Handbook on Social Innovation and Social Policy 1800887442, 9781800887442

Citation preview

HANDBOOK ON SOCIAL INNOVATION AND SOCIAL POLICY

ELGAR HANDBOOKS IN SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE This exciting series provides a comprehensive overview of cutting edge research on Social Policy and Welfare, forming a definitive guide to the subject. The Handbooks present original contributions by leading authors, selected by an editor internationally recognised as a preeminent authority within the field. Titles in the series are truly international in their scope and coverage, and use a comparative approach to analyse key research themes. Equally useful as reference tools or high-level introductions to specific topics, methods and debates, these Handbooks will be a vital resource for academic researchers and postgraduate students. For a full list of Edward Elgar published titles, including the titles in this series, visit our website at www​.e​-elgar​.com​.

Handbook on Social Innovation and Social Policy Edited by

Stephen Sinclair Professor of Social Policy, Yunus Centre for Social Business and Health, Glasgow Caledonian University, Scotland, UK

Simone Baglioni Professor of Sociology, Department of Economics and Management, University of Parma, Italy

ELGAR HANDBOOKS IN SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Stephen Sinclair and Simone Baglioni 2024

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2023952163 This book is available electronically in the Sociology, Social Policy and Education subject collection http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781800887459

ISBN 978 1 80088 744 2 (cased) ISBN 978 1 80088 745 9 (eBook)

EEP BoX

Dedicated by Stephen Sinclair with love and gratitude to my wife Susan and to Cora and Ray.   Dedicated by Simone Baglioni to the women and men who endlessly strive to keep societies up to the challenges, with passion, dedication and competence.

Contents

List of figuresix List of tablesx List of contributorsxi 1

Introduction: social innovation and social policy: a critical relationship Stephen Sinclair and Simone Baglioni

2

Social innovation and public policy Geoff Mulgan

15

3

Social innovation and social policy analysis Stephen Sinclair

24

4

Richard M. Titmuss revisited: social innovation and the crises ecosystem Lars Hulgård

38

5

The impact of social innovation on local welfare policy: lessons from a capability perspective Lara Maestripieri and Raquel Gallego-Calderón

6

Deliberate social innovations: on policy impact and policy transfer Tuur Ghys

7

Methodological resilience: researching social inclusion and social innovation in Latin America Urs Jäger, Wendelin Küpers and José Pablo Valverde

8

Paying for and providing social policies and social innovations Danielle Logue

9

Social policy, social innovation and gender equality Anna Domaradzka-Widła

104

10

Social innovation and sustainable development Jürgen Howaldt, Rick Hölsgens and Christoph Kaletka

120

11

Social innovation and social policy in Sub-Saharan Africa Gift Dafuleya

132

12

Social innovation in the Middle East and North Africa Region: implications for social policy thinking and practice Rana Jawad

vii

1

49 62

73 91

144

viii  Handbook on social innovation and social policy 13

Exploring interrelationships between social innovation, social policy, and people-centred social change in India Swati Banerjee, Abdul Shaban and Dipannita Bhattacharjee

159

14

Social policy, social innovation and health: tackling health inequalities in the United Kingdom Neil McHugh and Anna Macintyre

173

15

Innovating health services: the role of embedded social innovation movements 187 Benjamin Ewert

16

Social policy, social innovation and older people Giovanni Fosti, Elisabetta Notarnicola and Eleonora Perobelli

199

17

Social innovation and migration Simone Baglioni

211

18

Top-down funded employment integration programmes: promoting bottom-up social innovation to empower the disadvantaged Richard Hazenberg and Claire Paterson-Young

219

19

Social innovation and collaborative governance: the case of surplus food redistribution Benedetta De Pieri and Francesca Caló

235

20

Between green economy and reformism: an exploration of circular economy and social economy policy convergence in Quebec Rafael Ziegler, Eléonore Compère, Emmanuel Raufflet and Martine Vézina

245

21

Alternative platforms? On the dilemmas of policy and innovation in digital infrastructure Richard Pfeilstetter

264

22

Design thinking for social innovation Victoria Ciudad-Real and Gary Painter

275

23

Social innovation and citizen participation: the crucial coupling Peter Beresford

287

24

Conclusion: the future of social innovation and social policy Stephen Sinclair and Simone Baglioni

297

Index302

Figures

12.1

Categories of Social Entrepreneurship (SE)

148

14.1

Dahlgren and Whitehead’s rainbow model of the main determinants of health

175

19.1

Food Surplus Model (adapted from Baglioni et al., 2017)

238

20.1

Timeline of the policies in circular economy

249

20.2

Circular economy policies repertory

250

20.3

Timeline of the points of convergence of the policies in circular economy and social economy

254

20.4

Points of convergence in social economy and circular economy policies repertory255

22.1

Social innovation process

276

22.2

Fair Chance project co-production process

282

ix

Tables

7.1

Inquiry strategies in the context of methodological resilience

78

7.2

Guidelines for methodological resilience

83

22.1

Fair Chance project roles

281

22.2

Fair Chance project Design Thinking ideas

283

x

Contributors

Simone Baglioni holds a chair in Sociology in the Department of Economics and Management at the University of Parma, Italy. His research interests focus on migrant labour and migrant entrepreneurship, the gig economy and youth employment, civil society and social innovation. Swati Banerjee (PhD) is Professor of Social Work and Social Innovation at the School of Social Work, Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Mumbai. She also coordinates Right Livelihood College, Mumbai, which is part of a global network of universities initiated by The Right Livelihood Foundation. Her research interests include people-centred social innovation and development, community-based social entrepreneurship and empowerment of marginalized communities, participatory methodologies and design thinking for social change with a focus on epistemic justice and intersectionality. Peter Beresford OBE is Visiting Professor at the University of East Anglia and Emeritus Professor at Brunel University London and the University of Essex. He is a long-term user of mental health services and Co-Chair of the national disabled people’s organization Shaping Our Lives (https://​shapingourlives​.org​.uk). He has a longstanding background as writer, researcher, activist and educator in the context of public participation. Dipannita Bhattacharjee holds MPhil and PhD degrees in Social Work from TISS, Mumbai. Her research interests are in the areas of social innovation, intersectionality, gender, livelihoods and marginalization, and she has developed e-learning modules on gender and development for the University Grants Commission, India. She currently works as Assistant Manager at Cactus Communications, Mumbai, India, where she develops publication strategies and manages the publication process of manuscripts for international researchers and academicians. Francesca Caló is Senior Lecturer in Management at the Open University, Department of Public Leadership and Social Enterprise. She is Co-Director of the Centre for Social and Sustainable Enterprise. Her research interests focus on social innovation, co-creation, third-sector organizations and migrants work inclusion. Victoria Ciudad-Real is a Sociology doctoral student at the University of California, Irvine. Her research interests include immigrant integration, bureaucracies and social policy. She was previously a project manager for the USC Price Center for Social Innovation, where she managed research projects covering workforce development, housing insecurity and economic inclusion. Victoria completed her undergraduate education in Public Policy and Global Studies from UC Riverside and holds a Masters of Public Policy from the USC Price School of Public Policy. Eléonore Compère holds a Master’s degree in Management and Sustainable Development from HEC Montréal. She is a project manager at the International Institute for cooperatives Alphonse and Dorimène Desjardins at HEC Montréal, where she supports students’ projects on cooperatives and mutuals and helps advance research and knowledge transfer. She is also xi

xii  Handbook on social innovation and social policy the knowledge coordinator of the international partnership in social economy and circular economy. Gift Dafuleya is Professor at the University of Venda, where he holds a chair in the Department of Economics. His research interests focus on state and non-state social protection, migration, informal economy workers and social innovation. Benedetta De Pieri completed her PhD at the Yunus Centre for Social Business and Health at the Glasgow Caledonian University. Her research focuses on social innovation, social entrepreneurship and the role of cross-sectoral partnerships in supporting the generation of social impact. She has worked as a researcher at Bocconi University and in Politecnico di Milano, and as a fundraising consultant for non-profit organizations in the fields of social exclusion, poverty and healthcare. Anna Domaradzka-Widła is Assistant Professor and Director of the Institute for Social Studies at the University of Warsaw. She is a board member of International Society of Third Sector Research and a member of the editorial board of Voluntas. Her principal research interests are in civil society, social movements, urban sociology, gender, and the sociology of science and education. Benjamin Ewert is Professor of Health Policy and Health Professions at Fulda University of Applied Science in Germany. His research focuses on state–citizen relationships, governance issues and social innovation in the realm of health policy. He is co-editor of the book Beyond Nudge (Bristol University Press, 2023) and has published articles in academic outlets such as Health Economics, Policy and Law, Public Administration, Public Policy & Administration and Policy & Politics. Giovanni Fosti is Associate Professor of Practice in Welfare and Social Innovation at SDA Bocconi School of Management, and Contracted Professor of Public Management at Bocconi University. He’s a Researcher at CERGAS–SDA Bocconi School of Management. His research interests focus on strategy in the public sector, public governance, social innovation, networks for the public interest and service management. Raquel Gallego-Calderón (MSc & PhD, London School of Economics and Political Science) is Full Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Her research interests include public policy analysis, public administration and management, social welfare policies, social innovation and welfare state transformations. She has published in journals such as Public Administration, Governance, European Societies, International Public Management Journal, Public Policy and Administration, Policy Studies, Public Management Review, Social Indicators Research, and Regional and Federal Studies. Tuur Ghys is Associate Professor at the faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo León, and a lecturer in Sociology at the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey. His broad research interest covers the sociology of social problems and the policies aimed at addressing them, in particular poverty, inequality and migration. Richard Hazenberg is Professor of Social Innovation and Director at the Institute for Social Innovation and Impact, University of Northampton. His research focuses on social enterprise ecosystems and social innovation in international development, social investment, and

Contributors  xiii social impact measurement. Richard has worked on research across Europe, Asia and Latin America and is Associate Editor of the Social Enterprise Journal and the Journal of Social Entrepreneurship. He is also a trustee at a nationally recognized social enterprise working with disadvantaged youth. Rick Hölsgens works as social scientist at the Social Research Centre Dortmund, TU Dortmund University. He holds a PhD in Economic History from the University of Groningen. He is a member of the editorial board of the open access journal NOvation – Critical Studies of Innovation. His current work focuses primarily on the role of social innovations in relation to the transition to sustainability. Jürgen Howaldt is the director of Social Research Centre Dortmund, TU Dortmund University, and Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences. He is an internationally renowned expert in the field of social innovation and Co-founder and Chair of the European School of Social Innovation. His research focuses on Social Sciences-based innovation research and social innovation. Lars Hulgård is the founder of the Centre for Social Entrepreneurship, Roskilde University, Denmark, and Co-founder and former President of EMES International Research Network. He is Distinguished Professor at Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Mumbai, and part-time Professor at University of South-Eastern Norway. In 2022 he was made Knight of the Order of the Dannebrog by the Queen of Denmark for his work on social innovation. Urs Jäger is Professor at INCAE Business School in Costa Rica, where he holds the Chair of Sustainability VIVA Idea Schmidheiny. He is also the Executive Director of VIVA Idea, a think–action tank focused on scientific-based tool development for sustainable development. He focuses his research on the social inclusion of formal and informal markets. Rana Jawad is Professor of Global Social Policy at the University of Birmingham. She has researched social policy issues and welfare systems in the Middle East for two decades and is founder/convener of the MENA social policy (www​.menasp​.com). Her interests cover institutions, discourses and the politics of social policy in the region and she has extensive experience of working with civil society and policy-making bodies nationally and globally. Christoph Kaletka is the Deputy Director of the Social Research Centre Dortmund, TU Dortmund University. His main fields of work are social innovation, digital inclusion and digital learning spaces. He teaches social innovation at TU Dortmund University’s faculties of rehabilitation sciences and social sciences. He has co-edited the two volumes of the ‘Atlas of Social Innovation’ (https://​www​.s​ocialinnov​ationatlas​.net/​) as well as the Encyclopedia of Social Innovation at Edward Elgar Publishing. Wendelin Küpers is Professor of Leadership and Organization Studies at Karlshochschule International University in Karlsruhe, Germany and affiliated with the UNESCO Chair, ARTEM Nancy and Paris. Combining a phenomenological and cross-disciplinary orientation, his research focuses on embodied, emotional, creative and ethical dimensions of organizing and managing integral and sustainable practices. Danielle Logue is Director of the Centre for Social Impact at UNSW and Professor of Innovation & Impact at UNSW Business School. Danielle’s research portfolio draws on

xiv  Handbook on social innovation and social policy a broad base of organization and management theory to examine how enterprises and markets engage in processes of social innovation. Anna Macintyre is Honorary Research Fellow, School of Social Work and Social Policy at the University of Strathclyde. Her research interests are in the social and economic determinants of health and mental health, and the role of economic policies in supporting health equity and inclusion. Lara Maestripieri holds a PhD in Sociology and Social Research, granted by the University of Trento (2011). She is Distinguished Researcher ‘Ramon y Cajal’ in the Department of Political Science at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. She is a member of the Research group Analysis, Management and Evaluation of Public Policies (AGAPP), through her affiliation to the IGOP (Institute of Government and Public Policies). Her publications appeared in Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, European Societies and Revista Española de Sociología. Neil McHugh is a Reader in the Yunus Centre for Social Business and Health at Glasgow Caledonian University. His research interests are in social finance and health, and eliciting public values in relation to health resource allocation and for income-based policies, such as Universal Basic Income, to tackle health inequalities. Sir Geoff Mulgan is Professor at University College London (UCL). He was CEO of Nesta and the Young Foundation, Director of the UK Government’s Strategy Unit and Head of Policy in the Prime Minister’s office. Past books include Big Mind: How Collective Intelligence can Change Our World (Princeton University Press) and Another World Is Possible: How to Reignite Social and Political Imagination, published by Hurst Publishers/Oxford University Press in 2022. Elisabetta Notarnicola is Associate Professor of Practice in Welfare and Social Innovation at SDA Bocconi School of Management. At SDA Bocconi she is involved in many executive education initiatives dealing with the health and social care sectors, and more specifically service design, network management, integrated care, social innovation. She is the coordinator of the research area Social Policy and Social Innovation and of the Observatory on Long Term Care. Gary Painter is a BEARE Professor in Real Estate and the University of Cincinnati and also the Director of Homelessness Policy Research Institute. He is a leading figure in the field of social innovation with extensive expertise in housing, urban economics and education policy, and works with a variety of organizations and impact networks to address grand social challenges. His current research focuses on activating the SI process and exploring how social innovation can identify new models of social change. Claire Paterson-Young is Associate Professor at the Institute for Social Innovation and Impact, University of Northampton. Her research focuses on social impact and social justice. She has over 15 years’ practice and management experience in safeguarding, child sexual exploitation, sexual violence and youth justice. She is currently Associate Editor for the international Journal of Child and Family Studies, International Board Member for the YOUNG journal and Editorial Board Member for the international Journal of Qualitative Criminal Justice and Criminology.

Contributors  xv Eleonora Perobelli is Lecturer in Public Management at SDA Bocconi School of Management. Her research interests and scientific publications focus on topics of public services’ management in the welfare and long-term care domain, with two main declinations: service design and the management of services delivery by public–private hybrid organizations. She is currently a PhD Candidate in Management & Innovation at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Milan campus. Richard Pfeilstetter is Associate Professor at the University of Seville and author of The Anthropology of Entrepreneurship (Routledge, 2021). As an anthropologist and social worker, he worked in and on non-profits and start-ups in Spain, Germany and the UK. Emmanuel Raufflet Management, HEC Montréal. His research focuses on social innovation, sustainable development and the circular economy. He serves as one of the co-heads of the Quebec Research Network on the Circular Economy (2021–2026), which includes over 230 interdisciplinary researchers. Abdul Shaban (PhD) is Professor and Chairperson of the Centre for Public Policy, Habitat and Human Development, School of Development Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Mumbai. He has been the Deputy Director of TISS, Tuljapur Campus. He is an urban geographer and economist with research interests in issues related to cities, entrepreneurship, creative industries and religious minorities. He has been Visiting Professor at several universities, including LSE, Muenster University, Erasmus University and Paris Diderot University. Stephen Sinclair is Professor of Social Policy in the Yunus Centre for Social Business and Health and Co-Director of the Scottish Poverty and Inequality Research Unit at Glasgow Caledonian University. He is Chair of the editorial board of the Journal of Poverty & Social Justice, and a member of the policy committee of the UK Child Poverty Action Group. His principal research interests are in child poverty, welfare reform and social innovation. José Pablo Valverde is a PhD candidate at the University of St. Gallen and Knowledge Director of VIVA Idea, a think–action tank focused on sustainability and social inclusion. His research focuses on sustainability, collaboration, inter-organizational networks and brokerage dynamics between organizations tackling grand challenges. Martine Vézina is Professor of Social Economy and Social Innovation at HEC Montreal. Her research interests lie in the conceptualization of the managerial specificities of cooperatives and social economy organizations in relation to their democratic and participative governance and contribution to social transformation. She co-leads the Social and Collective Organizations research axis at the CRISES interdisciplinary research consortium on social innovation and transformation. She is also involved in research transfer through her participation to CIRIEC international and TIESS (Québec). Rafael Ziegler is Professor at HEC Montréal, and Director of the Alphonse and Dorimène Desjardins International Institute for Cooperatives. He is Associate Editor of the Journal of Human Development and Capabilities and of the Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, and member of the Réseau québécois de recherche en économie circulaire (Québécois Network for Research in Circular Economy – RQREC).

1. Introduction: social innovation and social policy: a critical relationship Stephen Sinclair and Simone Baglioni

Perhaps because it studies social problems, Social Policy sometimes has a rather gloomy outlook on the future and even something of a Cassandra complex, perennially anticipating crisis (e.g., O’Connor, 1973; Mishra, 1985; Taylor-Gooby, 2013). Concern about threats and predictions of crises might be familiar, but what is sometimes forgotten about Cassandra is that her prophecies were correct. Similarly, there are genuine grounds for concern about a range of grand challenges and new social risks that confront welfare systems and social policies (Mazzucato et al., 2019; Taylor-Gooby, 2004). Climate disruption, demographic transitions – ageing in the Global North and a ‘youthquake’ in the south (Paiche, 2021) – soaring inequalities, political polarisation and social fracturing, and the lingering effects of a global pandemic all pose existential threats to the foundations and forms of social welfare provision across the world. Social Innovation (SI) has emerged as a proposed response to some of these challenges and others. This Handbook brings together a range of distinguished scholars and expert analysts to consider whether SI offers any solutions, insights or hope in response to emerging social problems and persistent welfare needs. There are many books about SI. The distinctive contribution of this Handbook is that it examines how developments in and analyses of SI relate to some of the key themes addressed in the discipline of Social Policy, and vice versa. The editors and contributors believe that the dynamic developing field of SI inquiry can learn from over a century of Social Policy analysis, and that Social Policy theories and approaches will benefit by studying developments in SI practice and inquiry. Our aim in this Handbook is to stimulate dialogue and encourage mutual learning between these fields.

(YET AGAIN,) WHAT IS ‘SOCIAL INNOVATION’? SI can be a difficult idea to pin down. The term is ‘both ambiguously defined and weekly conceptualised’ (Slee, 2019: 154). This indeterminacy can be exasperating and lead to indifference or even hostility among some Social Policy analysts. Such frustration is shared by SI practitioners and commentators themselves. This is illustrated by the reflections of the Social Innovation Exchange (SIX) on a conference they organised: ‘When we were planning the Wayfinder at SIX, we envisaged coming away with a clear roadmap for the next ten years. In the event, however, attendees … left still frustrated that we continue to talk in circles about what social innovation is, rather than getting the job done, all the while the world is turning’ (SIX Wayfinder 2017: 15). To be fair, relatively few such events produce a shared manifesto or joint actions. Consensus is particularly challenging for less well-established or clearly formulated areas (Frey, 2003). Nevertheless, the disappointment expressed by SIX is under1

2  Handbook on social innovation and social policy standable: for those interested in taking practical action and effecting change, the persistent debate over the meaning of SI is frustrating. While the absence of an agreed definition of SI may be unsatisfactory, this apparent messiness reflects reality; and it is, after all, reality rather than conceptual tidiness that matters in understanding the social world. Whether we like it or not, SI is a disorderly field. This is partly because social innovations often emerge from practice rather than theory, and are often improvised, hesitant and revised rather than decisive or definitive. This inconvenient reality must be recognised: ‘Innovation in the public sector can be defined as a complex and iterative process through which problems are defined; new ideas are developed and combined, experiments are defined and new solutions are implemented and diffused’ (Van Gestel and Grotenbreg, 2021: 251). Such actions and interventions are not undertaken for the convenience of those who wish to study them but to actually do things. Furthermore, while SI might be difficult to define, so too is Social Policy, and that does not prevent entire academic departments and careers being dedicated to its study. What ought to concern Social Policy analysts is what can be learned about social issues and enhancing welfare from SI, not whether it is easily summarised. Fuzzy boundaries are therefore a feature and not a flaw of SI, and the analyst must accept that, ‘The range and variety of action that constitute social innovation today defies simple categorisation’ (Nicholls et al., 2015: 1). Another complication arising is that some things that might be regarded as ‘social innovations’ are not described as such by those directly involved (Bouchard et al., 2015: 70). In contrast, some things badged as ‘innovation’ are actually well established. The latter tendency is driven partly by the desire of some policy makers to promote ‘new’ initiatives that attract attention. As a result, ‘organizations often assume that they must generously sprinkle the term “innovation” throughout a proposal if they want to have any chance of receiving a grant’ (Seelos and Mair, 2016). Due to these various tendencies and pressures, SI is a ‘complex and multi-faceted institutional space that is still subject to competing discourses and definitions’ (Nicholls et al., 2015: 6). It has been described as a ‘quasi-concept’ or a pre-paradigm field, characterised by fluidity and contested interpretations (op. cit.: 14). The editors have not imposed a single definition of SI upon the contributors, nor insisted upon agreement over its nature, which does not exist. Our aim and role is to reflect the diversity of the field rather than fabricate an artificial consensus. We are not promoting a manifesto, but aiming to stimulate dialogue between fields to encourage mutual learning and critical engagement. Therefore, SI is interpreted widely in this Handbook to encompass the diverse contributions and commentaries offered. Nevertheless, although we will not trawl through a taxonomy of the variants of SI here (Cahill, 2010), some definition of SI is required to provide clarity and set boundaries on the scope of analysis. Fortunately, there has been some convergence if not unanimity in how SI is understood in recent years (Ayob et al., 2016). At its most general, SI may be regarded as novel ideas and empowering initiatives that are applied to effect sustained social value. This definition has several components, each of which requires further consideration. The most straightforward feature of SI is the final one in the description above – its social orientation. As one of the most familiar statements on the concept notes, ‘Social innovation is innovation that is explicitly for the social and public good. It is innovation inspired by the desire to meet social needs’ (Social Innovation Exchange/Young Foundation, 2010: 15). SI is distinguished from some other forms of innovation by its principal concern to advance

Introduction  3 well-being and address social or environmental issues, rather than purely commercial interests (Nicholls et al., 2015: 4). The Young Foundation definition goes on to highlight a second distinguishing characteristic: SI is innovation that is ‘social both in their ends and in their means’ (Murray et al., 2010: 5). Social innovations seek to enhance the capacity of communities and service users in some respect. This is also a feature shared with other initiatives and social policies, but SI is distinguished by the integral importance of a participatory, capability-enhancing and empowering process. SI involves doing things with rather than to people, or people doing things for and by themselves. Banerjee et al. (2020) describe this as ‘people-centred SI’, which might seem tautological, until it is appreciated that what this means in practice is open to interpretation and disputed. There are at least two discourses with different perspectives on this aspect of SI (Montgomery, 2016). First, there is a ‘democratic’ or radical SI tradition influenced by community activism and users’ rights movements. This approaches SI as a means of social transformation (e.g., Moulaert et al., 2005). In partial contrast to this is a more technocratic or business-oriented idea of SI. This is influenced by studies of technological innovation and social entrepreneurship, and analyses SI as a means of social advancement through improved design and developing ‘more effective, efficient, sustainable’ and just responses to social challenges (e.g., Phills et al., 2008). The contrast between these approaches should not be overdrawn. They should not be regarded as opposing factions but as providing distinctive insights into potential responses to social challenges. We take a pragmatic approach in this Handbook, prioritising neither approach nor prescribing any particular organisational form or privileging any sector (public, private, third or civil society) in our analysis of SI. As a matter of fact, SI often involves hybrid organisational forms, but that is a functional effect rather than a condition for inclusion in this study. Clearly not every effort to address social or environmental concerns should be regarded as a ‘social innovation’. Therefore a third defining feature of SI is the idea of novelty. SI involves something different and distinctive beyond conventional incremental change: ‘Innovation is introducing change into the established order’ (Godin, 2015: 5). However, despite being a defining feature, what counts as change and how much of it is necessary to be an innovation is also not straightforward. Several commentaries on SI classify different levels of divergence, often relating to the scale of operation or degree of impact rather than originality per se (e.g., Terstriep and Kleverbeck, 2018). For example, Van Gestel and Grotenbreg (2021: 251) distinguish between ‘wide’ and ‘small’ innovation, reflecting on the extent of transformational disruption involved. Similarly, Nicholls et al. (2015: 3) distinguish between incremental, institutional and disruptive innovation. Whereas institutional innovation aims to harness and modify the capacity of existing social economic structures (e.g., Fairtrade), disruptive innovation aims at more fundamental system-level changes (e.g., social and political movements). One difficulty in identifying the novelty of any SI in relation to its effects is that these are not always immediately apparent. If impacts emerge slowly or cumulate over time, it may not become evident that innovation has occurred until after the fact. Equally, some seeming innovations may be dramatic but insubstantial short-lived sensations. This reflects again that SI is a field of developing practice that ‘is seldom a smooth, efficient process, based on a proven, franchised “theory of change”. It typically involves a lot of deliberation, confusion, quarrelling, false starts, exhaustion, and, sometimes even failure’ (Schambra, 2003). There is often therefore no clear demarcation between incremental and innovative change (Slee, 2019:

4  Handbook on social innovation and social policy 168; SiX/Young Foundation, 2010: 15). Novelty may arise by adaptations to changing circumstances, or through inspired or opportunistic borrowing from and combination of existing practices and techniques rather than an unprecedented and entirely original departure. This relates to the final distinguishing feature defining SI, one of particular interest in Social Policy – the practical issue of application and creating sustained social value. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, interest in SI is driven by the need for better responses to both long-standing and new social challenges. However, novelty without impact is merely a curiosity, and there is an important difference between creative inventiveness and substantive innovation. Applied Social Policy needs more than new ideas – innovations must be practically realisable and make a difference: ‘Innovation … needs to prove itself on the basis of the impact that it actually creates. The goal is not innovation for its own sake but productive innovation’ (Seelos and Mair, 2016). Until it has made some change in the world, a social innovation merely possesses potential. In a complex and dynamic environment, the scale, scope and duration of change cannot be prescribed in advance, but the analysis of SI must consider these issues. In particular, as many SIs develop as localised responses to specific conditions, their capacity to make an impact beyond their original context is crucial (Ghys, 2017: 5). A further aspect of impact is duration – how sustained must the effects of an innovation be to become regarded as more than just an ad hoc improvisation? Conversely, how long does it take before an initiative ceases to be innovative and becomes standard practice or an established institution? SI shares these questions about viability, effectiveness and institutionalisation with Social Policy, which is why an exchange of learning between the fields is valuable.

SOCIAL INNOVATION AND SOCIAL POLICY: DIALOGUE AND DISAGREEMENTS Social Policy and SI have several common interests and characteristics. Both arose in response to the challenging conditions generated by complex societies. Each is concerned with measures to protect against risks and exigencies, ameliorate social ills, and effect social improvements. Consequently, at the heart of both Social Policy and SI there is a shared interest in the nature of well-being and the conditions of a good society. This relates both fields to normative and ethical questions as well as political and operational issues of policy making and delivery. Both Social Policy and SI operate across and between different sectors (public, private, voluntary, community) and diverse service areas (e.g., care, education, employment, health). Each is concerned with different levels and scales of operation – from the individual micro level, to communities and neighbourhoods, meso-institutional, the societal/macro scale, up to international and global initiatives. Some perennial Social Policy questions – about how effective welfare services are developed, delivered, impact and are experienced – are also central to understanding SI. To address such questions, both Social Policy and SI require inter- and multi-disciplinary analyses of wicked and complex problems and contested issues. Both Social Policy and SI raise debates about solidarity, altruism and equality issues, including the right to recognition and respecting differences (Spicker, 2006). This in turn requires considering the distribution of resources, opportunities and costs: who pays for and benefits from different forms of social provision? The respective roles and capacities of the state, market, community and households in providing welfare arise when such issues are examined. In short, while

Introduction  5 Social Policy and SI both overlap with several other fields and disciplines, the coincidence of interests between them is distinctive and strong. Nevertheless, although they have much in common, there are also significant differences in how Social Policy and SI analyses have respectively evolved. The discipline of Social Policy is concerned not only with developing or commenting upon responses to social problems but also accounting for how these conditions arise and how responses to them are constructed. The SI literature has to date rather less to say about these more theoretical issues, and has shown less interest in philosophical questions of social justice, citizenship and rights. Social Policy is the more established field of inquiry and a discipline with a distinctive institutional culture and academic discourse. Reflecting its foundation as Social Administration, a distinguishing feature of Social Policy has been interest in the role of government in welfare provision – signified by the centrality of analysing the ‘Welfare State’, albeit critically (Titmuss, 1958). The pivotal role of the state has been tempered by analyses of the social divisions and mixed economies of welfare (Sinfield, 1978; Powell, 2007). It has also been qualified by the increasingly comparative, international and global focus of Social Policy, which highlights the varied roles of diverse actors in different welfare regimes where the state may play a relatively marginal part (Cruz-Martinez, 2020). Studies of SI are not blind to the state, and there are interesting analyses of how government policies create the environment and conditions in which social innovations operate (Krlev et al., 2020). Nevertheless, their different approaches to the state and macro-social analysis is one reason why SI has a less-developed literature than Social Policy on such issues as the funding of large-scale welfare institutions and services, the contribution of welfare provision to economic productivity, and the structural factors shaping the distribution of income and wealth. In addition to these differences, there is also some debate over how compatible social innovations are with conventional social policies and systems (Baglioni and Sinclair, 2018). SI could be interpreted as representing the failure of conventional markets and public responses to social challenges: ‘Social innovation arises because the public or private delivery as lacking are deemed inadequate’ (Slee, 2019: 166). Microfinance – such as the Grameen Bank – is often cited as an example of where SI emerged to satisfy unmet needs and neglected communities. SI poses some probing questions for Social Policy analysis: is SI a compliment, a challenge or an alternative to conventional forms of welfare provision? Can governments cultivate SI and should Social Policy analysts promote this? Or would this undermine the autonomy of SI and/ or the rationale and viability of established welfare institutions? Is SI part of a post-welfare state turn? Or does it represent a return to a pre-welfare state era – to a time before the dominance (at least in the Global North) of public institutions, and when social problems were addressed by charities, moral entrepreneurs and through voluntary collectivism, if at all? It is therefore understandable that some Social Policy analysts may be wary of SI if they regard it as promoting or enabling the withdrawal of state responsibility for welfare provision. An alternative response is scepticism about whether SI is a sufficiently significant phenomena for Social Policy to consider at all. SI seems permanently promising and brimming with potential, but it has not delivered social transformation. There are undoubtedly interesting examples of local innovations in a variety of contexts. Unfortunately, many of these are difficult to replicate or operate at scale, and do not yet offer a viable alternative nor challenge to the established forms of welfare provision studied by Social Policy. The poster child of SI – microcredit – has not ended poverty nor even financial exclusion, and is not a solution to the challenges of sustainable development. If successful innovation requires a shake out of

6  Handbook on social innovation and social policy conventional ideas and organisations then there seem to be few genuine SIs capable of meeting existing or future grand challenges. SI has yet to have the impact upon macro-social conditions made by welfare states. It has also made less impact upon these systems and institutions than either emergencies (e.g., Covid) or ideology (e.g., neo-liberalism). Some scepticism towards it within Social Policy is therefore understandable. Despite this, as the chapters in this Handbook demonstrate, SI merits the attention of Social Policy analysts. It is unreasonable to expect SI to answer all the questions raised within Social Policy or solve welfare problems; after all, Social Policy itself has not. This is because some of these social conditions and academic and policy debates are insoluble. There have been undoubted improvements in well-being and social progress, but there can never be any definitive resolution to some social challenges, nor will any welfare state ever produce a final state of welfare. Dynamics societies will always generate new challenges, and debates over their nature and response will always provoke competing interests and reflect alternative worldviews. The value of SI should not be assessed by whether it resolves Social Policy debates, but by what insights it brings to areas of overlapping interest and what it offers in building a better future. If Social Policy does not engage with SI to address current and future problems then it has to produce a better alternative, as simply doing more of the same is not an option (Mazzucato, 2018).

CULTIVATING A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE The contributions to this Handbook take a critical perspective towards both SI and Social Policy. A critical approach is not of course a hostile nor negative one but rather questions prevailing assumptions, examines discourses and how issues are represented, and reflects upon the conventional approaches and potential blind spots of a discipline or field of inquiry (Williams, 2016). In one sense it is difficult to imagine an uncritical Social Policy perspective – its founders (e.g., the Webbs) and key thinkers (e.g., Titmuss) were as critical of social conditions and challenged assumptions as vigorously as commentators in any field. The constructive dialogue and reflexive learning offered in this Handbook reflects this critical tradition by considering ‘the role of social science both in revealing … underlying assumptions, ideology and power relations in the pursuit of knowledge and in challenging (rather than simply accepting or supporting, implicitly or explicitly) the inequalities and social injustices which exist in society’ (McCann and hAdhmaill, 2020: 8). One benefit of a critical perspective is that it provides some protection against the potential sampling bias to which some SI commentaries are vulnerable. Basing analyses of SI on case studies risks sampling on the dependent variable or cherry picking more successful initiatives and overlooking short-lived, ineffectual and unsuccessful experiments that are often more difficult to locate and study. This contrasts with public policies where independent commentators and political opponents have an interest in more open and systematic evaluation and highlighting potential limited or failed project. The lesson is that policy makers and analysts who aim to innovate and improve should welcome scrutiny and embrace criticism. Novel and effective critical insights are particularly likely from an outsider’s perspective (Hands, 2001). For example, it might seem that many SIs operate at the margins of Social Policy and focus on exceptional issues or groups that are neglected by mainstream welfare provision, e.g., integrating migrants and refugees, rehabilitating ex-offenders or redistributing surplus

Introduction  7 food (to select examples from chapters in this Handbook). But a critical perspective asks who decides that these are ‘marginal’ Social Policy issues, and questions why they are not central to welfare states – as some are increasingly likely to become? In this way, critical analysis de-centres the status quo. There is already a strong SI tradition that exemplifies this approach. The people-centred SI perspective mentioned above examines the relationship between Social Policy and prevailing power structures to generate change possibilities (Banerjee et al., 2020). Similarly, the ‘democratic’ SI tradition considers how community empowerment can challenge power differentials and reshape the future (Moulaert and MacCallum, 2019). This emphasis on change-making is integral to the critical orientation of SI and Social Policy, as ‘critical social research is interested not only in what is going on and why, but is also concerned with doing something about it’ (Taylor, 1997: 23). Nothing is more critical – in every sense of the word – than extending the possibilities for change. As noted above, both SI and Social Policy share a practical orientation, but effective change involves the unity of theory and praxis. The insights about society and power produced by combining SI practice and Social Policy theory will be essential to better understand the nature of social problems and identify responses to address them.

HANDBOOK CHAPTERS AND THEMES The 22 substantive chapters in this Handbook contribute to the possibility for change by providing critical insights into a range of theoretical and practical questions in Social Innovation and Social Policy. In Chapter 2, ‘Social Innovation and Public Policy’, one of the key thinkers on SI, Geoff Mulgan, discusses some of the ways in which national governments and other agencies have sought to cultivate and support Social Innovation. These measures include providing funding, creating SI incubators and hubs, and reforming legal systems to create a supportive innovation ecosystem. However, despite widespread enthusiasm for SI, such measures have met with varying degrees of success. Mulgan concludes that SI remains a marginal aspect of social and economic policy and has not yet risen to the scale necessary to meet any of the increasingly urgent and serious grand challenge. In Chapter 3, ‘Social Innovation and Social Policy Analysis’, Stephen Sinclair considers what insights SI contributes to some of the key issues considered in Social Policy. The chapter argues that, as Social Policy analysis is now global and comparative, there are compelling reasons why welfare analysts should pay attention to developments in SI. Social Policy could learn from SI particularly in responding more effectively to new social risks and future challenges. SI also offers insights into how welfare provision can better respect and cultivate the agency, participation and empowerment of service users. In turn, there is much that Social Policy can teach SI studies about citizenship rights, structural and systemic change, and how some forms of ‘welfare’ may have controlling and coercive effects. In Chapter 4, ‘Richard M. Titmuss Revisited – Social Innovation and the Crises Ecosystem’, Lars Hulgård interprets the work of one of the founders of the discipline of Social Policy as a contribution to SI. Titmuss was part of a generation who promoted institutional welfare reform to address the challenges faced by industrial societies in the post-WWII era. Hulgård argues that Titmuss’ work provides insights into how we can address the inter-related and compounding ‘crisis ecosystem’ confronting the world today. He argues that Social Policy and

8  Handbook on social innovation and social policy SI responses to these challenges must be based on understanding the inter-connected nature and different dimensions of this crisis. Hulgård concludes that addressing the complexity of the crisis ecosystem requires transition from what Titmuss described as institutional–redistributive welfare to an institutional–reciprocal welfare state, which emphasises the role of civil society and the solidarity economy. Lara Maestripieri and Raquel Gallego-Calderón examine SI in relation to one of the most influential theoretical perspectives in the study of Social Policy and welfare in Chapter 5, ‘The Impact of Social Innovation on Local Welfare Policy: Lessons from a Capability Perspective’. In particular, they ask whether SIs can empower service users and enable deprived communities to realise their potential. They argue that existing SIs are limited due to their local scale and reach; nevertheless, the imagination and flexibility of SIs provide valuable lessons for public service provision, which can enhance capabilities. Transferability is fundamental to the Social Policy aim of sharing learning to address social problems. In Chapter 6, ‘Deliberate Social Innovations: On Policy Impact and Policy Transfer’, Tuur Ghys asks whether SIs are simply laudable but limited local initiatives and what may be learned and transferred from them. Ghys observes that reproducing a response to a problem – such as an innovative poverty reduction programme – involves transferring the underlying idea of the nature of ‘the problem’ as well as the response. He argues that, as SIs consist of collaborative relationships, a particular culture and facilitating infrastructure, there is limited value in trying to formulate a general methodological framework for SI policy transfer. Instead, he argues that to make promising ideas realisable beyond their point of origin requires carefully considering the needs and local conditions in both the original and target contexts, and a process of deliberative reinstitutionalisation. The challenges of transferring SI knowledge and practice are discussed further in Chapter 7, ‘Methodological Resilience: Researching Social Inclusion and Social Innovation in Latin America’. Urs Jäger, Wendelin Küpers and José Pablo Valverde consider the challenging epistemological and research questions that arise in comparing SI in diverse contexts. In particular they discuss how to mediate differences and share knowledge between SI in ‘developed’ and ‘less developed’ settings. They question the assumption that economic theories and models from the Global North should be the norm and standard against which other global regions should be compared and ‘developed’ to resemble. They analyse the informal economy in Latin America and argue that a distinctive ‘methodological resilience’ is required to meet the challenge of cultural comprehension and produce valid research that genuinely understands social and economic issues in non-Western regions. They conclude that truly transformative SI would highlight the limitations of dominant economic models and ways of being. Cultural variations and tensions are also considered by Danielle Logue in Chapter 8, ‘Paying for and Providing Social Policies and Social Innovations’. Logue analyses different funding options for SI, including Social Impact Bonds, social stock exchanges and crowdfunding. She discusses the appropriate governance systems for these hybrid models, and examines the issues of participation, co-production and empowerment that they raise. She notes that the hybrid nature of SI can generate friction over the respective roles, cultures and interests of different sectors in relation to funding. SI is often regarded as a means to address problems by empowering disadvantaged groups, but its impact on gender inequalities remains underexplored. In Chapter 9, ‘Social Policy, Social Innovation and Gender Equality’, Anna Domaradzka-Widła relates the gendered dimension of SI to a longer tradition of Feminist Social Policy analysis, and critically appraises

Introduction  9 the potential of SI to reduce inequality. She notes that social policies have both increased equality and maintained gender divisions and disadvantages. SI is a potentially powerful tool to break down gender inequalities and increase access to opportunities such as inclusive forms of finance, support for women entrepreneurs and e-learning platforms. However, innovation is never gender neutral, as shown by the systematic gender and other biases built into some algorithms and facial recognition and other technologies. Domaradzka-Widła argues that the pursuit of equality is not a phase but a process and faces continuing challenges. She concludes that to ensure SI truly benefits all, more dialogue and shared learning is required between the field and gender equality studies. The increasingly evident and urgent climate emergency compels radical action, and in Chapter 10, ‘Social Innovation and Sustainable Development’, Jürgen Howaldt, Rick Hölsgens and Christoph Kaletka discuss the imperative for innovation in this area. They argue that the changes required cannot be simply technological: a just transition to a viable future requires considering equality and distributional issues. The authors argue that SI could make a potentially vital contribution to this transition. Due to its bottom-up responsive nature, SI is uniquely well suited to respond to the challenges posed by limits to growth and sustainability. The authors examine case studies that demonstrate the distinctive strengths of SI, but also reveal limitations in the scale and significance of impact. The chapter highlights the reforms needed in governance, inter-sectoral partnerships and creating a supportive ecosystem to realise the potential of SI and challenge existing power relations. However, the authors warn that we cannot be naïve about the politics of SI nor overlook potential resistance to change. The history of SI shows that some of the most prominent and promising innovations have been pioneered in the Global South, and valuable lessons may be learned from these varied experiences and conditions. In Chapter 11, ‘Social Innovation and Social Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Gift Dafuleya analyses SIs that developed from self-help organisations in a region that faces distinctive and deep-seated challenges not adequately addressed by state nor donor-financed social policies. He argues that these SIs show considerable imagination to tackle problems encountered by some of the most marginalised and economically vulnerable populations. Dafuleya suggests that a lack of trust between civil society and government in some Sub-Saharan African countries inhibits the development and capacity of SI. He concludes that collective organisation and representation is necessary to showcase the potential of SI and represent self-help organisations in national politics and policy making. Rana Jawad provides an overview of the circumstances and difficulties faced by SI in another important global region in Chapter 12, ‘Social Innovation in the Middle East and North Africa Region: Implications for Social Policy Thinking and Practice’. She notes that this diverse and important region has been overlooked in much of the literature on SI and Social Policy more generally, despite energetic SI initiatives in many countries. The approach taken to SI in the region emphasises social entrepreneurship rather than a more radical transformational approach. There is also a focus on the knowledge economy (particularly technological development) and business enterprise. However, despite some promising examples, the development and capacity of SI is hampered in several Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region countries by legal and institutional barriers. In Chapter 13, ‘Exploring Interrelationships between Social Innovation, Social Policy and People-Centred Social Change in India’, Swati Banerjee, Abdul Shaban and Dipannita Bhattacharjee outline the challenges faced by and role of SI in India and South Asia. Development policy may have reduced extreme poverty in the region, but several groups

10  Handbook on social innovation and social policy remain vulnerable to exclusion and marginalisation, particularly those segregated by caste and gender. The authors argue that neither top-down state direction nor market-led approaches have satisfactorily addressed the needs of some of the poorest populations in the world, as these approaches do not addresses structural power imbalances. The authors argue that a people-centred SI approach is essential to address poverty and marginalisation. This approach is bottom-up, context sensitive and respects the expertise of those who experience marginalisation. The chapter concludes that a sustainable livelihoods approach is required that goes beyond mere poverty alleviation to address structural barriers of discrimination and exclusion. Only by this means will SI effect the transformational change required. Incessant and increasing demands for health care and persistent morbidity and mortality inequalities pose seemingly intractable policy challenges. In Chapter 14, ‘Social Policy, Social Innovation and Health: Tackling Health Inequalities in the United Kingdom’, Neil McHugh and Anna Macintyre discuss the social determinants of health and the limitations of conventional health care provision to develop effective preventative interventions to address them. Their analysis shows the need for an inter-sectoral approach to understand complex health issues. They illustrate the potential positive health effects that some SIs have beyond their intended aims as illustrated by case studies at the micro-, meso- and macro levels. The authors argue that such SIs show potential but have not yet made an impact on the scale required. Nevertheless, they conclude that the imaginative approach offered by SI is worth developing within conventional health policies and institutions. Another aspect of SI in relation to health is discussed by Benjamin Ewert in Chapter 15, ‘Innovating Health Services: The Role of Embedded Social Innovation Movements’. He criticises conventional health care that commodifies provision and disempowers and alienates patients. Ewert argues that impactful innovations in health provision must be related to and supported by social movements. He illustrates this by looking at the examples of hospices and self-help organisations, and draws lessons from these for innovation in personalised health care. However, he warns that some SIs run the risk of being ‘tamed’ and appropriated by other sectors. Health and social care for older people is discussed by Giovanni Fosti, Elisabetta Notarnicola and Eleonora Perobelli in Chapter 16, ‘Social Policy, Social Innovation and Older People’. They argue that the ‘problem’ of population ageing should be reconceptualised. Older populations require new forms of care provision, pose challenges for families and households, and involve rethinking the nature of work and role of technology. However, the authors argue that these challenges also provide opportunities for a Silver and Longevity Economy. SI has the potential to contribute to developing the new systems and ways of living that will be required to meet this challenge and seize these opportunities. The authors illustrate this by examining how SI could successfully combine housing provision and digital inclusion to meet the needs of an older population. Chapter 17, ‘Social Innovation and Migration’ by Simone Baglioni, considers what has become one of the most politically contentious issues in social policy. Frictions between incoming and host populations and the marginalisation that many migrant communities encounter pose serious challenges to social cohesion and welfare. New and more effective responses are therefore required to meet some of the issues raised by and associated with migration. It is evident that migrants (including refugees and asylum seekers) are among the most resourceful and resilient people in the world, and this creates opportunities to develop new models of social integration and economic and cultural enrichment. The chapter considers

Introduction  11 examples of how the entrepreneurial talent of migrants has been harnessed not only to improve social inclusion but also to address needs in the host society. These examples include initiatives that regenerate urban areas in economic decline, and SIs that restore vital infrastructure in rural areas undergoing population decline and economic transformation. Such cases demonstrate how SI can enable migrants to make positive economic and cultural contributions that counter the negative propaganda and hostile environment promoted by populist political parties. In Chapter 18, ‘Top-Down Funded Employment Integration Programmes: Promoting Bottom-Up Social Innovation to Empower the Disadvantaged’, Richard Hazenberg and Claire Paterson-Young analyse a work integration social enterprise (WISE) programme in England to assess what factors were associated with more positive and negative outcomes. They argue that the most effective SIs were co-created with and empowered users, and took a ‘tapestry’ approach that wove together different forms of support addressing each individual’s circumstances and needs. Their analysis found that well-designed WISE initiatives can enhance client self-efficacy and well-being, although this did not always lead directly to employment. The least effective employment programmes were characterised by a high degree of centralisation and strict performance targets, and caused disadvantaged people to being ‘othered’. The authors identify some of the limits of current UK government employment programmes and demonstrate how wider policy paradigms and ideologies condition (and may limit) the potential effectiveness of SIs. In Chapter 19, ‘Social Innovation and Collaborative Governance: The Case of Surplus Food Redistribution’, Benedetta De Pieri and Francesca Caló discuss the issues faced in addressing a challenge that has not been part of the national welfare systems of most developed countries. Food poverty and reducing food waste are issues where innovative civil society initiatives have been ahead of the public sector. Meeting the complex needs of salvaging and redistributing unused food requires forming inter-sectoral relationships and innovative governance arrangements with new divisions of responsibilities, powers and operating models. The authors illustrate how these challenges have been met in a case study from Milan. They argue that there are potential lessons for developing initiatives in response to other social risks, but also challenges that require innovative multisector responses. Another form of productive recycling is examined by Rafael Ziegler, Eléonore Compère, Emmanuel Raufflet and Martine Vézina in Chapter 20, ‘Between Green Economy and Reformism: An Exploration of Circular Economy and Social Economy Policy Convergence in Quebec’. The authors analyse progress towards and issues encountered in transitioning to a circular economy in Quebec and Canada more generally. Since at least the ‘Quebec Declaration’ of 2011, this province has been a pioneer and advocate of SI, and therefore might seem a particularly promising case for transitioning to a more sustainable use of resources and production. The authors identify examples of explicit and implicit circular policies at the federal, province and municipal level in Canada, and examine how these relate to wider social economy policies. The complicated multi-governance arrangements they identify are familiar in many other social policy issues. Their findings suggest that technocentric and reformist circular economy models prevail in Canada rather than more transformational measures, and conclude that a shift towards a more sustained strategic approach is currently not promising. Scepticism about the radical innovative potential of information and communications technology is also evident in Chapter 21, ‘Alternative Platforms? On the Dilemmas of Policy and Innovation in Digital Infrastructure’, by Richard Pfeilstetter. In line with the ethos of the Handbook, Pfeilstetter takes a critical approach to the hype surrounding the transformational

12  Handbook on social innovation and social policy potential of IT platforms and asks, does the promise of IT as a mode and medium for social innovation match the reality? He observes that IT may have a transformative impact, but it is not necessarily an empowering nor progressive one if we become trapped in the business models of the ‘Big 5’ tech and social media companies. He considers both bottom-up and top-down responses to the challenges of ‘platformization’, i.e., ‘increased channelling of internet traffic through a handful of digital ecosystems gradually imposing their standards onto every wired operation.’ Pfeilstetter reflects upon some of the response options to this challenge by looking at a case study of a local online retail collaborative initiative in Spain and the capacity of EU legislation and central regulation of media tech. In Chapter 22, ‘Design Thinking for Social Innovation’, Victoria Ciudad-Real and Gary Painter discuss how applying Design Thinking principles and systematic co-production can improve social policy-making processes and outcomes. They suggest that Design Thinking could be a way to strengthen relations between service providers and users as it is a process in which the respective expertise of each is respected and fruitfully combined. The authors demonstrate this by examining the case of an initiative to improve employment for people with a criminal record in Los Angeles. They conclude that well-executed Design Thinking is a bottom-up, responsive and power-sharing process that creates the possibility to re-imagine issues and explore new ideas to tackle wicked social problems. The final substantive chapter, by Peter Beresford, relates SI to an older tradition of user-led and participatory social policy. In Chapter 23, ‘Social Innovation and Citizen Participation: The Crucial Coupling’, Beresford criticises SI approaches derived from business models and corporate social responsibility rather than from emancipatory social movements. He reminds us of the different traditions and conceptualisations of SI, and of the nature and purpose of ‘participation’ in social policy making. Beresford argues that both social innovation and participation are inherently political ideas, which should always be approached critically and with due regard to their nuanced and contested natures. In the concluding chapter, the editors note some of the recurring issues, key findings and prominent themes evident from the contributions, and reflect upon their implications for debates in and the development of social innovation and Social Policy. Some unanswered questions and further research needs are suggested, as well as the practical and policy lessons that may be learned from the chapters.

CONCLUSION: CONTINUING THE CONVERSATION This Handbook – and social innovation more generally – might frustrate policy makers seeking a programme of action or directions on how to address chronic or looming social challenges. Unfortunately, much of Social Policy analysis is neither intended to provide nor capable of providing such straightforward instrumental application. The contribution of Social Policy tends to be less direct than feeding into policy. Often the most profound contribution it makes is challenging received views, changing how issues are understood and providing new ways of thinking (Nutley et al., 2003: 39). In this respect, Social Innovation is already firmly part of the critical constructive tradition of Social Policy analysis. SI might not yet nor ever have answers to old and immanent social risks. However, by providing new insights and suggesting different courses of action to meet them, it could play an important part in building a more promising possible future.

Introduction  13

REFERENCES Ayob, N., Teasdale, S. and Fagan, K. (2016) ‘How Social Innovation “Came to Be”: Tracing the Evolution of a Contested Concept’, Journal of Social Policy, 45 (4): 635–653. Baglioni, S. and Sinclair, S. (2018) Social Innovation and Social Policy: Theory, Policy and Practice. Bristol: Policy Press. Banerjee, S., Carney, S. and Hulgård, L. (eds) (2020) People-Centered Social Innovation: Global Perspectives on an Emerging Paradigm. Abingdon: Routledge. Bouchard, M. J., Trudelle, C., Briand, L., Klein, J. L., Levesque, B., Longtin, D. and Pelletier, M. (2015) ‘A Relational Database to Understand Social Innovation and its Impact on Social Transformation’, in Nicholls, A., Simon, J. and Gabriel, M. (eds) New Frontiers in Social Innovation Research (pp. 69–85). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Cahill, G. (2010) ‘Primer on Social Innovation: A Compendium of Definitions Developed by Organizations around the World’, The Philanthropist, 23 (3): 259–271. Cruz-Martinez, G. (2020) ‘A Bottom-up Picture of Intra-national Welfare Regimes: The Case of Marginalised Communities in Puerto Rico’, Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy, 36 (2): 175–199. Frey, B. S. (2003) ‘Publishing as Prostitution? Choosing between One’s Own Ideas and Academic Success’, Public Choice, 116 (1–2): 205–233. Ghys, T. (2017) ‘Analysing Social Innovation through the Lens of Poverty Reduction: Five Key Factors’, European Public and Social Innovation Review, 2 (2): 1–14. Godin, B. (2015) Innovation Contested: The Idea of Innovation over the Centuries. Abingdon: Routledge. Hands, W. (2001) Reflection Without Rules: Economic Methodology and Contemporary Science Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krlev, G., Einarsson, T., Wijkström, F., Heyer, L. and Mildenberger, G. (2020) ‘The Policies of Social Innovation: A Cross-National Analysis’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 49 (3): 457–478. McCann, G. and hAdhmaill, F. (eds) (2020) ‘Introduction’, in McCann, G. and hAdhmaill, F. (eds) International Human Rights, Social Policy and Global Development (pp. 1–12). Bristol: Bristol University Press. Mazzucato, M. (2018) ‘Mission-oriented Innovation Policies: Challenges and Opportunities’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 27 (5): 803–815. Mazzucato, M., Kattel, R. and Ryan-Collins, J. (2019) ‘Challenge-Driven Innovation Policy: Towards a New Policy Toolkit’, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 20: 421–443. Mishra, R. (1985) The Welfare State in Crisis: Social Thought and Social Change. Brighton: Wheatsheaf. Montgomery, T. (2016) ‘Are Social Innovation Paradigms Incommensurable?’, VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 27 (4): 1979–2000. Moulaert, F. and MacCallum, D. (2019) Advanced Introduction to Social Innovation. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Moulaert, F., Martinelli, F., Swyngedouw, E. and Gonzalez, S. (2005) ‘Towards Alternative Model(s) of Local Innovation’, Urban Studies, 42 (11): 1969–1990. Murray, R., Caulier-Grice, J. and Mulgan, G. (2010) The Open Book of Social Innovation. London: Young Foundation / NESTA. Nicholls, A., Simon, J. and Gabriel, M. (2015) ‘Introduction: Dimensions of Social Innovation’, in Nicholls, A., Simon, J. and Gabriel, M. (eds) New Frontiers in Social Innovation Research (pp. 1–26). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Nutley, S., Davies, H. T. O. and Walter, I. (2003) ‘Evidence-based Policy and Practice: Cross-Sector Lessons from the UK’, Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, 20 (June): 29–48. O’Connor, J. (1973) The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Paiche, E. (2021) Youthquake: Why African Demography Should Matter to the World. London: Head of Zeus. Phills, J. A., Deiglmeier, K. and Miller, D. T. (2008) ‘Rediscovering Social Innovation’, Stanford Social Innovation Review, 6 (Fall). At https://​ssir​.org/​articles/​entry/​rediscovering​_social​_innovation​ # (accessed 9 May 2023). Powell, M. (ed.) (2007) Understanding the Mixed Economy of Welfare. Bristol: Policy Press.

14  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Schambra, W. A. (2003) ‘This is Social Innovation?’, Philanthropy Roundtable, 14 July. At https://​www​ .hudson​.org/​domestic​-policy/​this​-is​-social​-innovation​- (accessed 9 May 2023). Seelos, C. and Mair, J. (2016) ‘When Innovation Goes Wrong’, Stanford Social Innovation Review (Fall). At https://​ssir​.org/​articles/​entry/​when​_innovation​_goes​_wrong (accessed 9 May 2023). Sinfield, A. (1978) ‘Analyses in the Social Division of Welfare’, Journal of Social Policy, 7 (2): 129–156. SIX Wayfinder (2017) From Here to There: Social Innovation from 2006–2027. At https://​www​ .sixwayfinder​.com/​provocations​-1/​2018/​2/​11/​from​-here​-to​-there​-social​-innovation​-from​-2006​-2027 (accessed 9 May 2023). Slee, B. (2019) ‘An Inductive Classification of Types of Social Innovation’, Scottish Affairs, 28 (2): 152–176. Social Innovation Exchange / Young Foundation (2010) Study on Social Innovation. European Union / Young Foundation. Spicker, P. (2006) Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. Bristol: Policy Press. Taylor, S. (1997) ‘Critical Policy Analysis: Exploring Contexts, Texts and Consequences’, Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 18 (1): 23–35. Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004) New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the European Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taylor-Gooby, P. (2013) The Double Crisis of the Welfare State and What We Can Do About It. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Terstriep, J. and Kleverbeck, M. (2018) ‘Economic Underpinning of Social Innovation Social Innovations’ Contribution to Inclusive Growth’, in Howaldt, J. et al. (eds) Atlas of Social Innovation: New Practices for a Better Future (pp. 33–36). Dortmund: TU Dortmund University. Titmuss, R. M. (1958) Essays on ‘The Welfare State’. London: George Allen & Unwin. Van Gestel, N. and Grotenbreg, S. (2021) ‘Collaborative Governance and Innovation in Public Service Settings’, Policy & Politics, 49 (2): 249–265. Williams, F. (2016) ‘Critical Thinking in Social Policy: The Challenges of Past, Present and Future’, Social Policy & Administration, 50 (6): 628–647.

2. Social innovation and public policy Geoff Mulgan

INTRODUCTION There are long traditions of innovation in social policy and rather more recent traditions of policies for social innovation. The first category includes the creation of comprehensive welfare states, social services to support families, the elderly or children in need, and new ideas about urban planning or neighbourhoods. The second category forms part of a broader range of policies for innovation, ranging from classic R&D to support for start-ups, innovation districts, tax credits and procurement. It includes: ● The deliberate cultivation of a new field of finance and investment for social innovation, using a variety of labels (such as social finance or impact investment), and accounting for many tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars or euros of investment by some measures. ● The deliberate cultivation of experimentation, including randomised control trials, to test novel ideas in social policy. ● The deeper integration of civil society and social movements into policy making, and a greater commitment to involving the beneficiaries of policy in their design. ● Radical strategies for deepening democracy, including empowerment of local communities. ● The emergence of new subfields such as digital social innovation or civic tech, or social innovation in the context of the circular economy. Social innovation is not a single thing, and there remain a wide variety of definitions of the field, which straddle multiple scales, types of organisation and ethos (see Edwards-Schachter and Wallace 2017, and Godin 2012). Moreover, very different countries have attempted to develop more coherent social innovation policies using widely divergent methods – from South Korea and Canada to Slovenia, Croatia, Taiwan and Sweden (see for example OECD 2016 for an overview of innovation policy in Croatia). In this chapter I try to provide an overview of some of these tendencies, and the dilemmas they bring with them, ranging from President Obama’s creation of an Office for Social Innovation to the European Union’s many programmes.

THE ARRIVAL AND RE-EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL INNOVATION Social innovation is not a new concept or practice, but in the first two decades of the century it became more part of the mainstream and visible in public policy (Mulgan, 2019). Governments provided support for new legal forms, tax incentives, capacity-building programmes, opening out of public procurement, as well as support for hundreds of social innovation centres, funds, courses and incubators of all kinds, most of which didn’t exist at the beginning of the century.

15

16  Handbook on social innovation and social policy

THE MOVE INTO POLICY Greater interest in public policy began in the mid-2000s. There was already some policy interest in supporting social entrepreneurship and social enterprise, partly prompted by well-funded initiatives such as the Schwab Foundation, the World Economic Forum, Ashoka and the Skoll Foundation. These tended to emphasise providing support for individual social entrepreneurs – and encouraged some government initiatives, such as the UK’s £100m endowment for UnLtd in the late 1990s.1 After the 2000s there was a move to a more systematic approach, partly because of recognition of the limits of the individual-focused programmes.2 In place of an emphasis on the transformative power of individual social entrepreneurs, attention also focused on the role of public sectors, NGOs, and the role of policy in either enabling or crushing innovations. So policies evolved both in relation to policy for social innovation – covering law, money, procurement – and policy as social innovation, using human-centred design, citizen participation, open processes, citizens assemblies, public policy labs and many others3 (see Reynolds, Gabriel and Heales 2017, and Anheier et al. 2015).

DIVERSITY ACROSS COUNTRIES National cultures remain very diverse – and what social innovation means in Italy, with a long-established social economy and cooperatives, is very different from what it means in a country like Mexico. Bangladesh is home to some of the strongest institutions for social innovation, like BRAC and Grameen, and has therefore had less need for national government policy, though the government’s a2i team, which drives digital innovations, is one of the most impressive. Elsewhere, in countries such as Kenya (home of Ushahidi and some of the most dynamic digital innovation in the world), the field sits away from the state. Moreover, what social innovation means in a US city, or in a European nation, or in a country emerging from conflict, is bound to be radically different. Equally diverse are the motivations – to speed up solutions to big social challenges, to grow civil society, to feed a new source of jobs or to redress regional inequalities. These complexities were particularly apparent in the work of the European Commission, which set out one of the most ambitious programmes of policies on social innovation in its Innovation Union initiative (2010) and Social Investment Package (2013).4 These built on a broad definition of the field and covered many fronts, particularly trying to shift the orientation of big spending programmes such as the regional funds and Horizon 2020.5 As this indicates, policies for social innovation are likely to cover many topics, and to overlap with policies in related fields such as inclusive innovation.6 In what follows, I summarise some of the key themes that tend to predominate. 1.

Centres and Hubs

The easiest, and often first, step has been to support the spread of social innovation centres and labs – dedicated physical spaces and organisations aiming to promote social innovation in the round. There are prominent examples in Quebec, Adelaide, Amsterdam, Beijing, Delhi, Lisbon, Rio, Tilburg, the Basque Country and many others. Some are based on foundations

Social innovation and public policy  17 (like the Lien Centre in Singapore or Bertha in Cape Town), others on buildings (such as the CSI in Toronto), while others originated as offshoots of government (like TACSI in Australia and Nesta in the UK). TACSI is a particularly impressive example that focused on social work, and initially an imaginative programme called ‘Family by Family’ that mobilised families experiencing difficulties to help others (it was partly prompted by my spell as a thinker in residence for the South Australian Government). The programme was adopted across Australia and is a good example of how some of the most successful centres straddled government and civil society. The appeal of supporting centres is that it can be done quite quickly and requires no major structural changes. 2. Law For governments interested in improving the overall conditions for social innovation, a starting point has been law – providing legal forms that better enable social innovation. The UK introduced legislation for Community Interest Companies that could take equity in the early 2000s. France created a ‘Société Coopérative D’intéret Collectif’ and then the ‘Loi Economie sociale et solidaire’ to allow for more flexibility. Others have promoted B-Corps as a way for business to strengthen its social commitment and there are now many thousands in operation worldwide. Elsewhere the priority has been to establish a solid legal and constitutional basis for NGOs to operate and trade (and to resist attempts by some governments, from China to Russia and Turkey, to reduce civil society freedoms). 3.

Investment and Finance

The next challenge is money. Governments can provide their own money in targeted funds (as happened for example in Hong Kong or Australia) or they can incentivise or encourage more private investment. There’s been a big expansion of social investment funds – although only a small minority focus on innovation, these provide a new route to help innovations grow to scale – and of new funding tools that can support social innovation, such as crowdfunding platforms. The UK, for example, created a wholesale bank – the ‘Big Society Capital’ – in the 2000s funded out of unclaimed bank accounts, in order to invest in a new field of investment intermediaries. It also encouraged new asset classes – social impact bonds – of which there are now several hundred globally, most of them dependent on government as a contractor. In 2015, the French Public Bank of Investment created FISO (Fonds d’Innovation Sociale) – a repayable advance or zero-rate loan. The Irish Government-backed Social Innovation Fund provides investment and support programmes tailored to early or later-stage social innovations. The challenge in this space is to ensure funding at multiple stages – from very small grants for potentially promising ideas, to start-up funding and ultimately funding for growth. Here the field is helped by the widening of the menu for finance including grant funds, investment through loans and equity, convertible funding, matched crowdfunding, as well as public procurement, outcomes-based funding and bonds, in addition to participatory budgeting. The other challenge is security. It’s much easier to invest in ventures with relatively predictable earnings (like energy) or with assets to provide collateral (such as housing) (see Nicholas 2016 for a good overview of the issues).

18  Handbook on social innovation and social policy 4.

Science and R&D

A big hope in the early 2000s was that R&D funding – which had grown as high as 4% of GDP in some countries – would come to encompass social innovation as well as innovation in hardware. There were signs this might happen with the Horizon Europe funds, but it has largely failed to materialise. At one point the European Commission incorporated social innovation into many of its programmes, including the European Social Fund and the Horizon 2020 science and research funding, and in November 2018 Carlos Moedas, who was then the European Union’s Commissioner in charge of research, science and technology, gave a fulsome endorsement of social innovation: ‘In the European Union,’ he said, ‘we are going to put more money into social innovation, not because it’s trendy, but because we believe that the future of innovation is about social innovation’ (Roberts 2018). Ideally a significant proportion of R&D spend, both public and private, would be directed to innovations that are social in both their ends and their means, and growing interest in aligning R&D with the SDGs is likely to provide another prompt to integrate social innovation into broader innovation policies.7 However, as the EU experience showed, powerful lobbies try hard to restrict R&D funds to traditional recipients. 5.

Public Sector Innovation

Some public leaders tried to integrate social innovation into their broader efforts to promote innovation. Prominent examples included mayors such as the late Won Soon Park in Seoul, Ilmar Reepalu in Malmo, Ada Colau in Barcelona, Virginio Merola in Bologna, or Ann Hidalgo in Paris. These efforts often overlapped with programmes to promote public participation in budget setting (as in Paris), interest in new forms of ownership and commons, or the use of open innovation tools (as London did under Mayor Sadiq Khan). There has also been growing interest within national governments in the use of new methods to promote innovation with challenge prizes, accelerators, internal teams. The UAE now commits 1% of public spending to public innovation – a rare example of shifting towards more serious allocations. Sweden has also been a pioneer, with ambitious programmes launched in the second half of the 2010s. Taiwan is particularly interesting as an example that has sought to fuse social innovation and collective intelligence and data projects, many led by Digital Minister Audrey Tang. Many of these are tracked by the OECD’s Observatory of Public Sector Innovation (OPSI). 6.

Digital Social Innovation

The ubiquity of the Internet and mobile phones has spawned a dynamic field of digital social innovation that has increasingly interested policy makers, partly because of the potential scalability of digital solutions. The European Commission-supported programme on Digital Social Innovation mapped well over 2,000 organisations involved in digital social innovation projects in health, democracy and welfare, and there are thousands of others around the world sometimes described with the ‘civic tech’ label. An important recent group, for example, worked on open source intelligence, an approach that has become particularly visible during the Ukraine war. Some of these projects are supported by social innovation incubators and accelerators of all kinds, and transnational networks of social incubators such as GSEN, Impact Hub and

Social innovation and public policy  19 SenseCube. They pose policy challenges because even the most successful digital social innovations will never deliver the kind of exponential financial returns that supports venture capital in commercial innovation (and allows it to see 90% of investments fail). Instead, a greater emphasis has been put on opening up public procurement, and making more use of open source, to break open the grip of big commercial providers. Another recent interest has been in how civil society can better shape the 4th Industrial Revolution rather than being mainly a bystander (see Mulgan 2021). 7.

Sectoral Initiatives

The most important challenge for the field of social innovation has been to achieve and demonstrate big inroads on the major issues of our times such as ageing, unemployment, stagnant democracy or climate change. This implies that the priority for policy should be to move from generic social innovation policies to policies that link to major challenges and specific fields such as care for the elderly, achieving net zero or employment. This is beginning to happen, particularly around climate change where it is increasingly recognised that technology-focused innovation needs to be matched with innovation around lifestyles, neighbourhoods and social practices, such as food and food waste. This more focused work then has to decide on its level of focus. Much past activity focused on the individual (social entrepreneurs and innovators) – the individual venture, or the individual innovation – while at the other end of the spectrum, macro initiatives tried to change the behaviour of all businesses, or all charities, or promote systems change at a global level. But more impact may come from tackling issues at a middle level – specific sectors in specific places. For example, how to sharply improve the performance of the housing sector, or childcare, or training in a city or region, or connecting social innovation to programmes to cut carbon emissions. 8. Evidence The field of social innovation has spread in parallel with greater interest in evidence. In the US, initiatives to promote evidence culminated in Congress passing the Foundations for the Evidence-Based Policy Making Act in 2018. The UK set up a dozen ‘What Works Centres’, covering fields such as children’s social care, and during the pandemic supported the International Public Policy Observatory to track actions, evidence and innovations around topics such as mental health and homelessness, and to make the key findings from evidence accessible to decision-makers. A good example was the flurry of actions to support homeless people early in the pandemic, including in many US cities. Another example has been the spread of experiments around variants of Universal Basic Income.8 There has been much debate about common standards of evidence and how to ensure that attention to impact doesn’t crush innovations too early while also measuring impact rigorously. 9. Capacity Social innovation depends on certain capabilities: knowledge about how to generate ideas, develop them and scale them. Some governments have attempted to grow capacity, including many EU programmes supporting practical skills in design, prototyping, pilots, experiments,

20  Handbook on social innovation and social policy social investment, evaluation and iteration, often with the help of online tools and MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses), mobilising existing universities and colleges, and creating more grassroots academies. Some of the best arguments for growing these capacities include the resilience of civil society (see for example Moore et al. 2012) – a point confirmed during the COVID-19 pandemic when the strength of civil society, and more specifically the strength of relationships between local government and civil society turned out to be a good predictor of performance (see Mulgan, France and Chataway 2021). Another approach, which includes significant amounts of academic writing, has emphasised social innovation in relation to local economic and social development, though this has tended to emphasise broad analysis rather than specific policy prescription (see for example Moulaert et al. 2007). 10. Leadership A final theme has been the attempt to use the influence and convening power of government to advance social innovation. Barack Obama set up an office in the White House. Ex-Prime Minister Theresa May in the UK set up an ‘Inclusive Economy Partnership’ linking business, government and civil society to speed up innovations. President Moon in Korea set up a team for a while in the Blue House. In each case the aim was to speed up social innovation while also catalysing action outside government. Programmes of this kind have been less visible during the pandemic and subsequent crises. False starts and political winds? Not everything succeeded. Obama’s Office for Social Innovation in the White House did good work but did not survive the election of Donald Trump (and was not recreated under President Biden). The UK’s Big Society programme, initiated by then Prime Minister David Cameron, likewise didn’t survive a change of political leadership. Other leaders, like Angela Merkel, showed interest in social innovation, but didn’t take strategic moves to support it. Justin Trudeau in Canada was more energetic, partly thanks to a well-organised ecosystem of philanthropy and NGOs, and committed $1bn in support for social innovation in the late 2010s.9 Meanwhile, some traditional innovation agencies adopted some of the language of social innovation. Sweden’s Vinnova, Finland’s Sitra, Canada’s MaRS and Malaysia’s AIM all to different degrees complemented technology support with a new focus on social innovation. Europe’s Climate KIC has been an energetic supporter of innovative methods, as has the UNDP with its Accelerator Labs network set up at the end of the 2010s. Universities have also become more engaged with social innovation with many far-reaching programmes. Cardiff’s Social Science Park, launched in 2022, is a particularly interesting example as it co-locates academics, civil society, national and city government officials, to enable joint working on major social challenges.

COMMON CHALLENGES Three common problems have been apparent in all of these programmes. The first is patience. It takes time to build up new sectors and habits. Modern systems of science and R&D took many decades to reach maturity. Mature social and impact investment fields have generally taken a decade or two to emerge.

Social innovation and public policy  21 A second problem or challenge is getting the right balance between innovation and adoption. For most organisations for much of the time, innovation may be less important than effective implementation of existing ideas or adoption of ideas from elsewhere. A third problem has been what’s sometimes called ‘solutionism’: the belief, often promoted by Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and philanthropists, that for every problem there is a solution that can be rationally discovered and then scaled up. Social issues are rarely quite so simple and generally require action on multiple fronts.

THE GAP AND THE CLIMATE Despite the faltering spread of policies for social innovation, the scale of activity is still small relative to the scale of needs. The projects and initiatives listed above are modest and most of the organisations mentioned above are fragile. In some fields, hype has exceeded reality so far (including, at times, impact investment). Meanwhile, vastly more innovation funding still goes to the military than to society, and the world’s brainpower is still directed far more to the needs of the wealthy and warfare than it is to social priorities. More worrying is the shift in climate. Relatively centrist, pragmatic governments of both left and right were sympathetic to some of the arguments for social innovation. By contrast, authoritarian leaders of the kind who are thriving in much of the world – from Bolsonaro to Dutarte, Trump to Erdogan – tend to be hostile, suspicious of civil society and activism of any kind, and much more favourable to innovation that’s linked either to the military or to big business. China saw an upsurge of interest in social innovation in the 2000s, but then a sharp turnaround as government tightened up controls on civil society in the 2010s. A similar pattern was seen in Russia. In the light of this experience, the sometimes charged arguments (mainly in Europe) about whether social innovation and policies for social innovation are masks for neoliberalism or pro-market strategies look rather anachronistic and beside the point (see for example De Pieri and Teasdale 2021).

REFLECTION AND CONCLUSION The good news is that the range of policy initiatives described above now means that it’s becoming possible to do more serious comparative analysis of national strategies, making it easier to learn about what does and doesn’t work, and what deserves to be copied. But the bad news is that social innovation practices and ecosystems remain fragile.

