Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics 9780231522403

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HARMONY AND WAR

Contemporary Asia in the World

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CONTEMPORARY ASIA IN THE WORLD David C. Kang and Victor D. Cha, Editors This series aims to address a gap in the public-policy and scholarly discussion of Asia. It seeks to promote books and studies that are on the cutting edge of their respective disciplines or in the promotion of multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary research but that are also accessible to a wider readership. The editors seek to showcase the best scholarly and public-policy arguments on Asia from any field, including politics, history, economics, and cultural studies. Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia, Victor D. Cha, 2008 The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online, Guobin Yang, 2009 China and India: Prospects for Peace, Jonathan Holslag, 2010 India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia, Šumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, 2010 Living with the Dragon: How the American Public Views the Rise of China, Benjamin I. Page and Tao Xie, 2010 East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute, David C. Kang, 2010

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HARMONY AND WAR: CONFUCIAN CULTURE AND CHINESE POWER POLITICS

Yuan-kang Wang

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

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NEW YORK

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columbia university press Publishers Since 1893 New York  Chichester, West Sussex Copyright © 2011 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wang, Yuan-Kang. Harmony and war : Confucian culture and Chinese power politics / Yuan-kang Wang. p. cm. — (Contemporary Asia in the world) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-231-15140-5 (cloth : acid-free paper) — ISBN 978-0-231-52240-3 (ebook) 1. China—History—Song dynasty, 960-1279.  2. China—History—Ming dynasty, 1368–1644.  3. China—Military policy.  4. China—Strategic aspects.  5. Confucianism—China— History.  6. Confucianism—Political aspects—China—History.  7. Power (Social sciences)—China—History.  8. Harmony (Philosophy)—Political aspects—China—History.  9. Militarism—China—History.  I. Title.  II. Series. DS751.3.W375 327.51—dc22

2011 2010025011

Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. This book is printed on paper with recycled content. Printed in the United States of America c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared.

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To the memory of my father

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CONTENTS

List of Illustrations  ix List of Tables  xi Preface  xiii

1. Confucian Strategic Culture and the Puzzle  1 2. Culture and Strategic Choice  11 3. The Northern Song Dynasty (960–1127)  34 4. The Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279)  77 5. The Ming Dynasty (1368–1644)  101 6. The Ming Tribute System  145 7. Chinese Power Politics in the Age of U.S. Unipolarity  181 Notes  211 Glossary: Chinese Terms  271 Bibliography  275 Index  295

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ILLUSTRATIONS

MAPS

3.1. Song China and the Liao Empire, 1100  35 3.2. The Sixteen Prefectures and Song-Liao Conflicts  42 3.3. The Song Invasion of the Xi Xia, 1081  71 4.1. Southern Song and the Jin Empire, 1200  78 5.1. Ming China About 1580  117 6.1. The Seven Voyages of Zheng He (1405–1433)  158 FIGURES

3.1. Cumulative Frequencies of Conflict Initiation (960–1127)  57 4.1. Cumulative Frequencies of Conflict Initiation (1127–1234)  94 5.1. Grain Production in Military Colonies (1403–1571)  112 5.2. Cumulative Frequencies of Conflict Initiation (1368–1643)  112

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TABLES

1.1.  Major Periods in Imperial China  8 2.1.  Competing Theories of Chinese Strategic Choice  23 3.1.  Origins of Midlevel Song Officials and Above  38 3.2.  Song State Budget, 960–1059  56 3.3.  Itemized Tax Revenue, 1004–1047  64 4.1.  Percentage of Troops Controlled by the Four Generals  88 5.1.  Backgrounds of Ming Grand Secretaries, 1403–1644  104 5.2.  Degrees Held by Local Officials  105 5.3.  Horse Population During the Reign of Emperor Yongle  110 5.4.  Soldier Shortages in the Nine Garrisons (1541) 129 5.5. Military Disbursements from the Central Treasury to Border Garrisons  130 5.6.  Fiscal Situation of the Ming Treasury  140 6.1.  Ming China’s Seven Maritime Expeditions, 1405–1433  163 7.1.  The Power Structure of the United States and China (2007)  193

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PREFACE

is about the power politics of Confucian China. In general, Confucianism favors harmony and condemns war. The Great Wall of China is often said to be the symbol of an enduring Confucian strategic culture that is pacifist, antimilitary, and defensive. As Beijing engineers its rise on the world stage, Chinese leaders have employed the Confucian precept of harmony and benevolence to allay international fears of an increasingly powerful China. Did Confucianism constrain China’s decision to use force in the past? Did Chinese leaders consistently adopt a defensive grand strategy? Were Chinese war aims limited to border protection and restoration of the status quo ante? Most important, what can we learn from the past to shed light on the strategic trajectory of an ascendant China in today’s world? To answer these questions, I examine Chinese military policy during the Song dynasty (960–1279) and the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Based on a review of the important strategic decisions made by the Chinese leaders during these two periods, I argue that relative power concerns were at the heart of Chinese strategic choices; Confucian culture failed to constrain Chinese use of force. Instead, China was clearly a practitioner of realpolitik, behaving much like other great powers have throughout world history. Chinese decisions to use force were predicated on leaders’ assessment of the relative strength between China and its adversary. Moreover, Chinese grand strategy was not consistently defensive but, rather, was correlated with the country’s relative power: China tended to adopt an offensive grand strategy when its power was relatively strong and a defensive one when its power was relatively weak. In addition, Chinese leaders have not restricted their war aims to deterrence and border protection but at times adopted expansive goals such as acquisition of territory, destruction of enemy power, and total military victory.

THIS BOOK

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xiv  PREFACE

Notwithstanding the dominance of an antimilitarist Confucian culture, warfare was not uncommon in Chinese history. What caused Chinese leaders to practice realpolitik was anarchy. The anarchic structure of the system forced Chinese leaders, despite their training and socialization in Confucian discourse, to pursue power and even to go to war if necessary. In short, anarchy trumps culture. In writing this book, I came to subvert many of the deep-seated beliefs that I had acquired in my early education. While growing up in Taiwan, I received instructions in Chinese history and Confucian classics at school. The narratives that I was taught corresponded with conventional wisdom: a peaceful Confucian culture had produced a state that was defensive-minded and avoided outward expansion; the Chinese world order was constructed according to the way of the king (wang dao), not the way of the hegemon (ba dao); and Chinese territory expanded by the spreading of Confucian culture, not by military force. This study challenges all of these standard articulations. In a sense, this book is also a journey of self-reflection. I have incurred a long list of scholarly debts along the way. The stimulating intellectual environment at the University of Chicago nurtured me and this project. John Mearsheimer, in particular, encouraged me to ask an important question and undertake a study of Chinese military history using international relations theory. There were times when I doubted whether political scientists, whose minds focus on the present, would be interested in a study of China’s distant past, but John’s unflinching support and encouragement over the years kept me focused on the research. This book would not have been possible without him. I also thank two other members of my doctoral committee. Charles Glaser was generous in providing useful insights and critiques and cheerfully responded to my requests for help. Robert Pape spent many hours with me over coffee discussing my project and helped me sharpen my argument. I benefited immensely from their insightful advice and suggestions. A postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs allowed me to continue research on this project and receive invaluable feedback. Over the years, many people gave me helpful comments. First and foremost, I am deeply grateful to Andrew Marble, who read the various incarnations of this project with tremendous patience. His incisive comments and editorial skills greatly enhanced the manuscript. I am also indebted to Warren Cohen and Edward Friedman, who read the entire manuscript and offered astute suggestions. The generosity of both these scholars is much appreciated. Early drafts of this research were presented at the Program on International Security Policy and the Program on International

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PREFACE  xv

Politics, Economics, and Security at the University of Chicago, the Midwest Conference on Asian Affairs, the Midwest Political Science Association, the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica in Taipei, the Brookings Institution, the International Studies Association, and the American Political Science Association. For comments on drafts and presentations, I thank Alexander Wendt, Duncan Snidal, Daniel Drezner, Alexander Thompson, Alexander Downes, Deborah Boucoyannis, Takayuki Nishi, Dong Sun Lee, Sebastian Rosato, Jeffrey Hart, Kenneth Klinkner, Changhe Su, Steve Miller, Richard Rosecrance, Fiona Adamson, David Edelstein, Christopher Twomey, John Garofano, Ronald Krebs, Staci Goddard, Gregory Mitrovich, Yu-shan Wu, Richard Bush, Daniel Kempton, John Vasquez, Douglas Gibler, and Victoria Hui. Pardon me if I miss anyone. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Richard Bush for a visiting fellowship in the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. The opportunity came at a crucial time and allowed me conduct research on contemporary Chinese grand strategy, which became the basis for the last chapter of this book. I also thank Jeffery Bader for moderating a presentation of this research at the Brookings. For financial support at various stages of this research, I thank the Andrew Mellon Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation (through the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago), the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation, the National Science Council in Taiwan, and the Brookings Institution. I also thank my colleagues in the Department of Diplomacy at the National Chengchi University in Taipei and Shih-yueh Yang for his research assistance. Some of the research was conducted during my employment in the Department of Political Science at Northern Illinois University. I thank my colleagues, especially Daniel Kempton, Christopher Jones, and Danny Unger for their collegiality and support. At Western Michigan University, I am indebted to David Hartmann for a timely course release that allowed me to finally tidy up the manuscript. I am also grateful to Anne Routon of the Columbia University Press for shepherding me through the review and publication process. I thank the two anonymous reviewers commissioned by the Press for their helpful comments and suggestions. Above all else, I thank my wife, Chien-Juh Gu, for her love and unqualified support. Also an academic, she knew how important this book meant to me and patiently accompanied me every step of the way. She kept my spirits up in down times and helped me see the big picture. My life is amply

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xvi  PREFACE

enriched because of her. The arrival our two wonderful boys, Kevin and John, made our life complete and full of fun. Watching them grow is one of the most joyful experiences in life. Finally, I could not be where I am without the unconditional support and love of my parents. I dedicate this book to the memory of my father.

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HARMONY AND WAR

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1 CONFUCIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE PUZZLE

is increasingly felt around the globe. Its booming economy, growing military might, and rising diplomatic clout are gradually changing the international landscape. As China rises, many observers are wondering how a rich and powerful China will behave in the world. International relations (IR) scholarship offers various answers to this important question, ranging from dangerous power transition to cooperative international integration and to peaceful identity transformation.1 Yet, for Chinese civilian and military strategists, one argument repeatedly stands out: Because of its Confucian culture, China has not behaved aggressively toward others throughout history and will continue to be a pacific power after it has risen on today’s world stage. Confucianism denigrates the efficacy of military force as an instrument of statecraft, giving rise to a strategic culture that is pacifist, defensive, and nonexpansionist. The Great Wall embodied China’s strategic culture of peace and defense. According to this view, existing IR theory, developed mainly in the West, where wars were abundant, is ill suited to explain and understand the distinctive Chinese experience centered on peace and harmony. Chinese strategists are enamored of the distinction between the brutal, hegemonic way (ba dao) of the Western powers and the benevolent, kingly way (wang dao) of the Chinese world order. The West, they argue, is quick to use force to resolve interstate disputes, but China has always shunned violence in preference to defense and diplomacy. Against the realpolitik tradition of the West, China did not expand in history even when it was powerful. Chinese military strategists have given considerable attention to cultural variables. Lieutenant General Li Jijun of the Academy of Military Science, who first introduced the concept of “strategic culture” to China, argues that “the defensive character of China’s strategic culture is widely recognized in the world.”2 General Xu Xin, former deputy chief of staff of the People’s

CHINA’S WEIGHT

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2  CONFUCIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE PUZZLE

Liberation Army, argues that “the Chinese nation has a long tradition of honoring peace. As early as two thousand years ago, Confucius has emphasized that ‘peace should be cherished.’”3 Because of this preoccupation with defense, generations of Chinese leaders have chosen not to pursue an offensive-oriented strategy. Contemporary civilian analysts, though not necessarily using the term “strategic culture,” also suggest that China has a cultural preference for peace, harmony, and defense. Unlike the Westphalian system, in which interstate relations were formally equal but conflictual, the Confucian world order with China at the center was, in the words of Qin Yaqing, “unequal but benign.”4 Official policy papers and public statements by top leaders hew to the idea of a pacifist strategic culture. In a 2005 foreign policy white paper, the Chinese foreign ministry proclaimed that “Chinese culture is a pacific one.”5 The 2006 Defense White Paper stated that “China pursues a national defense policy which is purely defensive in nature.”6 The late senior leader Deng Xiaoping reiterated on several occasions that “China’s strategy is always and will be defensive. . . . If China is modernized in the future, its strategy will still be defensive.”7 Former Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen remarked, “China has never had the tradition of expanding abroad.”8 In a speech delivered at Harvard University in 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao stated, “Peace loving has been a time-honored quality of the Chinese nation. The very first emperor of the Qin dynasty commanded the building of the Great Wall 2,000 years ago for defense purposes.”9 President Hu Jintao announced in 2004 that “China since ancient times has had a fine tradition of sincerity, benevolence, kindness and trust towards its neighbors.”10 Granted, almost every nation will proclaim that it is peace-loving and that its security policy is defensive. What is striking about the Chinese case is the extent to which this preference for nonviolent, defensive measures is emphasized by the political, military, and academic elites—so much so that Andrew Scobell terms it the “Chinese Cult of Defense.”11 Like their Chinese counterparts, international analysts have long subscribed to the notion that Confucian culture has constrained China’s use of military force. In the West, the pacifist image of China has been in existence since the Enlightenment, when the philosophes praised Chinese civilization as “rational and peaceful.”12 Max Weber wrote about “the pacifist character of Confucianism” and observed, “The Confucianists, who are ultimately pacifist literati oriented to inner political welfare, naturally faced military powers with aversion or with lack of understanding.”13 John K. Fairbank asserted that Chinese culture has a “pacifist bias,” rendering the use of

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CONFUCIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE PUZZLE  3

force a “last resort.”14 Ralph Sawyer argued, “Despite incessant barbarian incursions and major military threats throughout their history . . . Imperial China was little inclined to pursue military solutions to external aggression.”15 Writing on the revival of Confucianism in today’s China, Daniel Bell opined, “Confucian theorizing on just and unjust war has the potential to play the role of constraining China’s imperial ventures abroad, just as it did in the past.”16 The popularity of this cultural argument cannot be overemphasized, yet there have been surprisingly few studies examining the proposition that China’s Confucian culture has constrained its use of force against external threats during its imperial past. Most of the existing studies focus on the People’s Republic of China after 1949, a period in which China has never been in a dominant position in the system. Few IR scholars have ventured to study Imperial China as the main body of their research.17 As such, they provide inadequate guidance on the issue of how China will behave when its power rises in the future. If history is any guide, studying Chinese strategic behaviors in the past will likely shed light on its future behavior. When was China most likely to use force? How had China behaved as it grew more powerful? Did Chinese war aims expand in the absence of systemic and military constraints? This book provides answers to these important questions.

THE CENTRAL QUESTION The central question of this study is: To what extent does culture influence a state’s use of military force against external security threats? Put in the context of China, did Confucian culture constrain Chinese use of force in the past? This question is grounded in IR theory. Structural realism holds that anarchy, defined as the absence of a central authority above states, pushes states to engage in power competition and use force when necessary; a state’s culture does not have an independent effect on how it behaves in the world.18 Cultural theories, in contrast, argue that ideational factors such as culture can transform the harmful effects of anarchy and have an independent effect on state behaviors. For instance, Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara argue that, in the aftermath of World War II, a culture of pacifism has become institutionalized in Japan, to the extent that Japanese policymakers no longer follow the logic of realist theory.19 Thomas Berger suggests that Japan’s “culture of anti-militarism” makes it very hard for that country to assume a substantial military role.20 According to cultural theorists, if leaders can forgo

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4  CONFUCIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE PUZZLE

the realist ideas of competition and instead cultivate the norms of cooperation, then international politics can be transformed; conflicts among states will no longer be inevitable. In the extant literature, there are two strands of cultural explanations in regard to China’s strategic behavior: Confucian pacifism and cultural realism. Both maintain that culture has an independent effect on how states behave in the world, but they disagree sharply over which culture best characterizes the Chinese tradition. Confucian pacifism depicts Chinese use of force as reluctant, reactive, and defensive.21 The antimilitarist ideas of China’s Confucian culture proscribed the use of violence in statecraft and prescribed peaceful, noncoercive means in resolving disputes. Having an antimilitarist strategic culture, China has rarely taken the initiative in using force—its actual use of force was for self-defense, a response to the aggression of others. Confucianism denigrates the efficacy of violence in statecraft and preaches peace and harmony in state-to-state relations: war is aberrant; brute force begets chaos. The use of force was unnecessary, futile, and counterproductive. The key to national security is good domestic governance built on moral education as well as cultivation of benevolence and virtue among the country’s leaders. Following Confucian precepts, a wealthy and powerful China has historically been a benign hegemon, not an expansionist power bent on dominating others. Looking ahead, because of this cultural heritage, a strong China will not behave aggressively toward others, nor will it be an expansionist power—even though its capabilities to do so have increased. In contradistinction to Confucian pacifism, cultural realism sees Chinese use of force as eager, proactive, and offensive. While acknowledging the parallel existence of Confucian pacifism, which is said to be symbolic and inoperative, Alastair Iain Johnston contends that China has had an often neglected, but operational, strand of realpolitik strategic culture.22 Because of this strategic culture, China viewed conflict as inevitable, held a zero-sum view of the adversary, and valued the utility of force in resolving interstate disputes. Furthermore, in times of superior strength, China preferred to pursue an offensive, expansionist grand strategy that included extended campaigns beyond the borders, annexation of territories, and total annihilation of adversaries. In times of relative weakness, China adopted a defensive grand strategy such as static defense and deterrence, or even an accommodationist grand strategy that entailed territorial concessions, economic incentives, and peace treaties. Contrary to the claim of Confucian pacifism, a rise in China’s relative power would lead to an increasingly aggressive, belligerent, and expansionist security policy. Importantly, according to cultural realism, Chinese

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CONFUCIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE PUZZLE  5

realpolitik was not a product of the anarchic structure of the system but rather a product of social learning. Chinese strategists have learned the precepts of realpolitik by reading the Seven Military Classics as well as other military writings. Because power politics is learned, it can therefore be unlearned. The hardwiring of realpolitik thinking in Chinese leaders can hence be replaced by a more peaceful discourse.23 Both Confucian pacifism and cultural realism start from a cultural, ideational perspective. Structural realism, on the other hand, holds that culture has little effect on how states behave in the world. The theory argues that, in an anarchic system, the distribution of power, not country-specific strategic cultures, accounts for much of international outcome and state behavior. In this view, the material structure of the system exerts overriding influence on state behavior. Realists do not deny that when international pressures are not salient, a state’s cultural and historical legacies may have an effect on its strategic behavior, but they do insist that power considerations frequently trump unit-level variables such as culture, ideology, and regime type. International anarchy, defined as the absence of a higher authority above states, is the permissive condition that allows war to occur regardless of the intentions of states. Because war is always a possibility in an anarchic system, survivalseeking states will arm themselves for security and seek to gain relative power at the expense of others, since power is the key to survival in a system with no central authority to protect states from aggression. A powerful state, with more resources at disposal, will pursue an offensive grand strategy by expanding its political, economic, and military interests abroad. Hence, structural realism shares with cultural realism an identical view of state behavior; they differ, however, over the source of realpolitik behavior, which structural realism attributes to the material structure of the system, whereas cultural realism finds the roots in a state’s strategic culture. Which of the three theories is the most persuasive? China provides an excellent opportunity to test competing theories about structural and cultural influence on state behaviors. Rarely in human history can we find a case like China in which a single pacifist culture dominated both the bureaucracy and the society for two thousand years. In comparison, the two familiar cases of culturalists (Japan and German) comprise only fifty years and are confounded by the security guarantee of the United States. Additionally, many scholars have argued for China’s uniqueness and nonrealist predilections in its dealings with foreign states.24 Hence in terms of ideational influence on a state’s strategic behavior, China presents a “most-likely case” for culturally contingent explanations, given the dominant influence of Confucianism. If

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6  CONFUCIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE PUZZLE

culture affects a state’s decision to use military force, we would expect to see markedly pacifist behaviors in the Chinese case. In this way, China presents a “least-likely case” for structural realism, which argues that structural imperatives force a state to be aggressive, regardless of its culture. In other words, China could be a crucial case for those who privilege the influence of anarchic structure and those who privilege cultural, ideational influence on state behavior.25 If structural realism holds up after such a tough test, the theory gains more credibility, since we would expect cultural theories to perform better in the Chinese case. Last but not least, structural realism is a theory that has its empirical roots in the West. By including a major case in Asia, starting as early as the tenth century, this study makes for a stronger test. I avoid “double counting” of the data by examining cases outside the West. If structural realism passes the test, it refutes the assertion that IR theory is ill suited for the non-Western world.26

RESEARCH STRATEGIES The central concern of this study is to examine whether culture has a significant influence on the strategic choice of states. To do that, the decisionmaking process will be crucial. By carefully scrutinizing the decision process, we can ascertain whether cultural considerations or power concerns motivated Chinese leaders to choose a particular military strategy. That is, we must investigate the conditions under which top leaders decided to go to war, strengthen defense, or sue for peace. We must also look into the relationship between increased military capability and war-proneness and examine whether Chinese war aims were purely defensive in nature or actually contained offensive objectives such as annihilation of the adversary and conquest of territory. As the methodology that can best answer the proposed research question, I employ the method of structured, focused comparison.27 I test for congruence of the fit between the theory’s predictions and the historical evidence and process-trace the decisions leading up to the adoption of a particular military strategy. This method is the most appropriate for my study because the nuances and contextual richness of historical case studies provide essential information about the key factors driving Chinese national security policymaking. Process-tracing has a unique advantage over other research methods.28 In cases in which Confucian pacifism and structural realism predict similar outcomes (for example, low-coercive strategies in times of military

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CONFUCIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE PUZZLE  7

weakness), examining the decision-making process of Chinese leaders choosing defense or not using force can help us resolve whether this decision was an outcome of cultural preference, as Confucian pacifism would expect, or an outcome of the military balance of power, as structural realism would expect. In addition to detailed studies of cases, the number of cases should be large enough to enhance the external validity and robustness of our findings while allowing us to identity the motives that led Chinese leaders to select certain military strategies at different times. Whenever appropriate, I supplement my case studies with quantitative data showing the overall trend between Chinese power and war-proneness. The universe of cases is vast in Imperial China, considering its more than two thousand years of written history (see table 1.1). To make the task manageable, I use the following criteria to select cases. First, the strength of Confucian ideology should be high in the selected periods, as indicated by its institutionalization through the civil service examinations and embeddedness in state and society. The proportion of recruited scholar-officials in the central decision-making apparatus and the development of Confucian thoughts among Chinese intellectuals are important clues to the breadth and depth of Confucianism in a particular period. Second, for a test of the Confucian strategic culture, the selected periods should more or less be insulated from non-Chinese influence. In the case of conquest dynasties (such as the Mongol Yuan dynasty and the Manchu Qing dynasty), Chinese strategic culture could be confounded with non-Chinese cultural heritages brought in by the alien conquerors. Third, the cases should be selected in a way that maximizes variations on our study variables. Specifically, the selected periods should include China at the height of its power as well as at the nadir; the strategic decisions should include both the use and nonuse of force; and the security environments should entail a variety of actors and threats. Based on these case selection criteria, I concentrate on two major periods in Chinese history: the Song dynasty (960–1279) and the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). First, these two dynasties are arguably the most Confucian periods in Chinese history, making them most-likely cases for Confucian pacifism but least-likely cases for structural realism. Compared to previous dynasties, Confucianism had become deeply imbedded in state and society since the Song dynasty.29 The breadth and depth of Confucian culture in the Song and the Ming dynasties makes them ideal cases for a test of the cultural argument. Second, these two dynasties are the most recent ones ruled by Han Chinese, not by alien conquerors such as the Yuan or the Qing dynasty. In other words,

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8  CONFUCIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE PUZZLE

TABLE 1.1  Major

Periods in Imperial China

PERIOD

YEAR

Spring and Autumn

722–481 BCE

Warring States

403–221 BCE

Qin

221–206 BCE

Han

206 BCE–220 CE

Period of North-South Disunion

220–589 CE

Northern Wei

386–535 CE

Sui

589–618 CE

Tang

618–907 CE

Five Dynasties and Ten States

907–960 CE

Song

960–1279 CE

Yuan (Mongols)

1279–1368 CE

Ming

1368–1644 CE

Qing (Manchus)

1644–1912 CE

they are “pure” Chinese dynasties; the influence of non-Chinese traditions could be more or less ruled out.30 Third, interdynastic comparison is superior to a single dynastic study. Each dynasty faced a different strategic environment. The Song was relatively weak and had never achieved hegemony in East Asia, whereas the Ming was much more powerful and had achieved regional hegemony. By examining two different dynasties, I have ensured that a security decision was not unique to a particular dynasty but rather a more universal phenomenon that has endured across different strategic contexts. Within each dynasty, I examine a series of strategic decisions involving the use and non-use of force, thus significantly multiplying the number of observable cases. These cases are identified when the Chinese court was seriously contemplating using force against external adversaries and when such deliberations were reserved in court documents. In the end, about thirty cases involving Chinese strategic choices are examined. The relatively large number of cases across a long time period (nearly six hundred years) promise

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to enhance the theoretical and empirical rigor of the results. In each dynasty, I focus on China’s security policy toward its main rivals, that is, those political units that had the potential to threaten Chinese survival and dominate the system. To broaden the scope of this study, I devote a chapter to examining China’s relations with other lesser powers in the Ming tribute system (see chapter 6). The tribute system profoundly affected the benign perception of the Chinese world order, and thus warrants a detailed treatment in a separate chapter. I employ a large amount of primary Chinese sources, supplemented by well-regarded secondary literature. To trace China’s decisions to use force, I examine policy debates that are preserved in official histories or the policy memorials (zouzhe) submitted to the emperors. I consult authoritative primary sources commonly used by historians of China. In lieu of mechanical content analysis, I closely read through court documents to uncover the actual cause of strategic choice. Of all the countries in East Asia, China has kept the most detailed historical records. Written or compiled by Confucian scholar-officials, these records had a tendency to describe events in terms favorable to China at the expense of the adversaries. Therefore, great discretion must be exercised.31 I minimize potential bias by consulting respected historiographies that seek to present a balanced account of China’s external conflicts. I will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the role of culture in strategic studies and the relevant theories as pertained to China. I lay out the research design and derive hypotheses on three strategic issues: grand strategy, use of force, and war aims. Next, I begin the task of comparing hypothesis and evidence. Chapter 3 presents an in-depth case study of the Northern Song dynasty’s security policy toward the more powerful Liao Empire and toward the Xi Xia state. Chapter 4 examines the Southern Song dynasty’s military struggle with the stronger Jin Empire. These two chapters investigate Chinese strategic choice when the country was the weaker power in the system. Chapters 5 and 6 examine Chinese strategic behavior when the country was the stronger power. Unlike the Song dynasty, the Ming dynasty was able to establish regional hegemony in East Asia. In Chapter 5, I focus on the Ming’s enduring rivalry with the Mongols and the decision to build the Great Wall. Chapter 6 studies Ming China’s tribute system by examining four cases—the annexation of Vietnam (1407–1427), seven maritime expeditions (1405–1433), Hami in Inner Asia (1473–1528), and the Sino-Japanese War over Korea (1592–1598). Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of the previous historical

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analysis and discusses how Confucian culture supplements realist theory. I then examine the current grand strategy of the People’s Republic of China and explicate the strategic logic underlying the policy of “peaceful development.” This study suggests that China will gradually shift to an offensiveoriented grand strategy as its power continues to grow.

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states aggress? Why do states use force to settle external disputes? The history of international relations is replete with examples of states conquering territories, making threats against each other, resolving disputes with force, expanding war aims, and coercing others into submission. Why do states behave this way? There is no shortage of explanations in the international relations (IR) scholarship: domestic pathologies, leadership traits, unbalanced distribution of power, misperception of intentions, and miscalculation of capabilities, to name just a few. Scholarship on China, however, frequently uses culture to explain a state’s grand strategy and decision to use force: strategic culture profoundly influences how a state positions itself in the world as well as how it treats its neighbors. The use of cultural variables is so widespread that, in Andrew Scobell’s words, “cultural interpretations have been at the core of the majority of studies of China’s foreign relations.”1 Three theories are most pertinent to Chinese security policy—Confucian pacifism, cultural realism, and structural realism. This chapter reviews the international-relations literature regarding cultural and structural theories of state behavior and examines the three theories in detail as they apply to China. WHY DO

CULTURE IN SECURITY STUDIES The idea that culture affects a state’s external behavior has broad intuitive appeal. Policymakers and commentators frequently use culture as an independent variable to explain, or expect, the foreign policy of another state. During World War II, for example, the U.S. military asked cultural anthropologists to profile the cultures of Japan and Germany as a guide to their strategic

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behaviors.2 The use of cultural variables in the study of international relations has a rich and long tradition. Although comprising different strands (national character, organizational culture, strategic culture, political culture, global culture, and so forth), cultural theories share a common dissatisfaction with realism.3 In general, in their analysis culturalists challenge realism’s emphasis on the role of material power in influencing strategic choice and privilege ideas, identity, and norms of appropriate behavior.4 Cultural theories attribute a state’s strategic choice to ideational variables, often at the unit level.5 That is, they trace the source of a state’s behavior primarily to culture—understood as shared ideas, beliefs, and values collectively held within a society or by its elites that are transmitted from one generation to the next through a process of socialization.6 Cultural norms not only have “constitutive effects” that define the identity of an actor, but they also have “regulative effects” that prescribe appropriate behavior.7 For example, one constitutive effect of strategic culture is that policymakers adhere to certain norms or rules of behavior, not for fear of the consequences of nonadherence, but because violation of these norms is considered illegitimate and inappropriate. In this sense, strategic culture limits the options of plausible policy choices and renders certain alternatives unacceptable. The thrust of culturalism is that norms tell us who we are and affect how we behave. If we could change what we think in our heads, we would be able to change how we behave. Cultural theories maintain that the effect of material structure on state behavior is indeterminate.8 Instead, material structure such as the international distribution of power must be viewed through a cultural prism in order to have effects on state behavior. As Alexander Wendt argues, “The distribution of capabilities only has the effects on international politics that it does because of the desiring and believing state agents who give it meaning.”9 For culturalists, strategic culture serves as cognitive lenses through which state agents give meanings to material structure. This, however, does not mean that material structures are irrelevant in affecting state behavior. As Alastair Iain Johnston notes, “What gives them causal power are the interpretations or meanings given to them.”10 The structure of international politics must hence be interpreted by state agents through strategic culture in order to have any effect on strategic choice. In contrast to country-specific strategic cultures, the structural theory of international relations seeks to explain international outcomes and state behaviors from a systemic perspective.11 The theory argues that anarchy, defined as the absence of central authority above states, drives states to behave

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aggressively toward each other. In contrast to cultural explanations, structural theory argues that structural effects will override domestic factors such as culture, ideology, and regime type. As Kenneth Waltz explains, “an internationalpolitical system is one of self-help. In a self-help system, states are differently placed by their power. States are self-regarding units. State behavior varies more with differences of power than with differences in ideology, in internal structure of property relations, or in government form. In self-help systems, the pressures of competition weigh more heavily than ideological preferences or internal pressures.”12 In other words, two states with different domestic characteristics, such as culture or regime type, would behave similarly if placed under the same structural conditions. Cultural variables, be they pacifism or militarism, do not have an independent causal effect in explaining state behavior. States with different historical or cultural backgrounds will tend to behave similarly in an anarchic system. By focusing on the structural causes of war, structural theory demonstrates that anarchy can push well-intentioned states to behave aggressively toward others. External environment, not internal characteristics, largely influences how states behave in the world and provides the most powerful force shaping the likelihood of war and peace. Changes in the character of states at the unit level will not eliminate the causes of war at the structural level. For example, turning autocracies into democracies or altering the strategic culture of states will not necessarily produce peaceful external behavior—these are changes in the system, not of the system; the structural causes of conflict still exist. The situational context in which a state finds itself vis-à-vis others can force it to adopt policies that make war likely. For instance, Germany’s naval buildup in the early twentieth century can be seen as a response to Britain’s dominance at sea, which had the effect of making war more likely. “The tragedy of international relations,” writes Fareed Zakaria, “is that it does not take bad states to produce bad outcomes.”13 The following section will explicate the cultural and structural theories as pertained to China. In the Chinese case, there are two variants of cultural explanation: Confucian pacifism stresses Chinese decision makers’ aversion to violence and tendency to resolve security issues through defensive and noncoercive measures, whereas cultural realism emphasizes Chinese leaders’ preference to use force to eliminate security threats but attributes such a realpolitik inclination to culture. Structural realism agrees with cultural realism on Chinese leaders’ preference for realpolitik, but traces such preference to the material structure of the system.

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THREE THEORIES OF CHINESE STRATEGIC CHOICE CONFUCIAN PACIFISM

Confucian pacifism is a widely held opinion in existing scholarship on Chinese strategic behavior, particularly within China. According to this conventional wisdom, Chinese decision makers have historically stressed the primacy of defense and been reluctant to use force to resolve security problems. The use of force, in this view, is not an effective way to gain security. The best way to achieve political and military objectives, in lieu of violence, is to use stratagems, diplomatic maneuvering, cultural attraction and other nonviolent measures. Use of force signifies the failure of statecraft and should only be a last resort. As such, China seldom strikes first. When the use of force becomes necessary, it is usually in response to aggression from others. In this situation, China’s resort to violence is defensive in nature and the resulting war is usually a limited one, aiming simply to restore the status quo ante. Wars of annihilation and wars of conquest, the literature contends, are rarely used in Chinese history.14 This tendency to stress a minimal level of violence is said to stem from China’s historical legacy and Confucian culture. Confucius considered the cultivation of virtue and caring for people as far more important than military force. Aside from Confucianism, aversion to the use of force is evident in virtually all strains of Chinese philosophy, including Laozi (Daoist), Mozi (Mohist), and even Sunzi (Sun Tzu). Laozi rejects force as an effective means of statecraft, emphasizing “using softness to overcome hardness” (yi rou ke gang). Mozi condemns offensive warfare in his concept of “against attacking” (fei gong) and argues for “universal love” (jian ai) as the solution to conflict. When Sunzi does discuss force, “he does so almost always to stress the need to conserve it.” Sunzi uses the word li (force) only nine times throughout The Art of War, while Clausewitz uses Gewalt eight times in the two paragraphs defining war alone.15 Confucianism is evidently not the only school advocating nonviolent means to security, but it is undoubtedly the dominant school of thought throughout Imperial China. The minimal-violence axiom of the various ancient Chinese philosophies was absorbed into Confucianism. Any deviations from the Confucian canon risked being rejected by the mainstream. Proponents of China’s nonbelligerent, antimilitarist culture invariably traced its origins to Confucianism.16 Few would dispute that Imperial China had a Confucian culture and that this culture disparages the use of force. Although most proponents of this view do not usually use constructivist vocabulary, underlying the Confucian argument is the notion that culture

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has a significant impact on state behavior—in other words, because Chinese culture is pacifist and antimilitarist, so is its behavior. Following this logic, the literature in this vein claims that China has historically not been an expansionist country bent on dominating others. Simply stated, China has had no intentions of expanding abroad. This non-expansionist aspect of Chinese security policy still obtained when China grew in power and possessed more resources for expansion.17 Nonetheless, the fact that Chinese territory has actually expanded in history does not present an anomaly for Confucian pacifism. When expansion did occur, contends the literature, it was not accomplished by outright military conquest but, rather, by cultural attraction and the voluntary submission of the people in China’s peripheries. The resulting Sinocentric order might be hegemonic, but it was a benign one. John K. Fairbank wrote about the “pacifist bias” of Confucianism: “Warfare was disesteemed in [Confucianism]. . . . The resort to warfare (wu) was an admission of bankruptcy in the pursuit of wen [civility or culture]. Consequently, it should be a last resort. . . . Herein lies the pacifist bias of the Chinese tradition. . . . Expansion through wen . . . was natural and proper; whereas expansion by wu, brute force and conquest, was never to be condoned.”18 Many authors, implicitly or explicitly, also hold the views that Confucian pacifism placed “an emphasis on psychological warfare, on attempting to gain victory by stratagem rather than by brute force alone,”19 had an “antimilitarist bias,”20 showed “a general preference for defensive warfare,”21 esteemed the “primacy of defense” and had an “aversion to violence in war,”22 and preferred the “spread of culture as the primary means, force as a supplementary one.”23 Four key features of Confucian pacifism can be gleaned from this literature: the culture of antimilitarism, defensive grand strategy, the theory of just war, and limited war aims. THE CULTURE OF ANTIMILITARISM  As noted, scholars trace the source of

China’s pacifism to its Confucian culture. Confucianism has dominated China’s political discourse since the Han dynasty (206 bce– 220 ce), when Emperor Han Wudi adopted Confucianism as the state ideology. To help institutionalize this ideology, Confucian classics were made the sole requirement in the civil service examination system that was employed to recruit state officials. Through the examination system, virtually all state officials were trained and well versed in the Confucian discourse. Confucian scholars went to great lengths to exalt civility and culture (wen) and belittle martial behavior and force (wu). At the risk of oversimplifying a vast body of thought, Confucianism stresses the cultivation of benevolence (ren) and virtue (de) by

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the ruler as the first priority of statecraft. A virtuous ruler naturally elicits the obedience and submission, not only from his subjects but also from foreigners who come to pay tribute to the sage king. Thus, in the words of Mencius (ca. 372–289 BCE), “A benevolent person is invincible in the world” (ren zhe wu di yu tianxia).24 Chaos and disobedience arose when the ruler was morally depraved. The key to state security, both internal and external, was hence moral education and enculturation of the people and of foreigners too. Military expansion and wars of conquest, within the Confucian conception of security, undermine the legitimacy of the ruler and are therefore unnecessary and self-defeating. According to Mencius, any person claiming to be an expert at waging war has committed “a grave crime.”25 As Don Wyatt notes, the book Mencius is “replete with passages that disparage the pursuit of war,” citing warfare as the “most wasteful, counterproductive, and misguided” of all human activities.26 In Imperial China, civil officials enjoyed a superior status over their military counterparts. Civilian control of the military was highly institutionalized during most of the imperial period.27 Key positions with decision-making power were assigned to those who had passed the Confucian civil service examinations and obtained the highest jinshi degree. This had a significant impact for social mobility by attracting the best talent into the civil bureaucracy, while relegating the inferior to the military and as well as to others. As the main route to prominence in political careers, the civil service examination system institutionalized Confucian norms by requiring candidates to study Confucian classics, an educational process that usually started from early childhood and lasted for decades. Consequently, this system helped internalize the pacifist and benevolent norms of Confucianism in the minds of candidates aspiring to careers.28 As a result of state promotion of the Confucian ideology, a culture of antimilitarism prevailed in Imperial China. Because scholars in Confucian classics had the most promising future, Chinese society developed a mentality that looked down upon those who chose the military path. Although there were exceptions, soldiers have generally held low status in Chinese society since the Song dynasty.29 A popular ballad of the time (one that still lingers today) states, “Good iron is not wrought into nails; good men do not become soldiers” (hao tie bu da ding, hao nan bu dang bing). For example, in the Song dynasty an occasion arose when the emperor asked a civil official to switch to a military position. When this official asked his mother for permission—a good practice of Confucian filial piety—she had her son caned and reprimanded, “Why would you disgrace your ancestors?”30 Similarly, one writer of

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the Song era observed that winning first place in the civil service examination was far more glorious than leading hundreds of thousands of troops to victory on the battlefield.31 Confucianism’s emphasis on civil virtue and its antimilitarist bias, coupled with the government promotions that the civil service exam system offered, has a profound impact upon Chinese elites. Lei Haizong, an influential Chinese historian, wrote in the 1930s that Chinese intellectuals (shidaifu) had lost the martial spirit even since the Han dynasty, when Confucianism became the state ideology. The “antimilitarized” or “demilitarized” culture (wu bing de wenhua) that China internalized sapped its ability to fight.32 There were scholar-officials who excelled in both Confucian classics and military skills, of course, such as Fan Zhongyan (998–1052) of the Song dynasty and Wang Yangming (1472–1529) of the Ming dynasty. But they were the exceptions rather than the rule. Chinese society has undeniably produced the military schools of thought (bingja) as well as folk stories glorifying famed generals and military heroes. Yet Chinese culture as a whole has produced a perception of itself as one that fundamentally places civil values above military values.33 Imperial China’s disdain for the military has been duly noted in the past by Western observers. Max Weber wrote, “the military were . . . despised in China . . . and that a cultivated literary man would not engage in social intercourse on an equal footing with army officers.”34 Matteo Ricci, the Jesuit missionary appointed to the Ming court in the 1600s, remarked that military science was not considered important in China; an ordinary Chinese man would rather be a low-ranking Confucian philosopher than a high-ranking military officer.35 Contemporary sinologists also note this phenomenon. John King Fairbank writes, “Disparagement of the solider is deeply ingrained in the old Chinese system of values.”36 H. G. Creel writes about the “exaltation of the military” in the Roman Empire and comments that “since military men  .  .  . were not admired in China as they were in the Roman Empire, generals did not normally command great prestige.”37 DEFENSIVE GRAND STRATEGY  China’s reliance on nonviolent means is often contrasted with the Western tendency toward expansion and colonization. An often-cited phrase in Chinese scholarship is Mark Mancall’s observation: “China’s sense of its civilization did not include an aggressive mission either to civilize the rest of the world or to shoulder its burdens.”38 In this view, China has always adhered to a defensive grand strategy that relies on cultural attraction (the “benevolent way”), whereas the West prefers an offensive grand strategy that draws on brute force (the “hegemonic way”).

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Confucian pacifism holds that the country’s rulers remain on the defensive and demonstrate their magnanimity, awesomeness, and virtue while China builds up its strength. The state relies on noncoercive policies (such as accommodation, cultural attraction, détente, and static defense), even when the capacity to pursue expansionist policies grows. Hence, upon gaining more power, China does not become more aggressive by adopting an offensive grand strategy. On the other hand, when the state lacks strength, it concentrates on internal measures such as cultivating benevolence and virtue and improving people’s livelihood. Adversaries are thus pacified as the state gains more virtue and magnanimity. As the Analects of Confucius says, “when distant subjects are unsubmissive one cultivates one’s moral quality in order to attract them, and once they have come one makes them content.”39 Because the preference for nonviolent measures is a constant, there should be no variation in the tendency to use force regardless of the balance of power between China and its adversary. THE THEORY OF JUST WAR  Imperial China’s culture of antimilitarism, how-

ever, does not dismiss military force. After all, both Confucius and Mencius lived through periods of warfare. Confucius was in favor of military preparedness, but ranked its importance behind people’s livelihood and trust in government.40 The “just war” tradition in the West can be attributed to Christianity, but it has a secular origin in China, captured in the Confucian-Mencian theory of “righteous war” (yizhan).41 As benevolent governance is of the utmost importance, a state uses force only when reasons for doing are morally justifiable (jus ad bellum). The conduct of war must follow the principle of benevolence and justice, for instance, not attacking civilians and withdrawing after the just cause is served (jus in bello). Military force is first and foremost used in self-defense. If a state that practices moral statecraft and seeks to promote peace and harmony is invaded by another state, then the victim can justifiably mobilize the country for war. If China is threatened by another power, however, the first option is use of nonviolent measures, such as diplomatic persuasion, cultural attraction, monetary incentives, and static defense. China uses force only when these defensive options are exhausted. China was hence never an aggressor, but a reluctant defender.42 Second, as morality plays a central role in Confucian culture, the use of force is also justified when the ruler of another state is morally depraved. This idea, akin to the modern concept of “humanitarian intervention,” stipulates that if the ruler of a state is found to be unjust or abusing its people, a punitive expedition can be launched against that state to punish the abusive ruler

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and rescue the suffering people. For instance, when a usurper murdered the ruler of Qi, Confucius called on his own ruler, the Duke of Lu, to take punitive actions against the usurper even though his home state of Lu was weaker than Qi. For Confucians, moral and ethical principles override the sovereignty of another state and take precedence over the reality of power balance.43 For moral and practical reasons, however, the invading army must be benevolent in its treatment of the local population. Once the political objectives (such as installing a righteous ruler) are accomplished, the armed forces should withdraw.44 The Chinese character for “force” (wu) is said to embody the theory of just war. The character has two components: zhi (meaning “stop”) and ge (meaning “dagger-ax”), implying that the purpose of using force is to forestall further violence, as in self-defense, or to punish foreign leaders who mistreat their own people. LIMITED WAR AIMS  Chinese leaders rarely contemplated expansive war aims

such as total destruction of the enemy, conquest of enemy territories, or killing the civilians of an enemy state. When the use of force became unavoidable, Chinese war aims were to restore the status quo ante, to deter or to repel the enemy rather than to annihilate them.45 China rarely took the initiative by going beyond the frontier to attack enemies or conquer territories. This “defensive-mindedness” rendered offensive wars of annihilation unnecessary, given that the main objectives of offensive campaigns were to deny the enemies access to Chinese cities and farmlands. As Michael Loewe points out in a study of the military campaigns of Han Emperor Wudi (r. 141–87 BCE) against its principal enemy the nomadic empire of Xiongnu, “Campaigns were designed to deter an enemy and to repel him, or to protect Chinese outposts and communication lines, rather than deliberately to destroy an enemy or to annex his territory.”46 As long as Chinese territory was secure, there seemed to be no need to launch offensive campaigns. CULTURAL REALISM

Contrary to Confucian pacifism, cultural realism holds that China prefers the use of force to counter external aggression, but locates the root of such behavior in strategic culture. In his often-cited Cultural Realism, Alastair Iain Johnston contends that China acted according to the dictates of realpolitik during its imperial past, but what caused China to act this way “are not anarchical structures generating realpolitik self-help impulses, but rather the parabellum

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strategic culture.” Chinese military writings reveal a culture prescribing that “the best way of dealing with security threats is to eliminate them through the use of force.”47 Contra structural realism, Johnston contends that the reason China has acted in a realist manner is not a result of the anarchic structure of the system, but because Chinese policymakers inherited a realpolitik cultural heritage; cultural variables have an independent effect on a nation’s strategic choice. States with different types of strategic culture thus behave differently, even though they operate under the same structural conditions. For a cultural realist, the material structure of international politics is interpreted through a cultural lens in order to give it meaning: “the parabellum strategic culture is a prism through which changes in relative capabilities are interpreted. Absent this paradigm, changes in relative capabilities should, in a sense, be meaningless.”48 In this view, material structure does not have independent causal power. What ultimately determines the effects that shifts in relative capabilities have on a state’s strategic choices is the cultural lens through which decision makers decipher the significance of structural changes. The final strategic choice is constrained by this interpretive lens. According to Johnston, strategic culture has two components: (1) a central paradigm concerning the nature of conflict, the nature of the adversary, and the efficacy of force, and (2) a ranked set of strategic preferences derived from the central paradigm.49 Based on this conception, he then selects as the “object of analysis” the Seven Military Classics, a collection of ancient military texts compiled in the eleventh century. He uses content analysis techniques to identify the causal links between certain types of foreign policy beliefs and state security. Through cognitive mapping and symbolic analysis, Johnston concludes that the Seven Military Classics reveal two sets of strategic culture—a symbolic, Confucian-Mencian culture and an operational, realpolitik one. The Confucian-Mencian strand served merely a symbolic, idealized function: “an habitual discourse designed, in part, to justify behavior in culturally acceptable terms.”50 The other strand, the parabellum strategic culture, is both operative and dominant, and is what has caused China to behave like a realist power in history. China might have justified its aggressive behavior in the Confucian-Mencian language; in practice, however, China was a hard realpolitiker, rationally pursuing power over normative values and preferring to use force as its relative capabilities increased. Johnston then tests the predictions of a hard realpolitik model against Ming China’s security policy vis-à-vis the Mongols—China’s principal security threat at that time— and finds that the Ming’s grand strategic choices were congruent with the parabellum strategic culture, hence the claim that it was operational.

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Importantly, this ancient realpolitik strand of strategic culture has endured into the contemporary period. In a follow-up study of Maoist China in the contemporary period, Johnston concludes that “China has historically exhibited a relatively consistent hard realpolitik or parabellum strategic culture that has persisted across different structural contexts into the Maoist period (and beyond).”51 The main thrust of cultural realism is to raise two important points. First, Chinese strategic culture is no different from the tradition of Western realpolitik. In common with its Western counterpart, China has been practicing realpolitik for centuries. Second, and perhaps more important, this realpolitik behavior is learned through a process of socialization in a realpolitik culture, and can therefore be unlearned should decision makers be exposed to a non-realpolitik discourse.52 For instance, if decision makers stopped both thinking and practicing realpolitik and switched to the democratic norms of live-and-let-live, a zone of peace among states would appear.53 Cultural realism can hence be seen as part of a constructivist project aimed at transforming the pessimistic outlook on the effects of anarchy as postulated by structural realism.54 STRUCTURAL REALISM

Power, the currency of international politics, is central to realist theories. Great powers care deeply about how much power they have relative to one another. As great powers exert enormous influence on the international system, realist theories tend to focus on such consequential states. Structural realism holds that the anarchic structure of the international system forces states to compete for power, and that cultural differences among states matter relatively little to their security behavior. Because the structure of the system creates similar incentives, all great powers are assumed to be alike. When placed under a similar structural condition, there is little difference between the international behavior of a democratic state and that of an autocratic one, or for that matter, of a pacifist state and that of a militarist one. “Offensive” structural realism holds that the anarchic international structure offers many incentives for states to pursue expansionist, offensive strategies.55 The best way for a state to be secure in an anarchic world is to maximize relative power.56 Because every state has some offensive capability and cannot be certain about the intentions of others, in an anarchic system with no recourse for help, states inevitably fear the prospect of getting harmed by

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others. The danger of being the weaker side in international politics is well captured in the Melian dialogue described by Thucydides over two thousand years ago: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”57 States must provide for their own security if they expect to survive. In a self-help world, power is the best guarantor of security, and the essential currency for states to obtain what they want. Strong states generally have higher chances of survival and of prevailing over other states. As John Mearsheimer points out, in an anarchic world marked by uncertainty and fear, “states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system.”58 States strive to maximize their share of relative power over others, because the more power a state has, the more secure it will be.59 Hence, states constantly look for opportunities to alter the existing balance of power in their favor.60 The logic of anarchy dictates that states harbor revisionist intentions toward each other, making war possible. This does not mean that they act on those intentions anytime or anywhere. States are not reckless expanders.61 Instead, they rationally calculate the costs and benefits of each opportunity to expand. Although certain states may appear to pursue a status quo policy during a particular time frame, this is either because they do not have the capability to alter the existing balance of power or because they are facing a stronger adversary—they may be biding a more propitious time. Once states have the material wherewithal, they will strive to tilt the existing balance of power in their favor. War is the main strategy states adopt to gain power over others in a system populated by states with revisionist intentions.62 States place a high premium on the utility of force because, in the words of Robert Gilpin, military force is the “ultimate determinant of political affairs.”63 In international politics, states tend to rely on the use, or threatened use, of force to achieve their security objectives.64 When there is an opportunity to use force to gain power or weaken adversaries, states will not hesitate to make war, provided that the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs of doing so. States, therefore, are “primed for offense.”65 Although their aim is security, states are driven by anarchy to think and act aggressively in the system because the best defense is a good offense. States are not content with passive defense that simply protects borders from attacks or allows them to strike only after being attacked. Rather, they prefer to take the initiative by going on the offensive. Depending on systemic and military constraints, a state’s war aims include total military victory, political destruction of the adversary, and annexation of territories. During war, states tend to expand their war aims

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until met with systemic or military constraints—that is, absent foreign intervention and after a decisive military victory, states tend to enlarge their war aims in order to gain more power.66 Key to the offensive realist argument is that states tend to be more aggressive as their power grows and thus adopt an offense-oriented grand strategy. According to Mearsheimer, rising states, or potential hegemons, “are not likely to be satisfied with the balance of power. Instead, they will aim to acquire more power and eventually gain regional hegemony.”67 Power breeds appetite for more power. Rising states will put to good use their increased capabilities to gain more power—by acquiring political control over overseas territories, building up military or naval power, or demanding greater influence in great power decision-making. In their dealings with lesser states, rising states will likely be more assertive, and more coercive, on issues it deems important. With more resources at their disposal, rising states tend to expand their political interests abroad and adopt a more expansive grand strategy.68 When a rising state has achieved dominant status in its region, it will strive to stay in that position and make sure that no other states arise to challenge it. The three theories of strategic choice are summarized in table 2.1. Both Confucian pacifism and cultural realism are cultural, ideational theories that make opposite predictions. Cultural realism and structural realism make essentially the same predictions as regards Chinese behavior: China has historically acted like a realist power. Their differences lie in the sources of that behavior: for cultural realism the source of realpolitik behavior is strategic culture, which is ideational, whereas for structural realism the source lies in the anarchic structure of the system, which is material.

TABLE 2.1  Competing

Theories of Chinese Strategic Choice

SOURCES OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR

PREFERRED STRATEGY

Confucian pacifism

Ideational

Cultural realism

Ideational Offensive, power-maximizing, modulated by military capabilities

Structural realism

Material Offensive, power-maximizing, modulated by military capabilities

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Defensive, nonexpansionist

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24  CULTURE AND STRATEGIC CHOICE

WAS CHINESE REALPOLITIK A PRODUCT OF CULTURE? The theory of cultural realism challenges the predominant view of a nonbelligerent, antimilitarist Confucian strategic culture, dismissing it as having a symbolic, but not operative, effect on Chinese strategic behavior. Through textual analysis, cultural realism extracts realpolitik elements from Chinese military writings, arguing that these neglected elements constituted a strategic culture. The theory then examines Ming China’s grand strategic choices and finds that they were congruent with the expectations of a realpolitik model. The crucial question is: Was the Ming’s realpolitik behavior a product of culture or the result of the anarchic structure of the system? Because Imperial China is a severely understudied area in the field of international relations, Johnston’s merging of IR theory with the study of China can be seen as a landmark achievement. For military historians, his pioneering work provides the much-needed support for the argument that the Chinese have not been oblivious to warfare and that military force was frequently used in Chinese history. Although I agree with Johnston that China has been a practitioner of realpolitik, I disagree with his contention that Chinese realpolitik was a product of culture—rather, it was a product of anarchic structure. Despite its broad appeal, there are two problems with cultural realism. First, it mischaracterizes Chinese strategic culture as realist when the weight of evidence points in the opposition direction—to a Confucian antimilitarist culture. Imperial Chinese leaders were strongly socialized in Confucian classics but weakly socialized in military texts. Second, even if we assume that China has realpolitik strategic culture, cultural realism is an incomplete theory because it does not explain the source of realpolitik thinking.

MISCHARACTERIZATION OF CHINESE STRATEGIC CULTURE

To make the case that China has a dominant realpolitik strategic culture one must show that Chinese leaders have been socialized in the realpolitik axioms. That is, for the Seven Military Classics to be the object of analysis for Chinese strategic culture, one must establish that top officials, including emperors, immersed themselves in those texts and were socialized into the strategic precepts embodied therein. Unfortunately, cultural realism falls short on this point, providing weak evidence of socialization in military texts. The theory supplies two pieces of evidence on the socialization and transmission of the realpolitik strategic culture in Ming times. First, anecdotal evidence suggests

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that a number of Ming emperors, civil officials, and military officers had read the Seven Military Classics, and some even took time to compose military treatises or memorialized on the military problems of the dynasty. That the Ming elites were familiar with the military classics shows socialization at work. Second, the military-education system of the Ming dynasty helped transmit realpolitik axioms across time and across different strategic contexts. The Ming witnessed a “growth industry” of bingshu (military treatises or texts) and, as an indication of the influence of the classic military writings, the majority of the Ming war manuals and military treatises consistently cited the Seven Military Classics.69 At first glance, these two pieces of evidence appear strong. The socialization and transmission of the realpolitik strategic culture described in Cultural Realism, however, are problematic. First, anecdotal evidence that particular emperors or top advisers had read the military texts must be weighed against their decades of education and socialization in Confucianism. Reading military texts does not necessarily imply that one has accepted or internalized the norms embodied therein.70 Despite the claim that those ancient military texts were “relatively widely read” among Ming elites,71 even more widely read throughout the Ming times (and throughout most of Imperial China) were the Confucian classics—the Four Books, the Five Classics, and other derivative commentaries and annotations. The Confucian classics dwarfed that of the military corpus. The education of emperors indeed focused on Confucian literature. Before being appointed to office, career-aspiring Chinese intellectuals spent years immersing themselves in the Confucian classics with one goal in mind: passing the civil service examinations. The exam questions were drawn exclusively from the Confucian classics and Chinese history, all as interpreted by the great Song neo-Confucian Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Each candidate needed to demonstrate not only an excellent grasp of the classical and historical texts but that he adhered to their orthodox interpretations.72 As a result of state promotion of Confucianism, virtually all officials in the Ming government held a jinshi degree.73 For example, the Ming established a grand secretariat (neige) in 1403 to serve as “a collective of chiefs of staff for the emperor.” Of the 164 grand secretaries in the Ming dynasty, 95.7 percent held the jinshi degree.74 Confucianization of the Ming bureaucracy was at central government level and also spread to the local level.75 Although no serious leaders could dismiss military texts out of hand, the texts were, in general, held in low regard and sometimes considered “taboo” by the mainstream of Chinese thought. As Arthur Waldron points out, “For the Confucians, whose humane and pacifistic concepts dominated Chinese philosophy for millennia,

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26  CULTURE AND STRATEGIC CHOICE

the theories of the military specialists were anathema.”76 Ralph Sawyer writes, “Military thought  .  .  . suffered from disparagement and disrepute during almost all the past two millennia in Imperial China.”77 It is appropriate to say that compared to military classics, Confucian classics played a far greater role in the socialization of top court officials, as well as military officers. The Ming founding emperor Hongwu, for instance, instructed his generals “to get close to Confucian scholars, employ the books of the ancients, and listen to their remarks; in this way, your intelligence and knowledge will be enriched.”78 In 1369, he ordered the establishment of Confucian schools in every prefecture and county.79 The so-called military schools (wuxue) in the Ming dynasty military commanderies (dusi) were mostly Confucian schools.80 Top decision makers were usually civil officials who had gone through the civil examination system; with a few exceptions, military officers had no significant decision-making powers. The military establishment was under the tight control of the civil service.81 Practically every Chinese decision maker was immersed and socialized in the Confucian discourse, which embodied the shared beliefs and norms that prescribed acceptable patterns of behavior. Scholars aspiring to careers needed to master Confucian literature to pass the civil service examination. Once appointed, they were required to adhere to the Confucian discourse of benevolence and virtue—or encounter possible impairment to their career. The Confucian strategic culture should not, however, be dismissed as merely “symbolic” because it had no effect on the actual strategic behavior. At the ideational level, Confucianism had a profound influence on the cultural milieu of the Ming government. But the military threats that the dynasty faced might have moved certain officials to take it upon themselves to read military texts or even write military treatises on how to solve military problems. These texts, however, needed to adhere to the Confucian discourse of benevolence and virtue or risk being rejected by the mainstream. To make the texts palatable, the words ren (benevolence) and yi (righteousness) appear at various points in the Seven Military Classics as well as in other military writings.82 A contextual, interpretive reading of these military writings gives a strong impression of the influence of Confucianism. Herein lies the pitfall in focusing on the Seven Military Classics as the object of analysis for Chinese strategic culture: a vast body of the more influential Confucian classics is overlooked. Second, Imperial China’s military-education system served as a poor transmission mechanism for military thought. There is near consensus among historians that the military classics played a minor role in Imperial China’s

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military-education system. The education of military officers focused on skills such as archery and horsemanship, not on mastering the military classics. Military officers were often illiterate and had difficulties comprehending the military classics.83 The military examination system did little to socialize military officers in the Seven Military Classics. Most Ming officers were not recruited through the military examinations but through a hereditary system. The pool of hereditary offices was not supplemented with officers recruited from the military examinations until 1478. But as historian Charles O. Hucker observes, “these examinations did little, apparently, to change the hereditary character of the military service, and give it prestige comparable to that of the civil service, since they required only demonstrations of competence in military skills.”84 The written portion of the examinations did not come into effect until the Wanli emperor (r. 1573–1620) and was taken only after the candidates had passed tests of their military skills.85 Although the military examinations were regularly held, they were unsuccessful in recruiting enough officers. As Edward Dreyer explains, “any one possessed of the literary skill needed to master the military literature would naturally devote himself instead to studying for the civil-service examinations.”86 In short, by selectively drawing on realpolitik-conforming elements from the military classics and disregarding the Confucian-affirming evidence, as well as a vast body of Confucian writings, the theory of cultural realism underestimates the impact of Confucianism on Chinese strategic culture.87 It is hard to believe that the less important military texts and examinations would embody and transmit China’s strategic culture, and that the vast body of more important Confucian texts and examinations would take only a minor role. Compared to the Seven Military Classics, “far better known than these texts, and far more influential in the culture, were the Confucian classics.”88 In the end, the theory of cultural realism exaggerates the extent to which Chinese decision makers were socialized in the military classics, and thus it overstates the case that realpolitik precepts were learned. INCOMPLETE THEORY

The second problem with cultural realism is that it does not offer a theory that explains why leaders resort to realpolitik discourse but not to others. Where does the realpolitik strategic culture come from? What makes the Chinese leaders think like realists? One could analyze the military texts of any country and it would probably not be hard to extract realpolitik elements from them. Military texts by nature deal with warfare and conflict. Any serious military

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28  CULTURE AND STRATEGIC CHOICE

text takes force as a cause of state security, recognize warfare as a constant feature of interstate relations, and adopt a zero-sum view of the adversary. Studies have shown that Western and Chinese military writings share similar logic about warfare. Michael I. Handel’s textual analysis of the works by Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong, Clausewitz, Jomini, and Machiavelli shows that “the logic of strategy and waging war is universal rather than parochial, cultural, or regional.” 89 This remarkable conclusion begs the question of why strategists of various cultures should think the same way in regard to national security issues. Cultural realism is silent on this crucial issue. As Johnston admits in a subsequent study of Maoist China, “I am in no position to comment about the primordial origins of hard realpolitik strategic cultures, but I am willing to argue that their presence is a precondition for realpolitik behavior.”90 Yet, the source of realpolitik thinking is precisely what is at stake here. Absent a theory that explains this thinking, cultural realism is not complete. In contrast, structural realism offers a theory on the source of realpolitik thinking: It is the anarchic structure of the international system that compels states to practice realpolitik. In the absence of a central authority to enforce order, security-seeking states are driven by the material structure of the system to pursue power at the expense of cooperative norms. Because states across culture and across time have been operating in anarchy, their strategic behaviors tend to be similar. As Jack Snyder comments on Johnston’s work, “His adherence to a cultural account of Chinese strategic practices remains untroubled by the fact that these ideas and practices are similar to those of the anarchic European balance-of-power system, the ancient Greek citystates, and the ancient Indian states system described by Kautilya, a set of cultures diverse in almost every way except their strategic behavior. . . . The evidence from historical state systems strongly suggest that the situational incentives of anarchy have significantly shaped strategic behavior in ways that transcend culture.”91 The anarchic structure of the system pushes states of various cultures to think and act in a similar fashion. Circumstances, not beliefs, therefore, largely determined Chinese behavior. To argue that the realism we observe in Chinese strategic behavior is cultural “probably reaches too far.”92 Hence, by arguing that Chinese realpolitik is a product of strategic culture, the theory of cultural realism mistakes effect for cause: realpolitik thinking is a product of material incentives. What is crucial is not the idea in the military texts, but the factors that drive it. To sum up, cultural realism has the problems of selection bias and incompleteness. It overstates the extent to which Chinese decision makers were

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socialized in the military classics and does not offer an explanation of where realpolitik ideas come from. The textual analysis of the Chinese military classics appears overly technical and skewed toward a parabellum reading of strategic culture, ignoring the salient Confucian strand. In the end, the theory falls short of demonstrating the superiority of the cultural approach over that of structural realism.93 Thus, if Confucianism was the dominant discourse, Johnston’s empirical finding that Ming China’s security policy accords with structural realist expectations in effect demonstrates the overriding influence of structural constraints over cultural ones, and lends further support to structural realism.94

RESEARCH DESIGN Both cultural realism and structural realism make the same predictions regarding Chinese behavior: China has historically acted like a realist power. Their differences lie in the sources of that behavior: for cultural realism the source of realpolitik behavior is strategic culture, whereas for structural realism the source lies in the anarchic structure of the system. As regards theory testing, this presents a methodological problem: it is extremely difficult to disentangle their indistinguishable predictions on state behavior. Johnston has apparently struggled with this problem and suggested several ways to design a critical test, but none of which, in his own words, “offers a neat solution to the initial problem.”95 For instance, one way to set up a critical test is to look for fluctuations in the parabellum calculus and see if strategic choices correlate with these variations. But this approach “is not entirely satisfying because of the difficulty in measuring relatively small fluctuations in changes in the strength of the parabellum strategic culture.”96 In a subsequent study of Maoist China, Johnston decides that the methodological problem of separating out cultural realpolitik from structural realpolitik “does not require a critical test,” because “structural realpolitik can be subsumed within the cultural realpolitik model.”97 Johnston is right about the impracticality of a critical test—but for the wrong reason. It is more accurate to say that structural realpolitik subsumes cultural realpolitik, not the other way around. As noted earlier, the fact that states of different cultures have interpreted and acted on their interests in the way described by structural realism lends credence to the claim that structural incentives often override cultural ones. Hence, if structural realism subsumes cultural realism, there is indeed no need to set up a critical test to separate the

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30  CULTURE AND STRATEGIC CHOICE

two out. In addition, I have demonstrated that cultural realism mischaracterizes China’s strategic culture because this approach narrowly selects confirming elements from Chinese military writings and downplays a vast body of disconfirming Confucian literature. We are thus left with two major theories: Confucian pacifism and structural realism.98 In the four empirical chapters that follow, I will establish that Confucian pacifism was the dominant strategic culture during the periods under study and thereby remained at the core of the Chinese tradition. The next task is to determine which theory— structural realism or Confucian pacifism—better explains China’s strategic choice. The remainder of this book will test the predictions of these two theories against the empirical record. Before proceeding, it is important to discuss the role of Legalism in Imperial China. Legalism (fa ja) is often said to be the realist tradition of ancient Chinese statecraft, and the main competitor to Confucianism.99 In general, Legalism disparaged the Confucian emphasis on rule by morality and instead sought to strengthen state power though rule of law combined with harsh punishments. During the Warring States period, Legalists helped the state of Qin conquer other states and unify all of China.100 But as Chinese scholar Hsiao Kung-chuan points out, after the Han dynasty, Legalism ceased to develop as a school of thought and evolved into “practical statecraft” (shiyong zhi zhishu).101 As Chinese territory grew in size, administering an enlarged empire required specific technical knowledge and skills. The Confucian reliance on the virtue of the administrator turned out to be inadequate in practice. Legalism’s abundance of “administrative techniques” (shu) filled in this void and, in the words of H. G. Creel, “that is probably the chief reason why Chinese government continued to be strongly influenced by Legalism, long after Legalism as a developing philosophy had virtually ceased to exist.”102 To help administer the vast country, Chinese emperors and their Confucian scholar-officials co-opted many of the Legalist techniques into their toolbox. In other words, Legalism is not a culture, but a type of practice. Hence, structural realism should be analytically separated from Legalism, and this study should not be construed as a test of Legalism against Confucianism.103 THREE STRATEGIC ISSUES

I derive hypotheses from Confucian pacifism and structural realism based on a set of three strategic issues: (1) grand strategy, (2) use of force, and (3) war aims. First, Confucian pacifism suggests that China adheres to a defen-

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sive or accommodationist grand strategy—regardless of how much power the country has. As China grows more powerful relative to others, it does not adopt a more offensive grand strategy.104 China does not try to weaken its adversaries, even when the capability to do so has increased. Instead, China alternates between accommodationist and defensive grand strategies, or pursue them simultaneously. An accommodationist grand strategy entails policies that manifest the magnanimity, awesomeness, and benevolence of the regime or that use economic incentives, diplomacy, bandwagoning and other noncoercive measures. A defensive grand strategy includes policies that focus on static defense along the border, use internal balancing to mobilize resources, build a balancing alliance, or other low-coercive policies. In contrast, structural realism predicts that as China grows more powerful relative to others, it becomes more coercive and shifts to an offensive grand strategy. A more powerful China has more resources at its disposal, which enables it to pursue an expansionist policy. An offensive grand strategy entails policies that employ offensive use of military force, establish a sphere of influence, dictate the boundaries of appropriate behavior, grab resources beyond the frontiers, or other high-coercive measures. The country thus expands as far as its resources allow. Second, Confucian pacifism suggests that China prefers nonviolent means (for example, diplomatic maneuvers, static defense, economic incentives, and cultural attractions) to settle security problems; China uses force only after being attacked and rarely strikes preemptively or preventively. The use of force is a last resort. Hence, preventive wars due to an anticipated power shift are rare. We should be able to observe serious, nontrivial reluctance before the use of force. Importantly, the preference for noncoercive means is rooted in a cultural belief that using military forces violates Confucian principles, rather than because of lack of military capability. Structural realism, in contrast, suggests that China prefers the use of force to settle security problems; that China, faced with a military threat, uses force when a window of opportunity opens or uses force to prevent a window of vulnerability from enlarging. Consideration of relative capability, however, is crucial to the decision to use force. China refrains from using force if the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits. Third, Confucian pacifism suggests that Chinese war aims (defined as the political objectives of a war) do not escalate beyond original border protection. The purpose of military campaigns is purely defensive: to restore the status quo ante, to deter the enemy from attacking Chinese territories, or to pacify the adversary. Wars of annihilation are unnecessary. China does

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32  CULTURE AND STRATEGIC CHOICE

not conquer territories by force or expand war aims even if the opportunity to do so arises. Structural realism, on the other hand, predicts that China escalates its war aims beyond the borders. China aims for total military victory, political destruction of the adversary, or annexation of territories. Chinese war aims continue to expand until met with systemic or military constraints. MEASURING POWER

Power is at the heart of realist theories. Testing structural realism against Confucian pacifism requires a credible measurement of China’s relative power during the period under study. Measuring power before the Industrial Revolution, however, presents a daunting challenge. The data on wealth, population, and military power are scattered and nonsystematic. The problem becomes more severe as we go further back in history. This challenge notwithstanding, there are several means a researcher can employ to obtain a relatively credible estimate of power in the pre-modern world. To measure power, I rely on three indicators: (1) assessments by key decision makers, (2) anecdotal data on state capability, and (3) assessments by historians. First, I consult primary court documents and ask: What was the leaders’ assessment of China’s relative power position at that time? Did they see China in a powerful or weak position? Second, I search for anecdotal data that shed light on state capability, such as the number of troops and horses, grain production, government budget, fiscal balances, and domestic rebellions. These data serve as indirect measures of Chinese power. Third, I consult historians’ accounts of China’s power position during a particular period in Chinese history. Sinologists who specialize in the history of Imperial China can provide credible assessment of Chinese power. To be sure, the measure I am using is not perfect, but to the extent that these three indicators—leaders’ assessments, anecdotal data, and historians’ assessments—positively correlate with one another, the final measurement will likely capture China’s actual relative power during the period under study. SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES

The hypotheses of both cultural and structural explanations are summarized here. Most predictions directly contradict one another, which is good for theory testing, since ambiguous results are ruled out.

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CONFUCIAN PACIFISM

Main hypothesis: A pacifist Confucian culture constrains Chinese use of force 1. Grand strategy: China will not adopt an offensive grand strategy even if the balance of power shifts in its favor. 2. Use of force: China will prefer to use nonviolent means to settle security problems. If there is an opportunity to use force, China will not take advantage of it. 3. War aims: Chinese war aims will be limited and will exclude conquest of territories and annihilation of adversary. STRUCTURAL REALISM

Main hypothesis: The anarchic structure of the system pushes China to prefer the offensive use of force. 1. Grand strategy: China will adopt an offensive grand strategy when it grows more powerful than others. 2. Use of force: China will prefer to use force to settle security problems. If there is an opportunity to use force, China will take advantage of it. 3. War aims: Chinese war aims will not be limited and will include conquest of territories and annihilation of adversary.

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3 THE NORTHERN SONG DYNASTY (960–1127)

THE SONG dynasty is known for its extraordinary cultural achievements in literature, art, and philosophy. Confucianism was refined and reinterpreted, thereby giving rise to neo-Confucianism, which became the orthodox ideology for statecraft and elite education. Dieter Kuhn calls this period “the Age of Confucian Rule.”1 Cultural achievements aside, the Song made several advances in science and technology. The Song’s three great inventions—gunpowder, the compass, and printed books—would later have a profound impact on human history. The Song civilization was so ahead of the rest of the world that John K. Fairbank calls it “China’s greatest age.”2 However, in terms of military power, epithets such as “perennially weak and unable to rise” (ji ruo bu zhen) or “emphasizing civility and belittling martialism” (zhong wen qing wu) are habitually attached to the Song dynasty. Unlike other Chinese dynasties, the Song never achieved military dominance and was instead threatened with the prospect of foreign invasion and even conquest. Because the Jurchens invaded and conquered part of the Song dynasty’s territory in 1127, capturing two emperors, historians generally divide the Song period into the Northern Song dynasty (960–1127) and Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279). The power structure during this period was largely bipolar. The sedentary Song dynasty was under constant military threats from the nomadic Liao Empire to the north, which historian Jing-shen Tao describes as “the most powerful state in East Asia at the time.”3 (See map 3.1.) According to one statistic, the Liao Empire had a strong cavalry force of 500,000 men, outnumbering the Song dynasty’s 193,000 cavalry and infantry by more than two and a half to one.4 China was a “lesser empire” in the interstate system,5 but neither was powerful enough to dominate East Asia. Unlike other periods of Chinese history in which formal equality between China and its neighbors was ruled out, the Song-Liao diplomatic relationship was

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36  THE NORTHERN SONG DYNASTY (960–1127)

conducted as one between two equal states.6 Chinese security policy was pragmatic and flexible, taking into consideration the reality of power. In the eleventh century, another nomadic power, the Xi Xia, rose to threaten the Song’s northwestern frontier, ushering an era of triangular international politics. Confucian discourse reached an unprecedented level among elites and officials. Studies and commentaries in the Confucian genre proliferated in Song times, giving rise to neo-Confucianism, which stressed the power of the mind in transforming human affairs. The professional military, highly regarded in the Tang dynasty (618–907), lost prestige in Song times, which it did not recover until the last Chinese dynasty in the twentieth century. Confucian intellectuals and men of letters achieved a decidedly dominant position in state and society.7 Confucianism was institutionalized through the civil service examination system, producing the highest per annum number of scholar-officials among all Chinese dynasties. These officials occupied central positions in the Song government and offered advice to the emperors. The high degree of the Confucian ethos in Song China makes it a crucial case for testing Confucian pacifism against structural realism. If the antimilitarist ideas embedded in the prevailing Confucian culture were to have an independent effect on Chinese military policy, we should be able to observe significant moderation of aggressive behavior in Song China. In this sense, the Song dynasty presents a most-likely case for an ideationally based cultural model, but a least-likely case for a power-based realist model. If, despite the preeminence of Confucian discourse among policymaking elites, Chinese behavior still largely conformed to the predictions of structural realism, this evidence would undermine the argument that Confucian culture has an independent effect on state behavior.

