act, 103, 106, 111

Index 371 Clean Power Plan, 111, 112 Clement, Tony, 128 Climate Action Network, 99, 109 climate change: and 2008 election, 103–4; and Canada, 116; and CanadaUS relations, 111–12, 115–16; and Chrétien government, 101; and Harper government, 11–12, 14, 33, 87–8, 99–100, 109, 110–11, 113, 115; and Mulroney government, 100–1; and Obama administration, 104, 108; policy formulation/implementation in Canada, 100–1; and public polling, 103; and Trudeau government, 99, 112, 116 Clinton, Hillary, 172, 221 CNOOC (Chinese National Offshore Oil Company), 260 Colombia, 50, 82 Colvin, Richard, 52–3, 70n83 communications strategy. See Message Event Proposal (MEM) communism, 278. See also anticommunist rhetoric Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 198, 353 conditional engagement. See principled engagement conditional multilateralism, 17, 125, 127, 128–30, 137–8, 138n13 Conservative foreign policy, 26–8, 30–1 conservative internationalism, 18–19, 235. See also internationalism Conservative Party election platforms, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 21n6 Conservative Party of Canada (CPC), 20, 143–4, 166, 167, 334–5, 347 conservativism, 26–8 constructive typology, 128–9 continentalism, 128–30, 132 Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD), 88

372 Index “cool politics,” 258, 263 Copeland, Daryl, 42, 70n80 Copenhagen Accord, 113 corporate sponsorship, 199 Costa Rica, 196 Council on Foreign Relations, 193 counterterrorism, 125, 131–3, 137 CPCCA (Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to Combat AntiSemitism), 304 Crown corporations, 260 Cuba, 241, 347–8, 358n27 CUSFTA (Canada-US Free Trade Agreement), 178, 196 Dalai Lama, 258 Dalby, Simon, 92 Dallaire, Roméo, 331 Danes, the, 218 Darfur, 331 Dawson, Laura, 191 Day, Stockwell, 86, 144, 263 defence policy, 126–31, 136–7 defence spending, 141n39 Deficit Reduction Action Plan, 219 democracy, 8–9, 144–5, 244–5 Dempster Highway, 213 Deng Xiaoping, 268 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). See Foreign Affairs Department Department of National Defence, 136–7, 153 Desrosiers, Marie-Eve, 125 Detroit-Windsor crossing, 202 development assistance, 82, 247–8, 261, 325–9, 332. See also foreign aid Diefenbaker, John, 33, 124, 198, 212–13, 293n51 Dion, Stéphane, 101, 103–4, 148, 149, 152, 309–10 diplomacy, 202, 203, 204, 240, 269, 322–5

Distant Early Warning Line, 213 Doha Development Agenda, 196 Dolata, Petra, 215 domestic policy, 165 domestic politics, 34, 343, 355 Duceppe, Gilles, 146, 148, 157n29 Durand, Paul, 51 Economic Action Plan (Canada), 193–4 economic diplomacy, 202, 203, 204 economic relations (and the Americas), 242–4 Edgar, Alistair, 17, 192 education, 199 Egypt, 297 Emerson, David, 170–1, 195 Energy East pipeline project, 110 energy industry, 173, 174 energy resources, 102, 110 enlightened internationalism, 335–6. See also internationalism Erekat, Saeb, 301 Eurocentric world view, 295, 296–7, 305–7, 308 Evangelical Christians, 20, 307, 318n63 Evans, Paul, 19, 32–3 Export Development Canada, 333 External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 194 Falkland Islands/Malvinas territorial dispute, 46 Fantino, Julian, 83, 202, 327 Farney, James, 25 Fast, Ed, 193–4, 197, 199, 204 federal bureaucracy, 41, 44–5 First Nations communities, 111 flag-planting, 280–1 FOCAL (Canadian Foundation for the Americas), 238 Foreign Affairs Department: and Americas Strategy, 238–9; and the