NOTES 1. 2.

These and later policies are documented in OECD (2010). In 2006 the Young Foundation and CCCPE jointly organised an event in Beijing that led to the creation of SIX, the Social Innovation Exchange. The event brought together foundations, innovators, social entrepreneurs and corporates, along with senior figures from governments in China, the UK and elsewhere. It set out a rough roadmap towards making social innovation more mainstream; this was later published as Social Silicon Valleys by the Young Foundation and the Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship: Mulgan et al. (2006).

22  Handbook on social innovation and social policy 3. See the useful report Social Innovation Policy in Europe, Where Next? (Reynolds, Gabriel and Heales 2017), and Anheier et al. 2015. 4. At https://​eur​-lex​.europa​.eu/​legal​-content/​EN/​TXT/​PDF/​?uri​=​CELEX:​52010DC0546 and https://​ ec​.europa​.eu/​social/​main​.jsp​?langId​=​en​&​catId​=​1044​&​newsId​=​1807​&​furtherNews​=​yes (accessed 20 November 2023). 5. The Commission adopted a definition that I had proposed: ‘Social innovations are innovations that are social in both their ends and their means. They are innovations that are not only good for society but also enhance individuals’ capacity to act’ (2013, p. 6). See also Reynolds, Gabriel and Heales 2017. 6. See for example Krlev et al. 2020. 7. See for example the STRINGS (Steering Research and Innovation for the Global Goals) project backed by the UN and others to steer research towards the global goals. 8. A rapid evidence review on basic income experiments can be found here: https://​theippo​.co​.uk/​basic​ -income​-review​-policy​-design/​ (accessed 20 November 2023). 9. He was able to build on an earlier wave of activity documented in Goldenberg et al. 2009.

REFERENCES Anheier, H.K., Krlev, G., Preuss, S., Mildenberger, G., Einarsson, T. and Flening, E. (2015) Social Innovation in Policy: EU and Country Level Profiles and Policy Perspectives, Deliverable 2.2 of the project: ‘Impact of the Third Sector as Social Innovation’ (ITSSOIN), European Commission, 7th Framework Programme, 28 February. At http://​itssoin​.eu/​site/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2015/​09/​ITSSOIN​ _D2​_2​_Profiles​-and​-policy​-perspectives​.pdf (accessed 16 March 2003). De Pieri, B. and Teasdale, S. (2021) ‘Radical Futures? Exploring the Policy Relevance of Social Innovation’, Social Enterprise Journal, 17 (1): 94–110. Edwards-Schachter, M. and Wallace, M.L. (2017) ‘Shaken, But Not Stirred: Sixty Years of Defining Social Innovation’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 119: 64–79. European Commission (2013) Guide to Social Innovation. At https://​ec​.europa​.eu/​regional​_policy/​ sources/​docgener/​presenta/​social​_innovation/​social​_innovation​_2013​.pdf (accessed 16 March 2022). Godin, B. (2012) ‘Social Innovation: Utopias of Innovation from c. 1830 to the Present’, Project on the Intellectual History of Innovation Working Paper No. 11. At http://​ www​ .csiic​ .ca/​ PDF/​ SocialInnovation​_2012​.pdf (accessed 16 March 2022). Goldenberg, M., Wathira, K., Larry, O. and Williamson, M. (2009) ‘Social Innovation in Canada: An Update’, Canadian Policy Research Networks Research Report, September. At https://​oaresource​ .library​.carleton​.ca/​cprn/​51684​_en​.pdf (accessed 16 March 2022). Krlev, G., Einarsson, T., Wijkström, F., Heyer, L. and Mildenberger, G. (2020) ‘The Policies of Social Innovation: A Cross-National Analysis’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 49 (3): 457–478. Moore, M.L., Westley, F., Tjornbo, O., Holroyd, C. and Nicholls, A. (2012) ‘The Loop, the Lens, and the Lesson: Using Resilience Theory to Examine Public Policy and Social Innovation’, in Nicholls, A. and Murdock, A. (eds), Social Innovation: Blurring Boundaries to Reconfigure Markets. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 89–113. Moulaert, F., Martinelli, F., González, S. and Swyngedouw, E. (2007) ‘Social Innovation and Governance in European Cities: Urban Development Between Path Dependency and Radical Innovation’, European Urban and Regional Studies, 14 (3): 195–209. Mulgan, G. (2019) Social Innovation. Bristol: Policy Press. Mulgan, G. (2021) ‘The Social Economy and the Fourth Industrial Revolution’, Stanford Social Innovation Review, April. Mulgan, G., France, R. and Chataway, J. (2021) Social Capital: What Roles Has It Played during COVID-19, and How Can It Be Harnessed for Recovery? International Public Policy Observatory, 9 November. At https://​covidandsociety​.com/​social​-capital​-roles​-during​-covid​-19​-harnessed​-for​ -recovery/​(accessed 16 March 2022). Mulgan, G., Tucker, S., Ali, R. and Sanders, B. (2006) Social Innovation: What it is, Why it Matters and How It Can be Accelerated. London: The Young Foundation. At https://​i3w7d2w8​.stackpathcdn​.com/​

Social innovation and public policy  23 wp​-content/​uploads/​2012/​10/​Social​-Innovation​-what​-it​-is​-why​-it​-matters​-how​-it​-can​-be​-accelerated​ -March​-2007​.pdf (accessed 16 March 2022). Nicholas, A. (ed.) (2016) Social Finance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. OECD (2010) ‘Social Entrepreneurship and Social Innovation’, SMEs, Entrepreneurship and Innovation, OECD Publishing. doi: 10.1787/9789264080355-50-en OECD (2016) Social Innovation Policy Framework for Croatia, Global Relations Policy Handbook, June. At https://​www​.oecd​.org/​south​-east​-europe/​programme/​Social​_Innovation​_Policy​_Framework​ _Croatia​.pdf (accessed 16 March 2022). Reynolds, S., Gabriel, M. and Heales, C. (2017) Social Innovation Policy in Europe, Where Next?, D5.3: Annual State of the Union Report – Part 1. At https://​media​.nesta​.org​.uk/​documents/​social​_innovation​ _policy​_in​_europe​_​-​_where​_next​.pdf (accessed 16 March 2022). Roberts, J. (2018) ‘Carlos Moedas: The EU will Fund More Social Innovation Because it’s the Future of Innovation’, Horizon: The EU Research & Innovation Magazine. At https://​ec​.europa​.eu/​research​ -and​-innovation/​en/​horizon​-magazine/​carlos​-moedas​-eu​-will​-fund​-more​-social​-innovation​-because​ -its​-future​-innovation (accessed 20 November 2023).

3. Social innovation and social policy analysis Stephen Sinclair

Social Policy is a problem-oriented discipline, defined by the issues that concern it rather than any particular methods. As such, it has flexible boundaries and borrows readily from across the social sciences. Although definitions are contested, Social Policy involves studying collective responses to recognised needs and the systematic promotion of welfare, interpreting that concept widely. Social innovation (SI), as defined in the Introduction to this Handbook, is obviously relevant to this interest. This chapter discusses the relationship between SI and the discipline of Social Policy rather than actual social policies. The chapter discusses how engaging with SI could inform Social Policy analysis, considers what insights it may contribute to important Social Policy questions, and highlights some of the lessons and welfare policy options it offers. The chapter also considers in turn what the study of Social Policy might contribute to understanding and advancing SI. As it is more likely that the respective hopes and shared promise of each field will be advanced by dialogue between them, mutual learning should be encouraged.

PRAGMATISM AND PRACTICALITY Many of the questions that Social Policy addresses are universal. Providing care and protecting against risks are requirements in every human community. However, as populations expand and societies become more complex and diverse, the institutions that service needs and provide against the exigencies of life become more differentiated and institutionalised (Titmuss, 1958). Social Policy developed as a discipline to analyse and evaluate these various responses (and failures to respond) and service systems. It was a relatively late addition to the family of social sciences, and first emerged around the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries as an applied discipline, concerned with training professional welfare workers (Pinker, 1971). As a result, it initially focused on informing provision and improving practice. However, Social Policy analysts1 quickly learned not to take their lead from nor set the subject’s scope by the institutional boundaries of the ‘welfare state’ nor restrict their analyses to state welfare. The variety of forms and varied effects of collective responses to troubling social conditions are considerable. These alternatives are also revealing: as Baldwin observes, ‘approached from the right angle, the nuts and bolts of social policy testify to the heated struggles of classes and interests. The battle behind the welfare state lays bare the structures and conflicts of modern society’ (1990: 1). Welfare provision and systems tell us a great deal about a society, such as how social relations are conceptualised, and which issues and groups are and are not prioritised (notably women and care work, for much of the time: Brannen and Moss, 1997). Welfare provision is also an institutionalised expression of ideas about rights and duties, and sentiments of solidarity and shared identity (van Oorschot, 1998). Welfare systems reflect in part different states of economic development, but are not wholly determined by that, and the form they can take is limited only by human imagination (Wilensky, 1975). 24

Social innovation and social policy analysis  25 Social policies and welfare regimes are so diverse and complicated that categorising them – let alone comparing and analysing their respective qualities – is both challenging and contested (Kennet, 2014). Social theorists and policy analysts are forced to impose an artificial order to simplify and manage the daunting complexity and diversity of the world. As noted in another context, ‘All models are wrong, but some are useful’ (Box, 1979: 202). Both ‘SI’ and the ‘welfare state’ are conceptual abstractions, but useful ways to make sense of a diverse range of activities and social arrangements, provided their artificiality is never forgotten. Most of those who develop SIs focus on practicalities; their attention is directed to effecting change rather than analysis per se. ‘These are feet-on-the-ground head-in-the-stars people’ such as those described by Donnison in the 1970s, running a community housing project for recovering alcoholics in the UK – ‘humane, courageous and effective people’ (1982: 102). Such pioneering and energetic reformers may not regard themselves as social innovators (certainly not at that time), nor have much active interest in nor engagement with Social Policy analysis. But much of the history of Social Policy analysis has documented work of this kind, so the relationship between it and SI is not new. And, irrespective of whether social innovators know or care, Social Policy analysis has also directly informed and indirectly influenced SIs – by examining where they have come from, how they operate, why they take particular forms, how effective they are, and what might be learned from them. Corresponding to a measure of indifference towards Social Policy analysis among some practising SIs, there has been a degree of scepticism towards SI from within Social Policy. This is partly an expression of frustration at the apparent lack of impact of SI; in particular, the seeming inability of SIs to deliver sustained societal-level change (as noted in the Introduction). Critics of SI see it as perennially full of promise but failing to deliver; or, at least, not up to the scale of many of the challenges studied by Social Policy. The critical questions that Social Policy poses towards SI include: What is the evident impact of SIs? What are its distinctive contributions, particular strengths, apparent limitations, and what can be learned from these and applied to address social problems and advance welfare?

A SHARED AGENDA There are two compelling reasons why Social Policy would benefit from considering SI. First, Social Policy analysis must now be informed by a global perspective; second, more effective responses to chronic challenges and emerging risks are required. SI has the potential to contribute to both of these areas. A Global and Comparative Perspective The scope of the discipline of Social Policy has always been wide (Titmuss, 1974). However its parameters and interests have expanded significantly in recent decades (George and Page, 2004). SI has become increasingly relevant to Social Policy as the latter adopts a global rather than national perspective, and looks beyond established practice for lessons on how to address new challenges and develop better responses to more familiar problems. Leaving aside the contentious question of whether SI emerges in response to the ‘failure’ of state welfare, it is clear that in many parts of the world, the state is not necessarily the principal provider of welfare services and social protection. National welfare states do not operate in

26  Handbook on social innovation and social policy some developing countries, and this creates the need and opportunity for SI. This is prompting interest in socially innovative models of mixed provision, co-creation and citizen participation (Nicholls et al., 2015: 8).2 Perhaps SI might also be a viable or better option in countries without a fully developed central ‘welfare state’. SI may offer a way for such countries to avoid mass bureaucratic state-centred provision and move directly to bottom-up, post-welfare state services. SI may offer a potential leapfrog opportunity in such cases, comparable to how the development of mobile telephony allowed some countries to by-pass large-scale investment in landline telecommunications. This infrastructural imperative created opportunity and facilitated the development of innovative forms of service provision, such as the MPesa mobile money transfer service (Raworth, 2017: 198). However, perhaps such an approach relegates these less-developed societies to a second-class form of welfare provision. The only way to know is to undertake comparative Social Policy research and examine the respective impact of conventional forms of welfare provision relative to SI. One survey of the development of Social Policy analysis concluded, ‘Looking ahead, then, it may be that South–North policy transmission could become as important as the once-assumed superiority of the North–South power relationship’ (Ellison and Haux, 2020: 14). There is no monopoly of insight into nor ideas on how to address social challenges, and SIs and social policies developed in the Global South provide a potential range of imaginative alternatives from which the rest of the world might learn. Of course, this involves formidable challenges in determining what lessons may be drawn from different contexts and how far particular aspects of SI may be transferred and implanted elsewhere. However, this is an area with a rich tradition of Social Policy insight3 and one other reason why the discipline will benefit from engaging with the literature and practice of SI. Responding to Risks As many Social Policy analysts have observed, the national welfare states that were developed after World War II were created to meet ‘Old Social Risks’ (OSRs) affecting the majority of the population at some time and in some respect (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). Mass mainstream services were designed to address everyday demands and common exigencies, such as illness, the additional costs of raising children, unemployment and old age. However, these systems were not set up to deal with a range of ‘New Social Risks’ (NSRs) that subsequently emerged and have intensified in recent years. Several different ‘giants’ now troll society in addition to those documented by William Beveridge in 1942. The institutions established and measures taken to address ignorance, idleness, sickness, squalor and want in the post-War period are not equipped neither to tackle chronic insecure and low-paid employment, ‘left behind’ and disposable communities (Bauman, 2004), and changing and increasing care demands, nor to respond to calls to reduce inequalities between identity groups. Established welfare systems have struggled to devise satisfactory and sustained responses to meet these needs. Measures taken to date have not been embedded nor embraced in the way that older welfare services were, but are often ‘meagrely funded, more stringently regulated and highly stigmatic’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2015: 598). While OSR systems strain under the pressure of increased demand (e.g., due to population aging), and NSRs remain at best partially addressed, a new set of Grand Societal Challenges are looming that threatens the viability of welfare states (Mazzucato, 2018). The UN World Social Report (2020) identified the main current threats and future risks as widening dispari-

Social innovation and social policy analysis  27 ties in income and wealth; technological developments, including automation on employment, cyber dependency and the likely development of Artificial Intelligence; climate change; increased urbanisation; and mass migration. To this ominous list could be added, increasing social fragmentation, political polarisation and anomie. It has been suggested that these threats are not simply coterminous but compounding, so that many societies – if not the whole world – are transitioning from a situation of ‘polycrisis’ to ‘permacrisis’. This is a condition where societies are not faced with separate hazards but a rapid succession of complex major challenges that overlap and interact (Zuleeg et al., 2021). Despite these threats, conventional welfare states should not be dismissed, and have proven to be vital in sustaining society, particularly during recent crises (Pierson, 2021). The value of collective protection and progressive provision should also be defended against ideologically motivated detractors (Jencks, 2015). However, current social policies are not addressing effectively either existing or imminent challenges, and need to adapt to continue to be relevant. This is not a new requirement – no national welfare system has persisted unaffected by and unresponsive to social changes. But the magnitude and complexity of current threats are considerable, and new and better responses to NSRs and future challenges are required. It is not possible to specify in advance what form any effective responses will take. However, they will need to be different from what is already in place; which is to say, innovation is necessary. It therefore seems that SI – in one form or another – will become indispensable to the development of social policies. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development report on Policy Innovations for Transformative Change noted that, to meet the Sustainable Development Goals, ‘innovative policies, which are informed by solid evidence and grounded in normative values such as social justice and sustainability, need to be forged through inclusive political processes, new forms of partnership, multilevel governance reforms and increased state capacity’ (UNRISD, 2016: 5). Gathering evidence, probing the normative foundations of policies and informing how they are implemented, is the essence of Social Policy analysis. Therefore, the dialogue between innovation and Social Policy must intensify. Social Policy has several distinctive contributions to make that will enrich the understanding and effectiveness of SI. In particular, four areas of Social Policy insight are worth considering: the inescapability of politics; the questions of rights; the importance of structural change; and recognising the darker side of welfare.

SOCIAL POLICY LESSONS FOR SOCIAL INNOVATION Lesson 1: Politics is Inescapable SI scholars and practitioners are not blind to the significance of politics in influencing how SIs develop, operate and make an impact (or fail to do so). It is recognised that ‘SI does not emerge in an institutional vacuum, but usually “bumps” into elements of the (welfare) state’ (Ghys, 2017: 5). There are many studies of the institutional and political–cultural ecosystems that facilitate or retard the development and impact of SI (e.g., Pel et al., 2019). Those who study SI recognise that seeking to advance alternative organisational forms and empower some might threaten the vested interest, which could generate resistance. Therefore, ‘for social innovation to have real impact, engaging with political processes is essential’ (Nicholls et al., 2015: 17).

28  Handbook on social innovation and social policy In addition, there is a strand within SI scholarship and activism that is inherently political and envisages SI as a radical movement promoting new social formations (e.g., Moulaert et al., 2009; Banerjee et al., 2019). Other SI advocates, from a more social enterprise and social business orientation, might feel that SI offers a win–win outcome and are more agnostic about political questions. However, actions that impact upon resources can never be simply technocratic. Genuinely transformative change – rather than the partial amelioration of problems – is likely to cause some disruption, impinge upon sectional interests and involve considerations of power, which is the very stuff of politics. Social Policy analysis has devoted considerable attention to the politics and conflict involved in welfare interventions and policy reforms. The origins of state welfare in class conflict – or efforts to pre-empt such conflict – are well documented (Korpi, 1978). Similarly, the conflicts and social divisions that have shaped the differential development, coverage and status of different forms of welfare have been central concerns to Social Policy (e.g., Titmuss, 1958; Mann, 1991). Marshall famously described the status of shared social citizenship as being ‘at war’ with class divisions (1992). Subsequent analyses of social divisions of welfare from Feminist, Disabled rights, Anti-racist and other perspectives have extended and deepened understanding of the conflicts involved over contested conceptions of citizenship and differential welfare entitlements (e.g., Lister, 1997; Halvorsen et al., 2017; Saloojee, 2003). As much of SI has been focused on practicalities and concerned with getting things done, it has perhaps paid less attention to why some things get done while others do not, and may in fact be inhibited or prevented. Contributing to a better understanding of the politics of welfare is therefore an area where Social Policy analysis might usefully inform the study of SI. For example, it has been observed that the sustainability of many SIs depends upon the political context, as decisions about providing public funding and other supports are vulnerable to the fortunes and favour of political sponsors (Brandson, 2014: 9). The downside of SIs being new and nimble is that they may be susceptible to changing fashions and the outcomes of political contests. As they may be less institutionalised, some SIs are less protected by the vested interests and the forces of inertia that lead to path dependency in established welfare services and systems. To adapt a familiar philosophical tenet, existence can take precedence over effectiveness. A common plaintive complaint by advocates of innovation is, ‘Too much of the money available to address social needs is used to maintain the status quo, because it is given to organisations that are wedded to the current solutions, delivery models, and recipients’ (Christiansen et al., 2006). The positional authority of existing institutions can over-ride the potential of risky innovation. There is a considerable body of Social Policy analysis investigating how institutional authority, political discourses and shifting paradigms shape the policy environment and resource allocation, and this is available to illuminate the fate of SI (e.g., Hall et al., 1975; Kingdon, 2010). Lesson 2: Recognise Rights It is clear that much mainstream social welfare provision does not always serve vulnerable and disadvantaged groups well, particularly women, minority groups, disabled people and those prevented from achieving economic independence. This failure to deliver might be thought to provide a prima facie case for SI. However, this relates to the issue of the sustainability of SIs just discussed. It is not enough for an SI to be good just once nor for a short while. The services

Social innovation and social policy analysis  29 provided to vulnerable users must be reliable and provision consistent. This raises the issue of users’ rights; in particular, whether SIs can guarantee social citizenship or human rights. Compared to Social Policy analysis, there is relatively little discussion in the SI literature of service users’ rights. It could be argued that it is neither the responsibility nor the purpose of SIs to address rights, except in so far as no agent should violate human rights. If SIs were entirely distinct from statutory services, it might be thought that questions of rights or citizenship do not arise. However, this view rests upon a narrow conceptualisation of ‘citizenship’ and also ignores the relationship between SI and the wider legal and welfare environment (Lister, 1998). An SI that has any longevity and degree of formality at all requires and acquires some legal status, and is therefore constituted in part by law and social regulation. SIs therefore operate within a legal context and have obligations both to society and their users. What, therefore, can users have a reasonable right to expect and what claims can they legitimately make in relation to the SI? As organisations that espouse participation and aim to empower users, SIs may involve a different relationship between providers and users from that of conventional welfare service providers. In some SIs there may be no clear distinction between providers and users, as those involved operate as prosumers. In these circumstances, the SI is not an entirely external institution in relation to which someone has rights but is a members’ association in which ‘rights’ comprise implicit norms, expectations and moral conventions. If there is no real division between users and providers, or the former have such effective voice that they control the organisation, then perhaps they don’t need to have a set of rights to which to appeal. In fact, any need to articulate official rights might be interpreted as a sign of the breakdown in these quotidian relationships. Alternatively, it may be an effect of scale, as the SI becomes too large to rest upon informal conventions entirely. It could therefore be the case that the clients and users of SIs have either limited justiciable rights or have powers rather than rights. Whatever the particular relationship may be, SIs have a potential impact upon users’ wellbeing and rights in several respects, so this issue cannot be ignored. In particular, Social Policy analysis highlights two respects in which SI has a potential positive relationship to rights and three ways in which SI may pose a risk to rights. The first potential positive impact of SI is that it may enhance users’ capabilities to access and realise their rights to other citizenship services (e.g., housing, social protection, etc.) by providing them with the resources needed to exercise these rights. There are many SIs that, either through advocacy or empowerment, enhance the effective demand of disadvantaged groups. A second and related potentially positive contribution of SI to rights relates to equalities issues and addressing the disadvantaged experienced by discriminated or excluded populations. Many SIs have been created explicitly to meet the needs of marginalised groups and promote their right to equal treatment or more equal outcomes. In both these respects, SI has the potential to enhance and help realise rights. However, against these potentially positive effects, SI might weaken or jeopardise social citizenship rights in several ways. The first concern is the risk of segregated provision and residualisation. Welfare services to meet OSRs do not help only the poorest but are used by all, even if this is not evident to everyone (Hills, 2017). Both NSRs and emerging grand challenges may impact first and hardest upon the most vulnerable, but no one is immune to their consequences. SIs that are directed mainly or entirely to addressing the needs of the most marginalised are potentially fragile and will not be able to protect their rights and wellbeing in the face of the current and imminent challenges. SI that focus only upon a few or on the symp-

30  Handbook on social innovation and social policy toms of social risk will have a limited impact and fail to protect rights as social and economic conditions are transformed. A second way in which SI poses a risk to rights is that it may be used as a substitute for full and formal citizenship. In some cases, SIs have not simply complemented conventional welfare provision but have taken on roles previously performed by public policies. In these circumstances, the SI must be assessed by comparison with the standards of public provision. As Nicholls et al. remark, there can be a democratic deficit when SI takes the place of what were previously ‘the welfare responsibilities of the elected state’ (2015: 20). What was before a matter of policy, with some measure of political accountability, becomes a private civil society matter. Irrespective of the quality of the service or outcome, this privatisation shifts the accountability of providers and alters service users’ rights. This is one basis for objections to funding and delivering public welfare services using Social Impact Bonds, as these convert service users from citizens with rights into commodities used to trigger payments for providers (Sinclair et al., 2021). A third way in which the relationship between SI and citizenship rights may not be positive is that SI could weaken the state’s responsibility to provide rights. If SIs are catering to some need or addressing some rights, this might weaken the imperative upon the state to provide. It is an open question whether this advances or retrenches rights, and one to which Social Policy analysis could usefully contribute. For example, is the right to food stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights satisfied by the availability of foodbanks (OHCHR, 2010)? Would a state be able to claim it is fulfilling its duty in this regard if it takes no action other than to allow people to access the food they need by means of an SI or charity? (UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, n.d.). Or is the existence of an SI or charity itself testimony to a failure to protect this right by other – perhaps more regular and dignified – means? Respecting rights involves more than providing outputs – the basis of the claim to entitlement is important. Many SIs provide excellent, respectful and responsive services and empower users through co-production. But a justiciable right is a different form of power, and not one that should be lightly weakened or replaced by SI. Lesson 3: Think Big Social innovators are able to be unreasonable, in the sense that George Bernard Shaw described in Man and Superman, i.e., they create the change that they want to see rather than wait for the world to change as they would like. As largely independent civil society and user-led initiatives, SIs are also less bound by many of the factors that inhibit innovation among public bodies, such as institutional inertia, media scrutiny, public demand and political considerations. An advantage of the small scale and localism of many SIs is that they may go under the political radar and therefore have the freedom to prioritise users’ needs however they see fit. The response of many SIs to unsatisfied need and unresolved problems is collective self-help rather than protest. In this sense, such SIs are apolitical, with both the positive and negative potentialities that entails. On the one hand, practical and action-oriented SIs may have no need to build a consensus for social reform. On the other hand, some SI practices and discourses may depoliticise social problems. In this sense, SI may not be as disruptive as some advocates suggest. The practical unreasonableness of SI is not necessarily disagreeable to the status quo if it does not disturb it much or even serves to preserve it.

Social innovation and social policy analysis  31 The practical and sectional focus of many SIs can limit the scale of their impact. Westley and Nino describe SI as ‘a complex process that profoundly changes the basic routines, resource and authority flows, or beliefs of the social system in which it occurs’ (2010: 2). This is a visionary but demanding definition of SI. How many initiatives can claim to have made such a transformational impact? If SI is defined widely enough (e.g., to include organised labour, the formation of welfare states, the women’s movement, etc.) then perhaps profound changes can be claimed. But this overstretches the concept so that it become effectively meaningless. Restricting SI to refer to actual initiatives and organisations that address social and environmental challenges in novel, effective and empowering ways leaves fewer plausible examples of successful and sustained radical departure. As even staunch advocates of SI acknowledge, ‘There aren’t enough examples of large-scale, deep and systemic change’, and so far ‘success looks marginal’ in relation to the scale of many of the problems that many SIs address (SIX Wayfinder, 2017: 3, 1) Social innovators are practical problem solvers. Why isn’t this good enough for Social Policy, which is, after all, supposedly concerned with solving problems? The answer is that the cumulative learning of Social Policy analysis shows that structural- and system-level change is required to address the foundations of problematic social conditions. As the UNRISD notes, transformation ‘requires changes in social structures and relations, including addressing the growing economic and political power of elites and patterns of stratification related to class, gender, ethnicity, religion or location that can lock people (including future generations) into disadvantage and constrain their choices and agency’ (2016: 3). The (probably apocryphal) story is told of how at a public event during the Depression a well-intentioned social reformer was explaining to a crowd of unemployed workers how a nutritious meal could be made from just the head of a fish, but was interrupted by a pointed heckle – ‘Who ate the rest of the fish?’4 Some well-meaning and inspired social innovator might be able to invent a new way to cook a fish head while ignoring the question of what happened to the rest of it. The same lacuna marks much of SI, and its more astute commentators recognise, ‘small-scale, disconnected, individual projects’ will not produce systemic change (SIX Wayfinder, 2017: 10). Community initiatives that only address the local symptoms of problems will only have a community impact. They are laudable but limited. Even larger voluntary collectives have limited impact when they act on their own. How many credit unions (or Time Banks or other imaginative SIs) does it take to change society? Evidently, more than we currently have, as credit unions have been around since the 1850s (Sinclair, 2014). Similarly, although microcredit is imaginative and admirable in many respects it has not transformed the position of women in poorer countries. One systematic review of microcredit concluded, ‘there is no evidence for an effect of microcredit on women’s control over household spending … [and it is] very unlikely that, overall, microcredit has a meaningful and substantial impact on empowerment processes in a broader sense’ (Vaessen et al., 2014: 10). It may only take one such SI to change an individual’s life. But unless we are happy to change society one life at a time, this is not the scale of impact needed nor the level of activity required. Unless allied with movements pressing for fundamental change, SI accommodates rather than challenges social conditions. As Banerjee et al. conclude, an ‘inconvenient truth’ confronting SIs is, ‘collective challenges are best met by political consensus and the establishment of common resource pools through systems of taxation and the shared sense of ownership and obligation they engender’ (2019: 3). This realisation should temper expectations of the scope

32  Handbook on social innovation and social policy of effect that social innovators and individual SIs are likely to have. They cannot impose their will upon a political system, as is sometimes implied by the image of the heroic dynamic change-maker. To effect genuine and sustained transformational change requires mobilising strategic interests and/or social movements to generate and maintain a supportive political climate and policy environment. This is the lesson of the long gestation and ultimate global impact of neo-liberalism since the formation of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009; Burgin, 2015). Social Policy analysis and the literature on social movements highlight how political environments and policy possibilities are changed, and SI would be empowered and emboldened by engaging more from these studies (Nicholls et al., 2015: 19). Lesson 4: Be Wary of ‘Welfare’ The core functions of public welfare provision are to protect, to enable and to control. Many welfare services do all three, perhaps most notably education, health care and social security. The balance between these three priorities varies between different service areas and welfare regimes. It also varies over time, reflecting the relative strength of different ideologies and political platforms. For example, the controlling and coercive aspects of social security have intensified in the UK in recent decades with the extension and reinforcement of welfare conditionality and sanctions (Dwyer, 2019). The foundation of social insurance in German under Bismarck in the 1880s helped shape the initial intellectual development and agenda of Social Policy analysis. National welfare systems were analysed in relation to the politics of class abatement in modern industrial societies (Dahrendorf, 1959; Przeworski, 1985). This function meant that social policies involved elements both of compromise and control (Fox-Piven and Cloward, 1971). The dynamic tension within social policies between competing tendencies of amelioration, preservation and correction also reflects the interests and outlooks of the social reformers who were the key intellectual and institutional founders of Social Policy, at least in Britain. These include Beatrice and Sydney Webb and William Beveridge, and other associates of the Fabian tradition that set the agenda and tone for much of the development of Social Policy as a discipline (George and Wilding, 1985). Reflecting these conflicting purposes, and also the central role accorded the state in welfare provision, many social policies have focused on doing things to people. Social Policy has been principally concerned with analysing the relative effectiveness and various effects of what has been done. This preoccupation was modified somewhat in the 1980s/90s with the growing interest in the experience and position of service users. This interest was shared by those who sought to amplify the voice of welfare consumers (e.g., LeGrand, 2007) and those who championed empowering experts by experience through co-production (e.g., Beresford, 2016). This development is part of the reason for the interest in SI, which has an empowering and emancipatory potential (Huber, 2010). However, SI has shown less interest than Social Policy in examining the controlling and potentially coercive aspects of social welfare provision (Wacquant, 2009). Nevertheless, these cannot be overlooked. While they may be created to assist and liberate disadvantaged groups through empowerment, SIs are not immune to the tendency of all institutions to establish standardised processes which impose some degree of conformity upon users. While SIs may not be core components of the disciplinary dimension of welfare, they cannot entirely detach themselves from these. Therefore, those interested

Social innovation and social policy analysis  33 in SI should consider how they may be complicit in surveillance and exercise forms of soft coercion. There are valuable insights from Social Policy analysis that could be applied to better understand these aspects of how SIs operate and the impact they have (Campbell and Davidson, 2009).

SOCIAL INNOVATION AND SOCIAL POLICY: DEVELOPING THE DIALOGUE Social Policy is an eclectic, reflexive and dynamic discipline with porous borders and open to new insights. Social innovation should therefore be embraced as part of the commitment in Social Policy to learn lessons, from wherever they arise, that may provide insights and inform social improvement. This is particularly important in a period when political renewal and institutional revival are required to restore faith in democracy and belief in the positive capabilities of government. The sentiments of solidarity upon which collective welfare provision depends have weakened, and pessimism about the future of welfare is leading some towards resigned acceptance and ‘reluctant individualism’ (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2019). SI cannot fix this on its own, but it can be part of a process of social renewal. This will be aided by considering three issues that SI raises for Social Policy: relations, reliability and regionalism. Many SIs depend upon and reinforce ‘thick’ and intense relationships between providers and users. SIs do not simply seek to provide for their users but also empower them; therefore the relationships they establish go beyond mere transactions. As co-produced and participatory initiatives, SIs often have a personal quality and emotional intensity that conventional welfare institutions lack. These qualities may be better suited to the diverse circumstances and expectation of personalised and responsive provision in a post-Fordist world. Therefore, Social Policy would benefit from studying examples of effective and engaging forms of SI to inform public welfare service reform. Large-scale social welfare policies and support systems take time to construct and often have teething problems and blindspots. In contrast, SIs are able to improvise relatively quickly. But although it is important not to let the perfect become the enemy of the adequate, a speedy and good enough temporary innovation may not provide the kind of reliable and sustained provision that some issues and users need. If the benefits of SIs are to become permanent, they need stability and some degree of institutionalisation. Can the imagination and dynamism of SIs be incorporated into established welfare institutions? What kind of trade-offs are involved in reconciling local flexibility and responsiveness with the standardisation and duty to maintain equitable treatment required for welfare rights? Is the charisma of radical SIs lost if they become routine components of social welfare systems (Weber, 1947: 147)? There have been many studies of the relative friction or symbiosis between SIs and existing welfare infrastructure, and some of the chapters in this Handbook contribute to this analysis. This will remain an important area where SI and Social Policy can share lessons and learning. As the opportunity structures of social welfare systems vary between countries and over time, it is not possible to propose a general theory of how SIs should operate across all contexts. However, the SI and Social Policy literatures together identify some potential avenues for development, and one worth considering is the potential for regional approaches and meso-level initiatives. As mentioned before, for much of its development over the past century and more, Social Policy analysis was concerned with state action at the societal level,

34  Handbook on social innovation and social policy and characterised by a ‘top-down’ approach. This macro-institutional approach contrasts with the more localised focus of much of the existing writing on SI. But many social issues exist between these levels. Even communities that are marginalised or excluded are not detached from their wider environments. The factors and forces that shape them may exist beyond their borders and need to be addressed at the appropriate scale (Alcock, 2005). Economic regeneration, inclusive growth, adapting to climate change and integrating transport networks are examples of challenges that need regional-level action. Consequently, ‘the region is a promising space’ for SI to address (Terstriep, 2016: 54). A practical example of this are experiments in Community Wealth Building and city- or region-level place-making programmes. These take a variety of forms reflecting the particular circumstances in different localities.5 But the shared aspiration of all such projects is to create an infrastructure and establish practices that retain local assets and reinvest wealth within an inclusive and sustainable local economy designed to promote wellbeing rather than exploitation, extraction and despoilment (Brown and Jones, 2021). This innovation shares some principles with and builds upon older pioneering SIs, such as Participatory Budgeting. Such regional innovations may be an ideal form for innovations that both connect effectively with people and have the capacity to make a significant impact. That aside, it is not possible to outline in advance what a welfare system informed by SI will look like, as ‘[t]he architect of social change can never have a reliable blueprint’ (Hirschman, 1970: 343). Effective responses will be developed through experiment, dialogue and reasoned appraisals of experience; and Social Policy analysis can usefully contribute to this process. SI provides a nursery of novel ideas and laboratory of interesting experiments. But good intentions and good ideas are not enough – compelling interests need to be harnessed and practically applied. As Margaret Thatcher once observed, the parable of The Good Samaritan teaches us that it is not enough simply to have good intentions.6 The Samaritans organisation learned this and created a network of expert advice supporting those in need. Practical utopias are required to meet old, new and imminent social risks and advance welfare. SIs can provide inspirational examples of these which Social Policy analysis can temper through testing. As Richard Feynman observed, ‘If we want to solve a problem that we have never solved before, we must leave the door to the unknown ajar’ (1955: 15). And once through the door, we need to consider what our next step should be and how best to proceed to our destination.

NOTES 1. Or what would then be known as Social Administration. 2. As shown by the respective contributions from Dafuleya, Jawad, and Banerjee et al. in this Handbook. 3. And also discussed in the respective contributions from Ghys and from Jäger et al., in this Handbook. 4. Various sources claim that remark was directed at the Conservative MP Lady Astor, but there is no reliable evidence that the incident actually occurred. 5. At https://​cles​.org​.uk/​community​-wealth​-building/​what​-is​-community​-wealth​-building/​ (accessed 9 May 2023). 6. Margaret Thatcher offered a radically different interpretation of the parable: https://​www​.scotsman​ .com/​news/​uk​-news/​margaret​-thatchers​-sermon​-mound​-1580740 (accessed 9 May 2023).

Social innovation and social policy analysis  35

REFERENCES Alcock, P. (2005) ‘Maximum Feasible Understanding: Lessons from Previous Wars on Poverty’, Social Policy and Society, 4 (3): 321–329. Baldwin, P. (1990) The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State, 1875–1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Banerjee, S., Carney, S. and Hulgård, L. (eds) (2019) People-Centered Social Innovation: Global Perspectives on an Emerging Paradigm. Abingdon: Routledge. Bauman, Z. (2004) Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts. Cambridge: Polity. Beresford, P. (2016) All Our Welfare: Towards Participatory Social Policy. Bristol: Policy Press. Box, G.E.P. (1979) ‘Robustness in the Strategy of Scientific Model Building’, in Launer, R.L. and Wilkinson, G. N. (eds) Robustness in Statistics (pp. 201–236). London: Academic Press. Brandson, T. (2014) WILCO Final Report (Welfare Innovations at the Local Level in Favour of Cohesion). At http://​www​.wilcoproject​.eu/​wordpress/​wp​-content/​uploads/​WILCO​-final​-report​_final​ .pdf (accessed 23 March 2023). Brannen, J. and Moss, P. (1997) ‘Government Policy’, in Ungerson, C. and Kember, M. (eds) Women and Social Policy: A Reader (2nd edition) (pp. 116–118). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Brown, M. and Jones, R.E. (2021) Paint Your Town Red: How Preston Took Back Control and Your Town Can Too. London: Repeater Books. Burgin, A. (2015) The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Campbell, J. and Davidson, G. (2009) ‘Coercion in the Community: A Situated Approach to the Examination of Ethical Challenges for Mental Health Social Workers’, Ethics and Social Welfare, 3 (3): 249–263. Christiansen, C.M. et al. (2006) ‘Disruptive Innovation for Social Change’, Harvard Business Review, December. At https://​hbr​.org/​2006/​12/​disruptive​-innovation​-for​-social​-change (accessed 23 March 2023). Dahrendorf, R. (1959) Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Donnison, D.V. (1982) The Politics of Poverty. Oxford: Martin Robertson. Dwyer, P. (ed.) (2019) Dealing with Welfare Conditionality: Implementation and Effects. Bristol: Policy Press. Ellison, N. and Haux, T. (2020) Handbook on Society and Social Policy. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Feynman, R.P. (1955) ‘The Value of Science’, Engineering and Science, Vol. XIX, December: 13–15. Fox-Piven, F. and Cloward, R. (1971) Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare. London: Vintage. George, V. and Page, R.M. (eds) (2004) Global Social Problems. Cambridge: Polity. George, V. and Wilding, P. (1985) Ideology and Social Welfare (2nd edition). London: Routledge. Ghys, T. (2017) ‘Analysing Social Innovation through the Lens of Poverty Reduction: Five Key Factors’, European Public & Social Innovation Review, 2 (2): 1–14. Hall, P., Land, H., Parker, R.A. and Webb, A. (1975) Change, Choice, and Conflict in Social Policy. London: Heinemann. Halvorsen, R., Hvinden, B., Bickenbach, J., Ferri, D. and Guillén Rodriguez, A.M. (eds) (2017) The Changing Disability Policy System: Active Citizenship and Disability in Europe. Abingdon: Routledge. Hills, J. (2017) Good Times, Bad Times: The Welfare Myth of Them and Us. Bristol: Policy Press. Hirschman, A.O. (1970) ‘The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding’, World Politics, 22 (3): 329–343. Huber, A. (2010) Empowering People, Driving Change: Social Innovation in the European Union. Bureau of European Policy Advisers. At https://​ec​.europa​.eu/​migrant​-integration/​library​-document/​ empowering​-people​-driving​-change​-social​-innovation​-european​-union​_en (accessed 22 March 2023). Jencks, C. (2015) ‘The War on Poverty: Was It Lost?’, New York Review of Books, 2 April. Kennet, P. (ed.) (2014) A Handbook of Comparative Social Policy (2nd edition). Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing.

36  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Kingdon, J. (2010) Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy (2nd edition). London: Pearson. Korpi, W. (1978) The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism: Work, Unions and Politics in Sweden. London: Routledge. LeGrand, J. (2007) The Other Invisible Hand: Delivering Public Services through Choice and Competition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lister, R. (1997) Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. London: Palgrave. Lister, R. (1998) ‘Vocabularies of Citizenship and Gender: The UK’, Critical Social Policy, 18 (56): 309–331. Mann, K. (1991) Making of an English Underclass? Social Divisions of Welfare and Labour. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Marshall, T.H. (1992) Citizenship and Social Class. London: Pluto. Mazzucato, M. (2018) ‘Mission-oriented Innovation Policies: Challenges and Opportunities’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 27 (5): 803–815. Mirowski. P. and Plehwe, D. (2009) The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Moulaert, F., MacCallum, D. and Haddock, S. (eds) (2009) Social Innovation and Territorial Development. London: Routledge. Nicholls, A., Simone, J., and Gabriele, M. (2015) ‘Introduction: Dimensions of Social “Innovation”, in Nicholls, A., Simone, J. and Gabriele, M. (eds) New Frontiers in Social Innovation Research (pp. 1–26). London: Palgrave Macmillan. OHCHR (2010) The Right to Adequate Food. Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 34. Pel, B., Wittmayer, J., Dorland, J. and Søgaard Jørgensen, N. (2019) ‘Unpacking the Social Innovation Ecosystem: An Empirically Grounded Typology of Empowering Network Constellations’, Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 33 (2): 311–336. Pierson, C. (2021) The Next Welfare State: UK Welfare after COVID-19. Bristol: Policy Press. Pinker, R. (1971) Social Theory and Social Policy. London: Routledge. Przeworski, A. (1985) Capitalism and Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Raworth, K. (2017) Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist. London: Random House. Saloojee, A. (2003) Social Inclusion, Anti-Racism and Democratic Citizenship. Toronto, ON: Laidlaw Foundation. Sinclair, S. (2014) ‘Credit Union Modernisation and the Limits of Voluntarism’, Policy & Politics, 42 (3): 403–419. Sinclair, S., McHugh, N. and Roy, M.J. (2021) ‘Social Innovation, Financialisation and Commodification: A Critique of Social Impact Bonds’, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 24 (1): 11–27. SIX Wayfinder (2017) From Here to There: Social Innovation from 2006–2027. At https://​www​ .sixwayfinder​.com/​provocations​-1/​2018/​2/​11/​from​-here​-to​-there​-social​-innovation​-from​-2006​-2027 (accessed 22 March 2023). Taylor-Gooby, P. (ed.) (2004) New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the European Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taylor-Gooby, P. (2015) ‘Making the Case for the Welfare State’, Policy & Politics, 43 (4): 597–614. Taylor-Gooby, P., Leruth, B. and Chung, H. (2019) ‘Identifying Attitudes to Welfare through Deliberative Forums: The Emergence of Reluctant Individualism’, Policy & Politics, 47 (1): 97–114. Terstriep, J. (ed.) (2016) Boosting SI’s Social & Economic Impact. Gelsenkichen: Institute for Work and Technology. Titmuss, R.M. (1958), ‘The Social Divisor of Welfare: Some Reflections on the Search for Equity’, Essays on ‘The Welfare State’ (pp. 34–55). London: George Allen & Unwin. Titmuss, R.M. (1974) Social Policy. London: George Allen & Unwin. UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (n.d.) About the Right to Food and Human Rights. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. At https://​www​.ohchr​.org/​en/​special​-procedures/​sr​-food/​ about​-right​-food​-and​-human​-rights (accessed 22 March 2023). United Nations (2020) World Social Report, 2020: The Challenge of Inequality in a Rapidly Changing World. At https://​www​.un​.org/​development/​desa/​dspd/​world​-social​-report/​2020​-2​.html (accessed 22 March 2023).

Social innovation and social policy analysis  37 UNRISD (2016) Policy Innovations for Transformative Change: UNRISD Flagship Report 2016 (Overview). Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Vaessen, J., Rivas, A., Duvendack, N., Palmer Jones, R., Leeuw, F., van Gils, G., Lukach, R., Holvoet, N., Bastiaensen, J., Hombrados, J.G. and Waddington, H. (2014) ‘The Effects of Microcredit on Women’s Control over Household Spending in Developing Countries: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis’, Campbell Systematic Review, 10 (1). https://​onlinelibrary​.wiley​.com/​doi/​10​.4073/​csr​ .2014​.8 van Oorschot, W.J.H. (1998) Shared Identity and Shared Utility: On Solidarity and its Motives. Tilburg: Work and Organization Research Centre, WORC Paper, Vol. 98.11.008/2. Wacquant, L. (2009) Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Weber, M. (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: The Free Press. Westley, F. and Nino, A. (2010) ‘Making a Difference: Strategies for Scaling Social Innovation for Greater Impact’, The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, 15 (2). At https://​ innovation​.cc/​document/​2010​-15​-2​-2​-making​-a​-difference​-strategies​-for​-scaling​-social​-innovation​ -for​-greater​-impact/​(accessed 9 May 2023). Wilensky, H. (1975) The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditure. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Zuleeg, F. et al. (2021) Europe in the Age of Permacrisis. European Policy Centre, 11 March. At https://​ www​.epc​.eu/​en/​Publications/​Europe​-in​-the​-age​-of​-permacrisis​~3c8a0c (accessed 22 March 2023).

4. Richard M. Titmuss revisited: social innovation and the crises ecosystem Lars Hulgård

INTRODUCTION: THE PROMISE OF UNIVERSAL WELFARE Richard Titmuss had no formal academic degree, yet in 1950 he became the Founding Chair of Social Administration at the London School of Economics, where he taught Social Policy with an elaborate understanding of social innovation (SI). Following Titmuss, Social Policy is intrinsically related to social change and social innovation. Social Policy is an intervention in social change; accordingly, a social policy intervention always reaffirms or changes the power balances in society. Titmuss’ notion of social policy intervention is remarkably similar to current understanding of SI and social change that puts an emphasis on solidarity, collective action, and power (Jessop, Moulaert, Hulgård, and Hamduch, 2013; Hulgård and Ferreira, 2019; Moulaert and MacCallum, 2019; Teasdale, Roy, and Hulgård, 2021). Among his most famous contributions to the field is that of three social policy frameworks, which later sociologists and scholars of public administration developed into the three welfare regimes: Liberal, Conservative, and Social Democratic (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, Titmuss himself was more interested in understanding the micro- and meso-level impact of different policies and interventions on individuals, families, and communities than in building macro-level regime theory. It was his belief that if certain policies allow the negative consequences of social change to lie and impact where they fall, this will lead to more inequality and segregation both within and between countries (Titmuss, 1987). Policy responses to social change can either reinforce and accelerate existing patterns of inequality or they can be redistributive and institutional responses aimed at greater equity. If we want to stop the generators of inequality, Titmuss argued, then we need active, innovative, redistributive, and inclusive welfare policies responsive to the needs of people affected by change. Often welfare state theorists following the macro-oriented approach outlined by Esping-Andersen (1990) have failed to understand the historic specificities and institutional dynamics within and among particular welfare regimes. Such research has been stronger in examining the economic aspects of state intervention in welfare than understanding changing institutional configurations between agents of change. Furthermore, such macro-oriented scholarship has been informed by a kind of ranking of welfare states, with the Nordic countries at the top and countries in the South at the bottom. Exemplifying this approach, Greve (2020) uses the notions of ‘better’ and ‘generous’ when describing what marks out the Social Democratic welfare regimes from the Liberal model and welfare state in Southern European countries (Greve, 2020: 47). First, this kind of research has failed to see that the generation of a universal welfare state was a broad policy agenda across countries and regions globally in the wake of World War II, expressed in diversified forms according to the particular historic trajectory of the region. For example, when India became independent from the British empire in 1948, it was with a double commitment to being both a socialist republic and a strong welfare 38

Richard M. Titmuss revisited: social innovation and the crises ecosystem  39 state. Thus, the preamble to the Constitution of 1950 declares India a ‘Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic’, followed by several indications of its commitment to welfare. More specifically, in Article 38 of the Indian Constitution it is declared that the state shall ‘strive to promote the welfare of the people … in particular, strive to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavor to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities’ (Indian Constitution, 1950). Members of the Constitutional Assembly debated intensely on how to materialize this ambition of welfare for all citizens. One member argued for replacing the article on welfare with one promoting a socialist order of collectivizing the most important sectors of the economy. Furthermore, how socialist and economic democracies could be achieved in many institutional diverse forms was debated. Thus, the goal of building a modern inclusive welfare state was not solely European or Scandinavian. Countries such as the USA had its ‘version of the modern welfare state (where) social programs were never “welfare” hand-outs for the poor alone’ (Skocpol, 2003: 72). Nor in the US was welfare only to be organized through ‘civic voluntarism’; it should be arranged through partnership with ‘muscular representative democratic governance’ (Skocpol, 2003: 73). Second, welfare state theory aimed at understanding comparative differences between countries risks not depicting how access to welfare for the vast majority may be at the expense of extreme neglect of a minority. In the words of Titmuss, ‘what is “welfare” for some groups may be “illfare” for others’ (1974: 27). It may well be that the Nordic Social Democratic welfare states were among the most economically egalitarian internationally, but since the late 1990s, at least in Denmark, this had come at the cost of a deep stigmatization of refugees and immigrants. In a study of racism in Danish welfare provision, Padovan-Özdemir and Øland conclude that there is a ‘widespread and deeply rooted neglecting, silencing and evading of race, racism and racialization in the Danish and, more broadly, Nordic welfare states’ (2022: 15).

THE WELFARE STATE AS A SOCIAL MEGA-INNOVATION Welfare states, as they emerged in the 1930s and were institutionalized in the wake of World War II, were social mega-innovations aimed at innovating all spheres of industrial society. Between the mid-19th century and World War I more than one million Swedes (one fifth of the Swedish population) migrated, mainly to the USA. At the beginning of the 20th century, Sweden ‘was one of the poorest countries in Europe’ (Sernhede, Rosales, and Söderman, 2019: 25). Only after the military shot and killed five striking workers participating in a demonstration in 1931, did the famous Swedish welfare state begin to emerge through concerted action between vital state, market, and civil society stakeholders and institutions (Hulgård, 2017: 14). Swedish social engineers and Nobel Prize recipients Gunnar and Alva Myrdal prescribed an all-encompassing process of change in order to implement a full-scale institutional–redistributive welfare state: ‘Bad habits must be changed. The ignorant must be educated. The irresponsible must be wakened. There is a need for a complete societally organized action of propaganda in the area of educating the people’ (Myrdal and Myrdal, 1934: 226). As in the ‘strong’ version of SI (Ayob, Teasdale, and Fagan, 2016) social innovators were driven by strong values and a process perspective, but with the conviction that the social engineer knows best what to do, and how to do it. The architects and innovators of welfare

40  Handbook on social innovation and social policy knew what was best for people who had to engage in the process of changing their bad habits. This understanding of welfare was further underpinned by an introduction of the professional public servant as the key operator in the implementation of the institutional–redistributive model of welfare. Accordingly, the realization of the welfare state as a social mega-innovation followed the prescriptions of top-down policy-making where ‘the actions of implementing officials’ are a key to success (Sabatier, 1986). The public welfare state, or the ‘People’s Home’ as it was called in Sweden, was a result of the power of Social Democracy in the 20th century combined with success in engaging all major societal stakeholders in the social mega-innovation. The vision was to build a soft socialist state on top of a liberal economy. At the peak of the redistributive welfare state, and just before losing power to a Liberal–Conservative coalition government after the Social Democratic Party had ruled for 44 years uninterrupted between 1932 and 1976, Prime Minister Olof Palme claimed, ‘The era of neo-capitalism is drawing to an end …. It is some kind of socialism that is the key to the future’ (The Economist, February 2, 2013). The implicit argument was that the evolution of the Scandinavian welfare state had succeeded in controlling financial capital to such a degree that, in conjunction with the redistributive force of the welfare state, it had been able to develop a form of socialism. This seemed to work for a while, in the sense that the Swedish welfare state operated as a rare combination of an almost pure capitalist economy with a strong welfare state in the areas of redistribution and decommodification. On the one hand, with more than 90% of GNP produced by the private sector, Sweden had one of the most capitalist economies in the world. On the other hand, the redistributive and institutional character of the Swedish welfare state was based on comparatively high public spending as a proportion of GDP, peaking at 67% in 1993. However, only 10 years later the proportion of GDP devoted to public spending had dropped to 49%, which made The Economist predict that Sweden ‘could soon have a smaller state than Britain’ (February 2, 2013). Olof Palme was wrong in his prediction of neocapitalism drawing to an end. The institutionalization of a universally oriented welfare system in the wake of World War II was followed by an equally steady downsizing and privatization of welfare, and increasing emphasis on liberalization of economies, privatization of social services, and promotion of neoliberal ideology (Merrien and Mendy, 2010; Pleyers, 2010). Nevertheless, for a while the goal of constituting a soft kind of socialist policies on top of liberal market economies in diversified forms after World War II seemed to work as hoped for by planners, policy-makers, and social movements. Chancel and Piketty (2021), in their study of global income inequality between 1820 and 2020, make a distinction between within-country and between-country inequality. Both types of inequality have stabilized at ‘extreme levels’, which reflects a hierarchical global economic order that arose under the hegemony of ‘Western dominance and colonial empires’ (Chancel and Piketty, 2021: 19). Whereas within-country inequality dropped between 1910 and 1980 due to worker mobilization and policy responses to the two world wars, between-country inequality kept rising. The authors conclude with the hope, ‘the march toward more within-countries equality led by socialist political movements’ that also tried to push for more equality between countries could serve as an inspiration for ‘new forms of internationalist–egalitarian political mobilization around alternative economic system and grassroots movements like Black Lives Matter, Fridays for Future and MeToo’ (Chancel and Piketty, 2021: 18). Titmuss’ dry argument that welfare for some comes at the cost of ‘illfare’ for others is even more relevant today. This was the case when he analyzed how access to health and other services in countries in the North

Richard M. Titmuss revisited: social innovation and the crises ecosystem  41 came at the cost of an expansive brain drain in countries such as India, that had paid for the educations of the professional classes migrating.

SOCIAL INNOVATION IN THE INSTITUTIONAL– REDISTRIBUTIVE WELFARE STATE For Titmuss, the institutional–redistributive welfare state is aimed at promoting values of inclusion and integration. The welfare state is intrinsic to the function of modern society; as such, it is required in good times and in bad times. Modern society cannot work without inclusive social policies deeply embedded in all spheres of society. To Titmuss, this model was based on a broad sociological approach to industrial, technological, social, and economic change. The role for social welfare is to ‘play as a positive and dynamic agent of change: to promote integrative values; to prevent future dis-welfares; to penetrate economic policies with social welfare objectives’ (Titmuss, 1987: 264). As a generator of large-scale and policy-driven SI, the institutional–redistributive welfare model encouraged individuals to understand themselves as belonging to broader national or even transnational communities across divisions of sex, ethnicity, and status. Accordingly, Titmuss emphasized solidarity both within and among countries, for instance in his analysis of the costs of brain drain to India and other states in the South that had paid for the education of medical doctors, engineers, and other professionals that states in the North vigorously tried to convince to work in their hospitals and build their welfare states’ infrastructure. When he insisted on illuminating how one group’s welfare may be another group’s ill-fare, he came close to the strong SI approach as articulated by Moulaert and MacCallum, emphasizing that social innovation as a concept must be reserved to processes ‘based on values of solidarity, reciprocity and association’ (2019: 1). If a particular SI is part of a scheme that leads to ill-fare for some social groups, it is not based on values of solidarity, reciprocity, and association, and should not be classified as a social innovation. This is the case with much of the catalytic philanthropy and CSR-driven social innovation that is embedded in highly hierarchical economic structures. Social innovation is a space for interaction between government and society. Already in a speech to the Fabian Society in 1959, Titmuss had argued that the welfare state he supported vigorously needed social innovation. Despite being one of the chief advocates of the universal welfare state after World War II, Titmuss saw, early on, that it catered better to those who needed it least. In the speech, he called for massive investments in social innovation. He spoke about the intrinsic relation between public policy and social innovation in a way that serves as a milestone even today: ‘the quality of education, housing and medical care of the poorest third of the nation calls for an immense amount of social inventiveness: for new institutional devices, new forms of co-operation, social control, ownership and administration. Social ideas may well be as important in Britain in the future as technological innovation’ (Titmuss, 2010: 150). More than 60 years have passed since Titmuss gave his speech, and the problems have only intensified on a global scale, requiring determined and targeted public policy for social innovation at all levels. We must move beyond Titmuss’ notion of welfare, which was crucial for making the institutional welfare state in the wake of World War II. This worked as a space for concerted action for pulling entire countries out of poverty through universal access to education, social services, and efficient planning systems, and enabling the impact of trade unions and other

42  Handbook on social innovation and social policy interest organizations, etc. It worked in promoting decommodification and redistribution in a culturally relatively homogenous society; but it is not capable of solving the multiple crises today. In The Gift Relationship from 1970, Titmuss outlined a space for what he dubbed ‘creative altruism’, which is a type of gift relationship where actions are ‘carrying no explicit or implicit right to a return gift or action’ (Titmuss, 2018: 179). Despite such indications of institutionalized practices of reciprocity and solidarity, the institutional–redistributive welfare state only represents a half-developed structure with no active place for reciprocity and civil society as structuring principles in economy and society. Titmuss’ emphasis on redistribution generated by strong public engagement is too weak when it comes to facing the multi-dimensional challenges in the world of today. Today as a global citizenry, we face a complex and multi-dimensional crisis that is in desperate need for sustainable answers. In fact, the most urgent question when talking about the connection between crises management and social innovation may be, is the SI ecosystem suited to tackle the crises ecosystem?

SOCIAL INNOVATION AND THE CRISES ECOSYSTEM The ecosystem approach was introduced recently by scholars ‘as an emerging theoretical approach and heuristic model’ (Howaldt, Kaletka, and Schröder, 2016: 97) and a vehicle for EU policies within the social economy (Borzaga et al., 2020). Howaldt, Kaletka, and Schröder formulate the ecosystem approach as focusing on the interfaces between differentiated and separate societal sectors of state, business, and civil society that need to engage in constructive partnerships ‘in order to reap the full potential of social innovation’ (Howaldt et al., 2016: 106). At the level of the EU, the social enterprise ecosystem is depicted as the intersection of four institutional circles representing, (1) the capacity to self-organize; (2) visibility and recognition; (3) resources; and (4) research, education, and skills development. The argument that follows from this analysis is, ‘the ecosystem is shaped by the interplay between all these factors’ (Borzaga et al., 2020: 48). In the arguments of social innovation and social economy scholars, an ecosystem emerges when separated and perhaps even self-referential sectors and institutions collaborate and start building organizational and interrelated capacity (Howaldt et al., 2016). The welfare state as it was institutionalized in the last half of the 20th century had the power to build such interrelated capacity across divides of sectors and classes. It had a capacity to build bridges of solidarity across intersecting lines. However, to build an ecosystem of policies and interventions sufficiently equipped to promote solutions, we first need a developed understanding of the problems, and here it becomes clear that neither the scholarly nor the policy ecosystems approach to the contemporary multi-dimensional crisis is adequate. When the architects of the post-World War II welfare states designed planning systems, education, and social services, they did so to tackle the social questions of poverty and economic inequality. Today, the driver of inequality is better understood as just one element in the crises’ ecosystem. Not only do efficient solutions present themselves as an ecosystem; so too do problems. The intertwined characteristics of contemporary crises put the population of the world at a multi-dimensional risk higher than ever before in human history. When Piketty claimed in Capital in the 21st Century (2014) that the level of economic inequality may be bigger than ever before in human history, he did not foresee the networked and permanent character of crises. Whereas the term ‘financial crisis’ (that in 2008–2009) is addressed throughout his book, the word ‘climate’ is mainly addressed

Richard M. Titmuss revisited: social innovation and the crises ecosystem  43 in relation to ‘the political climate’ or ‘the ideological climate’. His focus was the crisis of inequality generated by mechanisms of wealth creation. Until the financial crisis, the public understanding was that crises replace each other, and even today the usual way of understanding and dealing with a crisis is singular and separate – in the sense that we speak about the security crisis, the polarization crisis, the food crisis, the biodiversity crisis, the health crisis, the energy crisis, the inflation, etc. However, both the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have made clear how crises are feeding and fueling each other, thus exposing entire peoples and populations to a rapidly declining quality of life. The war is a security crisis with a devastating impact on vast populations in the European regions most directly involved. It is an energy crisis whose negative impact and reach is yet to be seen. It is a food scarcity crisis, a migration and displacement crisis, and it is a crisis of polarization between and within nations. Thus, we experience a crises ecosystem where one crisis strengthens the next one, and solutions aiming at solving one crisis tend to nourish the entire ecosystem. The interwoven characteristics of contemporary crises experienced by populations everywhere in the world are widening the gaps between rural and urban areas, and driving the increase in multi-dimensional forms of inequality, including wealth, income, health, justice, and access to food, water, and social services. Just as the social enterprise ecosystem is designed to shape social enterprise as an organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), for the sake of becoming an important societal agent of change and social innovation, the crises ecosystem is the context in which solutions are formulated and implemented. If a policy lacks an understanding of the entire crises ecosystem, it is likely to lead to a growth in the crises ecosystem rather than in the solutions ecosystem, whether in the social economy or in any other sector. At the time of writing, autumn 2022, there is no possibility for neglecting the interconnected characteristics of crises that are shaping the future of planetary existence; and following this, it makes more sense to address the entire crises ecosystem than to keep operating as if solutions can be implemented one crisis at a time. The one-crisis-at-a-time approach is resonating with the volunteerism approach to social innovation, often claiming that a neighborhood can be ‘saved’ one child at a time by heroic individuals and social entrepreneurs (Hulgård and Ferreira, 2019). However, we have often seen how one unit at a time has caused more troubles than positive change. Microcredit platforms that target individual micro-entrepreneurs without deep contextual knowledge may contribute to empowerment of the individual entrepreneur and yet do damage to the community as such. A study of microcredit in Bangladesh concludes that microcredit is a means of class oppression often resulting in further inequality and poverty for the majority of the borrowers (Pietiläinen, 2019). This may be a too generalized conclusion on the outcome of microcredit. However, particularly in the North, microcredit lending to families in poverty in the South has been articulated as a way of bringing entire world regions out of poverty one woman, one family, one community at a time. Often such platforms are designed without any understanding of socio-economic conditions and power balances. When the digital microcredit platform MYC4 was established in 2007, the CEO Mads Kjaer said that ‘our goal is to eliminate poverty in Africa’ through the lending platform. In 2013 he became Schwab Foundation’s Social Entrepreneur of the year; in 2014 he was the third most twitting person at the World Economic Forum; and in 2016 MYC4 went bankrupt. The founder became an international celebrity, but the model of pulling Africa out of poverty one unit at a time was a neo-colonial example of arrogance. In contrast to the one-unit-at-a-time model, we have argued that the Kerala-based large-scale poverty eradication program Kudumbashree is an example of

44  Handbook on social innovation and social policy People-Centered Social Innovation that aims at understanding ‘people in their entire context and capacities and not just as individuals aiming to improve their market value’ (Shajahan and Hulgård, 2020: 69).

SOCIAL INNOVATION IN THE INSTITUTIONAL–RECIPROCAL WELFARE STATE The crises ecosystem represents a societal challenge bigger than any other before in human history. Climate change and loss of biodiversity have caused climate change scientists to insist that as a global citizenry we begin talking about ‘the endgame’ caused by ‘the potential catastrophic impact’ of ‘the magnitude and rate of climate change’ (Kemp et al., 2022: 1). We can continue to address individual parts of the crises ecosystem, or we can begin understanding it as a whole constituting a combination of epistemological and ontological challenges. If we choose the latter, we will find inspiration in contributions that see the crisis from the perspective of the entirety of Modernity. When coining the notion of ‘epistemicide’, Santos (2008) illustrated how the process of colonization can only be understood in full as a united epistemological, political, and economic process aimed at marginalizing all aspects of ‘indigenous’ knowledge and existence. Latour and Schultz (2022) argue that the decoupling of the world we live in from the world we live from presents a situation where future generations have to solve the problems of the present. While the people of today harvest the benefits, the people in the future pay the costs. To reconnect the world we live from with the world we live in, they conclude, ‘it is a bitter lesson to learn that the “primitive” of the past must teach us how to resist modernization’ (Latour and Schultz, 2022: 55). This argument resonates both with Karl Polanyi’s thesis that a self-regulating market is a utopia, which if it existed would have physically destroyed man and ‘transformed his surroundings into a wilderness’ (Polanyi, 1944: 3), and Max Weber’s profound critique of Western Modernity. In his seminal work from 1904 on the genesis and diffusion of European Modernity, he gave a diagnosis of the immense environmental pressures the world population faces today. According to Weber, the agents of modernity in the 16th century turned the invention of a new spirituality into a set of rules that ordinary people in the Global North gradually started to turn into codes of life. This happened to such a degree that no one alive today can avoid acting in accordance with the logics of the modern capitalist order. In this framework, lifestyles today are, first, bound to the capitalist order, and the capitalist order itself is bound to an economic, political, cultural, and epistemological framework of Modernity that shapes all aspects of how we look at the world and interact with each other. In the words of Weber: ‘This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt’ (Weber, 2005: 123). To establish a link between the individual parts of the crises ecosystem, we need to begin to understand better the entirety and connect knowledge on the stimuli of the individual parts. Thus, the conclusions on inequality offered by Piketty (2014) and Chancel and Piketty (2021) on inequality must be related to other elements in the crises ecosystem. In a comparative study of polarization McCoy, Press, Somer, and Tuncel (2022) found that ‘polarization is increasing worldwide’ and experiencing ‘extreme levels’ in the largest democracies in the Western

Richard M. Titmuss revisited: social innovation and the crises ecosystem  45 hemisphere, Brazil, Mexico, and the United States (McCoy et al., 2022: 1). The authors point to the need ‘to innovate new mechanisms to reduce or better manage’ the phenomenon of the extreme levels of polarization. Patterns of migration show a similar frightening increase. By the end of 2021, almost 90 million people globally were forcibly displaced, according to the UNDP, and the total number of international migrants has increased over the past five decades. In 2020 the total number of migrants in the world was 281, and 128 million people more than in 1990 were living in a country different to that of their birth. We could continue a tour de force through the elements of the crises ecosystem and show their interlinkage, and how the one-unit-at-a-time way of addressing them often contributes to the fortification of the entire system. Accordingly, a new approach is needed, and we label this approach the institutional–reciprocal model of welfare. Just as the institutional–redistributive welfare state was able to pull Sweden and other countries out of poverty and extreme migration by the mid-20th century, we must hope to achieve the next level of an institutional welfare state that is better equipped to address the crises ecosystem. We argue that in order to address the complexity of the crises ecosystem, we need a transition from Titmuss’ institutional–redistributive welfare state to an institutional– reciprocal welfare state (Hulgård, 2015), with a much greater emphasis on civil society and the solidarity economy as mechanisms of coordination. From the literature on social innovation and solidarity economy, we know that a much more differentiated understanding of economic integration is required than what is usually understood by the term ‘market economy’. Following Karl Polanyi (1944), a social and solidarity economy for a plural society is based upon a full recognition of three economic principles that cannot be reduced. The first principle is the market. Economic integration through the market is usually organized through an enterprise whether it is based upon the interests of shareholders or owners and stakeholders in the social and solidarity economy. The second principle is redistribution; that is, the power to move resources and the negative consequences of growth between social groups. The welfare state implemented in the decades after World War II is a typical example of a redistributive force in favor of potentially marginalized citizens. The third principle is reciprocity. This principle is still not only the weakest in terms of institutional power but also the most contested of all three principles of economic and societal integration. However, it is also the main driver of social innovation in the strong version, as an ethical approach to social change based on values of democratic solidarity, reciprocity, and association (Moulaert and MacCallum, 2019: 1). It is our thesis that Titmuss laid a foundation for understanding the complexity and networked character of social problems and solutions, and also for understanding how three different welfare regime ideal types respond to those problems. However, the pure top-down orientation of the institutional–redistributive model of welfare does not work properly in a world where problems have a networked and interlinked character across climate change, economic inequality, security issues, migration, etc. Furthermore, the main question today is not reserved to social integration and social justice, but to make the planet inhabitable and sustainable for all species. We are concerned with the fact that the old models of welfare are inadequate to respond to the complexity of contemporary crises and produce a response across the elements of the entire system. Social Democracy and other types of institutional–redistributive models of welfare finally need to free themselves from the skepticism and even hostility towards people’s self-organization. This skepticism is part of the historic legacy with roots in the First International, and it was articulated in the Social Democratic skepticism towards the generation

46  Handbook on social innovation and social policy of cooperatives as a way of building livelihood and social justice. Today it is found in the view of the limited place for civil society and the solidarity economy as structuring principles for democratic solidarity. So far, Social Democracy has prevented itself from producing a vision of entrepreneurial activities other than those based upon private enterprise in the conventional market, although reciprocity is an economic principle of utmost importance. A new social mega-innovation is needed to build a new partnership between ‘the state’ and the new ‘alternative economic cultures’ (Castells, 2012) to promote large-scale eco-social transformation (Andersen et al., 2023). Social enterprises based upon the principles of the social and solidarity economy, as they are emerging throughout the world, are important parts of this (Laville, 2010; Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). In the social innovation vocabulary, the transition is led by an ethical commitment to change generated by values of democratic solidarity, reciprocity and association (Moulaert and MacCallum, 2019: 1). But in the end, the success of an institutional–reciprocal welfare state to address fully the crises ecosystem depends on its ability to ‘opening up the canon of knowledge’ (Santos et al., 2008). The ‘canon of knowledge’ that guided the welfare states was largely limited to understanding only the principles of market and redistribution as ways of serving the interests of people. But even more seriously, it was a binary view of the world in which we live as being separate from the world from which we live. The institutional–reciprocal model of welfare is not utopian since we have several indications of its potential. The strategy is to give civil society a much stronger societal position without losing the objectives of social justice, redistribution and the institutional mechanisms of ‘the old’ universal welfare state. The Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright’s call for promoting the role of ‘fraternité’ has been picked up by a diversity of movements, practitioners, and scholars at a global scale. In his book on a world without poverty, Muhammad Yunus argued that ‘capitalism is a half[-]developed structure’ since it only appeals to the selfish side of human beings. His vision is to demand recognition and an institutional framework that invests in social enterprises and endeavors which are dynamic, innovative, and appealing to the altruistic sides of human beings (see Hulgård, 2015). Yet, there are important principles to derive from Titmuss’ teachings that we can use in preparing the social mega-innovations needed today. His insistence on understanding how a social intervention always produces circles of impact, not only with respect to those who were immediately targeted, could be the first element in an ecosystem approach to understanding both problems and solutions. Furthermore, the ethical foundation of his approach to welfare and public policy is to intervene in economic, social, and technological change with the intention of shifting the negative consequences to all of society. Titmuss argued that if certain policies allow the negative consequences of social change to lie and have impact where they fall, it will lead to more inequality and segregation both within and between countries. This is a relevant if not even a necessary starting point for addressing the entire crises ecosystem with adequate social innovations for the benefit of eco-social sustainability.

REFERENCES Andersen, A.S., Hauggaard-Nielsen, H., Budde Christensen, T. and Hulgaard, L. (2023). Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Socio-Ecological Challenges. New York: Routledge. Ayob, N., Teasdale, S. and Fagan, K. (2016). ‘How Social Innovation “Came to Be”: Tracing the Evolution of a Contested Concept’, Journal of Social Policy, 45(4), pp. 635–653.

