Happiness (The MIT Press Essential Knowledge series) 9780262544207, 0262544202

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HAPPINESS

The MIT Press Essential Knowledge Series

A complete list of books in this series can be found online at https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/series/mit-press-essential-knowledge-series.

HAPPINESS TIM LOMAS

The MIT Press

|

Cambridge, Massachusetts

|

London, England

© 2022 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. The MIT Press would like to thank the anonymous peer reviewers who provided comments on drafts of this book. The generous work of academic experts is essential for establishing the authority and quality of our publications. We acknowledge with gratitude the contributions of these otherwise uncredited readers. This book was set in Chaparral Pro by New Best-set Typesetters Ltd. Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data Names: Lomas, Tim, 1979-­author. Title: Happiness / Tim Lomas. Description: Cambridge, Massachusetts : The MIT Press, [2022] | Series: The MIT Press essential knowledge series | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021046820 | ISBN 9780262544207 (paperback) Subjects: LCSH: Happiness. Classification: LCC BF575.H27 L6528 2022 | DDC 152.4/2—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021046820 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For Laila Grace

CONTENTS

Series Foreword 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

ix

The Concept of Happiness  1 The Roots of Happiness  21 The Forms of Happiness  55 The Architecture of Happiness  The Drivers of Happiness  131 The Facilitation of Happiness  The Future of Happiness  213

Acknowledgments  239 Glossary  241 Notes  247 Further Reading  277 Index  279

97 169

SERIES FOREWORD The MIT Press Essential Knowledge series offers accessible, concise, beautifully produced pocket-­size books on topics of current interest. Written by leading thinkers, the books in this series deliver expert overviews of subjects that range from the cultural and the historical to the scientific and the technical. In today’s era of instant information gratification, we have ready access to opinions, rationalizations, and superficial descriptions. Much harder to come by is the foundational knowledge that informs a principled understanding of the world. Essential Knowledge books fill that need. Synthesizing specialized subject matter for nonspecialists and engaging critical topics through fundamentals, each of these compact volumes offers readers a point of access to complex ideas.

1 THE CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS

Few experiences are as cherished or sought-­after today as happiness. Indeed, analogues and variations of this beneficent state have been a dominant human concern throughout recorded history. Yet few phenomena are also so elusive or poorly understood. Across fields of human endeavor—­from academia to advertising—­the promise of happiness is celebrated and pursued. It remains an opaque and contested notion, however, with little consensus on what it is or how to find it. Compounding the issue, it is often conceptualized via other constructs that are equally vague or contentious, such as well-­being. I cannot then be too definitive in defining happiness here at the outset, since this whole book is devoted to exploring its nuances. Yet one must stake out some territory to get the conversation started at all. So this brief introduction offers some basic orienting definitions to which the book will

Few phenomena are as sought-­after as happiness, yet few are also so elusive or misunderstood. This book summarizes the latest scholarship on happiness, offering an interdisciplinary analysis of this most cherished of experiences.

then bring further complexity. The following articulation is by no means the only way of configuring the ground, and is inevitably influenced by my background as a psychologist situated in the area of positive psychology. Nevertheless, it is commensurate with most of the relevant literature with which I’m familiar. We’ll start by considering well-­ being, which most scholars regard as an overarching concept that includes happiness within it.1 Broadly speaking, well-­being can be defined as including all the manifold ways humans can be, do, and live well (although I shall offer a more comprehensive and technical definition later in the chapter). There are numerous ways of conceptualizing this vast arena, but one effective way is to differentiate it in terms of four distinct ontological dimensions (i.e., with ontology referring to the nature of being): physical, mental, social, and spiritual. So, we can first differentiate between physical and mental well-­being, denoting the state of the body and mind, respectively. I should note, though, that this distinction does not map onto the ontological objective versus subjective dichotomy. This latter binary is a subtly different way of carving up being, distinguishing between phenomena that exist objectively (i.e., as material, physical entities) versus those that exist subjectively (i.e., as qualia—­a catch-­all term for all conscious experience). In that respect, physical and mental well-­being both have objective physiological aspects (how the body and brain are functioning)



The Concept of Happiness    3

and subjective phenomenological aspects (how the body and mind are experienced by the person). Added to these, many theorists emphasize the importance of social well-­being, which essentially denotes the quality of one’s interpersonal relationships and communities. Its significance is reflected in the World Health Organization’s definition of health—­ unchanged since 1948—as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-­being, and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity.” In addition, some scholars propose that spiritual well-­being should be recognized, reflecting the quality of relationship one has with phenomena deemed sacred (such as a god).2 Admittedly, not all people value such potentials or even hold that they exist, so this dimension may be more speculative and less universal than the others (which are undoubtedly applicable and relevant to all). Still, it is worth considering. Indeed, these may conceivably not be the only relevant dimensions. Recent years have seen a fascinating debate around the ontological nature of the virtual/digital/online world, for example, both in terms of human beings’ presence and activity in these spaces (e.g., interacting as avatars), and the phenomena that exist there (e.g., virtual money and tools).3 It may be that this initial taxonomy will soon need revising to incorporate virtual well-­being, especially with people spending increasing amounts of time online, and as the state and impact of these digital

4  chapter 1

worlds—now sometimes called the “metaverse”—are better understood. Or consider the natural environment: human beings are not only impacted by nature, they are part of nature. One could therefore make a good case for identifying an ecological dimension to our existence, hence acknowledging the significance of ecological well-­being. This too might one day need adding to the framework here. For now though, it may be prudent to keep our focus just on the four main dimensions outlined above: physical, mental, social, and spiritual. We can then view all four as arrayed on a spectrum between a negative and positive pole, with a neutral and nominal zero at the midpoint. I will introduce some nuance to this metaphor below, since the notion of these each being a singular continuous and moreover separate spectrum is somewhat misleading; nevertheless, I shall tentatively deploy it for now. Let’s now bring two additional concepts into the conversation: illness and health. We can label the negative territory of each spectrum as illness, and the positive territory as health. Thus one can refer to physical illness and health, mental illness and health, and even social or spiritual illness and health (although these latter usages are less common). Let us also use suffering to collectively signify the negative territory of the dimensions, and thriving or flourishing for their positive territory, especially their upper reaches (i.e., the further along each of these spectra one is, the more one is thriving/flourishing).



The Concept of Happiness    5

Then expanding even further outward, flourishing can also be deployed to describe the all-­encompassing context in which these dimensions are situated. I tend to use well-­being, and subsidiary terms like health and happiness, for singular living beings (i.e., with a central locus of sentience and agency). But flourishing can function more expansively to also include the systems in which humans are embedded and that shape their well-­being—­systems both living (e.g., their community) and nonliving (e.g., the economy). This whole dynamic scene—­all the dimensions of well-­being, and the systems and factors that influence them—­constitutes flourishing. The four well-­being dimensions cover great expanses of territory. As such, discrete fields have emerged to attend to their various regions. There has traditionally been stronger emphasis on their negative territory, on curing or at least ameliorating illness. These are the prerogatives of fields such as medicine and physiotherapy for physical illness, psychiatry and psychotherapy for mental illness, social work for social illness, and religion and philosophy for spiritual illness. These fields can broadly be seen as respectively focused on discomfort, distress, strife, and anomie, though they are not only focused on these (medicine, for instance, also applies when people are not experiencing discomfort per se). These fields might ideally propel people into positive territory, but prioritize helping them reach the relative

6  chapter 1

neutrality of zero (the absence of illness). This aim is reflected in Sigmund Freud’s remark that the goal of psychotherapy was mainly limited to turning “hysterical misery into ordinary unhappiness.”4 Escaping negative territory is of course important. But must we stop there, or can we strive to go further? Crucially, the absence of illness does not necessarily entail the active presence of health. A person might be relatively free of suffering, yet not thriving either. Instead, they may be languishing around zero—­not ill per se, but not excelling physically, mentally, socially, or spiritually. Consequently, there is increasing interest in this salutary positive territory. Physical well-­being is the province of disciplines like sports science, which probe the outer limits of human performance and behavioral capability. Social well-­being is the focus of some aspects of arenas like public policy, education, and community organizing, which include efforts to improve society. Spiritual well-­being is again the prerogative of religions and philosophies, which help people develop connections with the sacred. We might broadly regard these fields as respectively focused on promoting vitality, conviviality, and transcendence—­ though again, as with the fields above, they are not only focused on these outcomes. Most relevantly here, mental well-­being has been explored by fields like humanistic and positive psychology. Now we can finally bring happiness back into the conversation. Essentially, I suggest we view almost this entire



The Concept of Happiness    7

positive mental territory as the realm of happiness—­with certain exceptions, as elucidated shortly—­which for now we might define simply yet also expansively as a desirable mental experience of quality. I will unpack this definition over the course of the book, but a few explanatory remarks may be useful now. “Desirable” means that this state is generally coveted, pursued, valued, and appreciated (although some forms of happiness may not meet all of these criteria for all people). “Mental” is used expansively to encompass all psychological processes and experiences, including but not limited to emotions. “Experience” refers to a state of being that has a subjective component (i.e., qualia), and can vary widely in duration—­from a fleeting emotion lasting seconds to a durable way of being that could even last for years. Finally, “quality” alludes to the notion of quality of life, a common concept in work on well-­being. Moreover, the principle of quality itself has been meaningfully and influentially explored by philosopher Robert Pirsig, who saw it as a fundamental and irreducible sense of a phenomenon being good or valuable in some way.5 I should note that happiness might not cover all aspects of mental well-­being—­hence the “almost” two paragraphs above—­since this territory would include the mind broadly “working well” too. As per the spectrum metaphor, one could see how its various faculties—­attention, perception, memory, and so on—­are capable of not only being

8  chapter 1

relatively free of problems (at zero on the spectrum) but also thriving to various degrees. Insofar as the experience of mental well-­being is concerned, however, happiness arguably does capture most of the terrain. Moreover, one can harness this definition to conceptualize the other dimensions of well-­ being, too. First, following the discussion above, well-­being can be operationalized in technical terms as a multidimensional phenomenon, spanning illness and health, encompassing the physical, mental, social, and spiritual dimensions of existence. One can then define health—­which could also be described as the attainment of well-­being—­as a desirable state of quality in relation to any and ideally all dimensions of existence (with “state” including but not limited to “experience”). Conversely, one can define illness—­i.e., a lack of well-­being—­as an undesirable state lacking quality in relation to any and, at worst, possibly all dimensions of existence. These descriptions can then be adapted specifically for any given well-­being dimension. So, for instance, spiritual health—­ or, the attainment of spiritual well-­ being, also referred to as transcendence—­is a desirable state of quality in relation to one’s spiritual existence. Conversely, spiritual illness—­or, a lack of spiritual well-­being, also referred to as anomie—­is an undesirable state lacking quality in relation to one’s spiritual existence. And so on. The respective well-­being phenomena and specializations are illustrated in figure 1. I should emphasize that



The Concept of Happiness    9

Illness –

Illness –

[Religion/ philosophy]

Spiritual

Anomie

[Social Work]

[Religion/ philosophy]

Transcendence

Social

Strife

[Social Policy]

Conviviality

Health +

Health +

Suffering

Thriving

Illness –

[Psychiatry/ Psychotherapy]

Mental

Distress

Happiness

Physical

Illness –

[Humanistic/ Positive Psychology]

[Medicine]

[Sports Science]

Discomfort

Vitality

Health +

Health +

Figure 1  Dimensions and specializations of well-­being.

its labels are merely indicative rather than exhaustive. The respective realms are covered not only by the fields listed, nor are the fields necessarily limited to these realms; for example, mental illness is not only attended to by psychiatry and psychotherapy, nor are they only focused on mental illness. Similarly, as noted above with respect to happiness,

10  chapter 1

the realms are not completely signified by their descriptive labels, nor are these descriptive labels confined to these realms; for instance, mental illness is not only about distress, nor is distress limited to the mental realm. Nonetheless, as a rough heuristic, the figure broadly indicates the relevant territories. One must note, though, that the spectrum metaphor is imperfect. For a start, as alluded to above, it may be misleading to view each of these as straightforward continua from illness to health, as if progressing “rightward” along a spectrum means that illness lessens to the point where one crosses over into the realm of health. Indeed, some scholars prefer to view the territories of illness and health as separate spectra. With mental well-­being, the dual continua model suggests that mental illness and health may be relatively disconnected—­physiologically, functionally, and experientially—­and that people can experience aspects of illness and health at the same time.6 This view can be represented visually by placing the continua orthogonally to create a two-­dimensional space in which people can be variously situated, as represented in figure 2.7 From the perspective of the dual continua model, mental illness and health are not mutually exclusive. Put another way, happiness is not incompatible with suffering. This is just as well, given that many thinkers and traditions view suffering as inherent to the human condition. That the spectra may be orthogonal means that a person could



The Concept of Happiness    11

Mental health

Mental illness

No mental illness

No mental health

Figure 2  The dual continua model of mental illness and health.

be struggling in some respects, yet also experiencing some happiness. Moreover, the picture is even more complicated still. Illness and health may not merely be orthogonal; crucially, they are also not singular. Instead, they themselves contain multiple continua—­for instance, different forms of mental illness or health—­with any given person concurrently doing poorly on some and better on others. These dynamics are illustrated in figure 3, which depicts the multifaceted nature of mental well-­being. I have reverted to the original image of a singular dimension—­rather than the

12  chapter 1

etc.

Mental well-being

Anxiety

etc.

Eudaimonic

Health

Illness Depression

Hedonic

etc.

etc. Distress

Happiness

Figure 3  The differentiated mental well-­being spectrum.

two-­dimensional space presented in figure 2—­otherwise the visual would have been too cluttered. Yet one should ideally keep the dual continua model in mind, and think of illness and health as distinct spectra. In relation to mental illness, the figure features two of the most common issues (anxiety and depression), as well as “etc.” bubbles to signify the many other mental problems that can afflict people. Similarly, in relation to mental health, it includes two of the main forms of happiness (hedonic and eudaimonic), as well as “etc.” bubbles to indicate various other potential forms (which we’ll explore in chapter 3). The black circles suggest a given person might be located at certain points along all of these distinct axes at a given point—­experiencing various forms of distress and happiness to different degrees during a particular period.

The Concept of Happiness    13

A further nuance to add to the spectrum metaphor is that we ought not to simplistically associate illness and health with, respectively, negative and positive qualia. Qualia can be appraised as negative and positive in numerous ways, including valence (unpleasant versus pleasant), desirability (unwanted versus wanted), morality (bad versus good), and utility (unconducive or conducive to well-­being).8 Arguably, for an experience to be deemed constitutive of suffering, it must tick at least two negative boxes and possibly more. That said, an experience may be negatively valenced yet positive in other ways and so still deemed a form of well-­being. A sportsperson, for instance, might experience negatively-­valenced qualia in relation to their passion—­physical (e.g., sore muscles), mental (e.g., performance-­related anxiety), social (e.g., loneliness), and even spiritual (e.g., religious doubt)—­yet still derive certain forms of happiness from it. Some forms might even involve the negative qualia (e.g., physical pain and exertion being interpreted positively as sources of meaning and accomplishment). We will keep these nuances in mind throughout the book. A final limitation to note regarding the spectrum metaphor is that it misleadingly implies that the four well-­ being dimensions are discrete and easily differentiated. In reality, they are intertwined and interpenetrating, to the point where their conceptual boundaries are fuzzy and somewhat arbitrary. The distinction between mental and

14  chapter 1

physical well-­being, for example, is arguably an artifact of the “mind-­body” dualism dominant in the West since René Descartes.9 By contrast, other cultures have made less rigid distinctions between these realms; indeed, in the West their close interaction is increasingly recognized too, as reflected in the identification of phenomena deemed psychosomatic. As such, this book endeavors to highlight these interconnections between the dimensions, showing how happiness is thoroughly intertwined with the physical, social, and spiritual elements of people’s lives. Nuances aside, though, the spectrum metaphor is a useful heuristic. Our primary focus, then, is on the positive territory of the mental spectrum, which I am broadly designating as happiness. In so doing, I’m explicitly advocating an expansive vision of what happiness means, encompassing a significant range of experiential territory. Like many concepts, happiness is a contested construct, deployed in different ways by different people (and even by the same person at various times). Some people use it more narrowly, viewing it perhaps as merely synonymous with pleasure. By contrast, others—­myself included, and hence this book—­regard it more expansively, enfolding wide swathes of psychological states relating to well-­being. Happiness is thus not only an affective phenomenon but also encompasses other aspects of mental life, such as character, attention, perception, and knowledge. Many mental states and processes are multidimensional of course, featuring at



The Concept of Happiness    15

least some affective aspects. But of the forms of happiness considered here (see chapter 3), some are not primarily affective, and a few may not even include affect at all. This point about viewing happiness expansively can be best understood using a cartographic metaphor. One function of language is to map our experiential world.10 Some words cover more ground than others and can encompass more granular concepts within them. “Love,” for instance, is an “empire uniting all sorts of feelings, behaviors, and attitudes, sometimes having little in common.”11 Then, within that empire, more specific words cover particular regions, from “passion” to “care.” My perspective on happiness is similar. Here I deploy it expansively to cover most of the positive territory of mental well-­being (recognizing that it might not cover all of it, and that this territory also includes the mind “working well”). It spans the kaleidoscopic diversity of positive mental experiences—­as elucidated in chapter 3—­from uplifting emotions like joy and bliss to nourishing states such as meaning and purpose. Moreover, its scope ranges from the most modest increments into this positive realm (e.g., the mildest, briefest, most inconsequential moments of pleasure), to its farthest possible reaches (e.g., the most intense, long-­lasting, consequential, rewarding experiences possible). I take this perspective not least because I feel it resonates with how happiness tends to be used in common

16  chapter 1

I’m advocating an expansive vision of what happiness means, defining it broadly as a desirable mental experience of quality, which encompasses wide swathes of psychological states relating to well-­being.

language. When a parent, for example, says, “I just want my child to be happy,” they are usually not just referring to happiness in a narrow, hedonic sense. Rather, I believe they generally hope the child lives their best life—­one of connection and love, creativity and purpose, fulfillment and flourishing, and so on. They want them to be happy in the deepest, highest, most expansive sense possible. So all of that is within our purview here. This book delves into this terrain over five main chapters, drawing on multiple fields of scholarship, and offering a genuinely interdisciplinary analysis of the topic. There is inevitably a strong tilt toward psychological perspectives, this being my own academic field. I have embraced work across disciplines, however, from philosophy and sociology to economics and anthropology. It will not be possible to exhaustively cover all the applicable literature given the book’s brief nature. Nevertheless, the text highlights the vast scope and range of the relevant work. Chapter 2 offers an overarching historical perspective, charting how happiness (and related concepts) has been understood over the centuries around the world, and how these legacies have shaped the current thinking. Turning then to contemporary academic perspectives, chapter 3 concentrates on happiness as a concept, looking at its myriad of forms. Chapter 4 explores the mechanics of happiness, the manifold processes—­spanning physiology, psychology, phenomenology, culture, and society—­that

18  chapter 1

constitute its architecture. Chapter 5 examines how happiness is shaped by numerous influencing factors, from economics to politics. Lastly, chapter 6 addresses applied efforts to promote happiness. A brief concluding chapter then summarizes the book, and offers suggestions for future directions in happiness research and practice. With all of that in mind, let’s begin!



The Concept of Happiness    19

2 THE ROOTS OF HAPPINESS

We start our journey by first looking backward, thereby gaining an appreciation of how we have reached our current standing. Doing so heeds calls to situate fields like psychology in a historical context, not as timeless or universal bodies of knowledge, but emerging in a specific time and place, influenced by long cultural processes.1 So this chapter looks at how happiness has been understood over the centuries around the world, thus allowing us to see how current views have been influenced by these prior developments. Most cultures did not call the phenomenon in question “happiness” of course. This term only emerged in English in the sixteenth century, preceded by “happy” in the fourteenth, both of which implied being favored by fortune. This meaning is reflected in their etymological roots in the Old Norse hap, which similarly underpins terms like “happenstance.” It was not until around the 1590s

that happiness began to take on its current character of denoting—­per the working definition here—­a desirable mental experience of quality. It’s also fair to say, however, that most cultures— maybe even all—­have taken an interest in well-­being and happiness, as broadly defined here. Since the dawn of civilization, people have engaged with questions of well-­being, of how best to be, do, and live well. Then more specifically, cultures have also explored the notion of happiness (in terms of the expansive definition offered here). As such, this chapter reviews a panoply of philosophical, religious, and cultural perspectives from humanity’s history, showing how these have broached ideas pertaining to happiness. As with all chapters, the coverage cannot come close to being exhaustive given the book’s brevity. But it will suffice to indicate the breadth and depth of thinking worldwide on these topics. To structure the presentation, I’ll survey our long past in rough chronological order, beginning in prehistory and culminating in present-­ day science. Along the way, we’ll see how ideas around happiness emerged and evolved.

Aboriginal

The origins of humankind stretch back far into the unrecorded mists of prehistory. In places like the Olduvai Gorge

22  chapter 2

Throughout history, people have reflected on well-­being: how best to be, do, and live well. Furthermore, cultures have also tended to inquire into happiness, insofar as this denotes a desirable mental experience of quality.

in Tanzania, we find evidence of stone tools made by early hominid species dating back an astonishing 2.6 million years. Our own species of Homo sapiens is widely thought to have emerged around 200,000 years ago, although recent finds in Morocco may have pushed this further back to 300,000.2 Thereafter, our long evolution is tentatively marked by the incremental creation of culture. Evidence has been found of modern tool use by the San hunter-­gatherers of South Africa, for instance, dated to 44,000 BCE. Among the earliest-­known cultures—­that is, of which traces are preserved—­are those indigenous to Australia, to which humans first migrated some 50,000 years ago. Thereafter, a rich, complex culture began to emerge and flower, as illustrated by forms of rock art dated to 26,000 BCE, with other examples potentially far older.3 Throughout this long developmental arc, ideas and insights pertaining to well-­being and happiness started to take shape. A powerful example is the nexus of thought and practice encompassed by the term aljerre-­nge, which signifies the complex cultural-­religious belief system of the Arrente (with other Aboriginal peoples having comparable knowledge systems known by different names). Such systems are sometimes rendered in English as Dreamtime or The Dreaming—­terms coined by anthropologist William Stanner in the 1950s.4 His neologisms have been criticized as mistranslations or at least non-­ideal renderings of the original terms (though his respect for these concepts and

24  chapter 2

Here we consider philosophical, religious, and cultural perspectives from humanity’s rich history, showing how these have cultivated ideas and practices relating to happiness and how such accomplishments have shifted and developed over time.

the cultures which generated them is generally acknowledged). Nevertheless, his intent seems to have been to highlight the epistemological significance of dreams as a means of acquiring knowledge, including receiving guidance from ancestors. Insofar as concepts like aljerre-­nge can be understood and interpreted from a modern Western perspective—­ which is debatable—­they appear to denote holistic, all-­ encompassing ways of perceiving all life as interconnected. Stanner also coined the term “everywhen” for this mode of understanding, embracing past, present, and future. No mere synonym for timeless, everywhen acknowledges the ongoing relevance of the primordial ancestral beings and powers that shaped the world. Moreover, it is not simply an origin myth, but rather a vibrant, complex, living reality.5 Aboriginal peoples past and present engage with this reality for guidance about how they should best live—­ from relationships with the land to personal interactions. In that respect, aljerre-­nge is a formative theory of well-­ being, a vision of how humans ought to be, and remains among our oldest extant perspectives on flourishing.

Mesopotamian

While Aboriginal cultures were developing, comparable advances were apace across numerous world regions. Indeed,

26  chapter 2

entering recorded history, major milestones appear to have occurred in numerous places somewhat in parallel.6 First, beginning around 12,000 BCE, were early attempts at farming and agriculture, around which formed settled communities. Then, from around 5000 BCE on, we see the first stirrings of more complex civilizations: societies characterized by urban development, industrial innovation, and advanced symbolic communication. A particularly important region in that respect is the fertile soil of Mesopotamia. From this cradle emerged many of our oldest empires, including those of Assyria, Akkad, and Babylon. By 4000 BCE, these societies had won many world-­shaping accomplishments, from monumental architecture to innovations in metallurgy and writing. And from here hails the world’s oldest surviving work of literature, The Epic of Gilgamesh, dated to around 2100 BCE. It illuminates the concerns of our forebears, revealing existential worries that remain of paramount importance—­ above all, how to become reconciled with mortality and find some happiness within our all-­too-­brief lives. Its protagonist is Gilgamesh, the semi-­mythical tyrannical king of Uruk, and centers on his burgeoning awareness of his finitude and the futility of earthly pursuits. Along the way, he receives advice about his plight and how to find the happiness that eludes him. A taverner at the gates of the underworld, for instance, encourages the embrace of simple pleasures: “Until the end comes, enjoy



The Roots of Happiness    27

your life, spend it in happiness, not despair. Savor your food, make each of your days a delight, bathe and anoint yourself, wear bright clothes that are sparkling, let music and dancing fill your house, love the child who holds you by the hand, and give your wife pleasure in your embrace.”7 Ultimately, Gilgamesh finds some comfort in striving to be a beneficent ruler and creating a magnificent city. In so doing, he realizes he can attain an immortality of sorts in being remembered as a great man. Above all, it is a tale of finding meaning in life, despite its existential limitations, through a commitment to a virtuous path. Indeed, this vision finds itself reflected in contemporary theories of certain forms of happiness, as we will see.

Chinese

Also among the oldest civilizations, and certainly the longest continuous one, is China, whose founding Xia dynasty emerged circa 2070 BCE. Many philosophies and ideas arose throughout its rich history that directly pertain to our central topic. By way of example, consider the school of thought known as Taoism. With origins stretching back into unrecorded antiquity, Taoism can be more recently traced to the I Ching (translated as the Book of Changes), which developed orally before crystallizing in written form around 1150 BCE. The

28  chapter 2

text was formulated to help interpret divination practices, often involving the generation and analysis of hexagrams (permutations of six broken and unbroken lines). Central to the process is that hexagrams represent states of becoming rather than being. Their focal point is the “moving” lines; any that are dynamic or unstable and so herald the shift to a different hexagram. Thus the overarching principle of the I Ching is change— paradoxically, the one constant in the universe. As Richard Wilhelm wrote in introducing his translation, “He who has perceived the meaning of change fixes his attention no longer on transitory individual things but on the immutable, eternal law at work in all change.” Here we find the origin of Taoism, for this law is “the Tao, the course of things, the principle of the one in the many.”8 Moreover, the I Ching not only identified the ubiquity of change but the dynamic through which it occurs too: the dialectical interaction between opposites, which eventually became symbolized by the yin-­yang motif. Fundamentally, Taoism holds that a deep experiential understanding of the Tao is the path to well-­being. Such guidance suffuses the Tao Te Ching, a canonical text attributed to Lao-­Tzu, who possibly lived between the sixth and third centuries BCE. As verse 16, for instance, suggests, “To be of heaven is to be in Tao.”9 Taoism highlights principles such as wu-­wei, for example, which translates as “nonaction,” but means surrendering to and aligning



The Roots of Happiness    29

oneself with the organic patterns of life (as, say, a skilled sailor harnesses the wind). Hence we find exhortations to be “Yielding as ice when it begins to melt; Blank as a piece of uncarved wood; Yet receptive as a hollow in the hills” (verse 15). Such ideas have proved influential to this day, including helping to shape the conceptualizations of various forms of happiness considered in the next chapter.

Vedantic

As Taoism was emerging in China, comparable developments were fomenting elsewhere, not least on the Indian subcontinent. There we see world-­shaping achievements such as the Vedas, the foundational texts of what is now called Hinduism, which took shape between 1500 and 500 BCE. The four Vedas each comprise four types of material: Samhitas (mantras and prayers), Aranyakas (rituals and ceremonies), Brahmanas (commentaries on rituals and ceremonies), and Upanishads (philosophical and spiritual teachings). The Vedas have considerable relevance to our deliberations here. Much reference, for example, is made to ānanda, an intense, profound happiness often translated as bliss. It can even mean eternal bliss in the context of a belief in saṃsāra, the ongoing cycle of birth, death, and rebirth to which human beings are subject in Vedantic metaphysics.

30  chapter 2

In that sense, ānanda can denote experiential release from saṃsāra into a durable state of total well-­being—­a supreme psychospiritual attainment known by terms like mokṣa and nirvāṇa, common to traditions including Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. Moreover, such states are not merely intellectualized concepts. Central to the Vedas is how to attain them. The Upanishads in particular focus on an experiential union between Ātman and Brahman. The former describes something like an inner spirit or soul, an unchanging essence beneath the contingent flux of personality. The latter is often depicted using terms such as Godhead or Ultimate Reality, usually conceived in panentheistic terms (i.e., not only immanent in the cosmos, per pantheism, but also transcending it). Their union is captured by the phrase Tat Tvam Asi (That Art Thou), although there are different perspectives as to its nature; the “non-­dual” Advaita school tended to uphold an absolute equality between Ātman and Brahman, for instance, whereas the Shuddhadvaita saw the former as part of the latter.10 The Vedas—­and subsequent teachings—­elucidate paths for attaining such states, such as yoga, which featured in the foundational Vedic texts before finding fuller expression in classic works like the Sutras of Patanjali (second century BCE).11 Yoga encompasses a nexus of psychospiritual practices, of which there are numerous branches, each offering a different path to liberation, including hatha (physical



The Roots of Happiness    31

practice), rāja (meditation), mantra (vocalized sound), guru (dedication), karma (service), bhakti (devotion), jnana (study), and tantra (esoteric). It is a testament to the power of these ideas and techniques that they continue to be practiced, and moreover have been embraced globally.

Judaic

As the Vedas were slowly coming into being, similarly influential teachings were gradually emerging to the west in the form of the Tanakh, the canonical collection of Jewish scripture—­including the Torah (the Pentateuch), Nevi-­im (books of the prophets), and Ketuvim (Hagiographa). As with most such foundational texts, details of their authorship are uncertain and much debated. Rabbinic tradition holds that Moses—­who may have lived in the thirteenth century BCE—­received the Torah from God on Mount Sinai and committed it to writing. Modern scholarship, however, suggests it may have been assembled over centuries before attaining its canonical version around the fifth century BCE.12 Historicity aside, it is among the most consequential texts in history, with much to offer around our main theme. The Torah, for example, contains one of humankind’s oldest codified moral frameworks: the Aseret ha-­ Dibrot (Ten Commandments). Although preceded and

32  chapter 2

possibly informed by the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (circa seventeenth century BCE), it is arguably the most influential such framework in history, shaping multiple world religions and continuing to guide people today.13 Its mitzvot—­laws or precepts—­are legendary: exhortations to worship one god, honor one’s parents, and respect the Sabbath, along with proscriptions against idolatry, blasphemy, killing, adultery, theft, dishonesty, and covetousness. These were augmented by many further mitzvot throughout the Torah—­as many as 613, according to common reckoning.14 Together these laws constitute a codification of wisdom, a guide for how to live, offering a meaningful perspective on well-­being that continues to hold relevance for our understanding of happiness. Moses ben Maimon (aka Maimonides), preeminent Jewish theologian of the Middle Ages, for instance, argued that fulfilling religious duties should result in simḥah (usually translated as gladness or joy). Referencing Deuteronomy, the fifth book of the Torah, he wrote, “The joy [simḥah] which a person expresses in doing a mitzvah, and in the love of God that He commanded through them, is a great act of worship. And whoever restrains himself from this joy is deserving of punishment from God, as is said [in Deut. 28:47]: ‘[You will be punished] because you did not serve the Lord with joy and gladness.’”15 Thus forms of happiness, clothed in religious interpretations and significance, were central to Judaic teachings.



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Buddhist

In the long, winding history of humanity, another dramatic collective shift seemed to occur between the eighth and third centuries BCE. In multiple locations, profound, unprecedented cognitive revolutions unfolded in relative parallel. Philosopher Karl Jaspers called this the Achsenzeit—­axial age—­to signify a pivotal turning in the earth’s history.16 Among its luminaries, few are as influential as Sid­ dhārtha Gautama, better known by the honorific Buddha (enlightened one), born circa 480 BCE (or possibly earlier). As with many traditions, Buddhism’s origins are veiled by a lack of historicity in the source documents. Nevertheless, the mythologized narrative describes the Buddha as living a sheltered life until age twenty-­nine, when a series of existential encounters with mortality compelled him to pursue a religious path dedicated to exploring the human condition.17 Living in a context shaped by Vedanta, the Buddha initially spent five years engaged in ascetic yoga practices. He eventually deemed such self-­mortification unhelpful, though, and resolved to pursue a “middle path” (between indulgence and asceticism). The Buddha committed to meditating until he had attained nirvāṇa—­introduced above and discussed further in chapter 3—­and sat for forty-­nine days until achieving his breakthrough. He then

34  chapter 2

spent the next forty-­five years formulating and disseminating his insights—­known as the dharma, implying laws of nature—­which are squarely focused on questions of happiness and well-­being. Central to the dharma is the Four Noble Truths. First, life is pervaded by dukkha—­often translated as suffering, yet perhaps better rendered as dissatisfaction (since Buddhism recognizes there are joys in life, but even these are imperfect). This is tempered by the second, however, which is that the cause of dukkha can be identified, attributed mainly to people’s tendencies toward craving and attachment. Moreover, having understood these causes, the third truth offers the redemptive hope that dukkha can be alleviated. The fourth supplies a map toward this goal: the Noble Eightfold Path.18 The path is a detailed prescription for “right living.” Its ultimate goal is the zenith of nirvāna, but even if this superhuman peak may be unattainable for most people, the route itself offers opportunities for lessening dukkha and more reliably experiencing sukha (its antonym). The path has eight elements, frequently envisioned as spokes on a wheel, in that all support each other and should be cultivated together. These elements, prefixed by the adjective samyak (right or best), cover three broad dimensions of life: wisdom (vision and resolve), ethical conduct (speech, conduct, and livelihood), and meditation (effort, mindfulness, and concentration). A vast set of teachings then speak to



The Roots of Happiness    35

the nuances of these elements and their promise in facilitating happiness (as we explore further in the next chapter).

Hellenistic

Arguably no era has had a greater influence on contemporary thinking around happiness than Hellenistic Greece. Even today many luminaries remain household names, their teachings the foundation of myriad aspects of modern life, and with numerous concepts still bearing a Greek etymological imprint, from democracy (power of the people) to philosophy (love of wisdom). Among this vast corpus of thought, Greeks had much to say on happiness and well-­being. Of these intellectual pioneers, Aristotle undoubtedly has had the strongest influence on contemporary thought. Among his many contributions is the pivotal distinction between two forms of happiness: hedonic and eudaimonic. The former refers essentially to pleasure, while the latter reflects deeper forms of happiness arising through self-­ cultivation, which he defined as the “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.”19 Etymologically it refers to having a good daimōn, a guiding spirit or perhaps, from a modern perspective, one’s conscience. A complex idea, it encompasses the cultivation of character, pursuit of knowledge, and commitment to ethical development.

36  chapter 2

Aristotle was disparaging of hedonism, and likewise of most people, whom he complained were “slavish in their tastes,” preoccupied with superficial pleasures.20 Whether that analysis is fair is another issue, especially since his moral attitudes in general (e.g., regarding women) have been critiqued by modern standards. Nevertheless, this hedonic-­eudaimonic distinction has proved influential to this day—­even if the former is judged less harshly now—­ and is central to contemporary thinking around happiness. The era had many other contributions to our central topic of course. Take Stoicism, founded by Zeno of Citium around 300 BCE. Among its adherents was the Roman Seneca, whose works include De Vita Beata (On the Happy Life), featuring lines such as “the happy man is content with his present lot, no matter what it is.”21 Epictetus took this thought to its extreme, claiming it was possible to be “sick and yet happy, in peril and yet happy, dying and yet happy, in exile and happy.”22 This does not, however, mean hedonic or even eudaimonic happiness but instead a more contented form characterized by ataraxia, a lucid, tranquil, imperturbable detachment from the vicissitudes of life.

Christian

“Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven” (Matthew 5:3–­11). Thus begins one of the most



The Roots of Happiness    37

famous passages in history, the Sermon on the Mount. Delivered by Jesus toward the end of his ministry, this oration is often regarded as the zenith of his teachings, the “essence of Christianity.”23 As with other traditions here, Christianity had much to say on happiness. Consider the poetically repeated motif of the sermon: blessed. In the early Greek of the New Testament, this was makários, later rendered as beātitūdō in Latin, and then béatitude in French. This eventually became “blessed” in English, derived from the Proto-­Germanic blodison, meaning to consecrate (originally with blood, as evident in its etymology). According to Darrin McMahon, however, in his exemplary Happiness: A History, an equally suitable—­ and even preferable—­rendering of makários is “happy.”24 The sermon could therefore equally run, “Happy are the pure in heart, for they will see God.” This is no mere pleasure, but among the deepest—­or highest—­happiness possible. Here we strike against the limitations of language in that “happiness” can encompass many emotional states, from the banal to the sublime. In that respect, granular terms like blessed can indicate its more profound forms. As historian Thomas Carlyle wrote, “There is something higher than happiness, and that is blessedness.”25 Yet it would arguably be better to expand our conception of happiness itself to encompass notions like blessedness, and in chapter 3 we’ll include such states under the label chaironic happiness.

38  chapter 2

Semantics aside, Jesus’s message was revolutionary. The prevailing ideas on happiness in the Roman world tended to position it either as determined by fate (and hence beyond people’s control) or only amenable to influence by select people (e.g., wealthy, powerful men). By contrast, Jesus not only preached that happiness could be attained by the poor and persecuted, but even more radically that such people were more blessed than the rich and powerful. This spectacular vision was not quite equivalent to the self-­empowerment of the Stoics, as people remained at the mercy of God’s grace. Nevertheless, it was a redemptive idea that helped shape the modern world.

Islamic

A central debate within Christianity was whether the blessed state described by Jesus was attainable on earth or only in the afterlife. We find similar considerations in the last great monotheistic tradition to emerge, Islam, which originated in Mecca in the seventh century CE. There the Prophet Muḥammad was born in 570, and received revelations from Allah (God), the recitation of which became the Quran. Now Islam has the second-­highest number of adherents worldwide (nearly two billion), with the Quran among the most influential texts ever composed. Again, among its teachings are in-­depth commentaries on our key themes.



The Roots of Happiness    39

It differentiates forms of happiness, for instance, including mut’a and sa’adah. The former refers to sensual pleasure, akin to the hedonism disparaged by Aristotle, and likewise denigrated as mere earthly satisfaction. That said, in considering the farah (joys) available in this life, the Quran differentiates “blameworthy” forms, which celebrate “the life of this world” (13.26), from “praiseworthy” ones rejoicing “in the bounty of God and His grace” (10:58). In any case, sa’adah is valorized as a superlative, even ultimate happiness, only accessible to believers in the afterlife. The latter features in the title, for example, of the classic work The Alchemy of Happiness by the great eleventh-­ century Persian theologian Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī. Considerable attention is paid in Islam to the nature of this reward, with the Quran painting beautifully detailed images of Jannah (paradise).26 This is portrayed as a vast Edenic garden of rewards and joys, featuring many regions and levels, access to which depends on people’s conduct in life. Some aspects of its account attend to sensual delights (such as beautiful sights), and others on more elevated visions (like beholding God). Such evocations, though, do not mean that Islamic perspectives on happiness are only focused on the afterlife. As with the notion of praiseworthy joys, its teachings elucidate what a good life on earth involves. This includes character development—­such as the cultivation of

40  chapter 2

temperance, modesty, and self-­restraint—­which pertains to eudaimonia. Indeed, both Greek and Islamic scholars contributed to the blossoming vision of humanity in the Renaissance.

Renaissance

The pre-­context for our next era is the so-­called Dark Ages, a period of European history roughly from 500 to 1200 CE. Its disparaging coinage derives from Petrarch (1304–­ 1374), reflecting a perceived near absence of independent thought, juxtaposed with the forthcoming “light” of his age. The term is misleading, as this epoch did include openness and creativity. Nevertheless, Western peoples’ outlook was dominated by the church, which had taken on some dark tones, often despairing of the possibility of worldly happiness. In The Misery of the Human Condition, for instance, the future Pope Innocent III (1161–­1216) bleakly wrote, “All [people’s] days are full of toil and hardship . . . Rich or poor, master or slave, married or single, good and bad alike—­all suffer worldly torments and are tormented by worldly vexations.”27 Yet a dialectic counterpoint to such pessimism em­ erged through an optimistic humanism, celebrating humankind and the possibility of happiness on earth (not only in the afterlife). This movement took root in the



The Roots of Happiness    41

twelfth century with the formation of Europe’s first universities, leading the nineteenth-­century historian Jules Michelet to coin the term Renaissance to describe the rebirth of learning that ensued—­driven above all by the rediscovery of the classical world, with the increasing availability of Greek and Roman works. Through these dynamics, Europe embraced newly encountered perspectives on the good life. Initially, most scholarship remained within a Christian matrix—­a synthesis exemplified by Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–­1274), who integrated church teachings with classical philosophy, such as equating Aristotle’s notion of a prime mover with God. By the fourteenth century, however, some strands of humanism began to slowly become extricated, with an independent spirit epitomized by Petrarch, reflected in the legend of him climbing Mont Ventoux to appreciate nature for its own sake. The church had tended to denigrate such pleasures as self-­indulgence. But humanism ushered in secular visions of the good life, including encouraging people to engage in their own pursuits of truth and beauty. The Renaissance then bloomed in the fifteenth century, as the Italian awakening spread north. A celebrated event was the discovery in 1417 of Lucretius’s long-­lost poem De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of the Universe).28 In this, he discussed the ideas of Epicurus (341–­270 BCE), who saw humans as entirely physical products of the cosmos

42  chapter 2

who cease to exist after death. As such, Epicurus argued that the goal of life should be happiness—­though not the hedonic self-­indulgence with which his name is often erroneously associated today, but per the Stoic ideal of ataraxia. Thus even while Christianity remained hegemonic in Europe, secular visions of happiness were increasingly prominent.