Arctic, 219; and Harper government, 16–17, 41–2, 45–6, 49, 54–5, 344; and malaise under Harper, 16, 46–54, 60–1, 344, 351; Office of Religious Freedom, 12; and political staffers, 46–8; Robertson on, 45. See also Baird, John foreign aid: and Chrétien government, 326; and election platform, 8; focus of, 82; and Harper government, 82–3, 327; as a term, 31. See also development assistance Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPPA), 195, 260 foreign policy: in the Americas, 240; and the Arctic, 280; Canadian, 290n19; and Canadian conservativism, 167; in China, 19, 55; conservativism and ideology in, 25–8; credibility of Canadian, 58–9; criticism of Harper’s, 33–4, 61; diaspora-pleasing bent of, 349–50; and domestic politics, 34, 343, 355; and Harper, 10–11, 35, 190; as ideological, 24; and international peace/security, 279; and Israel, 296; as principled, 352–3; and Trudeau, 59–60; veneration of tradition in, 27. See also Primat der Außenpolitik (primacy of foreign policy) foreign policy documents, 5 foreign service officers, 70n78 forestry industry, 170 fossil fuel production, 101 Fowler, Robert, 78, 84, 85, 331 Fox, Vicente, 171–2 Fox News, 179 Franklin’s ships, 224 free trade, 18, 178, 190, 194, 195–6, 257 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) process, 196 Freeland, Chrystia, 60, 178, 265 fuel standards, 101, 105–6, 107, 113, 114

Index 373 G7 summit, 173, 188n64, 322 G8 summit, 80, 81–2, 90, 294n59, 322, 324 G20 summit, 80, 81–2, 94n10 Gaddafi, Muammar, 279, 282 Galloway, George, 304–5 Garneau, Marc, 60 Gates, Robert, 153 Gateway strategy, 258 Gaza, 299, 301, 302, 304. See also ArabIsraeli conflict; Israel Gecelovsky, Paul, 335 Gellman, Harvey, 308 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 196 Germany, 78, 277. See also Merkel, Angela Gerring, John, 24 Ghana, 82 GHG emissions: in Canada, 116; and pipelines, 108, 175, 176; and the US, 105. See also Clear Air Act Gingrich, Newt, 189 Global Commerce Strategy, 199 Global Forum for Combating AntiSemitism, 302 Global Markets Action Plan (GMAP), 23n18, 194, 198–9, 203, 333 Goods and Services Sales Tax (GST), 166 Goodyear, Gary, 303 Graham, Bill, 145, 146 Graham, John, 53, 237 “Great Recession” of 2008–9, 58, 193 greenhouse gas emissions. See GHG emissions Griffiths, Andrew, 68n59 Grod, Paul, 285. See also Ukraine gun lobby groups, 89 Haiti, 10, 57–8 Halper, Stefan, 28 Hamas, 299

374 Index Hampson, Fen, 93, 199 Hans Island, 218 Harper government: and Africa, 322–35; and Anglosphere, 306–7; budgetary aspects of, 53, 126; and Canadian trade policy, 191–2, 195, 199; and climate change, 11–12, 14, 33, 87–8, 99–100, 109, 110–11, 113, 115; and counterterrorism, 125, 131, 137; decade of darkness under, 42–3, 48–9, 126–7, 346; defence strategy of, 126–7, 128–9, 130–1, 136–7, 141n39, 227; and energy resources, 102, 110; and foreign aid policy, 82–3, 327; global economic troubles under, 193; Global Markets Action Plan, 23n18; and gun owners, 89; and human rights, 270; and Iran, 180; and Iraq War, 170; and Israel, 295, 298–305, 309, 350; managing style of, 46–54, 60–1; and Obama administration, 105; policy practice under, 330; and political power, 90; and public service, 62n1; scientific freedom under, 69n64, 223; and sovereignty, 12, 183; and Syria, 283–4; top-down approach of, 54–5; and Ukraine, 284– 5; and United Nations, 77, 89, 99–100; and US policies/politics, 106–7, 110. See also Foreign Affairs Department Harper government, foreign policy of: aims of, 44, 343; as breaking with tradition, 43–4, 239; characterizations of, 26, 190, 248, 290n19; and Conservative base, 347; criticism of, 33–4, 61; diaspora-pleasing bent of, 349–50; domestication of, 343, 355; and election outcomes, 35; evolution of views on, 181; and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 179; open federalism of, 346; as principled, 352–3; and UN Security Council, 352. See also ideology