CONFUCIAN DOMINANCE OF THE SONG GOVERNMENT Confucianism was the official ideology of the Song dynasty. The excessive power the military wielded over civil officials was a main reason for the breakup of the preceding Tang dynasty. To prevent a repetition, the Song government structure was designed to give the civil service supreme power over the military. Civil control of the military was thus consolidated in Song times. “Confucianism was of overriding importance in establishing a model for [Song] rulers.”8 Consequently, the civil service and the Confucian

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literati enjoyed unprecedented status in Song times. As historian Ying-shi Yu argues, Confucian norms and values shaped the “political culture” of the Chinese bureaucracy.9 Owing to this emphasis on civil service, the average number of officials recruited through the Confucian civil service examination grew to 361 per year—at least three times higher than any other Chinese dynasty.10 The civil service examinations, established toward the end of the sixth century, took on an essential role in staffing the Song bureaucracy. The exam system recruited only about 10 percent of the Tang dynasty officials—a figure that soared in the Song dynasty.11 Confucian scholar-officials became indispensable to the decision-making process. All imperial edicts, for instance, had to be countersigned by the chief councilor (equivalent to the prime minister) before they were issued.12 Although the emperor possessed the ultimate decision-making power, he was “constrained by Confucian norms” and “bound . . . by the influences that his Confucian education and his Confucian advisers exerted on him.”13 Socialization in the Confucian discourse was a long and persistent process, transmitted through the civil service examination system. Career-aspiring candidates generally prepared early for the civil service examinations by attending, usually from childhood, local Confucian schools and studying and memorizing Confucian classics. Commentaries written in the Confucian canon also constituted a critical part of their education. In the civil service examinations, candidates were required to write policy essays, write from memory, compose poetry, and expound on the Confucian classics.14 To succeed, mastery of Confucianism was essential. The recruitment process of the civil service examinations brought the Confucian literati from all levels of society into the Song decision-making apparatus. Song Shi, the standard Song history compiled by the Mongol Yuan dynasty in the fourteenth century, devotes a substantial section to biographies of officials. Normally, only officials of merit warranted mention in the standard history. According to Song Shi, two-thirds (895) of the 1,397 recorded officials during Song times held a jinshi degree (literally meaning “presented scholar,” sometimes translated as “doctor of letters”). This number is significant because most of the recorded officials held high offices in the central government. Table 3.1 shows that Confucian scholar-officials constituted a dominant position in the Song government. There is little evidence that the Song dynasty had a realpolitik strategic culture. The military examinations appear to have been a weak socialization mechanism in the discourse of realpolitik and to have played a

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38  THE NORTHERN SONG DYNASTY (960–1127)

TABLE 3.1  Origins

of Midlevel Song Officials and Above

EXAMINATIONS Jinshi

Military degree Others

895 66.36 percent

3

YIN PRIVILEGE*

OTHERS

TOTAL

231

239

1,397

16.54 percent

17.10 percent

100 percent

29

* Recruited because of blood relations to higher officials. Source: Miao Shumei, Song Dai Guanyuan Xuanren He Guanli Zhidu [The System of Recruitment and Management of Song Officials] (Kaifeng, Henan: Henan daxue chubanshe, 1996), 102.

negligible role in recruiting key officials. Throughout the 320 years of Song history, only three high-ranking officials were recorded in Song Shi as having possessed a military degree. The dominant culture was a Confucian one. Edward Dreyer notes, “During the Song (960–1279) strong antimilitary attitudes became dominant within the educated elite.”15 Although a third of officials were recruited on basis of recommendation, blood relations with existing officials, or military feats, they were usually not appointed to important positions.16 In practice, officials with a Confucian jinshi degree were those to whom the Song emperors gave serious decision-making responsibilities. Key advisors to emperors, including the chief councilor, almost without exception possessed that degree. These officials were conversant in Confucian literature, as well as the pacifist, benevolent, and humane ideas embodied therein.

FORGING A POWERFUL STATE (960–979) Before the Song came into existence in 960, the powerful Liao dynasty (907– 1125), established by the Khitans of western Manchuria, ruled North China. The Liao Empire was a multiethnic state that included the Khitans, Inner Asian tribal peoples, and Han Chinese.17 A nomadic people, the Khitans were accomplished horsemen, a skill that had historically posed a major threat to the sedentary Chinese. In addition to having the advantage in cavalry warfare, the Liao had also occupied several key strategic positions along the Song-Liao borders, most notably the Sixteen Prefectures of Yanyun, which had been

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ceded by the Later Jin (936–947) regime in 938, before the Song’s existence.18 Although other smaller political units (Korea, Bohai, Tibet, Uighurs, and the Xi Xia) coexisted within the system, the Liao and the Song formed a fundamentally bipolar structure. The powerful Liao Empire was the Northern Song dynasty’s primary security threat. Early Song leaders were well aware of the need to strengthen the country before tackling the Liao threat. In 963, Emperor Taizu (r. 960–976) explained the importance of gaining power resources to his brother Kuangyi (the future Emperor Taizong): the Song must replenish its impoverished treasury by conquering the rich southern areas, he said, before it could deal with the formidable Liao Empire.19 The rich and fertile southeastern China had historically been the economic foundation of various Chinese dynasties. In 981, for instance, 72 percent of the grains shipped nationwide to the Song capital of Kaifeng came from this region.20 The Sichuan region in the southwest, known as the Land of Heavenly Abundance (tianfu zhi guo), was another key strategic asset of economic resources. At the beginning of the Song, however, these wealthy and populous areas were occupied by a number of Chinese states left over from the previous era of great disunion. Acquiring these regions was a strategic necessity, since it would be extremely difficult to support a largescale campaign against the Liao without the economic resources that these prosperous lands provided. The strategy that Song founding Emperor Taizu chose was consequently first to conquer these southern states and later to focus on the Liao Empire in the north. He maintained a “passive defense posture” along the northern border and launched wars of conquest in the south.21 This early strategy of “defense in the north, offense in the south” successfully built the Song power base. States that fell victim to Song offensives included Nanping (963), Later Shu (965), Southern Han (971), Southern Tang (975), and Wu Yue (978).22 As the campaign of territorial expansion drew to an end, two targets remained on the Song acquisition list—Northern Han, a client state of the Liao located in Shanxi Province, and the Sixteen Prefectures acquired by the Liao in 938. Both of them lay on the Song-Liao borders. After more than a dozen years of military campaigning, most of China was under Song control. With more resources at hand, the Song court grew confident of its capability directly to confront the Liao, and it shifted to an offensive grand strategy against its biggest external threat. The political objective of the offensive campaigns was, in the words of Peter Lorge, “to establish the real or ritual dominance of the Song dynasty over every polity with which it was in contact.”23

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OFFENSIVE GRAND STRATEGY (979–986) THE NORTHERN HAN CAMPAIGN

Bordering between Song China and the Liao Empire, the strategic value of the Northern Han, dominated by Shatuo Turks from Inner Asia, could not be disregarded. (See map 3.2.) Emperor Taizu had shown a keen interest in annexing Northern Han after establishing the Song dynasty. He was, however, advised by officials to wait until the Song had conquered other states in the south.24 Supported by the Liao and well protected by the Taihang mountain range, Northern Han would be a hard target to conquer. This difficulty notwithstanding, Emperor Taizu continuously probed for weaknesses in Northern Han defenses, looking for an opportunity to attack.25 He attempted three offensives on Northern Han (968, 969, and 976) but was thwarted each time by Liao military interventions. Aware of the strategic value of Northern Han as a buffer state, whose highlands could be employed to outflank any Song offensives against the Liao that could advance only through the open Hebei Plain in North China, the Liao could not permit its client state to fall under the Song.26 While the Song was occupied with southern campaigns, the Liao repeatedly dispatched soldiers and cavalry forces, sometimes numbering as many as sixty thousand, to attack Chinese positions. Song leaders, however, had anticipated attacks while they were conquering rivals in the south, and they accordingly made preparations to strengthen northern defenses. As a result, Song border defenses repelled Liao incursions.27 Weary of military confrontation, the two countries began exchanging regular diplomatic missions in late 974, requesting an armistice. Peace was short-lived, however, because the Song was eager to conquer Liao’s protectorate, the Northern Han. THE DECISION TO USE FORCE  In 979, the Song court discussed the issue

of attacking Northern Han. Cao Bin, the commissioner of military affairs (shumishi), commented that past attempts at conquering Northern Han had failed because of military setbacks or logistical deficiencies, but now that the country’s soldiers and armory were in excellent condition, attacking Northern Han would be an easy task. A number of officials, however, opposed the war plan. Xue Juzheng, the chief councilor (zaixiang), argued that although Liao interventions had foiled past attempts at conquering Northern Han, this defiant state had been severely weakened by Song military assaults and should not pose a threat. Conquering it would add little to the Song state. An imperial decision at the highest level was required to resolve the policy

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dispute. Emperor Taizong (r. 976–997) remarked, “Although at present the issue [attacking Northern Han] remains the same, the situation has changed. They are weak but we are strong.”28 A decision was thus made to invade the defiant Northern Han, with the emperor personally leading the army. The Chinese emperor believed that China’s relative power position had improved and that this increase in power justified the use of force. This reasoning accords with structural realism, which posits that a state will assume a more offensive posture as its power grows. Indeed, by 978 most of the rival Chinese states had been conquered and annexed to the Song state. Historian Wang Gungwu writes, “The year 979 represented the climax of [Song] power.” Envoys from important non-Chinese states such as Korea, Champa, and the Tangut had been arriving with tribute.29 With the fertile southeastern and southwestern China under control, thus substantially augmenting Song’s power base, the Song leaders believed that the odds of winning the war were in their favor. The Song court soon launched a war. The initial war aim was the conquest of Northern Han. As the attack was in process, the Liao sent an envoy to the Song court demanding an explanation as to why the Song had attacked the Liao ally. The Song bluntly replied: “Hedong [Northern Han] disobeyed our command. Its crime should be punished. If the Northern dynasty [Liao] does not assist it, our peace treaty will still be valid. Otherwise, we will fight.”30 This was tantamount to a declaration of war against the Liao, which would surely send troops to rescue its client state. As it did in the past, the Liao dispatched a relief force to assist its ally. What was different on this occasion was that the Song army intercepted and routed Liao troops before they reached the Northern Han capital of Taiyuan.31 Upon seeing its effort had failed, the Liao decided to abandon its ally and fortify the Sixteen Prefectures against possible Song attack. With Liao assistance gone, the Northern Han emperor surrendered to the Song armies in June 979.32 EXPANSION OF WAR AIMS  The Northern Han surrender fulfilled the Song’s

initial war aim. The decisive victory emboldened the Song emperor, who next considered whether to attack the Liao and capture the Sixteen Prefectures. The strategic importance of the Sixteen Prefectures cannot be overemphasized; they controlled the strategic passes between the steppe and the open plains of Hebei. Liao acquisition of this territory gave the Khitans a springboard from which to project power into North China, severely compromising Song defenses. The fertile agriculture in the Sixteen Prefectures also made the territory “the wealthiest region in the Liao empire,” as Nap-Yin Lau puts

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L I A O Th e S i

x t e e n P r e fe c tu r e

Yunzhou (Datong)

s

Linyü

Youzhou (Yan) (Beijing)

(Shanhai Guan)

nan

Luancheng

Gu a n

NORTHERN HAN ( 95 1 – 979 )

Gulf of Bohai

Taiyuan

SONG ll Ye

Shanyuan Kaifeng

Luoyang

ow

R.

The Sixteen Prefectures and Song-Liao Conflicts Song invasion, 979; conquered Northern Han, but defeated by Liao at Youzhou Song invasion, 986; defeated by Liao Liao invasion, 1004–1005; led to Treaty of Shanyuan

0 0

100 km

Capital

City

Strategic fortified passes

100 mi

MAP 3.2

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it.33 For both strategic and economic reasons, the Liao would not give up the Sixteen Prefectures without a fight. Now that the original war aim of conquering Northern Han had been accomplished, the Song emperor contemplated whether or not to press on to the Sixteen Prefectures. Because the Song armies were weary and their supplies short, most generals were opposed to attacking the Liao holdouts in the Sixteen Prefectures, but they dared not speak out, perhaps knowing that the emperor had made up his mind. Some insisted on attacking the Liao nonetheless. Cui Han, an officer of the Palace Guards, proposed that the Song armies launch an attack: “We should ride on the wave of victory. It should be very easy to acquire [the Sixteen Prefectures]. This excellent timing must not be missed.” Emperor Taizong, pleased with this suggestion, decided to expand war aims from conquering Northern Han to “attacking the Khitan and acquiring Youji [the Sixteen Prefectures].”34 Apparently, the Chinese emperor believed that in light of the current victory, the conquest of additional territories could be done easily and cheaply. As Eric Labs points out, the expansion of war aims can occur when policymakers believe that “expanding their aims would be cheap and easy.”35 The Song armies won some preliminary battles before reaching the walls of the Liao Southern Capital, in present-day Beijing, and besieged the city. Just as the southern capital was on the verge of collapse, a large relief force of Liao cavalry, led by Yelu Xiuge and Yelu Xiezhen, came to the city’s rescue. On July 30, 979, the Song armies were crushed on the banks of the Gaoliang River in the southeastern sector of Beijing. Emperor Taizong sustained arrow wounds and fled in a mule cart.36 Although the Sixteen Prefectures were saved, the Liao had forever lost the buffer state of Northern Han. Its southern territories were now exposed to the Song’s direct assault. The Liao tried to remedy this strategic disadvantage by attacking Song positions at Mancheng, Waqiao Pass, and other military holdouts from 980 to 982, but Song defenses repelled each foray. The details provided in this case lend support to structural realism. Contrary to Confucian pacifism, Chinese use of force was proactive, not reactive. If anything, the Song leadership actually favored military violence. Confucian pacifism would in addition have a hard time explaining the Song’s expanded war aims. The new Song territorial ambitions were based on strategic and security concerns: acquiring the Sixteen Prefectures would make it difficult for the Liao to invade China in the future. Anticipating the Liao threat down the road, the Song emperor sought to enhance China’s relative power while he still had the chance. Given that the Song had reached its zenith of power,

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Emperor Taizong’s confidence in attacking the Liao was not unjustified.37 Although the war aim expansion failed to achieve the new objective of capturing the Sixteen Prefectures, its strategic motivation should not be overlooked. CONTINUING CONFLICTS WITH THE LIAO

Despite the crushing defeat at the Gaoliang River, the Song never gave up hopes of capturing the Sixteen Prefectures along the Song-Liao border, without which China’s security could not be ensured. The Song continued both to probe for weakness in the Liao and to wait for the opportunity to strike. For the next few years, Emperor Taizong contemplated launching a strike at the Liao Southern Capital on several occasions. His offensive ambitions, however, were held in check by lack of military capability. For instance, Taizong considered attacking the Liao in 980 but had to be reminded by his courtiers of the daunting logistical problems. They advised the Song emperor to train troops and accumulate military materiel before launching an attack, arguing that “once our treasury is abundant and our villages are wealthy, it should not be too late to use force.” The emperor concurred.38 In 982, Emperor Taizong contemplated attacking the Liao again. Officials reminded him of the danger of incessant warfare and suggested that he let the people rest. To justify his restraint from using force, Taizong cited Laozi’s famous admonition, which paralleled Confucian pacifism: “The army is an inauspicious instrument. The saint uses it only when he has no other alternatives.”39 Debates about using force against the Liao created two factions within the Song court. The “war faction” was initially made up of military officers, later joined by civil officials, who favored taking offensive actions against the Liao. Their position in the court rose and fell according to battlefield outcomes. Military setbacks weakened the voices of these hawkish officials and strengthened the power of the “peace faction.”40 To justify its dovish stance, the peace faction frequently alluded to the cultural argument of antimilitarism. For instance, an official named Zhang Qixian proposed internal rectification as the best means to state security: “Let the world know Your Majesty’s benevolence, and respect and support Your Majesty’s kindness. Use this virtue to embrace far-away people and use kindness to benefit your people. Then the submission of people from afar can be expected.”41 However, the rising influence of Confucian pacifism should by no means be construed as independently constraining Chinese decision makers: its ascendance came only after offensive actions had failed to achieve Chinese objectives, and was used to justify restraints in using force.

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THE DECISION TO USE FORCE  The opportunity to use force finally came. In 986, a number of officials submitted memorials to the Song court requesting offensive actions to recover the Sixteen Prefectures. They wanted to take advantage of the perceived power shift wrought by the enthronement of a teenage emperor in the Liao court. Liao Emperor Shengzong (r. 982– 1031) inherited the throne at age eleven in 982, and it seemed to the Song that a window of opportunity had indeed opened. As several officials suggested: “The Khitan master is at a young age. All matters of the state are decided by his mother. The great general Han Derang used her trust to abuse power, which was resented by their people. Please take advantage of this opportunity to take Youji [the Sixteen Prefectures].”42 These officials also alluded to an intelligence report that the Khitan empress dowager was having an affair with Han Derang and that the Khitan emperor was upset about it.43 Geoffrey Blainey argues that internal strife in the stronger state can shift perceptions of the balance of power between two states, creating a window of opportunity for the weaker state.44 For the weaker Song, the disarray in Liao domestic politics seemed to present an opportunity for attack. The offensive ambition of Emperor Taizong rekindled, he called for a court meeting. Deputy Chief Councilor Li Zhi, representing the peace faction, opposed the attack. The Sixteen Prefectures were strategically vital to the Liao, Li pointed out. A Song attack would certainly provoke a vehement response, and it would take tens of thousands of men to besiege the Southern Capital at Beijing. Mobilizing these troops would require substantial funds and provisions, and it was not certain whether or not the Chinese border areas could muster enough materials to supply these soldiers. Moreover, the terrain surrounding the Southern Capital was flat and far away from hills, which would make finding stones to load the catapults necessary for siege warfare particularly difficult. Li Zhi was hence adamantly opposed to war with the Liao, let alone a campaign personally led by the emperor. It seemed to him folly to engage in such a risky endeavor.45 The war faction, however, submitted a detailed war plan. Drafted by Minister of Justice Song Qi, who grew up in the Beijing area and was familiar with the terrain there, as well as with Liao defenses, the plan laid out a strategy of attack and specific routes to be taken. It called for flooding the northern area of the Southern Capital, thus cutting off reinforcements from the Liao north. The plan included tactical formation designed to counter Liao battle maneuvers. Emperor Taizong, eager for military actions, adopted Song Qi’s plan and mobilized the country for war.46

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It is worth noting that this round of debate centered on the operational feasibility of a military strike. The members of the peace faction were opposed to such a move because they considered the campaign too risky. The war faction, on the other hand, carried the day by presenting a seemingly feasible war plan. Cultural arguments were largely absent in the debate.47 In the spring of 986, Song China launched a large-scale offensive against Liao positions from three directions, deploying nearly 200,000 men. The surprise attack caught the Liao off guard. Yelu Xiuge, the famous general who led the relief force that crushed the Song offensive in 979, “dared not come out to fight.”48 Song armies captured major cities and prefectures and continued to push north. The critical situation on the battlefield forced the Liao to withdraw its expeditionary forces from Korea and relocate them to its coastal defenses to prevent a Song sea attack. The Liao emperor Shengzong and empress dowager Chengtian (Xiao) personally led the full force of the Khitan cavalry to the frontline. The Song offensive, however, was hampered by a lack of cooperation among field commanders. The Song main forces were routed in June at Qigou Pass southwest of present-day Beijing, and they suffered great losses. Many were killed in a fleeing stampede or drowned when crossing the Juma River. Other Song forces were subsequently defeated and forced to withdraw.49 Why did the Song offensive fail again? Simply put, Emperor Taizong made a fatal error in misjudging Liao domestic politics.50 He had meant to take advantage of the teenage Liao emperor’s inexperience, but he overlooked the role of the empress dowager, who wielded the real power. Empress Dowager Chengtian (d. 1009) was a capable ruler who commanded the deep loyalty of Liao officials. Administrative skills aside, she was also steeped in military affairs and capable of commanding ten thousand cavalry. She led armies in the field against the Song in 1005, while in her sixties.51 Under her rule, assisted by capable military commanders, the power of the Liao Empire consistently grew. The Song court thus made a serious miscalculation in this situation. The Battle of Qigou Pass was a turning point in Song security policy, marking the last time the Song went on the offensive against the Liao. Thereafter, its military posture shifted to static defense.52 No longer capable of a real offensive, the Song could only fortify frontier defenses. The two Song offensives in 979 and 986 had gravely threatened the survival of the Liao Empire. As the compilers of Liao History noted, “During these two wars, the Liao was in extremely grave danger!”53 The Liao Empire counterattacked in the winter of 986, hoping to further weaken the Song to the extent that it would

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no longer be capable of launching offensives to capture the Sixteen Prefectures. Fierce battles caused heavy casualties on both sides, forcing the Liao to withdraw.54

DEFENSIVE GRAND STRATEGY (986–1005) Offensive motivations continued to dominate Song strategic planning, but were circumscribed by declining capability. Two large-scale offensives (979 and 986) against the Liao had failed to achieve the objective of capturing the Sixteen Prefectures. Worse still, Liao reprisals and attacks in the years after further weakened the Song state. Its war-torn northern frontiers were no longer able to sustain enough troops for defense. In 987, the emperor issued edicts to conscript soldiers in the border areas of Hebei and Henan, but his chief councilor and other officials strongly advised against it for fear of driving the peasants into banditry and interfering with agriculture. The emperor accepted their advice.55 The Song emperor subsequently ordered civil and military officials to come up with a strategy to deal with the Liao threat. Beginning in 987, a series of memorials was submitted to the Song court. They invariably made the observation that the Song lacked the military capability to capture the Sixteen Prefectures, as had been demonstrated by repeated military failures. Unlike previous policy debates, virtually no officials advocated offense as a realistic policy. But they were divided on how to deal with the Khitan threat: whether they should build up defenses against or make peace with the Song archrival. Palace censor Zhao Fu argued from the position of Confucian pacifism. He proposed a peace deal with the Liao whereby both countries negotiated the demarcation of borders and vowed to maintain “joyful and peaceful” relations. He noted that the Khitans and the Chinese (huaren) were similar—both preferred peace to war—and that as such the Khitans could be “transformed by virtue” (dehua) and pacified. Zhao made a note of airing his Confucian principles and the danger of war, arguing that the saint would avoid killing and use virtue to pacify the enemy. Using force would be futile because the Khitans had the advantage in cavalry warfare and had occupied key strategic terrains. The best path to security, according to Zhao Fu, was that of showing benevolence to and making peace with the Liao. The emperor praised Zhao Fu for his proposal.56 Although no decision was made at the time, Zhao Fu’s proposal approximated the terms of the final peace treaty concluded fifteen years later at Shanyuan.

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Most officials nevertheless called for a strengthening of defenses and carrying out of military reform (including better training of troops and breeding more horses to offset the Song disadvantage in cavalry warfare) while waiting for the opportunity to strike. Zhang Ji, division chief in the Ministry of Finance, submitted a memorial in early 989. He suggested that the Song “train soldiers and gather grains. Deploy them along the frontiers. If [the Khitans] come, defend against them. If they leave, do not pursue.” He counseled that the emperor could make peace with the Liao as a time-buying expedient, using the breathing space to rebuild national strength and let the war-weary people rest. But he cautioned, “Our country can never sleep tight when the crooked enemies are not killed and the Sixteen Prefectures are not recovered.” Once the Song had regained power, the emperor should lead an expeditionary force to annihilate the enemies and “burn down their leader’s place of worship.” When that day came, “all under heaven would then be obtained and pacified.”57 Other officials suggested allying with the enemies of the Khitans and “using barbarians to attack barbarians.”58 The consensus that emerged from this round of policy discussion was to adopt a defensive posture vis-à-vis the Liao and broach no peace deal. The Song was not prepared to give up its aspiration to capture the Sixteen Prefectures. The reason for adopting a defensive grand strategy was mainly because the Song court acknowledged its insufficient offensive capabilities. As a result, Song leaders began to strengthen fortifications in three border prefectures (Zhenzhou, Dingzhou, and Gaoyangguan) and deployed 100,000 soldiers in each. They also constructed new fortresses and stockades along the frontiers.59 In the meantime, the Liao in 988 and 989 continued to send troops to attack Song positions. In accordance with a defensive strategy, Song border troops were ordered to stand guard and not to pursue the enemy too far. Consistent with structural realism, as its power declined, Song China adopted a defensive posture in its conflicts with the Liao. Consideration of relative power lay at the heart of policy debates. As was clearly revealed in policy discussions, the departure from the offensive policies of the past was largely due to insufficient capabilities rather than cultural aversion to violence. After the failures in offensive campaigning, the Song had lost the wherewithal—but not the will—to initiate fighting. Records of court discussions reveal that behind the defensive grand strategy stood a strong offensive desire to destroy the enemy. Song officials frequently compared their security problems with those of the Han dynasty Xiongnu threat to the north. They desired the day when the Song could, in a way similar to the Han’s eventual defeat of the Xiongnu, strike deep into Liao territory, overrun the

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palace with troops, and burn down the Liao emperor’s place of worship.60 But capturing the Sixteen Prefectures would be necessary for that to happen. As expected by offensive structural realism, the Song was not content with a moderate amount of power. Rather, it still wanted to maximize relative power and destroy the Liao—an objective that was held back by insufficient capabilities. Confucian pacifism arguments thus appeared only after offensive strategies had failed to resolve the security problem. The shift to a defensive grand strategy was based on the premise that the use of force would not produce the desired policy outcome—the capture of the Sixteen Prefectures. Confucian pacifism’s aversion to violence provided convenient cover in support of a less aggressive policy. In light of the Song’s weakness, officials began to draw on Confucian pacifism and argue for internal rectification and the implementation of virtuous statecraft. But these officials were quick to point out that the defensive policies were largely measures of expediency (quan). Once China became powerful, it would still not be late to go on the offensive. Hence, Confucian pacifism was used to justify both defensive and appeasement policies, and as such did not have an independent effect on China’s security policy. As revealed in policy debates, it was China’s lack of capability that led to a moderation in military posture. THE FINAL SHOWDOWN

As the Song adopted a defensive grand strategy vis-à-vis the Liao, it began to face a growing problem on the western frontier when the Tanguts of Xi Xia rebelled, forcing the Song to deploy troops there. From a security standpoint, the Song might face a two-front war if the Xi Xia were to align with the Liao. Consequently, Song security policy toward the Liao hinged on battlefield developments in the Xi Xia; its Xi Xia policy, in turn, depended on Song relations with the Liao. In general, the Song adopted a defensive posture toward one state and an offensive stance toward the other. It could ill afford to initiate fighting on two fronts. Growing security problems, however, put a severe strain on Song finances. Military expenditures surged, “crippling the state’s budget, consuming threefourths of the annual tax revenues.”61 This daunting fiscal problem notwithstanding, the Song court did not curtail its offensive motivations and still looked for an opportunity to weaken the Liao. Emperor Zhenzong (r. 997–1022) acceded to the Chinese throne in 997. By this time, ten years had passed without a major war between the Song and

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the Liao. Zhenzong initially expressed his peaceful intentions to the Liao, hoping to avoid war on the northern border and so deal with the rising Tangut threat. His peace overtures, however, went unanswered.62 Unbeknownst to the Chinese at that time, the Khitans were preparing for an offensive against the Song. When a Khitan mobilization was finally detected in 999, the Chinese emperor went on an imperial inspection of 200,000 troops, to boost their morale.63 Unable to win, the Khitans retreated after ravaging the Hebei border areas. Even though the Song adopted a defensive posture on the northern borders, its offensive motivations remained. In 1000, Emperor Zhenzong asked Qian Ruoshui, governor of the Song capital, Kaifeng, for plans to “eliminate the barbarians.” Qian replied that “the Khitans cannot be eliminated unless Youzhou [Sixteen Prefectures] is acquired.” But previous expeditions to recover the Sixteen Prefectures had failed, and at great human cost. The high risk of war, Qian suggested, justified an order that those who proposed plans to eliminate the Khitans be “executed.” Citing the danger of war, Qian called for restraint on use of force: “The best option is to win quietly by defending the four barbarian borders.”64 Meanwhile, the Tanguts of Xi Xia took advantage of the Song-Liao confrontation successfully, expanding into nearby territories. To deal with the growing security problem on its northwestern frontier, the Song decided to continue its defensive policy with the Liao and attack the Tanguts. Once the Tanguts were defeated, the Song reasoned, it could come back to deal the final blow to the Liao. In late 1000, the Song launched a military campaign against the Tanguts but stumbled into a stalemate. To make matters worse, the Liao invaded in 1001, but luckily for the Song, heavy rain forestalled the Khitan offensive and forced its retreat. Believing that this recent setback made the Liao incapable of invading immediately, the Song dispatched 60,000 troops to fight in the Xi Xia. But the Song was still not able to prevail because the guerrilla tactics of the Tanguts impeded the Song offense. In 1002, the Song lost to the Tanguts the strategic Lingzhou region on the fertile Ordos steppe.65 As the Tanguts expanded westward, they clashed with a Tibetan tribe based in Liangzhou. A Tibetan ambush mortally wounded the Tangut leader, Li Jiqian, and he died in 1004. His death relieved the military pressures on China’s northwestern frontier. As the Song fought the Tanguts, it fortified cities on the northern plains, making them difficult for the Khitans to conquer. The fortification was so robust that the Khitans described two of the reinforced cities as “Iron City” and “Bronze Gate.” In addition to carrying out intense fortification, the

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Song also constructed an extensive water network across the Hebei plains composed of “canals, ditches, paddy fields, pools, swamps, floodgates, water barriers, and the like.”66 This water network not only helped supply military provisions to Song troops but also slowed down the advance of the Khitan cavalry. This defensive project, spanning hundreds of miles from the Taihang Mountains in the west to the Gulf of Bohai in the east, was so large and extensive that Peter Lorge described it as “The Great Ditch of China.”67 That the Liao avoided these water obstacles in their recent incursions into Song territory is testament to the project’s effectiveness. Defense buildup aside, the Song also actively recruited militia to conduct guerrilla warfare and fight in close coordination with regular troops. In 1002, it recruited 50,000 to 70,000 militiamen in the capital area.68 These recent developments in Song military preparations had the effect of shifting the balance of power in its favor.69 Although the Liao leaders had not read Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War (“What made the war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta”), as “the strongest military force in East Asia,”70 they certainly understood the logic of preventive war. Some of the Song’s military buildups—fortified cities, water networks, and militia—could be interpreted as defensive measures against potential Liao invasions, but in the eye of the Khitans they seemed to indicate preparations for a large-scale war against them. As the security dilemma in international politics is triggered by uncertainty about the other side’s intentions, it was potential Song capabilities, not intentions, which figured prominently in the Liao military decision. As the Liao envoy later explained during peace negotiations in 1005, the Song’s military buildup led the Liao to suspect that the Song “would take further actions.”71 Khitan defectors to the Song also reported that the Liao was apprehensive of the Song’s military power and economic strength; it was the Liao’s fear of a pending Song invasion that prompted it to launch a preemptive strike.72 Liao security concerns were further exacerbated by the impending cessation of hostilities between the Song and the Xi Xia: the removal of military pressures on China’s western frontier would better position the Song to fight in the north. The Song actually transferred fifteen thousand troops from the Xi Xia warfront to the Liao border area in 1004.73 Hence, uncertain about the Song’s intentions, the Liao decided to launch a large-scale invasion before it was too late. As Nap-Yin Lau explains, “The war was trigger by the Liao’s alarm over its declining advantages over the Song’s strengthening military power.” F. W. Mote also writes, “The Liao emperor was uncertain about the Song court’s intentions, so he opted for a first strike.”74

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The Liao invaded in the winter of 1004 with 200,000 crack troops, reaching the outskirts of the Song capital Kaifeng in two months.75 Its proclaimed objective was to regain the Guannan region that had been wrung from it in 959 by the Later Zhou, the Song predecessor.76 The Treaty of Shanyuan concluded in January 1005 ushered in a century of peace between the two most powerful countries in East Asia. COURT DEBATE  As the Liao forces advanced toward the Song capital at Kai-

feng, the Song court engaged in intense debate on how to respond. A number of officials were troubled by the deep penetration of Liao forces into Song territory and urged Emperor Zhenzong to move the capital to Jinling (modern Nanjing) in the south or even to Chengdu deep in the southwest. Lacking natural barriers, they suggested, the current capital at Kaifeng was difficult to defend. Their suggestion was vehemently opposed by Grand Councilor Kou Zhun, who argued that these defeatists should be “condemned and beheaded.” He argued that an imperial expedition would so overawe the enemies that they would “naturally flee.” If the Khitans did not withdraw, a clever stratagem would be able to destroy their schemes and exhaust them, ensuring a Song victory.77 Emperor Zhenzong, however, wavered between the two options of leading an imperial expedition to the frontline and relocating the capital to the south. It would take another three months for the Chinese emperor to make the final decision. Kou Zhun nevertheless understood the great risks involved in the imperial expedition and undertook measures to protect the safety of the imperial entourage. As Emperor Zhenzong approached his destination at Shanyuan, unnerved at the prospect of fighting, he once again considered moving the capital south. In order to coax the emperor into crossing the Yellow River, Kou Zhun argued that the emperor’s withdrawal would demoralize the Song troops and smash their resistance “like a shattered ceramic tile.” Worse still, the Khitan armies would likely pursue and capture the fleeing emperor. Finally, the decision was made that the Chinese emperor should personally go to the frontline. In early January 1005, after several rounds of more prodding by Kou Zhun and Gao Qiong, the timorous Zhenzong crossed the Yellow River and reached Shanyuan, where troops were resisting the Liao onslaught. The sight of the unfurling yellow dragon banner of the Chinese Son of Heaven immediately raised the morale of the embattled Song troops, who all cried, “Long live the Emperor!” (wansui). Their voices could be heard tens of miles away, according to Chinese sources, which also reported that “the enemies looked at each other and started trembling.”78

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THE NEGOTIATION  By this time, it had become increasingly apparent that

neither side could prevail in the conflict. Although the Khitans had overrun several Song frontier prefectures, they bypassed a few strongholds such as Beiping stockade, Baozhou, and Yingzhou, after failing to defeat them. In the siege of Yingzhou, for instance, the Khitan casualties amounted to thirty thousand.79 On January 7, 1005, the Khitans suffered a major military setback when their famed general and statesman Xiao Dalan, mastermind of the invasion, was ambushed and killed by the Song armies near Shanyuan. His death demoralized the Khitan troops and threw them into confusion.80 A military stalemate had developed. The conditions were ripe for peace. As both armies positioned themselves for a final showdown, negotiators were still busy looking for a peaceful solution. As early as November 1004, both sides had been exchanging envoys as the war progressed.81 For the Song, the option of suing for peace had been on the table for some time. The offensive strategy from 979 to 986 had failed to defeat the Liao, damaging the Song military power. As discussed earlier, a few officials had called for a peace deal after the defeat at Junziguang in 986, but were dismissed because the Song court still hoped to subjugate the Liao. Now that the Liao forces were advancing on the Song capital at Kaifeng, a peaceful settlement held strong appeal for the Song emperor. During the negotiation process, the Khitans demanded cession of the Guannan region, which the Song adamantly refused. The Song court argued that it had inherited Guannan from the Later Zhou dynasty (950–960). Although Guannan had been ceded to the Liao in 938 by the Later Jin dynasty and recaptured by the Later Zhou in 959, the territorial dealings of its predecessor were unrelated to the Song. Despite the Liao’s repeated requests, the Song refused to yield on the Guannan issue even if it meant war. Guannan comprised two of the Sixteen Prefectures and three vital strategic passes that controlled access to the Hebei Plain in North China.82 Absent Guannan, the Song’s northern defenses would be dangerously compromised. The Song came up with a counteroffer, “money for peace,” whereby it offered yearly payments of money and silk to the Liao in exchange for peace. Bluntly put, the Song was prepared to bribe its powerful adversary into accepting a peace deal (the Song actually used the word “annual bribe” [suiluo] to describe the proposed deal).83 To the Khitans, this was a temping offer, taking into account the precarious state of their military. Fierce resistance in their southward invasion forced armies to bypass a few Song prefectures and fortifications. They had lost the great general who planned the invasion, were zeroed in on by intact Song armies from the east and the west, and risked

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being cut off from the rear and trapped in China. Recognizing that they were in a military stalemate, the Liao agreed to this “money for peace” formula.84

ACCOMMODATIONIST GRAND STRATEGY (1005–1081) THE TREATY OF SHANYUAN

After four decades of contemplating and actually using force, the Song finally realized that it was in no position to dominate, let alone annihilate, the Liao. Repeated Liao attacks had drained Song military and financial resources. Lacking offensive power, the Song chose to accommodate and appease the Liao. The historic Treaty of Shanyuan (Chanyuan) was concluded on January 19, 1005. In that treaty, more appropriately known as a sworn “covenant” (meng), the Song agreed to provide the Liao an annual payment of 200,000 bolts of silk and 100,000 taels of silver.85 Both sides agreed to demarcate and respect one another’s borders, effectively annulling Song claims to the Sixteen Prefectures. Neither side would disturb the farmland and crops of the other. In addition, no new fortifications and canals would be constructed along the border, although those existing might be repaired. As soon as the treaty was concluded, the Liao withdrew their forces. The treaty also had symbolic significance. To formalize their peaceful relationship, the emperors of both countries thereafter addressed each other as “brother” and recognized one another’s status as equal actors in the international arena. The Song changed the names of places with derogatory overtones. For instance, Polu (“Breaking up the Caitiffs”) was changed to Xinan (“Faith and Peace”), and Pingrong (“Pacifying the Barbarians”) became Baoding (“Protecting the Peace”). Official documents began to address the Liao as the “Great Khitan state” (da qidan guo) or the “Northern Court” (beichao) rather than the “Northern Barbarians” (beilu).86 The demarcated borderline set by the Treaty of Shanyuan hardened the concepts of cultural identity, ethnicity, and loyalty, and the moral caliber of Han Chinese that crossed the borders—voluntarily or involuntarily—to work in the Liao court would be questioned by future Chinese historians.87 Chinese historiographies, including contemporary studies, are largely critical of the Treaty of Shanyuan. While recognizing the long peace it engendered, they view the treaty as a cowardly arrangement that reflected the diffidence and incompetence of the Song court.88 The deal was humiliating, they argue. The Song actually stood a good chance of winning the war. Morale was high, and the Liao troops had made a strategic mistake in bypassing several Song strong-

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holds in their southward expansion, exposing their armies to rear attack. Indeed, some Song generals recognized this situation and proposed such attacks.89 It is not possible, on basis of the information available, to assess the likelihood of victory if the Song had continued fighting. Even if it had won, it is also not clear whether the Chinese could have withstood future counterattacks. But based on the data of previous Song-Liao conflicts, each side seems to have had difficulties subjugating the other. From the birth of the Song dynasty in 960 to the Treaty of Shanyuan in 1005, the Song initiated three conflicts (two major wars in 979 and 986 and one border skirmish in 999) with the Liao, averaging 0.07 per year. All ended in defeat. In contrast, the Liao initiated a total of twenty-two conflicts during the same period, averaging 0.49 per year. (Some of these conflicts appear to have been border raids initiated by frontier officials rather than centrally planned). Among them, thirteen ended in failure, five in victory. Four were inconclusive. But the five victories were mostly border skirmishes and did not achieve any significant annexation of territory.90 The inability of either the Song or the Liao to capitalize on various offensives confirmed the bipolar structure in which neither side was able to prevail. In addition, the Song treasury had run a deficit since its founding in 960. The new dynasty spent the first two decades conquering other independent Chinese states. Thereafter, the Song devoted its attention to the Liao. Constant warfare put a heavy drain on the national treasury. As shown in table 3.2, the Song’s fiscal situation improved substantially after the peace of Shanyuan. It was not until the war with the Xi Xia around the 1040s that the treasury fell into deficit again. THE LONG PEACE

The Treaty of Shanyuan ushered in a century of peace between the two most powerful empires in East Asia. As shown in figure 3.1, there was no recorded incidence of conflict between the two states, except in 1122 when the Song joined the Jurchens to annihilate the Liao.91 Both sides concluded the Shanyuan treaty because they knew that neither would be able to subjugate the other by force. Despite various attempts, none of their territorial ambitions could be fulfilled by military campaigning. To both, the expected benefits of settlement apparently outweighed the expected costs of continued fighting. The Song was willing to pay its adversary annually for peace, and the Liao was content with a battle-free yearly income. The two fought no major conflict thereafter.

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TABLE 3.2  Song YEAR

State Budget, 960–1059 GOVERNMENT SURPLUS/DEFICIT

960–969

-828,894*

970–979

-894,321

980–989

-356,010

990–999

-376,826

1000–1009

178,948

1010–1019

155,364

1020–1029

693,647

1030–1039

656,828

1040–1049

-304,435

1050–1059

1,050,075

* Unit: Silver–kilo. Source: Robert M. Hartwell, “The Imperial Treasuries: Finance and Power in Song China,” Bulletin of Sung Yuan Studies 20 (1988): 62.

For Song China, the indemnified peace was a bargain. F. W. Mote estimates that the annual payments accounted at most for “no more than 3 or 4 percent of the state’s annual revenues.”92 A military solution might not have been as cheap as the diplomatic one. More striking still is Song China’s flexibility as regards the tribute system. Although both countries scrupulously avoided using the word “tribute” (gong) to describe the annual payments (the exact wording was “to assist with [Khitan] military expenditures” [zhu jun lu zhi fei]), the treaty was tantamount to China paying tribute to placate its powerful adversary—a “tribute in reverse,” in the words of historian Liensheng Yang.93 Although the tribute system was predicated on the notion of Chinese superiority, the Treaty of Shanyuan presumed at least a relationship of equality between the two nations. Such equality with neighbors was rare in Chinese history. The Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) had experienced a period of equality with the nomadic Xiongnu Empire, and the Tang dynasty established a marriage alliance with Tibet on an equal footing. These

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FIGURE 3.1.  Cumulative

Frequencies of Conflict Initiation (960–1127).

arrangements took place mainly because China lacked the military power to subjugate its adversaries into participating in the tribute system.94 Geopolitical reality forced the Song to acknowledge its lesser status, however humiliating or distasteful it might have seemed to the Chinese. As a matter of fact, countries like Korea, the Xi Xia, and other Inner Asian states all paid tribute at various times to the Liao Empire. XI XIA AND TRIANGULAR POLITICS

The entry of a third power, the Xi Xia, in the early eleventh century ushered in an era of triangular politics in East Asia. The Song’s security nightmare was a Liao–Xi Xia alliance against China, and consequently Song leaders sought to prevent its formation. Song military policy toward the Xi Xia went from initial offense to defense and to eventual accommodation. Throughout this period, offensive motivations were visibly present in the Chinese decisionmaking process, only to be constrained by lack of military capabilities. THE RISE OF THE TANGUTS  The Tangut people, ethnically related to the

Tibetans, inhabited the Song’s northwestern frontier of the Xi Xia. During the Tang dynasty, they moved into Xiazhou at the edge of the Ordos Desert and provided military support when needed. The Tang court, in recognition

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of Tangut military assistance during the Huang Chao Rebellion (875–884), bestowed the imperial surname, Li, on the Tangut leader. By the end of the Tang dynasty, the Tanguts had become politically autonomous. In 967, Song Emperor Taizu conferred the posthumous title “King of Xia” on a deceased Tangut leader, a move that symbolized nominal Chinese suzerainty. During the Song’s conquest of Northern Han in 979, the Tanguts, whose homeland was abundant in cavalry horses, provided military assistance to the Chinese. The Liao, however, also recognized the strategic value of the Tanguts and pressured them to submit to subsidiary status. To survive, the Tanguts were forced to play a two-faced game, shifting allegiance as they saw fit.95 According to Chinese sources (the Tanguts left no records), in 982, Li Jipeng, the unpopular Tangut leader, submitted to the Song court and presented five prefectures, vowing to give up his title “King of Xia.” Emperor Taizong took advantage of this opportunity to remove the Tanguts as a potential threat and to gain access to warhorses in the Xi Xia. The strategic Ordos region also provided a good northwestern defense against the Liao.96 Li Jipeng’s cousin, Li Jiqian, opposed his submission and led a resistance movement against Song rule. War ensued in the next two decades. In order to balance Song power, the Tanguts in 986 submitted to the Song’s archrival, the Liao, and immediately gained assistance in the war against the Song. The Tanguts paid annual tribute to the Liao court, which granted a princess to marry into the Tangut ruling house to strengthen the alliance. The LiaoTangut alliance posed a serious threat to Song security. To counter the alliance, the Song court sought to build alliance relationships with the Uighurs and the Tibetans, both threatened by the Tanguts.97 Because the Tanguts had frequently raided their tribute missions to China and invaded their territories, both the Uighurs and the Tibetans were eager to join forces with the Song against the Tanguts.98 Taking advantage of the Song-Liao confrontation, the Tanguts embarked on an expansionist agenda to conquer more territories and strengthen their power base. The Song counterattacked, but was thwarted by Li Jiqian’s guerrilla tactics. In 1002, Li Jiqian finally conquered the Song strategic city of Lingzhou (renamed Xiping) by the Yellow River in the fertile Ordos and used it as the capital of the Xia state. The conquest of Lingzhou gave the Tanguts a springboard for westward expansion. Li Jiqian’s expansionist activities clashed with a Tibetan tribe in Liangzhou, and he was mortally wounded in an ambush and died in 1004. His son, Deming, succeeded the Tangut throne at age twenty-two. For the Song, the death of the Tangut leader seemed to present an opportunity for attack. An official named Cao Wei suggested that the Song take

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advantage of this window of opportunity to conquer the Tanguts: “At this moment, their country is in danger, with a feeble son [on the throne]. If we do not capture and destroy them now, they will become too strong to control in the future. Please let me lead elite troops to launch a surprise attack to capture and deliver Deming to our imperial palace. The area south of the [Yellow] River would become our prefectures and counties again. We should not miss this opportunity.”99 However, the Song, threatened with imminent Liao invasion, had deployed most its troops to the northern border. Unable to fight on the western front, the Song emperor decided to make a peace offering to the Tanguts on the conditions that the Tanguts return Lingzhou, restrict their residence in Xiazhou, and demobilize troops.100 As the envoys shuttled back and forth, the Song engaged itself in serious fighting with the Liao. In the aftermath of the Treaty of Shanyuan, the Song had no stomach for another war, and it continued to negotiate a peace treaty with the Tanguts. The Song was so eager for peace that it gave up several demands including the return of Lingzhou and the submission of Tangut royal hostages to the Song court. A peace deal was concluded in the autumn of 1006. The Song court enfeoffed Li Deming as King of Xiping, effectively recognizing the de facto independence of the Xi Xia.101 Peace with the Song allowed the Tanguts to expand westward into the He Xi region. Their prime target was the Uighurs residing in Ganzhou. Starting in 1008, Li Deming launched several attacks on Ganzhou, twice with Liao assistance. It was not until 1028 that he succeeded in conquering that territory. The Song court adopted a hands-off policy and watched its former ally fall under prey. Emboldened by victory, the Tanguts conquered Liangzhou, another Uighur oasis state, in 1032. The acquisition of the He Xi region gave the Tanguts a pastoral base to enrich and empower their state.102 THE SONG–XI XIA WAR (1038–1044)  As the Tanguts grew in power by con-

quest, its subservient status to the Song court became unbearable. They began to demand formal equality in bilateral relations. In 1032, Li Yuanhao (b. 1003), who had previously shown adept military skills in the conquest of Ganzhou and Liangzhou, succeeded his father. To show the distinctiveness of the Tanguts from the Chinese, he adopted a Tangut script to be used in official communications, restored the old Tangut dress code, and issued a head-shaving decree for all males. He also undertook military and administrative reforms that gave the Tangut state a political shape. It was estimated that the Tangut troops numbered from 150,000 to 300,000.103 In 1038, Yuanhao proclaimed himself Emperor of Great Xia. For the Song, which had been accustomed

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to being the Tanguts’ suzerain, this bold move by a “western barbarian state” was a major affront. In Chinese eyes, the international arena already had two “Sons of Heaven,” and the Song court, having previously been forced to recognize the equal status of the Liao, had no intent to let in a third one. Seeing Yuanhao’s action as rebellion, the Song rejected the Xi Xia envoy that was sent to request recognition, revoked the “King of Xiping” title, imposed economic sanctions by closing all frontier markets, and put a ransom on Yuanhao’s head. The Song began to make preparations for war. For its part, the Liao court was not as harsh, seeing the strategic benefit of the Xi Xia as a Song security threat. But it did not want another “peer competitor” either, choosing to address Yuanhao as King of Xia rather than recognizing him as emperor.104 Both the Song and the Xi Xia were the weaker powers in the triangular relationships with the Liao. Balance-of-power logic suggests that both states should ally against the stronger Liao. This did not happen, however, mainly because the Confucian culture of hierarchy impeded rational policymaking. The Song court saw Xi Xia independence as rebellion of a vassal state and refused to recognize it, let along making it an ally. Had the Song made an alliance with the Tanguts, China’s security environment might have substantially improved. But the cultural legacy of Confucian hierarchy made the alliance unthinkable for Song officials. In this case, cultural variable supplements structural realism by explaining behaviors contrary to structural logic.105 Military conflicts soon erupted between the Song and the Xi Xia.106 Like the Khitans, the Tanguts, who resided in a horse-producing region, were skilled in cavalry warfare and took advantage of their horse-riding skills to confront the Song infantry, inflicting heavy casualties. Yuanhao’s victory at Sanchuankou in 1040 caught the Song court by surprise. To deal with the growing Tangut threat, over the next four years the Song’s strategy went from offense to defense and then to accommodation. In 1040, Song Emperor Renzong (r. 1022–1063) appointed Han Qi and Fan Zhongyan as deputy commissioners of military affairs for the pacification of Shaanxi. The court debated whether to adopt an offensive strategy or a defensive one. Court officials agreed on the merits of using force but sharply disagreed on whether the Song had the capability to go on the offensive. The debate centered on assessment of military capabilities; virtually no officials argued along Confucian line.107 Han Qi was in favor of attack, submitting an offensive operational plan to strike at the Tanguts. However, other officials, led by Fan Zhongyan, opposed the attack and preferred a defensive strategy. The main reason of their opposition was the Song’s military weakness. They recognized the weakness of the Song armies and the strength of the Tanguts. Pang Ji flatly stated, “our generals are

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mediocre; our soldiers are not sharp.” Yuanhao and his courtiers, in contrast, were united and strong. A defensive posture, added Pang, would be the best strategy: “We should wait until they are internally divided, and then launch a major attack. This is the best strategy.”108 Han Qi countered, “I heard some of my colleagues insisted on defense, thinking that defense would ensure us victory. I fear that several of our stockades and forts would be lost, our border garrisons would be gradually weakened, and our troops would be gradually demoralized. If the bandits ride on this trend, they would want to swallow the east of our Shaanxi region.”109 In Han Qi’s view, the best defense is a good offense; if the Song did not attack, more territories would be lost to the Tanguts. The Song emperor adopted Han Qi’s plan for attack. Unfortunately, in 1041 the Song expeditionary armies were lured and ambushed by the Tanguts, and suffered a demoralizing defeat at Haoshuichuan, losing six thousand men. Military defeat forced the Song court to reevaluate its policy and adopt a defensive posture advocated earlier by Fan Zhongyan.110 The Song, nevertheless, suffered another disheartening defeat at Dingchuanzhai in 1042, losing 9,400 soldiers. It appeared that military campaigning could not solve the Xi Xia problem. An increasing number of officials began to call for peace. They were wary of a possible Liao–Xi Xia alliance. As early as 1039, a key official in the Song court Fu Bi had expressed his concern: The western enemy and the northern enemy are allies, and your servant worries about their disturbances in China. Since ancient times foreign states have often allied themselves against China, and now we can witness such an alliance again. Formerly Yuanhao established marital relations with the Khitan emperor; they were personally very close and privately conspired to invade China. When the Xi Xia gradually advanced, it relied upon the Liao’s power; when there was urgent need for foreign aid, the Xia received military assistance from the Liao. They have even formed an alliance and pledged mutual assistance. If they do this in a variety of ways, our defenses will be divided. All in all, the Xia people dare to be our enemy because they have already secured help from our great enemy [the Liao].111

Other officials such as Liu Ping and Yang Jie also voiced their concern about a Liao–Xi Xia alliance in 1039 and 1041.112 To thwart such an alliance, a few officials suggested making an alliance with the Uighurs in Inner Asia, as had been done in the Tang dynasty, and with the Tibetans.113 Commensurate with these alliance strategies, some officials suggested driving a

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wedge between the Liao and the Xi Xia and persuading the former to attack the latter.114 LIAO EXTORTION  The Liao, on the other hand, was aware of the Song–Xi

Xia conflict and saw it as an opportunity to enhance its power position, even though both the Song and the Liao had been at peace for three decades following the conclusion of the Treaty of Shanyuan in 1005. In 1037, the Liao emperor Xingzong (r. 1031–1055) had already expressed his wish to “unify the universe.” Acquiring Guannan, a disputed strategic territory, would be the first step in conquering China. The Liao decided to take advantage of the Song’s military setbacks with the Xi Xia. In late 1041, Xingzong sent an envoy to the Song to demand the return of Guannan. To back up the demand, the Liao mobilized troops in the border prefectures and made plans to invade the Song.115 Before using force, the Liao sent two emissaries to the Song court to demand the return of the ten counties in Guannan. Earlier, news of imminent Khitan attack had reached the Song court, which responded by beefing up defenses in the north and dispatching Fu Bi as an envoy to the Liao court, hoping to avoid a military confrontation. The Song could not afford to fight a two-front war with the Liao and the Xi Xia and decided to appease its primary adversary. At one point, the Song emperor even considered marrying a Chinese princess to the Liao emperor’s son, which Fu Bi opposed for being too humiliating. Increasing annual payments to the Liao seemed the best option. In keeping with the Treaty of Shanyuan, the Song court offered monetary incentives to the Khitans: “If there was to be an imperial marriage, there would be no increase in annual payments. If the Khitans ordered the Tanguts to submit to the Song, there would be an increase in the annual payments of two hundred thousand units. Otherwise, there would be only one hundred thousand units.”116 The Song made it clear that if the Liao insisted on taking back the Guannan, it would have to go to war for such a move. Since the Liao emperor could not be assured of victory if he launched an attack, he accepted the offer of money.117 The new treaty of 1042 increased annual payments to the Liao from 100,000 taels of silver and 200,000 bolts of silk to 200,000 taels of silver and 300,000 bolts of silk, and noted that “the increased amount of the annual gift is intended as a substitute for the tax yielded by the ten counties of the Guannan area.”118 The Liao was able to force the Song to use the word “submitting an offering” (na) to describe the payments, symbolizing Liao superiority. Once again, the Song bought off its adversary with money. To evaluate this appeasement policy, we must understand the relative power position of the

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Song. Lack of military capabilities was crucial. Ouyang Xiu, an official and a prominent figure in the neo-Confucian movement, described the decrepit situation of the Song military in June 1042, during the negotiation process: Our soldiers are growing older, while the enemies are getting stronger day by day. We tried to combine the strength of nine prefectures to pacify a small barbarian in the west, but nobody dared to come forward. Now the big adversary in the north has violated the treaty, taking wanton actions. How are we going to defend against it? . . . Today, the solders deployed along the borders numbered approximately 700,000 to 800,000. This is a lot. But training is lax, and the number is overblown by the elderly and the weaklings. [The strength of] ten men does not even match that of one; that is, 700,000 to 800,000 soldiers cannot even be used as 70,000 to 80,000 men.119

Fan Zhongyan echoed Ouyang Xiu’s dire assessment of the Song power position: “We have been in peace for too long. People do not know how to fight and are easily frightened upon hearing the arrival of enemies.”120 In short, military weaknesses, compounded by the threat of the Xi Xia, compelled the Song court to appease the Liao. PEACE WITH THE XI XIA  Incessant warfare with the Tanguts had substantially

stretched the capacity of the Song state, depleting treasury and impoverishing the border areas. The Song lost three major battles in Sanchuankou (1040), Haoshuichuan (1041), and Dingchuanzhai (1042) and feared a joint Liao–Xi Xia attack. Late in 1041, Zhang Fangping, administrator of the Bureau of Policy Criticism (zhi jianyuan), wrote, “Ever since Yuanhao rebelled, we have dispatched several contingents of troops, yet without success. . . . Today, our border defense outlays totaled 10 million units. More than 100,000 people have been killed since the war started. Thus, since antiquity, people discussing border affairs have invariably agreed that peace with the barbarians was beneficial, war harmful.”121 The Song emperor was pleased with his peace proposal: “This is exactly what I have in mind.”122 Other officials also observed the adverse position of the Song finance. “Eighty or ninety percent of our treasury income went to the military,” wrote Fu Bi. “Our troops can be said to be many. Our treasury can be said to be exhausted.”123 Yu Jing observed that, “Five years have passed since our country started using force. We have experienced three major battles. Troops were routed, generals dead. Treasury is empty. People are hungry and troubled by the problem of supplies.”124 The list of problems went on and on.

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There were also signs of pending internal rebellions that arose from the economic hardships caused by the war.125 To make up for the skyrocketing military expenditures, the Song government imposed heavy taxes that resulted in a fourfold increase in revenue (table 3.3). Although the numbers were not adjusted for inflation, the effect of heavy taxes was clear in the minds of officials. Heavy taxes and corvee service obligations could drive people into banditry. A 1039 famine left 1.9 million people in the North China Plain in dire need of state relief, and in 1043 2.5 million people in Shanxi required assistance.126 Ouyang Xiu pointed out in a memorial, “Today, there are so many unfarmed lands under Heaven. . . . These lands are not abandoned for their barrenness. The reason people do not diligently farm is because heavy taxes have forced them to flee!”127 To cope with the rising domestic problems and to improve the Song’s military preparedness, the Song court adopted the Qingli Reforms (1043–1045) spearheaded by Fan Zhongyan and his associates.128 Hence military weakness, fiscal difficulties, and the threat of internal rebellion forced the Song to make peace with the Xi Xia. As expected by structural realism, a state experiencing extreme hardship would adopt a more accommodative policy toward its adversary. The Song could not afford to continue the war it was unable to win and run the risk of jeopardizing its rule at home. As most officials recognized, continuing the warfare had become much more costly than cutting a peace deal with the Tanguts. Peace would allow the Song the much-needed breathing space to strengthen itself. The Tanguts, on the other hand, also wanted peace. The economic embargo imposed by the Song had hurt their economy. Supplies were short

TABLE 3.3  Itemized ITEMS

Tax Revenue, 1004–1047 1004–1007

1041–1047

Commercial taxes

4,500*

19,750

Liquor taxes

4,280

17,100

Salt taxes

3,550

7,150

12,330

44,000

Total * Unit: 1,000 guan.

Source: Li Huarui, Song Xia Guanxi Shi [History of Song-Xia Relations] (Hebei: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1998), 54.

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and prices were rising. By this time, Yuanhao had lost half of his troops. Discontent was on the rise.129 When the Liao pressured the Xi Xia to make peace with the Song, as was stipulated by the agreement of 1042, the Tangut leader, Yuanhao, immediately sent an envoy to the Song court. Although most Song officials were inclined to accept a peace deal, there were still lingering doubts about Liao–Xi Xia collusion, even a joint attack. Indeed, in the summer of 1043, Yuanhao had secretly proposed to the Liao emperor for a joint military attack on the Song. The Liao turned him down.130 What the Song did not realize was that the conflict of interests between the Liao and the Xi Xia ran much deeper than the Chinese had thought. The Tanguts were not happy with the high-handed attitude of the Liao and did not wish to remain a Liao vassal state. They were also upset by the second Song-Liao peace treaty of 1042, because the Liao was reaping handsome profits from the Xi Xia’s conflicts with the Song. The Liao, on the other hand, had been suspicious of the Tanguts’ dealings with the Song. The Tanguts had been playing a double-faced game, invested as a vassal at the same time by both the Liao and the Song. Moreover, the Tangut population in the Liao Empire had also been causing disturbances, apparently with the support of the Xi Xia. The Liao did not want to have another powerful neighbor to its southwest that could cause problems down the road. When the news of a possible Liao attack on the Xi Xia reached the Song court, most officials were skeptical.131 Nonetheless, the Song court recognized the strategic benefits of an all-out war between these two enemies and quickly concluded a peace deal with the Xi Xia, thus giving the Tanguts a free hand to slug it out with the Liao, hoping that both adversaries would be weakened by the war.132 In June 1044, Yuanhao agreed to accept a nominally inferior status as “ruler of the Xi Xia state,” calling himself “subject” (chen) of the Song, although he continued to use imperial nomenclature within his country.133 As the nominal suzerain, the Song “bestowed” a large annual payment of 255,000 units to the Xi Xia, effectively buying them off for peace. In the autumn of 1044, the Liao emperor led a cavalry of more than 100,000 men to attack the Xi Xia. In a characteristic demonstration of his military feat, Yuanhao routed the Liao offensive and captured several high-ranking officials. The Liao emperor barely escaped.134 Conflicts continued almost every year. Yuanhao was assassinated in 1048 in a domestic power struggle. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the Liao launched a second offensive in 1049. The war was inconclusive, each side suffering losses. The conflicts dragged on until 1053 when both states became weary and signed a peace treaty. The Xi Xia, recognizing its insufficient capability in sustaining a long-term

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conflict, agreed to accept the inferior status as a vassal. Over the next twenty years, the Tanguts frequently dispatched envoys with gifts to the Liao court. Given its superior power position, the Liao eventually prevailed.

OFFENSIVE GRAND STRATEGY (1081–1085) THE SONG–XI XIA WAR

There was a brief period of peace in the wake of the Song–Xi Xia peace treaty of 1044. Beginning in the 1060s, tensions began to rise as both engaged in frequent border skirmishes. Because of early policies and external warfare, the Song state had accumulated many domestic problems. At one point, the government raised as many as 1.25 million troops, causing severe fiscal crises and internal rebellions.135 In 1069, an official estimated that 83 percent of total national income was spent on maintaining such a large army, causing severe economic problems across the country.136 There were also a large number of surplus officials who received salary without holding active post. The call for reform was loud and clear. Emperor Shenzong (r. 1067–1085) ascended the Chinese throne amid this midcentury financial crisis. Troubled by the military defeats of his predecessors, he was determined to wipe away generations of shame by “redefining the political map through conquest and expansion.”137 Shenzong understood that the Song needed money to finance the war, telling his war minister, “If we are to raise troops for our frontier campaigns, then our treasuries must be full.”138 The Song emperor’s determination to launch an offensive campaign, however, did not go unopposed. Fu Bi, the official who negotiated the 1042 treaty increasing annual payments to the Liao, advised the emperor in 1068 to follow the Confucian prescription: “It would be best if you could spread virtue and act benevolently, and not speak of war for twenty years.” Shenzong responded with silence.139 In the meantime, the Xia court was plagued by factional violence over whether to pursue a pro-Chinese or a pro-Tangut cultural policy.140 The Song court watched this internal struggle intently and waited for the opportunity to strike. INTERNAL BALANCING  Emperor Shenzong appointed Wang Anshi as chief

councilor to oversee the reform to increase Song power. Wang argued that the Song must undertake government reforms to strengthen the state and adopt economic policies to create wealth. He implemented the “mutual security system” (baojia) to organize farmers into local militias who could become

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soldiers in times of war, harnessing the Song’s larger population into a formidable military force.141 The essence of Wang Anshi’s New Policies (1069–1073) was “enriching the state and strengthening the military” (fu guo qiang bing), which was essentially a strategy of internal balancing. Its ultimate aim, writes historian Ray Huang, “was to deliver the benefit to the battleground in north China.”142 Like Emperor Shenzong, Wang recognized that the Song must build up its power base before engaging in any serious military endeavor. Wang Anshi gained his Confucian jinshi degree in 1042, ranking fourth among 839 degree winners.143 His realpolitik, however, is well known in Chinese history. Wang understood that building a powerful state was key to security. “To achieve victory over the barbarians [Liao and Xi Xia],” he said in a discussion with Emperor Shenzong in 1071, “we only need to develop our domestic statecraft during leisure times. Make our generals and officials competent, our treasury plenty, and our military strong.”144 In another discussion with the emperor, Wang summarized his intent: “After our treasury is abundant, we can use force.” Responding to the Confucian pacifism argument that virtue should be emphasized over force, he argued that virtue (de) and force (li) must go hand in hand. A virtuous ruler would still have to cater to the barbarians if he was militarily inferior, as attested by the many examples in Chinese history. For Wang, weakness would invite aggression; strength would cause security. Enriching the state would substantially improve the livelihood of the people and make the state strong. However, his comment that “if we are capable of using force, we need not worry about finding a good reason to use it” raised many eyebrows among Confucian-minded officials.145 Wang was criticized for being anti-Confucian, and some of his policies were often described as Legalist. But Wang’s Confucian credential was strong. As F. W. Mote points out, “His political thought, while incorporating some elements of what we today could call a ‘managed economy,’ was entirely Confucian in its conceptual foundations and in its ideals.”146 Wang Anshi was ashamed of the peace settlements of 1005 and 1042 with the Liao that required the Song emperor to call the Liao emperor “uncle” and the Liao empress dowager “grandmother.” But he was also keenly aware of China’s shortcomings and advocated restraint during the border disputes with the Liao in the 1070s.147 An all-out war must be avoided, because enhancing state power through domestic reforms was the most urgent task at hand.148 China should wait until it had accumulated enough material wherewithal to strike at adversaries. Chinese strategy was to attack the Xi Xia first and then turn its attention on the Liao. The Xi Xia was the weaker power in the triangular relations and

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thus would be easier to conquer, so the thinking went. An offensive policy was made in the 1070s. To pave the way for the invasion of the Xi Xia, the Song sought to conquer the tribes located on the Xia’s southeastern and southern borders. These regions were rich in natural resources, including warhorses, and contained lucrative foreign trades that could be exploited to finance the conquest of the Xi Xia.149 The campaign to conquer the southeastern tribes at Hengshan was hampered by Tangut intervention, but the Song scored a handsome victory in the Tanguts’ southern border.150 Emperor Shenzong was eager to wipe out China’s security rivals. He had wanted to launch offensive wars early on, but Wang Anshi restrained the emperor’s ambitions, arguing that the country was not strong enough to attack the Tanguts or the Khitans.151 After Wang Anshi was dismissed in 1076 because of increasing opposition to his New Policies, the emperor shifted the reform focus from “enriching the state” to “strengthening the military.”152 He embarked on a wide range of military reforms in order to streamline the Song armies. As early as 1077, he had begun preparations for war by stockpiling weapons in the prefectures bordering the Xi Xia.153 His war endeavor, however, was not unopposed. In 1078, Zhang Fangping submitted a memorial (composed by the great literary writer Su Shi) forcefully making the case against war. Because war was a dangerous business, it should be resorted to only when there were no other alternatives. Zhang referred to several historical precedents in which excessive use of force led to the demise of dynasties. “Those who like to use force will face demise,” cautioned Zhang. The emperor, though apparently moved, was determined to use force and refused to follow Zhang’s plea for restraint.154 Zhang Fangping’s memorial deserved special attention because it was submitted when China was planning to use force. His argument was, in essence, a Confucian one, and was echoed by other members of the “peace faction.” As we have seen earlier, in the 1040s, Confucian antimilitarism was used by officials to justify the change from an offensive to a defensive posture at a time when China lacked sufficient offensive capability, and hence had a largely symbolic effect. In contrast, Zhang’s memorial was more than just symbolic; it was clearly aimed at stopping a pending use of force. However, the admonitions of the peace faction were rejected because Emperor Shenzong believed that China was in a much better power position than the one in which it had been decades earlier.155 THE DECISION TO USE FORCE  The power of the Song state steadily rose after

the adoption of Wang Anshi’s massive restructuring of the Song economy.

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Historian Paul Forage notes that the war of 1081–85 marked “the apogee of Song power, the best the Song could achieve militarily after a decade of preparation with government treasuries awash with funds raised during the Wang Anshi reforms.”156 For its part, the Song court had been paying close attention to the power struggle within the Tangut government since the 1070s, sending spies to gather intelligence and looking for an opportunity to attack the adversary that had caused so much trouble on China’s borders. The opportunity came in 1081 when Chinese intelligence reported that the Xi Xia emperor Bingchang (r. 1068–1086), who favored a pro-Chinese policy, was imprisoned by his mother, the empress dowager, who favored an anti-Chinese stance, causing a leadership crisis. Seeing a window of opportunity, officials began submitting proposals calling for an attack. “The Xi Xia is in an internal rebellion. We should mobilize troops to chastise them,” suggested General Chong E, adding, “This is an once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.” If the Liao took advantage of this opportunity to annex the Xi Xia, it would become so strong that Chinese security would be severely jeopardized. But “if the Xi Xia frontier belongs to China, then the Khitans would be isolated. When they are isolated, we can have designs on them.”157 He volunteered to capture the Xi Xia emperor: “The Xia state has no leader. Bingchang is just a child. I will go and snatch his arms and bring him here.”158 Some officials opposed the attack, suggesting a “divide and rule” strategy to break up the Xia state and let the divided Tanguts govern themselves. The Song emperor, however, rejected their “naïve” proposal. The emperor was determined to conquer the Xi Xia: “The Xia is in turmoil. If we don’t get it, the Liao will get it. We must not miss [this opportunity].”159 China assembled a total of 300,000 soldiers in what was “the largest offensive operation launched by the Northern Song.”160 The war aims were to capture the Tangut capital, wipe out the Xi Xia state, and then turn the Song forces to subjugate the Liao.161 Supplying these massive troops was so critical to victory that the Song employed an unusually large number of porters, making the ratio of porters to combatants slightly over 1:1. The invasion troops hence numbered more than 600,000. The Song launched a full-scale attack from five directions. Its intention at conquering the Xi Xia state was fully revealed in the invasion plan. The five armies were to rendezvous at the Tangut capital at Lingzhou (Xiping), and put it under siege. In response, the Tanguts, understanding the critical problem of Chinese logistics, adopted a scorched-earth policy and dispatched light cavalry to attack Chinese supply lines. That strategy worked. Two of the Chinese armies were forced to withdraw because they ran out of food,

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suffering huge casualties as they retreated. Two armies made it to Lingzhou but were unable to penetrate the defenses of the Xi Xia capital. The Tanguts breached the dikes along the Yellow River and flooded the besieging troops. At the news of these setbacks, the fifth army was ordered to withdraw before reaching Lingzhou. (See map 3.3.) Thus, the first phase of Chinese offensives ended in failure. The Song, however, captured a few prefectures along the way. The failure did not curtail Chinese offensive ambition. Officials immediately suggested plans for a second attack. To pave the way for it, the Song strengthened the defenses of the captured territories and built a new fortified city at Yongle. But before the Song could launch a second strike, the Xi Xia counterattacked with full force. A Tangut force of 300,000 swamped the fortifications at Yongle and decimated the Chinese. On hearing the news of the devastating defeat, the Chinese emperor broke in tears and refused to eat.162 It was estimated that the Song had lost at least 600,000 men since the war started, including troops, porters, and militias. Human lives aside, the economic costs were staggering.163 As a result of these wrenching defeats, the Song emperor lost confidence in the advice offered by frontier generals and their ability to carry out offense. Growing weary of warfare, he abandoned the plan of conquering the Xi Xia.164 The retraction of Chinese goals did not end the war however. The conflicts continued to drag on for several years, as the Tanguts repeatedly sent forces to recover their lost territories still held by the Chinese. They were repelled. Tangut attacks finally forced the Song to return four of the six captured territories in 1088, but not the strategically more important ones, in exchange for some Chinese prisoners of war captured at Yongle. But that concession did not bring peace to both countries. Sporadic warfare dominated the relationship between these two rivals until the end of the Northern Song dynasty in 1127.

THE FALL OF NORTHERN SONG (1085–1127) RISE OF THE JURCHENS  Unlike the Song, the Liao was a truly multiethnic

empire, establishing five capitals (the Supreme Capital, the Eastern Capital, the Central Capital, the Western Capital, and the Southern Capital) to accommodate the various ethnic groups that were absorbed into the Liao Empire. Controlling and ruling over such a heterogeneous state required constant vigilance to military power. The early Liao frequently employed military forces to suppress rebellions or to intervene in the domestic affairs of vassal states such as Korea. From the mid-1050s onward, however, the Liao

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Song Invasion of the Xi Xia, 1081 Heishui (Kara Khoto)

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Lanzhou Yellow R.

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MAP 3.3

court was weakened by internal strife between the Yelu and the Xiao clans. Attempted coups, assassinations, and corruption characterized Liao politics. The state’s resources “were squandered on in-house fighting instead of being fully deployed in the military tasks of the frontier. Liao power and prestige were diminished.”165 To make matters worse, the state developed a fiscal crisis in the latter half of the eleventh century.166 Dwindling tax revenue made it increasingly difficult to administer the vast empire. As the Liao declined in power, its component ethnic tribes began to assert themselves. The Jurchens, a Tungusic people in northeastern Manchuria and direct forebears of the Manchus, rose in power and challenged the survival of the Liao Empire. The Jurchens had been in discontent over Liao mistreatment and excessive demands over annual tribute. Led by Wanyan Aguda, the Jurchens united themselves and put military pressures on the Liao’s eastern border. In 1115, Aguda proclaimed the Jin dynasty (1115–1234), himself posthumously known as Emperor Taizu (r. 1115–23). The Liao emperor led an army to chastise the Jurchens’ recalcitrance but was forced to flee in defeat. Day by day, Aguda’s armies grew in size, joined by other non-Jurchen tribes as well. In 1116, the Jurchens conquered the Liao Eastern Capital. Four years later, the Liao Supreme Capital also fell.

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“ALLIANCE BY THE SEA”  The stunning success of the Jurchens caught the

attention of the Song court, which had been looking for a strong ally to balance Liao power. The Song had never forgotten the Sixteen Prefectures and saw the rise of the Jurchens as a great opportunity to help it capture the strategic territory.167 Both shared a common enemy: the Liao. Using horse buying as cover, in 1118 the Song court dispatched envoys in secrecy to the Jin court by sea (so as to avoid crossing Liao territories and risk being detected), proposing an alliance to destroy the Liao. After some haggling, both sides reached an agreement on joint attack in 1122. Known as the “alliance by the sea” in Chinese history, the Song-Jin agreement called for the return of the area surrounding the Liao Southern Capital (Beijing) to the Song, and the Song “transfer” of annual payments from the Liao to the Jin.168 As the negotiation proceeded, the Jin conquered the Liao Central Capital in 1122. To improve its bargaining position, the Song court realized that it must score some military victories. In 1122, the Song mobilized 100,000 troops and attacked the Liao forces at the Southern Capital, but failed to take over the city. It tried again later that year but still failed. The Song’s ignominious failures aroused contempt among the Jurchens, who went so far as to make poems and songs to ridicule the Song’s laughable failures. The Liao Empire was collapsing and severely weakened, but the Song still had difficulties scoring victory against its tottering rival. Seeing that their efforts had failed, the Song commander in the frontline invited the Jurchens to attack the Southern Capital.169 In what would turn out to be another indignity to the Song court, when the Jurchens, who had been victorious throughout the campaign, reached the wall of the Southern Capital, the city surrendered without a fight. The Jurchens looted the city. Until now the Song had gotten almost nothing. Its military weakness was clearly revealed on the battleground. Still, the Song demanded the Jin fulfill the alliance agreement by handing over the Yanyun region (Sixteen Prefectures). As the Song’s disreputable failures had significantly weakened its bargaining position, the Jin dismissed many of the Song’s demands (including the handover of Liao Western Capital at Datong). In the final agreement, the Jin only agreed to hand over Beijing and the surrounding six prefectures (two of which had already surrendered to the Song). The Song would make annual payments of 300,000 bolts of silk and 200,000 taels of silver, plus one million strings of cash to cover the taxes yielded by the Southern Capital area.170 THE DEMISE OF THE LIAO EMPIRE  The Jurchens continued to pursue the fleeing Liao emperor well into the west, and finally captured him in 1125 at

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the edge of the Ordos Desert, thereby destroying the Liao Empire. The Liao emperor was downgraded to the status of a prince and died a few years later. A royal relative Yelu Dashi led the remnants of Khitan forces and established a new state in Central Asia. Known as the Western Liao in Chinese history and Kara Khitan in Central Asia, the state encompassed a vast region extending two thousand miles from present-day Kazakhstan to the borders of the Xi Xia and Tibet. HEGEMONIC WAR

The Asian international system was rattled by the sudden rise of the Jurchens and the rapid fall of the Liao Empire. By 1124, the Xi Xia had submitted to the Jin as a vassal state. With the Liao gone, the Song became the peer competitor of the newborn Jin Empire. The ineptitude of the Song military and the material wealth of Song China made it a tempting target for the Jin. Moreover, the Song state had been plagued by rampant problems of internal rebellions since the mid–eleventh century. During the Southern Capital campaign of 1122, the Song court was forced to redeploy troops to suppress domestic rebellions elsewhere.171 To tilt the distribution of power in its favor, the Jin decided to launch an all-out invasion of Song China in 1125. The strategic logic is a preventive one: “If we do not strike first,” explained a famed Jin general, Zongwang (Wolipu), who was the second son of the Jin founding emperor Aguda, “[the Song] might become a future problem.”172 In late 1125, the Jin launched what would later become a hegemonic war against Song China in order to “unify the universe.” Robert Gilpin defined hegemonic war as “a war that determines which state or states will be dominant and will govern the system.”173 The Song armies were no match for the Jurchen juggernaut and continued to retreat. Song Emperor Huizong hastily abdicated the throne to his son and fled south. Soon the Jurchens reached the wall of Kaifeng, the Northern Song capital. Thanks to a few able officials who beefed up the defense of the capital, the Song fended off the Jurchen offensive. The frightened Song court sent an envoy to the Jurchen camp to negotiate the terms of withdrawal. The Song agreed to pay, among other things, 5 million taels of gold and 50 million taels of silver to “award” the Jurchen troops, make annual payments of 2 million guan, cede three strategically located towns, address the Jin emperor as “uncle,” and send a prince as hostage. When the Chinese relief forces arrived, the Jurchen commander withdrew his troops before pocketing the indemnity in full.174

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Although the first Jin offensive did not succeed in terminating the Song dynasty, the Jurchens were able to wrest enough concessions from the Chinese. The hiatus in fighting would give them time to consolidate their gains. Their offensive ambition, however, was not curtailed. No sooner had they withdrawn than they started making war preparations in earnest. They first allied with the Xi Xia to put military pressure on the Song’s northwestern border, and they returned an occupied town to Korea so that it agreed to be a vassal state.175 The next year, in 1126, the Jin launched a second offensive in full force. This time, the Jurchens penetrated Kaifeng and captured the Chinese emperor Qinzong and his abdicated father Huizong. Three thousand members of the royal family and officials were kidnapped and sent to the Jin state in the north. After 167 years, the Northern Song dynasty ended in 1127.