The Enlightenment

Moving into the sixteenth century, this burgeoning secularism began to generate new modes of inquiry. Most consequential were the first major stirrings of empirical science, as propelled by the likes of Sir Francis Bacon (1561–­1626) and Galileo Galilei (1564–­1642). Their efforts inaugurated a compelling new sense that well-­being could be influenced by freethinking study and measurement of the natural world. Hand in hand with this empiricism, a bold vision and narrative started to seize the collective imagination, namely progress, with the emergence of this temporal mindset widely recognized as marking the transition into modernity.29 Previously, the dominant Christian orientation had been a powerful combination of retrospective yearning for a golden age (the Garden of Eden) and eschatological hope for future redemption (paradise). But driven by



The Roots of Happiness    43

advancements in science and technology, a potent belief emerged in the linear, inexorable improvement of life, as reflected in Bacon’s utopian novel New Atlantis. This belief truly took hold in the eighteenth century, epitomized by The Encyclopédie, led by Denis Diderot and involving over 150 scholars, which advocated for the advancement of science, secularism, tolerance, rationality, and open-­ mindedness. The age consequently was known as the Enlightenment, with an overarching message that happiness can be found on earth, above all through the development of character and pursuit of truth. Moreover, not only were people encouraged to pursue the good life independently but there were also concomitant efforts to arrange it systemically. A powerful idea emerged: that society itself could be restructured to better enable flourishing. This vision helped propel the revolutions in the United States (1776) and France (1789), with their respective founding ideals of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and liberty, equality, fraternity. In practice, these ideals were difficult to realize and sometimes betrayed. Even so, the belief in the perfection of society as a pathway to happiness became forcefully attractive. In many respects, the world today bears the imprints of this era. Political thinking, for instance, is shaped by Enlightenment ideals like utilitarianism, as developed by Francis Hutcheson (1694–­1746), and later Jeremy Bentham (1742–­1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–­1873).

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This is a family of consequentialist ethical theories—­ where the ultimate arbiter of an action is its consequences rather than abstract principles—­that aim to maximize well-­being. In Hutcheson’s words, “The best action is the one that procures the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers.”30 With such thinking we enter the contemporary era, where happiness becomes an academic concern.

Therapeutic

In our modern age of scholarship on happiness and well-­ being, one can arguably identify four main waves. The first began in earnest around two hundred years ago with the formalization of psychiatry and psychotherapy. Their roots stretch further back of course. Throughout history, cultures have identified and treated problems which these disciplines today call mental illnesses or “disorders.” The fields themselves then emerged in proto form over many centuries. An early milestone in the West was the founding of a priory in London in 1247 to shelter the sick and infirm, which treated “insanity” as early as 1403, and served exclusively that purpose from 1676 on. In 1808, Britain then legislated for the widespread establishment of such asylums, in the same year that psychiatry itself was coined by Johann Reil—­from the Greek psyche (soul or mind) and



The Roots of Happiness    45

iatros (healer). The profession then announced itself with the first major work by Emil Kraepelin, widely celebrated as the father of the field. Around this time psychotherapy was also coming into being—­a term coined by Walter Dendy in 1853—­though initially just as a feature of psychiatry itself. While these fields were concerned with well-­being, it was of a limited kind, although this limitation itself was not appreciated until the second wave. As elucidated below, the pivotal insight of the newer incoming wave was to regard mental well-­being as a spectrum—­as discussed in the introduction—­spanning a negative pole (the presence of illness), through zero (the absence of illness), to a positive pole (the active presence of health). Yet this first wave focused almost exclusively on its negative territory. Many key figures did not even acknowledge the positive territory, and if they did, it was generally not deemed relevant or amenable to their endeavors. Their prerogative was to help people reach the relative neutrality of zero, as reflected in Freud’s remark quoted earlier about the goal of psychotherapy being limited to turning “hysterical misery into ordinary unhappiness.” There were exceptions, such as William James’s pioneering work The Varieties of Religious Experience, which touched on ideas and experiences that we might situate in the positive realm of the spectrum. Overall, though, the focus was on alleviating mental illness.

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It was the subsequent openness to explore more positive territory that heralded the emergence of a new second wave. This first wave did not cease of course; psychiatry and psychotherapy still flourish today. Indeed, waves of scholarship tend to not dissipate but rather continue to unleash energy; likewise, newer waves usually do not replace earlier ones but instead augment them. So while these fields continue to play vital roles vis-­à-­vis well-­being, they were joined from the 1920s onward by a newer generation of humanistic scholars and practitioners.

Humanistic

In a dialectical process, the negative focus of the first wave soon compelled some to center on the positive potential of humankind. Among the first was Otto Rank, initially a protégé of Freud who broke away in the 1920s to con­ centrate on healthy developmental processes (in contrast to Freud’s focus on psychopathology). For instance, Rank’s Will Therapy examined the primal “creative will”; critiquing Freud for reducing creativity to a mere by-­product of the sex drive, it looked at people’s self-­consciousness and agency in the creative process, and above all their own individuation, moving “from creature to creator, in the ideal case, creator of himself, his own personality.”31



The Roots of Happiness    47

For Rank, psychotherapy should therefore create nurturing spaces for clients to explore these individuation processes. In turn, he influenced Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers, widely regarded as the twin founders of humanistic psychology. As Rogers said, “I became infected with Rankian ideas and began to realize the possibilities of the individual being self-­directing.”32 He proceeded to create his person-­centered therapeutic approach, envisaged as helping people become “self-­actualized”—­essentially, the fulfillment of human potential, and a modern incarnation of the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia—­including by reaching a congruence between their actual and ideal self. Rogers’s efforts were complemented by Maslow, who also helped develop the notion of self-­actualization. To account for such possibilities, he proposed his well-­known— but somewhat misunderstood too—­hierarchical conception of human needs to explain how this process might unfold, as we’ll explore in chapter 5. Moreover, he beautifully captured the spirit of this new wave by establishing its foundational spectrum metaphor: “It is as if Freud supplied us the sick half of psychology and we must now fill it out with the healthy half.”33 Which brings us to this book’s central focus, for this “healthy half” refers to the positive territory of the mental well-­being spectrum, to the broad terrain encompassed by the label happiness. Furthermore, since Rogers and

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Maslow first stressed the importance of this realm, research and theory has steadily accumulated, with an emphasis on scientific approaches ushering in a third wave.

Scientific

Although the first two waves did incorporate the scientific method—­testing theories through empirical research—­ they were mainly anchored in a therapeutic context. Gradually, though, interest in well-­ being overflowed these applied arenas and began attracting scientific attention across numerous fields, heralding a new wave. These energies started building in the 1960s, driven by attempts to measure well-­being (with quantification a hallmark of science). For example, an important construct in happiness research is life evaluation, for which the dominant assessment tool was developed back in 1965: psychologist Hadley Cantril’s Self-­Anchoring Striving Scale, which asks respondents to consider where they currently stand on a ten-­rung ladder whose base and top represent, respectively, their worst and best possible life.34 This is still widely used, including in the influential Gallup World Poll (GWP), whose results are the basis for the high-­profile World Happiness Report (WHR), which annually ranks nations on this item.35 Besides this, many other key scales were in place by the 1980s.



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This wave then crested at the turn of the millennium, exemplified and propelled by the creation of positive psychology by Martin Seligman (on assuming the presidency of the American Psychological Association in 1998). Although scientific work on well-­being had been accumulating for years, positive psychology assembled its disparate pieces and placed the resulting picture center stage in psychology. The narrative is that prior to positive psychology’s emergence, the field was generally focused on disorder and dysfunction. Some areas did attend to positive well-­being, such as the ongoing tradition of humanistic psychology and the emerging scales above. But overall, psychology tended to dismiss notions like happiness as not especially serious or worthy of scientific attention. It was therefore significant when Seligman used his presidency to give these topics the weight and significance they merited. Indeed, much of this book draws upon the scientifically informed work associated with or inspired by positive psychology. Yet the development of well-­being science has continued apace, to the point where a new fourth wave is now emerging in response to issues with this scientific base.

Global

As productive and innovative as well-­being scholarship has been over recent decades, it has faced various critiques.

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Thankfully, though, such critiques are helping improve its methods and understanding as scholars respond to the charges. Some issues are significant, but they nevertheless can be resolved without the field fundamentally changing, and thereby constitute a refinement of the three waves above. When assessing factors that influence happiness, for instance, most current research is correlational, which limits the extent to which causality can be ascertained. In that case, the answer is to conduct more longitudinal studies, which indeed is happening. Doing so does not revolutionize the science, though, but rather improves it. Some academic critiques and responses are so fundamental, however, that they constitute a real paradigm shift—­in philosopher Thomas Kuhn’s terminology—­and herald a new wave. This is so with one of the most challenging contentions faced by contemporary well-­being science: that it is Western-­centric, and so lacks the universal validity and scope toward which it strives. Psychology has long been taught and practiced the world over of course. Still, as an international endeavor, its center of gravity has been the West and—­following the Second World War—­North America in particular, given the overall political, economic, military, and cultural hegemony of the United States.36 These dynamics have meant that concepts, priorities, and methods associated with US psychology have come to dominate the field. In turn, the contours of US psychology have been shaped by the



The Roots of Happiness    51

predominant values and traditions of the United States. Tracing the patterns further back, the United States itself has been influenced by the historical currents mentioned above, particularly the Western lineages, from Greek philosophy and Christianity to the Renaissance and Enlightenment. An example of such dynamics is the US tendency toward individualism. As theorists like David Bakan have argued, human beings have two fundamental modes of existence: agency (as autonomous self-­contained beings) and communion (as also inextricably part of networks of other people and processes).37 Cultures appear to differently emphasize these modes: following theorizing by Geert Hofstede and Harry Triandis, decades of research suggests that the West generally tilts toward individualism and the East toward collectivism (although these broad generalizations belie the complex dynamics of these regions, as we explore in subsequent chapters).38 This individualism can be traced to Western eras like the Enlightenment, and is characterized by an emphasis on personal agency and rights (in contrast to collectivism, which prioritizes the group).39 Such traditions influence how people in those cultures perceive and understand the world, including scholars themselves. An influential article in 2010 pointedly argued that the vast majority of research in psychology—­up to 96 percent by some estimates—­has been conducted by and on people

52  chapter 2

in societies considered “WEIRD” (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic).40 Significantly, most of the world is not comparably WEIRD, which raises questions about the validity and universality of such work. For instance, shaped by their cultural situatedness, Western scientists are liable to focus more on happiness as an individual phenomenon (e.g., dwelling on personal strengths), rather than attending to its collective dimensions (e.g., its sociocultural aspects). In the context of the wider dynamics of globalization, however, such trends are shifting. Although there has been cross-­cultural research in psychology for over a century, it has remained fairly niche and underappreciated in the field as a whole. Yet now scholars are getting better at not only conducting research globally—­rather than restricting it to WEIRD contexts—­but also engaging with different cultural perspectives around happiness. This includes, for example, not only doing cross-­cultural assessments using Western-­derived constructs like Cantril’s ladder—­ which is still very valuable and useful—­but exploring diversity in what happiness actually means in various places. Indeed, such engagement is the premise of my own research over recent years (and hence my particular interest in these global dynamics): a lexicography of “untranslatable” words relating to well-­being.41 These are words without exact equivalents in English, and so signify phenomena overlooked by English-­speaking cultures—­thus



The Roots of Happiness    53

also by psychology, whose default language is English—­ but identified by another culture.42 Through this project, I’ve sought to enrich the map of concepts relating to well-­ being by incorporating ideas from other cultures. My approach has been to analyze these words looking for common themes, and twelve categories have emerged so far, grouped into three meta-­categories: qualia (featuring positive emotions, ambivalent emotions, embodiment, and cognition), relationships (love, prosociality, eco-­connection, and aesthetics), and development (character, competence, understanding, and spirituality).43 Although still a work in progress, the project suggests that current Western-­centric conceptualizations of well-­being are overlooking important ideas and perspectives from other cultures. Such work thus reflects—­and is inspired by—­the emergent fourth wave of global scholarship, as do many other research endeavors we’ll encounter throughout the book. In so doing, the chapters that follow seek to provide a snapshot of a truly dynamic, fast-­moving, and exciting world scene, beginning with contemporary ideas around the very concept of happiness itself.

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3 THE FORMS OF HAPPINESS

The previous chapter considered the roots of happiness, tracing some of the formative historical influences that have shaped modern thinking on this topic, culminating in four waves of contemporary well-­being research and practice. Having set this context, the book will now explore different aspects of this scholarship. Much of the literature hails from the third wave—­characterized above all by a scientific approach—­since this constitutes the main arena in which most of the relevant research has taken place. One should also be mindful, however, that the majority of this work is Western-­centric, influenced especially by scholarship in the United States. So where possible, we’ll pay attention to the emerging fourth wave, acknowledging that our current understanding of happiness is not final or total but instead continues to improve, including by becoming more cross-­cultural and global.

But even in its present imperfect state, the existing scholarship on happiness is truly vast and comprehensive, spanning numerous fields of inquiry and endeavor, from physical sciences such as biochemistry to more social sciences like economics. It has been driven above all by psychology, which has led the way in developing key models and metrics. That said, happiness research is genuinely interdisciplinary. Even if many of the ideas and methodological tools primarily originated in psychology—­although their roots stretch back into the traditions featured in chapter 2—­they have since been harnessed by other fields. As such, the book will cover the breadth of happiness research across academia. We begin in this third chapter by looking at current perspectives on what happiness is. By that I mean how happiness has been conceptualized and operationalized by contemporary science into discrete forms or types. In doing so, I want to carefully thread the needle of summarizing the consensus of third wave scholarship while also pointing to fourth wave developments that challenge or complexify this consensus. In a nutshell, from a third wave perspective, modern scholarship has tended to follow Aristotle in identifying two main kinds of happiness: hedonic and eudaimonic. Yet newer, fourth wave scholarship points to additional nuances and types that may warrant inclusion in our evolving taxonomies.

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This chapter explores perspectives on what happiness is, considering how it has been conceptualized by contemporary science into discrete forms (even if actual experiences may interweave several at once).

A significant case in point is Gallup. Founded in the United States in 1935, it conducted its first survey abroad in 1938, and gradually expanded its overseas reach, culminating in establishing its annual GWP in 2005, surveying citizens in more than 160 countries. It usually includes around a hundred items, covering most aspects of life, including well-­being. For that, it has focused on what tend to be regarded as the two main aspects of hedonic happiness (although I will introduce some nuance to this classificatory approach below): life evaluation and positive emotions. Thus with such efforts, well-­being scholarship had already been taking on global dimensions. More recently, however, Gallup has gone even further in its worldwide engagement via the new Global Wellbeing Initiative—­a partnership with a Japan-­based research foundation called Wellbeing for Planet Earth—­with which I’m privileged to be involved.1 Its impetus is the recognition that despite assessing happiness globally since 2005, the GWP metrics are still Western-­centric, with measures like life evaluation—­as assessed by Cantril’s ladder—­influenced by Western traditions such as individualism. It’s not that such measures lack global relevance; people the world over do understand and respond to these items. The issue is whether they capture the full picture of happiness, or conversely, whether there may be dimensions that are being overlooked since they are not widely acknowledged in Western cultures (as has been suggested by my own lexicography project).

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Consequently, the Global Wellbeing Initiative aims toward a more cross-­culturally inclusive picture of well-­ being by developing new items for the GWP that reflect non-­Western perspectives. The initial focus has been on Eastern cultures, with nine items included in the 2020 poll, covering topics like balance and harmony, peace and calm, and communal well-­being. These have been augmented in the 2021 poll by questions on vitality, connection to nature, and mindfulness. The plan going forward is to expand the scope still further to include perspectives from other world regions. Through endeavors like this, well-­ being scholarship is becoming more globally comprehensive, inclusive, and nuanced. As such, here I’ll tentatively add to the two main forms established in the literature: hedonic and eudaimonic. To begin with, I identify several forms of happiness that are often included within these two, but arguably are better considered as distinct forms in themselves. Hedonic happiness is usually seen as comprising positive feelings and judgments of life satisfaction or evaluation. I’ll reserve hedonic just for positive feelings, however, and describe the latter as evaluative happiness. With eudaimonia, it now seems to have become a catchall term for all happiness-­ related experiences that fall outside the scope of hedonia, including character development, meaning/purpose, and mastery/achievement. Here I’ll reserve eudaimonia specifically for character development, and extract these



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other elements as two separate forms: meaningful happiness and accomplished happiness. Having thus identified five different forms, I further discuss another nine potential ones that can be found in the literature (particularly its emerging fourth wave). These fourteen forms are not mutually exclusive, and a given well-­being experience may certainly involve several intertwined. A helpful metaphor is therefore to view these forms as different “flavors”; despite being distinct, they can be blended together to create unique and complex tastes. Nevertheless, it is helpful to conceptually acknowledge these distinct forms to show the granular varieties of happiness. Even these fourteen may not be exhaustive, and other forms may exist. I gave consideration, for instance, to including a notion of aesthetic happiness, capturing the powerful experiential state of being moved by beauty. Yet ultimately it seemed it could be adequately accounted for by a combination of several forms here (e.g., hedonic, absorbed, meaningful, and intellective). Still, further scholarship will possibly—­even probably—­ identify other forms beyond the fourteen here. Having so many distinct forms can become somewhat complicated and unwieldy though. As such, I have organized them according to whether their primary modality is either feeling, thinking, or doing—­recognizing, though, that every form probably involves all three in some way,

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Current research focuses on two main forms: hedonic (essentially, feeling good) and eudaimonic (essentially, becoming good). Emergent scholarship, however, suggests various other potential forms, with this chapter reviewing fourteen in total.

since experience is generally multidimensional—­as illustrated in figure 4. As the cautious language here suggests, this classificatory approach is only based on my conceptual analysis of these forms and has not yet been explored empirically (e.g., using factor analysis). Even so, it is a useful way of organizing the relevant ideas. I should also acknowledge that rather than multiply the taxonomy in this way, some people may simply prefer to expand hedonia and eudaimonia to encompass these other forms. This case has been made, for instance, regarding broadening eudaimonia to include spirituality. There may be merit to the simplicity of that approach, and in some contexts—­for example, teaching the topic to children—­ presenting just a binary hedonic-­eudaimonic distinction might be appropriate. In general, though, introducing further granularity by conceptualizing other forms is useful. One should be clear, however, about the relative weight of the respective literature. I would estimate that roughly around 50 percent of the scientific work focuses on evaluative happiness, followed by 30 percent on hedonic, and 15 percent on forms currently treated as eudaimonic (including those I classify here as distinct forms, such as meaningful happiness). The other types then share about 5 percent between them. That said, this 5 percent figure only pertains to these being explored as forms of happiness per se, and many have a substantial literature on their own terms. Notions of balance and harmony, for instance, are

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Feeling Hedonic Contented Mature Chaironic Vitalic

Happiness

Doing

Thinking

Eudaimonic Accomplished Harmonic Relational Nirvanic

Evaluative Meaningful Intellective Absorbed

Figure 4  Fourteen provisional types of happiness.



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not usually treated as forms of happiness per se, but there is a voluminous literature on relevant topics such as work-­ life balance. As such, these concepts do have a substantial basis in academic scholarship. In terms of happiness itself, though, these other forms are admittedly more tentative and speculative. But it is worth bearing them in mind to appreciate potential future directions in this arena. Indeed, work will be needed to explore not only these less well-­substantiated forms (e.g., to ascertain whether they do merit including in an enriched taxonomy), but also whether there are additional possibilities besides the ones considered here. We are really only beginning to appreciate the full potential scope and complexity of happiness, and other forms may yet be revealed. As a final point, I’ve sought to find a common thread among these forms by defining them with reference to the conceptualization of happiness elucidated in the introduction, namely a desirable mental experience of quality. This notion will animate and interweave all fourteen forms, beginning with hedonic happiness.

Hedonic

The first five forms considered here pertain primarily to feelings. By far the most widely researched form is hedonic

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happiness, sometimes also referred to as subjective well-­ being, a construct primarily developed by Ed Diener and colleagues.2 Essentially, this form is about feeling good. Yet subjective well-­being is not unitary. It is usually interpreted as comprising two main aspects: affective and cognitive. The affective aspect means feeling good in life (i.e., positively valenced emotions), and the cognitive aspect involves feeling good about life (i.e., a positive appraisal of one’s existence). Here I would like to immediately introduce some taxonomic nuance, as indicated above, and suggest that hedonic happiness is best conceptualized as only pertaining to the affective aspect of subjective well-­being. We can then refer separately to the cognitive aspect—­which is not really about hedonia, as conventionally understood—­as a distinct form of evaluative happiness, discussed later in the chapter. So, this book will reserve hedonic happiness only for the affective aspect of subjective well-­being. This aspect tends to involve assessing current or recent feelings through the prism of positive affect (PA) versus negative affect (NA). Emotions can generally be categorized—­with exceptions known as mixed emotions—­as having either a pleasant (PA) or unpleasant (NA) hedonic tone, such as joy or sadness, respectively. Tools like the Positive and Negative Affect Scale then ask to what extent people felt such emotions over a given period, with the resulting ratio



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offering an appraisal of subjective well-­being’s affective aspect.3 Thus hedonic happiness could be regarded as a desirable mental experience of quality in relation to one’s present emotions, with particular emphasis on high arousal PA (which differentiates it from our next form). As a final point here, I generally avoid the term subjective well-­being in this book. Although the construct may have a precise and narrow meaning for scholars in the field—­combining cognitive and affective aspects of mental well-­being, as elucidated above—­the words themselves imply something far broader. As articulated in the introduction, well-­being can be understood as having mental, physical, social, and spiritual dimensions, all of which can be experienced subjectively. As such, “subjective well-­ being” implies people’s own felt sense of their well-­being across all four dimensions. By contrast, the established construct of subjective well-­being mainly pertains to the mental dimension, and only a portion of it at that. So to avoid confusion, I will not use the label here, and will instead refer separately to its affective and cognitive aspects as hedonic and evaluative happiness, respectively.

Contented

Closely aligned with hedonia is contented happiness, often conceptualized as low arousal PA. From one perspective,

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one could simply expand our conception of hedonia to include such feelings. It is arguably more useful to view this as a distinct form, however, since it includes states not usually considered particularly hedonic (e.g., tranquility), and even ones that might not be positively valenced at all (e.g., equanimity). We could thus view contented happiness as a desirable mental experience of quality in relation to one’s present emotions, but with particular emphasis on low arousal PA. One way to appreciate these dynamics is to conceptualize PA along a spectrum of arousal, from quieter states such as peace or calmness, to more energized ones like joy or bliss. Most research on PA focuses on relatively high arousal forms such as enjoyment (though frequently not the peaks of PA, which are reflected in some forms below, such as chaironic happiness). Yet researchers increasingly acknowledge that this prioritization may reflect a Western cultural bias, and relatedly, that inattention to lower arousal affect is a conceptual lacuna.4 Consequently, scholars are now paying more attention to cultures that emphasize low arousal experiential states. As noted above, the Global Wellbeing Initiative, for instance, has focused on developing new items for the GWP based on Eastern perspectives on well-­being, with the 2020 poll including three pertaining to contented happiness: In general, do you feel at peace with your life? Did you experience calmness during a lot of the day yesterday?



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Would you rather live an exciting life or a calm life? Such research will help expand academic conceptions of happiness to include such states. Moreover, just because contentment may have been highlighted more by Eastern cultures, it is not only valued or experienced by people in those cultures, and may be more universal than is appreciated. Indeed, on the third question above, most people in every country polled—­ with the exceptions of Georgia and Vietnam—­tended to prefer a calm life (low arousal PA) to an exciting one (high arousal PA). Similarly, research on lay perceptions of happiness worldwide, including in Western countries, found the most prominent definition was “inner harmony,” encompassing inner peace, contentment, and balance.5 Note, though, that inner harmony not only includes low arousal states (peace and contentment), but also balance and harmony, which we’ll explore below as a subtly different form of harmonic happiness.

Mature

Contented happiness took us into affective territory where positive valence is relatively mild or even absent, such as neutral states of equanimity. Strikingly, we can travel even further “downward” to find forms of happiness involving some negative valence. Such experiences

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are not necessarily in the negative territory of the mental well-­being spectrum though; as we saw in the introduction with the example of a sportsperson, just because an experience is negatively valenced does not automatically mean it constitutes suffering. Still, some experiences could be characterized as such, but through a strange alchemy, one may yet potentially find forms of happiness in these very experiences, meaning they might no longer be appraised as suffering. Central to eudaimonia, for instance, is personal development, as elucidated below. This may often include and even require experiences that are difficult rather than pleasant. Consider psychotherapy, which usually involves becoming aware of, reflecting on, and integrating negative aspects of oneself (in Jungian terms, “the shadow”). Similar dynamics apply to other opportunities for growth, both voluntary (e.g., learning a skill) and involuntary (e.g., crises). The latter is reflected in a burgeoning literature on “post-­traumatic growth,” in which the process of wrestling with distressing experiences can potentially generate some positive changes in people (e.g., renewed appreciation for life).6 Psychologist Paul Wong has proposed the idea of mature happiness to account for such dynamics.7 Drawing on Buddhism, he argues that suffering is inherent to the human condition and cannot be eluded. Buddhism, however, also holds that powerful forms of happiness—­including



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the zenith of nirvāṇa, discussed in chapter 2 and further below—­can yet be found by facing and engaging with such suffering. Similarly, Wong drew inspiration from Viktor Frankl, whose pioneering creation of logotherapy—­ healing through meaning—­ derived from his personal trauma experienced in the camps of World War II8. Frankl asserted powerfully that not only might redemption be found amid life’s difficulties, but such challenges may even be a source of fulfillment too, and are intimately connected to deeper forms of happiness. Indeed, philosophical traditions like Taoism suggest distress may be necessary for happiness to be known at all, in that phenomena usually require a counterpart for their existence (e.g., “up” only makes sense in relation to “down”). People’s very experience and knowledge of suffering may therefore be what makes their happiness so precious and valued—­the dark backdrop that allows the light to shine all the brighter. As Khalil Gibran expressed it poetically, “The deeper that sorrow carves into your being, the more joy you can contain.”9 This insight does not necessarily come easily or quickly to people, but instead may need to be attained through hard-­won experience, hence Wong’s qualifier “mature.” That said, some people do express a preference for a “psychologically rich life,” which involves having diverse and complex experiences and emotions, including those that may be challenging or negatively valenced.10 In any case,

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sought or not, mature happiness might be viewed as a desirable mental experience of quality regarding the way one has responded to suffering in one’s life.

Chaironic

The potential horizons of affective happiness are further expanded—­this time upward—­by another useful concept proposed by Wong. Although conceptualizations of hedonia focus on high arousal PA, these tend not to include its most intense or significant forms (but rather less highly charged states like enjoyment). For such elevated states, he proposed the idea of chaironic happiness, based on the Greek chairo, which has meanings like gladness, joy, and bliss, but also grace and blessing. With such roots, this form could be viewed as a kind of spiritual happiness, defined by Wong as “feeling blessed and fortunate because of a sense of awe, gratitude, and oneness with nature or God.”11 We should note that one need not necessarily equate such happiness purely with positively valenced emotions. Indeed, Wong suggests this form can overlap with mature happiness in that, for some people, the solace and even fulfillment they might find in their suffering is often interpreted as spiritual. This kind of transformational process might even be seen as the heart of spirituality, as embodied in the powerful redemptive motif of Christ on the



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cross. But whether involving suffering or not, this type of happiness does seem to be qualitatively different—­more elevating or profound perhaps—­than mere hedonic forms. With its spiritual overtones, such happiness naturally intersects with the idea of spiritual well-­being. In the introduction, I suggested the latter could be viewed as the quality of relationship one has with phenomena deemed sacred (e.g., God)—­that is, how one stands in relation to spiritual dimensions of existence. By contrast, chaironic happiness is centered more on feelings of spirituality. Clearly there is considerable overlap between these phenomena, but nevertheless there is value in differentiating them. What spiritual means, though, is itself much debated. But a good starting point is what philosopher Rudolf Otto influentially called the numinous: anything qualitatively different from regular events and modes of consciousness.12 This could include moments of stillness or insight in meditation or prayer, being profoundly moved by art, experiencing oneness with the world, falling so deeply in love that one’s self dissolves, and so on. That said, such states need not necessarily be conceptualized as spiritual; Maslow’s notion of peak experiences covers similar ground and is open to secular interpretations. Thus we might broadly conceive of chaironic happiness as a desirable mental experience of quality in relation to self-­transcendence. Crucially, chaironic states are qualitatively different from closely related experiences such as flow (discussed

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below in relation to absorbed happiness). The added X factor is hard to pin down, but is best seen as involving the sacred in some way. This term is also elusive, but many modern conceptualizations rest on the pioneering work of sociologist Émile Durkheim, who contrasted it with the profane: the latter pertains to ordinary everyday life, and the sacred concerns “things set apart and forbidden.”13 This can include divine beings, and associated places and objects, but also phenomena that are “just” precious or meaningful, like memories or objects one holds especially dear.14 A potential further element here is the idea of grace. In Christianity, for instance, it describes the “unmerited” love and redemption bestowed on humans by God—­a gift granted not because humans have earned it but rather freely given. Chaironic experiences have a similar dynamic. Although one can try to facilitate them—­practicing meditation, for example—­one cannot force or will their appearance. Rather, they tend to arrive spontaneously and out of the blue (by grace, if you will), and depart just as mysteriously, eluding attempts to prolong or capture them. Which is perhaps what make them so precious and sought after.

Vitalic

Of the five forms of happiness pertaining primarily to feelings, this last one brings us into slightly different



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ontological territory. Specifically, into a consideration of the body—­into one’s existence as a physical being. Among these fourteen forms are three that branch away from mental well-­being and reach out toward the other three dimensions of well-­being. We’ve just seen how chaironic happiness intersects with spiritual well-­being, and below relational happiness connects to social well-­being. Completing the picture, vitalic happiness pertains to physical well-­being. In the introduction, the positive realm of the physical spectrum was labeled vitality, being positioned as the physical analogue to happiness. It therefore refers to not only being relatively free of physical illness (zero on the spectrum) but thriving too (excelling physically in some way). From a critical perspective, however, the whole distinction between physical and mental is somewhat artificial and constructed, since the mind permeates the body and vice versa, as explored further in later chapters. In objective terms, the physical body and brain constitute one interconnected system. Likewise, in subjective terms, many qualia involve both embodied physical sensations and mental phenomenology. Take an experience like joy, for example. This is not only a mental event (objectively as brain activation, and subjectively as emotionality), but a physical one too (objectively as physiological processes distributed throughout the body, and subjectively as embodied feelings).

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Likewise, vitality not only has physical aspects (e.g., high levels of bodily energy), but mental aspects too (e.g., a mind-­set characterized by zest and gumption), both of which have objective manifestations (i.e., physiological activation) and subjective manifestations (i.e., qualia).15 With that in mind, although vitality fundamentally pertains to the physical well-­being spectrum, conceptually and experientially it overlaps with the mental spectrum. Indeed, some aspects of it may pertain more to the mind than the body, like an enthusiastic attitude, resilient spirit, or vivacious personality. We might thus refer to these more mental manifestations of vitality as vitalic happiness, involving a desirable mental experience of quality with respect to one’s physical being. As ever, though, more research is needed to explore these dynamics. Indeed, vitality has often been overlooked by researchers, perhaps reflecting the Western-­centric nature of academia, with embodiment having been relatively neglected in the West compared to other cultures. To that end, the Global Wellbeing Initiative introduced an item on vitality in the 2021 GWP. Its formulation was tricky due to an impoverished English lexicon in this area. After much discussion, we opted to ask about “enthusiasm,” since this seems to incorporate both physical (e.g., energy) and mental aspects (e.g., attitude). Through such analyses, we may find that vitalic happiness really does constitute an important aspect of mental well-­being.



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Evaluative

Having considered forms of happiness that are primarily about feelings, we turn our attention to four that have more to do with thinking. By that I do not only mean discursive thoughts but also cognition in the broader sense, encompassing modalities such as perception and attention. This first form is perhaps the most widely studied type of happiness, accounting for at least 50 percent of the empirical research by my rough estimate. I’m referring to the second main aspect of subjective well-­being, which I call evaluative happiness. Although often conflated with hedonia, as noted above, it makes sense to treat it as distinct. Whereas hedonia is primarily affective, evaluative happiness is mainly a cognitive phenomenon, being a desirable mental experience of quality with respect to appraising one’s life (either as a whole, or in relation to specific domains, such as work). Evaluative happiness has been operationalized via constructs like life evaluation, life satisfaction, and quality of life. These reflect one’s global assessment (all elements together) of life generally (over a reasonable span of time rather than a passing moment). One of the earliest measures was Cantril’s ladder, which has subsequently been augmented by many others, the most prominent being the Satisfaction with Life Scale, which as of early 2022 has nearly thirty-four thousand citations.16

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These are valuable and influential constructs. The WHR, for instance, has made an immense impact—­highlighting the importance of happiness to arenas such as economics and policy making—­all based on Cantril’s ladder (in the GWP). This item is well chosen. If you could only pick one question to ask people about well-­being, that is probably the best, since it invites reflection on their life as a whole. Even so, it may not capture everything about happiness; people might prioritize another form of it—­such as pursuing a virtuous path, as per eudaimonia—­even if it detracts from other aspects of their life and hence hinders their life evaluation overall. Nevertheless, we will have much more to say about evaluative happiness throughout the book. When we consider the mechanics (chapter 4), factors (chapter 5), and interventions (chapter 6) relating to happiness, much of this research focuses on this form in particular.

Meaningful

With this next form, we move into territory usually associated with eudaimonia. As noted above, contemporary scholarship follows thinkers like Aristotle in presenting this latter concept as a broad counterpart to hedonia. The most prominent model in this space is Carol Ryff’s influential model of “psychological well-­being,” which features



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six dimensions: self-­ acceptance, positive relationships, autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life, and personal growth.17 Clearly, these are in a very different realm from hedonia. Yet eudaimonia has arguably now become a catchall category for anything happiness-related that is non-­ hedonic. The expanded taxonomy here therefore offers an opportunity to refine our understanding of eudaimonia, since it allows some of the qualities frequently bundled up within it their own space, as distinct forms of happiness in their own right. In that regard, let us reserve eudaimonia for self-­development—­essentially, the cultivation of character and virtue, as elucidated below—­as this is more closely connected with classical theorizing on the concept. Doing so then enables other dimensions within Ryff’s model, which are not necessarily to do with self-­ cultivation, to be considered separately. The first of these is meaning and purpose in life, widely seen as integral to well-­being. Besides Ryff, for example, they are central to Martin Seligman’s PERMA model of flourishing, alongside positive emotions (i.e., hedonic happiness), as well as engagement, relationships, and achievement (with these aligned, respectively, with absorbed, relational, and accomplished happiness, as explored below). For Seligman, meaning/purpose can be found in “belonging to and serving something that you believe is bigger than then self.”18

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In that description, though, we can see how finding meaning/purpose in life does not necessarily involve eudaimonic cultivation of character. Many people find some meaning and purpose, for instance, in supporting sports teams, myself included (shout out to Brentford and Liverpool football clubs!). Such activities certainly fall within Seligman’s definition, yet they do not require any self-­ development or pursuit of virtue. For reasons like these, it is helpful to disaggregate meaningful happiness from eudaimonia, allowing it to be recognized as valuable on its own terms, namely as a desirable mental experience of quality with respect to one’s meaning and purpose in life. As a final point, this form overlaps with mature happiness in that it can also include experiences that are negatively valenced yet are interpreted positively in other ways. In my twenties, for example, I spent several years working as a psychiatric nursing assistant. This included many challenging episodes, which evoked various difficult emotions. Overall though it was highly meaningful to me, not least because I felt I was doing something valuable and worthwhile. This is not the same as evaluative happiness; at that point, I was not particularly satisfied with my life overall for various reasons, nor indeed with my career per se. Yet still I found real purpose in what I was doing. Such complexities again attest to the value of a more granular taxonomy.



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Intellective

Still within the realm of thought is a form of happiness that has been largely overlooked by modern scholarship, but may warrant inclusion here. It pertains to the cultivation of character and virtue that is central to eudaimonia, as elucidated below, and from one perspective, could be simply enfolded within as one of its elements or manifestations. Similarly, it overlaps with chaironic happiness. The advantage to an expanded taxonomy, however, is it creates space to appreciate forms on their own terms, without being subsumed within broader categories, as has happened with this particular type. We find its importance addressed in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, which was pivotal in establishing the notion of eudaimonia. Toward the end, the text suggests that the highest form of happiness comes from the highest exercise of virtue, namely the reflective study, contemplation, and understanding of what is best and most noble in life. For those who are spiritually inclined, such contemplation may take on an avowedly religious character (hence the overlap with chaironic happiness). In his influential interpretations of Aristotle, for example, Aquinas depicts such contemplation as a perfect happiness, involving complete satisfaction of the will, found in a full, final intellective vision of God. These ideas indicate an intellective or contemplative happiness, wherein one can soar up into elevated and

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rarefied states of being through reflecting on, as well as understanding, some great good. Here “intellective” is used, since although “contemplative” is in keeping with the way Aristotle discussed this topic, in modern discourse it has connotations with meditative states, which pertain more to absorbed, chaironic, and nirvanic happiness. In sum, we might describe this form as a desirable mental experience of quality relating to one’s intellectual or contemplative being (i.e., aspects of mental life that particularly concern intellect, cognitions, and understanding).

Absorbed

The final form of happiness relating to thinking—­using the latter in its broadest sense to refer to cognition generally—­covers various valued states denoted by labels like absorption, engagement, focus, creativity, and play. These align with the notion of engagement in Seligman’s PERMA model, and above all center on how attention modalities are deployed. This form could therefore be de­ picted as a desirable mental experience of quality relating to one’s attentional engagement. Among the most widely studied phenomena here is psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s notion of flow.19 Using an experiencing sampling method—­where people are contacted at random moments and asked about their



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current thoughts/feelings—­he examined which activities in life people found most rewarding, and observed a pattern of experiential phenomena that he called flow. The activities themselves tend to be intrinsically valued (enjoyed for their own sake), and well matched to one’s skills, neither too demanding (which can be stressful) nor too easy (which can be boring). Common examples are playing sport or music, though the range of possibilities is essentially limitless. The resulting mental state is one of total involvement, absorption, concentration, or captivation. One is completely focused on the task, with no intruding or extraneous thoughts. Such focus elicits a loss of subjective sense of self and time, which is usually experienced as liberating. Crucially, these activities are not exactly enjoyable per se—­otherwise they might be classified under hedonism—­ even if people describe them as such afterward. They are not primarily affective states at all, but instead are a different mental order altogether. This form also encompasses the multitude of practices and states covered by the term meditation. We will discuss meditation in more detail in chapters 4 and 6, but the essential point here is that it involves above all training attention skills, such that one can deploy these to enhance well-­being. At the risk of oversimplifying a complex topic, a distinction is frequently made between two main meditative forms (even if many practices involve

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a mix or sequence of both): focused attention and open awareness.20 Some forms of focused attention overlap with flow. One may enter deep absorption by focusing intently on stimuli like the breath, say. That said, flow may not necessarily be equivalent; a crucial difference lies in the relative presence of conscious awareness. In flow, people commonly get “lost” in the activity and are not consciously present per se. By contrast, most meditation is characterized by heightened conscious awareness and increased presence in the moment. Yet such distinctions are still not well understood, and more research is needed to better tease these phenomena apart. In comparison, other forms of meditation facilitate states of open awareness. Rather than focusing on specific stimuli, one aims to be expansively receptive to all qualia that pass through consciousness, registering but not clinging onto them. A metaphor often invoked is watching clouds float through the sky. The practice of mindfulness is one example of open awareness—­even if many mindfulness sessions begin with focused attention to stabilize the mind—­as we explore further in chapter 6.

Eudaimonic

Finally, we move into forms of happiness that are more about “doing” (though of course they still also involve



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feeling and thinking). The place to begin is with eudaimonia, which in its broader sense has been discussed extensively already. Here I am using it in a more selective way, however. As noted above, eudaimonia has become something of an umbrella term for all happiness-­related phenomena that fall outside the remit of hedonia—­from meaning and purpose to mastery and accomplishment. Yet an expanded taxonomy allows these phenomena to be valued as distinct forms of happiness in their own right. This means we can preserve eudaimonia for dimensions of mental well-­being that align more closely with its classical framing. As articulated by the likes of Aristotle, eudaimonia is essentially about self-­ development, the cultivation of one’s character. This does not simply mean having a “personality” but rather trying to become one’s best self. Moreover, it has a moral dimension. Eudaimonia is not just about becoming skilled at something (which is captured by accomplished happiness below). It also embeds a sense of aiming toward acting and thinking in ways that foster the good. Or as Aristotle put it, eudaimonia is the “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.”21 We might therefore position eudaimonic happiness as a desirable mental experience of quality in relation to one’s personal development. Such ideas find their modern articulation in a wealth of concepts and models relating to self-­development. To begin with, the very possibility of such development was

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articulated by the humanistic psychologists who ushered in the second wave of well-­being scholarship—­introduced in chapter 2—­including Rank, Rogers, and Maslow, as well as Kurt Goldstein, credited with coining the term self-­actualization.22 This latter phrase evoked the possibility that within every person is a seed of potentiality, which with careful nurturing may blossom and bear fruit to its fullest capability. Scholars then sought to capture the precise dynamics of self-­development, including identifying potential stages. Maslow, for instance, created his well-­known hierarchy of needs—­as we’ll discuss in chapter 5—­with self-actualization near its peak, followed by self-transcendence. Other models were then fashioned that identified a broadly similar pattern—­that is, culminating in some form of self-­ actualization—albeit with slightly different emphases, from Erik Erikson’s framework of psychosocial development, to Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development.23 Such are the potential contours of eudaimonic happiness.