Harper government and Israel: explicitly pro-Israeli stance, 179–80; motivations for support, 91–2; and party politics, 298; travel to Israel, 301; and United Nations, 90, 127, 134 Harper, Stephen: and Afghanistan, 126–7, 142, 144–5, 169; on the Americas, 235, 239–40; and Americas policy, 235, 236–7, 238, 240–1, 242–8, 249; on Canada’s relationship with other nations, 44; and Canada-US relations, 165, 168–71, 172, 177, 200; on Canadian values, 183n10, 204–5; conservative positions of, 29; and Cuba, 240–1; election of, 276; and Foreign Affairs Department, 41–2, 44–6, 49; and G7/8/20 summits, 80–2; on Hussein, 168; and Iraq, 16, 29, 86–7, 168; on isolationism, 192–3; and Israel, 56, 90, 91–2, 127, 134, 179–80, 301; on Keystone XL pipeline project, 87, 174– 5, 201; life after Prime Minister, 142, 177, 178–9; life before Prime Minister, 91, 165, 166, 308; media appearances of, 179; and multilateralism, 43, 278– 80; on NAFTA renegotiations, 178–9; and NATO, 81, 128, 152, 288n10; and Obama, 18, 90, 172–7; objectives in office, 34, 43; on oil/gas, 202; opinions on, 28–9, 92–3, 224, 344; opposition to Kyoto Protocol, 29, 38n27; on other governments, 29, 167–8, 189, 286; and peacekeeping, 134–5; priorities in office, 44; reasons for withdrawal from Afghanistan, 151–4; references to foreign policy, 5–6; rejection of United Nations, 77, 79, 83–4, 94n4; reputation of, 194; rhetoric of fear, 39n43, 282; and Russia, 276–7, 281, 286–7; on social issues, 91; “third way,” 240; on TPP, 197; on trade, 190, 204; travel

to China, 259–60; and Trudeau, 179, 180–1; Trudeau’s attacks on, 124–5; on Trump, 177, 186n48, 187n53; and United Nations, 29, 126–7, 130; on the US, 29; view of Canada, 193; and voters, 63n2; on women, 14; xenophobia of, 200–1. See also Arctic, the; Canada-US relations; Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (MNCH) initiative; principled engagement; Reform Party Harper, Stephen, and China: overview of, 256–7, 271–2; after time in office, 273n11; analysis of, 348; and Canadian elections, 263; meetings with, 258–9; and multilateralism, 261–2; and Nexen Energy, 260; policy, 262–4; posture towards, 257–62, 270; principled engagement with, 263–4; travel to, 259–60, 262. See also China; Trudeau, Justin, government of: and China Harper, Stephen, speeches of: analysis of, 15; anti-communist rhetoric in, 277–8; appeals to morality, 13, 15, 282; on Iraq, 168; on other governments, 144, 180; on Palestinians, 308; at Summit of the Americas, 235; on “third way,” 240; on trade, 193 Harper-Dion deal, 152 Harper’s war. See Afghanistan Havana, 57–8, 348, 358n27 Haworth, Richard, 223 health care, 12 Heinbecker, Paul, 25, 26, 73n123, 194, 301 Heine, Jorge, 248–9 Hess-von Kruedener, Paeta, 290 Heyman, Bruce, 176 Hezbollah, 298. See also Arab-Israeli conflict; Israel Hillier, Rick, 126, 132, 135, 146

Index 375 Hlatky, Stéfanie von, 17 Holodomor, 284–5, 294n56 Honduras, 240 hostage diplomacy, 269 Howard, John, 237 Hu Jintao, 259 Huawei, 268 human rights and economic interests, 203 human security framework, 84, 85, 95n17, 237 Hume, David, 27 Hussein, Saddam, 127, 168 Ibbitson, John, 44, 73n125, 143, 224, 312 ideology, 24–5, 26, 33, 34 Ignatieff, Michael, 149, 153 immigration policy, 6 Inconvenient Truth, An (film), 103 Indigenous Permanent Participants, 211, 213, 216 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 102–3 International Criminal Court (ICC), 84 International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 325 International Maritime Organization (IMO), 218 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 137, 169 internationalism, 128, 129–30, 132, 248, 250n3, 335–6. See also conservative internationalism Inuit, 212. See also Arctic, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, 216 inuksuk, 212 Iran, 180, 314n13, 320n88, 347 Iraq: Canadian-American military cooperation, 172; and Chrétien, 127; and Harper government, 170; Harper on, 16, 29, 86–7, 168; public opinion on, 169; and United Nations, 137