CONCLUSION Confucian culture did not constrain the Northern Song dynasty decision to use force. Despite having a Confucian culture that denigrated the use of force, Chinese strategic behavior was consistent with structural realist expectations: Considerations of the balance of power—not cultural aversion to warfare—dominated the decisions to use force. Even when the Northern Song did decide not to use force, the decision-making process still reveals a high degree of offensive motives, constrained only by insufficient military capabilities. Although non-use of force was sometimes cloaked in the language of Confucian antimilitarism, restraint on the use of force generally reflected pragmatic thinking based on consideration of logistical and economic obstacles.176 Officials arguing along this nonbelligerent line were quick to point out that once China became powerful, it should start using force. Thus behind these defensive and accommodationist policies were strong offensive motivations merely biding a more propitious time to be enacted. The historical record shows that Northern Song leaders looked for any opportunity to weaken their adversaries. Upon pinpointing a weakness (often in the form of domestic instability caused by leadership crisis), Song leaders did not hesitate to go on the offensive. If the balance of power was judged to be favorable, Song leaders preferred to take military actions against the adversary. The Northern Song took the initiative in launching three major military campaigns against its adversaries. The Northern Han campaign in 979 was predicated on the Song emperor’s reckoning that Song power had

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grown after the conquest of other Chinese states in the south. The massive offensives against the Liao in 986 and against the Xi Xia in 1081 were both prompted by the perceived power shift created by internal leadership crises in the two states. As its power grew, the Song shifted to an offensive grand strategy, as it did in 979 and 1081. Furthermore, Chinese war aims were not limited to border defense but included conquest of territories and annihilation of adversaries. The Song court was intent not only on capturing the Sixteen Prefectures but also on finding ways to destroy the Liao. There is, however, only one case of war-aims expansion: the decision to attack the Liao after the conquest of Northern Han in 979. For the other wars initiated by the Song, the campaigns failed to achieve their original objectives, let alone leading to an expansion of war aims. For some analysts, the argument advanced here—the material distribution of capabilities largely shaped Song China’s security policy—may seem to overlook nonstructural factors such as leadership traits, factional infighting, or domestic politics.177 For instance, Song founding emperor Taizu was a military man, which might explain his preference for military solutions to the dynasty’s security problems; the second emperor Taizong assumed the throne under the suspicion of being a usurper, and successful military actions would boost his domestic standing and confirm his fitness to rule; the third emperor Zhenzong was known for his timidity and indecision, which could explain Song acceptance of the Treaty of Shanyuan. But, then again, Song strategic choices might have been an outcome of infighting between the war and peace factions. These nonstructural explanations have their merits, but they do not necessarily contradict the structural realist account based on assessments of the Song-Liao balance of power. As a broad-gauged theory, structural realism is good at explaining a state’s tendency toward certain types of behavior, but cannot account for all the details. The theory recognizes that there could be non-security motives for state behavior. But it has little to say about them, other than that when non-security motives contradict power considerations, the latter usually prevail.178 Fine-grained theories that incorporate unit-level variables may be needed to give more detailed explanations of motives not related to security. There is, however, a trade-off between parsimony and explanatory power. It is striking how the character of international politics has endured across space and time. Europe and Asia had little contact before modernity, yet both invariably practiced power politics for survival. Security competition and war characterized the interstate relations of both systems. What explains this remarkable resemblance? There is little evidence that either Europe or

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Asia had learned power politics from one another, as both systems existed separately in antiquity. The root cause of this similarity has much to do with the ordering principle of the system: anarchy, the absence of a central government above states. States in an anarchic system were compelled to look after themselves and to pursue power for security. It was the material structure of the system, not cultural beliefs, that compelled them to practice power politics. Hence, the idea of Chinese exceptionalism is overstated.

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4 THE SOUTHERN SONG DYNASTY (1127–1279)

course of the Jurchen invasion, the Song dynasty was reconstituted in the south. In many respects, the Southern Song dynasty was a continuation of the Northern Song. The structure of the interstate system remained essentially bipolar, dominated by the Song and the Jin. Xi Xia ceased to be an important player and remained for the most part the Jin’s vassal state. The Jin Empire was the most powerful state in the system, with an estimated population of 44 million.1 The Southern Song inherited what was left of the Northern Song state, about two-thirds of its territory, with most of the area north of the Yangtze River lost to the Jin. (See map 4.1.) As a relatively weaker power, the Southern Song was frequently forced to accommodate many of the Jurchen demands, including humiliating terms of peace. Its relative weakness notwithstanding, the Southern Song dynasty was able to survive for, remarkably, 150 years. The loss of North China and the Jin capture of two Song emperors were a deep source of shame for Southern Song officials. Revanchist ambitions to recover the lost territory consequently dominated China’s military policy. But the reality of power between the weaker Song and the stronger Jin must be considered. The tensions between revanchism and power reality gave rise to a security policy oscillating between war and accommodation, which became a central feature of court debates. Confucian scholar-officials continued to dominate the decision-making process. The civil service examinations attracted the best and the brightest into the echelon of imperial bureaucracy. Unlike the Northern Song, however, these officials were more reluctant to take up military command appointments. Professional soldiers, with a few exceptions such as Yue Fei, remained on the margins of prestige and elite status. The heavy emphasis on Confucian education would have a profound influence on elite life in Song times. As F. W. Mote notes, “One of the changes of Song elite life

DURING THE

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was that because status now depended so heavily on demonstrated competence in book learning, the elite became bookish and even effete, less apt than their predecessors to pursue physically vigorous lives.”2 In many ways, Southern Song elites became more deeply socialized into Confucianism. Some considered the fall of the Northern Song a consequence of moral decay and called for the rejuvenation of Confucianism. Zhu Xi’s (1130–1200) neo-Confucian movement was developed in the context of Song-Jurchen confrontation.3 Among the ruling elites, there was a growing trend of pacifism and aversion to war. Many attributed the peace settlement with the Jin to this strong emphasis on civility over martialism in Song culture. But the crucial question is: To what extent was the peace settlement independently caused by an ideational preference for defense and accommodation? How much of it could be attributed to the balance of power between the Southern Song and the Jin? Structural realism holds that this balance of power would be crucial in influencing Chinese strategic choices. An improvement in the Song’s power position would push it to pursue a more aggressive strategy, whereas a decline would pull it to adopt a more conciliatory strategy. Chinese war aims would not be limited to restoration of the status quo ante but would include the destruction of the Jin state. Confucian pacifism, on the other hand, would expect the weak Song to stress internal rectification and moral statecraft and avoid using force unless in self-defense. Even in self-defense, Chinese war aims would be restricted to repelling enemy advances and restoring the status quo ante. These defensive war aims would not include total annihilation of the enemy or conquest of rival territories. Once peace broke out, China would mainly rely on noncoercive measures such as moral statecraft and cultural attraction to pacify the enemy. Because Song military actions were a response to Jin aggression, they seemed justifiable from the Confucian perspective. The Southern Song’s military expeditions might be seen as consistent with the Confucian theory of just war because they were made in self-defense. But, as we will see, a closer examination of the decision-making process reveals that Confucian prescriptions for state security were rarely adopted. Instead, Song leaders highly valued the utility of military force in causing security and took measures to improve its power. Contra Confucian pacifism, good domestic governance was seen as a necessary condition for strengthening military power, not as a cultural magnet attracting the submission of foreigners. Noncoercive, accommodationist policies were adopted because the Song lacked offensive military capabilities to attack the Jin, not because of a cultural aversion to war.

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ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOUTHERN SONG DYNASTY Although the Jurchens captured most of the Song imperial family, the resistance armies were able to locate Prince Kang, ninth son of the captured Emperor Huizong. They were eager to continue the Song dynasty. Having a descendant from the royal family as the new leader could boost the morale of the disintegrating Song armies and rally support among the populace. On June 12, 1127, Prince Kang, posthumously known as Emperor Gaozong (r. 1127–1162), ascended the Chinese throne in Shangqiu and led the resistance against the Jurchen invasion. The security objective of the new regime, known as the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) in history, was to survive the Jurchen invasion and hopefully recover lost territories. The Jurchens, eager to achieve hegemony in East Asia, launched three major offensives from 1127 to 1130 aimed at destroying the Song. The Jurchen offensives were so intense that in 1129 the fleeing Southern Song Emperor Gaozong offered to give up his imperial title and become a Jin vassal in exchange for peace. He even wrote a humiliating letter to the Jurchens to beg for peace: “I have no one to defend me and no place to run. This is why I fearfully hope that you will pity and pardon me.”4 The Jurchens, whose original war aim was the conquest of Song China, ignored Gaozong’s repeated pleas for mercy and pressed on. The new Chinese emperor had to run for his life and at one point hid in a boat along the Chinese coast to avoid being captured. As the Jurchens pressed south, they met with fierce Chinese resistance. The Jurchen cavalry, accustomed to the cold climate in North China, encountered difficulties adjusting to the warmer weather in the south, their rear exposed to Song naval attacks along the Yangtze River. In the third offensive, the Jurchens suffered severe casualties in 1130 as they crossed the Yangtze River on their way back to North China. A military stalemate had developed.5 Thus, no decisive winner emerged from the hegemonic war between the Song and the Jin. Although the Jurchen offensives failed to annihilate the Song dynasty, it was the first time in Chinese history that a nomadic people from the steppe was able to invade as far south as the Yangtze River.6 A key reason for the military stalemate was the Southern Song’s naval power combined with existing geographical barriers. Although the Jurchens were skilled in mobile cavalry warfare, the Yangtze River provided a natural barrier for the Southern Song, whose superior naval forces were able to thwart Jurchen advances at critical moments. In the third major offensive in 1130, for instance, the Jurchen invasion forces suffered a serious setback in the naval battle of Huangtiandang in the Yangtze River, and 100,000 of their

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soldiers barely escaped. Upon return to the north, Jin commanding general Wanyan Zongbi was said to be deeply shaken and never ventured to cross the Yangtze again. Song naval strength and military resilience surprised the Jurchens. Contemporary history had this comment: “Every time Zongbi met an acquaintance, he would hold his hand and wept, saying how hard and dangerous it was to cross the river; he almost died.”7 After three years of resistance and a failed coup attempt against Emperor Gaozong in 1129, the Song finally stabilized the government in the new capital at Lingan (at present-day Hangzhou) in 1130. The Jin, seeing that their southward advances had failed, shifted the focus of their offensives to the Shaanxi and Sichuan region, and they erected a puppet Qi state to rule the conquered Chinese territories as a buffer state. The Southern Song court, on the other hand, scrambled to strengthen defenses and reorganize the government structure. As the Song put its house in order, it became in a better position to deal with the Jin advances. In the summer of 1130, the Song went on the offensive to attack Jin positions in Shaanxi. The objective was to force the Jurchens to redeploy their forces to the northwest, thus relieving the Song capital of heavy military pressure.8 Although outnumbered, the Jurchens defeated the Song forces and occupied Shaanxi. They continued to advance toward Sichuan but met with fierce Song resistance. After losing a few battles, they suspended the offensive. PEACE VERSUS WAR

The Southern Song obtained much-needed breathing space after the Battle of Huangtiandang, in which the Yangtze River and the Song’s superior naval forces obstructed the Jurchen offensives. The following years saw a steady rise in Song power. As the Southern Song regime stabilized in the new capital at Lingan, Chinese agricultural production began to rise, sending the Song economy on the path to recovery. The temporary cessation of conflict allowed the Song court to recruit and train more soldiers and to transform the militia, which had been a crucial part of Southern Song resistance, into regular troops, boosting the number to 200,000 in 1134.9 The Southern Song’s security policy oscillated between suing for peace and launching a counteroffensive. The military balance of power was crucial in the Song’s strategic choice. As a result of the invasion, a third of Song territory had been lost to the Jurchens. The two captured Northern Song emperors (Huizong and Qinzong), along with thousands of imperial relatives and high officials, were sent to the cold forests of the far Northeast (Manchuria)

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and, as it turned out, would never see their homes again. A number of civilian and military officials strongly advocated attacking the Jurchens and recovering the lost territories. The emperor, however, was too frightened of Jurchen power to authorize a major offensive. Having personally experienced the military might of the Jurchen armies and having barely escaped capture himself, Emperor Gaozong preferred negotiated accommodation to war. But before the Jin would adjust its war aims from the conquest of Song China to a negotiated peace, the Song court needed to prove it could withstand the Jin’s offensives by scoring some victories on the battlefield. Now that the Song had strengthened itself, it started contemplating a counteroffensive. The Jin puppet state of Qi, taking advantage of Song-Jin conflict, had attacked and occupied several Song strategic towns and prefectures, including Xiangyang, which controlled the Song’s access to Shaanxi and Sichuan. The Song court had been keenly aware of the encroachment of the Qi, and entered into a discussion on how to handle the situation. The strategic value of Xiangyang was too important to overlook. In 1134, the Song decided to attack the Qi and recover Xiangyang and its surrounding towns. The offensive was to be led by one of the most famous generals in Chinese history, Yue Fei (1103–1142).10 Yue Fei’s forces were among the best-trained armies of the Southern Song and quickly recovered Xiangyang and the surrounding military bases. Unable to fend off the Song offensive, the Qi requested military assistance from the Jin, which immediately dispatched a relief force to help its client state. But the Qi-Jin joint forces were routed. The Xiangyang campaign was the first major victory for the Southern Song regime and greatly strengthened the defense zone north of the Yangtze.11 The Song victory shocked the Jin court, whose leaders soon launched a joint counteroffensive with the Qi in the autumn of 1134. Song defenses repelled these attacks. Military victories emboldened the Song court, whose hands were further strengthened by the pacification of domestic rebellions. Yue Fei had recently suppressed a major internal rebellion led by Yang Yao and absorbed his well-equipped inland naval forces and some fifty thousand soldiers.12 This improvement in power position precipitated a second largescale Song counteroffensive in 1136 against the Qi. However, after occupying several towns, the Song forces were overextended and had to withdraw. Alarmed by the Song offensives, Liu Yu, the Qi leader, requested military assistance from the Jin to attack the Song. The Jin court, however, viewed its client state as a liability rather than an asset and refused to send a relief army. In desperation, Liu Yu launched a last-ditch attack on the Song in 1136. The

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Song armies routed the Qi offensive and acquired a substantial amount of war booty. The Qi’s ignominious defeat prompted the Jin court to reevaluate the strategic value of its client state. The rationale for setting up the Qi no longer existed: The Chinese area north of the Yangtze had been stabilized by the puppet regime. Additionally, a number of Song armies had defected to the Qi, arousing fear that it might grow too strong for the Jin to control. In 1137, the Jin invaded the Qi and annexed its territory. Liu Yu was demoted to the rank of prince.13

ACCOMMODATIONIST GRAND STRATEGY (1138–1206) Since its inception in 1127, the Southern Song government had wanted to make peace with its formidable opponent and repeatedly sent envoys to the Jin court requesting a cease-fire. The Jin, so far victorious on the battlefield, was more interested in conquering the Song than making peace. It rejected the requests and arrested the Song envoys. Yet a decade later it became increasingly clear that the Song was a tough target to conquer. The Southern Song had proven its ability both to withstand attacks and to launch counteroffensives. The number of Song soldiers had also steadily grown. In 1127, the Southern Song had approximately 100,000 soldiers. By 1135, that number had doubled to 200,000.14 Quantity aside, the quality of Song armies had also improved. As the military balance shifted more in the Song’s favor, the Jin finally recognized that continuing the war would be too costly. A political solution was necessary. In 1137, an internal power struggle in the Jin court prompted it to send an envoy to the Song asking for a peace treaty.15 The Jin emperor needed a peaceful external environment to consolidate domestic rule. THE FIRST PEACE OF 1138  The pending peace negotiation aroused a fierce

debate in the Song court. As was the case in the Northern Song dynasty, officials were divided between the peace faction and the war faction.16 The peace faction, led by Chief Councilor Qin Kuai, had the support of the emperor. Weary of the war and the damages to the economy and the people, these officials were eager to reach a negotiated settlement with the Jin. They argued that peace could be a time-buying expedient in preparation for future attacks; Chinese history had many precedents, such as the Han dynasty’s initial accommodation of the Xiongnu Empire. Song military counteroffensives, despite recent battlefield victories, seemed incapable of destroying the Jin at the moment. Peace would allow the Song government to replenish

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war-depleted treasuries and bring prosperity to the people. As Emperor Gaozong commented on why peace was desirable: “Ever since I assumed the throne 10 years ago, the enemies have brought disasters and have not been pacified. Equipping and supplying the armies have heavily burdened the people. The world has not received kindness and benefaction.”17 The war faction, in contrast, advocated going on the offensive and recovering as much territory as possible. Its war aim was not simply restoration of the status quo ante but the total annihilation of the Jin state. The war advocates, comprising generals such as Yue Fei and Han Shizhong as well as certain civil officials, were deeply suspicious of Jurchen intentions. The Jurchens had reneged on the Song-Jin “alliance by the sea” of 1120 and had attacked a former ally, the Northern Song. They were treacherous, insatiable, and untrustworthy. Pro-war officials were outraged by the Jurchens’ excessive demand of Song subordination—the Jin diplomat to the Song court bore the official title of “Investiture Envoy to South of the [Yangtze] River” [Jiangnan zhaoyu shi], as if he were being sent to a local district; the word “Song state” was not even used. For the Chinese, this slight was utter humiliation. The war faction was aware of the Jin’s domestic turmoil and saw the peace offering as a Jurchen ruse to buy time before launching the next attack.18 Signing a peace treaty would fall into the enemy’s trap. To work around Confucian norms, pro-war officials argued that the Confucian precept of benevolence did not apply to the Jurchens; they must be subdued by force. As deputy minister of war Wang Shu made clear, “The enemies are such that they cannot be tamed by benevolence and grace.”19 Military force was the best guarantor of national security. In the words of Zhang Jun, a former chief advisor to the emperor, “no state can be sustained without army”; subordinating to a foreign country would bring nothing but disaster.20 The best strategy was to keep on fighting or, barring that, to beef up defenses and wait for an opportunity to strike. For the war faction, Chinese war aims were not limited to repelling attacks and recovering lost territories. Rather, the Jin state must be destroyed. The military balance of power was crucial in the Song’s final strategic choice favoring accommodation. Palace Censor Zhang Jie offered his assessment of Song power in a memorial to the emperor in 1138: “The Jin is strong, but we are weak. There is a sharp discrepancy in our national power.”21 Even war advocates recognized Song weakness: “At present, they [the Jin] are so powerful but we are so weak. Even the children know this,” admitted Wang Shu in 1138.22 For Emperor Gaozong, he had personally witnessed the formidable power of the Jurchens as they relentlessly pursued the fleeing emperor in 1130, forcing him to plea for mercy from the Jurchens. In his view, the

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relative weakness of the Song justified an accommodationist strategy—the Jurchens were too powerful. Although the Jin court rejected the Song’s early peace overtures, Song bargaining position had substantially improved with proven military resilience on the battlefield. The Jurchens were now ready to negotiate a peace. To overcome the opposition of the war faction, Emperor Gaozong used the return of the coffins of his father Emperor Huizong (who had recently died in captivity in Manchuria, in 1135) and two deceased empresses, and the living Empress Dowager Wei (Gaozong’s mother), as a subterfuge for peace.23 Filial piety was highly appreciated in Confucian culture and provided a good justification for the accommodationist policy. Peace would allow Song China to consolidate domestic rule and rebuild its power. Zhang Jie laid out this rationale in a memorial to the emperor: “Our border defense should use peacemaking as cover and defense preparation as substance; war should be a last resort.” Emperor Gaozong said to his courtiers, “This is the utmost truth!”24 The emperor had previously urged, “Even when the peace deal is completed, we must not relax on our military defenses.”25 The Song court understood that it must strengthen its power before launching an offensive. Military power was the prerequisite to recovering the lost territory. Earlier in the same year, Zhang Jie stated, “Since antiquity, nobody could, after failing to win by force, repel the enemy and recover the country with goods and money. Victory is ensured only after our army has become strong. Only then can we recover the Central Plains.”26 As we will see, the Song leadership was biding time and went on the offensive when it saw an opportunity. Like other Chinese emperors, Emperor Gaozong was socialized into Confucianism. Song officials urged him to practice the kingly way (wang dao) with faith, and without doubt. When Wang Shu argued along Confucian line that “the way to subdue foreign countries is to love the people. . . . All the bingshu [military texts] are rooted in loving the people,” Gaozong was so pleased that he promoted Wang Shu to deputy minister of war.27 With a few exceptions, however, court discussions seldom touched on Confucian principles but instead focused on assessing military capabilities and deciphering the real intentions behind the Jin’s peace offering. What role, then, did Confucian pacifism play in the peace process? As Emperor Gaozong was determined for peace, the aversion to violence embedded in Confucianism provided cultural justification for his accommodationist policy. As the Jin envoy approached the Song capital at Lingan, a number of memorials were submitted to the emperor opposing the humiliating peace deal. But Mo Jiang submitted a memorial outlining the benefits of peace.

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An offensive strategy would exacerbate the Song’s already grim situation. Mo used Confucian precepts to oppose continuing the war: Raising an army of 100,000 would impoverish 700,000 families and cause unrest. “This is a dangerous way,” he said. Peace would permit commerce to prosper, allow people to engage in productive activities, and increase the state’s treasury. Pleased, Emperor Gaozong summoned Mo to the imperial palace and issued an edict stating that Mo’s argument showed good knowledge about world affairs and should be adopted.28 A peace treaty was concluded in 1138. It was a humiliating deal for the Song. In East Asian history, China was accustomed to being the suzerain of neighboring states. This lofty position would be reversed in Southern Song times because of Chinese military weakness. In the peace negotiation, the Jin delegate acted as if he were an imperial envoy sent by the Jin emperor to a vassal state.29 The Southern Song accepted its inferior status as a vassal (cheng chen) and agreed to make an annual payment of 250,000 taels of silver and 250,000 bolts of silk to the Jin. In return, the Song would obtain the territories in Henan and Shaanxi formerly ruled by the puppet Qi state. The Jin would return the coffins of the deceased emperor and empresses, as well as the living Empress Dowager Wei.30 Thus, the peace treaty of 1138 was similar to the Treaty of Shanyuan concluded by the Northern Song with the Liao Empire in 1005. There is one crucial difference, however. As a result of the Southern Song’s weaker power, formal equality was now replaced with formal inequality. Unlike the Northern Song’s equal diplomatic status with the Liao, Song-Jin diplomacy would henceforth be conducted as one between a vassal state and an overlord. In effect, the Southern Song government was forced to bribe its powerful adversary for peace and accept a lesser status. Nevertheless, the treaty of 1138 was short-lived. A number of Jin officials considered the cession of Henan and Shaanxi unnecessary and wanted them back. War soon broke out. OUTBREAK OF WAR  Like the Song, the Jin court was divided between peace

and war advocates. An internal power struggle led to the execution of most of the peace advocates in 1139. Pro-war general Wanyan Zongbi obtained control of the military and immediately made preparations for war against the Song. The Jin’s new leadership argued that “if we do not acquire the Song now, it would be difficult to do so in the future.”31 In 1140, the Jin abrogated the peace treaty and launched a large-scale invasion. The stated objective was to recover Henan and Shaanxi, which had been ceded to the Song in 1138.

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The Jin soon reoccupied Henan and Shaanxi and continued to press southward. To counter the formidable Jin cavalry, the Song infantry came up with an ingenious device that used long pikes like scythes to hack at the enemy horses’ legs. This new tactic worked well. The Jurchens met fierce resistance in the siege of Shunchang, a strategic stronghold near the Huai River, and were forced to withdraw to Kaifeng. The Jin offensive in the Shaanxi region also stumbled into a stalemate. Military setbacks made the Jin court realize that it could not destroy the Southern Song and decided to sue for peace.32 On the other hand, the Song counteroffensive led by Yue Fei swept across central China and recovered several towns. The Northern Song capital at Kaifeng (now occupied by the Jin) was within striking distance. By this time, it appeared that the Song stood a good chance of recovering lost territories and even destroying the Jin. Yue Fei requested permission to advance forward and annihilate the Jin, but the Song leadership denied his request. In a move that would make future generations of Chinese seethe with lament, the Song court issued twelve “Golden Tablets,” the most urgent form of military communication at that time, to order Yue Fei to withdraw.33 Instead of continuing the counteroffensive, the Song court went into peace negotiations with the Jin. THE DECISION TO SUE FOR PEACE  Why was the Song so eager for peace?

The primary reason was Song military weakness and the realization that “the North had become conclusively unrecoverable.”34 Anecdotal data on national capability suggest that the Song was having growing domestic problems that necessitated a peaceful external environment. The Southern Song had been in a state of war with the Jin for thirteen years since 1127. Financing the war required a constant infusion of material and money, which would have to be shored up by the civilian population. As a result, the tax burden on the populace was inexorable, whose income had been decimated by the war-torn economies. There were several instances of internal rebellion. Many officials, including war advocates, recognized this problem. Yue Fei, when requesting military supplies, reportedly frowned and remarked, “the people of the southeast are going to be extremely exhausted.”35 Another war advocate, Wang Shu, observed in a memorial in 1136 that the Song was using less than 40 percent of its farmlands to support the armies, while the majority of land remained untilled.36 Needless to say, the Song emperor and the peace faction frequently referred to the dire fiscal situation and the heavy tax burden on the people to justify their decision for peace. The Song state had reached a point in which the expected benefits of settlement exceeded the expected costs of continuing the war.37 Despite a few Song battlefield victories, the Jin remained very

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strong, and it was not clear whether or not the Southern Song could sustain the offensives much longer. Commenting on the Yue Fei incident, the MingQing intellectual Wang Fuzhi (1627–1679) argued that by forcing Yue Fei to withdraw from the frontline in 1140, Qin Kuai probably had saved him from a defeat.38 A second reason was the Song court’s concern over the growing power of the generals. Military warlordism was a serious problem in the late Tang dynasty, contributing to the breakup of the country. The Northern Song government learned this lesson well and implemented measures to restrict the power of the military; civilian control of the military was tight. The civilmilitary situation, however, changed in the Southern Song. Constant warfare with the Jin created a group of powerful generals that might threaten imperial rule. Emperor Gaozong and Qin Kuai believed that the generals’ power must be restricted. As table 4.1 indicates, by 1135, the four generals controlled an astounding 90 percent of the total national troops, compared to 5 percent in 1127, when the Southern Song dynasty had just been founded. The power of the generals threatened the Song emperor and the central decision-making process. In addition to the disproportionate size of their troops, many generals frequently disobeyed imperial orders and directly confronted the Song court. Recall that the first Song emperor, Taizu, assumed the Chinese throne through a military coup in 960 and, to safeguard his imperial succession, left specific instructions to future emperors that the power of the generals must be restricted. For his part, Emperor Gaozong was almost overthrown in a military coup in 1129, making him keenly aware of the problem of potential warlordism.39 Previous defections of generals to the enemy camp

TABLE 4.1  Percentage

of Troops Controlled by the Four Generals*

YEAR

1127

1130

1132

1135

Troops commanded by the four generals

5,000

30,000

133,000

180,000

Total national troops

100,000

100,000

170,000

200,000

5

30

Percentage

79.4

90

*The four generals are Han Shizhong, Liu Guangshi, Zhang Jun, and Yue Fei. Source: Huang Kuanzhong, Nan Song Junzheng Yu Wenxian Tansuo [An Inquiry into the Military Affairs and Documentation of the Southern Song] (Taipei: Xinwenfeng, 1990), 55.

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deepened his distrust and suspicion of the military. Gaozong once remarked, “The generals with their troops . . . are like an oversized tail whose wagging is too much for the dog.”40 A number of officials also submitted memorials expressing their concerns over the excessive power of the generals.41 To protect the throne, the power of the overbearing generals must be controlled, Gaozong reasoned. The cessation of external conflict would reduce the Song court’s dependence on the generals, making it easier to restrict their power.42 Finally, with the last Northern Song emperor, Qinzong, still in captivity, his brother, Emperor Gaozong, might have feared that the Jin would try to undermine him by returning Qinzong, who had a legitimate claim to the Chinese throne.43 The Jurchens seemed to have exactly such a ruse in mind. On this deathbed years later, the Jin general Wanyan Zongbi instructed that if the Song should become too strong to control in the future, the Jin could return Qinzong to Kaifeng (the Northern Song capital, now under Jin occupation) and let the two brothers fight.44 The Shaoxing Peace Accord (named after Emperor Gaozong’s reign period) was concluded in late 1141. The terms, worse than the first peace of 1138, were extremely humiliating for Song China. Song-Jin relations were defined in terms of political subordination and fictive kinship. The text preserved in Jin Shi [Jin History], but not in Song documents, states that “future generations of [Song] children will solemnly obey the rules of the vassal.” The Southern Song accepted its inferior status as a vassal state of the Jin Empire and agreed to pay an annual “tribute” (gong) of 250,000 taels of silver and a similar number of bolts of silk. The text of the Song oath exhibited extreme humility. The Jin was addressed as the “superior state” (shang guo), and the Song referred to itself as the “insignificant fiefdom” (bi yi). The border of both countries would be the middle course of the Huai River. Two strategic prefectures, Tang and Deng, along with a vast tract of land were ceded to the Jin. In return, the Jin would send back the coffins of the deceased captured emperor Huizong and empresses, and the living empress dowager.45 As the peace negotiation was in progress, Emperor Gaozong proceeded to consolidate his power by stripping the generals of their command of troops. Many were forced to retire or even executed, Yue Fei being the most infamous example. Yue Fei was put in prison on trumped-up charges of insubordination and suspected treason. Although no real evidence was produced, he was poisoned and died in prison in 1142. His tragedy found its way into folk novels and plays, triggering a process of mythmaking that profoundly influenced Chinese nationalism. He was worshipped as a Daoist deity, second only to Guan Yu of the Three Kingdom period (220–265 CE), and had an

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honored place in the Ming state pantheon and in the temples of many cities. The Chinese continue to worship Yue Fei today.46 The Shaoxing peace accord was a product of the military balance of power between the Song and the Jin. Neither side was able to win a decisive victory on the battlefield. The Jin, despite repeated attempts, failed to destroy the Song and encountered military setbacks. The Song, though the weaker party, had managed to stabilize the regime in the south and successfully demonstrated military resilience through battlefield victories. Although Song domestic politics in curbing the growing power of the generals played a role in the peace process, it was the Song state’s relative weakness that explained the final strategic choice of accommodation. The peace process by no means implied an absence of offensive motivations. In court discussions and memorials, Chinese officials, including generals, recurrently proposed warfare as the best solution to Song security problem. In their eyes, the Jurchens were treacherous and untrustworthy, as proven by the Jin’s breach of the alliance with the Northern Song.47 They argued that only by recovering the lost territory and destroying the Jin could China’s security be guaranteed. For many officials, military forces were highly efficacious for attaining Song security objectives. Song military weakness, however, constrained the preference for offense, resulting in the accommodation of Jin demands. The peace treaty enabled both states to concentrate on domestic issues and enter into a period of peaceful coexistence for two decades. Song economy grew and the population steadily increased.48 The Jin, however, was still bent on conquering China and launched a large-scale invasion in 1161. JURCHEN INVASION

The wanton reign of Jin Emperor Xizong (r. 1135–1141) in his late years led to his murder in 1149 by a cabal of relatives and courtiers. His cousin Wanyan Liang usurped the throne and became the new Jin emperor. He was known in history as Prince Hailing, posthumously denied the imperial title due to his brutality and excesses. He was, however, an ambitious ruler bent on “unifying the universe,” and his professed targets included the Song state, Korea, and the Xia state.49 To pave the way for invasion, Hailing implemented several measures aimed at centralizing state power. In a move that signified his intention to become the ruler of all China, he moved the capital from Manchuria to modern-day Beijing in 1151, and then farther south to Kaifeng, the Northern Song capital. In 1159, he began war preparations in earnest, conscripting 240,000

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Jurchen, Xi, and Khitan men, plus 270,000 Chinese and Bohai men throughout the country, and gathering 560,000 horses. In addition to land attack, Hailing ordered the construction of warships to attack Lingan, the Southern Song capital, from the sea. In 1161, he launched an all-out invasion of the Southern Song, reportedly comprising a million men (but more likely 600,000). The objective was destruction of Southern Song and conquest of China.50 The Jurchen army, in a four-pronged offensive, crossed the border at Huai River and soon advanced toward the Yangtze River, the Song’s most important defense line. The main battles were decided on the water. Better equipped and trained, Song navy incapacitated the Jurchens’ most dreaded weapon, the cavalry, as the latter attempted to cross the Yangtze at Caishi. The eventual outcome of the war, however, was not decided on the battlefield, but by Jurchen domestic politics. Jurchen aristocrats and tribesmen, resenting Prince Hailing’s autocratic rule, launched a coup d’état back home and erected a new emperor, Shizong, on October 27, 1161. A group of officers also had enough and murdered Hailing in his camp near Yangzhou. The rest of the Jurchen armies were withdrawn. SONG COUNTERATTACKS  The Song success in repulsing the Jurchen offen-

sive, plus political instability in the Jin court, presented an opportunity of attack for the Song court. With the Jin court in disarray due to the coup, a window of opportunity had opened. Many officials proposed taking advantage of this opportunity to recover the lost territories and annihilate the Jin. As Peter Lorge points out, had the Song not attacked, the window of opportunity might be closing as the Jurchens stabilized their government.51 The pressure from pro-war officials prompted the aging Emperor Gaozong to abdicate the throne in favor of his adopted son, who became Emperor Xiaozong (r. 1162– 1189). The Song court, however, remained divided between war and peace factions. Pro-war officials insisted on launching an offensive strike immediately; the opportunity was too good to miss. Zhang Jun proposed that the Song send warships to attack Shandong from the sea and dispatch an army to attack the Central Plains in a pincer strike.52 Conversely, pro-peace officials suggested that the Song should beef up defenses and, in the words of Shi Hao, “wait for the opportunity to recover [lost territories].”53 Much of the Song success in resisting the Jin invasion was due to superior naval strength, but the Song army was not yet strong enough to fight the formidable Jurchen cavalry in an offensive war. The new emperor wavered. In 1163, the Song at last began to make war preparations. But two years had passed since Prince Hailing’s invasion. The Jin court had stabilized its rule

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and had suppressed a Khitan rebellion in the north.54 To put military pressure on the Song, the Jin deployed 100,000 troops in Henan and launched a series of border attacks.55 The best time for using force had passed. The Song launched a counteroffensive in 1163 with 60,000 men in what was known as the Longxing Northern Expedition (named after Xiaozong’s reign period).56 Led by Zhang Jun, the Song army crossed the Huai River and scored a number of victories along the way. Song occupation of Suzhou so enraptured Emperor Xiaozong that he wrote a personal letter to Zhang Jun praising him for the greatest victory in ten years. The Jin, in response, dispatched 100,000 relief forces to retake Suzhou. The Song military command, however, suffered a severe coordination problem, for two key generals held a grudge against each other. Their personal feud had a devastating effect on the performance of the Song army. Jurchen troops routed tens of thousands of Song troops in Fuli on June 27, 1163.57 THE LONGXING PEACE ACCORD  The failed campaign strengthened the voice of the peace faction, and the Song court entered into peace negotiation. The Jin demanded the return of four prefectures occupied by the Song, annual payments, Song acceptance of a subservient status, and the return of Jin defectors, mostly Han Chinese. Emperor Xiaozong asked Zhang Jun for his opinion of the peace talk. Zhang Jun saw the matter in terms of power: “If the Jin is strong, it will attack; if it is weak, it will stop. It does not matter whether or not to make peace.” Pro-peace officials, in contrast, argued for a long-term plan of self-strengthening, using the peace to give the Song army and people a rest; the best strategy was to wait for something to happen in the Central Plains (such as an uprising) and take advantage of it.58 The war faction made a strong case to Emperor Xiaozong, who decided to get tough, instructing Song envoys not to cede any territory. The peace negotiation got bogged down because the Song refused to give up its holdings. To put more pressure on the Song, the Jin started another round of offensives and occupied several Song cities and prefectures, forcing the Song to finally relent. In the Longxing Peace Accord of 1165, the Song ceded six prefectures. The Song-Jin border remained on the Huai River. In return, Song status was upgraded from that of a vassal state to that of a fictitious “uncle-nephew” relationship; the Song leader was allowed to call himself “emperor.” However, as had been required by the 1141 Shaoxing Peace Accord, the Song emperor would still have to descend from his elevated throne when receiving state letters from Jin envoys.59 Song “annual tribute” (sui gong) was renamed to “annual payment” (sui bi) and was reduced from

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250,000 to 200,000 units of silver and silk.60 Thus, the terms seemed to be an improvement over the Shaoxing Peace Accord. This change mainly reflected the shifting balance of power between the two states.61 The Song had demonstrated its power through resisting Jurchen invasions and launching a series of counterattacks. On the other hand, internal power struggles and Khitan rebellions had weakened the Jin state in 1162. Though still formidable, it was not as powerful as before. THE SONG OFFENSIVE OF 1206–1208

The Shaoxing Peace Accord preserved four decades of peace between the two most powerful states in East Asia. As shown in figure 4.1, from 1164 to 1205 there were no recorded cases of conflict between the Song and the Jin.62 However, the data clearly show that the Jin was more aggressive throughout the period of 1127–1234. It initiated a total of twenty-two conflicts, averaging 0.20 per year. In contrast, the Song initiated ten conflicts, averaging 0.09 per year. Most of the Jin conflict initiation (n = 13) took place in the early years (1127–1141) when it attempted to conquer the Southern Song, averaging 0.93 per year. A peaceful external environment allowed both states to attend to domestic affairs and build up their power base. Emperor Xiaozong appointed several members of the war faction to important positions, and proceeded to implement measures to strengthen Song military and defense, “while awaiting another opportunity to pursue his life-long ambition of restoring former territories to the empire.”63 The Song court frequently debated the issue of attacking the Jin, but most court officials argued that in light of Song military weakness, the best strategy was to use the peace to build up power through internal reconstruction and development.64 Offensive ambitions remained constant—only to be constrained by lack of military capabilities. In 1172, for instance, Xiaozong attempted to launch an attack but was forced to cancel the war plan after the death of a key commanding general.65 However, no actual use of force was undertaken until the early thirteenth century, when Han Tuozhou became the chief councilor. THE DECISION TO USE FORCE  Jin power went into a decline in the late twelfth century. The Song court had been attentively watching the domestic situation of the Jin. The nomadic tribes in the Mongolian steppe grew in power and frequently raided Jin borders, forcing it to beef up fortifications and to launch a number of punitive campaigns. Moreover, from the 1190s onward,

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FIGURE 4.1.  Cumulative

Frequencies of Conflict Initiation (1127–1234).

the Yellow River started to change course and flooded a vast region under Jin rule. This natural disaster affected the most fertile area of the Jin state and severely debilitated its economic foundation, leading historians to link it to the decline of the Jin state. The Mongolian campaigns and natural catastrophes inevitably taxed into Jin treasury. The Song, on the other hand, had kept a watchful eye on the situation, as its annual embassies brought back valuable intelligence.66 It appeared that the opportunity to use force had come. Han Tuozhou concluded that this opportunity was too good to pass. He had twice (1189 and 1195) been the Song envoy to the Jin court and had personally witnessed the deteriorating situation of that state. Song Shi Ji Shi Ben Muo (A Detailed Account of the Events of Song History) records, In [1204], Han Tuozhou made the decision to attack the Jin. At that time, the Jin was troubled by the northern Tatar tribes, and no year had passed without the Jin raising an army to punish them. [The Jin was] constantly ravaged by war, its soldiers in a distressing plight. Jin treasury was empty and its national power was weakened day by day. Mobs of bandits emerged like bees. People’s livelihood had become unbearable. . . . [Thus] the discussion on recovering [lost territories] was back on.67

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In the eye of the Song court, the apparent weakness of the Jin state suggested that the balance of power had shifted to the Song’s favor. When Qiu Chong opposed the proposed offensive, arguing that “the army is cruel and war dangerous,” a Confucian pacifist argument, Han Tuozhou dismissed it.68 Emperor Ningzong (r. 1195–1224), eager to prove himself as an able leader, approved Han’s war plan. Hence, the Song had been probing for weakness in the Jin state, and when such a weakness was found, it proceeded to take advantage of it by going on the offensive. In 1206, the Song breached the 1161 Longxing Peace Accord and launched a large-scale attack on the Jin, comprising 160,000 men. The Song campaign, however, was “badly organized and incompletely led.”69 Despite some initial successes, the Song armies suffered an ignominious defeat. Many soldiers deserted, surrendered, or defected to the Jurchen camp. The Jurchen troops occupied several towns and penetrated deeply into Song territory. In hindsight, although Jurchen power was declining, the Song court overestimated the extent of Jin decline as well as Song military capabilities to attack the Jin.70 Seeing that its offensive had failed, the Song court began to sue for peace. Han and his clique were held responsible for the failed campaign. A cabal of courtiers in the peace faction staged a coup and murdered Han Tuozhou. For their part, the Jurchens also wanted peace on the southern border so that they could concentrate on the growing Mongol menace. Both countries signed a new peace treaty on November 2, 1208. As punishment for Song aggressiveness, the annual payment was raised from 200,000 to 300,000 taels of silver and bolts of silk. Additionally, the Song would pay war reparations to the Jin. At the Jin’s insistence, the head of the “war criminal” Han Tuozhou was sent to the Jin in exchange for the return of occupied territories during the war.71 THE SONG-MONGOL ALLIANCE

As Jurchen power declined, a group of Mongol tribes began to unite under a single leadership. Through conquest, they absorbed other nomadic tribes in the steppe and forged a Mongol nation. In 1206, their leader Temujin was proclaimed Chinggis Khan (Genghis Khan), or “Universal Ruler.” In a matter of decades, the Mongol cavalry would overrun the Eurasian continent and establish a vast empire. The Jin state continued to decline. Plagued by flood and external warfare, a major fiscal crisis emerged to debilitate the Jurchen economy. To deal with the problem, the Jurchen government raised taxes and issued a glut of new currency, causing widespread inflation and rebellions.72

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Starting in 1211, Chinggis Khan attacked Jin positions every year. The Mongols occupied several towns and gradually expanded their territory at the Jin’s expense. In 1214, the Jin, to alleviate its fiscal crisis, asked the Song to deliver the annual payment one year in advance but was flatly refused.73 Thereafter, the Song refused to make future payments, effectively terminating the existing treaty. The next year the Mongols conquered the Jin Central Capital at Beijing. The Jurchen court fled to the Southern Capital at Kaifeng. The Jin territory was substantially reduced to include only the region around the Yellow River. From 1218 onward, Chinggis Khan concentrated his expansionist efforts by campaigning in western Asia, thus sparing the Jin immediate demise. The Jin tried to compensate for the loss of territory by attacking the Southern Song, but the weakened Jin forces could not penetrate Song defenses. Chinggis Khan died in 1227 while directing the campaign to annihilate the Tangut state of Xi Xia. His third son, Ögödei, succeeded him and continued his campaign of conquest. The new khan first turned his attention to the extermination of the Jin state. Before Chinggis Khan’s death, he had suggested to his son that the best way to destroy the Jin was to go through the territory controlled by the Song. This would entail acquiring the assistance of the Southern Song. “The Song has been in a generational blood feud with the Jin, and would certainly grant our request,” said Chinggis Khan.74 In 1232, Ögödei dispatched an envoy to the Song proposing an alliance to annihilate the Jin. Although a few officials cautioned against such a deal, citing the lesson of the Song-Jin alliance that led to the demise of the Northern Song, most Southern Song officials were eager for “revenge.” The Song emperor agreed to the alliance proposal. The Mongols promised the return of Henan that had been under Jin control.75 Meanwhile, the siege of Kaifeng was in progress. The Jin emperor fled that heavily besieged city in early 1233 and found refuge in Caizhou. The Song-Mongol joint forces attacked this Jin last stronghold with full force in December 1233. In February 1234, Caizhou was penetrated. After 120 years, the Jin dynasty ended with the suicide of its last emperor. RESURGENCE OF SONG REVANCHISM

From 1234 onward, there was a common border between Mongolia and China. At this juncture, however, both states turned their attention to consolidating the spoils of war. The Song court was “enraptured” over the demise of its archrival, the Jin; many officials congratulated themselves for successfully knocking out the state that had been bullying Song China for more than a century. But some foresaw the danger of a powerful Mongol nation

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and suggested strengthening defenses and fortifications.76 To hedge against that possibility, the Song beefed up its defenses along the new border. In fact, the Mongols were also suspicious of Song intentions and strengthened their defenses as well.77 As a result of the Song-Mongol joint war to destroy the Jin, the Song obtained several prefectural towns in Henan, and its border moved forward to the north. However, one strategic pass, Tongguan, and three strategic bases south of the Yellow River, Luoyang, Kaifeng, and Shangqiu (the “three capitals”), were occupied by the Mongols. These areas used to belong to the Northern Song but were conquered by the Jin. Previously, the Jin was able to ward off Mongol offensive for several years by controlling these strategic spots. Months after the fall of the Jin, the Song court entered into a debate on whether to recover the “three capitals.” By this time the Mongol main forces had already withdrawn from these war-ravaged areas, creating a tempting power vacuum.78 Song officials Zhao Fan and his brother Zhao Kui suggested taking advantage of this opportunity by sending troops to occupy these areas. Although supported by Chief Councilor Zheng Qingzhi, most officials were opposed to the campaign. They did not dispute the merit of recovering the three capitals, but they were concerned about the Song’s military capability to accomplish such a task. The Song was still weak and not ready to use force. Qiao Xingjian memorialized, Your minister does not worry about whether we could win the war or not, but about whether we would be able to hold on to the territories after occupation. If we win but fail to hold on to them, this would be my deepest concern. For since antiquity, a capable ruler must first cultivate good domestic governance before turning his attention to external affairs. Your Majesty, please take a look at today’s domestic governance. Is it good, or is it not good?79

He then went on to cite numerous internal problems in the Song state. The military was insufficient, the people hungry and poor; war might drive them into banditry and rebellion. Li Zongmian supported Qiao’s argument, saying, “We cannot even defend ourselves, let alone launching an offensive!”80 Although a number of officials argued for internal rectification, their reasoning was not out of a cultural concern for Confucian principles. Rather, internal rectification was seen as the necessary step for building up the country’s power base. Once China became powerful, it could start using force. As Li Zongmian argued, “We should reinforce and consolidate the root, strengthen

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solders and horses, and wait for the opportunity to take action. It would not be too late to use force.”81 However, Emperor Lizong (r. 1224–1264) was determined to prove himself as an able ruler and decided to use force in the summer of 1234.82 The power vacuum at the “three capitals” made them a tempting target. The Song armies recovered Kaifeng and Luoyang, but failed to hold on to them. They were soon defeated by Mongol reinforcements and lost nearly thirty thousand men.83 Thereafter, the Song adhered to a defensive posture against the Mongols. THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA

The Mongols’ conquest of a vast tract of territory whetted their appetite for more, which would eventually include all of China. In the autumn of 1234, Ögödei said to his ministers, “Now the Central Plain [the Jin], Xi Xia, Korea, and Uighur states have all been subjugated as our vassals. Only the southeastern corner [the Song] is still obstructing our imperial teaching. I want to punish them in the name of Heaven.”84 Needless to say, the Song offensive to recover the “three capitals” hardened his determination to eradicate that state. In 1235, the Mongols launched a three-pronged invasion of South China. The campaign dragged on for several years and failed to conquer China because the Mongol forces were too spread out and did not have a good inland naval force.85 Ögödei died in 1241, ushering in a power struggle within the Mongol ruling elites. The Song was thus spared further military intrusions and chose to focus on strengthening defense. The Mongol leadership was stabilized in the early 1250s. Möngke became the new khan and began to make preparations for a new round of offensive against the Song, the most populous and most wealthy land at that time. He first sent his brother Khubilai to conquer the Kingdom of Dali in China’s southwest in 1253. This newly acquired territory provided a well-situated base to attack the Song from the south, thus bypassing the natural barrier of the Yangtze River.86 Although the Song was militarily weaker and in no position to threaten the powerful Mongols in the near term, the prospect of a resurgent Song, writes historian Morris Rossabi, compelled Khubilai to “seek to subjugate the Sung [Song] before it could become a more powerful adversary.”87 This explanation is consistent with structural realism. In anarchy, states fear the power of the opponent and take measures to weaken it before it is too late. The conquest of South China, however, was not an easy task, taking more than forty years to complete. The Mongols were not accustomed to the warmer weather in the south, and the Song navy was still formidable. It was

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not until March 19, 1279, that the Mongols finally completed the conquest of China. On that day, unable to fend off Mongol pursuit, Song loyalist Lu Xiufu, with the child emperor in his arms, committed suicide at sea in southern Guangdong, killing both. For the first time in history, China would be completely under alien rule, the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368).

CONCLUSION The Southern Song dynasty’s strategic choice of accommodation was the result of Jin superior power and Song relative weakness. Jin military strength forced the Southern Song to become a vassal state and to offer annual tribute to appease its formidable adversary. As Southern Song relative power improved in the 1160s, the terms of the peace settlement improved for the Song as well; annual payments were reduced, and the Song’s status was upgraded from that of a vassal to that of an “uncle-nephew” relationship. Although the Southern Song’s security policy was accommodative, court discussions revealed a high level of offensive-mindedness. Confucian scholar-officials recurrently proposed launching military strikes to retake lost territories and annihilate the Jin state, but their aspirations were held in check by lack of adequate military capabilities. Most officials agreed that the Song must increase power before using force. In according with structural realism, shifting balance of power largely affected how the Song treated the Jin. When Jin power was in decline in the thirteenth century, the Southern Song took advantage of it by launching a major offensive in 1206. When the Mongols rose in power, the Southern Song allied with them and successfully destroyed the Jin state in 1234. But, alas, history repeated itself. Just as the Jurchens turned against their former ally and destroyed the Northern Song, the Mongols turned against the Southern Song and conquered all of China in 1279, after forty-five years of assault. Critics might contend that the Southern Song’s military campaigns were consistent with Confucian pacifism because they appeared to be self-defense in response to Jin invasion. But tracing the process of Song strategic choices reveals that Confucian prescriptions for national security were seldom adopted. Although the Southern Song’s political elites received Confucian learning in their education, few scholar-officials alluded to Confucian principles in the debate on war and peace. Rather, assessments of military capabilities were central to court discussions. Confucian culture had little effect on the Southern Song’s strategic choice and decisions to use force. Confucian scholar-officials assumed the worst when it came to Jin intentions—the

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Jurchens were viewed as treacherous and untrustworthy. As such, becoming powerful was the best way to guard against changing intentions and ensure security. This is not to say that Confucianism had no effect whatsoever. Its main role was in providing culturally acceptable justification for nonviolent, accommodative policies in times of military weakness. Antiwar officials, in addition to citing the Song’s weak national power, would at times employ the Confucian aversion to violence to justify their accommodationist position. Nevertheless, the humane and pacifist ideas embedded in Confucian culture did not translate into Chinese strategic choices, which were mainly based on Song leaders’ assessment of the military balance of power.

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5 THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)

CHINA DURING the Ming dynasty was much more powerful than its neighbors, which was not so in the Song dynasty. For a good part of the region’s history, Ming China was the regional hegemon in East Asia. Yet it built the Great Wall, a defensive fortification that has become a national symbol of China. Proponents of Confucian pacifism assert that China did not pursue offensive strategies when it was powerful and that the Great Wall was the best proof of a consistently defensive posture even when Chinese power was preponderant. The extraordinary strength of Ming China permits us to test this claim. Has Confucian culture kept China from pursuing an offensive grand strategy during periods of military superiority? Ming China’s main security threat came from the northern border. The Mongols, who had conquered China and established the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), withdrew to the steppe after being overthrown by Chinese rebels and yet remained a formidable adversary. Debates about how to deal with the Mongol problem dominated Ming national security decision making. Founding Emperor Hongwu (r. 1368–1399) in his Ancestral Injunctions (Huang Ming Zu Xun), which were meant to be the guideline of foreign policy for future generations of Ming leaders, exhorted his successors to guard against the Mongol threat: “As for the [nomadic] barbarians who threaten China in the north and west, they are always a danger along our frontiers. Good generals must be picked and soldiers trained to prepare carefully against them.”1 The Ming dynasty implemented the civil service examination system that put Confucian scholar-officials in the central leadership. These officials were well versed—and socialized—in the humane and antimilitarist precepts of the Confucian classics. If culture influences strategic choices, given the preeminence of Confucian discourse among policy elites, we

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expect to observe a clear pattern of antimilitarism in the Ming security policy. That is, contrary to realist predictions, when presented with an opportunity to use force, the Ming would not take advantage of it. Instead, it would exercise restraint and choose less coercive measures. As the Ming grew more powerful, it would not become more aggressive and use the increased capacity to take offensive actions against the Mongols. Instead, it would adhere to a defensive posture and rely on low-coercive policies that demonstrated the benevolence and awesomeness of the Chinese empire. Chinese initiation of conflict would remain few and far between. Finally, even when the Ming was involved in a conflict with the Mongols, it would aim to restore the status quo ante rather than destroy the Mongols or annex more territories. Chinese war aims would not expand beyond original border protection. Conversely, if structural realism provides a better account of Ming strategic choices than Confucian pacifism does, we expect to see that, for the purpose of gaining more power, the Ming would prefer to use military force to settle security problems. It would probe for weaknesses in the Mongols and would launch a strike when a weakness was found. Nonetheless, rather than being a mindless aggressor, Ming decision makers would rationally calculate the costs and benefits of using force. Second, as the Ming grew more powerful, it would become more aggressive toward the Mongols because it now had the military capabilities to pursue an offensive grand strategy. When the balance of power shifted against it, the Ming would adopt a defensive posture along the northern frontiers. A further decline in power would force the Ming to appease the Mongols and accommodate their demands. Third, Ming war aims would expand beyond the border until met with structural or military constraints. The Ming would aim for total military victory, political destruction of the Mongols, or annexation of territory. In short, to make the case for structural realism, the evidence must show that there was no antimilitarist tendency in Ming China’s decision to use force. Ming leaders, in the absence of systemic and military constraint, would prefer to launch offensive campaigns when the country had the military capability to do so. Defensive policy would be adopted when the country lacked the wherewithal to weaken the Mongols or to alter the status quo in its favor. In times of military weakness, Ming China would accommodate the Mongols while attempting to devote national resources to building a stronger power base. Once it had accumulated sufficient power, it would take offensive measures to weaken the Mongols.

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CONFUCIAN DOMINANCE OF MING BUREAUCRACY Confucian scholar-officials, selected through competitive civil service examinations, dominated the Ming government. Although the emperor (whose early education also required considerable training in Confucianism) held the ultimate decision power, as historian Charles O. Hucker observes, “the civil service dominated government to an unprecedented degree.”2 The civil service frequently submitted policy proposals to the emperor, who could make a ruling or summon a court meeting to discuss them. There was tight civilian control of the military. Although the military elites enjoyed a prominent status in the early Ming, after the first few decades of the dynasty, the military establishment “came under the almost complete dominance and control of the civil service.”3 Despite occasional interferences by eunuchs in the Ming government, the civil service in general wielded significant influence in the decision-making process. Emperor Hongwu recognized the importance of Confucianism in Ming governance. Immediately after ascending the throne, he proclaimed that “the way of Confucius is so broad and enduring that it coexists with heaven and land” and promised to “carry out the way of previous saints.”4 In 1369, he ordered the establishment of Confucian schools in every prefecture and county.5 In 1381, the Ming court engaged in mass production of Confucian classics (the Four Books and the Five Classics) and distributed them to every county school in the country to be used for preparation for the civil service exams.6 The best students were sent upward to the National Academy (guo zi xue, later renamed guo zi jian) for final instruction in Confucianism. Upon graduation, these elite students were appointed to various positions in the government. As a result of state promotion of Confucianism, the number of students at the National Academy grew from 966 in 1383 to 1,487 in 1391 and to 1,837 in 1397. The local school system had a teaching staff of 3,700 and more than 25,000 students.7 However, the role of the National Academy in recruiting Ming officials would soon fade out. Under the reign of Emperor Yongle (r. 1403–1424), the Confucian civil service examination system (keju) became the most important avenue for recruiting officials.8 The National Academy assumed a different role as a way station for admitted students to prepare for the final jinshi examination.9 The examinations were held triennially, with questions drawn exclusively from the Confucian classics—The Four Books, The Five Classics, and Chinese history, all as interpreted by the great Song neo-Confucian Zhu Xi (1130– 1200). Each candidate not only must demonstrate an excellent grasp of the

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classical and historical texts but also must adhere to the orthodox interpretations of them.10 The examination comprised three levels. Qualifying examinations were held at the county level and were open to virtually all students. Candidates who passed were called xiucai (talented men). They advanced to the next level at the province, or the equivalent. Those who passed the provincial exams were called juren (elevated men). The final level was held at the imperial capital. Once there, candidates must pass an examination conducted by the Ministry of Rites before being personally tested by the emperor in the imperial palace. Successful candidates were then bestowed a jinshi degree (literally “presented scholar,” sometimes translated as “doctor of letters”). Candidates holding a jinshi degree were then appointed to various positions in the Ming government. From 1371 to 1397, Emperor Hongwu recruited 923 jinshi. These Confucian officials played a crucial role in the governing of the new empire.11 As noted earlier, although emperors held the ultimate decision-making power, they relied on a host of advisors to help manage state affairs or draft imperial edicts. Virtually all officials in the Ming government held a jinshi degree.12 For example, the Ming established a grand secretariat (neige) in 1403 to serve as “a collective of chiefs of staff for the emperor.”13 Of the 164 grand secretaries (daxueshi) in the Ming dynasty, 95.7 percent held a jinshi degree (table 5.1). The Confucianization of the Ming bureaucracy took place not only at the central government level but also at the local level. Table 5.2 lists the degrees held by local officials during the Ming dynasty. After the civil service examination system was fully implemented by Emperor Yongle, there had been a steady rise in the percentage of provincial officials holding a jinshi degree. Holding a jinshi degree became the essential requirement for any significant position. Confucian culture dominated the Ming bureaucracy and society.

TABLE 5.1  Backgrounds JINSHI

of Ming Grand Secretaries, 1403–1644 OTHERS*

TOTAL

157

7

164

95.7 percent

4.3 percent

100 percent

*Others include government students (shengyuan), recommendations (jianju), tribute students (gongsheng), and village selection (xiangju). Source: Wang Qiju, Mingdai Neige Zhidu Shi [History of the Ming Grand Secretariat] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989), 378.

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72

79

78

90

94

95

99.6

99.4

98.9

99.3

98.9

98.8

97.4

Yongle (1403–1424)

Xuande (1426–1435)

Zhengtong (1436–1449)

Jingtai (1450–1456)

Tianshun (1457–1464)

Chenghua (1465–1487)

Hongzhi (1488–1505)

Zhengde (1506–1522)

Jiajing (1522–1567)

Longqing (1567–1573)

Wanli (1573–1620)

Tianqi (1621–1627)

Chongzhen (1628–1644)

2.1

1.2

.9

n/a

.8

.6

.4

4

4

5

14

15

15

6

.5

n/a

.2

.7

.3

n/a

n/a

2

2

5

8

6

13

34

LOWER DEGREES

45

68

73

79

80

87

84

83

61

59

63

76

53

54

JINSHI

40

26

23

19

17

12

15

15

35

33

31

15

24

11

15

6

4

2

3

1

1

2

4

8

6

10

24

34

JUREN LOWER DEGREES

PREFECTURAL

29

28

32

33

28

29

35

28

27

27

19

30

24

16

JINSHI

51

56

54

54

55

54

51

49

39

33

31

28

18

16

20

16

14

13

17

17

14

25

35

40

50

43

57

67

JUREN LOWER DEGREES

SUBPREFECTURAL AND COUNTY

Source: James B. Parsons, “The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy: Aspects of Background Forces,” in Chinese Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies, ed. Charles O. Hucker (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 219.

* Figures are percentages. Provincial officials include the provincial governor (xunfu), regional inspectors (xunan), administration commissioners (buzheng shi), and surveillance commissioners (ancha shi). Prefectural officials include prefectural magistrates (zhifu). Subprefectural and county officials include subprefectural magistrates (zhizhou) and county magistrates (zhixian).

60

Hongwu (1368–1398)

JINSHI JUREN

PROVINCIAL

Held by Local Officials*

REIGNS OF EMPERORS



TABLE 5.2  Degrees

THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)  105

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106  THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)

With an overwhelming number of Ming central decision makers possessing an advanced Confucian degree, how did the idealized discourse of benevolence and antimilitarism influence Ming strategic choice and decision to use force?

OFFENSIVE GRAND STRATEGY (1368–1449) Ming power was at its highest during the period from 1368 to 1449. The country had a sizeable number of well-trained troops, a record number of horses for cavalry warfare, and an unprecedented amount of grain production in military colonies. The Mongols, on the other hand, were already weakened after being overthrown and driven out of China. Their power was divided among a few tribes. Toward the end of this period, however, the balance of power started to shift to the disadvantage of the Ming. The Mongols began to unite under a single leader and became a formidable force. For its part, the Ming made a key strategic mistake by withdrawing garrisons, which in effect opened the frontier to incessant Mongol raids and exposed the defense of Beijing. Added to the Ming’s woes was growing economic distress that chipped away at the treasury. The period ended with the Ming’s ignominious defeat at Tumu in 1449. EARLY RELATIONS WITH THE MONGOLS

In the thirteenth century, Mongol cavalry overran Eurasia and conquered vast tracts of territory, including China. Although the Ming founders drove off the Mongol rulers of China, fear of Mongol conquest foreshadowed Ming national security policymaking.14 The early Ming, taking advantage of superior military strength, adopted an offense-oriented strategy, relentlessly putting military pressures on the Mongols and pursuing them well into the steppe. In 1370, the Ming occupied Yingchang (in today’s Inner Mongolia) and drove the Mongols back to its traditional capital at Karakorum across the Gobi. This decisive victory enabled China to restore its border up to the Great Wall line (no wall was built yet) for the first time in four hundred years, since the tenth century. The Song dynasty was never able to accomplish this goal. After the initial victory, the Ming court on two occasions in 1370 sent diplomatic letters to urge the Mongol emperor to submit to Ming authority and acknowledge the transfer of the Mandate of Heaven or face invasion. The Mongols ignored these threats.15 Since the northern frontier was secured at that time, the Ming

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THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)  107

proceeded with the more urgent task of consolidating the new empire by conquering its Chinese rivals in the southwest and Sichuan. Once the new regime was consolidated, Emperor Hongwu launched a series of offensive campaigns in 1372 designed to crush the Mongols. He sent his best generals to lead an army of 150,000 to go beyond the borders to invade Karakorum, the traditional Mongol capital, as well as in the Gansu corridor, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria. These large-scale military actions suggested that Emperor Hongwu probably hoped to “govern the Mongol steppe as part of his empire,” thus solving the security problem in the northern frontiers once and for all.16 The Veritable Records of the Ming (Ming Shi Lu) noted that the purpose of the military expedition was to “annihilate” the Mongols and “clear the desert forever.”17 Nevertheless, except for some victory in the Gansu corridor, the Ming forces suffered a disastrous defeat due to their unfamiliarity with the steppe terrain, the clever strategy of the Mongols, and overextended supply lines. This major defeat made Emperor Hongwu realize that the Mongols were difficult to annihilate.18 Meanwhile, other problems were draining on Ming military resources. The growth of wokou (Japanese, mixed with some Chinese) piracy in the coastal areas required the Ming government to deploy troops for coastal defense; the aboriginal peoples in southwestern China rebelled against the new dynasty and required major military campaigns to pacify them.19 Thus, for the next fifteen years, the Ming government temporarily shifted to a defensive posture on the northern frontier.20 This policy made sound strategic sense. The new regime had to consolidate the country and strengthen its power before embarking on an expansionist endeavor. Chinese leaders constructed a line of garrisons and watchtowers and stationed heavy troops along the border. To ensure maximum loyalty, Emperor Hongwu deployed his princes along the northern frontier, protecting the border with the best forces of the dynasty.21 The Mongols continued raiding Chinese territories, but Ming counterattacks rarely went beyond the borders.22 Although Emperor Hongwu moderated his goal of annexing Outer Mongolia after the defeat of 1372, this moderation was not the result of Confucian pacifism but rather of insufficient capability. Even during this period of defense, the Ming still looked for opportunities to strike at the Mongols, carving out the borders inch by inch and establishing garrisons to strengthen defenses. Domestically, the Ming government focused attention on consolidating its rule over China and building a strong economy. The Mongols, however, did not sit idle during this time. One group under Naghachu grew strong in the northeast, with forces large enough to

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108  THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)

threaten invasion. Instead of waiting for the Mongols to attack, in 1387 the Ming sent an army of 200,000 to attack Naghachu and forced his surrender, along with 40,000 of his soldiers.23 The remaining Mongol forces saw Naghachu’s surrender as defection and continued fighting. Encouraged by the victory over Naghachu, Ming war aims expanded to include crushing the Mongol emperor, Töghüs Temür, in the northwest. In the next year, Emperor Hongwu sent his general Lan Yu to lead 150,000 troops across the Gobi to attack the Mongol emperor.24 Ming forces spotted his encampment at Buyur Lake and launched a surprise attack. The Mongol crown prince and some three thousand nobles were captured, but Töghüs Temür fled to Outer Mongolia. He was assassinated by one of his relatives a year later. The death of Töghüs Temür was a serious blow to Mongol cohesion, ending potential Chinggisid pretensions to the Mongol throne. The Mongols were divided and leaderless for the next generation, relieving the military pressure on the northern border.25 Despite the weakening of the Mongols, Emperor Hongwu was still worried about their regrouping, which could pose a serious threat. He dispatched scouts to search for the remaining Mongols and discovered that they had a cavalry force of only five thousand soldiers; some of their followers were even contemplating surrender. In 1390, he sent his son, the Prince of Yan, who would later become the Yongle emperor, to lead troops beyond the garrisons to force their surrender. In 1392, he instructed Zhou Xing, commander of Beijing, to “reconnoiter the northern desert and search for remaining barbarians in order to permanently solve the border problem.” As a result, only a few Mongol forces remained in eastern Mongolia. At the same time, the Ming gradually moved its garrisons outward and constructed new border cities, pushing the defense line farther north.26 In sum, during the reign of Emperor Hongwu, the Ming constantly looked for opportunities to weaken the Mongols. The use of force was hardly a last resort. Rather, the Ming preferred to initiate offensive campaigns whenever there was an opportunity. As the Ming grew more powerful by continuous military victories and conquests, it became more aggressive and went beyond the borders to pursue the Mongols well into their heartland. Under Emperor Hongwu, Ming China had about 1.8 million soldiers,27 while Mongol soldiers (mostly cavalry) usually numbered in the hundreds of thousands. Ming war aims continued to expand until they met with military and resource constraints. Insufficient capability forced the Ming to temporarily adopt a defensive stance after the military defeat of 1372. The Ming, however, was not content with the status quo. It recognized the dangers posed by the Mongols and

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THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)  109

was eager to change the status quo to its favor. Once the Ming government had consolidated its rule and built a strong economic base, it began attacking the Mongols in 1387. The early Ming was unable to completely eradicate the Mongol threat because it did not have enough horses to mount cavalry warfare in Outer Mongolia, a sine qua non for the conquest of the vast land. The Ming court understood this strategic disadvantage and vigorously implemented the “horse program” (mazheng), designed to increase the number of horses.28 At one point, it was estimated that China had only ten thousand to twenty thousand horses along the border, while the Mongols had 100,000.29 This would clearly put Ming armies at a great disadvantage in the desert plain. In an imperial edict in 1375, Emperor Hongwu stated, “The horse program is what our country relies heavily on.” He cited a historical parallel in the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), which was threatened by the powerful nomadic Xiongnu Empire but could not launch a strike because of a severe shortage of horses. The Han founding emperor could not even find enough horses for his personal chariot. It was only when the number of horses had become plentiful that the Han launched a northern expedition to subdue the Xiongnu.30 ESTABLISHING REGIONAL HEGEMONY IN EAST ASIA

Emperor Hongwu died in 1398. His successor Emperor Jianwen (r. 1399–1402) attempted to centralize power from the feudal princedoms. A bloody civil war broke out when the Prince of Yan rebelled. Emperor Jianwen was supposedly killed when the imperial palace was set ablaze. The Prince of Yan ascended the throne and proclaimed himself Emperor Yongle (r. 1403–1425). The usurpation made Emperor Yongle very concerned with establishing himself as a Confucian ruler to enhance his legitimacy. He received early classical education in the Confucian tradition of government under Hanlin scholars. He even wrote a didactic tract in Confucianism, ordered the compilations of ancient Confucian classics, and declared Confucianism the orthodox ideology of the Ming state,31 as had been done in previous Chinese dynasties. Nevertheless, the reign under Emperor Yongle was one of great expansion and imperial conquest. Ming power reached its highest during his reign. Edward Dreyer depicts him as “a model Confucian emperor.”32 Nevertheless, as HokLam Chan points out, “when circumstances warranted it, the emperor did not hesitate to use force.”33 The Yongle period was the most powerful period in the Ming dynasty. During his reign, Ming China had about 1.5 to 2.5 million soldiers throughout the

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110  THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)

country, and at the end of his reign the Ming had about 863,000 soldiers in the garrisons along the northern frontier. Provisions of food and other materials for military campaigns were also more plentiful than other periods.34 The number of horses, a key element in cavalry warfare in the Mongolian steppe, steadily rose from 37,993 in 1403 to 1,585,322 in 1423, a remarkable fortyfold increase (table 5.3).35 The number peaked in the 1430s, and then declined gradually. By 1445, Ming official history recorded that horses in Beijing had become insufficient.36 The Ming implemented a military colony system (tun tian) to feed soldiers in garrison posts. As Arthur Waldron describes, “The idea was to settle soldiers permanently along the frontiers, where, in times of peace, they would farm under the supervision of their officers, and in their spare time practise military skills. In wartime they could be mobilized to fight.”37 Grain production in the military colonies reached 23,450,799 piculs (dan) during the reign of Emperor Yongle and fell to 3,728,739 piculs in 1571 (figure 5.1),

TABLE 5.3  Horse

Population During the Reign of Emperor Yongle

YEAR

NUMBER OF HORSES

YEAR

NUMBER OF HORSES

1403

37,993

1413

234,855

1404

49,213

1414

271,961

1405

58,599

1415

310,657

1406

67,455

1416

368,705

1407

73,840*

1417

514,439

1408

81,907

1418

623,020

1409

96,431

1419

482,427*

1410

122,417

1420

899,287

1411

152,719

1421

1,090,912

1412

181,140

1422

1,199,315



1423

1,585,322

* This number is inexact. Source: Edward L. Farmer, Early Ming Government: The Evolution of Dual Capitals (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 171.

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THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)  111

about one-seventh of the highest figure.38 These figures suggest that the reign of Yongle was the most powerful period in Ming history. In fact, Ming China was the strongest, wealthiest, and most populous country on earth at that time.39 Structural realism predicts that a state will adopt an offensive grand strategy at the height of its relative power. Given these indicators on capability, we would expect to see greater level of coerciveness during the period of Ming supremacy than during later times. Aggregate data bear this out (figure 5.2).40 In its 277 years of history, more than a half of Ming conflict initiation (n = 29) took place during the period 1368–1449, averaging 0.35 per year. The average conflict initiation for the whole dynasty was 0.17 (n = 46). In comparison, the Mongols initiated only ten conflicts during 1368–1449, averaging 0.12 per year. Sometime in the 1450s, as Ming power declined, Mongol conflict initiation began to surpass that of the Ming. After the Tumu battle in 1449, the Mongols initiated a total of 242 conflicts, averaging 1.23 per year. Under the reign of the Yongle emperor, Ming China enjoyed a preponderance of power in East Asia. As the regional hegemon, Ming China’s adopted, in the words of Edward Farmer, “a vigorous policy of expansion.”41 First, the Ming attacked Vietnam and annexed it as a Chinese province. Second, the Ming sent seven large-scale maritime expeditions to project power abroad that effectively gave China command of the sea from Japan to the Malacca straits (see chapter 6). Third, the Ming launched six major offensive campaigns to crush the Mongols. John Mearsheimer defines a hegemon as “a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system. No other state has the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it.”42 Ming China certainly fits this description. Neither Japan nor Korea could be considered great powers, whereas the Mongols were already defeated and split into competing tribes. MONGOLIAN CAMPAIGNS

Taking advantage of its unsurpassed power, the Ming court worked to strengthen and consolidate its hegemonic position in the system. Like his father, Hongwu, Emperor Yongle harbored hopes of incorporating Mongolia into the Ming Empire.43Annexing Mongolia could solve the security problem on the northern frontiers that had plagued the Chinese empire for centuries. Hence he continued the offensive strategy of his father and, in the words of Edward Farmer, sought “the direct destruction of Mongol power through the

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FIGURE 5.1.  Grain

Production in Military Colonies (1403–1571).

FIGURE 5.2.  Cumulative

wang15140_bk.indd 112

Frequencies of Conflict Initiation (1368–1643).