Accomplished

While eudaimonia focuses on the cultivation of character, accomplished happiness is more about skills. Essentially it means being able to successfully navigate one’s



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environment, which clearly is integral to well-­being. It is reflected in numerous concepts, spanning illness and health. With the former, it is manifested in constructs such as coping and resilience. Then in more positive terms, this form involves thriving in the contexts one finds oneself, reflected in notions such as mastery (one dimension of Ryff’s model). Although mastery is often incorporated into eudaimonia, I am reserving the latter for character development, as elucidated above, allowing us to consider mastery on its own terms. Although skills and character sometimes overlap, they are not identical. Creativity may be a character strength, for example, but painting is a skill. Indeed, one can be skilled at abilities that matter little in terms of one’s personal values, but are nevertheless conducive to well-­being. Moreover, skills are not necessarily about becoming one’s best self—­the essence of eudaimonia—­but rather the interplay and fit between oneself and one’s environment. In that respect, skills tend to be context dependent and situationally relevant. A city dweller may be adept at navigating an urban environment (e.g., dealing with busy roads), for instance, but not a rural one (e.g., identifying wildlife), and vice versa for a rural inhabitant. Finally, this form of happiness is not only about the skills themselves but also the rewards one may receive from their successful use, as per the notion of achievement

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in Seligman’s PERMA model. These can be social (e.g., status and recognition) and/or nonsocial (e.g., material benefits, such as safely negotiating one’s milieu). Both rewards are powerful forces, motivating as well as shaping human concerns and behavior. Accomplished happiness might therefore be conceived as a desirable mental experience of quality in relation to successfully navigating life’s challenges.

Harmonic

When thinking about navigating life, two interlinked concepts are particularly relevant: balance and harmony. Furthermore, their importance is not limited to dealing with the world around but instead appears to extend across all areas of existence. Indeed, balance and harmony may even be a “golden thread” running through all aspects of well-­ being.24 As such, their successful instantiation in one’s life might be regarded as a form of “harmonic” happiness. Before giving examples, it is worth differentiating balance and harmony, as these are not synonymous (even if often treated as such). Balance tends to denote the quality of relationship between two dialectically related phenomena, either poles of a spectrum (e.g., hot versus cold), or dichotomous categories (e.g., work versus life). Temporally such dyads can



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be either synchronic (in the moment), such as the homeostatic equilibrium of temperature (neither too cold nor too hot), or diachronic (over time), for example averaging a good work-­life balance over one’s career. In most cases, people are concerned with optimal balance, as reflected in concepts such as Aristotle’s golden mean, the “Goldilocks principle,” and the Swedish notion of lagom, all of which denote an ideal of calibrating just the right amount of a given quantity:25 not simply identifying the midpoint on a spectrum, or just crudely giving equal priority to two categories, but carefully finding the ideal point or relative weight (which may sometimes be skewed far toward one pole or category). Then in conceptualizing harmony, traditions like Chinese and Greek philosophy frequently elucidated it as an ideal using the example of music, where it denotes a pleasing, ordered gestalt of multiple notes.26 So if balance describes an ideal connection between two phenomena, harmony might be the emergent relationship quality between multiple such balancing acts. Consider a harmonious marriage. This implies not just finding balance regarding one aspect of the partnership (e.g., the division of tasks), but potentially all of them (or at least most). On reflection, balance and harmony are relevant across all aspects of life and indeed throughout the forms of happiness. With emotions, for instance, we find concepts like emotional equanimity, equilibrium, complexity,

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and diversity.27 The first two pertain more to balance and are closely linked to contented happiness, describing an equipoise between positive and negative emotionality. By contrast, the latter are more about harmony among a broad and well-­differentiated range of feelings, including even negative ones, and thus has relevance to mature happiness and a psychologically rich life. But balance and harmony not only pertain to emotions. Take character, say, where Aristotle’s golden mean holds that virtue is found in an optimal balance between extremes (e.g., courage as avoiding both timidity and rashness), which has relevance to eudaimonia.28 Or work-­life balance, which reflects the judicious allocation of time and resources to various life elements, and may be integral to forms like meaningful and evaluative happiness. Or in the social arena, good self-­other interactions involve balancing each other’s needs, which is important for relational happiness (introduced next). From this perspective, well-­ being involves numerous such balancing acts, with their overall configuration ideally being in harmony. As such, harmonic happiness constitutes a desirable mental experience of quality with respect to how well the elements of one’s life are ordered and operating together. Moreover, although this could be deemed a specific form of happiness, in a meta sense these principles also apply to the other forms, as alluded to above. Perhaps then, in its fullest, deepest sense, the most



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complete form of happiness might be found in attaining harmony among all the forms themselves.

Relational

Although I’ve positioned happiness as covering the mental dimension of well-­being, some forms transcend its boundaries, overlapping with its other dimensions. We’ve seen chaironic and vitalic happiness intersect with spiritual and physical well-­being, respectively. Completing the trifecta, relational happiness brings in a consideration of social well-­being. It is therefore of a different ontological order to the other forms here, which tend to be conceived as individual experiences. Some may involve other people (e.g., meaningful happiness arising from joining a community), but are generally conceptualized as existing within the person as a psychological state. This focus on intrapsychic happiness may reflect the individualism of Western cultures that shaped the development of psychology. By contrast, some other cultures prioritize forms that are fundamentally relational and intersubjective.29 Such processes exist at the level of multiple people as an emergent gestalt. Just as a melody does not inhere in single notes but instead in a sequence, relational happiness is a property of a social group, shared among multiple living

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beings. Rather than an intrapersonal state, it involves interpersonal synchrony and togetherness. With this form, one could not speak of an individual feeling good if others in their group are not, reflected in the saying that a person is only as happy as their unhappiest child. We should note here the subtle difference between relational happiness and social well-­being. The latter pertains to the quality of people’s relationships and communities, signifying their breadth, depth, strength, and so on. By contrast, relational happiness is a shared experience, which is somewhat different. In being thus shared, it is therefore also distinct from experiencing other forms of happiness because of a relationship. Relational happiness, then, might be conceived as a shared desirable mental experience of quality arising from a relationship dynamic. The little research there is on relational happiness suggests it is emphasized in cultures regarded as more collectivistic (e.g., in the East) and downplayed in those deemed more individualistic (e.g., in the West). As such, it has largely been overlooked in contemporary academia given its Western-centricity. Yet we may well find that—­as with other overlooked forms—­this mode may be more universally valued and experienced than is appreciated. Indeed, from a critical perspective, simply mapping the collectivist-­individualist dichotomy onto an East versus West binary may represent a contemporary incarnation of the pejorative Orientalist discourse identified by



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Edward Said.30 Such generalizations tend to obscure the dynamic heterogeneity of these regions: there are movements and cultures in the West that embrace elements of collectivism, and conversely, emergent forms of individualism in the East (and indeed, the modernization theory of cultural change suggests a relatively universal movement in the direction of individualism).31 Moreover, even if the West is predominantly individualistic, its people nevertheless still need relationships and recognize their importance, as seen in the voluminous literature on social capital. Arguably, the fullest manifestation of relational happiness is love—­at least reciprocal love between living beings, for other forms also exist—­ which most people would surely regard as a universal. We must thus be wary of assuming that relational happiness (and other forms here) only pertains to certain cultures, and be open to it potentially having wider relevance.

Nirvanic

This chapter has covered a great deal of ground, with this expanded taxonomy allowing for an extensive accounting of the nuances of happiness. But even the diversity of forms above might be incomplete. Despite the wealth of scholarship over the past century, our understanding remains provisional and in need of further efforts. We may

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have not yet touched the outer limits of what humans are capable when it comes to well-­being. To that point, this chapter has mainly focused on contemporary academic concepts of happiness, developed in psychology as practiced in the West, but this is not the only arena in which relevant ideas have been formulated. As we saw in chapter 2, many religious, spiritual, and philosophical traditions have also developed detailed theories in this space. Moreover, these are not merely historical, as if superseded by modern academic ideas. Many traditions still exist and continue to offer much to our understanding of happiness. Let’s consider Buddhism. This choice reflects several factors. First, of all comparable traditions, it may be the most psychologically oriented, replete with detailed theories on the mind and well-­being. Second, for that reason perhaps, it has received the most attention in contemporary psychology, reflected in many thousands of studies on meditation, most of which focus on Buddhist-­derived practices like mindfulness. Third, I have personally and professionally (as the subject of my PhD) been drawn to this tradition for over twenty years, and have found it of great relevance to happiness. From one perspective, Buddhism is entirely focused on helping people find happiness—­in the deepest sense—­ and has accumulated twenty-­five hundred years’ worth of intricate teaching and practice toward this goal. We cannot



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delve into their details here, so it will necessarily suffice to merely allude to the “nirvanic” happiness that is central to the Buddhist vision. Key to Buddhism is the Noble Eightfold Path, a detailed prescription for “right living,” as introduced in chapter 2. Advancing even a little along this path is likely to improve well-­being, including the forms of happiness above. But its ultimate goal is nirvāṇa. While fundamentally elusive and ineffable, aspects of its meaning can be glimpsed by considering its etymology, namely to blow out or extinguish. Phenomena to which this process might apply range from psychological patterns that contribute toward duḥkha (e.g., craving and attachment), to one’s very sense of selfhood. In so doing, one may experience the kind of ultimate happiness denoted by terms like nirvāṇa. More esoterically, nirvāṇa promises release from saṃsāra, the endless cycle of birth, death, and rebirth that is inherently pervaded by duḥkha (in the metaphysics of Buddhism and comparable traditions). This cycle can be interpreted according to various time frames, from successive physical lives implied by theories of reincarnation to the moment-­to-­moment way the human self is continually renewed. As such, metaphysical claims of reincarnation aside, most Buddhists believe one can potentially attain nirvāṇa in this lifetime. Clearly, we are in esoteric and rarefied territory here, and readers are encouraged to explore the topic further.

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Suffice it to say that nirvāṇa cannot be understood simply as a feeling or thought but rather a whole way of being (hence its inclusion here as a type of doing). In terms of our common definitional thread, one might thus describe nirvanic happiness as a desirable mental experience of quality with respect to one’s relative freedom from suffering. This dry description, however, belies the vast promise of nirvāṇa in Buddhism, where it is positioned as being of a radically different existential order to other human states, potentially constituting a veritable zenith of flourishing. With that we conclude our expansive—­but still not exhaustive—­tour of the varieties of happiness.



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4 THE ARCHITECTURE OF HAPPINESS

Having explored different forms of happiness, we turn to the fascinating question of how such states are manifested and experienced. These include physiological, psychological, phenomenological, and sociocultural processes, which together create the “architecture” of happiness. Essentially, this chapter examines what happiness is made of. This is subtly different from the next chapter, which looks at factors that influence it. Economic factors play a role in how happy people are, for example, but money itself does not constitute happiness. The question of what does constitute happiness—­or similarly, what generates, produces, or creates it—­is our focus here. Our starting point is to recognize these mechanics as multidimensional. So I’ll briefly introduce a framework to help us approach the material with that in mind. First, the notion of dimensions can be understood in terms of

Neurophysiological dynamics constitute the “raw material” for happiness, which is then filtered through psychological processes—which themselves have been shaped by sociocultural influences—to create the subjective experience of happiness.

ontology, as we saw in the introduction, where I discussed four main dimensions of well-­being (physical, mental, social, and spiritual). Here though I would like to bring in a different ontological schema: the Integral Framework, created by philosopher Ken Wilber. He also identifies four principal dimensions, but his are mind, body, culture, and society.1 These are created by juxtaposing two common binaries: mind-­body and individual-­collective. Before delving into the details, I should note that such divergence between frameworks is not only fine—­there is more than one way to carve up existence—­but can be useful. By bringing different frameworks together, and exploring their intersections and tensions, one can better tease apart and conceptualize the subtle complexities of life. In that respect, Wilber’s schema can help us better appreciate the dynamics of our four main well-­being dimensions. The first binary featured in Wilber’s framework is the mind-­body dichotomy. This has been debated for centuries by philosophers, and in some form is accepted by most thinkers (except for strong materialist or idealist monists). In the context of Wilber’s model, “mind” refers broadly to subjective experience (our inner, private, phenomenological world of qualia), whereas “body” refers to our objective existence (as a physical, material being). This distinction is different to that between the mental and physical dimensions of well-­being, and indeed



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uses the terms mind and body in a subtly different way. In the introduction, mental and physical well-­being were described as reflecting the state of one’s mind and body respectively. Moreover, I suggested that both mind and body have subjective aspects (i.e., qualia) and objective aspects (i.e., physiological processes). By contrast, in Wilber’s framework, mind and body denote this subjective-­ objective dichotomy itself. These semantic nuances reflect the fact that words like mind and body can have numerous meanings, some of which overlap or even conflict. When using these words, I will aim to make clear in the text which meaning is being invoked. The relationship between mind and body—­in both senses of these words—­is complex and disputed. In terms of the mind-­ body distinction as deployed in Wilber’s framework, at present, the dominant scientific approach is the neural correlates of consciousness paradigm, which traces patterns of association between mind (subjective states) and body (physiological states).2 Yet their relationship remains poorly understood and is still fundamentally quite mysterious. This paradigm does not, or cannot yet, establish causality, for instance. Brain states do not necessarily cause subjective experience per se. Qualia may well depend—­ supervene, in philosophical terminology—­ on brain states for their existence. The brain, however, is better seen as the physiological architecture or mechanism by which the mind is instantiated, rather than its cause.

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A positive mood, say, has been linked to neurotransmitters such as serotonin and dopamine. But its proximate cause may be a hug from a loved one, the response to which is then expressed physiologically in the brain as neurotransmitter activity and phenomenologically in the mind as a pleasant emotion. In that sense, mind and body—­subjective and objective existence—­may be two sides of the same coin: mind is the body/brain experienced from the “inside,” and the body/brain is the mind observed from the “outside.” The second binary is the individual-­collective distinction. This draws on the idea—­introduced in the previous chapter—­that humans have two fundamental modes of existence: agency (as autonomous beings) and communion (as part of networks). Wilber’s insight was to juxtapose this binary with the mind-­body distinction, creating a two-­by-­two matrix, with mind versus body as the columns, and individual versus collective as the rows, as illustrated in figure 5. The top row covers the standard mind-­body dichotomy—that is, applied to the individual—­ as outlined above. The bottom row is where the model is especially innovative, suggesting that subjective mind and objective body can also be understood as existing at a collective level. Collectively, mind is an intersubjective phenomenon that Wilber labels as culture. When people form groups (of any scale), they enter a shared experiential horizon, featuring



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SUBJECTIVE

OBJECTIVE

SUBJECTIVE

OBJECTIVE

Consciousness and its qualia

INDIVIDUAL

MIND CULTURE

Relationships and shared qualia

COLLECTIVE

INTERSUBJECTIVE

Physiological processes

BODY SOCIETY

Material systems and structures

INTEROBJECTIVE

Figure 5  The Integral Framework.

common ideas, values, traditions, and even feelings (as per relational happiness). Likewise, the collective also has a body, an interobjective material reality denoted as society, which includes anything that is physically observable or measurable. At the level of a nation, for instance, this ranges from its demographics and economy to its climate and geography. Here one can again note the valuable intersections between Wilber’s framework and the four well-­being dimensions outlined in the introduction. Above we saw that mental and physical well-­being are orthogonal to the

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mind-­body distinction, in that both forms of well-­being have subjective and objective aspects. Similarly, social and potentially even spiritual well-­being can be understood as having both intersubjective and interobjective aspects. With Wilber’s framework in mind, this chapter considers some key processes by which happiness is generated. Much of the presentation concentrates on the upper-­right dimension of the body/brain, which is where most scientific research is situated—­in paradigms referred to as affective neuroscience or the neural correlates of well-­being approach.3 Crucially, though, it will not only do so. It is important to also consider the roles played by subjective, intersubjective, and interobjective dynamics, especially as these are often overlooked. As with all chapters, the presentation cannot be exhaustive; the literature is too voluminous and complex. But it at least shows the main jigsaw pieces. One heuristic for how these fit together is that neurophysiological dynamics constitute the “raw material” for happiness. This material is then usually filtered through psychological processes, which themselves have been shaped by sociocultural influences, to create experiences of happiness, as illustrated in figure 6. There are two final points to mention. First, the relevant literature mostly revolves around hedonic or evaluative happiness, as does happiness research generally (as noted previously). There are valuable exceptions, but



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Neurophysiology

Psychology

~’raw material ’~

~’filtering’~

Phenomenology ~’experience’~

E.g., ...

E.g., ...

E.g., ...

– Genetics

– Emotions

– Sensations

– Neurochemistry

– Thoughts

– Feelings

– Neural networks

– Attention

– Perceptions

Culture/Society ~’shaping’~ E.g., ... – Language – Values – Traditions

Figure 6  The architecture of happiness.

unless otherwise stated, the happiness in question pertains to these two main forms. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the dynamics illustrated above apply to all forms of happiness. Second, there is sometimes a blurry line between whether something can be deemed to create happiness (the focus of this chapter) or influence it (the next chapter), and at times the distinction is tricky to maintain. It is ambiguous whether temperament, for example, constitutes part of the architecture of happiness itself or simply

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is an influence. Nevertheless, in other instances the division is evident and clear. In any case, subtle semantics aside, these next two chapters together provide a good appraisal of the myriad of processes that create and shape happiness, beginning here in the realm of the body/brain.

Genetic

Let’s start with the biological cards people are born with. As with most aspects of human functioning, researchers have investigated whether there is a genetic aspect to happiness. This inquiry is driven by the two-­part observation that people appear to have relatively stable temperamental happiness baselines or “set points,” and more significantly and relevantly, that these vary among people. One thus wonders whether, as with phenotypes like personality, such patterns may be influenced by inherited predispositions. Both observations are complex and contested, but are generally fairly well supported. Regarding baselines, a substantial literature has emerged around the idea of a “hedonic treadmill.” This was prompted by eye-­catching research that appeared to show that striking changes in fortune—­for good (e.g., winning the lottery) or bad (e.g., a debilitating accident)—­did not seem to durably alter happiness.4 There were short-­term alterations, understandably, but people reportedly adapted



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to their circumstances surprisingly quickly (after a few months, say), whereupon they seemingly returned to their habitual level of happiness. The study did not actually measure happiness before and after the change, however, but instead relied on people’s retrospective and prospective ratings, and subsequent work has provided more nuance to its conclusions. On the plus side, it seems possible to shift one’s baseline upward through activities like meditation (as we explore in subsequent sections, and further in chapter 6); conversely, some experiences may be so traumatic that baselines are durably lowered.5 Yet overall, people’s happiness appears relatively stable. In any case, any within-­person change does not undermine the central point about a genetic underpinning to happiness: a given event may improve happiness baselines overall, yet genetically-­influenced individual differences may stay relatively constant. Which brings us to the second point. Significantly, people seem to vary in their baseline. Many factors potentially contribute to this variation, including socialization.6 But at least part of the puzzle appears to be genetic. Researchers have reached this conclusion via various methods, most prominently studies involving the “classical twin design.” Such work relies on the fact that monozygotic twins share approximately 100 percent of their segregating genes, while dizygotic twins on average share just 50 percent. Crucially, though, if twins are raised in

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the same family, they share a common family environment. As such, differences between monozygotic twins are attributable to unique environmental experiences, while differences between dizygotic twins may be due to such experiences and unique genetic factors. By comparing phenotypic similarity for monozygotic versus dizygotic twins, researchers can then model the extent to which individual differences in a given phenotype—­such as happiness—­ can be variously attributed to additive genetic, dominant genetic, shared environmental, and unique environmental variations. Overall, meta-­analyses of such research suggest a heritability for happiness of around 40 to 50 percent, meaning around 40 to 50 percent of individual differences are due to genetic factors, and 50 to 60 percent to environmental influences.7 It is a complex picture, however, and not as simple as “nature versus nurture.” Genetic and environmental factors are not independent but rather have complicated interactions through gene-­environment interplay, including gene-­ environment correlation and gene-­environment interaction. Regarding gene-­environment correlation, a genetic propensity for happiness may enhance the chances of experiencing happiness-­ inducing events and environments; a temperamentally sociable or agreeable person, say, is more likely to have positive social interactions, enhancing their well-­being even further.8 Then regarding



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gene-­environment interaction, genetic factors can influence the extent to which environmental conditions affect well-­being, as per the framework of vantage sensitivity.9 The serotonin transporter gene 5-­HTTLPR, for instance, has been tentatively connected to mental illness, with short (rather than long) alleles linked to outcomes such as depression (although such findings and interpretations are disputed).10 Moreover, an emerging body of work suggests that people with short alleles are not only more vulnerable to stress (the “diathesis-­stress perspective”), but are also more sensitive to environmental influence per se—­good and bad—­so in positive contexts are more likely to accrue gains in well-­being.11 Although the research initially tended to focus on specific genes such as 5-­HTTLPR, the trend now is toward genome-­wide association studies. This work indicates that most common human emotional and behavioral phenotypes tend not to be influenced by a few genes with large effects, but rather by hundreds or thousands of genetic markers—­known as single nucleotide polymorphisms—­ with small effects. Regarding happiness, the most comprehensive genome-­wide association study to date identified 148 single nucleotide polymorphisms associated with life satisfaction and 191 with PA.12 Needless to say, though, this is a hugely complex topic, and we have barely scratched the surface here. Similar considerations apply to our next factor.

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Neurochemical

The physiological processes most directly implicated in creating feelings of happiness involve neurochemicals (organic molecules or peptides generated by and modulating the nervous system). Neurochemical activity is influenced by genes, but also by the environment and people’s behavior. A classic example of the latter is the way exercising can generate the “runner’s high,” to which the compounds below contribute. With happiness, researchers often highlight serotonin, dopamine, oxytocin, and endorphins in particular, and to a lesser extent, endocannabinoids, gammaaminobutyric acid (GABA), and epinephrine (adrenaline). This section will briefly consider each. One should note first though that a comprehensive review found that evidence for their effect on happiness specifically is tentative or inconclusive; most studies had inconsistent or weak results as well as poor experimental designs.13 In general, academic understanding in this arena has not been guided by such studies (i.e., which focus on happiness itself), but instead by research on outcomes such as depression, which has then been extrapolated to more positive forms of well-­being. While depression and happiness might be situated on either side of a metaphoric mental well-­being spectrum, they are not necessarily underpinned by the same physiological mechanisms, as emphasized by the dual continua model



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mentioned in the introduction. Current knowledge on the neurochemical bases of happiness as such is thus tentative and provisional at best. Even so, there is some justification for thinking the following may at least play some role in happiness, and potentially even scope for cautiously linking these neurochemicals to specific forms. Perhaps the most prominent neurochemical discussed in relation to happiness is serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine). This is a monoamine neurotransmitter (i.e., involved in transmitting signals between neurons) and hormone involved in various processes, from sleep to nausea. Most relevantly here, it is implicated in mood; low levels are linked to depression and anxiety, with serotonin boosters (Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors) being for decades the most prominent class of medicines for depression and other conditions.14 It can also be elevated naturally by activities like exercise and environmental factors such as natural light. So to the extent that serotonin may enhance mood—­potentially by reducing NA and/or increasing PA—­we might conceivably link it to happiness, particularly its “feeling” forms such as hedonic and contented varieties. Attention has also focused heavily on dopamine (3,4-­dihydroxyphenethylamine), a neurotransmitter and hormone involved in numerous phenomena, including memory, attention, and body movements. Primarily, though, it appears to be associated with pleasure, and

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related states like motivation and enthusiasm, functioning as a reward pathway, released in relation to progress toward goals.15 Many addictive drugs, such as cocaine, act on the dopamine system, but it can be activated in healthier ways too, including working toward any kind of desired outcome. In that sense, it pertains not only to hedonia but potentially forms like eudaimonic, meaningful, and accomplished happiness as well (which encompass goal-­ related self-­development and achievement). Moving more into the territory of relational happiness, oxytocin is a neuropeptide (protein-­like molecules involved in neural communication) and peptide hormone that has been called the “love hormone” or “bonding molecule” in popular culture. It is integral to bonding, trust, and connection, playing a key role in experiences like romantic attachment, sex, childbirth, and child-­rearing.16 More broadly, it is implicated in increasing PA and activation of the parasympathetic nervous system (linked to relaxation and recuperation), and conversely, lowering NA and stress, and reducing sympathetic nervous system activity (fight or flight), and so also has relevance to forms like contented happiness.17 Endorphins (endogenous opioid neuropeptides and peptide hormones) constitute the fourth main class that has been studied. Their function is revealed by their etymology: endogenous (produced by the body) morphine (an opiate analgesic). Thus they are opioids—­powerful



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pain-­and mood-­altering substances that also include legal (e.g., fentanyl) and illegal (e.g., heroin) drugs—­naturally produced by the brain. Of behaviors that prompt endorphin release, exercise is the exemplar, but others range from expressing anger to singing. These not only relieve pain but may potentially generate forms of happiness too, particularly its more energized or euphoric varieties, which brings us into the higher reaches of hedonia and possibly even chaironic territory.18 Besides these four, other neurochemicals are less well studied and understood, but nevertheless may play a role in happiness. These include endocannabinoids: endogenous neurotransmitters that bind to cannabinoid receptors. These contribute to homeostasis—­from appetite and metabolism to the cardiac and reproductive systems—­ which perhaps falls within the purview of harmonic happiness. They are also implicated in elevating mood, which again pertains to hedonic and perhaps chaironic happiness. The most well-­known is anandamide—­after the Sanskrit ānanda, translated as bliss, discussed in chapter 2—­a marijuana-­like substance that generates intensely positive feelings.19 Endocannabinoids are linked to exercise too, with suggestions that they, not endorphins, may be most responsible for the runner’s high.20 Emotional intensity of a different sort is associated with epinephrine (adrenaline), a hormone central to the fight-­or-­flight response of the sympathetic nervous system.

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In some instances, its activation would not constitute happiness at all, such as situations of fear, anger, or stress. But in other contexts, it may drive experiences of thrill and excitement, which in their visceral intensity perhaps especially pertain to vitalic happiness.21 Additionally, for people particularly drawn to risk seeking who value these kinds of challenging rewards, such experiences may even incorporate elements of eudaimonic self-­development. Finally, in more tranquil territory is GABA (gamma-­ aminobutyric acid), an amino acid and the chief inhibitory neurotransmitter in the central nervous system (i.e., decreasing activity by blocking or inhibiting certain brain signals). Given this role, it is associated particularly with contented types of happiness (while conversely deficits are implicated in stress, anxiety, and mood disorders).22 This interpretation is corroborated further by findings that it is produced naturally in response to relaxation-­ focused activities like meditation (while it is also found in or activated by certain substances, from medications such as barbiturates to particular foods).23 Besides these endogenous neurochemicals is a veritable universe of psychoactive compounds that can generate happiness-­related experiences. By way of example, consider N,N-­dimethyltryptamine. Found in certain plants (e.g., acacia) and animals (e.g., some frog species), it is a potent hallucinogen that is illegal in many countries. But where legal, it can function as an “entheogen,” eliciting



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spiritual experiences.24 It is an active ingredient in ayahuasca, for instance, used in shamanic and other religious rituals in South American cultures. In such contexts, it is linked to states that might be associated with chaironic or nirvanic happiness, from experiences of ego dissolution and self-­transcendence to perceived encounters with divine beings.25

Neural

Intertwined with neurochemical activity—­ and precipitated by such activity—­is the firing of neurons themselves, particularly the coordinated activation of neural networks. There are various ways of conceptualizing and studying these dynamics, driven by the technology available to peer into brain processes. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) indicates the activation of brain regions by showing blood flow patterns, for instance, while electroencephalography (EEG) measures the electric activity caused by neurons firing. Such paradigms have generated a burgeoning interest in the neural correlates of happiness. This agenda includes investigations into its functional neuroanatomy—­ that is, the brain regions and circuits involved. A recent systematic review found that despite considerable variation, some consistent patterns were observed.26 The strongest and most widely observed

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association with happiness involved the anterior cingulate cortex, a region in the medial wall of each hemisphere with important connections to both the higher-­level cognition of the prefrontal cortex and the emotional activity associated with the limbic system. The anterior cingulate cortex is therefore not only associated with pleasure and pain but also the self-­regulation of emotions. Besides that, other notable regions include the orbitofrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, superior temporal gyrus, and thalamus, which are involved in networks associated with processing and integrating stimuli that are relevant to one’s ongoing well-­being. Such research focuses mainly on hedonic happiness. But there is some work on other types, notably a thriving research agenda into meditation, which principally pertains to contented, absorbed, nirvanic, and chaironic forms. This paradigm includes a decades-­long collaboration between leading neuroscientists and the Dalai Lama and his team. Consequently, brain activity during meditation has been explored in hundreds of studies, allowing for the identification of the key regions and processes involved, and even elucidating subtle variations depending on the type of meditation. Two critical regions implicated across different practices are the aforementioned anterior cingulate cortex and prefrontal cortex.27 Both play pivotal roles in controlling attention—­a defining feature of meditation—­and other



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higher-­level cognitive activities like regulating cognitive/ emotional processing. During meditation, analyses show increased activation in these regions, bolstering evidence that meditation develops attention regulation skills. Furthermore, differences are observed between long-­term and novice meditators, implying durable practice effects.28 Complementing fMRI analyses, the EEG paradigm measures brain waves, which arise from the large-­scale synchronization of neurons (including distributed neural networks). When neurons are stimulated by neurotransmitters, this alters their electric potential and often that of their neighboring cells too. The synchronized oscillations create larger regional currents, analyzed in terms of various parameters. Amplitude is the signal’s magnitude, reflecting the level of synchronized activity. Frequency denotes oscillatory cycles per second, divided into bands with functional significance: delta (one to four hertz), theta (four to eight hertz), alpha (eight to twelve or thirteen hertz), beta (thirteen to thirty hertz), and gamma (thirty to up to as much as two hundred hertz). Then coherence is the relationship stability between measurement points, reflecting functional connectivity between brain regions. With meditation, a key signature across different practices is increased amplitude and coherence in alpha and theta bandwidths.29 Although interpreting these dynamics can be difficult, this pattern may reflect a state of relaxed alertness, a potent mix of contented and absorbed

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happiness perhaps. This understanding is corroborated by meditators themselves via the neurophenomenology paradigm, where physiological assessments are combined with subjective reports. Other patterns include gamma synchronization, possibly reflecting activity in the default mode network—­a circuit including the medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and angular gyrus—­which is thought to signify the generation of reflective thoughts.30 As with all sections, this coverage of neurodynamics is necessarily partial and brief. I’ll just mention one other notable finding: hemispheric asymmetry. A greater activation of the left hemisphere relative to the right is associated with PA and approach-­related behaviors (i.e., toward stimuli deemed desirable); conversely, a greater activation of the right relative to the left is linked to NA and withdrawal-­related behavior.31 Left-­sided activation is also reliably observed in meditation compared to eyes-­ closed rest, complementing the findings above as to its benefits.32 Thus even with this brief snapshot, we can gain some insight into the neural dynamics that help provide the architecture of happiness.

Psychological

There are numerous emergent layers in the creation of mental states. In some ways, these can be regarded as



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being of lower and higher orders. At the base are neurophysiological building blocks such as biochemistry. On these are built the larger-­scale activities of neural networks. Then, at some hazy, indeterminant point, out of the neurophysiological dynamics emerge psychological mechanisms. Here we start to encounter processes like emotion and thought. The ontological status of these latter processes is nuanced and complex. In Wilber’s framework, they straddle the mind-­body divide, bridging the upper dimensions. The sections above were firmly in physiological brain territory. The section below on phenomenology is squarely in the realm of the subjective mind. But psychological dynamics are somewhere in between, or put another way, a mix of both. Phenomena like emotions have aspects open to conscious and subjective inspection (and so involve the mind, per Wilber’s deployment of this term), but also aspects that are not, being more unconscious or automatic (and so are better seen as still pertaining to the brain). In terms of psychological factors that help generate happiness, many play some role, from perception to memory. Again, there is not space here to be all-inclusive so it will suffice to focus on two of the most salient: emotions and thought. These are often seen as distinct or even oppositional, as per discourses of emotion versus reason. They are increasingly acknowledged as intertwined, however, each shaping the other.33 So if the neurophysiological

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processes above constitute the raw material of happiness, these become fashioned into a mental state by the complex interplay of emotion and thought. Let’s look into this process, beginning with emotions. The dominant theoretical approach regarding emotions involves naturalistic models, which conceptualize them in essentialist ways as universal “natural kinds” (i.e., as inner states generally available to all people). The circumplex model posits that affect is generated by the interaction of two independent neurophysiological systems: valence (pleasant-­unpleasant) and arousal (active-passive).34 Conversely, the basic emotions paradigm associated with psychologist Paul Ekman proposes six main emotions—­anger, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness, and surprise—­which differ vis-­à-­vis antecedent events, appraisal, and probable behavioral responses, and are served by discrete and independent neural systems.35 With such models, an event like the reward-­contingent release of dopamine could generate a positively valenced emotion (per the circumplex model) or a feeling of hedonia (per the basic emotion model). Naturalistic models have been critiqued by constructionist theories, however, which center on emotions as products of the complex dynamics of social interaction and the cultural context in which this occurs.36 Since such encounters are primarily discursive, emotions are seen as predominantly linguistic constructions (even if they also have embodied affective manifestations). From this



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perspective, given language differences across cultures—­ explored below—­there is great cross-­cultural variation in how emotions are experienced, interpreted, and understood. Although these contrasting perspectives may seem in opposition, between them is a middle ground—­which this book embraces—­featuring theories that incorporate elements of both. Such theories allow for the possibility of relatively universal affective experiences, but recognize these may be strongly shaped by sociocultural contexts. In doing so, such theories reflect the intertwining of emotion and thought highlighted above. Neuroscientist Lisa Feldman Barrett’s conceptual-­ act model, for instance, proposes that discrete emotions emerge from conceptual analyses of a “momentary state of core affect.”37 Core affect arguably pertains to the naturalistic theories; a generic feeling of pleasure, say, might be a relatively universal state linked to dopaminergic activity. Core affect, however, is then filtered through people’s culturally influenced linguistic-­conceptual schemata and so interpreted as a specific emotion with particular meaning. These schemata not only determine what label the feeling is given but how it is appraised too—­that is, perceived as desirable or undesirable, socially appropriate or inappropriate, merited or underserved, and so on. Such thoughts are interwoven throughout the emotional experience. The role of thought specifically in the emotion creation process has been especially highlighted by cognitive

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theories of mental illnesses and their associated therapies. In the early twentieth century, psychodynamic models of psychotherapy (e.g., Freud) were ascendant, attributing mental illness to childhood troubles and involving lengthy processes of digging into this history. But from the 1960s onward, pioneered by Aaron Beck, cognitive theories took a more direct approach, connecting such issues to current thought patterns.38 Depression, for instance, was associated with a triad of negative thoughts about the self (e.g., “I’m useless”), the world (e.g., “No one likes me”), and the future (e.g., “It won’t get better”). Such patterns may have developed in childhood, of course. Yet one need not dwell on history to correct them; it can be powerful simply to challenge these thoughts (e.g., “What evidence do you have that no one likes you?”). Based on such insights, cognitive therapy eventually became the dominant model in psychotherapy.39 Moreover, just as negative thoughts are interwoven through distressing emotions, positive thoughts may help generate or shape happiness. This is the premise behind the positive thinking movement led by minister Norman Vincent Peale in the 1950s.40 There are limits to the power of such thoughts, and negatively valenced cognitions and emotions can even sometimes be conducive to well-­being (e.g., if they encourage adaptive courses of action).41 But generally, there are close connections between positive thoughts and emotions, which is why interventions aimed



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at generating such thoughts (e.g., gratitude diaries) can be effective in facilitating happiness, as we explore in chapter 6.42

Phenomenological

The psychological dynamics above straddle the subjective versus objective mind-­body divide: some aspects constitute objective nonconscious brain processes, while others fall into the realm of subjective qualia. Now we move fully into the latter terrain: the mysteries of phenomenology. “Mystery” is indeed apt. We now have a decent—­albeit still limited—­ understanding of which brain processes and regions are associated with certain mental states. Philosopher David Chalmers, however, famously called that the “easy problem” of consciousness, in contrast to the far harder problem of how conscious experience arises from brain activity, of which we still have almost no definitive knowledge, only tentative speculations.43 Nevertheless, arise it certainly does, and aside from exploring how this happens, one can and should also study consciousness on its own terms (i.e., vis-­à-­vis its own dynamics). The importance of doing so is emphasized by philosopher Frank Jackson: “Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain,” he wrote, “you won’t have told me about the hurtfulness of

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pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky.”44 From that perspective, we can ask how happiness feels in the broadest sense—­not only how we label it emotionally (e.g., pleasure), but what it really feels like, in all of its rich, embodied complexity. This brings us into the remit of phenomenology, a school of philosophy and psychology initiated in the nineteenth century by Edmund Husserl that systematically investigates the nature of subjectivity.45 Such inquiry can take various forms, from meditative introspection by researchers themselves to asking others to describe their inner world. One productive line of inquiry is delving into language itself for clues about subjectivity. The foremost theorists in this arena are linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, whose groundbreaking book Metaphors We Live By had over seventy-six thousand citations as of early 2022.46 Their work—­and the scholarship inspired by it—­highlights the intimate way that thought and language are intertwined with, and shaped by, our embodied experience in the world. As Lakoff writes, our conceptual systems “grow out of bodily experience . . . [being] directly grounded in perception, body movement, and experience of a physical and social character.”47 As we explore the world as infants, our embodied experience generates three types of schemata: spatial orientations (e.g., up, down), ontological concepts (e.g., substance,



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container), and structured experiences (e.g., eating, moving). These provide the basis for a rich, complex system of metaphoric concepts, which also take three main forms (each drawing primarily on one of the schemata). Orientational metaphors allow people to think abstractly using spatial dynamics (e.g., “rising levels of happiness”). Ontological metaphors confer entity or substance status onto phenomena, such as describing one’s mind as a container (e.g., “full of thoughts”). Finally, structural metaphors allow abstract processes (e.g., understanding) to be configured as concrete activities (e.g., “I see what you mean”). Studying metaphors relating to happiness offers insights into its phenomenological dynamics. I conducted an analysis of academic discourse in this area, and above all found a sense of expansiveness associated with feeling good.48 Lakoff and Johnson themselves underscore the use of vertical orientational metaphors in this respect, with up and down associated with PA and NA respectively (e.g., feeling “on a high” versus “downhearted”). But the picture is more complicated, as people can also speak of “deep” happiness. As such, my analysis suggested happiness is not only about feeling elevated in phenomenological space—­though it includes that—­but the space itself being experienced as larger too. Psychologist Barbara Fredrickson makes a similar point with her influential broaden and build theory of positive emotions.49 When one is feeling low, the world tends

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to shrink, closing in on itself. But when feeling good, the reverse occurs: we look outward and upward; we connect with more of the world; we somehow feel lighter, airier, expanding to embrace more of life. Moreover, there may be subtle nuances in how this space is structured depending on the type of happiness. Hedonic and chaironic forms might involve feelings of soaring into the heights, for example, whereas contented and harmonic forms are potentially more about being grounded in depth. Besides expansiveness, a wealth of metaphors reveals other dimensions to happiness. Some are ontological, like the way positive feelings may be invoked by referencing liquid in a container (e.g., “bubbling up”). Relatedly, structural metaphors include depicting oneself as moving quickly between places, often in ways that intersect with orientational metaphors (e.g., “I was uplifted”). That said, some of these metaphors can apply to negative states too (such as “brimming with anger”), and so are not necessarily exclusive to happiness. They nevertheless reveal pertinent dynamics about its phenomenology.

Sociocultural

Our final stop on this brief architectural tour takes us into the collective realms of Wilber’s framework: the intersubjective domain of culture and interobjective domain of



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society. There are so many intersecting dynamics that we can barely scratch the surface. Still, I can at least highlight the importance of these dimensions, since they are frequently overlooked in accounts of how happiness is created (which tend to focus on physiology and psychology). For culture and society fashion the substance of happiness in many ways. If neurophysiological processes constitute the raw material of happiness, which then becomes worked into a mental state by the interplay of emotion and thought, these psychological processes are themselves strongly shaped by sociocultural dynamics. This shaping occurs in many interlinked ways. For a start, culture influences people’s values, which affect how they perceive and understand happiness. We encountered examples in the previous chapter, where forms like contented, harmonic, relational, and nirvanic happiness tend to be more highly valued in Eastern cultures than in Western ones. Such patterns reflect historical trends in those places, from the prominence of traditions like Buddhism and Taoism (which emphasize contented, harmonic, and nirvanic forms), to the associated tendencies toward collectivism (relational forms). Moreover, culture’s impact is not limited to what people deem valuable. Its tendrils reach deep into the mind, shaping processes as fundamental as our sense of self and time. A key factor here is language, which as we

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saw above is integral to emotion formation. Language is a quintessential cultural product. More relevantly, it varies by cultures—­influenced by factors ranging from history and tradition to climate and geography—­which in turn shape people’s minds in those cultures. This recognition is known as the linguistic relativity hypothesis, or the Sapir-­ Whorf hypothesis after the anthropologists most closely associated with its development. As Benjamin Lee Whorf summarized it, “We dissect nature along lines laid out by our native languages. . . . The world is presented as a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized . . . largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.”50 The linguistic relativity hypothesis has generated much discussion and research over the decades. Essentially, its overarching point is that language affects how people experience the world, with debates then focusing on how and to what extent it does. This principle affects all aspects of experience, including happiness, as I’ve explored over recent years in my own lexicographic project (introduced in chapter 2). From a linguistic relativity hypothesis perspective, such words reveal variation in how people in different cultures not only think about but also experience happiness. Indeed, languages can disclose and even create new realms of qualia. For instance, some Eastern philosophies and practices—from medicine to martial arts—­have developed



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detailed ideas relating to subtle “energies” in and around the body, such as the Chinese notion of qi and Sanskrit concept of prāṇā.51 Whatever these energies’ actual nature, they might not necessarily be universally experienced or perceived. People in such cultures may be more likely to dwell on—­look for, concentrate on, articulate, and remember—­qualia that appear to reflect these currents. By contrast, people outside these cultures, even if experiencing similar sensations, are perhaps more likely to ignore, miss, downplay, or forget them. In such ways, cultural contexts shape our very experience of happiness and life more generally. As a final point, intersubjective cultural dynamics (like language) are influenced by interobjective societal factors. Political scientist Ronald Inglehart, for instance, argued that a culture’s values are shaped by its degree of existential security.52 The greater the sense of threat and peril—­from poverty and susceptibility to disease to the risk of invasion and geopolitical instability—­the more readily people appear to embrace conservative traditions, strong in-­group solidarity, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule. By contrast, the greater their security, the more people seem willing to adopt more liberal, open, and progressive ideals. This is but one theory among many regarding cultural evolution and change, but such models generally hold that culture is at least partly shaped by societal factors like politics and economics.