Richard M. Titmuss revisited: social innovation and the crises ecosystem  47 Borzaga, C. et al. (2020). Social Enterprises and their Ecosystems in Europe. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, European Commission. Castells, M. (2012). Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age. Chichester: Wiley. Chancel, L. and Piketty, T. (2021). Global Income Inequality, 1820–2020: The Persistence and Mutation of Extreme Inequality. World Inequality Lab, Working Paper No. 2021/19. Defourny, J. and Nyssens. M. (2010). ‘Conceptions of Social Enterprise and Social Entrepreneurship in Europe and the United States: Convergences and Divergences’, Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, 1(1), 32–53. DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W. (1983). ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’, American Sociological Review, 48(2), pp. 147–160. Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Greve, B. (2020). Welfare and the Welfare State: Central Issues Now and in the Future. Abingdon: Routledge. Howaldt, J., Kaletka, C. and Schröder, A. (2016). ‘Social Entrepreneurs: Important Actors within an Ecosystem of Social Innovation’, European Public Social & Social Innovation Review, 1(2), pp. 95–110. Hulgård, L. (2015). ‘Differing Perspectives on Civil Society and the State’, in Laville, J.L., Eynaud, P. and Young, D. (eds), Civil Society, the Third Sector and Social Enterprise. New York: Routledge, pp. 204–222. Hulgård, L. (2017). ‘Folkhemmet 2.0’, 100 Sociala Innovationer som kan förändra Sverige. Malmö Universitet: Möteplats Sociala Innovation, pp. 14–21. Hulgård, L. and Ferreira, S. (2019). ‘Social Innovation and Public Policy’, in Howaldt, J., Kaletka, C., Schröder, A. and Zirngiebl, M. (eds), Social Innovation Atlas, Vol. 2. Much: Oekon Verlag, pp. 26–29. Indian Constitution (1950). ‘The Constitution of India’. At https://​www​.constitutionofindia​.net/​read​[accessed 14 December 2023]. Jessop, B., Moulaert, F., Hulgård, L. and Hamduch, A. (2013). ‘Social Innovation Research: A New Stage in Innovation Analysis?’, In Moulaert, F., MacCallum, D. and Mehmood, A. (eds), The International Handbook on Social Innovation: Collective Action, Social Learning and Transdisciplinary Research. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 110–130. Kemp, L. et al. (2022). ‘Climate Endgame: Exploring Catastrophic Climate Change Scenarios’, PNAS, 119(34), e2108146119. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1073/​pnas​.2108146119. Latour, B. and Schultz, N. (2022). Memó sur la nouvelle classe écologue. Danish edition: Notat om den nye økologiske klasse. København: Hans Reitzels Forlag. Laville, J.-L. (2010). ‘The Solidarity Economy: An International Movement’, RCCS Annual Review, 2(2), 3–41. McCoy, J., Press, B., Somer, M. and Tuncel, O. (2022). Reducing Pernicious Polarization: A Comparative Historical Analysis of Depolarization. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications. Merrien, F.X. and Mendy, A.F. (2010). ‘International Organizations’, in Hart, K., Laville, J.L. and Cattani, A.D. (eds), The Human Economy. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 39–50. Moulaert, F. and MacCallum, D. (2019). ‘Advanced Introduction to Social Innovation’. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Myrdal, A. and Myrdal, G. (1934). Kris I befolkningsfrågan. Stockholm: Bonniers. Padovan-Özdemir, M. and Øland, T. (2022). Racism in Danish Welfare Work with Refugees. Abingdon: Routledge. Piketty, T. (2014). ‘Capital in the Twenty-First Century’. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press (translated by Arthur Goldhammer). Pietiläinen, S. (2019). The Failure of Microcredit to Reduce Poverty. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School. Pleyers, G. (2010). ‘Alter-Globalization’, in Hart, K., Laville, J.L. and Cattani, A.D. (eds), The Human Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 63–74. Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

48  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Sabatier, P.A. (1986). ‘Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches to Implementation Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis’, Journal of Public Policy, 6(1), 21–48. Santos, B. de S. (2008). Another Knowledge Is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies (ed.). London: Verso. Sernhede, O., Rosales, R.L. and Söderman, J. (2019). När betongen rätar sin rygg. Göteborg: Bokförlaget Daidalos. Shajahan, P.K. and Hulgård, L. (2020). ‘Genealogy and Instituitonalization of People-Centered Social Innovation in Kudumbashree, Kerala, India’, in Banerjee, S., Carnery, S. and Hulgård, L. (eds), People-Centered Social Innovation. Global Perspectives on an Emerging Paradigm. New York: Routledge, pp. 69–88. Skocpol, T. (2003). Diminished Democracy. From Membership to Management in American Civic Life. Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press. Teasdale, S., Roy, M.J. and Hulgård, L. (2021). ‘Power and Conflict in Social Innovation: A Field-based Perspective’, in Kaletka, C., Howaldt, J. and Schroeder, A. (eds), A Research Agenda for Social Innovation. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 169–188. Titmuss, R. (1974). ‘Social Policy: An Introduction’, in Abel-Smith, B. and Titmuss, K. (eds), Social Policy. London: Allen & Unwin, pp. 7–12. Titmuss, R. M (1987). ‘The Philosophy of Welfare: Selected writings of Richard M.’ Titmuss. London: Allen & Unwin. Titmuss, R. (2010). Welfare and Wellbeing: Richard Titmuss’ Contribution to Social Policy, eds Alcock, P., Glennerster, H., Oakley, A. and Sinfield, A. Bristol: Policy Press. Titmuss, R. (2018). The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. Bristol: Policy Press. Weber, M. (2005). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Routledge. Yunus, M. (2008). Creating A World Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of Capitalism. New York: Public Affairs.

5. The impact of social innovation on local welfare policy: lessons from a capability perspective Lara Maestripieri and Raquel Gallego-Calderón

Socially innovative initiatives have gained consensus in recent years as one of the modalities through which citizenship can promote democratisation of local welfare provision. The bottom-up approach and the communitarian practices that characterise such initiatives have opened up processes of co-production and responsibility-sharing in which citizens can have a greater say on and actively mobilise for their own well-being. However, evidence demonstrates a socio-economic bias in participation in these initiatives, with high-skilled (although not necessarily affluent) middle classes benefitting more from social innovation than more vulnerable individuals. This evidence therefore questions the capacity of socially innovative initiatives to tackle social inequalities. This chapter focuses on the contribution that the debate on Capabilities and empowerment can make to the analysis of the relationship between social innovation and inequalities. There has been huge scientific and policy interest in social innovation (SI) in the past two decades, but less attention has been paid to the possible influences that socially innovative initiatives can have on policy learning and innovation, focusing especially on the provision of local welfare services. Analysing SI under the capabilities frame allows us to answer the question, is social innovation capable of improving the capacity of citizens to live the life they value? Even more important, are local public bodies able to learn from successful SI and improve their capacity to cope with the increasing diversity of needs of citizens? We argue in this chapter that SI can foster the empowerment of those receiving local welfare provision as it allows them to pursue their own values, in accordance with the principles of the Capability approach. However, the tension between democratisation and socio-economic bias in access to SI can only be resolved by the full integration of service users into local public welfare provision. Although local public policy plays an important role in determining the set of entitlements offered to citizens, its role and relationships with SI have largely been ignored within the scientific literature. In fact, to date, the literature has mostly focused on how public policy can foster SI, with much less attention to how innovation can trigger a process of policy learning by public bodies. We argue that SIs in themselves are rarely able to generate collective empowerment in society, because of their limited number of participants, the difficulty of scalability outside their original context, and their incapacity in involving the most excluded and vulnerable population strata. However, their capacity to cope with the increasing diversity of citizens’ needs can inspire public intervention. At the same time, public leadership can preserve the redistributive nature of policies, which may be undermined if social innovation is led by private promoters (Martinelli, 2012). The capacity of the public sector to learn from SI can produce positive benefits for local public policy, which can be transformed to intercept and respond to the needs of citizens in general, or to those of target groups, thereby increasing 49

50  Handbook on social innovation and social policy collective empowerment. Therefore, SI is a potential win–win outcome, but only if public policy learns from it rather than delegating services to it. In this chapter we start filling this gap by addressing the potential of local policy innovation to impact on citizens’ welfare and on social inequalities. Particular attention is given to how SI may have a role in Southern European welfare states (Ferrera, 1996). In fact, Southern European welfare models have been particularly vulnerable to the “new social risks” triggered by the post-industrial transformation (Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Bonoli, 2005, 2007). These new social risks have impacted particularly hard in the familistic system that characterises South Europe (Saraceno and Keck, 2011; Marí-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes, 2013). Social innovation may thus play a role in how inequalities are tackled by public policies in these societies (Martinelli, 2012). The chapter is organised as follows. We first reflect on the definition of SI in the light of the Capability approach. Next, we consider the socio-economic bias that often characterises experiences of SI. We then explore why SI is relevant to local public policy, and consider the challenges and policy lessons raised. We conclude with a reflection of how Southern European welfare states may provide a complex context for SI.

DEFINING SOCIAL INNOVATION USING THE CAPABILITY APPROACH The concept of social innovation has been extensively debated in recent years across several different disciplinary perspectives. It has reached the status of a “quasi-concept” (Jenson, 2015), since it remains empirically controversial, is characterised by multiple meanings, and has been advocated by neoliberal and democratic advocates in policy debates (van der Have and Rubalcaba, 2016; Montgomery, 2016). Several attempts to define it have been proposed, but the neoliberal definition offered by BEPA (2010) remains that most widely adopted (Martinelli, 2012). In this definition, what is stressed is the capacity of SI to improve the capabilities of individuals and to enhance the society’s capacity to act, through innovations that are both “social in their ends and means” (Baglioni and Sinclair, 2018, p. 14). In contrast to the idea that innovation is associated with new marketable technological products, the adjunct of the adjective “social” stresses the importance of going beyond market relationships to address unsolved social problems (Ziegler, 2017). There are three main components associated with this “social” nature. First, SI refers to collective solutions that address social needs unmet by either the market or state (the practice component). Second, these solutions are distinguished by their capacity to change existing social relations (the process component). Third, the participation of users should be a transformative process (the empowerment component) (Moulaert et al., 2005; Gerometta et al., 2005; Moulaert and Mehmood, 2020; Baglioni and Sinclair, 2018). Applying the principles of the Capability approach, empowerment implies that SI should enable participants to achieve what they value and have reasons to value, by participating in the definition and provision of services that are able to meet their freely chosen unmet needs. It is important to differentiate two of the main concepts relating to empowerment in the Capability perspective: what people could do (“capabilities”) and what people actually do (“functioning”) (Martinetti, 2008). Functionings are achieved through capabilities – which SI potentially enables (Ziegler, 2010) – while realised function-

The impact of social innovation on local welfare policy  51 ing are those beings and doings that a person enjoys at a given point of time (Tiwari, 2017). Thus, functioning is the goal of capabilities. Empowerment links the content and processes of SI (Oosterlynck et al., 2013). The concept of empowerment is firmly embedded within a Capability definition of SI, as it can be defined as an expansion of agency (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007). In Sen’s view agency is the critical component of empowerment: it is the ability to make one’s own choices and translate them into desired outcomes (Sen, 1999). Empowerment is thus the result of the combination of functionings, capability and agency that can occur at different levels (individual or collective) (Tiwari, 2017). A distinctive contribution of the Capability approach lies in the fact that agency is not assessed simply using the formal rights and entitlements of any particular social system, but in relation to actual capacity to define what one has reason to value and enjoy within such a system (Sen, 1999). Under the Capability approach framework, SI may be thought of as a conversion factor, a concept that refers to the goods and services that enable desired functionings to be achieved (Tiwari, 2017). Three elements define relative empowerment. First, empowered individuals have agency, i.e., the ability to define their goals and act to obtain them. Second, empowerment implies resources, which is access to material and non-material assets to exercise agency. Third, there are outcomes: the combination of agency and resources may lead to a social change in which all participants have the capacity to achieve their goals (Haugh and O’Carroll, 2019). Empowered individuals exercise agency to remove social barriers and overcome obstacles that may hinder their own and others’ well-being; that is, factors that may constrain agency (Kabeer, 1999; Haugh and Talwar, 2016). In this sense, SI and empowerment are connected through the concept of social transformation (Rappaport, 1987). From this perspective, the relational nature of empowerment becomes central to defining SI. Following Ayob et al. (2016), it is possible to identify two traditions in the academic debate on SI: a weak tradition, which considers social innovations to be new or alternative practices that achieve an increase in personal utility (individual empowerment); and a stronger tradition, which considers SIs to be collaborative co-productions that change existing power relations (collective empowerment) (Ayob et al., 2016; Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2017). Individual empowerment occurs when a person, following their involvement in SI, develops greater efficacy, personal competence and the capacity to exercise agency. Collective empowerment occurs when groups and organisations acquire the capacity to influence the distribution of economic, political and social resources and impact upon existing inequalities (Haugh and O’Carroll, 2019). We argue that one of the ways in which collective empowerment can be measured is the capacity of the SI to influence public policy, at least at local level. In theory, one of the explicit goals of SI is to empower communities and the individuals involved in the activities within them (Sinclair and Baglioni, 2014). The key element that triggers the process of individual empowerment is thus the direct participation of citizens, as SI implies that solutions are developed with and by the participants (Baglioni and Sinclair, 2018). But if individual participation is enough to meet the conditions for the weak SI tradition, the collective empowerment required by the strong tradition goes beyond mere individual participation. In fact, from this perspective, the key element of socially innovative projects are mobilisation–participation processes: these processes should be able to trigger a transformative social change, with a consequent impact on social relations and the governance of local public policy (Moulaert et al., 2013). In the end, one of the main characteristics of SIs is their

52  Handbook on social innovation and social policy intention to invest in capacity-building, fostering the empowerment of those involved (Ewert and Evers, 2014). This focus on collective empowerment reprises how SI has been conceptualised in the French tradition, not only as the outcome of an unmet need, but also as a politically oriented collective project (Chambon et al., 1982; Fontan et al., 2004). For this reason, SI’s relationship with public bodies is central, as it can offer the possibility not only to institutionalise, but also to finance SI activities and to sustain them politically. Thus, one of the main goals of SI is to change the social and institutional context in which it operates, and by which it has been incubated. Consequently, local public bodies are natural interlocutors of SI projects – they have a direct relationship, and they also influence SIs by offering resource and political recognition, and learning from them (Fontan et al., 2004). In conclusion, the collective empowerment dimension of SI highlights the resilience of public policies (i.e., their capacity to respond to changing socio-economic conditions) and increases socio-political capabilities and access to resources through individual and collective involvement in SI (The Young Foundation, 2012). However, to be successful, collective empowerment should change local public policy provision and welfare outcomes (Häikiö et al., 2017). But empirical evidence demonstrates that social innovation does not empower people equally, increasing the risk of confirming and magnifying rather than reducing inequalities (Cruz et al., 2017; Maestripieri, 2017; Eizaguirre and Parés, 2019; Avelino et al., 2019; Arampatzi, 2022).

SOCIO-ECONOMIC BIASES OF SI In theory, citizen-led SI initiatives propose new products and services that are aimed at satisfying social needs. However, these new solutions are tailored to the needs of the citizens who actively engage in promoting and managing them. In their view, these practices cover their needs more effectively and efficiently than existing institutionalised (public and private) provision models. According to the literature, the citizens participating in SI initiatives are more active and of a higher socio-economic level than the average population in their communities (Eizaguirre and Parés, 2019). Thus, on the one hand, SI conveys positive aspects, such as improving the capacity of these citizens to make their opinion heard through participation, and increasing the capacity of local welfare services to cope with diverse needs. But, on the other hand, it may contradict redistributive policy aims, which is particularly important in the context of scarce resources following local welfare retrenchment resulting from austerity and the rescaling of policies (Kazepov, 2010). Numerous studies have demonstrated that SI might create new inequalities (Martinelli, 2012; Cruz et al., 2017; Maestripieri, 2017; Eizaguirre and Parés, 2019; Avelino et al., 2019; Arampatzi, 2022). On the one hand, not all citizens have the capacity or agency to engage in social innovations: studies have demonstrated that social innovators are usually more educated and active than those who access conventional services (Maestripieri, 2017; Eizaguirre and Parés, 2019). It is, in fact, empirically proven that the most empowered and participative strata of society participate in socially innovative initiatives, to the detriment of the most vulnerable and socially excluded strata (Cruz et al., 2017; Arampatzi, 2022). On the other hand, the need for SI emerges when current welfare systems fail to satisfy citizens’ needs; in this way, support for SI might be used to justify reduced investment in

The impact of social innovation on local welfare policy  53 public policies (Oosterlynck et al., 2013). The rhetoric of SI has been strong in promising the democratisation of welfare by increasing the participation of recipients (Moulaert et al., 2013), but it has also been applied in the context of retrenchment to justify reducing the responsibility of public actors to provide goods and services (Oosterlynck et al., 2013). A reduced role for the State is supposedly compensated for by increased action from civil society and private actors. But more welfare actors does not necessarily imply more support for all citizens equally. In fact, the most innovative and disruptive Sis are able to involve only a small number of participants. This seriously calls into question the capacity of SI solutions to scale-up and meet the needs on a wider scale (Häikiö et al., 2017). The support municipalities have given in recent years to innovative welfare initiatives has been accompanied by a reduction in direct public investments in conventional welfare provision (Avelino et al., 2019). When resources for welfare are tight, requirements for accessing services become extremely selective, targeting only populations that have multiple problems, leaving some other vulnerable citizens in need. Thus, the reduction or absence of public policy may reinforce inequality, if market failings are only compensated by social innovations (Martinelli, 2012; Arampatzi, 2022). As a result, the attempts at empowerment involved in SI initiatives may have unintended counter-effects, in that policies designed to empower often require people to already be sufficiently empowered to respond to a new policy (Avelino et al., 2019). The absence of policy in the area of SI may lead to the systematic exclusion of populations who lack the skills and agency necessary to participate in initiatives, and risk reducing the capacity of local welfare to cope with increasing demands.

THE RELEVANCE OF SI FOR LOCAL PUBLIC POLICY Public policy addresses problems, demands and needs beyond individual interests. The concept of public policy requires institutional involvement, which can come in a variety of forms (regulation, provision, etc.) and through a variety of mechanisms (discourse building, economic support, sanctions, control, evaluation, etc.). In democratic contexts, public policy also requires citizens’ participation, which can come through different channels and degrees of involvement. Thus, one of the main challenges for public policy is addressing the heterogeneity of needs and diversity of demands in a community (Kraft and Furlong, 2021). Most social innovation is a local experience (Ewert and Evers, 2014). In the rhetoric of the strong tradition (Ayob et al., 2016), SI favours the mobilisation of “hidden resources” from civil society and helps visualise the diversity and liveliness of the local context (Moulaert et al., 2013). It entails the mobilisation of actors at a local level that position themselves between the market and public provision. These include social entrepreneurs, third-sector organisations, and community and family networks (Häikiö et al., 2017). SI triggers the empowerment of welfare beneficiaries by disrupting traditionally top-down service provision and stimulating a bottom-up process where citizens actively co-produce their welfare together with third-sector organisations, private funders and the State. Thus, the “consumers of welfare” become cooperating actors. Citizen engagement extends to the point that they actively work to ensure the provision of services, with the risk of exploitation that free (or low-paid) labour entails (Arcidiacono et al., 2018). In the most disruptive conceptualisations of SI (Ayob et al., 2016), such as that of Moulaert et al. (2013), social innovation emerges from the direct

54  Handbook on social innovation and social policy participation of citizens in decision-making processes, who contribute to the co-production of welfare services. Advocates of the strong SI tradition affirm that it achieves collective empowerment, with beneficial returns for the capacity of local public policy to increase citizens’ capability. Scholars who support SI highlight the failures of conventional service delivery to meet demand for welfare, which, particularly at the local level, is becoming increasingly diverse. Socially innovative initiatives promote solutions grounded in social relations and, thanks to the direct involvement of the beneficiaries, offer solutions tailored to their needs (Moulaert et al., 2013). SI has caught the interest of scholars of local welfare because such initiatives have been successful in meeting unsatisfied welfare needs. SI has also offered emancipatory practices that have developed in opposition to public social services and the increasing pervasiveness of market-based provision (Häikiö et al., 2017). On this basis, applying a “socially innovative” analytical framework to local policy welfare (Moulaert et al., 2013; Ziegler, 2017) underlines the involvement of multiple actors and the participation of citizens in defining social policies and in delivering services. SI allows citizens to regain their voice, increase their autonomy and actively shape how the services they need are provided. The localised dimension of SI derives from its very nature: SI initiatives are pragmatic solutions to needs not sufficiently tackled by the state nor market. They are context-dependent and embedded solutions and, as such, typically developed by local communities at neighbourhoods or city level (Oosterlynck et al., 2013). The local level determines their development and consolidation, as local conditions and relationships are the arena in which SIs are nurtured, grow and consolidate (Martinelli, 2012; Saruis et al., 2021). The role that SI plays in the local welfare systems depends on the landscape in which the innovations are embedded: they fit into and around institutions by doing what they are allowed to do or what no one else will. They are in a symbiotic relationship with public bodies, a relationship that is dynamic in nature and that can evolve over time (Baglioni and Sinclair, 2018). However, the scope and activities of SI in local welfare depends upon the extent to which local authorities endorse initiatives that involve communities and integrate social logics that go beyond public and private provision (Brandsen and Evers, 2019). The role of public actors is that of enabler rather than direct provider, in a situation where the “privatisation” of social services is led not by markets but by local communities and service users (Moulaert et al., 2013). The state’s role as an enabler might also entail exclusionary processes and effects: if SIs involve only the most capable citizens, what happens to the rest? SI might become a justification for budget cuts and outsourcing welfare services, which could increase inequality and reduce the capacity of local public bodies to innovate themselves (Avelino et al., 2019; Arampatzi, 2022).

PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FROM SI Social innovative initiatives are a source of valuable information for policy learning, offering potential solutions to address heterogeneous and diverse needs, and dynamic channels to enable citizenship participation and effective governance networks. Interpreting public policy in terms of the Capability approach implies ensuring that everyone has the capability to achieve the functionings that are recognised as valuable by citizens. Assessing the capacity of a policy to tackle individual needs is concerned with what individuals are actually capable

The impact of social innovation on local welfare policy  55 of being and doing. Potential achievements constitute the Capability Set of a person – that is, their real freedom to be what they want and do what they freely chose. Public policy should not focus on outcomes (functionings, in Sen’s terminology), but should provide the environment necessary for real freedom of choice that constitutes each person’s capabilities set (Bonvin, 2006). Entitlements – rights provided by the state – and commodities, being goods and services offered on the market, are not enough to guarantee genuine freedom, as this condition depends on what a person values and has reason to value in terms of beings and doings. From this perspective, the purpose of public policies is to create conditions that allow individuals to choose the life they have reason to value (Bonvin, 2006). Policy innovation may result from learning and drawing lessons from policy precedents or societal experiences (Moyson et al., 2017). Local welfare initiatives are “collective practices that arise at the municipal or neighbourhood level for creating or sustaining the welfare of individuals, groups or communities through the provision of services” (Häikiö et al., 2017: 281). In contrast to citizen-led initiatives, public policy is inextricably linked to institutions acting to intervene in a wide variety of issues in society. Although public policy may involve complex governance dynamics, the involvement of public authorities is a defining feature (Howlett and Tosun, 2021; Knill and Tuson, 2012). A policy respecting the principles of the Capability approach should allow participation in the policy of all relevant local actors, each of whom should have a voice in the definition of the policy objectives, actions and assessment (Bonvin, 2006). Chambon et al. (1982) see SI as a form of resistance against institutional immobility, as a way to produce new ways of meeting social needs that are not subsumed in the current institutional offer. However, to actually achieve the potential of transformation implied by SIs, their proposed solutions should be scaled-up and diffused outside the limited audience of innovators (Häikiö et al., 2017: 281). This is why assessment of the impact of SI should include its capacity to be institutionalised and become part of public policy (Martinelli, 2012; Baglioni and Sinclair, 2018). Institutionalisation is a concept that refers to the capacity of local socially innovative initiatives to have an influence on public discourse and on wider policies. The SI literature observes that successful projects have the potential to be scaled-up and become integrated into the conventional provision of local welfare, thus consolidating policy change. These studies point out two ways in which this could happen: (i) changing the public discourse and legitimising the broadening and diversity of practices and solutions; (ii) the initiatives being recognised and formalised beyond the local scale, as a legitimate alternative for welfare provisions (Häikiö et al., 2017).

SOCIAL INNOVATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES Social innovation has been a promising concept in the discussion of local welfare states in recent years. As shown in this chapter, the promise of democratisation of welfare services and the supposed capacity to tackle diverse needs have been arguments used by local policymakers to promote support for SI (Baglioni and Sinclair, 2018). However, the evidence has demonstrated that the case for SI has also been used instrumentally by policymakers to hide retrenchments and local devolution of service provisions, reducing the capacity of welfare systems to protect citizens from risks (Oosterlynck et al., 2013; Avelino et al., 2019; Arampatzi, 2022).

56  Handbook on social innovation and social policy In fact, SI does not emerge in the neighbourhoods in which the needs are more evident and pressing, but rather in neighbourhoods with stronger social capital and civic capacity (Cruz et al., 2017; Blanco and Leon, 2017; Eizaguirre and Parés, 2019; Arampatzi, 2022). These considerations are particularly relevant in the context of Southern European welfare states. The development of Southern European welfare regimes – namely, those in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain – was inextricably linked to transitions to democracy, starting in the 1970s for all countries (except Italy), and to European Commission-led welfare policy diffusion processes (Ferrera, 1996; Marí-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes, 2013). In contrast to other European welfare states, the Southern models emerged and consolidated over the 1980s, in the context of profound, ongoing structural changes that have led to welfare state retrenchment and recalibration from the 1990s to the present (Gallego et al., 2005). This welfare model is marked by its low levels of social spending – which is consistent with its development during the late industrial society when political consensus over social spending was already going down – and by the relevance of the traditional family model, based on the figure of the male breadwinner and the gender roles this entails (Castles, 1993; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Vesan, 2015). Some studies highlight the importance of religion and culture in explaining the survival of these traditional family values (Castles, 1994; van Kersbergen and Manow, 2010). This welfare regime type is characterised by the distinctive role of family care (Marí-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes, 2013). But despite the emphasis placed on the role of the family, this has not been accompanied by social policies that reinforce the family’s capacity to provide well-being in the absence of institutional help. Several studies (Gallego et al., 2005; Saraceno and Keck, 2011; Marí-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes, 2013) have highlighted the demands – and even overload – that this places upon some families, in which unpaid work is mainly provided by women (even when they work full-time), in a context in which public and private service provision is insufficient to meet families’ needs. This familialist approach does not compensate for the weakness and fragmentation of public assistance and social care policies supporting young people leaving the parental home, providing care for dependents, or addressing the challenges of labour market transformation (Marí-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes, 2013). Given this context, the emergence and impact of “new social risks” (NSRs) has been particularly disruptive in Southern European societies (Ranci et al., 2021). NSRs refer to the difficulties raised by the transition to a post-industrial society (Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Bonoli, 2005, 2007). NSRs include inadequate welfare protection stemming from labour market precarity: low-paid work; unemployment due to obsolete skills; unstable jobs and careers; and the difficult of reconciling paid and unpaid family work, etc. Some SIs have found non-standard solutions to these risks that were not covered by the welfare system inherited from industrial society.1 Although policies that combat NSR follow EU regulations, they differ considerably not only across Southern European welfare regimes, but also between regions with devolved powers (Gallego and Subirats, 2011, 2012). It seems that leftist governments and expansive economic periods put a premium on NSR policies’ unstable, intermittent and often reversible development (Bonoli, 2005). NSR have placed the family “pillar” of the Mediterranean welfare model under unsustainable pressure such that families can no longer perform their traditional “shock absorber” role (Vesan, 2015). Middle-class households have been increasingly exposed to financial insecurity and vulnerability in Southern Europe, putting into question the capacity of this welfare model to protect against risks (Ranci et al., 2021).

The impact of social innovation on local welfare policy  57 Further analyses point to profound transformations since the 2000s in these countries, which are shaking up the Southern European welfare model. First, European integration and later the 2008 global crisis led to fiscal austerity and cost-containment policies, together with the retrenchment and calibration of income-maintenance and service provision policies to counteract population aging. The step-back of public bodies as service providers opened up new spaces for market-driven solutions, but also created space for civil society to step in (Eizaguirre and Parés, 2019). Second, the sharp transition to a post-industrial society, with a service-based economy and with family and gender relations much closer to the neighbouring Northern European countries, has sparked unprecedented challenges for Southern European welfare regimes (Marí-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes, 2013). Women – entrapped by the double demand of care provision and labour market participation – have been unable to compensate for the lack of services provided by the public, while the cost of market solutions makes these inaccessible to most of the working and low-middle classes. This has left families increasingly exposed to a lack of welfare. Citizens have been forced to resort to new care strategies outside the traditional family provider model (Caïs et al., 2020) and SIs have been one of these strategies (Evers et al., 2014; Häikiö et al., 2017; Saruis et al., 2021). For example, the municipalities of Athens and Madrid have both promoted SIs to abdicate from their role as service providers, assuming instead the role of local development facilitator, to the further detriment of their citizens’ welfare (Arampatzi, 2022). In policy discourse, the social is often considered a resource available for promoting cost-effective strategies in restructuring the local welfare services (Avelino et al., 2019). Can we thus argue that SI might improve the capacity of Southern European welfare states to provide their citizens’ well-being? Pol and Ville (2009) argue that pure social innovations occur when markets are not able to address needs. This can only occur where satisfying needs does not create sufficient profit incentive, either because the need is not sufficiently widespread or because those in need lack sufficient resources to pay for market solutions. Studies show that in such situations bottom-up mobilisation of citizens addresses needs (Gerometta et al., 2005; Blanco and Leon, 2017), but only rarely does the benefit created spillover outside areas with high social capital (Eizaguirre and Parés, 2019; Arampatzi, 2022) and the most active citizens (Cruz et al., 2017). These initiatives require continuity beyond their purely voluntaristic nature (Maestripieri, 2017), in order to foster scalability beyond the local (Häikiö et al., 2017). The role of the public bodies is crucial (Martinelli, 2012). The public-sector role should intervene to facilitate the emergence of citizens’ SI initiatives – through incentive schemes – or, more effectively, propose a process of institutionalisation in which local welfare systems learn from the most effective social innovations and extend these to the general citizenship (Pol and Ville, 2009; Martinelli, 2012; Häikiö et al., 2017). One such case is the success of socially innovative provision of care for young children in the city of Barcelona (Gallego and Maestripieri, 2022b). In the most recent education plan (published in April 2021), the city decided to invest in the promotion of a new service – called Espai Familiars. This service has been tailored based on the experience of SIs, and widened to the entire citizenship by public support in terms of spaces, human resources and knowledge. What had been accessible only to those who could afford the higher price of SI provision, is now available to all those who need an alternative to traditional early education provision. This process has promoted policy learning and reformulated policy for early childhood (Gallego and Maestripieri, 2022a).

58  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Southern European societies have been particularly capable of promoting SI at local levels (Arampatzi, 2022): there are many such initiatives that address a wide variety of experiences. Examples include time banks, complementary currencies, consumption cooperative, parents-led childcare services, co-housing and community gardens, among many others.2 All have triggered increasing social participation in cities and neighbourhoods affected by crisis and social exclusion in the south of Europe (Blanco and Leon, 2017). However, as the case of early years childcare demonstrates, only through institutionalisation are SIs able to go beyond the limitations of their voluntaristic nature (Fraisse et al., 2021; Gallego and Maestripieri, 2022a, 2022b). To conclude from where we began: the potential of social innovation for empowerment lies in its capacity to foster innovation in public policy. It is still largely policies provided by local public bodies that allow citizens to access services that address their unmet needs, especially among the most vulnerable and excluded parts of the population. SI is extremely important in drawing attention to unsatisfied needs, but to avoid the socio-economic bias highlighted in this chapter, public policy has to step in, promoting the general empowerment of citizenship. This is especially crucial in Southern European welfare regimes, in which SI should not become a justification to trigger processes of retrenchment, budget cuts and dismantling current welfare state arrangements (Avelino et al., 2019), but an opportunity for public policy learning, as shown in the case of Barcelona (Gallego and Maestripieri, 2022a, 2022b).

NOTES 1. See https://​www​.s​ocialinnov​ationatlas​.net (accessed 14 November 2023). 2. Ibid.

REFERENCES Arampatzi, A. (2022). Social innovation and austerity governance in Athens and Madrid: Rethinking the changing contours of policy and practice, European Urban and Regional Studies, 29(1): 45–58. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1177/​09697764211028900 Arcidiacono, D., Loconto, A., Maestripieri, L., and Podda, A. (2018). Editorial: Introducing the wave of the prosumers in the age of labour market shattering, Sociologia del Lavoro, 152: 3–16. https://​doi​ .org/​10​.3280/​SL2018​-152001 Avelino, F., Wittmayer, J. M., Pel, B., Weaver, P., Dumitru, A., Haxeltine, A., … O’Riordan, T. (2019). Transformative social innovation and (dis)empowerment, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 145: 195–206. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1016/​j​.techfore​.2017​.05​.002 Ayob, N., Teasdale, S., and Fagan, K. (2016). How social innovation “Came to Be”: Tracing the evolution of a contested concept, Journal of Social Policy, 45(4): 635–653. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1017/​ S004727941600009X Baglioni, S., and Sinclair, S. (2018). Social innovation and social policy: Theory, policy and practice. Bristol: Policy Press. BEPA (2010). Empowering people, driving change: Social innovation in the European Union. At http://​ ec​.europa​.eu/​bepa/​pdf/​publications​_pdf/​social​_innovation​.pdf (accessed 14 November 2023). Blanco, I., and León, M. (2017). Social innovation, reciprocity and contentious politics: Facing the socio-urban crisis in Ciutat Meridiana, Barcelona, Urban Studies, 54(9): 2172–2188. https://​doi​.org/​ 10​.1177/​0042098016659044 Bonoli, G. (2005). The politics of new social policies: Providing coverage against new social risks in mature welfare states, Policy and Politics, 33(3): 431–449.

The impact of social innovation on local welfare policy  59 Bonoli, G. (2007). Time matters: Postindustrialization, new social risks, and welfare state adaptation in advanced industrial democracies, Comparative Political Studies, 40(5): 495–520. Bonvin, J. M. (2006). Promoting capability for work: The role of local actors, in Transforming unjust structures: The capability approach (pp. 121–142). Dordrecht: Springer. https://​link​.springer​.com/​ book/​10​.1007/​1​-4020​-4432​-1 Brandsen, T., and Evers, A. (2019). Social innovations in the urban context: Different types of local social innovations, in Howaldt, J., Kaletka, C., Schröder, A., and Zirngiebl, M. (eds), Atlas of social innovation, 2nd volume – A world of new practices (pp. 58–63). Munich: Oekom Verlag GmbH. Caïs, J., Torrente, D., and Bolancé, C. (2020). The effects of economic crisis on trust: Paradoxes for social capital theory, Social Indicators Research, 153(1): 173–192. DOI: 10.1007/s11205-020-02385-w Castles, F. G. (ed.) (1993). Families of nations: Patterns of public policy in western democracies. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company. Castles, F. G. (1994). On religion and public policy: Does Catholicism make a difference?, European Journal of Political Research, 25(1): 19–40. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1111/​j​.1475​-6765​.1994​.tb01199​.x Chambon, J.-L., David, A., and Devevey, J.-M. (1982). Les innovations sociales. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Chiappero-Martinetti, E., Houghton Budd, C., and Ziegler, R. (2017). Social innovation and the capability approach: Introduction to the special issue, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 18(2): 141–147. Cruz, H., Rubén Martínez, M., and Blanco, I. (2017). Crisis, urban segregation and social innovation in Catalonia, Partecipazione e conflitto, 10(1): 221–245. Eizaguirre, S., and Parés, M. (2019). Communities making social change from below: Social innovation and democratic leadership in two disenfranchised neighbourhoods in Barcelona, Urban Research and Practice, 12(2): 173–191. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1080/​17535069​.2018​.1426782 Esping-Andersen, G. (1999). The social foundations of post-industrial economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Evers, A., Ewert, B., and Brandsen, T. (2014). Social innovations for social cohesion: Transnational patterns and approaches from 20 European cities. Liege: EMES, European Research Network. Ewert, B., and Evers, A. (2014). Blueprints for the future of welfare provision? Shared features of service innovations across Europe, Social Policy and Society, 13(3), 423–432. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1017/​ S1474746414000074 Ferrera, M. (1996). The “Southern Model” of welfare in social Europe, Journal of European Social Policy, 6(1): 17–37. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1177/​095892879600600102 Fontan, J. M., Klein, J. L., and Tremblay, D. G. (2004). Innovation et société: Pour élargir l’analyse des effets territoriaux de l’innovation, Geographie Economie Société, 6(2): 115–128. https://​doi​.org/​10​ .3166/​ges​.6​.115​-128 Fraisse, L., Petrella, F., and Richez-Battesti, N. (2021). From grassroots social innovation to public experimentation in the French Local childcare system: The managerial turn, Autonomie Locali e Servizi Sociali, 44(3): 457–476. Gallego, R., and Maestripieri, L. (2022a). La innovación social en los cuidados 0–3: entre la desigualdad y la equidad en las políticas públicas, Papers, 107(3). https://​doi​.org/​10​.5565/​rev/​papers​.3060 Gallego, R., and Maestripieri, L. (2022b). Women’s empowerment and social innovation in childcare: The case of Barcelona, Spain, European Societies, online first, DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2022.2092641 Gallego, R., and Subirats, J. (2011). Regional welfare regimes and multilevel governance, in Guillén, A. M., and León, M. (eds), The Spanish Welfare State in European Context (pp. 97–118). Farnham: Ashgate. Gallego, R., and Subirats, J. (2012). Spanish regional and welfare systems: Policy innovation and multi-level governance, Regional and Federal Studies, 22(3): 269–288. Gallego, R., Gomà, R., and Subirats, J. (2005). Spain: From state welfare to regional welfare, in McEwen, N., and Moreno, L. (eds), The territorial politics of welfare (pp. 103–126). London: Routledge. Gerometta, J., Häussermann, H., and Longo, G. (2005). Social innovation and civil society in urban governance: Strategies for an inclusive city, Urban Studies, 42(11): 2007–2021. https://​doi​.org/​10​ .1080/​00420980500279851 Häikiö, L., Fraisse, L., Adam, S., Jolanki, O., and Knutagård, M. (2017). The Janus face of social innovation in local welfare initiatives, in Martinelli, F., Anttonen, A., and Mätzke, M. (eds), Social services

60  Handbook on social innovation and social policy disrupted (pp. 281–301). Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. https://​doi​.org/​10​.4337/​9781786432117​.00024 Haugh, H. M., and O’Carroll, M. (2019). Empowerment, social innovation and social change, in George, G., Baker, T., Tracey, P., and Joshi, H. (eds), Handbook of inclusive innovation: The role of organizations, markets and communities in social innovation (pp. 486–502). Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Haugh, H. M., and Talwar, A. (2016). Linking social entrepreneurship and social change: The mediating role of empowerment, Journal of Business Ethics, 133(4): 643–658. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1007/​s10551​ -014​-2449​-4 Howlett, M., and Tosun, J. (eds) (2021). The Routledge handbook of policy styles. Abingdon: Routledge. Ibrahim, S., and Alkire, S. (2007). Agency and empowerment: A proposal for internationally comparable indicators, Oxford Development Studies, 35(4): 379–403. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1080/​13600810701701897 Jenson, J. (2015). Social innovation: Redesigning the welfare diamond, in Nicholls, A., Simon, J., and Gabriel, M. (eds), New frontiers in social innovation research (pp. 89–106). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kabeer, N. (1999). Resources, agency, achievements: Reflections on the measurement of women’s empowerment, Development and Change, 30(3): 435–464. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1111/​1467​-7660​.00125 Kazepov, Y. (ed.). (2010). Rescaling social policies: Towards multilevel governance in Europe (Vol. 38). Farnham: Ashgate Publishing. Knill, C., and Tuson, J. (2012). Public policy: A new introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kraft, M. E., and Furlong, S. R. (2021). Public policy: Politics, analysis and alternatives. London: Sage. Maestripieri, L. (2017). Are Solidarity Purchasing Groups a social innovation? A study inspired by social forces, Partecipazione e Conflitto, 10: 955–982. https://​ddd​.uab​.cat/​record/​185689 Marí-Klose, P., and Moreno-Fuentes, F. J. (2013). The Southern European Welfare model in the post-industrial order, European Societies, 15(4): 475–492. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1080/​14616696​.2013​ .835853 Martinelli, F. (2012). Social innovation or social exclusion? Innovating social services in the context of a retrenching welfare state, in Franz, H.-W., Hochgerner, J., and Howaldt, J. (eds), Challenge Social Innovation (pp.  169–180). Berlin; Heidelberg: Springer. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1007/​978​-3​-642​-32879​-4 Martinetti, E. C. (2008). Complexity and vagueness in the capability approach: Strengths or weaknesses, in Comin, F., Qizilbash, M., and Alkire, S. (eds), The Capability approach: Concepts, measures and applications (pp. 268–309). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Montgomery, T. (2016). Are social innovation paradigms incommensurable?, Voluntas, 27(4): 1979–2000. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1007/​s11266​-016​-9688​-1 Moulaert, F., and Mehmood, A. (2020). Towards a social innovation (SI) based epistemology in local development analysis: Lessons from twenty years of EU research, European Planning Studies, 28(3): 434–453. Moulaert, F., Martinelli, F., Swyngedouw, E., and González, S. (2005). Towards alternative model(s) of local innovation. Urban Studies, 42(11): 1969–1990. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1080/​00420980500279893 Moulaert, F., MacCallum, D., Mehmood, A., and Hamdouch, A. (2013). General introduction: The return of social innovation as a scientific concept and a social practice, in Moulaert, F., MacCallum, D., Mehmood, A., and Hamdouch A. (eds), The international handbook on Social Innovation: Collective action, social learning and transdisciplinary research (pp. 1–9). Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Moyson, S., Scholten, P., and Weible, C. (2017). Policy learning and policy change: Theorising their relations from different perspectives, Policy and Society, 36(2): 161–177. Oosterlynck, S., Kazepov, Y., Novy, A., Cools, P., Barberis, E., Wukovitsch, F., … Leubolt, B. (2013). The butterfly and the elephant: Local social innovation, the welfare state and new poverty dynamics, ImPRovE Methodological Paper, 13(02). Pol, E., and Ville, S. (2009). Social innovation: Buzz word or enduring term?, Journal of Socio-Economics, 38(6): 878–885. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1016/​j​.socec​.2009​.02​.011 Ranci, C., Beckfield, J., Bernardi, L., and Parma, A. (2021). New measures of economic insecurity reveal its expansion into EU middle classes and welfare states, Social Indicators Research, 158(2): 539–562. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1007/​s11205​-021​-02709​-4

The impact of social innovation on local welfare policy  61 Rappaport, J. (1987). Terms of empowerment/exemplars of prevention: Toward a theory for community psychology, American Journal of Community Psychology, 15(2): 121–148. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1007/​ BF00919275 Saraceno, C., and Keck, W. (2011). Towards an integrated approach for the analysis of gender equity in policies supporting paid work and care responsibilities, Demographic Research, 25: 371–406. https://​ doi​.org/​10​.4054/​DemRes​.2011​.25​.11 Saruis, T., Kazepov, Y., and Boczy, T. (2021). Consolidare l’innovazione sociale in contesti diversi di welfare: tra dinamiche trasformative e adattamento, Autonomie locali e servizi sociali, 44(3): 579–592. Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. Sinclair, S., and Baglioni, S. (2014). Social Innovation and Social Policy: Promises and risks, Social Policy and Society, 13(3): 469–476. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1017/​S1474746414000086 Taylor-Gooby. P. (ed.) (2004). New risks, new welfare: The transformation of the European welfare state. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Young Foundation. (2012). Social Innovation Overview: A deliverable of the project: “The theoretical, empirical and policy foundations for building social innovation in Europe” (TEPSIE), European Commission – 7th Framework Programme, Brussels: European Commission, DG Research. Tiwari, M. (2017). Exploring the role of the Capability approach in Social Innovation, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 18(2), 181–196. DOI: 10.1080/19452829.2016.1271312 van der Have, R. P., and Rubalcaba, L. (2016). Social innovation research: An emerging area of innovation studies?, Research Policy, 45(9): 1923–1935. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1016/​j​.respol​.2016​.06​.010 van Kersbergen, K., and Manow, P. (2010). Religion, class coalitions, and the Welfare States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1017/​CBO9780511626784 Vesan, P. (2015). Ancora al Sud? I Paesi mediterranei e le riforme delle politiche del lavoro negli anni della crisi economica, Meridiana, 83: 91–119. Ziegler, R. (2010). Innovations in doing and being: Capability innovations at the intersection of Schumpeterian political economy and human development, Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, 1(2): 255–272. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1080/​19420676​.2010​.511818 Ziegler, R. (2017). Social innovation as a collaborative concept, Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 30(4): 388–405. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1080/​13511610​.2017​.1348935

6. Deliberate social innovations: on policy impact and policy transfer Tuur Ghys

INTRODUCTION This chapter discusses the deliberate adoption of social innovations beyond their original context, in contrast to the goal of ‘growing’ social innovation in general. Many insights have been generated in the last decades on how policy makers can encourage, upscale, incubate and facilitate a steady flow of local social innovations (Westly and Antadze, 2010; Brandsen, 2014; Simon et al., 2014). However, with so many case studies of social innovations (SIs) across the world, policy analysts might be interested in implementing particular SIs to tackle social policy challenges. From this perspective, two strategic discussions develop: how to analyse the (potential) policy impact of social innovations before adopting them; and the challenges involved in transferring the innovation of interest to a different policy context. Taken together, the feasibility of attempting to deliberately transfer SI depends both on the potential of the innovation to tackle social needs, and on how much of this is lost (or gained) through the transfer process. After a brief conceptual delineation, this chapter reflects on both these issues in the context of social policy, drawing predominantly on examples from poverty reduction. The final section of the chapter will argue that while importing SIs is usually considerably more challenging than growing them locally, there are certain advantages to this more deliberate approach. This chapter is primarily aimed at providing strategic orientation rather than developing a particular methodology (let alone proposing any ‘measurement’ instruments), although some discussions have methodological implications. This focus follows from one of the core arguments of this chapter, which is that the policy impact of SI should be analysed in relation to specific social policy problems, which limits the use of general methods. The analysis approaches social problems from a structural perspective, relating them to the general arrangement of society and the distribution of power and resources. Policy transfer is conceptualized as “a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 344). This definition is chosen because it includes the dimension of time, which is discussed in the third part of the chapter. Policy transfer is thus seen as an intentional, knowledge-based process (Obringer, Smitt and Starke, 2013: 113). This places us at some distance from more ‘enthusiastic’ SI research that looks over the shoulder of innovators. SI itself is discussed elsewhere in this book; therefore, it suffices to note that when SI is mentioned this refers to specific social initiatives or concepts (such as a worker cooperative), not the field as a whole nor a theory of social change.

62

Deliberate social innovations: on policy impact and policy transfer  63

POLICY IMPACT: CAN SOCIAL INNOVATIONS MAKE A DIFFERENCE? “Mrs. Corney,” said the beadle, smiling as men smile who are conscious of superior information, “out-of-door relief, properly managed: properly managed, ma’am: is the parochial safeguard. The great principle of out-of-door relief is, to give the paupers exactly what they don’t want; and then they get tired of coming.” (From Oliver Twist, Dickens, 1838, chapter 23)

The first questions to ask regarding ‘policy impact’ are not just what type of policy impact is envisioned, but whether the intention of policy is to make a durable impact on social problems at all. After all, SIs occur because certain needs are unmet by the state or market, and these needs often “exist for reasons other than a total lack of resources” (Holman, 1978: 202). As Danziger remarks, in some contexts: “Poverty remains high, not because of a shortage of effective antipoverty policy options, but because the public and policy makers have not made reducing poverty a high priority” (2007: 10). The desired policy impact of spreading SI might be to soften the retrenchment of the welfare state (Martinelli, 2012). Alternatively, SI might serve for what in Mexico is called ‘simulation’: pretending to make social policy while really maintaining the status quo; as, for example, with artistic projects that paint poor neighbourhoods in bright colours. Social innovations themselves are often seen as an unqualified good (Larsson and Brandsen, 2016: 293), but in practice they might empower some groups and disempower others (Heiskala, 2007) or have unintended consequences. Two reflections follow from this. First, there is an important difference between engaging with a social problem and contributing to a structural reduction of that problem. To achieve the latter, the initiative must interact with or be alternative to the social, economic, cultural or political causes or contributing factors of the problem, in a way that actually reduces the risk of exposure to it. In contrast, there are many initiatives (by state or civil actors) that deal with people in poverty or the consequences of poverty (such as nutrition, motivation, policing, etc.) but which are not technically poverty reduction measures. While the examples in this chapter will be about poverty, students of, for example, crime or gender violence will find this a familiar observation. According to a meta-study of SI (Miller et al., 2017) in the fields of poverty and sustainable development, the vast majority of initiatives focus on immediate needs instead of structural changes: “Many of the … social innovation initiatives studied are, in essence, concerned only to meet immediate social needs without recognising that typically these are merely the symptoms of more structural root causes, which are hardly considered let alone addressed” (41–42). Since policy analysis is inherently normative (Lasswell, 1951), we will assume that the purpose of transferring SI should indeed be to make a structural impact on the social problem. Second, there is no inherent relation between how successful a social innovation is in terms of scale or diffusion and its desirability in terms of the policy impact. Foodbanks have been spread throughout Europe (themselves a transfer from the United States) in recent decades, but while undoubtedly playing a key role in poverty management, they have not contributed to its structural reduction (Lambie-Mumford, 2013). A darker example is the British workhouses of the 19th century, where people in need of material help were forced to work and live in institutions operated by the parish or local community leaders. This innovative alternative to welfare spread to Canada and the United States, where this form of pseudo slavery survived into the 20th century long after the practice was abandoned in the United Kingdom (Wagner, 2005).

64  Handbook on social innovation and social policy The analysis of policy impact, therefore, should not start from the objectives set by social innovators themselves, nor from short-term political objectives, although it can never be fully detached from these. In order to analyse the potential policy impact of transferring adopting social innovations, analysis should primarily focus on how the intervention relates to the social needs they engage with and the specific challenges of the policy field in question. If analysis starts from the social problem itself (e.g., crime, loneliness, etc.), analytical frameworks can be drawn that help us estimate how the approach of a specific SI interacts with the causes of a particular problem. This has as the immediate consequence that analytical tools for SI in general are of limited use to understand the impact of changes in specific social relations. Before further elaborating on this, a number of reservations should be made. First, one could argue that some SIs (e.g., participatory budgeting) cannot be reduced to a single field or problem. This is true especially for process innovations, but they can still be analysed from the perspective of one or multiple social policy fields. Second, one might suggest that an assessment that starts from structural impact is too severe or demanding for bottom-up projects. As noted above, most SIs are simply not concerned with attacking the root causes of social problems (regardless of what ‘radical’ scholars might read into the concept), and not judging them by their own objectives can lead to sobering results. This is true, but the problem in social policy transfer is fulfilling social rights of populations, not promoting SI. An additional challenge arises while assessing the feasibility of SI transfer in particular: we must disentangle the potential of a given initiative from its local limitations. SIs will not have a structural impact on a social problem if nothing in their approach relates to the (re)production of that problem, regardless of how well they are executed – just as a cheese omelette without cheese will fail no matter how good the cook. Yet in practice, promising projects can still fail to grow for various reasons, such as the loss of a charismatic leader, resistance from local interest groups (Ghys, 2020), lack of ambition, budget cuts, etc. While these factors are important in evaluating the domestic success of an SI and SI policy, in the case of policy transfer (in which the SI will start over in a new setting), these factors are mainly relevant by providing lessons on what the initiative may be vulnerable to. Are there inherent limits to diffusion, or does scale change the nature of the SI? After all, the impact of an SI can be radically different depending on its size: a single worker cooperative where workers are the owners of the company is an interesting local employment project, while hundreds of thousands of cooperatives means a de facto realization of Marxist communism. As mentioned above, for the purpose of deliberately adopting policies there is limited value in a general methodology or analytical framework regarding the impact of SI. Theoretical and methodological work must be done in different fields to identify relevant structural factors. To reduce the level of abstraction, I will briefly discuss the example of my own analytical framework regarding SI in the field of poverty reduction (see Ghys, 2018). Poverty Reduction: An Example Poverty is conceptualized here as a condition in which someone has such a shortage of economic resources in relation to general living standards, that they become socially excluded from multiple domains of life. It is a structural problem in which economic, social, cultural and political causes explain the level of poverty in a particular context (Royce, 2018). To analyse the potential of SI to address this situation, we can distinguish between five factors. In relation to a specific case study, these can be split into 12 sub-factors, which on a methodological

Deliberate social innovations: on policy impact and policy transfer  65 level can be further operationalized into points of attention, interview questions, codes, etc., depending on the preferences of researchers. As this discussion is intended to be illustrative, we will not go beyond the detail of the five main factors. The first factor is concerned with the structural social and economic causes of poverty, such as inequality, exclusion, structural unemployment, etc. Does the SI focus on such causes, and if so, does it promote institutions or services that are alternatives to those that produce poverty? The second factor relates to the position of people in poverty. Is the approach of the SI aimed at improving the situation of individuals in poverty; does it counter (or consolidate) particular obstacles in the trajectory out of poverty? How accessible is the innovation, and how does it alter the internal and external power dynamics of a policy or project? The third factor is concerned with the political and cultural context, and aims to assess how the approach of the SI interacts with solidarity and agenda setting, paying attention to factors such as stereotypes and awareness, mobilization of people in poverty, politicization of needs, etc. The three factors above help to estimate the core potential of a social innovation, but whether it can be realized further depends on other factors for which lessons must be drawn. The fourth factor is concerned with scale and diffusion, and tries to explain the current spread and significance of an SI, as well as the conditions for upscaling/diffusion and its sustainable operation. Lastly, the fifth factor is concerned with interaction with the government and existing social policy. It is relevant to study if and how state actors are involved in the delivery of the initiative, and how it relates to welfare services, as well as to identify potential tensions regarding overlap in tasks or responsibilities. Although necessary, estimating the potential impact of an SI is difficult in practice, since in many cases we are assessing neither a pure idea nor an established policy, but an emerging practice ‘out there’ that must be explored. Some aspects of SI can be assessed by comparing the initiative to existing theoretical and practice knowledge of the problem, while others only become visible through empirical examination. The former analysis of course assumes that we correctly grasp the transformation of social relations produced by the SI, which would require examining research or documentation beyond any promotional material produced by the social entrepreneurs themselves.

POLICY TRANSFER: SURVIVING THE JOURNEY The assessment of the policy impact of SI is itself of course context-dependent, and thus liable to change during policy transfer. This change in context therefore should be taken into account in any intentional adaptation of SI, and this section explores some themes to consider in such analysis. Brandsen (2014) remarks, “adopting an innovation from elsewhere is from the perspective of the adopting parties, not fundamentally different from inventing one” (p. 11). Not only is policy transfer similar to normal (rational) policy making (James and Lodge, 2003), SI itself is stripped down to a mechanism at the point of transfer (unless those who produced it somehow move with it). Stripped of its local networks of actors (and, to a lesser extent, its symbols), the SI is made vulnerable to the various political factors and ideological considerations that can stop or distort structural solutions to social problems. But the comparison to normal policy

66  Handbook on social innovation and social policy making also requires us to pay particular attention to the questions of if and how adopting SIs are different. At the risk of repeating some common insights on policy transfer, the following discussion reflects on some key themes to take into account in the analysis of transfer and implementation. Transfer over Space and Time In contrast to invention, innovation is always new in relation to its context, and such things as patents and competition play a much smaller role in social than in technological innovation. This implies that innovative concepts can be transferred not just from different spaces but also from the (national) past. Various considerations follow from this fact. For a start, the whole discourse of innovation might make us forget that many SIs are updates of older concepts and projects, and aren’t actually new at all. For example, foodbanks have innovated how food parcels for the needy are collected, but in the United States Piven and Cloward (1979: 47–49) identify government policies stimulating this in the 1930s. In Belgium, De Smedt and Vranken (2018) even trace organized food charity as part of public social policy back to the 13th century. This raises questions about the ‘disruptive potential’ of certain projects that are really re-introductions of older ideas. Alcock (2005) similarly notices the continual reappearance of (unsuccessful) community-based projects to fight inner city poverty, which were first transferred from the United States to the United Kingdom in the 1970s, and then repeated 30 years later. Once we become aware that SIs have often been tried (and forgotten) before, it is worth analysing what explains their trajectory: did the concept have inherent problems, or did it disappear for external reasons, for example? Looking at past practices is a normal part of rational policy analysis, yet the focus on innovation risks overlooking this. Additionally, we must be aware that transferring innovations over space almost always also implies transferring over time, creating an additional contextual change (as discussed below) regarding impact. For example, the case for adopting a child trust fund might have been easier ten years ago than it is today. In this ‘asset-based welfare’ SI, adopted by the British government between 2002 and 2011, children were provided with a fund at birth deposited by the government money, with a higher amount for lower-income families. The idea was that this endowment would grow over time, with family members able to add to it, and become available to the child once they turned 18. While the concept is still feasible (see Gregory, 2011), the idea of saving money from birth (instead of giving it at adulthood) was more attractive when inflation was roughly three times lower in the early 2000s than during the Covid-19 crisis. Transfer of Both Solutions and Problems We must be aware that when deliberately adopting SI from elsewhere, we are transferring the response not just to a certain social need, but also to the perception of that need. While SI might enter a policy process at the stage of comparing possible responses, the concept or project often comes with a particular definition of the problem. Social innovators can make radically divergent assumptions about social needs and their causes, even if addressing the same problem, incorporating paternalistic, radical, liberal, or other attitudes. Sometimes the SI projects themselves might be valuable but are mismatched by (underestimating) the problems they are supposed to resolve. In the case of community-based projects, such as these discussed by Alcock (2005), some SI came with the (mistaken) assumption,

Deliberate social innovations: on policy impact and policy transfer  67 “neighbourhoods and communities … can mobilise local relations (promoting ‘social capital’) in order to generate social inclusion. However, social exclusion dynamics have wider societal origins and operate independently of the neighbourhood programs in question” (Eizaguirre et al., 2012: 2008). Policy transfer could add to this confusion. To use a hypothetical example: a community project addressing social isolation developed in the Netherlands might be less fruitful on a poor overpopulated hillside in Brazil. In the Netherlands context, loneliness may be correctly identified as a key contributor to social exclusion, while in the Brazilian context, fostering local interaction might do little to address socio-geographical exclusions that operate on a group level. Critically reviewing both the underlying assumptions of the social need and the applicability of the innovation, is essential to transferring and adopting SIs. Changing Institutional Contexts This attention to changes in context must also be extended to the institutional surroundings and societal structure in which SIs are embedded. For social innovations that can be directly implemented by state actors as public policies, this requires taking into account structural differences, such as the shape of the labour market. European innovations in, for example, labour market integration, might pre-suppose the existence of a formal labour market, which is not self-evident in a Latin American context. Similarly, while the impact of microcredit is already disputed (Bateman, Blankenburg and Kozul-Wright, 2018), it may be even less significant in highly formal economies, like the United Kingdom, where a micro-economy is much less developed. Large structural differences such as these may be evident to those with knowledge of the field. They will come to the surface in any serious policy analysis. Less visible are the various institutional links that SI maintains with other (social) services and projects. While SI is often seen as a ‘bottom-up’ affair, in many cases it is more accurately described as ‘bottom-linked’ (Garcia and Pradel, 2019; for insightful cases see Cools, 2017), and dependent upon a wider arrangement of institutional support. These can stretch across governance scales, and vary from referral by public services, special permits, information sharing, to subsidies, land and capital loans, or police protection. For example, the ‘Housing First’ approach to homelessness, which was popularized in Canada, proposes that, instead of trying to offer welfare and support services to people on the street that could lead to positive housing outcomes, policy should start with providing housing and then work on treatment. While making the right to housing effective is still important, the viability of this approach partly depends on the existence of other services and their associated cost. Furthermore, projects like these as well as, for example, recovery houses for addicts (see Fairbanks II, 2009), might assume that clients are able to sign up to some form of social assistance income to pay for accommodation. The absence of such supportive financing might not be immediately evident in other contexts; this does not fundamentally alter the innovation, but it can change its impact and cost estimates. These issues highlight the importance of not just analysing the SI itself, but also its interaction with other institutions and welfare programs, including those (legal, health, police, labour, fiscal, etc.) outside the direct policy field. Social innovations are rarely both fully bottom-up and able to make a structural impact at the same time.

68  Handbook on social innovation and social policy The Importance of the Social Environment To understand what more might be lost in transfer, we must pay attention to a distinct feature of SIs: they are social in both means and ends. This refers to the specific social relations and configuration of actors that give rise to SI. As Brandsen (2014: 11) remarks, part of transferring a SI to other contexts is adjusting the collaborative relations of which it consists. These social relations and actors might or might not be present in a different setting, and their absence can fundamentally alter the impact of the innovation. In some scenarios, this is a question of sheer manpower. For example, many SIs depend upon volunteer work. While volunteers are not unique to a particular location, local citizens might lack the required ideological, religious or social justification, or motivation to be mobilized in a particular project. Given that SIs are alternatives to the normal functioning of social systems, they might require actors with atypical motivations – such as religious organizations – willing to work with otherwise shunned or stigmatized groups. In other cases, the problem is the presence of particular competences or skills, which the government will have to source if it is not organically present in communities. One social resource that deserves mention is trust within networks – for example, in the collaboration between police forces and local residents, or between innovations that focus on training former criminals or refugees and potential private-sector employers. To transfer an SI requires either the re-construction or re-imagining of its collaborative relations, which in some cases is simply not possible. Governments can modify or absorb certain SIs to compensate for this, but this can alter the SI at a conceptual level. For example, what can be done by volunteers can often technically be done by state actors, but we must account for intangibles, like trust (e.g., in homework assistance), or legal limitations, such as working with immigrants or drug addicts.

WHAT IS GAINED IN TRANSFER? Our reflections on policy transfer have so far focused on what is ‘lost in transit’, highlighting the difficulties in both identifying feasible SIs and deliberately implementing these outside their context of origin. While these challenges are substantial, the purpose of this chapter is not to discourage the adaptation of SI, and the discussion would be incomplete without paying attention to what can be ‘gained’ from policy transfer. To start with, while we usually have to cope with imperfect information in studying SIs and emerging social practices in unfamiliar settings, this also helps to create a certain analytical distance and clarity. Most governments (and researchers) at least formally want to encourage SI in general, which can lead to bias in wanting to see local SIs succeed, and a predisposition to discerning positive effects. Just as parents praise their children’s poor drawings in the hope of encouraging an interest in drawing, so too policy makers risk supporting local projects that might ultimately (and predictably) have little structural impact on the problem they ostensibly address. Being detached from the desire to grow SI can help us analyse them with the same rigour applied to other policy responses. While much of the social context and network is lost in transfer, this itself can also provide an opportunity for better implementation of some SIs. As was discussed earlier, we can try to differentiate between the potential of a concept and its actual implementation, even if they are

Deliberate social innovations: on policy impact and policy transfer  69 observed together in a case study. Implementation can, for example, be hindered by resistance from local interest groups, personal conflicts, lack of adequate funding, ideological red lines of the actors involved, or other local path dependencies. When policy analysis is able to identify the limits of a particular example of implementation, it can suggest lessons to improve the effectiveness of the innovation. As noted earlier, policy transfer usually involves the loss of the organic social actors who created the innovation, which can change the nature of the SI and might require governments to play a more involved role in implementation. The latter can be advantageous from a perspective of social rights and professionalization; for example, in the case of transferring tasks in emergency aid from charities to the state. While difficult, deliberate adaptation of SI can also be an opportunity to provide equal territorial access (Andreotti et al., 2012), which bottom-up social projects cannot always provide, due to their unplanned diffusion. Older SIs can be modified to make use of new institutional opportunities. A case study by Cools (2017) of re-use centres for household goods (‘ECO-WISE’) in the United Kingdom and Belgium shows that, although the SI appeared roughly 20 years earlier in the UK, the Belgian variant is more diffused and developed. This is not an example of direct policy transfer nor learning from one to the other (the Belgian project was inspired by the Netherlands), but rather an illustration of how some SIs could be improved upon when intentionally adopted and adapted. The UK case grew from charities and depended on volunteers, while the Belgian case was implemented by civil society and state actors, with broad embedment within public policies, such as environmental and labour market subsidies. The latter turned the centres into social employment projects, addressing poverty not just from a cost (i.e., access to cheaper goods) but also an income side. Finally, the transfer of SI itself can contribute to ongoing innovation by looking beyond the concrete manifestations (the project-shape) of the SI in a local context. Social innovation, in particular innovation with structural potential, consists of social relations that are alternative to the normal institutional order, but which usually become visible in the operating culture of a particular local initiative. This means that SI can embody alternative principles with the potential to structurally impact upon social problems, without (as an initiative) being able to realize this potential itself. In the case of structural poverty reduction, this usually relates to alternatives to the capitalist logic that reproduces the problem. For example, social restaurants (Ghys, 2017) are in essence similar to the re-use centres described above, in combining a commercial service (i.e., cheap food) for vulnerable groups with employment for (other) vulnerable groups. This example shows that in the right environment and with appropriate training, people who may be some distance from the labour market (e.g., ex-convicts, migrants, etc.) can still be integrated into employment. Governments could feasibly adopt this SI, but they could also promote the principle of sacrificing efficiency (and thus profit) to ensure that marginalized groups are included in the broader economy. Similarly, a ‘community garden’ project, where local groups cultivate small plots of land, might have a negligible impact on poverty due to low productivity in urban contexts. These gardens embody the principle of collective services at the neighbourhood level, which could be transferred to more impactful fields, such as heating, public internet, solar parks, etc. It might be that ‘policy transfer’ in this sense is stretched to become ‘inspiration’. However, this illustrates that the transformation of innovations or principles found elsewhere can be productive, despite or sometimes because the original form is abandoned.

70  Handbook on social innovation and social policy

CONCLUSION Social innovation can generate initiatives, concepts and principles with the potential to meet social needs, but often does so in specific contexts with limited and fragile social networks. The transfer of such innovations is difficult, requiring analysis of both which models are feasible and how they could be translated to new institutional contexts. In this chapter, we first discussed the difficulty in estimating the policy impact of SI, noting that the (lack of) growth or success of an SI in itself is not indicative of its potential. SI serves social, economic, organizational and ideological objectives other than solving social problems, leading to the methodological challenge of estimating impact relevant to the policy field we aim to address. This contrast in the approach of SI with (sociological) knowledge of the field involves reflecting on “the aspects of the innovation that can produce particular effects, and whether these can be replicated in other contexts. Specifying the underlying theory of a SI also reveals the view of the world upon which it is based; i.e. beliefs about the social forces which determine circumstances” (Sinclair and Baglioni, 2014: 473). Adopting promising concepts from other contexts leads to its own sets of challenges; and as many have noticed, much can be lost in transit. Furthermore, as the original network usually doesn’t transfer with the concept, when an SI is implemented as deliberate policy, it must be (re)institutionalized. Even if this works, this process might strip the SI of its creative or disruptive capacity, as well as the potential protest function of its originators. Nevertheless, separating the concept from the original (social) form also brings opportunities. For example, the process enables us to translate what are often civil or market initiatives into policies that are more embedded in the welfare state, and therefore more firmly established social rights. It must also be noted that, at least for the field of poverty, SIs with structural potential often propose alternatives to conventional capitalist logic or elite interests. Social policy could take advantage of this, although that might hinder its politically acceptability or growth in some contexts (Ghys, 2020), especially when transferred without the original promotors and their symbolic capital. A strategic and selective approach to SI as social policy might go against some of the ‘spontaneous’ discourse commonly associated with it, and strip the concept of some of its mystique. Yet a strategic approach is needed to avoid SI from becoming just another concept with the potential to mask an approach to social problems centred on self-help, market integration and charity. Otherwise, we end up in a situation in which everybody is engaged with social problems, but nobody seems to solve them.

REFERENCES Alcock, P. (2005) ‘Maximum Feasible Understanding: Lessons from Previous Wars on Poverty’, Social Policy and Society, 4(3), pp. 321–329. Andreotti, A., Mingione, E., and Polizzi, E. (2012) ‘Local Welfare Systems: A Challenge for Social Cohesion’, Urban Studies, 49(9), pp. 1925–1940. Bateman, M., Blankenburg, S., and Kozul-Wright, R. (2018) The Rise and Fall of Global Microcredit Development, Debt and Disillusion. Abingdon: Routledge. Brandsen, T. (2014) Wilco Final Report. Available at: http://​www​.wilcoproject​.eu/​wordpress/​wp​ -content/​uploads/​WILCO​-final​-report​_final​.pdf (accessed 7 April 2022).

Deliberate social innovations: on policy impact and policy transfer  71 Cools, P. (2017) Social Innovation and Welfare Reform: Exploring their Institutional, Normative and Knowledge Dimensions of their Relationship through Case Studies of Local Social Innovation for Social Inclusion in England and Flanders. Antwerpen: Universiteit Antwerpen. Danziger, S.H. (2007) Fighting Poverty Revisited: What Did Researchers Know 40 Years Ago? What Do We Know Today?, Focus, 25(1), pp. 3–11. De Smedt, H., and Vranken, J. (2018) ‘Van armentafels en voedselbanken: nil novi sub sole?’, in Opdebeek, I., Van Zimmeren, E., and Vermeir, D. (eds), Voor recht, rechtvaardigheid en Camus. Brugge: Die Keure, pp. 29–71. Dickens, C. (1838) Oliver Twist; or, the Parish Boy’s Progress [ebook, n.p.]. London: Richard Bentley. Dolowitz, D., and Marsh, D. (1996) ‘Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature’, Political Studies, 44, pp. 343–357. Eizaguirre, S., et al. (2012) ‘Multilevel Governance and Social Cohesion: Bringing Back Conflict in Citizenship Practices’, Urban Studies, 49(9), pp. 1999–2016. Fairbanks II, R. (2009) How It Works: Recovering Citizens in Post-Welfare Philadelphia. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Garcia, M., and Pradel, M. (2019) ‘Bottom-linked Approach to Social Innovation Governance’, in Van den Broeck, P., et al. (eds), Social Innovation as Political Transformation. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 97–98. Ghys, T. (2017) ‘Exploring the Potential of Belgium’s Social Restaurants for Poverty Reduction’, Japan Social Innovation Journal, 7(1), pp. 23–32. Ghys, T. (2018) ‘Analysing Social Innovation through the Lens of Poverty Reduction: Five Key Factors’, European Public & Social Innovation Review, 2(2), pp.  1–14. Doi: https://​doi​.org/​10​.31637/​epsir​.17​ -2​.1 Ghys, T. (2020) ‘Resisting Social Innovation: The Case of Neighborhood Health Centers in Belgium’, European Public Social & Social Innovation Review, 5(2), pp. 14–26. Gregory, L. (2011) ‘An Opportunity Lost? Exploring the Benefits of the Child Trust Fund on Youth Transitions to Adulthood’, Youth & Policy, 106, pp. 78–94. Heiskala, R. (2007) ‘Social Innovations: Structural and Power Perspectives’, in Hämäläinen, T.J., and Heiskala, R. (eds), Social Innovations, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 52–79. Holman, R. (1978) Poverty: Explanations of Social Deprivation. London: Martin Robertson. James, O., and Lodge, M. (2003) ‘The Limitations of “Policy Transfer” and “Lesson Drawing” for Public Policy Research’, Political Studies Review, 1(2), pp. 179–193. Lambie-Mumford, H. (2013) ‘“Every Town Should Have One”: Emergency Food Banking in the UK’, Journal of Social Policy, 42(1), pp. 73–89. Larsson, O., and Brandsen, T. (2016) ‘The Implicit Normative Assumptions of Social Innovation Research: Embracing the Dark Side’, in Brandsen, T., Cattacin, S., Evers, A., and Zimmer, A. (eds), Social Innovations in the Urban Context. London: Springer, pp. 293–302. Lasswell, H.D. (1951) ‘The Policy Orientation’, in Lerner, D., and Lasswell, H.D. (eds), The Policy Sciences. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 3–15. Martinelli, F. (2012) ‘Social Innovation or Social Exclusion? Innovating Social Services in the Context of a Retrenching Welfare State’, in Franz, H.W., Hochgerner, J., and Howaldt, J. (eds), Challenge Social Innovation. New York: Springer, pp. 169–180. Miller, J. et al. (2017). Summary Report on Social Innovation for Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development, SI-Drive. Available at: https://​www​.si​-drive​.eu/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2018/​03/​SI​ -DRIVE​-D10​_4​-Final​-Policy​-Field​-Report​-Poverty​-Reduction​.pdf (accessed 7 April 2022). Obringer, S.J., Schmitt, C., and Starke, P. (2013) ‘Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer in Comparative Welfare State Research’, Social Policy & Administration, 47(1), pp. 111–129. Doi: 10.1111/ spol.12003 Piven, F., and Cloward, R. (1979) Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail. New York: Random House. Royce, E. (2018) Poverty and Power: The Problem of Structural Inequality, 3rd edn. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

72  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Simon, J., Schon, R., Kitcher, H., Millard, J., Carpenter, G., and Ingermann, A. (2014) Growing the Field of Social Innovation in Europe: A deliverable of the project TEPSIE. Brussels: European Commission, DG Research. Sinclair, S., and Baglioni, S. (2014) ‘Social Innovation and Social Policy: Promises and Risks’, Social Policy & Society, 13(3), pp. 469–476. Wagner, D. (2005) The Poorhouse: America’s Forgotten Institution. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. Westly, F., and Antadze, N. (2010) ‘Making a Difference: Strategies for Scaling Social Innovation for Greater Impact’, The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, 15(2), pp. 1–19.

7. Methodological resilience: researching social inclusion and social innovation in Latin America Urs Jäger, Wendelin Küpers and José Pablo Valverde

INTRODUCTION In this chapter we introduce the concept of methodological resilience as an approach that takes interrelated events as a guideline to create and employ qualitative research designs to investigate social inclusion. By social inclusion, we refer to social policies and social innovations that aim to connect informal and formal market actors (George et al., 2012, p. 661). Researchers who study these phenomena face significant challenges posed by the extreme cultural differences between their own contexts and those they explore. We argue that, when using qualitative methods to explore social inclusion, bridging these extreme cultural differences requires a certain type of resilience that has a particular character. Correspondingly, we define resilience as the capacity to cope with challenges and recover from adversity, showing flexibility to adapt to ever-changing external demands (Block and Kremen, 1996). To lay the groundwork for this analysis, we first highlight the need for empirical, qualitative research (Eisenhardt et al., 2016) in the field of social inclusion, using the example of Latin America. As advocated by many scholars (e.g., George et al., 2016a), we argue that researchers have a responsibility to refrain from imposing static, external standards while studying and generating findings on social innovation (SI) and social policy. More specifically, we introduce methodological resilience as a relational process that allows researchers to address humanity’s grand challenges by going beyond applying the standards of so-called ‘developed’ economies to ‘developing’ ones (including when researchers hail from developed economies within developing countries). Building on previous work that calls for ontological and epistemological sensitivity when studying social inclusion (Banerjee, 2003; Banerjee and Linstead, 2004; Reinecke and Ansari, 2015), we propose a methodological orientation and set of guidelines that will help SI and social policy researchers design effective and resilient empirical research into social inclusion. Empirical research already provides a broad body of knowledge on social inclusion in general (Mair et al., 2012; Reinecke and Ansari, 2015), and in Latin America specifically (Gutiérrez et al., 2016; Koschmann et al., 2012). With respect to innovation and policy, social inclusion is an increasingly recognized and challenging global phenomenon that is sparking an increasing need for theory (Godfrey, 2011). Nevertheless, the complexity of executing research designs among marginalized communities in excluded contexts has made qualitative studies of social inclusion relatively rare. Scholars researching social inclusion often describe low-income markets as characterized by informality (Mair et al., 2012). These informal markets emerge because informal institutions give actors operating in contexts of poverty the legitimacy needed to exert their freedom to prosper (Webb et al., 2009). These 73

74  Handbook on social innovation and social policy actors are engaging in ‘illegal’ yet legitimate market activities that function in contexts of poverty (Godfrey, 2011; Webb et al., 2009), such as urban slums plagued by criminal gangs, severe environmental pollution, and limited access to basic services. Informal market actors operate on a non-regulatory basis, and are rarely taxed, monitored by any form of government, included in Gross National Product data, or granted access to their country’s legal framework (Mair et al., 2012). Meanwhile, formal institutions such as social policy – i.e., the codified regulative and protective mechanisms represented by explicit, coercive rules that shape market interactions enforced by state authorities – exist at the regulatory level (North, 1990; Scott, 2013). As most researchers are unfamiliar with informal, non-regulatory contexts, they face unique methodological challenges in understanding them. To build our argument, we first focus on the above-mentioned need for empirical qualitative research in Latin America, and the risk that such research entails with respect to methodological biases. We then introduce the concept of methodological resilience, which is based on an approach that takes ‘inter-knowing’ and embodied practice (Küpers, 2011, 2015) as a methodological foundation from which to develop an inquiry strategy suitable to studying informal markets. From there, we discuss and critically compare four well-established inquiry strategies (ethnomethodology, ethnography, narrative research, and action research) that provide a point of orientation for defining and further outlining what methodological resilience means. Finally, we present guidelines for methodological resilience that can help researchers develop empirical qualitative research designs to explore social inclusion in informal markets.