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THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)  113

military invasion of Mongolia.”44 In the eyes of the emperor, only until the Mongol threat was removed could Chinese security be ensured. Destroying Mongol power, however, was no easy task. Throughout history, logistical difficulties had prohibited various dynasties from successfully campaigning in the vast steppe region in the north. Geography and military technology made military expeditions difficult. Chinese troops had to travel a great distance across desert, steep mountains, and other rough terrain. Overextended supply lines exposed the rear to enemy ambushes, leaving the invading troops in danger of being cut off and trapped in the steppe. In the second century BCE, for instance, the Han dynasty lost 60 to 70 percent of its troops and about 100,000 horses while campaigning in the steppe. The Tang dynasty (618–907) was only able to establish a brief period of control after expanding into the Northwest. The Northern and Southern Song dynasties, faced with a formidable threat in the north, failed in their efforts to recapture territories in the north, let alone expanding into the steppe.45 In addition to logistical difficulties, the military skills of agrarian and nomadic societies differed sharply. The nomadic people were, in general, skilled in horsemanship and cavalry warfare, whereas the settled people were more accustomed to infantry warfare. Although the Chinese usually possessed more power resources and a larger number of troops, the mobility of cavalry forces and accidents of geography frequently combined to obstruct Chinese ambitions to conquer the steppe. Despite the defensive advantages enjoyed by the Mongols, Emperor Yongle steadily applied offensive pressures.46 To prepare for the Mongolian campaigns, Emperor Yongle moved the capital northward from Nanjing to Beijing, near the Ming-Mongol border. Beijing was Yongle’s princely fief before he staged the coup d’état. Moving the capital to his power base enabled him to better control his troops and manage Mongol affairs. The city was also an ideal location for managing the enlarged empire—if he succeeded in conquering Mongolia. To support the new capital and future military campaigns in the frontiers, the Ming constructed a massive Grand Canal, more than a thousand miles long, connecting Hangzhou and Beijing to transport surplus grains from the central plains and the rice bowl south of the Yangtze River.47 The balance of power was in favor of the Ming. The Ming army was much larger in number and well trained. The Mongols, on the other hand, were divided among several tribes, specifically the Western Mongols (Oirat) and the Eastern Mongols (Da Dan). Both fought for dominance of the Mongol people. The political division of the Mongols enabled Emperor Yongle to employ a tactic of “divide and rule” by cultivating good relations with the weaker Mongols and attacking the stronger ones. This strategy of realpolitik

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114  THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)

allowed him to maintain a balance of power between them, exploit their conflicting interests, and check the growth of their power.48 For instance, early in Yongle’s reign, the Eastern Mongols were a stronger adversary and refused to send a tributary embassy to the Ming court, even murdering a Ming envoy. The Ming turned to the weaker Oirats and showered their leaders with gifts, titles, and privileges. In 1409, at the Ming’s encouragement, the Oirats attacked the Eastern Mongols and forced them to retreat to Kerülen River. To take advantage of the Eastern Mongols’ disarray, in 1409, Emperor Yongle sent General Qiu Fu to lead an army of 100,000 to attack the Eastern Mongols across the Gobi. The Mongols feigned retreat, lured the overconfident Qiu Fu deep into their territory, and crushed his army.49 In response, Emperor Yongle decided to take the matter into his own hands. This “Emperor on Horseback”50 personally led five large-scale offensive campaigns against the Mongols (1410, 1414, 1422, 1423, and 1424).51 Chinese troops marched over a thousand miles into the Mongolian heartland. These military expeditions were “intended to assert Chinese military superiority” in Mongolia by seeking the “direct destruction of Mongol power.”52 The scale was unprecedented, some of them comprising half a million troops. The timing was to “take advantage of a perceived weakness among his enemies or to forestall the formation of a coalition that would produce a serious attack on the Ming borders.”53 To supply the army, the entire country was mobilized for each expedition. In March 1410, about 500,000 Ming troops set out to attack the stronger Eastern Mongols and reached the northern shores of Kerülen River. According to Ming sources, Emperor Yongle led a force to advance further north, caught up with the Mongol Khan Bunyashiri’s forces on the banks of the Onon River, and defeated them on June 15, but Bunyashiri escaped to the west. Ming forces then turned east to pursue another Mongol forces led by the chancellor Arughtai and defeated them near the Great Khingan Mountains, but Arughtai also escaped. Fearing that the supply line had overextended, the Chinese proclaimed victory and headed back home. Once one Mongol faction was severely weakened after Chinese attacks, however, the other rose in power and became a new security problem for the Chinese. A few years later, the Oirats grew stronger. The Ming then allied with the Eastern Mongols and went on the offensive to attack the Oirats in 1414, pursuing them as far as the Tula River. Again, logistical problems forced the Ming to disengage and withdraw. Among Emperor Yongle’s five Mongolian campaigns, except for the second one in 1414, four were launched against the Eastern Mongols. The terrain in the Mongolian steppe provided a natural defensive cover that shielded the Mongols from Ming assaults. The last three

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THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)  115

campaigns were not effective because the Eastern Mongols fled at the news of Ming offensive. Ming forces could not even find and strike at the main arm of the mobile Mongol cavalry. Nevertheless, in each of these campaigns, the Ming forces pursued the Mongols as far as its military capability allowed. The first three campaigns struck deep into the Mongolian heartland near the Kerülen River. The Ming also used cannon in the battles, causing severe casualties in the Mongols. Logistical problems, however, made the operations difficult to sustain for a long period of time, forcing the Ming army to withdraw.54 Emperor Yongle died of illness during the final and fifth campaign in 1424, thus ending the Ming offensive. Although these campaigns did not destroy the Mongols, their strength was severely weakened after the assaults. As a result, the Ming’s northern frontiers enjoyed several years of peace after the Mongolian campaigns. Apparently, Emperor Yongle believed that the best defense was a good offense. Ming China during this period showed little hesitance about using force. If anything, Ming use of force was relentless. Defense clearly was not what the Ming leaders had in mind. In fact, large offensive campaigns were the preferred answer to the Mongol threat. The huge stockpile of wealth and resources allowed the Ming to raise a mass army. Like a good realpolitiker, Emperor Yongle took advantage the divided Mongols and exploited the differences among them. But the nature of the terrain and the accompanying logistical problems made Chinese offensives difficult to sustain. Despite repeated efforts, the goal of destroying the Mongols could not be accomplished. The Manchus of the Qing dynasty, whose steppe origin made them cognizant of the exigencies of steppe warfare, eventually overcome the logistical problem of campaigning in the steppe in the eighteenth century through better skills and stratagems. As Peter Perdue demonstrates, commercialization and market integration allowed the Qing dynasty to build a network of supply route capable of supporting large armies in the steppe for several years at a time. This massive supply network enabled Qing armies to march at greater distance than that of Napoleon’s march on Russia over much more hostile terrain, and to successfully conquer the Zunghar Mongol state and incorporate the vast steppe region into the Qing empire.55 THE BEGINNING OF MING DECLINE

The Ming-Mongol balance of power began to shift to the disadvantage of the Ming after the death of Emperor Yongle in 1425. The decline of Ming power can be attributed to two causes. First, the Ming made a key strategic mistake

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116  THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)

by pulling back its forward defense line, making it harder to defend the northern frontiers. Second, the economic situation deteriorated sharply, making it difficult to sustain military operations. Exacerbating the situation was the toughening of Ming policy in regard to trade with the Mongols.56 Relieved of constant Chinese assault, the Mongols were gradually united under a single leader, posing an increasing threat to the Ming. RETRACTION OF THE DEFENSIVE LINE

During the Hongwu period, the Ming had two lines of defense. The first line, the “eight outer garrisons,” lay far outside of the capital Beijing and close to the Mongolian border. The purpose of these garrisons was actually offensive, part of a strategy of piecemeal encroachment into Mongolian territories. The outer garrisons, including Dongsheng, Kaiping, and Daning, were used as forward bases to facilitate further expansionist wars. They could also hold off enemy attacks until relief forces arrived from the inner regions, thus creating crucial strategic depth for defense. The second line was closer to Beijing along the Great Wall line (although the Wall had not yet been built) and was mostly for defensive purpose. The early Ming moved the outer line forward by taking offensive actions step by step. By 1398, the Ming had carved out a considerable portion of territory in the steppe.57 During the Yongle period, for reasons that are still unclear,58 the Ming gradually withdrew all but one of the eight outer garrisons. Starting with Dongsheng and Daning in 1403, the Ming pulled back one garrison after another. The last garrison, Kaiping, had also to be pulled back in 1430 because of its isolation (map 5.1). There is consensus among scholars that this retraction of outer defense lines would later have grave consequences on Ming security.59 Contemporaneous Ming officials involved in the later debates to recover the Ordos also saw the retraction of the outlying garrisons as a grave strategic mistake.60 With the disappearance of the outer line of defense, Xuanfu, the main garrison center in the second defense line and only a hundred miles from Beijing, would now bear the direct brunt of Mongol assaults, along with an adjacent garrison at Datong.61 Under Emperor Yongle, the repercussion of this error could be offset by the Ming’s overwhelming power, but after his death, the strain began to emerge. The Ming Empire would no longer project power into the steppe; instead, the nomads would come in and occupy the strategic zone and used it as a forward base to raid Chinese territory.

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MAP 5.1

0

0

City

500 km

Modern Boundaries

Great Wall

Hami

500 mi

THAI

ow R.

9

KHMER

Ye ll

Jiayu

AVA BURMESE

TIBET

kunlun mtns.

Ming boundaries about 1580

Capital

Lop Nor

Turfan

U I G H U R S TAT E S

Ming China about 1580

pa mir mtns.

O I R AT

8 7

6

R.

5

4

Yangtze R.

2

Beijing

3

Kaiping

MONGOLS

MING

Ordos

on

EASTERN

On

Baysing (Guihua) Dongsheng

M O N G O L S Helun (Karakorum)

Lake Baikal

M TNA

VIE

R.

Ar g

un

an d

na

l

R.

(KO RE A )

Am

ur

CHOSON

1

Hangzhou

Nanjing

ca

Daning

Guangzhou (Canton)

gr

R. ow Ye ll

wang15140_bk.indd 117 Ussuri R.

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Datong Shanxi Yulin Guyuan Ningxia Gansu

5 6 7 8 9

Xuanfu 3 4

Liaodong Jizhou

1 2

GARRISONS

NINE

JA PA N

118  THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)

ECONOMIC CAUSES  Emperor Yongle’s expansionist activities cost dearly for

the country. His three major foreign policy initiatives (the occupation of  Vietnam, maritime expeditions, and Mongolian campaigns) exacted a heavy toll on Ming finances. Domestically, Emperor Yongle spent a good fortune constructing the new capital in Beijing. Although the exact figure of the emperor’s spending is still unclear, Ray Huang speculated that the actual costs of Emperor Yongle’s undertakings might have exceeded the normal income of the state by two or three times.62 These fiscal excesses undoubtedly put a strong burden on Ming treasury, let alone the people. Moreover, the Ming system of financing military units also faced growing problems. As noted, the Ming government adopted the military colony system that was originally established in the Han dynasty to achieve self-sufficiency for the military garrisons that lay far away from the political center. The system was rather successful during the reigns of emperors Hongwu and Yongle, leading the founding emperor to boast that he was able to maintain an army a million soldiers strong without costing the people even one kernel of grain.63 After the Yongle reign, the military colony system gradually failed to produce enough grain, horses, or recruits for the state’s needs. As figure 5.2 indicates, in 1428 grain production fell to less than 25 percent of its height in 1403, further declining to 12 percent in 1448. The frontiers became barely arable. Military officers turned into landlords, ruthlessly exploiting the labor of soldiers. Many soldiers, unable to feed themselves, deserted their posts. Desertion rates in the hereditary border garrisons (weisuo) soared. It was recorded that 1.2 million soldiers deserted their posts in 1438, losing about half of its original manpower of about 2.5 million men. The number rose to 1.6 million in 1449.64 The shortage of grains in the frontier military establishment necessitated the transportation of grains from inner provinces, causing more strains on the economy.65 RISE OF MONGOLIAN POWER  While Ming power declined, Mongol power rose. In 1434, the Oirats under Toghon defeated the Eastern Mongols in a decisive battle and killed their leader Arughtai. The Oirats became the dominant force in Mongolia and sought to reunite the Mongol people under their leadership. Toghon hoped to deliver a decisive blow at China but died in 1439.66 His son Esen (d. 1455) succeeded him. In a decade or so, Esen, a competent leader, made himself a dominant force in the northern Chinese frontier zone from Manchuria in the east to Xinjiang in the far west.67 The Ming failed to deal effectively with this new threat. The outer garrisons had already been withdrawn, fiscal situation was deteriorating, and the

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army was losing the skill to fight cavalry warfare.68 To make matters worse, the Ming court was distracted by a series of wasteful campaigns attacking the small Luchuan state in the Yunnan-Burma border, sending 150,000 men.69 These expensive and prolonged campaigns diverted crucial resources from the northern frontier. The Ming court finally recognized the danger of the strengthened Oirats and tried to split their leadership by bribing Esen’s political opponent, but the tactic of divide and rule was already too late. Esen, after securing his rear and flanks, was determined to invade China.70 THE TUMU DEBACLE

In July 1449, Esen launched a full-scale invasion of China, ostensibly over a dispute over the size of the Mongol tribute missions to the Ming, and occupied several strategic posts along the frontiers. Esen attacked from four directions: he led the Mongol main forces to attack Datong, sent his military chief to besiege Xuanfu, dispatched the Uriyangkhad Mongol tribe to raid into Liaodong in the east, and sent another cavalry force to invade Gansu in the west. These forces were to rendezvous at Beijing.71 Emperor Zhengtong (r. 1435–1449), swayed by the influence of court eunuch Wang Zhen, decided to personally lead a “punitive expedition.” However, the minister of war, Kuang Ye, strongly advised against such a move, citing the logistical problems of campaigning in the steppe. He maintained that existing defensive measures should be sufficient to ward off Mongol attacks. In a memorial submitted to the emperor, he cited Confucian pacifism: “The Six Armies must not be lightly employed. . . . Armies are instruments of violence; warfare is a dangerous business. The ages of antiquity undertook war with cautious respect, not daring to do so carelessly. The Son of Heaven, although the most exalted of men, would now go personally into those dangers. We officials, though the most stupid of men, nonetheless say that this must not occur.”72 Kuang Ye understood the shortcomings in Ming capabilities and advocated a more cautious response. The Confucian aversion to military force strengthened his case for restraint. The emperor, however vetoed Kuang Ye’s suggestion, replying that the Mongols had violated Ming borders and dishonored Chinese favor to them: “We have no choice but to lead a great army in person to exterminate them.”73 The Ming court hastily raised an army of 500,000 men. The mass army, however, was ill equipped, ill provisioned, and ill led. This imperial expedition turned out to be the greatest military blunder of Ming times.74

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From the start, the preparation for this campaign was ill conceived. Civil and military officials scrambled “in a frenzy of confusion trying to get ready” in two days. Most officials knew that this imperial expedition entailed a grave danger and tried to stop it. On the day of departure, a supervising secretary threw himself in front of the emperor, begging, “Your majesty may make light of your imperial person, but what of the dynasty, what of the state?” The emperor, who was twenty-two years old at that time, now listened only to the eunuch Wang Zhen, who knew little about military affairs but encouraged the emperor to go ahead. Amid incessant rain and storms, the Ming army kept marching without seeing the enemy. Along the march, officials still tried to stop the expedition and even plotted to assassinate Wang Zhen, but they could not prevail. On the thirteenth day, the sight of thousands of unburied Chinese corpses on the battlefield at Yanghe, on the outskirts of Datong, terrified everyone. After the sixteenth day, Wang Zhen decided to turn back and called off the expedition. But he made a fatal strategic mistake: fearing that the restless troops would destroy crops if they passed through his hometown in Yuzhou, he forced the Ming troops to make a northern detour, thus exposing them to Mongol raids. As the army camped at Tumu, a postal station with a limited supply of water, on their way back, Esen’s forces ambushed them. The Chinese army, with no water to drink for two days, broke apart as the Mongols attacked in full force from all sides. Wang Zhen and other officials were killed. The Chinese emperor was captured.75 The outcome surprised both Esen and the Ming court. Esen had not expected such an enormous victory. Beijing was now wide open and undefended before his forces. However, Esen made a strategic mistake by not immediately marching toward Beijing after Tumu.76 The Ming capital was in turmoil at the news of the emperor’s capture. Some officials even proposed moving the capital to the south, but they were quickly condemned as defeatists.77 Thomas Barfield suggests that Esen was only leading part of the Oirat force, approximately 20,000 men, when he ambushed the Ming army, and might have been hesitant about marching forward with such a small force, when another Chinese army might arrive in time.78 Whatever the reason, Esen decided to keep the emperor as a prisoner and used him to ransom Ming frontier garrisons. In response, the Ming quickly enthroned the captured emperor’s half-brother as the new ruler, Emperor Jingtai (r. 1450–1457). The Ming court scrambled to reinforce the defenses of Beijing by recalling and training troops from nearby areas. The number of soldiers in the capital area quickly surged to 220,000. By this time, more than one month had passed after Esen captured the Ming emperor. Seeing that his ransom attempt had

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failed, Esen, aiming to conquer at least North China,79 finally marched on Beijing with 70,000 troops but could not penetrate its reinforced defenses. A week later, he was forced to withdraw. Ming armies pursued him until he had fled out of Chinese borders. Esen’s coalition began to fall apart after his failure to take over Beijing. He failed to extort large ransoms to reward his allies or to at least occupy some Chinese territories. He was killed six years later in an internal strife. The Eastern Mongols (Da Dan) rose to replace the Oirats as the leader in the steppe.80 This Tumu debacle marked a turning point in Ming strategy towards the Mongols. It was the end of the era of offensive grand strategy and the last time the Chinese army went beyond the northern border en masse to pursue the nomads. Instead, China withdrew from the steppe transition zone. This zone could be used by the Chinese to put pressure on the steppe, or by the Mongols to exploit Chinese weakness. Since the weakened Ming could not afford this zone, the Mongols gradually moved in and used it as a forward base to raid Chinese territory, creating a serious strategic problem.81

DEFENSIVE GRAND STRATEGY (1450–1548) In the second period (1450–1548), Ming power continued to decline. The number of soldiers required on the borders became insufficient; problems of desertion and low morale plagued the Ming military; domestic rebellions were on the rise; and factional conflicts crippled the Ming court. In contrast, the Mongols, aside from some brief periods of internecine conflicts, were united under a series of able leaders and became increasingly powerful. They occupied the strategically vital Ordos and projected power from there. Unable to launch offensive campaigns, the Ming began a project of defensive construction of what would later become the Great Wall of China. BUILDING THE GREAT WALL

If there is a symbol of the idea of China’s defensive orientation, it is the Great Wall. The wall that exists today was built by the Ming dynasty. By its nature, the extensive line of fortification worked as a defensive apparatus against foreign intrusion. Proponents of Confucian pacifism take the Great Wall as a constant feature of Chinese grand strategy and use it as evidence to support the claim that China has historically adopted a defensive strategy. But without looking at the historical context of the wall’s construction, one cannot get an

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accurate view of the strategic rationale underlying China’s security policymaking. Was the wall an outcome of a cultural preference for defense, or was it a result of military weakness? Answering this question requires a careful examination of the process of deciding to build walls. The advantage of such an approach is that, by studying court discussions on strategic choice, one would be able to ascertain the underlying strategic motivation of wall building. Evidence of Ming policymakers using Confucian precepts to justify their preference for defensive fortifications over offensive campaigns would lend support to Confucian pacifism. Conversely, evidence of Ming leaders comparing the military capabilities between China and its adversary and using relative military weakness to justify defensive wall building as a temporary expedient to build up strength before the next offensive would strengthen the case for structural realism. Historically, wall building was not a constant feature of Chinese security policy. The early Ming was able to have security by going on the offensive, without building walls. Ming China’s overwhelming strength sustained an offensive grand strategy, which weakened the Mongols. The Tumu debacle marked a dramatic shift in the balance of power between the Ming and the Mongols. The military blunder weakened the Ming, making it unable to stay on the offensive. Consequently, the Ming shifted from an offensive grand strategy to a defensive one. Unable to launch military expeditions across the steppe, the Ming chose to build a system of defensive fortifications over an extended period of time to ward off Mongol raids.82 Known as the Nine Garrisons (but not the “Great Wall”) by Ming contemporaries,83 the border defense system would become a symbol of China’s pacifism today. As noted earlier, the Ming withdrew several key garrisons from the outlying frontier areas, creating a power vacuum in the strategically important Ordos (He Tao), a U-shaped fertile area along the Yellow River bend. Arthur Waldron likens the strategic importance of the Ordos to that of the Rhine and the Rhineland for France and Germany.84 Whoever controlled this region would have a great military asset at disposal. After Tumu, the Eastern Mongols occupied the Ordos and used it as a forward base to raid the Ming’s Shanxi and northern Shaanxi regions. In ways similar to the debates over the Sixteen Prefectures in the Northern Song dynasty (see chapter 3), for the next eight decades or so, the central issue on the Ming security agenda was recovery of the Ordos region. Policy debates in the Ming court exhibited a high level of offensive motivations. The benevolent and antimilitarist ideas embedded in Confucianism appeared to have little or no effect on Ming strategic choice. Many officials,

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socialized in the Confucian discourse, insisted on employing offensive campaigns to recover the Ordos. In 1466, senior Grand Secretary Li Xian proposed an offensive campaign to attack the Mongols led by Ma’alikhai who had settled in the Ordos. Li Xian, using a famous refrain since the Han dynasty about how a single Chinese district outnumbered the nomads, noted that Ming negligence had allowed the Mongols to occupy the Ordos and stressed that a major attack against the Mongols was the best way to have a secure border. He added, “We must annihilate all of them.”85 Emperor Chenghua (r. 1465–1487) approved his plan of attack, but it never materialized. Other officials such as Cheng Wanli and the Prince of Xiang also suggested an offensive campaign, but no action was taken.86 Ma’alikhai continued raiding. Voice for a defensive strategy began to emerge. In 1471, Yu Zijun, grand coordinator (xunfu) of the Ordos region, submitted a memorial calling for the construction of a wall about thirty feet high. But building walls required a large infusion of money and labor. Bai Gui, the minister of war, and other officials opposed Yu’s proposal on the grounds that the costs would be enormous and the burdens on local labor too excessive. The court still wanted to recover the Ordos. In 1472, Bai Gui submitted a memorial proposing a military campaign to recover the Ordos in February when Mongol horses were emaciated by winter. This plan, also approved by the emperor, met with grave difficulties. Field generals Zhao Fu and Wang Yue reported that they needed 150,000 elite troops to accomplish the mission, but they had only 20,000 under their command. Added to the difficulties was a starving local population ravaged by warfare and daunting logistical problems. They suggested that the court consider the wall-building proposal submitted by Yu Zijun.87 A court meeting rejected their suggestion and accused them of cowardice in the face of the Mongol menace.88 Zhao Fu was replaced. His successor had no better luck, and the Mongols continued raiding. The plan for offensive wars, however, was impractical. In his authoritative The Great Wall of China, Arthur Waldron analyzes the Ming’s military difficulties: [T]he offensive policy, sound as it may have been in strategic principle, was unrealistic in practice, as many officials realized. The Mongols were very strong. In the Ordos, they had a fine base, with both water and pasture. The Ming, by contrast, had virtually no capacity to transport an army even to the southern margin of the Ordos, let alone support it once there. A Ming army would not necessarily prove victorious in any case. The Mongols could draw them deeper and deeper into the desert and steppe, refusing to give battle, the

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treatment Arughtai had meted out to the Yung-lo [Yongle] emperor. Or they might lay some horrible ambush, and destroy the whole force.89

In addition to lack of offensive capabilities, perennial border conflicts exacted a heavy toll on the local population. Special taxes were levied to pay for the military expenses, and the people were forced to transport materiel. There were fears that the peasants might turn into banditry and flee the frontier area. Since proposals for offensive campaigns were going nowhere because of the tremendous military obstacles, a growing number of officials began to favor a strategy of static defense, building a long line of defensive fortifications along the northern frontiers. Ye Sheng, for instance, inspected the frontier area in 1471 and reported that the border garrisons in Shaanxi and Xuanfu suffered a severe shortage of soldiers: fewer than twelve thousand troops were defending a border five hundred miles long. Offensive actions, therefore, should not be taken lightly. Rather, he suggested a defensive posture, the “strengthening of walls and clearing of fields” (jianbi qingye).90 By the fifteenth century, more than eight hundred years had passed without a “Great Wall” in China. The last Chinese dynasty that embarked on a massive wall-building project was the Sui dynasty (589–617). The hegemonic Tang dynasty (618–907) saw no need to build walls for security, whereas the weak Song dynasty (960–1279) chose to make peace with the nomadic empires and “did almost no wall building.”91 With Ming power in decline and Mongol threat on the rise, the Ming court began to see the merits of wall building. In 1472, Yu Zijun, taking into account the dire border situation, submitted another memorial to the court and called for wall building. He argued against offensive strategy because it would be too costly. “Offensive wars are difficult; defense would be easier,” Yu said. Protective walls would allow the peasants the breathing space they so desperately needed, reviving local economy. He noted that defense was an expedient strategy. Once the Ming had accumulated enough strength, it could launch a military expedition to the north. A stream of reports on the enormous cost of offensive operations began to change minds, favoring a defensive grand strategy. Emperor Chenghua finally agreed with Yu Zijun’s proposal, noting that “constructing border walls is a strategy that we can manage for a long time.”92 The manageable costs of wall building were confirmed a few weeks later, when border commander Zhao Fu reported that an attack would require 150,000 soldiers advancing over a period of two months and costing 450,000 piculs (29,925 tons) of grain, and would need 110,000 porters in addition to the troops. Wall building, on the

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other hand, was much cheaper and a relatively long-term solution, requiring only 50,000 men. Emperor Chenghua was even more convinced of the advantage of defense.93 A military victory in 1473 provided the breathing space needed to construct walls. Ming border intelligence reported that the Mongols led by Bäg Arslan had left their encampments at the Red Salt Lake (Hongyanchi) and gone on a rampage in the west. The Chinese general in charge of the area, Wang Yue, who held a Confucian jinshi degree, decided to take advantage of this opportunity. Instead of attacking the Mongol main forces, Wang Yue was ruthless in the use of force, attacking Mongol encampments in which only women, children, the elderly, invalids, and animal herds were left behind. According to Chinese accounts, Ming forces killed 350 people and livestock and burned down tents. When the Mongol forces heard the news, they hurried back but were ambushed by Ming armies. The Mongols “fled with tears in their eyes” and retreated to the north, leaving the Ordos quiet for several years.94 The wall was completed in 1474. It spanned only the Ordos region, extending from Hengcheng to Qingshuiying, about 2,087 li (695 miles) long. The wall averaged thirty feet high, along with hundreds of supporting signal towers and fortifications. It took more than 40,000 men several months to finish. The wall shielded Ming military colonies from Mongol attacks, providing more than sixty thousand piculs (3,990 tons) of grain each year.95 Layers of walls were gradually added. Unlike later walls that were made of stone and brick, Yu Zijun’s wall was made of sandy earth, and there were doubts that it would be sturdy enough to ward off the nomads. This concern was proved unwarranted in 1482 when a large number of Mongols invaded and were trapped within the walls, unable to find a way out. Ming forces slaughtered the disoriented nomads. People in the border areas saw this victory as a vindication of Yu Zijun’s strategy.96 Yu’s wall was a precursor to the Great Wall that was subsequently built in the sixteenth century. To sum up, the Ming’s military capability was severely weakened after Tumu. Half a million soldiers were reportedly lost.97 Structural realism predicts that the Ming would be less aggressive during such a period of relative weakness. The Ming’s behavior confirmed this. Sometime during the midfifteenth century, the Mongols for the first time initiated more conflicts than the Ming (see figure 5.2). From 1449 until the first wall building in 1474, the Ming initiated only one conflict, averaging 0.04 per year. In contrast, the Mongols were much more aggressive during this period and initiated forty conflicts, averaging 1.6 per year. Although Li Xian and Bai Gui advocated offensive campaigns to recover the Ordos, their plans failed to materialize.

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Lack of capability forced the Ming to choose defensive fortifications along the northern frontiers. Confucian norms and ideals gave way to a realistic assessment of military power. Ming China’s wall building was an outcome of military weakness, not Confucian strategic culture. The decision-making process did not support the claim that there was an aversion to military force in Chinese security policymaking. Rather, preference for offensive warfare was evident throughout the debate. Ming officials preferred launching an attack on the Mongols, but they were constrained by a realistic assessment of relative power. Officials immersed in the Confucian tradition lamented that a country as great as China should come under the mercy of the culturally inferior nomads, and they repeatedly called for offensive campaigns to eradicate the Mongol threat and recover the Ordos. Nevertheless, offensive war plans were discarded because the Ming’s military capability was simply not powerful enough. To justify restraint, the burden of military expenditure on the population was used, since, according to Confucianism, sagacious rulers built security not by war but by caring for the welfare of the people. Our process tracing, however, shows that the fundamental cause of defensive strategy was lack of military capability. THE SECOND DEBATE ON RECOVERING ORDOS

Although the Ming court decided to construct defensive walls as a result of its inability to launch an offensive war against the Mongols, the Ming’s security environment did not improve. The balance of power continued to shift in the Mongols’ favor. As Ming power declined in the mid-sixteenth century, officials began to debate the best strategy to solve the Mongol problem. The second debate over the Ordos centered on whether to launch a military expedition or to build more walls. THE EMERGENCE OF A POWERFUL MONGOL LEADER  Although the walls built

in the 1470s provided some relief from Mongol raids, over the next fifty years a series of Mongol leaders emerged to build confederations among their tribes, posing an even bigger threat to the Ming. During the reign of Emperor Hongzhi (r. 1488–1505), Dayan Khan (Batu Möngke), a descendant of Chinggis, became the most powerful Mongol leader and built a Mongol confederation. He settled in the Ordos in 1500 and used this fertile land as a forward base to raid China.98 The next year, he led 100,000 cavalrymen and launched a major attack on Guyuan and Ningxia. The Ming borders were shaken, and the killing was exceptionally brutal. The Ming military was incapable of warding

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off Mongol attacks.99 Dayan Khan inched into the Ordos and adopted a new tactic that had not been applied by the Mongols before. In 1514, he built a line of several tens of fortified camps from which he could project power to attack Datong and Xuanfu, the two most important strategic points between the Ordos and Beijing.100 The early Ming built outward garrisons to project power into the steppe. The Mongols would now use that same strategy to nibble at Ming territories. Ming history recorded a series of Mongol intrusions into the frontiers during this period. Dayan Khan died in 1524. The Mongols were engulfed in internecine tribal conflicts until the early 1540s, when Altan Khan (1507–1582) emerged as their principal leader. Altan Khan was arguably “the most effective Mongol leader since the fall of the Yuan [dynasty].”101 He went so far as to found a city (today’s Huhehot, the capital of Inner Mongolia) on the northeast of the Ordos, thus controlling the strategic corridor from the Ordos to Beijing. From there, Ming borders were raided for nearly thirty years.102 Altan Khan was reportedly capable of gathering 100,000 cavalrymen in the battlefield.103 In the 1540s, he repeatedly requested the Ming court to allow trade and tribute relations. Such relations had been permitted with the Jurchens and the Uriyangkhad Mongols. Each year, nevertheless, the Ming court turned down Altan Khan’s request. He decided to raid the Chinese border in order to get what he wanted.104 DECLINING MING POWER  As the Mongols rose in power, Ming military

strength continued to deteriorate at the turn of the sixteenth century. In 1489, more than 19,000 troops deserted their garrisons in Xian. In Guanxi, there were 120,000 troops in military colonies during the Hongwu period, but the number dropped to 18,000 in 1492, meaning that about 15 percent remained. In Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi province, only 141 out of the quota of 4,753 men were on barracks duty in the Left Guard in 1502, less than 3 percent of the authorized strength. Wang Qiong, minister of war from 1510 to 1515, reported that in his time eight or nine out of ten soldiers had deserted the military colonies. By the early sixteenth century, military colonies in the interior typically operated at only 10 percent of their prescribed strength, while the army posts in the northern frontier operated at a somewhat better 40 percent. Approximately 300,000 soldiers were in service along the northern frontier in 1487, still inadequate for the two-thousand-mile border.105 These forces constituted only one-third of the troops deployed in the frontier during the Yongle period. The Ming established a long line of garrisons along the northern frontier over an extensive period in response to Mongol raids. They were the so-called

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Nine Garrisons (jiu bian): from east to west extending 1,500 miles, these were Liaodong, Jizhou, Xuanfu, Datong, Shanxi, Yulin, Ningxia, Guyuan, and Gansu (see map 5.1). After the pullback of the last “eight outer garrisons” in 1430, the Nine Garrisons became the first line of defense against Mongol attacks. After Tumu, the Ming government adopted a series of measures to beef up defenses. Yet the number of soldiers in these inner garrisons plummeted. Table 5.4 lists the prescribed strength of each garrison and the degree of shortage in 1541. It is clear from this table that soldier shortage was a serious problem for the Ming northern defense. The three garrisons with the least shortage, Jizhou, Xuanfu, and Datong, were all located near Beijing. Their strategic importance in protecting the Ming capital explained their relatively higher number of soldiers. Compounding the Ming’s military problem was food scarcity. Many garrisons had difficulty supplying enough food for their soldiers. An increasing number of soldiers deserted their posts in search of food, leaving the weak and poorly trained behind. Military discipline was lax. Officers became landlords in the military colonies and exploited the labor of soldiers. The grim conditions in the border garrisons and the officer’s harsh treatment of soldiers caused mutinies among troops. In 1510, disgruntled troops murdered the new governor of Ningxia, and in 1521 the governor of Gansu was killed by his troops. In 1524, a major mutiny broke out in Datong because the overwrought soldiers were asked to build five new forts; they killed the grand coordinator. Another mutiny took place in Datong in 1533.106 Wei Huan, the Ming contemporary who in 1541 compiled Huang Ming Jiu Bian Kao, an authoritative study on the Nine Garrisons, wryly commented on the ineptitude of Ming officers: that they attacked the enemy’s elderly and children but reported back a major military victory; that they claimed their horses had gone out to pursue the enemy when in fact the horses were still inside the garrison; and that they even reported nothing had happened when their city had fallen to the enemy!107 Thus, Ming military capabilities had become insufficient. The northern defense system suffered from the problem of soldier and food shortages as well as a low level of morale and combat-readiness. Military expenditures also rose sharply. In the early Ming, soldiers were recruited from hereditary military families, who provided for their own subsistence and basic equipment. After Tumu, the Ming government started recruiting mercenaries to fill the empty posts. Each recruit cost about five taels of silver per year. By the end of the sixteenth century, the cost had risen to eighteen taels per soldier. The number reached thirty taels by the end of the dynasty in the mid-seventeenth century.

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TABLE 5.4  Soldier GARRISON Liadong

Shortages in the Nine Garrisons (1541)

PRESCRIBED STRENGTH 129,138

SHORTAGE

PERCENTAGE OF SHORTAGE

41,736

32.3

Jizhou

50,371

5,145*

10.2

Xuanfu

58,062

3,153

5.4

Datong

59,909

8,297

13.8

Shanxi

27,547

5,454

19.8

Yulin

58,067

10,952

18.7

Ningxia

70,263

35,119

50.0

Guyuan

67,294

19,450

28.9

Gansu

79,945

43,781

54.8

600,596

173,387

28.8

Total

* This number is from 1521. Source: Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi [Military History of the Ming], vol. 15 of Zhongguo Junshi Tongshi [General Military History of China] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1998), 624–625.

Wall building also cost dearly. At least 1,262 miles had been constructed since 1470. Each mile cost about 6,000 taels of silver, and this sum could leap to 44,500 taels per mile if the project were mismanaged.108 Table 5.5 presents a sample of military disbursements to the border garrisons. Military expenditures had become a heavy burden on the Ming treasury. In sum, the mid-sixteenth century witnessed rising Mongol power and declining Ming capability. The military forces of the Ming not only declined in quantity but also in quality. Domestically, rising incidents of internal rebellion threatened the regime’s survival.109 In contrast, the political cohesion of the Mongols improved to a considerable degree. The Mongols had occupied key strategic positions that facilitated their attack on the Ming. As Ray Huang concludes in his study of military expenditures during this period, “the military strength of the Ming Empire reached its nadir in the mid-sixteenth century.”110 Such was the backdrop for the second debate that led to a policy outcome in favor of even more wall building.

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TABLE 5.5  Military

Disbursements from the Central Treasury to Border Garrisons*

YEAR

TAELS OF SILVER

1521

430,000

1522

590,000

1539

1,000,000

1549

2,210,000

1569

2,400,000

1578

3,223,051

1593

3,800,000

* Numbers and years are approximations. Source: Han-sheng Chuan and Lung-Wah Lee, “Mingdai zhongye hou taicang suichu yinliang de yanjiu” [Annual expenditure of silver taels of the Taicang vault after the mid-Ming period], in Xianggang Zhongwen Daixue Zhonghua Wenhua Yanjiusuo Xuebao [Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong] 6, no. 1 (December 1973): 189–192.

THE DEBATE  Like the first round in the 1470s, the second round of debate was

characterized by a sharp division between pragmatists and hardliners. Pragmatists, mostly border commanders, favored more accommodating measures such as trade, wall building, and diplomatic means. They had firsthand experience with Mongol strength and understood that the Mongols were interested in obtaining Chinese goods. Permitting trade would help ease tensions so that they would not need to raid or plunder. Hardliners, on the other hand, were mostly court officials who insisted on offensive campaigns to recover the Ordos. They often accused border commanders of cowardice in the face of the Mongols. They subscribed to the traditional China-centered view and saw Mongol recalcitrance as an affront to Chinese authority that therefore must be punished. The debate started when Zeng Xian, commander of the Shaanxi three borders defense area, submitted a proposal calling for recovery of the Ordos by offensive campaigns, followed by intensive fortifications along the loop of the Yellow River. On January 8, 1547, he submitted a memorial to the Ming court explaining why an offensive campaign was necessary. He first quoted Han dynasty official Jia Yi’s (201–160 BCE) famous words that although the barbarians were numerous, they were only as numerous as a large Han

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prefecture. The Mongols became a security problem because the Ming had lost a crucial strategic area (Ordos) to them. Then he went on to say: Their dens and nests [in the Ordos area] are now firmly established. To drive them out will be difficult. But I fear the consequences [of their presence in the River loop] will daily grow more serious. Therefore, there is no better policy for dealing with them than the recovery of the Ordos area. Not to approve this plan, but rather out of fear to choose the inferior policy of taking defensive measures only, may be compared to attempting to stop water from boiling without knowing enough to remove the firewood; it will not stop catastrophes along the border.111

For Zeng Xian, an offensive attack on the Mongols was the best way to have security on the northern frontier. Chief grand secretary Xia Yan, who wanted to use this hardliner policy to consolidate his political position in the court, supported Zeng Xian’s proposal.112 Xia Yan was “a rather orthodox Confucian” and Zeng Xian, though born into a military family, was also classically educated and got his jinshi degree in 1529.113 Confucian influence was evident in Zeng Xian’s memorial. In the beginning, he alluded to a famous saying of Confucius: “When our domestic rule is rectified, remote people will submit to us.” He also noted the cruelty and danger of warfare. But he was merely paying lip service to the pacifist idea. Later on, he spoke of the Confucian distinction between Chinese and barbarians and felt ashamed of the inability of border commanders to eradicate the barbarian threats. Citing an age-old metaphor attributed to Jia Yi of the Han dynasty, “China is the head, barbarians the feet. This cannot be confused,” he continued: “The ugly barbarians violated their obedience to us, subverting the order of heaven. They must be exterminated under the kingly law and never be pardoned.”114 The emperor instructed the ministry of war to study Zeng’s proposal. The ministry of war was skeptical of military expedition and instead suggested building defensive fortifications: Building fortifications and recovering the Ordos are both difficult. Comparing these two, recovering the Ordos is even more difficult. If we want to lead tens of thousands of men, prepare fifty days of food, and drive deep into the remote and dangerous cave that must be contested, in order to expel the barbarians who had occupied there for several decades, how difficult would that be! Therefore, we would be better off by repairing walls and digging trenches. When these are completed, success can be expected.115

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The Jiajing Emperor (r. 1522–1567) nevertheless liked Zeng Xian’s proposal. He instructed further studies of the plan and ordered the ministry of war to appropriate 200,000 taels (260,000 ounces) of silver to Zeng Xian for war preparations. Zeng’s proposal was circulated among officials and border commanders, but they were reluctant to carry it out.116 One year later, Zeng, with his subordinates, submitted an exhaustive proposal, including eighteen detailed points in recovering the Ordos, followed by eight diagrams on troop formation. A number of officials, however, were opposed to Zeng Xian’s plan. Although many saw the Ordos recovery debate as a political struggle between Xia Yan and grand secretary Yan Song, there existed a number of officials who harbored no political animus and judged the proposal on its merits.117 They saw Zeng’s proposal unrealistic and dangerous. Among them was Weng Wanda, governor of the border areas of Xuanfu and Datong, to the west of Beijing. Emperor Jiajing relied heavily on Weng Wanda’s assistance, granting virtually every request of his.118 In response to Zeng’s proposal, Weng submitted a memorial outlining his opposition. Although he saw good strategic reason in recovering the Ordos, the opportunity for doing so simply did not exist. The Mongols were very strong, totaling 300,000 to 400,000, and had already settled in the Ordos. In contrast, the Ming was no longer as strong as during the reigns of emperors Hongwu and Yongle. “Times have changed. The strong and the weak have switched places,” Weng pointed out. Because the Ordos had long been lost to the Mongols, the Ming’s knowledge and intelligence of the terrain was lost as well. Supplying the attacking troops would be a daunting challenge. There was a serious danger that the tens of thousands of Ming offensive forces might be lost in the unfamiliar terrain of Ordos. He pointed out that the Mongols were advantaged in offensive mobile warfare, whereas the Ming military was good at using firearms for defensive fortifications. Citing Sun Zi’s famous dictum, “Know the enemy and know yourself; this is the key to a hundred victories,” he proposed that the Ming strengthen fortifications, train soldiers, build up military strength, and wait for opportunity to strike. “When they are divided, we can take advantage of it. It would be the best time to recover the Ordos.”119 Other critics such as Tang Shunzhi and Yang Bo saw great risks in the Ordos recovery proposal. Tang cited the Ming’s poor intelligence and insufficient strength, arguing that the military expedition might lead to disaster.120 Arthur Waldron examined Zeng Xian’s proposed costs of a year’s campaign in the Ordos and found that they were “gross underestimates of the true costs of the campaign.” Zeng’s proposed costs totaled 316,850 taels (411,905 ounces)

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of silver per year, while Waldron estimated that it would cost at least 1,252,755 taels (1,628,581 ounces) per year, almost four times as much. Zeng’s figures failed to consider factors such as clothing, weapons acquisition, and transportation costs. He also ignored the costs of building walls after the Ordos was recovered.121 THE FINAL POLICY OUTCOME  The prohibitively high costs of the offensive

campaign forced Emperor Jiajing to recant his support of Zeng Xian’s war plan. He remarked, “The Ordos barbarians have long been a problem. Today an offensive campaign has been proposed. But can sending troops be justified? Do we have enough soldiers? Do we have enough food? Can we foresee victory? . . . I am only afraid that innocent people would be killed for a crime they did not commit.”122 Now even the emperor was not sure about the feasibility of a military attack. Emperor Jiajing was, in effect, invoking the antimilitarist strand of Confucian pacifism against the military expedition, that the welfare of the people outweighs the benefits of war. As the emperor’s position became clear, more and more officials joined in opposition to the proposed campaign, including grand secretary Yan Song, who noted: “Today, our military forces are far weaker than those of our ancestors; our internal and external treasuries are depleted.”123 The massive military expedition would put an excessive burden on the local people, possibly driving them to banditry or rebellion. The proposed offensive campaign was canceled. The Ming began to build more extensive walls along the borders. A few months later, both Zeng Xian and Xia Yan were executed for allegedly stirring up border troubles. The Chinese remember this Ordos recovery debate as one between patriots and villain officials.124 Zeng Xian and Xia Yan are seen as patriotic heroes, while Yan Song is seen as a great villain who corrupted Ming politics. The merits of true policy debates, however, are often lost in such a moralistic view.125 Despite the intentions to recover the Ordos, the key issue in court debate was whether or not China had the military capability. The final policy outcome in favor of more wall building reflected China’s assessment of its military capability and should not be construed as the product of a cultural preference for defense. Proposals for recovering the Ordos had been put forth by Li Xian and Bai Gui in the 1470s, but they were rejected because China lacked the capability to do so. The Ming court was forced to settle on static defense by building walls along the Ordos frontiers. The second debate had a similar effect on China’s national security policy. By this time, the earth walls built in the late fifteenth century had decayed. From the mid-sixteenth century onward, more

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extensive walls were built from the west to the east. In order to construct permanent walls, brick and stone were used. As fortifications strengthened in the Ordos, the Mongols gradually moved east and raided the borders where fortifications were weak or not yet constructed. Like the Maginot Line, the Ming defensive line could be easily bypassed. In 1550, the Mongols bypassed Ming fortifications by advancing from the northeastern gap in the Ming defensive line and reached the city walls of Beijing.126 The Ming responded by building more fortifications to the east. The defensive line would eventually extend to the sea and became what is known as the Great Wall today. The foregoing discussion reveals a constant theme in the making of Chinese national security policy. Many Chinese officials exhibited a preference for offensive campaign when China was weak and plagued by border security problems. For them, the insubordination of frontier nomads was an insult to the Chinese world order and must be remedied through military expeditions. Yet, this offensive tendency was checked by a realistic assessment of China’s relative power. Notwithstanding the proposals to recover the Ordos, the military capability of the Ming was simply not strong enough to accomplish such a task. To counter the hardliners who favored offensive campaigns regardless of China’s capability, supporters of defensive strategy frequently used the phrase “externally, demonstrate a policy of loose rein; internally, prepare for war and defense” (wai shi ji mi, nei xiu zhan shou).127 That is, like herding cattle (hence the term ji mi), China should grant the nomads autonomy and treat them with flexibility and leniency, but should be prepared for war lest the nomads attack. These pragmatists sometimes invoked the antimilitary strand of Confucianism to justify their call for restraint. But they quickly pointed out that static defense was an expedient measure (quan bian) to buy time, a stopgap to build up power for the next strike. Once the military was powerful enough, China would deliver the decisive blow to the Mongols. The examination of the decision making of the Ordos recovery debates demonstrates the superiority of structural realism over cultural explanation. Almost every participant in the debates was a Confucian scholar-official. Virtually none argued for internal rectification or the cultivation of virtue as the best solution to external threats, although some alluded to it in passing. Rather, court documents reveal that Chinese leaders preferred taking offensive military actions to eradicate the Mongol threat. Their cultural education in Confucianism did not appear to constrain this preference for the use of force. It was lack of military capability that forced the Ming to adopt static defense as an expedient solution to border problems.

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ACCOMMODATIONIST GRAND STRATEGY (1549–1644) Ming power reached rock bottom during the period from 1549 to 1644. Military capability as well as troop morale and fighting skills continued to deteriorate. To make matters worse, soaring cases of internal rebellion severely weakened state power. This period also witnessed the climax of the building of the Great Wall. The Mongols were united under a powerful leader and continued to take advantage of their secure footholds in the border zone to raid Chinese frontiers. They succeeded on various occasions in penetrating Chinese defenses, even advancing to the city walls of Beijing. CULTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO COMPROMISE

The northern frontier of China has historically been a major source of its security threat since more than two thousand years ago. Yet native Chinese regimes, despite being more populous and economically advanced, have failed to effectively deal with the nomadic threat. Two factors accounted for the intractability of China’s frontier problem. The first was the imbalance of military skills between the mobile nomads and the sedentary Chinese. Although the Chinese outnumbered the nomads, the superior horsemanship and marksmanship of the nomadic people gave them a tactical advantage over Chinese infantrymen. Nomadic cavalrymen could attack a large concentration of Chinese foot soldiers and withdraw quickly out of the range of Chinese archers. China’s long, meandering border made defense difficult, forcing the Chinese to spread out military forces along the frontier, whereas the nomads could take advantage of their mobility to quickly assemble forces and overrun a Chinese border garrison, retreating before Chinese relief forces arrived.128 For instance, in 1537 about forty thousand Mongol forces attacked the Datong garrison, defended by fourteen thousand Ming soldiers. By the time reinforcements had arrived, the Mongols were nowhere in sight.129 The second factor was the economic dependence of nomadic people on settled societies. Far from being self-sufficient, the nomads’ pastoral economies were ill suited for producing grains, textiles, metals, luxury goods, and herbal medicines. Nomadic people needed these goods either for subsistence or, in the case of ambitious leaders, for awarding local chieftains and followers to ensure loyalty. When these items could not be obtained by trade, the nomads turned to raiding or conquering sedentary societies in order to get what they wanted. In addition to being a supply source of subsistence and luxury goods, China also provided a market for the nomads to sell surplus livestock.130

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For Chinese leaders, the asymmetry in military skills and economic relationship posed a dilemma. On one hand, military expeditions required costly preparations and countrywide mobilizations as well as resolution of the daunting logistical problems of campaigning far into the steppe. On the other hand, permitting trade with the nomads risked strengthening China’s formidable adversaries, who might use their increased military strength against China in the future. But if the diplomatic solution of trade were not adopted, it would provoke more raids and attacks from the nomads. This was exactly what happened when the Ming repeatedly turned down Mongol requests for trade. For fifty years in the sixteenth century, the Mongols attacked almost every autumn, when their horses were fattened after grazing in the spring and summer. Why was it so difficult for the Chinese to reach a diplomatic compromise with the nomads, which would seem a rational strategic choice under the circumstances described here? The answer, ironically, has a lot to do with Confucian culture. Compromise in foreign policy was especially difficult because of the distinction between Chinese (hua) and barbarians (yi) and the insistence on a hierarchy with China at the top. Han dynasty official Jia Yi opposed the accommodationist heqin policy on the grounds that it violated Confucian ideas of hierarchy; it was too humiliating. Noting that the population of the nomads did not exceed that of a large Chinese district, Jia Yi famously lamented, “That a great empire has come under the control of the population of a district is something your minister feels must be a source of shame for those who are in charge of the affairs of the empire.”131 The great Han historian Sima Qian (145–87 BCE) wrote in Shiji (Historical Records) that the Xiongnu nomads were warlike people by nature: “It is their custom to herd their flocks in times of peace and make their living by hunting, but in periods of crisis they take up arms and go off on plundering and marauding expeditions. This seems to be their inborn nature. . . . Their only concern is self-advantage, and they know nothing of propriety or righteousness”132 Ban Gu’s (32–92 CE) Hanshu (Standard History of the Han) described the same nomads as “covetous for gain, human-faced but animal-hearted,” a phrase frequently cited by later generations.133 Song Confucian scholar-official Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072) described the nomads as “insects, reptiles, snakes, and lizards,” adding: “How could we receive them with courtesy and deference?”134 The moralistic approach to the nomads endured into the Ming period. A frequently used analogy in Ming policy memorials was the one made by Jia Yi: China was the head of a person, the “barbarians” the feet. When foreigners refused to submit to China, the situation was likened to that of a person hang-

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ing upside down.135 As Waldron points out, the ethnocentric and xenophobic worldview of the Confucian literati, mostly from Ming China’s southern region, “made it hard for policymakers to behave rationally.”136 Accommodation with the nomads would violate these cultural norms. Hence, Confucian culture contributed to excessive moralizing in foreign policy, hindering rational decision making. MONGOL REQUESTS FOR TRADE

Altan Khan repeatedly sent requests for trade (disguised as “tribute”) relations, only to be rejected by the Ming court. He needed Chinese goods to award his followers and build a confederation among Mongol tribes. These resources included grain, cotton fabrics, metal pots, agricultural tools, silk, and other luxuries.137 When such resources could not be obtained by trade, Altan Khan decided to raid in order to get what he wanted. In autumn 1550, he launched a major campaign along Ming fortifications and advanced to the walls of Beijing. Once again, he presented a request for trade and tribute. The Ming court realized that they could no longer ignore such a request. Su You, governor of Xuanfu and Datong, proposed that trade be allowed for one year, after which the issue of tribute would be examined. In the meantime, the Ming should “externally, demonstrate a policy of loose rein; internally, prepare for war and defense.”138 The ministry of war studied his proposal and suggested that the markets be opened four times a year. Emperor Jiajing wavered and asked for the opinion of grand secretary Yan Song, who stressed that allowing trade with the Mongols was only a temporary measure to buy time to strengthen defenses. He suggested that the number of trading fairs be reduced to twice a year. The emperor approved on April 9, 1551.139 Just when the preparation for opening markets was under way, Yang Jisheng, an official in the ministry of war, submitted a memorial on April 20 pleading the emperor to reconsider. Like Li Xian and Zeng Xian of the Ordos recovery debates, Yang Jisheng favored taking a tough stance toward the nomads. The Mongols were “dogs and sheep” and were “deceitful and capricious,” their appetite “extremely insatiable.” They could not be pacified by compromise: they would demand more. Yang had expected the emperor to launch a northern expedition to crush the Mongols, but the trade proposal was tantamount to making peace, which made Yang Jisheng “look up to heaven and let out a deep sigh.” He volunteered to hunt down Altan Khan and hang his head in the street. Emperor Jiajing read his memorial several times and was swayed by it. He called for a meeting. Officials pointed out that the Ming government’s

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refusal to trade had been an excuse for war by the Mongols and argued that opening the markets could prevent further attacks. It was only an expedient measure to buy time. News of trading fairs was already out; stopping abruptly would upset the Mongols and provoke more attacks. The emperor hesitated for a long time and finally ordered that the markets be open only once a year, but he rejected Altan Khan’s request for tribute.140 In June 1551, horse fairs were held in Datong and Xuanfu. The border markets were fragile, however. Trade was initially limited to horses paid in satin and cotton fabrics. Soon Altan Khan requested to trade cattle and sheep for beans and grains, the reason being that only the rich Mongols could afford to trade horses, but the poor only had cattle and sheep. The Ming court rejected the request on the ground that the Mongols did not eat beans and grains (not true) and that these products must be intended for Chinese defectors who had fled to Mongolia. On September 6, 1551, the Ming court reversed its decision to open the market. The border commander who favored trading grains was recalled and demoted; tensions began to rise. Unable to get what he wanted, Altan Khan decided to raid. As it turned out, the year 1551 was the only time in the next twenty years in which the Mongols did not attack.141 The Ming reverted to building more walls, signal towers, and forts on an unprecedented scale. The three reigns of Jiajing (d. 1567), Longqing (r. 1567–1573), and Wanli (r. 1573–1620) emperors witnessed “the climax of Ming wall building.”142 Given the Ming’s deteriorating power position, it should have compromised with the Mongols in 1551. But it would take another twenty years before a deal was finally reached. This lag in strategic adjustment was largely due to culture. The Chinese worldview put China at the center of all states and political units. When this “world order” was challenged, so the thinking went, chaos and catastrophes would befall. Officials frequently advocated aggressive policies to “exterminate” the barbarians who had violated the way of Heaven. Compromise with the enemies, in their view, was not only unbecoming a great country but would also damage the “awesomeness” (wei) of China. Making peace with the adversaries would compromise the moral norms of the state; these signs of weakness would make the adversaries belittle China and become more intransigent. Sinocentrism made compromise especially difficult.143

THE SETTLEMENT OF 1571 It would take a further deterioration in the Ming treasury and military power to finally overcome the cultural hurdle to compromise. As noted previously,

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the Ming treasury was plagued by the problem of skyrocketing military expenditures caused by growing incidents of Mongol invasions. Exacerbating the problem was the Ming’s declining capacity to foot the military bills. The Ming suffered “fiscal bankruptcy” in the latter half of the dynasty. Rising expenditures and dwindling revenues contributed to recurrent budget deficits. The Ming treasury had enjoyed a surplus until 1527 but fell into deficits thereafter. Table 5.6 presents the balance sheet of the Ming treasury. The budget deficit rose more than sixteenfold during 1551–55. The failed market opening in 1550–51 and subsequent Mongol raids apparently aggravated the Ming treasury. In fact, Ming budget deficit was at all time high during the period from 1551 to 1570. Military expenditures accounted for more than half of the Ming budget. From 1548 to 1617, military expenditures constituted approximately 60 to 80 percent of the total disbursements of the central treasury, reaching as high as 97.3 percent in 1612.144 In addition to the fiscal problem, the combat-readiness and morale of Ming troops were in sharp decline as well. During the Mongol raid of the suburbs of Beijing in 1550, only 140,000 of the nominal 380,000 troops could be assembled; among these, only 50,000 to 60,000 had been properly trained. The elite Imperial Guards, on hearing the news that the Mongols were within sight of Beijing, burst into tears and shuddered at the thought of fighting.145 Moreover, soaring incidences of domestic rebellions required the central government to divert military resources to suppress them. More than 80 percent of the country’s entire 603 cases of rebellions took place in the second half of the dynasty (1506–1644),146 forcing the Ming government to redeploy armies that could have been dispatched to the northern frontiers to put down rebellions within the country. Thus, the balance of power shifted further to the disadvantage of the Ming. Structural realism suggests that in times of severe weakness, China would adopt more accommodative measures to solve security problems. But cultural factors made this rational strategic choice difficult. It would take a further decline in Ming relative power to overcome Confucian moralism in foreign policy. Insufficient military capability made further confrontation costly and harder to sustain. As we will see, the Ming finally made a compromise with the Mongols in 1571. Altan Khan continued to raid Chinese borders after the failed market opening in 1551. He requested permission for trade and tribute in 1553 and again in 1559, but the Ming adamantly turned him down and arrested his envoys. On several occasions during these two decades, Ming troops went beyond the border to attack the Mongols, but they suffered severe casualties.147 The

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TABLE 5.6  Fiscal

Situation of the Ming Treasury

PERIOD

INCOME IN TAELS (000)*

DISBURSEMENTS IN TAELS (000)

BALANCE IN TAELS (000)

1518–27

2,000

1,330

+670

1528–48

1,650

2,940

-1,290

1549

3,957

4,123

-166

1551–55

2,000

4,766

-2,766

1566–70

2,228

4,380

-2,152

1571–75

2,960

3,019

-59

1576–80

3,960

3,691

+269

1581–85

3,712

5,038

-1,362

1586–90

3,673

4,792

-1,119

* All numbers are averaged and rounded. Source: Han-sheng Chuan and Lung-Wah Lee, “Mingdai zhongye hou taicang suichu yinliang de yanjiu” [Annual expenditure of silver taels of the Taicang vault after the mid-Ming period], in Xianggang Zhongwen Daixue Zhonghua Wenhua Yanjiusuo Xuebao [Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong] 6, no. 1 (December 1973): 196–197.

war of attrition made both sides weary. The economies of Chinese border cities were in shambles, farmlands abandoned, local population exhausted. Ming treasury suffered from all-time-high deficits. For their part, the Mongols also suffered from Chinese attacks; vast stretch of grasslands burned, making nomadic life difficult. Emperor Jiajing died in 1567. Competent officials who wished to reduce border tensions and reform politics were ascendant in the Ming government, among them grand secretary Zhang Juzheng. The conditions were ripe for peace.148 The opportunity came when Altan Khan’s grandson, Bagha-achi, fled to China over a family dispute in 1570. Wang Chonggu, governor-general of Xuanfu and Datong, suggested that instead of treating Bagha-achi as a hostage he be treated as a guest of honor and granted an official rank. If Altan Khan came to the border to ask for the return of his grandson, he would have to trade Chinese fugitives for him. If Altan Khan invaded Chinese borders, the Ming would make sure that his grandson would be the first to be killed. If Altan Khan abandoned his grandson, the Ming would treat him well. When

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Altan died, the Ming would use Bagha-achi as a counterweight to Altan’s successor, using the time-honored strategy of divide and rule.149 In a subsequent memorial, Wang Chonggu made clear that both offensive and defensive strategies had failed: “Attacking them would not eradicate the threat. Defending against them has always been plagued by the problems of troop shortage, exhausted soldiers in garrisons, and insufficient money to supply the border.” Times had changed: the current policy of defense without accommodation was not sustainable. He recommended the Ming court to accommodate Altan Khan’s request for trade and tribute.150 Wang Chonggu’s proposal roused a heated debate in the Ming court. The arguments were similar to the debates two decades earlier when Altan Khan requested trade and tribute in 1551. But what was different was the further deterioration in Ming relative power. The minister of war, nonetheless, could not make a decision. At the insistence of grand secretaries Gao Gong and Zhang Juzheng, Emperor Longqing (r. 1567–1573) finally agreed to bestow an honorary rank on Bagha-achi. When Altan Khan came to ask for his return, he was pleased to see his grandson treated well by the Chinese. He handed over Chinese fugitives and requested that the markets be opened. In addition, Altan Khan had good strategic reason to make peace with Ming China. He had just invaded Tibet in 1566 and again in 1571, and he was ready to turn northwest to challenge the Oirats. Peace with the Ming would enable him to divert more resources to fight his rivals and allow him to exchange essential commodities with China.151 The Ming court discussed Altan Khan’s request for opening the markets. Wang Chonggu submitted another memorial on March 7, 1571, describing the benefits of opening the markets and setting forth an eight-point plan detailing each contingency. He pointed out that the Mongols were driven by economic needs; their nomadic lifestyle meant that their daily necessities such as cloth, needles and yarns, pots, and axes must be supplied by China. They raided to get what they wanted. The incessant warfare along the borders had made the garrisons unable to hold out much longer. He reiterated his early argument on the ineffectiveness of static defense: “[People in] the Nine Garrisons will have no time to rest their shoulders; fiscal capacity will be in danger of insolvency. Even the wise men will not be able to subdue the enemy without fighting, nor would it be possible to keep intact the entire army and the entire territory.”152 Wang referred to previous examples of Ming-Mongol tribute relations to make the point that his proposal had precedents. Given the circumstances, an accommodationist grand strategy could bring security. He noted that Altan Khan was the most powerful leader of the

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Mongol tribes. If China made peace with him by giving him and his followers honorary titles and allowing them to trade, “they would be grateful for the grace of the Son of Heaven and the honorary titles they receive, and would discipline their tribes not to violate Chinese garrisons.”153 In the meantime, the Ming could use the peace as a breathing space to repair garrisons and rebuild the military. “After three or five years, our army will be strong and in high spirit; our border defenses will be solid. Even if the barbarians were to rebel against us, our accumulated strength over the years would allow us to ward off the enemies if we choose to defend, or to win victory if we choose to attack.” The granting of honorary titles and trading privileges was just a “temporary small expedient of loose rein.”154 The Ming court discussed Wang’s proposal and took a vote: twenty-two were in favor, seventeen were opposed, and the remaining five were in favor of tribute relations but not trade. On April 2, 1571, a final decision was made. Wang’s plan was to be carried out, with minor modifications. Ten days later, the Ming emperor granted Altan Khan the title Shunyiwang, “Obedient and Righteous Prince.” Altan Khan promised to respect Ming borders.155 Despite the rigorous resistance to accommodation, shrinking state power eventually forced the Ming to cut a deal with the Mongols in 1571. Since Altan Khan’s rise to power in 1540 until the settlement of 1571, the Ming initiated a total of ten conflicts, averaging 0.32 per year.156 The Mongols were much more aggressive and initiated eighty-seven conflicts, averaging 2.8 per year. During this period, the Ming faced a fiscal crisis and increasing domestic rebellions. Static defense could not hold out much longer, as Wang Chonggu’s memorials made clear. Thus, it made good strategic sense to accommodate Mongol demands and make peace with them. The Ming borders to the northwest became relatively peaceful after the settlement of 1571.157 Military funds for the border regions were diverted for other purposes. Expenses for the armies in Xuanfu, Datong, and Shaanxi in 1577 dropped to only 20–30 percent of previous amounts. Supplies to the armies were also significantly improved.158 Border situations, however, began to deteriorate after the death of chief grand secretary Zhang Juzheng, who understood the value of compromise and had been the most powerful supporter of the peace deal. Hardliners began to reassert themselves and the peace gradually broke down.159 Meanwhile, Ming security concern shifted to the northeast. The Manchus rose in power and were poised to challenge Ming authority. The Mongol tribes began to ally with the Manchus.160 In 1644, the Manchus conquered all of China and established the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), putting both sides of the Great Wall under Qing control.

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CONCLUSION The historical record shows that Ming China’s Confucian culture did not constrain its decisions to use force. The aversion to military force embedded in Confucianism did not independently influence Ming strategic choices, which were mainly a function of relative power. On matters of war and peace, Ming emperors and their advisors, whose education required mastery of Confucian discourse, chose to base their security policy on their assessment of the balance of power between the Ming and the Mongols. The Confucian prescription of benevolent leadership might be useful for governing the vast country and making people submit to the sage ruler, but the idealized discourse of virtuous statecraft turned out to be inadequate for national security. The key to having security, as the Ming rulers recognized, was to build a strong foundation of power. This chapter’s survey of Ming-Mongol relations supports the power-based explanation of structural realism. An antimilitarist Confucian culture did not appear to constrain Chinese use of force. Although factional politics played a role in certain strategic debates, such as the rivalry between Yan Song and Xia Yan, the broad contours of Ming strategic choice was consistent with structural realist expectations. Chinese grand strategy went through three stages: from offensive to defensive and then to accommodation. This shift correlates with the balance of power between the Ming and the Mongols. The Ming was the most powerful during the period of 1368–1449, and it consequently adopted an offensive strategy vis-à-vis the Mongols by applying relentless use of force against the Mongols. As the balance shifted to the disadvantage of the Ming after the Tumu fiasco in 1449, the Ming chose a defensive grand strategy during 1450–1548 and built defensive walls along the northern frontiers. The balance reached rock bottom during 1549–1644, and the Ming was forced to accommodate the Mongols and accepted their demand for trade and tribute. In Ming-Mongol relations, there was little reluctance about the use of force. On various occasions, Ming China took the initiative by attacking the Mongols. Although at times these campaigns were preceded by diplomatic measures, they usually contained explicit military threats in the form of “submit, or face invasion,” and therefore should not be construed as Chinese reluctance to using force. However, the difficulty of campaigning in the vast steppe made the Ming’s offensive aspirations hard to realize. The Mongols, skilled in mobile cavalry warfare, either refused to give battle or retreat after defeat. Overextended supply lines frequently forced the Ming army to turn back.

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Ming war aims were not limited to border protection, as contended by proponents of Confucian pacifism, but included conquest and destruction of the adversary. There was no “primacy of defense.” Rather, the early Ming adopted an offensive posture that went beyond the Chinese-controlled areas and well into the Mongolian heartland. These were wars of conquest and wars of annihilation. Defense became the chosen strategy only after China had lost the capability to launch offensive campaigns. Nonetheless, even during periods of static defense, policy debates evinced a preference for offense and total destruction of the Mongols. Lack of military capability, not antimilitarist norms, proscribed such an attempt. One might be struck by the difficulty of making compromise in Ming security policymaking. It took the Ming nearly fifty years to finally accept the Mongol request for trade and tribute. Sinocentrism made accommodating the nomad’s request difficult, causing a lag in strategic adjustment. Incessant nomadic attacks challenged the Confucian norm of hierarchy that put China at the top of nations. As such, China had to punish its adversaries for their insubordination and unruliness to rectify the abnormal situation. Making peace with the culturally inferior enemies was considered shameful and was to be avoided. For this reason, Altan Khan’s request for trade and tribute was repeatedly turned down. It took a further worsening of the border situation and a rampant fiscal crisis to force the Ming to make peace with the Mongols. As realist theory explains, international structure sets a parameter for a state’s security policy; the state suffers if its strategic choice deviates from structural imperatives. In Ming-Mongol relations, Confucian culture contributed to strategic irrationality and caused a lag in the Ming’s strategic adjustment, at the cost of more human lives and a severe fiscal crisis. Structural imperatives, however, usually push states to adapt and adjust, as the Ming did in the decision to accommodate the Mongols in 1571.

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6 THE MING TRIBUTE SYSTEM

chapters deal with China’s security policy toward its primary adversaries: the Liao Empire, the Jin Empire, and the Mongols. This chapter will examine the Ming dynasty’s interactions with secondary states under the tributary framework. For proponents of Confucian pacifism, the tribute system—an idealized form of interstate interactions that put China at the center—symbolizes the nonviolent, noncoercive aspect of the Chinese world order. By entering the tribute system, foreign states accepted Chinese superiority not because of the overwhelming power of China but because of the cultural attractiveness of a higher civilization. The Confucian international order was benign and harmonious. Military force has little utility in the tribute system. John Fairbank writes of the “pacifist bias” in the Chinese world order: “the Chinese empire grew by the acculturation of its borders. Its expansion was the expansion of a way of life.”1 Rather than expanding by brute force, the Chinese empire grew in size by cultural attraction. China’s superior culture worked like a giant magnet, attracting secondary states—voluntarily—into the Confucian scheme of benevolent hierarchy. International relations, broadly construed, were hierarchic and non-egalitarian. Mark Mancall writes, “The concept of legal equality or the sovereignty of the individual political units in the world order did not exist.”2 China, as the paramount leader, maintained order in the system and reserved the right to intervene in the internal affairs of its vassals. The view of a benevolent tribute system is widespread. “China does not have a significant history of coercive statecraft,” writes sinologist David Shambaugh. “The tribute system may have been hegemonic, but it was not based on coercion or territorial expansionism.”3 Other specialists also hold that the tribute system has been peaceful and benign. Samuel Huntington writes that “Asians generally are willing to ‘accept hierarchy’ in international relations,” THE PRECEDING

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which has created peace and stability in the region.4 Zbigniew Brzezinski also thinks the tribute system was benign: “Perhaps in the future the Chinese may draw a more relevant lesson from their imperial past of how a deferential tributary system can work.”5 In an elaborate study of Asia international history, David Kang argues, “East Asian regional relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in the West.”6 I take issue with the popular view that coercion and the threat of violence have been absent from the sinocentric tribute system. I argue that military force has been crucial to establishing, maintaining, and enforcing the tribute system. Behind the facade of tribute and deference lay the foundation of hard power that supported it. By examining the historical record, I seek to uncover the strategic motivations underpinning the tribute system, which cultural explanation tends to overlook.

THE TRIBUTE SYSTEM The tribute system has often been used to describe the peaceful nature of the Chinese world order.7 Under this hierarchical system, foreign states were attracted by the superior Chinese culture and civilization and voluntarily became vassals. At home, they adopted the Chinese calendar, and their rulers had to be enfeoffed by the Chinese emperor. Investiture by China was expected to enhance the legitimacy of the local rulers. Leaders of vassal states could address themselves only as “king”; the term “emperor” was reserved only for China, although some vassal kings addressed themselves as “emperors” with respect to their subjects. Vassal states periodically sent embassies to pay tribute to the Chinese emperor with goods produced in their own countries. In court meetings, tributary envoys performed certain rituals, including kowtow, to symbolize their submission to the Chinese emperor and to accept their inferior status as a vassal state. In return, the Chinese emperor, to demonstrate the benevolence of his throne, lavished these envoys with a much higher value of Chinese goods and luxuries such as silk, tea, treasures, and agricultural products. In accordance with Confucianism, the influx of foreign envoys to pay tribute to the Chinese emperor strengthened the legitimacy of his throne, because the tribute symbolized his status as the accepted ruler of the universe. The tribute system also served a security function. By allowing foreigners to pay tribute, it was hoped, they would be transformed into civilized peoples and pose no threat. This cultural transformation served as a “defense mecha-

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nism” to protect China from foreign attacks.8 Tributary states could also call for Chinese help if attacked. As the leader of the system, China provided the public goods of security. In addition to ritualistic and security considerations, the tribute system helped facilitate and regulate trade between China and its tributaries, as tribute was often the only permitted form of trade sanctioned by Confucian bureaucrats. In the eyes of the Confucians, commercial activities were of little importance for virtuous statecraft; profits were disdained. Hence, according to Chinese accounts, China did not profit from tributary relations, since what the emperor bestowed upon the foreign envoys was always in excess of what they had brought in to the imperial court. As a self-sufficient empire, China was not interested in foreign lands and desired no foreign goods. Rather, it was foreigners who desired Chinese goods and luxuries.9 Hence, the tribute system functioned as an institution that helped China manage foreign relations, preserve a dominant position in East Asia, and maintain peaceful borders. The benign depiction of that system has much to do with scholars’ heavy reliance on the Chinese historical records, which tend to present a kinder, gentler image of the country itself.10 Often overlooked in the sinocentric literature are the views of the tributary states. John Fairbank, who popularized the idea of a benign tribute system, also recognized the problem of potential bias: “When we find that Lord Macartney, sent by George III [of England] in 1793 to demand trade concessions, is faithfully enshrined in the Chinese records as a tributary envoy, what are we to think of the preceding millennia of so-called tributary missions?”11 Scholars who studied nonChinese actors have noted the sharply different interpretation of the tribute system from those at the receiving end of Chinese power. In his renowned study of Ming-Mongol relations, Henry Serruys observes, “We are used to speak of Barbarians offering tribute to the emperor and at least theoretically acknowledge his suzerainty . . . yet in fact it was the Ming empire which paid the Mongols (or the [Jurchens]) for calling themselves subjects and for relative security on the northern frontiers. . . . Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the Mongols thought of the tribute system as a tribute paid to them, not the other way about.”12 Foreigners who came to imperial China also noted the role of tribute as a form of Chinese payment for cooperation. Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), an Italian Jesuit who worked in the Ming court, observed that “the Chinese themselves (who are by no means ignorant of the deception) delude their king, fawning with devotion as if truly the whole world paid taxes to the Chinese kingdom, whereas on the contrary tribute is more truly paid to those

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kingdoms by China.”13 Since Chinese return of goods exceeded the value of the tribute, some vassals saw this as lucrative payment for their cooperation. More needs to be said about the economic incentives for tributaries to accept the tribute system. Trade with China was exceedingly profitable, but was restricted within the tribute system. The enormous economic incentives for the foreign states when they enter into the tribute system were a key factor in their decision to accept nominal Chinese supremacy. Because the Chinese insisted that trade must be conducted through the tribute system, foreign states had few options. In the premodern age, when the concept of sovereignty did not take hold, accepting nominal Chinese dominance and the ceremonial trappings of the tribute system seemed a small price to pay for the huge benefits of trade. At times, foreign merchants eager to trade with China forged diplomatic letters, disguised themselves as tributary envoys and reaped handsome profits.14 The Chinese court paid for all the expenses of tributary envoys after they had entered Chinese territory, including traveling, lodging, and food, and it conferred luxurious goods as return gifts. In various occasions, the costs of entertaining tributary envoys were so high that China was forced to restrict the number and frequency of tributary missions. For instance, the Oirat Mongols normally sent a tributary mission of a few hundred men, but to gain more profits, the number surged to more than two thousand men in the 1440s. In 1448, they sent a tributary mission of 2,524 men but falsely exaggerated the number at 3,598. Upon learning this trickery, the Ming court reduced the return gifts to only one-fifth of those requested, which precipitated a major Mongol attack one year later.15 Profits from trade also prompted Japan, facing a domestic economic crisis, to reinstate and send a tributary mission to the Ming in 1453. One estimate puts the profit margin of Sino-Japanese trade at 500–600 percent, a return so lucrative that it led local factions in Japan to fight for the right to send “tributary” missions.16 For its part, the Ming court was not oblivious to the profit motives of tributary envoys. One official in the ministry of rite commented in 1529 that “when foreigners send tribute, they only have profits in mind.”17 The promise of tributary trade could also be used to reward or punish vassal states. Because of asymmetric dependence, China could use suspension of tributary relationships to discipline unruly states, a tool similar to what might be termed “economic sanctions” today. For instance, when the Mogul state of Turfan conquered Hami in the sixteenth century, the Ming court terminated Turfan tribute as punishment, cutting off the flow of trade. As one official explained, “The western vassals depend on China because tribute and

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trade support their lifelines. If we refuse tribute, they would not get the tea they desire and would become sick and swollen to death. They would not get the musk they desire; snakes and insects would poison their crops, leaving no harvest. Therefore, closing off tribute is like grasping the throat of the western vassals, sentencing them to the fate of death.”18 Although in most cases foreign states depended on China for trade, tributary trade was not always one-way. China sometimes needed foreign goods as well, such as gold, ginseng, and animal pelts. Faced with the threat of Mongol cavalry, for instance, the Ming dynasty imported strategic resources, especially horses for cavalry warfare, from tributary states such as Hami and Korea.19 A closer look at the tribute system reveals that, although economic and cultural considerations were at play, it was the threat of military force— implicit and explicit—that kept vassal states in line. Whenever not backed by military power, the system usually fell apart.20 As Wang Gungwu points out, “There could not surely be a stable [tribute] system without power, sustained power.”21 In the tribute system, those who accepted Chinese supremacy were granted tributary trade privileges; those who did not, notes Peter Perdue, “were defined as inhuman, therefore deserving extermination.” In the seemingly pacific tribute system, “the iron fist always was held in reserve behind the smooth ritual mask.”22 For example, in a letter dated 1397 to Srivijava in Southeast Asia, Ming Emperor Hongwu threatened invasion if the small state did not submit: “This petty little country, by daring to be willful and refusing to submit, seeks its own destruction.”23 Similarly, the threat of military force was evident in Ming China’s effort to bring Japan into the tribute system. In 1369, Japan’s Prince Kanenaga, apparently annoyed by the condescending tone of the diplomatic letter that showed Chinese superiority, imprisoned and executed some of the Chinese envoys sent by Emperor Hongwu to demand tribute. The Ming court threatened invasion but was reminded by the Japanese of the Mongols’ failed attempts to conquer Japan in 1281. A letter sent by Kanenaga in 1382 explicitly denied the legitimacy of Chinese dominance: “Now the world is the world’s world; it does not belong to a single ruler. . . . I heard that China has troops able to fight a war, but my small country also has plans of defense. . . . How could we kneel down and acknowledge Chinese overlordship!”24 In response, the Ming denied trade privileges. Eager to trade with the Ming, the shogun Yoshimitsu sent a mission in 1399 and addressed himself “your subject, the King of Japan.” Because this departed from Japanese tradition, his successor quickly repudiated the arrangement in 1411. Both governments, however, were not able to stop the flow of trade voyages and, as Warren Cohen points out, “retained the pretence that the voyages were

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official tribute missions signifying Japan’s acquiescence in China’s claim to hegemony.”25 The Ming tribute system also hit a snag with the powerful Timurid Empire of Central Asia (roughly in modern Iran and Afghanistan). The Muslim conqueror Timur (Tamerlane) was so annoyed by the Ming diplomatic letter treating him as a vassal that he decided to lead a full-scale invasion of China in 1404 to chastise the Chinese infidels. He died on his way, thus averting a potentially bloody conflict. His successor, Shahrukh Bahadur, sought to maintain good relations with the Ming. In contrast to Emperor Hongwu’s threat to invade Japan, Emperor Yongle, despite some initial bickering over diplomatic protocols, treated Shahrukh as “a fellow monarch.” This equal treatment perhaps reflected the power of the Timurid Empire and its long distance from China.26 Hence, the strong set up a tribute system for the weak to follow. Distant empires and secondary states with some power to defend themselves were able to keep their independence and remained on the outer rim of the tribute system. In Asian history, there were even times when China had to pay tribute to a more powerful state. As we saw in chapter 4, the weak Southern Song dynasty accepted its inferior status as a vassal state of the Jin Empire in 1138. Although the tribute system had a cultural component in Confucianism, its implementation and maintenance was a function of material power. Without the backing of power, the system usually became unsustainable.27 To sum up, the lesser states of East Asia submitted to Chinese overlordship for three reasons. First, it was an important form of trade, which was mostly forbidden outside the tributary framework. Second, Chinese recognition and investiture could boost the legitimacy of local rulers, a valuable political asset when there were rival contenders for the throne. Third, China served as the guarantor of security for the lesser states and could be called upon for military assistance.28 In terms of international relations theory, joining the tribute system was a strategy of getting on the bandwagon. Stephen Walt notes that “the weaker the state, the more likely it is to bandwagon rather than balance” and that states “will also be tempted to bandwagon when allies are simply unavailable.”29 His observation aptly applies to the Chinese tribute system. Tributary states lived next to the strongest power in East Asia and there were no other allies of significance that could be counted upon to balance Chinese power. Lesser states submitted to Chinese authority and accepted hierarchy because they did not have better alternatives. Relative weakness, geographic proximity and lack of a counterbalancing ally forced them to accept Chinese dominance.