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Indeed, the point about Wilber’s framework is that all dimensions are interconnected and reciprocally influence each other. This applies to everything in life, not least happiness, which is a co-creation of mind, body, culture, and society. This multidimensionality applies in the next chapter too, where we turn to the subtly different question of how happiness is influenced.



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5 THE DRIVERS OF HAPPINESS

Our journey now takes us into the maze of factors that shape and contribute to people’s happiness. Whereas the previous chapter looked at how happiness is created, this chapter is more about why it is experienced, exploring the influences that “drive” people’s well-­being. There is a vast literature on this topic, looking at diverse, interconnected factors at both individual levels (e.g., comparing people within a country) and collective ones (e.g., comparing countries). That said, as will become evident, most research focuses on either evaluative or hedonic happiness. In the future we’ll hope to see comparable research into other forms, but for now empirical knowledge around factors is mainly restricted to these outcomes. Moreover, our understanding is limited in other ways, which are worth also emphasizing to contextualize the discussion below.

Having considered how happiness is created, our focus here turns to the kaleidoscope of intersecting factors that influence it, asking why people experience different levels of happiness (i.e., which conditions affect it).

First, most analyses are cross-­sectional (examining patterns of associations at a given point) rather than longitudinal (tracking people over time). As is well-­known, correlation doesn’t mean causation. It is possible that social support, say, does lead to happiness, but the reverse could also be true (happier people accrue more support), as could the possibility that a third factor drives both (e.g., personality may influence social support and happiness).1 So bear in mind that for most research here, unless explicitly stated, directional causality has not been conclusively demonstrated. Nevertheless, the literature is certainly suggestive of factors that may well be causal. Second, we must be cautious when interpreting research that compares countries. The previous chapter discussed how variation in language and culture shapes how people experience and understand the world. Moreover, this affects the validity of the research itself. With concepts like life satisfaction, while researchers make efforts to ensure translations into other languages are precise, there are usually at least subtle differences between terms. This issue is compounded by cultural variation in how people respond to research; in more individualistic cultures, for instance, there are tendencies to accentuate and stress one’s happiness versus downplaying it in more collectivist ones.2 Researchers are aware of these issues and work hard to mitigate them, yet it bears keeping them in mind.



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Still, caveats notwithstanding, considerable strides have been made in understanding factors that may shape happiness. A prominent example is the WHR, which since 2012 has ranked nations annually on self-­reported life evaluation. The top ten rarely change, usually featuring the Nordic nations plus a handful of other affluent Western ones. Indeed, in 2021, Finland ranked top for the fourth consecutive time, followed by Iceland, Denmark, Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Norway, New Zealand, and Austria.3 These rankings are based on answers to Cantril’s ladder question in the GWP, with people in these countries rating their life as nearly 8 out of 10 on average. By contrast, countries ranked at the bottom—­in 2021, Lesotho, Botswana, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and lastly Afghanistan—­have devastatingly low scores around the third rung, with Afghanistan a desperate 2.5 out of 10. The rankings themselves are interesting and newsworthy. But the deeper question animating such research is why certain countries are happier. The obvious answer is that happier countries are richer, while the most miserable are riven by poverty. That is certainly part of the explanation. Additional factors are at play as well though. Based on other GWP data, for example, the 2020 WHR identified six factors deemed most important in creating “environments for happiness” and estimated their relative contributions.4 Social support was found to be most crucial (33 percent of these factors’ total impact), followed by

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GDP per capita (25 percent), healthy life expectancy (20 percent), freedom (13 percent), generosity, as gauged by contributions to charities (5 percent), and corruption perceptions (4 percent). Note, though, that such figures are relative to the factors examined; including others would alter these calculations. Kate Raworth’s influential “doughnut economics” paradigm, for example, identifies twelve factors as essential for well-­being: water, food, health, education, income/ work, peace/justice, political voice, social equity, gender equality, housing, networks, and energy.5 Adding these into the WHR’s statistical mix would alter the percentages above. Also bear in mind that the GWP is cross-­sectional and so cannot demonstrate causality. Nevertheless, whichever factors are selected and analyzed, collectively they appear to significantly affect happiness. Indeed, the 2020 WHR estimated that its six selected factors accounted for three-­quarters of the variation in happiness among countries. The average happiness in the top ten countries was more than twice as high as the bottom ten, with a 4.16 points difference. Of that, 2.96 was traced to the impact of the six factors: one-­third of this 2.96 impact (0.94 points) was due to GDP per capita, followed by social support (0.79), healthy life expectancy (0.62), freedom (0.27), corruption perceptions (0.25), and generosity (0.09). One might be intrigued by the different rankings above, with social capital the most important and GDP the



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largest contributing factor. Social support is more equally distributed and so has a less dramatic impact. By contrast, GDP is extremely unequal—­twenty times higher in the top than the bottom ten nations—­which significantly affects the rankings. Whichever way you slice it, though, both matter greatly to happiness, as do the other factors. One way to conceptualize the importance of such factors is through telic (i.e., goal satisfaction) theories of happiness. These hold that people have basic needs, and well-­being depends, at least partly, on their environment meeting these. The most famous model is Maslow’s, featuring six main needs: physiological, safety, love and belonging, esteem, self-­actualization, and self-­transcendence.6 His innovation was to conceive of these somewhat hierarchically: the lower levels are more fundamental, taking priority over the higher ones, and if not adequately satisfied, then the higher ones diminish in importance. Everyone wants to be respected, for instance, but if one is starving, that dominates one’s concerns. That said, there are caveats around this notion of a hierarchy. There is no record of Maslow developing the iconic pyramid configuration with which his work is associated.7 He also eschewed the idea that one might ascend “up” the hierarchy by fulfilling—­ and thus leaving behind—­ its foundational levels, writing that most people are “partially satisfied in all their basic needs and partially unsatisfied in all their basic needs at the same time.”8 Furthermore,

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higher-­level resources can mitigate a relative lack of lower ones; meaning and purpose, for instance, can be achieved even amid material deprivation. Indeed, efforts to address such deficiencies may provide people with purpose, the levels of which are often higher in countries with greater economic and material difficulties.9 Besides, one can also conceive of needs nonhierarchically, as doughnut economics does. Or consider the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, designed as a “blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all.”10 Each could be regarded as a universal need. In fact, the 2020 WHR calculates the percentage of the variance in national happiness accounted for by each goal: no poverty (6 percent of the variance), zero hunger (6 percent), good health and well-­being (9 percent), education (6 percent), gender equality (6 percent), clean water and sanitation (8 percent), affordable and clean energy (7 percent), decent work and economic growth (11 percent), industry, innovation, and infrastructure (13 percent), reduced inequalities (2 percent), sustainable cities and communities (5 percent), responsible consumption (11 percent), climate action (3 percent), life below water (0 percent), life on land (0 percent), peace, justice, and strong institutions (6 percent), and partnership for the goals (1 percent). Whether conceptualized hierarchically or not, the same point applies: humans have core needs, and happiness is shaped by the extent to which their environment



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meets these. It is not only shaped by needs per se, however. Although the concept of needs is often not clearly defined, it tends to imply contingency (being satisfied is not a given) and necessity (people would struggle to manage without it being met). In that sense, happiness is also shaped by factors that don’t meet these criteria, like temperament (explored in the previous chapter) and demographic characteristics (discussed below). As such, a broader way to conceptualize the factors that shape happiness is in terms of “multivariable conditionality.” The idea of conditionality is influenced by Buddhist theorizing on the nature of existence, where phenomena do not exist independently but rather come into being dependent on a complex network of supporting conditions. The notion of multivariability then describes the way an outcome may be the product of numerous intersecting variables. Legal theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw’s influential notion of intersectionality makes a similar point, describing how identity categories—­like gender and ethnicity—­ create compound effects beyond those of the individual categories per se.11 Although her concept has influenced this chapter, it applies more to analyses of oppression and privilege. So out of respect for her original meaning, I’ll instead use multivariability, which as we’ll see can be observed with the factors that shape happiness. This chapter mainly revolves around contextual factors (e.g., social circumstances), though also includes some

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more individual ones (e.g., health). Significantly, the impact of contextual factors is often downplayed in certain quarters, with fields like positive psychology critiqued as paying them insufficient attention. Such biases may reflect the individualism of the Western contexts in which such fields developed. Through this cultural lens, people are liable to focus more on happiness as an individual phenomenon (e.g., concentrating on people’s personal qualities) rather than attending to or even recognizing its collective dimensions (e.g., affected by sociocultural factors). This point is reflected in a prominent model of factors that contribute to the variance in happiness.12 It proposed that only 10 percent of the variance is shaped by people’s environment, 50 percent by genetics, and 40 percent by “intentional activities.” The model has been influential, with the percentages memorably visualized as a pie chart, contributing to a discourse that context matters little. Relatedly, the field has emphasized strategies to promote happiness that fall within intentional activities, such as gratitude practices. Such interventions certainly can be powerful, as we explore in the next chapter. But we cannot overlook the importance of context in the way the model implies. To start with, the 10 percent figure is disputed; indeed, one analysis returned to the same sources used to derive the original model and calculated a range of 18 to 26 percent.13 Yet even if correct, the figure is frequently misunderstood as applying to everyone. It instead pertains



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to populations, however, within which individuals may be differentially impacted by their environment. People in deprived or troubled surroundings, for instance, are likely to be more affected by their situation than those in relatively affluent or stable contexts. With that in mind, this chapter examines the main conditions that shape happiness, weaving together two types of perspectives: individual and national. Some studies take a population and look at the impact of various factors on individual happiness; other assessments, like the WHR, compare whole populations in relation to such factors. Take wealth, for example; individual-­level analyses explore the effect of income on people’s personal happiness, while country-­level research assesses the relationship between GDP and each country’s happiness as a whole. Both perspectives are important. The relevant literature is vast and by no means limited to the six factors analyzed by the 2020 WHR. I have grouped the multitude of influences into eight overarching categories—­illustrated in figure 7—­which we’ll look at in turn. Moreover, as broad as these categories are, they do not cover all the relevant drivers. This chapter mainly focuses on environmental contributors, but starts with two that are more individual: health and demographic characteristics. Then besides these, there are two other broad individual categories discussed extensively elsewhere in the book: physiology (what a person is), as covered in chapter

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Culture language art philosophy

Governance freedom ethics civil rights

Equality relative income comparison social policy

Health wellness exercise healthcare

Demographics race/ethnicity sex/gender age

Happiness

Economics income work GDP

Relationships partners family friends

Resources services neighborhood environment

Figure 7  The drivers of happiness.



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4, and activity (what a person does), as examined in the next chapter. As such, the shaping of happiness is an incredibly complex affair. Indeed, one aim of this chapter is to highlight this complexity, this kaleidoscope of multivariable conditionality. If the only factor that mattered was wealth, say, it would be easy to compare and rank people or countries on that basis, and then draw inferences about their happiness. A person or country, though, may be relatively wealthy, but fare worse than their peers on other factors such as relationships. This should give us pause in making hasty conclusions and generalizations, and encourage more nuanced and tentative interpretations.

Health

Although this chapter mostly focuses on contextual influences, its review starts with the more individual factor of physical health, which is among the most significant predictors of happiness. This is especially so for people who suffer poor health. People who are relatively healthy may take this for granted and so it may not figure prominently when they appraise their life. Yet if health becomes an issue, it really can adversely impact happiness.14 More broadly, there are intimate connections—­still not well understood—­between physical and mental well-

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The contextual creation of happiness is a highly complex and dynamic process, a kaleidoscope of causes referred to here as “multivariable conditionality” (i.e., whereby happiness arises as a condition of numerous intersecting variables).

being. Furthermore, these influences run in both directions: the mind affects the body (psychosomatic effects), and vice versa (somatopsychic effects).15 Indeed, as emphasized in previous chapters, so intertwined are mind and body that dividing these into distinct spheres—­ whether in terms of our mental versus physical being (as per the four well-­being dimensions introduced in chapter 1), or in terms of subjective versus objective dynamics (as per Wilber’s Integral Framework in chapter 4)—­can seem inappropriate and outdated. Stress, for example, is usually viewed mainly as a psychological phenomenon, related to the perceived demands of a situation exceeding one’s ability to manage them. Yet it is also thoroughly physiological in manifestation and impact, as exemplified by the fight-­ or-­ flight response (with more recent formulations adding freeze, fright, and faint).16 When under duress, the sympathetic nervous system releases “stress hormones”—­principally cortisol and epinephrine—­that prime the body for action, including increasing the heart rate and oxygen intake. Short term, such activation can be beneficial in helping one deal with the source of stress. But if sustained through prolonged exposure to the stressor, these processes can have adverse consequences. These include the dysregulation of the hypothalamic-­pituitary-­adrenal axis—­part of the neuroendocrine system that regulates processes ranging from immune system functioning to digestion—­which

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can lead to illness.17 Thus stress is harmful and unpleasant, both physically and mentally, to the point where even terms like psychosomatic and somatopsychic can seem irrelevant (since body and mind are so interlinked). The flip side to such interactions, however, is that happiness is connected to physical health, with causal impact potentially in both directions. From a somatopsychic perspective, good health seems to facilitate happiness. An analysis of European nations, for example, calculated that a one standard deviation improvement in health predicted higher happiness by 1.72 points (0.82 of a standard deviation), more than four times the difference of changing status from unemployed to employed.18 Relatedly, health-­ promoting activities like exercise are also associated with happiness, both directly (e.g., the runner’s high) and indirectly (e.g., via its effect on health). More intriguingly perhaps, from a psychosomatic perspective, happiness may possibly promote health too. One review that included prospective longitudinal studies indicated that accounting for baseline health and socioeconomic status, factors like PA appeared to predict health and longevity.19 Such research and its interpretations are contentious and disputed, however, and can have problematic elements, such as implying that people may be partly at fault for their illnesses (e.g., by being insufficiently positive in their outlook).20 As such, while the possibility of psychosomatic influence is significant, it is



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also poorly understood, and one must tread carefully in interpreting and communicating findings purporting to show causal links between happiness and physical health. Besides being an individual factor, health has collective dimensions too, as illustrated by the 2020 WHR, where healthy life expectancy was the third most important factor in determining country rankings. There the issue is more about how nations fare in facilitating health, such as their provision of health care. Certainly, there are striking international differences in this area. An analysis of the amount spent annually on diabetes, for instance—­in international dollars, which adjusts for differences in purchasing power among currencies—­ranged from $36 per person with diabetes in Ethiopia to $7,383 in the United States.21 Such inequities are liable to affect healthy life expectancy and in turn national happiness. Of course, these kinds of disparities are driven by other factors considered here, such as socioeconomic dynamics (e.g., countries’ GDP), which reinforces the overall message of this chapter that happiness is shaped by intersecting influences.

Demographics

While health is more individually focused, and the factors below are more environmental, this second one sits at the intersection of the personal and the collective. Happiness

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is shaped by demographic dynamics that reflect how culture and society interact with people’s particular characteristics. Moreover, these characteristics themselves combine in complex ways (as indeed do all factors), as articulated by Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality. Still, research and understanding around these issues—­alone and in combination—­are relatively lacking in academia, having not received the attention they warrant. As such, more work is needed to better understand these issues. To begin with, we need greater awareness of how happiness is shaped by ethnicity and race. In the United States, for instance, White people tend to report higher levels of happiness than Black people, although some researchers optimistically suggest this gap has narrowed over time; a study analyzing data from 1972 to 2006 concluded that “two-­thirds of the black-­white happiness gap has been eroded.”22 Recent years have seen a worldwide reckoning with these topics, however, as exemplified by the Black Lives Matter movement, propelled by the recognition that racism and discrimination—­personal and systemic—­still harm lives and corrode societies in ways many people may not even be cognizant of. Unfortunately, academic attention to these issues lags behind this cultural awakening; an article in 2000 lamented the near absence of consideration of race and ethnicity in happiness research, and the situation has not greatly improved since.23 The events of recent years have



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prompted an increased focus on these topics, though, even if the relevant scholarship will take some time to become realized and published. Moreover, at least some research exists in this arena, and it shows that ethnicity and race continue to affect happiness—­even if this impact is hopefully eroding, as some suggest—­and that more attention to these problematic dynamics is needed. The Minorities’ Diminished Returns theory, for example, holds that the effects of socioeconomic indicators on positive outcomes are systemically smaller for racial and ethnic minority groups, attributed to economic and psychological processes connected to racism and discrimination.24 A US study found that educational attainment, for instance, had a smaller impact on happiness for Black versus White people.25 Generally, education improves happiness, directly (e.g., a sense of accomplishment) and indirectly (e.g., via income). Yet its boosting effect is unequal; in contrast to comparably educated White people, Black people are liable to poorer health outcomes, both mental and physical.26 That is, the impact education usually has on happiness may be reduced for Black people—­and other minority groups—­due to the systemic inequities and racism they are liable to still experience irrespective of being highly educated. Such dynamics may then be complicated further by other demographic factors, such as sex and gender. Indeed, Crenshaw’s work on intersectionality arose from observations that, relative to Black men, Black women may face

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additional challenges—­in the workplace, for instance—­ due to gender-­based discrimination. In terms of sex and gender in themselves, their impact on well-being is complex. The study on trends from 1972 to 2006 also concluded that the “gender happiness gap has disappeared entirely,” with women happier in the 1970s, but with men now having parity. The picture may be more nuanced, though, once one delves into the details. An analysis of Gallup data, for example, found that women tend to express greater life satisfaction and PA and greater stress and NA.27 Such findings might seem to suggest that women experience more intense emotions as such, good and bad, so are happier and unhappier. But the story may be even more complicated still. My PhD looked into the gender dynamics of emotional experience—­ specifically, the impact of meditation on men’s mental health—­and the literature indicates that women are not necessarily intrinsically more emotional. Men have the potential to be comparably so, but this capacity is often neutered through gendered socialization processes, including masculinity norms of toughness and stoicism.28 Moreover, even if men seem unemotional—­not self-­ reporting mental health issues, say—­they may still be distressed internally or express it differently.29 Women are more likely to internalize their distress, expressing it as sadness perhaps, and hence be assessed as having depression (since its diagnostic criteria reflect such



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manifestations).30 By contrast, men are more liable to externalize it through behaviors such as aggression and substance misuse. Such patterns appear to be reflected in the observation that in the United Kingdom, for instance, men account for 96 percent of the prisoners31 and two-­ thirds of the alcohol deaths.32 So as with ethnicity and race, we must be careful about drawing simplistic conclusions regarding sex and gender. A final demographic trend worth noting—­particularly because it may run counter to expectations—­is around age. There is a common narrative, particularly in Western cultures, of aging as mainly a process of decline and worsening quality of life. Aging does present many challenges and hardships, from physical issues around illness to psychological problems such as loneliness.33 Still, it appears that happiness, especially life satisfaction, may be relatively U-shaped across the life span.34 It seems to decline into middle age, before rising back up in people’s fifties and sixties—­although it may tail off again after seventy-­ five—­possibly linked to factors like the reduced burden of work in retirement and lowered concern with social status. There are again nuances. Such findings usually involve controlling for variables such as health and family situation, which mediate the relationship between age and happiness; some argue these should not be “controlled away,” however, otherwise we may misinterpret what actually happens as people age, since the detrimental effects of deteriorating

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health or loss of family may be likely consequences of growing older.35 The U-­shaped pattern is also not observed universally (though it holds in most cultures), while the timings of inflection points depend on factors like country-­ level happiness.36 Nevertheless, the trend is relatively robust and may be among the most corroborated demographic findings regarding happiness. Even so, more work is needed to better understand these age-­related dynamics. Indeed, the impact of demographic factors in general needs much greater consideration, investigation, analysis, and appreciation. Here we have only briefly touched on three key areas, but many others deserve our collective attention. Issues relating to sexuality, for instance, can have significant implications for happiness; people belonging to so-­called sexual minorities (e.g., LGBTQIA+ identities) are liable to experience reduced well-­being compared to heterosexual populations, in large part due to the pervasive structural stigma—­e.g., discriminatory laws, policies, and attitudes—­that such groups still routinely suffer.37 In future we shall need greater efforts to better understand and moreover redress these kinds of inequalities in happiness.

Relationships

Having begun our narrative with more individually focused factors, we now move into the main territory of this



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chapter, namely contextual influences (though of course, as noted, both health and demographics have contextual elements). Of these, relationships may be the most important. This was the conclusion of the 2020 WHR, in which the GWP question accounting for the largest amount of variance concerned social support (“If you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friends you can count on to help you whenever you need them?”). Some comparable assessments have different rankings, such as identifying income as the most important factor, with relationships following.38 Whatever the analysis, though, relationships are near the top. There are many ways of appreciating the importance of relationships. A particularly influential concept is social capital: the “sum total of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual (or a group) by virtue of being enmeshed in a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”39 Such capital takes many forms. A prominent analysis of the World Values Survey, for example, argued that social capital is linked to happiness through “many independent channels and in several different forms,” from marriage and family, friends and neighbors, to workplace ties and civic engagement.40 As that latter sentence suggests, relationships are complex, including being applicable at many levels of scale, from intimate familial bonds to wider societal dynamics.

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With the family, marriage has received particular attention. Obviously, there are unhappy marriages, and conversely, happy unmarried couples. But overall, married people tend to be happier, not only than single people, but than cohabiting couples (potentially because marriage is a more stable arrangement).41 There are moderating factors, naturally; for instance, the benefit of marriage over cohabitation seems greater in cultures that lean toward collectivism, possibly because marriage is more of a cultural norm, so there are greater social costs to being unmarried.42 Generally, though, the link between marriage and happiness is well substantiated. One might wonder about the difficulty of ascertaining causality with correlational research, and speculate that happier people are more likely to marry, for which there is support.43 But there is also evidence for a positive impact of marriage; using longitudinal data, researchers controlled for premarital happiness and still found that married people tend to be more satisfied, suggesting “a causal effect at all stages of the marriage.”44 Explanations range from the romantic (e.g., feeling loved) to the functional (e.g., division of household labor).45 Extending outward, networks of friendship and association are important. A striking demonstration is provided by a Finnish study comparing a specific region’s Finnish-­speaking majority with its Swedish-­speaking minority. Other than linguistic differences, the groups are



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very similar, sharing almost identical genetic profiles and physiology, educational attainment, employment patterns and prospects, socioeconomic status, access to services, and so on. Yet the Swedish-­speaking minority tend to live far longer—­nearly nine years longer for men.46 The study concluded that these striking disparities were mainly due to differences in social capital. The Swedish speakers were appraised as having stronger relationships, more active social lives, and a better sense of community. These patterns were interpreted as benefiting their health in two main ways: they were physically fitter, and had more support to help them through stress. Such people are also just likely to be happier, given the importance of relationships. Moreover, the impact of community is not limited to personal connections but has structural significance too, as our next section explores.

Resources

The theoretical premise of this chapter is that happiness depends partly on people’s context meeting their essential needs. Resources thus refers generically to all amenities that are (or should be) available in a given area to satisfy these needs. This applies at varying levels of scale—­ regional to international—­but most analyses focus on people’s local community. Although a nebulous concept,

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community in this sense refers roughly to a populated geographic area that a person can readily access (i.e., without too much travel), such as their hometown. A granular picture of resources that matter is provided by a Canadian study that used concept mapping to identify 120 unique neighborhood categories, grouped into six clusters.47 The first two are broadly structural: necessary human and social services (e.g., medical/health facilities), and the affordability of these services. The next two, while still structural, are more social: neighborhood support (ranging from cognitive factors like social trust to organizational elements such as good policing), and neighborhood composition (i.e., mix of people). The last two are more environmental: the absence of negative situational factors (e.g., crime), and the natural environment (e.g., green areas). Such resources constitute the practical manifestation of many other factors in this chapter, where the rubber meets the road. From a bird’s-­eye view, one can speak about issues like economics, equality, and governance, as we discuss below. But community resources are how such processes play out in people’s day-­to-­day lives. For people living in a relatively deprived area, for instance, this impoverishment would adversely affect all of these resources, from issues with services such as health care, to the presence of negative factors like crime.48 These resources are embedded within and shaped by even wider systemic factors, moreover, from government



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policy to economic patterns. Psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner’s influential ecological systems theory, for instance, identifies six nested levels: the individual, microsystem (immediate social settings, like one’s family or workplace), mesosystem (the interaction between the microsystems), exosystem (the communities in which microsystems are situated), macrosystem (the broader structures that impinge on exosystems), and chronosystem (how all these systems change over time).49 Thus the provision of local resources operates within macrosystemic parameters, such as governmental willingness and ability to fund them, which in turn are constrained by national and international economic trends. We’ll explore some of these macrosystemic processes over the next few sections, beginning with economics.

Economics

Rivaling relationships in importance—­ even exceeding them in some analyses—­are economic considerations.50 There are many nuances to this topic, but the overarching message is that the common refrain that “money can’t buy happiness” is wrong . . . up to a point. The literature is complex, contentious, and much debated, but most scholars agree that whether individuals or countries, if people are poor, increases in wealth really can improve their

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happiness, particularly its evaluative forms. The reason is simple: it allows them to better meet their fundamental needs (e.g., food security). Once these are adequately met, however, increasing wealth does not necessarily improve happiness, and the relationship becomes more complicated. We’ll consider what makes it complicated below. First though, to emphasize, lower down the financial scale there really is a strong association between money and happiness, at both the individual and country level. People in poverty find it harder to meet their basic needs and relatedly are exposed to stressors—­from crime to pollution—­ that invariably lower well-­being. A review of the research on mental health in low-­and middle-­income countries, for instance, found that 79 percent of the studies reported a close association between poverty and mental disorders such as depression and anxiety.51 In that context, increases in wealth—­income for individuals or GDP for countries—­genuinely helps redress these issues, alleviating mental illness and also enhancing happiness. This impact may be strengthened further given that the most common pathway to wealth generation, work, is itself associated with happiness. Longitudinal studies suggest that being made unemployed not only significantly reduces life evaluation in the short term, but even if people regain employment it may be durably lowered.52 That said, other research has challenged these



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conclusions; some even indicates that being out of work can potentially facilitate happiness provided people are materially secure.53 Overall, however, even though work can be stressful, most research finds at least some happiness benefit to being occupationally engaged—­including voluntary activities—­for reasons ranging from meaning and engagement to social connection and support.54 To return to the main point, employment also generates income, which itself can enhance happiness. Where the literature becomes more nuanced and even surprising—­ depending on one’s assumptions—­is where the impact of money may wear off. This issue was brought to attention in the 1970s by economist Richard Easterlin, who observed that while countries like the United States were growing richer, they did not seem much happier.55 So counterintuitive was this that it became known as the Easterlin paradox. It is only paradoxical if one expects such linkage, but that is a dominant ideology in the modern age and a pillar of consumer capitalism.56 That said, some dispute its central premise, arguing that wealth does produce reliable linear gains in happiness (i.e., no leveling off). One analysis of the GWP reported a strong correlation (0.74) between life satisfaction and GDP—­implying that GDP explains more than half of the cross-­national variation in that particular well-­being metric—­which moreover stayed robust at all levels of

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wealth.57 Similarly, a US study using an experience sampling method—­introduced in chapter 3 in relation to flow—­observed a linear trend that continued even above earnings of $80,000 per year, although significantly, effect sizes were very small, meaning the relationship is still weak.58 Still, probably most scholars do think the link does tail off. A comprehensive review of 111 studies, for example, found the correlation between economic status and happiness was strongest among low-­income developing economies (r = 0.28, which is still statistically weak), and weakest among high-­income ones (0.1, which is negligible).59 Likewise, another analysis of the GWP found an average “income satiation” —­the inflection point at which the correlation weakens—­of $95,000 for life evaluation and $60,000 for PA (or whatever gives the equivalent purchasing power in respective currencies).60 There was interesting regional variation, with evaluative satiation points ranging from $35,000 (Latin America and the Caribbean) to $125,000 (Australia and New Zealand), and hedonic satiation spanning $30,000 (again Latin America and the Caribbean) to $110,000 (the Middle East and North Africa). But whatever the regional details, such findings suggest that income satiation does kick in at some point. There are many potential explanations, but one of the most prominent relates to societal equality.



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Equality

In interpreting phenomena like income satiation and the Easterlin paradox, one reason held as particularly relevant is the distinction between absolute and relative wealth. Both matter for happiness. Absolute wealth refers to how much money a person or country has irrespective of how much others have. In that sense, as people or countries get richer, they can buy more goods and services (notwithstanding dynamics like supply and demand). Doing so helps improve their happiness in the ways outlined above. But humans are social creatures and also intensely interested in relative wealth: how affluent we are compared to other people.61 This creates some interesting and powerful dynamics. The first concerns the hedonic treadmill from the previous chapter. Many countries may be getting richer, but expectations of what constitute a good life rise accordingly too. This is especially because our main reference point for judging how we are doing is others near to us now rather than people in earlier generations or remote places.62 In the 1960s, for instance, a single household black-­and-­white television may have sufficed for people to feel affluent in the United States. Now people may feel impoverished without their own smartphone—­whose computing power exceeds that of the Apollo 11 module—­since most others around have one, even if they know abstractly that they

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have more resources compared to historical forebears or people in poorer world regions. But perhaps even more significant than this treadmill effect is the degree to which societies are unequal. Given our natural tendencies toward social comparison, inequality is a force multiplier, tempering and even counteracting the happiness gains one might otherwise expect from rises in absolute wealth. Indeed, epidemiologists Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett have argued that a society’s inequality, rather than its wealth, is the principal determinant of its well-­being (although some have criticized their analyses as unidimensional).63 The more unequal a place—­ the bigger the gap between rich and poor—­the worse it appears to do on most metrics, from physical and mental health to crime and educational performance. This pattern generally holds not only when comparing countries but also regions within a country. Even more troublingly, many places are becoming increasingly unequal. In the United States, for instance, the ratio of CEOs’ remuneration to their average employee’s pay rose from 21:1 in 1965 to 320:1 in 2019, and more broadly CEOs earn up to five hundred times the median US salary.64 Indeed, that the wealthiest countries do not rank higher in the WHR—­with the United States nineteenth in 2021—­is attributed in large part to their inequality. By contrast, countries in the top ten may be relatively affluent, but their high placing is often mainly explained by



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their relative equality, exemplified by egalitarian social policies and strong safety nets. In the top country, Finland, for example, the ratio of CEO to employee pay was “only” 48:1 in 2019.65 Moreover, inequality not only affects people worse off but is detrimental to all. Wealthier people may fare better in terms of social comparison since they are doing relatively well. They can also insulate themselves from poverty and even society to some extent, such as by living within gated communities. Such remedies, however, can become gilded cages that curtail their freedoms in other ways. After all, the wealthy still inhabit the same cities and regions as those worse off, and to the degree that inequality corrodes social capital and other precious communal resources, it affects everyone. As former US president John F. Kennedy said, “If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.”66

Governance

Considerations around issues like equality bring us to a nexus of influences encompassed by the label governance. This encapsulates the way people’s lives are shaped by top-­ down societal power structures and dynamics, such as the policies enacted by those vested with authority. Two of

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the six factors identified by the 2020 WHR as most contributing to variation among countries, for instance, were freedom and corruption. These are not only determined by governance of course; freedom can be conceived in individualized terms as a belief in one’s autonomy and self-­ efficacy. Yet analysis of these topics has also focused on the role of governance in their realization. With freedom, sociologist Ruut Veenhoven defines this as “the possibility to choose”—­a formulation harnessed in the GWP item on which the WHR analysis is based (“Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to choose what you do with your life?”).67 This has two components: the capacity and opportunity to choose. The former is an individual quality (as per theories of self-­ efficacy), but the latter is a governance issue, dependent on regulations, norms, and structures in a society. This matters greatly, with Veenhoven calculating that differences in this area explain 44 percent of the variation in happiness among nations.68 Veenhoven identifies three main types of freedom relating to governance. First, there is economic freedom, for which the Index of Economic Freedom identifies four dimensions: the rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency, and market openness.69 Second, there is political freedom, with Freedom House emphasizing three dimensions: the electoral process, political pluralism and



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participation, and government functioning.70 Third, there is civil freedom, with the Index of Economic Freedom articulating four dimensions: freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.71 These are all interrelated, with high correlations in Veenhoven’s analysis between economic and political (r = 0.69), economic and civil (0.58), and political and civil (0.66) freedoms. Moreover, besides freedom, governance affects happiness in numerous ways. As noted above, corruption was another key factor in the WHR analysis. The control of corruption is also one of the six indicators used by the World Bank in global assessments of governmental quality, alongside voice and accountability (civil rights), stability, bureaucratic effectiveness, regulatory framework (economic policies), and rule of law (efficacious legal systems).72 These indicators overlap with the freedoms above, particularly voice and accountability and rule of law. Thus governance processes significantly affect well-­ being. An analysis of multiple surveys across fifty-­five countries found that three factors showed especially strong and replicable relationships with happiness: income (discussed above), individualism (explored below), and human rights.73 For the latter, the researchers used a framework delineating forty different rights, aggregated into three dimensions: gross human rights violations (e.g.,

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detention without charge), civil rights (e.g., independent courts), and political rights (e.g., press freedom).74 Based on such research, it is increasingly acknowledged that happiness partly depends on “effective social and political institutions.”75

Culture

Our brief tour of happiness drivers concludes with one that is more abstract and nebulous, but nevertheless plays a key role: culture. This label encapsulates the intersubjective dynamics of a given people, encompassing everything from their shared values and ideas to communal traditions and practices. Moreover, it operates at all levels of scale—­per Bronfenbrenner’s systems theory—­from microsystems like families up to macrosystems such as whole geopolitical regions (e.g., the West). In one sense, culture is all-­pervasive. Language is a cultural product, for example, and can fundamentally shape people’s perceptions and experiences of happiness, as examined in the previous chapter. Culture therefore permeates all other factors here. Processes like economics or governance are in part manifestations or reflections of cultural values. Perhaps for these very reasons, however, culture is tricky to study and interpret (in contrast to more concretely measurable outcomes such as income).



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Relatedly, the relevant literature is difficult to parse, with complex and even contradictory patterns. Consider the phenomenon of individualism versus collectivism. The analysis cited above in relation to governance calculated that the three factors most associated with national variation in happiness were income, human rights, and individualism. In that regard, the authors suggested that the latter is associated with greater freedom, which is a key factor in happiness too. Yet such assessments are countered by research indicating that collectivism may be more conducive to happiness, at least insofar as it promotes factors that are also important, such as strong social connections.76 Complicating the picture further, individualism/collectivism not only influences these drivers but also how happiness itself is viewed. Relationships matter to happiness, as discussed above, but the degree to which people themselves deem this factor important is culturally influenced, with greater valorization in more collectivist places; indeed, in such cultures, happiness itself may be construed in more interdependent terms, with emphases on relational forms.77 Hence the impact of culture on happiness is profound and complex, with countless intersecting currents of interest, and we can barely scratch the surface here. So to highlight its significance, I’ll mention one cultural product that, perhaps of all such phenomena, has the most

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reliable findings with respect to happiness and well-­being more broadly: religion and spirituality. The wealth of research on this topic—­often known as the “religion-­health connection”—­ involves numerous intertwining threads, spanning multiple dimensions of life.78 At a psychological level, religion and spirituality are associated with diverse beneficial qualities. These include generosity, for example—­highlighted by the WHR as significant in itself—­with traditions often encouraging charity, which enhances happiness not only for the recipient but for the giver too.79 Religion and spirituality are also particularly good at generating meaning, providing comprehensibility (understanding existence) and significance (endowing one’s own life with purpose).80 These frameworks of meaning then facilitate other positive outcomes, including—­via redemptive beliefs, such as in an afterlife and a deeper plan to existence—­providing a buffer against trauma and helping allay existential fears around mortality.81 Religion and spirituality engender happiness in other ways as well. Physically they promote health behaviors and outcomes—­ through ethical prescriptions/proscriptions, such as alcohol prohibition—­which in turn impact happiness, as seen above.82 Then beyond these individual factors, religion and spirituality are effective vehicles for the social aspects of well-­being. Religious involvement is usually a collective act, intersubjectively (e.g., sharing



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beliefs with fellow adherents) and interobjectively (e.g., attending common places of worship). Religions thus provide especially effective cultural and structural support for cultivating social capital, encouraging “long-­term investments of time and energy and exchange relations, within contexts governed by norms of trust, reciprocity and mutual obligation.”83 As with all cultural dynamics—­ and happiness factors generally—­there are of course nuances, and religion and spirituality are not inevitably or uniformly beneficial. Some organizations can be unwelcoming to certain people, such as vis-­à-­vis sexuality, which can generate considerable distress. Or there can be tensions between personal and societal dynamics: one could belong to a religious community and/or country, but personally not feel religious or spiritual, or vice versa. Such situations are liable to engender cultural alienation or estrangement, which can hinder happiness.84 Overall, though, religion and spirituality often help drive happiness, as can many other cultural dynamics. Moreover, as we better understand these processes of influence, we can work toward more effectively cultivating happiness, as the final main chapter explores.

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6 THE FACILITATION OF HAPPINESS

This book has offered a brief tour of the rich landscape of happiness—­its roots, types, architecture, and factors. But arguably the underlying question animating all of these considerations, deep down, is, Can we actually improve happiness? Understanding it better is all very well as an intellectual exercise, but I suspect that driving most research and thinking is ultimately the hope of making a difference in people’s lives—­to which we turn our attention in this final substantive chapter. Folk wisdom may express skepticism about whether this goal is even achievable. A saying attributed to both Henry Thoreau and Nathaniel Hawthorne—­though it appears in neither’s known writings—­begins, “Happiness is a butterfly, which when pursued, is always beyond our grasp.” Common experience and scientific knowledge converge in attesting that one cannot simply will happiness

We’ve looked at the fine-­grained contours of happiness—­its roots, types, architecture, and factors—­but perhaps the underlying question animating all of these considerations, deep down, is, Can we actually improve people’s happiness?

into being. But that does not render us powerless. Indeed, the quote continues, “But if you sit down quietly, [happiness] may alight upon you.” This implies that happiness can be cultivated, if only indirectly by pursuing other means—­a sentiment similarly expressed by philosopher John Stuart Mill: “Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way.”1 The point is, there are ways to be happier, and moreover to assist others in that goal (which, as Mill suggests, may paradoxically be among the surest ways toward our own well-­being). Such possibilities form the basis of this chapter. Although this is not a self-­help book, some sections below may hold lessons and relevance for you personally, while other strategies pertain to improving people’s lives more generally. Once again though, so expansive is the relevant literature this chapter cannot begin to be exhaustive. Nevertheless, it gives a good overview of the relevant terrain. I do mean terrain in the most expansive sense. As noted previously, research on happiness has been critiqued for focusing on the individual, reflecting deeper currents of individualism in the West (in which such work has mainly taken place). Applied forms of scholarship can



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thus seem preoccupied with personal remedies, encouraging gratitude or mindfulness, say. Such practices do have their place and are included here. We must not limit our sights to these, however. Happiness is influenced by a complex of contextual factors, as we saw in chapter 5, from economics to governance. If we truly want to improve people’s lives, we must also attend to these factors. Otherwise, our best efforts will be limited and partial. This point was made polemically by critics of positive psychology, who wrote, “To suggest that self-­help exercises can suffice in the absence of social transformation is not only shortsighted but morally repugnant.”2 In fairness, I don’t think many people, if any, believe self-­help exercises suffice in that way. Most probably do support social improvements and merely suggest that such exercises can still play some positive role in bettering people’s lives. Nevertheless, to really enhance happiness, we cannot only focus on helping individuals but must also consider the systemic sociocultural contexts in which they are situated. I don’t mean this in some Orwellian “social engineering” type way, but rather simply that as we engage with society—­from working to improve our local community to voting in elections—­we can aim to keep people’s happiness in mind. Some people may balk at this suggestion, perhaps viewing such attempts to influence happiness as problematic.

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Appealing to important notions of individual freedom, for instance, some critics contend that authorities have no right to “interfere” in people’s well-­being.3 There is certainly merit to those arguments. But sociocultural contexts inevitably influence well-­being, regardless of how we feel about that influence. Every decision that people make about structures and systems affects the happiness of those within these networks. So unless we truly feel other people’s welfare doesn’t matter or is not our business, it is worth trying to make these processes more conducive to well-­being. Doing so does not only mean focusing on what sociologist Robert Bellah and colleagues called “social in the narrow sense.”4 When fields like positive psychology do pay attention to context, it is often limited to microsystems such as families or schools. As important as these locales are, though, we also need to consider the broader systems that influence such microsystems and affect people’s ability to flourish, such as educational and economic opportunities. To appreciate how expansive is the relevant terrain, we can use a map that I created with some colleagues. This schema involved adapting Wilber’s Integral Framework—­ introduced in chapter 4—­by stratifying the individual and collective dimensions into various layers. The result is the Layered Integrated Framework Example (LIFE) model, a version of which is outlined in figure 8.5 There are



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MIND

Behavior

BODY

Physicality

Cognition

Emotions

Consciousness

Microsystem

Mesosystem

Exosystem

Macrosystem

CULTURE Figure 8  The LIFE model.

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Ecosystem

SOCIETY

numerous ways of stratifying these dimensions, so this is just one “example” of the relevant layers (hence the name). The individual domains have been stratified into five levels that are particularly relevant here. These levels are not separate or distinct but instead overlap and intersect in complex ways, as we saw in chapter 4. Furthermore, they straddle the subjective and objective dimensions, in that the phenomena have both subjective (e.g., qualia) and objective (e.g., physiological) aspects. Nevertheless, differentiating these levels conceptually is a useful heuristic, allowing us to survey the terrain with more granularity. The collective domains are stratified using Bronfenbrenner’s systems theory, introduced in the previous chapter. Only its middle four tiers are included, though, since the individual (Bronfenbrenner’s first tier) is represented by the upper domains of the LIFE model, and the chronosystem (his outer tier) is implicit in the LIFE model overall. In addition, we’ve added the ecosystem, since even macrosystems are embedded within the broader context of nature. Again, these levels also straddle subjective and objective dimensions, with both intersubjective (e.g., shared qualia) and interobjective (e.g., material systems) aspects. This chapter briefly touches on all ten levels, giving a selective overview of the relevant activities and practices that can potentially facilitate happiness. Naturally we want to focus on high-­quality evidence. With the drivers of happiness, we saw the importance of longitudinal research



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in demonstrating causality (but also noted that such research was relatively sparse). Interventions have a similar gold standard in the form of randomized controlled trials (RCTs). These involve randomly assigning people into an intervention (e.g., mindfulness) or a control group. The latter often constitutes simply doing nothing while waiting to do the intervention, though ideally there is also an “active” control group (i.e., an activity which is also potentially rewarding but is nevertheless meaningfully different from the intervention). If the groups are comparable at the baseline, then subsequent differences can be tentatively ascribed to the activity. There are many caveats of course. With a successful intervention, for example, it is hard to definitively know the “active ingredient”—­mindfulness itself, say, or simply doing something interesting with nice people—­although having an active control condition can help with these considerations. Conversely, some activities may well be valuable, but haven’t yet been assessed via RCTs. Indeed, certain initiatives may not even be amenable to such methodologies; toward the end of the chapter, I consider the impact upon happiness of progressive social movements, for instance, which by their very nature would elude the constraints of an RCT. We would not want to exclude such cases, and so may need to accept forms of evidence that are potentially less conclusive or clear-­cut than that provided by scientific trials (while remaining cognizant of

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this limitation). As such, this chapter mostly highlights research involving RCTs, but does not treat these as infallible, nor close the door to other remedies that presently lack this gold standard evidence.