THE NEED FOR EMPIRICAL QUALITATIVE RESEARCH ON SOCIAL INCLUSION IN LATIN AMERICA Many Latin American countries were formally constituted as independent nations during the first half of the nineteenth century. In most parts of the region, privileged families of Spanish ancestry (often called ‘criollos’) led this process of independence, in which European institutional structures were overlaid upon Latin American contexts (Rustow, 1980). This process stifled the emergence of democratic and market institutions that would allow minority voices to be considered in public decisions. Furthermore, whereas Europe had established its democratic institutions over a long period of time, Latin America was forced to develop its institutions within a relatively short period of time. After independence, privileged groups that benefited from the institutions that had been overlaid on the region reproduced a colonial order devoid of public spaces or democratic ideals, leading to a nearly non-existent civil society (Olvera, 1998). This dynamic is evident in the constitutional laws of Latin American countries, which were copied from European constitutions and indiscriminately applied to Latin America’s socio-economic structures, stratification, and cultures (Touraine, 1988). Accordingly, political and economic institutions resemble those of European nation-states. These foreign and decontextualized solutions led to systems with ‘weak’ institutional support and the exclusion of large segments of actors and stakeholder voices from formal policy and participation in markets. Today, a large section of Latin American society lives and works in informal sectors, making the region one of the most unequal in the world (Jäger and Sathe, 2014; Nicholls-Nixon et al., 2011). Faced with the challenge of high rates of informality, entities such as the United Nations, multilateral agencies, NGOs, corporations, and governments are urgently seeking to diagnose

Researching social inclusion and social innovation in Latin America  75 these problems and develop standardized solutions. An increasing number of studies has strengthened knowledge of the global challenge of informal markets where most of the poor live (Godfrey, 2011; Webb et al., 2009). For instance, 33% of the world’s urban population – equalling roughly 800 million people – reside in informal markets of slums, mainly in the developing world (UNFPA, 2011). This research has engendered a notion that informal markets are incapable of stepping up to the level of urgency needed to address such challenges (George et al., 2016b). Such research largely explores how developing economies can create and rapidly formalize institutions according to global standards (Chen, 2006). These orientations and solutions focus on either generating social policy or reproducing or adapting policies from developed countries to allow informal contexts to ‘catch up’ with the developed world. Such solutions are generally discussed by policy makers and experts familiar with developed economies, where formal markets are in place and institutionalized standards have developed over the course of centuries (Jäger and Valverde, 2021). Researchers have therefore begun to question whether parties from developed contexts – often with deep ‘ontological cultural differences’ in relation to many Latin American contexts – can effectively design and impose standards that address social problems through a formal market lens (Banerjee and Linstead, 2004). By neglecting to observe and interiorize such extreme structural and cultural differences, actors who are deeply rooted in formal markets often fail to understand the value of discovering what is ‘present in the void’, so to speak. Such commentators have difficulties in understanding how SI and social policy can, in fact, be grounded in the norms and values of informal markets.

THE NEED FOR METHODOLOGICAL RESILIENCE TO EXPLORE INFORMAL MARKETS Informal markets are distinctly different from the contexts in which most researchers live and work. Because of this difference, researchers who explore informal market phenomena are vulnerable to various methodological biases. We divide these into three main categories: (a) ontological, (b) relational, and (c) evaluative. (a)

Ontological Bias

Ontological bias refers to a researcher’s explicit or implicit understanding of what being and becoming means. To illustrate this bias in situations where actors from formal markets study SI and policy phenomena in informal markets and must therefore navigate contexts of extreme difference, we turn to the example of researching relations between Western markets and indigenous communities. Qualitative studies dedicated to indigenous communities have explored what Western management and organizational thinking can learn from indigenous culture – which is often collective – about ecological embeddedness (Whiteman and Cooper, 2000), organizational and practical wisdom (Spiller et al., 2011; Intezari et al., 2020), ethical leadership (Haar et al., 2018), and the ethics of care (Spiller et al., 2010). However, these approaches implicitly or explicitly use a Western lens to explore indigenous cultures, most often imposing particular Western ontological and epistemological conceptions and practices on the indigenous context (Banerjee and Linstead, 2004). Furthermore, they (consciously or unconsciously) transmit the economic understanding of development assumed

76  Handbook on social innovation and social policy by Western cultures. This can have disempowering effects on cultures that do not share this understanding, such as rural populations in the so-called developing world (Banerjee, 2003). The example of exploring relations between indigenous communities and formal markets, while highly specific, underscores the common challenge of unconsciously transmitting or unintentionally transferring and applying the ontological or epistemological views of one context onto another, while empirically exploring aspects of informal, low-income markets in rural communities or urban slums. (b)

Relational Bias

Most researchers do not have biographical roots in the informal markets where most of the world’s poor live and work. For instance, studies suggest that a scant 2% of authors doing management research in Africa are based in the region (Acquaah et al., 2013). Since they are unlikely to have grown up in poor and informal environments, researchers must intentionally embed themselves within the social relations of informal markets during research. Further, since so few researchers involved in qualitative research that explores informal environments have been socialized in these markets, they encounter phenomena profoundly different from their own. Consequently, they face a relational distance between the environment in which they have been socialized and the actors and phenomena they are studying. Importantly, relational bias must be carefully considered when developing and using empirical research designs, which unfortunately is often not taken into account in conventional research, and this can lead to an additional bias – namely, evaluative bias. (c)

Evaluative Bias

For formal market actors – often including the researchers themselves – informal markets are an unfamiliar environment. Most of the world’s poor, defined as those who earn less than USD 10 per day, operate outside the formal rules of functioning institutions (Godfrey, 2011; Hart, 2010). Actors who are engaged in formal markets, once inside these contexts, unconsciously interpret the data from the formal market perspective in which they live, work, and have been trained. Scholars have provided valuable contributions with respect to analysing the social innovations and policies that arise in informal markets; for example, identifying the economic and institutional gaps faced by low-income market actors. Nevertheless, most of these contributions make the implicit and reductionist assumption that poverty can be resolved by using an economic lens to help informal market entities adjust to formal markets – in effect becoming formalized themselves. What this literature largely neglects is how the previously mentioned methodological biases can influence research on SI and policy in informal, low-income markets. Therefore, we propose that empirical researchers need to first and foremost reflect on their ontological, epistemological, and methodological grounding (George et al., 2012).

METHODOLOGICAL RESILIENCE AS A MEANS OF EXPLORING INFORMAL MARKETS DIFFERENTLY Qualitative research is structured differently from quantitative research. Nevertheless, it follows data-gathering rules, such as those based on interviews, document analyses, and par-

Researching social inclusion and social innovation in Latin America  77 ticipatory observations. We propose that researchers from Western and so-called developed economies who explore social phenomena in informal markets face considerable cultural differences that require them to cultivate a specific type of resilience in their use of qualitative methods. Methodological resilience is necessary to prevent the ontological, relational, and evaluative biases outlined above. It implies the resilient use of established methods, such as ethnomethodology, ethnography, narrative research, and action research. Methodological resilience follows a relational approach (Küpers, 2005, 2014) that interprets the acts of knowing and organizing as ever-emerging events that are dispersed, ‘inherently indeterminate’, and continually reconfiguring processes (Tsoukas, 1996, pp. 13, 22; Cook and Brown, 1999). In these events, researchers shift their attention from what is ‘contained’/within individuals, communities, or a given knowledge base to what transpires between people, objects, and phenomena in informal markets. When this shift is enacted, obtaining data gathered in informal markets becomes based on embodied and relational processes (Küpers, 2008) that are also influenced by affects and emotions as well as other atmospheric qualities of the specific situation and context. These relational processes comprise joint or dialogically structured activities, forming a kind of responsive action (Shotter, 1993; Stacey, 2001). As an ongoing event of relating and responding, data gathering is the outcome of a complex set of inter-relations between ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ in informal contexts; an outcome by which feelings, cognitions, and meanings are continually created, re-created, questioned, and re-negotiated. In a systemic interplay, these processes weave together in a relational chiasmic and reversible nexus. The inclusion of embodied, emotional knowing and learning provides renewed possibilities for developing deeper, richer, and more textured research experiences and a better understanding of how the knower/learner and the known/learned are ‘enfleshed’ with one another. Thus, in methodological resilience, all parties involved in the knowing and acting process meet in an ‘on-goingness’ of relating. By recognizing the primacy of relational processes, researchers convert these into media, in which knowing and organizing are continuously created and changed in the course of being practised. Thus, any act of knowing and enacting depends on a set of relationships to others in a continuous, dynamic, and informal (ex)change. As this embodied and emotional knowledge – which is making and knowing processes – is based on processual indeterminacy and discontinuity, knowledge and knowing can only be studied as phenomena in motion (Merleau-Ponty, 2013). Such an orientation to study needs to be approached through surprise, controversies, and contestation, taking into account the cultural specificity and context-dependency of knowledge systems (Patriotta, 2004). Therefore, viewing embodied and emotional knowing as complex responsive process implies an emerging transformation of inseparable individual and collective identities. That is, knowing occurs as a series of transformations in embodied and emotional meanings and interpretations, which are simultaneously individual, social, systemic, and emerging in a continual state of becoming (Chia, 1996). After data gathering in the field, researchers re-member their actual lived bodily and emotional experience within the events, to (re-)discover a living and knowing process that occurs in-between. This relational being in-between (inter-being) is part of a pre-subjective and pre-objective as well as a pre-collective inter-corporeality of what Merleau-Ponty (1964) calls flesh. This ‘enfleshed’ matrix refers to all levels of experience, preceding and enabling all horizons and accomplishments. It manifests as the silent, and invisible ontological bond (that makes expression possible and makes visible) out of which self, others, communities,

78  Handbook on social innovation and social policy and ‘objects’ as well as all related phenomena, arise in responsive relations. In such fields of constitutive experiences, all inter-relational processes are ever moving between order and disorder and are always becoming; they are never complete but are an active and ambiguous immanence of transcendence.

WHAT METHODOLOGICAL RESILIENCE CAN LEARN FROM ESTABLISHED INQUIRY STRATEGIES The following well-established inquiry strategies can help demonstrate what methodological resilience means: (a) ethnomethodology, (b) ethnography, (c) narrative research, and (d) action research (see Table 7.1). Table 7.1

Inquiry strategies in the context of methodological resilience

Established methods

Elements demonstrating methodological resilience as a means of exploring social innovation and

of Inquiry

social policy in informal markets in Latin America

Ethnomethodology

● Focus on exploring the subject’s lifeworld ● Critical reflection of the researcher as observer ● Interest in the process of meaning making about phenomena ● ‘Becoming the phenomenon’: intense interaction between researcher and researched ● Context-specific research cultures using a variety of methodological devices

Ethnography

● ‘Thick description’ of a culture and social system ● Intense and longitudinal relation between researchers and field ● Participant observation and other techniques, including study of the meaning of objects ● Reciprocity between researcher and researched

Narrative research

● Narratives and stories as an expression of one’s lifeworld ● Integration of embodied knowing that denotes joint emotional and relational processes ● Narrative (thematic, context interactional, performative) analysis ● ‘Checking’ stories and negotiating meanings between researcher and researched ● Interview techniques and storytelling ● Narrative report of the research

Action Research

● Researched becomes researcher ● Intense relation-as-collaboration process ● Integration of various techniques (interviews, focus groups, consultancies) ● Transformative change through the research process

(a) Ethnomethodology Methodological resilience aligns with the ‘phenomenological sensibility of ethnomethodology’ (Maynard and Clayman, 1991, p. 388), which advocates an openness to surprises when gathering data in and about informal markets. This alignment is fourfold. First, both methodological resilience and ethnomethodology examine everyday procedures and practices through which actors produce recurring characteristics of their social world (Garfinkel, 1996). Second, both focus on exploring how one’s lifeworld emerges as a result of microprocesses comprising social interactions that form participants’ common-sense knowledge (Heath and Hindmarsh, 2002). Third, both assume that human actions in the everyday world are driven by un-reflected, unquestioned expectations and implicit rules. Accordingly, it is the task of

Researching social inclusion and social innovation in Latin America  79 researchers to highlight and elicit them (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000). Fourth, neither uses any sort of procedural manual for research but develops context-specific research cultures and uses a variety of methodological devices to investigate the background expectations and implicit rules of the locale under study. However, the emic perspective of ethnomethodologists who only investigate the outward displays of phenomena and engagement via participant observation differs from methodological resilience, mainly due to the status of intention, theoretical focus, and the problem of generalization. Deliberately, ethnomethodologists do not explore why people do what they do (‘why’ questions), but rather the methods they employ in doing what they do (‘how’ questions). For ethnomethodology (and conversation analysis), ‘why’ questions are what members of society ask and answer for themselves. Methodological resilience does not follow this logic of ‘ethnomethodological indifference’ (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, p. 345; Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994, p. 122), which is a disinterested stance on the purpose or the practices under study. Rather, it posits that a commitment to refrain from granting epistemic privilege does not imply a disinterested social science, nor an indifference to the plight of individuals and groups (Lynch, 1997). Thus, the potential for critique that methodological resilience offers exists in a specific tension – namely, the space between a ‘pheno-practical’ account that does not devalue the participants’ understanding of their lifeworld, and the uncovering of a moral order or normative expectancy that is irremediably implicated in the constitution of their social world. In its practical orientation, methodological resilience either disturbs or reveals the taken-for-granted status of the local practices studied. More specifically, methodological resilience explores the role and significance of the living body and the experience of embodiment, as well as the intentional processes in which it engages, as essential components of the constellations of everyday life. As the ‘body lives things, objects, and features of the world before they can be conceived’ (Maynard and Clayman, 1991, p. 390), methodological resilience rejects the mind–body dichotomy in an effort to make the analysis answerable to the inter-corporeity of subjective, inter-subjective, and inter-objective phenomena in its ambiguous and interrelated nexus. Like ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973), methodological resilience does more than merely record what a person is doing or how phenomena appear. It strives to go beyond (or rather beneath) mere facts and surface appearances. By describing the detailed webs of inter-relations and ‘con-+-Texts’, it also approaches underlying intentional and experiential streams, influences, and effects. Methodological resilience also differs from ethnomethodology in relation to the status of the researcher’s subjectivity, with the researcher understood as a member of the phenomenal practice explored – in the sense of the researcher ‘becoming the phenomenon’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000). Methodological resilience aims to interpret mundane (i.e., implicit) reasons in such a way as to understand their organizational contribution to inquiries of every kind, even those involving the research itself. Thus, methodological resilience pursues a radical reflexivity – a willingness to confront primordial presuppositions, including those that permit the researcher’s own sustained investigation. (b) Ethnography Ethnography aims to describe and interpret a social or cultural group that has developed shared patterns (Miller and Salkind, 2002) by trying to uncover its forms, codes, or rituals, analysing how these groups and patterns co-ordinate particular meanings, actions, and communications

80  Handbook on social innovation and social policy (Philipsen, 1992). This methodological strategy and its corresponding ethnographic principles, as well as studies originating from social anthropology and cultural studies, has expanded over multiple disciplines and fields of application (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983; Tedlock, 2003), including social science in general and organizational studies in particular (e.g., Barley, 1996; Heracleous, 2001; Ahrens, 1997). It examines the behaviour of participants in a given social situation in an effort to understand how such behaviour is interpreted by them. Ethnographers also attempt to discern pervasive patterns, such as life cycles and cultural themes by gathering objects and visual material to trace evidence, as well as identifying stories or narratives (see narrative research), rituals, and myths or by uncovering cultural themes (van Maanen, 1988; Robson, 2002). To generate research results, ethnographers engage in extensive fieldwork for collecting data through (participant) observations, photography, and interviews (Bateson and Mead, 1942), or by other means that are helpful for interpretation. They are sensitive to fieldwork issues such as locating key informants, and critically reflect on themselves as observers in the field. Therefore, fieldwork, and phenomenography in particular (Marton, 1988), is concerned with contextuality and reciprocity between the researcher and the researched and, consequently, the quality criteria of research are localized in this reciprocity (van Maanen, 1988) and responsiveness (Küpers, 2015). Like methodological resilience, ethnography describes a strategy and uses specific methods to become deeply immersed in the worldly setting of the field under study for a prolonged period. Nevertheless, ethnographical techniques for interpretation are open on how to make relational and processual dimensions accessible, particularly with respect to the relationship between presence and representation in relation to the other, as well as the need for ‘othering’ (Fabian, 1990). Methodological resilience, in contrast, aims to listen to and engage closely for a longer time, since data gathering happens from the direct standpoint of the subjects under study. Thus, methodological resilience develops a proto-native understanding of and within the context of a culture and its inhabitants as a desirable extension of involvement. As this may imply that the researchers ‘eventually come to view the setting entirely from an insider’s perspective’ (Barley, 1990, p. 240; Pettigrew, 1990), they must protect themselves from the risk of appropriating an insider point of view (i.e., of ‘going native’) and, rather, reflect on their role as researcher/participant. In this sense, methodological resilience assumes an interplay and thus a mutual influence between the researcher and the researched, though in a radical relational and in-foreseeable process. This is particularly due to a proposed embodied involvement and self-critical reflexivity, which goes beyond understanding different, mutually excluding perspectives in the sense of multi-perceptivity (Pettigrew, 1990), also expressed in the detailed written account of these processes and perspectives as they emerge in the locale under study. (c)

Narrative Research

We continue our exploration of methodological resilience by comparing and juxtaposing it with narrative research, which seeks to describe the meaning of experience for individuals as they construct or relate to stories (narratives) about or in their lifeworld (Rossman and Rallis, 2017). The narrative researcher aims to learn from the participants in a given setting. A narrative is a first-person oral telling or retelling of situations related to the personal or social experiences of an individual or group (Miller and Salkind, 2002) in organizational acts

Researching social inclusion and social innovation in Latin America  81 (Boje, 1995; Gabriel, 1995; Czarniawska, 1998), especially relevant in ‘life-worlds of change’ (Küpers, 2012). From the perspective of methodological resilience, narratives may be valued as an important method to make accessible embodied and expressed forms of knowing and understanding as well as their (re)construction in narrated forms (van Maanen, 1988). Likewise, in view of methodological resilience, narratives become a media through which to express contents, structures, and experience of knowing–acting as well as being–becoming. Therefore, narratives make knowledge both accessible and integrated in empirical processes of knowing and be(com)ing. Furthermore, Oliver (1998, p. 244) stresses, ‘stories go in circles’; or, as we might add, in spirals. They do not follow linear storylines, and storytelling can take the form of rhizomatic ‘antenarrratives’ that do not follow information processing and the causal logics of beginning–middle–end (Boje, 2010). Furthermore, living stories and storytelling ‘is before narrative closure; it is speculative, and it is in the flow of experience. The meaning of events depends upon the locality, the prior sequence of stories and the transformation of characters in the wandering discourses’ (Boje, 2001, p. 4). Being never-ending, living stories change depending on the timeframe, people, and emotions involved, thus are ‘all about movement, the tour, a founding of story spaces, a networking in the unfolding present, where each story is dialogically relational to another one, and must be told to tell of another social relationship, another context’ (Boje, 2010, p. 3). Accordingly, it is vital to listen deeply to stories (and their tellers) because they can be found inside and between other stories. Likewise, the lines between all that is relevant to the co-creation and communication of messages within and about narrative research on informal markets includes a radical processual perspective, as it conceptualizes ‘stories-in-con-+-Text’ methods, stories-in-stories, and time-in-time (Küpers, 2012). These reflective strategies provide material for researchers to analyse a given story about a problem, setting, character, or action (Miller and Salkind, 2002), contributing thicker descriptions of storytelling practices and settings to the literature. Methodological resilience aims for narrative analyses, narrative interviews, and the recounting of stories, as this allows researchers to consider processes and accounts relating to different phenomena and interconnections between them. Methodological resilience also favours a ‘narrative history of story’ (van de Ven and Huber, 1990). Throughout the research process, researchers collaborate with participants by ‘checking’ the story and negotiating its meaning within the database. This sort of validation leads to a convincing narrative report on the research, which has often served as a de facto validation (Angrosino and de Pérez, 2000). In this sense, quality criteria appear not as static conditions for truth, but as narratives that describe a process of reflections on the act of knowing. In sum, narrative research is a strong methodological strategy in practice, though the methodological consequences of embodied knowing – which denotes joint emotional and relational processes – must be carefully conceptualized (May, 1994). (d)

Action Research

Methodological resilience is both closely related to and distinct from the long tradition of action research as co-initiated by Lewin (1943). Action research follows a flexible and responsive cycle of action, critical reflection, and repeated action. Correspondingly, methodological resilience uses an experimental research process that, rather than being standardized, is modified ‘on the run’ in response to what happens; that is, it blurs any clear-cut demarcation between

82  Handbook on social innovation and social policy researcher and researched (Meyer, 2000). Instead, methodologically resilient researchers attempt to integrate processes of knowing in a scientific sense into processes of knowing in the field. In these integrative processes, ‘final’ documents appear not as means for integration but as research goals. Since both action research and methodological resilience try to make the practical processes of knowing accessible, their presentation (via books, articles, etc.) appears as a process in which actors from informal markets are not seen as objects but as partners in a relational process of knowing and solutioning. In this integrative sense, both methodologies make actors from informal markets part of the research process by inter-relationally helping them to jointly learn (Krathwohl, 1993). Consequently, in the sense of participatory research and collaborative inquiry, methodological resilience may be aligned with action research (Zuber-Skerritt, 1996; Meyer, 2000). Beyond these similarities, however, there is a key difference between action research and methodological resilience in terms of the focus of research results. Action research focuses on a combination of action and describing problematic situations with the goal of modifying them towards a desirable direction – that of solving real-world problems. Correspondingly, the primary purpose of action research is to change existing social systems (Marshall and Rossman, 1995; Rossman and Rallis, 2017; Krathwohl, 1993). This orientation is considered emancipatory in the sense that it encompasses not only understanding, but also transformation (Robson, 2002). Consequently, the references for action researchers are the actors within the field under study. Rather than undertaking research on them, action researchers adjust to the needs of these actors (Meyer, 2000). The source of action research results thus resembles a spiral: planning a change, acting, and observing what happens after (Robson, 2002; Krathwohl, 1993; Rossman and Rallis, 2017). In this process, action researchers aim at inquiring of the researched, who might make use of the study’s results? Their response then guides the researchers in the methods used to plan the study and collect and interpret the data (Krathwohl, 1993). In this way, the researched become quasi-researchers. Not excluding pragmatic concerns nor improved ‘participatory action research’ (Kemmis and McTaggart, 2000), methodological resilience emphasizes a hermeneutic understanding of embodied and processual and an even more participatory relationship to the phenomena involved in knowing – in its inter-relational nexus. It is committed to involving the researched in both the diagnosis and emerging resolution of problems, rather than imposing solutions to pre-defined issues. Presenting the results of methodological resilience will likely lead to empirical and practical changes in the field. Further, it conceptualizes and enacts the introduction and development of research results as a relational process between the researched and researchers. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine whether the changes experienced are rooted in research results or in other phenomena. While providing insights into the implicit process of knowing in the field, the research results are open to different interpretations and evaluations of researched and researchers, and these interpretations are in turn integrated in the processes of data gathering. During the whole process, the researched co-operate in the research activities but are not researchers themselves.

Researching social inclusion and social innovation in Latin America  83

GUIDELINES FOR USING METHODOLOGICAL RESILIENCE TO EXPLORE INFORMAL MARKETS The need to diagnose problems like widespread informality is urgent, as is the need to develop standardized solutions to respond to and solve them. But, as shown above, studying informal markets from developing contexts implies approaching and navigating radical cultural differences and methodological biases. As discussed in this chapter, this is a highly relevant issue that calls researchers from Western, so-called developed economies to cultivate a specific type of resilience in their use of methods. In this final section, we propose guidelines that can be used to create research designs for investigating social innovation and inclusion phenomena, particularly related to informal markets in Latin America. The six guidelines for methodological resilience presented below are based on the approach towards inter-knowing and embodied practice outlined above (Küpers, 2011) as well as the combined methodologies of ethnomethodology, narrative research, ethnography, and action research (see Table 7.2). Table 7.2

Guidelines for methodological resilience

Guidelines for methodological

Responses to

resilience

methodological biases

1.

Practice methodological resilience when exploring

● Remain open to observing and interiorizing extreme cultural differences

Overcome ontological bias

informal markets

● Be willing to go beyond common standards of qualitative research

Access relational dimensions

● Foster relationships between researchers and researched

Overcome relational

● Define a process of meaning making about phenomena

bias

methods 2. 3.

Co-create impact

● Disturb or reveal the taken-for-granted status of practices at local sites ● Plan a change, act, and observe what happens, through a co-creation process between researchers and researched ● Involve the researched in problem diagnosis and solutioning

4.

Integrate the embodied

● Critically reflect on the role of researcher as observer

knowing of researchers in

● Integrate embodied knowing of the researched into research process

relations with the researched

● Enable the researched to co-operate in research activities ● ‘Becoming the phenomenon’: allow intense interaction between researchers and researched ● ‘Check’ stories with researched and negotiate meanings ● Enable intense and longitudinal relations between researchers and researched

5.

Constantly adapt the manual

● Use a variety of methodological devices and techniques, such as

for the use of different

(semi-structured and narrative depth) interviews and (participant)

techniques

observation techniques ● Express lifeworld in narratives ● Create thick descriptions of relations between extremely different cultures and social systems

6.

Negotiate quality criteria

● Define criteria in the interaction between researchers and researched ● Use narrative report of the research as an intermediate result

Overcome evaluative bias

84  Handbook on social innovation and social policy 1.

Practice Methodological Resilience when Exploring Informal Markets

Empirical researchers are first and foremost required to reflect on their ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions and groundings (George et al., 2012). While this is generally the case, it is particularly important when gathering data in contexts of extreme cultural difference and in informal settings. This proposition responds to the ontological bias, which refers to researchers’ explicit or implicit understanding of what being and becoming means and who they are and how they relate to the phenomena under study. If researchers do not reflect on this bias when empirically exploring contexts of informal, low-income markets, they may unconsciously transmit and continue to impose an ontological/epistemological view onto another context. Their problematic solutions focus on generating, reproducing, or adapting social policies designed for developed countries, in order to allow informal settings to ‘catch up’ with the so-called developed world. We argue that the reason for this strong acceptance of the formalizing approach is that many researchers are not open to observing and interiorizing the extreme cultural differences of informal markets. As most researchers are deeply rooted in formal markets (and often its underlying links to coloniality: Quijano, 2016), they often fail to comprehend the value of discovering what is present in the void and do not know how to ground social innovation and social policy in the norms and values present in informal markets. Discovering the informal in this way requires a methodological approach that departs from the conventional logic held by many common standards of qualitative research methods, and establishes strategies such as ethnomethodology, ethnography, narrative research, and action research in a resilient and contextually sensitive manner. In other words, it requires methodological resilience. 2.

Access Relational Dimensions

Many researchers face the risk of a relational bias, which, as shown above, refers to the distance between the contexts in which researchers are socialized and those of the actors and phenomena they explore, who are embedded in informal markets. This relational bias must be carefully considered in empirical research designs. Since very few researchers involved in qualitative research projects have been socialized in societies dominated by informal markets, they are confronted with social relations that are profoundly different from those with which they are familiar. Methodological resilience aims to address this challenge by enacting embodied in-person meetings on an ongoing process of relating and inter-knowing between the researchers and the researched. In these processes, knowing is continuously created and changed in the course of being practised. Thus, any knowing and enacting always depends on a set of relationships to others and is processed in a continuous and dynamic sense-making about phenomena. 3.

Co-create Impact

Another practice that responds to the relational bias is for researchers to co-create impact with actors from informal markets. This relates to action research following a spiral model of planning a change, acting, and observing what happens (Robson, 2002; Krathwohl, 1993; Rossman and Rallis, 2017). Beyond this spiral, methodological resilience as demonstrated before emphasizing a hermeneutic understanding of the embodied and processual phenomena

Researching social inclusion and social innovation in Latin America  85 involved in both knowing and its inter-relational nexus. For this reason, methodological resilience is committed to involving people in the diagnosis, planning, and finding or developing of solutions (solutioning) of problems and issues rather than imposing solutions to pre-defined problems, as action research sometimes tends to propose. 4.

Integrate the Embodied Knowing of Researchers in Relations with the Researched

As discussed above, embodied knowing denotes joint emotional and relational processes. An example would be events in which researchers and actors from an indigenous community jointly participate in an indigenous spiritual ceremony. As we saw, embodied knowing also comprises dialogically structured activities that operate as a kind of responsive action, such as the mutual expression of respect and active listening on the part of the researchers. Integrating the concept of embodied knowing into data-gathering processes is another practice that can mitigate relational bias (see guideline 2). Researchers take their own embodied knowing seriously and in scientific terms when gathering data on informal markets. This is an important point, as methodological resilience assumes an interplay between the researcher and the researched. This in turn can more likely lead to a co-operation between the two (and others), which enters a radical relational and unpremeditated process. In this practice, the researchers are embodied and involved. Following emotional relational and dialogically structured activities, they take the time to critically self-reflect on their experiences, for instance by explaining why certain emotions arose during these processes. Accordingly, they listen and engage closely with informal markets for an extended period to develop a ‘proto-native’ understanding of and within the context of a culture and its ‘inhabitants’. This goes beyond understanding different, mutually excluding perspectives in the sense of multi-perceptivity (Pettigrew, 1990), as current qualitative research methodologies propose. In this sense, they become the phenomena and, through dialogue, check stories with informal market actors. 5.

Constantly Adapt the Manual for the Use of Different Techniques

As most researchers face an unfamiliar environment in informal markets, they often unconsciously interpret data from a formal market point of view. This can lead to what we have called an evaluative bias, in which researchers assume that an economic understanding will help informal market entities adjust to formal markets. To respond to this risk, we suggest that researchers may be better off not using any sort of manual or map to guide their research procedures. Rather, they should develop context-specific and culture-sensitive research relationships and designs; that is, use an array of methodological devices to investigate the underlying expectations and implicit rules and specific practices. A valuable technique here is the use of narratives, which offer an important method for approaching embodied implicit as well as expressed forms of knowing in a given lifeworld (van Maanen, 1988). 6.

Negotiate Quality Criteria

Another practice that mitigates evaluative bias is how researchers handle the quality and validity criteria of their research. Throughout the research process, researchers collaborate with the

86  Handbook on social innovation and social policy researched by ‘checking’ the story and negotiating the meaning of the data gathered. This sort of validation leads to the production of a convincing narrative report (Angrosino and de Pérez, 2000). In this sense, quality criteria appear not as static conditions of truth, but as a narrative of processes of reflecting on the knowing and the non-known. Rather than using standardized forms, the criteria are modified ‘on the hoof’ in response to what occurs as phenomena. In this process, researchers try to integrate the process of knowing in scientific terms into the process of knowing in the field. In these integrative processes, versions of narrative reports appear as means of provisional integration, rather than as research goals in and of themselves. While providing insights into the implicit process of knowing that occurs in the field, the research results remain open to different interpretations and evaluations from both the researched and researchers, and these interpretations are in turn integrated into the data-gathering processes.

CONCLUSION Based on the general insights introduced in this chapter, and more specifically the guidelines for methodological resilience, we call for more empirical qualitative research on informal markets, such as those observed in Latin America. This call aims to consider extreme cultural differences and avoid imposing solutions designed by actors who are embedded in so-called developed economies. We argue that researchers have significant responsibilities when generating studies that advocate alternative ways to approach social policy and social innovation, rooted in the unique phenomena of informal markets. Our call seeks to circumvent the insufficient static, external standards of conventional research. Rather, we advocate a relational process that allows researchers to address humanity’s grand challenges in a holonic and integral manner. Overall, our proposal for a methodological resilience and for a different form of research design and practice to explore informal markets is a new praxis of inquiry based on a profound transformation of the terrain of knowledge production and application. It challenges taken-for-granted institutional orders and biased knowledge production by formulating alternatives that constitute opportunity for agency and thus a (transformative) praxis that can be connected to a Freire-ian dialogue and conscientization orientation that is rooted in Latin America (Freire, 1970, 1993). In a post- and transdisciplinary spirit, forms of methodological resilience mobilize, develop, and integrate concepts, methods, and knowledges to approach and address phenomena and problems independent of disciplining and disciplinary boundaries, while being aware of both the epistemic and ontological limits of inherited orientations (though without falling into an anti-disciplinary approach of ‘anything goes’ eclecticism and/or incoherence). By creating new participatory modes of knowledge, discourse, and institutional frameworks across all sectors of academic, private, and public life, this kind of research builds up a ‘Transdisciplinary Momentum’ (Thompson-Klein, 2013). It is part of a more integral research approach that offers pathways for overcoming (exclusionary) binary arguments of ‘either–or’ antinomies. Such an integral approach considers mutual, complementary, and interconnected positions that seek to interpret, draw together, and bring new insight to social policy and social innovation. These insights enable researchers to interpret what they discovered in ways that provide a larger, more comprehensive understanding and transformation of the practices of a heterogeneous set of practitioners. This contributes to the development of constructive,

Researching social inclusion and social innovation in Latin America  87 locally useful, and emancipatory holarchy of knowledge following an integral methodological pluralism and epistemology. The research proposed here provides a shared language for addressing the basic patterns and problems of research practices. It can also be used as a functional and strategic guideline that is careful to overcome bias and avoid reducing what would oversimplify, isolate, or fragment researchers’ understanding. Offering enriched perspectives and developmental orientations, an integral meta-theory of organization and leadership needs to be designed to illuminate blind spots, reductionistic pictures, and interpretations of approaches, theories, methods, and findings as well as critically questioning mistaken or misleading assumptions. Such an integral orientation helps to generate a reflexive sensitivity to contextual factors, as well as embedment and innovative conceptual flexibilities, and to develop new and empirically supported ideas and theories. It may also contribute to the more timely relevance and development of integral understandings for practitioners, thus facilitating corresponding practices. Regarded integrally, theory and practice are essential parts of a whole (holon) that have become artificially separated and have evolved into more narrow meanings. Theory without data is empty; furthermore, without the constant test of practice, it is liable to become dogmatic, formulaic, or just plain wrong. In turn, data and practice without theory (i.e., critical reflection), is either blind or falling into a mere action-driven practice that fails to see the big picture, embeddedness, and consequences. Conversely, integrating theory and practice may help bridge the divide between practitioners and academics, in favour of genuine co-operative inquiry. As a differentiated reminder of the multifaceted wholeness and tremendous multi-dimensionality of phenomena, further investigations and implementation of methodological resilience are likely to serve as a helpful antidote to the ideological narrowness of knowledge acquisition and one-sided reductive orientations while providing the basis for a more integral way of understanding informal phenomena and markets.

REFERENCES Acquaah, M., D.B. Zoogah, and E.N. Kwesiga (2013), ‘Advancing Africa through management knowledge and practice: The way forward’, African Journal of Economic and Management Studies, 4, 164–176. Ahrens, T. (1997), ‘Talking accounting: An ethnography of management knowledge in British and German brewers’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 22 (7), 617–637. Alvesson, M. and K. Sköldberg (2000), Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi: SAGE. Angrosino, M.V. and K. de Pérez (2000), ‘Rethinking observation: From method to context’, in N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 673–702. Banerjee, S. (2003), ‘Who sustains whose development? Sustainable development and the reinvention of nature’, Organization Studies, 24 (1), 143–180. Banerjee, S.B. and S. Linstead (2004), ‘Masking subversion: Neocolonial embeddedness in anthropological accounts of indigenous management’, Human Relations, 57 (2), 221–247. doi:10.1177/0018726704042928. Barley, S.R. (1990), ‘Images of imaging: Notes on doing longitudinal field work’, Organization Science, 1 (3), 220–247. Available at http://​www​.jstor​.org/​stable/​2635004 (accessed 2 December 2021). Barley, S.R. (1996), ‘Technicians in the workplace: Ethnographic evidence for bringing work into Organizational Studies’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 41 (3), 404–441. https://​doi​.org/​10​.2307/​ 2393937

88  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Bateson, G. and M. Mead (1942), Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis. New York: New York Academy of Sciences. Block, J. and A.M. Kremen (1996), ‘IQ and ego-resiliency: Conceptual and empirical connections and separateness’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 349–361. Boje, D.M. (1995), ‘Stories of the storytelling organization: A postmodern analysis of Disney as “Tamara-Land”’, The Academy of Management Journal, 38 (4), 997–1035. https://​doi​.org/​10​.2307/​ 256618 Boje, D.M. (2001), Narrative Methods for Organizational and Communication Research. London: SAGE. Boje, D.M. (2010), Storytelling and the Future of Organizations: An Antenarrative Handbook. London: Routledge. Chen, M.A. (2006), ‘Rethinking the informal economy: Linkages with the formal economy and the formal regulatory environment’, in B. Guha-Khasnobis, R. Kanbu, and E. Ostrom (eds), Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 75–92. Chia, R. (1996), ‘The problem of reflexivity in organizational research: Towards a postmodern science of organization’, Organization, 3, 31–59. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1177/​135050849631003 Cook, S.D.N. and J.S. Brown (1999), ‘Bridging epistemologies: The generative dance between organizational knowledge and organizational knowing’, Organization Science, 10, 381–400. http://​dx​.doi​ .org/​10​.1287/​orsc​.10​.4​.381 Czarniawska, B. (1998), A Narrative Approach to Organization Studies. London: SAGE. https://​dx​.doi​ .org/​10​.4135/​9781412983235 Eisenhardt, K.M., M.E. Graebner and S. Sonenshein (2016), ‘Grand challenges and inductive methods: Rigor without rigor mortis’, Academy of Management Journal, 59 (4), 1113–1123. doi:10.5465/ amj.2016.4004. Fabian, J. (1990), ‘Presence and representation: The other and anthropological writing’, Critical Inquiry, 16, 753–772. Freire, P. (1970), ‘Cultural action and conscientization’, Harvard Educational Review, 40 (3), 452–477. Freire, P. (1993), Pedagogy of the Oppressed, rev. edn, trans. M.B. Ramos. New York: Continuum. Gabriel, Y. (1995), ‘The unmanaged organization: Stories, fantasies and subjectivity’, Organization Studies, 16 (3), 477–501. doi:10.1177/017084069501600305 Garfinkel, H. (1996), ‘Ethnomethodology’s program’, Social Psychology Quarterly, 59 (1), 5–21. https://​ doi​.org/​10​.2307/​2787116 Garfinkel, H. and H. Sacks (1970), ‘On formal structures of practical action’, in J.C. McKinney and E.A. Tiryakian (eds), Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Developments. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 338–366. Geertz, C. (1973), Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture. New York: Basic Books. George, G., A.M. McGahan, and J. Prabhu (2012), ‘Innovation for inclusive growth: Towards a theoretical framework and a research agenda’, Journal of Management Studies, 49 (4), 661–683. George, G., C. Corbishley, J.N.O. Khayesi, M.R. Haas, and L. Tihanyi (2016a), ‘From the editors— Bringing Africa in: Promising directions for management research’ [Editorial], Academy of Management Journal, 59 (2), 377–393. https://​doi​.org/​10​.5465/​amj​.2016​.4002 George, G., J. Howard-Grenville, A. Joshi, and L. Tihanyi (2016b), ‘Understanding and tackling societal grand challenges through management research’, Academy of Management Journal, 59 (6), 1880–1895. doi:10.5465/amj.2016.4007 Godfrey, P.C. (2011), ‘Toward a theory of the informal economy’, Academy of Management Annals, 5 (1), 231–277. doi:10.1080/19416520.2011.585818 Goode, E. and N. Ben-Yehuda (1994), Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Gutiérrez, R., P. Márquez, and E. Reficco (2016), ‘Configuration and development of alliance portfolios: A comparison of same-sector and cross-sector partnerships’, Journal of Business Ethics, 135 (1), 55–69. Haar, J., M. Roche, and D. Brougham (2018), ‘Indigenous insights into ethical leadership: A study of Māori leaders’, Journal of Business Ethics, 160, 621–640. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1007/​s10551​-018​-3869​-3 Hammersley, M. and P. Atkinson (1983), Ethnography: Principles in Practice. London: Tavistock.

Researching social inclusion and social innovation in Latin America  89 Hart, S. (2010), Capitalism at the Crossroads: Next Generation Business Strategies for a Post-Crisis World. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall Pearson. Heath, C. and J. Hindmarsh (2002), ‘Analysing interaction: Video, ethnography and situated conduct’, in T. May (ed.), Qualitative Research in Action, London: SAGE, 99–121. Heracleous, L. (2001), ‘An ethnographic study of culture in the context of organizational change’, Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 37, 426–446. Intezari, A., C. Spiller, and S. Yang (2020), Practical Wisdom, Leadership and Culture: Asian, Indigenous and Middle-Eastern Perspectives. Abingdon: Routledge. Jäger, U. and V. Sathe (2014), Strategy and Competitiveness in Latin American Markets: The Sustainability Frontier. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Jäger, U. and J. Valverde (2021), ‘International nongovernmental organization governance: Brokering between developed countries and the developing world’, in G. Donnelly-Cox, M. Meyer, and F. Wijkström (eds), Research Handbook on Nonprofit Governance. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. doi: https://​doi​.org/​10​.4337/​9781788114912​.00026 Kemmis, S. and R. McTaggart (2000), ‘Participatory action research’, in N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 567–607. Koschmann, M.A., T.R. Kuhn, and M.D. Pfarrer (2012), ‘A communicative framework of value in cross-sector partnerships’, Academy of Management Review, 37 (3), 332–354. Krathwohl, D.R. (1993), Methods of Educational and Social Science Research: An Integrated Approach. New York: Longman/Addison Wesley. Küpers, W. (2005), ‘Embodied implicit and narrative knowing in organizations’, Journal of Knowledge Management, 9 (6), 113–133. Küpers, W. (2008), ‘Embodied “inter-learning”: An integral phenomenology of learning in and by organizations’, The Learning Organisation: An International Journal, 15 (5), 388–408. Küpers, W. (2011), ‘Embodied inter-practice: Phenomenological and pragmatic perspectives on creative practices between habits and improvisation’, Phenomenology & Practice, 5 (1), 100–139. Küpers, W. (2012), ‘Embodied transformative metaphors and narratives in organisational life-worlds of change’, Journal of Organizational Change Management, 26 (3), 494–528. Küpers, W. (2014), ‘Embodied inter-be(com)ing: The contribution of Merleau-Ponty’s relational ontology for a processual understanding of Chiasmic Organising’, in J. Helin, T. Hernes, D. Hjorth, and R. Holt (eds), Oxford Handbook of Process Philosophy and Organization Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 413–431. Küpers, W. (2015), Phenomenology of the Embodied Organisation: The Contribution of Merleau-Ponty. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Lewin, K. (1943), ‘Defining the “field at a given time”’, Psychological Review, 50 (3), 292–310. https://​ doi​.org/​10​.1037/​h0062738 Lynch, M. (1997), ‘Ethnomethodology without indifference’, Human Studies, 20 (3), 371–376. Mair, J., I. Marti, and M.J. Ventresca (2012), ‘Building inclusive markets in rural Bangladesh: How intermediaries work institutional voids’, Academy of Management Journal, 55 (4), 819–850. Marshall, C. and G.B. Rossman (1995), Designing Qualitative Research. London: SAGE. Marton, F. (1988), ‘Phenomenography: A research approach to investigating different understandings of reality’, in R.R. Sherman and R.B. Webb (eds), Qualitative Research in Education: Focus and Methods. London: Falmer Press, 141–161. May, R. (1994), The Translator in the Text: On Reading Russian Literature in English. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Maynard, D.W. and S.E. Clayman (1991), ‘The diversity of ethnomethodology’, Annual Review of Sociology, 17, 385–418. Available at http://​www​.jstor​.org/​stable/​2083348 (accessed 15 December 2021). Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964), The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Merleau-Ponty, M. (2013), Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge. Meyer, J. (2000), ‘Using qualitative methods in health related action research’, The British Medical Journal, 320, 178–181. http://​dx​.doi​.org/​10​.1136/​bmj​.320​.7228​.178 Miller, D.C. and N.J. Salkind (2002), Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement, 6th edn. London: SAGE. https://​dx​.doi​.org/​10​.4135/​9781412984386

90  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Nicholls-Nixon, C.L., J.A.D. Castilla, J.S. Garcia, and M.R. Pesquera (2011), ‘Latin America management research: Review, synthesis, and extension’, Journal of Management, 37, 1178–1227. North, D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Oliver, K.L. (1998), ‘A journey into narrative analysis: A methodology for discovering meanings’, Journal of Teaching in Physical Education, 17 (2), 244–259. doi:10.1123/jtpe.17.2.244 Olvera, A. (1998), Problemas conceptuales en el estudio de las organizaciones civiles: De la sociedad civil al tercer sector, Instituto de Investigaciones Histórico-Sociales-Universidad Veracruzana. Patriotta, G. (2004), ‘On studying organizational knowledge’, Knowledge Management Research & Practice, 2, 3–12. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1057/​palgrave​.kmrp​.8500017 Pettigrew, A.M. (1990), ‘Longitudinal field research on change: Theory and practice’, Organization Science, 1 (3), 267–292. Available at http://​www​.jstor​.org/​stable/​2635006 (accessed 15 December 2021). Philipsen, G. (1992), Speaking Culturally. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Quijano, A. (2016), ‘Coloniality of power and Eurocentrism in Latin America’, International Sociology, 15 (2), 215–232. Reinecke, J. and S. Ansari (2015), ‘When times collide: Temporal brokerage at the intersection of markets and developments’, Academy of Management Journal, 58 (2). doi:10.5465/amj.2012.1004. Robson, C. (2002), Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Rossman, G. and S. Rallis (2017), An Introduction to Qualitative Research, 4th edn. London: SAGE. https://​doi​.org/​10​.4135/​9781071802694 Rustow, A. (1980), A Historical Critique of Civilization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Scott, W.R. (2013), Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests and Identities, 4th edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Shotter, J. (1993), Cultural Politics of Everyday Life: Social Constructionism, Rhetoric and Knowing of the Third Kind. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Spiller, C., L. Erakovic, M. Henare, and E. Pio (2010), ‘Relational wellbeing and wealth: Māori business and an ethic of care’, Journal of Business Ethics, 98 (1), 153–169. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1007/​s1055 1-010-0540-z Spiller, C., E. Pio, L. Erakovic, and M. Henare (2011), ‘Wise up: Creating organizational wisdom through an ethic of Kaitiakitanga’, Journal of Business Ethics, 104 (2), 223–235. doi:10.1007/ s10551-011-0905-y Stacey, R. (2001), Complex Responsive Processes in Organizations: Learning and Knowledge Creation, 1st edn. London: Routledge. https://​doi​.org/​10​.4324/​9780203361481 Tedlock, B. (2003), ‘Ethnography and ethnographic representation’, in N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd edn, 165–213. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Thompson-Klein, J. (2013), ‘The transdisciplinary moment(um)’, Internal Review, 9 (2), 189–199. Touraine, A. (1988), Le parole et le sang. Paris: Odile Jacob. Tsoukas, H. (1996), ‘The firm as a distributed knowledge system: A constructionist approach’, Strategic Management Journal, 17 (Special Winter Issue), 11–26. UNFPA (2011), State of the World Population 2011: People and Opportunities in a Population of Seven Billion. New York: United Nations Population Fund. van de Ven, A.H. and G.P. Huber (1990), ‘Longitudinal field research methods for studying processes of organizational change’, Organization Science, 1 (3), 213–219. van Maanen, J. (1988), Tales of the Field: On Writing Ethnography. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Webb, J., L. Tihanyi, R. Ireland, and D. Sirmon (2009), ‘You say illegal, I say legitimate: Entrepreneurship in the informal economy’, Academy of Management Review, 34 (3), 492–510. doi:10.5465/ amr.2009.40632826 Whiteman, G. and W.H. Cooper (2000), ‘Ecological embeddedness’, Academy of Management Journal, 43 (6), 1265–1282. doi:10.2307/1556349 Zuber-Skerritt, O. (ed.) (1996), New Directions in Action Research, 1st edn. London: Routledge. doi​.org/​ 10​.4324/​9780203392935

8. Paying for and providing social policies and social innovations Danielle Logue

INTRODUCTION: THE CHANGING ORGANIZATIONAL AND GOVERNANCE LANDSCAPE IN THE FUNDING OF SOCIAL POLICY Against the backdrop of public-sector austerity and the characterization of complex and intractable societal issues as ‘grand challenges’, the need for innovation in social policy and programs – and their funding – is deemed more acute than ever (e.g., George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi and Tihanyi, 2016; Voorberg, Bekkers and Tummers, 2015). This has contributed to the increasing popularity, particularly after the Global Financial Crisis, of the idea of creating enterprises and financial mechanisms that facilitate private investment into solutions to social problems to generate both financial and social returns (e.g., Arena, Bengo, Calderini and Chiodo, 2016; Bugg-Levine and Emerson, 2011; Elkington and Hartigan, 2008; Loder, 2011; Schinkus, 2015; World Economic Forum, 2011). Amongst these responses, a suite of innovative financing mechanisms has emerged, requiring new forms of collaboration and governance, and resulting in redistribution of responsibilities for social goods and services, as part of a broader recognition that the ability of public, private and non-profit sectors to solely address such challenges has passed (Voorberg et al., 2015). These financing mechanisms are reshaping the organizational and governance landscape for both paying for and delivering social policies, and more broadly public good. In this chapter, I briefly explore three such social finance mechanisms that have emerged in this context to fund social programs and solutions to social problems – social impact bonds (SIBs), civic crowdfunding platforms and social stock exchanges. Social finance is defined as financial mechanisms and vehicles that aim to provide both social and financial returns. In each example, I consider how these financial mechanisms work, the social problems and context to which they are being applied, and their effects and impact based on emerging research findings globally. They each raise important questions for Social Policy analysis: ● How and by what means are these mechanisms considered successful? ● How are power and responsibility for financing and the delivery of social policy changed or impacted by these financing mechanisms? ● What are the opportunities and challenges in scaling such mechanisms? ● What are some of the unintended consequences emerging in financing social policy and social programs in this way?

91

92  Handbook on social innovation and social policy

SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS SIBs have emerged as a new and innovative way to finance social programs to address a variety of social problems (Jackson, 2013; Social Finance US, 2015). They are an innovative device for the collaborative design, funding and provision of social services, across government, private sector and social service providers (for an overview, see OECD, 2016). What makes SIBs interesting is the significant opportunity they present in generating social innovation. By social innovation I refer to the “creation of long-lasting outcomes that aim to address societal needs by fundamentally changing the relationships, positions and rules between the involved stakeholders” (Voorberg et al., 2015:1334; see also Logue, 2019). SIBs do this by reconfiguring relations at the intersection of the public, private and social sectors (Callanan, Law and Mendonca, 2012; see also Clark, Emerson and Thornley, 2014), attempting to navigate complexity as they identify, fund, implement and assess solutions to specific social problems, redistributing risk and reward in new ways amongst the very different actors involved. The many reports on SIBs produced over the recent years (e.g., Deloitte, 2012; McKinsey & Company, 2012; OECD, 2016) broadly converge on a common understanding of the actors, roles and activities required for an SIB to function: (a) an intermediary organization that contracts with (b) the government (or a state agency) for the delivery of social programs to the benefit of constituents; (c) a non-profit service provider contracted by the intermediary that delivers the program and works with beneficiaries; (d) a private investor who provides upfront capital to the intermediary in anticipation of being repaid investment and return by the government if the program undertaken meets performance targets; (e) an independent assessor who verifies, by the end of the program period, whether predetermined impact targets have been met; and, typically, (f) an independent process evaluator to assess a focal SIB arrangement. In practice, SIBs potentially attract “private investment to social programs by paying a market rate of return if predefined outcomes targets are met” (Warner, 2013:303). In this arrangement, SIBs “monetize benefits of social interventions and tie pay to performance, limiting government control once the contract is signed” (Warner, 2013:303), enabling more freedom for the non-profit provider to take action to achieve the agreed-upon outcomes. Private investors receive a financial return if social outcomes are achieved, based on the equivalent savings accruing to government from the success of the program. In this way, government only pays for successful programs. SIBs are not a debt instrument in the form of a bond (Fraser, Tan, Lagarde and Mays, 2018; Schinkus, 2015; Warner, 2013) but rather multi-stakeholder partnership agreements that share common features and objectives with certain forms of public–private partnerships. The return on investment in SIBs is contingent upon specified social outcomes and impact measures being achieved; thus, in terms of investment risk, SIBs are similar to a structured product or an equity investment (Liang, Mansberger and Spieler, 2014). In a sense, SIBs act as a social futures contract, opening new ways to route financial streams from capital markets to third-sector organizations for social purposes while minimizing the risk for public finances at no cost. Much of the emerging literature on SIBs, drawn disciplinarily from across social policy, law, finance, health and public administration, frames this innovation as a ‘win–win–win’ for all involved (Arena et al., 2016; Fraser et al., 2018; Warner, 2013). That is, governments only pay for programs that work, non-profit service providers have freedom to design and deliver programs that achieve outcomes, and investors (often philanthropists) achieve social

Paying for and providing social policies and social innovations  93 and financial returns. The large volume of ‘grey literature’ on SIBs published by government agencies, think tanks and consulting groups (often themselves active in the brokering of SIBs) provide overwhelmingly positive commentary and optimism for the potential impact of this new form of collaboration (Fraser et al., 2018). For example, it has been said that SIBs offer extraordinary potential in representing a “more effective way to distribute grant dollars, catalyse investment in the non-profit sector, unlock impact data, and foster greater transparency and accountability” (Beck, Schwab and Pinedo, 2016). SIBs are presented as having a transformative power by bringing governments, private investors and non-profit organizations together “in a completely new and performance-driven way” (Beck et al., 2016), fostering innovation in collaborative initiatives to achieve social outcomes (Arena et al., 2016). Others see SIBs as infusing “a for-profit ethos into important yet underfunded and inefficient social-welfare programs” (Humphries, 2014:433). Even though this new arrangement for funding solutions to social problems was only created in 2010, interest in SIBs has diffused rapidly and globally, with over 138 SIBs launched since and over 69 currently in development at the time of writing (see Social Finance US, 2015; see also Dimitrijevska-Markoski, 2016; Fraser et al., 2018). This global diffusion and uptake is unsurprising given the positive framing of SIBs. However, the global diffusion is surprising given that systematic insights are now emerging regarding their success and impact (Klimavičiūtė, Chiodo, De Pieri and Gineikytė, 2021). There was early concern that SIBs may contribute to the potential financialization of social policy through the domination of the market logic (Warner, 2013), and the further infusion of private-sector values and New Public Management ideology into the domain of the state (McHugh, Sinclair, Roy, Huckfield and Donaldson, 2013). For example, SIBs have been seen as simply an extension of New Public Management reforms (e.g., Joy and Shields, 2013) subordinating the public and non-profit sectors to financial-sector interests (Lake, 2015). On this view, the ultimate success of SIBs will depend on their increased presentation in financial terms in order to attract mainstream private investors (Schinkus, 2015), with clients or problems being selected to ensure performance outcomes are achieved with less of a focus on the social mission (Joy and Shields, 2013). Similarly, some have raised concerns over SIBs being a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” (McHugh et al., 2013) for the social sector, as it represents an ideological shift (towards a market logic), where the sectors’ activities are directed away from programs in areas of high need to those that are most measurable and investable. Other concerns regarding the transparency of SIBs have also emerged: contractually SIBs are seen as commercial-in-confidence arrangements, making it difficult for any accountability of public funds (Warner, 2013). Little is known about how negotiations play out, how impact and its measurement are decided, and how those involved during and after the processes are changed by them (Jolliffe and Hedderman, 2014; Joy and Shields, 2013; Schinkus, 2015). SIBs may also be inherently limited in their ability to attract investment precisely because of the heterogeneous problems they address, from homelessness, recidivism, foster care, youth employment and aged care, to health and social care, early childhood development, neonatal care, workforce development, deprivation and physical activity (for a review see Arena et al., 2016). Heterogeneity hinders standardization, making it more difficult for investors to compare investment opportunities. Critics have also questioned the sustainability of this financial product and whether SIBs, as an innovative form of private investment in financing social issues, are a “flash in the pan” (Arena et al., 2016:927).

94  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Recent analysis of the benefits of using SIBs or outcomes-based contracting in the provision of social services, particularly across countries in Europe (Klimavičiūtė et al., 2021), suggests SIBs are most effective when used to test whether innovative social programs are effective or scalable, and in social policy areas where groups are facing multiple barriers that existing social policy cannot accommodate. This latest report found mixed results as to the efficacy and impact of SIBs. For example, the report notes examples of where such financing mechanisms resulted in episodes of ‘creaming’ (choosing the least challenging participants to assist, in order to meet outcome targets) and ‘parking’ (not choosing the most challenging participants in order to meet outcome targets). Yet it also found instances where SIBs did assist very challenging groups for whom previous social policies had failed. The all-important caveat, though, is that it is difficult to compare SIBs to traditional financing mechanisms where outcomes are not, or are differently measured. There also remains a lack of detail as to the costs involved in the design and oversight of a SIB, and comprehensive outcome measurement frameworks are needed to prevent perverse incentives. Other emerging findings suggest the challenges in scaling social impact bonds, given the differing understandings of what ‘scaling’ may even mean for the relevant stakeholders. For example, according to Seelos and Mair (2017), scaling involves the adoption of successful innovation outputs and organizing their efficient delivery to serve more people better. To this end, Seelos and Mair (2017) describe four scaling modes for organizations: (1) scaling through productivity increases; (2) scaling through adding resources; (3) scaling through replication (expanding to different environments, such as different social policy areas or geographic locations); and (4) scaling through knowledge transfer. These different modes are important to explicate in any discussion of how SIBs may be ‘scaled’. There are also limits as to when SIBs may be useful, given some settings require immediate action, but the time taken to establish a SIB can be lengthy, due to the degree of difficulty in getting all parties to agree on outcomes and an associated measurement framework in a complex social problem setting. The costs to develop a SIB, often a bespoke contracting arrangement, are another limitation, especially where the contract is relatively small compared to establishment and operational costs. Overall, social impact bonds are part of a movement of ‘paying for outcomes’ in the way governments approach the funding of social policy and social programs. Reports suggest that SIBs enable new relational configurations and are a mechanism for bringing together different types of expertise, including a deep understanding of social problems, skills in finance, competencies in contract management, and different approaches to impact measurement. They provide opportunities for new types of social programs or policy innovations to be tried and often enable flexibility in their delivery. The focus on outcomes means that delivery can be changed or modified as required to improve chances of success. All of this also comes at little financial risk to government. And the original intent behind the design of a SIB is to provide longer-term savings for government. Yet as recent reports note (Klimavičiūtė et al., 2021; see also University of Oxford Government Outcomes Lab),1 there is growing convergence around the types of social problem areas where SIBs seem most suited, and these are often for those groups who face multiple and complex barriers and for whom existing social programs are inadequate. This raises an inherent dilemma in SIBs: for investors, replicating a successful SIB with a proven model is an attractive investment, yet for government, if there is no risk, the benefit of applying an SIB is lost. Ultimately, while SIBs are demonstrating some positive outcomes, there remains the overall concern that SIBs further represent the marketization of

Paying for and providing social policies and social innovations  95 social problems and solutions, or “financialization” as others have described2 and the moral dilemma of profiting from vulnerable groups (Logue, Höllerer, Millner, Jebali and Clegg, 2021a).

SOCIAL MISSION PLATFORMS AND CIVIC CROWDFUNDING As a mechanism and now successful organizational model, digital platforms have generated global information-sharing networks (e.g., Facebook, X) and also business models based on directly connecting supply and demand, cutting out traditional intermediaries in markets (e.g., Uber, Airbnb). The online crowdsourcing of ideas and capital has transformed business tasks such as innovation and technical problem solving, and product design, and has also revolutionized start-up financing and scaled peer-to-peer lending (Piezunka and Dahlander, 2015). What was once the responsibility of a few experts is now distributed to professional and amateur alike via tapping the power of the crowd. Many platforms have emerged to source ideas and funding from crowds – doing so across countries – to support the development of new products and services, for both personal profit and collective good (e.g., Kickstarter, StartSomeGood, Chuffed). The objective of crowdfunding is to collect money for investment, generally by using online social networks (Belleflamme, Lambert and Schwienbacher, 2014). What these various digital platforms have in common is their role in providing coordinating infrastructure by connecting actors from different sectors or fields, and different countries, incentivizing participation, setting rules for engagement, and arguably, given their form, stabilizing and shaping social relationships and interactions, and so structuring these new spaces in an ongoing way. Within this broad range of crowdfunding has emerged crowdfunding for social purposes – increasingly labelled as ‘civic crowdfunding’ – which is the use of crowdfunding for projects that produce community or quasi-public assets (Davies, 2014, 2015). Rather than providing debt financing, or obtaining equity in a firm, civic crowdfunding platforms enable donations to social projects, campaigns, non-profit organizations and charities. These social mission platforms enable the resourcing of social projects by way of distributed private capital investment and/or grants (Stiver, Barroca, Minocha, Richards and Roberts, 2015). Civic crowdfunding platforms may involve actors from the government, the community and private investors interacting in new relational configurations to identify, select, fund and implement solutions to social problems. In such new interaction spaces and relational configurations, there is opportunity for innovation and novel ideas, new voices, and genuine local commitment, given the general absence of institutional constraints and norms derived from previous relations or traditional forms of financing local social programs (such as grants programs). Yet, these new relational configurations and interactions mean that responsibility for deciding on the problem (and geographic area) and the appropriate public solution is no longer the sole purview of the State or local authority (Bernier and Hafsi, 2007) but is negotiated via the platform. For example, private funders outside of local, provincial or state government boundaries can also readily channel funds into local, community-selected problems and proposed solutions. Civic crowdfunding may include funding the development of public assets such as public parks, playgrounds, bike tracks and walkways, and also temporary public infrastructure and activities such as artistic and sporting events, seasonal lighting and decorations (Davies, 2014; Stiver et al., 2015). There are three emerging forms of civic crowdfunding, categorized according to the outcome procured by the funder (Massolutions, 2015; Mollick, 2014): (1) producing or

96  Handbook on social innovation and social policy co-funding public goods and services (community centres, waste recycling and collection) for the collective good; (2) altruistic giving, so donating without reward where the outcome may be private and not shared; and (3) social purpose giving, or donating with reward/return, also described as social purpose spending. Platforms are also interesting as a coordinating system precisely because they try not to over-specify nor qualify appropriate interactions. This is both their strength and their limitation, raising particular tensions not experienced by more traditional social project financing mechanisms. Platforms may also be more transactional in their dealings with users, not requiring long-term relationships between participants to function but instead a high volume of transactions. Emerging research is already showing distinct differences in the quality of interactions and deliberations on digital platforms when compared to non-platform deliberations on the same topic (Aragon, Gomez and Kaltenbrunner, 2017), noting the influence of platform design decisions in producing a distinct ‘platform logic’ that shapes platform interactions (Andersson Schwarz, 2017). These emerging findings also highlight how platforms may “strategically manipulate network effects” (McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017:148) when trying to jump-start network effects and encourage participation from multiple types of users. In one of the first strategic analyses of a civic crowdfunding platform, Logue and Grimes (2022b) explored a civic crowdfunding platform that focuses on co-funding public goods and services for the collective good, where “the goods produced are expected to be goods that can be consumed equally by members of a community, regardless of their contribution to the production of the good (the crowdfunding campaign itself)” (Davies, 2015:343). Logue and Grimes (2022b) identified three challenges faced by the social mission platform: (1) legitimacy challenges, by which they needed to help stakeholders trust and make sense of their value proposition; (2) participation challenges, by which they had to encourage community members, government and investors to engage via the platform; and (3) exchange challenges, by which they had to guide and govern interactions on the platform so that they retained their social mission yet also maintained a position of neutrality in this governance. In responding to these challenges, Logue and Grimes (2022b) show how the platform cultivated “institutional infrastructure” as a means by which the platform could grow, and retain and deliver on its social mission. For example, they describe how the social mission platform rhetorically crafted boundaries around the platform to help the different types of participants make sense of where it ‘sat’ against traditional grant financing or private business investment. For business participants (often investors), they emphasized how it was a low-risk investment option (given the platform’s all-or-nothing funding model) yet also an innovative opportunity for local place-based investment. To create bridges and connections across such a diverse set of participants, they framed participation as being about ‘democracy’. This is an overarching and polysemous frame that can simultaneously bring participants together and mean different things to each type of participant. For example, democracy was about empowerment for community members, fair distribution of responsibility for local development for business investors, and wider participation in decision making for local councils. To govern interactions on the platform and ensure activities were aligned with the social mission, the platform created ‘blueprints’ for activity to guide interactions and facilitate the creation of norms around best practice. This was often done via much offline activity in workshops and via the provision of guidebooks and educational templates. Cultivating institutional infrastructure in the new space for interaction is important for several reasons. As Logue and Grimes (2022b) demonstrate, although it is clearly possible

Paying for and providing social policies and social innovations  97 for social mission platforms to grow and simultaneously create positive impacts, it is also possible for such growth to occur in ways that undermine the presumed and intended value of the platform. In their case study, Logue and Grimes (2022b) show how concerns arose when analysts of the platform revealed that community participants were often ‘white, wealthy, highly educated’, and not those from more disadvantaged neighbourhoods who may lack the resources, internet access and time to run funding campaigns, and who also more desperately needed social goods and services and support. This meant that the platform was at risk of reinforcing the social inequality that it initially set out to address. This, in turn, raises questions around whether such platforms that essentially enable the privatization of public policy making are really ‘platforms for the people’ in that they can efficiently and fairly co-produce public goods and services, more so than traditional financing mechanisms. Here, we observe how new ways of financing solutions to social problems, especially those that are bottom-up and led by community members, may also lead to perverse effects. These emerging findings from studies of social mission platforms also have clear managerial and governance implications for purpose-driven organizations looking to avoid mission drift – that is, divergence between an organization’s actions and its identity. Battilana and Lee (2014), for instance, argue that the risk of such drift increases when organizations face competing prerogatives related to their social and financial missions. In the context of social mission platforms, a platform’s limited control over its own growth, as is typically the case, might create additional risk. Platforms often evolve in unexpected ways, generating unintended consequences. To uphold the integrity of the founders’ original values and missions for their organizations, these founders, or their supporters in government, must be willing to intervene in ways that might at times discourage their growth.

IMPACT INVESTING AND SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGES As part of the broader discourse on how to finance solutions to social and environmental problems and supplement government financing of social policy, including achieving the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, impact investing has emerged as one possible market-based solution for mobilizing private-sector capital. Impact investing is an investment approach that intentionally seeks both social and environmental impact as well as a financial return on investment (Logue and Grimes, 2022a). It is an approach situated alongside other investment movements, such as ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance) investing, responsible finance and sustainable finance. The term ‘impact investing’ was allegedly coined in 2007 at a meeting hosted by the Rockefeller Foundation, with philanthropists, global institutions, banks and consulting firms supporting (with varying motivations) the development of markets for profit-seeking investments that can generate social and environmental good (Hehenberger, Mair and Metz, 2019; Monitor Report, 2009; Porter and Kramer, 2011; World Economic Forum, 2012). Fuelling excitement has been speculation as to the potential size of this market, from early estimates of $500 billion within five to ten years (Monitor Report, 2009), to over $1 trillion in the coming years (Cohen, 2018), even though many recognized the numbers as rather spurious (GIIN, 2019). This potential lent itself to a decade of overwhelmingly positive discourse on impact investing as a growing force in the global economy (KPMG, 2019), essential for mobilizing the $2.5 trillion in private investment needed to achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals,3 and cast as an historical turning point in capitalism. This

98  Handbook on social innovation and social policy potential has also garnered much government interest, with explorations of how social policies and the financing of foreign aid can be supplemented by such investment, through blended financing, supporting social enterprises to become ‘investor ready’ and co-financing necessary market infrastructure, such as funds, brokers and platforms for matching investors with enterprises (Logue, McAllister and Schweitzer, 2017). And while progress on the ground often seems limited, with market-building efforts in some places becoming an end in and of itself, it is an idea that is seemingly too good not to be true (Logue, Hwang, Höllerer and Yu, 2021b). Amongst these market building efforts for impact investing has been the emergence of market infrastructure, including social stock exchanges. Like any market, impact investing requires associated infrastructure to connect (social) enterprises that are in need of funds, with well-intentioned investors who are seeking social and financial returns, and as such there has been global encouragement for social stock exchanges (Yunus, 2007). A survey conducted by the Asian Development Bank provided momentum for this idea by indicating that 74% of investors not currently involved in ‘impact investing’ would consider conducting business on a social stock exchange (Shinozaki, 2014). The G8 Taskforce on impact investing and the World Economic Forum (2012) also suggested that social stock exchanges had the potential to offer value to retail and institutional investors by providing access to liquid securities of impact enterprises. The earliest three platforms that specifically self-identified as social stock exchanges were launched in Toronto (Toronto Social Venture Connection or SVX), London (London Social Stock Exchange or SVX) and Singapore (Impact Investment Exchange or IIX) in 2013, followed by other platforms in Brazil, Kenya, South Africa and the US. Yet after almost a decade of effort, there are mixed results in their outcomes and viability. As one of the founders of Singapore’s Impact Investment Exchange publicly reflected: “Whether it is a true stock exchange or a directory of socially-minded organizations, each platform will face the challenge of finding and screening enterprises, building trust and maintaining relationships over the long run, and building pathways for them to grow and become ready to list” (Impact Investment Exchange, 2019). Emerging insights from a study on the earliest platforms (Logue and Grimes, 2022b) show core challenges that need to be addressed, regardless of geographic location. The excitement and attention around impact investing needs to be translated by the social stock exchange to assist stakeholders to make sense of where this exchange sits in the national financial ecosystem, in relation to existing government support and financing options. It also needs to make decisions around governance, specifically the technical trading mechanism and the consequent regulatory approvals, and whether to address this by partnering with existing exchanges or to pursue independence. A social stock exchange also needs to make crucial decisions around measurement frameworks in order to address information asymmetries and provide the standardization required for trading in financial markets. For example, this may be via proprietary measurement systems created by an exchange, or third-party frameworks that provide certification, such as BCorporation Certification, amongst other options. These are consequential decisions that set the boundaries for this market, as to who can participate and what ‘counts’ as social impact and social value. Another challenge facing exchanges is building relationships, trust and credibility in financial markets and across all other relevant stakeholders in an emerging market for impact investing. With other financial options available to enterprises, the value proposition needs to be clear and networks need to be strong to generate participation and engagement from both sides of the market. These are challenging tasks, and some social

Paying for and providing social policies and social innovations  99 stock exchanges have collapsed after failing to establish measurement frameworks and a clear value proposition. Others persist but now pursue an exchange as an end goal, instead focusing on market capability building and trialling different financial products on other mainstream exchanges. Others have transformed, embarking on vertical expansion of financial offerings from a listing platform to full brokerage services and now crowd-sourced equity options. This provides a suite of financing options for social enterprises as they grow and scale. While social stock exchanges are perhaps not directly involved in funding government social policy, they are part of an emerging impact investing market that is attracting government attention, funding and support for its development, and shaping understandings of social value and financing options available for social services and programs. Their development and convergence on measurement frameworks, and their push for more social enterprises that are ‘investor ready’, dramatically reshapes the organizational landscape of social policy delivery forms for the future.

THEORIZING IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL INNOVATION IN THE FINANCING OF SOCIAL POLICY Decisions around who measures social impact and calculates social value, and how, especially in settings where the financialization of social impact is required for new investment vehicles to function, have enormous consequences for which public goods and services are prioritized and delivered. These new relational configurations change distributions of risk and responsibility, and challenge institutional structures as well as broader understandings of public good. For example, theoretical conceptualization of SIBs attracts scholars from multiple disciplines, yet given they draw together actors from different institutional domains, future research could do well to consider an institutional theory lens (Logue, 2019). An institutional theory lens (focusing on the construction, legitimacy and taken-for-grantedness of social structures; see also Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence and Meyer, 2017) on such cross-sector collaboration suggests that these challenges of bringing actors together from different institutional domains is problematic because they are often guided by their domain-specific logics – that is, “participants in a collaborative process bring with them various institutional affiliations, and the institutionalized rules and resources” (Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy, 2000:29) from their respective ‘home domains’. This leads to cross-sector collaborations being characterized by institutional plurality and, more often than not, institutional complexity (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta and Lounsbury, 2011). These conceptual insights on the challenges of addressing complex social problems by bringing together actors from different institutional domains makes the case of SIBs an interesting empirical puzzle to explore. This theoretical approach offers analytical purchase in seeking to understand and investigate how the rules of this financing mechanism are negotiated, how the institutional complexity is navigated and by whom, and especially, the effects not only on the SIB itself, but on the ‘home domains’ of participants in an SIB. More broadly, when analysing the range of these socially innovative financing mechanisms for social policy, it reminds us that social innovation is a contemporary manifestation of historical tensions of the relationship between ‘economy’ and ‘society’. It reflects long-standing debates raised in the works of Adam Smith (1759, 1776) regarding the embeddedness of markets in society, or alternatively the subjugation of society into market-based forms of

100  Handbook on social innovation and social policy organizing and the development of civil society. Many of these social innovations in financing for social policy and programs are grounded in understandings of market-based solutions. Although these efforts may render capitalism more conscious or benevolent, as Pope Francis recently stated, “the pandemic has shown that free-market policies cannot solve all of humanity’s most dire needs” (Gallagher and Benveniste, 2020). A fundamental question is whether the same system that generates many of the pressing societal and environmental problems can be sufficiently transformed to become solutions for these same problems (Amis, Mair and Munir, 2020; Farchi, Logue, Fernandez and Vassolo, 2021). The ways in which we decide to finance social policy and programs that are impactful generate both intended and unintended institutional change. As these novel financing approaches often require change in or affect existing relational and social structures, including routines, resource and authority flows, governance and values (Parés, 2015; Westley and Antadze, 2010), it makes institutional theory a compelling lens through which to advance theorizing and understandings of social finance (Logue, 2019). As Van Wijk, Zietsma, Dorado, De Bakker and Marti succinctly describe it, “Social innovation efforts then depend not only on the will of actors to see them through but also on the institutional conditions that frame them” (2019:891). Foregrounding context (institutional conditions) and processes of institutional change offers potential to examine social innovations in finance across settings, time and levels of analysis. Importantly, it directs scholarly attention to how these innovations are shaping and reshaping existing institutional conditions, for better or worse.