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The rest of this chapter will examine the Ming’s relations with tributary states. I study four cases: the annexation of Vietnam (1407–1427), maritime expeditions (1405–1433), the debate over the recovery of Hami in Inner Asia (1473–1528), and the Sino-Japanese War over Korea (1592–1598). These cases were selected with several aims in mind. First, the timing and geographic location of each case vary considerably from each other. The maritime expeditions and annexation of Vietnam happened at a time when Chinese power reached its zenith, whereas the cases of Hami and Korea took place during Chinese relative decline in power. This variation in timing allows us to test for congruence between changes in relative power and the strategy selected. The broad scope in geographic location, including Ming relations with Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and Inner Asia, also increases variation in strategic contexts. Second, these cases provide variations on the dependent variable, thus avoiding the problem of selection bias. Three of the cases—Vietnam, Korea and, to a lesser extent, the maritime expeditions—involved the use of force, and one case, Hami, did not. This allows us to discern the conditions leading to the use and non-use of force. In addition, Chinese war aims expanded in Vietnam, but not in Korea, which enables us to test for the hypothesis that such expansion is contingent on the absence of military or systemic constraints. Third, the maritime expeditions and the Korean intervention should be easy cases for the Confucian explanation. The maritime expeditions have often been used to demonstrate the benevolence of Confucian culture, and the Korean case fit nicely with the Confucian counsel of “helping the invaded.” In contrast, Confucian pacifism would have difficulty in explaining the annexation of Vietnam and inaction in Hami. If structural realism succeeds in explaining all of them, the theory gains more credibility. Finally, by investigating four cases rather than a single, in-depth case study, we will likely lose some depth in the analysis. However, this loss in depth is compensated by gains in range. Each of the four tests is not definitive by itself, but when added together, they provide forceful evidence for structural realism.

ANNEXATION OF VIETNAM (1407–1427) Northern Vietnam, or Annam (called Annan in Ming times), was incorporated as a province of China called Jiaozhi during the Qin, Han, and Tang

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dynasties. In the tenth century, it became an independent kingdom, paying tribute to the Song dynasty in exchange for Chinese noninterference. The Mongol Yuan dynasty attempted invasions in the 1280s but was ultimately driven out. Vietnam was understandably proud of its ability to maintain independence despite living next door to a superpower. Wang Gungwu notes that Vietnam “had long been defiant about its right to be a southern empire equal to China” and was “proud of its record of survival against Mongolian coercion.”30 Vietnam’s desire to assert its autonomy, however, would become a source of tension during Ming times. During the reign of Emperor Hongwu, Vietnam’s Tran dynasty submitted to China and became a vassal state, receiving the title King of Annam. Vietnam was involved in continuous warfare with its southern neighbor, the Hinduized kingdom of Champa. As vassal states, both looked to China to resolve their disputes. Preoccupied with northern defenses, Emperor Hongwu took no actions other than issuing verbal admonitions asking both sides to stop fighting and respect each other’s territories. Vietnamese politics went through a series of usurpations. The Hongwu emperor had a difficult time discerning and recognizing the legitimate ruler, intermittently rejecting Vietnamese tribute missions, and was incensed when he found out he had been deceived by usurpers. At one point, he issued a threat of invasion but did not follow through.31 A RIGHTEOUS WAR TURNED TO CONQUEST

As Ming power grew, the situation began to change. In 1400, a court minister named Le Qui-ly (ca. 1335–1407) murdered the king and usurped the ruling Tran dynasty, killing most of the royal family. Le Qui-ly claimed to the Ming court that the Tran family had died out and that his son was a royal relative, and he requested Ming recognition and investiture. Lacking accurate information, the Ming court initially recognized Le’s son as the king of Annam. Then a Vietnamese refugee named Tran Thien-binh arrived at the Ming court and claimed to be a prince of the Tran house. A fact-finding mission was sent to Vietnam and confirmed Tran’s story. Tran was to be restored as king. Le confessed his usurpation and agreed to receive the new king. In 1406, the Ming sent an army escort of five thousand men to accompany Tran’s return to Vietnam. They were ambushed when they crossed the border, and Tran was killed. Enraged, Emperor Yongle decided to punish Le. With the deception of his father in mind and backed by overwhelming military might, the Ming emperor could not allow the treachery to continue.

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In many ways, the Vietnam campaign has the making of a righteous war in the Confucian sense.32 Usurpation of the throne, border troubles with China, and attempted conquest of neighboring Champa seemed to violate the sinocentric world order that Ming China had been trying to impose on East Asia.33 In keeping with the Confucian theory of just war, the Ming original war aim was to restore the Vietnamese royal family and then withdraw. In the instruction to his generals before departure, Yongle specified the political objective of this campaign: “When the criminal is captured, we will select a virtuous offspring of the Tran family as king. We will help him rule the place, and then withdraw our forces.”34 Apparently, the Ming court did not plan to annex Vietnam at this point. In 1406, a large expeditionary force—800,000 men, according to Ming records— was sent to punish Vietnam,35 a scale so large that it was comparable to the series of Mongolian campaigns years later. As a righteous force, Yongle admonished his troops not to destroy Vietnamese tombs and rice fields, not to plunder for wealth and women, and not to kill prisoners of war.36 The Vietnamese troops were no match for the Ming juggernaut and soon lost two capitals and other major towns of the Red River delta. The next year, the Ming army captured the usurper Le and his son and sent them to the Chinese capital of Nanjing. They were put in prison. Le Qui-ly was later exiled to Guangxi.37 According to Confucianism, once the political objective of a righteous war is accomplished, the invading forces should withdraw. Before sending out the mass army, the Chinese emperor declared that he would withdraw his forces once a new ruler was installed in Vietnam. Now that the Ming had occupied the country, however, its war aim expanded from punitive expedition to conquest. At the suggestion of Ming commander Zhang Fu, who argued that Vietnam had been a part of China since ancient times and would like to become a Chinese territory again, Emperor Yongle went ahead and annexed Vietnam as a Chinese province, establishing an administrative structure akin to inland provinces such as Guangxi and Yunnan. Attempts were made to assimilate the Vietnamese. The new province was named Jiaozhi, Vietnam’s ancient name in the Tang dynasty.38 The conquest of Vietnam paid off handsomely. As a result of the war, Ming China obtained 13.6 million piculs of grain, 230,590 elephants, horses and cattle, 8,677 ships, and 2.5 million military weapons. Ming records show that Vietnam had a population of about 3,120,000 and an unsinicized tribal population (manren) of 2,087,500.39 The acquired grains were substantial, almost equal to the amount of grain (14.4 million piculs) produced by Ming military

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colonies in 1407.40 The conquest was so lucrative that Emperor Yongle took pains to emphasize that he was motivated by a just cause, not greed: “I am for the welfare of all the people under heaven. How can I be warmongering and coveting the wealth of the land and people! But the rebellious criminals cannot go unpunished; the poor people cannot be unassisted.”41 At this time, the Mongols were embroiled in internecine conflicts. Although there were border raids, they were not yet a serious threat to the Ming.42 The Ming’s overwhelming military power enabled the country to embark on a program of expansion. Two years later, the Ming would launch a series of large-scale expeditions to attack the Mongols. By the time of the Vietnam conquest, the spectacular maritime expeditions led by Zheng He had already begun in 1405. Ming expansionism was at all-time high. THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW

Vietnam proved to be a hard place to administer. The Chinese conquest “ignored the strength of the historical traditions of Vietnamese independence and their hostility toward Chinese overlordship.”43 The Vietnamese resented Chinese rule and rebellions soon followed. At first, the Ming was able to subdue these rebellions by its preponderant military might; twice between 1408 and 1413, it sent armies to crush the insurrections.44 Vietnamese resistance notwithstanding, China was able to keep the territory for about two decades as a province. Nevertheless, constant rebellions developed into a financial and military burden on Ming resources.45 The costs of administering the new territory soared. One commander reported in 1421 that the Chinese armies in Vietnam suffered from the problem of insufficient supplies and that the hit-and-run tactics of the Vietnamese guerrillas had made it increasingly difficult to maintain Chinese positions there.46 The pressure to withdraw began to build up. Emperor Yongle died on the way of the last Mongolian campaign in 1424, followed by the brief reign of Emperor Hongxi (r. 1424–1426). In 1426, the new Chinese emperor Xuande (r. 1426–1435) began seriously contemplating withdrawing forces from Vietnam. He consulted his ministers, who were divided over the issue. One faction, led by the minister of personnel Jian Yi and the minister of revenue Xia Yuanji, argued that withdrawal would give up two decades of hard labor and damage China’s prestige abroad. They suggested that China should put in more efforts to suppress the rebellions. The other faction, led by grand secretaries Yang Shiqi and Yang Rong, favored withdrawal, citing historical precedents that Vietnam had historically been a

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liability when it was annexed in the Han dynasty. In a court meeting, Emperor Xuande alluded to Emperor Hongwu’s Ancestral Injunctions that the small countries on China’s borders should not be conquered because they would be too unruly to administer. He noted that the original intention of Emperor Yongle was to restore the legitimate Tran ruler, not to annex Vietnam as a province. But since Vietnam’s incorporation, “we used military forces every year in Jiaozhi. Many innocent people have been killed. The people of China were exhausted from running around.” He wanted to restore Vietnam as a tributary state.47 In another meeting with the two Yangs, Emperor Xuande referred to an ancient parallel of a righteous war in which, around the year 534 BCE, the state of Chu restored the state of Chen four years after having invaded the latter to punish a usurper. Xuande stated that withdrawal would allow the peoples of China and Vietnam to live peacefully. Yang Shiqi and Yang Rong agreed, adding that withdrawing Chinese troops would demonstrate the shining virtue of the Ming emperor.48 In the meantime, Vietnamese rebels led by Le Loi began large-scale frontal assaults on Chinese positions. The Chinese army was defeated and lost some twenty thousand to thirty thousand men. The Ming court dispatched reinforcements in late 1426, but suffered a crushing defeat and lost seventy thousand men. Before news of the second military reverses reached the Ming court, Le Loi had sent a letter asking for a truce. He claimed that he had located a descendant of the Tran royal family. If China granted Vietnam autonomy, he would acknowledge the Tran descendant as king. For the Ming court, the unexpected appearance of a member of the usurped Tran family provided a face-saving excuse for withdrawal. On November 16, 1427, Emperor Xuande summoned a meeting to discuss Le Loi’s request. Zhang Fu, the commander who conquered Vietnam in 1407, insisted on continuing the occupation: “Our officers and men have endured years of hardship to conquer [Vietnam]. This petition is a ruse by Le Loi. We should send more troops to wipe out the rebels.” Jian Yi and Xia Yuanji repeated their previous view that withdrawal would reveal Chinese weakness to the world. On the other hand, Yang Rong highlighted the strain of war and urged acceptance of Le Loi’s peace proposal: “We may turn disaster into good fortune. The suggestion to send in more troops should not be adopted.” Yang Shiqi suggested that the original plan of Emperor Yongle was not to annex Vietnam as a province, but to restore the Tran throne. The next day, the Chinese emperor announced his decision to withdraw from Vietnam. The Vietnamese rebel leader, Le Loi, however, double-crossed the Chinese. When Ming officials reached Vietnam to negotiate the armistice, Le Loi rebuffed them, claiming

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that the Tran descendant had died. Le Loi requested that he be recognized as king. Le Loi also refused to repatriate Chinese administrators and troops.49 Aware of Le Loi’s intrigue, the Ming emperor had no better alternative but to acquiesce, but he still refused to grant Le Loi the title of king. When Le Loi died in 1434, the Ming emperor finally granted his son the title of “King of Annam.” However, the Vietnamese kings continued to address themselves “emperors” within their country and established a mini-tribute system in Southeast Asia.50 The initial Vietnam campaign supports the just war theory of Confucian pacifism, but the subsequent conquest refutes it. Le Qui-Ly’s usurpation of the throne and his deception of the Ming court provided a just cause for China, the suzerain of the tribute system, to send an expeditionary force to restore the Tran house. But the Ming decision to annex Vietnam violated the Confucian principle. Our case study shows that the Ming war-aim expansion and the reluctant withdrawal from Vietnam support the power-based explanation of structural realism. Without military and systemic constraint, the Ming took advantage of the opportunity to increase power. However, the high cost of continuing the occupation finally compelled the Ming to withdraw from Vietnam. The Confucian precept of withdrawing after a righteous war offered a good face-saving justification, although it was already twenty years later. Emperor Xuande and the two Yangs all cited historical precedents in accordance with this Confucian principle. The fundamental cause of withdrawal, however, was the enormous financial burden and Chinese inability to suppress Vietnamese insurgences. Ming China weighed the costs and benefits of conducting further military campaigns and concluded that the costs outweighed the benefits. During the next century, Chinese influence in Southeast Asia went into a decline. The Ming conquest of Vietnam alarmed Southeast Asian states about Chinese expansionism. Chinese inability to crush Vietnamese resistance weakened its authority in the eyes of those states. A wasteful campaign from 1440 to 1449 in the small tribal state of Luchuan in northern Burma not only disrupted economies in the southwestern provinces but also further weakened Ming authority there.51 The Luchuan campaign, along with the more disastrous Tumu debacle later in 1449, severely weakened Ming capability and prestige. After 1449, “Ming China never again sent large armies to fight beyond its southern borders.”52 Sino-Vietnamese relations reverted to the rhetoric of tribute system. Vietnam acknowledged Chinese nominal superiority by accepting the tributary framework, while a weakened Ming contented itself in this face-saving

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arrangement. With the Ming no longer able to mediate, Vietnam eventually conquered its perennial rival Champa in 1471. Champa had pleaded for Ming assistance, but the weakened Ming was reluctant to send troops.53 The strain on the tribute system without the backing of power was in full view.

MARITIME EXPEDITIONS (1405–1433) Structural realism suggests that as a state gains more power, it will expand its political and economic interests abroad. Powerful states expand because they can.54 As the most powerful state in the system, Ming China not only dominated the Asian continent—incorporating the region of Yunnan into China, annexing Vietnam, and attacking the Mongols—but also projected overwhelming Chinese power across the ocean. As an outgrowth of its power, Ming China, being the “wealthiest and most populous economy on earth,”55 dispatched seven maritime expeditions during 1405–1433 to the “Western Ocean” (the maritime area west of Borneo extending to the Indian Ocean) that expanded its political and economic interests abroad.56 Led by the eunuch and military commander Zheng He, the Chinese armada sailed to Southeast Asia, India, and the Persian Gulf and went as far as presentday Somalia and Kenya in East Africa. The size of the fleets was unprecedented, larger than that of the Spanish Armada of 1588. Each expedition carried about 27,000 soldiers on 250 ships. The largest of the treasure ships (baochuan) was 440 feet long, dwarfing Christopher Columbus’s eightyfive-foot Santa Maria.57 These spectacular expeditions have become a powerful source of the revival of sea-power mentality among modern Chinese elites who wish to expand China’s maritime interests and relive the glories of the past.58 Chinese naval dominance was unprecedented in world history. As Joseph Needham writes in his highly acclaimed study of the history of Chinese science, “In its heyday, about +1420, the Ming navy probably outclassed that of any other Asian nation at any time in history, and would have been more than a match for that of any contemporary European State or even a combination of them.”59 At the height of Ming naval power, there were 3,500 ships in operation along the coast of China, 2,700 of which were warships that guarded the patrol stations on the coast and another 400 warships were stationed at the Xinjiangkou naval base near the early Ming capital of Nanjing. For overseas countries, “the very name of the Ming navy was sufficient to inspire awe” and sometimes forced their capitulation.60 The great size of

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MAP 6.1

1000 mi

0

Dhufar

1600 km

La’sa

0

Malindi

Mogadishu Brava

AFRICA

Aden

ARABIA

Jidda

Cochin Quilon

Calicut

Maldive Is

bay of bengal

indian ocean

Malacca

FIRST USE OF FORCE IN 1407

Palembang

S U M AT R A

Semudera

Lambri

THIRD USE OF FORCE IN 1415

Colombo

CEYLON

Ayutthaya

SIAM

gtz

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

TA I WA N

Fuzhou (Changle)

east china sea

J AVA

Surabaja

BORNEO

Qui Nhon

south china sea

n Ya

. eR

Nanjing Liujia Harbor

MING CHINA

.

VIETNAM BURMA (ANNAM)

Chittagong

Nagapattinam

INDIA

SECOND USE OF FORCE IN 1410

Laccadive Is

arabian sea

Hormuz

TIMURID EMPIRE

The Seven Voyages of Zheng He (1405-1433) Yel low R

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the Ming navy gave China the ability to land a large army across the ocean in small states it wished to dominate. Zheng He’s expeditions are often used to support Confucian pacifism and illustrate the benevolent nature of Chinese power.61 Many hold the view that China did not intend to conquer the overseas states but was merely interested in exploring unknown territories far away from home, promoting commerce and diplomatic relations, and demonstrating the benevolence of the Chinese emperor. In short, Zheng He and his fleets were peaceful explorers. Unlike the Europeans, China did not colonize or conquer the overseas territory it had visited. That China did not colonize the overseas countries does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the expeditions were peaceful. Overlooked in the prevailing view is the immense military power of the fleets. The Chinese armadas were backed by 26,803 soldiers, in addition to other support personnel (the number varied slightly in each expedition, but within the 27,000 range).62 It was the largest fleet ever witnessed at that time, comprising 250 ships, including about sixty outsized “treasure ships.”63 As Edward Dreyer points out, “The ability to conduct [military operations] was obviously perceived as necessary when the voyages were planned, and this fact refutes any interpretation of the voyages as essentially peaceful in character. Zheng He’s armada fought on only three occasions, but it overawed local authorities without fighting on many more.”64 THREE MILITARY OPERATIONS

Chinese history recorded at least three occasions of Zheng He’s using force. The three military operations received special attention in the biography of Zheng He in the official Ming Shi (Ming History) compiled by Qing historians, occupying more than one-third of the space.65 The two inscriptions in Liujia Harbor (near present-day Shanghai) and Changle (in Fujian), erected by Zheng He in 1431 before departing for the last voyage (1431–1433), also gave a salient place to the three military conflicts.66 The prominence given to the military operations in primary Chinese documents suggests that the use and threat of force was an important part of the maritime expeditions. First, in 1407 on his return from the first voyage (1405–07), Zheng He encountered Chinese “pirate” leader Chen Zuyi in Palembang (on the island of Sumatra in present-day Indonesia) who, according to the Veritable Records of the Ming, “pretended to submit but secretly plotted to engage and repel the imperial army.” Chen Zuyi had in 1406 sent his son to present tribute to

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the Ming court and was given paper currency in return. This action suggested that he was requesting Ming recognition of his leadership in Palembang. But Shi Jinqing, a local Chinese from Guangdong then residing in Palembang, informed Zheng He that Chen Zuyi was a pirate leader who had preyed on merchant ships in the area and harbored ill designs on the Chinese fleet. Zheng He listened to Shi’s warning and made preparations against a possible attack. When Chen Zuyi attacked with his forces, Zheng He fought and captured him, killing five thousand people and burning ten ships. Chen Zuyi was delivered to the imperial capital at Nanjing and “beheaded.” Shi Jinqing was awarded a cap and belt by Emperor Yongle and was appointed as pacification commissioner.67 Since the title was typically granted to the chieftains of aboriginal peoples on the Chinese borders, it implied a higher degree of Chinese rule than would be exercised over the ruler of a tributary state.68 Second, in the hardest-fought of the three campaigns, in 1410 the Chinese fleet captured the king of Ceylon, Alakeshvara (Alagakkonara), and delivered him to China for disobeying Ming authority. Ming record states that on Zheng He’s first voyage to Ceylon (today’s Sri Lanka), Alakeshvara “had been rude and disrespectful and intended to kill Zheng He”; the king had also intercepted and plundered tribute missionaries en route to and from China. When Zheng He arrived in Ceylon on the third voyage (1409–11), Alakeshvara lured him into the country, blocked his retreat route, and threatened to attack the Chinese fleet with more than fifty thousand troops if Zheng He did not turn over the precious cargoes on his ships. Zheng He fought back in a surprise attack with two thousand men on land, captured the king and his family, and brought them back to Nanjing. Ming officials asked that the king be executed but the emperor pardoned his life. He instructed that Alakeshvara be returned to Ceylon and a family relative be selected as the new king.69 Sinhalese accounts of the same incident, however, are quite different, telling a story about how they tricked Zheng He into capturing the wrong king. Alakeshvara, who met Zheng He upon his arrival in Ceylon, refused to pay tribute to China and erect the tablet brought by Zheng He to symbolize Chinese suzerainty. Zheng He returned in the third voyage to avenge this affront to the Ming Empire. Alakeshvara, who was actually a local chief, used Zheng He to depose the legitimate king, Vijaya Bahu VI, and seized the throne himself. When the Ming emperor returned Bahu VI, Alakeshvara murdered him upon arrival. To avenge his father’s death, Vijaya Bahu VI’s son killed Alakeshvara and became the new king, Sri Parakrama Bahu VI.70 Both the Chinese and Sinhalese accounts described the same event in sharply different ways. The Chinese painted the military operation as self-

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defense against the alleged Sinhalese plundering and attack, whereas the Sinhalese emphasized their refusal to submit to Chinese authority as the cause of conflict. Although existing documents do not provide enough evidence to evaluate the conflicting accounts, they do remind us of potential bias in the existing records. Third, in 1415 on the fourth voyage (1412–15), Zheng He fought and captured Sekandar, a rebel leader against Zain al-’Abidin, the king of Semudera in northern Sumatra, recognized by China. Sekandar was upset that the Ming envoy did not confer presents on him, thus rejecting his legitimacy, and “led several tens of thousands troops to attack the Imperial Army.” Zheng He led his troops as well as those of Semudera to fight Sekandar and pursued him to the state of Lambri, where he was captured along with his wife and children. Sekandar was sent to the Chinese capital and publicly executed.71 In a way, the Chinese fleet participated in a civil war and supported the ruler friendly to China. The result of this military operation reflected Chinese regional hegemony and affirmed Ming authority over the foreign states in the tribute system. In addition to actual use of force, Ming China also made threats to use naval power if lesser states disobeyed Chinese suzerainty. For example, the state of Majapahit on Java was divided between areas dominated by the East King and the West King. The Ming recognized both kings. A civil war broke out in 1401 and ended in 1406. The victor, the West King, attacked the personnel of a Chinese embassy en route to other tributary states, killing 710 Chinese who had landed in the rival territory of the East King. When Emperor Yongle was about to launch a punitive expedition in 1407, the West King dispatched an envoy to the Ming court begging forgiveness. The Chinese emperor noted that the East King was also recognized by the Ming and chastised the aggression of the West King. He demanded sixty thousand ounces of gold as compensation for the deceased Chinese and said bluntly that “failure to comply would draw a punitive expedition. What happened in Annam can serve as an example.”72 He was referring to the Ming’s invasion of Vietnam that had recently occurred. By this time, Zheng He’s second voyage was about to begin. Fearing Chinese invasion, the Javanese settled for one-sixth of the amount demanded.73 A second example is the Ming threat to attack Burma in 1409. The ruler of Burma tried to enlist the leader of Mubang to rebel against the Ming. Mubang reported the ruse to the Ming court. Emperor Yongle praised his loyalty, conferring three thousand ounces of gold and silk brocade and silk gauze. The Chinese emperor dispatched an envoy to Burma demanding

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repentance and admonished that if Burma did not change its ways, “I will send an admiral to invade from the ocean.”74 The historical accounts of what had transpired in the three military conflicts and other threats to use naval power were all drawn from Chinese documents; with a few exceptions, most non-Chinese sources are virtually nonexistent. But since the rare Sinhalese account of Zheng He’s capture of the king of Ceylon differed sharply from the Chinese version, some caution should be exercised in interpreting the events. The possibility that Chinese accounts were shaped to serve Chinese interests cannot be ruled out. What we can infer from these military operations is that the maritime expeditions were not peaceful exploration, but rather power projection activities designed to serve a political purpose—spreading the tribute system with China at the center.75 Through its overwhelming naval power, Ming China was able to discipline unruly political units unreachable by land, and overawe others into accepting Chinese supremacy. FORCE AND DIPLOMACY

Zheng He’s armadas served Chinese interests through a skillful combination of force and diplomacy. In many ways, the maritime expeditions performed a function akin to what Thomas Schelling called “compellence.” Compellence involves the deployment of military power to get an adversary to stop doing something (for example, threats to attack Burma from the sea in 1409) or start doing something (for example, submitting to Ming authority). Compellence, in Schelling’s words, “usually involves initiating an action . . . that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds.”76 It deftly combines diplomacy with the threat to use force: “To be coercive, violence has to been anticipated. And it has to be avoidable by accommodation. The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.”77 In the places the Chinese fleets had visited, backed by the “power to hurt,” China demanded their submission and acknowledgment of Chinese supremacy. In most cases, the demonstration of Chinese naval power was enough to inspire awe and force foreign countries into compliance with the norms of the tribute system. As Chinese historians of the Qing times suggested, “Those who did not submit were pacified by force.”78 The 27,000 soldiers of the Ming fleet, possibly equipped with firearms, were strong enough to overpower local potentates who commanded “seven or eight thousand” soldiers.79 Those who accepted Chinese supremacy were awarded with gold, silk, and other

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NUMBER OF CREW

NUMBER OF SHIPS*

China’s Seven Maritime Expeditions, 1405–1433 FARTHEST DESTINATION

27,550

ca. 250 (?)

ca. 250 (41+)

Hormuz (perhaps to Brava)

Mogadishu and Brava

Source: Edward L. Dreyer, Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405–1433 (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007).

* “Treasure ships” are in parentheses.

Seventh voyage (1431–33)

ca. 27,000

Sixth voyage (1421–22)

Malindi

ca. 27,000

Fifth voyage (1417–19)

ca. 250 (?)

Fought and captured Sekandar in Semudera

27,670 ca. 250 (63) Hormuz (or 28,560)

Calicut

Fourth voyage (1412–15)

249 (?)

Fought and captured the King of Ceylon

ca. 27,000

Fought and captured “pirate” chief Chen Zuyi in Palembang

MILITARY OPERATIONS

Third voyage (1409–11) ca. 27,000 ca. 250 (48) Calicut

Second voyage (1407–9)

First voyage (1405–7) 27,800 255 (62) Calicut



TABLE 6.1  Ming

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valuables, and became a Chinese vassal. Those who refused were invaded or forced to obey, their rulers captured and sometimes sent to China. Chinese fleets brought back innumerable treasures, spices, and rare animals, including giraffes (touted at the auspicious mythical animal qilin to flatter the emperor) from Africa. Hence, Zheng He’s expeditions were aimed at promoting the tribute system and projecting Chinese power across the sea. He made this purpose clear in an inscription that he erected in Liujia Harbor in 1431 to commemorate the voyages he had conducted: “When we arrived at the foreign countries, barbarian kings who resisted transformation [by Chinese civilization] and were not respectful we captured alive, and bandit soldiers who looted and plundered recklessly we exterminated. Because of this, the sea lanes became pure and peaceful, and foreign peoples could rely upon them and pursue their occupations in safety.”80 The amalgamation of force and diplomacy worked well for the Ming. As a result of this active promotion of the tribute system, the number of Ming tributary states rose to more than sixty.81 For Emperor Yongle, who usurped the throne from his nephew, this increase in tributary envoys presumably boosted his legitimacy, which might partly explain why he dispatched Zheng He abroad in the first place. When the expedition was suspended after the sixth voyage (1421–22), the number of foreign embassies that came to China declined as well—a clear indication that the overwhelming naval power of Zheng He’s fleets was the key to maintaining the tribute system. The drop in the number of tributary envoys to China prompted Emperor Xuande to order the seventh and what turned out to be the last expedition (1431–33) to spread the prestige of the Ming Empire. He instructed in the imperial edict carried by Zheng He to foreign states: “Everything was prosperous and new, but you foreign countries, distantly located beyond the sea, had not heard and did not know. For this reason, I specially sent Grand Eunuch Zheng He, Wang Jinghong and others, bearing the imperial edict, to go and instruct you.”82 In short, Zheng He’s expeditions had the effect of projecting Chinese power and bringing overseas states into the tribute system. As Edward Dreyer concludes, “Zheng He’s voyages were undertaken to force the states of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean to acknowledge the power and majesty of Ming China and its emperor.”83 The Chinese fleets, backed by a large number of forces, successfully established Chinese primacy in the states they had visited.84 The overseas states agreed to accept Chinese suzerainty and pay tribute to the Ming court. Since the early Ming restricted trade by privately owned ships and channeled legitimate forms of trade through the tribute

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system, foreign states had an incentive to enter the tribute system in order to trade with China. As the sole superpower in East Asia, China mediated several conflicts between Southeast Asian states.85 Chinese power and sphere of influence spread all across Southeast Asia, and to a lesser extent, across the Indian Ocean. These maritime expeditions stopped after 1433. The building of the new capital in Beijing (1402–1421), the construction of the Grand Canal to transfer grain to the north, and fiscal profligacy of the imperial court exacted a heavy toll on the Ming treasury. The regime suffered a fiscal crisis, making it unable to subsidize these expensive missions.86 Moreover, Confucian scholar-officials, who were traditionally against the acquisition of exotic things, opposed the extravagance of the expeditions as well as the influence of eunuchs in government.87 What is more important, there was a revival of Mongol power, requiring the Ming court to divert more resources to deal with the rising threat in the northern border. The Mongols kept putting military pressure on China’s continental borders, effectively pulling the seagoing Chinese back on the continent.88 Although there were intermittent cases of Japanese-Chinese piracy, no significant threat existed on the seaboard. Because China is a continental state, maritime expansion was plausible when there was relative peace on the land borders.89 Because the land frontier was insecure, China would have to divert resources from the coast in order to deal with the more pending problems on land. Consequently, Ming naval power went into a decline. Previously, the coast guard fleets took an offensive stance toward the wokou pirates (Japanese mixed with Chinese). The official Ming history Ming Shi recorded the doctrine in the following words: “The wokou come by sea and should be resisted at sea.”90 To implement this doctrine, the Ming constructed naval bases (zhai) far out at sea on offshore islands and stationed as many as five thousand men in some of them. As Ming power declined, these offshore bases were gradually pulled back during the reign of Emperor Zhengtong (r. 1436–1449). Thereafter, the Ming rarely sent out warships to sea; they were instead left to rot in port. The number of fleets plummeted. For example, the Zhejiang provincial fleet had an assigned strength of more than 700 ships; by 1440, less than half of that number was in service. By 1474, only 140 of the 400 ships of the Xinjiangkou fleet near Nanjing were seaworthy.91 The situation was similar for all of the guard stations along the coast. In the coastal provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian, recorded the Ming Shi, “the sea defenses deteriorated to the extent that, out of ten warships and patrol boats, only one or two were left.”92

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To sum up, Ming China launched the maritime expeditions as an outgrowth of its preponderant power and withdrew as a result of declining power. Shortage of funds, security entanglements on the northern border, and the opposition of Confucian officials to trade and to eunuch dominance of commercial activities contributed to the decision to pull back from the ocean.

HAMI: CHINA’S VASSAL ON THE WESTERN BORDER Inner Asia served as China’s gateway to the Western Regions (xiyu, literally referring to the areas west of China). Historically, China’s contacts with Persia, the Middle East, and Europe passed through the Silk Road here. The region was filled with oases and deserts, inhabited by nomadic people. It was China’s western flank as well as Mongolia’s. Because of its strategic importance, peoples from the steppe as well as from China have tried to dominate this region, with China prevailing in the long run. As Owen Lattimore observes, “The history of the Chinese in Central Asia . . . is a history of imperialism and conquest.”93 In the early Ming, preventing the Mongols from dominating the Western Regions was a vital concern of Emperor Hongwu. He sought to control, or maintain good relations with, the Uighur residents there. In 1372, the Ming established guards (wei) in the Uighur districts close to the Chinese border. In 1391, Chinese troops marched into Hami (Qomul), a major city-state in Uighuristan. Hami was located at the door of a strategically important corridor that connected China with Inner Asia. The objective of this campaign was to weaken Hami and to prevent it from being controlled by a hostile power. Shortly thereafter, Emperor Hongwu withdrew his troops because the supply line was overextended and it would be too costly to administer the area.94 As its power rose, Ming China was determined to dominate the region. As soon as Emperor Yongle assumed power, he dispatched an embassy to Hami. In response, the ruler of Hami, Engke Temur, sent a tributary mission to China. By then, Hami had become a Chinese protectorate. When Engke Temur was assassinated by the Eastern Mongols in 1405, the Ming emperor installed Toghto, who was related to the Hami royal family and had been reared at the Chinese court, as the new ruler of Hami. Toghto’s incompetent reign ended with his death in 1411. Nonetheless, Hami continued to maintain good relations with the Ming, providing intelligence about neighboring areas and facilitating the passage of tributary envoys to and from the Ming. As a suzerain, China came to Hami’s assistance when the Oirat Mongols raided the

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town. The tributary relations provided China with the much-needed horses for campaigning against the Mongols, as well as sheep, camels, sal ammoniac, and jade. In return, Hami was bestowed with Chinese paper money and silk.95 As a tributary state, Hami served as “a buffer zone” between China and potentially hostile Central Asians, thus “heightening China’s security.”96 LOSING CONTROL

Chinese dominance of Inner Asia began to be challenged as its power declined. The increasingly powerful Oirat Mongols, led by Esen, turned their eye on this important strategic region. Acquisition of Hami by the Mongols would put substantial military pressures on China’s western flank. From 1444 onward, Esen repeatedly raided the oasis town. As Hami’s suzerain, the Ming could do little to help, itself falling at the mercy of Esen in the disastrous battle of Tumu in 1449. Chinese military capability continued to decline. The real challenge to Chinese dominance came when the nearby Moghul state of Turfan grew in power by conquest. Its ruler, Sultan ‘Ali (d. 1478), based in the oasis town of Turfan, took control of a vast stretch of land in Central Asia. In 1473, ‘Ali invaded Hami and occupied the Uighur city. The Ming court discussed how to respond to the aggression of Turfan (a Ming tributary). The ministry of war argued that Hami had been the strategic throat to the various barbarians in the Western Regions. If China did not come to its rescue, several neighboring non-Chinese guards would be threatened by Turfan. Should that happen, China’s lines of defense on the western border would be all gone. The Ordos Mongols would take advantage of the Ming withdrawal, and China’s western frontier would be in jeopardy.97 The inability of China to rescue its vassal state was revealed in this invasion. In Turfan’s invasion of Hami, the Ming initially deferred the task of confronting Turfan to the non-Chinese guards nearby, asking them to send coalition forces to expel ‘Ali’s troops. The ministry of war explained, “Using barbarians against barbarians would benefit China.”98 Instead of sending Chinese troops, the Ming court dispatched vice commissioner-in-chief, Li Wen, to its western border Gansu to raise local troops in the non-Chinese guards of Chijin Mongols and Handong. When the troops were raised, Li Wen still failed to recover Hami. Now that the military option had failed, Emperor Xianzong told the Turfanese that if they withdrew from Hami and returned the king’s mother and the town’s golden seal, all their crimes would be forgiven. As an extra incentive, the Ming would confer handsome gifts on the Turfanese for their cooperation.99 The Turfanese ignored the Chinese

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emperor’s words, even though he went so far as to promise rewards for their aggressive acts against neighbor. Despite being Hami’s suzerain and having good strategic reason to protect it, the Ming state was not able to repel the aggression perpetrated by one tributary against another. Chinese failure to help its ally stemmed from the difficult strategic environment the Ming court faced at that time. In 1478, the court discussed again the issue of whether to dispatch Chinese troops to help recover Hami. Yu Zijun, the minister of war, and others expressed their reservations: To help the invaded and to continue the deceased are important matters of our state. Nevertheless, the inauspiciousness of armies and the danger of war are also very important. If our four corners had been pacified, we ought to help them. But now the northern barbarians [Mongols] are invading our border, and the southern barbarians have long been in revolt. The appropriation of military provisions has never been in rest. The first priority of governance since ancient times has always been China first; the barbarians come next.100

The emperor agreed and did not authorize the use of force, issuing only verbal support for Hami. The situation dragged on for years. Hami was left on its own. In 1482, Hami’s exiled leader, Han Shen, led his own force of 8,600 (assisted by 1,300 troops from non-Chinese guards) and successfully expelled the Turfanese and recovered Hami. Although not directly helping him, the Ming court praised Han Shen’s bravery. As a symbol of being the suzerain, the court bestowed gifts and honors on Han Shen, his followers, and the Chinese who had assisted him.101 Chinese behaviors were consistent with structural realism. The hard reality of power was crucial to the maintenance of the tribute system. As Chinese capability declined, it became increasingly difficult for China to protect its vassal states. Chinese resources were constrained by the Mongol threats and could not be diverted to its peripheral region in Inner Asia. Because the Ming was so preoccupied with protecting its homeland, it adopted a virtually handsoff policy in regard to the trouble of its vassal state Hami. Rather than having China provide the public goods of security, vassal states had to provide for their own security. Although the Confucian teaching of “helping the invaded and continuing the deceased” (xing mie guo, ji jue shi) was frequently mentioned in policy discussions, the policy outcome was constrained by a realistic assessment of China’s capability and strategic constraints.

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RESCUING HAMI

Turfan, though expelled from Hami, was still eager to expand into this key strategic area between China and Central Asia. In 1488, Sultan Ahmad, Turfan’s new leader, entered Hami, using a proposed marriage alliance with the city-state as a ruse, and assassinated its ruler, Han Shen. Once again Turfan occupied the city and rejected Chinese demands to withdraw. For its part, the Ming remained incapable of sending troops to rescue Hami. Ming officials, outraged by Turfan’s affront to Chinese authority, wanted to send troops to punish Turfan. Grand Secretary Liu Ji noted that Ahmad’s killing of the Ming-appointed Han Shen was “a criminal act of extreme insult to China.” Despite his Confucian training, he viewed the affront to Chinese authority worthy of extermination: “If we send a great general to lead our heroic armies to attack their caves and nests and exterminate their species, it would still not be too excessive according to human heart and the reason of Heaven.”102 But he knew the difficulty of launching a military strike, citing the drought in Shaanxi Province, which bordered Hami, and the Ming’s lack of capability to mount a punitive expedition.103 As the use of force was infeasible, the Ming court decided to try economic sanction by cutting off trade and tribute relations with Turfan, while keeping the threat of invasion. Turfan, apparently hurt by the economic sanction, withdrew from Hami in 1492. The Ming bestowed gold coins on Ahmad for his cooperation.104 The Ming court installed Shamba, a descendant of Hami’s royal family, as the new ruler of Hami. Ahmad, the Turfan leader, kidnapped him a year later. In response, the Chinese emperor Hongzhi (r. 1488–1505) dispatched two officials from the ministry of war to the border area of Gansu to plan for the recovery of Hami. They spent two years without any significant result. The Ming court punished their incompetence by imprisonment.105 Emperor Hongzhi then appointed Xu Jin as left assistant-in-chief to plan for the military action. Xu Jin proved more competent. He understood the military constraints that China was facing and proceeded to remove them. He bribed the non-Chinese guards of Handong and Chijin to gain their support in the campaign against Turfan, obtained accurate intelligence about the invasion route, negotiated a truce with the Oirat Mongols so that they would not attack Chinese northwestern frontiers, and made logistical arrangements for his armies. When he learned of a secret route to Hami, Xu Jin led his motley army of 2,300 Chinese and non-Chinese and recaptured Hami in 1495. Ahmad continued raiding the town.106

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The Ming court decided to take economic sanction to a higher level. At the suggestion of minister of war, Ma Wensheng, Emperor Hongzhi decided to put harsh economic pressure on Turfan by suspending all trade and tribute from Central Asia to China. The court hoped that by cutting off this lucrative trade, other non-Chinese nomads of the region would put pressure on Turfan to make peace. The policy worked. Turfan caved in, released Shamba, and returned the seal in 1497.107 Turfan’s withdrawal showed that the economic benefits arising from trade within the tribute system was a major reason vassal states agreed to acknowledge Chinese supremacy. For the next decade, Turfan still looked for opportunity to take control of Hami. By 1508, Turfan had dominated the surrounding areas. Its new leader, Mansur, occupied Hami in 1513.108 The Ming court, however, could no longer afford to send troops to such a far-off region. As chapter 5 points out, many of the military posts along the borders were operating at a fraction of its prescribed strength, leading the minister of war, Wang Qiong, to lament that during 1510–1515, some nine out of ten of his soldiers had deserted the military colonies. By this time, the Ming court could not “pursue the aggressive policies of the past”109 and had shifted to a defensive posture. To add more pressure on Turfan, the court cut off trade and tribute relations. With Hami firmly in its pocket, Turfan responded by raiding Chinese border guard of Shazhou in 1517, killing seven hundred Chinese soldiers and gradually moving east toward the Chinese border.110 As Ming Shi describes, “Thereafter, Hami was no longer recoverable. The threat had spread to Gansu.”111 DEBATE OVER THE RECOVERY OF HAMI

Over the next decades, the Ming court frequently debated whether to recover Hami or not. There were three options: dispatch Chinese armies to recover Hami, adopt a defensive posture on the border, or accommodate Turfan’s demands. Offensive campaigns were the preferred choice. Officials in the court expressed their wish to send a punitive expedition to recover Hami. But the Ming was simply unable to do it. After Turfan had occupied Shazhou in 1517, minister of war, Wang Qiong, observed that if the Ming redeployed troops from the border areas to attack the Turfanese, it would expose those areas to foreign attacks. Exacerbating the situation was that the soldiers and the people of the borders of Shaanxi and Gansu were already impoverished by drought. They might rebel if mobilized.112 Offensive campaign was thus ruled out. Accommodation was out of the question because it would further

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damage Chinese authority and prestige. Therefore, the Ming court instructed border commanders to adopt a defensive posture. The situation dragged on. The court repeatedly debated the issue of whether to reinstate trade and tribute relations with Turfan. As noted earlier, trade and tribute relations were quite lucrative for the nomads. Since the founding of the Ming dynasty, both Hami and Turfan have dispatched large tribute missions, usually more than one hundred envoys, to the Ming court. It was the only legal form of trade under Ming law. During a tributary mission, foreign merchants were permitted to trade for up to five days near the College of Interpreters (hui tong guang).113 Because of the asymmetric dependence in the tribute system, China could suspend tributary relations to exert pressure on the foreigners. Nonetheless, China was not strict in prohibiting trade and tribute relations, because it desired some of the foreign goods, especially horses.114 Hardliners criticized this wavering in policy and argued that allowing trade only made the Turfanese more aggressive toward China. In 1525, Chen Jiuchou, censor of Gansu, argued that permitting trade and tribute had aggravated the Ming’s border trouble with Turfan. Since the country’s military and financial situation precluded a punitive expedition, the best way was to shut off tributary relations and strengthen defense. Yang Yiqing, the minister of war, supported Chen’s recommendation. In a memorial submitted to the court in 1526, Yang suggested that unless Turfan returned Hami and Shazhou, trade and tributary relations would not be reinstated. Launching a military expedition would be too dangerous, not only because of the impoverished border areas but also because of a possible two-front war with the Mongols in the north. For the moment, China should rebuild defense and ensure the supply of military provisions. Emperor Jiajing (r. 1522–1567) agreed.115 Driven by economic interests, Turfan still dispatched missions to request trade and tribute. Like the Mongols, when their request was not granted, the Turfanese raided Chinese borders. The Ming court grew weary of the situation. Officials began to suggest abandoning Hami. In 1528, minister of justice, Hu Shining, submitted a memorial to the emperor suggesting that the Ming abandon the effort to recover Hami. He argued that even if the Ming installed a new ruler in Hami, it would not be able to protect it from Turfan invasion, as past experience had shown. If the Ming abandoned Hami, just like it had done earlier with Vietnam, then the country would no longer be exhausted by constant raids and extortions from Turfan. If Turfan stopped raiding Chinese borders, trade and tribute would be permitted; otherwise, they would be closed off.116

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This suggestion met resistance from hard-liners. One official from the Hanlin Academy, Huo Tao, argued that if the Ming abandoned Hami and accommodated Turfan’s request for tribute, it would whet the appetite of the Turfanese, who would raid farther east toward the Chinese border. Responding to officials who suggested that the famine in Shaanxi made military actions difficult, Huo Tao argued: “To protect Hami is to protect Gansu. To protect Gansu is to protect Shaanxi. If one says that because Hami is difficult to protect we should abandon it, then Gansu is also difficult to protect, should we abandon it as well?”117 Losing the strategic stronghold of Hami would wreak havoc on Chinese security, just as the Song dynasty’s loss of the Sixteen Prefectures had caused trouble. Wang Qiong, commander of Shaanxi’s three border areas, endorsed Huo Tao’s opinion. Emperor Jiajing ordered the ministry of war to study the pros and cons of the military expedition and make a suggestion. Hu Shining, now minister of war, replied that the recovery of Hami was not an urgent matter for the Ming. The benefits were few. Hami had been weakened by repeated invasions and was too distant, about five hundred miles from the closest border. Turfan would not be able to raid China from a far distance. What really threatened Gansu was not Turfanese but the Mongols, who were “the most valiant.” He proposed, “For now, we should allow trade and tribute as an expedient measure. The long-term solution is to have sufficient provision and solid defenses.”118 The Ming emperor concurred. In 1530, the Ming court accommodated Turfan’s demand for trade and tribute and stopped raising the Hami issue again.119 In effect, the Ming recognized Turfan’s de facto control of its previous protectorate of Hami. Thus, declining military power finally forced the Ming to adopt an accommodation strategy to appease the Turfanese. In 1529, censors Tang Ze and Liu Lian, who had gone to the border area, offered a dire assessment of Ming power. They noted that “we do not have the capability to shock [Turfan] with force”: “The prescribed strength of our army was empty and has not been replenished; the soldiers were not sufficient. As I looked over the military colonies, nine out of ten were deserted; there was not enough food. . . . To send a mass army . . . to recover the long-lost territory is like sending a sheep to the tiger.”120 Another official, Gui Er, corroborated their observation of the decrepit situation of the Ming military. Gui memorialized that the frontier soldiers were so poor and hungry that they “did not have enough cloth to wear and was always hungry; the horses were so emaciated that they could not even gallop; the weapons were so rusted that they could not even be used.” In the

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garrisons, only three to five thousand of the nominal ten thousand soldiers were left. A soldier was doing the job of two or three men. Even the two- or three-year-olds were helping out in order to get food.121 Thus, what prevented the Ming from launching offensive campaigns was insufficient military capability. The growing Mongol threat put additional constraints on the Ming’s offensive motivation. Structural realism predicts that in times of severe weakness, a state is more likely to accommodate the demands of its adversary. Ming behavior bore this out. Even when officials were advocating accommodation, they still stressed that when the Ming army had become strong at a later time, they should look for an opportunity to weaken the Turfanese. Virtually all officials memorialized that Turfan’s conquest of Hami must be punished by force, but most would quickly point out that the Ming lacked the military capability at the moment and should wait until it had regained strength. They also emphasized that the Mongol threat was the most pending security problem that required immediate attention. In many respects, the debate over the recovery of Hami was similar to the debate over the recovery Ordos discussed in chapter 5. Court discussions revealed an unambiguous preference for offensive campaigns to solve the security problem, but such an offensive inclination was constrained not by Confucian culture but by lack of military capability. Chinese use of force was a function of military capability. The early Ming dynasty was able to keep Hami as a vassal through superior military forces. From 1450s onward, declining capability made it increasingly difficult to maintain Hami as a vassal. Although the Ming sent military assistances and recovered Hami twice, Turfan would come in and retake Hami after the Ming had withdrawn. Hami was too far away from China’s borders and was difficult to defend. The Chinese were forced to abandon Hami and concentrated their efforts on dealing with the Mongols.

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1592–1598 A MODEL TRIBUTARY STATE

Of all the tributary states of China, Korea was arguably “a model Chinese tributary state.”122 The Koreans accepted Chinese suzerainty, adopted the Chinese calendar, frequently sent tributary missions to declare loyalty, used Chinese characters in official documents, and imported Confucian culture en masse. The tribute system served both well, providing security, commerce, and cultural transmission. In the words of Donald N. Clark, “The Koreans, by

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providing tribute and gestures of submission, bought security and autonomy by forestalling Chinese intervention. By paying tribute, Korean kings also purchased imperial legitimacy and support. For the Chinese, the tribute system meant that Korea would strive to act like a loyal vassal state, posing no threat and supporting Chinese security objectives in the area.”123 The early Ming’s relations with Korea were marred by a host of issues: disputes over Korean ties with the Mongols, the usurpation of the Korean court by General Yi Song-gye (1355–1405), who founded the Choson dynasty (1392–1910), and competition for influence over the Jurchens in Manchuria.124 After Emperor Yongle’s accession, bilateral relations began to thaw. Nevertheless, Korea paid a price for Chinese protection. The Ming court demanded human tribute—girls to serve in the imperial household and boys to serve as eunuchs—from Korea, and Ming envoys, some of whom were ethnic Korean eunuchs, assumed a condescending demeanor, even flogging Korean officials when their demands were not met. Fearing Chinese power, the Korean court dared not protest.125 After 1435, the practice of human tribute ended. Thereafter, Sino-Korean relations went into an amiable phase. Korea frequently sent tributary missions to the Ming court. What distinguished the Korean embassies from other tributary states was that the Koreans always brought back various Chinese books and literature.126 Because the Koreans admired and accepted the Confucian culture on a large scale, their envoys were considered civilized, and their seating arrangement in the Ming court was always the highest among the tributaries.127 JAPANESE INVASION

In 1590, the warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–1598) unified Japan and turned his eye to the Asian continent. He wanted to conquer China. As early as 1577, Hideyoshi said to his superior Oda Nobunaga that after Japan was unified he would lead an army to Korea and then conquer Ming China. In 1587, he said in a private letter to his wife, “It is my lifelong goal to annex China into our territory.”128 In 1590, Hideyoshi sent a letter to the king of Korea demanding assistance in his campaign to conquer China. The Korean court, embroiled in factional conflict, took Hideyoshi’s demand as a bluff and did not make precautionary preparations against Japanese invasion. Thus, the Korean court was caught off guard when the Japanese landed on Pusan in May 1592. The invasion force comprised 150,000 men. Within two months, the Japanese army occupied Seoul and Pyongyang. The Japanese, however, were not able to advance further because of an overextended

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supply line and rear-guard harassment by Korean militia. In addition, the Japanese navy suffered a disastrous blow in the Battle of Hansan Island in July 1592. The Korean navy under Admiral Yi Sun-sin routed Japanese vessels and blocked Hideyoshi’s attempt to supply his forces in Pyongyang by way of the Yellow Sea. Hideyoshi was forced to supply his troops through the treacherous land routes.129 The Korean king, Sonjo, fled to Uiju on the Yalu River, where he sent an envoy to the Ming court to request military assistance. At this time, Ming China was plagued by the problems of coastal piracy and Mongol rebellions in the northwest. There was not much force that could be deployed to the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the Ming court was divided over whether to send an army or not. A group of officials were opposed to dispatching troops. They argued that China should concentrate on defending its northeast.130 Nonetheless, the Ming court could not overlook the fall of Pyongyang and its impact on Chinese security. In addition, two Japanese vanguard divisions had reached the Yalu and Tumen Rivers in northeastern Korea.131 The security risk of inaction was too great to be ignored. Emperor Wanli decided to send Chinese troops to help the Koreans. Although Chinese decision to use force was in part motivated by Korea being a vassal state, the fundamental reason was strategic: Korea was a buffer state protecting the mainland, in the words of Ming officials, a “fence” (fanli). As Song Yingchang, the supreme commander of Ming troops in Korea, later argued, “[Hideyoshi’s] invasion of Korea was really aimed at China. Saving Korea is not just for the sake of a vassal state. Once Korea is consolidated, [our northeast] will be protected. Our capital will be as solid as the Tai Mountain.”132 Emperor Wanli commented: “We must send troops immediately to assist [Korea] lest we have border problems in the future.”133 CHINA CROSSES THE YALU

On the day the Japanese occupied Pyongyang, a small contingent of three thousand Chinese soldiers crossed the Yalu River on June 15, 1592. They were badly beaten at Pyongyang in August 1592. The Ming decided to mobilize the country for war. Emperor Wanli appointed a civil official, Song Yingchang, as the supreme commander. Once the Mongol rebellion in Ningxia on the northwestern frontier was pacified, the Ming redeployed the troops to the Korean peninsula. It dispatched an expeditionary force of 35,000–70,000 men and closed the seaports on the eastern coast to prevent Japanese attack from the sea.134 Emperor Wanli further decreed that an expeditionary army

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of 100,000 would be assembled “to retake Korea and eventually to invade Japan.”135 In January 1593, Chinese forces crossed the Yalu River and soon recovered Pyongyang. Sino-Korean forces continued to advance south until Japanese reinforcements stopped them at Seoul. The Chinese vanguard forces were routed. The main forces withdrew to Pyongyang.136 Meanwhile, Japanese forces also faced obstacles. The weather had become very cold. The supply lines were overextended, and Korean and Chinese agents burned a huge food depot. More than fifty thousand Japanese soldiers were lost in the war, or about one-third of the invasion force; most died from hunger, exhaustion, and cold.137 Hideyoshi decided to withdraw his forces to Pusan and fortified their positions along the southern tip of the Korean peninsula. A military stalemate had developed. China and Japan began peace negotiations. The negotiations, however, were bogged down because of the sharp division between both sides. Ming China demanded complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces; Japan wanted to keep the occupied territories as its own. The Ming court was divided on whether to continue the war or to make peace. Although the majority opposed the peace party’s proposal of granting the privilege of “investiture and tribute” on Japan, the Ming emperor decided to make peace for fear of the drain on the already difficult Ming treasury.138 He would invest Hideyoshi without granting tribute–that is, trade. The sinocentric notion of the tribute system inhibited the peace talks. The Ming court mistakenly thought that the Japanese had surrendered and wanted Chinese investiture as a vassal. The Chinese negotiator, Shen Weijing, was so fearful for his life that he did not report to the Ming court what the Japanese had really demanded: recognition of Japanese interests in Korea. The Japanese negotiator, Konishi Joan, accepted the Ming demand for withdrawal and the offer of investiture without authorization from Hideyoshi. What followed was “one of the greatest diplomatic blunders of all time.”139 When the Chinese envoy arrived in Japan in 1596 to invest Hideyoshi as “King of Japan,” Hideyoshi was so infuriated that he expelled the Ming envoy and threatened to kill Konishi. The Ming court had been blindsided by the traditional notion of the tribute system and misunderstood Japanese politics. Japan already had an emperor, who had no real power, at that time. Hideyoshi, the real power, had expected the partition of Korea, a Korean prince as hostage, and the marriage of a Ming princess to the Japanese emperor. Becoming a tribute-bearing vassal to the Ming court was not part of his demands.140 He decided to attack again.

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THE SECOND INVASION

Hideyoshi launched a second invasion in early 1597. He mobilized another 121,100 troops from Japan and landed them on the southern tip of the Korean peninsula to join another 20,000 Japanese forces that had fortified there since the first invasion.141 The Ming court responded by assembling 75,000 soldiers and sailors from all over China. Officials who had favored a peaceful settlement earlier were disgraced or punished. Unlike the first campaign that saw the fall of Pyongyang, the Japanese troops were stopped fifty miles south of Seoul. When Chinese reinforcements arrived, the fighting turned into a stalemate. At sea, the Chinese navy assisted the Korean navy in joint operations with land forces. Korean Admiral Yi Sun-sin blocked Japanese naval supply ships from heading toward the Yellow Sea at the naval Battle of Myongnyang in October 1597. With lines of communication in jeopardy, Japanese forces were forced to withdraw to the south as winter set in, building fortresses along the southern tip of the peninsula that extended along a line more than 120 miles long. Seeing that the position of their troops was untenable, the Japanese withdrew nearly half of their invading forces in the spring of 1598.142 As the war progressed, it became increasingly clear that the Japanese were nowhere near achieving their aim of conquering Korea, let alone the Chinese mainland. Hideyoshi died in September 1598. Many of his subordinates were tired of the war and decided to withdraw. The news of his death was kept secret so that his inner circle of advisors could arrange for complete withdrawal. In the meantime, Japanese beachheads in Ulsan and Sachon were under severe attacks by a large contingent of Chinese and Korean forces. The Japanese repelled and decimated the attacking army. The war ended with the Battle of Noryang in December 1598, when the Korean and Chinese navies attacked the withdrawing Japanese fleets. By 1599 Japanese forces had been completely withdrawn. Ming China won the Sino-Japanese War at a heavy price. It cost the treasury more than 7.8 million taels of silver, roughly equaling two years of the nation’s annual income.143 The war was a drain on the depleting treasury and diverted crucial resources from other pending internal and external problems. Near the end of the war, many officials were already advocating withdrawal. As the compilers of Ming History noted, the Ming had “lost hundreds of thousands of men, wasted millions of military expenditure. Yet China and Korea still had no odds of winning.”144 The war was exceptionally brutal; tens of thousands of innocent Koreans, including women and children, were slaughtered or mutilated.145 Furthermore, the war gave the Manchus an opportunity

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to increase power at the expense of the Ming, paving the road for their eventual conquest of China in 1644.146 The Sino-Japanese War in Korea contrasts with Ming abandonment of Hami six decades ago. Both were vassal states, but clearly the Ming placed a higher strategic value on Korea. Two factors explain their different treatment. First, during Turfan’s invasions of Hami, the Mongols still posed a serious security problem for the Ming, which could not afford a two-front war. In contrast, by the time Japan invaded Korea, the Ming had already made peace with the Mongols in 1571 (see chapter 5), removing the perennial threat on its northern frontier. The Ming state was in a better position to assist its vassal. Second, Japan was Ming China’s number two security threat that had to be dealt with. Japanese and homegrown piracy along the Chinese coast during the sixteenth century had been a serious security problem for the Ming court, making coastal defense a key issue in the making of national security policy.147 It came as no surprise that a Ming manual of war, Wu Bei Zhi (1617), ranked Japan as China’s second threat, after the Mongols.148 In other words, the presence of military and systemic constraints contributed to the Ming’s decision to abandon Hami, and the relative absence of which made the military intervention in Korea possible. Japanese invasion of the Korean peninsula posed a serious security problem for Ming China. Without Chinese military intervention, a hostile Japan could well have occupied Korea and put itself next to the Chinese border.149 As Mao Zedong would realize more than 350 years later in his decision to send troops to Korea in 1950, China found the prospect of a hostile power across the Yalu River highly threatening. The Ming adopted an expansive war aim in the Korean War; its stated objective was not just the restoration of the status quo in Korea but also included an invasion of Japan. Unlike the Vietnamese case, Chinese war aim did not expand in Korea. The Ming’s relative weakness put a military constraint on its political objective of the war. Ming China of the late sixteenth century was far less powerful than it was during the reign of Emperor Yongle. The Ming treasury suffered fiscal bankruptcy through much of the sixteenth century. From 1548 to 1617, military expenditures accounted for approximately 60 to 80 percent of the total disbursements of the central treasury.150 At the same time, the country was plagued by internal rebellions that required the Ming court to divert resources to suppress them. More than 80 percent of the Ming’s rebellions happened in the second half of the dynasty (1506–1644).151 Recall that the Ming was not able to dispatch a large amount of troops to Korea until the rebellions in Ningxia had been

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put down. In short, the inadequate military capability of the Ming precluded escalation of its war aims.

CONCLUSION The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that structural realism provides a better explanation of Chinese strategic behavior than Confucian pacifism does. The presence of the tribute system did not translate into peaceful interstate relations. Wars remained a recurring fact of life. The antimilitarism associated with Confucian culture failed to constrain Chinese leaders in their decision to use force or expand war aims. Consistent with structural realism, Ming China sought to dominate the Asian state system by maximizing relative power. Chinese grand strategy correlated with its rise and fall in power. As China grew more powerful, it became more expansionist. Chinese strategic interests expanded as far as resources allowed, both on the Asian continent and across the ocean. The Ming launched several large-scale attacks on the Mongols, invaded and conquered Vietnam, and expanded Chinese maritime interests to an unprecedented level. When Chinese power declined, the country shifted to a defensive posture, sometimes forced to abandon its vassal ally, such as Hami. As the preeminent power in Asia, Ming China practiced Confucian expansionism, establishing and spreading the tribute system to manage foreign relations and preserve dominance. Foreign states were drawn to the system by the lucrative economic incentives of trade and the fear of military coercion by the Ming. Within the tribute system, relations among states were not necessarily peaceful, as is often claimed by Confucian pacifism. Behind the facade of harmony and benevolence lay the iron fist of military force. The Ming invasion of Vietnam was carried out in the name of upholding the Confucian values associated with the tribute system, but the subsequent expansion of war aims to annex Vietnam cannot be explained by Confucian pacifism. As the regional hegemon, Ming China dispatched seven maritime expeditions to project power and spread the tribute system. Granted, unlike the Europeans, the Chinese armadas did not conquer overseas territories. But China was able to dictate the terms of acceptable behavior by virtue of its overwhelming power. Most overseas states were overawed into accepting the tribute system, and if they refused, military force was used to coerce them. That the three military operations conducted by Zheng He’s fleets were saliently noted in Chinese documents as well as in the two inscriptions erected in Liujia Harbor

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and Changle should give pause to the claim that the maritime expeditions were peaceful by nature. Confucian pacifism performed slightly better in the cases of Hami and Korea. Both fit the Confucian precept of “helping the invaded.” However, the decision-making process reveals that strategic considerations were more important than cultural motives. Hami was a strategic stronghold to the Western Regions, serving Chinese interests by facilitating the smooth flow of tributary embassies. When Turfan invaded and conquered Hami—both were Ming vassals, at least in name—the Ming attempted to help the victim, with limited success, but was eventually forced to abandon it due to insufficient capability and the looming Mongol threat. In contrast, Ming China sent more than 35,000 troops to Korea when Japan invaded the country in 1592. The invasion gravely threatened Ming security, since Japan posed a much bigger threat than Turfan did. The Ming could not afford to have Korea occupied by a hostile power. Because the Ming had accommodated the Mongols at the time of the Japanese invasion, it was able to send troops to rescue Korea. Confucian culture plays a supplementary role in understanding Chinese strategic behaviors. Structural realism predicts that powerful states will be expansionist, yet the theory remains underspecified as to the details of expansionist activities. Initiation of wars and acquisition of territory are typical of great power expansionism, yet not all great powers share the same repertoire of expansionist behaviors. In the case of China, Confucianism helps explain a particular type of Chinese expansionism—spreading the tribute system. According to Confucianism, when domestic governance is virtuous and benevolent, foreign states will naturally come to pay tribute to the sage king. Hence, the number of tributary embassies to the imperial court served as an important indicator of the virtue and legitimacy of the Chinese throne. This consideration motivated Emperor Yongle to dispatch the Chinese armadas to spread the tribute system (supported by large military forces) and bring back tributary envoys from as far as Africa. The drop in tributary embassies after the suspension of Zheng He’s fleets in 1422 prompted Emperor Xuande to dispatch the seventh fleet in 1431 to bring back more foreign envoys. In this way, Confucianism supplements the structural realist prediction that rising states will expand their political interests abroad.

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did not constrain Chinese use of force: China has been a practitioner of realpolitik for centuries, behaving much like other great powers have throughout world history. In general, China’s grand strategic choices were shaped by the country’s power position, with Chinese leaders having adopted an offensive posture when relatively strong and a defensive one when relatively weak. The historical record shows that Chinese leaders have been sensitive to the balance of power with their adversaries and adjusted military policy accordingly. What, then, are the implications of this study for understanding China’s strategic behavior today? What can we learn from the past? China’s security policy today rests in the context of a unipolar world dominated by the United States. Today’s Beijing asserts that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will staunchly adhere to a defensive grand strategy and follow the path of “peaceful development.” Is there a strategic logic underlying China’s “peaceful development” strategy? Can structural realism explain Beijing’s strategic choice?

CONFUCIAN CULTURE

THE HISTORICAL RECORD The pattern of Chinese security policy largely confirms the expectations of structural realism: Chinese leaders have preferred to use force to resolve external threats to China’s security, taken on a more offensive posture as the country’s power grew, and adopted expansive war aims in the absence of systemic or military constraints. Confucian culture did not constrain the leaders’ decisions to use force; in making such decisions, leaders have been mainly motivated by their assessment of the balance of power between China and its adversary. Central decision makers have looked for opportunities to increase

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power because they saw the accumulation of power as the best way to ensure national security. Thus the structure of power, not cultural preferences, was critical to understanding Chinese strategic choices. The popular belief that Confucian pacifism has guided China’s security policy is therefore a myth. There is little evidence of a preoccupation with defense in actual security policymaking. On the contrary, one observes a high level of belligerence toward the adversaries. Benjamin Schwartz writes about “muscular Confucianism,” a strand of ultraconservative and aggressive attitude among Chinese officials and Confucian literati toward Western influences in the late Qing dynasty, which can be traced back to the Song dynasty.1 Likewise, we observe a high level of aggressiveness in the SongMing period when court officials advocated an offensive crusade against the northern “barbarians” in the name of upholding Confucian values. The Song dynasty, considered weak by Chinese dynastic standards, sought to initiate offensive campaigns to destroy its archrivals, the Liao and the Jin. Court discussions reveal a clear preference for offense, but the Song leadership was constrained by lack of military capabilities. Military failures forced Song leaders to accommodate their more powerful adversary by offering bribes and tribute. Despite Song’s being the lesser state in the system, the Song emperors would at various times throughout the dynasty call for a court meeting to discuss plans of attack, but their offensive motivations were often checked by military weakness. Although the final policy outcome—defense and accommodation—would seem to support Confucian pacifism, a close look at the decision-making process reveals much more than simply looking at the outcome: top leaders still preferred offensive warfare. The noncoercive strategies selected by Song leaders were considered temporary measures to buy the time that would allow them to strengthen defenses and build up power before the next strike. When the Song leaders perceived a relative increase in power, either through internal balancing or a decline in an adversary’s power, they initiated war to weaken the adversary—for example, the attack on the Liao in 986 or the attack on the Jin in 1206. Contrary to the assertions that Confucian pacifism has guided China’s security policy, security through expansion was not anathema to Chinese leaders. During times of overwhelming strength, Chinese emperors have sought to expand the country’s political, military, and economic interests abroad. At the height of its power during the period from 1368 to 1449, the Ming Dynasty initiated twenty-nine military attacks against the Mongols, invaded and annexed the state of Vietnam, and dispatched seven large-scale maritime expeditions to project power to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. When

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Ming power was in relative decline after 1449, the country shifted to a defensive posture along the frontiers. The Great Wall—the symbol of Confucian pacifism—was built after the Ming dynasty had repeatedly failed to subjugate the Mongols through offensive campaigns. Before constructing the wall, the Ming emperors had wanted to use force to solve the Mongol problem once and for all, but they were constrained from doing so because Ming China lacked the military capability. Although the Great Wall was a defensive fortification, the military context surrounding its construction should be taken into consideration before one jumps to the conclusion that China has historically preferred defense and shunned offense. Three general themes emerge from this study. First, in accordance with realist expectations, Chinese decision makers frequently probed for weakness in the country’s adversaries and took advantage of it when found. They did not hesitate when an opportunity (such as leadership crisis in the adversary) to use force presented itself, all the while paying close attention to China’s capabilities in deciding whether to launch military strikes. Defense or accommodation was usually the result of insufficient military capabilities. Contrary to the proponents of Confucian pacifism, Imperial China was not reluctant to use force, and it did not see force as a last resort. Although the literature is laden with the idea that China had been pacifist in the use of force, there is little evidence in the historical record to support this claim. Like many countries in other parts of the world, Imperial China preferred to use force to solve security problems. Second, China’s level of coerciveness correlated with its relative power position. Chinese security policy was generally more coercive when China was in a stronger position and more accommodating when the country was weak. In times of strength, Imperial China adopted an offense-oriented strategy by attacking its adversaries or expanding interests abroad. In times of weakness, Chinese leaders sought to maintain a defensive posture in military deployment or to accommodate the demands of China’s adversaries, while embarking on domestic reforms aimed at strengthening the military forces and improving the economy. In policy debates, the central decision makers made it clear that these low-coercive policies were matters of expedience, ones necessary to provide the breathing space to improve China’s relative power position. Once China had become strong, it could launch a military strike. Third, Chinese war aims were not limited to defensive border protection or the restoration of the status quo ante. Offensive motivations, such as destruction of the adversary, total military victory, and acquisition of territories, were

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evident in policy debates as well as in actual behavior. When China was on the offensive, Chinese war aims expanded in the absence of systemic or military constraint.2 There was little “defensive-mindedness” in security policy. When China adopted a defensive posture, the decision was motivated not by a cultural preference for defense but by insufficient offensive capability. Civil and military officials still spoke of the need to go on the offensive and annihilate the enemies. But the weakness of China’s military power forced them to choose the less preferred strategy of defense or accommodation. Hence, the idea of “Chinese exceptionalism” appears overstated. Upon close examination, China’s policymaking on matters of security bore a striking semblance to the realpolitik behavior of other countries. On issues of war and peace, China was not much different, adopting an offensive posture when strong and shifting to a defensive one when weak. The historical record does not show a cultural preference for defense over offense. It is important to note that Chinese power politics was not rooted in culture, but rather in the anarchic structure of the international system in which no central authority existed to enforce order. The same structural context of anarchy in which China and other great powers in world history were situated accounted for much of the similarity in their strategic behaviors, despite their having different cultures.

THE ROOTS OF CHINESE REALPOLITIK The roots of realpolitik-related behaviors have been a prominent subject in security studies. Scholarly debates center on the levels of analysis.3 Firstimage scholars emphasize the role of individual leaders. According to this view, human nature and the psychology of leaders are largely responsible for causing states to pursue realpolitik or go to war. Second-image scholars trace the cause of realpolitik to the internal characteristics of states. Certain cultures or regime types are more susceptible to pursuit of power in disregard of ideals, ethics, norms, and morality. Third-image scholars focus on the structure of the system in which a state is situated and argue that anarchy forces a state to pursue realpolitik at the expense of other states. Structural concerns often override human nature or domestic traits. This study supports the structural view of realpolitik. Although Imperial China had an antimilitarist culture at the unit level, structural imperatives impelled the country to pursue power for security and to resort to military force in order to settle disputes with other political units in the system. In practice, the

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Chinese pursuit of power overrode the Confucian norms of benevolent statecraft. The structural imperatives of power were well understood in court debates over security issues. Fears of attacks by adversaries—be they Khitans, Jurchens, or Mongols—motivated top leaders to pursue power regardless of their ideological or cultural preferences. Military might was considered essential for national security. In fact, structural realism holds that all great powers behave this way. This structural view of realpolitik does not rule out the possibility that there could be nonstructural motives for conflict. For instance, nationalism, pursuit of glory, factional politics, or even revenge could lead a nation into war. Structural realism does not have much to say about these nonstructural causes, except that when these causes conflict with structural pressures the latter usually win out.4 In essence, structural causes carry more weight than unit-level factors. If, say, going to war to avenge being wronged would hurt a state’s power position, then the state would refrain from behaving aggressively; otherwise, that state would be worse off. Structure sets the parameters for plausible policies to be selected; actual outcomes may be determined by other factors. These nonstructural factors supplement but do not replace structural realism. As Kenneth Waltz argues, structures “shape and shove” states into behaving in a certain manner but do not determine how states will behave. States ignore structural pressures at their peril.5 It must be emphasized that nothing in this study suggests that Imperial China was inherently aggressive or culturally hardwired for hegemony. The main point is that the root of aggressive behavior lies in the anarchic structure of international politics, which forces states to pursue power regardless of their domestic politics, ideology, or culture. Imperial China might well have a peaceful culture, but the structural imperatives of anarchy overrode the peaceful inclination of Confucianism. Simply put, structural imperatives trumped Confucian culture. In many respects, the military policy of Imperial China bore much resemblance to that of the European countries. China is no exception to the structural logic of realpolitik. Although the idea of a pacifist tendency in Chinese use of force has been popular, there is little evidence to support the sui generis view.

HOW CONFUCIAN CULTURE SUPPLEMENTS STRUCTURAL REALISM It is a truism that no international relations theory can explain everything. Structural realism is no exception. The theory is good in explaining a state’s

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tendency toward certain types of behaviors, but there will be cases that a broad-gauged theory such as structural realism cannot explain. Other variables may have to be introduced to supplement realist explanation. This study argues that Imperial China has behaved in accordance with structural-realist expectations. Culture supplements, but does not supplant, structural realism. What role, then, did Confucianism play in China’s security policy? Michael Desch suggests three possible ways in which cultural theories might supplement structural realism: by explaining the lag between structural change and adjustments in state behavior, by accounting for the irrational behavior of some states, and by explaining structurally indeterminate situations.6 In the case of China, we may add a fourth way in which culture supplements realist theory: by providing culturally acceptable justification for military restraint. First, Confucianism explained the lag between structural change and adjustments in Chinese behavior. By most accounts, Ming power reached its nadir in the mid-sixteenth century. Structural realism predicts that the Ming would choose accommodative policies vis-à-vis the Mongols. As it turned out, the Ming court did accept the Mongol request for trade and tribute in 1551, but it quickly reversed course a few months later because of the opposition of Confucian scholar-officials. In their view, compromise with the enemies would damage the prestige and awesomeness of the Chinese throne. The sinocentrism of Confucian culture caused a lag between structural change and strategic adjustment. It would take another twenty years and a more deteriorated power position for the Ming to finally overcome the cultural resistance to compromise and accept the Mongol demands in the settlement of 1571. Second, Confucianism undermined Imperial China’s ability to adjust to structural pressures and impeded rational policymaking.7 The notion of suzerain-vassal hierarchy made it especially difficult for China to compromise when it should have. The result was suboptimal policies. For instance, both Song China and the Xi Xia faced the common threat of the more powerful Liao Empire. Balance-of-power logic suggests that China would ally with the Xi Xia, but the Song dynasty’s insistence on treating the Xi Xia as a vassal state made it virtually impossible for the alliance to take shape. Instead, the Song viewed the Xi Xia’s independence as a major affront to Chinese prestige and chose to launch punitive wars against it, opening the door for Liao extortion in 1041. Had the Song made an alliance with the Xi Xia, Song China’s security environment might have improved significantly. Similarly, the moralistic outlook of Confucianism hampered Ming China’s ability to accommodate the Mongol request for trade and tribute, forcing

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the latter to attack Chinese borders to get what they wanted. Had the Ming dynasty accommodated the Mongols, its northern borders might have been less ravaged by war. Third, Confucianism might account for Chinese strategic behavior in structurally indeterminate situations. Realists maintain that structure not only explains a good deal of state behavior and international outcomes but also sets limits on the range of strategic options. Realist theory uses a little to explain a lot. However, parsimony comes at a price. There will be situations that broad-gauged theories like structural realism cannot explain. For instance, realist theory predicts that balance of power will happen but cannot say when it will happen. As Waltz points out, the theory “deals with the pressures of structure on states and not with how states will respond to the pressures.”8 To answer how states will respond to structural pressures, we need more finegrained theories, such as those that employ domestic variables like culture.9 Additionally, structural realism predicts that rising states will expand political interests abroad, but the theory does not specify the type of expansionist activities a state may undertake. Conquest, initiation of wars, stationing troops abroad, or an activist foreign policy could all be elements of expansionism.10 Confucianism accounted for a unique type of Chinese expansion: spreading the tribute system. This Confucian expansionism could explain why Ming China did not conquer and colonize the states that its powerful naval fleets had visited, but chose to establish and enforce the tribute system—backed by strong military forces. Finally, Confucian pacifism supplements structural realism by providing a culturally acceptable justification for military restraint in times of relative weakness. Typically, when China was weak, officials would refer to Sun Zi’s adage that the best strategy was to subdue the enemy without fighting. They argued that offensive wars would bring disaster not only because of Chinese weakness but also because of the inauspiciousness of armies and the danger of war. The antimilitarist idea of Confucian strategic culture was used to justify low-coercive policies as well as non-use of force. Instead of offense, China should practice virtuous statecraft, rectify domestic politics, and adopt a defensive posture. Arguments for military constraint shrouded in Confucian pacifism were more palatable to war advocates and easier to sell. While making the case for military restraint, officials would point out that defense or accommodation were a short-term expedient to buy the time necessary for building up military capabilities. Once China had become powerful, it could solve the security problem by launching a military strike against adversaries. However, in times of military superiority, arguments invoking

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Confucian pacifism would become rare, and even when Confucian scholarofficials broached them, they would quickly be overruled.