376 Index ISAF: Kandahar, 131–3, 137 Islam. See Muslims Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), 131–2, 136 isolationism, 192–3 Israel: Canadian relations/interests with, 20, 297, 298–9; and Christian Zionism, 307; and foreign policy, 296; and international law violations, 310; and Obama, 299–300; and Trudeau government, 309–11; and war on Gaza, 299, 301, 302, 304. See also Arab-Israeli conflict; Palestinians: sovereignty of; Rights and Democracy scandal. See also Harper government and Israel “Israel-Palestine: Mapping Models of Statehood and Paths to Peace” (conference), 303 Jacobson, David, 152, 185n38 Jaffer, Mobina, 331 Jeffrey, Brooke, 65 Jewish people, 295–6, 303–4, 306, 307, 308 Joint Task Force (JTF) 2 soldiers, 85 Jones, Peter, 351 Kagan, Robert, 28 KAIROS (Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives), 302 Kandahar. See Afghanistan Kazemi, Zahra, 32, 39n38 Kenney, Jason: on Canadian Arab Federation, 302; and China, 258, 348; “cool politics, warm economics,” 263; and Muslims, 307; on Russian fighters, 279; and Ukraine, 285 Kent, Peter, 88, 109 Kerckhove, Ferry de, 42 Kerry, John, 176 Keystone XL pipeline project: about, 173; and Alberta, 173–4, 346–7; and

Canada-US relations, 111, 173–6, 201, 346–7; and Harper, 87, 174–5, 201; and Obama administration, 100, 108, 109–10, 114, 176; opposition to, 174–5; and Trudeau, 176; and Trump, 181 Khadr, Omar, 307, 360n45 Kirkpatrick, Jeane J., 27 Koring, Paul, 176 Kosovo, 127 Kovrig, Michael, 273n14 Kristol, Irving, 28 Kristol, William, 28 Kyoto Protocol: and Alberta, 101; and Baird, 88; Canada’s involvement in, 87–8, 99, 101–2, 109; and Chrétien, 87; enforcement of, 114; Harper’s opposition to, 29, 38n27; second commitment period, 102, 114; withdrawal from, 101, 102, 103, 109, 113, 220 Lagassé, Philippe, 125 Landriault, Mathieu, 345 Latin America, 10, 199–200, 203, 237 Lavoie-Deslongchamps, Hugo, 18 Lebanon, 298 Lewis, Stephen, 334 Li Keqiang, 264 Libben, Joshua, 330, 332 liberal internationalism. See conservative internationalism Liberal Party of Canada, 29, 144, 248, 258, 278, 344 Libya, 172, 279, 282, 283 Libyan National Transitional Council, 282 Line 3 pipeline project, 116 Livni, Tzipi, 300 Lukashenko, Alexander, 41–2 lumber trade, 170–1 Lynk, Stanley Michael, 310

MacCallum, Elizabeth, 296 Mace, Gordon, 18 MacKay, Peter, 52, 71n93, 153, 216–17, 299 Mackenzie King, William Lyon, 78 Malawi, 82 Mali, 331, 341n50 Malone, David, 80 Manley, John, 149 Manley Report, 140n33, 149 Manning, Preston, 263 MAPP (Mission in Support of the Peace Process), 50 Martin, Lawrence, 49–50, 66n28, 307 Martin, Paul, government of, 101–2, 126, 169, 171–2, 261, 297 Massie, Justin, 17, 32, 128 Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (MNCH) initiative, 20, 81, 83, 323, 348–9; changes under Liberals, 361n52; Muskoka Initiative (MI), 328–9 McDonald, Marci, 318n63 McKay, Ian, 125 McKenna, Peter, 17, 34 McKercher, Asa, 18 McMillan, Tom, 26 McNee, John, 78 McQuaig, Linda, 314n5 Mearsheimer, John J., 28 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), 305, 310 Meng Wanzhou, 268, 269 Merkel, Angela, 81, 266 Message Event Proposal (MEM), 49–50, 86 Mexico, 178–9, 201, 241. See also Beyond the Border initiatives Miller, Kristi, 69n64 Milliken, Peter, 302 Minard, Paul, 345 mining interests, 203