Consciousness

Let’s start with the individual dimension. Here the foundational tier is consciousness, since its development and deployment underpin most activities pertaining to the other individual levels. When discussing “working with” emotions or cognitions to enhance happiness, say, this usually involves people first becoming aware of these qualia. To begin, a quick note about terminology. Consciousness is a nebulous, complex word with various meanings. I’m using it to refer collectively to two related concepts: awareness and attention. Essentially, awareness generally refers to subjectivity (the conscious registration of qualia), while attention denotes the modular cognitive mechanisms that control what enters awareness (including sustained, selective, and executive attention).6 Awareness implies sensate reactivity, while attention is a searchlight: “Attention reaches. It is awareness stretched toward something. It has executive, motoric implications. We attend to things.”7 Crucially, awareness and attention are not just psychological processes, but also skills amenable to training.



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Moreover, such enhancement is associated with well-­ being. The activity most strongly linked to this development is meditation, the central purpose of which—­across its diverse forms—­is enhancing consciousness. As one authoritative review puts it, meditation denotes “a family of self-­regulation practices that focus on training attention and awareness in order to bring mental processes under greater voluntary control and thereby foster general mental well-­being.”8 Taking this as a starting point, we can differentiate practices according to four parameters: behaviors of mind, object, attitude, and form.9 Behaviors of mind refers to the type of awareness/ attention. Meditation practices are often classified according to two main types, as discussed in chapter 3 (in relation to absorbed happiness): focused attention and open monitoring.10 These labels are sometimes interpreted as rough analogues of two concepts in Pāli (the language of early Buddhist texts): samatha and vipassana. Focused attention practices primarily involve sustained attention on a stimulus like the breath. They also utilize the other attention modalities, however: executive (to stop mind wandering), switching (disengaging from distractions), and selective (redirecting focus back to the stimulus). Open monitoring, by contrast, is a broad receptivity, an “open field capacity to detect arising sensory, feeling and thought events within an unrestricted ‘background’ of awareness, without a grasping of these events in an

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explicitly selected foreground or focus.”11 It is sometimes equated with mindfulness, defined as “the awareness that arises through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment.”12 Both forms of awareness have been linked empirically to well-­being in manifold ways across its main dimensions (mental, physical, social, and spiritual), and in both the negative and positive territory of the spectra (alleviating suffering and promoting thriving). To appreciate this, let’s bring in the second parameter—­the object of attention/ awareness in meditation. One can meditate on literally any object, from inner stimuli such as the breath to outer phenomena like the natural world. The Dalai Lama, for example, describes meditation as “a deliberate mental activity that involves cultivating familiarity, be it with a chosen object, a fact, a theme, a habit, an outlook or a way of being.”13 This expansiveness means meditation has been harnessed for many physical and mental health conditions as well as to promote happiness more broadly. Most prominent, there has been a proliferation of research on mindfulness, including many hundreds of clinical RCTs. This began in the late 1970s with Jon Kabat-­ Zinn’s pioneering Mindfulness-­Based Stress Reduction intervention, which successfully treated chronic pain, where teaching people to be gently mindful of pain, rather than resisting it, decreased pain sensations.14 In subsequent



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years, these techniques have been applied to manifold conditions and issues, based around a core principle: cultivating awareness means one is less likely to react to qualia in unhelpful instinctive ways. In Mindfulness-­Based Cognitive Therapy, for example—­designed to prevent a relapse into depression—­people learn to reflect nonjudgmentally on negative thoughts (as opposed to “believing” these thoughts, which can lead to rumination and subsequent relapse).15 A wealth of research has now shown this technique to be effective in treating diverse mental disorders and to promote happiness, even if its effectiveness may be more modest than its proponents sometimes imply. For instance, my colleagues and I conducted a systematic review of 153 studies of mindfulness interventions in the workplace, and found a generally positive impact on many mental well-­being measures, covering both distress (e.g., reducing anxiety) and happiness (including evaluative, hedonic, meaningful, and chaironic forms).16 Yet the effect sizes were rather moderate overall—­with some studies even reporting no improvements on certain measures—­ while the quality of the studies was not always optimal. As such, more and better research is still needed to fully establish the efficacy of such interventions and mindfulness generally. The third parameter is attitude: meditators are exhorted not to be attentive in “cold, critical” ways but

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instead with an “open-­hearted, friendly . . . affectionate, compassionate quality.”17 People can struggle to generate such feelings, however, especially if they are liable toward self-­criticism. Given this, there are practices designed to promote these qualities, such as the metta bhavana, translated and operationalized as loving-­kindness meditation. Through guided emotional imagery, practitioners are usually encouraged to generate positive feelings for themselves and then extend these outward to increasingly wide circles of people. Research has found this can enhance various forms of happiness; a workplace-­based RCT, for instance, appeared to increase participants’ positive emotions, in turn building their personal resources (e.g., social support), which subsequently enhanced life satisfaction.18 Finally, form concerns the various physical postures in which one can meditate. Most iconic is the full lotus (crossed legs with the feet resting on the opposing thighs), but a wealth of others have been developed, both static and dynamic. The classic illustration is yoga, possibly the earliest recorded form of meditation, with evidence of its practice dating back to 3000 BCE.19 Etymologically it means to yoke or unite, and involves bringing together mind and body in various ways. There are numerous branches—­as many as twelve per some taxonomies—­but most relevant here is hatha, the branch most well-­known in the West. This itself has various schools, but all combine physical postures with breathing and meditative techniques. Such



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schools have long celebrated the potential for it to enhance well-­being in a wealth of ways—­not only physically, but mentally, socially, and perhaps especially spiritually—­ and now find corroboration from scientific research.20

Emotions

Our next realm is emotions. Not emotions as an outcome, since most well-­being interventions aim to enhance positive emotions in some way. I mean activities that work with emotions to promote happiness. Crucially, emotions are not something one just passively has; they can be actively engaged with, and to an extent consciously shaped, cultivated, and potentially even generated. Significantly, these possibilities extend to happiness-­related emotions. One way to appreciate these potentials is via the concept of emotional intelligence, specifically psychologists John Mayer and Peter Salovey’s influential hierarchical model.21 It features four branches, namely emotional: awareness, facilitation of thought, understanding, and management. The first two constitute experiential emotional intelligence (information processing of emotional stimuli), which provide a foundation for the higher strategic branches (the skilled management of emotional information). A wealth of work has linked emotional intelligence to happiness, including amplifying positive

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emotions, repairing negative ones, and enhancing well-­ being more broadly.22 The first branch, awareness, essentially overlaps with the notion of consciousness above. Most mindfulness programs, for instance, involve an awareness of emotions. Beyond such interventions are many others designed to enhance emotional awareness in various contexts. These include social and emotional learning initiatives in educational settings, such as one helping disadvantaged children through emotional coaching.23 Other examples include programs in correctional settings that address destructive emotional and behavioral patterns through improving emotional awareness.24 Even simply being aware of one’s emotions is conducive to well-­being in numerous ways (as seen above with mindfulness): one is less likely to react instinctively to negative emotions in unhelpful patterns, and one may be better able to savor and appreciate positive emotions. Emotional intelligence, moreover, goes beyond just awareness. Thus the second branch is the “emotional facilitation of thought,” namely the “ability to generate emotions.”25 Numerous practices are found in this space. One example is loving-­kindness meditation, introduced above, shown to promote well-­being in both clinical and nonclinical contexts.26 Another prominent strand of research is around gratitude, such as keeping a gratitude journal (i.e., regularly noting aspects of life for which one is grateful).



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Recent reviews have found this to reliably improve well-­ being, not only mentally, but even potentially physically (via mediating factors like sleep quality).27 Such studies temper the somewhat pessimistic folk wisdom cited at the start of the chapter, suggesting in contrast that some happiness-­related feelings possibly can be directly cultivated. Moreover, emotional intelligence competencies may go further still. Building on the first two branches, the third involves the even higher-­level skill of emotional understanding: having insight into the psychodynamics of one’s emotional experience. Contemplative or reflective activities are particularly helpful in this regard. In my PhD, I observed that meditation enabled men to overcome tendencies toward emotional disconnection—­linked in part to gendered socialization processes, such as masculine norms of toughness—­ and cultivate emotional intelligence and thus well-­being. Through repeated introspection, they gained experiential insight into patterns such as the transiency of emotions, as captured by the phrase, “This too will pass.” This recognition was reassuring when in distress, allowing men to better cope and maintain equilibrium, and generally exist in a more open, flexible, dynamic emotional space, which they greatly valued. The apex of the hierarchy is emotional management: knowing which emotion-­focused strategy is best suited to a specific situation. It is therefore the culmination of

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Folk wisdom and scientific knowledge converge in attesting that one cannot simply will happiness into being. But the emerging research suggests there are potential ways to be happier and moreover to assist others in that valued goal.

the other branches: awareness of one’s emotions, understanding how best to change them (if desired and/or appropriate), and being able to do so. In that sense, activities centered on the first three branches all contribute to this fourth branch. Programs have also been designed to collectively promote all four branches. In one successful four-­week intervention, for example, the final session concentrated specifically on emotional management, including theoretical group discussions around coping strategies, role-­play activities, and meditative mind-­body exercises.28 So although work around cultivating emotional intelligence is relatively new and needs further validation, it shows promise in potentially helping to promote happiness and well-­being.

Cognition

Our next level is cognition, a flexible term used expansively to signify all mental activities, from perception to memory, and more narrowly “thinking.” This latter sense is how I’m invoking it here, as an overarching label for the way thoughts can affect well-­being. For if that is indeed the case, then we can “work with” thoughts to improve people’s happiness. The power of the mind in this respect has been acknowledged for centuries. In Hamlet, for instance, William

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Shakespeare proposed that “there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so.” In literal terms the sentiment is contentious; some events are surely objectively better or worse than others. But even then, one’s thoughts about these can exacerbate or lighten the burden. Even farther into history, the Buddha told a parable of the “two arrows.” The misfortunes of life are like an arrow that wounds; but negative thoughts about them are a second arrow that compounds the hurt. While one may not be able to divert the first arrow, the second is potentially within one’s power to avoid. Modern scholarship and therapies have corroborated these insights. The past century has seen an astonishing proliferation of forms of psychotherapy—­and associated fields like counseling and coaching—­all essentially aiming to improve well-­being by working with thought patterns. Their fundamental mode of impact is discursive: therapist and client talk through the latter’s issues in some way, thus helping people develop more constructive ways of thinking about their lives. Currently the most prominent practices in this space hail from cognitive theories and therapies of mental difficulties, especially cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), introduced in chapter 4. Thousands of studies have been published on its efficacy, and it seems at least as effective as medication at treating challenges such as depression and anxiety, and is often more sustainable and



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cost-­effective in the long term.29 Such studies tend not to focus on happiness per se but rather on ameliorating distress. Nevertheless, some research has explicitly concentrated on happiness-­related outcomes. An RCT of CBT for social anxiety, for instance, found it helped people switch from unhelpful emotion regulation strategies (e.g., suppression) to more constructive ones (e.g., cognitive reappraisal), which improved life satisfaction.30 Moreover, CBT insights have migrated beyond clinical settings to inform well-­being-­related initiatives more broadly. One example is the Master Resilience Training program, developed for US military personnel; it appears to be helpful in inculcating various positive qualities (e.g., coping skills) and hence potentially improving responses to stress.31 It includes CBT components, such as the ABC model of explanatory styles, where the potential for a negative Activating event to have adverse emotional Consequences depends on one’s Beliefs about that event. The program thus teaches people to query their unhelpful beliefs, asking, Is it still meaningful? Is it accurate? Is it overly rigid? Is it useful? and so on. A salient example in a military context might be the notion that asking for help shows weakness, which could undermine well-­being (e.g., contributing to reluctance to seek help). People can thereby be empowered to develop more adaptive beliefs (e.g., reconfiguring help seeking as indicative of responsibility and courage).

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Beyond these more formalized interventions, researchers have harnessed their techniques in creating flexible activities that people can try themselves. These include simply reflecting on and writing about one’s positive experiences. An influential study had students do this for twenty minutes on three consecutive days; relative to a control group (who wrote about a neutral topic), this not only enhanced positive mood but also was associated with increased physical well-­being, as gauged by fewer subsequent health center visits.32 Numerous related activities have since been developed, such as the gratitude journal exercise highlighted above. Besides CBT, many other therapeutic practices work with cognitions to improve well-­being, from Freudian psychoanalysis to existential psychotherapy. Covering these is beyond our scope here, so CBT serves as an exemplar for the power of cognitively focused interventions in general to enhance well-­being in various ways—­not “only” treating disorders, but potentially actively promoting happiness.

Physicality

The next tier is physicality, which for our purposes essentially means physical health. If our reference point is well-­being, this is an intrinsic aspect—­equal in standing to mental health—­so it is axiomatically relevant. In that



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respect, fields such as medicine become germane, though such expansion takes us far beyond this book’s scope. But even in terms of mental health and happiness more specifically, physical health is a significant factor, as discussed in the previous chapter. Indeed, the LIFE model was designed to emphasize the close connections between mind and body—­and relatedly between physical and mental well-­being—­with all tiers intertwining the subjective and objective aspects of our being. In the context of this chapter, interest in physicality means promoting happiness by attending to physical health. As with all sections, there’s far more of relevance than can be covered, but I can mention a few salient examples, which generally fall within the ambit of “body maintenance activities”—­keeping the body healthy and working well. First, it’s worth noting a key principle: the importance of balance and harmony. These concepts were introduced in chapter 3 within the notion of harmonic happiness, yet they are also fundamental to well-­being more broadly, and hence it is difficult to discuss its cultivation without invoking these. Rarely can one definitively prescribe the simple absence or presence of a given phenomenon as conducive to well-­being; it is usually more a question of finding the right amount, thereby striking the optimal balance between too little and too much. The first broad arena is rest and sleep. Their importance is increasingly recognized, as reflected in works by

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figures like writer Arianna Huffington, with research linking them to happiness, both indirectly via physical health and more directly through psychological processes.33 With the latter, for instance, one study connected sleep quality to life satisfaction through a mediating factor of belief in the zero-­sum finite nature of happiness (a mindset that occurs more under conditions of scarcity): poor sleep constitutes the deprivation of a cognitive resource, which activates this belief and hence hinders life satisfaction.34 For numerous reasons, then, it is important that people get enough sleep—­with eight hours often cited as ideal, although this varies among individuals—­while avoiding excessive sleep, which can also be problematic.35 The second main area is physical activity, encompassing all forms of exertion. Again, balance is key. Consider the workplace. Excessive activity—­ for instance, long working hours—­is problematic, leading to issues such as burnout.36 Such concerns have generated initiatives like the European Union Working Time directive, mandating an average maximum workweek of forty-­eight hours. Underactivity can also be an issue, though, whether underemployment or sedentary jobs. In the latter respect, interventions include adopting active workstations, which can promote well-­being and happiness specifically (e.g., life and work satisfaction).37 A particularly important subcategory of activity is exercise. This affects happiness in numerous ways, from



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in-­ the-­ moment mood elevation (discussed in chapter 4), to longer-­term impacts via mediating factors like improved health (as per chapter 5). Again though, balance is needed, both in the amount and type of exercise. With the former, insufficient exercise can be problematic (the current US guidelines recommend minimum weekly levels of 150 minutes of moderate or 75 minutes of vigorous exercise), as can excessive amounts (from physical issues like injury to psychosocial outcomes associated with addiction).38 Then regarding types, most guidelines recommend a harmonious mix of endurance, strength, flexibility, and balance activities. The final area I’ll mention is nutrition. Again, balance and harmony are important. Rarely can a substance be categorically deemed helpful or harmful; even “water intoxication” can be dangerous. Rather, it depends on the right amount, which can also vary among individuals due to their unique physical characteristics and needs. Moreover, a balanced diet is key, even if there are perennial disagreements over what it involves. Research is emerging on the value of the Mediterranean diet, for instance—­ principally including vegetables, fruits, legumes, cereals, nuts, and fish—­which has consistently been found to be beneficial for health and potentially even happiness specifically.39 More particularly, for example, one study found PA was higher on the days that people ate more fruit and vegetables; furthermore, this intake predicted mood the

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following day.40 So in all of these subtle ways, happiness can be influenced through people’s physical actions and choices.

Behavioral

The final individual tier is behavior. This also pertains to activity, but whereas physicality covered health-­related aspects of this arena, behavior is more about conduct—­how people live out their ethics, character, and passions, all of which affect happiness. As such, by thoughtfully improving one’s conduct, well-­being too may be enhanced. A good place to begin, given our consideration of mindfulness above, is ethics. Most scientific literature on mindfulness centers on secularized versions, disconnected from the Buddhist traditions in which it originated and presented mainly as a method of attention training. Significantly, though, in Buddhism, mindfulness is embedded in a broader nexus of values and traditions, including ethical teachings. The key point is that mindfulness may help people react to the content of their minds with equanimity, but the ethical quality of their behavior shapes this very content. This argument connects to the complex notion of karma, which holds that acting ethically—­like treating others kindly—­increases the possibility of experiencing positive mental states in future.



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I observed these dynamics in my PhD research, where the meditators I interviewed reported that engaging with Buddhism—­including trying to act ethically—­really did enhance their lives. From a disinterested scientific viewpoint, we might regard such possibilities as hypotheses to examine rather than as established facts, notwithstanding research like my own. But on inspection, such dynamics are very plausible, and moreover are corroborated by other research and reflections unrelated to Buddhism. If you’ve acted in ways you subsequently felt were wrong, you likely will have been troubled by shame and regret; conversely, virtuous patterns of behavior may generate more uplifting states of mind such as eudaimonia.41 Also central to eudaimonia—­both as classically conceived and interpreted by modern science—­ is character. This has attracted considerable attention, perhaps most prominently in the Values in Action taxonomy of character strengths.42 It identifies twenty-­four strengths deemed relatively universal, aggregated into six broad virtues: wisdom and knowledge (e.g., curiosity), courage (e.g., honesty), humanity (e.g., kindness), justice (e.g., leadership), temperance (e.g., prudence), and transcendence (e.g., gratitude).43 This offers people a positive discourse for thinking about themselves, complementing frameworks that are more neutral (like the “big five” model of personality traits) or negative (such as classifications of mental disorders).

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Moreover, the strengths paradigm has a strong applied element. Cultivating strengths appears to be a reliable pathway to well-­being—­although research into these effects is still relatively sparse, with few RCTs—­with numerous strengths-­based programs and activities designed to promote such cultivation.44 In education, for example, strengths interventions have been found to enhance happiness and well-­being more broadly (e.g., social skills), including among students with special educational needs.45 Similarly, occupational initiatives—­ such as strengths-­ based coaching—­show promise in promoting engagement, meaning, and overall satisfaction at work.46 A final behavior worth highlighting is engagement with rewarding activities. A great example is artistic pursuits, as I summarized in an article on “positive art,” which reviewed research into the diverse ways that enjoying and/ or practicing art can promote well-­being.47 Artistic modalities have long been harnessed in ameliorating mental disorders—­particularly for people, like children, who struggle with discursive forms of therapies—­from music to art therapy. Now, beyond the clinical arena, art is beginning to be appreciated as among the most powerful routes to happiness, leading to the emergence of numerous art-­ based well-­being activities and interventions, spanning modalities from music and dance to painting and crafting. Specifically, I identified five main pathways through which engagement with art can be beneficial: sense



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making (enabling people to comprehend their life and find meaning in it), enriching experience (facilitating new or elevated emotional states), aesthetic appreciation (reveling in beauty or skill), entertainment (pleasure, fun, and play), and bonding (connecting with others through art, and even experiencing self-­transcendence and group consciousness). You may perhaps be able to identify some of these dynamics in your own engagement with art, and hence intuitively appreciate the potential for such experiences to facilitate various forms of happiness.

Microsystem

Many books on improving happiness tend to limit their focus to the personal landscape above, concentrating on practices that individuals can do to better their own lives. In a sense, that’s fair enough; this terrain covers so much ground that there’s more than enough material for one book. If we truly want a comprehensive and holistic picture of how to facilitate happiness, however, we need to also consider people’s broader sociocultural context, which I’ve stratified using Bronfenbrenner’s systems theory. We begin with the microsystem, highlighting three of the most prominent to show the scope of possibilities here: families, schools, and workplaces.

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Possibly the most impactful microsystem is the family, given the significance of close relationships in shaping happiness, as explored in the previous chapter. Thus interventions have been devised to improve familial dynamics. For couples and families in particular need, there is therapy and counseling, which are the interpersonal equivalents of individual treatment for mental challenges.48 Complementing these are activities aimed at advancing families further into positive territory, facilitating happiness even among those relatively free of interpersonal strife. One example is strengths-­based parenting programs—­drawing on the strengths paradigm above—­which can help parents harness strengths in themselves and their children.49 Relatedly, there’s burgeoning interest in promoting happiness at school, exemplified by paradigms like social and emotional learning, and positive education.50 Their premise is that education is not only about intellectual development but helping children flourish more broadly too. Such programs include honing the skills discussed above—­via age-­adapted activities—­from mindfulness to emotional intelligence.51 Furthermore, these paradigms not only involve individually targeted interventions, but also transforming microsystems themselves to be more structurally conducive to well-­being. This includes fomenting a more positive culture, whereby well-­being itself becomes an institutional priority, as exemplified by a “whole



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school approach” referred to as “learn it [i.e., well-­being], live it, teach it, embed it.”52 Finally, promoting happiness at work is an increasingly prominent topic. This concern is not new; coaching has been harnessed in occupational settings since the 1940s, and always had an emphasis on well-­being, even if only instrumentally to improve performance.53 Yet recent years have seen an intensification of interest, as shown by the emergence in the early 2000s of paradigms like positive organizational scholarship and positive organizational behavior.54 These have strong applied elements, focusing on improving well-­being at work. As with education, there are numerous individually focused activities—­such as mindfulness interventions—­that have a demonstrable, if modest, impact on well-­being in the workplace, as discussed above. Further, there are efforts to structurally improve the microsystem itself, without which individually focused interventions risk merely being a sticking plaster to mask an unhealthy work environment. The American Psychological Association’s Psychologically Healthy Workplace Program, for instance, assesses good practices and employers on five categories: work-­life balance, health and safety, employee involvement (e.g., in decision-­making), employee development, and employee recognition.55 Other initiatives include acknowledging the role of leaders in shaping the culture of an organization, and formulating strategies

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to improve leadership skills, such as executive coaching.56 There are many other relevant initiatives, but these will suffice in showing the potential for enhancing happiness through attending to the microsystem.

Mesosystem

The great value of Bronfenbrenner’s systems theory is it allows the sociocultural world to be conceptualized with nuance and complexity. Rather than simply being part of a homogeneous, monolithic collective, we exist within multiple social spheres. Some are arranged hierarchically according to scale; microsystems are embedded within exosystems (the broader community), and exosystems are embedded within macrosystems (wider structures). Still, the picture is yet more complex. We also inhabit various spheres at the same level of scale, including numerous microsystems such as family, friends, school, and workplace. Crucially, microsystems intersect in complex, consequential ways, with “mesosystem” used to describe an interaction between two or more such systems. If aiming to improve happiness by engaging with microsystems, our efforts can be even more impactful if we also account for their mesosystemic intersections. Consider children’s well-­being. Mesosystemic paradigms—­ like family-­centered positive psychology—­recognize that



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people “exist in inter-­locking contexts,” with the two primary microsystems for children being home and school, which have a “bidirectional, reciprocal influence over each other.”57 Thriving at school is influenced by children’s home life, and vice versa. Unfortunately, this contextual perspective is often lacking. In the words of Isaac Prilleltensky, an influential community psychology theorist, “We typically psychologize children’s problems and ignore the social and political context in which their problems occur.”58 Interventions, however, are beginning to take greater account of the mesosystem. With home-­school interaction, an exemplar is Families and Schools Together (FAST), designed to build protective factors for well-­being, like social capital.59 It involves eight weekly meetings run by the FAST team in which families attend the school to participate in joint activities with their children, and thereafter monthly groups run by the parents themselves. It is particularly aimed at disadvantaged families, which are at greater risk of low social capital—­w ith its attendant risks, such as poorer educational outcomes—­and so are more likely to benefit. Indeed, the UK government, which has highlighted the importance of early interventions to address socioeconomic inequality, included FAST in its Parenting Early Intervention Programme.60 RCTs have demonstrated various positive outcomes for FAST, from social capital to educational attainment.61 Moreover, it is seen as cost-­effective

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and has been recommended by bodies like Save the Children.62 Into adulthood, the most prominent mesosystemic interaction is work-­life balance. Extensive research has shown this significantly affects well-­being, with imbalance being a leading cause of burnout, for example.63 Imbalance takes various forms, though it usually involves “role-­conflict”: the “simultaneous occurrence of two (or more) sets of pressures such that compliance with one would make more difficult compliance with the other.”64 Arguably the most prevalent form is the conflict between work and family life.65 This applies even—­and perhaps especially—­if the competing “pressures” are both sources of happiness, since a person would be positively pulled in two directions, with well-­being diminished by each impinging on the other. Mesosystemic interventions might thus involve strategies to alleviate such conflicts. In the aforementioned Psychologically Healthy Workplace Program, recommendations include flexible work arrangements and assistance with caring responsibilities. Such practices are increasingly popular, and are also becoming more viable and widely implemented. At the onset of the COVID-­19 pandemic in March 2020, for instance, the percentage of people working from home in the United States doubled from 31 to 62 percent in just three weeks.66 Such changes are understandable given the circumstances, but even



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more significant is that more than 50 percent of people in the United States want to continue working remotely in some form postpandemic, and two-­thirds of companies are considering making the current home-­working practices permanent.67 As such, working patterns are trending in the direction of greater flexibility, which from a mesosystemic perspective is likely to benefit well-­being.

Exosystem

Moving up through Bronfenbrenner’s tiers, microsystems are situated within exosystems. Essentially this means one’s community, which usually refers to a populated geographic area that one can readily access, as discussed in chapter 5. However, more recently its usage has broadened to include virtual spaces, reflecting the fact that people are spending increasing amounts of their lives online. In any case, whether “real” or “virtual,” these wider structures exert top-­down influence on the microsystems within—although the impact can also be exerted upward, since people influence their communities. As such, a powerful route to improving lives is by shaping exosystems in positive ways. Such efforts take many forms, varying in scale and scope. At the more modest end, communities can be

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improved by any individual within them. Moreover, in so doing, positive feedback loops can be created. If a person works to better their community, this itself can directly improve their happiness, particularly eudaimonic or meaningful forms.68 Among the most powerful routes toward finding meaning is contributing to “something that one believes is bigger than the self,” of which one’s community is an obvious example.69 In addition, by then having an improved social environment, this too can influence one’s well-­being. Good illustrations of these dynamics are group efforts to bring greater order and beauty to one’s locale. Indeed, many cultures have traditions of such collective endeavors—­together with research showing their value to well-­being—­from gardening to public art.70 These activities are valuable even if done individually; gardening, for instance, is conducive to happiness in many ways, from constituting a form of exercise to a psychologically rewarding engagement with nature; adding a communal dimension then brings social well-­being into play too.71 Furthermore, the collective itself benefits from common green spaces, which include offering opportunities for reflection and aesthetic appreciation.72 Scaling up, one finds ambitious initiatives to work with whole communities. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Well London Project was devised to improve



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well-­being in marginalized regions of the city.73 As a coproduced project—­collaborating with local people to identify and meet their needs—­the constellation of activities varies. But common features include improving public spaces to encourage physical activity, providing guides to local health resources, and fun activities that foster social capital. Encouragingly, an RCT suggested the program had positive impacts on physical and mental health.74 Comparable examples can be found around the world, such as the Family Wellbeing Programme, an Australian community empowerment initiative.75 Finally, there are top-­down efforts driven by local authorities. One example is urban planning, involving designing buildings and public spaces with happiness in mind, as per paradigms like “positive architecture.”76 Consider the concept of “shared spaces”: recognizing that many cities have ceded much of their public space to traffic, making it unwelcoming to pedestrians, proponents advocate reshaping their designs to redress this balance, not only making them more pleasant, but safer.77 The Dutch town of Makkinga, for instance, removed all traffic signs and markings, compelling drivers and pedestrians to interact more carefully. Not only did it become more aesthetically pleasing, but traffic speeds were reduced by over 40 percent (previous measures achieved only 10 percent reductions). Similar initiatives are beginning to be implemented more widely, including by the UK government.78

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Macrosystem

The most expansive of Bronfenbrenner’s tiers is the macrosystem: the “overarching institutional patterns . . . such as the economic, social, educational, legal, and political systems” of which the other levels are “concrete manifestations.”79 These have a huge impact on happiness. Of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, for instance—­which are inextricably linked to well-­being, as noted in chapter 5—­most involve interconnected macrosystemic processes, from politics to economics. So, to improve happiness, we can look to shape these systems to be more conducive to that end. Indeed, many institutions are increasingly moving toward adopting well-­being-­ related agendas. The forerunner is Bhutan, which back in 1972 replaced GDP as its gauge of societal progress with Gross National Happiness (GNH).80 This is assessed by canvasing citizens on nine relevant domains: psychological well-­being, time use, community vitality, cultural diversity and resilience, ecological diversity and resilience, health, education, living standards, and good governance. Crucially, from our applied perspective, GNH is used by the Gross National Happiness Commission, a planning branch of the government, to inform policy decisions. While Bhutan is not without its issues81, it remains a pioneer in developing well-­being-­related policies.



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Other countries have subsequently followed Bhutan’s lead. The United Kingdom’s Office for National Statistics, for example, started gathering data in 2011 on happiness—­hedonic, evaluative, and meaningful—­in its Integrated Household Survey, disseminated annually to two hundred thousand people, to create a National Well-­ Being Index.82 Moreover, the then prime minister, David Cameron, announced this index would guide policy decisions, and established the Behavioural Insight policy unit toward this end. Critics have questioned how much influence these developments actually had on his agenda, with his government accused of implementing regressive policies that were detrimental to well-­being, particularly for poorer people.83 Nevertheless, it was significant that well-­ being had entered the political discourse. Moreover, comparable developments elsewhere have gone even further; in 2019, New Zealand explicitly designed its entire budget around well-­being, emulating Bhutan in prioritizing happiness over GDP.84 Not everyone endorses such initiatives. Libertarian philosophy, for example, argues that governments should not impinge on people’s freedoms (beyond enforcing minimal mechanisms to prevent harm to/by other people). Recognizing such contentions, there are attempts to fashion well-­being policies that nevertheless uphold people’s right to eschew them. These include libertarian paternalism, also known as nudge theory (which was the foundation

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for the United Kingdom’s Behavioural Insight team).85 This sought to reconcile libertarianism with the opposing theory of paternalism (that governments know best and should compel people to act accordingly). The strategy is to arrange the “choice architecture” so the desirable option—­from a well-­being perspective—­is the default, making its take-­up more likely (e.g., by virtue of people’s inertia). Such approaches can be effective; a meta-­analysis of nudge strategies to promote dietary change, for instance, showed these did encourage healthier behaviors.86 Political dynamics must be appraised in the context of other macrosystems such as economics. Although political and economic spheres exist in reciprocal relationship, the latter seem to be widely assuming primacy, with government policies increasingly driven by the financial markets. Following the 2008 global crash, for instance, austerity policies have been imposed across the world in the name of deficit reduction, severely curtailing state spending, including on the kinds of happiness-related initiatives above.87 Alongside calls to change political systems to better serve well-­being, therefore, are attempts to similarly reconfigure economic ones. Indeed, some economists and think tanks have advocated for a “positive economic paradigm”—­one not only concerned with profit maximization, but prioritizing the well-­being of people and the environment.88 The New Economics Foundation think tank, for example, takes



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its motto from the subtitle of economist Ernst F. Schu­ macher’s classic text Small Is Beautiful: Economics as If People Mattered.89 Their remit is thus developing policy to “transform the economy so that it works for everyone.”90 This includes the Happy Planet Index, which assesses societal progress by weighting countries’ life satisfaction against their ecological footprint. Calls to reform the economic sphere—­and society more broadly—­have also emerged in the form of progressive social movements, such as the Occupy protests and more recently Black Lives Matter.91 Furthermore, these have had a tangible impact on society—­especially the latter—­which is empowering to those advocating for social progress. The possibility of changing macrosystems can sometimes seem reserved for select people with top-­ down power, such as political leaders. Yet people at the grassroots can exert potent bottom-­up influence, as protest movements throughout history have shown. Thus all people, however seemingly powerless, can influence positive macrosystemic change, which may consequently improve their lives. In addition, participating in social movements might itself engender happiness, particularly eudaimonic and meaningful forms.92 The dynamics are complicated, as activism can also be stressful and risky, especially for marginalized groups, so its relationship with well-­being is not straightforward.93 Nevertheless, activism

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might not only improve society but may offer some personal well-­being benefits too.

Ecosystem

Finally, we need to consider the global ecosystem. Although not in Bronfenbrenner’s original theory, this was included in the LIFE model since even macrosystems are embedded within the still-­larger context of the biosphere, on which all levels depend for their very existence. Hence environmental issues are of fundamental concern to happiness. Our planet must be able to support life for human well-­being to even be conceivable. Then even aside from existential survival, our quality of life depends heavily on the state of the environment (such as air quality). Unfortunately, we have collectively developed a destructive mode of engagement with nature. Although many cultures do respect and even revere the natural world, recent centuries have seen the dominance of a disconnected, extractive, predatory ethos, with nature constructed as a resource to be exploited.94 Although associated with Western nations in particular, given the complex dynamics of globalization this ethos is now hegemonic across the industrialized world, reflected in the policies of many governments.



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Such trends adversely affect happiness in various ways. First and foremost is the existential threat posed by climate change. Such concerns are accompanied by other dangers to life and welfare. In the context of COVID-­19, for example, journals like Nature and Science have argued that industrialization exacerbates the risk and severity of pandemics.95 For instance, deforestation and encroachment on undeveloped territory increases people’s contact with wildlife and livestock—­as do practices like factory farming—­elevating the risk of zoonotic viruses jumping species into humans. Besides such physical threats, the environmental crisis is mentally distressing, as people warned even as early as the 1970s.96 Such concerns have since accelerated, with the concept of ecoanxiety emerging in the past decade, defined as “the generalized sense that the ecological foundations of existence are in the process of collapse.”97 Although data on ecoanxiety per se are limited, environmental concerns are widespread and are harming mental health.98 Moreover, their prevalence is escalating; a survey of almost two hundred thousand people across the world reported that 77 percent were worried about planetary damage in 2019, rising sharply from 71 percent just five years before.99 So if we want to promote happiness, encouraging more sustainable relationships with nature must be included. This can take numerous forms, spanning all

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Bronfenbrenner’s tiers. At the microsystem level, households and businesses can be made more energy efficient, for instance. Mesosystemically, people can be helped to work from home where possible, and where not, energy use commuting between microsystems might be reduced, such as via carpooling or active commuting. Exosystem initiatives include encouraging and facilitating the use of more environmentally friendly forms of transport (and moreover reducing the need for travel), while at a macrosystem level, policy commitments to sustainability are becoming established nationally and internationally, though much more work still needs to be done to secure and implement the changes needed. The causal dynamics here—­linking sustainable behaviors to happiness—­are both direct and indirect. With the latter, such actions will improve the viability of the planet, which is crucial for happiness. People’s subjective experience of this impact, however, may be diffuse and diluted; individual activities may not perceptibly influence the environment, so there is not a tight feedback loop by which people may be rewarded for such behaviors. As such, relying on indirect links alone to encourage adaptive change might be difficult. Fortunately, there may also be some direct links between ecologically friendly actions and happiness. Active commuting, for example, is associated with physical and mental health.100 The links are particularly strong



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when the behavior involves spending time in nature, as reflected in geographer Wil Gesler’s work on therapeutic landscapes.101 For instance, meta-­analyses have shown significant associations between nature connection and both hedonia and eudaimonia.102 Indeed, in the context of COVID-­19, engagement with the natural world appears among the best coping resources and predictors of well-­ being, with most people regarding the environment as important to them.103 From an applied perspective, people can be encouraged and helped to connect with nature. Relevant initiatives range from outdoor engagement programs, and environmental literacy education, to the Japanese practice of shinrin yoku (“forest bathing”), and even just simply spending time in gardens and parks.104 Furthermore, psychology itself has much to gain from a greater appreciation of the importance of nature—­and ways to connect with and value it—­including by engaging with cultures that excel in this area (such as Japan with its traditions and therapeutic practices around shinrin yoku). Doing so will also help address the broader criticism of psychology vis-­à-­vis Western centricity, and its need for better cross-­ cultural understanding and appreciation. With that, our tour of happiness is just about complete. It only remains to summarize our journey in the concluding chapter.

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7 THE FUTURE OF HAPPINESS

This book has offered a brief overview of contemporary perspectives on happiness. In this final chapter, I’ll summarize the ground we’ve covered by gradually constructing a conceptual map that ties its various elements together. We’ll then conclude by considering the way ahead for scholarship on happiness, examining how current issues and limitations can be remedied by future research.

A Map of Happiness

The book began by defining some key terms. First, well-­being was positioned as an overarching concept, encompassing all the ways humans can be, do, and live well. More specifically, four main dimensions were identified: mental, physical, social, and (more tentatively) spiritual. All four were then

conceptualized as if arrayed on a spectrum between a negative and positive pole, with their respective territories labelled as illness and health. The metaphor is imperfect: each spectrum contains multiple continua—­different forms of mental illness or health, for instance—­with people doing poorly on some and better on others, potentially even concurrently. Nevertheless, it is a useful heuristic. Bringing these different elements together, well-­being was defined in technical terms as a multidimensional phenomenon, spanning illness and health, encompassing the physical, mental, social, and spiritual dimensions of existence. I then described the attainment of well-­being as a desirable state of quality in relation to any and ideally all dimensions of existence. Such attainment thereby constitutes a condition of health on any given wellbeing spectrum, with terms like thriving and flourishing used when people particularly excel in those regards. These relationships are represented in figure 9. It replicates figure 1 from the introductory chapter, but with a different configuration. First, it positions mental, physical, and social well-­being in a triangular formation as the main interrelated, self-­reinforcing structure of overall well-­being. Spiritual well-­being is then placed outside the triangle, being more speculative and potentially less universally relevant. It is also situated rising upward, for obvious symbolic reasons. The figure has been rendered in simplified form too, as it will serve as the cornerstone

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W12

+ W10 W11 W3 W8 W1

W2 W5

W7

W4

W9 W6

Figure 9  The dimensions of well-­being.

for the map that this chapter will gradually construct. The map will be explicated by letter and number labels that will remain constant. Thus well-­being is denoted by the letter W, with the following numbers illustrating its various dimensions: W1: Mental well-­being W2: Mental illness (distress) W3: Mental health (happiness) W4: Physical well-­being



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W5: Physical illness (discomfort) W6: Physical health (vitality) W7: Social well-­being W8: Social illness (strife) W9: Social health (conviviality) W10: Spiritual well-­being W11: Spiritual illness (anomie) W12: Spiritual health (transcendence) We can now add to this figure, incorporating the topics covered throughout the book. Our focus is of course happiness, conceptualized as covering the positive realm of the mental well-­being spectrum, which this book explored in particular detail. This included differentiating various forms of happiness in chapter 3. I noted that most current scholarship focuses on hedonic and evaluative happiness, often collectively referred to as subjective well-­being. To a lesser extent, there is also interest in eudaimonia, which I deconstructed into three distinct forms: eudaimonic (centered around personal development), meaningful, and accomplished happiness. Yet I also noted an emerging recognition that other forms may exist and warrant adding to this taxonomy.

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W12

+ W10 H1 – H14

W11

W3 W8 W1

W2 W5

W7

W4

W9 W6

Figure 10  Dimensions of well-­being and types of happiness.

Overall, fourteen different forms were identified and discussed, though to reiterate, these are not mutually exclusive, and a given experience may well interweave several or more at once. These have been added to the developing map in figure 10. Happiness is denoted by the letter H, with the different forms represented the notation H1–­H14 inside the circle. I sought to bring further conceptual order to the kaleidoscope of forms by grouping them according to whether they primarily pertained to either feeling (forms 1–­5), thinking (forms 6–­9), or doing (forms 10–­14).