CHINESE POWER POLITICS IN THE MODERN AGE Although this study focuses on Imperial China, its findings have important implications for understanding modern China’s security policy. Many China specialists have pointed out that the People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy has followed realist axioms. “China acts like a realist power on the world stage,” write Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross.11 In the words of Thomas Christensen, “China may well be the high church of realpolitik in the post–Cold War world.”12 Similarly, Avery Goldstein observes, “China’s contemporary leaders, like their predecessors in Imperial China, prize the practice of realpolitik.”13 Given that the structure of the international system remains anarchic, it is hardly surprising that Chinese strategic behavior has been consistent with the expectations of realist theory throughout the ages. The PRC’s alliance pattern illustrates balance-of-power logic. Threatened by the superior power of the United States, Mao Zedong proclaimed on June 30, 1949, that his future regime would “lean to one side.”14 The Sino-Soviet alliance was designed to counter the power of the stronger United States. Realpolitik-related concerns pulled both Beijing and Moscow together; ideological solidarity played a secondary role. In a detailed study of the Sino-Soviet alliance using declassified Chinese and Soviet archives, Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Litai Xue conclude that ideology played “a secondary role” in the Sino-Soviet alliance. “Ideological declarations could serve power politics, but not determine it. . . . [T]he ultimate concern on both sides was not class struggle, but state interests. . . . In the final analysis, realpolitik governed their thinking and strained their relations.”15 China’s subsequent rapprochement with the United States was also driven by balance-of-power logic. Moscow’s military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border posed a severe security problem for Beijing. Soviet military deployments in the Far East rose from about twelve divisions in 1961 to twentyfive in 1969, soaring to forty-five in 1973.16 Tensions escalated into a border clash at Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in 1969. At the same time, Washington became increasingly concerned about Soviet long-range missile buildups and rising military capabilities. China provided a regional counterweight to Soviet power. In the end, converging strategic interests led to President Nixon’s visit to China in 1971, opening the door for Sino-American cooperation. Real-

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politik guided Maoist China’s security policy; ideology barely affected the negotiations between Beijing and Washington. As Robert Ross points out in his study of Sino-American negotiations, “In matters of war and peace, alignment policy, and strategic cooperation, Mao was a realist.”17 Regarding the use of force, existing studies are consistent with the finding of this book—namely, that Confucian pacifism has little effect. In a study of Chinese use of force since 1949, Allen Whiting finds that seizing the initiative, preemptive attacks, and risk acceptance and management characterized the pattern of PLA deployment from 1950 to 1996.18 A study by the Rand Corporation argues that in a conflict situation the Chinese military would seek to achieve surprise in order to inflict a psychological shock.19 Thomas Christensen finds that preventive-war logic has guided Chinese use of force: “The PRC has used force most frequently when it perceived an opening window of vulnerability or a closing window of opportunity.”20 Rational cost-benefit calculation, not cultural consideration, was the main determinant of the PRC’s decisions to use force. The PRC has not adhered to strictly defensive war aims. Leaving aside militarized territorial conflicts in which the stakes were lower, China has fought two major wars since 1949: the Korean War (1950–1953) and the SinoVietnamese War (1979). China adopted expansive war aims in the Korean War, the most critical war of the regime’s history. Although Chinese intervention was motivated by defensive concerns, once China entered the war it pursued expansive war aims, calling for total victory and the expulsion of United Nations troops entirely from the Korean Peninsula. When about a quarter million Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River, the Chinese leaders led by Mao Zedong and Marshall Peng Dehuai were not simply committed to a defensive war to restore the status quo ante at the thirty-eighth parallel. Rather, Mao sought “total victory” and “total destruction of American forces in Korea.”21 In the October 2, 1950, telegraph to Stalin, Mao laid out China’s political objective in the war: “Annihilate and expel, within Korea, the invading forces of the United States and other countries.”22 The war aims remained unchanged until the Chinese forces met with military difficulties nine months later. Failures on the battleground forced Mao to contract his war aims and to accept the prewar status quo at the thirty-eighth parallel—reluctantly.23 Chinese war aims in the second major military conflict—the punitive war against Vietnam in 1979—were less expansive. Unlike the Korean War, Beijing was not aiming to destroy the Vietnamese army or to change the territorial status quo. Its main objective was geopolitical: to compel Vietnam to reverse its pro-Soviet behavior. However, Chinese use of force did not conform to

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the idea of “attack only after being attacked.” Beijing took the initiative in attacking Vietnam. It was alarmed by Vietnam’s alignment with the Soviet Union and the potential increase in Soviet military deployments near China’s southern border.24 Fear of encirclement prompted Beijing to take actions. To balance growing Vietnamese influence in Southeast Asia, Beijing supported the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 prompted Beijing to send troops across the border to “teach Vietnam a lesson.” In February 1979, China amassed 300,000 troops on the border and dispatched 80,000 of them into Vietnam. To Beijing’s chagrin, the Chinese troops performed poorly, suffering an estimated 25,000 casualties.25 Beijing failed to achieve its political objective of reversing Vietnam’s pro-Soviet tilt. Instead, Vietnam was drawn closer to Moscow after the war. The PLA’s severe loss would later become the catalyst for China’s military modernization in the 1980s. This brief survey of the PRC’s security policy supports the realist explanation. Although the PRC has been acting like a realist power since its founding in 1949, the ability of structural realism in explaining China’s post–Cold War behavior is being questioned today. Critics points out that at the turn of the twenty-first century, China’s foreign policy appears nonconfrontational yet proactive. Gone are the revolutionary rhetoric and revisionist behaviors of the Maoist era. Through the carefully crafted guideline of “peaceful development,” Beijing strives to reassure its neighbors of China’s benign intentions and to present a kinder, gentler image to the world. In contrast to the bellicosity of its earlier foreign policy, it seems that China is transforming itself into a “responsible great power” in the world. Beijing has adopted an activist diplomatic agenda, joining various international institutions. For these critics of realist theory, it seems that China has become more integrated into the international system and is beginning to show the characteristics of a status quo power.26 Through participation in international institutions, Chinese diplomats and strategists are being socialized into the norms of cooperation and appropriateness, even at the risk of damaging China’s relative power interests. China may not have forgone realpolitik completely, yet there is growing tension between realpolitik and idealpolitik in the thinking and practice of Chinese foreign policy.27 Can structural realism still explain China’s current approach? It is still premature to conclude that Chinese leaders have abandoned realpolitik in favor of idealpolitik. Whether recent changes in behavior are indications of an ongoing transformation toward idealpolitik or a tactical response to international pressures remains a debated subject. After all, one would be

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hard pressed to argue that centuries of Chinese realpolitik could be quickly replaced by a few decades of participation in international institutions. History is replete with periods of optimistic international outlook, only to be crushed by an unexpected turn of events (such as, for instance, the period leading up to World War I). On the issue of whether Chinese hard realpolitik can be replaced by soft idealpolitik, the jury is still out. What follows is an attempt to show that structural realism does a reasonably good job of explaining China’s recent strategic adjustment.

PURSUING POWER IN THE UNIPOLAR WORLD Power is the currency of international politics and the ultimate guarantor of security. Classical realist Hans Morgenthau defines interests in terms of power.28 In international politics, strong states are, in general, more capable of protecting themselves than are weak ones. For China, power is crucial to serving the nation’s vital interests, as summarized in various versions of China’s Defense White Papers: protecting the country from external threats; curbing separatism and preventing Taiwan from declaring de jure independence; and preserving domestic order and social stability.29 Without a strong foundation of power, it would be hard to protect these vital interests. For Chinese policymakers, China’s modern history offers the best lesson about the imperatives of power: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”30 The Qing dynasty’s relative weaknesses in the nineteenth century enabled the Western powers and Japan to encroach upon China’s sovereignty and territorial interests, resulting in the infamous “century of humiliation.” To free the country from further suffering, generations of Chinese leaders since the Opium War in 1839–1842 have endeavored to rebuild a powerful nation. They understood that in international politics weakness invites aggression, and strength begets security. The desire for a strong country was a major reason that Sun Yat-sen led the revolution to overthrow the incompetent Qing dynasty and establish the Republic of China in 1912. Later on, Chiang Kai-shek continued the agenda of building a strong China but was thwarted by the Japanese invasion. In 1949, Mao Zedong, emerging as the victor in the Chinese civil war, proudly proclaimed that the Chinese people would no longer tolerate foreign intrusions. It is hardly surprising that New China was a revisionist state bent on changing the balance of power in its favor. China’s century of humiliation demonstrated to the Communist leadership that power is the key to state survival.31 Thus, “strong country” (qiangguo)

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is a constant theme of contemporary Chinese statecraft and a deep-seated aspiration of the populace. The benefits of power are well understood in China. As Shi Yinhong, one of China’s leading experts of foreign affairs, notes, having the status of a strong power brings “confidence and dignity to billions of Chinese people, significantly reduces the likelihood of China being suppressed or bullied by today’s superpower, significantly alleviates the potential and actual threats posed by countries hostile to China, significantly helps China secure the cooperation and support of other countries (including other great powers) and more effectively maintain and pursue the international interests that China deserves.”32 In a nutshell, a powerful China will have a better chance of protecting national interests and preserving freedom of action in the world. China’s power aspiration, however, does not operate in a vacuum. It faces the international constraint of American preponderance. The international system became unipolar after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As the only superpower, the United States produces more than a quarter of the world’s total economic output and accounts for nearly half of the world’s total military expenditures. No other state in modern history has achieved such a preponderance of wealth, might, and influence. The overwhelming power enables Washington to set the boundaries of acceptable behavior in the world and to enforce them if necessary. Chinese strategists understand the extent to which American power could limit China’s international aspirations and activities. A reduction in the Sino-American power gap is not only desirable but also necessary: it would enhance China’s ability to protect its vital interests. As Hu Angang writes, China’s grand strategy is aimed at “significantly reducing the relative gap in comprehensive national power with the United States.”33Concerns over relative power are at the heart of China’s grand strategy. Currently, China appears to adopt a defensive grand strategy and has gone to great lengths to stress that its security policy is “purely defensive in nature.”34 This strategic choice reflects China’s relative power position. A large power gap exists between the United States and China. Table 7.1 shows a snapshot of the U.S.-China power gap in 2007. Though it is a crude measure, the United States enjoys a substantial lead in economic output and military spending. As we have seen in previous chapters, Chinese strategic choice is a function of relative power: China adopts a defensive/accommodationist grand strategy during periods of relative weakness and an offensive one during periods of relative strength. China’s current emphasis on defensive strategy correlates with its weaker power position in the system.

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TABLE 7.1  The

Power Structure of the United States and China (2007)

GDP ($TRILLION) United States China

MILITARY EXPENDITURES ($BILLION)

13.81 (25%)*

547 (45%)

3.28 (6%)

58.3 (5%)

* The world percentage is in parentheses. Source: GDP figures are from World Bank, World Development Indicators Online. Military spending figures are from SIPRI Yearbook 2008.

U.S.-CHINA SECURITY COMPETITION As the predominant power in the world, the United States has kept a close watch on the rise of a potential hegemon and has made it clear that the Asian balance of power must be maintained. Washington believes that its security interests will be best served by not allowing another power to dominate Asia (or Europe). At the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon secretly drafted a new grand strategy in 1992 designed to preserve U.S. hegemony by “precluding the emergence of any future global competitor.”35 Although the Clinton administration subsequently toned town the rhetoric and chose softer language such as “leadership,” the policy was reaffirmed in the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002: “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.”36 Preserving regional balance of power and preventing the rise of a dominant state in Eurasia has been a fundamental goal of American security strategy since World War I. Melvyn Leffler, in a detailed study of archival evidence, concludes, “From the closing days of World War II, American defense officials believed that they could not allow any prospective adversary to control the Eurasian land mass. This was the lesson taught by the two world wars. Strategic thinkers and military analysts insisted that any power or powers attempting to dominate Eurasia must be regarded as potentially hostile to the United States.”37 Prominent U.S strategy thinkers share the goal of preserving global dominance and preventing the rise of a regional hegemon. Joseph S. Nye, former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, argues that maintaining regional stability and “deterring the rise of hegemonic forces” constitutes the rationale for stationing American troops in

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East Asia.38 Samuel Huntington avers, “A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder.”39 Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger emphasizes that “it is in the American national interest to resist the effort of any power to dominate Asia.”40 China’s growing power has the potential to challenge existing American policy as well as the current configuration of power in Asia. This “structural contradiction” is well recognized by most Chinese analysts, who see the United States as determined to maintain its dominant position in Asia and the Pacific and to constrain China’s rise.41 Although disagreement exists over whether Chinese and American strategic objectives might be compatible, most Chinese analysts acknowledge that Washington sees China as the main strategic competitor. From the Chinese standpoint, “the United States sees China as the potential threat and strategic adversary in the 21st century.”42 China has become the “main adversary” (zhuyao duishou) in America’s Asia strategy because “China’s rise will bring structural challenge to American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.”43 Uncertainty about each other’s intentions is driving the security dilemma between the United States and China. Each side sees its actions as defensive but views the other’s as threatening. The United States sees its forward military presence in Asia as conducive to peace and prosperity in the region, but China is apprehensive about American “hegemonic behavior” in Asia and elsewhere. Similarly, the Chinese government goes to great lengths to emphasize that China’s military modernization is defensive in nature, but the United States (as well as China’s neighbors) is not so sure about Beijing’s intentions. This skepticism is evident in the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review, published in 2006: “Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies.”44 Although most Americans perceive their power to be benign, China’s view is starkly different. As Yang Jiemian, one of China’s leading America watchers, writes, “China obviously does not pose a threat to the United States, but the United States poses a certain threat to the security of China’s core national interests [e.g., sovereignty and socio-political stability].”45 There is near-consensus among Chinese commentators that in the aftermath of the Cold War the United States is determined to pursue a policy of “sole hegemony” (du ba) and to build a unipolar world to its liking.46 China’s rise will challenge the dominant position of the United States, which in turn will strive to preserve its dominance by constraining China. The competitive dynamic of international

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anarchy is generating fear of American power for the Chinese. As Wang Jisi, one of China’s foremost foreign affairs analysts, frankly remarks, “the United States poses the biggest external security threat to China.”47 U.S. diplomatic and military actions along China’s periphery after the end of the Cold War had the effect of increasing China’s fear of American power and strategic encirclement. Washington strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance and encouraged Japan to expand its military capabilities and assume a larger role in regional affairs.48 Washington is also strengthening its own forward military presence by redeploying troops from Europe to East Asia and stationing nuclear-powered submarines and long-range bombers at Guam. The enhanced maritime forward presence gives the United States “the power to blockade mainland ports in the event of war,” and the increased air power at Guam will permit U.S. aircraft to “target Chinese military and civilian assets while remaining out of range of China’s air defenses.”49 In Central Asia, the United States has established a military presence to prosecute the post–9/11 war on terrorism. In South Asia, Washington has accepted India’s nuclear status and moved to strengthen ties with this “key strategic partner.”50 Of all the issues in Sino-American relations, Beijing considers Taiwan to be the most important and potentially disruptive. Beijing charges that Washington’s military ties with Taiwan are emboldening the island to pursue de jure independence, and are thus damaging to China’s vital interest. The view that Washington is using Taiwan to constrain China is widespread among Chinese leaders. As former vice premier and top diplomat Qian Qichen notes in his memoir, “Supporting the Taiwan authority and promoting [the strategy of] ‘using Taiwan against China’ has been the established policy of the various administrations of the United States.”51 U.S. policymakers will likely disagree with Qian’s assertion, but that is how the Chinese leadership perceived American policy toward the Taiwan Strait. The provision of defensive armaments to Taiwan has not ameliorated the security dilemma in the Taiwan Strait, but it is instead seen by Beijing as threatening to Chinese national interests.52 To sum up, China and the United States are engaged in a competition for relative power. The United States wishes to maintain its predominant position in international politics, whereas China wants to narrow the power gap by maximizing its relative power. Although the pursuit of power is high on Beijing’s agenda, the United States presents the primary constraint on China’s power aspirations. The crucial strategic question for Beijing is this: Given the unipolar structure of power, how does China maximize its relative power without drawing a strong response from the United States? Such a strategy must entail increasing economic and military capabilities and at the same

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time minimizing international concerns over China’s rising power. Beijing needs to find a way to survive, and thrive, under the power structure of American hegemony and push for an end to unipolarity.

THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT One of the central tenets of structural realism is that the distribution of power (polarity) will have a profound impact on the likelihood of war as well as state behavior.53 Given the unipolar distribution of power, prudence dictates that China should not invite the “focused enmity” of the United States, such as by forming a military alliance with other states. As William Wohlforth points out, the coordination problem of forming a counterbalancing coalition against an offshore unipolar leader would be especially difficult to overcome.54 Because the United States enjoys supremacy in almost every dimension of power (including military, economic, and technological), China should avoid policies that directly confront the United States. In a unipolar world, China has strong incentives to stay out of the strategic spotlight of the United States and concentrate on internal efforts to strengthen its power base. A stable external environment would give China the much-needed time to offset the power gap with the United States gradually. To counterbalance American power, Beijing is pursuing a two-pronged strategy. The first prong is a self-strengthening strategy that emphasizes internal efforts to enhance power by finding an optimal mix between accelerated economic growth and military modernization. This is essentially an internal balancing strategy designed to maximize China’s relative power and shrink the power gap with the United States. The second prong is an external strategy that stresses proactive diplomacy to create and maintain a stable external environment. This diplomatic offensive calls for extensive participation in multilateral institutions, forging bilateral partnerships, and engaging in economic diplomacy to gain international clout for China. The gist of this grand strategy is well captured in the official policy theme of “peaceful development” (heping fazhan): Beijing wishes to maintain a peaceful external environment that is most amenable to the development of China’s comprehensive national power. An outright, hard balancing effort would likely provoke an active U.S. response (such as containment), which would not serve China’s interests. Adopting a strategy of peaceful development, on the other hand, promises to increase Chinese power but also ameliorate international concerns about China’s rising power and discredit

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the “China threat theory.”55 Hence, peaceful development is a strategy of smart balancing. Because hard, external balancing is difficult in a unipolar world, the primary means that Beijing is employing to close the power gap with the United States is through internal efforts to increase China’s capabilities.56 Whether China will be able to rise to the rank of “world great power” will ultimately depend on its economic wealth, technological prowess, and military might. Accordingly, Beijing is setting economic development as its principal task, and in the meantime it is embarking upon a military modernization program with an emphasis on asymmetric capabilities—a program that is designed to enable China to prevail, or to hold its own, in the event of conflict with the United States. The Chinese leadership fears that if it were to place too much emphasis on military modernization, the country would follow the doomed footsteps of the Soviet Union. This well-calibrated strategy seeks to find an optimal balance between “guns” and “butter.” As the 2008 China Defense White Paper makes clear, by coordinating economic development and national defense, Beijing “strikes a balance between enriching the country and strengthening the military.”57 THE PRIMACY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Strategic concerns motivated China’s emphasis on economic development. In a famous talk with leading members of the Central Committee in 1990, senior leader Deng Xiaoping instructed: “If China wants to withstand the pressure of hegemonism and power politics and to uphold the socialist system, it is crucial for us to achieve rapid economic growth and to carry out our development strategy.”58 The Chinese leadership has taken this dictum to heart, setting economic development as the primary goal of statecraft. In the post–Cold War period, economic development can help the Communist Party stay in power and can serve as a foundation of national security. China’s ability to protect its vital security interests ultimately rests on its military might, which in turn rests on economic wealth.59 This privileging of economic development serves the long-term purpose of offsetting China’s power gap with the United States. The collapse of the Soviet Union offers Beijing a sobering lesson about the adverse consequences of prioritizing the military and distorting economic infrastructure: China should maintain an optimal balance between economic development and military modernization.60 As China’s rise requires minimizing concerns over its newfound capabilities and military posture

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in Asia, assigning priority to economic issues is less likely to alert neighbors and trigger counterbalancing efforts than embracing a Soviet-style military modernization that aims to surpass the armaments of the other superpower.61 Consequently, Chinese leaders have been at pains to stress that China’s rise presents tremendous economic opportunities, not military threats. International reasons aside, there is also a domestic consideration. Economic development not only can increase China’s potential power but also can bring political benefits to the communist leadership in Beijing: Making the country prosperous will earn legitimacy for the Communist Party and help it stay in power. The regime has taken credit for feeding 1.3 billion people and turning China from an economic backwater into an economic powerhouse, and frequently sets goals to continue and accelerate this growth. For instance, China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan, passed in 2005 by the National People’s Congress, aimed to double the country’s 2000 per capita GDP by 2010 and to have an overall GDP of U.S.$4 trillion (China’s GDP easily surpassed the $4 trillion target in 2008). In order to meet these objectives, Beijing must solve a host of domestic governance problems—rural poverty, the coastal-interior development gap, income inequality, the reform of state-owned enterprises, and corruption, to name just a few.62 This daunting task is not to be taken lightly. As Zheng Bijian, the architect of the “peaceful rise theory,” repeatedly emphasized, “China has a population of 1.3 billion. Any small difficulty in its economic or social development, spread over this vast group, could become a huge problem.”63 Hence, Beijing has every incentive to stress the peaceful aspect of its foreign policy: it cannot afford an unstable international environment. By emphasizing economic development and the trade and investment opportunities China presents to the outside world, and at the same time downplaying its military might, Beijing hopes to alleviate regional fears of China’s rising power.64 Economic development is the aspect of Beijing’s security strategy that has been most successful to date. The economic gap between China and the United States is gradually shrinking. In 1979, the year Deng Xiaoping started the “reform and opening up” policy, the size of the U.S. economy was approximately 31.5 times that of China’s. In 2002, the size of the U.S. economy ($9.22 trillion) was 7.6 times larger than China’s ($1.21 trillion). In 2007, the size of the U.S. economy ($13.8 trillion) was only 4.2 times larger than that of China’s ($3.28 trillion).65 That same year, China surpassed Germany as the world’s third-largest economy, behind the United States and Japan. The economic gap is expected to shrink further if China sustains its rapid growth rate. By some measures, China has surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest economy.

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MILITARY MODERNIZATION

China’s military modernization fits into the concept of hard (internal) balancing, an area that has aroused the most concerns in the region. Official defense expenditures have seen a double-digit increase every year since 1989 (14.5 percent per year on average), reaching $70 billion in 2009, a 14.9 percent rise over the previous year.66 China’s defense spending is growing faster than its economy. A Pentagon analysis reveals that China’s officially disclosed defense budget from the period of 1996 to 2008 grew at an average of 12.9 percent in real terms, outpacing the rate of GDP growth at 9.6 percent.67 This analysis is consistent with the consensus among China watchers that the country’s defense spending since the 1990s has increased at a rate that “substantially exceeds” economic growth.68 China’s 2008 Defense White Paper admits this trend, noting that, from 1998 to 2007, “the average annual increase of defense expenditure was 15.9 percent, while that of GDP was 12.5 percent.”69 Due to issues of transparency and accounting method, China’s actual defense spending is believed to be two to three times above the official figure, making it the third-largest military spender in the world. These figures, however, should be interpreted with caution. Chinese defense expenditures, though rising, remain a fraction of the U.S. defense budget, which stands at $515.4 billion in 2009. China’s official defense budget accounts for about 1.4 percent of its GDP; when adjusted for extrabudgetary revenue allocated to the PLA, China spends roughly the same percentage of GDP on defense as the United States does—about 3–5 percent. In contrast, the former Soviet Union spent as much as 20 percent of its GDP on defense. Given the growing size of the Chinese economy, Beijing could have allocated more money to defense.70 Nonetheless, Chinese leaders recognize “the danger of investing too much in military modernization too early in its own development process.”71 As noted earlier, Beijing strives to find an optimal balance between economic development and military modernization so that its efforts to increase defense capabilities do not jeopardize economic growth on the one hand and do not cause excessive alarm in the United States on the other. An all-out effort by Beijing to increase China’s military capabilities would not only provoke a counterbalancing effort by neighbors but also risk distorting the country’s economic structure, as the experience of the Soviet Union has demonstrated. Much of China’s military buildup is geared toward balancing American power, particularly in a conflict over Taiwan. Such a balancing motive is evident in the PLA’s acquisition of advanced air, naval, and missile capabilities to

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achieve local access denial. Beijing has intensified efforts to procure the military capabilities to deter Taiwan from declaring de jure independence and to counter U.S. efforts to assist Taiwan should conflict erupt. The PLA has demonstrated capacity to interdict U.S. satellite communications by successfully testing a direct ascent antisatellite (ASAT) weapon in January 2007. Chinese submarines and surface warships were able to maneuver in close proximity to U.S. aircraft carriers without being detected. These advances raise questions about the U.S ability to respond in a Taiwan crisis in a timely manner.72 The Chinese military is acquiring medium-range ballistic missiles, an extensive C4ISR (command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) system, advanced submarines, antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and precision-strike aircraft. Through this “multiple layers of offensive systems utilizing sea, air, space, and cyber-space,” China aims to deter or disrupt potential U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait.73 The long-term effects of the PLA’s increased capabilities, however, go beyond the Taiwan Strait. After all, military capabilities in the Taiwan theater can be reconfigured for other contingencies. Beijing has begun to place “a greater emphasis on acquiring more ambitious power projection capabilities beyond Taiwan.”74 Presumably, China’s advanced weaponry can be redeployed for other regional contingencies not involving Taiwan.75 The PLA’s airborne early warning and aerial-refueling programs will extend its air power into the South China Sea. In fact, some of China’s military planners have proposed a larger military role well beyond contingencies in the Taiwan Strait. In an interview conducted in March 2005, General Wen Zongren, then political commissar of the Academy of Military Science, laid out a strategic (not nationalistic) view of why China must acquire Taiwan: controlling the island is of “far reaching significance to breaking international forces’ blockade against China’s maritime security. . . . Only when we break this blockade shall we be able to talk about China’s rise. . . . [T]o rise suddenly, China must pass through oceans and go out of the oceans in its future development.”76 Such a view may not represent the dominant thinking in the PLA, but it is indicative of the Chinese military’s need to think beyond Taiwan. As to doctrinal development, PLA theorists have scrutinized U.S. military operations after the Cold War. The PLA has studied the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War and adapted its doctrine to “local war under high-technology conditions.” The NATO-led Kosovo campaign of 1999 reinforced this doctrine. Yet due to some technological bottlenecks, acknowledged in China’s 2004 Defense White Paper, the PLA adjusted its doctrine to “local war under the conditions of informationization.” In order to close the technological gap,

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the PLA has emphasized the strategy of “leapfrog development” (kuayueshi fazhan), using information technology as a force multiplier. According to Major General Wang Baocun of the Academy of Military Science, the key to mitigating the gap between the PLA and the armed forces of advanced countries is the development of information technology. The PLA should take advantage of the advances in China’s civilian IT sector to build “informationized” (xinxihua) armed forces. Major General Wu Yujin of the Armored Force Engineering Institute, recognizing that the PLA is facing “grave challenges” in improving its backward armaments and equipment, points out that China does not need to complete the whole process of “mechanization” (equipment acquisitions) before embarking upon “informationization” (networking of equipment), as the militaries of advanced countries have done. Instead, informationization and mechanization can go hand in hand, and the former can even lead the latter. The goal is to catch up with the advanced militaries in the shortest amount of time. Otherwise, China “would likely be in a passive position in future military struggles.”77 The PLA’s modernization will likely take a long time; whether it can catch up with U.S. military capability in the next few decades remains an open question. To deal with American military forces in the short run and to compensate for China’s technological gap, Chinese military experts have been studying asymmetric warfare; that is, how a weaker force can prevail over a much stronger one, especially in the event of a Taiwan conflict. For instance, Colonel Jiang Lei, who was among the first to receive a doctorate in military affairs (1997) in China, writes: “Realistically speaking, in the future, winning a . . . limited war under high-technology conditions means that, as strategic guidance, [we must] be prepared to fight superior enemies equipped with high-technology armaments and, under the new historical conditions, implement [the strategy of] defeating better-equipped enemies by using inferior equipment.  .  .  . [Such a strategy] will be particularly necessary in the next two or three decades.”78 In an internally circulated PLA textbook, Zhanyi Xue (The Study of Campaigns), leading Chinese military officers argue, “Our weaponry has improved greatly in comparison to the past, but in comparison to the militaries of the advanced countries, there will still be a large gap not only now but long into the future. Therefore, we not only must accelerate our development of advanced weapons, thus shrinking the gap to the fullest extent possible, but also [we must] use our current weapons to defeat enemies. . . . [We must] explore the art of the inferior defeating the superior under high-tech conditions.”79 Similarly, the much-hyped book by two Chinese colonels entitled Unrestricted Warfare (Chaoxianzhan, literally meaning

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“war beyond limits”) reflects the search among some members of the Chinese military for an asymmetric strategy to exploit the vulnerabilities of a much more advanced armed force, even through nonmilitary means such as cyberwarfare or targeting financial institutions or the media.80 Elements of China’s asymmetric warfare include counterspace systems, cyberwarfare against civilian and military networks, attacks on financial infrastructure, information operations, and Three Warfares (psychological, media, and legal). Through these innovative strategies and tactics, the PLA hopes to deliver the “assassin’s mace” to paralyze the superior opponents. The goal of an asymmetric strategy is not to challenge U.S. global preponderance or to defeat the United States, but, as Thomas Christensen points out, “to develop politically useful capabilities to punish American forces if they were to intervene in a conflict of great interest to China.”81 DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE

The strategy of peaceful development requires a stable external environment. Beijing views certain aspects of the U.S. preponderance as menacing to Chinese security interests and harbors suspicion that the United States is taking measures to constrain China’s rise. In response, Beijing needs to build a coalition of friendly states to “minimize Washington’s ability to contain or constrain China in the region.”82 Such diplomatic coordination efforts must not appear to be outright balancing against the United States. The rationale is straightforward: Military alliances with the purpose of hard balancing would provoke a vigorous U.S. response, whereas skillful diplomacy could frustrate American policy objectives detrimental to Chinese interests without drawing Washington’s “focused enmity.”83 Beijing accomplishes this strategic objective by engaging in multilateral institutions, building bilateral partnerships and conducting economic diplomacy. Before the mid-1990s, Beijing viewed multilateral institutions with suspicion because it feared that those institutions could be used by other countries to “gang up on” China. Instead, Beijing preferred bilateral relationships, in which it could hope to have more leverage by virtue of its size. By 1996, however, Beijing realized that multilateral diplomacy could help ameliorate concerns over China’s rising power. This shift was evident in then–General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s report to the Fifteenth Communist Party Congress in 1997, which included the line, “We must actively participate in multilateral diplomatic activities.” Additionally, by Beijing’s calculation, membership in international organizations would give China a greater right and ability to

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reshape their rules to better suit Chinese interests; Beijing had viewed most institutions as serving Western interests.84 As Beijing became more confident of its power, it gradually saw the benefits of institutions as instruments of foreign policy. International institutions were increasingly seen as a potential tool to advance Chinese interests. Such an instrumental view of multilateral institutions is substantively different from socialized acceptance of supranational rules and norms.85 Hence Beijing’s use of multilateral institutions accords with Waltz’s interpretation: “International institutions serve primarily national rather than international interests.”86 China’s active participation in multilateral institutions is a strategic response to U.S. dominance. In the words of Wang Yizhou, a noted Chinese foreign policy expert: “To be clear, an important reason why China now increasingly values multilateral diplomacy is U.S. hegemonic behavior after the Cold War and its superpower position. The hegemonic thinking and unilateralism in handling great power relations by some forces in the U.S. have not only exacerbated great power relations, causing possible imbalances in the international strategic structure, but have also created wide-ranging and persistent misgivings.”87 In other words, the unbridled exercise of American power was a major cause of China’s increased participation in multilateral institutions. Through participating, China would be able to voice its concerns in multilateral forums, prevent these institutions from simply reinforcing U.S. interests, and “help hasten the end of the unipolar era.”88 The network of China’s multilateral diplomacy has expanded significantly. In Southeast Asia, Beijing is developing relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as “a counterweight to U.S. power”89 and to “weaken U.S. hegemony in the unipolar system.”90 Starting in 1995, partly in response to ASEAN initiatives to draw in China, Beijing began to engage the Southeast Asian states and actively shaped the evolution of the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and Korea) and ASEAN+1 (China) mechanisms. Beijing has participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on security affairs and has made a concerted effort to reassure ASEAN states that China’s development presents significant economic opportunities—not threats—to the region. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, by refusing to allow the Chinese currency to depreciate, Beijing reassured its Southeast Asian neighbors that a rising China could be a “responsible great power” in the region. Moreover, Beijing was the first non-ASEAN state to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which pledges nonaggression, and has proposed to establish an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area by 2015 (the first phase was completed in January 2010). It adopted the preferred positions of ASEAN states in the

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Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Thanks to this good-neighbor (muling) policy, of all the great powers in the region, China has made the most inroads into Southeast Asia, an area that has begun to view China more favorably, at the expense of the United States, in the post–9/11 world.91 China also has taken the initiative in Central Asia, creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 to fight the “three evils” of separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism. Comprising China, Russia, and the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the SCO represents Beijing’s efforts to project its influence into the region, secure energy supplies, stem secessionist activities in China’s Muslim region of Xinjiang, and “not to let U.S. dominance in regional and world affairs remained unchecked.”92 The strengthening of the SCO’s institutional apparatus reflects Beijing’s desire to counter rising U.S. influence in Central Asia after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Stephen Walt even considers the security cooperation in the SCO as an example of an alliance against the United States.93 The U.S. military presence in Central Asia, though ostensibly stationed there for counterterrorism purposes, has created strategic pressures on China’s western frontier.94 In his visit to Iran in 2002, PRC President Jiang Zemin publicly opposed the stationing of American troops in Central Asia.95 At a summit meeting in July 2005, the SCO issued a statement calling for a “final timeline” for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from its members.96 Central Asia now figures prominently in the geopolitical calculations among China, Russia, and the United States. Of all the multilateral institutions, the United Nations Security Council offers the most effective venue for China, a veto-holding permanent member, to constrain and limit U.S. policies.97 China collaborated with Russia in 1999 over the Kosovo Crisis to prevent UN approval for the U.S.-led intervention and was highly critical of the NATO-led Kosovo campaign. Similarly, in the lead-up to the Iraq War in 2003, China joined France and others in the Security Council calling for protracted inspections rather than the use of force favored by the United States.98 In the aftermath of the North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, China opposed a more comprehensive package of sanctions embraced by the United States and voted in favor of limited sanctions.99 China’s actions have the effect of limiting the options available to the United States. Not surprisingly, China has advocated a greater role for the United Nations in future international affairs. In addition to multilateral institutions, China has continued to cultivate bilateral relationships in the form of “partnerships.” Through the partner-

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ships, Beijing seeks to maximize leverage by linking economic benefits with bilateral relations. The concept of partnership is open to potential allies and adversaries and does not necessarily assume cooperative outcomes. It recognizes national differences in culture, ideology, and interests and seeks to build a mechanism to manage the areas of potential conflicts. These partnerships allow China to find a middle ground between traditional allies and adversaries and, in the words of Avery Goldstein, “enable China to address concerns about U.S. preponderance without resorting to the more directly confrontational” approach to balance American power.100 Russia is the foremost example of this type of relationship. It is the main supplier of China’s arms—accounting for 85 percent of China’s total arms imports since the early 1990s—and in the view of the Pentagon a “significant enabler of China’s military modernization.”101 U.S. military operations in the Balkans during the 1990s gave rise to common concerns in Beijing and Moscow about American interventionism into what is considered the internal affairs of states. Against this backdrop, and in light of NATO expansion and the strengthening of U.S. alliances in Asia, China and Russia moved to strengthen bilateral ties by forging a “strategic cooperative partnership” in 1996. Subsequent developments drove Moscow and Beijing closer together. In 2000, U.S. plans to build a missile defense system and to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty led Russia and China to issue a joint statement voicing their opposition to what were considered strategically destabilizing moves by Washington.102 The two countries reaffirmed that the international strategic balance must be maintained.103 The next year the Sino-Russian partnership took another step forward with the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. Though not a military alliance like the 1950 SinoSoviet Alliance, article 9 of the treaty calls for immediate consultations in the event of threat. In a rebuke to Washington’s bypassing of the United Nations in invading Iraq in 2003, both countries reiterated that the maintenance of world peace is the main responsibility of the UN Security Council and jointly opposed the use of military force to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Further expanding their cooperation, in 2005 China and Russia conducted their first-ever joint military exercise, involving ten thousand air, land, and naval personnel. To limit U.S. power, China is also deepening its relations with the European Union (EU) in general, and it is cultivating partnerships with France, Britain, and Germany in particular. One Chinese analyst argues that the SinoRussian partnership is not enough to constrain U.S. power and to expedite the arrival of multipolarity—the key is to win over Europe.104 China now holds

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regular summit meetings with the EU, and each is now the other’s largest trading partner. China has also conducted search-and-rescue exercises with French and British naval ships, and plans are underway for further military exchanges. Finally, the EU has been considering lifting the arms embargo that it imposed on China following the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square; removing the embargo could significantly enhance China’s military capability and Washington has pressured the EU not to lift it. As Barry Posen points out, European nations are seeking ways to balance American power and to preserve the EU’s political autonomy.105 Some analysts believe that the China-EU strategic partnership is largely the result of shared concerns over U.S. power.106 Nonetheless, as the thorny issues of Tibet and human rights have caused frictions between China and the EU, the future of China-EU relations will hinge on the weight both give to geopolitical concerns. Although balance of power is often framed in military terms, the concept of balancing does not exclude using economic means to constrain the dominant state.107 China is now the largest trading partner of almost every state in East and Southeast Asia; before 2000, that role belonged to the United States. To reap political and economic benefits, Beijing has been promoting “politically driven” free trade agreements (FTAs) with Southeast Asian states and others.108 Although still at an early stage, there are indications that China is attempting to form a regional trading bloc or lock up energy and natural resources in its economic competition with the United States. China’s proposal to build an ASEAN–China Free Trade Area is a case in point. Beijing is well aware that Washington sees it as a potential competitor and hoped that the FTA would stimulate domestic development and growth and firmly tie Southeast Asian economies to China. Under the FTA, China provides an alternative market to North America and Europe as well as growth opportunities for members. ASEAN members will enjoy reduced tariffs before the WTO rules take effect, and its non-WTO members will receive most favored nation (MFN) benefits. The FTA will be the first regional trading bloc that China has joined: “The FTA arrangement with ASEAN helps Beijing support its long-term interests in mitigating, if not countering, U.S. influence in Asia.”109 The FTA will strengthen Sino-ASEAN trade and investment links and facilitate Beijing’s efforts to secure the supplies of energy and raw materials from the resource-rich Southeast Asia. Successful regional integration will also enhance the prospect of a multipolar world.110 Beijing is also strengthening ties with African countries and offering various forms of economic assistance. China’s no-strings-attached economic assis-

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tance provides a sharply different alternative to that of the Western countries and aid agencies, which sets stringent, often painful, conditions on aid recipients. Chinese investments and economic aids help develop African economy; Africa’s rich natural resources are important for the Chinese economy and the large number of African votes provides diplomatic support for Chinese interests in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and its affiliates.111 NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999 prompted Beijing to view Africa as a potential counterweight to what the Chinese leaders saw as a U.S.-led disregard of sovereignty.112 Beijing took the initiative in setting up regular ministerial-level meetings between China and the African states, promising debt relief and tariff exemption, and established the ChinaAfrica Cooperation Forum in 2000. In the wake of the U.S.-led Iraq War, Premier Wen Jiabao noted in the 2003 opening speech of the Forum meeting in Ethiopia, “The people of the world share the aspiration for peace, stability, and development. But hegemonism is raising its ugly head.”113 China hosted a grandiose summit meeting in Beijing in 2006, under the auspices of China-Africa Cooperation Forum. As a testament to growing Chinese clout in Africa, leaders from forty-eight out of the continent’s fifty-three countries attended the conference. China has become active in America’s backyard—Latin America. Latin America’s votes at the United Nations and other international institutions can help China “counterbalance U.S. influence.”114 China maintains military cooperation with Cuba and operates joint signal intelligence and electronic warfare facilities on the island. China has also established a presence in the Panama Canal, prompting a number of U.S. congressional and military leaders to express concerns about its potential impact on U.S. interests in the strategic waterway.115 Strategic considerations aside, Beijing looks to the region for a steady supply of energy resources, raw materials, and foodstuffs. China’s trade with Latin America is increasing rapidly, making it the region’s second-largest trading partner after the United States. However, Chinese trade and investment in Latin America remain far behind those of the United States, less than 10 percent of the U.S. total.116 Nonetheless, the gap is expected to shrink. Washington has taken note of China’s growing influence in the international economy. In the 2006 report National Security Strategy, the White House accuses Chinese leaders of “expanding trade, but acting as if they can somehow ‘lock up’ energy supplies around the world or seek to direct markets rather than opening them up—as if they can follow a mercantilism borrowed from a discredited era.”117 In Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East,

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China is investing heavily in oil, natural gas, and raw resources and building up their infrastructure—without demanding domestic political reforms in the host countries. Beijing’s dealings with Sudan, Zimbabwe, Iran, and Venezuela have been criticized by Washington. China’s “no strings attached” economic assistance program offers an alternative to international economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund. Over time, the Chinese approach may establish a new set of international economic rules.

CONCLUSION As it did in the past, structural realism remains a powerful guide to understanding Chinese strategic behavior in the twentieth century. Being a weaker power in the unipolar world, China has every incentive to adopt a defensive posture and avoid provoking the United States. Beijing’s current nonconfrontational strategy is a rational, calculated response to U.S. preponderant power. The “smart” way to balance against the American colossus is for China to develop national capabilities while simultaneously engaging in diplomatic coordination with other countries to constrain U.S. actions harmful to Chinese interests. An outright balancing coalition is both too costly and too risky in a unipolar system. Rather, China will do best by concentrating on economic development while striving to maintain a peaceful international environment. The “peaceful rise” strategy is consistent with this logic: it increases China’s relative power while minimizing, though not eliminating, international concerns over its rise. Like its imperial predecessors, the PRC has made the pursuit of power the core element of its security policy. Beijing’s adoption of a defensive grand strategy reflects its relative weakness vis-à-vis the United States. The crucial question remains: Will China continue to adopt a defensive grand strategy when it reaches power parity with the United States? This is ultimately an empirical question that only the future can answer. However, this study suggests that, based on both theory and history, China will gradually shift to an offensive grand strategy when it has accumulated sufficient power. A wealthy and powerful China will tend to be more assertive in regional and global affairs, expand political and economic interests abroad and dictate the boundaries of acceptable state behavior; it may be tempted to use coercive or nonpeaceful means to advance security interests or resolve disputes. As China rises in power, its security competition with the United States will likely intensify, especially in East Asia. The structural contradiction between

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the existing hegemon intent on maintaining the Asian balance of power and the rising power with the potential to dominate the region will become more evident in the next few decades. Unipolarity will fade away. Properly managing the U.S.-China security competition will be the most challenging task in the twenty-first century.

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NOTES

1. CONFUCIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE PUZZLE

1. Realists argue that the process of China’s rise will likely be characterized by intense security competition with the United States and possible military clashes. Liberals, on the other hand, argue that engagement with China will integrate the country into the existing international system, creating a benign and trustful great power. Constructivists argue that positive social interaction with the world will transform China into a status quo power, accepting and eventually internalizing the norms of appropriate behavior. For a nuanced survey of these arguments, see Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 7–45. 2. Li Jijun, “Lun zhanlue wenhua [On strategic culture],” Zhongguo junshi kexue [China Military Science], no. 1 (1997): 8–15, at 9. See also Gong Yuzhen, Zhongguo Zhanlue Wenhua Jiexi [An analysis of Chinese strategic culture] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2002). 3. Xu Xin, “Daodi shui weixie shui? [Who’s threatening whom?],” Liaowang [Outlook] 8–9 (1996): Reported by Fang Zhi, 48–49, at 48. Likewise, General Xing Shizong, the commandant of the National Defense University, argues that a kind of pacifism rooted in culture and historical legacy has profoundly influenced China’s defense goal and strategy. Xing Shizong, “‘Zhongguo weixie lun’ keyi xiu yi [The ‘China threat thesis’ can come to an end],” Qiushi [Seeking Truth] 3 (1996): 16–20. 4. Qin Yaqing, “Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7 (2007): 313–340, at 330; Liu Zhiguang, Dongfang Heping Zhuyi: Yuanqi, Liubian Ji Zouxiang [Oriental pacifism: Origin, evolution, and trends] (Hunan: Hunan chubanshe, 1992); Yan Xuetong, “Zhongguo anquan zhanlue de fazhan qushi [Trends in the

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development of China’s security strategy],” Liaowang [Outlook] 8–9 (1996): 50–52. 5. “China’s Peaceful Development Road,” State Council Information Office, December 22, 2005. http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Dec/152669.htm. 6. “China’s National Defense in 2006,” Information Office of the State Council, December 2006. Similar statements can also be found in previous versions of white papers available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white. 7. Quoted in Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 107. 8. Qian Qichen’s interview with the People’s Daily, December 18, 1997, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guoji/209/4955/4956/20010410/438145. html. 9. “Remarks of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao: ‘Turning Your Eyes to China,’” Harvard University, December 10, 2003. http://www.news.harvard.edu/ gazette/2003/12.11/10-wenspeech.html. 10. Keynote speech at the Boao Forum for Asia 2004 annual conference, April 24, 2004. http://www.boaoforum.com/boao/2004nh/cd/t20040424_733981 .shtml. 11. Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapter 2. 12. Arthur Waldron, “The Art of Shi,” The New Republic (June 23, 1997): 36–41, at 36. 13. Max Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, trans. Hans H. Gerth (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), 140, 169. 14. John K. Fairbank, “Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience,” in Chinese Ways in Warfare, ed. Frank A. Kierman Jr. and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 7–9. 15. Ralph D. Sawyer, The Art of the Warrior: Leadership and Strategy from the Chinese Military Classics (Boston: Shambhala, 1996), 3. 16. Daniel Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 35. 17. Notable exceptions include Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000); Victoria Tin-bor Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 18. The classic statement is Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

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19. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 84–118. 20. Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 119–150. See also Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 21. Although the term “pacifism” sometimes refers to the rejection of every form of violence as a solution to disputes, such as nonviolent resistance, I use the term broadly in this book to refer to the belief that peaceful methods are in principle more feasible and more desirable than military force in resolving conflict. I use the term interchangeably with antimilitarism, nonbelligerence, and antibellicosity in security policy. 22. Johnston, Cultural Realism. 23. Johnston’s second book is a move in this direction, arguing that China’s participation in international institutions is transforming the realpolitik outlook of Chinese leaders and analysts alike. Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 24. See, for example, Barry Gills, “The Hegemonic Transition in East Asia: A Historical Perspective,” in Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, ed. Stephen Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). At 195, Gills states, “It can be argued that East Asia developed its own distinctive international theory. This international theory was derivative of the views of Mencius [a disciple of Confucius] in that it downplayed the role of force and upgraded the role of virtue or moral example.” 25. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 218–219. On crucial case, see Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Strategies of Inquiry, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 113–123. 26. For example, David Kang argues that European-derived theories “do a poor job as they are applied to Asia.” David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 57–85, at 58. 27. Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979); Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” in Advances in Information

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28. 29.

30.

31.

Processing in Organizations, ed. Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985). On further exposition of the method of structured, focused comparison, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005). George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, chapter 10. Peter K. Bol, This Culture of Ours: Intellectual Transitions in T’ang and Sung China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Gong Yuzhen, Zhongguo Zhanlue Wenhua Jiexi, 120–121; Peter Lorge, War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795 (New York: Routledge, 2005), 4, 33. The Qing dynasty is not a good case for this study because of its non-Chinese traditions. As Peter Perdue points out, the Qing dynasty inherited a cultural tradition quite distinct from other Han Chinese dynasties, drawing on a mix of Confucianism, Manchu shamanism, and Tibetan Lamaism. Peter C. Perdue, “Culture, History, and Imperial Chinese Strategy: Legacies of the Qing Conquests,” in Warfare in Chinese History, ed. Hans van de Ven (Boston: Brill, 2000), 263. Similarly, the Nationalist period is not a good case because the Confucian civil service examination system was abolished. Unlike the imperial period, studying Confucian classics ceased to be a requirement for recruiting officials. Many Nationalist leaders have studied in the West or Japan, and Confucian culture was questioned by Chinese elites for causing China’s backwardness. Like the Qing dynasty, the Nationalist period could be confounded by non-Chinese traditions. F. W. Mote, Imperial China: 900–1800 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 28.

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1. Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4. Alastair Iain Johnston notes that “within the China field there seems to be little controversy about the proposition that ‘deep’ history and culture are critical sources of strategic behavior”; see Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 22. 2. Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 144– 145. 3. The end of the Cold War sparked rising interests in cultural variables. Culturalists fault realism for failing to predict (or explain) the demise of the

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Soviet Union, and they suggest that ideas such as Gorbachev’s “new thinking” do a much better job. See, for example, Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999); and Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). However, as Stephen M. Walt correctly points out, no other international-relations theory has predicted the end of the Cold War: “criticizing realism for failing to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union is a bit like chiding it for failing to explain the Great Depression, the behavior of sub-atomic particles, or the causes of cancer.” See Walt, “The Gorbachev Interlude and International Relations Theory,” Diplomatic History 21, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 476. For a good explanation of the Soviet Union’s collapse, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000–2001): 124–151. 4. For some scholars, the term “culturalism” is synonymous with “constructivism” because both are concerned with the impact of norms on state behavior. But in terms of levels of analysis, culturalism tends to focus on how domestic norms affect the security behavior of states, whereas constructivism leans toward studying the impact of international norms on state policy. Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program,” International Studies Review 4, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 49–72. 5. The main pieces in this literature include Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 84–118; Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 119–150; Jeffrey W. Legro, “Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II,” International Security 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 108–142; and Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars,” International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 65–93. Although most culturalists start from the unit-level, some analyze culture from a systemic perspective. For a typology, see Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” 156. 6. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, 6; Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 9; John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security

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7. 8.

9. 10.

11. 12.

13. 14.

15.

16.

Policy After Unification (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 22–23; Johnston, Cultural Realism, 34–35. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, 5. Structural realism is often mischaracterized as a deterministic theory. However, structural realism is better understood as a probabilistic theory. As Kenneth N. Waltz notes, “Structures shape and shove; they do not determine the actions of states.” Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 24. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 185. Alastair Iain Johnston, “International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, ed. Samuel Kim (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 68–69. The seminal work is Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 329. Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 34. See, for example, Li Jijun, “Lun zhanlue wenhua” [On strategic culture], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [Chinese Military Science] 1 (1997): 8–15; Gong Yuzhen, Zhongguo Zhanlue Wenhua Jiexi [An Analysis of Chinese Strategic Culture] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2002); Tiejun Zhang, “Chinese Strategic Culture: Traditional and Present Features,” Comparative Strategy 21, no. 2 (April–June 2002): 73–90; Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War (New York: Routledge, 2007). Arthur Waldron, “Chinese Strategy from the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries,” in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 101–102. See also David Shepherd Nivison, “The Classical Philosophical Writings,” in The Cambridge History of China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C., ed. Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Johnston, Cultural Realism, 63–66. For example, in Cultural Realism, Alastair Iain Johnston uses the term “Confucian-Mencian paradigm.” Huiyun Feng uses the term “Confucian strategic culture” to describe this received wisdom of strategic thinking and argues that “the fundamental philosophical underpinning of The Art of War remains Confucian.” Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy

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17.

18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

25.

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Decision-Making, 22. Tiejun Zhang speaks of “Confucian domination on the strategic culture.” Zhang, “Chinese Strategic Culture.” See also Gong Yuzhen, Zhongguo Zhanlue Wenhua Jiexi. Gong Yuzhen, Zhongguo Zhanlue Wenhua Jiexi. See also the preface to this book by Wu Rusong. Similarly, Tiejun Zhang writes, “The resort to non-military means to external aggression was also evident either when China was strong militarily (e.g. the Han and Tang Dynasties) or when it was weak (such as in the Northern Song and Southern Song Dynasties).” Zhang, “Chinese Strategic Culture,” at 77. Huiyun Feng writes, “China did not expand in history when it was strong.” Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 4. Along the same line, Daniel Bell observes, “One feature of imperial China was that it did not expand in ways comparable to Western imperial powers, even when it may have had the technical ability to do so.” Daniel Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 34. John K. Fairbank, “Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience,” in Chinese Ways in Warfare, ed. Frank A. Kierman Jr. and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 7–9. Chinese writers of military affairs have long been influenced by this tradition, well before Fairbank. An important source of the thinking of “pacifist bias” comes from the almost exclusive reliance on Chinese documents. Official Chinese historical records have a tendency to justify warfare in culturally favorable terms. In most cases they are the only written sources available, because many other states or political units throughout imperial China left no records of their own. Edward S. Boylan, “The Chinese Cultural Style of Warfare,” Comparative Strategy 3, no. 4 (1982): 345. Wei Rulin and Liu Zhongpin, Zhongguo Junshi Sixiang Shi [History of Chinese Military Thought] (Taipei: Liming, 1985), 437. Quoted in Johnston, Cultural Realism, 63. A long list of similar quotes can be found in Johnston’s pages. Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-yu Shih, Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840–1980 (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1993), 32. Chong-Pin Lin, China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition Within Evolution (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988), 19–20, 33. Xu Peigen, Zhongguo Guofang Sixiang Shi [History of Chinese Thought on National Defense] (Taipei: Zhongyang wenwu gongyingshe, 1983), 21. Mencius, trans. D. C. Lau (Baltimore: Penguin, 1970), 7.B.3, 194. Note that Lau translates the sentence as, “A benevolent man has no match in the Empire.” Ibid., 7.B.4, p. 194.

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26. Don J. Wyatt, “In Pursuit of the Great Peace: Wang Dan and the Early Song Evasion of the ‘Just War’ Doctrine,” in Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period, ed. Don J. Wyatt (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 98. 27. Adelman and Shih, Symbolic War, 30–31. 28. Pi Mingyong and Wei Luo, “Keju xingshuai yu zhongguo junshi de yanbian” [The rise and fall of the civil service examination system and the evolution of China’s military], Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and Management] 5 (1996): 32–33. One estimate puts the average age in the Qing dynasty for obtaining xiucai (the lowest Confucian degree) at twenty-four, for juren at thirty, and for jingshi (the highest degree) at thirty-five. Ibid., 32. 29. Adelman and Shih, Symbolic War, 30–31; Gong Yuzhen, Zhongguo Zhanlue Wenhua Jiexi [An Analysis of Chinese Strategic Culture] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2002), 120–122. 30. Xu Yougen, Wuju Zhidu Shilue [A Concise History of the Military Examination System] (Shuzhou: Shuzhou daxue chubanshe, 1997), 124. 31. Gong Yuzhen, Zhongguo Zhanlue Wenhua Jiexi, 121. 32. Lei Haizong, Zhongguo Wenhua Yu Zhongguo De Bing [Chinese Culture and Chinese Soldiers] (Beijing: Shangwu, 1940; reprint 2001), 101–130. See also Kenneth Swope, “Introduction,” in Warfare in China since 1600, ed. Kenneth Swope (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2005), xi; Nicola Di Cosmo, “Introduction,” in Military Culture in Imperial China, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 1–2. 33. Di Cosmo, “Introduction,” 3. On Chinese officials who combined civil qualities with martial ones in the Song dynasty, see Don J. Wyatt, “Unsung Men of War: Acculturated Embodiments of the Martial Ethos in the Song Dynasty,” in Di Cosmo, Military Culture in Imperial China, 192–218. 34. Max Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, trans. Hans H. Gerth (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), 115. 35. Xu Yougen, Wuju Zhidu Shilue, 124. It goes without saying that even military officers suffered from an inferiority complex. In the Qing dynasty, a high-ranking general swore that he would never let his children go into the military. Instead, he wanted them to study Confucian classics and become “useful” persons. Another general felt no less inferior, regaining his peace of mind only after he had successfully transferred to a civil position. Pi Mingyong and Wei Luo, “Keju xingshuai yu zhongguo junshi de yanbian,” 34. 36. John King Fairbank, The United States and China, 4th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 68. 37. Herrlee Glessner Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 249.

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38. Mark Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1984), 11. 39. Confucius, The Analects, trans. D. C. Lau (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), 16.1, 139. 40. A passage from The Analects is revealing. When asked about government, Confucius commented: “Give them enough food, give them enough arms, and the people will have trust in you.” If one is forced to give up one of these three, which should one give up first? Confucius answered: “Give up arms.” When asked to choose one of the remaining two, Confucius answered: “Give up food. Death has always been with us since the beginning of time, but when there is no trust, the common people will have nothing to stand on.” Ibid., 12.7, 113. 41. Wyatt, “In Pursuit of the Great Peace,” 77. 42. Yan Xuetong applies this view to the PRC. Yan Xuetong, “Lengzhan hou Zhongguo de dui wai anquan zhanlue” [China’s external security strategy after the Cold War], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] 8 (1995): 23–28; Yan Xuetong, “Zhongguo anquan zhanlue de fazhan qushi” [Trends in the development of China’s security strategy], Liaowang [Outlook] 8–9 (1996): 50–52. 43. Cho-yun Hsu, “Applying Confucian Ethics to International Relations,” Journal of Ethics and International Affairs 5 (March–April 1991): 20. 44. Johnston, Cultural Realism, 69–71. This theory of just war is developed further by Mencius (an essential Confucian classic, written by Mencius, the main disciple of Confucius). When the King of Qi attacked the state of Yan, causing other feudal states to contemplate war with Qi, the king asked Mencius what to do next. Mencius replied: “Now when you went to punish [Yan] which practised tyranny over its people, the people thought you were going to rescue them from water and fire, and they came to meet your army, bringing baskets of rice and bottles of drink. How can it be right for you to kill the old and bind the young, destroy the ancestral temples and appropriate the valuable vessels? Even before this, the whole Empire was afraid of the power of [Qi]. Now you double your territory without practising benevolent government. This is to provoke the armies of the whole Empire. If you hasten to order the release of the captives, old and young, leave the valuable vessels where they are, and take your army out after setting up a ruler in consultation with the men of [Yan], it is still not too late to halt the armies of the Empire.” Mencius, 1.B.11, 70 (emphasis added). 45. Johnston, Cultural Realism, 64–66. 46. Michael Loewe, “The Campaigns of Han Wu-Ti,” in Chinese Ways in Warfare, ed. Frank A. Kierman Jr. and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 106.

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47. Johnston, Cultural Realism, x. The word parabellum comes from the Roman adage “si vis pacem, para bellum” (“if you want peace, prepare for war”). 48. Ibid., 264. 49. Ibid., 37–38. 50. Ibid., preface x. 51. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 217. 52. Johnston’s second book is a move in this direction. Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 53. Johnston, Cultural Realism, 264. 54. See, for example, Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 55. For the flagship statement of offensive realism, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). Other important works along the line of offensive realism include Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Eric J. Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims,” Security Studies 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 1–49; Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Christopher Layne, “The ‘Poster Child for Offensive Realism’: America as a Global Hegemon,” Security Studies 12, no. 2 (Winter 2002–2003): 120–164; Colin Elman, “Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America’s Rise to Regional Hegemony,” American Political Science Review 98, no. 4 (November 2004): 563–576. Henceforth, unless otherwise noted, the term “structural realism” used in this book refers to offensive realism. 56. The other variant of structural realism is “defensive” realism. Defensive realism takes a somewhat benign view of anarchy, arguing that international structure offers more disincentives than incentives for aggression, which ameliorates security competition. Having too much power provokes others to balance against you. Moreover, geography and technology usually favor defense, making conquest difficult. Because expansion is counterbalanced and conquest does not pay, states are better off with a moderate amount of power. States learn over time that overexpansion is counterproductive and self-defeating. The best way to be secure is to maintain the existing balance of power. The defensive realist claim that structure offers few incentives for expansion, however, is not persuasive. First, balancing may not always be efficient. Faced with an aggressor, states face powerful incentives to pass the buck and let the buck-catcher bear the costs of confronting the aggressor. Second, the

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57. 58. 59.

60.

61.

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conceptualization of the offense-defense balance is often conflated with two other variables that determine war outcomes: balance of power and military skill. Offense-defense balance is hard to operationalize; the theory is hard to falsify because contradictory cases can be explained away by introducing another variable: misperception. Third, it is inherently difficult to determine what constitutes an “appropriate” amount of power—the amount of power that is considered appropriate today may not be so tomorrow. Major works on defensive realism include Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 485–507; Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994–1995): 50–90.; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000–2001): 128–161. Although the term “defensive realism” appeared after the publication of his book, Waltz can be considered a defensive realist, for, he writes, “The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.” Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126. Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York: Free Press, 1996), 352. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 31. My discussion of structural realism draws heavily on Mearsheimer’s works. As Mearsheimer argues, “the greater the military advantage one state has over other states, the more secure it is.” John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994–1995): 11–12. As Robert Gilpin writes, “If a state fails to take advantage of opportunities to grow and expand, it risks the possibility that a competitor will seize the opportunity and increase its relative power.” See Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 88. This harsh version of realism, as Fareed Zakaria writes, “has often been caricatured as maintaining that nations and their leaders are power-hungry jingoists, thrusting onto the international area anywhere and everywhere. Although the hard version of realism predicts that rising, powerful states will

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62. 63. 64.

65. 66.

67. 68. 69. 70.

71. 72.

expand, it argues that they will pursue their ends in a rational way, measuring risks, opportunities, costs, and benefits. The best solution to the perennial problem of the uncertainty of international life is for a state to increase its control over that environment through the persistent expansion of its political interests abroad—but only when the benefits exceed the costs.” See Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 20. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 138. Robert Gilpin, “No One Loves a Political Realist,” Security Studies 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 8. Benjamin Frankel, “Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction,” in Realism: Restatement and Renewal, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1996), xviii; Sean M. and Steven E. Miller Lynn-Jones, “Preface,” in The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), ix–x. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 3. On the expansion of war aims, see Eric J. Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims,” Security Studies 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 1–49. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 344–345. Zakaria, From Wealth to Power. Johnston, Cultural Realism, 46–48, 176–177. The example of the Qing Emperor Kangxi (r. 1661–1722) is revealing. The Manchu emperor, who was steeped in military affairs and had personally led expeditions to conquer the Mongols, was especially critical of the Seven Military Classics. In 1710, dissatisfied with the military examinations for officers, Kangxi blamed the military texts: “I have read the seven military classics [sic] in their entirety and find them a real mishmash, to the point that they can not possibly be brought into accord with righteousness.” Instead, he praised the Confucian axiom of benevolence and the kingly way (wang dao) and instructed that the Confucian classics of Analects and Mencius be included in military exams. Quoted from S. R. Gilbert, “Mengzi’s Art of War: The Kangxi Emperor Reforms the Qing Military Examinations,” in Di Cosmo, Military Culture in Imperial China, 246–247. Although Kangxi was not a Ming emperor, his remark suggests that one needs to be careful in extrapolating the act of reading the military classics as evidence of socialization. Johnston, Cultural Realism, 176. Charles O. Hucker, “Ming Government,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 8, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 2, ed. Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 39–40.

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73. James B. Parsons, “The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy: Aspects of Background Forces,” in Chinese Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies, ed. Charles O. Hucker (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 271 n. 28. 74. Hucker, “Ming Government,” 82. Although there have been some variations, according to Hucker, “by the 1420s the grand secretaries were beginning to play an important executive role in government” (77). The grand secretariat, however, cannot be considered as the main executive body, because it fell under the purview of the six ministries. See Wang Qiju, Mingdai Neige Zhidu Shi [History of the Ming Grand Secretariat] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989), 378. 75. Parsons, “The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy: Aspects of Background Forces,” 219. 76. See Waldron’s reviews in Arthur Waldron, “The Art of Shi,” The New Republic (June 23, 1997), 38; Arthur Waldron, “Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in China,” China Quarterly 147 (September 1996): 962–964. 77. Ralph D. Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer with Mei-chun Sawyer (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 1. Sawyer goes on to say that “self-styled Confucians eschewed—whether sincerely or hypocritically—the profession of arms and all aspects of military involvement from the Han dynasty on, growing more vociferous in their condemnation with the passing of centuries.” 78. Ming Shi Lu [Veritable Records of the Ming] (Taipei: Zhongyang yenjiu yuan lishi yuwen yenjiu suo, 1963), Taizu 14: 0185. 79. Ming Tong Jian [Comprehensive Mirror of the Ming], compiled by Xia Xie, c. 1870 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), 2:232; F. W. Mote, Imperial China: 900–1800 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 571. 80. Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi [Military History of the Ming], vol. 15 of Zhongguo Junshi Tongshi [General Military History of China] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1998), 179. 81. Hucker, “Ming Government,” 9. 82. Zhang, “Chinese Strategic Culture,” 76; Gong Yuzhen, Zhongguo Zhanlue Wenhua Jiexi, 110–111. 83. Charles O. Hucker, The Traditional Chinese State in Ming Times (1368– 1644) (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1961), 18. Ping-ti Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368–1911 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 218. Robin Higham and David Graff write that “The Tang, Song, Ming and Qing dynasties did offer military examinations, but these tended to emphasize horsemanship and archery more than knowledge of military texts.” Robin Higham and David A. Graff, “Introduction,” in A Military History of China, ed. David A. Graff and Robin Higham (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002), 11.

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84. Hucker, The Traditional Chinese State in Ming Times, 18. 85. Chinese Military History Writing Group, ed., Zhongguo Junshi Shi [Chinese Military History], vol. 3, Bingzhi (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1986), 425. 86. Edward L. Dreyer, “Military Continuities: The PLA and Imperial China,” in The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s, ed. William W. Whitson (New York: Praeger, 1972), 10. The same situation applied to the Song Dynasty. Many who failed the civil service examination went on to take the military one instead. James T. C. Liu writes of the Song, “Young men who failed to get a degree in the civil service examinations might go through the much easier test to get a military degree instead, with the intention of requesting a transfer to the civil service; but even military officers who had the privilege of periodically requesting a military appointment for a dependent often did not want family members to follow in their footsteps.” James T. C. Liu, China Turning Inward: Intellectual-Political Changes in the Early Twelfth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 62. See also Miao Shumei, Song Dai Guanyuan Xuanren He Guanli Zhidu [The System of Recruitment and Management of Song Officials] (Kaifeng, Henan: Henan daxue chubanshe, 1996), 25–26. In the late Qing dynasty (1644–1911), the written military examinations had so degenerated that historian Ping-ti Ho wryly remarked that it had become “a mere formality and sometimes nothing but a joke.” Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368–1911, 218. On the trivial role the military classics played in the education of military officers, see also Ichisada Miyazaki, China’s Examination Hell: The Civil Service Examinations of Imperial China, trans. Conrad Schirokauer (New York: Weatherhill, 1976), 102–106. 87. As Zhang Tiejun points out, “it is not persuasive to assert . . . that traditional Chinese strategy-makers . . . who were educated with Confucianism would substantially take anti-Confucian attitudes in making security strategies, and certainly untenable to argue against the significant Confucian impacts on traditional Chinese strategic culture.” Zhang, “Chinese Strategic Culture,” 75. While I agree with Zhang’s point on the dominance of the Confucian antimilitarism, we part company on the issue of whether Confucian culture has significant influences on Chinese strategic choices. 88. Waldron, “The Art of Shi,” 38. 89. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2001), xxiv. 90. Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” 267. 91. Jack Snyder, “Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War,” International Organization 56, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 10–11. 92. Waldron, “The Art of Shi,” 38.

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93. See also Lowell Dittmer’s review in Lowell Dittmer, “Cultural Realism,” Review of Politics 59, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 191–194. 94. Johnston, Cultural Realism, chapter 7, esp. 231–242. A similar kind of bifurcated division between strategic culture and practice can also be seen in feudal Europe. In his study of feudal Europe, Markus Fischer finds that although the communal discourse of that time prescribed unity, cooperation, and lawfulness, in practice the behaviors of states reflected power politics in the manner of modern states. See Markus Fischer, “Feudal Europe, 800–1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 427–466. 95. Johnston, Cultural Realism, 262–266; the quotation is at 266. Specifically, Johnston suggests four ways of conducting a critical test. First, set up a counterfactual test and ask what would have happened if Chinese policy makers had endorsed the Confucian-Mencian strategic axioms instead of the parabellum precepts. But this approach “is not the most satisfying one for ruling out a structural explanation.” Second, look for fluctuations in the parabellum calculus and see if such fluctuations have produced changes in behavior. Third, design a cross-national test and look for countries in which the parabellum paradigm is absent. For instance, “one can posit that between democracies the parabellum paradigm is inoperative or absent.” Finally, examine the various periods in Chinese history and see if the parabellum strategic culture has persisted “across very different structural conditions across time.” 96. Ibid., 263. 97. Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” 264. 98. Proponents of cultural theories may counter by insisting on the possibility of multiple strands of strategic culture. Andrew Scobell contends that China “has a dualistic strategic culture. The two main strands are a Confucian one, which is conflict-averse and defensive-minded, and a Realpolitik one that favors military solutions and is offense-oriented.” Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, 15. The main problem with this line of argument is that it accepts the Realpolitik strand at face value despite disconfirming evidence to the contrary. Among all the strategic traditions in China, Confucianism was the dominant one. That is why Confucianism penetrates various aspects of Chinese military writings. Unsurprisingly, Scobell’s depiction of the “Chinese Cult of Defense” rests entirely on explicating Confucian pacifism; little is said about the Realpolitik strand. 99. Throughout Chinese history, the debate between the Legalist and Confucian ways of statecraft has been a recurrent theme. The debate was first systematically preserved in the Yan Tie Lun [Discourses on Salt and Iron], which recorded a pivotal court debate during the Han Dynasty in 81 BCE. The debate covered a wide range of topics, including state control of commerce

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and industry, problems of statecraft, and foreign policies. The Legalists favored state control of the economy and taking military actions against the Xiongnu, the Han dynasty’s major threat. They argued that the financing of the frontier troops depended on the revenue from state monopoly of salt and iron. In contrast, the Confucianists demanded a return to the laissez-faire policy of the past and rejected the efficacy of military campaigns against the Xiongnu. Instead, they advocated pacifying the Xiongnu through benevolent rule at home, attracting the enemy’s submission via Chinese culture and prosperity. They saw no value in conquering more lands. See Huan Kuan, Discourses on Salt and Iron: A Debate on State Control of Commerce and Industry in Ancient China, trans. Esson M. Gale (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1931). Confucianists won the debate. 100. On the Qin’s state-building process, see Victoria Tin-bor Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 2. 101. Hsiao Kung-chuan, Zhongguo Zhengzhi Xixiang Shi [History of Chinese Political Thought] (Taipei: Lianjing, 1982), 9. 102. Herrlee Glessner Creel, Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 151-152. 103. On this point, I concur with Johnston that, for theory testing, behavior and practice should be separated from a definition of culture. Johnston, Cultural Realism; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Strategic Culture Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray,” Review of International Studies 25 (1999): 519–523. 104. I am using Johnston’s typology of grand strategy: offensive, defensive, and accommodationist. Johnston, Cultural Realism, 112–113. But my formulation is somewhat different from his. For instance, Johnston considers “balancing alliance behavior” as part of an accommodationist strategy, whereas I consider balancing as part of a defensive grand strategy. 3. THE NORTHERN SONG DYNASTY (960–1127)

1. Dieter Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule: The Song Transformation of China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009). 2. John K. Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). This is the title of chapter 4. 3. Jing-shen Tao, Two Sons of Heaven: Studies in Sung-Liao Relations (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), 10; Warren I. Cohen, East Asia at the Center: Four Thousand Years of Engagement with the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 107. 4. Liao Shi [Liao History], comp. Tuo-tuo et al., circa 1343 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974 reprint) 35: 401, hereafter LS; Song Shi [Song History], comp. Tuotuo et al., circa 1345 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977, reprint) 187:4576, hereaf-

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5.

6. 7.

8.

9. 10.

11. 12.

13. 14.

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ter SS; Lau Nap-yin and Huang K’uan-chung, “Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty Under T’ai-Tsu (960–976), T’ai-Tsung (976–997), and Chen-Tsung (997–1022),” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 5, part I, The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907–1279, ed. Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 221. Troop numbers in imperial China are notoriously difficult to have an accurate account of. Primary historical narratives and documents at times reported an unusually large amount of troop movements or war casualties. Because of the lack of other verifying sources, these numbers are best viewed as a measure of “magnitude” rather than the exact amount of troops or casualties. Wang Gungwu, “The Rhetoric of a Lesser Empire: Early Sung Relations with Its Neighbors,” in China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 47–65. Tao Jing-Shen, “Barbarians or Northerners: Northern Sung Images of the Khitans,” in ibid., 66–86. Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule; Jacques Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization, trans. J. R. Foster and Charles Hartman, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 331, 344–346. As Kuhn notes (99–100), neo-Confucianism also grew out of an attempt to deal with the challenges posed by the rising influence of Buddhism and Daoism in Chinese society and to reestablish the superiority of Confucianism. Karl F. Olsson, “The Structure of Power Under the Third Emperor of Sung China: The Shifting Balance After the Peace of Shan-Yuan” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1974), 26. E. A. Kracke Jr., Civil Service in Early Sung China: 960–1067 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), 55–56. Ying-shi Yu, Song Ming Lixue Yu Zhengzhi Wenhua [Song-Ming NeoConfucianism and Political Culture] (Taipei: Yuncheng wenhua, 2004). Miao Shumei, Song Dai Guanyuan Xuanren He Guanli Zhidu [The System of Recruitment and Management of Song Officials] (Kaifeng, Henan: Henan daxue chubanshe, 1996), 36. Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, 121. Zhang Qifan, Song Chu Zhengzhi Tanyan [An Inquiry Into the Politics of Early Song] (Guangdong: Jinan daxue chubanshe, 1995), 66; Thomas H. C. Lee, Government Education and Examinations in Sung China (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 143. F. W. Mote, Imperial China: 900–1800 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 99–100. Lee, Government Education and Examinations in Sung China, 139–171; Miao Shumei, Song Dai Guanyuan Xuanren He Guanli Zhidu, 12–34; Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, 129.

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15. Edward L. Dreyer, “Continuity and Change,” in A Military History of China, ed. David A. Graff and Robin Higham (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002), 25. 16. Incidentally, the plethora of these officials later created an overstaffing problem for the Song government. Miao Shumei, Song Dai Guanyuan Xuanren He Guanli Zhidu, 66–69, 72–103. 17. Mote, Imperial China, 60. 18. These prefectures actually comprised nineteen prefectures, not sixteen, but the phrase “Sixteen Prefectures” was commonly designated to refer to these territories. Ibid., 65. 19. Lau Nap-yin and Huang K’uan-chung, “Founding and Consolidation,” 224, fn. 62. 20. Wang Xuhua and Jin Yonggao, “Song Liao hezhan guanxi zhong de jige wenti” [A few issues concerning the Song-Liao relationship of peace and war],” in Liao Jin Shilun Wenji [Collections of Liao-Jin Historiographies] (Liaoning: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1985), 231; Chinese Military History Writing Group, ed., Zhongguo Junshi Shi [Chinese Military History], vol. 2, Binglue (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1986), 194; Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, 34. 21. Mote, Imperial China, 112; Jing-shen Tao, Song Liao Guanxi Shi Yanjiu [A Study of the History of Song-Liao Relations] (Taipei: Lianjing, 1984), 18–19; Lau Nap-yin and Huang K’uan-chung, “Founding and Consolidation,” 221–224. 22. Mote, Imperial China, 106, 112; Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi [Military History of Northern Song, Liao, and Xia], vol. 12, Zhongguo Junshi Tongshi [General Military History of China] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1998), 62–83. 23. Peter Lorge, “The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border,” in Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period, ed. Don J. Wyatt (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 68. 24. Xu Zi Zhi Tong Jian Chang Bian [A Draft Sequel to the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government], comp. Li Tao, c. 1170 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), 9:205, hereafter as XCB. 25. Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, 12–13; Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 84. 26. Denis Twitchett and Klaus-Peter Tietze, “The Liao,” in The Cambridge History of China, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 85. 27. Wang Xuhua and Jin Yonggao, “Song Liao hezhan guanxi zhong de jige wenti,” 232–234. 28. XCB 20:442–443.