Index 377 Minsk Agreement, 285 Mission in Support of the Peace Process (MAPP), 50 Moens, Alexander, 143 Montreal Council on Foreign Relations, 323 Montreal Protocol, 99 Mulcair, Tom, 42 Mulroney, Brian, government of: and Africa, 321, 322–3; and the Arctic, 33, 213; and Canada-US relations, 167; climate change under, 100–1; and GST, 166; Rights and Democracy, 303; and the Soviet Union, 277–8 Mulroney, David, 51, 54–5, 259, 261, 298, 357n11 multilateralism: in Africa, 323, 329; and Baird, 323; versus bilateralism, 195–8; and Canada, 59; and diplomacy, 240; and Harper, 43, 89, 125, 241, 261–2, 278–80, 287n2; mistrust of, 261–2; and peace operations, 329–32; shift away from, 51, 287n2; and strategic culture, 130; and Trudeau, 265, 266, 354. See also conditional multilateralism Muskoka Initiative (MI), 328–9 Muslims, 296–7, 306–7, 311. See also Palestinians NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), 7, 172, 178–9, 189–90, 349, 361n54 Narine, Shaun, 20, 24 national anthem, 212, 227 National Citizens Coalition, 166 National Development Policy, 213 National Energy Board, 107 National Round Table on the Environment and Economy (NRTEE), 103, 115, 118n14 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): and Canada, 31–2,

378 Index NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): and Canada (continued): 131–3, 137, 143, 278, 322; and Harper government, 81, 128, 152, 288n10; and Libya, 279, 282; members, 277; and Putin, 32; Resolute Support Mission (RSM), 135–6; and Serbia, 85; support for, 6; and Trudeau government, 124; and Ukraine, 19, 279–80. See also Afghanistan NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), 133–5, 154, 156n4 Nelvana of the Northern Lights (comic book), 212, 228n3 neoconservativism, 26, 29 neocontinentalism, 32 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 91, 300 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 324 Nexen Energy, 260 Nicaragua, 82 NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), 6 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 7, 172, 178–9, 189–90, 349, 361n54 North American Leaders’ Summit, 173 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See NATO North Korea, 32 North Warning System, 213 Northern Gateway pipeline project, 110, 111, 115 Northern Strategy, 213–15, 216, 226 Northwest Territories, 213. See also the Arctic Nossal, Kim Richard, 21, 170, 356n4, 358n28, 361n49, 362n56 NRTEE (National Round Table on the Environment and Economy), 103, 115, 118n14 Nunavut, 213, 215 Nutrition North Canada program, 214, 229n14

Oakeshott, Michael, 27 Obama administration: and Arab-Israeli conflict, 299–300; and Canada-US relations, 172; and climate change, 104, 108; and Keystone XL pipeline project, 100, 108, 109–10, 114, 176; and Paris Agreement, 111 Obama, Barack: and Harper, 18, 90, 105, 172–7; and Middle East, 132, 180, 299–300; on NAFTA, 172, 190; popularity in Canada, 17; and Trudeau, 177, 186n45 Observers (Arctic Council), 220 O’Connor, Gordon, 170 Oda, Bev, 56, 82, 83, 202, 302, 338n22 Office of Religious Freedom, 12 Official Development Assistance (ODA), 6, 31 oil/gas, 74, 102, 107, 175, 202, 260, 291n24 Oliver, Joe, 175 Ontario, 108, 116 Operation ATTENTION, 134 Operation Nanook, 217 Operation Unified Protector (OUP), 282 Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, 322 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 127, 137, 277, 285, 349 Organization of American States (OAS), 50, 57, 235, 240 O’Toole, Erin, 116 “Ottawa process,” 84 overseas development assistance, 31 P5 + 1 group, 180 Palestine, 90–1, 299, 300. See also Arab-Israeli conflict Palestine Royal Commission (Peel Commission), 306 Palestinians: and BDS, 305; and Canadian government, 295, 308–9; and