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H1: Hedonic H2: Contented H3: Mature H4: Chaironic H5: Vitalic H6: Evaluative H7: Meaningful H8: Intellective H9: Absorbed H10: Eudaimonic H11: Accomplished H12: Harmonic H13: Relational H14: Nirvanic Already the map is becoming more fine-­grained and comprehensive. The next step is to incorporate details about human beings. The previous chapter introduced the LIFE model, which identified five layers to the person. Imagine these as five concentric circles enfolding the

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P5 P4 P3 P2 P1

W12

+ W10 H1– H14

W11 W3 W8 W1

W2 W5

W7

W4

W9 W6

Figure 11  Dimensions of well-­being, types of happiness, and layers of the person.

well-­being dimensions, as illustrated in figure 11. In addition, although not represented visually here, all of these layers have subjective (e.g., qualia) and objective (e.g., physiological) dimensions. These personal layers are denoted by the letter P, with their stratification as follows: P1: Consciousness P2: Emotions P3: Cognitions



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P4: Physicality P5: Behavior Furthermore, people are situated within complex sociocultural environments, which the LIFE model differentiated into five tiers. Let’s picture these as five circles enfolding the person, as illustrated in figure 12. Again, although not represented visually here, all of these layers have intersubjective (e.g., culture) and interobjective (e.g., society) dimensions. These environmental layers are denoted by the letter E, with their stratification as follows: E1: Microsystem E2: Mesosystem E3: Exosystem E4: Macrosystem E5: Ecosystem The map now includes a detailed picture of the person and their environment. At this point we can incorporate the multiplicity of factors that variously help generate, influence, and promote happiness, as covered in chapters 4–­6. Some factors are more individual (e.g., temperament) and others more collective (e.g., economics). Let’s begin

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E5 E4 E3 E2 E1 P5 P4 P3 P2 P1

W12

+ W10 H1– H14

W11 W3 W8 W7

W1

W2 W5

W4

W9 W6

Figure 12  Dimensions of well-­being, types of happiness, and layers of the person and environment.



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with the former. There are many—­far more than could be discussed in this book—­with some key ones included in figure 13. These are configured as if filtering through the layers of the person (i.e., with manifestations in all layers). These individual factors are denoted by the letter I, with the various types as follows: I1: Health/physiology I2: Temperament/personality I3: Age/development I4: Sex/gender I5: Race/ethnicity I6: Cognition/intelligence I7: Motivation/will I8: Behavior/action I9: Values/choices I10: Beliefs/ideas We can then also incorporate the collective factors. Again, there are countless relevant ones, but some key ones are featured in figure 14. These are likewise shown as if filtering through the sociocultural layers of the environment (i.e., with manifestations in all layers). 222  chapter 7

E5 E4 E3 E2 E1 I10

I1

P5 P4 P3 P2 P1

I2

I9 W12

+ W10 H1– H14

W11 W3 W8

I8

W2 W5

I3 W7

W1

W4

W9 W6

I7

I4

I6

I5

Figure 13  Dimensions of well-­being, types of happiness, layers of the person and environment, and individual factors.



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F

C1 E5 E4 E3 E2 E1

C10 I10

C2 I1

P5 P4 P3 P2 P1

I2

I9 C9

C3

W12

+ W10 H1– H14

W11 W3 W8

I8

W2 W5

I3 W7

W1

W4

W9 W6 C4

C8 I7

I4

I6

I5

C7

C5

C6

Figure 14  The flexible map of flourishing.

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These collective factors are denoted by the letter C, with the various types as follows: C1: Relationships C2: Community C3: Demographics C4: Religion C5: Governance C6: Infrastructure C7: Economics C8: Tradition C9: Culture C10: Language With that, the map is essentially complete. The letter F in the top left denotes it as an overall map of flourishing. This term has not figured prominently in the book—­ except sometimes as a rough synonym for well-­being—­but now we can capitalize on a distinction outlined in the introduction. There I suggested that we use well-­being, and subsidiary terms like health and happiness, for singular living beings. I then proposed deploying flourishing more expansively to include the systems in which humans are

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embedded, both living (e.g., the community) and nonliving (e.g., the economy). These systems have a considerable impact on well-­being, constituting many of the factors that influence it. In that respect, this whole dynamic scene—­all dimensions of well-­being, and the systems and factors that influence these—­together makes up flourishing. The map therefore constitutes a distilled summary of this entire book. Before we consider future directions, a final point to emphasize about this map—­per the label above—­is its flexibility. Its overall configuration is conceptually and logically stable; it makes sense to represent the person as encompassed by their environment, with factors exerting influence through the individual and collective layers. Its specific elements are adaptable and fungible, however, capable of being switched around or substituted for others depending on one’s priorities. The map highlights twenty factors, for instance—­ten individual and ten collective—­but there are many other viable options not featured here. Individual factors could also include memory or attention, for example, while collective factors might extend to, say, education or the law. Indeed, depending on how granular one’s taxonomy is, one could identify hundreds or even thousands of discrete factors. Instead of just listing beliefs/ideas together as one factor, say, one could enumerate specific beliefs and ideas (e.g., from democracy and co-­operation to freedom and human rights). So, the map can easily be adapted to

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suit different agendas as well as advances in knowledge (discussed shortly). In terms of such advances, another crucial form of flexibility the map possesses is around cross-­cultural differences. A challenge with developing frameworks that aim to be universally applicable is how to nevertheless acknowledge cultural variation. This map does aim toward such universality, particularly in terms of its structure, and potentially also its elements (which although flexible and adaptable, may potentially be relevant to all people). Still, even scholars who lean toward universalism recognize that cultures differ—­sometimes significantly so. This not only includes variation in relation to the factors (e.g., national differences in GDP), but how well-­being itself is conceptualized too. Compare cultures that are more individualist, for example, with those that lean toward collectivism; the former tend to prioritize personal well-­being while the latter valorize more relational forms. So an additional culture-­specific information level could be added to the map, indicating whether particular elements are emphasized or downplayed by certain cultures. This could be done simply through plus and minus signs, as illustrated in figure 15. One could tailor it for Eastern contexts, for example, by highlighting its various relational components, such as social health (W9), the relationship factor (C1), and relational happiness (H13). One could also signify other happiness forms stressed in



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F

C1+ E5 E4 E3 E2 E1

C10 I10

C2 I1

P5 P4 P3 P2 P1

I2

I9 C9

C3

W12 2+ 12+ 13+ 14+

I8

+ W10 H1– H14

W11 W3 W8

W2 W5

I3 W7

W1

W4

W9+ W6 C4

C8 I7

I4

I6

I5

C7

C5

C6

Figure 15  The flexible map of flourishing (with an Eastern cultural emphasis).

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such cultures, including contented (H2), harmonic (H12), and nirvanic forms (H14). The metaphor that comes to mind is a musical one: elements are like notes available to all people, but cultures create specific melodies by selecting or emphasizing different notes. Furthermore, as our understanding of cross-­cultural dynamics advances, more informational detail could be added. Instead of simply indicating emphasis or de-­ emphasis (with plus and minus signs), one could include the degree of (de-­)emphasis, perhaps with superscript numbers from one to ten (very weak to very strong emphasis, respectively). Further still, the map could even be sensitized to individuals, tailored to their personality and environment. In this way, we might truly move toward the kind of nuanced, refined understanding of happiness that people and cultures—­in all of their rich uniqueness—­ need and merit. The book now concludes with some suggestions for how we can progress further toward this goal.

Waves of the Future

This book has offered an up-­to-­date picture of the current scholarship on happiness. As with any area of inquiry, however, our understanding is partial and provisional, beset by limitations and biases. I have drawn attention to these issues throughout the book, which has brought a spirit of



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critical reflection to the topic. These critiques are not meant disparagingly of course. The scholarship featured here is excellent—­thorough, careful, thoughtful, and so on—­as are the researchers involved. With any endeavor, though, there is always room for improvement. Scholars are usually aware of these issues and may indeed be hindered from addressing them by factors beyond their control (such as a lack of funds). But we can still reflect on these problems and do our best to ameliorate them going forward. The critiques are many and varied, but most fall into two categories that relate to the waves of well-­being scholarship discussed in chapter 2. There I identified four main waves over the past two hundred years, reflecting the respective emergence of psychiatry and psychotherapy (first), humanistic psychology (second), scientific psychology (third), and now a more global scholarship (fourth). The two main classes of critique—­and hence ways forward for academia—­concern the third and fourth waves. The first class pertains to the third wave, and focuses on the need to improve our methodologies. Relatedly, the second class concerns the fourth wave, and centers on the importance of a more global outlook. Let’s take these in turn. The third wave is characterized by an emphasis on harnessing science to understand well-­being (in contrast to the second wave, which did have scientific elements, but was more about therapeutic practice). In that respect, considerable strides have been made. Yet these efforts still

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have their limitations, which impede the validity of the results, the weight we can place on the conclusions, and the soundness of our knowledge. The most prominent issue is an overreliance on cross-­ sectional survey data to explore the dynamics of happiness. This means essentially asking people about their well-­being at a given point using relevant questionnaires. Such research is very useful, and can certainly tell us a great deal about flourishing. Nonetheless, an overreliance on such data by scholars has at least two significant issues—­one pertaining to the cross-­sectional aspect and the other to the survey aspect. The main problem with the cross-­sectional aspect is that this methodology can only assess patterns at a given moment. As such, it cannot reveal causality, which is what we really need to know to understand well-­being more deeply. We might find a correlation between social support and happiness, for instance, which would certainly be valuable information. However, while social support may well cause happiness, equally the effect could run the other way, or a third factor such as personality could drive both outcomes.1 Our understanding would therefore be limited unless we could ascertain these dynamics. Even methodologies that are longitudinal cannot conclusively indicate causality unless they track the same people over time—­known as a “panel” study—­which many such efforts do not do (not least because such designs can



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be more complicated and expensive). This applies to the annual GWP, for instance, whose results form the basis of the WHR. The GWP is an incredible research endeavor—­ with which I’m privileged to be involved through the Global Wellbeing Initiative, introduced in chapter 3—­but even so, its design involves asking a different sample of people each year, which limits the causal inferences one can draw from the data. As such, more longitudinal studies, especially ones with panel designs, are needed for a clearer understanding of causality. Moreover, these should ideally measure and control for potential confounding variables (e.g., socioeconomic considerations), so that the analysis can truly allow a rigorous and sophisticated understanding of the causal dynamics.2 Thankfully, research endeavors are being developed to address these needs. A good example is the groundbreaking Global Flourishing Study—­with which I am also very grateful to be involved—­led by Tyler VanderWeele, director of the Human Flourishing Program at Harvard University, and Byron Johnson, director of the Institute for Studies of Religion at Baylor University. They and their teams have recently received nearly $45 million—­mainly from the John Templeton Foundation—­to partner with Gallup to conduct a huge longitudinal panel survey of flourishing. Beginning in 2021, the project is envisaged as lasting at least five years (and likely longer) and will involve over

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two hundred and forty thousand people in twenty-­two countries. By surveying the same people each year, this allows a better analysis of causality than the standard cross-­sectional methodology of most comparable research efforts (e.g., the GWP). The second main issue with survey data concerns the survey aspect itself. Although this methodology is very useful in assessing people’s thoughts and feelings, there are nevertheless concerns around people’s ability to accurately, reliably, or truthfully self-­report such data. Self-­reports are still invaluable, but we need to bear these issues in mind when interpreting such data. As such, we can ideally seek to augment surveys with other methodologies. Given real-­world constraints—­such as tight research budgets—­these may not always be feasible. But it is worth at least aiming in that direction if possible. There is great potential, for example, in harnessing neurophysiological technologies such as EEG and fMRI to investigate the dynamics of happiness, as discussed in chapter 4. This work should ideally be augmented by qualitative research, per the neurophenomenology paradigm. If we’re interested in the neural correlates of mental states, we also need detailed understanding of these very states, which is something only qualitative research can truly provide; if you really want to know what someone thinks or feels, you essentially have to ask them. Qualitative methods are also valuable in their own right, with diverse



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approaches capable of shedding light on flourishing in numerous ways. Examples just from my own work—­also mentioned in chapter 4—­ range from analyzing metaphors in academic discourse to explore the phenomenology of happiness, to investigating the life narratives of Buddhists to understand the impact of meditation upon various aspects of well-­being. Beyond these relatively well established—­ yet still underused—­methodologies, as technologies and social trends evolve, we’re seeing even newer paradigms emerge. These include mining big data for information—­aided by artificial intelligence and machine learning—­such as exploring language patterns on Twitter to analyze national levels of happiness.3 Given the inventiveness of scholars and lightning-­fast pace of technological progress, the ease and availability of such methodologies will surely rapidly improve in the coming years, together with the advent of new paradigms one cannot yet even envisage. Calls to enhance and expand the repertoire of methodologies intersect with the second class of critique and response, which pertain to the fourth wave of well-­being scholarship. The charge is that, for much of its history, well-­being research has tended to be Western-­centric—­as highlighted throughout the book—­ influenced particularly by the values and traditions of the United States. In response, there are exhortations for more globally inclusive and nuanced scholarship—­one that accounts for

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cross-­cultural variation in how happiness is experienced, perceived, and conceptualized. Fortunately, such developments are already underway, reflected in the emergence of this new fourth wave, which constitutes a more global endeavor. To begin with, this work includes conducting well-­being research globally using conventional metrics, as indeed the GWP has done since 2005. But even more paradigm-­shifting are efforts to explore cross-­cultural differences in how happiness is actually understood and interpreted. One example is the Global Wellbeing Initiative, involving the development of new items for the GWP that reflect non-­Western perspectives on well-­being—­such as contented, harmonic, and relational forms of happiness—­as discussed in chapter 3. Such efforts will surely be augmented over the coming years, and similar initiatives are undoubtedly already unfolding across the world. Indeed, global power dynamics are rapidly shifting across many fields of endeavor. The latter half of the twentieth century may have been dominated by the United States, which in turn influenced fields like psychology, yet in the twenty-­first century, new centers of power are emerging such as China and India. It seems inevitable that these dynamics will also affect well-­being scholarship, moving its emphasis away—­at least to some extent—­from its current Western-­centric tendencies. Then beyond these already-­unfolding developments, one cannot help trying to peer even farther over the



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The book concludes by considering potential pathways forward for well-­being scholarship, particularly the need to develop more cross-­ culturally inclusive and nuanced perspectives on happiness.

horizon to imagine what future waves of scholarship might look like. Might we someday see a fifth wave, for example, that transcends the human-­centric focus of the global fourth wave to broach the dizzying possibilities of nonhuman forms of well-­being? These could range from the natural life-­forms with which we share this planet (including not only sentient creatures but all forms of organic matter, as well as the biosphere as a whole), to the oncoming advances in artificial intelligence (with some observers predicting the emergence of silicon-­based forms of consciousness), and even the radical possibility of extraterrestrial intelligent life (whose existence in the universe many thinkers view as exceedingly likely, even if such beings have not yet visited earth). All of these potentialities have implications for scholarship, not least since our own human well-­being will require coexisting sustainably and peacefully alongside these nonhuman life-­forms. In any case, such speculations aside, as we look ahead to the coming decades to advances in science, and to movements toward more global scholarship, our understanding of happiness will assuredly continue to be transformed. Indeed, such is the pace of change that this book will undoubtedly need updating relatively soon. That is the nature of a fast-­evolving field and world. But this brief review does hopefully at least offer an accurate snapshot of the current state of the art, and so stands as a marker of progress along our valiant journey toward greater happiness.



The Future of Happiness    237

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thank you first and foremost to my amazing wife, Kate, my wonderful family, our dog, Daisy, and most excitingly . . . our new baby, Laila Grace! You all make me so happy, and I am eternally grateful for all of your love and support. Thank you too to my friends and colleagues for your companionship and collaboration over recent years; you’ve truly helped to shape this book. Significant people to mention include: Tyler VanderWeele especially, who really helped me develop my ideas here, and his team at the Human Flourishing Program at Harvard University; Yoshiki Ishikawa, Alden Lai, Bumpei Tamamura, and everyone at Wellbeing for Planet Earth; Priscilla Standridge, Benedicte Clouet, Khorshied Samad, Kristjan Archer, Pablo Diego-­ Rosell, Joe Daly, and everyone at Gallup involved with the Global Wellbeing Initiative; Meike Bartels, Michael Pluess, and Margot Van De Weijer; and colleagues and students at the University of East London. Thank you also to my agent, Esmond Harmsworth, and everyone at Aevitas, and to my editorial team, Phil Laughlin, Deborah Cantor-­ Adams, and Cindy Milstein, and everyone at the MIT Press, for helping to bring this book into being. Finally, thanks to you, reading this, for giving my book a chance. I hope it brings some extra happiness into your life.

GLOSSARY Note: The following terms can be defined in many varied ways, giving rise to considerable debate in the literature. These definitions here just reflect the way that I am using these words in this book. Nevertheless, some terms still have several meanings, as indicated below. The particular meaning that applies to a given usage in the text will be evident from the context. Body

Meaning 1: One’s existence as a physical being. Conceptualized in contrast to meaning 1 of the “mind” (i.e., one’s existence as a mental being). The distinction, however, is fuzzy and socially constructed (i.e., it is not self-­evident or universally agreed what and where the boundary between body and mind is, or even that there is a boundary). Note too that ontologically, in this first meaning, body and mind each have both objective dimensions (i.e., material, physiological activity) and subjective dimensions (i.e., phenomenal qualia). This meaning is more common in the text, often applying, for example, when discussing physical well-­being. Meaning 2: All physiological activity (i.e., objective, material dimensions of both one’s physical and mental being). Conceptualized in contrast to meaning 2 of the “mind” (i.e., all subjective qualia, encompassing both one’s physical and mental being). This usage is less common in the text, but is occasionally used, particularly when discussing Wilber’s Integral Framework. Culture

Intersubjective aspects of social existence (e.g., shared values and ideas, etc.). Conceptualized in distinction to “society” (see the definition below) in the context of the Integral Framework. Experience

A condition or mode of being which has a subjective component (i.e., qualia), and which is not permanent but can vary widely in duration (from seconds to years).

Flourishing

Meaning 1: A desirable state of quality in relation to any and ideally all dimensions of well-­being (physical, mental, social, and spiritual). This meaning is synonymous with “thriving,” and is somewhat synonymous with “health” and meaning 2 of “well-­being” (in that flourishing/thriving refer to excelling or having especially positive states in these dimensions, whereas health and meaning 2 of well-­being refer to all positive states generally). Physical/mental/social/spiritual flourishing (select as appropriate): a desirable physical/mental/social/spiritual state of quality, with particular emphasis on excelling physically/mentally/socially/spiritually, or on having especially positive forms of physical/mental/social/spiritual experience. Meaning 2: The entire constellation of well-­being related phenomena. This includes the well-­being dimensions themselves, as well as the myriad of systems and factors—­both living (e.g., one’s community) and nonliving (e.g., the economy)—­that influence them. Happiness

A desirable mental experience of quality. Absorbed happiness: A desirable mental experience of quality in relation to one’s attentional engagement. Accomplished happiness: A desirable mental experience of quality in relation to successfully navigating life’s challenges. Chaironic happiness: A desirable mental experience of quality in relation to one’s spiritual being (i.e., interpreted as spiritual in nature). Contented happiness: A desirable mental experience of quality in relation to one’s present emotions, with particular emphasis on low arousal feelings. Eudaimonic happiness: A desirable mental experience of quality in relation to one’s personal development. Evaluative happiness: A desirable mental experience of quality in relation to appraising one’s life (either as a whole or regarding specific domains). Harmonic happiness: A desirable mental experience of quality in relation to how well the elements of one’s life are ordered and operating together.

242  Glossary

Hedonic happiness: A desirable mental experience of quality in relation to one’s present emotions, with particular emphasis on high arousal feelings. Intellective happiness: A desirable mental experience of quality in relation to aspects of mental life that particularly concern intellect, cognitions, wisdom, and understanding. Mature happiness: A desirable mental experience of quality in relation to the way one has responded to suffering in one’s life. Meaningful happiness: A desirable mental experience of quality in relation to one’s meaning and purpose in life. Nirvanic happiness: A desirable mental experience of quality in relation to one’s relative freedom from suffering. Relational happiness: A desirable shared mental experience of quality arising from a relationship dynamic. Vitalic happiness: A desirable mental experience of quality in relation to one’s physical being. Health

The attainment or realization of a desirable state of quality in relation to any and ideally all dimensions of well-­being (physical, mental, social, and spiritual). Synonymous with meaning 2 of “well-­being” and somewhat synonymous with “thriving” and meaning 1 of “flourishing” (see definitions above and below for details). Physical/mental/social/spiritual health (select as appropriate): a desirable physical/mental/social/spiritual state of quality, referred to generically and expansively as vitality, happiness, conviviality, or transcendence. Illness

An undesirable state lacking quality in relation to any and, at worst, all dimensions of well-­being (physical, mental, social, and spiritual). Somewhat synonymous with suffering, except the latter often refers particularly to struggling or having especially negative forms of experience in these dimensions. Physical/mental/social/spiritual illness (select as appropriate): an undesirable physical/mental/social/spiritual state lacking quality, referred to generically and expansively as discomfort, distress, strife, or anomie.

Glossary    243

Interobjective

As per “objective” (see the definition below), but with particular emphasis on systemic or aggregated phenomena (as opposed to isolated individual objects or processes). Intersubjective

As per “subjective” (see the definition below), but shared among multiple people (e.g., a communal emotion). Mental

Aspects of existence pertaining to meaning 1 of the “mind” (see the definition below). Mind

Meaning 1: One’s existence as a mental being. Conceptualized in contrast to meaning 1 of the “body” (see the definition above). This usage is more common in the text, often applying, for example, when discussing mental well-­being. Meaning 2: All subjective qualia (encompassing both one’s physical and mental being). Conceptualized in contrast to meaning 2 of the “body” (see the definition above). This usage is less common in the text, but is occasionally used, particularly when discussing Wilber’s Integral Framework. Objective

Aspects of phenomena that exist as physical, material objects or processes. Conceptualized in distinction to “subjective” (see the definition below). Physical

Aspects of existence pertaining to meaning 1 of the “body” (see the definition above). Qualia

See “subjective” below. Quality

A fundamental and irreducible condition, experience, or appraisal of a phenomenon being good or valuable in some way.

244  Glossary

Social

Aspects of existence pertaining to interpersonal connections and interactions. Society

Interobjective aspects of social existence (e.g., material/physical structures and systems). Conceptualized in distinction to “culture” (see the definition above) in the context of the Integral Framework. Spiritual

Aspects of existence interpreted as qualitatively distinct from, and usually more significant or special than, “ordinary” or “regular” experiences. Often described using qualifiers like sacred, transcendent, higher, and deeper. State

A condition or mode of being, which can vary widely in duration (from seconds to years). Subjective

Aspects of phenomena that exist and are perceived within consciousness, referred to generically as qualia. Conceptualized in distinction to “objective” (see the definition above). Note that most human experiences have both subjective and objective aspects (e.g., an emotion is both experienced subjectively within consciousness and has objective physiological correlates). Suffering

An undesirable state lacking quality in relation to any and, at worst, all dimensions of well-­being (physical, mental, social, and spiritual). Somewhat synonymous with illness, except it often refers particularly to struggling or having especially negative forms of experience in these dimensions. Physical/mental/social/spiritual suffering (select as appropriate): an undesirable physical/mental/social/spiritual state lacking quality, with particular emphasis on struggling physically/mentally/socially/spiritually, or having especially negative forms of physical/mental/social/spiritual experience. Thriving

A desirable state of quality in relation to any and ideally all dimensions of well-­being (physical, mental, social, and spiritual). Synonymous with meaning

Glossary    245

1 of “flourishing” and somewhat synonymous with “health” and meaning 2 of “well-­being” (see definitions above and below for details). Physical/mental/social/spiritual thriving (select as appropriate): a desirable physical/mental/social/spiritual state of quality, with particular emphasis on excelling physically/mentally/socially/spiritually, or having especially positive forms of physical/mental/social/spiritual experience. Well-­being

Meaning 1: A multidimensional spectrum, spanning illness and health, encompassing the physical, mental, social, and spiritual dimensions of existence. Physical/mental/social/spiritual well-­being (select as appropriate): a spectrum, spanning illness and health, pertaining to the body/mind/sociality/spirituality. In common language, it can also refer more specifically just to the health-­related region of the spectrum—­that is, physical health (vitality), mental health (happiness), social health (conviviality), or spiritual health (transcendence). Meaning 2: The attainment of well-­being refers specifically just to health-­related regions of the spectrum, and in that respect is synonymous with “health” and somewhat synonymous with “thriving” and “flourishing” (see the definitions above). Physical/mental/social/spiritual well-­being (select as appropriate): a desirable physical/mental/social/spiritual state of quality, referred to generically and expansively as vitality, happiness, conviviality, or transcendence.

246  Glossary

NOTES Chapter 1

1.  Anna De Chavez, Kathryn Backett-­Milburn, Odette Parry, and Stephen Plate, “Understanding and Researching Wellbeing: Its Usage in Different Disciplines and Potential for Health Research and Health Promotion,” Health Education Journal 64 (2005): 70–­87, https://doi.org/10.1177/001789690506400108. 2.  Tyler J. VanderWeele, Katelyn Long, and Michael J. Balboni, “On Tradition-­ Specific Measures of Spiritual Wellbeing,” in Measuring Wellbeing: Interdisciplinary Perspectives from the Social Sciences and the Humanities, ed. Matthew Lee, K.  D. Kubansky, and Tyler  J. VanderWeele (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 482–­498. 3. Philip Brey. “The Social Ontology of Virtual Environments.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 62, no. 1 (2003): 269–­282, https://doi.org /10.1111/1536-7150.t01-1-00011. 4.  Jerome Breuer and Sigmund Freud, “Studies on Hysteria,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 2), ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), 308. 5.  Robert Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values (London: Random House, 1974). 6.  Corey L. M. Keyes, “Mental Illness and/or Mental Health? Investigating Axioms of the Complete State Model of Health,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 73, no. 3 (2005): 539–­548, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022 -006X.73.3.539. 7.  Matthew Iasiello and Joep Van Agteren, “Mental Health and/or Mental Illness: A Scoping Review of the Evidence and Implications of the Dual-­Continua Model of Mental Health,” Evidence Base: A Journal of Evidence Reviews in Key Policy Areas 1 (2020): 1–­45, https://doi.org/10.21307/eb-2020-001. 8.  James O. Pawelski, “Defining the ‘Positive’ in Positive Psychology: Part I. A Descriptive Analysis,” Journal of Positive Psychology 11, no. 4 (2016): 339–­356, https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2015.1137627. 9.  Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error (New York: Random House, 2006). 10.  Tim Lomas, “Experiential Cartography and the Significance of ‘Untranslatable’ Words,” Theory and Psychology 28, no. 4 (2018): 476–­495, https://doi .org/10.1177/0959354318772914.

11.  Bernard I. Murstein, “A Taxonomy of Love,” in The Psychology of Love, ed. Robert J. Sternberg and Michael L. Barnes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 33. Chapter 2

1. Michael Muthukrishna, Joseph Henrich, and Edward Slingerland, “Psychology as a Historical Science,” Annual Review of Psychology 72 (2021): 717–­ 49, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-082820-111436. 2.  Jean-­Jacques Hublin, Abdelouahed Ben-­Ncer, Shara E. Bailey, Sarah E. Freid­ line, Simon Neubauer, Matthew M. Skinner, Inga Bergmann, et al., “New Fossils from Jebel Irhoud, Morocco and the Pan-­African Origin of Homo Sapiens, Nature 546, no. 7657 (2017): 289–­292, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature22336. 3.  Bruno David, Jean-­Michel Geneste, Fiona Petchey, Jean-­Jacques Delannoy, Bryce Barker, and Mark Eccleston, “How Old Are Australia’s Pictographs? A Review of Rock Art Dating,” Journal of Archaeological Science 40, no. 1 (2013): 3–­10, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jas.2012.08.019. 4.  William E. H. Stanner, The Dreaming and Other Essays (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2009). 5.  Henry F. Skerritt, Hetti Perkins, Fred R. Myers, and Narayan Khandekar, Everywhen: The Eternal Present in Indigenous Art from Australia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016). 6.  Anil K. Gupta, “Origin of Agriculture and Domestication of Plants and Animals Linked to Early Holocene Climate Amelioration,” Current Science 87, no. 1 (2004): 54–­59, www.jstor.org/stable/24107979. 7.  Jonathon M. Riley, “‘Love the Child Who Holds You by the Hand’: Intertextuality in the Odyssey and the Epic of Gilgamesh,” Studia Antiqua 12, no. 2 (2014): 20–­31. 8.  Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), lv. 9.  Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching: Translated with Notes by Arthur Waley (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997), 162. 10.  Bina Gupta and William C. Wilcox, “‘Tat tvam asi’: An Important Identity Statement or a Mere Tautology,” Philosophy East and West 34, no. 1 (1984): 85–­94, https://doi.org/10.2307/1398491. 11.  Edwin F. Bryant, The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali: A New Edition, Translation, and Commentary (New York: North Point Press, 2015). 12.  Hendrik. J. Koorevaar, “The Torah Model as Original Macrostructure of the Hebrew Canon: A Critical Evaluation,” Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 122, no. 1 (2010): 64–­80.

248  Notes

13.  David P. Wright, Inventing God’s Law: How the Covenant Code of the Bible Used and Revised the Laws of Hammurabi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 14.  Ronald M. Eisenberg, The 613 Mitzvot: A Contemporary Guide to the Commandments of Judaism (Rockville, MD: Schreiber, 2005). 15.  M. T. Laws of the Luvav 8:15, cited in Michael Fishbane, The Exegetical Imagination: On Jewish Thought and Theology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 158. 16.  Karl Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte (Munich: Piper, 1949). 17. Sameet M. Kumar, “An Introduction to Buddhism for the Cognitive-­ Behavioral Therapist,” Cognitive and Behavioral Practice 9, no. 1 (2002): 40–­43, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1077-7229(02)80038-4. 18.  Bhikkhu Bodhi, Noble Eightfold Path: Way to the End of Suffering (Onalaska, WA: Pariyatti Publishing, 2011). 19. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 11. 20. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 6. 21.  Seneca, “On the Happy Life,” in Moral Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), 115, cited in Darrin McMahon, Happiness: A History (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 55. 22. Epictetus, Discourses (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 2016), cited in Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (Oxford: Routledge Classics, 1945), 219. 23.  Charles Quarles, Sermon on the Mount (Nashville, TN: NAC Studies in Bible Theology, 2011), back cover. 24. Darrin McMahon, Happiness: A History (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2011). 25.  Cited in Darrin McMahon, “From the Happiness of Virtue to the Virtue of Happiness: 400 bc–­ad 1780,” Daedalus 133, no. 2 (2004): 5–­17, 9. 26.  Safwah M. Kamil and Mohd Yazid Mohd Yunos, “Examination of the Ideology of the Calmness Concept Based on Quranic Paradise Imagery towards Establishing an Environmental Islamic Garden in Malaysia,” Advances in Environmental Biology 9, no. 23 (2015): 120–­123. 27.  Pope Innocent III, On the Misery of the Human Condition: De Miseria Humane Conditionis (Indianapolis: Bobbs-­Merrill, 2007). Cited in Marvin Perry, Sources of the Western Tradition (Vol. 1) (London: Wadsworth, 2008), 288. 28.  Stuart Gillespie and Philip Hardie, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Notes    249

29.  Richard Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas That Have Shaped Our World View (London: Random House, 2010). 30.  Francis Hutcheson, “The Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue,” in Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, ed. J. B. Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 365–­386. 31.  Otto Rank, Will Therapy: An Analysis of the Therapeutic Process in Terms of Relationship (New York: W. W. Norton, 1936), 2. 32.  Cited in Howard Kirschenbaum, On Becoming Carl Rogers (New York: Delacorte, 1979), 95. 33.  Abraham Harold Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1962), 5. 34.  Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965). 35.  John F. Helliwell, Richard Layard, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Jan-­Emmanuel De Neve, World Happiness Report 2021 (New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2021). 36.  Wade E. Pickren, “Indigenization and the History of Psychology,” Psychological Studies 54, no. 2 (2009): 87–­95, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12646-009 -0012-7. 37.  David Bakan, The Duality of Human Existence: Isolation and Communion in Western Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). 38.  Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-­ Related Values (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980); Harry Triandis, “Collectivism v. Individualism: A Reconceptualisation of a Basic Concept in Cross-­cultural Social Psychology,” in Cross-­cultural Studies of Personality, Attitudes and Cognition, ed. Gajendra K. Verma and Christopher Bagley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988), 60–­95; Vas Taras, Piers Steel, and Bradley L. Kirkman, “Improving National Cultural Indices Using a Longitudinal Meta-­ analysis of Hofstede’s Dimensions,” Journal of World Business 47, no. 3 (2012): 329–­341, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2011.05.001. 39.  Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). 40.  Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine, and Ara Norenzayan, “Most People Are Not WEIRD,” Nature 466, no. 29 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1038/466029a. 41.  Tim Lomas, “Towards a Positive Cross-­cultural Lexicography: Enriching Our Emotional Landscape through 216 ‘Untranslatable’ Words Pertaining to Well-­being,” Journal of Positive Psychology 11, no. 5 (2016): 546–­558, https:// doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2015.1127993.

250  Notes

42.  Tim Lomas, “Experiential Cartography and the Significance of ‘Untranslatable’ Words,” Theory and Psychology 28, no. 4 (2018): 476–­495, https://doi .org/10.1177/0959354318772914; Tim Lomas, “Towards a Cross-­ cultural Lexical Map of Wellbeing,” Journal of Positive Psychology 16, no. 5 (2021): 622–­ 639, https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2020.1791944. 43.  Tim Lomas, “The Spectrum of Positive Affect: A Cross-­cultural Lexical Analysis,” International Journal of Wellbeing 7, no. 3 (2017), https://doi.org /10.5502/ijw.v7i3.608; Tim Lomas, “The Value of Ambivalent Emotions: A Cross-­cultural Lexical Analysis,” Qualitative Research in Psychology (2017): 1–­25, https://doi.org/10.1080/14780887.2017.1400143; Tim Lomas, “The Flavours of Love: A Cross-­cultural Lexical Analysis,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 48, no. 1 (2018): 134–­152, https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12158; Tim Lomas, “The Dimensions of Prosociality: A Cross-­cultural Lexical Analysis,” Current Psychology 40 (2021): 1336–­1347, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144 -018-0067-5; Tim Lomas, “The Elements of Eco-­Connection: A Cross-­cultural Lexical Enquiry,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 16, no. 24 (2019): 5120, https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16245120; Tim Lomas, “The Roots of Virtue: A Cross-­cultural Lexical Analysis,” Journal of Happiness Studies 20, no. 4 (2019): 1259–­1279, https://doi.org/10.1007 /s10902-018-9997-8; Tim Lomas, “The Dynamics of Spirituality: A Cross-­ cultural Lexical Analysis,” Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 11, no. 2 (2019): 131–­140, https://doi.org/10.1037/rel0000163. Chapter 3

1.  https://www.globalwellbeinginitiative.org; Louise Lambert, Tim Lomas, Margot P. van de Weijer, Holli-­Anne Passmore, Mohsen Joshanloo, Jim Harter, and Ed Diener, “Towards a Greater Global Understanding of Wellbeing: A Proposal for a More Inclusive Measure,” International Journal of Wellbeing 10, no. 2 (2020): 1–­18, https://doi.org/10.5502/ijw.v10i2.1037. 2.  Ed Diener, Assessing Well-­Being: The Collected Works of Ed Diener (New York: Springer, 2009). 3.  David Watson, Lee Anna Clark, and Auke Tellegen, “Development and Validation of Brief Measures of Positive and Negative Affect: The PANAS Scales,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47 (1988): 1063–­1070, https:// doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063. 4.  Yukiko Uchida and Shinobu Kitayama, “Happiness and Unhappiness in East and West: Themes and Variations,” Emotion 9, no. 4 (2009): 441–­456, https:// doi.org/10.1037/a0015634.

Notes    251

5.  Antonella Delle Fave, Ingrid Brdar, Marié P. Wissing, Ulisses Araujo, Alejandro Castro Solano, Teresa Freire, María Del Rocío Hernández-­Pozo, et al., “Lay Definitions of Happiness across Nations: The Primacy of Inner Harmony and Relational Connectedness,” Frontiers in Psychology 7 (2016), https://doi .org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00030. 6.  Eranda Jayawickreme and Laura Blackie, “Post-­traumatic Growth as Positive Personality Change: Evidence, Controversies and Future Directions,” European Journal of Personality 28, no. 4 (2014): 312–­331, https://doi.org/10.1002 /per.1963. 7.  Paul T. P. Wong, “Toward a Dual-­Systems Model of What Makes Life Worth Living,” in The Human Quest for Meaning: Theories, Research, and Applications, ed. Paul T. P. Wong (New York: Routledge, 2012), 3–­22. 8.  Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985). 9.  Khalil Gibran, The Prophet (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), 36. 10.  Lorraine L. Besser and Shigehiro Oishi, “The Psychologically Rich Life,” Philosophical Psychology 33, no. 8 (2020): 1053–­1071, https://doi.org/10.1080 /09515089.2020.1778662. 11.  Paul T. P. Wong, “Positive Psychology 2.0: Towards a Balanced Interactive Model of the Good Life,” Canadian Psychology 52, no. 2 (2011): 69–­81, 73. 12.  Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923). 13.  Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Carol Cosman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 47. 14.  Elisha D. Goldstein, “Sacred Moments: Implications on Well-­being and Stress,” Journal of Clinical Psychology 63, no. 10 (2007): 1001–­1019, https:// doi.org/10.1002/jclp.20402. 15.  Richard M. Ryan and Christina Frederick, “On Energy, Personality, and Health: Subjective Vitality as a Dynamic Reflection of Well-­being,” Journal of Personality 65, no. 3 (1997): 529–­565, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494 .1997.tb00326.x. 16.  Ed Diener, Robert A. Emmons, Randy J. Larsen, and Sharon Griffin, “The Satisfaction with Life Scale,” Journal of Personality Assessment 49, no. 1 (1985): 71–­75, https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa4901_13. 17.  Carol D. Ryff, “Happiness Is Everything, or Is It? Explorations on the Meaning of Psychological Well-­being,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57, no. 6 (1989): 1069–­1081, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.57.6.1069. 18.  Martin E. Seligman, Flourish: A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-­being (New York: Free Press, 2011), 17. 19.  Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Happiness (New York: Random House, 2013).

252  Notes

20.  Antoine Lutz, Heleen A. Slagter, John D. Dunne, and Richard J. Davidson, “Attention Regulation and Monitoring in Meditation,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12, no. 4 (2008): 163–­169, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.01.005. 21. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 12. 22.  Kurt Goldstein, Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940). 23.  Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950); Lawrence Kohlberg, “Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-­Developmental Approach to Socialization,” in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. David A. Goslin (London: Rand McNally, 1968), 347–­480. 24.  Tim Lomas, “Life Balance and Harmony: Wellbeing’s Golden Thread,” International Journal of Wellbeing 11, no. 1 (2021): 50–­68, https://doi.org/10.5502 /ijw.v11i1.1477. 25.  Linnea Dunne, Lagom: The Swedish Art of Balanced Living (London: Running Press Adult, 2017) 26.  Chenyang Li, “The Ideal of Harmony in Ancient Chinese and Greek Philosophy,” Dao 7, no. 1 (2008): 81–­98, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-008-9043-3. 27.  Catherine Juneau, Nicolas Pellerin, Elliott Trives, Matthieu Ricard, Rébecca Shankland, and Michael Dambrun, “Reliability and Validity of an Equanimity Questionnaire: The Two-­Factor Equanimity Scale (EQUA-­S),” PeerJ 8 (2020): e9405, https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.9405; Gisela Labouvie-­Vief, Daniel Grühn, and Joseph Studer, “Dynamic Integration of Emotion and Cognition: Equilibrium Regulation in Development and Aging,” in The Handbook of Life-­Span Development, Volume II: Social and Emotional Development, ed. Richard M. Lerner, Willis F. Overton, Alexandra M. Freund, and Michael E. Lamb (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010), 79–­115; Sun-­Mee Kang and Phillip R. Shaver, “Individual Differences in Emotional Complexity: Their Psychological Implications,” Journal of Personality 72, no. 4 (2004): 687–­726, https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.00277.x; Jordi Quoidbach, June Gruber, Moïra Mikolajczak, Alexsandr Kogan, Ilios Kotsou, and Michael I. Norton, “Emodiversity and the Emotional Ecosystem,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 143, no. 6 (2014): 2057–­2066, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038025. 28.  Jamie A. Gruman, Margaret N. Lumley, and M. Gloria González-­Morales, “Incorporating Balance: Challenges and Opportunities for Positive Psychology,” Canadian Psychology 59, no. 1 (2018): 54–­64. 29.  Yukiko Uchida and Yuji Ogihara, “Personal or Interpersonal Construal of Happiness: A Cultural Psychological Perspective,” International Journal of Wellbeing 2, no. 4 (2012): 354–­369, https://doi.org/10.5502/ijw.v2.i4.5.

Notes    253

30.  Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Vintage, 1979). 31. Takeshi Hamamura, “Are Cultures Becoming Individualistic? A Cross-­ Temporal Comparison of Individualism–­Collectivism in the United States and Japan,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 16, no. 1 (2012): 3–­24, https:// doi.org/10.1177/1088868311411587. Chapter 4

1.  Ken Wilber, “An Integral Theory of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 4, no. 1 (1997): 71–­92. 2.  Juergen Fell, “Identifying Neural Correlates of Consciousness: The State Space Approach,” Consciousness and Cognition 13, no. 4 (2004): 709–­729, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.001. 3.  Richard J. Davidson, “Affective Neuroscience and Psychophysiology: Toward a Synthesis,” Psychophysiology 40, no. 5 (2003): 655–­665, https://doi.org /10.1111/1469-8986.00067; Marcie L. King, “The Neural Correlates of Well-­ being: A Systematic Review of the Human Neuroimaging and Neuropsychological Literature,” Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience 19, no. 4 (2019): 779–­796, https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-019-00720-4. 4.  Philip Brickman, Dan Coates, and Ronnie Janoff-­Bulman, “Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36 (1978): 917–­927, https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.36.8.917. 5.  Richard E. Lucas, “Adaptation and the Set-­Point Model of Subjective Well-­ being: Does Happiness Change after Major Life Events?,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 16, no. 2 (2007): 75–­79, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467 -8721.2007.00479.x. 6.  Feyza Corapci, Wolfgang Friedlmeier, Oana Benga, Catherine Strauss, Irina Pitica, and Georgiana Susa, “Cultural Socialization of Toddlers in Emotionally Charged Situations,” Social Development 27, no. 2 (2018): 262–­278, https:// doi.org/10.1111/sode.12272. 7.  Margot van de Weijer, Lianne de Vries, and Meike Bartels, “Happiness and Wellbeing; The Value and Findings from Genetic Studies,” PsyArXiv Preprints, 2021, https://doi.org/10.31234/OSF.IO/ZVU8J. 8.  Robyn E. Wootton, Oliver S. P. Davis, Abigail L. Mottershaw, R. Adele H. Wang, and Claire M. A. Haworth, “Genetic and Environmental Correlations between Subjective Wellbeing and Experience of Life Events in Adolescence,” European Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 26, no. 9 (2017): 1119–­1127, https:// doi.org/10.1007/s00787-017-0997-8. 9.  Michael Pluess, “Vantage Sensitivity: Environmental Sensitivity to Positive Experiences as a Function of Genetic Differences,” Journal of Personality 85, no. 1 (2017): 38–­50, https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12218.