NOTES 1. See https://​golab​.bsg​.ox​.ac​.uk/​ (accessed 20 August 2022). 2. Ibid. 3. See https://​sdgimpact​.undp​.org (accessed 20 August 2022).

REFERENCES Amis, J. M., Mair, J., and Munir, K. A. (2020). The organizational reproduction of inequality, Academy of Management Annals, 14(1),195–230. Andersson Schwarz, J. (2017). Platform logic: An interdisciplinary approach to the platform-based economy, Policy and Internet, doi/10.1002/poi3.159 Aragon, P., Gomez, V., and Kaltenbrunner, A. (2017). Detecting platform effects in online discussions, Policy and Internet, doi: 10.1002/poi3.165 Arena, M., Bengo, I., Calderini, M., and Chiodo, V. (2016). Social impact bonds: Blockbuster or flash in the pan? International Journal of Public Administration, 39(12), 927–939. Battilana, J., and Lee, M. (2014). Advancing research on hybrid organizing: Insights from the study of social enterprises, The Academy of Management Annals, 8(1), 397–441. Beck, L., Schwab, C., and Pinedo, A. (2016). Social Impact Bonds: What’s in a name?, Stanford Social Innovation Review, 12 October. Accessed on 20 August 2022 at https://​ssir​.org/​articles/​entry/​social​ _impact​_bonds​_whats​_in​_a​_name Belleflamme, P., Lambert, T., and Schwienbacher, A. (2014). Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd, Journal of Business Venturing, 29(5), 585–609. Bernier, L., and Hafsi, T. (2007). The changing nature of public entrepreneurship, Public Administration Review, 67(3), 488–503. Bugg-Levine, A., and Emerson, J. (2011). Impact investing: Transforming how we make money while making a difference, Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization, 6(3), 9–18.

Paying for and providing social policies and social innovations  101 Callanan, L., Law, J., and Mendonca, L. (2012). From Potential to Action: Bringing Social Impact Bonds to the US. New York: McKinsey & Company. Clark, C., Emerson, J., and Thornley, B. (2014). Collaborative Capitalism and the Rise of Impact Investing. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Cohen, R. (2018). On Impact. Accessed on 20 August 2022 at https://​www​.onimpactnow​.org Davies, R. (2014). Civic crowdfunding: Participatory communities, entrepreneurs and the political economy of place, Entrepreneurs and the Political Economy of Place (9 May). Accessed on 3 March 2015 at https://​papers​.ssrn​.com/​sol3/​papers​.cfm​?abstract​_id​=​2434615 Davies, R. (2015). Three provocations for civic crowdfunding, Information, Communication and Society, 18(3), 342–355. Deloitte (2012). Paying for outcomes: Solving complex societal issues through Social Impact Bonds. Accessed on 4 September 2022 at http://​www2​.deloitte​.com/​content/​dam/​Deloitte/​ca/​Documents/​ insights​-and​-issues/​ca​-en​-insights​-issues​-paying​-for​-outcomes​.pdf Dimitrijevska-Markoski, T. (2016). Social impact bonds: A new tool for governance of social programs – evidence from the UK, USA and Australia, International Journal of Public Policy, 12(3), 261–275. Elkington, J., and Hartigan, P. (2008). The Power of Unreasonable People: How Social Entrepreneurs Create Markets that Change the World. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. Farchi, T., Logue, D., Fernandez, P., and Vassolo, R. (2021). Freedom behind bars: The central role of emotions in naturalizing an analogy for social change, Organization Studies, doi: 01708406211053214 Fraser, A., Tan, S., Lagarde, M., and Mays, N. (2018). Narratives of promise, narratives of caution: A review of the literature on social impact bonds, Social Policy & Administration, 52(1), 4–28. Gallagher, D., and Benveniste, A. (2020). Pope Francis says capitalism has failed in the pandemic, CNN Business, 4 October [n.p.]. George, G., Howard-Grenville, J., Joshi, A., and Tihanyi, L. (2016). Understanding and tackling societal grand challenges through management research, Academy of Management Journal, 59(6), 1880–1895. GIIN (2019). Sizing the Impact Investing Market. Accessed on 23 November 2023 at https://​thegiin​.org/​ assets/​Sizing​%20the​%20Impact​%20Investing​%20Market​_webfile​.pdf Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Lawrence, T. B., and Meyer, R. E. (eds). (2017). The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism. London, UK: Sage. Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E. R., and Lounsbury, M. (2011). Institutional complexity and organizational responses, Academy of Management Annals, 5(1), 317–371. Hehenberger, L., Mair, J., and Metz, A. (2019). The assembly of a field ideology: An idea-centric perspective on systemic power in impact investing, Academy of Management Journal, 62(6), 1672–1704. Humphries, K. (2014). Not your older brother’s bonds: The use and regulation of social-impact bonds in the United States, Law and Contemporary Problems, 76, 433–452. Impact Investment Exchange (2019). Accessed on 23 November 2023 at https://​iixglobal​.com Jackson, E. (2013). Evaluating social impact bonds: Questions, challenges, innovations, and possibilities in measuring outcomes in impact investing, Community Development, 44(5), 608–616. Jolliffe, D., and Hedderman, C. (2014). Petersborough Social Impact Bond: Final report on cohort 1 analysis, prepared for the UK Ministry of Justice. Leicester, UK: University of Leicester and Qinetiq. Joy, M., and Shields, J. (2013). Social impact bonds: The next phase of third sector marketisation? Canadian Journal of Non Profit and Social Economy Research, 4(2), 39–55. Klimavičiūtė, L., Chiodo, V., De Pieri, B., and Gineikytė, V. (2021). Study on the benefits of using social outcome contracting in the provision of social services and interventions. European Commission. Accessed on 20 August 2022 at https://​op​.europa​.eu/​en/​publication​-detail/​-/​publication/​d3b2cc2b​ -a183​-11eb​-b85c​-01aa75ed71a1/​language​-en KPMG (2019). Enlightened Capital: The Role of Trust in Impact Investing. Accessed on 1 July 2019 at https://​assets​.kpmg​.com/​content/​dam/​kpmg/​us/​pdf/​2019/​05/​enlightened​-capital​-trust​-in​-impact​ -investing​-2019​.pdf Lake, R. W. (2015). The financialization of urban policy in the age of Obama. Journal of Urban Affairs, 37(1), 75–78. Liang, M., Mansberger, B., and Spieler, A. C. (2014). An overview of social impact bonds, Journal of International Business & Law, 13(2), 267–282. Loder, J. (2011). The promise of social impact bonds, Social Space, 2011(1), 42–47.

102  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Logue, D. (2019). Theories of Social Innovation. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Logue, D., and Grimes, M. (2022a). Living up to the hype: How new ventures manage the resource and liability of future-oriented visions within the nascent market of impact investing, Academy of Management Journal, https://​doi​.org/​10​.5465/​amj​.2020​.1583 Logue, D., and Grimes, M. (2022b). Platforms for the people: Enabling civic crowdfunding through the cultivation of institutional infrastructure, Strategic Management Journal, 43(3), 663–693. Logue, D., McAllister, G., and Schweitzer, J. (2017). Social Entrepreneurship and Impact Investing Report, University of Technology Sydney. Logue, D., Höllerer, M. A., Millner, R., Jebali, J., and Clegg, S. (2021a). Negotiating institutional complexity in cross-sector collaboration: Intermediary work in social impact bonds. Working Paper, UTS Centre for Business & Sustainable Development. Logue, D., Hwang, H., Höllerer, M. A., and Yu, K. (2021b). Too good not to be true: Unpacking myth and ceremony in impact investing. EGOS Conference Paper. Massolutions (2015). The Crowdfunding Industry Report. Accessed on 20 August 2022 at www​ .massolution​.com McHugh, N., Sinclair, S., Roy, M., Huckfield, L., and Donaldson, C. (2013). Social impact bonds: A wolf in sheep’s clothing?, Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, 21(3), 247–257. McIntyre, D. P., and Srinivasan, A. (2017). Networks, platforms, and strategy: Emerging views and next steps, Strategic Management Journal, 38(1), 141–160. McKinsey & Co. (2012). From potential to action: Bringing social impact bonds to the U.S. Accessed on 20 August 2022 at http://​mckinseyonsociety​.com Mollick, E. (2014). The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study, Journal of Business Venturing, 29(1), 1–16. Monitor Report (2009). Investing for Social & Environmental Impact. New York: Rockefeller Foundation. Accessed on 20 February 2021 at http://​www​.monitorinstitute​.com/​impactinvesting OECD (2016). Social Impact Bonds: State of Play and Lessons Learnt. Paris: OECD. Accessed on 20 February 2021 at https://​www​.oecd​.org/​cfe/​leed/​SIBs​-State​-Play​-Lessons​-Final​.pdf Parés, M. (2015). Market-based social innovation: Are business strategies and social change compatible?, Public Administration Review, 75(4), 628–631. Phillips, N., Lawrence, T. B., and Hardy, C. (2000). Inter-organizational collaboration and the dynamics of institutional fields, Journal of Management Studies, 37(1), 23–43. Piezunka, H., and Dahlander, L. (2015). Distant search, narrow attention: How crowding alters organizations’ filtering of suggestions in crowdsourcing, Academy of Management Journal, 58(3), 856–880. Porter, M., and Kramer, M. (2011). Creating shared value, Harvard Business Review, 89(1–2), 2–17. Schinkus, C. (2015). The valuation of social impact bonds: An introductory perspective with the Peterborough SIB, Research in International Business and Finance, 35, 104–110. Seelos, C., and Mair, J. (2017). Innovation and Scaling for Impact. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Shinozaki, S. (2014). Capital market financing for SMEs: A growing need in emerging Asia, Asian Development Bank, 121, January. Accessed on 4 February 2019 at https://​www​.adb​.org/​sites/​default/​ files/​publication/​31179/​reiwp​-121​.pdf Smith, Adam (1759). Theory of Moral Sentiments (1st edn). Strand and Edinburgh: A. Millar; A. Kincaid & J. Bell. Smith, Adam (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1 (1st edn). London: W. Strahan. Social Finance US (2015). Foundations for Social Impact Bonds: How and why philanthropy is catalyzing the development of a new market. Accessed on 4 February 2019 at http://​www​.socialfinanceus​ .org/​sites/​socialfinanceus​.org/​files/​Foundation​%20for​%20Social​%20Impact​%20Bonds​,​%202014​.pdf Stiver, A., Barroca, L., Minocha, S., Richards, M., and Roberts, D. (2015). Civic crowdfunding research: Challenges, opportunities, and future agenda, New Media and Society, 17(2), 249–271. Van Wijk, J., Zietsma, C., Dorado, S., De Bakker, F. G., and Martí, I. (2019). Social innovation: Integrating micro, meso, and macro level insights from institutional theory, Business & Society, 58(5), 887–918.

Paying for and providing social policies and social innovations  103 Voorberg, W. H., Bekkers, V. J., and Tummers, L. G. (2015). A systematic review of co-creation and co-production: Embarking on the social innovation journey, Public Management Review, 17(9), 1333–1357. Warner, M. E. (2013). Private finance for public goods: Social impact bonds, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 16(4), 303–319. Westley, F., and Antadze, N. (2010). Making a difference: Strategies for scaling social innovation for greater impact, Innovation Journal, 15(2), 1–19. World Economic Forum (2011). Mainstreaming Impact Investing. Accessed on 4 February 2019 at http://​reports​.weforum​.org/​impact​-investment/​preface World Economic Forum (2012). From the Margins to the Mainstream: Assessment of the Impact Investment Sector and Opportunities to Engage Mainstream Investors. Accessed on 4 February 2019 at https://​reports​.weforum​.org/​impact​-investment/​ Yunus, M. (2007). Establishing a social stock market, 18 November. Accessed on 4 February 2019 at https://​zeenews​.india​.com/​news/​south​-asia/​yunus​-for​-establishing​-a​-social​-stock​-market​_408128​ .html

9. Social policy, social innovation and gender equality Anna Domaradzka-Widła

INTRODUCTION This chapter analyses different interpretations of gender equality in the context of social policy and social innovation (SI) and how these views are implemented. As expressed in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (2021), gender equality is a fundamental human right and a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. However, gender equality remains a contested concept, interpreted in a variety of ways. As Verloo and Lombardo (2007) point out, these diverse meanings stem from the diverse visions of gender equality, and the way in which different political and theoretical debates crosscut these visions. It also reflects the geographical contexts in which those visions and debates are located. As a result, there is little consensus among academics and political and civil society actors on what gender equality means and should mean. It has been hotly debated within feminist theory itself and therefore tends to generate continuous dilemmas for both policymakers and activists. Therefore, what exactly is gender equality and how it should be addressed within a social policy context remain open questions. Some interpretations tend to focus on equality, others on equity,1 or diversity. As a result, gender equality policies can be studied as clusters of contesting views on addressing the gender issue (Verloo and Lombardo 2007). This ambivalence stems from the fact that contrary to the biological category of sex, gender is a social construct. It often comes with rigid and taken-for-granted gender roles, well embedded in local cultures, social policy patterns and global marketing strategies. Moreover, traditional gender roles entail hierarchical ordering between men and women, where the role of males is to hold power and females are traditional caregivers (Ertan 2022). As a result, the social dynamics of gender binaries tend to shape power relations, leading to visible discrepancies in women’s participation in parliaments and governments, as well as in STEM professions (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) and other dominant branches of the economy. This power dynamic is also reflected in the field of social policy. Public services and social support systems often strengthen gender roles in the process of addressing women as primary beneficiaries in their roles of mothers and carers. Those systems rarely focus on understanding the different needs of citizens in the life course and tend to operate based on the stereotypical vision of the family unit. The traditionally underfunded field of social policy is also feminized at the level of direct social work, where most employees are female, but men tend to be promoted faster. This has a number of negative consequences for the motivational system as well as prestige of the profession (Renzetti and Curran 2005). Similarly, social innovation and technology seldom benefit women and men equally. This gap hinders efforts to achieve gender equality and prevents women from becoming both innovators as well as beneficiaries of new goods and services that could address their needs. While 104

Social policy, social innovation and gender equality  105 still underdeveloped, ‘disruptive’ and ‘gendered’ innovations are increasingly recognized as complementary sources of solutions within the social policy sphere, but also in other fields such as labour markets, finance, management and technological development (Innovation for Gender Equality 2019). As a result, international organizations, national governments and impact investors seem to appreciate more the importance of gendered social and digital innovations as a way to address diverse social challenges and accelerate the achievement of development goals. In recent years, we also observe slow progress in opening the discussion of gender equality and social policy practices to the fact that there are increasing numbers of young people coming out as transgender and gender non-conforming (TGNC), and also that coming out is happening at younger ages than ever. Although ethical constraints make it impossible to provide concrete data, multiple studies have indicated that TGNC young people are disproportionately represented in foster care and juvenile justice settings, and that TGNC youth face significant prejudice and discrimination related to their transgender or gender non-conforming identity (Irvine and Canfield 2018; Irvine, Canfield and Roa 2017; Earls 2002; Marksamer, Spade and Arkles 2011). This increases their risk of facing negative outcomes such as addiction and poor mental health, and may severely influence their whole life. Due to the lack of data or well-developed policy tools concerning TGNC, this chapter will not be able to contribute to analysis of this aspect of gender equality. However, it is important to keep in mind that gender equality is a complex concept, going beyond binaries or inequalities between cis men and cis women. Therefore, any gender equality policy nowadays should reflect on the problems and needs faced by growing population of gender non-conforming citizens as well as sexual minorities. The chapter will first focus on the place of gender equality in the social policy field, to see how it tends to be addressed in public policies at both the national and the international level. It will then move to describe recent developments in terms of gender equality within the social innovation field. As a place where social, economic and digital inspirations meet, and grassroots efforts can be scaled up, SIs bring the promise to deliver more equality, especially in recent times of crises. Its role in complementing less flexible social services systems and its increasingly technological focus will be critically assessed as well. Finally, feminist criticism concerning social policy, social work and SI is summarized in separate subchapters. This leads to conclusions relating to recent developments in implementing gender equality and challenges connected with the ongoing economic, pandemic and refugee crises.

GENDER EQUALITY POLICY AND SOCIAL POLICY Social policy is one of the important drivers of gender equality, but it can also preserve hidden patterns of discrimination. Its tools and interventions, including SIs, have the potential to improve the wellbeing of women, men and gender non-conforming people, help to avoid discrimination or make up for unfair inequalities. The political priorities set forth by the Europe­an Union and United Nations are very clear about advancing the gender equality agenda, especially through women’s empowerment and poverty reduction. At the same time, inequalities persist in labour market, education system or welfare provisions (UN Women 2021). New policies emerge around the globe that reverse the previous achievements of the feminist agenda.

106  Handbook on social innovation and social policy This proves that the struggle for gender equality is not a phase, but a long-term process that should be accompanied by regular monitoring and evaluation as well as pressure to do better. The last decades have also highlighted the need for a clearer separation of gender equality policy from wider social policy. This change is a response to the need to diagnose the respective needs of women and men at different phases of the life course instead of focusing only on selective mechanisms aimed at reducing existing inequalities (Rajkiewicz, Supińska and Księżopolski 1996). As Klimczak and Wódz (2020) point out, gender equality policies are not only strategies, recommendations and documents, and their analysis should not focus solely on the implementation process, encountered limitations or successes. To better understand the needs of citizens, it is necessary to consider the experiences of female and male citizens at different stages of life and representing diverse social strata (this should also be applicable to the TGNC persons). This enables the identification of gaps as well as achievements in the field of gender equality policies and helps to identify areas that require further support and actions to increase gender equality. The development of gender equality policies should also be analysed in the context of legislative changes. For example, in the case of European Union new member states, those policies result mainly from the necessity to adapt national law to EU directives, laws and regulations. That is why the issue of gender equality appears primarily in labour market policies, on which the EU focuses to enforce the common market rule, while there is less effort to counteract discrimination against women in health care, education or family life. Although primarily market driven, since the 1957 principle of equal pay for equal work, the EU has developed a range of social policies with gender equality as a founding value. However, social justice objectives and equality between women and men in the member states remain to be realized (Plomien 2018). Further analysis of the EU’s social and gender policies highlights uneven developments and concerns over the Union’s role in social progress and gender equality. Its market-driven policies often lead to defining gender equality narrowly: in terms of economic benefits and avoiding the waste of talent, this amounts to reducing gender mainstreaming to the strategy of flexibility and mobility in the labour market (CEDAW 2014; Charkiewicz 2010; Czerwińska and Piotrowska 2008). This has contributed to weak cooperation between various political and social actors in promoting equal rights for women and men, and the lack of a comprehensive view of gender equality policies addressing different areas and phases of life. Based on recent studies (e.g., Klimczak and Wódz 2020), this chapter emphasizes the importance of gender equality policy, as well as its intersectional nature (taking age, family situation and social status into account) and the necessity to meet the changing needs of women and men over the life course. It also highlights dimensions of life such as education, family, labour market and pension system, where the main inequalities and deficits are exemplified, and which deserve particular solutions and monitoring within overall equality policy. The standard indicators and methods of evaluation used in social policy are not enough to reveal specific gender problems and inequalities that often result from traditional scripts and outlooks. For example, they often do not show how policies that focus on maternal issues exclude women from decent retirement pensions, nor how they create financial dependencies within the family, strengthening traditional gendered power relations. This type of focus is even more important in the context of the dominant socio-economic order, based on a neoliberal model, which leads to privatization of gender roles and conserving

Social policy, social innovation and gender equality  107 inequalities. As a result, social policies implemented by several different European governments limited expenditure related to women, families, children or youth, pushing the burden into the private sphere. Consequently, despite formal provision guaranteeing the equality of citizens in all spheres of life, one could easily identify political and economic discrimination against women in countries like Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the United Kingdom (Desperak 2013; Fuszara, Grabowska, Mizielińska and Regulska 2009). However, since the 1980s, we have observed a process of integrating gender equality policies into mainstream social policies, as illustrated by the documents and strategies of the United Nations and the European Union. This approach is also reflected in EU member states’ legal acts and policies aimed at combating discrimination and ensuring the equal treatment of men and women. For example, the recent EU Gender Equality Strategy presents policy objectives and actions to make significant progress by 2025 towards a gender-equal Europe. It underlines that the goal is ‘a Union where women and men, girls and boys, in all their diversity, are free to pursue their chosen path in life, have equal opportunities to thrive, and can equally participate in and lead our European society’ (European Union 2020). The key objectives include: ending gender-based violence; challenging gender stereotypes; closing gender gaps in the labour market; achieving equal participation across different sectors of the economy; addressing the gender pay and pension gaps; closing the gender care gap and achieving gender balance in decision-making and in politics. The Strategy pursues a dual approach of gender mainstreaming combined with targeted actions, and intersectionality is a horizontal principle for its implementation. While the Strategy focuses on actions within the EU, it is consistent with the EU’s external policy on gender equality and women’s empowerment. At the same time, gender quality remains one of the Sustainable Development Goals and is included in the UN, UNICEF, WHO and World Bank international standards and documents to ensure that such policies are enforced through horizontally integrated governance processes. While analysing the importance of gender equality in the field of social policy and within social innovations, we can discern international, national and local perspectives. Although much progress in developing gender equality measures can be noted at the international level, in several countries the trend is reversed, and so-called pro-family policies are being introduced, often accompanied with harsh anti-abortion laws and anti-LGBTQ slogans. Several countries also lag behind their EU counterparts in terms of anti-homophobia measures, including Bulgaria, Czechia, Lithuania, Italy and Poland. Several conservative governments that came to power in the last decade have been leading a vocal anti-LGBTQ campaign (Wilczek 2020). This highlights an urgent need to increase international pressure to secure the implementation of equal rights rule, including reproductive rights and access to education and the labour market. In this context, feminist analyses of social work, social policy and welfare state models have played an important role by highlighting the hidden patterns of discrimination and their socio-economic consequences, as discussed below.

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL INNOVATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GENDER EQUALITY POLICIES Social innovations are on the rise due to several ongoing crises – economic, pandemic and refugee – and reflect the targets set by Sustainable Development Goals. Those new initiatives,

108  Handbook on social innovation and social policy programs or technologies aim to improve the lives of people, particularly those who are disadvantaged, and promote the wellbeing of society. More precisely, they can be defined as innovations that are social both in their ends and in their means, introducing new ideas (products, services and models) that simultaneously meet social needs (more effectively than alternatives) and create new social relationships or collaborations (European Union 2010). Globally, women are playing an increasingly important role in the creation and implementation of SIs, hence within the social innovation discourse gender equality is now articulated as a key determinant in conquering societal challenges. It can be said that both innovation and women’s empowerment require thinking outside the box and acting beyond existing, predefined parameters and traditional interventions. Meanwhile, the services designed and addressed to women are already a visible field: from mobile banking and loans systems that facilitate women’s entrepreneurship to e-learning platforms that bring education to those who could not otherwise participate. As such, SIs have the potential to serve as powerful tools to break gender inequalities, increasing awareness and access to opportunities. This is crucial for many women who were experiencing discrimination due not only to their gender, but also to their age, ethnicity, education, income or disability. While SI is increasingly seen as a means to address challenging social and economic problems, little is known about the connection between innovation and gender equality. What we know is that the EU policy strategies for growth and innovation embrace a strong commitment to promote SI (European Union 2010). This social perspective on innovation differs from the earlier innovation policies in EU member states, which mainly focused on high-tech service and products innovations. This technological focus was restricted to a narrow range of industries, disciplines and innovation types being acknowledged in policy and research, following a distinct gendered pattern where men and so-called masculine activities (like programming, computer games, VR, mechanical engineering) were prioritized, and the male-dominated areas were at the forefront. Thus, public resource distribution and other forms of public legitimacy for innovation processes have to a large extent served to reinforce segregating and hierarchical notions of gender, with men/masculinity as the norm (Lindberg 2012; Pettersson 2007; Pettersson and Lindberg 2013). Therefore, the concept of gendered innovation has been defined to make sure that the development and implementation of new goods and services, as well as methods and organizational forms, are conducted with gender awareness and inclusion in mind. This includes the UNICEF Gender and Innovation toolkit with best practices, to support designers and implementers of digital products and services, to benefit girls and young women equally, and to help close the gender digital divide. It refers to good practices describing targeted efforts to include female users in design and product-testing exercises, so girls and young women attend consultations, feel comfortable and safe, and freely share views and experiences (UNICEF 2020). In the long run, the gendered innovation approach aims to change traditional gendered patterns and structures in industry, organizations and society at large (Alsos, Ljunggren and Hytti 2013; Andersson et al. 2012; Danilda and Thorslund 2011; Lindberg and Schiffbänker 2013; Ranga and Etzkowitz 2010; Schiebinger 2008). In recent years, the similar notion of ‘undoing gender’ has been employed in the field of innovation to analyse processes and diminish segregating notions of gender. Lindberg (2016) underlines the importance of SI in remaking segregating and hierarchical gender patterns, where men and women are kept apart and where activities and characteristics linked to men and certain masculinities are ascribed a higher value than those linked to women and feminin-

Social policy, social innovation and gender equality  109 ities. Gendered innovation can be a tool to counterbalance the pattern of segregation and hierarchy between men and women in the area of innovation (Lindberg 2012; Pettersson 2007), which often takes the form of uneven distributions of power, resources and status. While it is complicated to fully eradicate gendered patterns, since changes can evoke resistance and restoring responses (Abrahamsson 2014; Gunnarsson, Andersson and Vänje 2003), it is important to work on undoing them by creating new opportunities and educating stakeholders on the benefits of such change. In this field, the transformative potential of EU strategies lies in their ability to highlight and promote innovation in a wide range of sectors, industries, organizations and disciplines, covering men-dominated, gender-balanced and women-dominated ones (Lindberg 2016). When we analyse the fields of SI and gender equality, it is clear that innovation is never gender-neutral and could therefore benefit from the gender equality lens. At the same time, policies advancing gender equality should be more open to fields such as SI or social finance, to encourage positive changes. As Saska-Crozier (2016) points out, there is a need for mutual learning, because an understanding of SI that does not appreciate gender analysis will be incomplete, and those working to advance gender equality may find ways to enhance their work with social innovation. However, the double blindness between the fields prevents championing gendered SIs. This also includes technological innovations, although they increasingly address the gender inequalities and openly seek to solve problems related to gender (UNICEF 2020). Technologies promise to empower individuals through networks, information and digital trade, which allows for circumventing the traditional power relations. For example e-banking and microloans systems facilitate the entrepreneurship and financial independence of women, while new digital education tools allow girls and women to learn even if their access to schools is restricted. Similarly, new technologies in cities, including lighting and space arrangement, create more safety and independence for women and girls. While often fuelled by different approaches, new solutions, products and services can have gender transformative effects even if they do not claim women’s empowerment as an explicit objective. For example, improvements in transportation infrastructure, water and sanitation systems, or access to information and communication, as well as agricultural and medical technologies, all produce shifts in gender relations and may improve women’s position. Similarly, new technologies and information processes have the potential to change social attitudes about what is possible for women and girls and gender non-conforming persons, and increase access to employment opportunities, or to financial resources for their own businesses. To assess how innovations can create long-term, positive shifts in gender relations, Malhotra, Schulte, Patel and Petesch (2009) from the International Center for Research on Women describe three areas of innovation that, when they intersect, have the potential to progress women’s empowerment: (1) technology use, (2) changing social norms, and (3) economic resilience. They also underline that when women flourish in any of these areas, and especially when they thrive in all three, we can observe a demonstrable shift in gender relations. This is because, historically, these three domains have been persistent and universal barriers to gender equality in almost every culture. However, as our world is experiencing technological and social change, those innovations have the potential to address many areas where women are disadvantaged. This includes areas such as employment, transport and mobility, reproductive health, and information and communication technologies. Specific technologies, such as water filtration and sanitation, reproductive technologies, alternative energy sources, but also

110  Handbook on social innovation and social policy the Internet and smartphones, can ease the burden and empower women on multiple levels: individual, household, economic, social and political (Malhotra et al. 2009). Social innovations that advance women’s economic resilience are vital as they allow women to have an independent source of income and produce a more equitable flow of financial and non-financial opportunities and benefits. Among important innovations in this area are services such as microfinance, different savings and insurance funds, as well as legal and social strategies to increase women’s access to employment, capital and productive assets (see for example Women’s World Banking; Pro Mujer; Self Employed Women’s Association, a trade union in India for women workers in the informal sector, and its microfinance arm SEWA Bank; or Grameen village phones in Bangladesh). However, innovations in the area of social norms are also crucial, because women’s empowerment requires the transformation of traditional gender attitudes, as well as challenging inequitable behaviours and harmful practices.2

TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIAL INNOVATION AND GENDER EQUALITY POLICIES Focusing on the technological side of both social innovations and social policies, it is important to monitor the way new technologies are designed and implemented, to make sure they address gender-related inequalities and avoid creating new forms of digital division. Technology itself is often described as neutral, but existing examples of gendered results from algorithmic governance, and other Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine-learning implementation, already show that technological innovation should always be analysed through the social and gender lens (Criado Perez 2019). For example, digital assistants and chatbots have an important role to play in creating better access to social services and saving time of social workers so they can focus on direct assistance. However, tech developers should take care not to reinforce gender stereotypes (e.g., by feminizing chatbots) and reflect diversity in infographics. To ensure that AI, VR (virtual reality) or AR (augmented reality) technologies and their benefits are accessible to all citizens, we need to address the diversity of needs and preferences in the population. This also needs to take into account that women are more than twice as likely as men to feel unwell from using VR, with symptoms such as nausea, sweating and general discomfort (Sagnier, Loup-Escande and Valléry 2019). Many believe that AI and big data, when employed in a social policy and innovation field, can help better understand gender-specific needs when designing products and services. However, recent implementation failures have highlighted that it is important to ensure they are free of gender bias. Data show that facial recognition software performs better on men’s than women’s faces overall (and does not recognize transgender people, especially during transition periods), and is better on lighter than darker skin, while wearing makeup can reduce the accuracy of facial recognition methods. In other words, when creating digital solutions, consideration is required to free the technological process of gender bias and omissions, through applying an intersectional approach. To ensure that technological solutions are in line with gender equality criteria, they should also take into account gender issues in access to energy, including energy poverty (analysed by age) as well as the gender dimensions in transportation services and infrastructure, including gender-diverse individuals’ transportation needs. Similarly in urban planning, a gender dimen-

Social policy, social innovation and gender equality  111 sion should include access to housing, employment and urban facilities, along with ensuring the quality of public spaces. Gender and diversity issues should also be taken into account when identifying causes and solutions for the climate crisis to address behavioural and structural determinants and develop climate services and decision-support tools and methodologies without exacerbating inequalities. Also, when assessing impacts, disaggregating data by sex and/or gender is crucial. Last, but not least, citizen science or user-led social innovation has great potential to engage in gender-sensitive and intersectional data collection, development and testing procedures, as well as ensuring greater acceptance of these solutions among diverse social groups. Examples include augmented or virtual reality walks that encourage people to imagine and express their preference concerning the changes in the public space before they are introduced. Another example is smartphone apps allowing for voicing opinions, voting, or digital recording of animals or plants, increasing awareness of biodiversity and acceptance of eco-minded projects.

FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL POLICY AND THE WELFARE STATE The beginnings of a feminist-oriented systematic reflection on social policy date back to the 1980s and are closely related to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) comparative research on welfare state regimes. This caused a wave of criticism from feminists, who accused the author of ‘gender blindness’, by, for example, ignoring the role of the family as an important supplier of goods and services, and also through the inequal division of labour in the family and unequal access to social benefits and pensions. As a result, Esping-Andersen’s analysis disregarded the social rights of those citizens (mainly women) who are financially dependent on other family members (Razavi 2007). The resulting criticism of Esping-Andersen’s typology, inspired further comparative studies of social policy systems. Although criticized for his gender blindness (Duncan 1995), Esping-Andersen’s typology brings together three aspects important for gender equality: the professional activity of women, organization of care and childbearing. He also noted that provision in countries implementing the conservative–corporate welfare model make combining professional work and childbearing extremely difficult (Esping-Andersen 1996: 67). However, in the social democratic model, cheap, state-provided and widely accessible childcare allows women to participate more widely in the labour market. In turn, in the liberal model, minimal and stigmatizing benefits force women to be professionally active and/or become dependent on a man. It is possible to point to some common themes in feminist analysis of social policy (Klimczak and Wódz 2020). First is the assumption that the status of a woman in society is a result of the cultural production of gender categories. The second concerns the unsatisfactory status of women in contemporary societies. A third assumption is that this situation can be changed by women themselves (through the actions of women’s movements) and the state (through social policy) (Hudson 1989; Sainsbury 2001; Williams 2001; Benhabib 2003; Fraser 2005). The summary of achievements of feminist thinkers in the science of social policy was well presented by Ciccia and Sainsbury (2018) and includes: (1) extending the category of social security to include issues related to reproduction (Lewis 1992); (2) broadening the understanding of social citizenship with issues related to the care of dependent family members (Lister 1997); (3) drawing attention to the relationship between the family and the state and the market

112  Handbook on social innovation and social policy in the ‘production’ of public care (Orloff 1993; Daly and Lewis 2003); and (4) noticing the importance of the gender dimension in shaping the welfare state (Skocpol 1992; Sainsbury 1999). The gender perspective put forward by the feminist thinkers, highlights not only inequalities in access to benefits and services between women and men, but also the different premises entitling both groups to these benefits and their legal or political legitimacy (Nelson 1990). Another important consequence is the inclusion of the family and civil society in the discussion of the social security system, alongside the traditional actors – the state and the market. As a result, issues related to the unequal distribution of paid and unpaid work between women and men have gained importance at the policy-making level. A gender perspective reveals the importance of the factors determining benefit entitlement and how these rights should apply to an individual rather than be derived from marital status or the role played in the family. Last, but not least, the issue of women’s access to the labour market was highlighted by feminist analyses as a necessary condition for equal opportunities and women’s independence. Through a gender analysis of social policy, particular models or welfare state regimes can be seen as based on a traditional gender division of labour, resulting in discrimination of both sexes (Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 2001). This includes, for example, burdening men with breadwinner roles and perceiving them as less trustworthy carers, while limiting women opportunities at the labour market, in business and within the political system. A feminist perspective also emphasizes the entanglement of social policy in familialism, based on an image of a dichotomized world, divided into the female and male spheres. This is reflected in the model of the male breadwinner (Lewis 2002), which places the family at the centre of social policy, recognizing it as a key institution of social life, representing the interests of the individual. Familialism is accompanied by a strict division of tasks and responsibilities between spouses, with a clear separation of the spheres of activity. The male sphere of activity being located outside the home, in the public sphere, is the source of the husband’s role as breadwinner. The female sphere of activity is in the private sphere and is related to caring of family members by the wife. At the same time, the male is the preferred employee, to be served by the remuneration system to support his family. The family itself is treated as a private sphere, where care is provided free of charge by a woman obliged to deliver it. As Klimczak and Wódz (2020) point out, the notion of care is central to feminist considerations of social policy. Identified with long-term unpaid domestic work, care gained a new meaning with the expansion of the welfare state into spheres related to motherhood and parental benefits. Recently, under the influence of the feminist thinkers, the meaning of the term has been extended to include all forms of care for dependent persons, provided in the family and outside it, both by women and by men. As a result, new solutions encouraging men to share caring responsibilities on an equal basis with women are being implemented (e.g., fathers-only parental leave). In the labour market, a more equal division of paid and unpaid work between the sexes (Fraser 1994; Lister 1997) is being promoted to change the legal and moral norms and transform the gender system. The concept of care as a ‘natural’ female responsibility, with man in the role of the head of the family, is being replaced by a new social policy model based on the universal breadwinner category (Fraser 2014). This allows for the deprivatization of care as well as transferring the related tasks to public institutions such as nurseries, kindergartens, elderly homes and daycare services, and so on, to allow women to take up full-time employment under conditions comparable to those of men (Fraser 2014). In this model, the role of

Social policy, social innovation and gender equality  113 social policy is to provide equal opportunities for women in accessing both the public space and the labour market as full citizens and breadwinners with the same salaries and social security as men, as well as conditions free from harassment and sexism. The universal breadwinner model and the model of the caregiver parity define the feminist social policy paradigm (Klimczak and Wódz 2020). To this, Fraser (2014) adds the model of the universal caregiver, which meets the principles of gender justice. It ensures counteracting poverty by guaranteeing systemic support, without stigmatizing individual categories of beneficiaries as well as counteracting exploitation within families and institutions. This is also a way to ensure the equality of income regardless of gender and elimination of hidden poverty in families, by including the value of women’s work and skills. As a result, those changes should guarantee equal access to free time for both men and women and respect for those with caring responsibilities. The role of social policy in counteracting marginalization should be based on the institutional support for caring tasks and making public space friendly to nursing mothers and parents with children. Feminist optics assigns fundamental importance to gender as a descriptive, analytical and explanatory category, and from this perspective it deconstructs and redesigns models of social policy. It opposes gender visibility against gender blindness (Szarfenberg 2016) and emphasizes that gender should always be considered along with other social categories, such as age, class or race, proposing a multidimensional approach to social work. Feminist models of social policy also propose both defamilialism (“the degree to which individuals can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of family relationships, either through paid work or social security provision”, Lister 1994: 37) and degenderization (that promote the elimination of gender roles, Saxonberg 2013) as essential components of their postulated social work approach (Kurowska 2016).

FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL INNOVATION We know that women and men face different socio-economic, cultural and institutional barriers, and these must be addressed if we want to develop innovative solutions meeting the demands of the 21st century. As Saska and Baruah (2016) point out, not taking gender inequality into consideration may constrain SI. Therefore, we must ensure that women, men and gender non-conforming people benefit equally from the opportunities and outcomes of SI. Also, to improve the ability of social innovation to meet today’s pressing social and economic concerns, the field must engage with gender equality. Feminist research on innovation paves the way towards more critical assessment of the social process behind them and potential benefits and costs (Pecis and Berglund 2021). It observes that innovations are usually entrenched in masculine practices (McIntyre 2015; Wikhamn and Knights 2013) and that the role models in this field are mainly white men (Alsos, Ljunggren and Hytti 2013; Pettersson 2007). As a result, women’s contributions are often not perceived as innovative (Danilda and Thorslund 2011; Lorentzi 2011), and often become marginalized within institutional or policy-oriented systems. To counteract those processes, feminist approaches to innovation have introduced a gender analysis. Although it remains generally under-recognized, it opens up the field to alternative ways of conceptualizing, and promoting innovation. Pettersson and Lindberg (2013) underline that this can lead to re-inventing innovation and disclosing ‘paradoxical spaces’ of feminist resistance within the field.

114  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Based on the work of the Palladium Group (Davies and McGinty 2018), which runs the Human Development Innovation Fund (HDIF), three important insights have been collected regarding gender equality in the SI field. The first conclusion was that understanding the complex lives of women and girls and adopting a more inclusive interpretation of the ecosystem is crucial to help everyone access innovations. Another result was that putting girls at the centre of design increased the possibility for innovations to meet the needs of women, their children and communities. The third lesson is the need to create holistic learning opportunities that combine entrepreneurship and problem-solving skills, which lever the power of peer learning and enhance economic security for women and girls (Davies and McGinty, 2018). More importantly, bringing together social innovation and insights on gender equality offers a new way to address long-standing inequality (Ross 2015). Without understanding how gender roles shape different areas of life, social innovation won’t be able to achieve its potential. Moreover, gender equality activists and practitioners can learn from the existing social innovation how to accelerate their vision for equality. Despite the growth of the SI and entrepreneurship field, the relevance of gender to its analysis is still lacking. Despite the claims that SI can address women’s empowerment and although women may be the intended beneficiaries of particular solutions, there is no gender-sensitive framework for examining values and assumptions guiding their development (Muntean and Ozkazanc-Pan 2016). To address this gap, some scholars focus on gender as central to conceptualizing and understanding social innovations and entrepreneurship. Otherwise, they argue, the existing gender patterns may become replicated in social innovators’ activities (Gawell and Sundin 2014; Muntean and Ozkazanc-Pan 2016). As geographers studying women entrepreneurs point out, women are socially located within places differently from men (McDowell 2011), including place-specific ways that women are positioned in relation to leadership and ownership. As a result, gendered positions in the entrepreneurial world and beyond are likely to remain important in “creating opportunities for innovations and in determining their values” (Blake and Hanson 2005: 686). It can be argued, however, that the narrative about the (relative) success of women in social innovation and entrepreneurship, is riddled with problematic assumptions around the abilities of women in the Third World to fend for their families and communities. By indicating the preferred space for women to innovate as family, education, health, microenterprise or community social ventures, the field continues to exclude along gender lines, even if unintentionally (Muntean and Ozkazanc-Pan 2016). Those gendered characterizations – which are prominent in the social entrepreneurship field – may impede women’s ability to negotiate societal barriers, including implicit bias (Marlow and Patton 2005). Despite the complexity of issues covered by SI and social entrepreneurship, existing research and international reports either examine women’s impact on society and social issues or focus on SI and entrepreneurship as a platform for empowering women and achieving greater gender equality. Studies focused on women as the primary targets of diverse social innovations (e.g., microloans and microenterprise) are also disproportionally located in transition economies or developing nations. While we also find an increased interest of NGOs, micro-lenders and global aid institutions in those types of activities, they tend to be treated as proxy for women’s economic inclusion, and are often based on success cases, which does not reflect the general trends. However, as Callorda Fossati, Degavre and Saussey (2016) point out, SI has an important potential to become a tool for a feminist socio-economics. After all, social innovations are

Social policy, social innovation and gender equality  115 “new and disruptive towards the routines and structures prevailing in a given (welfare) system or local setting” (Evers, Ewert and Brandsen 2014: 11). The critical question from a feminist socio-economic perspective might be, whether these new and disruptive practices are effectively ‘innovative’ and ‘social’ for the female population with diverse needs over the life course.

CONCLUSION This chapter has analysed the role of gender equality in the field of social policy and social innovation. Underlining the role of gender in the areas of education, family life, the labour market and the pension system, and referring to the life course perspective, one can assess whether and how existing social policies meet the needs of women and men. Unfortunately, little has been said and done concerning the needs of the growing population of gender non-conforming citizens, who should be recognized in the future developments within the social policy and social innovation field. Reforming social policy and the SI field is part of a deeper and truly transformative change to reshape societal norms, attitudes and institutional practices. Greater gender equality in markets, political institutions, family systems and social roles are the only way to provide an ongoing foundation for not only women’s wellbeing, but a more just and equitable world. To create an alternative innovation path to improve gender empowerment on multiple dimensions (at the individual, organizational and household levels), we need to systematically build grassroots and gender equitable institutions. However, the pace of innovation diffusion and empowerment tends to be incremental. Moreover, we observe how structural gender equality remains elusive and requires women’s and other social movement activism, combined with bridging ties to government, the private sector and civil society actors. Meanwhile, a feminist perspective on social policy and SI broadens the framework of theoretical reflection on the global and local practices aimed at counteracting negative social phenomena related to poverty, exclusion, exploitation and violence. This is extremely important in this era of repeated crises and late capitalism (Domaradzka and Gidron 2021). When the neoliberal state withdraws from sharing the costs of social reproduction (unlike in the welfare state or the socialist state), it shifts responsibility for the care of children, the elderly or disabled family members, to households, and especially to women (Charkiewicz and Zachorowska-Mazurkiewicz 2009). This shift has been accompanied by a reconstruction of the labour market in the spirit of the neoclassical economy, which often deprives people of stable employment and protection, and in case of women – due to the ‘double burden’ – excludes them from the new professional norms, based on time and spatial mobility. However, the SI community needs to further recognize innovations developed within the gender equality sector and treat women’s rights and feminist movements as innovations in themselves, contributing to building more just societies. In recent years, the concept of gender equality gained momentum and attracted increased commitment within the political and technological arenas. In the European Commission, a dedicated task force took responsibility for reflecting on women’s issues and advancing the gender equality agenda, in particular in impact as­sessments and evaluations. At the same time, gender equality continues to be under pressure in countries around the world – visible in recent anti-abortion laws introduced in Poland and the USA. The tendency, noticeable in some

116  Handbook on social innovation and social policy countries, to restrict and backslide on women’s rights signals the importance of constant dedicated gender equality analysis and policies. Looking ahead, it is necessary also to monitor and design social policies and social innovations to counter those set­backs. As mentioned above, three areas have to intersect to progress women’s empowerment – technology, social norms and economic resilience – and should therefore be closely observed. This concerns new challenges resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic or the recent waves of refugees from Syria and Ukraine. Previous studies suggest that the socio-economic impact of those crises might last much longer for women than for men. During times of economic crisis, global gender inequalities mean that particularly in low-income countries, women and girls are more likely to be taken out of school, are the first to reduce the quantity or quality of the food they eat or to forgo essential medicines, and are more likely to sell sex in order to survive. This negatively impacts on women’s health and the gains that have been made in girls’ education, undoing the progress that has been made towards achieving the development goals. Therefore, gender equality should be ingrained in new crisis-counteracting measures to overcome recent obstructions to closing the gender gap.

NOTES 1. Equality means each individual or group of people is given the same resources or opportunities. It recognizes that each person has different circumstances and allocates the resources and opportunities needed to reach an equal outcome. 2. Such practices include restrictions on women’s mobility and their rights to education, health, work or civic participation, child marriage, and female genital cutting.

REFERENCES Abrahamsson, L. (2014). ‘Gender and the modern organization, ten years after’, Nordic Journal of Working Life Studies, 4(4): 109–136. Alsos, G. A., Ljunggren, E., Hytti, U. (2013). ‘Gender and innovation: state of the art and a research agenda’, International Journal of Gender and Entrepreneurship, 5(3): 236–256. Andersson, S., Berglund, K., Thorslund, J., Gunnarsson, E., Sundin, E. (eds.) (2012). Promoting Innovation: Policies, Practices and Procedures. Stockholm: Vinnova. Benhabib, S. (2003). Trzy modele przestrzeni publicznej. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej. Blake, M. K., Hanson, S. (2005). ‘Rethinking innovation: context and gender’, Environment and Planning A, 37(4): 681–701. Callorda Fossati, E., Degavre, F., Saussey, M. (2016). ‘A feminist socio-economic approach of the third sector: a strand of thought to be?’ In ISTR’s 12th International Conference of ISTR (Stockholm, 30/06/2016-1/07/2016). At http://​hdl​.handle​.net/​2078​.1/​183470 [accessed: 13.12.2023]. CEDAW (2014). Alternative report on the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW Coalition of Polish NGOs. At www​.karat​.org [accessed: 26.03.2015]. Charkiewicz, E. (2010). Biznes projekt Polska. Polska, ale jaka? Feministyczna krytyka strategii Polska 2030. At http://​www​.ekologiasztuka​.pl/​pdf/​f0092charkiewicz​_polska​.pdf [accessed: 13.12.2023]. Charkiewicz, E., Zachorowska-Mazurkiewicz, A. (2009). ‘Wprowadzenie – kryzys opieki w Polsce i na świecie’, in: Gender i ekonomia opieki, Charkiewicz, E., Zachorowska-Mazurkiewicz, A. (Eds.), 7–21. Warsaw: Fundacja Tomka Byry. Ekologia i Sztuka. Ciccia, R., Sainsbury, D. (2018). ‘Gendering welfare state analysis: tensions between care and paid work’, European Journal of Politics and Gender, 1(1–2): 93–100. At https://​www​.ingentaconnect​ .com/​content/​bup/​ejpg/​2018/​00000001/​f0020001/​art00006​# [accessed: 19.02.2019].

Social policy, social innovation and gender equality  117 Criado Perez, C. (2019). Invisible Women: Exposing Data Bias in a World Designed for Men. New York: Abrams. Czerwińska A., Piotrowska, J. (2008). ‘Gendermeria. Równościowy monitoring’, Raport z wyników monitoringu, 151–159. Warsaw: Fundacja Feminoteka. Daly, M., Lewis, J. (2003). ‘The concept of social care and the analysis of contemporary welfare states’, The British Journal of Sociology, 51(2): 281–298. Danilda, I., Thorslund, J. G. (2011). Gender and Innovation. Vinnova: Sweden. Davies, E., McGinty, D. (2018). Does Social Innovation Actually Drive Gender Equity? At https://​skoll​ .org/​2018/​10/​01/​how​-social​-innovation​-can​-drive​-gender​-equity/​ [accessed: 13.12.2023]. Desperak, I. (2013). Płeć zmiany. Zjawisko transformacji w Polsce z perspektywy gender. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego. Domaradzka, A., Gidron, B. (2021). ‘From crises to a social and impact economy’, in: The New Social and Impact Economy, Gidron, B., and Domaradzka A. (Eds.), (285–297). Cham: Springer. Duncan, S. (1995). ‘Theorizing European gender systems’, Journal of European social policy, 5(4): 263–284. Earls, M. (2002). ‘Stressors in the lives of GLBTQ youth’, Transitions, 14(4): 1–3. At http://​www​ .advocatesforyouth​.org/​index​.php​?option​_com​_content​&​task​_view​&​id​_697​&​Itemid​_336 [accessed: 13.12.2023]. Ertan, Z. M. (2022). ‘The social entrepreneurship field & gender issues: a high potential intersection for change’, Social Innovations Journal. At https://​soci​alinnovati​onsjournal​.com/​index​.php/​sij/​article/​ view/​2018/​1771 [accessed 13.12.2023]. Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Esping-Andersen, G. (1996). Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies. London: Sage. European Union (2010). This is European Social Innovation, 2010. At https://​ec​.europa​.eu/​docsroom/​ documents/​19042 [accessed: 13.12.2023]. European Union (2020). A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020–2025. At https://​eur​-lex​ .europa​.eu/​legal​-content/​EN/​TXT/​?uri​=​CELEX​%3A52020DC0152 [accessed: 13.12.2023]. Evers, A., Ewert, B., Brandsen, T. (eds.) (2014). Social Innovations for Social Cohesion: Transnational Patterns and Approaches from 20 European Cities. At http://​www​.wilcoproject​.eu/​downloads/​ WILCO​-project​-eReader​.pdf [accessed: 03.11.2014]. Fraser, N. (1994). ‘After the family wage: gender equity and the welfare state’, Political Theory, 22(4): 591–618. Fraser, N. (2005). ‘Sprawiedliwość społeczna epoce polityki tożsamości: Redystrybucja, uznanie, uczestnictwo’, in: Redystrybucja czy uznanie? Debata polityczno-filozoficzna, Fraser, N., Honneth, A. (Eds.), 7–23. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej Edukacji TWP we Wrocławiu. Fraser, N. (2014). Justice interruptus: Critical reflections on the “postsocialist” condition. Abingdon: Routledge. Fuszara, M., Grabowska, M., Mizielińska, J., Regulska, J. (2009). Współpraca czy konflikt? Państwo, Unia i kobiety. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Akademickie i Profesjonalne. Gawell, M., Sundin, E. (2014). ‘Social entrepreneurship, gendered entrepreneurship?’, in: Social Entrepreneurship, Lundstrom, A., Zhou, C., von Friedrichs, V., Sundin, E. (Eds.), 273–291. New York, NY: Springer International Publishing. Gunnarsson, E., Andersson, S., Vänje, A. (2003). Where have all the structures gone? Doing gender in organisations, examples from Finland, Norway and Sweden. Stockholm: Center for Women’s Studies, Stockholm University. Hudson, A. (1989). ‘Changing perspectives: feminism, gender and social work’, in: Radical Social Work Today, Langan, M., Lee, P. (Eds.), 70–96. London: Unwin Hyman. Irvine, A., Canfield, A. (2018). Reflections on New National Data on LGBQ/GNCT Youth in the Justice System. LGBTQ Policy Journal. Spring 2017, 7: 27–36. Irvine, A., Canfield, A., Roa, J. (2017). ‘Developing gender-responsive mental health programming for Lesbian, Bisexual, Questioning, Gender Nonconforming, and Transgender (LBQ/GNCT) girls in the juvenile justice system with an intersectional lens’, in: Gender, Psychology, and Justice: The Mental

118  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Health of Women and Girls in the Legal System, Datchi, C., Ancis, J. (Eds.), 200–223. New York, NY: New York University Press. Klimczak, J., Wódz, K. (2020). ‘Genderowa perspektywa w polityce społecznej i w pracy socjalnej. Próba rekonstrukcji głównych założeń i ich implikacji dla praktyki’, Przegląd Socjologiczny, 69(2): 9–31. doi10.26485/PS/2020/69.2/1 Kurowska, A. (2016). ‘Defamilializacja i degenderyzacja – substytucyjne czy komplementarne perspektywy w porównawczej polityce społecznej’, in: Perspektywa gender w polityce społecznej, Kurowska, A., Pieliński, B., Szarfenberg, R., Wójtewicz, A. (Eds.), 109–207. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika. Lewis, J. (1992). ‘Gender and the development of welfare regimes’, Journal of European Social Policy, 2(3): 159–173. Lewis, J. (2002). ‘Gender and welfare state change’, European Societies, 4(4): 331–357. Lindberg, M. (2012). ‘A striking pattern: co-construction of innovation, men and masculinity in Sweden’s innovation policy’, in: Promoting Innovation: Policies, Practices and Procedures, Andersson, S. et al. (Eds.), 47–67. Stockholm: Vinnova. Lindberg, M. (2016). ‘Undoing gender in EU's social innovation policies?’, International Journal of Social Entrepreneurship and Innovation, 4(1): 67–79. Lindberg, M., Schiffbänker, H. (2013). ‘Entry on gender and innovation’, in Encyclopedia of Creativity, Invention, Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Carayannis, E.G. (Ed.). New York, NY: Springer. At https://​doi​.org/​10​.1007/​978​-1​-4614​-3858​-8​_454 [accessed: 13.12.2023]. Lister, R. (1994). ‘“She has other duties” – women, citizenship and social security’, in: Social Security and Social Change: New Challenges to the Beveridge Model, Baldwin, S., Falkingham, J. (Eds.), 31–44. London and New York, NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Lister, R. (1997). Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Lorentzi, U. (2011). ‘Gender Across the Board: Gender Perspective on Innovation and Equality’, Vinnova Report VR 2011:02. At https://​www​.vinnova​.se/​contentassets/​efe​5fd7595014​3e9aa1ba03​ 0329e4d89/​vr​-11​-02​.pdf [accessed: 13.12.2023]. Malhotra, A., Schulte, J., Patel, P., Petesch, P. (2009). Washington: Innovation for women’s empowerment and gender equality, International Center for Research on Women. At http://​www​.icrw​.org/​sites/​ default/​files/​publications/​Innovation​-for​-Womens​-Empowerment​.pdf, 108(7) [accessed: 13.12.2023]. Marksamer, J., Spade, D., Arkles, G. (2011). National Centre For Lesbian Rights & Sylvia Rivera Law Project, A Place of Respect: A Guide for Group Care Facilities Serving Transgender and Gender Nonconforming Youth. At www​.nclrights​.org/​site/​DocServer/​A​_Place​_Of​_Respect​.pdf​?docID​=​8301 [accessed 13.12.2023]. Marlow, S., Patton, D. (2005). ‘All credit to men? Entrepreneurship, finance, and gender’, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(6): 717–735. McDowell, L. (2011). Capital Culture: Gender at Work in the City, Vol. 65. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. McIntyre, M. P. (2015). ‘Queering all aboard: challenging the maleness of the leisure boat industry’, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business, 24(1): 4–22. Muntean, S. C., Ozkazanc-Pan, B. (2016). ‘Feminist perspectives on social entrepreneurship: critique and new directions’, International Journal of Gender and Entrepreneurship, 8(3): 221–241. Nelson, B. (1990). ‘The origins of the two-channel welfare state: workman’s compensation and mothers’ aid’, in: Women, the State, and Welfare, Gordon, L. (ed.), 123–151. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Orloff, A. S. (1993). ‘Gender and the social rights of citizenship: the comparative analysis of gender relations and welfare states’, American Sociological Review, 58(3): 303–328. Pecis, L., Berglund, K. (2021). ‘Hidden in the limelight: a feminist engagement with innovation studies’, Organization, 28(6): 993–1017. doi:10.1177/13505084211015380 Pettersson, K. (2007). Men and Male as the Norm? A Gender Perspective on Innovation Policies in Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Stockholm: Nordregio. Pettersson, K., Lindberg, M. (2013). ‘Paradoxical spaces of feminist resistance: mapping the margin to the masculinist innovation discourse’, International Journal of Gender and Entrepreneurship, 5(3): 323–341.

Social policy, social innovation and gender equality  119 Plomien, A. (2018). ‘EU social and gender policy beyond Brexit: towards the European Pillar of Social Rights’, Social Policy and Society, 17(2): 281–296. doi:10.1017/S1474746417000471 Rajkiewicz, A., Supińska, J., Księżpolski, M. (eds.) (1996). Polityka społeczna. Warsaw: Interart. Ranga, M., Etzkowitz, H. (2010). ‘Athena in the world of techne: the gender dimension of technology, innovation and entrepreneurship’, Journal of Technology Management and Innovation, 5(1): 1–12. Razavi, S. (2007). The political and social economy of care in a development context. Geneva: UNSRID. Renzetti, C. M., Curran, D. L. (2005). Kobiety, mężczyźni i społeczeństwo. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. Ross, F. J. (2015). ‘Mapping the innovation terrain for gender equality’, Stanford Social Innovation Review. https://​doi​.org/​10​.48558/​C22R​-S259 Sagnier, C., Loup-Escande, E., Valléry, G. (2019). ‘Effects of gender and prior experience in immersive user experience with virtual reality’, in: International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics, 305–314. Cham: Springer. Sainsbury, D. (ed.) (1999). Gender and Welfare State Regimes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sainsbury, D. (2001). ‘Gendering dimensions of welfare states’, in: Rethinking European Welfare, Fink, J., Lewis, G., Clarke, J. (eds.), 115–130. London: Sage Publications. Saska, S., Baruah, B. (2016). Social Innovation and Gender Equality: Bridging Two Solitudes. Available at SSRN: https://​ssrn​.com/​abstract​=​3572738 or http://​dx​.doi​.org/​10​.2139/​ssrn​.3572738 Saska-Crozier, S. (2016). ‘Can applying a gender lens to social innovation promote women’s rights and gender equality?’, Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository, 4098. At https://​ir​.lib​.uwo​.ca/​etd/​ 4098 [accessed: 13.12.2023]. Saxonberg, S. (2013). ‘From defamilialization to degenderization: toward a new welfare typology’, Social Policy & Administration, 47(1): 26–49. Schiebinger, L. (ed.) (2008). Gendered Innovations in Science and Engineering. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Skocpol, T. (1992). Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Szarfenberg, R. (2016). ‘O genderowej ślepocie i innych słabościach polskiej koncepcji aktywnej ​ C5%9Blepocie_i_ polityki społecznej’. At https://​www​.academia​.edu/​22943088/​O​_genderowej​_% innych_s%C5%82abo%C5%9Bciach_polskiej_koncepcji_aktywnej_polityki_spo%C5%82ecznej [accessed: 20.03.2020]. UN Women (2019). ‘Innovation for Gender Equality’, UN Women. At https://​www​.unwomen​.org/​sites/​ default/​files/​Headquarters/​Attachments/​Sections/​Library/​Publications/​2019/​Innovation​-for​-gender​ -equality​-en​.pdf [accessed: 13.12.2023]. UN Women (2021). ‘Facts and figures: Women’s leadership and political participation’, UN Women. At https://​www​.unwomen​.org/​en/​what​-we​-do/​leadership​-andpolitical​-participation/​facts​-and​-figures [accessed: 02.12.2021]. UNICEF (2020). Gender and Innovation: Building digital solutions with a gender lens. At https://​www​ .unicef​.org/​eap/​innovation​-and​-technology​-gender​-equality [accessed: 13.12.2023]. United Nations (2021). United Nations Sustainable Development Goals – Gender Equality. At https://​ www​.un​.org/​sus​tainablede​velopment/​genderequality/​ [accessed 21.11.2021]. Verloo, M. M. T., Lombardo, E. (2007). Contested Gender Equality and Policy Variety in Europe: Introducing a Critical Frame Analysis Approach. Budapest: CEU Press. Wikhamn, B. R., Knights, D. (2013). ‘Open innovation, gender and the infiltration of masculine discourses’, International Journal of Gender and Entrepreneurship, 5(3): 275–297. Wilczek, M. (2020). ‘Poland, Saudi Arabia and 29 others join US-led anti-abortion declaration on women’s rights’, Notes from Poland. At https://​notesfrompoland​.com/​2020/​10/​23/​poland​-saudi​-arabia​ -and​-29​-others​-join​-us​-led​-anti​-abortion​-declaration​-on​-womens​-rights/​ [accessed: 13.12.2023]. Williams, F. (2001). ‘Race/ethnicity, gender, and class in welfare states: a framework for comparative analysis’, in: Rethinking European Welfare, Fink, J., Lewis, G., Clarke, J. (Eds.), 131–162. London: Sage Publications.

10. Social innovation and sustainable development Jürgen Howaldt, Rick Hölsgens and Christoph Kaletka

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND (A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF) INNOVATION Sustainable development is an important concept focusing on human development within the requirements of the environment. In this chapter, we use a broad understanding of ‘sustainability’ as including social as well as ecological sustainability. Sustainable development is about meeting “the needs of the present, without compromising future generations to meet their needs” (Brundtland 1987, p. 8), and about keeping economic growth within ecological boundaries. However, the Brundtland report itself emphasized that sustainable development is also about social justice and equity rather than simply environmental and resources issues. The Sustainable Development Goals, as formulated in the ‘2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015, also underline that ecological concerns, such as climate change and clean water, need to be addressed hand in hand with social concerns, such as poverty and abatement of hunger across the globe. The European Green Deal, adopted by the European Commission on 14 July 2021, at first sight seems to focus primarily on climate-neutral economic growth,1 but explicitly aims to achieve this through what is called a ‘just transition mechanism’.2 These developments also have an impact on Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) policy (Mazzucato 2018). Whereas STI policy since the Second World War has been overly focused on technological innovations for economic growth, we see a change in recent years (Schot & Steinmueller 2018). With a growing awareness of ‘limits to growth’ and concerns about climate change, sustainability concerns have become more prominent in STI policy – albeit with a remarkable delay, as the first impactful warnings issued, for instance, by the ‘Limits to Growth’ (Meadows 1972) and ‘A Blueprint for Survival’ (Goldsmith et al. 1972) publications are now half a century old. The first considerations of sustainability/sustainable development can in fact be traced back to the sixteenth century (Warde 2011). Warde (2011, p. 170) claims that with Justus von Liebig’s 1862 publication Die Chemie und ihrer Anwendung, “a new ethic emerged that knowledge of those fundamental biological and chemical processes … would dictate the ability of societies to endure.”3 For a long time, sustainable development policies tended to focus primarily on combatting unsustainable technologies and/or incentivizing the development of more sustainable technological innovations. Examples include policy goals for renewable electricity and the phasing out of coal-based power plants, setting goals for banning internal combustion engines, or subsidizing research on hydrogen as a clean power source. Interestingly however, the aforementioned ‘Limits to Growth’ report had already in 1972 mentioned the need for “social innovations to match technological change” (Meadows 1972, p. 193). The potential of social innovation (SI) to address sustainability concerns is large, as unsustainability is as much a technological problem (e.g., fossil-based electricity production 120

Social innovation and sustainable development  121 and mobility) as a social challenge, mainly related to overconsumption, unsustainable lifestyles and inequality. The concept of sustainable development called for in Agenda 21 addresses radical changes at the level of political control and social practices that go far beyond (necessary) technological innovations. The sustainability discourse, which has been international and interdisciplinary since the beginning of the 1990s, claims a multidimensional concept of action is necessary to study the interface between economic, ecological and social rationalities. SI is required to satisfy needs better and differently, and deal more effectively than before with the unintended consequences and side-effects of industrial society (e.g., climate change). Particularly relevant in this context are service innovations to change consumption habits and resource utilization (e.g., in the areas of mobility, construction and housing, energy and water management). The transformation to sustainable development can only be achieved by comprehensive changes in behaviour at the most diverse levels and across fields of action, and with the help of new problem-solving strategies (cf. Brand 1997). Seen in this light, “sustainable development as a development concept that is not only environmental but also socio-political opens the view also to non-technical, social innovations and structural changes” (Wehling 1997, p. 38, own translation). In short, “Sustainable development cannot be achieved without social innovations” (Ornetzeder & Buchegger 1998, p. 31, own translation). However, whereas SIs are nowadays discussed more prominently than they were at the time of the Meadows or Brundtland report, it is still not fully understood how they can contribute to a transition to sustainability. The Guidebook for the Preparation of Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) for SDGs Roadmaps prepared by a United Nations Inter-Agency Task Team, for example, underlines the importance of a broad understanding of innovation, but struggles throughout to give social innovations space alongside the predominantly technological measures discussed (United Nations Inter-Agency Task Team on Science, Technology and Innovation for the SDGs & European Commission, Joint Research Centre 2021). There seems to be an inherent lag in conceptual approaches developed or adopted by the European Commission when it comes to including a social element, mirroring the example of innovation policy as a whole. Industry 4.0 – a term that refers to the fourth industrial revolution with the focus on a new level of organization and management of the entire value chain across the product life-cycle enabled by digital technologies – has been driven by productivity and technology considerations that now appear insufficient to make the expected transformative impact (Howaldt, Kopp & Schultze 2017). The subsequent Industry 5.0 concept now complements and extends the features of Industry 4.0, emphasizing not just economic and technological factors but also environmental and social dimensions. It envisages a future in which the producing sectors are focused on the interests of a wider variety of stakeholders, including a more sustainable society in general (see e.g., the new European Industrial Strategy and the European Skills Agenda). The EU Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, DG RTD, has now proposed a set of actions to help upscale the new idea of Industry 5.0 (European Commission. DG for Research and Innovation 2021). In a related development, economic recovery packages have been set in motion in many advanced economies to alleviate the effects of the Covid pandemic, with the European Union pushing for a twin transition, green and digital, accelerated by massive investment in the Next Generation EU package. “However, these structural transformations can have uneven effects and impact the most vulnerable actors disproportionally” (Pilati 2021, p. 3). To be successful, these sustainability and digital transitions will require adaptations and innovations in pro-

122  Handbook on social innovation and social policy duction processes, public administration and services, the labour market, skills development, infrastructure, and more. It remains unclear why the European Union has not declared it a triple transition from the start, including green, digital and social goals on an equal footing. Also, with the examples above in mind, it is also unclear why social innovation – complementing technological innovation – is not yet playing a more significant role in these mission-driven policies. Another interesting example can be found in the 2019 Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, which states in the summary for policymakers (IPBES 2019) that technological innovations – alongside, or as part of, consumption, demographic and governance changes – have caused biodiversity loss, but that SIs – alongside less detrimental technological innovations – are needed to counterbalance threats to biodiversity. Interestingly, though, the report does not actually define social innovation, nor does it make explicit how SIs can contribute to the transition to sustainability.4 However, with the increasing acceptance of the requirement for sustainability, the issue of the intersection of SIs and sustainability has expanded and gained socio-political relevance (cf. Howaldt & Schwarz 2021). The focus is no longer only on the guiding principles and abstract visions of a sustainable future, but also on the political, institutional and social preconditions and innovations necessary for their realization (cf. Linne & Schwarz 2003). Global challenges such as climate change and management of its associated consequences, have “arisen through the unthinking use of technology, which is why many attempts to remedy them through ‘better’ technology are part of the problem and not the solution” (Welzer & Leggewie 2008, own translation). Accordingly, many issues related to sustainability cannot be solved, or can only be solved inadequately, by new technologies or products. Instead, the ability of societies to, on the one hand, think in the long term and, on the other, to put values and their way of life to the test, is central to solving these problems (cf. Diamond 2006). The realization of sustainability, and the radical change envisaged by it, only has a chance if established behaviour patterns in all areas of society are questioned and, if necessary, redesigned (Ornetzeder & Buchegger 1998).

SOCIAL INNOVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT In view of the need to tackle major social challenges (such as growing social inequality, climate change, education inequalities), there is increasing debate about a new understanding of innovation. The conviction is gaining ground that social innovations – in addition to technical innovations – are of decisive importance. At the heart of the understanding of innovation in old industrial societies, technical innovations, in the sense of product and process innovations, were long considered to be the most important drivers of social development. However, an increasing number of researchers, practitioners and policymakers argue that SIs, in the sense of creative and purposeful changes in social practices, are of crucial importance for overcoming these challenges (Howaldt & Schwarz 2010; cf. Ayob, Teasdale & Fagan 2016). The importance of SI to address the social, economic, political and environmental challenges of the twenty-first century has been recognized not only within the Europe 2020 strategy but also on a global scale. Recent years have seen this new form of innovation emerging, both as an object of research and practice: SIs appear in a variety of forms and influence our lives widely (Howaldt et al. 2016). Already, there are numerous approaches and successful initiatives on an international scale that demonstrate the strengths and potential of SIs to

Social innovation and sustainable development  123 advance social integration through education and poverty reduction, in enabling sustainable consumption patterns, or in managing demographic change (Howaldt et al. 2019; see Howaldt et al. 2018). Empirical research on social innovations, which has intensified in recent years, shows that the concept of SI cannot be limited to one focus, be it social entrepreneurship or social economy, and demonstrates that widening the perspective is crucial for understanding the concept in its entirety. A broad range of actors is involved in the SI initiatives that have been mapped. Global mapping clearly shows the participation of partners from all sectors. The public, private and the civil society sector are represented to a high degree in all policy fields and world regions. Many initiatives have developed and flourished in social networks in which more than one sector is involved (Howaldt et al. 2018; Howaldt et al. 2019). Alongside the growing importance of SI and the growing variety of actors within the innovation process, there is an increasing awareness of the complexity of innovation processes, along with increasing demands as far as the management and governance of innovation are concerned. In this regard, the question arises as to which governance structures most effectively support the growth of SIs that are set as combined actions? Social innovation research has also revealed the capacities of SIs to modify or even re-direct social change and empower people, i.e., to address a wide variety of stakeholder groups, as well as the broader public, in order to improve social cohesion and allow for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. It sheds light on the great many, often nameless but still important, SIs responding to specific and everyday social demands or incremental innovations (Howaldt et al. 2019; Howaldt et al. 2018), such as, for instance, the South African initiative of The Clothing Bank, which collects excess merchandise (i.e., waste) from retailers and gives them to previously disadvantaged unemployed South Africans to start their own retailing business.5 Against this background, SIs contribute to sustainability transitions in a broad spectrum of cases, particularly if these sustainability transitions explicitly aim at introducing just transitions, i.e. inclusive transitions that also consider the effects of, and on, poverty and inequality (cf. Jasanoff 2018). If we look at the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (https://​sdgs​ .un​.org/​goals), we see that many are not (only) environmental, but (also) social in nature. In many of these areas, social innovations can play an important role in combatting existing challenges. With regard to SDG ‘Global Health and Well-being’, for instance, relevant measures need not always be techno-scientific (medicine) or economic. Castro-Arroyave, Monroy and Irurita (2020), to name just one example, describe how social innovations around housing improvement in Guatemala contributed to reducing the spread of diseases. As mentioned, SIs can be very diverse. They may range from local innovations targeting a specific group to global phenomena. They can therefore also address the various Sustainable Development Goals from a number of angles. On the one hand, we see how shifts in lifestyles, such as veganism, reduced flying or buying at local stores may be considered SIs, in the sense that they are conscious changes of social practices with the goal of reducing environmental pressures and/or increasing societal well-being. On the other hand, we can see countless examples of socially innovative initiatives emerging across the globe that contribute to (just) sustainability transitions; such as the example of Stromsparcheck, discussed below. One of the greatest challenges in the practical implementation of ideas of sustainable development is to reconcile the social, environmental and economic aspects. Often, sensible solutions are overshadowed by political or individual interests. Ghys (2020), for instance, addresses how neighbourhood health centres in Belgium met with opposition, even though

124  Handbook on social innovation and social policy these centres present some clear advantages for (especially poorer) patients. A naïve perspective – in which SIs are considered to be normatively good – might overlook this kind of resistance and focus policy in support of social innovations, such as the neighbourhood health centres, solely on the initiative itself. Instead, Ghys observed that (in Flanders) the neighbourhood health centres “ran against the interests of more powerful groups, primarily private doctors’ syndicates, and secondary certain rightwing political actors” (2020, p. 23). Although Ghys is primarily concerned with the (lack of) diffusion of neighbourhood health centres to address poverty and less with drawing policy recommendations, one can see from his example how policies aiming at introducing or diffusing SIs need not only to address the governance of the individual initiative, but also to consider the environment (or ecosystem) in which the social innovation is placed. This is no different for SIs aiming at overcoming sustainability challenges. Even though social innovations may appear normatively good (Murray, Caulier-Grice & Mulgan 2010), there may be opposition to their diffusion. The discussion of cargo bikes as substitute for cars to, for instance, transport children, that emerged in Germany in the runup to the 2021 national elections, is essentially about introducing the social innovation of non-polluting mobility practices. The potential of this social innovation to contribute positively to sustainability is large, at least within cities. Compared with still dominant cars, cargo bikes are a healthier mode of transportation, take up less space and don’t pollute. Political opposition is fierce nonetheless. However, even leaving aside the political debate around the cargo bikes, one must ask whether citizens are willing and able to adopt a SI that aims at changing mobility practices. Cargo bikes are (usually) slower than cars, have a smaller radius and less load capacity, and may be physically exhausting since one has to cycle. People may therefore not be willing or able to change their mode of mobility in this regard. Social policies may aim at reducing hurdles (for instance, by enhancing bike safety or creating ‘bicycle highways’) and may even aim to financially incentivize cargo bike use through tax benefits, but it is necessary to be aware of the limitations to diffusion and adoption. In the case of cargo bikes or neighbourhood health centres, resistance or adoption limitations may be more or less visible on the surface. For other (sustainable) social innovations, these may be less directly visible. Why, for instance, don’t more people buy their groceries locally? Why don’t more people buy second hand? Why don’t more people make use of initiatives such as repair cafés? Individual motivations may be as diverse as the range of social innovation initiatives, and need to be studied more. With a naïve view of SIs as normatively good – especially if they address sustainability concerns – these questions may be overlooked. However, in order to make use of the potential for SIs to address sustainable development challenges, they need to feature also in social innovation policymaking.