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29. Wang Gungwu, “The Rhetoric of a Lesser Empire: Early Sung Relations with Its Neighbors,” 51–52. 30. LS 9:101. 31. Liao intervention foiled three previous Song attempts in conquering Northern Han. The Song learned from these mistakes by deploying a large amount of armies to intercept Liao forces. The strategy worked. See Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 88. 32. Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao,” 86; Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 86; Wang Xuhua and Jin Yonggao, “Song Liao hezhan guanxi zhong de jige wenti,” 236. 33. Nap-Yin Lau, “Waging War for Peace? The Peace Accord Between the Song and the Liao in AD 1005,” in Warfare in Chinese History, ed. Hans Van de Ven (Boston: Brill, 2000), 181; Peter Lorge, War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795 (New York: Routledge, 2005), 22. 34. XCB 20:453–454. 35. Eric J. Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims,” Security Studies 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 19. 36. LS 9:102; Mote, Imperial China, 106–107; Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 182–187; Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao,” 86. 37. Wang Gungwu, “The Rhetoric of a Lesser Empire,” 51. 38. XCB 21:482–483. 39. Ibid., 528. 40. Mote, Imperial China, 112–113; Shui-lung Tsang, “War and Peace in Northern Sung China: Violence and Strategy in Flux, 960–1104 A.D.” (Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 1997), 105–108. 41. XCB 21:484–485; Wang Xuhua and Jin Yonggao, “Song Liao hezhan guanxi zhong de jige wenti,” 242–244. Some memorials of the peace faction were preserved in Song Chao Zhu Chen Zou Yi [Collections of the Memorials of Song Ministers], comp. Zhao Ruyu, c. 1185 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubashe, 1999), 129:1416–1428, hereafter SCZCZY. 42. XCB 27:602. 43. Song Hui Yao Ji Gao [Collection of Materials from the Song Dynasty], comp. Xu Song, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1957), 196:7677, hereafter SHYJG. 44. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), chapter 5. 45. XCB 27:602–603. 46. Ibid., 603–608. 47. Although Song Qi’s memorial alluded to the adage about the inauspiciousness of arms in a few lines, the bulk of his memorial deals with actual war plans. Ibid., 607. 48. LS 83:1300.

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49. XCB 27:608–614; LS 11:120–122; Lau, “Waging War for Peace?,” at 185; Mote, Imperial China, 113; Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 189–194; Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 220– 224; Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, 14. 50. Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, 14. 51. Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao,” 87–91. 52. Mote, Imperial China, 114; Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 198; Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 224. 53. LS 83:1305; Lau, “Waging War for Peace?” 185. 54. Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 198–201; XCB 27:625. 55. XCB 28:633–634. 56. Ibid., 635–637. 57. Ibid., 30:666–671. A year later, Zhang Ji submitted another memorial. “There are three ways to fend off the barbarians. . . . Repair castles and build fortifications on strategic locations. Train soldiers, gather grains, and deploy them along the frontiers. If [the enemies] come, defend against them. If they leave, do not pursue. This is the best policy. Put down armor and bows, use humble words and lavish gifts, send a princess to establish good relations, and deliver our national goods to win their hearts. Although this would be condescending for someone so respectable as to command ten thousand chariots, it could put a temporary stop to warfare along our three borders. This is the second best policy. Train soldiers and select generals, send them deep into enemy territory, fight everywhere with weapons, and decide winner and loser once and for all. This is the worst policy.” The first policy was infeasible because the Khitans had occupied key strategic terrains. Offense had also proved ineffective. The frontiers were already devastated by warfare. The Khitans were very strong, and China could be destroyed if the fighting continued. Therefore, he specifically asked for a policy of appeasement. The Khitans were beginning to have internal dissent, and would likely collapse by itself in the future. XCB 31:701–703. The same memorial was also recorded in SHYJG 196:7682–7683, with a different date. Since another memorial by Song Qi was misplaced in the same section (see XCB 27:608), the date in XCB seems more credible. 58. XCB 30:672, 677. 59. Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 205–507. 60. XCB 28:637; 30:671, 677. 61. Mote, Imperial China, 114–115. 62. XCB 57:1268; SS 273:9329; LS 81:1284; Lau Nap-yin and Huang K’uanchung, “Founding and Consolidation,” 263. 63. XCB 45:962.

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64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

82. 83. 84. 85.

86.

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XCB 46:992, 999–1001. Lau, “Waging War for Peace?” 204–205. Ibid., 187. Lorge, “The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border.” Lau, “Waging War for Peace?” 186–191. Lorge, “The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border,” 64. Lorge argues that the Song’s hydraulic network “changed the balance of power along the active section of the Song-Liao border, bolstering Song power.” Mote, Imperial China, 115. XCB 58:1291; SHYJG 196:7688; Lorge, “The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border,” 61. XCB 57:1268–1269. XCB 56:1246; SHYJG 175:6875. Lau, “Waging War for Peace?” 181; Mote, Imperial China, 115. Lau Nap-yin and Huang K’uan-chung, “Founding and Consolidation,” 262. Tsang, “War and Peace in Northern Sung China,” 119; David C. Wright, “The Sung-Kitan War of A.D. 1004–1005 and the Treaty of Shan-Yuan,” Journal of Asian History 32, no. 1 (1998): 6. XCB 57:1267. XCB 58:1284–1287; Wright, “The Sung-Kitan War of A.D. 1004–1005 and the Treaty of Shan-Yuan,” 13, 20–21. Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 215–218; Wright, “The Sung-Kitan War,” 34. XCB 58:1286–1289; Wright, “The Sung-Kitan War,” 20–21; Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao,” 107–108. Historical accounts on which side started the peace initiative were inconsistent. Song history asserted that it was the Liao that took the initiative by sending an envoy to China. Liao history said the opposite. XCB 57:1268; SS 7:125; LS 14:160. XCB 58:1290–1291; Mote, Imperial China, 68. XCB 58:1292. Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao,” 108. The Song and Liao texts of the treaty are reproduced in XCB 58:1298. For English translation (based on Qidan guo zhi published after XCB and compiled by Ye Longli, who earned the jinshi degree in 1247), see Wright, “The Sung-Kitan War,” 27–30. According to Song sources, Emperor Zhenzong was prepared to pay as much as three million units of silk and silver. He was exhilarated when he learned the actual payment was only 300,000. XCB 58:1292–1293. Ibid., 31–33; Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao,” 109.

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87. Naomi Standen, Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossing in Liao China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007). 88. See, for example, Wang Xuhua and Jin Yonggao, “Song Liao hezhan guanxi zhong de jige wenti,” 262–264; Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi 221; Jin Yufu, Song Liao Jin Shi [History of Song, Liao, and Jin] (Taipei: Shangwu, 1991 [1946]), 34–35. 89. Yang Yanlang, son of Song’s famous general Yang Ye, who died in a battle in 986, pointed out that the Liao forces were overextended and exhausted and would not be hard to defeat. He proposed attacking them and then overtaking the Sixteen Prefectures in a swift maneuver. Emperor Zhenzong appeared to have been swayed by his proposal but was too intimidated by the prospect of war to take on any action. The peace treaty was already promised, he said, and the people needed rest. Other officials were also in no mood for war and chanted “Long Live the Emperor” to show their support of the emperor’s decision for détente. XCB 58:1296–1297. 90. Chinese Military History Writing Group, ed., Zhongguo Junshi Shi [Chinese Military History], appendix, Lidai Zhanzheng Nianbiao [Annual Chronology of War] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1986), 4–32. 91. The raw data on conflict initiation is drawn from the annual chronology of war compiled by the Chinese Military History Writing Group. Ibid., 4–73. I examine the description of each battle in the chronology to determine which side initiated the conflict, that is, which side moved first to precipitate the ensuing battle. 92. Mote, Imperial China, 117. See also Wright, “The Sung-Kitan War,” 39; Ray Huang, China: A Macro History (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 130; Lau, “Waging War for Peace?” 213–214. The estimates are slightly different but they all point to a very small percentage of Song annual expenditures. 93. Lien-sheng Yang, “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order,” in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 21. 94. The early Han’s heqin (peace through kinship relations) policy toward the Xiongnu is another example of diplomatic equality between China and its neighbors. The Han was forced to acknowledge inferiority and pay a yearly tribute to Xiongnu in the heqin treaty of 198 BCE. When, however, the Han dynasty saw an overall increase in power, it started to attack the Xiongnu and eventually defeated it. Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asia History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Tang China also adopted a similar policy of marrying princesses to Tibetan leaders (btsan-po) in 641 CE. Yihong Pan, Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan: Sui-Tang China and Its Neighbors (Bellingham: Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University,

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1997), chapter 7. For an excellent study on the relationship between China’s marriage alliance and military strength, see Jennifer Holmgren, “A Question of Strength: Military Capability and Princess-Bestowal in Imperial China’s Foreign Relations (Han to Ch’ing),” Monumenta Serica 39 (1990–1991): 31–85. 95. Mote, Imperial China, 171–172. 96. Lau Nap-yin and Huang K’uan-chung, “Founding and Consolidation,” 251– 252; Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 227–228. 97. XCB 43:924; 49:1075–1076; 50:1087–1088; Wang Tian-shun, Xi Xia Zhan Shi [War History of Xi Xia] (Ningxia: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 1993), 98–99. 98. SS 492:14,154; 490:14,114–14,115. 99. XCB 63:1402. 100. Ibid., 56:1228. 101. Ibid., 60:1346–1347; 63:1398–1399, 1419–1420; 64:1424. 102. Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 238; Ruth Dunnel, “The Hsi Hsia,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 6, Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 178. 103. Dunnel, “The Hsi Hsia,” 181–186; Mote, Imperial China, 180–182. 104. Mote, Imperial China, 182–183. 105. On how culture supplements structural realism, see Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 141–170. 106. For detailed accounts of the Song-Xi Xia battles, see Michael C. McGrath, “Frustrated Empires: The Song-Tangut Xia War of 1038–1044,” in Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period, ed. Don J. Wyatt (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 151–190; Michael McGrath, “The Reigns of Jen-Tsung (1022–1063) and Ying-Tsung (1063– 1067),” in Twitchett and Smith, The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907– 1279, 300–316. 107. XCB 130:3079–3084; 131:3093–3100. 108. Ibid., 131:3094–3095 109. Ibid., 3099. 110. Wang Tian-shun, Xi Xia Zhan Shi, 144; Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 252; Li Huarui, Song Xia Guanxi Shi [History of Song-Xia Relations] (Hebei: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1998), 49. 111. XCB 124:2927; SCZCCY 131:1448. This is Jing-shen Tao’s translation in Two Sons of Heaven, 57–58. 112. XCB 125:2957; 134:3189. 113. Ibid., 126:2984; 127:3004. 114. Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, 58–59; LS 93:1374.

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115. Ibid., 60. 116. Ibid., 61; XCB 137:3286. Marriage alliance was also proposed during the negotiation, but the Song court considered it more humiliating than bribery. Such marriage, although much cheaper than the money offer, directly challenged the Sinocentric worldview and sense of superiority held by the Song dynasty. 117. XCB 137:3292. 118. Ibid., 3293–3294; Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, 61. 119. XCB 136:3251, 3255. 120. Ibid., 3261. 121. Ibid., 134:3192–3194. 122. Ibid., 3194. 123. SCZCCY 131:1449. 124. Ibid., 134:1488. 125. Ibid., 131:1450; 132:1456. 126. McGrath, “The Reigns of Jen-Tsung (1022–1063) and Ying-Tsung (1063– 1067),” 307–308. 127. SCZCCY 132:1460. 128. McGrath, “The Reigns of Jen-Tsung (1022–1063) and Ying-Tsung (1063– 1067),” 316–328. The Qingli Reform failed due to the opposition of vested interests in the Song government on charges of factionalism and the threat it posed to imperial power. 129. Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, 62; Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 257; Wang Tian-shun, Xi Xia Zhan Shi, 153; McGrath, “Frustrated Empires,” 170–171. 130. Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, 63. 131. Ibid., 66. 132. This is the bloodletting strategy described by John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 154–155. 133. Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, 64–66; Wang Tian-shun, Xi Xia Zhan Shi, 155. 134. Dai Xizhang, Xi Xia Ji [An Account of Xi Xia] (Ningxia: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 1988), 244–246. 135. Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 278. 136. Anthony William Sariti, “A Note on Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in the Northern Sung,” Sung Studies Newsletter 8 (October 1973): 3–11, at 6; Paul Jakov Smith, “Shen-Tsung’s Reign and the New Policies of Wang An-Shih, 1067–1085,” in Twitchett and Smith, The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907–1279, 349. 137. Smith, “Shen-Tsung’s Reign,” 353. 138. Quoted in ibid. 139. SS 313: 10255; ibid., 353–355.

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140. Mote, Imperial China, 187–188. 141. Lorge, War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795, 48; Smith, “Shen-Tsung’s Reign,” 383–435. 142. Huang, China: A Macro History, 134. Historians generally agreed on the military objective of Wang’s reforms. Paul C. Forage, “The Sino-Tangut War of 1081–1085,” Journal of Asian History 25 (1991): 1. Forage states that aside from revitalizing the empire, the aim was “to reconquer north China with all the glory and prestige of the Han and Tang dynasties before them.” Tao Jing-shen, in Two Sons of Heaven, states, “Wang had come to believe that the first priority of the government had to be the consolidation of [Song] power, while any attempt at external expansion was dependent upon the success of the domestic reform program” (68). See also Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 283–286, 305; Smith, “Shen-Tsung’s Reign,” 465. 143. Mote, Imperial China, 138. 144. XCB 220:5350–5351. 145. Ibid., 221:5377–5378. 146. Mote, Imperial China, 140. 147. On this border dispute, see Herbert Franke, “The Liao-Sung Border Conflict of 1074–1076,” in Studia Sino-Mongolica: Festschrift für Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1979); Christian Lamouroux, “The Song-Liao Border Dispute of 1074/75,” in China and Her Neighbors: Borders, Visions of the Other, Foreign Policy 10th to 19th Century, ed. Sabine Dabringhaus and Roderich Ptak (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1997); Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, 69–71. 148. Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, 68–78. 149. Smith, “Shen-Tsung’s Reign,” 466. 150. Taking advantage of a leadership crisis, the Song invaded a group of Tibetan tribes located in the Xi Xia’s southern border in the Gansu corridor in July 1072. The strategic rationale of this campaign was best explained by its original advocate Wang Shao: “The Xi Xia can be taken. And to take the Xi Xia, we should first recover the He and Huang river basins [in the Gansu corridor], then the Xia will have to worry about an enemy behind their back.” The Song captured six prefectures and incorporated the region into the empire. It was a major victory comparable only to the Northern Han campaign nearly a century earlier. Forage, “The Sino-Tangut War of 1081–1085,” 4 n. 8; Wang Tian-shun, Xi Xia Zhan Shi, 184. 151. Smith, “Shen-Tsung’s Reign,” 465; Lorge, War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795, 48. 152. Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 286. 153. Forage, “The Sino-Tangut War of 1081–1085,” 6.

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154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159.

XCB 286:7005–7009. Li Huarui, Song Xia Guanxi Shi, 82–85. Forage, “The Sino-Tangut War of 1081–1085,” 22. XCB 312. XCB 313. SSJSBM 40:389; Dai Xizhang, Xi Xia Ji, 370; Wang Tian-shun, Xi Xia Zhan Shi 194–205; Forage, “The Sino-Tangut War of 1081–1085,” 6–9. 160. Forage, “The Sino-Tangut War of 1081–1085,” 2. 161. Ibid., 12–13; Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 308; Lorge, War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795, 49; Paul Jakov Smith, “Introduction,” in Twitchett and Smith, The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907–1279, 23. 162. XCB 330:7945. 163. SS 486:14012; Forage, “The Sino-Tangut War of 1081–1085,” 17–18; Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 272; Wang Tianshun, Xi Xia Zhan Shi, 209. 164. XCB 330:7955. 165. Mote, Imperial China, 201. 166. Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 177. 167. Herbert Franke, “The Chin Dynasty,” in Franke and Twitchett, Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368, 224. 168. SJSBM 53:542; Ke Junzhe, Zhang Dachang, and Yu Guoshi, Jin Chao Shi [History of the Jin Dynasty] (Beizheng: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1992), 57. 169. SSJSBM 53:547; Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 254–255; Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 390–391. 170. SSJSBM 53: 547–549; Ari Daniel Levine, “The Reigns of Hui-Tsung (1100– 1126) and Ch’in-Tsung (1126–1127) and the Fall of the Northern Sung,” in Twitchett and Smith, The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907–1279, 632. 171. Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi, 327–359, 387. The most serious rebellion in late Northern Song was led by Fang La (1120– 1121). Heavy taxes and corrupt officials turned peasants into rebels, whose main grievance was that officials extracted their wealth in order to make up for the economic burdens caused by the annual payments to the Liao and the Xi Xia. 172. Jin Shi [Jin History], comp. Tuo-tuo et al., circa 1343. (Beijing: Zhognhua shuju, 1975, reprint), 74:1704. 173. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 15.

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174. Feng Dongli and Mao Yuanyou, Bei Song Liao Xia Junshi Shi 400–408; Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 260–266; Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, 97–105. 175. Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 272. 176. See also Sariti, “A Note on Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in the Northern Sung,” 3–11. 177. For example, Peter Lorge emphasized domestic factors as causing Song belligerence. Lorge, “The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border.” 178. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 11, 46. 4. THE SOUTHERN SONG DYNASTY (1127–1279)

1. Jin Shi [Jin History], comp. Tuo-tuo et al., circa 1343 (Beijing: Zhognhua shuju, 1975, reprint), hereafter JS. Volume 46 records that in 1187, the Jin population was 44,705,086. The population of Southern Song was estimated at well over 70 million. F. W. Mote, Imperial China: 900–1800 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 353. 2. Ibid., 346, 360. 3. James T. C. Liu, “The Jurchen-Sung Confrontation: Some Overlooked Points,” in China Under Jurchen Rule, ed. Hoyt Cleveland Tillman and Stephen H. West (Albany: SUNY Press: 1995), 44–45. 4. Li Xinchuan (1166–1243), Jian Yan Yi Lai Xi Nian Yao Lu [A Chronological Record of the Events Since Jianyan] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1956), 23:484, hereafter JYYL. 5. Chinese Military History Writing Group, ed., Zhongguo Junshi Shi [Chinese Military History], vol. 2, Binglue (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1986), 291–312; Ke Junzhe, Zhang Dachang, and Yu Guoshi, Jin Chao Shi [History of the Jin Dynasty] (Beizheng: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1992), 126–132; Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Junshi Shi [Military History of Southern Song and Jin], vol. 13, Zhongguo Junshi Tongshi [General Military History of China] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1998), 170–199. 6. Liu, “The Jurchen-Sung Confrontation,” 39. 7. Da Jin Guozhi, vol. 6. Quoted in Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Junshi Shi, 198; Jing-shen Tao, “The Move to the South and the Reign of Kao-Tsung (1127–1162),” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 5, part I, The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907–1279, ed. Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 655. 8. Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Junshi Shi, 200–203, 212. 9. JYYL 80:1309. 10. Ibid., 75:1241.

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11. Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 326–332; Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Junshi Shi, 219–222. 12. Mote, Imperial China, 302; Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 335. 13. Ke Junzhe, Zhang Dachang, and Yu Guoshi, Jin Chao Shi, 137–140; Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Junshi Shi, 226–233; Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 337–343. 14. Huang Kuanzhong, Nan Song Junzheng Yu Wenxian Tansuo [An Inquiry Into the Military Affairs and Documentation of the Southern Song] (Taipei: Xinwenfeng, 1990), 109; Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Junshi Shi, 203. 15. Ke Junzhe, Zhang Dachang, and Yu Guoshi, Jin Chao Shi, 178. 16. Mote, Imperial China, 298–299; Tao, “The Move to the South,” 677–680. 17. JYYL 123:1983, 1989. 18. Ibid., 120:1942; 121:1953; 123:1980–1981, 1984; 124:2009. 19. Ibid., 122:1976. Zhang Jun made the same comment in ibid., 125:2037. 20. Ibid., 125:2037–2038. 21. Ibid., 120:1940. 22. Ibid., 123:1984. 23. Ibid., 118:1900, 120:1938; Bi Yuan, Xu Zi Zhi Tong Jian [Sequel to the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government] (Beijing: Guji chubanshe, 1957), 119:3162, 120:3166, 3175, hereafter XZZTJ. 24. JYYL 122:1970. 25. Ibid., 120:1938; XZZTJ 120:3175. 26. JYYL 120:1941. 27. Ibid., 121:1961; 118:1910. 28. Ibid., 124: 2012–2013. 29. Ibid., 123:1979. 30. Ibid., 135:2172. 31. JS 77:1754. 32. Chen Zhen, Song Shi [Song History] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2003), 463; Tao, “The Move to the South,” 682. 33. Song Shi [Song History], comp. Tuo-tuo et al., circa 1345 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977, reprint) 365:11391, hereafter SS; Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 360. 34. Liu, “The Jurchen-Sung Confrontation,” 42. 35. XZZTJ 124:3301. 36. Wang Shengduo, “Song Jin Shaoxing heyi qian Nan Song caizheng mianling de yanjun xingshi” [The perilous situation of the Southern Song treasury before the Song-Jin peace of Shaoxing], in Yue Fei Yanjiu [Yue Fei Studies], ed. Yue Fei Yanjiu Xuehui (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996), 331.

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37. As James Liu writes, “If the war went on, the Jurchens might turn the tide, cross the Yangtze again, and threaten the fragile stability the Southern Sung [Song] had barely attained.” James T. C. Liu, “Yueh Fei (1103–41) and China’s Heritage of Loyalty,” Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 2 (February 1972): 293. Mote suggests that Emperor Gaozong “could well have concluded that peace . . . preserved his dynasty, and brought benefits to the Chinese people that far outweighed the costs of further warfare.” Mote, Imperial China, 307. 38. Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 49. 39. Huang Kuanzhong, Nan Song Junzheng Yu Wenxian Tansuo, 58. For a detailed account of the coup, see J.  W. Haeger, “Miao Fu,” in Herbert Franke, ed., Sung Biographies (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1976), 787–790. 40. JYYL 118:1904. This is James Liu’s translation in James T. C. Liu, China Turning Inward: Intellectual-Political Changes in the Early Twelfth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 95. 41. See, for example, JYYL 119:1924, 1932. 42. Huang Kuanzhong, Nan Song Junzheng Yu Wenxian Tansuo, 117. 43. Mote, Imperial China, 306. 44. Huang Kuanzhong, Nan Song Junzheng Yu Wenxian Tansuo, 467. 45. For a translation of the oath letter, see Herbert Franke, “Treaties Between Sung and Chin,” in Etudes Song in Memoriam Etienne Balazs, ed. Francoise Aubun (Paris: Mouton, 1970), 78–79. The abbreviated versions of the text are preserved, with some variations, in JYYL 142:2292–2293 and JS 77:1755–1756. 46. For an excellent account of how Emperor Gaozong’s effort in consolidating his power led to the execution of Yue Fei, see Huang Kuanzhong, Nan Song Junzheng Yu Wenxian Tansuo, 105–139. See also Mote, Imperial China, 299–305; Liu, “Yueh Fei (1103–41) and China’s Heritage of Loyalty.” 47. For instance, Wang Shu memorialized, “The enemy has been capricious since the breach of the alliance conducted at sea [with the Northern Song].” JYYL 120:1942; XZZTJ 120:3177. Yue Fei also stated, “The barbarians can not be trusted. We can not depend on making peace with them.” Huang Kuanzhong, Nan Song Junzheng Yu Wenxian Tansuo, 119. 48. Tao, “The Move to the South,” 697–703. 49. Ke Junzhe, Zhang Dachang, and Yu Guoshi, Jin Chao Shi, 243; Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Junshi Shi, 260; Tao, “The Move to the South,” 704; Peter Lorge, War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795 (New York: Routledge, 2005), 63. 50. Herbert Franke, “The Chin Dynasty,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 6, Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 240; Han

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51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Junshi Shi, 260; Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 367; Nansong Junshi Shi [Military History of Southern Song], comp. Su Pinxiao (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2008), 179–180. Lorge, War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795, 64. Song Shi Ji Shi Ben Muo [A Detailed Account of the Events of Song History], comp. Chen Banzhan, c. 1605 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977), 77:809. Hereafter SSJSBM. SS 361:11,308. JYYL 200:3394. Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 373; Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Junshi Shi, 272–280. SSJSBM 77:810; SS 361:11,308. Su Pinxiao, Nansong Junshi Shi, 189; Chen Zhen, Song Shi, 482. SSJSBM 77:811–813; SS 361:11,308–11,309. SSJSBM 77:814; SS 361:11,309; Lorge, War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795, 65–66. Gong Wei Ai, “The Reign of Hsiao-Tsung (1162–1189),” in Twitchett and Smith, The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907–1279, 735. SS 33:629; JS 6:735. Mote, Imperial China, 308; Lorge, War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795, 66. The raw data on conflict initiation are drawn from the annual chronology of war compiled by the Chinese Military History Writing Group. ZGJSS, “Lidai zhanzheng nianbiao,” 81–148. I examine the description of each battle in the chronology to determine which side initiated the conflict, that is, which side moved first to precipitate the ensuing battle. Ai, “The Reign of Hsiao-Tsung,” 720. Ibid., 732–737. Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Junshi Shi, 283–285; Chen Zhen, Song Shi, 487. Ke Junzhe, Zhang Dachang, and Yu Guoshi, Jin Chao Shi, 334–343; Franke, “The Chin Dynasty,” 245–247. SSJSBM 83:925. Ibid., 927. Franke, “The Chin Dynasty,” 248. Lorge, War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795, 66. SSJSBM 83:933–934; Chen Zhen, Song Shi, 496. Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Junshi Shi, 334–336. Franke, “The Chin Dynasty,” 254. Yuan Shi [Yuan History], comp. Song Lian, c. 1368. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976), 1:25. SSJSBM 91:1025. Whether the Mongols had actually promised the return of Henan remains dubious. Later chronicle compilers used the Mongol’s

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76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

87.

refusal to return all of Henan as a pretext for the Song’s post-Jin military actions on the Mongols. However, contemporary documents did not record such a territorial deal. The Song official letter justifying the post-Jin offensive did not even refer to such a “breach” of promise. See Chen Shisong et al., Song Yuan Zhanzheng Shi [History of the Song-Yuan War] (Chengdu: Sichuan shen shehui kexue yuan chubanshe, 1988), 44–46; Charles A. Peterson, “Old Illusions and New Realities: Sung Foreign Policy, 1217–1234,” in China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 223. Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Junshi Shi, 354. Chen Shisong et al., Song Yuan Zhanzheng Shi, 32–35. Peterson, “Old Illusions and New Realities,” 225–226. SSJSBM 92:1037. XZZTJ 167:4560. Ibid. Peterson, “Old Illusions and New Realities,” 229. Chen Shisong et al., Song Yuan Zhanzheng Shi, 51. XZZTJ 167:4565. Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Junshi Shi, 360. Morris Rossabi, “The Reign of Khubilai Khan,” in The Cambridge History of China, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 417, 430; Chen Shisong et al., Song Yuan Zhanzheng Shi, 111–112; Mote, Imperial China, 441. Rossabi, “The Reign of Khubilai Khan,” 429.

5. THE MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)

1. Quoted in Wang Gungwu, “Ming Foreign Relations: Southeast Asia,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 8, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 2, ed. Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 311–312. Emperor Hongwu also listed fifteen countries “not to be invaded”: Korea, Japan, Greater and Lesser Ryukyu islands, Vietnam, Champa, Cambodia, Samudra-Pasai (northern Sumatra), Java, Pahang, Srivijaya (central and southern Sumatra), Siam, Brunei, West Oceans, and Paihua (West Java). The strategic rationale was to maintain peaceful borders in the south so that more resources could be allocated to the north. 2. Charles O. Hucker, “Ming Government,” in ibid., 9. 3. Ibid., 29, 54–55. 4. MSL, Taizu 30:516–517. 5. MTC 2:232; F. W. Mote, Imperial China: 900–1800 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 571.

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6. Timothy Brook, The Chinese State in Ming Society (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 105. 7. John W. Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy: Professional Elites in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 215. 8. Emperor Hongwu held the first civil examination in 1370 but was so disappointed at the performance of the job candidates that he canceled the system in 1373. He relied on the recommendation method to recruit officials until 1384, when he realized that it could be easily abused by officials to benefit their protégés. The civil service examination was reinstated in 1385. 9. Mote, Imperial China, 572; Mao Xinyu, Zhu Yuanzhang Yanjiu [A Study of Zhu Yuanzhang] (Guangdong: Guangdong jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995), 140–141; Xu Shu’an, “Ming chao de keju xuanguan zhidu” [The system of recruiting officials through the civil service examinations in the Ming dynasty], Wenxian [Document] 2:255–265. 10. Hucker, “Ming Government,” 39–40. 11. Mao Xinyu, Zhu Yuanzhang Yanjiu, 143–145; Yang Guozheng and Chen Zhiping, Ming Shi Xin Bian [A New History of the Ming] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 47. 12. James B. Parsons, “The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy: Aspects of Background Forces,” in Chinese Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies, ed. Charles O. Hucker (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 271 n. 28. 13. Hucker, “Ming Government,” 82. Although there have been some variations, according to Hucker, “by the 1420s the grand secretaries were beginning to play an important executive role in government” (77). The grand secretariat, however, cannot be considered as the main executive body, because it fell under the purview of the six ministries. See Wang Qiju, Mingdai Neige Zhidu Shi [History of the Ming Grand Secretariat] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989), 339–343. 14. Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 248–249. 15. Edward L. Dreyer, “Military Origins of Ming China,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 7, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644 Part 1, ed. Frederick Mote and Denis Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 102. 16. Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 74; Morris Rossabi, “The Ming and Inner Asia,” in Twitchett and Mote, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 2, 224–225. 17. MSL, Taizu 71:1321.

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18. Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi [Military History of the Ming], vol. 15 of Zhongguo Junshi Tongshi [General Military History of China] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1998), 106–107; Cao Yongnian, Menggu Minzu Tongshi [General History of the Mongol Nationality] (Hohhot, Inner Mongolia: Nei menggu daxue chubanshe, 1991), 32. 19. Edward Dreyer, Early Ming China: A Political History 1355–1435 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 75. 20. MTC 5:301. Emperor Hongwu himself summed up this defense policy in 1376: “Build up military preparedness. Stay cautious on border defense. If the enemies come, defend against them. If they flee, do not pursue.” MTC 6:342. 21. Wu Han, Zhu Yuanzhan Zhuan [Biography of Zhu Yuanzhan] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1965), 156–161. 22. Dreyer, Early Ming China, 75–76. 23. MTC 9:450, 454. 24. John D. Langlois Jr., “The Hung-Wu Reign, 1368–1398,” in Mote and Twitchett, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1, 157–159; Dreyer, Early Ming China, 142; Cao Yongnian, Menggu Minzu Tongshi, 18. 25. Dreyer, Early Ming China, 140–143; Rossabi, “The Ming and Inner Asia,” 227. 26. Cao Yongnian, Menggu Minzu Tongshi, 20–22. 27. Li Sanmou, “Ming dai bian fang yu bian keng” [Border defense and borderland reclamation in the Ming dynasty], Zhongguo Bianjiang Shidi Yanjiu [China’s Borderland History and Geography Studies] 4 (1995): 20. 28. Edward L. Farmer, Early Ming Government: The Evolution of Dual Capitals (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 66–70, 87–90; Chen Wenshi, Ming-Qing Zhengzhi Shehui Shilun [History of Ming-Qing Politics and Society] (Taipei: Xueshen shuju, 1991), 1–75. 29. Farmer, Early Ming Government, 90. 30. MTC 5:324. 31. Hok-Lam Chan, “The Chien-Wen, Yung-Lo, Hung-Hsi, and Hsuan-Te Reigns, 1399–1435,” in Mote and Twitchett, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1, 218–219. 32. Dreyer, Early Ming China, 174. Although some have doubts about the Yongle emperor’s Confucian credential, exemplified by his usurpation of the throne and mass killings of political opponents, his promotion of Confucian teachings did result in the large recruitment of Confucian scholar-officials and the revival of Confucianism in the early Ming. 33. Chan, “The Chien-Wen, Yung-Lo, Hung-Hsi, and Hsuan-Te Reigns,” 222. 34. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 233.

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35. Farmer, Early Ming Government, 171. Farmer suggests that “because horses were essential to all military operations on China’s northern border, they provide an important index of Ming strength” (66). 36. Chen Wenshi, Ming-Qing Zhengzhi Shehui Shilun, 21. Ming official history stopped recording the number of horses after the end of Yongle reign in 1424. 37. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 82. 38. Wang Yuquan, Ming Dai De Juntun [Military Colonies in the Ming] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1965), 213–216. The data was tabulated from Ming shi lu, which ended in 1571. The numbers were incomplete and might contain reporting errors, but they at least reflected the deteriorating conditions in the military colonies. See also Ray Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 286–288. 39. Edward L. Dreyer, Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405–1433 (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 105. 40. The raw data on conflict initiation is drawn from the annual chronology of warfare compiled by the Chinese Military History Compiling Group. Chinese Military History Writing Group, ed., Zhongguo Junshi Shi [Chinese Military History], Appendix, Lidai Zhanzheng Nianbiao [Annual Chronology of War] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1986), 262–443. (Hereinafter Chronology.) A similar graph can be found in Johnston, Cultural Realism (237), but my coding criteria differ from his. The chronology provides a short description of each conflict happened during a particular year. Johnston’s coding method is this: “When the description uses terms such as “attacking” (gong), “striking” (ji), “punitively campaigning against” (zheng), etc., to describe Ming behavior or otherwise indicate that the conflict was precipitated most immediately by some positive action by the Ming, then I coded the case as an incident of Ming initiation” (234 n. 22). However, this mechanical coding method is flawed. The chronology uses the word ji to denote “defeat” rather than “strike.” It was used to describe a battle in which the Ming army defeated the invading Mongols, and thus should be coded as Mongol initiation, not Ming initiation as coded by Johnston. For example, in 1457, the Da Dan Mongols ambushed the patrolling Ming forces in Moershan, but were defeated. This incident was described in the chronology using the word ji (“Ming forces defeated Da Dan”), but it was by no means Ming initiation (Chronology, 315). In 1471, more than ten thousand Mongol troops raided Huaiyuan, but Ming forces defeated them. Again, ji was used to describe the battle (Chronology, 325). Thus the word ji here means more like the ji in jibai (defeat) rather than in daji (strike). In my coding, I read closely the description of each battle in the annual chronology to determine which side initiated the conflict, that is, which

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41. 42. 43.

44. 45.

46.

47. 48.

49.

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side moved first to precipitate the ensuing battle. As expected, my coding method yields more cases of Mongol initiation and fewer cases of Ming initiation than does Johnston’s. I am aware of the shortcomings of this simple coding method, since it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether an invasion was an independent or part of a previous event, and the scale of each conflict might confound the data (skirmishes and large-scale wars were indiscriminately counted as one incident). However, to the extent that these data correlate with anecdotal evidence on Ming capability, their validity is strengthened. Farmer, Early Ming Government, 104. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 40. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 75; Chan, “The Chien-Wen, Yung-Lo, Hung-Hsi, and Hsuan-Te Reigns,” 237–238; Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi, 292–293; Mao Peiqi and Li Zuoran, Ming Chengzu Shilun [On Ming Chengzu] (Taipei: Wenjin, 1994), 222. Farmer, Early Ming Government, 108. Peter C. Perdue, “Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and EighteenthCentury China, Russia, and Mongolia,” Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 4 (October 1996): 775. Chinese Military History Writing Group, ed., Zhongguo Junshi Shi [Chinese Military History], vol. 2, Binglue (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1986), 514. Offense-defense theory holds that when defense has the advantage, war is less likely because of the relative difficulty of conquest. The geography and military technology of Ming times seem to suggest that defense had the advantage, at least in a dyadic sense. The Mongols enjoyed the defensive advantage of geographical barriers and their superior mobility made them an elusive target to strike at. Despite the advantage of defense enjoyed by the Mongols, it did not deter the Ming from launching a series of offensive expeditions. Ming China was very powerful during the reign of Emperor Yongle, and it appeared to the Chinese leaders that the Mongols’ defensive advantage could be overcome by overwhelming use of force. Hence, the military balance of power does a better job of explaining strategic choice than the offense-defense balance does. Farmer, Early Ming Government, 153–162; Mote, Imperial China, 646–653. Morris Rossabi, China and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975), 42–43; Barfield, The Perilous Frontier, 235–238; Zhao Zhongchen, Ming Chengzu Zhuan [Biography of Ming Chengzu] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 353–354; Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi, 327. Rossabi, “The Ming and Inner Asia,” 227–228.

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50. This is the title of chapter 6 of Dreyer, Early Ming China. 51. On these five campaigns, see Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 521–530; Chan, “The Chien-Wen, Yung-Lo, Hung-Hsi, and Hsuan-Te Reigns,” 226–229. 52. Farmer, Early Ming Government, 107, 108. 53. Mote, Imperial China, 610. 54. Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 523; Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi, 329. 55. Perdue, “Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century China, Russia, and Mongolia.” See also Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005). 56. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 84–86. 57. Ibid., 76–79. 58. Arthur Waldron suggests that economic consideration might have been the reason for these withdrawals. The garrisons were too far away and isolated, becoming a drain on resources. See ibid., 81. Chi-hua Wu argues that Yongle was so concerned with protecting the new capital, Beijing, that he withdrew the forward forces and redeployed them around it, but he failed to send them back after Beijing was consolidated. Chi-hua Wu, “The Contraction of Forward Defences on the North China Frontier During the Ming Dynasty,” Papers on Far Eastern History 17 (March 1978): 1–13. 59. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 80; Johnston, Cultural Realism, 184; Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 532; Mao Peiqi and Li Zuoran, Ming Chengzu Shilun, 201–210; Wu, “The Contraction of Forward Defences”; Mote, Imperial China, 695–696. 60. See, for example, the memorials by Zeng Xian and Weng Wanda in MJSWB 237:2476; 225:2363. 61. Denis Twitchett and Tilemann Grimm, “The Cheng-T’ung, Ching-T’ai, and T’ien-Shun Reigns, 1436–1464,” in Mote and Twitchett, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1, 321–322. 62. Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China, 50. 63. Li Sanmou, “Ming dai bian fang yu bian keng,” 21. 64. Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi, 393. 65. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 83; Li Sanmou, “Ming Dai Bian Fang Yu Bian Keng,” 22–24; Twitchett and Grimm, “The Cheng-T’ung, Ching-T’ai, and T’ien-Shun Reigns,” 320. 66. D. Pokotilov, History of the Eastern Mongols During the Ming Dynasty from 1368 to 1634, trans. Rudolf Loewenthal (Chengdu: West China Union University, 1947), 35–39.

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67. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 87; Cao Yongnian, Menggu Minzu Tongshi, 111–119. 68. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 88. 69. Liew Foon Ming, “The Luchuan-Pingmian Campaigns (1436–1449) in the Light of Official Chinese Historiography,” Oriens Extremus 39, no. 2 (1996): 162–203; Twitchett and Grimm, “The Cheng-T’ung, Ching-T’ai, and T’ienShun Reigns,” 314–316; Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 531. 70. Pokotilov, History of the Eastern Mongols, 46–47. 71. Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 533; Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi, 401. 72. Quoted in Frederick W. Mote, “The T’u-Mu Incident of 1449,” in Chinese Ways in Warfare, ed. Frank A. Kierman Jr. and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 254–255. 73. Quoted in ibid., 255. 74. Twitchett and Grimm, “The Cheng-T’ung, Ching-T’ai, and T’ien-Shun Reigns,” 323; Barfield, The Perilous Frontier, 240–241. 75. Mote, “The T’u-Mu Incident of 1449,” 254–262. 76. Cao Yongnian, Menggu Minzu Tongshi, 124–127. 77. Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi, 425–426. For example, Hanlin official Xu Chen proposed, “The Mandate of Heaven is gone. Moving south is the only way to relieve the predicament.” 78. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier, 241. 79. Twitchett and Grimm, “The Cheng-T’ung, Ching-T’ai, and T’ien-Shun Reigns,” 328–329. 80. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 93. 81. Arthur Waldron, “Chinese Strategy from the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries,” in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 105–106. 82. Frederick W. Mote, “The Ch’eng-Hua and Hung-Chih Reigns, 1465–1505,” in Mote and Twitchett, The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 1, 389. 83. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 140. 84. Ibid., 61. 85. MSL, Xianzong 30:602–603; MSJSBM 58:72–73. 86. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 97. 87. MSL, Xianzong 108:2118–20; Pokotilov, History of the Eastern Mongols, 74. 88. MSL, Xianzong 108:2120. 89. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 101. See also MSL, Xianzong 108:2109–2110. 90. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 101–102. 91. Ibid., 46–49. Paradoxically, both the Liao and Jin empires built walls to ward off nomadic tribes further to the north.

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92. MSL, Xianzong 111:2161–2162; Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 102–103; MS 178:2091–2092. 93. Waldron, The Great Wall, 103. 94. MS 171:2019–2020; Waldron, The Great Wall, 104–105. The weakening of Ming power was also reflected in the number of Mongol casualties recorded in Ming history. There was a significant decline both in the number of Ming forces assembled and in the number of Mongol casualties. Pokotilov depicts this victory of Wang Yue “as a splendid illustration of the fear of the Mongols felt by the Chinese—The times of Yung-lo [Yongle] were long past, when the armies of the Son of Heaven frequently faced the nomads in their native steppes. Now, even a small campaign beyond the border troops was counted as an unusual feat of heroism.” Pokotilov, History of the Eastern Mongols, 77. Nevertheless, Wang Yue was still one of the best generals of the Ming (Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 103). On another two occasions in 1480 and 1498, he went beyond Ming borders to attack the Mongols and scored success. 95. MS 178:2092; Waldron, The Great Wall, 105. 96. MS 178:2092; Waldron, The Great Wall, 107; Mote, “The Ch’eng-Hua and Hung-Chih Reigns, 1465–1505,” 401–402. 97. Mote, “The T’u-Mu Incident of 1449,” 264–265. 98. Pokotilov, History of the Eastern Mongols, 84–85. 99. MS, 327: Da Dan Zhuan, 3762; Pokotilov, History of the Eastern Mongols, 86. 100. Pokotilov, History of the Eastern Mongols, 100; Waldron, The Great Wall, 111–112. 101. Waldron, The Great Wall, 122. 102. Ibid., 122–123; MS, 327. 103. Ray Huang, “Military Expenditures in Sixteenth-Century Ming China,” Oriens Extremus 17, nos. 1–2 (December 1970): 39. 104. Henry Serruys, Sino-Mongol Relations During the Ming II: The Tribute System and Diplomatic Missions (1400–1600) (Brussels: Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1967), 9–10; Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 123–124; Pokotilov, History of the Eastern Mongols, 107. 105. Huang, “Military Expenditures in Sixteenth-Century Ming China,” 39, 43. 106. James Geiss, “The Chia-Ching Reign, 1522–1566,” in Mote and Twitchett, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1, 450–452; Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 149–150. 107. Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi, 625–627. 108. Huang, “Military Expenditures in Sixteenth-Century Ming China,” 44–45; James W. Tong, Disorder Under Heaven: Collective Violence in the Ming Dynasty (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 121.

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109. Tong, Disorder Under Heaven. 110. Huang, “Military Expenditures in Sixteenth-Century Ming China,” 39. 111. MJSWB 237:2476. This is Waldron’s translation in The Great Wall of China, 127. 112. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 127. 113. Ibid., 121, 126. 114. MJSWB 237:2476, 2477; MSL, Shizong 318:5925–5927. 115. MSL, Shizong 318:5927. 116. MTJ 58:2231. 117. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 135. 118. MS 198: 2312. 119. MJSWB 225:2363–2366. 120. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 135–137. 121. Ibid., 133–134. 122. MSL, Shizong 332:6088. 123. Ibid., 6089. 124. See, for example, Chinese Military History Writing Group, Binglue, 541–544. 125. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 174. 126. Ibid., 141–164. 127. The “loose rein” policy (ji mi) was first introduced in the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). It was basically a policy of appeasement. It treated foreigners not as a subject but as a rival state, thus “keeping [them] under loose rein without severing the relationship.” Since the adversaries were not treated as a subject, disobedience would not be regarded as disloyal and would not require punitive expeditions. See Lien-sheng Yang, “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order,” in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 31–33. 128. David C. Wright, “The Northern Frontier,” in A Military History of China, ed. David A. Graff and Robin Higham (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002), 60–61; Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 32–35. 129. Geiss, “The Chia-Ching Reign, 1522–1566,” 472. 130. Sechin Jagchid and Van Jay Symons, Peace, War, and Trade Along the Great Wall: Nomadic-Chinese Interaction Through Two Millennia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); Barfield, The Perilous Frontier; Anatoly M. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, trans. Julia Crookenden (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 131. Quoted in Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 41. 132. Quoted in Wright, “The Northern Frontier,” 60. 133. Quoted in Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 35. 134. Quoted in Wright, “The Northern Frontier,” 57.

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135. Zeng Xian specifically referred to this analogy in his Ordos recovery memorial. 136. Waldron, “Chinese Strategy from the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries,” 102. 137. Serruys, Sino-Mongol Relations During the Ming II, 30; Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 36. 138. MSL, Shizong 371:6621–6623. 139. Ibid., 6624–6625. 140. Ibid., 371:6628–6635; MS 209: 2432; MTC 60: 2282–2284; MSJSBM 60:13–14. 141. MSL, Shizong 376: 6689–6693; MTC 60: 2287–2288; Serruys, Sino-Mongol Relations During the Ming II, 37; Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 176–177. 142. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 160. 143. Ibid., chapter 10. 144. Han-sheng Chuan and Lung-Wah Lee, “Mingdai zhongye hou Taicang suichu yinliang de yanjiu” [The annual expenditure of silver taels of the Taicang vault after the mid-Ming period], Xianggang Zhongwen Daixue Zhonghua Wenhua Yanjiusuo Xuebao [Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong] 6, no. 1 (December 1973): 196–197. 145. Tong, Disorder Under Heaven, 120–121. 146. Ibid., 6. 147. Chinese Military History Writing Group, ed., Zhongguo Jushi Shi, Lidai Zhanzheng Nianbiao, 2:360–384. 148. Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi, 741–742. 149. MJSWB 316:3351–3352; MS 222:2561; Serruys, Sino-Mongol Relations During the Ming II, 64–65. 150. MJSWB 316:3353–3354. 151. Jagchid and Symons, Peace, War, and Trade Along the Great Wall, 97. 152. MJSWB 317:3360. 153. Ibid., 3361–3362. 154. Ibid., 317:3367. 155. MS 222:2561–2562, 327:3766–3767; Serruys, Sino-Mongol Relations During the Ming II, 66–72; Pokotilov, History of the Eastern Mongols, 131–133. 156. Although this average seems greater than Yongle’s average of 0.27, it should not be construed as a more aggressive period. These conflicts were of a much smaller scale, usually involving a few thousand troops. These numbers were no match for Yongle’s half-million troops in his Mongolian campaigns. 157. Nevertheless, a breakaway Mongol tribe, led by Tumen Khan and not controlled by Altan Khan, still raided Ming borders to the northeast. See Pokotilov, History of the Eastern Mongols, 136–139.

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158. Serruys, Sino-Mongol Relations During the Ming II, 68–69 n. 11. 159. Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 186–188. 160. Jagchid and Symons, Peace, War, and Trade Along the Great Wall, 111–112. 6. THE MING TRIBUTE SYSTEM

1. J. K. Fairbank, “Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West,” Far Eastern Quarterly 1, no. 2 (February 1942): 129. See also John K. Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); J.  K. Fairbank and S.  Y. Teng, “On the Ch’ing Tributary System,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 6, no. 2 (1942): 135–246; Mark Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1984). 2. Mark Mancall, “The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Communist China and the Soviet Bloc 349 (September 1963): 17. 3. David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004–2005): 95. 4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 234. 5. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 209, 206. The prospect of a future Sinocentric order prompted a dozen experts to explore the issue in an edited volume. After examining the contemporary security dynamics in the region, these scholars concluded that a regional order centered on China “is decidedly not the case—at least not yet.” David L. Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), xi. 6. David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 66. See also David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 7. It should be noted that the term “tribute system” was a Western invention to describe China’s relations with neighbors. The Chinese did not use such a term. 8. Morris Rossabi, ed., China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 1; Fairbank, “Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West,” 137. 9. T. F. Tsiang, “China and European Expansion,” Politica 2, no. 5 (March 1936): 1–18; John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast:

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10.

11. 12.

13.

14. 15.

16.

17. 18. 19.

20.

21. 22.

The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842–1854 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), 29. Morris Rossabi, “The Ming and Inner Asia,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 8. The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 2, ed. Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 222–223. Fairbank, “Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West,” at 137. Henry Serruys, Sino-Mongol Relations During the Ming II: The Tribute System and Diplomatic Missions (1400–1600) (Brussels: Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1967), 21. Quoted in Joseph F. Fletcher, “China and Central Asia, 1368–1884,” in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Relations, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 208. The Ming court was aware of this problem, especially among envoys from the Western Regions (xiyu). See, for example, MS 332:8602, 8614. Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi [Military History of the Ming], vol. 15 of Zhongguo Junshi Tongshi [General Military History of China] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1998), 400–401; Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 89. Wang Xiangrong and Wang Hao, Zhongshiji De Zhongri Guanxi [SinoJapanese Relations During the Middle Ages] (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2001), 132–149. MSL, Shizong 100:2367. MJSWB 186:1911; see also MJSWB 181:1850. Edward L. Farmer, Early Ming Government: The Evolution of Dual Capitals (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 165; Donald N. Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations Under the Ming,” in The Cambridge History of China, ed. Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 280–281. Jing-shen Tao, Two Sons of Heaven: Studies in Sung-Liao Relations (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), 4, 8; Mancall, “The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy,” 18; Gari Ledyard, “Yin and Yang in the China-Manchuria-Korea Triangle,” in Rossabi, China Among Equals, 313–353; Benjamin I. Schwartz, “The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present,” in Fairbank, The Chinese World Order, 278. Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia,” in Fairbank, The Chinese World Order, 60. Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 548. Along the same line, Arthur Waldron writes: “With military hegemony, the Ch’ing [Qing] rulers could prescribe the nature and ritual of tribute. But of

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23.

24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34.

35.

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course it was warfare or its threat, and not the tribute ritual, which kept the Ch’ing neighbors in line.” Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 85. Quoted in Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia,” 52. By 1397, Srivijaya had been destroyed by Java two decades earlier and stopped sending tribute to China. Apparently, the Ming court was unaware of the demise of this small state when the threat of invasion was issued. Ming Shi 322: Japan; Edward Dreyer, Early Ming China: A Political History 1355–1435 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 120. Warren I. Cohen, East Asia at the Center: Four Thousand Years of Engagement with the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 170–171; F. W. Mote, Imperial China: 900–1800 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 613. Fletcher, “China and Central Asia, 1368–1884,” 209–216. Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, 4, 8. Rossabi, “The Ming and Inner Asia,” 224. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 28–31. Wang Gungwu, “Ming Foreign Relations: Southeast Asia,” in Twitchett and Mote, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 2, 309. John K. Whitmore, Vietnam, Ho Quy Ly, and the Ming (1371–1421) (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1985), 16. In his public announcement, the emperor stated the rationale for war: “The thief minister of Annam Le Qui-ly and his son repeatedly killed the kings, massacred the royal family, and usurped the throne. They imposed exorbitant taxes and ruthlessly plundered the people. They haphazardly arrested people and implemented cruel laws. The people of Annan had no one for help. . . . Now I will send my generals to lead an army to save the people and punish their crimes.” MSL, Taizong 56:0821. Whitmore, Vietnam, Ho Quy Ly, and the Ming (1371–1421), 82. MSL, Taizong 56:0824. John K. Whitmore also suggests that “the Chinese Emperor . . . wished merely to correct the Vietnamese situation and not to conquer the land. The goal of the massive expedition was to restore the Tran dynasty to the Vietnamese throne.” See John K. Whitmore, “Chiao-Chih and Neo-Confucianism: The Ming Attempt to Transform Vietnam,” Ming Studies 4 (Spring 1977): 52. MSL, Taizong 60:0868; 68:0944. See also Zhao Zhongchen, Ming Chengzu Zhuan [Biography of Ming Chengzu] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 344; Mao Peiqi and Li Zuoran, Ming Chengzu Shilun [On Ming Chengzu] (Taipei: Wenjin, 1994), 239–240. The number of 800,000 recorded in Ming Shi Lu may be an exaggeration, but it at least reflected the large-scale of the

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36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

campaign. Whitmore suggested that the invasion forces probably numbered 215,000 men. Whitmore, Vietnam, Ho Quy Ly, and the Ming (1371–1421), 89. MSL, Taizong 56:0824. MSJSBM 22:350. The official Ming history, Ming Shi Lu, records that some one thousand Vietnamese gentry came to Zhang Fu’s camp and told him, “The Tran family have all been killed by the Le thief. There were no heirs left to inherit the throne. Annan was originally a Chinese territory, but was later lost, immersing itself in barbarian culture and not hearing the teachings of rite and righteousness. Fortunately, the Saintly Dynasty has exterminated the criminals. Soldiers, civilians, the elderly and children can witness the glory and prosperity of Chinese culture. We feel so lucky! Please revert Annan as a prefecture like before so that we can gradually eradicate barbarian culture and forever immerse in saintly culture.” MSL, Taizong 66:0917. However, we have reason to believe that Zhang Fu engineered this request, since members of the Tran family had joined him against Le. See Whitmore, “Chiao-Chih and Neo-Confucianism.” MSL, Taizong 80:1070; MSJSBM 22:349. The numbers are slightly different in the latter, probably due to a misprint. Wang Yuquan, Ming Dai De Juntun [Military Colonies in the Ming] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1965), 213. MSL, Taizong 80:1070. Cao Yongnian, Menggu Minzu Tongshi [General History of the Mongol Nationality] (Hohhot, Inner Mongolia: Nei menggu daxue chubanshe, 1991), 3:77–82; Hok-Lam Chan, “The Chien-Wen, Yung-Lo, Hung-Hsi, and Hsuan-Te Reigns, 1399–1435,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 7, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1, ed. Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 223. Dreyer, Early Ming China, 209. Whitmore, Vietnam, Ho Quy Ly, and the Ming (1371–1421), 100–105; Jungpang Lo, “Policy Formulation and Decision-Making on Issues Respecting Peace and War,” in Chinese Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies, ed. Charles O. Hucker (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 57. Chan, “The Chien-Wen, Yung-Lo, Hung-Hsi, and Hsuan-Te Reigns,” 289–291. Lo, “Policy Formulation and Decision-Making,” 57. MSL, Xuanzong 16:0421; MSJSBM 22:356–357. MSL, Xuanzong 24:0634–0635; MSJSBM 22: 358; Lo, “Policy Formulation and Decision-Making,” 57–58. MSJSBM 22:360–361; Lo, “Policy Formulation and Decision-Making,” 58–60.

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50. Dreyer, Early Ming China, 229; Wang Gungwu, “Ming Foreign Relations,” 327–330. 51. On Luchuan campaign, see Liew Foon Ming, “The Luchuan-Pingmian Campaigns (1436–1449) in the Light of Official Chinese Historiography,” Oriens Extremus 39, no. 2 (1996): 162–203; Denis Twitchett and Tilemann Grimm, “The Cheng-T’ung, Ching-T’ai, and T’ien-Shun Reigns, 1436– 1464,” in Mote and Twitchett, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part I, 314– 316. 52. Wang Gungwu, “Ming Foreign Relations,” 326. 53. Ibid., 326–328. 54. Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 55. Edward L. Dreyer, Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405–1433 (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 105. 56. Detailed accounts of these expeditions in the English language include Dreyer, Zheng He, and Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne 1405–1433 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). See also Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China’s Quest for Seapower (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), chapters 1–4; Philip Snow, The Star Raft: China’s Encounter with Africa (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), chapter 1. 57. Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 21, 80. 58. For the revival of sea-power thought in the People’s Republic of China, see Jun Zhan, “China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Seapower Mentality and the South China Sea,” Journal of Strategic Studies 17, no. 3 (September 1994): 180–208. 59. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 4, Physics and Physical Technology, Part III: Civil Engineering and Nautics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 484. 60. Jung-pang Lo, “The Decline of the Early Ming Navy,” Oriens Extremus 5 (1958): 149–151. 61. For instance, as part of the efforts to promote China’s “peaceful rise,” the Chinese government in 2005 commemorated the six hundredth anniversary of Zheng He’s expeditions. Xu Zuyuan, the Chinese vice minister of communications responsible for the celebrations, commented in July 2004: “These were thus friendly diplomatic activities. During the overall course of the seven voyages to the Western Ocean, Zheng He did not occupy a single piece of land, establish any fortress or seize any wealth from other countries. In the commercial and trade activities, he adopted the practice of giving more than he received, and thus he was welcomed and lauded by the people of the various countries along his routes.” Quoted in Geoff Wade,

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62. 63.

64. 65. 66. 67.

68.

69. 70.

71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

“The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment,” Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society LXXVII, Part 1 (2005): 37–58. Dreyer, Zheng He, 128. MS 304:7766–7768, biography of Zheng He; Zheng Yijun, Lun Zheng He Xia Xiyang [On Zheng He’s Expeditions to the Western Oceans] (Beijing: Haiyang chubanshe, 1985), 102, 105; Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China’s Quest for Seapower, 33; Mao Peiqi and Li Zuoran, Ming Chengzu Shilun [On Ming Chengzu], 251; Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 87. The numbers of crew and ships vary in these accounts. I use Dreyer’s data because it is a relatively new study, and his treatment of the sources is reasoned and cautious. Dreyer, Zheng He, chapter 6. Dreyer, Zheng He, 129. MS 304:7766–7768, biography of Zheng He. Dreyer, Zheng He, 147. MSL, Taizong 71:0987, 0995. The character que (“repel”) was changed to jie (“rob” or “plunder”) in later Chinese documents, such as Ming Shi (MS 304: 7767, biography of Zheng He). Today’s Chinese account of the same incident invariably used the term “engage and plunder” (yaojie), which connotes that Zheng He’s military action was self-defense. Dreyer noted this discrepancy in Zheng He, 55–56. (Dreyer translated the word que as “escape,” but “repel” is more accurate.) Dreyer, Zheng He, 55–58; Wade, “The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment.” It was possible that the military conflict might have been the result of a local power struggle between Chen Zuyi and Shi Jinqing. An entry in Ming Shi Lu dated August 12, 1406, shows that Chen Zuyi sent a tributary mission to the Ming court and received paper money in return. Chen Zuyi was recorded as the “chieftain of the Old Harbor [Palembang],” suggesting that the Ming court was aware of his leadership role in Palembang. It was Shi Jinqing who informed Zheng He of Chen’s “secret plot” and his depredations of “piracy.” MSL, Taizong 116:1477–1478. Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 114–118. Some have argued that Zheng He wanted to steal the tooth relic of Buddha, but there is no credible evidence to support the claim. MSL, Taizong 168:1869–1870. MSL, Taizong 71:0997–0998. Dreyer, Zheng He, 63. MSL, Taizong 94:1251–1252. More cases of violence are discussed in Wade, “The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment.” Dreyer, Zheng He.

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76. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 72. 77. Ibid., 2. 78. MS 304:7767, biography of Zheng He; Ming Shi Gao, “Zheng He Zhuan,” in Zheng Hesheng and Zheng Yijun, eds., Zheng He xia Xiyang ziliao huibian [Collection of Research Materials on Zheng He’s Voyage to the Western Oceans] (Jinan, China: Qilu shushe, 1983), 902. Also see MTC 14:647–648; Dun J. Li, The Ageless Chinese: A History, 3rd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978), 283. 79. Dreyer, Zheng He, 87. 80. Quoted in ibid., 148, 192. The other inscription erected in Changle in 1431 had almost identical words. Ibid., 196. 81. Farmer, Early Ming Government, 106. 82. MSL, Xuanzong 67:1576–1577; MS 304:7768, biography of Zheng He. 83. Dreyer, Zheng He, xii. 84. However, Arab states in the Middle East were treated on a more equal footing, probably because “the Chinese were awed by the wealth and power of many of the Muslim potentates.” Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon, 39–40. 85. Zheng Yijun, Lun Zheng He Xia Xiyang, 363–366. Ming China mediated the conflicts between Malacca and Siam, between Sumatra and Java, between Ceylon and its neighbors, and so on. 86. On this, see Ray Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in SixteenthCentury Ming China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974). 87. Dreyer, Zheng He, 167–168. 88. John Fairbank suggests that the presence of the Mongol menace “undoubtedly inhibited any further court expenditure on China’s maritime expansion.” John K. Fairbank, “Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience,” in Chinese Ways in Warfare, ed. Frank A. Kierman Jr. and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 15. An article in China Military Science also makes the argument that China’s well-developed agricultural base and the security threat from the north makes a sea-going grand strategy difficult. Guangzhong Cheng, “Cong bijiao zhong kan Zhongguo diyuan zhanlue sixiang de jiazhi quxiang” [Choice of values of Chinese geographical strategy in comparison], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [Chinese Military Science] 1 (1998): 62. 89. Robert Ross argues that because of geography, China will be constrained to remain a continental power and the U.S. a maritime power. This geographical configuration predicts peace between the United States and China, because the interests of a continental power will not conflict with those of

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a maritime power. Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 81–118. However, if the People’s Republic of China were able to maintain peace on its land borders, it is quite conceivable that it could develop maritime interests that would eventually compete with those of the United States, provided that the Chinese economy continued to grow substantially. See, for example, Zhan, “China Goes to the Blue Waters.” 90. MS 126:15, quoted in Lo, “The Decline of the Early Ming Navy,” at 157. The so-called Wokou (“Japanese pirates”) actually included not only Japanese but also Chinese and a number of other Asian people who turned to illicit smuggling trade because of Ming restrictions. Kwan-wai So, Japanese Piracy in Ming China During the 16th Century (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1975), 2. 91. Lo, “The Decline of the Early Ming Navy,” at 157–158. 92. MS 205:1, quoted in Lo, “The Decline of the Ming Navy,” 159. 93. Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988 [1940]), 170–171. 94. Rossabi, “The Ming and Inner Asia,” 246–247. 95. Ibid., 248–249. Morris Rossabi, “Ming Foreign Policy: The Case of Hami,” in China and Her Neighbors: Borders, Visions of the Other, Foreign Policy 10th to 19th Century, ed. Sabine Dabringhaus and Roderich Ptak (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997), 83–85. 96. Rossabi, “Ming Foreign Policy: The Case of Hami,” 85. 97. MSL, Xianzong 118:2270; MSJSBM 40:586. 98. Ibid., 124:2380. 99. Ibid., 138:2588–2590. 100. Ibid., 180:3244–3246. 101. Ibid., 226:3877–3878. 102. Ibid., 44:0895. 103. Ibid., 44:0898. 104. MSJSBM 40:587. 105. Ibid., 588–589. 106. Rossabi, “Ming Foreign Policy: The Case of Hami,” 91–92; Wang Qiong, “Wei chuan feng shi,” in Chen Gaohua, Mingdai Hami Turufan Ziliao Huibian, 259. MSJSBM 40:589–590. 107. Rossabi, “Ming Foreign Policy,” 92–93; MSJSBM 40:590. 108. Rossabi, “Ming Foreign Policy,” 93–95; Morris Rossabi, “Ming China and Turfan, 1406–1517,” Central Asiatic Journal 16, no. 3 (1972): 223. 109. Rossabi, “Ming Foreign Policy,” 95. 110. MSL, Wuzong 145:2842–2843.

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111. MS 329:8533. 112. See Wang Qiong’s memorial in Chen Gaohua, Mingdai Hami Turufan Ziliao Huibian, 259–261. 113. Rossabi, “The Ming and Inner Asia,” 254–255. 114. Earlier, despite the hostilities between China and Turfan, tributary trade missions were still able to reach Beijing. See Rossabi, “Ming China and Turfan,” 206–225. 115. MSL, Shizong 63:1461–1464. 116. Ibid., 86:1950–1951. 117. Ibid., 95:2225–2228; MJSWB 186:1911–1914. 118. Ibid., 96:2254–2257. 119. MS 329:8535. 120. MSL, Shizong 100:2379–2381. 121. MJSWB 181:1849–1853. 122. Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations Under the Ming,” 272. 123. Ibid., 273. 124. Ibid., 273–293; Jiang Feifei and Wang Xiaofu et al., Zhong Han Guangxi Shi: Gudai Juan [History of Sino-Korean Relations: Ancient Volume] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1998), 268–278. 125. Jiang Feifei and Wang Xiaofu et al., Zhong Han Guangxi Shi, 278–280. 126. Zhang Shen, “Mingdai Chaoxian de qiu shu” [Korean request for books in the Ming dynasty], Wenxian [Document] 4 (1996): 140–151; Clark, “SinoKorean Tributary Relations Under the Ming,” 281–282. 127. Jiang Feifei and Wang Xiaofu et al., Zhong Han Guangxi Shi, 284. 128. Zhang Shenzheng, Zhong Ri Guanxi Shi [Sino-Japanese History] (Jilin: Xinhua shudian, 1986), 110–111. Other accounts are slightly different, but they all agree on Hideyoshi’s continental ambition. See, for example, Jurgis Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity: Japan’s Relations with China and Korea,” in The Cambridge History of Japan, ed. John Whitney Hall (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 265–271; Mary Elizabeth Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 207–208; Cohen, East Asia at the Center, 195–196. 129. Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations Under the Ming,” 293–295; Zhang Shenzheng, Zhong Ri Guanxi Shi, 291–299. 130. MSL Shenzong 250:4649. 131. Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations Under the Ming,” 195; Ray Huang, “The Lung-Ch’ing and Wan-Li Reigns, 1567–1620,” in Mote and Twitchett, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1, 568. 132. MSJSBM 62:968. 133. MSL Shenzong 250:4665.

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134. The historical records are not consistent about the number of Chinese troops dispatched to Korea, ranging from 35,000 to 70,000 men. About half were cavalry forces, which was a strategic mistake because the mountainous, heavily irrigated terrain in Korea was not suitable for cavalry warfare. The number might have gone up to 43,000 after the recovery of Pyongyang. Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi, 779 n. 1. 135. Ray Huang, “The Lung-Ch’ing and Wan-Li Reigns, 1567–1620,” in Mote and Twitchett, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1, 568. 136. Huang, “The Lung-Ch’ing and Wan-Li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 568–570. 137. Zhang Shenzheng, Zhong Ri Guanxi Shi, 308; Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity: Japan’s Relations with China and Korea,” 278. 138. Huang, “The Lung-Ch’ing and Wan-Li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 570–571. 139. Ibid., 571. 140. Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming,” 269–297; Huang, “The Lung-Ch’ing and Wan-Li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 570–571; Zhang Shenzheng, Zhong Ri Guanxi Shi, 310–313; Jiang Feifei and Wang Xiaofu et al., Zhong Han Guangxi Shi, 293–295. 141. Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi, 793. 142. Huang, “The Lung-Ch’ing and Wan-Li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 571–573; Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 287. 143. Han-sheng Chuan and Lung-Wah Lee, “Mingdai zhongye hou Taicang suichu yinliang de yanjiu” [Annual expenditure of silver taels of the Taicang vault after the mid-Ming period], Xianggang Zhongwen Daixue Zhonghua Wenhua Yanjiusuo Xuebao [Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong] 6, no. 1 (Dec. 1973): 169–244, at 202, 206. 144. MS 322:8358. See also Jiang Feifei and Wang Xiaofu et al., Zhong Han Guangxi Shi, 298; Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 290. 145. Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 290–293. 146. Huang, “The Lung-Ch’ing and Wan-Li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 575–576; Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations Under the Ming,” 298. 147. So, Japanese Piracy in Ming China During the 16th Century; Fan Zhongyi et al., Mingdai Junshi Shi, 650–732; Chinese Military History Writing Group, ed., Zhongguo Junshi Shi [Chinese Military History], vol. 2, Binglue (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1986), 552–589. 148. Lo, “Policy Formulation and Decision-Making,” at 53. 149. Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations Under the Ming,” 295. 150. Chuan and Lee, “Mingdai zhongye hou Taicang suichu yinliang de yanjiu,” 196–197. 151. James W. Tong, Disorder Under Heaven: Collective Violence in the Ming Dynasty (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 6.

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7. CHINESE POWER POLITICS IN THE AGE OF U.S. UNIPOLARITY

1. Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), 15–16. 2. Two clear-cut cases of war aim expansion in this study are the Song attack on the Liao after the conquest of the Northern Han in 979 (which turned out to be a case of miscalculation) and the Ming annexation of Vietnam in 1407. In other cases, China failed to achieve the original political objective, let alone to expand its war aims. 3. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). 4. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 46–48. 5. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 24. 6. Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 141–170. 7. Benjamin Schwartz also made this point. Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power, 14. 8. Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” 27. See also Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 10–11. 9. A good example is Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). Dueck combines both structural and cultural variables to explain strategic adjustments in U.S. grand strategy. 10. Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 3, 5, 18. 11. Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York: Norton, 1997), 4. 12. Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (September–October 1996): 37. 13. Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 198. 14. Mao Zedong, “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” in Mao Zedong Xuanji [Selected Works of Mao Zedong], vol. 4 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1960),1409–1410. 15. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War—Studies in International Security and Arms Control (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 219–220. See also Niu Jun, “The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance,” in Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945– 1963 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 73–74; Wooseon Choi,

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16. 17. 18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25. 26.

“Structure and Perceptions: Explaining American Policy Toward China (1949–50),” Security Studies 16, no. 4 (October–December 2007): 555–582. Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, 43–44. Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 254. Allen S. Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan,” International Security 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 103–131. Whiting suggests that these patterns are embedded in the PLA doctrine, defined as “formulated military practice reflected as a tendency in combat operations and tactics” (105). Although he comes close to equating doctrine with strategic culture, he does not elaborate and instead focuses on empirical case studies. Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000). Thomas J. Christensen, “Windows and War: Trend Analysis and Beijing’s Use of Force,” in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 52. Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 166; Jian Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 178. Mao Zedong, “Telegram to Stalin Concerning the Decision to Send Troops to Korea for Combat,” in Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts Since the Founding of the People’s Republic], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987), 539–541. Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu [Nie Rongzhen’s Memoirs] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984), 741–742; Xu Yan, Diyici Jiaoliang: Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng De Lishi Huigu Yu Fansi [The First Test of Strength: A Historical Review and Reflection on the War to Resist America and Assist Korea] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1990), 268; Jian Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 97–99. Robert S. Ross, The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975–1979 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), chapters 7–8. Vietnam’s mistreatment of ethnic Chinese and border disputes appeared epiphenomenal to strategic motivations. Christensen, “Windows and War,” 74. Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 200. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 5–56.

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27. Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 28. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978). 29. China began publishing defense white papers in 1995, and beginning in 1998 it released a new version every two years. For the English translations of these documents, see http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm. 30. Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York: Free Press, 1996), 352. 31. Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, 22–24; Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Litai Xue, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 47. 32. Shi Yinhong, “Guanyu zhongguo daguo diwei ji qi xingxiang de sikao” [Thoughts concerning China’s great power status and its image], Guoji Jingji Pinglun [International Economic Review] (September–October 1999): 44. 33. Hu Angang, preface to Meng Honghua, Jiangou Zhongguo Dazhanlue De Kuangjia [China’s Grand Strategy: A Framework Analysis] (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005). 34. See, for example, China Defense White Paper 2006, http://www.china.org. cn/english/features/book/194421.htm. Virtually all of China’s foreign and security policy announcements have consistently emphasized the defensive aspect of its grand strategy. 35. The draft was leaked to the New York Times. “Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan: Prevent the Re-emergence of a New Rival,” New York Times, March 8, 1992. 36. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2002). In National Security Strategy, released in March 2006, the White House reiterates: “We must maintain a military without peer. . . . America must continue to lead.” 37. Melvyn P. Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–48,” American Historical Review 89, no. 2 (April 1984): 356. 38. Joseph S. Nye, “The Case for Deep Engagement,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 4 (July–August 1995): 91. See also Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Nye argues that “Pax Americana is likely to last” (17) because of its hard and soft powers. 39. Samuel P. Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 83. 40. Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 135 (emphasis in the original).

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41. See, for example, Wang Yizhou, “Zhongguo yu duobian waijiao” [China and Multilateral Diplomacy], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and International Politics] 10 (2001): 5. 42. Chu Shulong, “Meiguo dui Hua zhanlue ji ZhongMei guanxi zouxiang” [U.S. Strategy toward China and trends in Sino-American relations], Heping yu Fazhan [Peace and Development] 2 (2001): 39–41. 43. Wang Jisi, “Meiguo baquan yu Zhongguo jueqi” [America’s Hegemony and China’s Rise], Waijiao Pinglun [Foreign Affairs Review] 84 (October 2005): 13–16. 44. Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006), 29. 45. Yang Jiemian, “Shilun ZhongMei zonghe guojia anquan hudong guanxi” [On the interacting relationship in Sino-American comprehensive national security], in Ni Shixiong and Liu Yongtao eds., Meiguo wenti yanjiu [Studies on American Issues] 4 (Shanghai: Shishi chubanshe, 2005): 141–142. 46. See, for example, Ni Shixiong, “Cong shijie geju kan ZhongMei guanxi” [Viewing Sino-American relations from the world’s configuration of power], Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Xuebao [Journal of the Renmin University of China] 5 (2001): 10–12; Chu Shulong and Gao Zugui, “Meiguo Yatai ji dui Hua zhanlue sixiang fazhan xin dongxiang” [New trends of development in U.S. strategic thinking over Asia-Pacific and China], Heping yu Fazhan [Peace and Development] 3 (2000): 32–37. As David Shambaugh points out, “For many years, Chinese analysts have accused the United States of pursuing global hegemony.” David Shambaugh, “China or America: Which Is the Revisionist Power?” Survival 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 25. 47. Wang Jisi, “Lengjing, lengjing, zai lengjing: Dui dangqian Meiguo yu ZhongMei guanxi de jidian guancha” [Calm down, calm down, calm down again: A few reflections on the current U.S. and Sino-American relations], Guoji Jingji Pinglun [International Economic Review] (September–October 2004): 7. Note that Wang does not equate “security threat” with “enemy.” David Shambaugh, in his study of Chinese military modernization, notes, “There is little doubt that Chinese leaders and strategists view the United States as the greatest security threat to world peace, as well as to China’s own national security and foreign policy goals.” David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 289. Evan Medeiros notes that “many Chinese policymakers and analysts are convinced that the United States poses the most significant long-term external threat to China’s national rejuvenation and regional aspirations.” Evan S. Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability,” Washington Quarterly 19, no. 1 (Winter 2005–2006): 154.