Harper, 308; organizations, 303; selfdetermination of, 296; sovereignty of, 90–1; supporters of, 304; and Trudeau, 309–10; Western perception of, 296–7, 306. See also Israel Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, 112, 115–16 Parable of the Talents/Good Samaritan, 335 Paradis, Christian, 83, 203 Paris, Roland, 34, 92, 190–1 Paris Climate Change Agreement, 99, 111, 112, 177 party policy conventions, 5 peacekeeping, 134–5, 179–80, 278, 322, 323, 329 Pearson, Lester, 296 Pearson, Michael, 78 Pearsonianism, 332, 347 Peleg, Ilan, 28 Pellan, Alfred, 53 personal security framework, 237 Peru, 82 pipelines: and Canada-US relations, 108; challenges from First Nations communities, 111; and GHG emissions, 108, 175, 176; infrastructure needed for, 107; opposition to, 111, 173–5; under Trudeau, 116. See also Keystone XL pipeline project Plouffe, Joel, 280 Polar Continental Shelf Program, 223 political power, 90 political staffers, 46–8 Portugal, 78, 80 post-secondary education, 199 Potash Corporation, 260 Pratt, Cranford, 335 Prentice, Jim, 104, 105, 174 Primat der Außenpolitik (primacy of foreign policy), 34

Index 379 Primat der Innenpolitik (primacy of domestic politics), 34 Primat der Wahlurne (primacy of the ballot box), 34 principled engagement, 19, 257, 260–1, 262, 263–4 principled stand, 278–9 protectionism, 200 public opinion, 92–3, 150–1, 169, 224, 344, 362n56 public service, 62n1 Putin, Vladimir, 32, 283, 286, 289n14 Quebec, 108, 166, 346 Québécois nationalism, 322 Rae, Bob, 153 Rambouillet peace negotiations, 84 Ranke, Leopold von, 34 Rayside, David, 25 realism/neorealism, 37n16 Reform Blue Books, 6 Reform Party, 165, 166–7, 334–5 Resolute Support Mission (RSM), 135–6 Resolution 1973, 281, 283 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, 282, 292n37 Responsible Resource Development strategy, 110, 115 Reynolds, John, 263 Rhodes, Ben, 177 Rice, Jeffrey, 17 Rights and Democracy scandal, 303–4 Roberts, Kari, 281 Robertson, Colin, 25, 45, 190 Rosenau, James, 182 Rousseff, Dilma, 241 Roussel, Stéphane, 32 Russell, Frances, 25 Russia: anti-Russian rhetoric, 280; and Arctic Council, 221–2, 223; Arctic policy of, 291n30;

380 Index Russia (continued): demographics in Canada, 294n54; flag-planting in the Arctic, 280–1, 289n11; and Harper, 216–18, 281, 286–7, 358n24; and Liberal Party of Canada, 278; and Libyan Conflict, 282; and Ukraine, 285; and the US, 293n47. See also Soviet Union Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM), 283 Rwanda, 331 Sahel, 282 Saskatchewan, 101 Saunders, Doug, 280–1 Scanga, Vanessa, 17 Scheer, Andrew, 269 Schmitz, Gerald J., 355n2 scientific freedom, 69n64 Scruton, Roger, 27, 28 Secretary of State for Canada-US relations, 7 security agenda (and the Americas), 245–7 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), 171–2, 201 Selley, Chris, 361n51 September 11 attacks, 85–6, 131–2, 170 Serdyukov, Anatoly, 283 Siddiqui, Haroon, 25 Simon, Mary, 214 Simpson, Jeffrey, 35 Slater, Joanne, 312 Smith, Heather, 248, 250n3 Smith, Jordan Michael, 25 Social Gospel tradition, 335 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), 303–4 softwood lumber trade, 171–2 South Africa, 322–3 sovereignty: Canadian, 279, 280; Harper government on, 12, 183. See also

Arctic, the: sovereignty in; Palestinians: sovereignty of Soviet Union, 277. See also Russia Spavor, Michael, 273n14 Stairs, Denis, 79–80 Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, 82 Standing Committee on National Defence, 146, 217–18 Stanfield Report, 297 Staring, Scott, 94n4 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 260, 269 Strait of Hormuz, 218 Strategic Counsel, 147 strategic culture, 128–30, 131–2 strategic partnership (as a term), 259 Sub-Saharan Africa. See Africa suicide of soldiers, 161n93 Summit of the Americas, 235, 241 Swift, Jamie, 125 Syria, 172, 283–4, 310 Taliban, the, 131, 132, 143, 162n94. See also Afghanistan terrorist organizations, 131 Thérien, Jean-Philippe, 18 “Third Option” strategy, 198–202 “Three Amigos” summits, 171 Throne Speeches, 5, 9–10, 11, 12–14 Tiessen, Rebecca, 328–9 trade agreements, 11 trade of softwood lumber, 170–1 trade policy, 191–2, 203–4 trade promotion, 12 Trans Mountain pipeline expansion (TMX), 110, 115, 116 TransCanada, 173 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 14, 172–3, 190, 195, 197–8 Trudeau, Justin: on Conservatives’ foreign policy, 204; and Harper, 124–5,