SOCIAL INNOVATION INITIATIVES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Having shown the importance of social innovation in the discourse on sustainable development, in this section we address the potential of SI in two different domains of sustainable development by focusing on examples of socially innovative initiatives, namely the German Stromsparcheck and the Irre menschlich initiative. The first aims at simultaneously helping low-income households save energy and reintegrating unemployed people into the labour

Social innovation and sustainable development  125 market; the second challenges the healthcare system through an inclusive approach. These examples also highlight the importance of political framework and conditions to whether social innovation realize their potential. Stromsparcheck: Addressing Social and Ecological Goals The first example is a project called Stromsparcheck, loosely translated as ‘electricity saving check.’6 Stromsparcheck was initiated in 2005 in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. The project was developed to combat the increasing number of power cuts for households unable to pay their electricity bills. Its aim was to support households with low income to save energy and thereby money. The project was initiated by the energy department of the City of Frankfurt, which observed that the number of households in which power cuts were imposed was increasing. Although reduced electricity consumption obviously has environmental benefits, the initial motivation was therefore not environmental, but social and economic. One of the challenges faced by low-income households is that they cannot afford to replace old appliances with more modern, less energy-intensive, ones. As a consequence, they may unnecessarily use a relatively large amount of energy.7 Part of the programme is therefore to offer energy-saving products, such as LED lights for a total value of 70 Euros, and financial support to replace old (over 10 years) and thus inefficient fridges or freezers. However, simply replacing appliances may not change energy-intensive behaviour. Part of the project is therefore to do a check with the households to see where they can save energy, and thus money, and to educate residents with regard to energy-saving behaviours. This check is repeated after one year. The energy-saving checks are carried out by people who have been unemployed for a longer period of time, and who received special training. The project therefore not only helps the low-income households to save energy, money and emissions, but also helps long-term unemployed people to re-enter the labour market with specific new skills. As such, Stromsparcheck addresses SDGs 1 (no poverty), 8 (decent work and economic growth) and 13 (climate action) – even though it does not make explicit reference to the SDGs. We thus see how this socially innovative initiative can contribute to sustainability by simultaneously contributing to emission reduction and combatting poverty and unemployment. Despite the fact that the project has spread throughout Germany, and even attracted international interest, it is also clear that the long-term durability of this charity-based project is dependent upon funding, and thus societal or political support. Currently, the project is supported by a grant from the German Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, which runs at least until the end of March 2023. The money to support Stromsparcheck originates from the Ministry’s revenues from emissions trading certificates. The Ministry financially supports climate protection measures to increase energy efficiency through the Klimaschutzinitiative (climate protection initiative). Stromsparcheck seems to be well embedded with the initiative,8 but competes nonetheless with other projects. Irre Menschlich: New Inclusion Strategies through Social Innovation As we have noted, social sustainability is an objective, or at least a welcome side-effect, of many social innovation initiatives, with the empowerment of a wide variety of stakeholder groups as a transversal topic. In particular, people with activity limitations – including people with difficulties in seeing, hearing, walking, learning or solving problems – are a primary

126  Handbook on social innovation and social policy target and actor group of social innovation initiatives: 17% of the 1,005 initiatives analysed in the SI-DRIVE project specifically focus on or actively involve people with such activity limitations (Eckhardt, Kaletka & Pelka 2016). This group is not limited to being recipients and the object of social innovation approaches, they often play an active role in the SI process (ibid.). Irre menschlich, loosely translated ‘madly human’, is one example of this large group of social innovation initiatives. It was first initiated in Hamburg in 1989 and provides people experiencing mental illnesses with the opportunity to make use of their own treatment experiences and thereby become experts on their own behalf, in order to help others with mental illnesses and their families. The services provided by this civil society initiative include information- and prevention-oriented events, lobbying for more tolerance, societal inclusion and de-stigmatizing psychiatry. The initiative took its first steps by hosting ‘psychosis seminars’ in which people who have experienced psychiatric treatment, their relatives and therapists try to find common ground to understand what psychosis can mean, and what kind of support the participants – not only the mentally ill person – may need. Working for a more just and diverse society and against the stigmatization of mentally ill people, Irre menschlich is an example in the field of social sustainability, addressing social justice and the equity and empowerment perspective of sustainable development. The innovative core is the implementation of trialogue seminars in which people who have experienced psychiatric treatment, their relatives and the professionals such as psychiatrists, come together and discuss manifold aspects of the illness and its treatment, specifically recognizing the expertise of the users of psychiatric services (Langer, Eurich & Güntner 2018). The main principle of this trialogic approach is an exchange on an equal footing, in which people who have experienced psychoses, their relatives and therapists learn from one another. Irre menschlich is also implementing the originally project funded by the EU – EX-IN (Experienced Involvement), which provides people in a crisis situation with peer counselling from ex-users of psychiatric services. By this means they receive first-hand information about treatment experiences and also get a feeling of belonging, which is supposed to help them overcome anxiety and insecurity. In order to provide this service, the initiative organizes further training for people with experience of psychiatric treatment. These people can then become peer counsellors, lecturers or staff in organizations for psycho-social care. This example is particularly interesting as the treatment of people with mental health problems, as well as their inclusion in society, has been a topic of political dispute for decades. In general, individual functioning and health were the main factors determining the level of societal participation someone was able to accomplish. Societal structures that could hinder or leverage individual participation were not given particular consideration. Over time, and to a large degree, due to the self-help movement of people with activity limitations, the ‘social model’ of disability emerged, which considers a poor interaction between environmental factors and individual functioning to be the core reason for limited participation and disabilities: “The focus shifted from the individual status as ‘being disabled’ to ‘getting disabled’ by societal structures” (Eckhardt, Kaletka & Pelka 2017, p. 69), reflected in the WHO’s International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) in 2001. Focusing on the particular situation of Germany’s care system challenged by initiatives such as Irre menschlich, this system was characterized by inhumane living conditions for patients in social psychiatry (Langer, Eurich & Güntner 2018). Starting slowly with the movement of ’68 and its anti-psychiatry protest, and strong impulses by the German psychiatry enquête commission from 1971 to 1975, many steps have been taken to reform psychiatric care, including

Social innovation and sustainable development  127 the creation of smaller mental institutions, an increasing number of social psychiatry units in standard care hospitals and more community-based mental health services (Bühring 2001; Häfner 2016). Still, a paradigm shift towards societal inclusion of people with mental illnesses and those with experiences in psychiatric care has not yet been completed. While political framework conditions have certainly improved in recent decades, manifold exclusion mechanisms are still in place. This is where initiatives like Irre menschlich step in and try to make a change. The trialogic approach, for example, has been scaled not only beyond Hamburg, but also to other contexts: it has become meaningful for other types of illnesses, for psychiatric treatment, for teaching and research. Trialogue seminars are also conducted in schools, police stations and other institutions (see www​.irremenschlich​.de) in order for people to understand the difficulties that mentally ill people experience in their daily life and in specific everyday situations. Thematically related initiatives such as Irrsinnig menschlich also pursue an anti-stigma strategy and focus on schools, higher education and companies. This initiative, which pursues an ambitious scaling strategy (see Irrsinnig menschlich 2021), always works with teams consisting of professionally and personally qualified experts and explicitly addresses SDGs 3 ‘Good Health and Well-Being’ and 4 ‘Quality Education’. Both initiatives address the need of inclusion and integration of mentally ill people in society and challenge the power of professionals to make decisions without appropriate consultation. Their work has disrupted and partly changed the system organizing treatment of mentally ill patients by supporting a more open and respect-oriented perspective towards service users, which is crucial, e.g., for promoting interventions based on home treatment rather than confinement (Langer, Eurich & Güntner 2018). Given, for example, the biography of Irre menschlich of more than 30 years and its ambition to impact on the public perception of mental illnesses, the acknowledgement of mentally ill persons as experts on their own behalf, and the acceptance of trialogic approaches, it can be considered an example of a socially sustainable initiative with socially innovative practice at its core.

CONCLUSION: UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF SOCIAL INNOVATION This chapter has examined the crucial role of social innovations in the comprehensive debate about sustainable development. We have shown the importance of social innovation in the context of sustainable development and how social and ecological aspects of sustainable development can be addressed simultaneously. We also argued that many projects and initiatives in civil society and the public sector do not develop the desired social impact, but remain limited to the local, experimental level and, at the same time, become the subject of political disputes. In order to unleash the potential of social innovations, the necessary conditions must be created, which often includes struggles against the power of path dependency and routine. In addition to changing habitual ways of thinking and developing and implementing successful projects, this also includes building infrastructures, funding programs, legal frameworks and ecosystems (cf. Kaletka, Markmann & Pelka 2017). An important building block to unfold the potential of SI is a systematic strengthening of cross-sectoral cooperation between actors from science, politics, business and civil society through supporting intermediary institutions, creative but also political initiatives, and funding programs. Like the development of technological innovations, the development and dissemination of social innovations require

128  Handbook on social innovation and social policy the establishment of supportive ecosystems that enable the interaction of actors from the various subsystems of business, science, civil society and the public sector. Thus, in recent years and decades, numerous organizations, initiatives, foundations and think tanks have emerged that are dedicated to researching and providing practical support for SIs (Wascher et al. 2018). Many of these institutions see themselves as crossing boundaries between social sub-areas and are forming new, closely interconnected practices of researching, advising, funding and financing innovation. Against this background, SI is increasingly becoming the subject of government innovation policy (cf. Bornstein, Pabst & Sigrist 2014; Domanski, Howaldt & Kaletka 2020). In 2009, Barack Obama established the Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation in the White House at the beginning of his first term in office. The German government’s new high-tech strategy, adopted in 2014, also anchors the topic of social innovation in German innovation policy for the first time. The preamble states, “We rely on an expanded concept of innovation that encompasses not only technological but also social innovations, and include society as a central stakeholder” (BMBF 2014, p. 4, own translation). This shifts the focus from the market potential of individual technology to society’s need for realizing sustainable solutions. It is also mirrored in the European Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 and an increasingly ambitious focus on social innovation development in programmes such as ESF Plus and Interreg Europe. “The complex challenges facing our society can only be solved if we think and act systemically and exploit the potential of new technological, economic, cultural, ecological and social developments in equal measure” (BMBF 2021, p. 2, own translation). Without the use of synergies and the interaction of social, environmental and economic aspects, a sustainable transformation of our societies will not be achieved. Against this background, synergies between social, environmental and innovation policy are increasingly forming.

NOTES 1. At https://​ec​.europa​.eu/​info/​strategy/​priorities​-2019​-2024/​european​-green​-deal​_en, last accessed 19 May 2021. 2. At https://​ec​.europa​.eu/​info/​strategy/​priorities​-2019​-2024/​european​-green​-deal/​actions​-being​-taken​ -eu/​just​-transition​-mechanism​_en, last accessed 19 May 2021. 3. Effects of carbon dioxide on climate change have been known at least since the mid-1800s (Hölsgens 2016). We must acknowledge, though, that the first serious warning signs of the unsustainability of Western lifestyles emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. 4. Another example of the growing prominence of social innovation in sustainability transitions can be found in Sovacool et al. (2020), who regularly mention social innovation as an important concept in future research on energy and climate, but who do not refer to the social innovation literature. 5. More information on the project can be found here: https://​www​.theclothingbank​.org​.za/​ (last accessed 16 August 2022). The Clothing Bank is one of over 1000 socially innovative initiatives mapped in the Atlas of Social Innovation (https://​www​.s​ocialinnov​ationatlas​.net/​map/​, last accessed 16 August 2022). 6. More information on the project can be found here: https://​www​.stromspar​-check​.de/​en/​english (last accessed 16 August 2022). The description of Stromsparcheck is partly based on Hölsgens, Lübke & Hasselkuß (2018). 7. With which we, of course, do not want to lay any blame for excessive greenhouse gas emissions with these low-income households. Quite the contrary, low-income households contribute significantly less to global warming due to the fact that, for instance, they may not own a car or may not go on far-away holidays (Kleinhückelkotten, Neitzke & Moser 2016).

Social innovation and sustainable development  129 8. At https://​www​.klimaschutz​.de/​ziele​-und​-aufgaben, last accessed 22 September 2021.

REFERENCES Ayob, N, Teasdale, S, & Fagan, K, 2016, ‘How social innovation “came to be”: tracing the evolution of a contested concept’, Journal of Social Policy, 45(4): 635–653. BMBF, 2014, Die neue Hightech-Strategie. Innovation für Deutschland. Available from: www​.bmbf​.de/​ pub​_hts/​HTS​_Broschure​_Web​.pdf (accessed 9 June 2021). BMBF, 2021, Ressortkonzept zu Sozialen Innovationen, Berlin. Available from: https://​www​.bmbf​ .de/​SharedDocs/​Publikationen/​de/​bmbf/​1/​168520​_Ressortkonzept​_zu​_Sozialen​_Innovationen​.pdf​?​ _​_blob​=​publicationFile​&​amp;v​=​4 (accessed 20 October 2021). Bornstein, N, Pabst, S, & Sigrist, S, 2014, Zur Bedeuting von sozialer Innovation in Wissenschaft und Praxis. Weshalb soziale Innovationen in Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft wichtiger werden and wie der SNF dazu beitragen kann, das Thema in der Schweiz zu positionieren. Available from: http://​www​ .snf​.ch/​Site​Collection​Documents/​Soziale​_Innovation​_Studie​_SNF​_W​_I​_R​_E​_2014​.pdf (accessed 15 October 2021). Brand, K-W, 1997, ‘Probleme und Potentiale einer Neubestimmung des Projekts der Moderne unter dem Leitbild “nachhaltige Entwicklung”. Zur Einführung’, in Nachhaltige Entwicklung. Eine Herausforderung an die Soziologie, ed. K-W Brand, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, pp. 9–32. Brundtland, GH, 1987, Our common future, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Bühring, P, 2001, ‘Psychiatrie-Reform: Auf halbem Weg stecken geblieben’, Deutsches Ärzteblatt, 98 (6), A301–A307. Available from: https://​www​.aerzteblatt​.de/​pdf​.asp​?id​=​25936 (accessed 2 October 2021). Castro-Arroyave, D, Monroy, MC, & Irurita, MI, 2020, ‘Integrated vector control of Chagas disease in Guatemala: a case of social innovation in health’, Infectious Diseases of Poverty, 9, no. 25. Diamond, J, 2006, Collapse: How societies choose to fail or survive, Penguin Books, London. Domanski, D, Howaldt, J, & Kaletka, C, 2020, ‘A comprehensive concept of social innovation and its implications for the local context: on the growing importance of social innovation ecosystems and infrastructures’, European Planning Studies, 28(3): 454–474. Eckhardt, J, Kaletka, C, & Pelka, B, 2016, ‘New initiatives for the empowerment of people with activity limitations. An analysis of 1,005 cases of (digital) social innovation worldwide’, in Universal access in human–computer interaction: 10th international conference, UAHCI 2016, held as part of HCI International 2016, Toronto, ON, Canada, July 17–22, 2016, eds M Antona & C Stephanidis, Springer, Cham, Heidelberg, pp. 183–193. Eckhardt, J, Kaletka, C, & Pelka, B, 2017, ‘Inclusion through digital social innovations: modelling an ecosystem of drivers and barriers’, in Universal access in human–computer interaction. Human and technological environments: 11th international conference, UAHCI 2017, held as part of HCI International 2017, Vancouver, BC, Canada, July 9–14, 2017, Proceedings, Part III, eds M Antona & C Stephanidis, Springer International Publishing, Cham, s.l., pp. 67–84. European Commission. DG for Research and Innovation, 2021, Industry 5.0: towards a sustainable, human centric and resilient European industry, Publications Office. Ghys, T, 2020, ‘Resisting social innovation: the case of neighborhood health centers in Belgium’, European Public & Social Innovation Review, 5(2): 14–26. Goldsmith, E, Allen, R, Allaby, M, Davoll, J, & Lawrence, S, 1972, ‘A blueprint for survival’, The Ecologist, 2(1): 1–43. Häfner, H, 2016, ‘Psychiatriereform in Deutschland. Vorgeschichte, Durchführung und Nachwirkungen der Psychiatrie-Enquête. Ein Erfahrungsbericht’, Heidelberger Jahrbücher Online, 119–145. Hölsgens, R, 2016, Energy transitions in the Netherlands: Sustainability challenges in a historical and comparative perspective, University of Groningen, Groningen. Hölsgens, R, Lübke, S, & Hasselkuß, M, 2018, ‘Social innovations in the German energy transition: an attempt to use the heuristics of the multi-level perspective of transitions to analyze the diffusion process of social innovations’, Energy, Sustainability and Society, 8, no. 8.

130  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Howaldt, J, & Schwarz, M, 2010, Social Innovation. Concepts, research fields and international trends. Available from: https://​www​.web​.sfs​.tu​-dortmund​.de/​odb/​Repository/​Publication/​Doc/​1289/​IMO​ _Trendstudie​_Howaldt​_Schwarz​_englische​_Version​.pdf (accessed 9 September 2022). Howaldt, J, & Schwarz, M, 2021, ‘Social innovation and social change’, in Research agenda for social innovation, eds J Howaldt, C Kaletka, & A Schröder, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA, USA, pp. 39–57. Howaldt, J, Kopp, R, & Schultze, J, 2017, ‘Why Industrie 4.0 needs workplace innovation: a critical essay about the German debate on advanced manufacturing’, in Workplace innovation: Theory, research and practice, eds PRA Oeij, D Rus, & FD Pot, Springer, Cham, pp. 45–60. Howaldt, J, Kaletka, C, Schröder, A, & Zirngiebl, M (eds.), 2018, Atlas of social innovation: New practices for a better future, Sozialforschungsstelle, TU Dortmund University, Dortmund. Howaldt, J, Kaletka, C, Schröder, A, & Zirngiebl, M (eds.), 2019, Atlas of social innovation, 2nd volume: A world of new practices, Oekom Verlag, München. Howaldt, J, Kaletka, C, Schröder, A, Rehfeld, D, & Terstriep, J, 2016, Mapping the world of social innovation: Key results of a comparative analysis of 1.005 social innovation initiatives at a glance. Available from: https://​www​.si​-drive​.eu/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2016/​12/​SI​-DRIVE​-CA​-short​-2016​-11​ -30​-Druckversion​.pdf (accessed 24 November 2017). IPBES, 2019, Summary for policymakers of the global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services, IPBES secretariat, Bonn, Germany. Irrsinnig menschlich, 2021, Jahres- und Wirkungsbericht 2020, Leipzig. Available from: https://​www​ .irrsinnig​-menschlich​.de/​app/​uploads/​2021/​04/​Irrsinnig​-Menschlich​_Jahres​-und​-Wirkungsbericht​ -2020​_web​.pdf (accessed 20 November 2023). Jasanoff, S, 2018, ‘Just transitions: a humble approach to global energy futures’, Energy Research & Social Science, 35(13): 11–14. Kaletka, C, Markmann, M, & Pelka, B, 2017, ‘Peeling the onion. An exploration of the layers of social innovation ecosystems: modelling a context sensitive perspective on driving and hindering factors for social innovation’, European Public & Social Innovation Review, 1(2): 83–93. Kleinhückelkotten, S, Neitzke, H-P, & Moser, S, 2016, Repräsentative Erhebung von Pro-Kopf-Verbräuchen natürlicher Ressourcen in Deutschland (nach Bevölkerungsgruppen). Available from: https://​www​.umweltbundesamt​.de/​sites/​default/​files/​medien/​1410/​publikationen/​ texte​_39​_2016​_repraesentative​_erhebung​_von​_pro​-kopf​-verbraeuchen​_natuerlicher​_ressourcen​ _korr​.pdf (accessed 25 August 2021). Langer, A, Eurich, J, & Güntner, S, 2018, Innovation Sozialer Dienstleistungen. Ein systematisierender Überblick auf Basis der EU Forschungsplattform INNOSERV, Springer VS, Wiesbaden, Germany. Linne, G, & Schwarz, M (eds.), 2003, Handbuch Nachhaltige Entwicklung. Wie ist nachhaltiges Wirtschaften machbar? VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. Mazzucato, M, 2018, Mission-oriented research & innovation in the European Union: A problem solving approach to fuel innovation-led growth, European Commission. Directorate General for Research and Innovation, Brussels. Meadows, DH, 1972, The limits to growth: A report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, Universe Books, New York. Murray, R, Caulier-Grice, J, & Mulgan, G, 2010, The open book of social innovation, NESTA, London. Ornetzeder, M, & Buchegger, B, 1998, Soziale Innovationen für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung. Available from: https://​www​.zsi​.at/​attach/​Ornetzeder​-Bucchegger​_SINE​-Endbericht​.pdf (accessed 5 October 2021). Pilati, M, 2021, National recovery and resilience plans: Empowering the green and digital transitions? Available from: https://​www​.epc​.eu/​content/​PDF/​2021/​National​_RRPs​_DiscussionPaper​.pdf (accessed 2 October 2021). Schot, J, & Steinmueller, E, 2018, ‘Three frames for innovation policy: R&D, system of innovation and transformative change’, Research Policy, 47: 1554–1567. Sovacool, BK, Hess, DJ, Amir, S, Geels, FW, Hirsh, R, Rodriguez Medina, L, Miller, C, Alvial Palavicino, C, Phadke, R, Ryghaug, M, Schot, J, Silvast, A, Stephens, J, Stirling, A, Turnheim, B, van der Vleuten, E, van Lente, H, & Yearley, S, 2020, ‘Sociotechnical agendas: reviewing future directions for energy and climate research’, Energy Research & Social Science, 70 [18 September], no. 101617.

Social innovation and sustainable development  131 United Nations Inter-Agency Task Team on Science, Technology and Innovation for the SDGs & European Commission, Joint Research Centre, 2021, Guidebook for the preparation of Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) for SDGs Roadmaps, Publication Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Available from: https://​op​.europa​.eu/​en/​publication​-detail/​-/​publication/​f9f6a6a8​-ac7e​ -11eb​-9767​-01aa75ed71a1/​language​-en (accessed 22 August 2022). Warde, P, 2011, ‘The invention of sustainability’, Modern Intellectual History, 8(1): 153–170. Wascher, E, Hebel, F, Schultze, J, & Kaletka, C, 2018, Labore sozialer Innovation. Bericht über internationale Fallstudien, Sozialforschungsstelle, Technische Universität, Dortmund. Wehling, P, 1997, ‘Sustainable Development – eine Provokation für die Soziologie?’ in Nachhaltige Entwicklung. Eine Herausforderung an die Soziologie, ed. K-W Brand, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, pp. 35–50. Welzer, H, & Leggewie, C, 2008, ‘Klimawandel: Überleben, aber wie?’, Die Zeit, 17 April.

11. Social innovation and social policy in Sub-Saharan Africa Gift Dafuleya

INTRODUCTION Social policy is one of the key instruments used to address vulnerability, poverty and inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Before 2000, social policy in SSA mainly constituted statutory provision of social services (Hall and Midgley 2004). Health provision has been at the core of social policy because of the burden of disease and factors contributing to ill-health and death with which Africa battles. Whereas there has been a significant fall (from 87.7 to 41.3 per 100,000 population) in the crude death rate attributable to the top 10 causes of mortality, the stubborn statistics that have remained the same over the past decade mostly relate to the burden of risk factors of morbidity and mortality (World Health Statistics 2018). Consequently, in the presence of imperfect health insurance markets, some communities have had to be innovative to improve health access through the creation of community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes. Social innovation (SI) to alleviate the burden of disease in Sub-Saharan Africa is therefore one of the areas on which this chapter focuses. Water quality and poor sanitation are significant risk factors to morbidity in SSA (Osei et al. 2015). There are large disparities between and within SSA countries in accessing clean water and suitable sanitation services, with one in four people still lacking adequate sanitation and 115 people dying every hour from water-borne-related diseases (UNICEF 2016). As reported by UNICEF, the task of fetching water from a location more than an hour away mainly falls on young girls and women, and this disrupts the school attendance of younger girls. Some communities have attempted to solve the water crisis in innovative ways, which this chapter also considers. In particular, the chapter concentrates on SI in this regard in a context where the delivery of social policy has been constrained by the macroeconomic environment prevailing in several SSA countries. Life expectancy increased from 50.9 years to 53.8 years between 2012 and 2015 in SSA (World Health Statistics 2018). In spite of this progress, life expectancy in the region still lags behind that of other regions, and death therefore still remains a high concern. Along with death is the cost associated with burying the deceased, which can be as high as the annual income of poorer households (Dafuleya and Tregenna 2020). Whereas conventional insurance markets offer life insurance and funeral policies, many people in Africa have created innovative ways to smooth income when faced with bereavement costs (Dafuleya and Zibagwe 2016). Thus, the chapter also focuses on SIs directed at addressing social issues related to the costs of death. There are other societal and environmental challenges not necessarily related to health issues that some Sub-Saharan African countries also face. These tend to be mainly addressed by countries that have a supportive macroeconomic environment, where SI funds are created to award or reward actors who commit to solving social challenges innovatively. Consequently, the actors involved vary, and range from individuals to non-profit organisations (NPOs) that 132

Social innovation and social policy in Sub-Saharan Africa  133 seek to bring sustainable solutions to social and environmental challenges. The chapter therefore also explores project-based social innovators who may seek state and/or philanthropic funding to solve social problems that bedevil communities. These social innovators can be seen as brokers between those who can assist and those needing assistance. This is different to social innovation in the form of self-help organisations where members assist themselves without external assistance. This chapter argues that SIs emanating from self-help organisations in SSA are predominantly small scale. They are generally formulated by people from within the same income category – typically low income – and so lack financial muscle to scale up and empower communities in sustainable ways. However, they typically address societal problems that are rarely considered by state- and donor-financed social innovators. Where social policy is weak and communities are too poor to address risk through formal markets, much of SI has come from self-help organisations. Where social policy and innovation drive is strong, the impetus has come from the state- or donor financing that encourages not-for-profit organisations to socially innovate for societal impact. The chapter reviews SIs from four countries in East and Southern Africa. In Rwanda, community-based health insurance implemented in strategic alliance with the government has led to improved access in healthcare. In Zimbabwe, innovation through asset-based savings is solving water challenges facing many households. In Ethiopia, Iddirs – burial societies – innovate to address the costs associated with funerals, which can destabilise household financial resources. In South Africa, a not-for profit organisation is assisting in the recreation of cities ecologically and economically in sustainable ways.

SOCIAL INNOVATION IN ACCESSING HEALTH SERVICES To improve access to healthcare, social policy in SSA has mainly relied on health grants and health fee waivers (World Bank 2018). With health grants, the government makes financial transfers to providers of health services. According to the World Bank (2018) report, they are mainly popular in Benin, Burkina Faso, Kenya and Gabon, and have the same effect on the health centres as fee waivers because the participants do not pay the health fees with their own money. Health fee waivers are not as popular as health grants in SSA, with only one country – Eswatini – recorded by the World Bank (2018) as having them. This could be because in the mid-1980s, leading international development partners, such as the World Bank and UNICEF, promoted the adoption of user fees for health services in the public health sector of low-income countries (Birger and Craissati 2009). These fees were promoted because they were thought to be a source of revenue that may improve efficiency in the face of insufficient public funding of government health facilities, and were also thought to remove excess demand (Barnum and Kutzin 1993). Yet fee waivers seek to improve access to health services for those who lack financial means and are excluded due to cost barriers. Bitrán and Giedion (2003) noted that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo it was nurses who were empowered to determine whose fees are fully or partially waived. Kenya committed itself to free public healthcare at independence in 1963 but then introduced fees in the late 1980s (Owino 1998). The result of the introduction of fees in rural Kenya was a drop in outpatient attendance of between 28 and 50 per cent (Osuga and Nordberg 1993).

134  Handbook on social innovation and social policy School meals have also been used as an instrument of social policy to improve the health of children. School feeding programmes exist in almost all African countries except those countries that seem to be war-torn. These programmes provide meals to children at schools, generally in poor and food-insecure areas with the objective of reducing hunger and improving nutrition among school children and improving school enrolment and attendance, including reducing gender gaps in accessing education. Despite measures to improve access to health and health provision, SSA continues to lag behind on six dimensions of health reported by the WHO (2018). Dimension 1 relates to the range of health services a country is able to provide to each of the groups in the life cycle, namely early childhood, school age, youth, working age and older persons. Dimension 2 includes the levels of utilisation of health services and the prevention of communicable and non-communicable diseases. Financial risk protection is the third dimension. It focuses on whether there are reductions in the financial barriers communities face in accessing essential services. The fourth dimension is service satisfaction and measures the responsiveness of available health services to the needs of each of the groups in the life cycle. The fifth dimension relates to the levels of appropriate health security. This is a key measure in the provision of health services because of the devastating effects of disease and health emergencies on health and well-being. This dimension is guaranteed only when a country builds capacity to prevent, detect and respond to disease and health emergencies and disasters. Although the detection of outbreaks has significantly improved, and improved this dimension positively, SSA countries face challenges in response and recovery. The coverage of health-related SDG targets is the sixth dimension, and includes malnutrition, early childhood development, and primary and secondary education. The dimension in which SSA countries perform worst is financial risk protection. The following case study illustrates how some communities have been trying to develop innovate ways to improve financial risk protection against the huge costs involved in accessing health services. Case Study 1: Community-based Health Insurance in Rwanda Within the social policy landscape of SSA, Rwanda’s CBHI is cited as best practice in how communities attempt to improve their access to healthcare (Chemouni 2018). Emerging from a history where patients paid fees to access healthcare, Chemouni (2018) states that the introduction of fee waivers came as a pragmatic decision immediately after the genocide in 1994. However, this did not last because of budgetary constraints, which resulted in poor healthcare services. To find a lasting solution to the challenge of access to healthcare services, the 1995 Rwandan Health Policy made a drive towards learning from CBHI and self-help mechanisms that existed in communities (Schneider et al. 2000). CBHI and/or self-help organisations are a form of mutual aid and community solidarity systems with a long history in Rwanda (Pathé and Butera 2005). They are a form of a coping strategy used by poor households by pooling funds to offset the costs of health not only in Rwanda, but elsewhere in SSA. In Rwanda, as attested by Pathé and Butera (2005), CBHI schemes have been effective in harnessing finances within communities faced by health emergences through structured tontines organised at cell levels – entities that provide basic services and help the population to achieve sustainable development. Therefore, the 1995 Rwandan

Social innovation and social policy in Sub-Saharan Africa  135 Health Policy encouraged the population to create or join CBHI schemes and/or self-help organisations, as these were seen as local innovations that could increase access to healthcare. In 1998/99, the Ministry of Health began to build upon the innovative experience of the CBHI schemes in the country by initiating a pilot in three health districts, which turned out to be important in shaping how CBHI would be implemented in the whole of Rwanda (Pathé and Butera 2005). These pilots helped to forge a partnership between government health agencies and the community, with the latter theoretically owning the schemes that were administered and governed by the local state bodies (UNDP 2021). The partnership was successful, leading to the rapid increase of CBHI schemes in Rwanda; consequently, enrolment in health insurance increased from 20 per cent of the population in 1999 to 90 per cent in 2011 (Chemouni 2018). Analysis by Farmer et al. (2013) and Jones (2018) shows that the CBHI schemes in Rwanda, after having partnered with the government, halved annual out-of-pocket healthcare costs and increased the utilisation of health services. Masabo (2019) and Urban et al. (2016) provide detailed accounts of how contributions are made in the CBHI schemes in Rwanda. Typically, the amount of contributions depends on the ability to pay. The Ubudehe1 system, which is an indigenous way of categorising poverty, determined who deserved to be fully or partly subsidised. These subsidies were introduced after 2006, when scheme membership became mandatory, and fines were enforced on those not contributing. Subsidising the scheme has meant that the financial burden is borne by the government or Global Fund and its partners. Ridde et al. (2018) report that donors bear a large share of the costs, and therefore sustainability is a serious issue to consider. Further challenges relate to complaints reported by UNDP (2021) about the differing quality of care and benefits available to CBHI members compared to those covered by conventional medical schemes.

SOCIAL INNOVATION IN ACCESSING WATER Access to improved water and sanitation is not only a fundamental human right, but is also a way to reduce water- and sanitation-related diseases. According to the WHO (2001), between 10 and 100 litres of water per person per day are needed to ensure that most basic needs, including health, are met. This is one dimension of water access that relates to quantity. Affordability is another dimension. Water and sanitation services are considered affordable if their costs do not exceed 5 per cent of a household’s income (McPhail 1993). The quality of the water must also be safe for drinking. This dimension of water, if applied in an urban set-up, typically means that water must be piped. Consequently, it is of concern that 400 million people still lack access to basic safe drinking water in SSA (WHO and UNICEF 2019). The supply of water must be reliable, easily accessible and close to places of residence. These are the three key dimensions of access to water that are important and which social policy in SSA is targeting to achieve near universal access (GIZ 2019). Several instruments have been used to improve access to water and improve sanitation. Subsidies are one of such instruments. They are effected through government intervention that reduces the price of a service below the price that would otherwise have prevailed (International Monetary Fund 2014). At times, more affluent urban areas are made to subsidise poorer urban areas so that all citizens may benefit from the six dimensions of water access. Water subsidies were implemented during COVID-19 in Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, and Togo.2

136  Handbook on social innovation and social policy There is no record of what Zimbabwe did to make sure households had access to water during COVID-19. Given that many people access water in places far away from their place of residence, even major urban areas risked households going without water for days during periods of lockdown.3 However, water shortages have been a longstanding problem in Zimbabwe, even before COVID-19. In 2021, Human Rights Watch reported that over 2 million people in the capital city and surrounding areas had no access to safe drinking water. Compared to 1988, when more than 80 per cent of the population had access to safe drinking water, the situation was dire in 2017, when the proportion had shrunk to 64 per cent. A growing number of Zimbabweans continue living without access to clean water and the case below demonstrates the innovativeness of some communities to ensure that they have access to safe water. Case Study 2: Savings Groups in Zimbabwe Zimbabwe has a long history of savings groups. Some are accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCAs), while others are rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). These clubs are similar in nature, as both provide savings and credit. However, the difference between an ASCA and a ROSCA is that the former allows for funds to grow for loan making, whereas the latter does not allow funds to accumulate but loans funds to members. Pure savings clubs do not provide loans. Their funds accumulate, only to be shared at a predetermined time. Other clubs are termed Village Savings and Loans (VSLs), and these are typically set up by non-governmental organisations on behalf of households. Due to the external assistance they receive, VSLs generally have better management structures than ASCAs and ROSCAs. Recent developments in relation to clubs include asset-based clubs (ABCs), which save assets such as household utensils and livestock. Chiroro et al. (2020) indicate that they are mainly composed of men and have been formed as a coping response to inflation, which usually erodes cash savings. The rich history of savings clubs in Zimbabwe continues to shape how many people view savings. As shown by Chiroro et al. (2020), these clubs developed different organisational and governance styles. A notable savings development movement that developed in the 1960s to harness community self-help activities was documented by Raftopoulos and Locaste (2001). In 1975, they recorded the presence of at least 3,000 savings clubs with a membership of 60,000, mainly composed of women. By 1998, they reported that the number of clubs in existence had increased to 7,000 with a total membership of 125,000. The author interviewed members of an ABC formed to confront the challenges of water access that many communities faced. This ABC is called the Legacy Borehole Drilling Trust. While the ultimate goal of the Trust is to improve farming, and food security, they have innovatively self-organised to provide access to water in a country with serious water shortages. The Trust has 320 members from across Zimbabwe, with some residing in United Kingdom, Ireland, South Africa, Australia, Botswana and Canada. The members are networked through a farming group with strong social capital and pursued the idea of owning a borehole drilling rig and vehicle so that each household will have two boreholes. A quote from the Trust’s public Facebook page indicates: The Legacy Borehole Drilling Organization was the brain child of clear thinking in the preparatory stages. It was not easy to recruit, organize and strategize. The initiation phase and definition phase

Social innovation and social policy in Sub-Saharan Africa  137 of our Legacy Drilling Project Management processes were built on each other to establish precisely what the project is expected to deliver to our farmers, while the planning phase sets out how this is to be achieved. We have a strong committed committee that is working flat out, 24/7 to make sure the project succeeds. Legacy Borehole Drilling Organization is here to change lives. We are a group of Zimbabwean people found in the whole world in UK, Ireland, South Africa, Australia, Botswana, Canada and around the globe. We managed to come together, put our minds together and form this organization to take agriculture in our country to another level.

As the savings made by the Trust were to be asset based, to avoid inflation, the members of the club agreed that they needed to communicate with a firm that assembles borehole drilling rigs and vehicles and develops an arrangement whereby they make monthly deposits to the firm until the funds are sufficient to purchase the rig. The Trust learnt this practice from grocery clubs that typically make savings with wholesalers and collect purchases worth the amount they contributed at the end of the year. Each of the members of the Trust was supposed to contribute US$1,000 over the agreed period, initially planned for between three and nine months. The total to be raised was US$320,000, which was estimated to be enough to purchase the borehole drilling rig and vehicle, and all the water surveying machines needed. Any other financial obligations that arose were divided equally and paid for by the members. With no member drop-out during the stages of making contributions and savings, the borehole drilling rig and vehicle was purchased by the Trust from South Africa, and it arrived in Zimbabwe in October 2020. In excitement, the Trust posted the following note on their Facebook page: What An Achievement: Positive thinking is powerful thinking. Team Legacy Borehole Drilling Trust, it is time for celebration. Mindfulness helps us to focus on one goal – to have our own rig. It helps us to be more relaxed, patient and compassionate towards the goal. There is no greater success than turning our true passion into a dream, and seeing its reality come to manifestation. Let’s continue to exercise our imagination and it will take us higher. Let’s continue to exercise our will and it will take us higher. Let’s continue to exercise our conscience and it will take us higher. Well done team Legacy Borehole Drilling Trust, keep the spirit of Ubuntu,4 together we can achieve greatness, we going to change our nation massively. Keep the spirit, this is the beginning of bigger projects to come. Our machine is heading to our home soil.

Since then, the project has been drilling boreholes for members in phases, based on their localities. As the drilling rig and vehicle entered from the southern border of Zimbabwe, it started servicing members in those areas before moving to other members based on their geographic location. To ease location, the rig and surveying machines are fitted with a tracking device. Once the drilling has been done for all members, the Trust will enter the next phase, which will most likely be hiring out the drilling rig and vehicle to others who need reliable water access.

SOCIAL INNOVATION TO COVER COSTS OF DEATH Groups formed to cover the costs of death have records dating back to 638 bc in Athens (Parrott 1985). There is also evidence of these groups in medieval Europe and England in particular, where they were registered as friendly associations (Cordery 2003). Johnston (1903) provides some of the background on how these groups operated in the Roman Empire. Their main objective was to insure for funeral expenses by paying a fee every week that was affordable to even the poorest families. In the event of bereavement in a member household, an

138  Handbook on social innovation and social policy agreed sum was disbursed for the funeral. The importance of burial societies in the West was significant compared to recent times, and shown by the decline in their numbers in the face of increased commercialisation of insurance products. In SSA, burial societies operate in a similar fashion as those in historic Europe. The literature shows that they exist in, among others, Botswana (Ngwenya 2003), Burkina Faso (Aliber and Ido 2002), Ethiopia (Bold and Dercon 2004), South Africa (Roth 2001), Tanzania (Dercon et al. 2006) and Zimbabwe (Hall 1987). Dafuleya and Tregenna (2020) show how burial societies and conventional funeral insurance, offered through formal markets, complement each other in providing a comprehensive cover for funeral expenses in Zimbabwe. This complementarity between informal and formal provision of funeral insurance partly explains why burial societies have continued to exist in SSA. Their continued survival is also explained by their innovativeness and dynamism in the face of challenging macroeconomic conditions (Dafuleya 2012). In an African set-up, death and burial have significant impact on the finances of the bereaved households. As detailed by Dafuleya and Zibagwe (2016), when bereavement occurs, the immediate task is to feed everyone who visits to pay their last respect to the dead. Immediate family members typically come to stay with the bereaved family for the entire mourning period, which lasts for about four days. Other costs that households face during bereavement include transport, a coffin, funeral parlour charges, a cemetery plot, contacting relatives, clothes for the deceased, and flowers. In Ethiopia, as will be shown below, burial societies have been innovating to cover these costs in ways that do not deplete households’ resources. Case Study 3: Iddirs (Burial Societies) in Ethiopia Insights from the literature (e.g., Dafuleya and Zibagwe 2016; Dercon et al. 2006) show that burial societies in Ethiopia are typically organisations made up of friends, relatives, workmates or community residents who come together to insure themselves and their extended families against death-related expenses. They are referred to as Iddirs in Ethiopia. Their finances rely on members’ monthly subscriptions to build up a risk-pooling fund. A one-off joining fee is paid by a new member; and to overcome moral hazards immediately after joining, a three-month waiting period must elapse before the member can start to claim. Thereafter, a member enjoys insurance cover for the whole family. In the event of death, a member or any person from their household notifies the committee, which then arranges for payment. The activities of the burial societies and their executive committees are governed by a constitution. If a burial society experiences more deaths, it depletes the funds of the organisation and starts drawing down on households’ meagre incomes and savings. Social innovation has therefore become a necessity for the financial sustainability of burial societies. Consequently, they have been involved in a lot of activities that either save funds or raise funds (Dafuleya 2012). To save funds, Dafuleya and Zibagwe (2016) show that some burial societies in Ethiopia have invested in assets that are typically required when there is a bereavement. These assets, which previously used to be hired, include tents, chairs, pots and other utensils. This has meant that burial societies now save money that otherwise would have been used by members to hire these facilities. Furthermore, instead of hiring labour for certain work that is typically needed during bereavement, burial society members provide their own labour. To raise funds, some burial societies hire out their assets to people who need them for events such as weddings, funerals or general meetings (Dafuleya 2012). This has seen burial societies

Social innovation and social policy in Sub-Saharan Africa  139 accumulating a lot of savings, which in turn reduce the burden to contribute large sums when faced with a lot of bereavements. A burial society named Lemsafa, established in 1993, is one example of many societies that have accumulated considerable financial assets. The society is registered with the Addis Ababa municipality and has 500 members in the capital. Between 2010 and 2018, when the author interviewed its executive members, the society maintained an average cash balance of US$60,000.

SOCIAL INNOVATION THROUGH BROKERS Some significant social challenges require both state and non-state actors to find innovative solutions. SSA has many NPOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) that seek to empower vulnerable communities or save the environment from degradation. In relatively more democratic states that respect the rule of law, many NPOs and/or CSOs enjoy freedom to tackle social challenges as they see fit. This may not be possible in countries where civil society is suppressed because of political turbulence and, as a result, CSOs have limited social space for operating other than to alleviate poverty. Consequently, governments that provide a conducive environment for civil society often have social innovations that extend beyond addressing the common challenges prioritised in SSA and also respond to equally damaging but lower priority issues. This is shown in the case drawn from South Africa below. Unlike the previous examples considered in this chapter, the case below does not describe a community innovating in response to a social problem it faces. Rather, this case presents an example of the brokerage capacity fulfilled by NPOs and/or CSOs. In this respect, civil society has crafted a niche function by bridging donors and communities or areas bedevilled by a social problem. Case Study 4: The GreenHouse Project in South Africa The South African White Paper on Science and Technology recognises the importance of civil society in the country’s drive towards social innovation (Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology 1996). The government of South Africa is not only responsive and open to initiatives from civil society, it also has financial incentives to promote their potential through incubators and social innovation competitions (Meldrum and Bonnici 2019). Civil society also searches for funds from non-state actors, including philanthropists and the public. The GreenHouse Project in South Africa is an example of an NPO in South Africa that featured in the Government Gazette of May 2012 as a successful social innovator. As described on its website:5 The GreenHouse Project is a registered section 21 not-for-profit company that runs the GreenHouse People’s Environmental Centre in Joubert Park, Johannesburg. The centre is a walk-in demonstration, outreach and information hub for environmental sustainability and sustainable living practices on: permaculture landscaping and organic food and herb gardening; materials reclamation for reuse and recycling; water harvesting and saving; environmental education and ‘green’ school tours.

The scope of The GreenHouse Project is diverse, yet its focus is to recreate cities ecologically and economically in sustainable ways, with special attention to promoting green livelihoods, energy systems, recycling resources and medicinal plants. The City of Johannesburg partners

140  Handbook on social innovation and social policy with The GreenHouse Project to disseminate practical strategies to enhance the quality of urban life.

CONCLUSIONS This chapter has provided two perspectives on SI in SSA. The first relates to people who decide to take action to address a social challenge they are faced with. In most cases, this happens in contexts where statutory social policy is weak and communities are too poor to address social risks through conventional markets. The markets for insurance are incomplete and therefore communities must create their own innovations to meet their needs and respond to the socio-economic stresses they experience. Given that these innovations are small scale and deal with small sums of money, they are typically rescue driven and rarely attract attention from policy-makers. However, where policy-makers have taken an interest in them, as in the case of CBHI schemes in Rwanda, community-based innovations have been scaled-up to national level and have proven to provide sound solutions to some of the social problems faced. Partnering with the government or donors helps to showcase the innovativeness of self-help organisations better than would have been the case if they operated on their own. Inclusiveness is also improved because those who cannot fully contribute financially may have their contributions subsidised. The second perspective relates to individual actors or NPOs who use their brokerage capacity to connect philanthropists or funders to societies that are going through challenges or misfortunes. Most often, these brokers are innovative enough to attract funds for a social cause they have identified and create ways to overcome these challenges. In many instances, brokers pursue social issues that are typically not pursued by self-help organisations. This is because the societal problems they address must also be in line with the objectives of the donors, which may not at times be in line with what communities prioritise. For instance, it is much easier to find brokers who deal with environment issues than it is to find self-help organisations prioritising these. States that do not respect the rule of law and have major political disturbances rarely invest in solving social challenges beyond common social services, such as health, water and sanitation. They typically prevent NPOs’ access to communities, leaving self-help organisations sprouting to assist themselves. Where states respect the rule of law and social policy is strong, civil society tends to be strong and typically partners with local governments to develop social interventions that have significant societal impacts. Three policy lessons emerge in line with these conclusions. First, whereas some of the self-help organisations may need funding or partnering with the state in order to scale up, most of them simply need a conducive environment to thrive. Such a conducive environment may come about when these organisations are involved in policy-making processes, where their inputs may be considered. Second, there is a need to create an umbrella body to represent the interest of self-help organisations and showcase their SI no matter how small scale they are. This could provide a platform for lesson sharing across different types of self-help organisations and may help to scale up their voices and participation in matters of social development. Government policy could earmark to partner self-help organisations with NPOs or social innovators who have been successful at using their brokerage for the purposes of mentorship. This may result in

Social innovation and social policy in Sub-Saharan Africa  141 skills transfer that is needed by most self-help organisations, as well as in helping them to create networks with philanthropists or funders. Third, there is a need to enumerate self-help organisations for the purposes of understanding the social challenges that they address in communities of SSA. Burial societies, for instance, are many in SSA, and they signal the need to insure against death expenses. At face value, spending to bury the dead may appear like a wasteful expenditure. Yet most communities see this as a way of making sure that those who are left behind do not use their money to bury the deceased. Thus, it may be an indirect survivor benefit scheme. Consequently, governments can develop rider survivor benefit programmes as an add-on to those with funeral insurance through burial societies. To encourage take-up, government may subsidise the rider survivor benefit programmes. It must be acknowledged that policy interventions in the operations of self-help organisations need to be carefully designed or else it may destroy their innovativeness. Most of these organisations are already sceptical of governments in their countries. Another limitation is that mentorship by NPOs or skilled social innovators will be a challenge because the world of funding is competitive. Mentoring self-help organisations may mean that the brokerage functions of NPOs and individual social innovators is threatened. Creating incentives for NPOs and social innovators to mentor self-help organisations is therefore salient.

NOTES 1.

This is a local term used to refer to the culture of collective work by community members aimed at pooling resources, particularly labour, to address challenges faced by households. 2. Accessed from https://​socialprotection​.org/​social​-protection​-responses​-covid​-19​-global​-south (2 December 2021). 3. For a detailed account of water shortages amid the COVID-19 pandemic in Zimbabwe, see https://​ afrobarometer​.org/​fr/​publications/​ad475​-zimbabweans​-grapple​-water​-shortage​-amidst​-covid​-19​ -pandemic (accessed on 20 February 2021). 4. ‘Ubuntu’ is a Ndebele (one of the local languages in Zimbabwe) term meaning ‘humanity’, typically used in the context of ‘I am because you are.’ 5. At http://​ghouse​.org​.za/​(accessed on 27 February 2022).

REFERENCES Aliber, M., and Ido, A. (2002) Microinsurance in Burkina Faso, Working Paper No. 29, Social Finance Programme. Barnum, H., and Kutzin, J. (1993) Public Hospitals in Developing Countries: Resource Use, Cost, Financing. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Birger, F., and Craissati, D. (Eds.). (2009) Abolishing School Fees in Africa: Lessons Learned in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Mozambique. Washington DC: The World Bank. Bitrán, R.A., and Giedion, U. (2003) Waivers and Exemptions for Health Services in Developing Countries. Washington DC: World Bank. Bold, T., and Dercon, S. (2004) Funeral Insurance Groups in Ethiopia, mimeo, University of Oxford. Chemouni, B. (2018) The political path to universal health coverage: Power, ideas and community-based health insurance in Rwanda, World Development, 106: 7–98. Chiroro, C., Chingarande, S.D., Dafuleya, G., and Ganda, Z. (2020) Pilot Study on Community Based Social Protection Organisations in Zimbabwe, Unpublished UNDP Report. Cordery, S. (2003) British Friendly Societies, 1750–1914. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

142  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Dafuleya, G. (2012) Enterprising in the face of death: Social entrepreneurship in African burial societies, Journal of Enterprising Culture, 20(03): 357–378. Dafuleya, G., and Tregenna, F. (2020) How effectively do households insure food consumption and assets against funeral expenses? The case of urban Zimbabwe, Review of Economics of the Household, 19(4): 987–1021. Dafuleya, G., and Zibagwe, S. (2016) The care market: Social capital and urban African funeral societies, in D. Lewandowski and G.W. Streich (Eds.), Urban Social Capital: Civil Society and City Life. London: Routledge (pp. 177–197). Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (1996) White paper on science and technology: Preparing for the 21st century. Pretoria: DACST. Available at https://​www​.gov​.za/​sites/​default/​files/​ gcis​_document/​201409/​science​technology​whitepaper​.pdf (accessed 18 February 2022). Dercon, S., De Weerdt, J., Bold, T., and Pankhurst, A. (2006) Group-based funeral insurance in Ethiopia and Tanzania, World Development, 34(4): 685–703. Farmer, P.E., Nutt, C.T., Wagner, C.M., Sekabaraga, C., Nuthulaganti, T., Weigel, J.L., Farmer, D.B., Habinshuti, A., Mugeni, S.D., Karasi, J.C., and Drobac, P.C. (2013) Reduced premature mortality in Rwanda: Lessons from success, British Medical Journal, 346: f65. GIZ (2019) Access to water and sanitation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Synthesis Report. Available at https://​www​.oecd​.org/​water/​GIZ​_2018​_Access​_Study​_Part​%20I​_Synthesis​_Report​.pdf (accessed 3 March 2022). Hall, A.L., and Midgley, J. (2004) Social Policy for Development. London: Sage. Hall, N.P. (1987) Self-reliance in practice: A study of burial societies in Harare, Zimbabwe, Journal of Social Development in Africa, 2(1): 49–71. Human Rights Watch (2021) Zimbabwe, Events of 2020. Available at https://​www​.hrw​.org/​world​ -report/​2021/​country​-chapters/​zimbabwe (accessed 3 March 2022). IMF (2014) Subsidy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa: Recent Progress and Challenges Ahead. Washington DC: IMF. Johnston, H.W. (1903) The Private Life of the Romans. Chicago, IL: Scott, Foresman and Co. Jones, W. (2018) Rwanda prescribes compulsory health care, 10 October. Available at https://​www​.ft​ .com/​content/​cec52ffa​-bfe2​-11e8​-84cd​-9e601db069b8 (accessed 12 December 2021). Masabo, J. (2019) Informality and social insurance in East Africa: An assessment of the law and practice, in M. Westerveld and M. Olivier (Eds.), Social Security Outside the Realm of the Employment Contract. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing (pp. 177–200). McPhail, A.A. (1993) The ‘five percent rule’ for improved water service: Can households afford more?, World Development, 21(6): 963–973. Meldrum, B., and Bonnici, F. (2019) How to Grow Social Innovation in South Africa. Available at https://​www​.s​ocialinnov​ationatlas​.net/​fileadmin/​PDF/​einzeln/​02​_SI​-in​-World​-Regions/​02​_19​_How​ -to​-Grow​-SI​-inSouth​-Africa​_Meldrum​-Bonnici​.pdf (accessed 27 May 2021). Ngwenya, B.N. (2003) Redefining kin and family social relations: Burial societies and emergency relief in Botswana, Journal of Social Development in Africa, 18(1): 85–110. Osei, L., Amoyaw, J., Boateng, G.O., Boamah, S., and Luginaah, I. (2015) The paradox of water accessibility: Understanding the temporal and spatial dimensions of access to improved water sources in Rwanda, Journal of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for Development, 5(4): 553–564. Osuga, B., and Nordberg, E. (1993) Effects of new service charges on attendance at rural health facilities in Kenya, East African Medical Journal, 70(10): 627–631. Owino, W. (1998) Public Health Sector Pricing Practices, Discussion Paper No. 13/98, Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, Nairobi, Kenya. Parrott, A.L. (1985) The Iron Road to Social Security. Lewis, Sussex: Book Guild Ltd. Pathé, D.F., and Butera, J.D. (2005) Community-based Health Insurance in Rwanda: Findings. Washington DC: The World Bank. Raftopoulos, B., and Lacoste, J.P. (2001) Savings mobilisation to micro-finance: A historical perspective on the Zimbabwe savings development movement, in International Conference on Livelihood, Savings and Debts in a Changing World: Developing Sociological and Anthropological Perspectives, Wageningen (pp.  14–16). Available at https://​www​.findevgateway​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​publications/​ files/​mfg​-en​-case​-study​-savings​-mobilisation​-to​-micro​-finance​-a​-historical​-perspective​-on​-the​ -zimbabwe​-savings​-development​-movement​-2001​.pdf (accessed 28 February 2022).

Social innovation and social policy in Sub-Saharan Africa  143 Ridde, V., Antwi, A.A., Boidin, B., Chemouni, B., Hane, F., and Touré, L. (2018) Time to abandon amateurism and volunteerism: Addressing tensions between the Alma-Ata principle of community participation and the effectiveness of community-based health insurance in Africa, BMJ Global Health, 3(Suppl 3): e001056. Roth, J. (2001) Informal microinsurance schemes: The case of funeral insurance in South Africa, Small Enterprise Development, 12: 39–50. Schneider, P., Diop, F.P., and Bucyana, S. (2000) Development and implementation of prepayment schemes in Rwanda, Technical Report 45. Bethesda, MD: Partnerships for Health Reform, Abt Associates. UNDP (2021) Informality and Social Protection in African Countries: A Forward-looking Assessment. Available at https://​www​.africa​.undp​.org/​content/​rba/​en/​home/​library/​reports/​informality​-and​-social​ -protection​-in​-african​-countries​-​-a​-forwar​.html (accessed 13 January 2022). UNICEF (2016) UNICEF’s Strategy for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 2016–2030 Executive Summary. Available at: https://​www​.unicef​.org/​documents/​unicef​-strategy​-water​-sanitation​-and​-hygiene​-2016​ -2030 (accessed 28 October 2021). Urban, S., Loveleen, D., and Yamabana, H. (2016) Progress towards Universal Health Coverage: Rwanda. Geneva: ILO. WHO (2001) Water for health: Taking charge. Geneva: WHO (document WHO/WSH/WWD/01.1). Available at http://​whqlibdoc​.who​.int/​hq/​2001/​WHO​_WSH​_WWD​_01​.1​.pdf (accessed 29 November 2022). WHO (2018) World Health Statistics 2018: Monitoring health for the sustainable development goals (SDGs). World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. WHO and UNICEF (2019) Progress on Household Drinking Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 2000–2017: Special Focus on Inequalities. Geneva: WHO. World Bank (2018) The State of Social Safety Nets. Washington DC: World Bank. World Health Statistics (2018) Monitoring Health for the SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals. Geneva: WHS.

12. Social innovation in the Middle East and North Africa Region: implications for social policy thinking and practice Rana Jawad

INTRODUCTION This chapter examines the main debates and evidence base that have emerged since the early 2000s on Social Innovation (SI) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Reflecting the geographical scope of this literature, the countries covered are in North Africa, the Southern Mediterranean, the Arab Gulf and also the Republic of Iran – hence there is particular attention to Arabic-speaking countries. As discussed in Greenwald and Constant (2015), the MENA region has diverse levels of wealth, population and economic structures. The chapter will account for these differences where it has scope to do so; for example, where the role of SI in relation to social policy is concerned, the most active non-state social ‘innovators’ have historically been in Egypt, Palestine, Morocco and Lebanon (in spite of difficult legal contexts) and the newer actors on the scene are the Arab Gulf states, led by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) where SI is a state-led endeavour promoting innovation in public services and in the private sector. Overall, SI in MENA has remained largely invisible from the social policy literature, hence the chapter provides a necessary descriptive overview of actors and types of organisations in the region. This is foregrounded by consideration of the international development policy context, particularly the role of influential donor agencies, such as the World Bank (WB) and United Nations (UN), in order to offer a suitable framing for examining SI in MENA. As such, the chapter proposes from the outset that ‘social innovation is also driven by simple welfare need’ (Nicholls, Simon and Gabriel, 2015:7), a factor that may have more resonance in highly indebted, economically struggling MENA countries that are under increased pressure to address social ills following the Covid-19 pandemic (Jeong, Waddah and Alhanaee, 2020) and continuously rising cost of living. To this end, a preliminary critical analysis is presented based on the core questions of this edited book, which are centred on the wider impact of SI on redistribution, citizen participation, effectiveness and efficiency. The chapter ends with a synthesis on what knowledge gaps need to be filled in order to advance the study and practice of SI in MENA social policy systems. The chapter is organised as follows. The first section explains how SI is understood in the present discussion, what its key corollary concepts are in the MENA region, and how this understanding is influenced by the policy of international actors like the World Bank and the EU, who are keen to promote economic development in low- and middle-income countries. Next, the current state of knowledge and evidence on SIs in the MENA region is reviewed, drawing from a wide range of non-academic and other sources. This shows a breadth of SI case studies from different Arab countries offering services, products, skills development and 144

Social innovation in the Middle East and North Africa region  145 capacity building in diverse sectors such as the environment, health, education and agriculture. Overall, the literature lauds the dynamism of MENA-based social entrepreneurs, but the two key messages that emerge are: (1) SI in MENA is a sector still facing major legal and institutional barriers for growth and sustainability and as such remains under-valued and poorly developed; (2) SI in MENA is heavily influenced by notions of social enterprise (as also noted in the European context by Borzaga and Bodini, 2014) and entrepreneurship, and as such is often ‘bifocal’ in nature (as per the definition of Pol and Ville, 2009), balancing a combination of social impact and financial sustainability demands. The data for the chapter are mainly document based and cover a representative sample of general SI literature sourced from the last decade using Scopus, Google Scholar, JSTOR and Web Science. In terms of SI in MENA, a comprehensive search of academic and major international policy documents was conducted using the above databases. This found that SI in MENA as a concern for social policy in the academic literature is almost entirely absent. The small number of very recent publications are located in business studies and public policy, with different emphases on private and public actors (see Jeong et al., 2020; Sadabadi and Mirzamani, 2021). The more commonly used terminology in the MENA literature is ‘innovation’ tout court and ‘social enterprise’ and ‘social entrepreneurship’, which reflect the more commonly used term of SI in the Western literature.

SOCIAL INNOVATION AS A CONCEPT FOR POLICYMAKING IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES Like other global policy concepts that often emanate from the public policy contexts of high-income, Northern Hemisphere countries, ‘innovation’ has entered the global discourses of international development and donor agencies who have an important bearing on the policy agendas of developing regions, including MENA (Mkandawire, 2007; World Bank, 2013, 2017). An extensive review of the academic, civil society and policy literatures revealed a constellation of corollary concepts that are in common usage in MENA: entrepreneurship, prosocial motivation, enterprise, corporate social responsibility, and small and medium enterprises. Less common is the usage of ‘social’ and ‘innovation’ together; the exceptions are referenced in this chapter. Hence, when innovation is discussed in academic and policy debates in the MENA region, it is first and foremost in relation to economic creativity and job creation. These, however, are seen in themselves as having social impact and necessary for economic development and social welfare in MENA due to the historically high rates of unemployment and increasing levels of poverty and inequality (Bibars, 2015; Mkandawire, 2007). The concept of social enterprise has received a relatively higher share of academic interest and is discussed in the next section. It is helpful to clarify how this chapter operationalises the concept of social innovation in a manner that can illuminate the MENA context. Rather than examine the wide range of definitions that have been reviewed elsewhere and are discussed by the editors of this book (Ayob, Teasdale and Fagan, 2016; Sinclair and Baglioni, 2014; Borzaga and Bodini, 2014), this chapter offers a framing for the present discussion based on the distinctive policy characteristics of the concept of SI from the perspective of the MENA region. As noted in the introduction, the contemporary challenges faced by the social policy systems of the MENA countries lead to a context whereby ‘social innovation is also driven by simple welfare need’

146  Handbook on social innovation and social policy (Nicholls et al., 2015:7). Pol and Ville (2009:883) pave the way through their insightful discussion of the differences and overlaps between social and business innovations, noting new categories of ‘pure’ and ‘bifocal’ innovations. Their now famous use of the term ‘desirable’ in the context of social innovation guides the discussion in this chapter and is re-stated below within the wider social policy relevant context of the definition itself: By and large, the existing definitions revolve around new ideas conducive to human welfare enhancement. We use this defining characteristic to suggest the following definition: an innovation is termed a social innovation if the implied new idea has the potential to improve either the quality or the quantity of life. Examples of innovations that fit nicely with this definition abound: innovations conducive to better education, better environmental quality and longer life expectancy are a few … free market economy will not produce the socially optimal amount of pure social innovations. Government has a role to play in correcting this market failure.

The role of the state is indeed the faultline in the policy resonance of SI, whether it is seen as only a counter-part actor to the market or whether it also needs to reply on the third-sector space of civil society and social enterprise (Bonifacio, 2014; Borzaga and Bodini, 2014). The ‘social innovation triad’ proposed by Nicholls et al. (2015) helps give shape to the space within which this debate around the role SI and the relative importance of state and non-state actors takes place. The difficulty for some developing country contexts, including the MENA region, is that the state was only briefly a powerful actor in public service provision in the two decades after post-war independence. What is also key to the concept of SI is its systemic nature; this is a concept fundamentally based on changing cognitive frameworks and therefore adopts a ‘heretical’ role (Banerjee, Carney and Hulgard, 2020), as summed up in Schumpeter’s notion of ‘creative destruction’ (Banerjee et al., 2020). Pol and Ville (2009) also note that many scholars emphasise the importance of the milieu in discussion of SI and the need to factor the specificity of time and place to better understand innovation. The above discussion of SI reflects the European policy context in the mid-2010s when SI dominated the social policy debates in the European Commission. Analysing formal and informal policy stances during a lengthy ethnographic study, Bonifacio (2014) notes that social innovation provided a new policy space for imagining social welfare beyond the confines of the post-war social European welfare state and an acceptance of private and civil society actors as new entrepreneurs in the development of solutions to ‘wicked social problems’, such as poverty, unemployment and stagnating social mobility (against a backdrop of low fiscal space and high budget deficits): SI seemed to combine these two apparently diverging demands in a harmonious synthesis: innovation could safeguard the conservative/liberal DNA of the Commission while its focus on the ‘social outcome’ could avoid the criticism that the EC was insensitive to, and unable to respond to, pressing social demands. From this perspective, SI appears more as a policy compromise than a novel policy stream. (159)

Bonifacio (2014) goes further by stating that, given the political impasse in many European countries, social innovation became a catch-all term suggesting that good ‘social outcomes’ can emerge from any sector outside of the state, thereby normalising the notion that the state is no longer the primary bearer of social rights. Writing in the years immediately following the 2009 financial crisis, Bonifacio (2014) notes the major challenges facing SI in the European policy discourse of the time, most notably difficulties of scale, replication and generalisability.

Social innovation in the Middle East and North Africa region  147 Indeed, the latter, he argues, is not simply about ‘enlargement of a successful SI initiative’ but ‘the creation of a new model or paradigm’ (150). As such, he ends on the rather grim note that SI may be a distraction from the deeper structural challenges that face societies at large: ‘endless material growth, debt economy, technology as a solution and not also, as a problem, and innovation as a necessity’ (165). The situation described above contrasts with the development policy discourses of major international actors such as the World Bank and the United Nations, which have presented innovation as a solution for weak state capacity, ineffective or absent public services and poor economic growth in developing countries (World Bank, 2010, 2013, 2017; UNDP, 2003). The World Bank produces a world ranking of innovation, and at the heart of its idea of innovation policy is the need for science and technology development to foster a knowledge economy (World Bank, 2010). As far back as 2003, the first Arab Human Development Report expressed harsh criticism of Arab countries by describing them as richer than they were developed and very far from developing knowledge societies. According to the World Bank, innovation refers to new technologies or practices that become widely used in a given society. Hence, ‘dissemination’ is a key element of innovation. Innovation is at the heart of economic development, social welfare, and protection of the environment. Innovation is fundamentally the task of the private sector and entrepreneurs. But history has shown that in moments of major transformations and crises, the role of governments has always been crucial. They alone can assume the launching of large-scale programs that help renew infrastructure while facilitating nationwide learning processes for innovative initiatives. (2010:1–2)

World Bank lending in the MENA region in education and health has increasingly taken the form of investment lending, spearheaded by two schemes particularly aimed at enhancing innovation: the Adaptable Program Loan (APL) and the Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL). These were established to support more flexibility and space for innovation during project implementation such as through risk taking and experimentation, thereby facilitating the discovery of country-specific solutions to key service delivery challenges (World Bank, 2017). One useful categorisation of countries that helps to situate MENA countries in the social innovation endeavour can be seen in Figure 12.1 below, which shows that MENA countries (which have an auditable record of SE) still do not have a favourable legal and institutional environment for the development of social enterprise as a key driver of innovation. Using the example of Tunisia, the World Bank (2017) notes that as they develop, social enterprises can have short- to longer-term goals, whereby in the short term they can fill a service gap by extending public services to poor households and in the medium term they can fulfil wider economic functions, such as by helping young people and women to access job markets and improving the efficiency of provision through public–private collaborations. In the longer term, SEs can contribute to economic and social cohesion as well as economic benefits through community-based development and decentralised service provision, and the generation of employment for populations not fully engaged in the labour force (World Bank, 2017).

148  Handbook on social innovation and social policy

Source: World Bank, 2017.

Figure 12.1

Categories of Social Entrepreneurship (SE)

THE CONDITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL INNOVATION IN MENA This section looks more closely at the evidence base on SIs in MENA societies. Arab countries in particular have been depicted in the academic literature as being socially conservative, tradition bound and at the extreme political end, authoritarian (Nour, 2014). There is even a view that, where family welfare is concerned, domestic violence even against children can often go unreported (Al Gharaibeha and Gibson, 2019). These factors combine with an urgent concern among governments and global policymakers that puts unemployment and weak economic growth at the top of the agenda. Indeed, ordinary citizens also express this concern, as can be seen through the Arab Barometer Surveys and regular episodes of civil unrest. Hence, as alluded to above, innovation in the MENA region is a concept understood first and foremost as being about the knowledge economy, technological development and dissemination, business enterprise and economic growth. A small number of academic publications assess innovation in the public sector, such as in the use of innovative technology in the UAE (Parahoo and Al-Nakeeb, 2019) or the case of an interactive policy lab discussion to solve disability care issues in Iran (Sadabadi and Mirzamani, 2021). It is, however, the social enterprise and corporate responsibility literature led by Jamali and Sidani (2012) and Jamali and Lanteri (2015) that has made possible the major strides in advancing the study of non-state business and social innovators in solving major social, economic and environmental problems in MENA. Equally, innovation has been highlighted by governments in the MENA region to describe their social

Social innovation in the Middle East and North Africa region  149 protection response to the Covid-19 pandemic, and the endeavour is spearheaded by technological solutions in access to education (see forthcoming UN-ESCWA, 2022 report). Schreiner and Jung (2018) provide a helpful review noting that SI is still a new concept with little application in MENA. Literature searches conducted for this chapter also corroborate their assessment that, rather than SI per se, the concepts that seem to be more relevant to the MENA region are social enterprise or social entrepreneurship (SE). According to Greenwald and Constant (2015:46), social entrepreneurship entails initiatives whose main goal is ‘positive social impact … using financially sustainable methods.’ This perspective overlaps with Pol and Ville’s (2009) ‘bifocal’ social innovation type and reflects the spectrum of issues that MENA social enterprises seek to grapple with, as chronicled by Greenwald and Constant (2015:n.p.). They focus on initiatives that target ‘marginalized or overlooked communities, in addition to those seeking to increase the provision of non-excludable “public goods” that are underprovided in the existing marketplace.’ There are four major international hubs or incubators of SEs in MENA: Ashoka, Synergos, the Schwab Foundation and the Skoll Foundation. Writing in the MENA context, Bibars (2015) alludes to the importance of systemic change that innovation promises and that even when they are addressing the most basic of needs related to lack for work, healthcare or adequate education, social enterprises in MENA are still managing to think outside the box and often use their own resources to defy the unhelpful legal, institutional and human resources base of MENA countries. Having said this, there are extensive examples of successful and even thriving social enterprises in MENA, which are documented below. Jamali and Sidani’s (2012) edited volume on Corporate Social Responsibility is insightful in showing the importance of religious, Islamic philanthropy in MENA (as also argued more recently by Jeong et al., 2020). It is evident from literature that the use and dissemination of technology and education resources are key themes of the MENA SE landscape. Schreiner and Jung’s (2018) review highlights ‘over one hundred initiatives pursuing social and environmental impact.’ The authors note the more extensive SI examples in Arab countries of the Southern Mediterranean (Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan) in contrast to the Arab Gulf states where there is a nascent but nevertheless growing SI sector, led as noted above by the UAE, which now has an official government strategy for innovation. It is argued here that an explanatory factor for this is the dominance of the centralised state system in the Arab Gulf Countries and the loyalties of Arab Gulf citizens to their ruling families and monarchies, which leaves little room for an independent civil society to develop. The SI sector in MENA has grown since the early 2000s and especially after the 2011 Arab uprisings, led in particular by educated activist youth (Bibars, 2015; Schreiner and Jung, 2018). As part of this, the social enterprise landscape is also expanding and becoming more inclusive, with increasing partnerships between NGOs, universities, governments and other stakeholders. A 2016 Reuters report, cited by Schreiner and Jung (2018), ranked the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey (the only MENA countries in the study) as some of the best places among the world’s largest economies for SE. However, these countries ranked low on access to funding, general public understanding of what SE is, and government policy support – all of which are determining factors for the growth of the SE sector. The key features of the MENA SI sector are described below.

150  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Profile of Innovators There is a good share of men and women founders that reflects the grassroots nature of SI in the region. The largest group are those aged between 20 and 35 with a higher than national average educational attainment, meaning a university degree. Many of the innovators may have also studied or lived abroad and come from higher-income social backgrounds; a large proportion of them have used their own resources to start their social enterprises (Bibars, 2015). A small proportion started their enterprises with grants or funds donated by family or friends (also noted in Zali, Bastian and Qureshi, 2013). A few innovators have been able to raise new income from sales, whilst others continue to rely on grants and awards – very few gained investment funding (Schreiner and Jung, 2018). A lack of venture capital is in fact seen as a major obstacle to SI development in MENA, as discussed below (World Bank, 2013). The list below shows a synthesis of key innovator or entrepreneur characteristics in MENA (Halabi, Kheir and Cochrane, 2017). This provides a preliminary view of the key characteristics and would benefit from further critical research to help refine and elaborate the categories, such as the categories of ‘human resources’ and ‘extracurricular activities’. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Social entrepreneurs are highly educated, most holding undergraduate or graduate degrees. Most social entrepreneurs found and fund SEs with family or friends. Many social entrepreneurs tackle social issues about which they have personal experiences. Social entrepreneurs suffer from a lack of adequate human resources. Social entrepreneurs operate in a mismatched legal and regulatory framework that does not suit their business models. 6. Social entrepreneurs are commonly engaged in extracurricular activities during their childhood and youth. 7. Social entrepreneurs are likely to have studied, lived or worked abroad. 8. Most social entrepreneurs pursue systematic change and reach out to their governments. 9. Social entrepreneurs are the first to devise new ways to deliver goods and services across all sectors in their markets. 10. Social entrepreneurs face multiple challenges related to financing their operations. Types of Innovations The sectors most likely to be involved in social entrepreneurship are education, health, agriculture and sustainable development, micro-finance, SME development, poverty reduction and support for refugees (Bibars, 2015; Hill and Nocentini, 2015; Greenwald and Constant, 2015; Schreiner and Jung, 2018). A sample of the examples is below. Education Notable SI examples are Thaki (Palestine/Jordan), which supports both refugees and disadvantaged children through self-paced learning courses and motivational electronic tools. Thaki also collects and repurposes donated electronic devices from large corporations to support high-quality education among youth in informal settlements. Another organisation in Morocco is Al Jisr, which has sought to fill the funding gap left by the decline of the government mentorship scheme. It started an ‘adopt-a-school’ programme where companies partner with parents, students and teachers to diagnose a school’s weakness and produce a plan of action to

Social innovation in the Middle East and North Africa region  151 address it, including financial and in-kind support as well as training in entrepreneurship and financial management. There is also a range of design and handicraft-based enterprises, which are common and support national heritage projects. These have traditionally played a key role in the development policies of low- and middle-income countries in MENA. They target women and support them in setting up small businesses to produce a range of hand-made and locally produced goods, such as food items, traditional clothing, embroidery and decorative handicrafts. This links to the strong emphasis among international and national policymakers in MENA on small and medium-sized enterprise as a strategic approach to social and economic development and also gender empowerment. Poverty alleviation and sustainable development Notable SIs include the Zikra Initiative (Jordan), which supports ‘exchange tourism’; here, marginalised community residents teach higher-income urban residents new skills from their traditions and lifestyle, thereby earning a source of income and supporting inter-community understanding. A notable micro-finance initiative is Enda Tamweel (Tunisia), which has grown significantly as a small loans provider from an initial portfolio of USD20,000 in 1995 to USD450 million and 215,600 clients in 2012. It is one of the highest-ranked micro-finance initiatives in the world. Sekem (Egypt) is one of the oldest sustainable development social enterprises in the region, founded in 1977. Based on a holistic approach to sustainable, community-based development, it supports a wide range of initiatives, from organic food production, to sustainable pharmaceuticals and healthcare, a school, a vocational centre. It also founded the Heliopolis University for Sustainable Development (Schreiner and Jung, 2018). Some SIs also work on social cohesion, such as Care for Love in Egypt and OffreJoie in Lebanon. Environment and agriculture Some SIs are helping to build the renewable sector and provide local solutions to food insecurity. An agricultural marketing platform in Turkey, tarimsalpazarlama.com, facilitates farmers’ access to markets where they can see their crops while providing information on good farming techniques and preventable diseases. Hemaya (Egypt) monitors, regulates and provides awareness of safe waste disposal procedures in the Sinai region and collects the waste of tens of thousands of local residents, which is then used as cattle feed or sent to Cairo for recycling. Recycle Beirut (Lebanon) addresses the refugee employment crisis in the country while also compensating for inefficient public waste management by hiring refugees to manage the city’s waste and recycling. Health Notable SIs are Hey Doc! (Lebanon, UAE), which is a ‘telemedicine platform that connects patients with doctors all over the world, providing refugees, marginalised groups, and rural dwellers faster and cheaper access to health professionals’ (Schreiner and Jung, 2018). Shamseya (Egypt) provides community-based problem-solving approaches to local healthcare through access to key services and education about how to receive and monitor good healthcare. B-fit Sport and Healthy Living Centres for Women (Turkey) is a franchise of exercise centres in Turkey, which aims to empower women through exercise, education and

152  Handbook on social innovation and social policy entrepreneurship. Its 250 centres are run by women, and organise seminars, courses, and other activities.