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48. As one Chinese scholar notes, the U.S.-Japan alliance “helps consolidate U.S. preponderance and balance China’s growing power.” Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005–2006): 126. 49. Robert S. Ross, “Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia,” in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 281. 50. India is identified as a “key strategic partner” in Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 28. 51. Qian Qichen, Waijiao Shi Ji [Ten Episodes in Diplomacy] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2003), 306. 52. Thomas J. Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict,” Washington Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 7–21. 53. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chapter 9. 54. William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5–41. For an elaboration of the argument, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 55. Yong Deng, “Reputation and the Security Dilemma: China Reacts to the China Threat Theory,” in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 186-214. 56. Ross, “Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia,” 288. 57. Information Office of the State Council, “China’s National Defense in 2008,” (2009), 9. 58. Deng Xiaoping, “Guoji xingshi he jingji wenti” [The international situation and economic problems], in Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping], vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 356. The label “hegemonism” was reserved for both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 59. As Mearsheimer writes, “wealth is the foundation of military might.” Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 82. 60. Ye Zicheng, “Zhongguo maixiang shijie daguo zhi ru” [China’s road to a world great power], Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [Studies of International Politics] 3 (August 2003): 73–86; Shen Jiru, “Duobian waijoa he duoji shijie” [Multilateral diplomacy and multipolar world], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and International Politics] 10 (2001): 20–24. 61. Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 31, 216. 62. Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

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63. Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (October 2005), 19. 64. Bates Gill, “China’s Evolving Regional Security Strategy,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 247–265. 65. World Bank, World Development Indicators Online (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, various years). 66. Xinhua, “China’s Defense Budget to Grow 14.9% in 2009,” at http://www .chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009–03/04/content_7535244.htm. 67. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2009,” 31. 68. Kenneth Lieberthal, “China: How Domestic Forces Shape the PRC’s Grand Strategy and International Impact,” in Strategic Asia 2007–08: Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2007), 34. 69. Information Office of the State Council, “China’s National Defense in 2008,” 65–66. 70. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 223–224. Similarly, Goldstein argues that “the belief that China was rapidly increasing its military capabilities was unduly alarmist.” Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 55. 71. David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 76. 72. Michael D. Swaine, “China: Managing China as a Strategic Challenge,” in Strategic Asia 2008–09: Challenges and Choices, ed. Mercy Kuo, Ashley J. Tellis, and Andrew Marble (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008), 78. 73. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2009,” 21. According to this report, China’s efforts to modernize its military have made “considerable progress.” The PLA has strengthened capabilities in both deterrence and strategic strike, improved anti-access/area-denial capabilities, positioned itself to contest electromagnetic dominance in future campaigns, and shifted the military balance in the Taiwan Strait to Beijing’s favor (vii–viii). 74. Swaine, “China: Managing China as a Strategic Challenge,” 78. 75. Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein, “Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: China’s Response to U.S. Hegemony,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 6 (December 2006): 970–971. 76. Quoted in Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2005,” 12. This quote is cited again in the 2006 version of the report. Along the same line, a senior PLA researcher was quoted as saying, “China is concealed by the first island

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77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

82. 83.

84.

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chain. If it wants to prosper, it has to advance into the Pacific in which lies China’s future. Taiwan, facing the Pacific in the east, is the only unobstructed exit for China to move into the ocean. If this gateway is opened, then it becomes much easier for China to maneuver in the West Pacific.” Quoted in You Ji, “Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games,’ in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999), 89. On Taiwan’s strategic value to China throughout history, see Alan Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). Wang Baocun, “Zhuazhu wojun ‘kuayueshi’ fazhan jiyu” [Capturing the opportunity for “leapfrog” development], Liaowang [Outlook] 28 (2003): 21; Wu Yujin, “Zhengcue chuli wojun zhuanbei jianshe de si da guanxi” [Correctly handling the four major relations of our equipment development], ibid., 21–23. Jiang Lei, Xiandai Yi Lie Sheng You Zhanlue: Guanyu Yi Lieshi Zhuangbei Zhansheng Youshi Zhangbei Zhi Di De Zhanlue Zhidao [Modern Strategy of Pitting the Inferior Against the Superior: Strategic Guidance for Defeating the Enemy with Better Equipment] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1997), 2. This is his dissertation. Lt. Gen. Wang Houqing and Maj. Gen. Zhang Xingye, eds., Zhanyi Xue [The Study of Campaigns] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2000) (military circulation only): 28, quoted in Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 9. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangshui, Chao Xian Zhan: Dui Quanqiuhua Shidai Zhanzheng Yu Zhanfa De Xiangding [Unrestricted Warfare: Scenarios About War and War-Fighting Methods in the Era of Globalization] (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1999). Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up,” 9. See also Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: Norton, 2005), 136. Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability,” 154. This strategy is similar to “soft balancing,” defined as “actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies.” Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 10. Jin Xin, “Guanyu kaituo xinshiji woguo duobian waijiao gongzuo de jidian sikao” [A few thoughts regarding extending our country’s tasks of multilateral diplomacy in the new century], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics

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85. 86.

87. 88.

89.

90. 91. 92.

93. 94.

95.

96.

and International Politics] 10 (2001): 36–41; Chu Shulong, “Duobian waijiao: Fanchou, beijing ji Zhongguo de yingdui” [Multilateral diplomacy: Scope, background, and China’s responses], ibid., 42–44; Jiang Yi, “Zhongguo de duobian waijiao yu Shanghai hezuo zuzhi” [China’s multilateral diplomacy and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization], Eluosi Zhongya Dongou Yanjiu [Russia, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe Studies] 5 (2003): 46–51. Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 119–128; Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (New York: Routledge, 2006), 135. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 21. See also John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994–1995): 5–49. Wang Yizhou, Quanqiu Zhengzhi He Zhongguo Waijiao [Global Politics and China’s Foreign Policy] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2003), 274. Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 127. Similarly, Medeiros and Fravel write, “Chinese leaders began to recognize that such [multilateral] organizations could allow their country to promote its trade and security interests and limit American input.” Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (November–December 2003): 22–35. Christopher R. Hughes, “Nationalism and Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: Implications for Southeast Asia,” Pacific Review 18, no. 1 (March 2005): 120, 130. Kai He, Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic Interdependence and China’s Rise (New York: Routledge, 2008), 47. Alice D. Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-Century Asia,” Asian Survey 43, no. 4 (August 2003): 623. Chien-peng Chung, “The Shanghai Co-Operation Organization: China’s Changing Influence in Central Asia,” China Quarterly 180 (December 2004): 995. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 102. Fu Mengzi, “Bushi zhengfu dui Hua zhengce yu Zhong Mei guanxi de weilai” [The Bush administration’s policy toward China and the future of SinoAmerican relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] 1 (2003): 17–22. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “China Opposes U.S. Presence in Central Asia,” CNN. com (April 22, 2002), http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/22/ china.iran/index.html. “Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation” (Astana, July 5, 2005), http://www.sectsco.org/news_detail. asp?id=500&LanguageID=2.

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97. T.  V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 46–71. 98. Compared to Kosovo, China’s stance during the Iraq war was relatively lowkey. Sutter, “China’s Regional Strategy,” 295. 99. Warren Hoge, “Security Council Backs Sanctions on North Korea,” New York Times, October 15, 2006. China was highly critical of North Korea’s nuclear test. In an unprecedented move, Beijing called Pyongyang’s action “flagrant and brazen,” a term usually reserved for adversaries. 100. Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 130–135. 101. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2005,” 23. 102. Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 136–143. 103. Zhao Huasheng, “Zhong E muling youhao hezuo tiaoyue yu Zhong E guanxi” [Sino-Russian treaty of good-neighborliness and friendly cooperation and Sino-Russian relations], Eluosi Yanjiu [Russian Studies] 4 (September 2001): 2–8, 15. 104. Ye Zicheng, “Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue shi zai bi xing” [China must implement the strategy of great power diplomacy], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and International Politics] 1 (2000): 5–10. 105 Barry R. Posen, “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” Security Studies 15, no. 2 (April–June 2006): 149–186. 106. David Shambaugh, “China and Europe: The Emerging Axis,” Current History 103, no. 670 (September 2004): 243–248. 107. Mark R. Brawley, “The Political Economy of Balance of Power Theory,” in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T.V. Paul, James L. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” 37. 108. Lieberthal, “China,” 50. 109. Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-Century Asia,” 641. 110. Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 1 (2005): 102–122; Hughes, “Nationalism and Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy.” 111. Chris Alden, China in Africa (New York: Zed Books, 2007), 8–36. 112. Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 229. 113. Xinhua, “Speech by Chinese Premier at Opening Ceremony of ChinaAfrica Cooperation Forum” (December 16, 2003), at http://news.xinhuanet. com/english/2003–12/15/content_1233811.htm.

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114. He Li, “China’s Growing Interest in Latin America and Its Implications,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 4 (2007): 835. 115. Chung-chian Teng, “Hegemony or Partnership: China’s Strategy and Diplomacy toward Latin America,” in China and the Developing World, ed. Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham, and Derek Mitchell (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), 91-92. 116. Li, “China’s Growing Interest in Latin America and Its Implications,” 857– 858; Teng, “Hegemony or Partnership,” 104. 117. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006) (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2006), 41.

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GLOSSARY: CHINESE TERMS

Aguda Altan Khan Annan Arughtai Bagha-achi Bai Gui Ban Gu baochuan baojia Baozhou Beiping bi yi Bingchang Bohai Caishi Caizhou Cao Bin Cao Wei Changle Chaoxianzhan Chen Jiuchou Chen Zuyi cheng chen Cheng Wanli Chengtian Chijin Chong E

wang15140_gloss_index.indd 271

阿骨打 俺答 安南 阿魯台 把漢那吉 白圭 班固 寶船 保甲 保州 北平 敝邑 秉常 渤海 采石 蔡州 曹彬 曹瑋 長樂 超限戰 陳九疇 陳祖義 稱臣 程萬里 承天 赤金 种諤

Cui Han Da Dan daji daxueshi de dehua Deng Xiaoping Dingchuanzhai Dingzhou du ba dusi Esen Fan Ji Fan Zhongyan fanli fei gong Feng Guoyong Feng Sheng Fu Bi Fuli Ganzhou Gao Gong Gao Qiong Gaoliang River Gaoyangguan Gaozong ge

崔翰 韃靼 打擊 大學士 德 德化 鄧小平 定川寨 定州 獨霸 都司 也先 范濟 范仲淹 藩籬 非攻 馮國用 馮勝 富弼 符離 甘州 高拱 高瓊 高粱河 高陽關 高宗 戈

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272  GLOSSARY

gong Guannan Gui Er guo zi jian guo zi xue Guyuan Hami Han Chi Han Derang Han Shen Han Shizhong Han Tuozhou Handong Hanlin Haoshuichuan He Xi Hengcheng Hengshan heping fazhan Hongwu Hongxi Hongyanchi Hu Angang Hu Shining Huaiyuan Huan Kuan Huang Ming Zu Xun Huangtiandang Huo Tao ji Jia Yi Jiajing Jian Yi jianbi qingye Jiang Lei Jiang Zemin Jiangnan zhaoyu shi Jianwen Jiaozhi

wang15140_gloss_index.indd 272

攻 關南 桂萼 國子監 國子學 固原 哈密 韓琦 韓德讓 罕慎 韓世忠 韓侂冑 罕東 翰林 好水川 河西 橫城 橫山 和平發展 洪武 洪熙 紅鹽池 胡鞍鋼 胡世寧 懷遠 桓寬 皇明祖訓 黃天蕩 霍韜 擊 賈誼 嘉靖 蹇義 堅壁清野 蔣磊 江澤民 江南詔諭使 建文 交趾

jibai jie jinshi Jingtai jiu bian Juma River Junziguan juren Kaiping Karakorum keju Kou Zhun Kuang Ye kuayueshi fazhan Lan Yu Li Deming Li Jipeng Li Jiqian Li Wen Li Xian Li Zhi Li Zongmian Liangzhou Lingan Lingzhou Liu Guangshi Liu Ji Liu Lian Liu Ping Liu Yu Liuja Harbor Lizong Longxing Lu Xiufu Luchuan Luoyang Ma Wensheng Ma’alikhai Mancheng

擊敗 劫 進士 景泰 九邊 拒馬河 君子館 舉人 開平 和林 科舉 寇準 鄺埜 跨越式發展 藍玉 李德明 李繼捧 李繼遷 李文 李賢 李至 李宗勉 涼州 臨安 靈州 劉光世 劉吉 劉濂 劉平 劉豫 劉家港 理宗 隆興 陸秀夫 麓川 洛陽 馬文升 毛里孩 滿城

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GLOSSARY  273

manren Mao Zedong mazheng Ming Taizhu Moershan Naghachu nei ge nei sheng wai wang Ningxia Ningzong Oirat Ordos Ouyang Xiu Peng Dehuai Qi Qian Qichen qiangguo Qiao Xingjian Qigou Pass Qin Kuai Qingshuiying quan que ren ren zhe wu di Sanchuankou Sha Zhou shang guo Shangqiu Shanyuan Shaoxing Shen Weijing Shengzong Shi Hao Shi Jinqing Shi Yinhong shumishi Shunchang Shunyiwang

wang15140_gloss_index.indd 273

蠻人 毛澤東 馬政 明太祖 磨兒山 納哈出 內閣 內聖外王 寧夏 寧宗 瓦剌 河套 歐陽修 彭德懷 齊 錢其琛 強國 喬行簡 岐溝關 秦檜 清水營 權 却 仁 仁者無敵 三川口 沙州 上國 商丘 澶淵 紹興 沈惟敬 聖宗 史浩 施進卿 時殷弘 樞密使 順昌 順義王

Song Qi Song Yingchang Su Shi Su You Su Zhou suiluo Taiyuan Tang Shunzhi Tang Ze Tao An Toghon Tongguan Tumu tun tian Wang Anshi Wang Baocun Wang Chonggu Wang Fuzhi Wang Jinghong Wang Jisi Wang Qiong Wang Shao Wang Shu Wang Yizhou Wang Yue Wang Zhen Wanyan Zongbi Waqiao Pass wei wei Wei Huan weisuo wen Wen Jiabao Wen Zongren Weng Wanda Wokou wu Wu Yujin

宋琪 宋應昌 蘇軾 蘇祐 宿州 歲賂 太原 唐順之 唐澤 陶安 脫懽 潼關 土木 屯田 王安石 王保存 王崇古 王夫之 王景弘 王輯思 王瓊 王韶 王庶 王逸舟 王越 王振 完顏宗弼 瓦橋關 威 衛 魏煥 衛所 文 溫家寶 溫宗仁 翁萬達 倭寇 武 吳玉金

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274  GLOSSARY

wu xue Xia Yan Xia Yuanji Xiangyang Xiao Dalan Xiaozong Xinjiang Xinjiangkou Xiongnu Xiping xiucai xiyu Xu Chen Xu Jin Xuande Xue Juzheng xunfu Yan Song Yan Tie Lun Yang Bo Yang Jie Yang Jiemian Yang Jisheng Yang Rong Yang Shiqi Yang Yanlang Yang Yao Yang Ye Yanghe Yanyun yaojie Ye Sheng Yelu Xiezhen Yelu Xiuge yi rou ke gang yi yi zhi yi yi zhan

wang15140_gloss_index.indd 274

武學 夏言 夏原吉 襄陽 蕭撻覽 孝宗 新疆 新江口 匈奴 西平 秀才 西域 徐珵 許進 宣德 薛居正 巡撫 嚴嵩 鹽鐵論 楊博 楊偕 楊潔勉 楊繼盛 楊榮 楊士奇 楊延郎 楊么 楊業 陽河 燕雲 邀劫 葉盛 耶律斜軫 耶律休哥 以柔克剛 以夷制夷 義戰

Yingchang Yingzhou Yongle Yu Jing Yu Zijun Yuanhao Yue Fei Yuzhou zaixiang Zeng Xian zhai Zhang Fangping Zhang Fu Zhang Ji Zhang Jie Zhang Jun Zhang Juzheng Zhang Qixian Zhao Fan Zhao Fu (Ming) Zhao Fu (Song) Zhao Kuangyin Zhao Kui zheng Zheng Bijian Zheng He Zheng Qingzhi Zhengtong Zhenzhou zhi zhong wen qin wu Zhongwang Zhou Xing Zhu Xi Zhu Yuanzhang zhuyao duishou

應昌 瀛州 永樂 余靖 余子俊 元昊 岳飛 蔚州 宰相 曾銑 寨 張方平 張輔 張洎 張戒 張浚 張居正 張齊賢 趙范 趙輔 趙孚 趙匡胤 趙葵 征 鄭必堅 鄭和 鄭清之 正統 鎮州 止 重文輕武 宗望 周興 朱羲 朱元璋 主要對手

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Abbreviations JYYL

J ianyan Yi Lai Xi Nian Yao Lu [建炎以來繫年要錄 A Chronological Record of the Events Since Jianyan], compiled by Li Xinchuan [李心傳 1166–1243]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1956. JS J in Shi [金史 Jin History], compiled by Tuo-tuo [脫脫] et al., circa 1343. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975. LS L  iao Shi [遼史 Liao History], compiled by Tuo-tuo et al., circa 1343. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974. MCZY M  ing Chen Zou Yi [明臣奏議 Collected Memorials of Ming Ministers]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985. MJSWB M  ing Jing Shi Wen Bian [明經世文編 Collected Documents on Ming Statecraft]. Hong Kong: Zhuji shudian, 1964. MS M  ing Shi [明史 Ming History]. Taipei: Guofang yenjiu yuan, 1962. MSJSBM Ming Shi Ji Shi Ben Mo [明史紀事本末 A Detailed Account of the Events of Ming History], compiled by Gu Yingtai [谷應泰], c. 1650. Shanghai: Shangwu, 1933. MSL M  ing Shi Lu [明實錄 Veritable Records of the Ming]. Taipei: Zhongyang yenjiu yuan lishi yuwen yenjiu suo, 1963. MTJ M  ing Tong Jian [明通鑑 Comprehensive Mirror of the Ming], compiled by Xia Xie [夏燮], c. 1870. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959. SCZCZY Song Chao Zhu Chen Zou Yi [宋朝諸臣奏議 Collection of the Memorials of Song Ministers], compiled by Zhao Ruyu [趙汝愚], c. 1185. Shanghai: Guji chubanshe, 1999. SHYJG S  ong Hui Yao Ji Gao [宋會要輯稿 Collection of Materials from the Song Dynasty], compiled by Xu Song [徐松]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1957. SS S  ong Shi [宋史 Song History], compiled by Tuo-tuo [脫脫] et al., circa 1345. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977. SSJSBM S  ong Shi Ji Shi Ben Muo [宋史記事本末 A Detailed Account of the Events of Song History], compiled by Chen Banzhan [陳邦瞻], c. 1605. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977.

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276  BIBLIOGRAPHY

XCB

XZZTJ

X  u Zi Zhi Tong Jian Chang Bian [續資治通鑒長編 A Draft Sequel to the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government], compiled by Li Tao [李燾], c. 1170. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979. X  u Zi Zhi Tong Jian [續資治通鑒 Sequel to the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government], compiled by Bi Yuan [畢沅], c. 1800. Beijing: Guji chubanshe 1957.

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INDEX

Academy of Military Science, 1, 200, 201 accommodationist grand strategy, 31, 77, 79; of Ming dynasty, 135–138, 143, 172, 173; of Northern Song dynasty, 54–66; relative power and, 192; of Southern Song dynasty, 79, 83–99 Afghanistan, 150 Africa, 157, 180; PRC and, 206–208 aggression, 18, 20; anarchy and, 22; Chinese response to, 14, 18, 19; initiated by weakness, 67, 191; of Jin, 79; offensive grand strategy and, 23 agriculture, 41, 47, 81, 257n88; famine and, 64; fertile regions for, 122; markets, 137–138, 141; Ming grain production, 106, 110–111, 112, 113, 118, 125, 137, 153–154, 165; rice, 113, 153; Song farmlands, 87; tools for, 137. See also military colonies; peasants Aguda, Jin founding Emperor, 71, 73 Ahmad, Sultan, of Turfan, 169 air forces, 205; of PLA, 199, 200; U.S., 195. See also missiles Alakeshvara (Alagakkonara), king of Ceylon, 160–161 ‘Ali, Sultan, of Turfan, 167 Altan Khan (1507–1582), 127, 137, 138, 139, 142, 144, 250n157; grandson of, 140–141 Analects of Confucius, 18, 219n40, 222n70 anarchy, 6; as absence of central government above states, 76; definition of, 3, 12; of international system, 28, 184, 188, 194–195, 222n61; state aggression and, 12–13, 22; structural imperative

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of, 185; structural realism and, 5, 13, 19–24, 33, 98 Annam (Annan; Northern Vietnam). See Jiaozhi; Vietnam annihilation: of enemy, 80, 84, 91, 99, 144; of Mongols, 107, 123; wars of, 31, 75 antimilitarism, 3, 15–17, 18, 38, 184, 223n77, 213n21; of Confucian culture, 4, 14, 24–27, 36, 68, 74, 101–102, 119, 122, 133, 134, 143, 179, 187. See also Confucian pacifism appeasement, 49, 54, 99, 102, 172, 230n57, 249n127; of Liao by Song, 62, 63 Arughtai, Mongol chancellor, 114, 118, 124 Asia: balance of power in, 193, 194, 209; international history of, 146; power politics in, 75–76; structural realism in, 6; United States and, 194, 205. See also under names of regions Asia-Pacific region, 194 assassinations, 19, 65, 71, 90, 91, 95, 108, 120, 128, 152, 160, 166, 169, 202 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 203–204, 206 asymmetric warfare, 197, 201–202 Bäg Arslan, 125 Bagha-achi, 140–141 Bai Gui, Ming minister of war, 123, 125, 133 balance of power, 18, 19, 22, 23, 45, 181, 220–221n56; Asian, 193, 194, 209; between China, United States, and Soviet Union, 188–190; European

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296  INDEX

balance of power (continued) system of, 28; logic of, 186, 188; Mao and, 191; military, 7, 81, 83, 84, 90, 100, 206, 245n46; military preparations and, 51; Ming and, 106, 113–114, 115–116, 122, 132, 139, 143; realist theory and, 187; Song and, 74, 75, 79, 93, 95, 99, 231n69; in Taiwan Strait, 266n73; in triangular politics, 60 balancing, 199, 205–207, 220n56, 265n48; hard, 202; imbalance and, 203; internal, in Song dynasty, 66–68; smart, 197, 208; soft, 267n83 bandits, banditry, 64, 94, 97, 124, 133, 164 bandwagoning, 31, 150 Ban Gu (32–92 CE), Hanshu, 136 barbarians (yi), 3, 48, 50, 54, 60, 63, 67, 101, 108, 130, 131, 133, 136, 142, 168, 182, 254n38; extermination of, 138; Ming tribute system and, 147; untrustworthiness of, 239n47; in Western Regions, 167; Zheng He and, 164 Barfield, Thomas, 120 Beijing, 108, 116, 117, 127, 128, 132, 266n73; attacks on, 72, 73, 121; capture of, 96; construction of capital at, 118, 165; defenses of, 120–121; exposure of, 106; horses in, 110; as Jin Central Capital, 90; as Liao Southern Capital, 43, 44, 45; as Ming capital, 113, 246n58; Mongols and, 134, 135, 137, 139. See also People’s Republic of China Bell, Daniel, 3, 217n17 benevolence, 2, 18, 31, 47, 226n99; Confucian discourse and norms of, 26, 38, 66, 84, 122, 145, 185, 217n24; of moral armies, 19; of Zheng He’s expeditions, 159 Berger, Thomas U., 3 bilateral partnerships, 202, 204–208 Bingchang, Emperor (r. 1068–1086), 69 bipolarity, 34, 39, 55, 77 Blainey, Geoffrey, 45 Bohai, 39, 91; Gulf of, 42, 51 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 146 Buddhism, 227n7, 256n70 Bunyashiri, Mongol Khan, 114 bureaucracy: Chinese, 5, 37, 77; civil, 16; Confucianism in Ming, 103–106, 143

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Burma, 119, 156; Ming vs., 161–162 Bush, George W., 193 Cambodia, 190, 241n1 cavalry, 34, , 69, 106, 109, 119; Han, 113; horsemanship exams and, 223n83; Jin/ Jurchen, 80, 87, 91; Khitan, 46, 47, 51; Liao, 38, 43, 65; Ming, 110, 167, 260n134; Mongol, 95, 108, 115, 123, 126, 127, 135, 143, 149; Song, 48; Tangut, 58, 60 Central Asia, 169, 170, 204; imperialism in, 166; Kara Khitan in, 73; republics of, 204; Timurid Empire in, 150; United States and, 195 Central Committee of CCP, 197 Central Plains, 85, 91, 92, 98 Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 257n85; Zheng He’s voyages to, 160–161, 162 Champa, 41, 153, 241n1; Vietnam vs., 152, 157 Chan, Hok-Lam, 109 Changle, 159, 180, 257n80 Chenghua, Ming Emperor (r. 1465–1487), 105, 123, 124–125 Chengtian (Xiao) (d. 1009), empress dowager, 45, 46 Chen state, 155 Chen Zuyi, 159–160, 256n68 Chiang Kai-shek, 191 China, Imperial, 3, 7, 8, 14, 24, 25, 26–27, 32, 183–186; antimilitarism of, 16–18; Legalism in, 30, 188, 217n17–18. See also under names of dynasties and emperors Chinese culture, 17, 146, 164, 226n99, 254n38: as rational and pacifist, 2–3; spread of, 15. See also under Confucian entries Chinese intellectuals (shidaifu), 17, 25 Chinese strategic choice, 8, 9, 79, 100, 182, 186, 192, 224n87; theories of, 14–23 Chinggis Khan (Genghis Khan, Temujin; r. 1206–1227), 95, 96, 126 Chongzhen, Ming Emperor (r. 1628– 1644), 105 Choson dynasty (Korea; 1392–1910), 174 Christensen, Thomas J., 188, 189, 202 Christianity, 18 civil service: abolition of, 214n30;

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INDEX  297

Confucianism and, 15–16, 17, 36–37; examinations (keju), 25, 26, 77, 101, 103, 222n70, 224n86, 242n8; in Ming dynasty, 103–106 Clark, Donald N., 173–174 Clausewitz, Carl von, 14, 28 climate and weather, 98, 120, 123, 169, 176 Clinton, Bill, 193 Cohen, Warren, 149–150 Cold War, 188, 193, 194, 195, 197, 200, 203, 214–215n3, 265n58 College of Interpreters (hui tong guang), 171 Communists, Communist Party, 191, 197, 198, 202 “compellence,” 162 Confucian culture, 10, 15, 20, 33, 36, 85, 101, 104, 136, 137, 143, 144, 151, 179, 180, 214n30, 224n87; Chinese pacifism and, 1–7; dominance of, 38; ethnocentrism in, 138; in Korea, 173, 174; morality and moralism in, 18–19, 139, 186, 213n24; as nonfactor in Chinese decisions to use force, 74, 99–100, 181; in Song and Ming dynasties, 7–8, 34, 143; strategic culture of, 216n16, 224n87; structural imperatives vs., 185; as supplement to structural realism, 185–188. See also antimilitarism: of Confucian culture; Confucianism Confucianism, 14, 29, 37, 85, 100, 109, 122, 126, 134, 146, 150, 153, 180, 182, 186, 187, 214n30, 224n87, 225n98, 226n99; dominance of, in China, 5, 15; hierarchy in, 60, 136, 144, 145, 186; Imperial China’s security policy and, 186; institutionalization of, 7, 36; Legalism vs., 30; military force and, 1, 31; in Ming Dynasty, 25–26, 102–106, 109, 131, 136, 143, 151, 243n32; muscular, 182; neo-, 34, 36, 63, 79, 103, 227n7; principles of, 97, 168; ren and de in, 15–16; revival of, 3; in Song dynasty, 36–38, 79; as state ideology, 17; tribute system and, 150; world order of, 2, 136, 145, 146. See also Confucian culture; Confucianists; Confucian literature, classics; Confucian pacifism Confucianists, 2, 8, 9, 226n99; as scholar

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officials, 15, 17, 26, 30, 36, 37, 77, 134, 136, 165, 186, 188, 243n32; in Ming dynasty, 101–106, 243n32 Confucian literature, classics, 15, 16, 25, 27, 30, 38, 103, 109, 214n30, 218n35, 219n44, 222n70 Confucian pacifism, 2–7, 11, 13, 14–15, 23, 33, 66, 85, 100, 145, 180, 182, 183, 187– 189, 211n3, 225n98; Chinese security policy and, 11, 182; as core of Chinese tradition, 30; cultural realism vs., 19; defensive strategic culture and, 13, 17–18; definition of, 213n21; Great Wall as symbol of, 183; just war and, 18–19; Laozi compared to, 44; Ming dynasty and, 101–102, 107, 119, 121–122, 133, 151, 156, 179; Ming tribute system and, 145, 179; nonviolence under, 31; post-1949 foreign relations and, 189; of Song, 36, 38, 47, 49, 67, 79, 95, 99; Song-Jin peace and, 85–86; structural realism and, 43, 187–188; war aims and, 19, 30, 31–33, 144; Zheng He’s expeditions and, 159. See also antimilitarism; peace Confucius, 103, 131, 213n24, 225n95; on military force, 14; on military preparedness, 18; morality and, 19; on peace, 2; on the people, 219n40 constructivism, constructivists, 14, 21, 211n1, 215n4 coordination problem, 196, 197 corruption, 71, 133, 198, 236n171 coups d’état. See generals: coups by Creel, H. G., 17, 30 Cuba, 207 cultural anthropology, 11–12 cultural realism, 5, 11, 19–21, 23; China’s strategic behavior and, 4–5, 13; Confucian pacifism vs., 4, 10, 13, 19; problems with, 24–29, 30; structural realism vs., 5–6, 23, 29, 134 Cultural Realism (Johnston), 19–20, 25 cultural theory, 3–4, 12, 23, 214–215n3, 215n4 culture, 3, 9; influence of, on state behavior, 4, 6, 7; definition of, 12; strategic choice and, 11–33; superiority of, 145, 146. See also Chinese culture; Confucian culture; strategic culture

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298  INDEX

cyberwarfare, 200, 202 Daning, 116, 117 Daoism, 14, 89, 227n7 Datong, 116, 128, 129, 132, 137, 140, 142; horse fairs at, 138; as Liao Western Capital, 72; Mongol attacks on, 119, 120, 127, 135 Dayan Khan (Batu Möngke), 126–127 de (virtue), in Confucianism, 15–16 defensive grand strategy, 17–18, 30–32, 79, 181; Great Wall and, 101, 121–122; Ming, 107, 121–135, 143, 171; of PRC, 181, 192, 208; Song, 47–54, 60, 61, 79 defensive realism, 220–221n56 defensive strategic culture, 182; Confucianism and, 1–2, 13, 15 Deng Xiaoping, 2, 197, 198, 265n58 Desch, Michael, 186 deterrence, 31, 193–194 development. See economic development; leapfrog development; peaceful development Dingchuanzhai, Song defeat at, 61, 63 Dingzhou, Prefecture of, 48 diplomacy, 18, 130; in accommodationist grand strategy, 31; activist, 190; diplomatic offensive and, 202–208; economic, 202; Jin-Song, 87–90, 92–93; Liao-Song, 34, 40, 47, 53–55; Ming, 150, 176; naval force and, 162–166; proactive, 196; trade and, 136; Xi Xia, 60 Dongsheng, 116, 117 Dreyer, Edward, 27, 38, 109, 159, 164, 256n63, 256n67 East Asia, 206, 208, 213n24; American troops in, 193–194, 195; Chinese hegemony in, 8, 9, 165; historical records in, 9; Jurchen hegemony in, 80; lesser states of, 150; Liao Empire in, 34, 51; Ming hegemony in, 101, 109–111, 147, 153; peace in, 52, 55, 93; regional relations in, 146; triangular politics in, 57 Eastern Mongols (Da Dan), 113–114, 118, 166; Oirats vs., 121; Ordos region and, 122

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economic development, 208; primacy of, in peaceful development, 197–199 education: Confucianism and, 15–16, 25, 37, 103–105, 109; of elites, 34; military, 25 emperors, 2, 92; children as, 99; Confucianism and, 85, 103; tribute system and, 146. See also under names of individual emperors Engke Temur, 166 Esen (d. 1455), 118; death of, 121; invasion of China by, 119–121, 167 Eurasia, 95, 106, 193 Europe, 28, 166, 179, 185, 193, 195, 225n94; power politics in, 75–76; PRC and, 205–206 European Union (EU), 205–206 exceptionalism, 76, 184 expansion, expansionism, 4, 15, 22; Confucianism and, 187; Ming, 107, 109, 111, 116, 118, 154, 156, 179; of Northern Song, 75; in offensive grand strategy, 31; security and, 182; structural realism and, 157, 187, 180; of Tanguts, 58, 59; of Turfan, 169 Fairbank, John King, 2–3, 15, 17, 34, 145, 147, 257n88 Fan Zhongyan (998–1052), 17, 60, 61, 63; Qingli Reforms and, 64 Far East, 188 Farmer, Edward, 111, 113 firearms, 115, 132 Five Classics, 25, 103 Five Year Plans, 198 Forage, Paul, 69 force (li), military force, 1, 3, 6, 14, 18, 23, 24, 51, 67, 70, 90, 102, 119, 126, 129, 133, 143, 145, 146, 155, 173, 180, 183, 184, 187, 201, 205; civilian control of, 16; Confucian principles and, 31; constraints on, 2, 186, 187; defensive use of, 4, 19; as last resort, 14, 31; Ming tribute system and, 145, 149–150; non-use of, 187; offensive use of, 4, 31, 40, 43–44; pacifism vs., 213n21; state security and, 28, 79, 84, 181; strategic decisions involving, 8, 20, 45–47,

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INDEX  299

68–70, 93–95; threat of, 149, 159, 161, 162; use of, 9, 22, 30, 33, 68, 74, 97, 115, 143, 151, 159, 161, 168, 183, 189; virtue and, 67. See also violence; wu foreign policy, 2; compromise in, 136; ethnocentrism in, 138, 139; Ming guidelines for, 101; Ming tribute system and, 146–147, 179; state security and, 20. See also diplomacy Four Books, 25, 103 Four Generals, 88. See also under names of individual generals France, 122, 204, 205–206 Fu Bi, 61, 62, 63, 66 Fujian, 159, 165 Gansu, 107, 119, 128, 129, 167, 169–172, 235n150 Ganzhou, 59 Gaoliang River, 43, 44 Gaoyangguan, Prefecture of, 48 Gaozong, Southern Song Emperor (r. 1127–1162), 80–86, 88–89, 91, 239n37 generals: in Chinese society, 17; coups by, 71, 81, 88, 91, 95, 113; grudges between, 92; Khitan, 45, 53; in Korea, 174; Ming, 26, 101, 107, 108, 114, 123, 125, 153, 253n32; PLA, 1, 200, 201, 211n3; Qing, 218n35; Song, 43, 46, 55, 60–61, 63, 67, 69, 70, 88–89, 90, 93, 232n89. See also warlords, warlordism Genghis Khan. See Chinggis Khan Germany, 5, 11, 13, 122, 198, 205, 206 Gilpin, Robert, 22, 73, 221n60 Gobi Desert, 106, 108, 114 Golden Tablets, 87 Goldstein, Avery, 188, 205, 266n70 Goncharov, Sergei, 188 Grand Canal, 113, 165 grand strategy, 9, 10, 11, 20, 30, 33. See also accommodationist grand strategy; defensive grand strategy; offensive grand strategy Great Britain, 13, 147, 205–206 “Great Ditch of China,” 51, 228n23, 231n69 Great Wall, 1, 2, 9, 106, 116, 117 (map), 134, 142; building of, 121–126, 135;

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as symbol, 101, 183. See also Ming dynasty: defenses of; Nine Garrisons Guam, 195 Guangdong, 99, 160 Guannan region, 42, 52, 53, 62 Guanxi, 127, 153 Guan Yu, 89 guerrilla warfare, 50, 51, 58, 154 Guyuan, 126, 128, 129 Hailing, Prince (Wanyan Liang), 90–91 Hami (Qomul), 9, 151, 180; as Ming vassal, 166–173, 177, 179; Turfan vs., 148–149 Handel, Michael I., 28 Han Derang, General, 45 Handong, 169 Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), 15–16, 30, 130–131, 136, 214n30, 229n31, 249n127; campaigns of, on steppes, 113; Confucianism in, 17, 223n77; debates in, 225–226n99; power of, 217n17; Vietnam and, 151–152, 155; Xiongnu and, 48, 56, 83, 109 Hangzhou, 113 Hanlin Academy, 172 Han Qi, 60–61 Hansan Island, Battle of, 175 Han Shen, 168, 169 Han Shizhong, General, 84, 88 Han Tuozhou, 93–95 Han Wudi, Emperor (r. 141–87 BCE), 15, 19 Haoshuichuan, Song defeat at, 61, 63 harmony, 1, 2, 4, 18, 179. See also benevolence; peace Hebei Plain, 40, 41, 47, 50, 51, 53 hegemony: ba dao (hegemonic way), 1, 15, 17; China’s claims to, 150; in East Asia, 8, 109–111, 161; hegemonic war and, 73–74; hegemonism and, 197, 207, 265n58; of United States, 193, 194, 203, 209, 264n46. See also regional hegemon Henan, 47, 86–87, 92, 96–97, 240–241n75 Hengcheng, 125 Hengshan, 68 He Xi region, 59

10/14/10 9:47 AM

300  INDEX

Hideyoshi Toyotomi (1536–1598), 174–178 hierarchy: Asians and, 145–146; Confucian, 60, 136, 144; tribute system and, 150, 186 Hindus, 152 Hongwu, founding Emperor of Ming dynasty (r. 1368–1399), 26, 101, 105, 116, 132, 149, 241n1, 243n20; Ancestral Injunctions, 155; attacks against Mongols by, 107; civil service exams under, 242n8; Confucianism and, 103, 104; death of, 109, 154; Japan and, 150; military colony system under, 118, 127; Vietnam and, 152; Western Regions and, 166 Hongxi, Ming Emperor (r. 1424–1426), 154 Hongzhi, Ming Emperor (r. 1488–1505), 105, 126, 169, 170 Hsiao Kung-chuan, 30 Huai River, 87, 91, 92 Huang, Ray, 67, 118, 129 Hu Angang, 192 Huang Ming Zu Xun (Ancestral Injunctions), 101 Huangtiandang, naval battle of, 80–81 Hucker, Charles O., 27, 103, 223n74, 242n13 Huhehot, 127 Huizong, Song Emperor, 73, 74, 80, 81, 85, 89 Hu Jintao, president, 2 Huntington, Samuel, 145–146, 194 Hu Shining, 171, 172 ideational, 3, 5, 6, 12, 23, 26, 36, 79 ideology, 5, 13, 185; Confucian, 7, 16, 34, 36, 109; idealpolitik and, 190–191; realpolitik vs., 188–189; state, 15, 17 Imperial Guards (Ming), 139 India, 28, 157, 195, 265n50 Indian Ocean, 157, 164, 182 Indonesia, 159 infantry, 34, 60, 87, 113, 135. See also troops inflation, 64, 95 information technology (IT), 201 Inner Asia, 9, 38, 40, 57, 61, 151, 166, 167, 168 Inner Mongolia, 106, 107, 127

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internal rectification, 97–98, 134 international economy, 208 international politics, 4, 75; anarchy and, 188; international organizations and, 202–203; military force and, 22; power in, 21, 191. See also power politics international relations (IR), 145–146, 160, 215n3, 217n21; cultural variables in, 12; in Imperial China, 24; Ming tribute system and, 150; in non-Western world, 6; question of aggression in, 11–13, rise of China and, 1; theory of, 3, 6, 185 Iran, 150, 204, 208 Iraq War, 204, 205, 207 Japan, 3, 11, 203, 214n30, 241n1; cultural realism and, 5; economy of, 198; Ming tribute system and, 148–150; Ming vs., 111, 151, 173–179, 180; pirates and, 107, 165, 258n90; Qing dynasty and, 191; United States and, 5, 195, 265n48. See also Sino-Japanese War Java, 161, 241n1, 253n23, 257n85 Jiajing, Ming Emperor (r. 1522–1567), 105, 132, 133, 137–138, 140, 171, 172 Jiang Lei, Colonel, 201 Jiangxi, 127 Jiang Zemin, 202, 204 Jianwen, Ming Emperor (r. 1399–1402), 109 Jian Yi, 154, 155 Jiaozhi (Northern Vietnam), 151–152, 153–154, 155. See also Vietnam Jia Yi (201–160 BCE), 130, 131, 136 Jin dynasty (1115–1234), 71, 78, 247n91; Later, 53; Sixteen Prefectures and, 39; Song and, 9, 72–74, 81–83, 87–90, 92–99, 182; strength of, 77, 84, 150. See also Jurchens Jingtai, Ming Emperor (r. 1450–1457), 105, 120 jinshi degree, 37, 38, 67, 125, 103–105, 131, 218n28 Jizhou, 128, 129 Johnston, Alastair Iain, 4, 21, 24, 28, 29, 213n23, 214n1, 225n95, 226nn103–104, 244–245n40; Cultural Realism, 19–20, 216n16; on material structures, 12

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INDEX  301

Junziguang, Song defeat at, 53 Jurchens, 100, 127, 147, 174, 185, 239n37; Liao vs., 72–73; rising power of, 70–71, 85; Song alliance with, 55, 72, 90; Song vs., 34, 73, 79, 80, 90–93, 99; Xi Xia alliance with, 74 just war, 18–19, 79, 153, 155, 156, 219n44 Kaifeng, 73, 74, 87, 90, 96, 97, 98; as Northern Song capital, 39, 50, 52, 53, 89 Kaiping, 116, 117 Kanenaga, Prince, of Japan, 149 Kang, David, 146, 213n26 Kang, Prince, 80 Kangxi, Qing Emperor (r. 1661–1722), 222n70 Karakorum, as Mongol capital, 106, 107 Katzenstein, Peter, 3 Kazakhstan, 73 Kerülen River, 114, 115 Khitans, 41, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 62, 68, 91, 185, 230n57; Liao Empire and, 38, 45, 73; rebellion of, 92, 93 Khmer Rouge, 190 Khubilai Khan, 98 Kissinger, Henry, 194 Konishi, Joan, 176 Kou Zhun, Song Grand Councilor, 52 Korea, 9, 39, 90, 149, 203, 241n1; Confucian pacifism and, 180; Japanese invasions of, 174–178; as Jurchen vassal, 74; Liao and, 46, 57, 70; Ming and, 111, 151, 173–179, 180, 260n134; Mongols vs., 98; Song and, 41. See also Korean War; North Korea Korean War (1950–1953), 189 Kosovo, 200, 204, 207 Kuang Ye, Ming minister of war, 119 Kuhn, Dieter, 34, 227n7 Labs, Eric, 43 Lan Yu, Ming General, 108 Laozi, 14, 44. See also Daoism Later Shu, 39 Later Zhou dynasty (950–960), 52, 53 Latin America, 207 Lattimore, Owen, 166 Lau, Nap-Lin, 41, 51

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leapfrog development (kuayueshi fazhan), 201 Leffler, Melvyn, 193 Left Guard, 127 Legalism (fa ja), 30, 67, 225–226n99 Lei Haizong, 17 Le Loi, as Vietnamese rebel, 155–156 Le Qui-ly (ca. 1335–1407), as usurper in Vietnam, 152–153, 253n32 Lewis, John, 188 Liangzhou, 50, 58, 59 Liaodong, 119, 128, 129 Liao dynasty (907–1125) and Empire, 35, 38, 42, 54, 247n91; capitals of, 70, 71, 72; internal strife in, 70–71; Northern Han and, 40, 41, 261n2; Northern Song dynasty vs., 9, 34, 39, 44–47, 49–54, 55, 75, 182, 186, 229n31, 231n69, 231n81; strength of, 34; Tanguts and, 58, 65; Xi Xia alliance with, 57, 61; weakness and demise of, 53, 72–73, 232n89 Liao History, 46 Li Deming, 58–59 Li Jijun, Lieutenant General, 1 Li Jipeng, 58 Li Jiqian, 50, 58 Lingan (Hangzhou), 91; as Song capital, 81, 85, 113 Lingzhou (Xiping), 69–70, 71 Liu Guangshi, General, 88 Liujia Harbor, 159, 164, 179 Liu Yu, as Qi leader, 82–83 Li Xian, Ming senior Grand Secretary, 123, 125, 133, 137 Lizong, Southern Song Emperor (r. 1224–1264), 98 Loewe, Michael, 19 Longqing, Ming Emperor (r. 1567–1573), 105, 138, 141 Longxing Northern Expedition, 92 Longxing Peace Accord (1165), 92–93, 95 Lorge, Peter, 39, 51, 91, 231n69, 237n177 Luchuan state, 119, 156 Luoyang, 97, 98 Lu Xiufu, 99 Mancall, Mark, 17, 145 Manchuria, 71, 81, 85, 90, 107, 118, 174

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302  INDEX

Manchus, 7, 71, 115, 214n30, 222n70; Ming vs., 142, 177–178. See also Qing dynasty Maoist China, 21, 28, 29, 191; realpolitik in, 188–189. See also People’s Republic of China Mao Zedong, 28, 188; Korea and, 178, 189; as realist, 189; revisionism of, 190, 191 maritime expeditions, 9, 154, 157, 159–162, 163, 179, 180, 256n67, 257n88 material structure, 12, 13, 20 Mearsheimer, John, 22, 23, 111, 221n59 Mencius (372–289 BCE), 16, 18, 20, 213n24, 216n16, 219n44, 222n70, 225n95 mercantilism, 207 methodology, 6–7 Middle East, 166, 207, 257n84 military: civilian control of, 36, 88–89; communications of, 87; conquest, 15; coordination of, 92; education of, 26–27, 223n83; exercises of, 205; expenditures on, 49; information technology and, 201; intelligence and, 125, 132; preparedness of, 18, 51; strategy and strategists of, 1–2, 6, 115–116. See also balance of power: military; war; war aims military colonies (tun tian), 106, 110, 118, 127, 128, 172; agricultural production of, 153–154; Great Wall and, 125 military modernization, 190, 199–202, 264n47, 266n73; as defensive, 194; economic growth and, 196, 197; Russia and, 205 military texts, 24–27, 28–29, 223n83; bingshu, 85; cultural realism and, 30 militias, 51, 66–67, 70, 81 Ming dynasty (1368–1644), 7–8, 17, 25–29, 90, 182, 223n83, 257n85; accommodationist grand strategy of, 102, 135–138, 143, 172, 173; bureaucracy of, 103–106, 223n74, 242n13; defenses of, 107, 108, 116–119, 138, 143, 183, 243n20; defensive grand strategy of, 102, 121–135, 143, 171; finances of, 106, 109, 114–116, 118, 128–129, 132–133, 138–140, 142, 144, 156, 157, 165, 171, 176–178; hardliners in, 130, 131, 137, 142, 171, 172; Japan vs., 151, 173– 179; maritime expeditions of, 151, 154, 157–166, 179, 182; Mongol settlement

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with (1571), 138–143, 186; Mongols vs., 9, 20, 106–109, 111–115, 157, 165, 179, 182–183, 244–245n40, 245n46, 248n94; northern frontier and, 107, 110, 111, 113–116, 121–129, 135, 143, 186, 246n58, 250n157; offensive grand strategy of, 101, 106–122, 130–132, 143, 182; power of, 9, 106, 109, 110, 116, 154, 165, 166; pragmatists in, 130, 134; realpolitik model and, 24–25; tribute system of, 9, 145–151, 179, 180, 251n7, 253n23; Vietnam and, 151–157, 182, 253n34, 253–254n35, 261n2; weakness of, 132, 135, 138, 156, 171, 173, 178, 183, 248n94; Western Regions and, 166–173 Ming Shi (Ming History), 107, 159, 165, 170, 177 Ming Shi Lu (Veritable Records of the Ming), 107, 159, 253n35, 254n38 missiles, 188, 199, 200, 205 Moghuls, 167 Mohism (Mozi), 14 Möngke Khan, 98 Mongolia, 96, 108, 118, 126–127, 166. See also Inner Mongolia; Mongols; Outer Mongolia Mongols, 7, 37, 99, 111, 147, 166, 174, 185, 222n70; conquest of China by, 98–99; divisions among, 113–115, 127, 132; Henan and, 240–241n75; Jin vs., 93, 95, 96; Ming settlement with (1571), 138–143, 177, 186; Ming vs., 9, 20, 101, 106–109, 111–115, 157, 165, 173, 179, 182–183, 244–245n40, 245n46, 248n94, 250n157; rising power of, 118–121, 132; Southern Song alliance with, 95–96; Southern Song vs., 98, 241n75; trade and, 130, 135–139, 141–144, 186; weakness of, 106, 108, 115. See also Chinggis Khan; Yuan dynasty Morgenthau, Hans J., 191 Moscow, 188, 190, 205 Mote, F. W., 51, 56, 67, 77, 79, 239n37 multilateral institutions, 202–203, 213n23, 268n88 Muslims, 150, 204, 257n84 Myongnyang, Battle of, 177 Naghachu, 107–108

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INDEX  303

Nanchang, 127 Nanjing (Jinling), 52, 78, 117, 157, 158, 165; as Ming capital, 113, 153, 160 Nanping, 39 Nathan, Andrew, 188 National Academy (Ming dynasty), 103 nationalism, Yue Fei and, 89–90 National People’s Congress, 198 NATO, 200, 204, 205, 207 naval power, 205, 206; geographic basis of, 257–258n89; of Japan, 175, 177; of Jin, 91; of Korea, 175, 177; of Ming, 111, 118, 157, 159–162, 177, 187; Mongol lack of, 98; of PLA, 199, 200; of rising states, 23; of Southern Song, 80–82, 91, 98; threats to use, 162; of United States, 195, 200. See also maritime expeditions Needham, Joseph, 157 New Policies, Wang Anshi’s (1069–1073), 67, 68 Nine Garrisons (jiu bian), 122, 128–129, 141. See also Great Wall Ningxia, 126, 128, 129, 175, 178–179 Ningzong, Southern Song Emperor (r. 1195–1224), 95 Nixon, Richard M., 188 norms, 12, 184, 185, 211n1 North China, 41, 53, 64, 67, 77, 80, 121 Northeast Asia, 151 Northern Han, 40, 43, 58; Song campaign against, 40–44 Northern Song dynasty (960–1127), 9, 34, 41, 77, 88, 90, 97, 113, 122; defensive grand strategy of, 47–54, 230n57; emperors of, 75, 89; fall of, 70–74, 79; Jurchen alliance with, 72, 90, 96; Liao vs., 39, 42, 44–47, 49–54, 55, 229n31, 231n81; offensive grand strategy of, 40–47, 66–70, 74, 75; power of, 38–41, 75; reforms of, , 64, 66–67; Tanguts vs., 58–59; weakness of, 63, 64, 217n17; Xi Xia vs., 60, 66–70. See also Song dynasty North Korea, 204, 269n99 Noryang, Battle of, 177 nuclear weapons, 195, 204, 269n99 Nye, Joseph S., 193

wang15140_gloss_index.indd 303

Oda Nobunaga, 174 offense-defense theory, 221, 245n46 offensive realism, 4–5, 21, 23, 99 offensive grand strategy, 6, 10, 19, 22, 48–50, 53, 57, 59, 73, 79, 85, 86, 101, 102, 111, 114, 116, 121, 122, 124, 143, 206; of China, 2, 4–5, 18, 181; condemnation of, 14; expansive, 21; of Ming, 101, 106–121, 122, 130–132, 143; of PRC, 208; relative power and, 192; of Song, 39, 40–47, 60, 61, 66–70, 74, 75, 93–98; structural realism and, 31, 33; of West, 17 Ögödei (d. 1241), 96, 98 Oirats, 118–121, 141, 148, 166, 169 Okawara, Nobuo, 3 Onon River, 114 Opium War (1839–1842), 191 Ordos region (He Tao), 50, 57, 58, 73, 117, 122, 167; Great Wall and, 125; Ming recovery of, 116, 123, 128–135; Mongols and, 126–127, 131 Outer Mongolia, 107 Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072), 63, 64, 136 Pacific Ocean, 194 Panama Canal, 207 Pang Ji, 60–61 parabellum strategic culture, 19–21, 29 passes (mountain), 41, 42, 43, 46, 53, 97 peace, 21, 65–66, 83–84; as beneficial, 63; China’s cultural preference for, 2, 18, 54, 59; heqin, 232n94; between Japan and Ming, 176; Jin faction for, 86; between Mongols and Ming, 140–142; negotiations for, 53–54, 59; between Song and Jin, 77, 80, 85–86, 87–90, 92–93; between Song and Liao, 40, 47, 48; Song faction for, 44, 45–46, 68, 75, 87, 91, 92, 95; between Song and Xi Xia, 61, 63–65; following Treaty of Shanyuan, 54–57, 62; war vs., 81–83; world, 205, 207, 264n47. See also Confucian pacifism; Longxing Peace Accord; Shaoxing Peace Accord; Treaty of Shanyuan peaceful development (heping fazhan), as current grand strategy of PRC, 10, 190, 196–208

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304  INDEX

peasants, 47, 124, 236n171 Peng Dehuai, Marshall, 189 Pentagon, 193, 194, 205 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 1–2, 189, 199–201, 262n18, 266n73 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 3, 188, 189, 196, 197, 200; Africa and, 206–207; current grand strategy of, 10, 190, 196–208; defense spending of, 199, 199; defensive grand strategy of, 181, 192; economic growth of, 196–198, 199; European Union and, 205–206; foreign policy of, 188, 190; founding of, 190; Latin America and, 207; military modernization of, 190, 194, 199–202; power gap between United States and, 192–193, 208; power politics and, 188–191; relations of, with United States, 188–190, 194–196, 201–205, 257– 258n89; relative power of, 192, 208; rise of, 1, 194, 198, 202, 208, 255n61; Russia and, 205; security policy of, 190; Taiwan and, 195, 266–267n76; trade relations of, 206–208. See also Maoist China Perdue, Peter, 115, 149, 214n30 Persia, 166 Persian Gulf, 157, 200 pirates, piracy, 107, 159–160, 165, 175, 178, 258n90 policy memorials (zouzhe), as research source, 9 Posen, Barry, 206 power, 6, 11, 13, 23, 89, 92, 97, 192; measuring of, 32; centralization of, 90, 109; fluctuations in Chinese, 3, 4–5, 181; in international politics, 21–22, 75–76, 191; Ming, 8, 9, 101, 106, 109, 127–130; Mongol, 118–119; projection of, 41, 111, 121, 127, 157, 162, 164, 179, 182, 200; reality of, 36, 77; relative, 183, 192, 208; security and, 67, 182, 191; Song, 38–41, 68–69; structure of, 34, 182; vacuums of, 97, 98. See also balance of power; force; power politics power politics, 184, 197, 225n94; ideology and, 188; learning of, 5, 76; modern Chinese, 188–191; practice of, 75–76 preemption, 98, 189

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process tracing, 6–7 psychological warfare, 15, 189, 202 Pusan, 174, 176 Pyongyang, 174, 175, 176, 177, 260n134, 269n99 Qi, 81–83, 86, 219n44 Qian Qichen, 2, 195 Qian Ruoshui, 50 Qiao Xingjian, 97 Qigou Pass, Battle of, 46 Qin dynasty, 2, 30, 151–152 Qing dynasty (1644–1911), 7, 115, 142, 159, 162, 222n70, 223n83; generals in, 218n35; jinshi in, 218n28; military exams in, 224n86; military hegemony of, 252–253n22; non-Chinese traditions of, 214n30; Western influences in, 182, 191 Qingli Reforms (1043–1045), 64, 234n128 Qingshuiying, 125 Qin Kuai, 83, 88 Qin Yaqing, 2 Qinzong, Song Emperor, 74, 81–82, 89 Qiu Chong, 95 Qiu Fu, Ming General, 114 RAND Corporation, 189 rationalism, 2 realism, 221–222n61: Chinese behavior and, 23, 28, 183, 187, 188, 190; classical, 191; cultural theories vs., 12; Legalism and, 30; realists and, 211n1, 214–215n3. See also structural realism; defensive realism; offensive realism realpolitik, 29; as China’s strategic culture, 4–5, 23, 24–27, 28, 29, 37, 181, 189, 213n23, 225n98; cultural realism and, 13, 19–21; idealpolitik vs., 190–191; roots of China’s, 184–185; Sino-Soviet alliance and, 188; of West, 1, 21; Yongle’s strategy of, 113–115 rebels, rebellions, 97, 133, 161, 170; Huang Chao, 58; by Khitan, 92, 93; against Jin, 95; against Ming, 107, 121, 135, 139, 142, 175, 178; against Mongols, 101; of Prince Yan, 109; against Song, 87, 236n171; by Vietnam, 154, 155 Red River delta, 153

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INDEX  305

Red Salt Lake (Hongyanchi), 125 regional hegemon, 23, 101, 111, 161; China as benign, 4, 15; of East Asia, 8, 9, 80; Ming dynasty as, 109–110, 179; U.S. interest in preventing rise of, 193–194; war and, 73–74 ren (benevolence), in Confucianism, 15–16 Renzong, Emperor (r. 1022–1063), 60, 63, 69, 70 Republlic of China, 191 revanchism, of Southern Song and, 77, 96–98 revisionism, 22, 190, 191 Ricci, Matteo, S.J., 17, 147–148 Ross, Robert, 188, 189, 257–258n89 Rossabi, Morris, 98 Russia, 204, 205. See also Soviet Union Sachon, 177 Sanchuankou, Song defeat at, 60, 63 Sawyer, Ralph, 3, 26, 223n77 Schelling, Thomas, 162 Schwartz, Benjamin I., 182 Scobell, Andrew, 2, 11, 225n98 scorched-earth policy, 69 security competition, 75; between United States and China, 193–196, 208–209, 211n1, 264n47 security policy, 16, 20, 21, 22, 31, 36, 77; of China toward main rivals, 9, 11; expansionist, 4; force and, 28, 181; Ming, 101, 102, 111, 113, 122, 126; national, 28, 178, 185; of PRC, 188, 190; Song, 9, 39, 44, 46, 60, 75, 81, 90, 99; tribute system and, 146–147, 167; of United States, 193. See also Confucian pacifism; cultural realism; structural realism security studies, 11–13 Sekandar, 161 self-defense, 4, 18, 19, 79, 99 self-help systems, 13 Semudera, 161 Seoul, 174, 176, 177 Serruys, Henry, 147 Seven Military Classics, 5, 20, 24–27, 222n70 Shaanxi, 61, 124, 129, 130, 142; drought in, 169, 170, 172; Jin and, 81, 87; Mongol

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raids in, 122; pacification of, 60; Song access to, 82, 86 Shahrukh Bahadur, 150 Shamba, 169, 170 Shambaugh, David, 145, 264nn46–47 Shandong, 91 Shanghai, 159 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 204 Shangqiu, 80, 97 Shanxi Province, 39, 64, 122, 128 Shanyuan (Chanyuan), Treaty of, 47, 52, 54–55, 62, 75, 86 Shaoxing Peace Accord (1141), 89–90, 92, 93 Shazhou, 170, 171 Shengzong, Liao Emperor (r. 982–1031), 45, 46 Shenzong, Song Emperor (r. 1067–1085), 66, 67, 68 Shen Weijing, 176 Shi Hao, 91 Shi Jinqing, 160 Shi Yinhong, 192 Shizong, Jin Emperor, 91 Shunchang, 87 Sichuan, 39, 81, 82, 107 Silk Road, 166 Sima Qian (145–87 BCE), Shiji, 136 Sinocentrism, 138, 144, 251n5; of Ming tribute system, 146, 176; of Ming world order, 153; of Song world order, 234n116 Sino-Japanese War (1592–1598), 9, 151, 173–179 Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 189–190 Sixteen Prefectures of Yanyun, 38–39, 42, 53, 122, 228n18; annulment of Song claims to, 54; Jin and, 72; Liao and, 41, 43, 232n89; Song attempts to conquer, 44, 45–47; Song security and, 48, 49, 75, 172. See also Guannan Snyder, Jack, 28 Song dynasty (960–1279), 7–9, 16, 25, 34, 35, 39, 90, 106, 124, 172, 186, 223n83, 224n86; bureaucracy of, 228n16; Confucianism in, 36–38, 182; emperors of, 40, 77, 81; finances of, 55–56,

10/14/10 9:47 AM

306  INDEX

Song dynasty (continued) 63, 64, 66, 68–69, 81, 83–84, 86, 87; Vietnam and, 152; Xi Xia vs., 50, 51, 55. See also Northern Song dynasty; Southern Song dynasty Song Qi, 45, 229n47 Song Shi, 37, 38 Song Shi Ji Shi Ben Muo, 94 Song Yingchang, 175 Sonjo, Korean king, 175 South Asia, 195 South China, 98–99 South China Sea, 200, 204 Southeast Asia, 149, 151, 156, 190, 203–204, 206; Zheng He expeditions and, 157, 164, 182 Southern Han, 39 Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), 78, 80–83, 99, 113, 237n1, 239n37; accommodationist strategy of, 83–99; defenses of, 96–98; Jin vs., 86–88, 90–98; Mongol alliance with, 95–96; Mongols vs., 98; Northern Song and, 77, 89; offensive strategy of, 93–98; peace between Jin and, 87–90, 92–93; weakness of, 77, 84, 86, 93, 97, 100, 150, 217n17 Soviet Union, 197–199, 265n58; Chinese alliance with, 188, 205; collapse of, 192, 197, 215n3; Vietnam and, 189–190. See also Russia spheres of influence, 31 Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Zheng He’s voyages to, 160–161 Sri Parakrama Vijaya Bahu VI, of Ceylon, 160 Stalin, Joseph, 189 state, states, 18; anarchy and, 76; behaviors of, 12–13, 15, 196; centralization of power of, 90; dispute resolution of, 11; powerful, 222n61; relief from, 64; rising, 23; security behaviors of, 21; strategic choice of, 6 static defense, 31, 46, 48, 133, 134 status quo policy, 22, 31, 178, 189, 211n1 steppe, 107, 136; cavalry on, 110; difficulty of campaigning on, 113, 114, 119, 143; Ming and, 116, 121, 248n94; Manchus and, 115; people from, 166

wang15140_gloss_index.indd 306

strategic choice, 143, 181; case studies of, 8–9; culture and, 11–33; decisionmaking process and, 6, 122; power structure and, 182. See also Chinese strategic choice strategic culture, 4, 11–13, 19–21, 23, 28–30, 37, 187, 216n16, 225n94, 262n18; Confucian, 7, 27, 126, 224n87; cultural realism and, 5, 23, 225n98; defensive, 1–3; mischaracterization of Chinese, 24–27; realpolitik, 4, 5, 23; Seven Military Classics and, 26 strategic logic, of peaceful development, 196–208 “strong country” (qiangguo), 191–192 structural realism, 21–23, 32, 36, 187, 216n8, 220n56; China as case of, 5–6; Chinese security policy and, 11; Confucian culture and, 6–7, 30, 185–188; cultural realism and, 29; culture in, 3; expansionism and, 157, 180; hypothesis of, 33; Ming and, 102, 110, 122, 125, 134, 139, 143, 151, 156, 168, 173, 179; offensive grand strategy and, 31; power and, 7, 32, 185, 196; PRC and, 190–191, 208; Song and, 36, 41, 43–44, 48–49, 60, 64, 74, 75, 79, 98. See also defensive realism; offensive realism; material structures structural theory, 13, 184 Sui dynasty (589–617), 124 Sumatra, 159, 161, 241n1, 256n68, 257n85 Sun Yat-sen, 191 Sunzi (Sun Tzu), 28, 132, 187; The Art of War, 14 Su Shi, 68 Su You, 137 suzerains, suzerainty. See vassals, vassalage / suzerains, suzerainty Suzhou, 92 Taihang Mountains, 51 Taiwan, 191, 266n73; expansion of PRC and, 266–267n76; United States and, 195, 199–200 Taiyuan, 41 Taizong, Song Emperor (Kuangyi), 39, 41, 43–47, 75

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INDEX  307

Taizu, Song founding Emperor (r. 960– 976), 39, 40, 58, 75, 88 Taizu, Jin founding Emperor (r. 1115– 1123), 71 Tang dynasty (618–907), 36, 37, 39, 61, 113, 217n17, 223n83; as hegemon, 124; Tanguts and, 57–58; Tibet and, 56, 232n94; Vietnam and, 151–152, 153; warlordism in, 88 Tang Shunzi, 132 Tanguts, 41, 60, 63, 68; expansion of, 50; Liao vs., 65; Mongols vs., 96; rebellion of, 49; rise of, 57–59. See also Xi Xia state Tang Ze, 172 Tao, Jing-Shen, 34 taxation, 64, 71, 87, 95, 124, 236n171, 253n32 Temujin. See Genghis Khan territory: annexation of, 22; cession of, 92; conflict over, 189; conquest of, 79, 81, 96, 116, 153–154; overseas, 23, 159, 179; recovery of, 91, 94, 95, 99, 125, 130, 151, 170–173. See also expansion, expansionism terrorism, 204 Three Kingdom period (220–265 CE), 89 Thucydides, 22, 51 Tiananmen Square, 206 Tianqi, Ming Emperor (r. 1621–1627), 105 Tianshun, Ming Emperor (r. 1457–1464), 105 Tibet, 39, 50, 206; Kara Khitan and, 73; Lamanism of, 214n30; Mongol invasion of, 141; Song and, 58, 61, 235n150; Tang and, 56, 232n94 Timur (Tamerlane), 150 Timurid Empire, 150 Toghon, 118 Toghto, 166 Töghus Temür, Mongol Emperor, 108 Tongguan Pass, 97 trade: Mongols and, 130, 135–139, 141, 143, 144, 186; PRC and, 206–208; Song embargo of Tangut, 64–65; tribute system and, 147–149, 164–165, 169–172, 176 Tran dynasty (Vietnam), 152–153, 155– 156

wang15140_gloss_index.indd 307

Tran Thien-binh, 152 Treaty of Shanyuan (Chanyuan; 1005), 47, 52, 54–56, 62, 75, 86 triangular politics, 36, 57–66 tribute (gong), tributaries, 71, 141, 147, 252– 253n22; Ceylon and, 160; Confucian expansionism and, 187; Hami and, 166–167, 168, 171; Korea and, 173–174; Ming system of, 9, 145–151, 179, 180, 251n7, 253n23; Mongols and, 114, 119, 127, 137–138, 186; naval power and, 162, 164–165; Song and, 56–57, 62–63, 72, 73, 86, 92–93, 95, 99, 150; Tang and, 58; trade and, 137, 139, 143, 144, 148–149, 164–165, 176; Turfan and, 169–172; Vietnam and, 152, 155, 156–157 troops: conscription of, 90; demoralization/desertion of, 53, 92, 95, 118, 121, 127, 128, 135, 139; Imperial Chinese, 227n4; Japanese, 174, 176, 177; Jin, 90–91, 92, 94; Jurchen, 91, 95; Khitan, 53, 91; mercenaries, 128; Ming, 101, 106–109, 113–114, 119–120, 123–125, 127–129, 135, 139, 153, 155, 159, 162, 172–173, 175–177, 248n94, 250n156, 253–254n35, 260n134; Mongol, 108, 113, 121; PLA, 189, 190, 205, 248n94; Russian, 188, 205; Song, 34, 88, 92, 95, 96; United Nations, 189; U.S., 193–195, 204; Vietnamese, 189. See also cavalry; infantry Tumen River, 175 Tumu, Ming defeat at (1449), 106, 111, 120–121, 128, 143, 167 Turfan, 148–149, 167–173, 177, 180 Turks, Shatuo, 40 Uighuristan, 166 Uighurs, 39, 58, 59, 61, 98, 166 Uiju, 175 Ulsan, 177 unipolarity, 194, 203, 208; contemporary, 181; fading of, 209; power politics and, 191–192, 196 United Nations, 189, 207; Security Council of, 204, 205 United States: Balkans intervention of, 205; Central Asia and, 204; communications satellites of, 200; defense

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308  INDEX

United States (continued) budget of, 199; economy of, 198; European Union and, 206; hegemony of, 193, 194, 203, 209, 264n46, 265n58; Iraq War of, 204, 205, 207; Japan and, 5, 195, 265n48; Korean War and, 189; military forces of, 201; power gap between China and, 192–193; relations of, with China, 188–190, 257–258n89; security competition of, with China, 193–196, 208–209, 211n1, 264n47; unipolarity and, 181, 191, 192, 194, 196, 203; in World War II, 11 Unrestricted Warfare (Chaoxianzhan), 201–202 Uriyangkhad Mongols, 119, 127 usurpers, usurpation, 19, 75, 90, 109, 164, 243n32; in Korea, 174; in Vietnam, 152–153, 155–156, 253n32 vassals, vassalage / suzerains, suzerainty, 177; Hami and, 166–173; Korea and, 175; Shaoxing Peace Accord and, 89; Longxing peace accord and, 92; Ming and, 145, 164; Mongols and, 98; Song and, 80, 86, 99, 150; trade and, 170; tribute system and, 148–149; Vietnam and, 152; voluntary, 146; Xi Xia and, 73, 77, 186 Venezuela, 208 Vietnam, 9, 111, 118, 161, 179, 241n1, 253n32, 253–254n35, 254n38; annexation of, 151–157, 253n34, 261n2; Ming withdrawal from, 154–156; PRC vs., 189–190, 262n24 Vijaya Bahu VI, of Ceylon, 160 virtue (de): Confucianism and, 4, 14, 15–18, 26, 30, 47, 66, 180, 213n24; in statecraft, 49, 67, 134, 143, 147, 187 Waldron, Arthur, 25–26, 110, 122, 137; on Ming economy, 246n58; on Ming military, 123, 132–133, 248n94; on Qing, 252–253n22 Walt, Stephen M., 150, 204, 215n3 Waltz, Kenneth, 13, 185, 187, 203, 216n8, 221n56 Wang Anshi, Song reforms and, 66–69, 235n142

wang15140_gloss_index.indd 308

Wang Baocun, Major General, 201 Wang Chonggu, 140–141, 142 wang dao (kingly way), 1, 85, 222n70 Wang Fuzhi (1627–1679), 88 Wang Gungwu, 20, 149, 152 Wang Jisi, 195, 264n47 Wang Qiong, Ming minister of war (1510–1515), 127, 170, 172 Wang Shu, 84, 85, 87, 239n47 Wang Yangming (1472–1529), 17 Wang Yizhou, 203 Wang Yue, 123, 125, 248n94 Wang Zhen, 119, 120 Wanli, Ming Emperor (r. 1573–1620), 27, 105, 138, 175–176 Wanyan Aguda, 71 Wanyan Liang (Prince Hailing), Jin Emperor, 90–91 Wanyan Zongbi, Jin General, 81, 86–87, 89 Waqiao Pass, 43 war, 75, 77; aversion to, 79; causes of, 13; of conquest, 153; harm of, 63; hegemonic, 73–74; between Jin and Southern Song, 86–87, 90–92; Jin faction for, 86–87; between Liao and Song, 40–47; between Liao and Xi Xia, 65; peace vs., 81–83; preparations for, 132; preventive, 51, 189; prisoners of, 153; reparations, 95; revisionist intentions and, 22; Song faction for, 44–46, 75, 83–84, 87, 91–93. See also force; just war; war aims war aims, 30, 33; of China, 6, 9, 151, 189; Confucian pacifism and, 31–32; expansion of, 22–23, 41, 75, 108, 153, 179, 184, 261n2; expansive, 181, 189; Jin, 80, 82; limited, 14, 19; Ming, 102, 144, 153, 178, 179; offensive, 183–184; Song, 41, 69, 75, 79, 84; total military victory, 22, 23 warlords, warlordism, 88, 174 Warring States period, 30 Washington, D.C., 188–189, 192–195, 202, 205, 207, 208 Weber, Max, 2, 17 Wei, Empress Dowager, 85 wen (civility and culture), 15 Wendt, Alexander, 12 Weng Wanda, 132

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INDEX  309

Wen Jiabao, Premier, 2, 207 Wen Zongren, General, 200 West, the, 214n30; Africa and, 207; Enlightenment and, 2; hegemonic way of, 1, 17; imperial powers of, 217n17; international organizations and, 203; international relations theory and, 1; just war tradition in, 18; military writings of, 28; Qing dynasty and, 182, 191; realpolitik in, 21; regional relations in, 146; roots of structural realism in, 6 Western Liao, 73 Western Mongols (Oirat), 113–114 Western Ocean, 157, 255n61 Western Regions (xiyu), 166, 167, 180, 252n14 Westphalian system, 2 White Papers, Chinese Defense, 2, 191, 197, 199, 200, 263n29 Whiting, Allen, 189, 262n18 Wohlforth, William C., 196 world order: Chinese, 1, 9, 134, 138, 145, 146, 153; Confucian, 2, 136 World War I, 191, 193 World War II, 3, 11–12, 193 wu (warfare, martial behavior, force), 15, 19 Wu Bei Zhi (1617; Ming manual of war), 178 Wu Yujin, 201 Wu Yue, 39 Wyatt, Dan, 16 Xi, 91 Xian, 127 Xiang, Prince, 123 Xiangyang: occupation of, 82 Xianzong, Ming Emperor, 167–168 Xiao clan, 71 Xiao Dalan, General, 53 Xiaozong, Southern Song Emperor (r. 1162–1189), 91–93 Xia state, 90 Xia Yan, 131, 132, 133, 143 Xia Yuanji, 154, 155 Xiazhou, 57, 59 Xinan (Polu), 54 Xing Shizong, General, 211n3

wang15140_gloss_index.indd 309

Xingzong (Liao Emperor, r. 1031–1055), 62 Xinjiang, 118, 204 Xinjiangkou naval base, 157, 165 Xiongnu: Han Dynasty and, 48, 56, 83, 226n99, 232n94; nomadic empire of, 19, 109, 136 Xiping (Lingzhou), 58, 59, 69–70, 71 Xi Xia state, 39, 58, 235n150; expansion of, 50; independence of, 59; Jin and, 73, 74, 77; Liao alliance with, 57, 61, 186; Mongols vs., 96, 98; Northern Song Dynasty vs., 9, 36, 55, 59–63, 68–70, 75; peace between Song and, 63–66; rebellion against, 49; Song-Liao conflict and, 49, 57–59. See also Tanguts Xizong, Jin Emperor (r. 1135–1141), 90 Xuande, Ming Emperor (r. 1426–1435), 105, 154–156; Zheng He expeditions and, 164, 180 Xuanfu, 116, 124, 127–129, 132, 137, 140, 142; horse fairs at, 138; siege of, 119 Xue Juzheng, 40 Xue Litai, 188 Xu Jin, 169 Xu Xin, General, 1–2 Yalu River, 175, 176, 178, 189 Yan, Prince of. See Yongle, Ming Emperor Yang Bo, 132 Yanghe, 120 Yang Jie, 61 Yang Jiemian, 194 Yang Jisheng, 137 Yang Rong, 154, 155, 156 Yang Shiqi, 154, 155, 156 Yangtze River, 77, 80–81, 82, 91, 98, 113, 239n37 Yang Yao, rebellion of, 82 Yang Yiqing, Ming minister of war, 171 Yangzhou, 91 Yan Song, 132, 133, 137, 143 Yanyun. See Sixteen Prefectures of Yanyun Yellow River, 52, 58, 59, 71, 97; dikes on, 70; floods of, 93–95; Jin and, 96; loop of, 130, 131; Ordos region and, 122 Yellow Sea, 175, 177

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310  INDEX

Yelu clan, 71 Yelu Dashi, 73 Yelu Xiuge, General, 46 Ye Sheng, 124 Yingchang (Inner Mongolia), 106 Yingzhou, 53 Yi Song-gye (1335–1408), founder of Choson dynasty, 174 Yi Sun-sin, Korean Admiral, 175, 177 yizhan (righteous war), 18 Yongle, Ming Emperor (r. 1403–1424), 70, 103, 105, 110, 127, 132, 160, 161, 178, 180, 245n46, 246n58; civil service exams and, 104; Confucianism and, 109, 243n32; death of, 115, 116; Hami and, 166; Korea and, 174; military colony system under, 118; Mongols and, 111, 113–115, 248n94, 250n156; as Prince of Yan, 108, 113; Timurid Empire and, 150; Vietnam and, 152–154, 155; Zheng He expeditions and, 164 Yoshimitsu, shogun, 149 Youji. See Sixteen Prefectures Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), 7, 37, 99, 101, 127, 152 Yuanhao (b. 1003), 59–61, 63, 65 Yue Fei, General (1103–1142), 77, 82, 84, 87–88, 239n47; death and worship of, 89–90 Yu Jing, 63 Yulin, 128, 129 Yunnan, 119, 153, 157

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Yuzhou, 120 Yu Zijun, 123–125, 168 Zakaria, Fareed, 13, 221–222n61 Zeng Xian, 130–133, 137 Zhang Fangping, 63, 68 Zhang Fu, 153, 155, 254n38 Zhang Jie, 85 Zhang Jun, 84, 88, 91, 92, 238n19 Zhang Juzheng, 140, 141, 142 Zhanyi Xue (The Study of Campaigns), 201 Zhao Fan, 97 Zhao Fu (1400s), 123, 124 Zhao Kui, 97 Zhejiang, 165 Zhenbao (Damansky) Island, 188 Zheng Bijian, 198 Zheng He, 256n70; maritime expeditions of, 154, 157, 163, 179, 180, 256n67; military operations of, 159–162; PRC commemoration of, 255n61 Zhengtong, Ming Emperor (r. 1436– 1449), 105, 119–120, 165 Zhenzhou, Prefecture of, 48 Zhenzong (Song Emperor, r. 997–1022), 49–50, 52, 75, 231n85, 232n89 Zhou Xing, 108 Zhu Xi (1130–1200), 25, 79 Zongwang (Wolipu), Jin General, 73 zouzhe (policy memorials), 9 Zunghar Mongol state, 115

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