179, 180–1; Harper on, 189, 361n54; and hostage diplomacy, 269; and Obama, 177, 186n45; reception of, 42; and Trump, 177 Trudeau, Justin, government of: and Africa, 335–6; and the Americas, 249; and the Arctic, 227; change in culture under, 59–60, 124–5, 249; changes under, 353–4; and China, 264–5; and climate change, 99, 112, 116; and foreign policy, 59–60; and Israel, 309–11; and Keystone XL pipeline project, 176; management style of, 60, 72n116; and multilateralism, 265, 266, 354; and pipelines, 123n72; and trade talks, 249–50 Trudeau, Pierre: and the Arctic, 213; and China, 257, 270; and the Soviet Union, 277; and “Third Option” strategy, 198; trade under, 194 Trump, Donald: about, 177; anti-Trump sentiment in Canada, 188n64, 265–6; and Canada-US relations, 266; effect on Canadian interests/commitments, 266; Harper on, 177, 180; and Iran, 180; and Keystone XL pipeline project, 181; and NAFTA, 178–9; opposition to free trade, 178; and Trudeau, 177; “tweet-storms” of, 179, 182 Turenne Sjolander, Claire, 248, 250n3 Turning the Corner, 103 tweets, 179, 182, 279 Tymoshenko, Yulia, 285 Ukraine: and Canada-US relations, 173; Canadian relations with/interests in, 19, 284–6, 349, 351–2; crisis in, 279; demographics in Canada, 294n54; and Kenney, 285; and NATO, 19, 279–80 Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC), 284–5, 293n51 UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), 89

Index 381 UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 217, 223 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 223 United Jewish Appeal Federation of Greater Toronto (UJA), 303–4 United National Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 99–100, 101, 105, 108–9, 114. See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) United Nations (UN): and Africa, 323; and Canada, 134–5; and Harper, 8, 29, 77, 79, 83–4, 126–7, 130; and Iraq War, 137; and Mackenzie King, 78; Millennium Development Goals, 81, 83; and Palestine, 300; and peacekeeping, 278, 329. See also Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 216 United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), 87 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 299 United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), 106 United States International Trade Commission, 170 UN Security Council (UNSC): and Arab League, 281–2; and Baird, 289n12; and Canada, 55–6, 66n39, 78, 79–80, 84–5, 122n64, 127, 141n41, 289n12; UN Security Council (UNSC) and Germany, 78; and Hussein, 127; and Mali, 331; and Portugal, 78, 80; reputation of, 27; and Resolution 1973, 281, 283. See also Axworthy, Lloyd US, the, 101, 102, 105, 178, 200, 293n47

382 Index US-Canada relations. See Canada-US relations vehicle fuel economy standards, 101, 105–6, 107, 113, 114 Victims of Communism (memorial), 278, 288n6 Vilnius Group, 277 Visegrad Group, 277 VTsIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center), 283 Wales Summit, 133 War of 1812 bicentennial commemoration programming, 88–9 War on Terror, 85–7 “warm economics,” 258, 263 warrior nation, Canada as a, 44, 125, 144, 182, 346, 351 wars, Canada’s participation in, 168. See also Afghanistan; Iraq Waxman-Markey Bill, 104–5 weapons of mass destruction, 87 Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, 34

Wells, Paul, 34 West Bank, 298. See also Israel West European and Other Group (WEOG), 78, 80 Western Climate Initiative (WCI), 100, 108, 115–16 Western Sahel, 282 Westminster model of public administration, 47 white hats/black hats (conceptual frame), 31–2, 34 Wilkins, David, 281 Will, George F., 27–8 Wilson, Michael, 50, 172 Winfield, Mark, 17 Wolfe, Robert, 195 women, 14, 249 xenophobia, 200–1 Xi Jinping, 267–8 Yanukovych, Viktor, 285 Yellowknife, 215 Yushchenko, Viktor, 294n56