FACTORS DETERMINING THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE SI SECTOR IN MENA Various authors identify a range of factors that play a key role in supporting the expansion and development of SI in MENA (Bibars, 2015; Hill and Nocentini, 2015; Greenwald and Constant, 2015; Schreiner and Jung, 2018). First, are the new generation of MENA-based incubators, accelerators, hubs and intermediary actors that provide the enabling environment with funding, training, a sense of belonging and capacity building. Notable examples are: Imece (Turkey), which is a social innovation platform that brings together individuals and institutions dealing with social issues and provides an incubation process; Ashoka Arab World (Egypt), which was one of the first to bring the concept of social innovation and entrepreneurship to the region, running the Arab World Social Innovation Forum and a thriving fellowship programme; and RISE Egypt, which utilises a global network of experts, investors and researchers to accelerate entrepreneurship for development in Egypt. Other less active hubs are Aspire Women and Nahdet El Mahrousa, which support start-ups through technological training and business service development. There is a clear overlap between business and social innovation, and this is because a country like Egypt needs economic development too. Other hubs in Lebanon and Tunisia are Jezzine and Cogite, which also provide resources, workshops and training spaces for innovators. The second set of key actors supporting innovation, though this is business oriented, are universities. They are developing a dedicated set of programmes and courses, such as Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business (Dubai) MBA program, which has a concentration in entrepreneurship and innovation. INSEAD Business School (Abu Dhabi) offers a Social Entrepreneurship Programme, whilst Heliopolis University (Egypt), started by the social enterprise Sekem, is based entirely on sustainable development principles, and Sagesse University’s NGO Management programme in Lebanon has a partnership with the Alliance for Social Entrepreneurship. In Turkey, Bilgi University has a social incubation centre and Sabanci University offers courses on social innovation and entrepreneurship. A third source of support for innovation are impact investing and social investment funds in MENA, which have grown over the years through recognition of the hybrid nature of the private sector and social impact. This again relates to the bifocal nature of social innovation highlighted in the work of Pol and Ville (2009). In 2016, the market was an estimated $1.8bn USD out of $114bn globally. A number of external impact investors have, or are considering, expansion in MENA, and the potential for Islamic finance (such as lending for the purchase of a house or for paying debts) in the social sector is increasingly being recognised. Responding to this gap, in 2016 the UNDP partnered with the Islamic Development Bank to create the Global Islamic Finance and Impact Investing Platform, which connects Islamic financiers with impact investors and impact enterprises to support innovative solutions to address sustainable development challenges (Schreiner and Jung, 2018). One final source is government support for social innovation, which has historically been a weak if not absent source in MENA. Some recent developments can be seen in the UAE Ministry of Community Development, which launched a Social Innovation Platform in 2016.

Social innovation in the Middle East and North Africa region  153 This encourages the sharing of creative and innovative ideas that support social services in the UAE, and establishing a culture of SI as a stepping-stone for sustainable development. In Turkey, the European Union is sponsoring the Employment and Social Innovation Programme, which is under the government’s Presidency of Social, Regional and Innovation Policies. One branch of the program is specifically looking at micro-finance and social entrepreneurship. Key challenges remain, however, in supporting the development of SI. Many of these are similar to those faced by other business-oriented enterprises. The three major ones are the policy and legal setting, lack of funding, and prevailing cultural norms that do not recognise the value of SI (Bibars, 2015). These reflect the lack of understanding in MENA countries of the capacity of a profit-making enterprise to also engage in social justice-oriented activities, hence the laws do not make tax concessions, for example, for such organisations. This also corresponds with a context in which business is considered as a separate endeavour to interventions that seek to enhance non-metric outcomes such as empowerment or equality. Most innovators in MENA choose to register as non-governmental organisations because there are no laws that allow them to benefit from special status of social enterprises (Greenwald and Constant, 2015; Hill and Nocentini, 2015). Although easier to register than a commercial enterprise, NGOs struggle with restrictive regulatory environments, such as limits on the types of activities that can be undertaken, arbitrary law enforcement (such contradictory information about the rights and responsibilities of NGOs), restrictions on engagement with and receiving funding from foreign organisations, restrictions on fund-raising and income-generating activities, and difficult registration procedures. There are some sectors of Arab media that sometimes criticise NGOs and those that receive foreign funding as covertly promoting foreign agendas. If the commercial registration route is chosen, there is a lack of tax exemptions and regulations applied to large corporations are also imposed on start-ups. This makes it difficult for the SI to provide a service of public benefit while simultaneously pursuing low returns. A second major impediment is, therefore, funding. Many social innovators often use their own private resources to set up and sustain an SI. Access to international investment or incubators exists, but this is not enough nor sustainable. SIs are therefore caught between NGOs that are favoured by international donor agencies and investment firms that are not interested in social impact. This results in limited project-based work that cannot be scaled up. Schreiner and Jung (2018) argue that a new model of work is required where poor people have access to funding for social innovation, although it is also noted that Arab Gulf states may have greater funding than other MENA countries. A final impediment is the lack of public and policy awareness of the important social impact of SIs. One of the main reasons cited for this lack of awareness is low visibility to the SI scene, which is mainly urban based and led by those with education and foreign language skills. There is also poor understanding of the bifocal nature of social innovation where private-sector work can combine with social benefit aims. In addition, a number of cultural barriers exist: weak recognition of the contribution of SIs is one of these as well as the dominance of philanthropy and religion charities providing a modicum of social welfare in MENA countries. However, various authors see Islamic principles as important motivators of corporate social responsibility and social enterprise (Jamali and Lanteri, 2015; Jeong et al., 2020). In addition, Jeong et al. (2020) note that the relatively wealthy UAE citizens are more likely to engage in ‘prosocial’ innovations. Some incubators are actively trying to change public attitudes towards how SIs can help young people; for example, SoUK LB (Lebanon) and Consult and Coach for a Cause

154  Handbook on social innovation and social policy (UAE), promote positive awareness about social business models and are creating a network of socially conscious professionals and SEs.

ASSESSING THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SIS IN MENA FOR SOCIAL POLICY This section reviews the data presented so far according to the core aims of this book: (1) What conditions and social issues come to be recognised as ‘social problems’, and why? (2) What interventions are effective and efficient? (3) Distributional issues – who pays for and benefits from social interventions? (4) Capability and citizenship – how (if at all) are societies organised to provide welfare, ensure participation and promote social justice? In order to answer these questions, it is helpful to understand the wider social policy context within which SIs operate. The MENA region (and Arab countries in particular) exercises a type of social contract generally described by expert analysts as an ‘autocratic bargain’. This skewed political settlement was historically based on the provision of free health and education, government jobs for all graduates and low prices for necessities, such as bread and fuel, but limited political and civil liberties. In practice it mainly benefited the urban middle classes and became aligned with factional loyalties. The persistence of social welfare systems that have poor coverage and weak resources, even after the Arab Spring events of 2011, means that political systems in MENA have been unable to provide quality services in a domestic context of accelerated population growth and increasing poverty, and a global context of free capital, international labour flows and private-sector dominance. The historical dependence on oil revenues in the region not only fostered authoritarian rule, but also enabled inefficient domestic political economies based on clientelism and misuse of public funds. Since the 1990s, the neo-liberal orthodoxy that has governed social and economic policies across the world also made its mark on MENA countries but with greater emphasis on privatisation and economic de-regulation than on political reforms for greater freedoms. Against this background, SIs that have been able to enter the development and social protection sectors have played a key role in addressing the basic social welfare needs of MENA populations as noted above, such as by providing education, health, sustainable development and poverty alleviation services. However, further research is needed to examine more rigorously the impact of these SIs on key social policy denominators such as redistribution, citizens’ participation and equity. The literature abounds with case study examples of good practice and it is clear that, at least in their objectives, SIs have targeted disadvantaged or marginalised groups. But the extent to which these efforts can become sustainable or generalisable across large populations of poor or unemployed groups remains to be seen. Arguably, the most significant source of non-state social welfare for vulnerable populations, particularly those employed in the informal sector, are religious welfare organisations. This is true for all communities in the MENA region. Qualitative research suggests that the large welfare organisations such as Caritas may have budgets in the tens of millions (US$) and reach beneficiaries in the tens of thousands. These organisations have been in operation for decades and have become entrenched in their societies. Often, they are linked to larger networks of schools and hospitals, and although they may charge fees for some of their services, they do provide both in-cash and in-kind services to the extremely poor. Religious groups tend to rely

Social innovation in the Middle East and North Africa region  155 on religiously based fund-raising activities, such as during the month of Ramadan, or they invoke religious teachings about paying zakat, helping orphans and supporting the family as the basic unit of society. In sectarian societies such as Lebanon and Iraq, these social welfare organisations are often linked to religious and political leaders and parties and, as such, serve to entrench social divisions even if they might offer services to those who are in need or from outside their sect. The SI sector would need to formulate a strong identity and funding base to match the religious welfare sector in MENA. A much smaller set of innovations is arising in the public sector in MENA countries. Following the notion that in the public sector, social innovation can motivate citizens to play an active role in the innovation process and strengthen public values such as effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy, Parahoo and Al-Nakeeb (2019) discuss a case study of the UAE where technological and organisational innovation helped engage citizens better. Al Gharaibeha and Gibson (2019) discuss another case study regarding child abuse in the UAE, whereby innovations in the reporting of cases helped public authorities address the matter more effectively and gained the trust of citizens. As noted by Bibars (2015) and Greenwald and Constant (2015), SE or SI in MENA reflects a new world of organisational structures, operating procedures and policy discourses. As such, it remains a sector with unfulfilled potential in solving social problems due to lack of financial investment, effective networks for stakeholder collaboration, partnerships with media, and dissemination and documentation of best practice. According to these authors, socialisation into mainstream governance and policymaking can support the co-production of policies that enable the success and growth of creative, demand-driven and successful initiatives. The informal sector is especially important in this regard since some authors argue that it is the arena in which many SIs emerge. However, it is important to note that these ideas are discussed against a background of weak and often partisan state activities in the public sphere, hence citizen mobilisation through SI is seen as a positive outcome. This does not solve the challenge of weak political and social rights for citizens in MENA countries; and if reliance on investment funding is required, then the prospects for redistribution are unclear.

CONCLUSION This chapter has provided an overview of SI in MENA and begun to construct a more critical examination of its nature and scope in relation to key principles of social policy outlined in this book. Based on an extensive document search of SI and SE (also including CSR) in MENA and backed up by the author’s research in the region, some key conclusions have emerged. The main thrust of the literature on SIs and SEs is still concerned with the dynamics of organisational growth and sector development of the field. There is a good range of case study material reported about different types of initiatives in the fields of education, health, poverty alleviation, social cohesion, sustainable development and agriculture. The literature lauds the impact of these, but there is no single standard of assessment and there is certainly no significant evidence base on issues of redistribution and efficiency – although we can glimpse some substantial achievements in relation to the inclusion of disadvantaged groups and effectiveness of service coverage. There is no doubt that the social welfare needs and economic challenges facing MENA populations are already significant and continue to escalate in the aftermath of Covid-19 and the spread of conflict in many countries. As such, SEs and SIs have emerged

156  Handbook on social innovation and social policy both spontaneously and through the efforts of international incubators to address these many challenges, especially where the statutory state services are missing. Hence, the SI field is still marked by the need to establish itself formally in a legal and institutional context that is not entirely favourable. How this identity will be forged is important and may parallel the existing experiences of NGOs in the region, which operate in oppositional mode to the state or are co-opted by political and business elites. This is not to say that there are no independent SIs, as there are indeed independent NGOs. Rather, political and institutional manoeuvring is required if the SI sector is to become more formally recognised in MENA and better established. Regarding other important social policy concerns such as effectiveness, efficiency and redistribution, as hinted above, further research is needed. Questions that emerge from the review conducted here are: in terms of redistribution, if SIs and SEs in MENA are dependent on personal funding or other voluntary and private-sector sources such as philanthropy, international investment and donor grants, what impact can this truly have on domestic wealth redistribution? Given the already high levels of income inequality in MENA and close association between political and business elites, further research should better assess the national and international political economy of the SE sector in MENA. Indeed, when funding and sustainability are a concern for SIs, they may well have to compromise their capacity for redistribution by focusing on more easily fundable direct service delivery. Whilst it is laudable that entrepreneurs are finding solutions to urgent social needs in MENA countries, where does this leave the social contract and state obligations to citizens? By-passing the state or compensating for gaps in public services may only prolong the lack of trust in state services. Moreover, countries that are beginning to institutionalise the innovation discourses are still very small in number, although the UAE stands out as one exception. But again the evidence base is still weak in terms of structural changes to the state public service system. For now, it would seem that the social policy systems in MENA remain rooted in the twin pillars of charity (whether religiously motivated or philanthropic) and an increasingly under-resourced state welfare system based on targeting and employment-based social insurance funds. Social entrepreneurs remain a small segment of this landscape whose wider impact on social welfare is restricted by a challenging institutional environment and lack of public awareness about the compatibility of financial sustainability and social impact. In an ironic twist of the policy logic we now face between SI and social policy, the protagonist of social policy discourses in the developing world and one-time director of UNRISD, Thandika Mkandawire, made a key argument in the mid-2000s as the term ‘social policy’ itself began to take root in the economic-driven field of international development: social policy could be the driver of innovation in developing countries because, when done well, it supports human capital development, productivity, and a range of other social and political benefits. The present author has argued the same for MENA countries for the best part of the last two decades. In the words of Mkandawire, [S]ocial policy can be innovation-enhancing, through its effects on human capital and skill formation; its capacity to alleviate risk and uncertainty by underpinning the social pacts necessary for managing the contractual nature of labour markets; its incorporation of labour into the saving-investment regime and inducement of long-term perspectives in the financial sector; and its contribution to political stability. (2007:13)

Social innovation in the Middle East and North Africa region  157

REFERENCES Al Gharaibeha, F., and Gibson, L. (2019) ‘Care and rehabilitation services to child victims of abuse in the United Arab Emirates: Examples of innovation’, Children and Youth Services Review, 101: 87–98. Ayob, N., Teasdale. S., and Fagan, K. (2016) ‘How social innovation “came to be”: Tracing the evolution of a contested concept’, Journal of Social Policy, 45(4): 635–653. Banerjee, S., Carney, S., and Hulgard, L. (eds) (2020) People-Centred Social Innovation: Global Perspectives on an Emerging Paradigm. Taylor & Francis. Bibars, I. (2015) ‘A Decade of Social Entrepreneurship in the Region’, in Jamali, D., and Lanteri, A. (eds), Social Entrepreneurship in the Middle East, Volume 1. Palgrave Macmillan: 14–38. Bonifacio, M. (2014) ‘Social innovation: A novel policy stream or a policy compromise? An EU perspective’, European Review, 22(1): 145–169. Borzaga, C., and Bodini, R. (2014) ‘What to make of social innovation? Towards a framework for policy development’, Social Policy & Society, 13(3): 411–421. Greenwald, D., and Constant, S. (2015) ‘The Context for Social Entrepreneurship in the Middle East’, in Jamali, D., and Lanteri, A. (eds), Social Entrepreneurship in the Middle East, Volume 1. Palgrave Macmillan: 39–66. Halabi, S., Kheir, S., and Cochrane, P. (2017) Social Enterprise Development in the Middle East and North Africa: A Qualitative Analysis of Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Occupied Palestine. Cairo, Egypt and Beirut, Lebanon, Wamda, accessed on 14 February 2022 at https://​wamda​-prod​.s3​.amazonaws​ .com/​resource​-url/​e2981f10ea87448​.pdf Hill, R., and Nocentini, M. (2015) ‘Social Enterprise in the MENA Region: False Hope or New Dawn?’, in Jamali, D., and Lanteri, A. (eds), Social Entrepreneurship in the Middle East, Volume 1. Palgrave Macmillan: 84–106. Jamali, D., and Lanteri, A. (eds) (2015) Social Entrepreneurship in the Middle East: Volume 1. Palgrave Macmillan. Jamali, D., and Sidani, Y. (2012) ‘Introduction: CSR in the Middle East: Fresh Perspectives’, in Jamali, D., and Sidani, Y. (eds), CSR in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1057/​ 9781137266200​_1 Jeong, S., Waddah, A., and Alhanaee, D. (2020) ‘Prosocial motivation as a driver of social innovation in the UAE’, Social Science Quarterly, 101(7): 2450–2464. Mkandawire, T. (2007) ‘Transformative social policy and innovation’, The European Journal of Development Research, 19(1): 13–29. Nicholls, A., Simon, J., and Gabriel, M. (eds) (2015) New Frontiers in Social Innovation Research. Palgrave Macmillan, accessed on 20 November 2023 at https://​library​.oapen​.org/​bitstream/​handle/​20​ .500​.12657/​27885/​1002117​.pdf​?sequence​=​1 Nour, S. (2014) ‘Prospects for transition to a knowledge-based economy in the Arab region’, World Journal of Science, Technology and Sustainable Development, 11(4): 256–270. Parahoo, S., and Al-Nakeeb, A. (2019) ‘Investigating antecedents of social innovation in public sector using a service ecosystem lens’, International Review on Public and Nonprofit Marketing, 16: 235–253. Pol, E., and Ville, S. (2009) ‘Social innovation: Buzz word or enduring term?’, The Journal of Socio-Economics, 38(6): 878–885. Sadabadi, A.A., and Mirzamani, A. (2021) ‘The sustainable development goals and leadership in public sector: A case study of social innovation in the disability sector of Iran’, Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 36(2): 286–300. Schreiner, K., and Jung, J. (2018) ‘An overview of social innovation in the Middle East and North Africa’, Social Innovation Exchange, accessed on 2 February 2022 at https://​soci​alinnovati​onexchange​.org/​ search/​node/​MENA Sinclair, S., and Baglioni, S. (2014) ‘Review article: Social Innovation and Social Policy – promises and risks’, Social Policy & Society, 13(3): 469–476. UN-ESCWA (2022) The COVID-19 Pandemic in the Arab Region: An Opportunity to Reform Social Protection Systems, accessed on 20 November 2023 at https://​publications​.unescwa​.org/​2022/​sdr4/​ index​.html

158  Handbook on social innovation and social policy United Nations Development Programme (2003) Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society. United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2003, accessed on 2 February 2022 at http://​www​.arab​-hdr​.org/​publications/​other/​ahdr/​ ahdr2003e. pdf World Bank (2010) Innovation Policy: A Guide for Developing Countries. World Bank Group, accessed on 14 February 2022 at https://​openknowledge​.worldbank​.org/​bitstream/​handle/​10986/​2460/​54893​ 0PUB0EPI11​C10Dislose​d061312010​.pdf​?sequence​=​1​&​isAllowed​=​y World Bank (2013) Transforming Arab Economies: Traveling the Knowledge and Innovation Road. World Bank Group. World Bank (2017) Social Entrepreneurship in Tunisia: Achievements and Way Forward. World Bank Group. Zali, M.R., Bastian, B.L., and Qureshi, S. (2013) ‘Promoting innovation in the MENA region: The role of social norms and individual factors in entrepreneurial networks’, International Journal of Business and Globalisation, 11(4): 413–426.

13. Exploring interrelationships between social innovation, social policy, and people-centred social change in India Swati Banerjee, Abdul Shaban and Dipannita Bhattacharjee

INTRODUCTION Banerjee (2018) interrogates whether social innovation (SI) can offer a pathway to guide the future of development and social policy in the South Asian region. In particular, she addresses some of the specific and emerging concerns in the region, including poverty and deepening inequities. Such complexities and subjective realities – rooted in structural constructs of power and intersectionalities – are often neither represented nor developed from ideas into practice within ‘mainstream’ development and social change processes nor in conventional social policy. This chapter thus critically explores the interface between social innovation and social policy to address such complex societal concerns and marginalities at the grassroots in South Asia, with a focus on India. This is explored by highlighting some key social policies and unpacking the different processes involved in their development and operation, including the drivers, social context, and social needs addressed; the key objectives and innovative strategies; the challenge of emerging social values; and the barriers faced in transforming marginalities at the grassroots. The majority of people living in poverty are found in Asia, the Pacific region, and Sub-Saharan Africa (Nkonya et al., 2011). Whereas in Africa most of the poor live in low-income countries, in Asia they are often found in lower middle-income countries, such as India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, and in upper middle-income countries like China (Braun & Gatzweiler, 2014). Globally, the rise in interrelated socio-economic problems is aggravated as a result of political unrests and war leading to refugee crisis, unemployment, and poverty (Terstriep & Kleverbeck, 2018). This is particularly true in the case of South Asia, where multidimensional forms of marginalization as a result of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and social exclusion are a key characteristic of many societies. While there has been a significant reduction in absolute poverty in the developing world (income poverty defined at US $1.25/day per capita declined from 43 per cent to 22 per cent from 1990 to 2008 (Ahmed, Hill, & Naeem, 2014), the number of people living in extreme poverty is still unacceptably high and has been further aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Empirical research suggests that the reduction in poverty has been more effective for people living just below the poverty line than for those at the bottom rung in terms of income (Braun, Hill, & Pandya-Lorch, 2009). The extreme poor are excluded due to structural inequities, including identities of caste, ethnicity, gender, race, and their intersectionalities, leading to lack of assets and education. These groups suffer from chronic poverty that is reproduced across generations and is linked to their marginality (Thorat, 2014).

159

160  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Research shows that the primary causes of poverty in India are closely linked to social exclusion, whereby certain groups are denied equal access to opportunities, such as sources of income, education, and participation in decision-making processes. Such exclusion is based on societal and market norms and, as argued by Sen (2000), such unfair exclusion and/or unfair inclusion with respect to opportunities negatively affects the capabilities of individuals, thus aggravating poverty among socially excluded groups. Exclusion of marginalized groups is influenced by multiple structural and systemic institutions and societal norms. In India, caste and gender are the two overarching and overlapping structures that determine the extent of marginalization of individuals and groups. Socio-cultural norms limit women’s ownership and control over productive resources. Furthermore, women’s labour, both productive and reproductive, is usually devalued. Constraints on mobility and reproductive roles significantly affect women from marginalized communities as they receive less and poorer education and are, therefore, bound to low-paying jobs. Hence, the expanse and experience of poverty is more severe for women compared to men, resulting in the feminization of poverty. Women in general have less access to food, education, healthcare, and other opportunities that may help them to move out of the poverty cycle. According to Sender (2003), the poorest rural households in Asia are characterized by a high ratio of adult females to adult males in household composition and are primarily dependant on women’s earnings. The caste system in India is another institutionalized hierarchical structure that produces and sustains the social exclusion of certain groups. Dalits or Scheduled Castes occupy the lowest position in this hierarchy. Similarly to women, they have also been historically excluded from ownership and control of the means of production, such as land, which is seen to be a symbol of social status. Since the caste system is justified by notions of purity and pollution, Dalits have traditionally been involved in occupations that are deemed polluting, such as manual scavenging and removing carcasses of dead animals. While there have been some changes in the economic condition of Dalits, they are still heavily involved in occupations that are looked down upon by the rest of society. Due to the lack of ownership of material assets, individuals from these communities are heavily dependent on wage labour. Furthermore, lack of access to education and discrimination in educational institutions have resulted in large gaps in educational status between Scheduled Castes and other castes. This, coupled with societal discrimination, affects their ability to move to better-paying work, making them vulnerable to chronic poverty. Individuals inhabiting the intersections of caste and gender experience multiple and extreme levels of discrimination. Poverty also translates into poor human development indicators among vulnerable groups. This is reflected in their poor educational status, higher dropout rates, and higher infant and maternal mortality rates. Furthermore, socio-cultural norms coupled with economic causes, such as low incomes, ensure that marginalized groups cannot only not afford to buy land, but are also not permitted to do so. Social exclusion is therefore transmitted across generations as this is connected to group and community identity, thus perpetuating the marginal status of these groups (Thorat, 2007). UNICEF’s report on the state of the world’s children highlights that about 81 per cent of children in the least-developed countries do not have access to early childhood education (UNICEF, 2021). While there has been some progress in reducing the number of out-of-school children, globally, there were still 64 million primary school-age children out of school in 2020. In West and Central Africa, less than 30 per cent of the children from the poorest households complete primary education, while girls remain at a disadvantage in accessing primary

Exploring interrelationships in India  161 education in Africa and South Asia (UNICEF, 2022). The International Labour Organization estimates that in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific region, nine out of ten children are involved in paid work (ILO, 2017). Therefore, the sustainable development challenges in South Asia include unemployment or lack of adequate income, hunger, little or no education, and limited access to healthcare and jobs, among other factors. Women and other marginalized communities face multiple levels of oppression due to traditional practices, a lack of effective legal protection, and unfair market practices such as lower wages and a monopoly over resources by privileged sections of the community. Addressing poverty effectively is therefore not just a matter of targeted poverty alleviation programs. In India, as poverty affects some groups disproportionately, effective poverty elimination strategies should address the structural causes of social exclusion and discrimination. This chapter discusses the importance of social innovation and public policies in bringing about transformative social change and development, particularly in the context of India. It also critically reviews some of the policies recently launched, aimed at bringing about such transformative change in Indian society. The next section of the chapter discusses the role of social policy in addressing marginalities in countries like India, and is followed by a discussion of People-Centred Social Innovation. The Social Policy and Social Innovation Ecosystem in India is then discussed, with a particular focus on the 2020 National Education Policy. By way of conclusion, the last section outlines a future research agenda.

ROLE OF SOCIAL POLICY IN ADDRESSING MARGINALITIES Social exclusion may be reproduced through deliberate government policies or as a result of policy blindness when it comes to excluded groups. Sustainable livelihood options are a key requirement in effective poverty alleviation strategies. While livelihood can simply be defined as the means of living and sustenance, Chambers (1995) defined livelihood as the means of gaining a living, including tangible assets (resources and stores), intangible assets (claims and access), and livelihood capabilities, including coping abilities, opportunities, and diverse freedoms. This definition marks a shift from poverty alleviation programmes targeted towards basic needs and income generation towards the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach, that includes having access and control over material and non-material resources in the form of land, property, rights, power, etc. Different groups have different levels of access and control over such resources, and this status quo is retained and reproduced by State reforms and policies. For instance, the series of land reforms implemented in India since the 1970s has focused on allocating land titles to marginalized groups. This has led to an increase in purchasing power amongst the rural poor. While largely successful in changing land ownership amongst men, the gender-blind nature of these reforms did not lead to a change in the social status of women, despite their being the primary food growers. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) implemented in 2005 is a workfare programme that pays a worker a minimum wage for unskilled manual work for a fixed number of days in a year. While it is considered to be a safety net, as it is an employment guarantee scheme, it is far from being a sustainable livelihood option as it does not lead to any change in asset ownership or control. Further, as discussed in the previous section, Scheduled Castes make up a disproportionate number of the casual labour force. This

162  Handbook on social innovation and social policy scheme preserves and reproduces this status quo, where marginalized sections of the population are unable to break free of the poverty cycle owing to a lack of policies that address social exclusion and marginality along with poverty alleviation. In India, where poverty is not just a function of income, but the social status of the individual also determines the degree of marginalization, addressing exclusion-induced poverty requires policies that are directed towards providing equal access to excluded groups. This is because socially excluded groups face multiple discrimination and are likely to be denied access to state and private provisions that hinder their ability to translate available resources into capital gains. Therefore, policies to address social exclusion need to be tailor made to target the specific vulnerabilities faced by marginalized communities. For instance, discrimination in the sphere of education, employment, and political decision making can be addressed by affirmative action to ensure representation. Policies also need to be conscious of the internal inequalities of these communities and ensure that these status quos are not reproduced. For instance, in the tea plantations in eastern and north-eastern India, provision to ensure education for the children of plantation labourers has ensured that boys can access higher education and move into other work, thus leading to a change in social status quo. However, girls continue to work as plantation labourers as they do not have the same access to education (Bhattacharjee, 2019). Top-down models of development have failed to address poverty and marginalization. Such an approach has been largely ineffective as it does not take into consideration the context-specific manifestations of poverty and marginalization. Without the involvement of the communities for whom the development initiatives are directed, reforms become unsustainable. Therefore, community-led programs that are context specific are expected to have more success. However, many of the exclusionary practices are reproduced by local hierarchies and power structures based on socio-cultural norms. Therefore, while such decentralization of governance structures and participatory decision making are key components in addressing marginalization, policies need to be context specific to address these traditional modes of power hierarchies. Reflections on the Relationship between Social Policy and Social Innovation In India, in the last seven decades, there has been an evolution of the development paradigm from that based on political and economic independence and self-determination to a more public-sector-driven, import-substitution-led industrialization (Bhagwati, 2004); in effect, from a socialist welfare State to a neo-liberal one. Public policies implemented during each of these periods reflect the characteristics of these different development paradigms. The terms ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ have been used in policy-implementation literature to describe how decisions are made and policies implemented (Sabatier, 1986). The difference between these approaches can be discussed in terms of the involvement of the stakeholders in the policy-making and -implementation process. In a top-down approach, as the name suggests, decisions are made at the State level and then implemented in the grassroots context targeted by these policies (Matland, 1995). Contrary to this, a bottom-up approach involves several stakeholders articulating their needs and designing a solution that may be scaled up to be formulated into a policy. The State and the market have been conceptualized in a dichotomous manner, with the State representing public interest while the market represents private interests. With the failure of the top-down model of development, which was a key feature of the

Exploring interrelationships in India  163 large-scale, public-sector-driven industrial development model of the Nehruvian era (Aoyama & Parthasarathy, 2018), and later the welfare state, the market emerged as an important vehicle to address social issues. However, there has been a failure of both State and market-led approaches to address social exclusion and marginality. The primary cause of this failure is due to the embedded power structures in the State and information irregularities in the market (Leonard, 2002), especially where there is a weak state and an undeveloped market (Aoyama & Parthasarathy, 2018). The consequences of this failure are more pronounced in the Global South, and in a country like India, that has the majority of the world’s poor (Aoyama & Parthasarathy, 2016). Churchman (1967) has written about the rising instances of ‘wicked problems’ in societies that have experienced this failure of the State and the Market. ‘Wicked problems’ are a “class of social system problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing” (Churchman, 1967: B142). Owing to multiple interdependencies and stakeholders, these problems cannot be easily resolved through public policies (Rittel & Webber, 1973) and require multi-disciplinary and multi-stakeholder solutions. This is the space where social innovation comes in, in the space of policy making as well as implementation, and engaging multiple stakeholders to design solutions to complex social issues (Aoyama & Parthasarathy, 2016). SI refers to innovation for social change (Michelini, 2012) designed to satisfy unmet social needs (Van Dyck & Van Den Broeck, 2013). The challenges posed by poverty and multidimensional marginalities require innovative approaches to reduce the vulnerabilities of populations under their clutches. In order for SI to be institutionalized and bring about the desired systemic change, it requires “the involvement of multiple institutions, norms and practices, as well as the introduction of multiple kinds of complementary innovations to cope with the high complexity of problems, which require structural changes in society” (Howaldt, Kaletka, & Schröder, 2018: 14). Such a conceptualization of SI is particularly relevant in the context of poverty and marginalization due to the social structural and systemic nature of these issues. The discussion is further strengthened by Moulaert, who suggests that SI focuses on “the fundamental needs of groups of citizens deprived [démunis] of a minimum income, of access to quality education and of [the] other benefits of an economy from which their community has been excluded” (2009: 18). Social innovation can therefore be envisioned as a “unifying policy concept around which cross-sectoral stakeholders can coalesce and organize” (Edmiston, 2016: 1). The significance placed on the novelty of the approaches designed to address social problems marks a departure from traditional ways of thinking. Social innovation has the potential to disrupt the status quo by also focusing on structural issues and power imbalances that have long ailed public policy and decision making. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) is a landmark act in a rights-based framework and is among the most ambitious, demand-driven employment generation programs in the world to benefit the rural poor (Zepeda, McDonald, Panda, & Kumar, 2013). This program is also significant as it collaborates with civil society and non-governmental organizations, especially for social audits to check corruption. As discussed in the previous section, MGNREGA has led to an increase in the purchasing power of the rural poor, as it guarantees a fixed number of days of paid work. However, Scheduled Castes disproportionately make up the casual labor force. However, assuring income through

164  Handbook on social innovation and social policy unskilled wage labor without targeting the structures responsible for marginalization in the first place is not enough to bring about the transformative social change that is a key element of social innovation. Therefore, for innovation to be transformative, it should also be able to address inequitable social relations. Due to the failure of these State-driven, top-down models of development in addressing poverty and marginalization, it is suggested that social innovation needs to be a context-specific, bottom-up, small-scale process (Grimm, Fox, Baines, & Albertson, 2013), that has the potential to address unresolved collective problems (Eizaguirre & Parés, 2019). This perspective places individuals at the local level and civil society actors at the centre of the social innovation process (Baptista, Pereira, Moreira, & Matos, 2019). While larger structural issues are responsible for marginalization and social exclusion, their manifestations are context specific and therefore need an effective response to be driven by local actors. The popular assumption is that the State may not possess enough knowledge or capabilities to design innovative policies (Seyfang & Longhurst, 2016). They may also lack the political will to disrupt the status quo. Therefore, while social innovations do not aim to replace State interventions to reduce such inequalities, they can aim at making them more effective through a more context-specific approach (Babu & Pinstrup-Andersen, 2007). An attempt at tackling social challenges will always involve intentional collaborative action among individuals, groups, collectives, and organizations/institutions (Hochgerner, 2018) to change the social relations and structures that have originally given rise to these social issues. People-Centred Social Innovation Policies targeting the poor are not effective in reducing extreme poverty without addressing structural forces of exclusion, discrimination, deprivation, deficiencies in governance and corruption, and multiple other forces that erode resilience of the poor. Therefore, there needs to be an understanding of the context-specific determinants of poverty that push people to the margins of society (Braun & Gatzweiler, 2014). According to Braun and Gatzweiler, De-marginalizing the marginalized requires the creation of the physical infrastructure and institutional arrangements that can help to overcome the barriers to access, exchange and communication, and facilitate a shift away from the margins of development through building accessible assets beyond natural capital (i.e., access to services that foster human capital and technology), while including the marginalized in the process. (2014: 4–5)

With the failure of top-down models of development to address poverty and marginalization effectively, there is a need to combine ideas of the centrality of people in the process of development initiatives and the social relational dimensions of social innovations in an organic way (Shajahan & Hulgard, 2020). This is not to suggest that structural problems leading to social exclusion and marginalization can be resolved without linking top-down actions of the state with the bottom-up actions of civil society, third sector, and the social and solidarity economy (Somers, 2008). However, the involvement of marginalized communities themselves is a critical component of effectively mitigating marginalization. Cox (1998) analyses the relevance of people-centeredness in the context of growing global inequalities. He argues that misplaced priorities and the power structures in the current development paradigm make it necessary to put people at the centre of the development

Exploring interrelationships in India  165 process. In order to correct distorted development, it is necessary to empower those who are excluded from the development process and create more participatory political, social, and economic structures (Cox, 1998). This directly relates to the idea of SI in the sense that it is about addressing unmet social needs of marginalized people, revamping social relations, and coordinating collective action through population empowerment (Moulaert, Martinelli, & Gonzalez, 2005). The concept of people-centred development thus has many overlapping features with SI, adopting participatory processes to change the oppressive social relations that are barriers to social justice and human dignity (Hulgård & Shajahan, 2013). Social innovation and people-centred development are therefore closely interlinked, as both emphasize empowerment as intrinsic to the development process and are directed at specific contextual social needs. According to Shajahan and Hulgard (2020), the key features of people-centred social innovation are participation, the public sphere, and plurality, which are much-neglected criteria in policy making. A people-centred approach to social innovation is therefore about understanding the situated context of diverse people, especially the most marginalized, for creating new plural and democratic spaces that are bottom up. It is therefore a commitment towards representation of the diverse, plural, and intersectional voices of marginalized groups and communities and their participation to co-produce social value. A people-centred approach to social innovation is hence significant in addressing the multidimensional challenges that plague policy makers, activists, and marginalized groups. The aim of such an approach is to articulate challenges from the perspective of the actors themselves, while working with social, cultural, economic, and political spaces at the micro, meso, and macro level (Banerjee, Carney, & Hulgard, 2020). People-Centred Social Innovation is transformative in the sense that it aims to address societal needs by focusing on marginalized people in their context and developing bottom-up strategies to address them, while also possessing the potential to adapt strategies to different contexts by institutionalizing them within the state apparatus (Banerjee, 2018).

THE SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM IN INDIA The evolution of social welfare in India began with social reforms and a focus on disadvantaged groups. British rule marked the beginning of organized social welfare, with the advent of industrialization and urbanization (Paranjpe, 1990). While this period broke down some of the caste-based occupational structures, thus making social mobility a theoretical possibility, the accompanying industrialization led to loss of work among traditional craftspeople, who became part of the working class. After independence in 1947, social welfare was one of the key missions of the government and proper planning was considered to be a key factor affecting the welfare of citizens. The National Planning Commission, formed in 1950, tried to address the issues of development, with the objectives of increasing production to improve per capita income, achieving full employment, reducing inequalities of income and wealth, and setting up a socialist society based on equality and justice without exploitation (Grover & Grover, 2002). Policies during the first 75 years were aimed at equitable redistribution of national resources, heavier taxation of the rich, subsidizing essential goods and services to poorer sections of the society, promoting the welfare of the poor and ‘downtrodden’, restrictions on

166  Handbook on social innovation and social policy the inflow of foreign capital investments, complete regulation of the economy, a prominent role for the public sector in industrial development, and fixed prices for many goods and services (Tripathi, 2003). However, due to international imperatives, a New Economic Policy was implemented in 1991 that led to economic restructuring, opening it up to liberalization and globalization. This marked the end of the public sector monopoly, thus opening up key domains, such as health and education, to privatization. However, in the last two decades, there has been a shift towards a rights-oriented policy. Some of the key policies implemented are the 2005 Right to Information Act, the 2005 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), the 2006 Forest Rights Act, the 2009 Right to Education Act of August, and The National Food Security Act of 2013. The government also introduced a National Education Policy with the aim of reducing marginalization in education; some components of this policy can be seen as an extension of the Right to Education Act. As sustainable livelihood choices, access to education and affordable healthcare, coupled with food security, are essential elements to live a full life. This section will focus on some of the key policies that have been implemented in these sectors, with a vision to address issues of poverty caused by marginalization and social exclusion. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), 2005 is a rights-based flagship scheme that guarantees 100 days of paid employment in a given financial year to every rural household whose adult members volunteer for unskilled manual work. This Act was also meant to create durable community assets that would enhance productivity, along with an increase in demand for labour and mandates that 33 per cent of the participants must be women (Haque, 2011). Data show a disproportionately high percentage of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the employment created under MGNREGA. This implies that poverty is more prevalent among these groups than throughout the rest of the population. Furthermore, the steady and continuous rise of these groups as beneficiaries of this program reflects the lack of change in their financial condition. While MGNREGA led to an increase in their purchasing power, poverty among the groups continues to persist due to a failure to address systemic issues (Haque, 2011). Similarly with regard to the participation of women, income-generation programs lead to an increase in the burden of women’s work, as they have to perform unpaid domestic labour at home. Therefore, without a change in the household distribution of work, such programs are not effective in bringing about a change in social status and improving financial security for women and other marginalized groups. Despite its drawbacks, this scheme is innovative in the sense that it involves civil society and non-governmental organizations in social audit, vigilance, and monitoring to ensure corruption-free implementation. With the aim to reduce poverty by creating sustainable livelihoods, the Government in 2011 introduced the National Rural Livelihood Mission (NRLM). A significant difference between MGNREGA and NRLM is that the latter seeks to create sustainable livelihood opportunities by promoting community-based institutions to facilitate financial inclusion among the rural poor. The policy recognizes the structural and institutional constraints faced by rural women that prevent them from realizing their right to livelihoods, resources, decent work, and social protection. The NRLM aims to create and empower Self-Help Groups (SHGs), where members provide mutual support while attempting to achieve collective objectives through community action (Chen, Renana, Kanbur, & Richards, 2008). These groups can seek for loans as start-up capital for new small businesses. This is particularly relevant in the context of rural communities where individuals, especially women, do not have access to financial

Exploring interrelationships in India  167 services. Self-help groups are not just tools for financial security for women; they also act as collective spaces of female solidarity and organization. They have the potential to impact upon women’s social and political participation in decision-making processes. Success stories from different states, such as Assam, Chhattisgarh, and Gujarat, demonstrate the far-reaching impact of this program beyond financial inclusion, including reductions in domestic violence and child marriage in the respective communities. National Education Policy 2020 The pandemic had a serious impact on the education sector. According to Human Rights Watch, globally more than 1.5 billion students are out of school and there have been school closures in over 188 countries (Karsan, 2020). The impact has been particularly severe for India, where lockdown due to the pandemic has heightened the difference in access to education between the privileged and the marginalized sections of society. While private schools shifted to online resources and alternative modes of teaching, lack of infrastructure in public schools have left students stranded at home without any means of education (Karsan, 2020). With the high dropout rates caused by the pandemic, these school closures may heighten the vulnerability of children in marginalized communities to child labour. This will further widen the learning gap between private- and public-school students, in turn widening social and class differences. In light of the current situation, the government passed the National Education Policy (NEP) (2020) with the aim of improving the quality of education in the country through structural, financial, and operational reforms. The key features of this policy include a focus on building infrastructure for greater enrolment, an emphasis on open school and distance learning programs to expand educational access, and inclusion of vocational training, internship, and computer coding in school. This policy marks a paradigm shift from rote learning and memory-based assessments to a more conceptual, practical, and hands-on experience-based learning through interactive classes (Sarna, Puri, & Kochar, 2021). The NEP is also significant in its strides towards inclusive education by proposing mandatory schooling for children from 3 to 18 years. Early childhood care and education would help build a foundation for lifelong learning and holistic development. Increasing the coverage of free and universal education to 18 years is significant for those who have not been able to access education due to socio-economic conditions (Roy, 2020). The policy not only focuses on increasing enrolment, but also on reducing dropout by building infrastructure such as restrooms, clean drinking water, playgrounds, proper environmental conditions, nutritious and healthy mid-day meals, proper boundary walls, and so forth, especially in government schools. This policy has multiple innovative elements that aim to reduce the disparity between private and public schools, and by extension the gap between the privileged and marginalized sections of population. Since the school dropout rates are much higher among the marginalized population, this policy aims to address this concern by developing alternative and unique education centres to cater to children who have been cut off from mainstream education due to migration or other socio-economic reasons. The policy also proposes to dissolve academic barriers by allowing students to choose subjects across disciplines. With a goal to break away from the existing rote-learning model, this policy strives to bring pedagogical and structural change by including comprehensive education with a focus on critical thinking, communication, digital literacy, vocational education, and research (Sarna, Puri, & Kochar, 2021).

168  Handbook on social innovation and social policy The policy proposes that students’ mother tongue should be the medium of instruction until the fifth grade (6 to 10 years age-group). Research shows that a mother tongue-based bilingual system positively impacts upon the quality of education and improves cognitive learning (Benson, 2005). It also reduces school dropouts considerably (Shreya, 2020). However, in the context of Indian states that have a varied linguistic intake, deciding upon a single mother tongue as the medium of instruction can also be exclusionary towards certain sections of population. Furthermore, the provision of English as optional until eighth grade can lead to further inequality, as marginalized sections of population in the public schooling system are likely to fall behind in the English knowledge skills that are essential in the job market. Under the NEP, foreign universities and foreign direct investment (FDI) have been allowed entry in the realm of higher education. Additionally, NEP also expresses the need to exclude private institutes and universities from strict governmental regulations. The policy has therefore opened up the possibility of increasing privatization of education, which will be detrimental to meeting the vision of equal access to education. This will be further aggravated with the internationalization of education, where foreign universities can open campuses in India. With higher fees for higher educational institutions, people from marginalized sections will not be able to afford higher education. Further, the inclusion of vocation training in school, while innovative, may lead to children from marginalized sections dropping out in favour of open schools and vocational courses. The dropout rates for girls and children from marginalized communities is disproportionately high. While the policy propagates inclusive education, it does not address the specific needs of the marginalized groups that would lead to higher enrolment and lower dropout, and ensure quality education for them. While there are some hits and misses for the NEP policy, it is still ground-breaking in terms of the formulation process. There was an intensive consultation process in formulating the draft policy and the Government of India received about 200,000 suggestions on the draft policy.

CONCLUSION Social innovations are key to addressing development challenges. They can play an important role in eradicating or bypassing the factors that lead to social exclusion and marginalization. In recent decades, India has created an ecosystem that has led to better grassroots social innovations, and matching these with state policies has resulted in some rights-based policies to become woven into the neo-liberal economic environment of the country. Some of these policies are related to livelihoods, but important among them is the right to education. Access to education is a crucial element in the sustainable development of a nation, as it is key to eliminating social exclusion and fostering social justice. Owing to the enormous role of education in poverty eradication and sustainable development, a strong education policy focusing on universalization of quality education that is equally accessible by all is essential. At the same time, the policy must be realistic, adaptable, inclusive, and enforceable in order to bring about positive change. The National Education Policy 2020 may enable marginalized groups to overcome the traditional skill and occupational disadvantages. However, the policy still lacks the vision to impart improved skills and higher education to the marginalized through state provision as it

Exploring interrelationships in India  169 bases itself on private-run educational institutions with a limited number of public-funded universities and colleges. The National Education Policy, while having a strong vision, does not have a complete roadmap for inclusive education that will reduce differences in educational status across gender, caste, class, and other social groups. In the wider societal context, social and community engagement, along with teaching learning and research, should be an educational goal of higher educational institutions. Universities have a responsibility to ensure economic growth and sustainable development among the communities in the regions in which they are established. Thus, community engagement is an important function of higher education institutions to identify the specific needs of the community, and this can drive People-Centred Innovation. Collaborating with other institutions and knowledge sharing through community engagement is a potential role of educational institutions. However, this function of universities is far from being integrated into educational policies in India. Hulgard and Shajahan (2013) discuss three pillars of social innovation that can potentially radicalize how universities engage in co-production of knowledge, while simultaneously addressing issues of social and cognitive justice. The first pillar is the readiness to undertake the risks associated with engaging in new combinations within the university system as well as collaboration with outside partners. The second pillar is the process dimension in social change that involves community engagement. This requires critical analysis of the roles of various stakeholders and a belief in participatory processes to address issues of social justice. The third pillar is epistemological openness, which is an extension of the other two pillars, and involves the willingness to challenge existing expert-based knowledge and engage in dialogue with the local community to determine the trajectory of social transformation. This community engagement thus has the potential to produce new knowledge and determine the direction of social change that is the key aim of social innovation. Thus, the key research questions drawn from this exploration of the interrelationship between social innovation, social policy, and social change for articulating a future people-centred research and practice agenda include: (1) What are the innovative processes and strategies for framing people-centred social policies, especially with a focus on marginalized groups and communities? (2) How should this understanding emerge from the micro-social context and the intersectional situated realities of people? And (3) how should local knowledges be highlighted within the policy agenda for epistemic justice?

REFERENCES Ahmed, A. U., Hill, R. V., & Naeem, F. (2014). The Poorest: Who and Where They Are? In J. v. Braun & F. W. Gatzweiler (Eds.), Marginality: Addressing the Nexus of Poverty, Exclusion and Ecology (pp. 85–99). Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer. Aoyama, Y., & Parthasarathy, B. (2016). The Rise of the Hybrid Domain: Collaborative Governance for Social Innovation. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Aoyama, Y., & Parthasarathy, B. (2018). When both the state and market fail: inclusive development and social innovation in India. Area Development and Policy 3(3), 330–348. Babu, S., & Pinstrup-Andersen, P. (2007). Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Developing Capacity to Reduce Poverty and Hunger. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.

170  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Banerjee, S. (2018). Social Innovation in South Asia: An Emerging Alternate Development Paradigm. In A. S. J. Howaldt (Ed.), Atlas of Social Innovation: New Practices for a Better Future (pp. 158–160). ZWE Sozialforschungsstelle: Technische Universität Dortmund. Banerjee, S., Carney, S., & Hulgard, L. (2020). People-Centered Social Innovation: An Emerging Paradigm with Global Potential. In S. C. Swati Banerjee (Ed.), People-Centered Social Innovation: Global Perspectives on an Emerging Paradigm (pp. 1–16). New York and London: Routledge. Baptista, N., Pereira, J., Moreira, A., & Matos, N. (2019). Exploring the meaning of social innovation: a categorisation scheme based on the level of policy intervention profit orientation and geographical scale. Innovation: Organization and Management 21(3), 379–397. Benson, C. (2005). Girls, Educational Equity and Mother Tongue-Based Teaching. Bangkok: UNESCO Asia and Pacific Regional Bureau for Education, Evaluative Report, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Bhagwati, J. (2004). In Defense of Globalization: With a New Afterword. New York: Oxford University Press. Bhattacharjee, D. (2019). Living at the Intersections: Exploring Life Worlds, Livelihoods and Gendered Experiences: A Study of Women in Tea Plantations. Unpublished thesis. Braun, J. v., & Gatzweiler, F. W. (2014). Marginality: An Overview and Implications. In J. v. Braun & F. W. Gatzweiler (Eds.), Marginality: Addressing the Nexus of Poverty, Exclusion and Ecology (pp. 1–23). Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer. Braun, J. v., Hill, R., & Pandya-Lorch, R. (2009). The Poorest and Hungry: Assessments, Analyses, and Actions. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute. Chambers, R. (1995). Poverty and Livelihoods: Whose Reality Counts? IDS Discussion Paper 347, January. Chen, M., Renana, J., Kanbur, R., & Richards, C. (2008). Membership-based Organisations of the Poor: Concepts, Experience and Policy. In M. Chen, R. Jhabvala, R. Kanbur, & C. Richard (Eds.), Membership Based Organizations of the Poor (pp. 3–20). London: Routledge Publishers. Churchman, C. (1967). Guest editorial: Wicked problems. Management Science 14(4), 141–142. Cox, D. (1998). Towards People-Centered Development: the social development agenda and social work education. The Indian Journal of Social Work 59(1), 513–530. Edmiston, D. (2016). The (A)Politics of Social Innovation Policy in Europe: Implications for Socio-structural Change and Power Relations. CRESSI Working Papers. Eizaguirre, S., & Parés, M. (2019). Communities making social change from below: social innovation and democratic leadership in two disenfranchised neighbourhoods in Barcelona. Urban Research & Practice 12(2), 173–191. Grimm, R., Fox, C., Baines, S., & Albertson, K. (2013). Social innovation, an answer to contemporary societal challenges? Locating the concept in theory and practice. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 26(4), 436–455. Grover, B., & Grover, S. (2002). A New Look At Modern Indian History. New Delhi: S. Chand & Company Ltd. Haque, T. (2011). Socio-economic impact of implementation of Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India. Social Change 41(3), 445–471. Hochgerner, J. (2018). Empowerment, Co-Creation and Social Innovation Ecosystems. In A. S. J. Howaldt (Ed.), Atlas of Social Innovation: New Practices for a Better Future (pp. 219–222). ZWE Sozialforschungsstelle: Technische Universität Dortmund. Howaldt, J., Kaletka, C., & Schröder, A. (2018). Social Innovation on the Rise: Results of the First Global Mapping. In A. S. J. Howaldt (Ed.), Atlas of Social Innovation: New Practices for a Better Future (pp. 12–15). ZWE Sozialforschungsstelle: Technische Universität Dortmund. Hulgård, L., & Shajahan, P. (2013). Social Innovation for People-Centered Development. In M. F. Moulaert (Ed.), The International Handbook on Social Innovation (pp. 93–104). Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. ILO. (2017). Global Estimates of Child Labour: Results and Trends 2012–2016. Geneva: ILO. Karsan, J. (2020). Covid 19 Lockdown: Impact of global pandemic on education sector. Retrieved on 15 March 2022 from https://​www​.indiatoday​.in/​education​-today/​featurephilia/​story/​covid​-19​-lockdown​ -impact​-global​-pandemic​-on​-education​-sector​-1698391​-2020​-07​-08

Exploring interrelationships in India  171 Leonard, K. (2002). When both states and markets fail: asymmetric information and the role of NGOs in African health care. International Review of Law and Economics 22(1), 61–80. Matland, R. (1995). Synthesizing the implementation literature: the ambiguity–conflict model of policy implementation. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5(2), 145–174. Michelini, L. (2012). Social Innovation and New Business Models: Creating Shared Value in Low-income Markets. New York: Springer. Moulaert, F. (2009). Social Innovation: Institutionally Embedded, Territorially (Re)Produced. In D. MacCullum, F. Moulaert, J. Hillier, & S. Vicari (Eds.), Social Innovaiton and Territorial Development (pp. 11–23). Farnham: Ashgate. Moulaert, F., Martinelli, E., & Gonzalez, S. (2005). Towards alternative model(s) of local innovation. Urban Studies 42(11), 1669–1990. Nkonya, I., Gerber, N., Baumgärtner, P., Braun, J. v., Pinto, A. D., Graw, V., … Walter, T. (2011). The Economics of Land Degradation: Toward an Integrated Global Assessment. Essen: Peter Lang. Paranjpe, N. (1990). Social Welfare in India: A Policy Perspective. New Delhi: Associated Publishing House. Rittel, H., & Webber, M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sciences 4(2), 155–169. Roy, S. (2020). Reforms, benefits and limitations of the new National Education Policy. Business Standard, 31 July. Retrieved on 24 May 2022 from https://​www​.business​-standard​.com/​podcast/​ education/​reforms​-benefits​-and​-limitations​-of​-the​-new​-national​-education​-policy​-120073101556​_1​ .html Sabatier, P. (1986). Top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research: a critical analysis and suggested synthesis. Journal of Public Policy 6(1), 21–48. Sarna, K. K., Puri, S., & Kochar, K. S. (2021). National Education Policy 2020: a critical review. Hans Shodh Sudha 1(3), 8–14. Sen, A. (2000). Social exclusion: concept, application and scrutiny, Social development paper no 1. Manila: Office of Environment and Social Development, Asian Development Bank. Sender, J. (2003). Rural Poverty and Gender: Analytical Frameworks and Policy Proposals. In H.-J. Chang (Ed.), Rethinking Development Economics (pp. 401–420). London: Anthem Press. Seyfang, G., & Longhurst, N. (2016). What influences the diffusion of grassroots innovations for sustainability? Investigating community currency niches. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 28(1), 1–23. Shajahan, P., & Hulgard, L. (2020). Genealogy and Institutionalization of People-Centered Social Innovation in Kudumbashree, Kerala, India. In S. Banerjee, S. Carney, & L. Hulgard (Eds.), People-Centered Social Innovation: Global Perspectives on an Emerging Paradigm (pp. 69–88). New York and London: Routledge. Shreya, K. (2020). India Spend Analysis: Why Early Learning In Mother Tongue Is More Effective. Retrieved on 24 May 2022 from https://​economictimes​.indiatimes​.com/​industry/​services​%20/​ education/​no​-switch​-in​-instruction​-medium​-from​-english​-to​-mother​-tongue/​regional​-languages​-with​ -nep​-20/​articleshow/​77271164​.cms​?from​=​mdr Somers, M. (2008). Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right To Have Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Terstriep, J., & Kleverbeck, M. (2018). Economic Underpinning of Social Innovation: Social Innovations’s Contribution to Inclusive Growth. In J. Howaldt, C. Kaletka, A. Schröder, & M. Zirngiebl (Eds.), Atlas of Social Innovation: New Practices for a Better Future (pp. 32–35). ZWE Sozialforschungsstelle: Technische Universität Dortmund. Thorat, S. (2007). Economic Exclusion and Poverty in Asia: The Example of Castes in India, 2020 Focus Brief on the World’s Poor and Hungry People. International Food Policy Research Institute. Thorat, S. (2014). Tackling Social Exclusion and Marginality for Poverty Reduction: Indian Experiences. In J. van Braun & F. W. Gatzweiler (Eds.), Marginality: Addressing the Nexus of Poverty, Exclusion and Ecology (pp. 205–220). Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer. Tripathi, S. (2003). New Economic Policy and Indian Youth. In V. Chandra (Ed.), Construction and Reconstruction of Indian Youth (pp. 205–231). Lucknow: Circle for Youth and Child Research Cooperation in India.

172  Handbook on social innovation and social policy UNICEF. (2021). The State of the World’s Children 2021. New York: UNICEF Office of Global Insight and Policy. UNICEF. (2022). UNICEF Data: Monitoring the Situation of Children and Women. New York: UNICEF. Van Dyck, B., & Van Den Broeck, P. (2013). Social Innovation: A Territorial Process. In D. M. F. Moulaert (Ed.), The International Handbook of Social Innovation: Collective Action, Social Learning and Transdisciplinary Research (pp. 131–141). Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Zepeda, E., McDonald, S., Panda, M., & Kumar, G. (2013). Employing India: Guaranteeing Jobs for the Rural Poor. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

14. Social policy, social innovation and health: tackling health inequalities in the United Kingdom Neil McHugh and Anna Macintyre

INTRODUCTION The circumstances of everyday life influence health outcomes and generate significant (and widening) health gaps between the best- and worst-off in society (Dahlgren and Whitehead, 2021; Marmot et al., 2020a). Conventional health(care) policies alone cannot improve population health and address health inequalities. The need to act on social, economic and environmental determinants requires action in non-health sectors and has led to calls for intersectoral approaches to policymaking (WHO, 2014). Outside of government, there is also growing recognition of the potential of socially innovative organisations and initiatives, specifically those without an explicit health focus, to address determinants of health (Daly and Allen, 2017; Roy et al., 2014). In this chapter we focus on social policy and social innovations to tackle health inequalities in the United Kingdom (UK). The first section focuses on social policies and health. We introduce Dahlgren and Whitehead’s model of the social determinants of health to conceptualise how to act on health; discuss the limits of the health improvement measures provided through the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) and conventional health policies; and outline the need for intersectoral policymaking. The second section focuses on social innovations (SIs). Specifically, we apply Whitehead’s (2007) typology of interventions to provide examples of SIs (including organisations that do not have an explicit health focus) that address health inequalities in the UK. We conclude with reflections on the connections between the fields of social policy and SI as they relate to health inequalities and consider implications beyond the UK.

SOCIAL POLICIES AND HEALTH: THE UK’S BATTLE WITH HEALTH INEQUALITIES In this section we draw upon Dahlgren and Whitehead’s model of the social determinants of health to highlight three significant developments in social policies and health inequalities in the UK. First, while making a very considerable contribution to raising general health standards and arguably the biggest social policy in health in the UK, the NHS has had very little impact on health inequalities. Second, successive Government enquiries have tried to highlight the role of wider determinants (which necessitate action in non-health social policies) but have had limited success in improving outcomes. Third, while social policies to address health inequalities require intersectoral action, this has proved evasive in practice. 173

174  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Dahlgren and Whitehead’s Model of the Social Determinants of Health The medical model of ill health focuses at the individual level on risk factors and behaviours (e.g., smoking, alcohol misuse, obesity) and individual pathologies (e.g., lung disease, organ damage, cardiovascular disease). Generally, this leads to a focus on interventions that seek to act on individual pathologies and risk factors associated with adverse health behaviours. While interventions such as smoking cessation or healthy eating campaigns can change some behaviours that cause ill health, the root causes are unchanged. This requires an understanding of the causes of the causes, i.e., why does an individual smoke or continue to drink alcohol? Asking such questions requires consideration of social, economic and environmental factors, otherwise known as social determinants of health (Dahlgren and Whitehead, 2007; Marmot and Wilkinson, 2006). A well-known model of determinants of health is the Dahlgren and Whitehead (2021, 1991) ‘rainbow’ model (see Figure 14.1). The model has been successful in countering the belief that health is determined by health services, such as the NHS, shifting the focus to wider determinants of health. It illustrates how different factors at the level of the individual, community and society interact to affect the conditions of daily life. For example, it makes visible how lifestyle factors, such as a nutritious diet, are impacted by the income available to individuals, what food is available and accessible to them, and the pricing structure of different types of food (Dahlgren and Whitehead, 2021). Thus instead of downstream interventions that focus on modifying health behaviours, it is recognised that action is required further upstream to target the circumstances that lead to health-damaging behaviour (Marmot et al., 2010). This upstream–downstream analogy was first used in the 1970s (McKinlay, 1979); instead of constantly rescuing people from a rapidly flowing river (a downstream intervention), upstream interventions involve investigating and acting upon what is causing people to fall into the river. The Dahlgren and Whitehead rainbow model also provides a theoretical framework to structure research on the social determinants of health and to critique and inform policy responses (Dahlgren and Whitehead, 2021). In regard to policy responses, despite recognition of the need to act on upstream determinants of health (the outer layers of the model), health policy and practice is criticised for continuing to focus on downstream interventions (the inner layers of the model) that aim to modify individuals’ health behaviours – this is known as ‘lifestyle drift’ (Douglas, 2016; Graham, 2009; Hunter et al., 2009; Katikireddi et al., 2013). This pattern is mirrored in research evidence, where the ‘inverse evidence law’ means evidence for interventions further downstream is easier to generate and thus more developed than for upstream interventions, making it simpler for policymakers to draw upon (Bambra et al., 2010; Ogilvie, 2005; Petticrew, 2004). Despite this, there appears to be consensus from researchers in the UK that addressing health inequalities requires action in the outer layers, on ‘macro’ policies (Smith and Kandlik Eltanani, 2015). Recent evidence on the UK public’s perspectives on health inequalities found a lack of resonance with structural solutions among those with experience of socioeconomic disadvantage, even when identifying wider determinants as causes of health inequalities (McHugh et al., 2019b). In contrast, evidence from citizens’ juries in three UK cities (Glasgow, Manchester, Liverpool) indicated support for policy solutions to improve living and working conditions to address health inequalities (Smith et al., 2021). The reasons for these contradictory findings is unclear but could relate to differences in methodological approach. In general, there is a paucity of work exploring public values for solutions to health inequalities (McHugh, 2021).

Tackling health inequalities in the United Kingdom  175

Source: Adapted from Dahlgren and Whitehead, 1991. Reprinted from Public Health, vol. 199, Göran Dahlgren and Margaret Whitehead, ‘The Dahlgren-Whitehead model of health determinants: 30 years on and still chasing rainbows’, pp. 20–24. Copyright (2021), with permission from Elsevier.

Figure 14.1

Dahlgren and Whitehead’s rainbow model of the main determinants of health

The Limits to Health(care) Policy for Addressing Health Inequalities: The Case of the UK National Health Service Perhaps more than any other area of policymaking, health has received significant attention over successive decades in the UK. Indeed, UK Governments have a long history of enacting social policies to improve the health of the nation; see, for example, the ‘great public works’ of sanitation reforms and the provision of a clean water supply that followed the Industrial Revolution (Hanlon et al., 2012). However, undoubtedly the most ambitious and encompassing programme was the creation of the welfare state (Beveridge, 1942; Timmins, 2001) including the NHS. Established in 1948, the NHS provides health care to all, free at the point of delivery, so that access is based on clinical need rather than ability to pay. It is publicly funded, through taxation, so distancing the provision of health care from the market (Donaldson, 2011). The NHS has been successful in lessening the financial risks associated with ill health and, in general, helping to improve population health. Health(care) policy centred on the resourcing, management and delivery of the NHS remains a critical area of social policy research and practice. Indeed, in 2018–19, approximately £153 billion was spent on health, which equates to 7.2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (The Health Foundation, 2019). However, despite over 75 years of the NHS, there is continued evidence of intractable health inequalities; “systematic differences in health between different socioeconomic groups within a society” (Whitehead, 2007, p. 473). In the UK, health gaps in mortality and morbidity

176  Handbook on social innovation and social policy between the best- and worst-off persist and have widened (Marmot et al., 2020b; McNamara et al., 2017; Scottish Government, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic has further exposed and reinforced existing inequalities (Bambra et al., 2021, 2020). Furthermore, since 2012, there has been evidence of a trend in the UK (and in many other high-income countries) towards stalling improvements in life expectancy (Marmot et al., 2020a). It is clear that within the field of social policy there are limits to the gains that can be made to population health in the UK through the NHS and health policies alone. UK Government Enquiries on Health Inequalities This last point has been well known for several decades as evidenced by a series of Government enquiries. In 1977, the then Department of Health and Social Security commissioned a report, Inequalities in Health (otherwise known as the Black Report), to investigate inequality in health care (Department of Health and Social Security, 1980). The Black Report documented an unequal improvement in health across all social classes, particularly in infant mortality rates and life expectancy, despite overall improvements in population health following the introduction of the NHS in the post-war period. Seminal studies of cohorts of civil servants in Whitehall demonstrated a consistent inverse association between the risk of mortality and morbidity on each rung of the employment grade ladder (Marmot et al., 1991, 1978). This highlights the social, rather than biological or genetic, nature of these inequalities and illustrates how important an individual’s position in a social hierarchy is for determining health. Backed by an expanding evidence base, successive UK governments have examined this social gradient in health. Two subsequent government inquiries – the Acheson Report (1998) and the Marmot Review (2010)1 – each commissioned by the Labour Secretary of State for Health of the day, have repeated the Black Report’s key messages and underlined that the drivers of health inequalities lie beyond health care, and squarely within the remit of social and economic policies. However, despite strong support from the public health community (see, for example, Smith et al. (2015) and Smith and Kandlik Eltanani (2015)), there has been very little effective social policy action to address the wider determinants of health, as evidenced by intractable inequalities in the UK. Moving Beyond Health: Intersectoral Policymaking to Address Health Inequalities Although it is not a new idea, one response to this lack of progress has been increased focus beyond health as a discrete policy area and moves towards intersectoral policymaking. Over 40 years ago the World Health Organization (WHO) signed the Alma Alta Declaration, which recognised the need to consider health holistically and move beyond direct health care services to impact positively on health inequalities (Rifkin, 2018). Since then, a wide variety of strategies and initiatives have been implemented to stimulate intersectoral action. One of the most prominent approaches is Health in All Policies (HiAP). In 2013, ‘The Helsinki Statement on Health in All Policies’ called on governments to adopt the principles of HiAP – intersectoral action on population health and health inequities2 – and the prioritisation of action on the social determinants of health (WHO, 2014). In the UK, there have been various attempts to adopt a HiAP approach. For example, resources developed in conjunction with Public Health England exist to support English local authorities to adopt a HiAP approach (Public Health England, 2016). There are pockets of progress in Scotland,

Tackling health inequalities in the United Kingdom  177 such as the collaboration between health and planning sectors to develop the Place Standard (Public Health Scotland, 2021). And the government in Wales has made Health Impact Assessments (HIAs) a statutory requirement for public bodies in specified circumstances (that are yet to be published) (Welsh Government, 2017). However, these successes are not matched by a coordinated and committed approach to HiAP at the highest level of government. In a review of attempts to introduce HiAP, Cairney et al. (2021) identify that, while there appears to be a coherent HiAP narrative, difficulties operationalising features of HiAP lead to an implementation gap. One important stumbling block is that HiAP advocates view HiAP as a technical exercise without sufficiently recognising how politics and power affect policymaking. Disappointingly, even exemplar HiAP models from across the world have had only modest success. For example, the South Australian Government adopted a dedicated HiAP unit within the Health Department in 2008, with a goal to inform policy early in its development using an intersectoral ‘Health Lens Analysis’ (Baum et al., 2019). However, even with vocal support among policymakers, the unit was not well funded, it had low influence, and it was unable to challenge “the underlying distribution of power, money and resources”, which limited its ability to impact health equity (Baum et al., 2019, p. 14; Cairney et al., 2021). Despite some successful case examples and strong advocacy and rhetoric for intersectoral policymaking, the reality is that in practice little has substantively changed. Importantly, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to this type of policymaking, the context needs to be accounted for and it is essential to secure (well-funded) political buy-in. To summarise this section, while health has been a significant and longstanding concern for social policy, so far it has failed to address one of society’s most pressing social issues, and unjust social inequalities in health remain significant in the UK and elsewhere. It is in this context that the potential of socially innovative organisations and initiatives has taken root, and it is to this we now turn.