254  Notes

10.  Avshalom Caspi, Karen Sugden, Terrie E. Moffitt, Alan Taylor, Ian W. Craig, HonaLee Harrington, Joseph McClay, et al., “Influence of Life Stress on Depression: Moderation by a Polymorphism in the 5-­HTT Gene,” Science 301, no. 5631 (2003): 386–­389, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1083968; Robert C. Culverhouse, Nancy L. Saccone, Amy C. Horton, Yinjiao Ma, Kaarin J. Anstey, Tobias Banaschewski, Margit Burmeister, et al., “Collaborative Meta-­analysis Finds No Evidence of a Strong Interaction between Stress and 5-­HTTLPR Genotype Contributing to the Development of Depression,” Molecular Psychiatry 23, no. 1 (2018): 133–­142, https://doi.org/10.1038/mp.2017.44. 11.  Claudia M. Haase, Ursula Beermann, Laura R. Saslow, Michelle N. Shiota, Sarina R. Saturn, Sandy J. Lwi, James J. Casey, et al., “Short Alleles, Bigger Smiles? The Effect of 5-­HTTLPR on Positive Emotional Expressions,” Emotion 15, no. 4 (2015): 438–­448, https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000074. 12.  Bart M. L. Baselmans, Rick Jansen, Hill F. Ip, Jenny van Dongen, Abdel Abdellaoui, Margot van de Weijer, Yanchun Bao, et al., “Multivariate Genome-­ Wide Analyses of the Well-­being Spectrum,” Nature Genetics 51 (2019): 445–­ 451, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41588-018-0320-8. 13.  Lianne P. de Vries, Margot van de Weijer, and Meike Bartels, “The Biology of Well-­being: A Systematic Review on the Association between Well-­being and the Brain, Neurotransmitters, Hormones, the Immune System, and Microbiome,” forthcoming. 14.  Cosima Locher, Helen Koechlin, Sean R. Zion, Christoph Werner, Daniel S. Pine, Irving Kirsch, Ronald C. Kessler, and Joe Kossowsky, “Efficacy and Safety of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, Serotonin-­Norepinephrine Reuptake Inhibitors, and Placebo for Common Psychiatric Disorders among Children and Adolescents: A Systematic Review and Meta-­analysis,” JAMA Psychiatry 74, no. 10 (2017): 1011–­1020, https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapsy chiatry.2017.2432. 15.  Oscar Arias-­Carrión, Maria Stamelou, Eric Murillo-­Rodríguez, Manuel Menéndez-­González, and Ernst Pöppel, “Dopaminergic Reward System: A Short Integrative Review,” International Archives of Medicine 3, no. 24 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1186/1755-7682-3-24. 16.  Kerstin Uvnäs-­Moberg, Anette Ekström-­Bergström, Marie Berg, Sarah Buckley, Zada Pajalic, Eleni Hadjigeorgiou, Alicja Kotłowska, et al., “Maternal Plasma Levels of Oxytocin during Physiological Childbirth—­A Systematic Review with Implications for Uterine Contractions and Central Actions of Oxytocin,” BMC Pregnancy and Childbirth 19, no. 1 (2019), 285, https://doi .org/10.1186/s12884-019-2365-9.

Notes    255

17.  Matthias Gamer and Christian Büchel, “Oxytocin Specifically Enhances Valence-­ Dependent Parasympathetic Responses,” Psychoneuroendocrinology 37, no. 1 (2012): 87–­93, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psyneuen.2011.05.007. 18.  Adam S. Sprouse-­Blum, Greg Smith, Daniel Sugai, and F. Don Parsa, “Understanding Endorphins and Their Importance in Pain Management,” Hawaii Medical Journal 69, no. 3 (2010): 70–­71, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov /20397507. 19.  Maria Scherma, Paolo Masia, Valentina Satta, Walter Fratta, Paola Fadda, and Gianluigi Tanda, “Brain Activity of Anandamide: A Rewarding Bliss?,” Acta Pharmacologica Sinica 40, no. 3 (2019): 309–­323, https://doi.org/10.1038 /s41401-018-0075-x. 20. Arne Dietrich and William F. McDaniel, “Endocannabinoids and Exercise,” British Journal of Sports Medicine 38 (2004): 536–­541, http://dx.doi .org/10.1136/bjsm.2004.011718. 21.  Archibald Hart, Adrenaline and Stress: The Exciting New Breakthrough That Helps You Overcome Stress Damage (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1995). 22.  Hanns Möhler, “The GABA System in Anxiety and Depression and Its Therapeutic Potential,” Neuropharmacology 62, no. 1 (2012): 42–­53, https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropharm.2011.08.040. 23.  Crissa L. Guglietti, Zafiris J. Daskalakis, Natasha Radhu, Paul B. Fitzgerald, and Paul Ritvo, “Meditation-­Related Increases in GABAB Modulated Cortical Inhibition,” Brain Stimulation 6, no. 3 (2013): 397–­402, https://doi .org/10.1016/j.brs.2012.08.005. 24.  Mark A. Hoffman, “Entheogens (Psychedelic Drugs) and the Ancient Mystery Religions,” in Toxicology in Antiquity, ed. Philip Wexler (Cambridge, MA: Academic Press, 2019), 353–­362. 25.  Christopher Timmermann, Leor Roseman, Luke Williams, David Erritzoe, Charlotte Martial, Héléna Cassol, Steven Laureys, et al., “DMT Models the Near-­Death Experience,” Frontiers in Psychology 9 (2018): 1424, https://doi .org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01424. 26.  Marcie L. King, “The Neural Correlates of Well-­being: A Systematic Review of the Human Neuroimaging and Neuropsychological Literature,” Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience 19, no. 4 (2019): 779–­796, https://doi .org/10.3758/s13415-019-00720-4. 27.  Andrew B. Newberg and Jeremy Iversen, “The Neural Basis of the Complex Mental Task of Meditation: Neurotransmitter and Neurochemical Considerations,” Medical Hypotheses 61, no. 2 (2003): 282–­291, https://doi.org /10.1016/s0306-9877(03)00175-0.

256  Notes

28.  Britta K. Hölzel, Ulrich Ott, Hannes Hempel, Andrea Hackl, Katharina Wolf, Rudolf Stark, and Dieter Vaitl, “Differential Engagement of Anterior Cingulate and Adjacent Medial Frontal Cortex in Adept Meditators and Non-­Meditators,” Neuroscience Letters 421, no. 1 (2007): 16–­21, https://doi .org/10.1016/j.neulet.2007.04.074. 29.  Tim Lomas, Itai Ivtzan, and Cynthia H. Y. Fu, “A Systematic Review of the Neurophysiology of Mindfulness on EEG Oscillations,” Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 57 (2015): 401–­410, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev .2015.09.018. 30. Anne Hauswald, Teresa Übelacker, Sabine Leske, and Nathan Weisz, “What It Means to Be Zen: Marked Modulations of Local and Interareal Synchronization during Open Monitoring Meditation,” NeuroImage 108 (2105): 265–­273, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.065. 31.  Richard J. Davidson, “Anterior Cerebral Asymmetry and the Nature of Emotion,” Brain and Cognition 20, no. 1 (1992): 125–­151, https://doi.org /10.1016/0278-2626(92)90065-T. 32. Ido Amihai and Maria Kozhevnikov, “Arousal vs. Relaxation: A Comparison of the Neurophysiological and Cognitive Correlates of Vajrayana and Theravada Meditative Practices,” PloS one 9, no. 7 (2014): e102990, https://doi .org/10.1371/journal.pone.0102990. 33.  Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error (New York: Random House, 2006). 34.  James A. Russell, “A Circumplex Model of Affect,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39, no. 6 (1980): 1161–­1178, https://doi.org/10.1037 /h0077714. 35.  Paul Ekman, “An Argument for Basic Emotions,” Cognition and Emotion 6, no. 3–­4 (1992): 169–­200, https://doi.org/10.1080/02699939208411068. 36.  Rom Harré, The Social Construction of Emotions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 5. 37.  Lisa Feldman Barrett, “Are Emotions Natural Kinds?,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 1, no. 1 (2006): 49, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916 .2006.00003.x. 38.  Aaron T. Beck, “Cognitive Therapy: A 30-­Year Retrospective,”American Psychologist 46, no. 4 (1991): 368–­375, https://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066x .46.4.368. 39.  Daniel David, Ioana Cristea, and Stefan G. Hofmann, “Why Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Is the Current Gold Standard of Psychotherapy,” Frontiers in Psychiatry 9 (2018): 4, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2018.00004. 40.  Norman Vincent Peale, The Power of Positive Thinking (New York: Random House, 2012).

Notes    257

41.  Tim Lomas, The Positive Power of Negative Emotions (London: Hachette UK, 2016). 42. Richard A. Emmons and Michael E. McCullough, “Counting Blessings versus Burdens: Experimental Studies of Gratitude and Subjective Well-­ being,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84, no. 2 (2003): 377–­389, 10.1037//0022–­3514.84.2.377. 43.  David J. Chalmers, “Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 4, no. 1 (1997): 3–­46. 44.  Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly 32, no. 127 (1982): 127, https://doi.org/10.2307/2960077. 45. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 1900). 46.  George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 47.  George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), xiv. 48.  Tim Lomas, “The Spatial Contours of Wellbeing: A Content Analysis of Metaphor in Academic Discourse,” Journal of Positive Psychology 14, no. 3 (2019): 362–­376, https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2018.1450437. 49.  Barbara L. Fredrickson, “The Broaden—­and—­–­Build Theory of Positive Emotions,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences 359, no. 1449 (2004): 1367–­1377, https://doi.org/10.1098 /rstb.2004.1512. 50.  Benjamin L. Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, ed. John B. Carroll (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956), 213–­214. 51.  Catherine L. Albanese, “The Subtle Energies of Spirit: Explorations in Metaphysical and New Age Spirituality,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 67, no. 2 (1999): 305–­325, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1465739. 52. Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Evolution: People’s Motivations Are Changing, and Reshaping the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). Chapter 5

1.  Xiumei Zhu, Sang Eun Woo, Caitlin Porter, and Michael Brzezinski, “Pathways to Happiness: From Personality to Social Networks and Perceived Support,” Social Networks 35, no. 3 (2013): 382–­393, https://doi.org/10.1016 /j.socnet.2013.04.005. 2.  Shigehiro Oishi, “Culture and Well-­being: Conceptual and Methodological Issues,” in International Differences in Well-­being, ed. Ed Diener, John F. Helliwell, and Daniel Kahneman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 34–­69.

258  Notes

3.  John F. Helliwell, Richard Layard, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Jan-­Emmanuel De Neve, World Happiness Report 2021 (New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2021). 4.  John F. Helliwell, Richard Layard, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Jan-­Emmanuel De Neve, World Happiness Report 2020 (New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2020). 5.  Kate Raworth, Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-­Century Economist (London: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2017). 6.  Scott B. Kaufman, Transcend: The New Science of Self-­Actualization (New York: Penguin, 2021). 7. Todd Bridgman, Stephen Cummings, and John Ballard, “Who Built Maslow’s Pyramid? A History of the Creation of Management Studies’ Most Famous Symbol and Its Implications for Management Education,” Academy of Management Learning and Education 18, no. 1 (2019): 81–­98, https://doi.org /10.5465/amle.2017.0351. 8.  Abraham H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50, no. 4 (1943): 388, https://doi.org/10.1037/h0054346. 9.  Ed Diener, Louis Tay, and David G. Myers, “The Religion Paradox: If Religion Makes People Happy, Why Are So Many Dropping Out?,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 101, no. 6 (2011): 1278–­1290, https://doi.org /10.1037/a0024402. 10.  https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals. 11. Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 9 (1991): 1241–­1299, https://doi.org/10.2307/1229039. 12.  Sonja Lyubomirsky, Kennon M. Sheldon, and David Schkade, “Pursuing Happiness: The Architecture of Sustainable Change,” Review of General Psychology 9, no. 2 (2005): 111–­131, https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.9.2.111. 13.  Nicholas J. Brown and Julia M. Rohrer, “Easy as (Happiness) Pie? A Critical Evaluation of a Popular Model of the Determinants of Well-­being,” Journal of Happiness Studies 21 (2020): 1285–­1301, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902 -019-00128-4. 14.  David W. Dowdy, Mark P. Eid, Artyom Sedrakyan, Pedro A. Mendez-­Tellez, Peter J. Pronovost, Margaret S. Herridge, and Dale M. Needham, “Quality of Life in Adult Survivors of Critical Illness: A Systematic Review of the Literature,” Intensive Care Medicine 31, no. 5 (2005): 611–­620, https://doi.org/10.1007 /s00134-005-2592-6. 15.  Kate Hefferon, Positive Psychology and the Body: The Somatopsychic Side to Flourishing (London: McGraw-­Hill Education, 2013).

Notes    259

16.  H. Stefan Bracha, “Freeze, Flight, Fight, Fright, Faint: Adaptationist Perspectives on the Acute Stress Response Spectrum,” CNS Spectrums 9, no. 9 (2004): 679–­685, https://doi.org/10.1017/s1092852900001954. 17.  Ashley L. Russell, Jeffrey G. Tasker, Aldo B. Lucion, Jenny Fiedler, Carolina D. Munhoz, Tao-­yiao John Wu, and Terrence Deak, “Factors Promoting Vulnerability to Dysregulated Stress Reactivity and Stress-­Related Disease,” Journal of Neuroendocrinology 30, no. 10 (2018): e12641, https://doi.org/10.1111 /jne.12641. 18.  Martin Ljunge, “Migrants, Health, and Happiness: Evidence That Health Assessments Travel with Migrants and Predict Well-­being,” Economics and Human Biology 22 (2016): 35–­46, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ehb.2016.03.004. 19.  Ed Diener and Micaela Y. Chan, “Happy People Live Longer: Subjective Well-­being Contributes to Health and Longevity,” Applied Psychology: Health and Well-­being 3, no. 1 (2011): 1–­43, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-0854 .2010.01045.x. 20.  Barbara Ehrenreich, Smile or Die: How Positive Thinking Fooled America and the World (New York: Granta Books, 2010). 21.  Ping Zhang, Xinzhi Zhang, Jonathan Brown, Dorte Vistisen, Richard Sicree, Jonathan Shaw, and Gregory Nichols, “Global Healthcare Expenditure on Diabetes for 2010 and 2030,” Diabetes Research and Clinical Practice 87, no. 3 (2010): 293–­301, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diabres.2010.01.026. 22. Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, “Happiness Inequality in the United States,” Journal of Legal Studies 37, no. S2 (2008): S33–­S79, https:// doi.org/10.1086/592004. 23.  Steven Philipp, “Race and the Pursuit of Happiness,” Journal of Leisure Research 32, no. 1 (2000): 121–­124, https://doi.org/10.1080/00222216.2000 .11949899. 24.  Shervin Assari, “Unequal Gain of Equal Resources across Racial Groups,” International Journal of Health Policy and Management 7, no. 1 (2018): 1–­9, https://doi.org/10.15171/ijhpm.2017.90. 25. Shervin Assari, “Race, Education Attainment, and Happiness in the United States,” International Journal of Epidemiologic Research 6, no. 2 (2019): 76–­82, https://doi.org/10.15171/ijer.2019.14. 26.  Shervin Assari, “Combined Racial and Gender Differences in the Long-­ term Predictive Role of Education on Depressive Symptoms and Chronic Medical Conditions,” Journal of Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities 4, no. 3 (2017): 385–­396, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40615-016-0239-7; Shervin Assari and Maryam Moghani Lankarani, “Race and Urbanity Alter the Protective Effect

260  Notes

of Education but Not Income on Mortality,” Frontiers in Public Health 4 (2016): 100, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2016.00100. 27.  Daniel Kahneman and Angus Deaton, “High Income Improves Evaluation of Life but Not Emotional Well-­being,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, no. 38 (2010): 16489–­16493, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas .1011492107. 28.  Tim Lomas, Masculinity, Meditation, and Mental Health (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 29.  Michael E. Addis and James R. Mahalik, “Men, Masculinity, and the Contexts of Help Seeking,” American Psychologist 58, no. 1 (2003): 5–­14, https:// doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.58.1.5. 30.  Ronald C. Kessler, “Epidemiology of Women and Depression,” Journal of Affective Disorders 74, no. 1 (2003): 5–­13, https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165 -0327(02)00426-3. 31.  Ministry of Justice. 2016. Story of the Prison Population: 1993–­2016. London: Ministry of Justice. 32.  Office for National Statistics, Alcohol-­Specific Deaths in the UK: Registered in 2018 (London: Office for National Statistics, 2019). 33.  Louise C. Hawkley and John T. Cacioppo, “Aging and Loneliness: Downhill Quickly?,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 16, no. 4 (2007): 187–­191, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00501.x. 34.  David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald, “Is Well-­being U-­Shaped over the Life Cycle?,” Social Science and Medicine 66, no. 8 (2008): 1733–­1749, https://doi.org/10.3386/w12935. 35. Ottar Hellevik, “The U-­ Shaped Age-­ Happiness Relationship: Real or Methodological Artifact?,” Quality and Quantity 51 (2017): 177–­197, https:// doi.org/10.1007/s11135-015-0300-3. 36.  Carol Graham and Julia Ruiz Pozuelo, “Happiness, Stress, and Age: How the U Curve Varies across People and Places,” Journal of Population Economics 30 (2017): 225–­264, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-016-0611-2. 37. John E Pachankis and Richard Bränström, “Hidden from Happiness: Structural Stigma, Sexual Orientation Concealment, and Life Satisfaction across 28 Countries,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 86 (2018): 403–­415, https://doi.org/10.1037/ccp0000299. 38. Francesco Sarracino, “Determinants of Subjective Well-­being in High and Low Income Countries: Do Happiness Equations Differ across Countries,” Journal of Socio-­Economics 42 (2013): 51–­66, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec .2012.11.006.

Notes    261

39.  Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. John G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood, 1986), 241–­258. 40.  John F. Helliwell and Richard D. Putnam, “The Social Context of Well–­ being,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences 359, no. 1449 (2004): 1435, https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb .2004.1522. 41.  Kristen Shultz Lee and Hiroshi Ono, “Marriage, Cohabitation, and Happiness: A Cross-­national Analysis of 27 Countries,” Journal of Marriage and Family 74 (2012): 953–­972, doi:10.1111/j.1741-3737.2012.01001.x. 42.  Ed Diener, Carol L. Gohm, Eunkook Suh, and Shigehiro Oishi, “Similarity of the Relations between Marital Status and Subjective Well-­being across Cultures,” Journal of Cross-­cultural Psychology 31, no. 4 (2000): 419–­436, https:// doi.org/10.1177/0022022100031004001. 43.  Richard E. Lucas, Andrew E. Clark, Yannis Georgellis, and Ed Diener, “Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84, no. 3 (2003): 527–­539, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.3.527. 44.  Shawn Grover and John F. Helliwell, “How’s Life at Home? New Evidence on Marriage and the Set Point for Happiness,” Journal of Happiness Studies 20 (2019): 373–­390, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-017-9941-3. 45.  W. Bradford Wilcox and Jeffrey Dew, “Is Love a Flimsy Foundation? Soulmate versus Institutional Models of Marriage,” Social Science Research 39, no. 5 (2010): 687–­699, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2010.05.006. 46.  Markku T. Hyyppä and Juhani Mäki, “Why Do Swedish-­Speaking Finns Have Longer Active Life? An Area for Social Capital Research,” Health Promotion International 16, no. 1 (2001): 55–­64, https://doi.org/10.1093/heapro /16.1.55; Markku T. Hyyppä and Juhani Mäki, “Social Participation and Health in a Community Rich in Stock of Social Capital,” Health Education Research 18, no. 6 (2003): 770–­779, https://doi.org/10.1093/her/cyf044. 47.  Jessica Burke, Patricia O’Campo, Christina Salmon, and Renee Walker, “Pathways Connecting Neighborhood Influences and Mental Well-­being: Socioeconomic Position and Gender Differences,” Social Science and Medicine 68, no. 7 (2009): 1294–­1304, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.01.015. 48.  Corina Graif and Stephen A. Matthews, “The Long Arm of Poverty: Extended and Relational Geographies of Child Victimization and Neighborhood Violence Exposures,” Justice Quarterly 34, no. 6 (2017): 1096–­1125, https:// doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2016.1276951.

262  Notes

49.  Urie Bronfenbrenner, Ecological Systems Theory (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1992). 50.  Sarracino, “Determinants of Subjective Well-­being.”. 51.  Crick Lund, Alison Breen, Alan J. Flisher, Ritsuko Kakuma, Joanne Corrigall, John A. Joska, Leslie Swartz, and Vikram Patel, “Poverty and Common Mental Disorders in Low and Middle Income Countries: A Systematic Review,” Social Science and Medicine 71, no. 3 (2010): 517–­528, https://doi.org/10.1016 /j.socscimed.2010.04.027. 52.  Richard E. Lucas, Andrew E. Clark, Yannis Georgellis, and Ed Diener, “Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfaction,” Psychological Science 15, no. 1 (2004): 8–­13, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.01501002.x. 53.  Jianbo Luo, “A Pecuniary Explanation for the Heterogeneous Effects of Unemployment on Happiness,” Journal of Happiness Studies 21 (2020): 2603–­ 2628, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-019-00198-4. 54.  Berrin Erdogan, Talya N. Bauer, Donald M. Truxillo, and Layla R. Mansfield, “Whistle While You Work: A Review of the Life Satisfaction Literature,” Journal of Management 38, no. 4 (2012): 1038–­1083, https://doi.org/10.1177 /0149206311429379. 55.  Richard A. Easterlin, “Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence,” in Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz, ed. Paul A. David and Melvin W. Reder (New York: Academic Press, 1974), 89–­125. 56.  Catriona Miller, “Finding the Golden Egg: Illusions of Happiness in an Age of Consumer Capitalism,” in The Happiness Illusion: How the Media Sold Us a Fairytale, ed. Luke Hockley and Nadi Fadina (London: Routledge, 2015), 89–­106. 57.  Daniel W. Sacks, Betsey Stevenson, and Justin Wolfers, “The New Stylized Facts about Income and Subjective Well-­being,” Emotion 12, no. 6 (2012): 1181–­1187, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029873. 58.  Matthew A. Killingsworth, “Experienced Well-­being Rises with Income, Even Above $75,000 per Year,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118, no. 4 (2021): e2016976118, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2016976118. 59.  Ryan Howell and Colleen J. Howell, “The Relation of Economic Status to Subjective Well-­being in Developing Countries: A Meta-­analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 134, no. 4 (2008): 536–­560, https://doi.org/10.1037/0033 -2909.134.4.536. 60.  Andrew T. Jebb, Louis Tay, Ed Diener, and Shigehiro Oishi., “Happiness, Income Satiation and Turning Points around the World,” Nature Human Behaviour 2, no. 1 (2018): 33–­38, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0277-0.

Notes    263

61.  Andrew E. Clark, Paul Frijters, and Michael A. Shields, “Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles,” Journal of Economic Literature 46, no. 1 (2008): 95–­144, https:// doi.org/10.1257/jel.46.1.95. 62.  Eduardo Pérez-­Asenjo, “If Happiness Is Relative, against Whom Do We Compare Ourselves? Implications for Labour Supply,” Journal of Population Economics 24, no. 4 (2011): 1411–­1442, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41488358. 63.  Richard G. Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better (London: Allen Lane, 2010); John H. Goldthorpe, “Analysing Social Inequality: A Critique of Two Recent Contributions from Economics and Epidemiology,” European Sociological Review 26, no. 6 (2010): 731–­44, https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcp046. 64.  Lawrence Mishel and Jori Kandra, CEO Compensation Surged 14% in 2019 to $21.3 Million (Washington DC: Economic Policy Institute, 2020). 65.  “Wage Gap between Bosses and Workers Widens,” Uutiset, July 22, 2019, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/wage_gap_between_bosses_and_workers _widens_paper_reports/10888171. 66.  John F. Kennedy, inaugural address, January 20, 1961 67. Ruut Veenhoven, “Freedom and Happiness: A Comparative Study in Forty-­Four Nations in the Early 1990s,’ in Culture and Subjective Well-­being, ed. Ed Diener and Eunkook M. Suh (Dordrecht: Springer, 2000), 259. 68.  Ruut Veenhoven, “Freedom and Happiness: Comparison of 126 Nations in 2006,” paper presented at the Legatum prosperity workshop, June 21–­22, London, 2008. 69.  Terry Miller and Anthony Kim, 2016 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington DC: Heritage Foundation, 2016). 70.  Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020 Methodology (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2020). 71.  Miller and Kim, 2016 Index of Economic Freedom. 72.  Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–­2008 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009). 73.  Ed Diener, Marissa Diener, and Carol Diener, “Factors Predicting the Subjective Well-­being of Nations,” in Culture and Well-­being, ed. Ed Diener and Eunkook M. Suh (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 43–­70. 74.  Dipak K. Gupta, Albert J. Jongman, and Alex P. Schmid, “Creating a Composite Index for Assessing Country Performance in the Field of Human Rights: Proposal for a New Methodology,” Human Rights Quarterly 16, no. 1 (1994): 131–­162, https://doi.org/10.2307/762414.

264  Notes

75.  Grant Duncan, “Should Happiness-­Maximization Be the Goal of Government?,” Journal of Happiness Studies 11, no. 2 (2010): 165, https://doi.org /10.1007/s10902-008-9129-y. 76.  Dorota Jasielska, Maciej Stolarski, and Michał Bilewicz, “Biased, Therefore Unhappy: Disentangling the Collectivism-­Happiness Relationship Globally,” Journal of Cross-­cultural Psychology 49, no. 8 (2018): 1227–­1246, https:// doi.org/10.1177/0022022118784204. 77. Hidehumi Hitokoto and Yukiko Uchida, “Interdependent Happiness: Theoretical Importance and Measurement Validity,” Journal of Happiness Studies 16, no. 1 (2015): 211–­239, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-014-9505-8. 78.  Christopher G. Ellison and Jeffrey Levin, “The Religion-­Health Connection: Evidence, Theory, and Future Directions,” Health Education and Behavior 25, no. 6 (1998), 700–­720, https://doi.org/10.1177/109019819802500603. 79.  Soyoung Q. Park, Thorsten Kahnt, Azade Dogan, Sabrina Strang, Ernst Fehr, and Philippe N. Tobler, “A Neural Link between Generosity and Happiness,” Nature Communications 8, no. 1 (2017): 1–­10, https://doi.org/10.1038 /ncomms15964. 80.  Michael F. Steger and Patricia Frazier, “Meaning in Life: One Link in the Chain from Religiousness to Well-­being,” Journal of Counseling Psychology 52, no. 4 (2005): 574–­582, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0167.52.4.574. 81.  Kenneth Kramer, The Sacred Art of Dying: How World Religions Understand Death (Malwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1988). 82.  Jessica L. Burris, Shannon E. Sauer, and Charles R. Carlson, “A Test of Religious Commitment and Spiritual Transcendence as Independent Predictors of Underage Alcohol Use and Alcohol-­Related Problems,” Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 3, no. 3 (2011): 231–­240, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022204. 83.  Darren E. Sherkat and Christopher G. Ellison, “Recent Developments and Current Controversies in the Sociology of Religion,” Annual Review of Sociology 25, no. 1 (1999): 363–­394, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.363. 84.  Warren D. TenHouten, Alienation and Affect (London: Taylor and Francis, 2016). Chapter 6

1.  John Stuart Mill, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X: Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. John M. Robson and Jack Stillinger (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1986), 146. 2.  Dana Becker and Jeanne Marecek, “Dreaming the American Dream: Individualism and Positive Psychology,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2, no. 5 (2008): 1767–­1780, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00139.x.

Notes    265

3.  Grant Duncan, “Should Happiness-­Maximization Be the Goal of Government?,” Journal of Happiness Studies 11, no. 2 (2010): 165, https://doi.org /10.1007/s10902-008-9129-y. 4.  Robert Neelly Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life: Updated Edition with a New Introduction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), xxv. 5.  Tim Lomas, Kate Hefferon, and Itai Ivtzan. 2015. “The LIFE model: A meta-­ theoretical conceptual map for applied positive psychology.” Journal of Happiness Studies 16(5): 1347–­1364, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-014-9563-y. 6.  Michael I. Posner and Steven E. Petersen, “The Attention System of the Human Brain,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 13, no. 1 (1990): 25–­42, https:// doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ne.13.030190.000325. 7.  James H. Austin, Zen and the Brain: Toward an Understanding of Meditation and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 69. 8.  Roger Walsh and Shauna L. Shapiro, “The Meeting of Meditative Disciplines and Western Psychology: A Mutually Enriching Dialogue,” American Psychologist 61, no. 3 (2006): 228–­229, https://doi.org/10.1037/0003–066X.61.3.227. 9.  William L. Mikulas, “Mindfulness, Self-­control, and Personal Growth,” in Psychotherapy, Meditation, and Health, ed. Mauritz G. T. Kwee (London: East-­ West Publication, 1990), 151–­164. 10.  Antoine Lutz, Heleene A. Slagter, John D. Dunne, and Richard J. Davidson, “Attention Regulation and Monitoring in Meditation,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12, no. 4 (2008): 163–­169. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.01.005. 11.  Antonino Raffone and Narayanan Srinivasan, “The Exploration of Meditation in the Neuroscience of Attention and Consciousness,” Cognitive Processing 11, no. 1 (2010): 2, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-009-0354-z. 12. Jon Kabat-­ Zinn, “Mindfulness-­ Based Interventions in Context: Past, Present, and Future,” Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice 10, no. 2 (2003): 144–­156, 145, https://doi.org/10.1093/clipsy.bpg016. 13.  Tenzin Gyatso, “Science at the Crossroads,” Explore: The Journal of Science and Healing 2, no. 2 (2006): 97–­99, 98, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.explore .2005.12.005. 14. Jon Kabat-­Zinn, “An Outpatient Program in Behavioral Medicine for Chronic Pain Patients Based on the Practice of Mindfulness Meditation: Theoretical Considerations and Preliminary Results,” General Hospital Psychiatry 4, no. 1 (1982): 33–­47, https://doi.org/10.1016/0163-8343(82)90026-3. 15.  Willem Kuyken, Ed Watkins, Emily Holden, Kat White, Rod S. Taylor, Sarah Byford, Alison Evans, et al., “How Does Mindfulness-­Based Cognitive

266  Notes

Therapy Work?,” Behaviour Research and Therapy 48, no. 11 (2010): 1105–­1112, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20810101. 16.  Tim Lomas, Juan Carlos Medina, Itai Ivtzan, Silke Rupprecht, Rona Hart, and Francisco Jose Eiroa-­Orosa, “The Impact of Mindfulness on Well-­being and Performance in the Workplace: An Inclusive Systematic Review of the Empirical Literature,” European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 26, no. 4 (2017): 492–­513, https://doi.org/10.1080/1359432X.2017.1308924. 17.  Kabat-­Zinn, “Mindfulness-­Based Interventions in Context,” 145. 18. Barbara L. Fredrickson, Michael A. Cohn, Kimberly A. Coffey, Jolynn Pek, and Sandra M. Finkel. “Open Hearts Build Lives: Positive Emotions, Induced through Loving-­Kindness Meditation, Build Consequential Personal Resources,”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95, no. 5 (2008): 1045–­ 1062, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013262. 19.  Jean Varenne, Yoga and the Hindu Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). 20.  Holger Cramer, Romy Lauche, Dennis Anheyer, Karen Pilkington, Michael de Manincor, Gustav Dobos, and Lesley Ward, “Yoga for Anxiety: A Systematic Review and Meta-­analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials,” Depression and Anxiety 35, no. 9 (2018): 830–­843, https://doi.org/10.1002/da.22762. 21.  John D. Mayer and Peter Salovey, “The Intelligence of Emotional Intelligence,” Intelligence 17, no. 4 (1993: 433–­442, https://doi.org/10.1016/0160 -2896(93)90010-3. 22. Nicolás Sánchez-­ Álvarez, Natalio Extremera, and Pablo Fernández-­ Berrocal, “The Relation between Emotional Intelligence and Subjective Well-­ being: A Meta-­analytic Investigation,” Journal of Positive Psychology 11, no. 3 (2016): 276–­285, https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2015.1058968. 23.  Karen L. Bierman, Robert L. Nix, Mark T. Greenberg, Clancy Blair, and Celene E. Domitrovich, “Executive Functions and School Readiness Intervention: Impact, Moderation, and Mediation in the Head Start REDI Program,” Development and Psychopathology 20, no. 3 (2008): 82143, https://doi.org/10.1017 /S0954579408000394. 24.  Parizia Velotti, Carlo Garofalo, Antonino Callea, Romola S. Bucks, Terri Roberton, and Michael Daffern, “Exploring Anger among Offenders: The Role of Emotion Dysregulation and Alexithymia,” Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 24, no. 1 (2017): 128–­138, https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2016.1164639. 25.  Arla L. Day and Sarah A. Carroll, “Using an Ability-­Based Measure of Emotional Intelligence to Predict Individual Performance, Group Performance, and Group Citizenship Behaviors,” Personality and Individual Differences 36, no. 6 (2004): 1443–­1458, 1444, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(03)00240-X.

Notes    267

26.  David P. Johnson, David L. Penn, Barbara L. Fredrickson, Piper S. Meyer, Ann M. Kring, and Mary Brantley, “Loving-­kindness Meditation to Enhance Recovery from Negative Symptoms of Schizophrenia,” Journal of Clinical Psychology 65, no. 5 (2009): 499–­509, https://doi.org. 27.  Alex M. Wood, Jeffrey J. Froh, and Adam W. Geraghty, “Gratitude and Well-­ being: A Review and Theoretical Integration,” Clinical Psychology Review 30, no. 7 (2010): 890–­905, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2010.03.005; Anna L. Boggiss, Nathan S. Consedine, Jennifer M. Brenton-­Peters, Paul L. Hofman, and Anna S. Serlachius, “A Systematic Review of Gratitude Interventions: Effects on Physical Health and Health Behaviors,” Journal of Psychosomatic Research 135 (2020): 110165, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychores.2020.110165. 28.  Delphine Nelis, Jordi Quoidbach, Moïra Mikolajczak, and Michel Hansenne, “Increasing Emotional Intelligence: (How) Is It Possible?,” Personality and Individual Differences 47, no. 1 (2009): 36–­41, https://doi.org/10.1016 /j.paid.2009.01.046. 29.  Eric L. Ross, Sandeep Vijan, Erin M. Miller, Marcia Valenstein, and Kara Zivin, “The Cost-­effectiveness of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy versus Second-­ Generation Antidepressants for Initial Treatment of Major Depressive Disorder in the United States: A Decision Analytic Model,” Annals of Internal Medicine 171, no. 11 (2019): 785–­795, https://doi.org/10.7326/M18-1480. 30.  Hooria Jazaieri, Philippe R. Goldin, and James J. Gross, “Treating Social Anxiety Disorder with CBT: Impact on Emotion Regulation and Satisfaction with Life,” Cognitive Therapy and Research 41, no. 3 (2017): 406–­416, https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10608-016-9762-4. 31.  James Griffith and Courtney West, “Master Resilience Training and Its Relationship to Individual Well-­being and Stress Buffering among Army National Guard Soldiers,’ Journal of Behavioral Health Services and Research 40, no. 2 (2013): 140–­155, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11414-013-9320-8. 32.  Chad M. Burton and Laura A. King, “The Health Benefits of Writing about Intensely Positive Experiences,” Journal of Research in Personality 38, no. 2 (2004): 150–­163, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00058-8. 33. Arianna Huffington, The Sleep Revolution: Transforming Your Life, One Night at a Time (New York: Harmony, 2016). 34.  J-­Eun Shin and Jung Ki Kim, “How a Good Sleep Predicts Life Satisfaction: The Role of Zero-­sum Beliefs about Happiness,” Frontiers in Psychology 9 (2018): 1589, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01589. 35.  Xiaorong Yang, Hui Chen, Suyun Li, Lulu Pan, and Chongqi Jia, “Association of Sleep Duration with the Morbidity and Mortality of Coronary Artery

268  Notes

Disease: A Meta-­analysis of Prospective Studies,” Heart Lung and Circulation 24 (2015): 1180–­1190, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.hlc.2015.08.005. 36.  N. Jovanović, Anja Podlesek, Umberto Volpe, Elizabeth E. Barrett, Silvia Ferrari, Martina Rojnic Kuzman, P. Wuyts, et al., “Burnout Syndrome among Psychiatric Trainees in 22 Countries: Risk Increased by Long Working Hours, Lack of Supervision, and Psychiatry Not Being First Career Choice,” European Psychiatry 32 (2016): 34–­41, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2015.10.007. 37.  Brittany T. MacEwen, Dani MacDonald, and Jamie F. Burr, “A Systematic Review of Standing and Treadmill Desks in the Workplace,” Preventive Medicine 70 (2015): 50–­58, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ypmed.2014.11.011. 38. US Department of Health and Human Services, The Physical Activity Guidelines for Americans (Washington, DC: US Department of Health and Human Services, 2018); Donald C. McKenzie, “Markers of Excessive Exercise,” Canadian Journal of Applied Physiology 24, no. 1 (1999): 66–­73, https://doi.org /10.1139/h99-007. 39.  Francesco Sofi, Francesca Cesari, Rosanna Abbate, Gian Franco Gensini, and Alessandro Casini, “Adherence to Mediterranean Diet and Health Status: Meta-­analysis,” BMJ 337, no. 7671 (2008): 673–­665, https://doi.org/10.1136 /bmj.a1344; Rosario Ferrer-­Cascales, Natalia Albaladejo-­Blázquez, Nicolás Ruiz-­Robledillo, Violeta Clement-­Carbonell, Miriam Sánchez-­San Segundo, and Ana Zaragoza-­Martí, “Higher Adherence to the Mediterranean Diet Is Related to More Subjective Happiness in Adolescents: The Role of Health-­Related Quality of Life,” Nutrients 11, no. 3 (2019): 698, https://doi.org/10.3390 /nu11030698. 40.  Bonnie A. White, Caroline Horwath, and Tamlin S. Conner, “Many Apples a Day Keep the Blues Away—­Daily Experiences of Negative and Positive Affect and Food Consumption in Young Adults,” British Journal of Health Psychology 18, no. 4 (2013): 782–­798, https://doi.org/10.1111/bjhp.12021. 41.  Bryant P. H. Hui, Jacky C. K. Ng, Erica Berzaghi, Lauren A. Cunningham-­ Amos, and Aleksandr Kogan, “Rewards of Kindness? A Meta-­analysis of the Link between Prosociality and Well-­being,” Psychological Bulletin 146, no. 12 (2020): 1084–­1016, https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000298. 42.  “Bring Your Strengths to Life and Live More Fully,” VIA Institute on Character, www.viacharacter.org. 43. Katherine Dahlsgaard, Christopher Peterson, and Martin E. Seligman, “Shared Virtue: The Convergence of Valued Human Strengths across Culture and History,” Review of General Psychology 9, no. 3 (2005): 203–­213, https:// doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.9.3.203.

Notes    269

44.  Denise Quinlan, Nicola Swain, and Dianne A. Vella-­Brodrick, “Character Strengths Interventions: Building on What We Know for Improved Outcomes,” Journal of Happiness Studies 13, no. 6 (2012): 1145–­1163, https://doi.org /10.1007/s10902-011-9311-5. 45.  Kaisa Vuorinen, Anne Erikivi, and Lotta Uusitalo-­Malmivaara, “A Character Strength Intervention in 11 Inclusive Finnish Classrooms to Promote Social Participation of Students with Special Educational Needs,” Journal of Research in Special Educational Needs 19, no. 1 (2019): 45–­57, https://doi.org /10.1111/1471-3802.12423. 46.  Marine Miglianico, Philippe Dubreuil, Paule Miquelon, Arnold B. Bakker, and Charles Martin-­Krumm, “Strength Use in the Workplace: A Literature Review,” Journal of Happiness Studies 21, no. 2 (2020): 737–­764, https://doi .org/10.1007/s10902-019-00095-w. 47.  Tim Lomas, “Positive Art: Artistic Expression and Appreciation as an Exemplary Vehicle for Flourishing,” Review of General Psychology 20, no. 2 (2016): 171–­182, https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000073. 48.  Maren Rathgeber, Paul-­Christian Bürkner, Eva-­Maria Schiller, and Heinz Holling, “The Efficacy of Emotionally Focused Couples Therapy and Behavioral Couples Therapy: A Meta-­analysis,” Journal of Marital and Family Therapy 45, no. 3 (2019): 447–­463, https://doi.org/10.1111/jmft.12336. 49.  Lea Waters, The Strength Switch: How the New Science of Strength-­Based Parenting Can Help Your Child and Your Teen to Flourish (New York: Penguin, 2017). 50.  Martin E. Seligman, Randal M. Ernst, Jane Gillham, Karen Reivich, and Mark Linkins, “Positive Education: Positive Psychology and Classroom Interventions,” Oxford Review of Education 35, no. 3 (2009): 293–­311, https://doi .org/10.1080/03054980902934563. 51.  Darren L. Dunning, Kirsty Griffiths, Willem Kuyken, Catherine Crane, Lucy Foulkes, Jenna Parker, and Tim Dalgleish, “The Effects of Mindfulness-­ Based Interventions on Cognition and Mental Health in Children and Adolescents—­A Meta-­analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials,” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 60, no. 3 (2019): 244–­258, https://doi.org/10.1111 /jcpp.12980; Pam Gershon and John Pellitteri, “Promoting Emotional Intelligence in Preschool Education: A Review of Programs,” International Journal of Emotional Education 10, no. 2 (2018): 26–­41. 52.  Erin Hoare, David Bott, and Justin Robinson, “Learn It, Live It, Teach It, Embed It: Implementing a Whole School Approach to Foster Positive Mental Health and Wellbeing through Positive Education,” International Journal of Wellbeing 7, no. 3 (2017): 56–­71, https://doi.org/10.5502/ijw.v7i3.645.

270  Notes

53.  Anthony Grant and Michael Cavanagh, “Toward a Profession of Coaching: Sixty-­Five Years of Progress and Challenges for the Future,” International Journal of Evidence-­Based Coaching and Mentoring 2, no. 1 (2004): 1–­16. 54.  Kim Cameron and Jane Dutton, eds., Positive Organizational Scholarship: Foundations of a New Discipline (San Francisco: Berrett-­Koehler Publishers, 2003); Fred Luthans, “Positive Organizational Behavior: Developing and Managing Psychological Strengths,” Academy of Management Perspectives 16, no. 1 (2002): 57–­72, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4165814. 55.  “Resources for Employers,” American Psychological Association, Center for Organizational Excellence, www.apaexcellence.org/resources/creatinga healthyworkplace. 56.  Bruce Peltier, The Psychology of Executive Coaching: Theory and Application (London: Taylor and Francis, 2011). 57. Susan M. Sheridan, Emily D. Warnes, Richard J. Cowan, Ariadne V. Schemm, and Brandy L. Clarke, “Family-­Centered Positive Psychology: Focusing on Strengths to Build Student Success,” Psychology in the Schools 41, no. 1 (2004): 7–­17, 11, https://doi.org/10.1002/pits.10134. 58. Isaac Prilleltensky, Geoffrey Nelson, and Leslea Peirson, “The Role of Power and Control in Children’s Lives: An Ecological Analysis of Pathways toward Wellness, Resilience and Problems,” Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 11, no. 2 (2001): 143–­158, 157, https://doi.org/10.1002 /casp.616. 59.  Lynn McDonald, Stephe Billingham, Tammy Conrad, Arthur Morgan, O. Nancy, and Estella Payton, “Families and Schools Together (FAST): Integrating Community Development with Clinical Strategies,” Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Social Services 78, no. 2 (1997): 140–­155, https://doi .org/10.1606/1044-3894.754. 60.  Geoff Lindsay and Steve Strand, “Evaluation of the National Roll-­Out of Parenting Programmes across England: The Parenting Early Intervention Programme (PEIP),” BMC Public Health 13 (2013): 972, doi: 0.1186/1471 -­2458-­13-­972. 61. Lynn McDonald, D. Paul Moberg, Roger Brown, Ismael Rodriguez-­ Espiricueta, Nydia I. Flores, Melissa P. Burke, and Gail Coover, “After-­school Multifamily Groups: A Randomized Controlled Trial Involving Low-­Income, Urban, Latino Children,” Children and Schools 28, no. 1 (2006): 25–­34, https:// doi.org/10.1093/cs/28.1.25. 62.  Geoff Lindsay, Stephen Cullen, and Chris Wellings, Bringing Families and Schools Together: Giving Children in High-­Poverty Areas the Best Start at School (London: Save the Children, 2011).

Notes    271

63.  Francesca M. Dimou, David Eckelbarger, and Taylor S. Riall, “Surgeon Burnout: A Systematic Review,” Journal of the American College of Surgeons 222 (2016): 1230–­1239, 10.1016/j.jamcollsurg.2016.03.022. 64.  Robert L. Kahn, Donald M. Wolfe, Robert P. Quinn, J. Diedrick Snoek, and Robert A. Rosenthal, Organizational Stress (New York: Wiley, 1964), 19. 65. Tammy D. Allen, Kimberly A. French, Soner Dumani, and Kristen M. Shockley, “A Cross-­national Meta-­analytic Examination of Predictors and Outcomes Associated with Work-­Family Conflict,” Journal of Applied Psychology 105, no. 6 (2020): 539–­576, https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000442. 66.  Jim Harter, “How Coronavirus Will Change the ‘Next Normal’ Workplace,” Gallup, May 1, 2020, https://www.gallup.com/workplace/309620/coronavirus -change-next-normal-workplace.aspx. 67.  Joey Haden, Laura Casado, Tyler Sonnemaker, and Taylor Borden, “21 Major Companies That Have Announced Employees Can Work Remotely Long-­term,” Insider, December 14, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com /companies-asking-employees-to-work-from-home-due-to-coronavirus-2020. 68.  Peggy A. Thoits, “Role-­Identity Salience, Purpose and Meaning in Life, and Well-­being among Volunteers,” Social Psychology Quarterly 75, no. 4 (2012): 360–­384, https://doi.org/10.1177/0190272512459662. 69.  Martin E. Seligman, Tayyab Rashid, and Acacia C Parks, “Positive psychotherapy,” American Psychologist 61, no. 8 (2006): 774–­788, 777, https://doi.org /10.1037/0003-066X.61.8.774. 70.  Carrie Draper and Darcy Freedman, “Review and Analysis of the Benefits, Purposes, and Motivations Associated with Community Gardening in the United States,” Journal of Community Practice 18, no. 4 (2010): 458–­492, https://doi.org/10.1080/10705422.2010.519682; Michael R. Mosher, 2004. “The community mural and democratic art processes.” Review of Radical Political Economics 36(4): 528–­537, https://doi.org/10.1177/0486613404269782. 71.  Aisling Bailey and Jonathan Kingsley, “Connections in the Garden: Opportunities for Wellbeing,” Local Environment 25, no. 11–­12 (2020): 1–­14, https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2020.1845637. 72. Sarah L. Bell, Cassandra Phoenix, Rebecca Lovell, and Benedict W. Wheeler, “Green Space, Health and Wellbeing: Making Space for Individual Agency,” Health and Place 30 (2014): 287–­ 292, https://doi.org/10.1016 /j.healthplace.2014.10.005. 73.  “What Is Well London?,” Well London, www.welllondon.org.uk. 74.  Gemma Phillips, Christian Bottomley, Elena Schmidt, Patrick Tobi, Shahana Lais, Ge Yu, Rebecca Lynch, et al., “Well London: Results of a Cluster Randomised Trial of a Community Development Approach to Improving

272  Notes

Health Behaviours and Mental Wellbeing in Deprived Inner-­city Neighbourhoods,” Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 68, no. 7 (2012): 606–­ 614, https://doi.org/10.1136/jech-2013-202505. 75. Janya McCalman, Alexandra McEwan, Komla Tsey, Eunice Blackmore, and Roxanne Bainbridge, “Towards Social Sustainability: The Case of the Family Wellbeing Community Empowerment Education Program,” Journal of Economic and Social Policy 13, no. 2 (2010): 146–­172. 76.  Susan Loh, Marcus Foth, Glenda Amayo Caldwell, Veronica Garcia-­Hansen, and Mark Thomson, “A More-­Than-­Human Perspective on Understanding the Performance of the Built Environment,” Architectural Science Review 63, no. 3–­4 (2020): 372–­383, https://doi.org/10.1080/00038628.2019.1708258. 77. Ben Hamilton-­ Baillie, “Shared Space: Reconciling People, Places and Traffic,” Built Environment 34, no. 2 (2008): 161–­181, http://www.jstor.org /stable/23289804. 78.  “Inclusive Transport Strategy,” Department for Transport, GOV.UK, July 25, 2018, www.gov.uk/government/publications/shared-space. 79.  Urie Bronfenbrenner, “Toward an Experimental Ecology of Human Development,” American Psychologist 32, no. 7 (1977): 513–­531, 515, https:// doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.32.7.513. 80.  Alejandro Adler Braun, “Gross National Happiness in Bhutan: A Living Example of an Alternative Approach to Progress,” Social Impact Research Experience Journal (Sire) 1 (2009): 1–­142, http://repository.upenn.edu/sire. 81.  Benjamin Mason Meier and Averi Chakrabarti, “The Paradox of Happiness: Health and Human Rights in the Kingdom of Bhutan,” Health and Human Rights 18, no. 1 (2016): 193–­208. PMID: 27781010. 82.  Glenn Everett, “Measuring National Well-­being: A UK Perspective,” Review of Income and Wealth 61, no. 1 (2015): 34–­42. 83.  Deborah Mabbett, “The Second Time as Tragedy? Welfare Reform under Thatcher and the Coalition,” Political Quarterly 84, no. 1 (2013): 43–­52, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2013.12003.x. 84.  Sigal Samuel, “Forget GDP—­New Zealand Is Prioritizing Gross National Well-­being,” Vox, June 8, 2019, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/6 /8/18656710/new-zealand-wellbeing-budget-bhutan-happiness. 85.  Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, “Libertarian Paternalism,” American Economic Review 93, no. 2 (2003): 175–­179, https://doi.org/10.1257 /000282803321947001; Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).

Notes    273

86.  Anneliese Arno and Steve Thomas, “The Efficacy of Nudge Theory Strategies in Influencing Adult Dietary Behaviour: A Systematic Review and Meta-­ analysis,” BMC Public Health 16, no. 1 (2016): 676, https://doi.org/10.1186 /s12889-016-3272-x. 87.  Damien Grimshaw and Jill Rubery, “Reinforcing Neoliberalism: Crisis and Austerity in the UK,” in A Triumph of Failed Ideas: European Models of Capitalism in the Crisis, ed. Steffen Lehndorff (Brussels: European Trade Union Initiative, 2012), 41–­58. 88.  Umair Haque, Betterness: Economics for Humans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2011). 89.  Ernst F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful: Economics as If People Mattered (London: HarperCollins, 1973). 90.  New Economics Foundation, https://neweconomics.org. 91.  Siddhant Issar, “Listening to Black Lives Matter: Racial Capitalism and the Critique of Neoliberalism,” Contemporary Political Theory 20 (2020): 48–­71, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-020-00399-0. 92.  Malte Klar and Tim Kasser, “Some Benefits of Being an Activist: Measuring Activism and Its Role in Psychological Well-­being,” Political Psychology 30, no. 5 (2009): 755–­777, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00724.x. 93.  Parissa Ballard, Xinyu Ni, and Nicole Brocato, “Political Engagement and Wellbeing among College Students,” Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology 71 (2020): 101–­209, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appdev.2020.101209. 94.  Vanessa Sage, “Encountering the Wilderness, Encountering the Mist: Nature, romanticism, and Contemporary Paganism,” Anthropology of Consciousness 20, no. 1 (2009): 27–­52, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1556-3537.2009.01009.x; George Monbiot, Out of the Wreckage: A New Politics for an Age of Crisis (London: Verso Books, 2017). 95. Jeff Tollefson, “Why Deforestation and Extinctions Make Pandemics More Likely,” Nature 584, no. 7820 (2020): 175–­176, https://doi.org/10.1038 /d41586-020-02341-1. 96.  Harold F. Searles, “Unconscious Processes in Relation to the Environmental Crisis,” Psychoanalytic Review 59, no. 3 (1972): 361–­374. 97.  Glenn Albrecht, “Psychoterratic Conditions in a Scientific and Technological World,” in Ecopsychology: Science, Totems, and the Technological Species, ed. Peter H. Kahn, and Patricia H. Hasbach (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 250. 98. Pihkala Panu, “Anxiety and the Ecological Crisis: An Analysis of Eco-­ Anxiety and Climate Anxiety,” Sustainability 12, no. 19 (2020): 7836, https:// doi.org/10.3390/su12197836.

274  Notes

99.  Martijn Lampert, Sander Metaal, Sheng Liu, and Laura Gambarin, Global Rise in Environmental Concern (Amsterdam: Glocalities, 2019). 100.  Monica Dinu, Giuditta Pagliai, Claudio Macchi, and Francesco Sofi, “Active Commuting and Multiple Health Outcomes: A Systematic Review and Meta-­analysis,” Sports Medicine 49, no. 3 (2019): 437–­452, https://doi.org /10.1007/s40279-018-1023-0. 101.  Wil Gesler, “Therapeutic Landscapes,” in The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology, ed. Hilary Callan (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-­Blackwell, 2018), https:// doi.org/10.1002/9781118924396.wbiea1422. 102.  Colin A. Capaldi, Raelyne L. Dopko, and John M. Zelenski, “The Relationship between Nature Connectedness and Happiness: A Meta-­analysis,” Frontiers in Psychology 5 (2014): 976, 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00976; Alison Pritchard, Miles Richardson, David Sheffield, and Kirsten McEwan, “The Relationship between Nature Connectedness and Eudaimonic Well-­being: A Meta-­analysis,” Journal of Happiness Studies 21, no. 3 (2020): 1145–­1167, https://link.springer .com/article/10.1007/s10902-019-00118-6. 103.  Iris A. Lesser, and Carl P. Nienhuis, “The Impact of COVID-­19 on Physical Activity Behavior and Well-­being of Canadians,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 11 (2020), 3899, 10.3390/ ijerph17113899. 104.  Kelly A. Hackett, Michael C. Ziegler, Jared A. Olson, Jessica Bizub, Melinda Stolley, Aniko Szabo, Elizabeth Heller, and Kirsten M. M. Beyer, “Nature Mentors: A Program to Encourage Outdoor Activity and Nature Engagement among Urban Youth and Families,” Journal of Adventure Education and Outdoor Learning 21, no. 1 (2020): 35–­52, https://doi.org/10.1080/14729679.2020 .1730203; Andrew Stables and Keith Bishop, “Weak and Strong Conceptions of Environmental Literacy: Implications for Environmental Education,” Environmental Education Research 7, no. 1 (2001): 89–­97, https://doi.org/10.1080 /13504620125643; Bum Jin Park, Yuko Tsunetsugu, Tamami Kasetani, Takahide Kagawa, and Yoshifumi Miyazaki, “The Physiological Effects of Shinrin-­yoku (Taking in the Forest Atmosphere or Forest Bathing): Evidence from Field Experiments in 24 Forests across Japan,” Environmental Health and Preventive Medicine 15, no. 1 (2010): 18–­26, https://doi.org/10.1007 /s12199-009-0086-9. Chapter 7

1.  Xiumei Zhu, Sang Eun Woo, Caitlin Porter, and Michael Brzezinski, “Pathways to Happiness: From Personality to Social Networks and Perceived Support,” Social Networks 35, no. 3 (2013): 382–­393, https://doi.org/10.1016 /j.socnet.2013.04.005.

Notes    275

2.  Tyler J. VanderWeele, “Can Sophisticated Study Designs with Regression Analyses of Observational Data Provide Causal Inferences?,” JAMA Psychia­ try 78, no. 3 (2021): 244–­246, https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2020 .2588. 3. Stephanie Rossouw and Talita Greyling, Big Data and Happiness, GLO Discussion Paper, Series 634, Global Labor Organization, September 2, 2020, https://glabor.org/big-­data-­and-­happiness-­a-­new-­discussion-­paper-­by -­glo-­fellows-stephanie-­rossouw-­and-­talita-­greyling/; Robb B. Rutledge, Adam Chekroud, and Quentin Huys, “Machine Learning and Big Data in Psychiatry: Toward Clinical Applications,” Current Opinion in Neurobiology 55 (2019): 152–­159, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2019.02.006; Ahmet Onur Durahim and Mustafa Coşkun, “#iamhappybecause: Gross National Happiness through Twitter Analysis and Big Data,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 99 (2015): 92–­ 105, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article /pii/S0040162515002024.

276  Notes

FURTHER READING Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly. Flow: The Psychology of Happiness. New York: Random House, 2013. Dalai Lama and Howard C. Cutler. The Art of Happiness: A Handbook for Living. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1999. Frankl, Viktor E. Man’s Search for Meaning. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. Haidt, Jonathan. The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom. New York: Basic Books, 2006. Helliwell, John F., Richard Layard, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Jan-­Emmanuel De Neve. World Happiness Report 2020. New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2020. Henrich, Joseph. The WEIRDest People in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020. Hesse, Hermann. Siddhartha. London: Bantam, 1982. Kaufman, Scott B. Transcend: The New Science of Self-­Actualization. New York: Penguin, 2021. Layard, Richard. Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. London: Penguin, 2011. Lee, Matthew T., Laura D. Kubzansky, and Tyler J. VanderWeele, eds. Measuring Well-­being: Interdisciplinary Perspectives from the Social Sciences and the Humanities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Lomas, Tim. Translating Happiness: A Cross-­cultural Lexicon of Well-­being. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2019. McMahon, Darrin. Happiness: A History. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006. Pirsig, Robert. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values. London: Random House, 1974.

Seligman, Martin. Flourish: A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-­being. New York: Free Press, 2011. Watts, Alan. The Meaning of Happiness: The Quest for Freedom of the Spirit in Modern Psychology and the Wisdom of the East. New York: New World Library, 2018. Wilber, Ken. 2001. Sex, Ecology, Spirituality: The Spirit of Evolution. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2001. Wilkinson, Richard G., and Kate Pickett. The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better. London: Allen Lane, 2010.

278  Further Reading

INDEX Note: Page numbers in italics indicate illustrations. Aboriginal peoples, 24, 26 Absorbed happiness, 81–­83, 115, 116, 178 Accomplished happiness, 60, 85–­87, 111, 216 Achievement, 86–­87 Achsenzeit (axial age), 34 Advaita school, 31 Aesthetic happiness, 60 Affective paradigm, 103 Afterlife and immortality, 28, 39, 40, 41, 167 Age, 150–­151 Aljerre-­nge, 24, 26 American Psychological Association, 50 Healthy Workplace Program, 198, 201 Ānanda (bliss), 30–­31, 112 Anandamide, 112 Angular gyrus, 117 Anomie, 6, 9, 216 Anterior cingulate cortex, 115 Anxiety, 13, 110, 113, 157, 180, 187. See also Ecoanxiety; Social anxiety Aquinas, Thomas, 42, 80 Aristotle Christian adaptation of, 42, 80 golden mean, 88, 89 and intellective happiness, 80–­81 Nicomachean Ethics, 80

philosophy of happiness, 36–­37, 56, 77, 84 Art, 195–­196 Artificial intelligence, 234, 237 Aseret ha-­Dibrot (Ten Commandments), 32–­33 Ataraxia (imperturbability), 37, 43 Ātman (spirit, soul), 31 Attention, 81–­83, 115, 177–­180 Attitude, 180–­181 Australia, 24, 204 Awareness, 83, 177–­180, 183 Ayahuasca, 114 Babylon, 27 Bacon, Francis, 43–­44 New Atlantis, 44 Balance, 59, 62, 64, 68, 87–­89, 190–­192 Barrett, Lisa Feldman, 120 Baselines, 105–­106 Beck, Aaron, 121 Behavior, cultivation of happiness through, 193–­196 Behaviors of mind, 178–­179 Bellah, Robert, 173 Bentham, Jeremy, 44 Bhutan, 205 Black Lives Matter, 147, 208 Blessedness, 38 Bliss, 30. See also Ānanda

Body. See also Physical health and well-­being maintenance activities, 190–­192 mind in relation to, 100–­101, 144–­145, 190 thought and language in relation to, 123–­125 vital happiness and, 73–­74 Western devaluation of, 75 Bonding, 111 Brahman (ultimate reality), 31 Brain consciousness in relation to, 122 hemispheric asymmetry, 117 measurement of activity in, 114–­ 115 mind in relation to, 100–­101 neuroanatomy, 114–­116 neurochemicals, 112, 113 Bronfenbrenner, Urie, 156, 165, 175, 196, 199, 202, 205, 209, 211 Buddha, 34–­35, 187 Buddhism, 31, 34–­36, 69–­70, 93–­95, 126, 138, 193–­194 Calm, 59, 67–­68 Cantril, Hadley, and Cantril’s ladder, 49, 53, 58, 76–­77, 134 Causality, 51, 133, 135, 153, 176, 231–­233 CBT. See Cognitive behavioral therapy Chaironic happiness, 38, 67, 71–­73, 80, 81, 90, 112, 114, 115, 125, 180 Change, 29 Character development. See also Ethics and morality; Personal development

280  Index

Aristotelian notion of, 36 Enlightenment notion of, 44 eudaimonic happiness based on, 15, 36, 59, 69, 78, 84, 194 Islamic notion of, 40–­41 Charity, 167 China, 28–­30, 235 Christianity, 37–­39, 41–­43, 73 Civil freedom, 164 Civil rights, 165 Classical twin design studies, 106–­ 107 Climate change, 210 Cognition, 186–­189. See also Thinking; Thought Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), 187–­189 Cognitive therapy, 121, 180 Cohabitation, 153 Collectivism community engagement, 203 Eastern cultures, 52, 91, 126 as factor in happiness, 166 health, 146 individualism vs., 52–­53, 91–­92, 99, 101, 166 marriage, 153 objective body (society), 101–­102, 125–­126 relational happiness, 91–­92, 126 significance of happiness in cultures based on, 133, 166 subjective mind (culture), 101–­ 102, 125–­126 Western cultures, 92 Communal well-­being, 59 Community, 154–­156, 202–­204 Community psychology, 200 Conceptual-­act model, 120

Conditionality. See Multivariable conditionality Consciousness, 177–­182, 237 Constructionism, 119–­120 Contemplation. See Intellective happiness Contented happiness, 66–­68, 89, 110, 111, 113, 115, 116, 125, 126, 229 Conviviality, 7, 216 Core affect, 120 Corruption perceptions, 135, 163, 164 Cortisol, 144 COVID-­19 pandemic, 201, 210, 212 Crenshaw, Kimberlé, 138, 147, 148 Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 81–­82 Culture, 101–­102, 125–­128, 165–­ 168 Dalai Lama, 115, 179 Dark Ages, 41 Data mining, 234 Demographics, 146–­151 Depression, 13, 108, 109, 110, 121, 149, 157, 180, 187 Descartes, René, 15 Development. See Character development; Personal development Dharma, 35 Diderot, Denis, The Encyclopédie, 44 Diener, Ed, 65 Diet, 192 Discomfort, 6, 216 Distress, 6, 11, 13, 69–­70, 121, 149, 168, 180, 184, 188, 210, 215. See also Stress Dopamine, 101, 109, 110–­111, 119

Doughnut economics, 135, 137 Dreamtime/The Dreaming, 24, 26 Dukkha (craving, attachment, dissatisfaction), 35, 94 Durkheim, Émile, 73 Easterlin paradox, 158, 160 Eastern cultures collectivism, 52, 91, 126 concept of energies, 127–­128 individualism, 92 research on, 59, 67–­68, 227, 228 types of happiness, 126 Ecoanxiety, 210 Ecological systems theory, 156, 175, 196, 199, 202, 205, 209, 211 Economic freedom, 163 Economics, 134, 156–­159, 207–­208. See also Gross domestic product; Wealth/income Educational attainment, 148, 200. See also School EEG. See Electroencephalography Ekman, Paul, 119 Electroencephalography (EEG), 114, 116, 233 Emotion. See also Positive emotions awareness of, 183 gender and, 149–­150 generation of, 183–­184 management of, 184, 186 psychology of, 119–­120 thought in relation to, 118–­121 understanding of, 184 working with, 182–­184, 186 Emotional intelligence, 182–­184, 197 Employment. See Work Endocannabinoids, 109, 112

Index    281

Endorphins, 109, 111–­112 Engagement, 81 Enlightenment, 43–­45, 52 Entheogens, 113–­114 Enthusiasm, 75, 111 Environment-­gene interaction, 106–­108 Epic of Gilgamesh, The, 27–­28 Epictetus, 37 Epicurus, 42–­43 Epinephrine (adrenaline), 109, 112–­ 113, 144 Equality, 160–­162 Equanimity, 67 Ethics and morality, 84, 193–­194. See also Character development Ethnicity, 147–­149 Eudaimonic happiness Aristotelian notion of, 36–­37, 48, 84 character development as essence of, 59, 69, 78, 84, 194, 216 community engagement, 203, 208 dopamine and, 111 epinephrine and, 113 humanistic psychology and, 48 Islamic notion of, 41 overview of, 83–­85 refinement of concept of, 59, 62, 78, 84 research focus on, 56, 61, 62 Evaluative happiness. See also Life evaluation; Meaningful happiness balance and, 89 cognitive nature of, 65 hedonic happiness distinguished from, 59, 65, 76

282  Index

life satisfaction associated with, 59, 76 meaningful happiness distinguished from, 79 mindfulness, 180 national happiness and, 206 research focus on, 62, 77, 103, 131, 216 significance of, 77 wealth linked to, 156–­157, 159 Exercise, 110, 112, 145, 191–­192, 203 Existential psychotherapy, 189 Extraterrestrial intelligent life, 237 Family, 197, 199–­200 Feelings. See also Emotion; Positive emotions balance of, 88–­89 chaironic happiness, 71–­73 contented happiness, 66–­68 harmony of, 88–­89 hedonic happiness, 64–­66 mature happiness, 68–­71 vitalic happiness, 73–­75 Fight-­or-­flight response, 111, 112–­ 113, 144 Finland, 134, 162 Flourishing/thriving, 5, 6, 225–­226 Flow, 72–­73, 81–­83 Focused attention, 83, 178–­179 Four Noble Truths, 35 Frankl, Viktor, 70 Fredrickson, Barbara, 124–­125 Freedom, 135, 163–­164, 173 Freud, Sigmund, 7, 46–­48, 121, 189

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 114, 233 GABA. See Gamma-­aminobutyric acid Gallup World Poll (GWP), 49, 58, 77, 134–­135, 149, 152, 158, 159, 163, 232, 235 Gamma-­aminobutyric acid (GABA), 109, 113 Gamma synchronization, 117 GDP. See Gross domestic product Gender, 148–­150, 184 Gene-­environment interaction, 106–­108 Generosity, 135, 167 Genetics, 105–­108 Gibran, Khalil, 70 Global Flourishing Project, 232 Global perspective happiness in, 51–­54 research from, 53–­55, 58–­59, 67–­68, 75, 227, 228, 229, 234–­235 Global Wellbeing Initiative, 58–­59, 67, 75, 232, 235 God Christian, 38, 39, 42, 73, 80 Islamic, 39–­40 Judaic, 32, 33 sacredness of, 72 union with, 71 Golden mean, 88, 89 Goldilocks principle, 88 Governance, 162–­165, 205–­209 Grace, 73 Gratitude journals, 122, 183–­184, 189 Greece, 36–­37

Gross domestic product (GDP), 134–­ 136, 140, 146, 157, 158, 205 Gross National Happiness (GNH), 205 GWP. See Gallup World Poll Happy Planet Index, 208 Harmonic happiness, 68, 87–­90, 112, 125, 126, 190, 229, 235 Harmony, 59, 62, 68, 87–­90, 190, 192 Hatha yoga, 181–­182 Health. See also Mental illness; Physical health and well-­being defined, 4, 9 fields devoted to, 7 happiness influenced by, 142, 144–­146 illness in relation to, 5 Hedonic happiness affective nature of, 65 chaironic vs., 71–­72 critiques of, 37 defined, 36, 59–­64, 66 endocannabinoids and, 112 evaluative happiness distinguished from, 59, 65, 76 expansive concept of, 62 measurement of, 58 mindfulness, 180 overview of, 64–­66 phenomenology of, 125 research focus on, 56, 58, 61, 62, 103, 115, 131, 206, 216 serotonin and, 110 Hedonic treadmill, 105–­106, 160 Hierarchy of needs, 48, 85, 136–­137 Hinduism, 30–­31 Humanism, 41–­42

Index    283

Humanistic psychology, 7, 47–­50, 85 Human origins, 22, 24 Human rights, 164 Husserl, Edmund, 123 Hutcheson, Francis, 44, 45 Hypothalamic-­pituitary-­adrenal axis, 144

Jesus, 37–­39, 71–­72 John Templeton Foundation, 232 Judaism, 32–­33 Jung, C. G., 69

I Ching, 28 Illness, 5–­7. See also Mental illness Immortality. See Afterlife and immortality Income. See Wealth/income Income satiation, 159, 160 India, 235 Individualism collectivism vs., 52–­53, 91–­92, 99, 101, 166 Eastern cultures, 92 as factor in happiness, 164, 166 significance of happiness in cultures based on, 133, 166 Western cultures, 52–­53, 58, 90–­ 92, 139, 171 Individuation, 47–­48 Inequality, 161–­162 Integral Framework, 99–­103, 102, 125, 129, 144, 173 Intellective happiness, 80–­81 Interpersonal relations. See Relational happiness Intersectionality, 138, 147, 148 Islam, 39–­41

Lagom (balance), 88 Language bodily experience in relation to, 123–­125 cultural basis of, 126–­127, 165 data mining, 234 experience shaped by, 127–­128 terminology related to happiness, 21, 58, 133 Lao-­Tzu, 29 Layered Integrated Framework Example (LIFE) model, 173, 174, 175, 190, 209, 218–­220, 219, 220 Libertarian paternalism, 206–­207 Life evaluation, 49, 58, 59, 76, 134, 159. See also Evaluative happiness; Meaningful happiness Life expectancy, 135, 146 LIFE model. See Layered Integrated Framework Example (LIFE) model Life satisfaction, 108, 150, 158, 191, 208 Limbic system, 115 Linguistic relativity hypothesis, 127 Logotherapy, 70 Longitudinal studies, 51, 133, 175–­ 176, 231–­233

Jainism, 31 James, William, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 46 Japan, 212

284  Index

Kabat-­Zinn, Jon, 179 Karma, 193 Kuhn, Thomas, 51

Love, 16, 72, 92, 111 Loving-­kindness meditation, 181, 183 Machine language, 234 Marriage, 153 Maslow, Abraham, 48–­49, 72, 85, 136 Master Resilience Training, 188 Mastery, 84, 86 Mature happiness, 68–­71, 79, 89 Meaningful happiness, 27–­28, 60, 77–­79, 89, 90, 111, 180, 203, 206, 208, 216. See also Evaluative happiness; Life evaluation Medial prefrontal cortex, 117 Meditation absorbed happiness, 82–­83 attitude in, 180–­181 behaviors of mind, 178–­179 Buddhism, 34, 35, 93 enhancing of consciousness, 178–­182 focused attention vs. open awareness, 82–­83 form in, 181–­182 gender and, 149 object of, 179–­180 practice of, 73, 106, 113, 178–­182 research on, 93, 115–­117, 149, 180, 194 yoga, 32 Mental illness, 108, 121, 157 Mental well-­being. See also Health; Mental illness differentiated model, 12–­13, 13 dimensions of well-­being, 3–­4, 99–­100

dual continua model, 11–­12, 12 fields devoted to, 6–­7, 45–­47 happiness in relation to, 7–­9, 16 negative perspectives, 5–­7, 14, 45–­47 physical in relation to, 15 positive perspectives, 5, 7–­8, 14–­ 16, 46–­50 spectrum model, 3–­15, 46 Mesopotamia, 27–­28 Metaphor, 123–­125 Metta bhavana (loving-­kindness meditation), 181, 183 Mill, John Stuart, 44, 171 Mind, body in relation to, 100–­ 101, 143–­144, 190. See also Cognition; Thinking; Thought Mind-­body dualism, 15, 99–­100 Mindfulness Buddhist foundation of, 35, 93 Eastern cultures, 59 emotional awareness, 183 ethics, 193 practice of, 83, 172, 179–­180 research on, 179–­180 school applications, 197 workplace applications, 198 Minorities’ Diminished Returns theory, 148 Mitzvot (laws, precepts), 33 Modernity, 43 Modernization theory, 92 Mokṣa (psychospiritual attainment), 31 Mood, 101, 110, 192 Morality. See Ethics and morality Moses, 32 Muḥammad, 39

Index    285

Multivariable conditionality, 138, 142 Music, 82, 88 Mut’a (sensual pleasure), 40 NA. See Negative affect National happiness, 137, 146, 205–­206 Nature, human relationship to, 209–­212 Needs, 136–­138, 154, 157. See also Hierarchy of needs Negative affect (NA), 65, 110, 111, 117, 124, 149 Negative valence, 14, 68–­70, 79 Netherlands, 204 Neural correlates of consciousness, 100 Neural correlates of happiness, 114–­117 Neural correlates of mental states, 233 Neural correlates of well-­being, 103 Neural networks, 114 Neuroanatomy, 114–­116 Neurochemistry, 109–­114 Neuroendocrine system, 144 Neurons, 114–­117 Neurophenomenology, 117, 233 Neurotransmitters, 101, 110, 113, 116 New Economics Foundation, 207–­ 208 New Zealand, 206 Nirvāṇa (psychospiritual attainment), 31, 34, 35, 70, 94–­95 Nirvanic happiness, 94–­95, 114, 115, 126, 229

286  Index

N,N-­dimethyltryptamine, 113–­114 Noble Eightfold Path, 35–­36, 94 Nonhuman well-­being, 237 Nudge theory, 206–­207 Numinous, the, 72 Nutrition, 192 Open awareness, 83, 178–­179 Opioids, 111–­112 Orbitofrontal cortex, 115 Orientalism, 91 Oxytocin, 109, 111 PA. See Positive affect Panel studies, 231–­232 Peace, 59, 67–­68 Peak experiences, 72 Peale, Norman Vincent, 121 PERMA model, 78, 81, 87 Personal development, 54, 69–­ 70, 84. See also Character development Phenomenology, 122–­125. See also Neurophenomenology Physical health and well-­being. See also Body; Health; Illness cultivation of happiness, 189–­193 dimensions of well-­being, 3–­4, 99–­100 fields devoted to, 6–­7 happiness influenced by, 142, 144–­146 mental in relation to, 15 social support and, 154 spectrum model, 3–­15 vital happiness and, 74 Pirsig, Robert, 8 Pleasure denigration of, 42

dopamine as cause of, 110 happiness in relation to, 15, 36 mild/fleeting, 16, 37, 38 sensual, 40 Political freedom, 163–­164 Political rights, 165 Politics. See Governance Positive affect (PA) diet and, 192 emotional category of, 65 genetics, 108 health and longevity linked to, 145 hedonic happiness, 65–­66 high arousal, 66–­68, 71 income and, 159 low arousal, 66–­67 neuroanatomy and, 117 orientational metaphors associated with, 124 oxytocin and, 111 serotonin and, 110 spectrum model, 67 women and, 149 Positive and Negative Affect Scale, 65 Positive education, 197 Positive emotions, 58, 59 Positive organizational behavior/ scholarship, 198 Positive psychology, 3, 7, 50, 139, 172, 173, 199 Positive thinking, 121–­122 Posterior cingulate cortex, 115, 117 Poverty, 128, 134, 137, 157 Prāṇā (energy), 128 Prefrontal cortex, 115 Progress, 43–­44 Psychiatry, 6, 10, 45–­47

Psychoanalysis, 189 Psychological well-­being, 77–­78 Psychology. See also Humanistic psychology; Positive psychology mechanics of happiness, 118–­122 ontological status, 118 research in, 52–­53, 56 Western-­centric character of, 51–­ 55, 212 Psychosomatic effects, 15, 144–­146 Psychotherapy, 6–­7, 10, 45–­46, 69, 121, 187 Purpose in life. See Meaningful happiness Qi (energy), 128 Qualia awareness of, 177 brain in relation to, 100 defined, 3 global perspective, 54 negative vs. positive, 14 physical and mental components of, 74 Quality, 8 Quality of life, 8, 76 Quran, 39–­40 Race, 147–­149 Randomized controlled trials (RCTs), 176–­177, 179, 181, 188, 200, 204 Rank, Otto, 47–­48, 85 RCTs. See Randomized controlled trials Relational happiness, 90–­92, 102, 111, 126, 166, 227, 235 Relationships. See Social support

Index    287

Religion. See Spirituality and religion Religion-­health connection, 167 Renaissance, 41–­43 Research. See also Science author’s, 53–­54, 58, 124, 149, 180, 194, 232, 234 causality, 51, 133, 135, 153, 175–­ 176, 231–­233 caveats about, 131, 133, 176–­177 correlational, 51 critiques of, 229–­235 cross-­cultural/global, 53–­55, 58–­ 59, 67–­68, 75, 133, 227–­229, 234–­235 cross-­sectional, 133, 135, 231 demographics as consideration in, 147–­148 Eastern-­inclusive, 59, 67–­68 fifth wave, 237 first wave, 45–­47 focus of, 58, 61, 62, 77, 131, 216 fourth wave, 50–­56, 60, 234–­235 interdisciplinary, 56 longitudinal, 51, 133, 175–­176, 231–­233 physiological processes, 103 recommendations for, 232–­237 scientific, 49, 55, 230–­231 second wave, 47–­49 third wave, 49–­50, 55–­56, 230–­ 232 types of happiness, 62 Western-­centric, 52–­53, 58, 67, 75, 91, 139, 171, 234–­235 Resources, as influence on happiness, 154–­156 Rights, 164–­165 Rogers, Carl, 48–­49, 85

288  Index

Runner’s high, 109, 112, 145 Ryff, Carol, 77–­78, 86 Sa’adah (ultimate happiness), 40 Sacred, the, 4, 7, 72, 73. See also Spirituality and religion Said, Edward, 92 Saṃsāra (cycle of life, death, and rebirth), 30–­31, 94 Samatha (focused attention), 178 Sapir-­W horf hypothesis, 127 Satisfaction with Life Scale, 76 Scholarship. See Research School, 197–­200. See also Educational attainment Science, 43–­44, 49–­50, 55, 230–­231. See also Research Secularism, 43–­44 Security, 128 Self-­actualization, 48, 85 Self-­Anchoring Striving Style. See Cantril, Hadley, and Cantril’s ladder Self-­development. See Character development; Personal development Self-­help, 172 Self-­reports, 233 Self-­transcendence, 72, 85, 114, 136, 196 Seligman, Martin, 50, 78–­79, 81, 87 Seneca, 37 Serotonin, 101, 108, 109, 110 Set points, 105–­106 Sexuality, 151, 168 Shakespeare, William, Hamlet, 186–­187 Shinrin yoku (forest bathing), 212 Shuddhadvaita school, 31

Siddhārtha Gautama, 34–­35 Sikhism, 31 Single nucleotide polymorphisms, 108 Skills, 85–­86 Sleep, 190–­191 Social and emotional learning, 197 Social anxiety, 188 Social capital, 92, 135, 152–­154, 162, 200 Social movements, 208–­209 Social support, 54, 134–­136, 151–­ 154. See also Bonding; Love Social well-­being dimensions of well-­being, 3–­4, 103 fields devoted to, 6–­7 relational happiness and, 90–­92 religion and spirituality, 167–­168 spectrum model, 3–­15 Society, 102, 125–­128 Somatopsychic effects, 144–­145 South Africa, 24 Spiritual happiness, 71 Spirituality and religion, 6, 7, 71–­72, 113–­114, 167–­168. See also specific religions; Sacred, the Spiritual well-­being chaironic happiness compared to, 72 dimensions of well-­being, 3–­4 fields devoted to, 6–­7 spectrum model, 3–­15 Stoicism, 37, 39 Strengths paradigm, 194–­195, 197 Stress, 108, 111, 113, 144–­145, 149, 154, 157. See also Distress Strife, 6, 197, 216 Subjective well-­being, 65–­66, 216.

See also Hedonic happiness Suffering Buddhist notion of, 35 defined, 5 experience of, 14 happiness in relation to, 11–­12, 69–­71 inherent in human condition, 11–­12, 69 spiritual aspect of, 71 Superior temporal gyrus, 115 Sustainable Development Goals, 137, 205 Sutras of Patanjali, 31 Sympathetic nervous system, 111, 112, 144 Tanakh, 32 Taoism, 28–­30, 70, 126 Tao Te Ching, 29 Telic theories, 136 Ten Commandments, 32–­33 Thalamus, 115 Therapy, 45–­47 Thinking. See also Cognition; Thought absorbed happiness, 81–­83 cultivation of happiness, 186–­189 evaluative happiness, 76–­77 intellective happiness, 80–­81 meaningful happiness, 77–­79 Thought. See also Cognition; Mind; Thinking bodily experience in relation to, 123–­125 emotion in relation to, 118–­121 psychology of, 120–­121 Thriving. See Flourishing/thriving Torah, 32–­33

Index    289

Tranquility, 37, 67 Transcendence, 7, 9, 194, 216. See also Self-­transcendence Understanding, emotional, 184 Unemployment, 157–­158 United Kingdom, 200, 203–­204 Behavioural Insight policy unit, 206, 207 United Nations, 137, 205 United States happiness in, 158, 161 race and happiness, 147 remote work in, 201–­202 research and scholarship, 51–­52, 55, 234, 235 social inequality, 161, 162 Upanishads, 30–­31 Urban planning, 204 Utilitarianism, 44–­45 Values, 126, 128. See also Ethics and morality Values in Action taxonomy, 194 Vedas, 30–­32, 34 Veenhoven, Ruut, 163–­164 Vipassana (open awareness), 178 Vitalic happiness, 73–­75, 90, 112–­ 113 Vitality, 7, 59, 74–­75, 216 Wealth/income, 140, 152, 156–­162, 164 WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic), 53 Well-­being. See also Mental well-­ being; Physical health and

290  Index

well-­being; Social well-­being; Spiritual well-­being concept of, 3 differentiated model, 12–­13, 13 dimensions of, 3–­4, 9, 10, 99–­103, 213–­214, 215, 217 dual continua model, 11–­12, 12, 109 ecological, 5 essential factors, 135 fields devoted to, 6–­7, 10 happiness in relation to, 3–­16 lexicography, 53–­54, 58 mental, 3–­4 nonhuman forms, 237 physical, 3–­4 social, 4 spectrum model, 5–­15 spiritual, 4 virtual, 4 Wellbeing for Planet Earth, 58 Well London Project (UK), 203–­204 Western cultures body devalued in, 75 Christian influence, 41 collectivism, 92 individualism, 52–­53, 58, 90–­92, 139, 171 life evaluation measures, 134 psychology discipline, 51–­55, 212 research bias, 15, 52–­55, 58, 67, 75, 91, 139, 171, 234–­235 science, 51 WHR. See World Happiness Report Wilber, Ken, 99–­103, 118, 125, 129, 144, 173

Wong, Paul, 69–­71 Work, 157–­158, 191, 198 Work-­life balance, 64, 88, 89, 198, 201–­202 World Bank, 164 World Happiness Report (WHR), 49, 77, 134, 135, 137, 140, 146, 152, 161, 163–­164, 167, 232 World Health Organization, 4 World Values Survey, 135 Wu-­wei (nonaction), 29–­30 Yoga, 31–­32, 34, 181–­182

Index    291

TIM LOMAS , PhD, is a Psychology Research Scientist at the Harvard T. H. Chan

School of Public Health and The Human Flourishing Program at Harvard University.