SOCIAL INNOVATIONS TO TACKLE HEALTH INEQUALITIES Applying Whitehead’s (2007) Typology of Interventions to Social Innovations As highlighted by the diversity of the contributions in this book, the field of SI encompasses a wide range of initiatives for tackling social and environmental problems. In relation to taking action on the social determinants of health, it is increasingly recognised that socially innovative organisations and initiatives have an important role to play (Daly and Allen, 2017; Roy et al., 2014). Building on the work of Smith et al. (2021),3 we apply Whitehead’s (2007) typology of interventions to provide some examples of SIs (including organisations that do not have an explicit health focus) to address health inequalities in the UK. Whitehead (2007) sets out four broad (and overlapping) categories of interventions: strengthening individuals; strengthening communities; improving living and working conditions; and promoting healthy macro-policies. Category one interventions use ‘person-based strategies’ to impact upon personal characteristics of the individual who is disadvantaged in some way, and may focus on an individual’s education, knowledge or skills. Category two interventions have a community focus, aiming to strengthen social interactions, improve social cohesion and mutual support. Horizontal interventions relate to initiatives aimed at those from the same community, while vertical interventions aim to increase bonds and relationships between people from different

178  Handbook on social innovation and social policy social groups. Category three focuses on improving the conditions of everyday life including exposure to health-damaging environments and access to essential services and goods. Initiatives include social housing, safer workplaces and better access to health(care) services. The final category focuses on policies that aim to alter macro socioeconomic, cultural and environmental conditions (the outer layer of the rainbow diagram in Figure 14.1) to reduce poverty and inequalities. Policies typically cover multiple sectors and can include progressive taxation policies and increasing the price of unhealthy commodities, such as cigarettes or sugary foods and drinks. In what follows, we discuss examples of SI in the UK for each category in Whitehead’s typology. Strengthening Individuals: The Role of the Arts and the Case of Sistema Scotland’s Big Noise One area in which there has been rapid recent development in SIs is in the relationship between health and the arts. Indeed, there is growing recognition of the role of the arts in improving health and wellbeing. Arts-based interventions and initiatives include performance, visual and electronic arts, literature and culture (Davies et al., 2012). As a rapidly expanding field in both research and practice, there are a wide variety of arts-based interventions that have been linked to health impact, in terms of preventing ill health and promoting wellbeing or in relation to treatment and the management of existing conditions (Fancourt and Finn, 2019). One example of an arts-based intervention that has preventative potential in relation to health inequalities across the life course is Sistema Scotland’s Big Noise (GCPH, 2015; Harkins and Moore, 2019). Big Noise is an immersive music-making and music education programme offered by Sistema Scotland (Big Noise, 2021). It is based on a model developed in Venezuela and targets children who are less well-off (Tunstall, 2012). Based around a symphony orchestra, it involves young people being taught by trained musicians how to play an instrument and to perform as part of a group. Big Noise programmes are currently working with around 2,800 children across four locations in Scotland (Big Noise, 2021). Although Big Noise can be conceptualised as a community-based intervention, it is also recognised for its perceived positive impact on individuals’ health, and a recent qualitative evaluation frames Big Noise as a ‘person-centred’ programme (Harkins and Moore, 2019). Therefore, we consider this socially innovative programme here in relation to its ability to ‘strengthen’ individuals. The relationship between the musician and the young person is viewed as key to the programme, with the musician taking on multiple roles, for example, educator, mentor and role model. This relationship is perceived as: improving the mental and emotional wellbeing of the young people by developing their confidence, esteem, resilience and sense of belonging, which could lead to young people making decisions that lead to healthier behaviour, for example, around diet, physical activity, alcohol and drugs (Harkins and Moore, 2019). As it focuses on early years and targets young people from less affluent communities, it is also projected to address health inequalities over the long term. A quantitative longitudinal evaluation is planned to better understand Big Noise’s impact (Harkins and Moore, 2019). Strengthening Communities: UK Men’s Sheds Social innovations to improve health by strengthening communities abound, not least in terms of the role that they can play in tackling health inequalities (Buck et al., 2021). While there is

Tackling health inequalities in the United Kingdom  179 no single definition of community(ies), it is widely recognised that they share characteristics in terms of place, interest, demographics, experience, traditions and/or beliefs (Brunton, 2017; Popay, 2006). A wide variety of approaches exist to engage communities to positively impact on health, ranging from decision makers and community members exchanging information, to community development and empowerment (O’Mara-Eves et al., 2013; Popay, 2006). One example of a socially innovative community-based organisation increasingly recognised for its potential to contribute to good health is Men’s Sheds (Kelly et al., 2019). Emerging from Australia in the 1990s, Men’s Sheds (otherwise known as Sheds), has expanded to countries such as the UK, Ireland, Canada and New Zealand (Earle et al., 1996). In the UK, there are approximately 1,500 Sheds across the various associations (see, for example, the UK Men’s Sheds Association (2021) and the Scottish Men’s Sheds Association (2022)), which offer a gendered space for men to take part in a range of practical activities, such as woodwork, and socialise (Kelly et al., 2021a). They are recognised as being socially inclusive, attracting men from different backgrounds and with different life experiences and those who are generally considered as ‘hard to reach’ (Bergin and Richardson, 2021; Kelly et al., 2021a). In this respect, Sheds has potential for leading to both horizontal and vertical community interactions. The gendered environment is a key feature in the ability of Sheds to positively impact on health. It is well known that males perform poorly on a range of health outcomes. Across the world, including the UK, males generally live shorter lives in worse health than females (Marmot et al., 2020b; WHO, 2016). Key explanations include the fact that males are more likely than females to engage in harmful health behaviours, such as smoking, and alcohol and drug misuse (Kennedy et al., 2020; WHO, 2016). While Sheds does not explicitly aim to impact on men’s health, there is evidence of Sheds acting on a range of health determinants, such as social isolation and loneliness, to improve aspects of physical and mental health (Kelly et al., 2019). This is important as social isolation and loneliness can have as great an impact on aspects of health as other better-known risk factors, such as obesity, smoking and physical inactivity (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2015, 2010). The social and practical activities that Sheds offer are perceived, for example, as decreasing depression and anxiety, improving confidence and self-esteem, and leading to increased mobility and improved health behaviours and knowledge (Kelly et al., 2019, 2021a; Kelly and Steiner, 2021). While Sheds has great potential to impact positively on health, it seems those involved in Sheds may resist calls to formalise the provision of health care through the initiative so as not to jeopardise the ability of Sheds to fulfil its primary aims (Kelly et al., 2021a). Improving Living and Working Conditions: Improving Health through Financial Inclusion, the Case of Microcredit While attempts to improve living and working conditions may typically lie within the realm of social policy, there are examples of relevant social innovations, particularly in the area of financial exclusion. Financially excluded individuals are forced to utilise a variety of coping mechanisms that could worsen their health as they find it difficult to access and use appropriate and affordable financial products and services that meet their needs (Leyshon, 2009; Rowlingson and McKay, 2017; Sinclair, 2013). These include, relying on friends and family for informal loans, or using high-cost rent-to-own organisations or sub-prime lenders (Biosca et al., 2020; Fuller and Mellor, 2008; Ibrahim et al., 2021). These mechanisms are associated

180  Handbook on social innovation and social policy with a variety of factors, such as shame and guilt and increased stress and anxiety, which can worsen health (Biosca et al., 2020; Ibrahim et al., 2021; Sweet et al., 2013). One example of a socially innovative response to financial exclusion, and one that is considered as having the potential to impact on health inequalities, is the provision of microcredit (Lenton and Mosley, 2012; McHugh et al., 2017). Microcredit involves the provision of small loans, to facilitate self-employment and consumption smoothing, at affordable interest rates to individuals who are financially excluded from mainstream lenders due to a lack of collateral and/or credit history (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010; Biosca et al., 2020; Lenton and Mosley, 2012). In the UK, the main providers of microcredit are Responsible Finance lenders, formerly known as Community Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs). While there are around 50 Responsible Finance providers, not all provide personal and/or business microcredit; some, for example, only provide loans for social enterprise (Dayson et al., 2020; Responsible Finance, 2019). It is difficult to provide an estimate of the number of microcredit lenders, as there is no agreed definition of microcredit in the UK (McHugh et al., 2019a, 2014). However, microcredit lenders differ from credit unions with regard to the type and eligibility of individuals served; microcredit lenders, generally, target the less well-off and have no requirements for membership or savings (Carnegie, 2020; Dayson et al., 2020). UK microcredit lenders are also conceptualised as alternative– oppositional institutions as, unlike more mainstream lenders, the wellbeing and interests of borrowers are, generally, prioritised above profit maximisation (McHugh et al., 2019a). Exploring the relationship between microcredit and health inequalities, particularly in high-income countries, is a nascent area of research (McHugh et al., 2017). The most in-depth study developed an empirically informed conceptual model based on qualitative interviews with borrowers from both a personal and a business microcredit lender in the UK (Ibrahim et al., 2021). The model illustrates perceived interactions between individuals’ initial financial, health and wellbeing circumstances; lending and repayment mechanisms and loan use; intermediate outcomes, such as financial inclusion, consumption smoothing and feelings of acceptance; and health and wellbeing-related outcomes, for example, stress and mental health, confidence and feelings of self-worth. In general, microcredit was perceived as a positive socioeconomic determinant of health. While further research is required to examine the quantitative impact of microcredit on health, this work speaks to the potential of microcredit acting in this way. This contrasts with research exploring other types of debt, where studies report negative associations between debt and poor mental health, physical health and self-reported outcomes (see, for example, Sweet et al. (2013)). This highlights the importance of, and need for, alternative economic spaces, particularly for those on low incomes who need financial products to meet their daily needs and manage (un)expected financial events. Promoting Healthy Macro-policies: The Potential of Basic Income as a Socially Innovative Social Policy In this final example, we see the opportunity for the fields of social policy and social innovation to converge around Basic Income (BI). A full BI is generally accepted as having five features: regular, unconditional, individual, cash payment to all in society (BIEN, 2021). Its implementation could result in a radical reimagining of societal safety nets with a new base level of financial support provided without conditionality that could transform society’s relationship with work. There are a variety of ways to operationalise a BI. For example, the size of

Tackling health inequalities in the United Kingdom  181 the cash payment could vary from one that replaces current unemployment benefits through to one that ends poverty, and funding options could include a variety of different tax and non-tax possibilities. However, a recent review concluded that a full BI has never been implemented in a high-income country, and so its potential health effects remain speculative (Gibson et al., 2020). Despite this, theoretical work, intervention evidence and modelling work suggests that BI has the potential to act on upstream determinants of health and impact positively on health and health inequalities. From theory, Johnson et al. (2021) use the social determinants of health framework to identify three qualitative pathways – reducing resource scarcity, reducing exposure to chronic stress and promoting positive health behaviours – to illustrate how BI could positively impact upon health. Available empirical evidence highlights that interventions similar to BI, such as negative income tax and unconditional cash transfers, impact positively on a wide range of health and wellbeing outcomes, such as infant obesity, depression and stress, and on non-health spillover effects, such as time spent in education (Gibson et al., 2020; Kangas et al., 2021). Finally, recent modelling work suggests that two different BI policies could narrow health inequalities and increase population health in Scotland (McAuley et al., 2016; Richardson et al., 2020). Overall, this evidence suggests BI is capable of positively impacting material, biopsychosocial and behavioural determinants of health. Key implementation challenges remain, particularly around cost and whether the general public favour BI over other competing income-based policies. Further research is need to explore public values for BI in relation to competing policy options to help inform the political will necessary for implementation (McHugh, 2021).

CONCLUDING COMMENTS The examples we have discussed from both social policy and SI research highlight how different socially innovative non-health interventions, initiatives and policies have the potential to impact on health inequalities in a variety of different ways. In seeking to explore the connections between the fields of social policy and SI as they relate to health inequalities we offer two reflections, consider implications beyond the UK, and finish by posing several questions about the interdependence of social policy and SI as they relate to social inequalities in health. First, most obviously, our focus on the UK demonstrates that health inequalities in developed countries persist and are widening, despite (and arguably in spite of) efforts in social policy. Indeed, while the importance of a publicly funded national health service must not be underestimated, it is clear that health(care) policy or indeed health-led policy has not and cannot address the significant health inequalities that remain. Thus the field of social policy must contribute to new responses to counteract this substantial challenge and shift policies upstream to focus on social, economic and environmental determinants of health. Emergent areas in this vein include a focus on advancing an inclusive economy with the aim to ensure economic systems deliver greater inclusion, equity and health for all (Shipton et al., 2021). Second, possibly in response to this failure of social policy to adequately address health inequalities, the field of SI has the potential to tackle this significant social problem. In both research and practice, there is a growing body of work demonstrating how socially innovative organisations and initiatives without a health focus can impact positively on determinants of health, and address associated inequalities. While it is unlikely that such innovations could

182  Handbook on social innovation and social policy achieve the reach and impact that the issue of health inequalities so urgently demands, it nevertheless demonstrates the importance of recognising how non-health initiatives can impact positively on health. To maximise their potential, these SIs may also require the support of conventional social policies. For example, sustainability is often an issue for the socially innovative initiatives outlined in this chapter, with financial pressures having the potential to comprise their existence or original aims (see, for example, Ibrahim et al. (2021) and Kelly et al. (2021b)). Research demonstrating their health impact is important in highlighting the value of these SIs to society and making the case for public funding, should it be required. While the focus of this chapter is the UK, our discussion and the tensions between the fields of social policy and social innovation it explores, are of relevance internationally. Health inequalities are prevalent both in countries seeking to move towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) and in countries with established publicly funded (and privately funded) health care systems. Therefore, the need to identify ways in which social policies and SIs (particularly those beyond health care) can act on health inequalities is a global issue. While we have examined contemporary examples from the UK, many of these have their roots farther afield. In terms of social policy, the best-known examples of approaches to HiAP come from non-UK countries such as Australia (as discussed above), Nordic countries (i.e., Finland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden) as well as Iran, Kenya and Cuba (see Cairney et al. (2021) for an overview of HiAP studies). While these approaches are not perfect, they offer a number of important lessons, for example, how a failure to account for power and politics can undermine approaches to intersectoral policymaking (Cairney et al., 2021). Likewise, with SI, variants of each of the four examples discussed originate from, or have been applied, in non-UK countries. This demonstrates that many of the same issues are being grappled with beyond the UK. Indeed, although a focus on the structure and funding of health systems dominates health policy (and social policies concerned with health) internationally, what the UK case makes clear (as one of the most prominent examples of UHC) is that health care cannot tackle inequities in population health. In an increasingly unequal world, social policy and SI must address the upstream determinants of health inequalities. The challenge for the fields is to ensure that those concerned with health extend their focus beyond health care, and those concerned with inequality consider their work relevant to health. Our discussion and reflections raise several questions about the interdependence of social policy and SI as they relate to social inequalities in health. Are SIs to address health inequalities a necessary response to the failure of social policies? Do individual and community-led initiatives obfuscate core issues of economic inequality by promising change that can only ever be delivered through transformative social policies? In addressing health inequalities, can or should SIs become embedded in social policy, or is mainstreaming innovation undesirable and counterproductive to their original purpose? As public funding is increasingly tied to demonstrable impact and given health impacts are generally only observable over the long term, how does this square with socially innovative organisations’ short-term funding issues? Could public funding lead to unintended consequences in terms of socially innovative organisations’ missions shifting to meet funding criteria in a way that comprises their ability to act on health? Do both fields have the potential to operate at all layers of the social determinants of health, or might they both always be susceptible to drifting ‘downstream’? These questions do not have easy answers, but answering them demands greater interdisciplinary and cross-cutting collaboration, and a re-articulation of the core purpose of both fields. Given

Tackling health inequalities in the United Kingdom  183 the consequences for societal wellbeing at stake, greater integration between social policy and social innovation seems a necessary and urgent task.

NOTES 1. While the Black Report had a UK-wide agenda, the Acheson Report and the Marmot Review focused only on England. 2. This term is used interchangeably with health inequalities here and relates to systematic differences in health between different social groups, such as the best- and worst-off (Smith et al., 2015). 3. Smith et al. (2021) used Whitehead’s (2007) typology to categorise policy solutions discussed and voted on in three citizens’ juries and in a national survey focused on health inequalities in the UK.

REFERENCES Acheson, D., 1998. Independent Enquiry into Inequalities in Health. London: The Stationery Office. Armendariz, B., Morduch, J., 2010. The Economics of Microfinance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bambra, C., Lynch, J., Smith, K.E., 2021. The Unequal Pandemic: COVID-19 and Health Inequalities. Policy Press Shorts Insights. Bristol: Policy Press. Bambra, C., Riordan, R., Ford, J., Matthews, F., 2020. ‘The COVID-19 pandemic and health inequalities’, Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 74, 964–968. Bambra, C., Gibson, M., Sowden, A., Wright, K., Whitehead, M., Petticrew, M., 2010. ‘Tackling the wider social determinants of health and health inequalities: evidence from systematic reviews’, Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 64, 284–291. Baum, F., Delany-Crowe, T., MacDougall, C., van Eyk, H., Lawless, A., Williams, C., Marmot, M., 2019. ‘To what extent can the activities of the South Australian Health in All Policies initiative be linked to population health outcomes using a program theory-based evaluation?’, BMC Public Health, 19(88), 1–16. Bergin, N., Richardson, N., 2021. ‘Sheds for Life’: getting the balance right in delivering health promotion through Sheds in Ireland’, Health Promotion International, 36, 605–615. Beveridge, W., 1942. Social Insurance and Allied Services, Inter-departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office. BIEN (Basic Income Earth Network), 2021. About basic income. At https://​basicincome​.org/​(accessed 21 November 2023). Big Noise, 2021. What is Big Noise? At https://​www​.makeabignoise​.org​.uk/​big​-noise/​(accessed 21 November 2023). Biosca, O., McHugh, N., Ibrahim, F., Baker, R., Laxton, T., Donaldson, C., 2020. ‘Walking a tightrope: using financial diaries to investigate day-to-day financial decisions and the social safety net of the financially excluded’, ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 689, 46–64. Brunton, G., 2017. ‘Narratives of community engagement: a systematic review-derived conceptual framework for public health interventions’, BMC Public Health, 17(944), 1–15. Buck, D., Wensel, L., Beech, J., 2021. Communities and Health. London: The King’s Fund. Cairney, P., St Denny, E., Mitchell, H., 2021. ‘The future of public health policymaking after COVID-19: a qualitative systematic review of lessons from Health in All Policies’, Open Research Europe, 1(23), 1–36. Carnegie, 2020. Fear and loaning impact of Covid-19 on affordable credit providers serving financially vulnerable customers. Carnegie UK Trust and Community Finance Solutions, University of Salford. Dahlgren, G., Whitehead, M., 2021. ‘The Dahlgren–Whitehead model of health determinants: 30 years on and still chasing rainbows’, Public Health, 199, 20–24. Dahlgren, G., Whitehead, M., 2007. European strategies for tackling social inequities in health: Levelling up Part 2. World Health Organization, The Regional Office for Europe.

184  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Dahlgren, G., Whitehead, M., 1991. Policies and strategies to promote social equity in health. Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden. Daly, S., Allen, J., 2017. Voluntary sector action on the social determinants of health. Institute of Health Equity. Davies, C.R., Rosenberg, M., Knuiman, M., Ferguson, R., Pikora, T., Slatter, N., 2012. ‘Defining arts engagement for population-based health research: art forms, activities and level of engagement’, Arts & Health, 4, 203–216. Dayson, K.T., Vik, P.M., Curtis, J.M., 2020. Scaling up the UK personal lending CDFI sector: from £20m to £200m in lending by 2027. Carnegie UK Trust. Department of Health and Social Security, 1980. Inequalities in Health, The Black Report. Department of Health and Social Security, London. Donaldson, C., 2011. Credit Crunch Health Care: How Economics Can Save Our Publicly-funded Health Services. Bristol: Policy Press. Douglas, M., 2016. ‘Beyond “health”: Why don’t we tackle the cause of health inequalities?’, in: Smith, K.E., Hill, S., Bambra, C. (Eds.), Health Inequalities: Critical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 109–123. Earle, L., Earle, T., Von Mering, O., 1996. ‘Sheds and male retirement: the place to go to and come back from’, Australasian Leisure for Pleasure Journal, 1, 5–19. Fancourt, D., Finn, S., 2019. What is the Evidence on the Role of the Arts in Improving Health and Well-being? A scoping review. Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe (Health Evidence Network (HEN) synthesis report 67). Fuller, D., Mellor, M., 2008. ‘Banking for the poor: addressing the needs of financially excluded communities in Newcastle upon Tyne’, Urban Studies, 45, 1505–1524. GCPH, 2015. Evaluating Sistema Scotland – initial findings report. Glasgow Centre for Population Health, Glasgow. Gibson, M., Hearty, W., Craig, P., 2020. ‘The public health effects of interventions similar to basic income: a scoping review’, The Lancet Public Health, 5, e165–e176. Graham, H., 2009. ‘Health inequalities, social determinants and public health policy’, Policy and Politics, 37, 463–479. Hanlon, P., Carlisle, S., Hannah, M., Lyon, A., 2012. The Future Public Health. Maidenhead: Open University Press. Harkins, C., Moore, K., 2019. People change lives: consolidating five years of evaluation learning from Sistema Scotland’s Big Noise centres in Stirling, Glasgow and Aberdeen. GCPH, Glasgow. Holt-Lunstad, J., Smith, T.B., Layton, J.B., 2010. ‘Social relationships and mortality risk: a meta-analytic review’, PLoS Med, 7(7), 1–20. Holt-Lunstad, J., Smith, T.B., Baker, M., Harris, T., Stephenson, D., 2015. ‘Loneliness and social isolation as risk factors for mortality: a meta-analytic review’, Perspectives on Psychology Science, 10, 227–237. Hunter, D.J., Popay, J., Tannahill, C., Whitehead, M., Elson, T., 2009. Learning lessons from the past: shaping a different future. Marmot Review Working Committee 3, Cross-cutting sub-group report. Ibrahim, F., McHugh, N., Biosca, O., Baker, R., Laxton, T., Donaldson, C., 2021. ‘Microcredit as a public health initiative? Exploring mechanisms and pathways to health and wellbeing’, Social Science & Medicine, 270, 113633. Johnson, M.T., Johnson, E.A., Nettle, D., Pickett, K.E., 2021. ‘Designing trials of Universal Basic Income for health impact: identifying interdisciplinary questions to address’, Journal of Public Health, 44(2), 408–416. Kangas, O., Jauhiainen, S., Simanainen, M., Ylikännö, M., 2021. Experimenting with Unconditional Basic Income: Lessons from the Finnish BI Experiment 2017–2018. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Katikireddi, S.V., Higgins, M., Smith, K.E., Williams, G., 2013. ‘Health inequalities: the need to move beyond bad behaviours: Table 1’, Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 67, 715–716. Kelly, D., Steiner, A., 2021. ‘The impact of community Men’s Sheds on the physical health of their users’, Health & Place, 71, 102649. Kelly, D., Steiner, A., Mason, H., Teasdale, S., 2019. ‘Men’s Sheds: a conceptual exploration of the causal pathways for health and well-being’, Health & Social Care in the Community, 27, 1147–1157.

Tackling health inequalities in the United Kingdom  185 Kelly, D., Steiner, A., Mason, H., Teasdale, S., 2021a. ‘Men’s sheds as an alternative healthcare route? A qualitative study of the impact of Men’s sheds on user’s health improvement behaviours’, BMC Public Health, 21(553), 1–9. Kelly, D., Teasdale, S., Steiner, A., Mason, H., 2021b. ‘Men’s Sheds in Scotland: the potential for improving the health of men’, Public Health Policy, 42, 258–270. Kennedy, E., Binder, G., Humphries-Waa, K., Tidhar, T., Cini, K., Comrie-Thomson, L., Vaughan, C., Francis, K., Scott, N., Wulan, N., Patton, G., Azzopardi, P., 2020. ‘Gender inequalities in health and wellbeing across the first two decades of life: an analysis of 40 low-income and middle-income countries in the Asia-Pacific region’, The Lancet Global Health, 8, e1473–e1488. Lenton, P., Mosley, P., 2012. Financial Exclusion and the Poverty Trap: Overcoming Deprivation in the Inner City. London and New York: Routledge. Leyshon, A., 2009. ‘Financial exclusion’, in: Kitchin, R., Thrift, N. (Eds.), International Encyclopaedia of Human Geography, Vol. 4. Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 153–158. Marmot, M., Wilkinson, R.G., 2006. Social Determinants of Health, second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marmot, M.G., Rose, G., Shipley, M., Hamilton, P.J., 1978. ‘Employment grade and coronary heart disease in British civil servants’, Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 32, 244–249. Marmot, M., Allen, J., Boyce, T., Goldblatt, P., Morrison, J., 2020a. Health Equity in England: The Marmot Review 10 Years On. The Health Foundation, London. Marmot, M., Allen, J., Goldblatt, P., Herd, E., Morrison, J., 2020b. Build Back Fairer: The COVID-19 Marmot Review. The Pandemic, Socioeconomic and Health Inequalities in England. Institute of Health Equity, London. Marmot, M., Allen, J., Goldblatt, P., Boyce, T., McNeish, D., Grady, M., 2010. Fair Society: Healthy Lives. Strategic Review of Health Inequalities in England Post-2010, The Marmot Review, London. Marmot, M.G., Stansfeld, S., Patel, C., North, F., Head, J., White, I., Brunner, E., Feeney, A., Marmot, M.G., Smith, G.D., 1991. ‘Health inequalities among British civil servants: the Whitehall II study’, The Lancet, 337, 1387–1393. McAuley, A., Denny, C., Taulbut, M., Mitchell, R., Fischbacher, C., Graham, B., Grant, I., O’Hagan, P., McAllister, D., McCartney, G., 2016. ‘Informing investment to reduce inequalities: a modelling approach’, PLoS ONE, 11, e0159256. McHugh, N., 2021. ‘Eliciting public values on health inequalities: missing evidence for policy windows?’, Evidence & Policy, 1–13. DOI: 10.1332/174426421X16286783870175 McHugh, N., Baker, R., Donaldson, C., 2019a. ‘Microcredit for enterprise in the UK as an “alternative” economic space’, Geoforum, 100, 80–88. McHugh, N., Baker, R., Biosca, O., Ibrahim, F., Donaldson, C., 2019b. ‘Who knows best? A Q methodology study to explore perspectives of professional stakeholders and community participants on health in low-income communities’, BMC Health Services Research, 19(35), 1–13. McHugh, N., Biosca, O., Donaldson, C., 2017. ‘From wealth to health: evaluating microfinance as a complex intervention’, Evaluation, 23, 209–225. McHugh, N., Gillespie, M., Loew, J., Donaldson, C., 2014. ‘First steps towards self-employment: microcredit for enterprise in Scotland’, Scottish Affairs, 23, 169–191. McKinlay, J.B., 1979. ‘A case for refocusing upstream: the political economy of illness’, in: Jaco, E.G. (Ed.), Patients, Physicians, and Illness: A Sourcebook in Behavioral Science and Health. New York, NY: Free Press, pp. 9–25. McNamara, C.L., Balaj, M., Thomson, K.H., Eikemo, T.A., Solheim, E.F., Bambra, C., 2017. ‘The socioeconomic distribution of non-communicable diseases in Europe: findings from the European Social Survey (2014) special module on the social determinants of health’, European Journal of Public Health, 27, 22–26. O’Mara-Eves, A., Brunton, G., McDaid, D., Oliver, S., Kavanagh, J., Jamal, F., Matosevic, T., Harden, A., Thomas, J., 2013. ‘Community engagement to reduce inequalities in health: a systematic review, meta-analysis and economic analysis’, Public Health Research, 1, 1–526. Ogilvie, D., 2005. ‘Systematic reviews of health effects of social interventions: 2. Best available evidence: how low should you go?’, Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 59, 886–892. Petticrew, M., 2004. ‘Evidence for public health policy on inequalities: 1: The reality according to policymakers’, Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 58, 811–816.

186  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Popay, J., 2006. Community engagement for health improvement: questions of definition, outcomes and evaluation. A background paper prepared for NICE. NICE, London. Public Health England, 2016. Local wellbeing, local growth: overview. Public Health England, London. Public Health Scotland, 2021. The Place Standard tool. Public Health Scotland, Edinburgh. Responsible Finance, 2019. Responsible finance: the industry in 2019. Responsible Finance, London. Richardson, E., Fenton, L., Parkinson, J., Pulford, A., Taulbut, M., McCartney, G., Robinson, M., 2020. ‘The effect of income-based policies on mortality inequalities in Scotland: a modelling study’, The Lancet Public Health, 5, e150–e156. Rifkin, S.B., 2018. ‘Alma Ata after 40 years: Primary Health Care and Health for All: from consensus to complexity’, BMJ Global Health, 3, e001188. Rowlingson, K., McKay, S., 2017. Financial Inclusion Annual Monitoring Report 2017. At https://​www​ .birmingham​.ac​.uk/​Documents/​news/​15518​-CHASM​-Report​-Stage​-4​.pdf (accessed 21 November 2023). Roy, M.J., Donaldson, C., Baker, R., Kerr, S., 2014. ‘The potential of social enterprise to enhance health and well-being: a model and systematic review’, Social Science & Medicine, 123, 182–193. Scottish Government, 2020. Long-term Monitoring of Health Inequalities: January 2020 report, An Official Statistics publication for Scotland, Health and Social Care. Scottish Men’s Sheds Association, 2022. At https://​scottishmsa​.org​.uk/​(accessed 21 November 2023). Shipton, D., Sarica, S., Craig, N., McCartney, G., Katikireddi, S.V., Roy, G., McGregor, P., Scobie, G., 2021. ‘Knowing the goal: an inclusive economy that can address the public health challenges of our time’, Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 75, 1129–1132. Sinclair, S., 2013. ‘Financial inclusion and social financialisation: Britain in a European context’, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 33, 658–676. Smith, K.E., Kandlik Eltanani, M., 2015. ‘What kinds of policies to reduce health inequalities in the UK do researchers support?’, Journal of Public Health, 37, 6–17. Smith, K.E., Bambra, C., Hill, S.E., 2015. Health Inequalities: Critical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, K.E., Macintyre, A., Weakley, S., Hill, S.E., Escobar, O., Fergie, G., 2021. ‘Public understandings of potential policy responses to health inequalities: evidence from a UK national survey and citizens’ juries in three UK cities’, Social Science & Medicine, 114458. Sweet, E., Nandi, A., Adam, E.K., McDade, T.W., 2013. ‘The high price of debt: household financial debt and its impact on mental and physical health’, Social Science & Medicine, 91, 94–100. The Health Foundation, 2019. Health spending as a share of GDP remains at lowest level in a decade. At https://​www​.health​.org​.uk/​news​-and​-comment/​charts​-and​-infographics/​health​-spending​-as​-a​-share​ -of​-gdp​-remains​-at​-lowest​-level​-in (accessed 21 November 2023). Timmins, N., 2001. The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State. London: HarperCollins Publishers. Tunstall, T., 2012. Changing Lives: Gustavo Dudamel, El Sistema, and the Transformative Power of Music. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. UK Men’s Sheds Association, 2021. About UKMSA. At https://​menssheds​.org​.uk/​about/​#:​~:​text​=​We​ %20provide​%20support​%20and​%20guidance​,and​%20in​%20empowering​%20local​%20communities (accessed 21 November 2023). Welsh Government, 2017. Public Health (Wales) Act 2017. Whitehead, M., 2007. ‘A typology of actions to tackle social inequalities in health’, Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 61, 473–478. WHO, 2016. World Health Statistics 2016: Monitoring Health for the SDGs. Geneva: World Health Organization. WHO, 2014. Health in All Policies. Helsinki Statement, Framework for Country Action: The 8th Global Conference on Health Promotion. Geneva: World Health Organization.

15. Innovating health services: the role of embedded social innovation movements Benjamin Ewert

INTRODUCTION Innovation research draws extensively on examples from the realm of health. Perceived as a volatile condition that largely materializes through the interaction of humans with their social environment, health can be expanded and promoted by Social Innovation (SI). More than any other societal subsystem, health systems adopt innovative products, technologies, and services with great eagerness and speed. Many of these innovations have considerable social implications. One only needs to think of the introduction of telemedicine or health apps, multiplying opportunities to receive medical advice but also impacting upon doctor–patient relationships. Likewise, physicians increasingly apply co-production approaches such as ‘shared decision making’ or ‘social prescribing’ that require active engagement from patients. However, these features of modern health service provision are not flagships of SI in the full sense of the term. Using them by no means involves “challenging extant power relations or creating utilitarian societal value” (Ayob et al. 2016, 644). The same applies for rather isolated and uncoordinated examples of local SI, such as informal consultation hours for individuals without health insurance, occasionally organized by volunteering General Practitioners. As outlined in this chapter, SI in health, as in other fields, requires a minimum level of local, translocal, and discursive embeddedness in order to have a transformative impact. Rather than being loose local projects or interactive approaches, health innovations need to be firmly rooted in a broader movement for social change. This takeaway message will be unfolded in five sections.1 First, the somewhat vague and narrow meaning of (social) innovation in the health sector will be discussed. Against this backdrop, subsequently the theoretical underpinnings of actual transformative SI are reviewed. Next, by shedding light on two successful movements of SI of the past (i.e., the self-help and hospice movement) the importance of multiple embeddedness, as well as political support, will be illustrated. Referring to current attempts at innovative health service provision, the penultimate section will show that large-scale reform is out of sight until further notice. The chapter closes by sketching out the bare bones of a movement for more meaningful health service innovation.

INNOVATION IN THE HEALTH SECTOR SIs are “new and disruptive towards the routines and structures prevailing in a given (welfare) system or local setting” (Evers et al. 2014, 11). A historical role model in this regard is the Peckham Health Centre, “a radically holistic approach to health in the 1930s” (Murray et al. 2009, 3). To this day, the Peckham Health Centre continues to inspire social innovators’ imagination (Hannah 2014). Located in South London, the public facility promoted community 187

188  Handbook on social innovation and social policy health by offering residents opportunities for recreational activities, social gatherings, and health counseling. The Peckham experiment sought to cultivate health and well-being among its visitors rather than applying a medical gaze to them (Conford 2016). Remarkably, researchers’ enthusiasm for the Peckham Health Centre tends to conceal its most critical lesson: the innovation was not prototyped, sustained, or scaled up. Instead, in 1950, after the National Health Service (NHS) had been established, the Peckham Health Centre closed. While the example of the Peckham Health Centre illustrates how uncertain the consolidation of SI is, it should not be misinterpreted as indicating a general reluctance towards innovation within health sectors. Quite the contrary is the case: health sectors are distinctly innovation prone rather than innovation averse. Particularly, medical advancement, in the form of new medicines and therapies, is a ceaseless source of innovation in modern healthcare systems. Examples of complete changes in social reality and relations evoked by medical innovations are scarce; however, it is worth mentioning in this regard the prescription of the birth control pill and the application of effective HIV treatments. Also, major societal trends, such as individualization, marketization, digitalization, and an orientation towards (medical) evidence, renew established forms of healthcare provision and doctor–patient relationships. Yet, customized precision medicine, the use of digital technology, and evidence-based interventions are innovations that hardly challenge the social foundation of healthcare delivery. They are not automatically promoting “[p]eople-powered health” (Mulgan 2019, 70) but often continue status quo practices under a new guise. Thus, it must be asked how innovation is strategically framed and perceived in the field of health. While SI research is repeatedly health-related (Mason et al. 2015; Valentine et al. 2017), SI does not dominate innovative thinking and practice in health. Real-world examples of SI in the health field often have a utopian appeal. The literature frequently presents ambitious counter-proposals to current healthcare provision schemes, suggesting that “[a]nother way is possible” (Hannah 2014, 116). In these (rare) local cases of truly transformative SI, such as the Alaskan Nuka System of Care (Gottlieb 2013), each and every facet of health service provision has been fundamentally changed, starting with the design, organization, and funding of delivery schemes addressing service users. Beyond these shining exceptions, the health sector is impacted by two other threads of the innovation discourse that, although they acknowledge the social dimensions of innovations, are not defined by them. First, references are made to the idea of disruptive innovation emanating from the field of public management (Christensen et al. 2018). Varkey et al. (2008, 383) distinguish three forms (i.e., product, process, structural) and two dimensions (i.e., nondisruptive, disruptive) of innovation in healthcare. Accordingly, innovative products are nondisruptive if they become updated or revised (e.g., a new generation of drugs) or disruptive if new products are invented (e.g., COVID-19 vaccination). Nondisruptive innovative processes concern new forms of healthcare service provision such as telemedicine, while disruptive processes concern new healthcare interventions (e.g., minimally invasive surgeries). Lastly, nondisruptive structural innovations refer to changes in organizational and institutional settings of healthcare provision (e.g., outpatient clinics), whereas disruptive ones refer to new healthcare management and business models (e.g., population-based integrated healthcare systems). Second, the debate on public and collaborative innovation and new forms of governance (Sørensen & Torfing 2015) has resonated in the health sector (Kickbusch & Gleicher 2012). While this strand suggests that “policy innovation must reach beyond the health system and its present form of organization” (Kickbusch 2007a, 339), it does not converge with the debate

Innovating health services: the role of embedded social innovation movements  189 on SI. Apparently, there is a considerable intellectual gap between grand policy designs and the small-scale level and local reality of SI that is strongly attached to “what works here and now”. At the same time, generally accepted features of SI, such as co-productive relationships or user participation (Evers & Ewert 2021), have been incorporated into the mainstream of healthcare provision. Rather than being disruptive (i.e., breaking routines and underlying structures), socially innovative approaches are often applied to protect the status quo in healthcare provision. To prevent the domestication and appropriation of SIs, they must be supported by a broader reform movement and not be stand-alone projects. Hence, in the next section, the theoretical concept of embedded SI is introduced and applied to health systems.

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF EMBEDDED SOCIAL INNOVATION Social innovators face a tricky question: how do they change social systems without becoming part of the system they seek to change? There are numerous examples of SI being colonized by health systems. As argued below, the trajectory of some self-help and patient organizations that often started their mission as change agents at the fringes of health systems before gradually turning into rather ordinary service providers is a telling example (Ewert 2015). The counter-question, however, is legitimate too: to what extent do social innovators need to be interlinked with the system they intend to change? Obviously, a complete refusal of patient organizations to cooperate with health systems’ key actors (e.g., insurance companies) would render them irrelevant. The intersection of both questions raises the issue of embeddedness. Embedded SIs belong to some sort of ‘ecosystems’ in which they are wrapped around, and which facilitate the evolution of SI. While ‘social innovation ecosystems’ (Pel et al. 2020) may partly overlap with the formal structures of policy systems (like that of health), they typically refer to a “diverse community of organizations, institutions, and individuals” (Autio & Thomas 2014, 207). The distinctive character of SI ecosystems will be investigated with regard to the realm of health. Building up to this understanding, different forms of embeddedness will be introduced. Management theory provides us with a solid account of innovation ecosystems (ibid.). They are ever-changing “collaborative arrangements” (ibid., 207) with blurred boundaries whose participants share the destiny of co-creation and innovation. In particular, the term “innovative ecosystems” seems useful since it “incorporates both production and use side participants” (ibid., 205) and, therewith, highlights from whose origins SI may potentially emanate. Focusing on health service provision, ecosystems go far beyond health policy actors (e.g., health ministries) and service providers (e.g., physicians and insurers) and necessarily include service users (e.g., insured persons and patients). Together, these may form an “evolving community” (ibid., 208) collaborating for the sake of health service innovation. In reality, innovative ecosystems consist of several communities rather than one depending on the field of health service and network constellations. Often these networks revolve around key challenges such as mental health or palliative care. Primarily conceived for the purpose of expert exchange, self-assurance, and mutual support, these networks may become fertile grounds for health service innovation. If this is the case, one may think of the emergence of integrated palliative care (den Herder-van der Eerden et al. 2017), which literature describes as “embedded social innovation” (Terstriep & Rehfield 2020, 856).

190  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Embeddedness is a defining feature of SI. For example, Moulaert (2009, 11) circumscribes SI as “institutionally embedded” and “territorially (re)produced”. This definition seems accurate if we consider examples of successful SI such as multi-professional outpatient departments that, after an initial phase of piloting and experimentation, have become a regular feature of healthcare provision. Making full sense of SI trajectories, however, requires a multi-dimensional understanding of embeddedness, especially if one seeks to study emerging or unconsolidated SIs. In line with Pel et al. (2020, 315–316) three SI ecosystems, carrying different notions of embeddedness, can be distinguished. First, SI is constituted as a place-based endeavor that is empowered by local embeddedness. As Pel et al. (2020) argue, “local roots” provide SI with “legitimacy”, a “critical mass”, “accommodation and material resources”, and “institutional anchorage” (ibid., 315). Examples of socially innovative health services that are supported by local communities are manifold. Often they are shaped by local stakeholders’ extraordinary commitment and pragmatic collaboration. A typical example are clearinghouse centers, which help individuals with an unsettled health insurance status to re-enter health insurance systems. For instance, in Frankfurt am Main (Germany), clearinghouse advice is coordinated, funded, and offered by a joint venture between the local public health department, the youth and social welfare office, and the counseling service from the city’s University of Applied Science. Second, translocal connectivity is important. According to Pel et al. (2020): “local [SI] initiatives are often supported … through translocal, international collaborations with like-minded local initiatives” (ibid., 315). This dimension empowers social innovators to overcome territoriality boundaries through the emergence of “translocal political voice”, “translocal collective identity”, and “translocal knowledge exchange”. In health provision, integrated care schemes have been promoted by a translocal community that aims “to inspire, influence and facilitate the adoption of integrated care in policy and practice around the world” (Integrate Care Foundation 2022). Third, SI “can also be empowered through wider processes of discursive resonance” (Pel et al. 2020, 315). Discursive resonance refers to the “circulation of a) organizational models; (b) formats of practices; (c) framings and narratives; and (d) codified knowledge on socially innovative concepts and practices” (ibid.). Traditionally, Community Health Nursing (CHN) has been an approach that created noticeable resonance in health system discourse (Dieckmann 2021). As will be argued in section 5, CHN models have been promoted through a lively debate revolving around issues such as cross-sectorial health policies, professional responsibilities, and co-production of health services. The likelihood of an SI flourishing, consolidating, and becoming resilient is best if it is embedded in all three ecosystems. However, it is worth noticing that while ecosystems are a necessary condition for SI they cannot guarantee their actual impact and long-term success. Instead, SI needs to be both rooted in supportive ecosystems and driven by a “social innovation movement” (Unger 2015). Hence, SI requires leadership and strategic orientation “to change some part of the established arrangements and assumptions of society” (ibid., 233). While embeddedness in ecosystems is a necessary criterion for this, SI should also be pursued with fierce determination by their initiators. Consisting of a wide range of actors (i.e., governmental, civil society, and market ones), an SI movement ideally seeks to (politically) steer SI’s mission of change and systemic renewal with “prophetic vocation” (ibid., 250). Thus, the following section reviews the journey of two embedded SI movements that have succeeded in fundamentally changing health service provision in the past.

Innovating health services: the role of embedded social innovation movements  191

THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF THE SELF-HELP AND HOSPICE MOVEMENT The previous achievements of SI movements in the realm of health can be summarized in a single phrase: ‘Humanizing healthcare’ (Hannah 2014) against all odds. Basically, this claim has always been about the re-appropriation of health by patients and service users. As criticized, healthcare, at least in Western societies perceived as a universal good, has been gradually deformed by a supposedly impersonal and inhuman system. Accordingly, the underlying rationales of healthcare’s consumption, provision, and production have been detached from its primary object, i.e., human health. Ivan Illich (1975) stressed modern healthcare’s corrosive power in his landmark book Medical Nemesis: The Exploration of Health by essentially arguing, “people had given up their autonomy to the medical profession, and become unhealthily dependent” (Lupton 2005, 122). Hence, the focal point of Illich’s book has been the inherent tension between individual autonomy and medical power calling for a reclaiming of “lay processes of healing, suffering and dying” (ibid.). This critique matched a widespread unease towards a self-referring medical–industrial complex resulting in the surge of a counter-movement. Two strands of this movement fundamentally changed service provision in health systems: organized self-help and hospice care. The Self-help Movement In view of medical professions’ dominance and industrialized healthcare provision, self-help and patient organizations call for a more active and autonomous role for service users (Croft & Beresford 1989). United by the principles of empowerment, co-decision and co-design, the self-help movement, ranging from small informal initiatives to semi-organized umbrella organizations, pursued social and systemic change. Retrospectively, the success of the self-help movement could be explained by the extent of its embeddedness in SI ecosystems. Self-help groups such as Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous (Flora et al. 2010) enriched and diversified local health service provision, succeeded in building translocal movements, and had a lasting impact on the health discourse. The self-help movement’s local dimension is traditionally explained by self-help groups’ main cause, i.e., “direct interpersonal communication among members” (ibid., 215) with similar health problems. Before the internet age, self-help group meetings were strictly place-based; the establishment of trust and reciprocity among ‘fellow sufferers’ required a supportive local infrastructure. Under the patronage of churches, city councils, and other advocates that, among other forms of support, provided meeting rooms free of charge and also goodwill, self-help groups complemented local health systems. Moreover, the urgency of pandemics such as HIV became at first noticeable in urban environments, increasing pressure to act (Schilling 2003). Thus, it is fair to say that the ‘local’ could be considered the nucleus of the self-help movement. Likewise, the translocal dimension has been crucial leverage to strengthen the self-help movement. At the national level, a succession of umbrella organizations was founded to coordinate the political lobbying activities of self-help movements. In Germany, this has been a decade-long process, starting with the foundation of the Federal Association for Aid for the Disabled in 1968, and ending with the inclusion of patients and self-help organizations within the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA), i.e., the highest decision-making body of the

192  Handbook on social innovation and social policy German health system’s joint self-government (Matzat 2006). In addition, the movement’s translocal identity has been further reinforced at the European level. For example, since 1997 the non-profit alliance EURORDIS has represented the voice of rare disease patients in Europe and, therewith, increases their political clout. Intellectually, the self-help movement has been embedded in a discourse that particularly gained momentum in the aftermath of the declaration of the Ottawa Charter by the World Health Organization (WHO 1986). “[C]onsidered a seminal document and template for health promotion” (Thompson et al. 2018, 73), the Ottawa Charter set the tone for health activists across health systems. Key strategies of the Charter, such as the commitment to ‘strengthen community action’ and ‘develop personal skills’, created a powerful narrative of empowerment and self-help agency (Segal et al. 1993). Despite calls for a “reconfiguration of the principles embedded in the Ottawa Charter” (Woodall & Freeman 2020, 629) alongside today’s health challenges (e.g., climate change), self-helpers are still attracted by the health promotion discourse stimulated by the WHO more than 30 years ago. The Hospice Movement Similar to collective self-help, the hospice movement developed in opposition to traditional notions of medicine and healthcare. Conceptually, hospice care perceives “the person as both a holistic individual and a member of a complex system of family, friends, society and culture” (Campbell 1986, 333) – that is, neither only a service recipient nor merely a patient. Moreover, by shifting the perspective from curative to palliative care of the terminally ill, the hospice movement shed light on care professions (e.g., nurses, chaplains, or social workers) and practices (i.e., palliative treatment) that have been marginalized by a curative and physician-led medicine. Viewed through an SI lens, the hospice movement’s key achievement has been the institutionalization of hospices and palliative care units in modern health systems (Abel 1986). The following features of local, translocal, and discursive embeddedness could be identified. The hospice movement’s local roots could be traced back to the establishment of the St. Christopher’s Hospice in England by Cicely Saunders in 1967. Saunders, a nurse by profession, did not accept that “hospitals usurped the role of the family and became the socially determined place to die” (Campbell 1986, 336). Instead, hospices were conceived as alternative institutions that are based on a strong “reliance on neighborhoods and local communities” (MacDonald 1991, 275). Hence, a central goal of the hospice movement has been the reintegration of death and dying within local life worlds and settings. From a translocal perspective, it is worth noticing that “hospice is primarily a concept of care, and not a specific place of care” (Miličević 2002, 30). As many SI, local examples of hospice care are “new in the immediate context where they appear” (Evers et al. 2014, 15) but can hardly be turned into best-practice approaches due to their strong dependence on context factors such as civic engagement by hospice associations. In contrast, hospice care owes its translocal character to plural conceptual manifestations, including – besides hospices – inpatient and outpatient palliative care units and bereavement services. In order to reflect care experiences, advance knowledge, and maximize the movement’s societal and political impact, transnational organizations have been founded (e.g., the International Association for Hospice and Palliative Care and the International Observatory on End of Life Care). In terms of discursive resonance, the hospice movement has been glued together through, on the one hand, the narrative of “bringing death to the public awareness” (Miličević 2002, 30)

Innovating health services: the role of embedded social innovation movements  193 and, on the other hand, challenging “[the] bureaucratization and institutionalization of modern medical care” (Abel 1986, 73). However, owing to the movement’s success, the thematic focuses of the discourse have changed significantly over the years. Having started with fundamental issues such as pain relief, the autonomy of the terminally ill, and the acknowledgment of non-medical professions’ role in hospice and palliative care, other aspects, such as care integration and multidisciplinary cooperation, have dominated debate since the 2000s (Ewert et al. 2016). It should become clear that the self-help and the hospice movement were embedded in an exemplary manner in local, translocal, and discursive ecosystems that strongly supported the emergence and consolidation of SI. By bundling criticism of medical practices and a deep malaise in society with health systems’ rationales, both movements managed to successfully ride the wave of empowerment and emancipation that led to institutional renewal from the 1970s onwards. However, as argued in the next section, this extraordinary historic constellation has been fading during the last two decades, making full-scale SI in health service provision less likely.

SOCIALLY INNOVATIVE PRACTICES THAT DO NOT CULMINATE IN A MOVEMENT Health systems in OECD countries did not turn into dystopia as predicted by Illich (1975) almost five decades ago. Rather the opposite has become true: to some extent today’s health services have become more humane, i.e., participatory, community oriented, and less paternalistic. Self-help groups and hospice care have become essential features of service provision, even if their respective provision cannot catch up with the resources of conventional healthcare providers. However, more recently, the once powerful emancipatory movement that succeeded in making health systems more civic and user-friendly is running out of steam. The reasons for this development are manifold and go beyond the scope of this chapter. However, besides the loss of importance despite its obvious achievements, two overarching developments of health system renewal have irreversibly changed the SI ecology: marketization and evidence-based practices. As in other fields of social policy, marketization processes in the health sector were accompanied by governments’ application of choice and competition among providers and services (Le Grand 2003). Additionally, “the rapid growth of a health market … translates health into a product that promises wellbeing” (Kickbusch 2007b, 89) and this has led to the construction of ‘healthcare consumers’ who are then actively addressed (Powell & Greener 2009). Likewise, faith in evidence-based practices has transformed health service provision (Fineout-Overholt et al. 2005). Disease Management Programs (DMPs), i.e., service schemes for chronically ill patients that strictly follow medical evidence, are built on predetermined scripts for user involvement that seek to put ‘knowledge to action’ (Dopson & Fitzgerald 2005). Both drivers of change – marketization and evidence-based practices – voraciously draw from the achievements of the emancipatory (health) movement without pursuing their initial values and goals. Building on the merits of an increasingly pluralized and participatory system that is no longer driven by the uncontrolled power of the medical profession (Kuhlmann 2006) set off an ambivalent process of healthcare system renewal. On the one hand, this – euphemistically called – “modernization” process led to a continuously addressing of active rather

194  Handbook on social innovation and social policy than passive service users (Ewert 2009); on the other hand, competition and market-oriented reforms significantly narrowed spaces for individual and collective agency in the health system. Consequently, socially innovative practices have become detached from their original ecology, and have been exploited for other purposes. This de facto appropriation has considerably thwarted the SI movement. Accordingly, SI did not disappear but stopped being a counterforce to health system institutions and stakeholders. Rather than becoming disseminated and upscaled in a way that would have further transformed health systems, as it had been done by the self-help and hospice movement, single features of SI have become reinterpreted. Above all, this concerns previous hallmarks of SI such as empowerment and co-production that gradually developed into ‘empty signifiers’. To be originally perceived as the “central theme that runs throughout the [Ottawa] Charter” (Hancock 2011, 405), empowerment turned into a regular feature of health service provision. Hence, empowering ‘people to exert more control’ (ibid.) has become a synonym for choosing individual healthcare services in a consumer-like manner and navigating through complex provision schemes. Examples of SI, drawing from a ‘normalized’ notion of empowerment, are user-centered interventions that leave asymmetries in terms of power and access to resources untouched. A case in point is the exploitation of ‘health nudges’, behavioral cues facilitating smart choices in areas such as food, exercise, but also insurance coverage and services, that fundamentally reinvent health promoters’ dictum of making healthier choices easier. Instead of being a formula to empower people and communities to make structural changes in their life worlds affecting the social determinants of health (e.g., work, income, education, etc.), nudges aim for modest behavioral adjustments of individuals (Ewert 2017; Ewert 2020). Hence, nudge calls for behavioral change within existing health systems and in line with prescribed norms and values; in sharp contrast, the rejection (and renewal) of both had been the starting point of the SI movement. In addition, co-production is nowadays a standard approach to health service delivery (Palumbo 2016) that cannot be equated with the ideal of a value-based, egalitarian, and democratic governance mode (Evers & Ewert 2021). Similar to empowerment, a socially innovative practice that theoretically includes transformative features had been deliberately reduced to its most basic feature: the co-implementation of services (Brandsen & Honingh 2018, 15). Thus, co-production is intently considered a ‘natural’ element of provider/professional–user relationships that primarily needs to be applied to increase services’ effectiveness. Due to the uno-acto-principle (i.e., the inseparability of service production and consumption), social services have always been deemed as an activity-based endeavor that requires collaboration. Even in the most paternalistic medical settings (e.g., hospital care) patients co-produced services by obediently following doctors’ advice. However, the characteristics of service production have fundamentally changed over time. While users’ compliance is still the ultimate objective, the means to achieve this goal have become more interactive and participatory, as can be shown by the gradual advancement of frameworks for professional–user interactions (i.e., from informed consent to shared decision making). In the course of this development, co-production, perceived as the aggregate of users’ active contributions within the service delivery process, turned into both a policy goal on its own and a key parameter to determine service quality. Yet, co-production’s increasing popularity comes with a price, i.e., arbitrariness. In view of today’s health services, co-production means everything and nothing – from sharing personal information with doctors to adhering to therapy regimes and to co-designing (parts of) service provision. However, farther-reaching notions of co-productive health services, including the

Innovating health services: the role of embedded social innovation movements  195 restructuring of service provision across sectors and the empowerment of users in relation to providers, are the exception to the rule (Evers & Ewert 2021). Although blueprints of service innovations showcase the potential of welfare renewal (Ewert & Evers 2014), their impact remains in most cases constrained to their local origins. Thus, service innovations that transform health service provision require local, translocal, and discursive embeddedness. Moreover, they cannot be reduced to single features (e.g., empowerment, co-production) – being constantly at risk of instrumentalization – but are per definition uncertain, multi-dimensional, and procedural undertakings. What might be a contemporary format for a movement pursuing such complex health service innovation?

REALIGNING MOVEMENTS FOR HEALTH SERVICE INNOVATION In view of the supposedly innovation-prone health sector, it is of the utmost importance to distinguish between innovative features that merely superficially modernize service provision and those that have the potential for effecting fundamental change. The latter need to be anchored in a movement rather than being restricted to local initiatives and modest policy reforms. Referring to the concept of SI ecosystems, it has been shown in this chapter that, above all, translocal and discursive embeddedness are indispensable requirements to revise traditional patterns of service provision in health systems. In conclusion, it should be argued that realigning a movement for socially innovative health services necessitates moving beyond local case studies. Instead, common challenges in service provision and intellectual efforts to counter them ought to be identified. In this regard, primary care fits as a starting point for SI. Across health systems, the provision of primary healthcare is confronted by severe societal developments (e.g., demographic change and a steep increase of non-communicable diseases) as well as infrastructural problems (e.g., shortages of doctors in rural areas but also specialist nurses). Notwithstanding local particularities, these challenges call for the transformation of primary care design. In this regard, Community Health Nursing (CHN), although by no means a new concept, is deemed to be an SI that has not yet unfolded its full potential. CHN is defined as “a special field of nursing that combines the skills of nursing, public health and some phases of social assistance and functions as part of the total public health program for the promotion of health, the improvement of the conditions in the social and physical environment, rehabilitation of illness and disability” (WHO 1974, 11). CHN has become a regular service offer in some health systems such as Canada and Finland. However, it still waits for its major international breakthrough, not least because CHN partly provokes fierce opposition by standard healthcare providers (e.g., hospitals and physicians), who are in fear of losing competences and power to ‘non-medical’ professions. For exactly this reason, CHN serves as an unbroken source of inspiration for health service innovation, as shown by the enormous attention that has been raised by the – CHN-like – Dutch Buurtzorg model (Lalani et al. 2019; Sheldon 2017). Thereby, CHN’s discursive embeddedness has been reoriented to quality-related aspects of modern health service provision such as assessment processes, evidence-based planning, and program implementation (Ervin & Kulbok 2018). Yet, it remains to be seen whether CHN approaches (like Buurtzorg) may become an integral part of health systems. Much depends on social innovators’ skills to form a powerful CHN movement that is equally rooted in local,

196  Handbook on social innovation and social policy translocal, and discursive ecologies. In this sense, the recent CHN campaign by a professional nursing association, research funding foundation, and universities in Germany has been a role model example. In 2021, joint lobbying efforts resulted in clear political will, stated by the newly elected federal government, to establish CHN as a new health profession. While the long-term impacts of this preliminary success are yet unknown, its symbolic message for health service innovation is encouraging: backed by the combination of local case studies, international dissemination, and discursive resonance, the emergence of a SI movement is still within the realms of possibility. Who knows; referring to this and similar experiences, perhaps there will eventually be renewed collective efforts to bring the Peckham experiment to a positive conclusion. More than ever, user-owned community health centers, such as the famous predecessor model in South London almost 90 years ago, would constitute an outstanding SI in the NHS and elsewhere.

NOTE 1.

I am grateful to Adalbert Evers for offering valuable ideas concerning the outline of this chapter.

REFERENCES Abel, E. K. (1986). The hospice movement: Institutionalizing innovation. International Journal of Health Services, 16(1), 71–85. Autio, E. & Thomas, L. (2014). Innovation ecosystems. In M. Dodgson, N. Philips, & D.M. Gann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Innovation Management (pp. 204–288). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ayob, N., Teasdale, S. & Fagan, K. (2016). How social innovation ‘came to be’: Tracing the evolution of a contested concept. Journal of Social Policy, 45(4), 635–653. Brandsen, T. & Honingh, M. (2018). Definitions of co-production and co-creation. In T. Brandsen, T. Steen, & B. Verschuere (eds.), Co-Production and Co-Creation (pp. 9–17). Abingdon: Routledge. Campbell, L. (1986). History of the hospice movement. Cancer Nursing, 9(6), 333–338. Christensen, C. M., McDonald, R., Altman, E. J. & Palmer, J. E. (2018). Disruptive innovation: An intellectual history and directions for future research. Journal of Management Studies, 55(7), 1043–1078. Conford, P. (2016). ‘Smashed by the National Health’? A closer look at the demise of the Pioneer Health Centre, Peckham. Medical History, 60(2), 250–269. Croft, S. & Beresford, P. (1989). User-involvement, citizenship and social policy. Critical Social Policy, 9(26), 5–18. den Herder-van der Eerden, M., Ewert, B., Hodiamont, F., Hesse, M., Hasselaar, J. & Radbruch, L. (2017). Towards accessible integrated palliative care: Perspectives of leaders from seven European countries on facilitators, barriers and recommendations for improvement. Journal of Integrated Care, 25(3), 222–232. Dieckmann, J. (2021). The history of public health and public and community health nursing. In M. Stanhope & J. Lancaster (eds.), Foundations for Population Health in Community/Public Health (pp. 20–37). St. Louis: Elsevier. Dopson, S. & Fitzgerald, L. (eds.). (2005). Knowledge to Action? Evidence-based Health Care in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ervin, N. E. & Kulbok, P. (2018). Advanced Public and Community Health Nursing Practice: Population Assessment, Program Planning and Evaluation. New York: Springer Publishing Company. Evers, A. & Ewert, B. (2021). Understanding co-production as a social innovation. In T. Bovaird & E. Loeffler (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook on Co-production of Public Services and Outcomes (pp. 133–153). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Innovating health services: the role of embedded social innovation movements  197 Evers, A., Ewert, B. & Brandsen, T. (2014). Social Innovations for Social Cohesion: Transnational Patterns and Approaches from 20 European Cities. Liege: EMES European Research Network. Ewert, B. (2020). Moving beyond the obsession with nudging individual behaviour: Towards a broader understanding of Behavioural Public Policy. Public Policy and Administration, 35(3), 337–360. Ewert, B. (2017). Promoting health in schools: Theoretical reflections on the settings approach versus nudge tactics. Social Theory & Health, 15(4), 430–447. Ewert, B. (2015). Change agents and service providers? User organizations in the German healthcare system. European Policy Analysis, 1(1), 149–167. Ewert, B. (2009). Economization and marketization in the German healthcare system: How do users respond? German Policy Studies, 5(1), 21–44. Ewert, B. & Evers, A. (2014). Blueprints for the future of welfare provision? Shared features of service innovations across Europe. Social Policy and Society, 13(3), 423–432. Ewert, B., Hodiamont, F., van Wijngaarden, J., Payne, S., Groot, M., Hasselaar, J., … & Radbruch, L. (2016). Building a taxonomy of integrated palliative care initiatives: Results from a focus group. BMJ Supportive & Palliative Care, 6(1), 14–20. Fineout-Overholt, E., Melnyk, B. M. & Schultz, A. (2005). Transforming health care from the inside out: Advancing evidence-based practice in the 21st century. Journal of Professional Nursing, 21(6), 335–344. Flora, K., Raftopoulos, A. & Pontikes, T. K. (2010). A look at the evolution of the self-help movement. Journal of Groups in Addiction & Recovery, 5(3–4), 214–225. Gottlieb, K. (2013). The Nuka System of Care: Improving health through ownership and relationships. International Journal of Circumpolar Health, 72(1), 21118. Hancock, T. (2011). The Ottawa charter at 25. Canadian Journal of Public Health, 102(6), 404–406. Hannah, M. (2014). Humanising Healthcare: Patterns of Hope for a System under Strain. Devon: Triarchy Press. Illich, I. (1975). Medical Nemesis. The Expropriation of Health. London: Marion Boyars. Integrate Care Foundation (2022). About IFIC. Retrieved on May 28, 2022 from https://​inte​gratedcare​ foundation​.org/​about​-ific Kickbusch, I. (2007a). Innovation in health policy: Responding to the health society. Gaceta Sanitaria, 21(4), 338–342. Kickbusch, I. (2007b). Responding to the health society. Health Promotion International, 22(2), 89–91. Kickbusch, I. & Gleicher, D. E. (2012). Governance for Health in the 21st Century. WHO Regional Office for Europe. Kuhlmann, E. (2006). Modernizing Health Care. Bristol: Policy Press. Lalani, M., Fernandes, J., Fradgley, R., Ogunsola, C. & Marshall, M. (2019). Transforming community nursing services in the UK: Lessons from a participatory evaluation of the implementation of a new community nursing model in East London based on the principles of the Dutch Buurtzorg model. BMC Health Services Research, 19(1), 1–9. Le Grand, J. (2003). Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy: Of Knights and Knaves, Pawns and Queens. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lupton, D. (2005). Limits to medicine: Medical nemesis. Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 10(2), 122–123. MacDonald, D. (1991). Hospice social work: A search for identity. Health & Social Work, 16(4), 274–280. Mason, C., Barraket, J., Friel, S., O’Rourke, K. & Stenta, C. P. (2015). Social innovation for the promotion of health equity. Health Promotion International, 30(suppl_2), ii116–ii125. Matzat, J. (2006). Self-help/mutual aid in Germany: A 30 year perspective of a participant observer. International Journal of Self-Help & Self-Care, 5(3), 279–294. Miličević, N. (2002). The hospice movement: History and current worldwide situation. Archive of Oncology, 10(1), 29–31. Moulaert, F. (2009). Social innovation: Institutionally embedded, territorially (re) produced. In D. MacCallum, F. Moulaert, J. Hillier, & S. Vicari Haddock (eds.), Social Innovation and Territorial Development (pp. 11–24). London and New York: Routledge. Mulgan, G. (2019). Social Innovation: How Societies Find the Power to Change. Bristol: Policy Press.

198  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Murray, R., Caulier-Grice, J. & Mulgan, G. (2009). Social Venturing. The Social Innovator Series. London: Nesta. Palumbo, R. (2016). Contextualizing co-production of health care: A systematic literature review. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 29(1), 72–90. Pel, B., Haxeltine, A., Avelino, F., Dumitru, A., Kemp, R., Bauler, T., … & Jørgensen, M. S. (2020). Towards a theory of transformative social innovation: A relational framework and 12 propositions. Research Policy, 49(8), 104080. Powell, M. & Greener, I. (2009). The healthcare consumer. The consumer in public services: Choice, values and difference. In R. Simmons, M. Powell, & I. Greener (eds.), The Consumer in Public Services: Choice, Values and Difference (pp. 99–118). Bristol: Policy Press. Schilling, R. (2003). The German AIDS self-help movement. In R. Rosenbrock & M. T. Wright (eds.), Partnership and Pragmatism: The German Response to AIDS Prevention and Care (pp. 82–90). London and New York: Routledge. Segal, S. P., Silverman, C. & Temkin, T. (1993). Empowerment and self-help agency practice for people with mental disabilities. Social Work, 38(6), 705–712. Sheldon, T. (2017). Buurtzorg: The district nurses who want to be superfluous. BMJ Clinical Research, 358, j3140. Sørensen, E. & Torfing, J. (2015). Enhancing public innovation through collaboration, leadership and new public governance. In A. Nicholls, J. Simon, & M. Gabriel (eds.), New Frontiers in Social Innovation Research (pp. 145–169). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Terstriep, J. & Rehfeld, D. (2020). Bridging local embeddedness and global dynamics: The economics of social innovation. European Planning Studies, 28(5), 853–863. Thompson, S. R., Watson, M. C. & Tilford, S. (2018). The Ottawa Charter 30 years on: Still an important standard for health promotion. International Journal of Health Promotion and Education, 56(2), 73–84. Unger, R. M. (2015). Conclusion: The task of the social innovation movement. New frontiers in social innovation research. In A. Nicholls, J. Simon, & M. Gabriel (eds.), New Frontiers in Social Innovation Research (pp. 233–251). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Valentine, L., Kroll, T., Bruce, F., Lim, C. & Mountain, R. (2017). Design thinking for social innovation in health care. The Design Journal, 20(6), 755–774. Varkey, P., Horne, A. & Bennet, K. E. (2008). Innovation in health care: A primer. American Journal of Medical Quality, 23(5), 382–388. WHO (1986). Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion. Retrieved May 28, 2022 from http://​www​.euro​.who​ .int/​_​_data/​assets/​pdf​_file/​0004/​129532/​Ottawa​_Charter​.pdf​?ua​=​1 WHO (1974). Community health nursing, Retrieved May 28, 2022 from https://​ apps​ .who​ .int/​ iris/​ bitstream/​handle/​10665/​41121/​WHO​_TRS​_558​.pdf​?seque Woodall, J. & Freeman, C. (2020). Where have we been and where are we going? The state of contemporary health promotion. Health Education Journal, 79(6), 621–632.

16. Social policy, social innovation and older people Giovanni Fosti, Elisabetta Notarnicola and Eleonora Perobelli

Demographic and social changes are impacting on welfare systems, requiring new answers for older citizens. This implies moving beyond the dominant (long-term) care paradigm to embrace a different perspective on ageing. The Silver and Longevity Economy (S&LE) view is consistent with this need, promoting societal awareness and a different approach to services for current and future silver generations. It is also consistent with social innovation’s premises, since it fosters the creation of new solutions by finding new ways to cross-fertilize different policy domains. Also, the two paradigms share the idea of merging public and private interventions in innovative ways when it comes to supporting individuals and communities; a focus on activating and engaging citizens through empowering services and initiatives; and the need for a shift in public policies with a focus on the advantages of collaborative governance and multi-stakeholder partnerships. To discuss this connection between social innovation (SI) and the Silver and Longevity Economy, this chapter starts by discussing the evolution of how ageing is constructed, then illustrates the main elements supporting an S&LE and SI to show commonalities and possible interconnections. Lastly, we exemplify this relationship in two fields – housing and digital solutions – showing spaces for innovation and concrete application of the theoretical paradigms discussed.

SOCIETY-WIDE AGEING The world’s population is ageing: 2018 marked the first time in history when persons aged 65 or above outnumbered children under 5 years globally (UN, 2021). Data from the UN “World Population Prospects: the 2019 revision” assert that by 2050, the world population will number 2 billion people aged 60 and over, up from 1 billion in 2020. This means that 1 in 6 people in the world will be over age 65 (16%), up from 1 in 11 in 2019 (9%). Ageing is leading towards a deep social transformation, since nearly all sectors of society are required to evolve and adapt to meet the needs associated with an older population. This is the case for the labour market, the demands for goods and services – such as healthcare, housing, transportation, insurances – as well as for managing family ties and inter-generational relationships. Thus, population ageing challenges several different policy areas that require better integration. Addressing the challenges and opportunities associated with ageing is an imperative for policy makers in Western societies, since a higher proportion of older people is increasing the pressure on already-stressed public healthcare and social protection systems. From this perspective, policy makers, together with private, public and third-sector organizations, 199

200  Handbook on social innovation and social policy should conceive older people as direct contributors to social and economic development, people whose abilities and resources should be recognized at all levels. The social innovation paradigm can guide such transition, encouraging all actors to focus on how emerging needs in society can be tackled in an innovative way. Following this premise, we believe that the SI paradigm could be fruitfully complemented by the Silver and Longevity Economy one, so as to increase societies’ readiness to respond to ageing. A study commissioned by the EU Commission defined the Silver Economy as, the sum of all economic activity that serves the needs of people aged 50 and over, including the products and services they purchase directly and the further economic activity this spending generates. Thus, Silver Economy encompasses a unique cross-section of economic activities related to production, consumption and trade of goods and services relevant for older people, both public and private, and including direct and indirect effects. (2018, p. 3)

Adding longevity to the definition of the silver economy is needed so as to signal a different approach to ageing, to see it as the start of a new phase of life, positively oriented towards staying active and living well, rather than as a process leading to the loss of something, such as health, wellness, or independence. The S&LE approach builds on the idea that ageing comes with an evolution in individual preferences, behaviours and needs that should be recognized by society as a whole. Moreover, due to its dynamic nature, the S&LE challenges the conventional age-determined definition of ageing. It focuses on the set of dimensions that mark and distinguish an individual’s life, such as cumulated knowledge capital, property and wealth stock, existing social ties, and the relationship with other generations. Moreover, S&LE sheds light on the different needs associated with distinct moments in life, for example the transition from work to retirement, or from being a parent to becoming a grandparent. Both the previously mentioned dimensions and the transitions themselves cannot be fully captured by an age-based perspective, as the latter misses the nuances associated with an individual’s life pattern. Hence, in this chapter we reject the conventional idea of ageing being associated with a specific age group (namely, 65 and over), to embrace the concept of generations, which allows us to consider current and, most importantly, future “silver” cohorts. Building on the seminal article from Mannheim,1 by “generation” we refer to a group of individuals who share the same birth cohort and who are influenced by the contingent socio-historical environment (e.g., wars, pandemics) that they experienced in their youth. Such common experience shapes these cohorts’ future life pattern and evolution. Hence, this construct goes beyond age as a criterion for distinguishing needs, since this only partially captures the influence that significant events and historical moments can have on an individual’s development. For example, people born after World War II during the years from 1946–1964 are often called “boomers” (or “baby boomers”) after the sharp increase in births and the economic development experienced in those years. Generation Z refers to people born between 1995 and 2010, the first to have experienced a pervasive presence of the internet throughout their life. Discussing ageing from a generation perspective requires systems to adapt their business model continuously, to consider the distinctive features that each cohort represents. For example, today “boomers” are among the oldest generations alive and most public long-term care services are built around their needs. These needs only partially include internet access, since the main focus of services is on care provision. However, when developing long-term

Social policy, social innovation and older people  201 care systems for the future, public, private and nonprofit providers will be forced to include the internet in their service design, since people from Generation Z have never experienced a world without it. Lastly, adopting an approach based on generation can better relate ageing to society, since it allows us to link it to the more comprehensive transformations that modern cultures are going through. This way, ageing becomes society wide and not related to a specific and static age group.

WHAT IS THE SILVER AND LONGEVITY ECONOMY AND HOW CAN IT CONTRIBUTE TO INNOVATIVE APPROACHES FOR OLDER PEOPLE? Scholars (e.g., Gilleard & Higgs, 2010) agree in replacing the traditional concept of ageing, moving beyond the concepts of third and fourth age, where the first is identified as the period immediately following the exit from the job market, followed by the second, the stage in life at which social and health needs emerge. This reconceptualization is not only a matter of defining an appropriate time frame to establish the start and duration of ageing, but also of adopting a life course approach that promotes a comprehensive vision of an individual’s entire existence, and also being able to grasp the interdependencies underlying different life trajectories. The concept of S&LE is consistent with this shift, because it requires discussing demographic, inter-generational and life path issues. S&LE includes several factors, as underlined by the OECD and the European Commission’s vision of this issue (Llena-Nozal et al., 2019; Varnai et al., 2018): ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Ageing population Economic growth Participation in the labour market Dissemination of a debate on ageing Coordination between different policy areas Adaptation of education and entrepreneurship systems Use of technology as an enabling factor Promotion of social inclusion.

Consequently, the topics that are covered by S&LE are: ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Housing and urban studies Wellness and healthy behaviour Transport, mobility and travel Culture and entertainment Financial and asset management Digital transformation and technology Social relations and social capital.

These dimensions are wider than the perspective adopted by most Western public policies when it comes to elderly and long-term care, which mainly focus on promoting active ageing, guaranteeing care interventions and related pensions schemes or cash benefits. Public policies

202  Handbook on social innovation and social policy are still strongly anchored to an association of ageing with illness and dependency, showing some attempts to open up to innovation but still far from internalizing the logic of S&LE. To overcome the traditional care-centred approach, it is necessary to shift the focus to life expectancy and quality of life, looking at multiple dimensions. Embracing an S&LE can also support the public welfare system in disentangling the wicked issues of funding future long-term care systems, in that it supports the adoption of a market-based approach or, when this is not possible, mixed public–private financing schemes. Also, it regards older people as resources rather than as a burden. It is oriented to expand service offers and support economic growth through innovation and the creation of (market) opportunities. With appropriate regulation and coordination mechanisms, it can be matched to compensate for the most common failures of traditional public interventions such as inequalities in service access, lack of universal coverage and rigidity of care solutions.

SILVER AND LONGEVITY ECONOMY AND SOCIAL INNOVATION The S&LE lends itself to innovation consistent with the paradigm of SI, defined as “the creation of new solutions that are able, simultaneously, to meet and respond to social needs more effectively than existing solutions, leading to new or improved skills and relationships and to a better use of assets and resources” (Caulier-Grice et al., 2012, p. 18). The concept of SI can be effectively combined with the changes promoted by S&LE, since both question unmet social needs and promote new ways to address traditional welfare issues. Also, the S&LE literature (Ianculescu & Alexandru, 2016; Varnai et al., 2018) highlights the need to identify: ● New service models (to respond to new needs and increase the ability to respond to evolving traditional needs) ● New skills to use and direct resources ● New ways of involving stakeholders. Returning to the first argument of this chapter, these innovations are needed in light of the new demographic and social trend of population ageing. Recently, IPSOS (2022) published a report concerning the future of ageing, discussing the five tensions that will drive this change. These include: 1. Tensions concerning financial resources and expected future spending for caring: younger generations will not benefit from social security schemes nor personal investment income and are starting to ask how to provide for a secure future. 2. Societal pressures to dissimulate about ageing, which push individuals towards unsustainable consumption behaviours. 3. The urgent need to guarantee independence and not over-burden (younger) generations in the face of epidemiological trends and the changing nature of families and social expectations. 4. The general preference for ageing at home versus the characteristics of 20th-century buildings and real estate markets. 5. The advent of new technologies and the conviction that the human touch is needed in caring.

Social policy, social innovation and older people  203 These trade-offs and tensions are far away from the concerns and responses of traditional policy interventions to ageing, and need innovative approaches. The fields of housing and of digital innovation provide two examples of how S&LE and social innovation can be intertwined to meet these challenges.

HOUSING, OLDER PEOPLE AND INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS The home is the centre of private and social life. Shaping a new concept of ageing and approaching it through the longevity lens is necessarily linked with the discourse of how and where we get older, following the view of ageing in place, namely the idea that everyone should get older to live at a residence of own choice, able to have access at every service that might be necessary. The availability of safe, accessible and affordable housing solutions connected to transportation, health and other community services is critical to maintaining the quality of life for older adults (Baker et al., 2014). Housing is simultaneously an individual and a collective issue. On the individual side, housing is connected with preferences and choices, and also with financial and income-related matters (i.e., how to manage wealth across different stages of life). Moreover, it is connected with the idea of ageing in the place (Callahan, 2019) at the crossroads between getting older while healthy and long-term care needs. On the collective side, housing can be seen in relation to the dual demands of different models of care (residential vs home care) and regulating urban development to ensure equal access to accessible housing. In many Western countries, the current supply of suitable housing is insufficient to meet fast-changing demographic needs, necessitating sweeping action at all levels of the public and private sectors (Vespa et al., 2020). The question arising is: how can systems reconcile individual choices with the idea that housing can be a way to boost longevity, in that it supports independent living, autonomy and active ageing prevention practices while integrating with individual needs? How is this interconnected with models of care? S&LE and social innovation play a role in answering this question since they introduce the idea that services funded through private resources can be integrated with public welfare provision, and that crossing between different interventions is needed. Some examples follow. Housing and long-term care (LTC) might be seen as complementary domains since care has to be provided in some place and housing can be adapted to tenants’ needs when they get older. Innovation is thus needed when it comes both to residential and home care, to adapt these services to not only consider assistance and care, but also to integrate preferences towards housing arrangements and new solutions that can be implemented at home thanks to technology and digital tools. Housing, then, is not only related to care, but to wellbeing in general. The house is thus a setting where prevention initiatives can be started, giving spaces to innovations related to both health and social activation. These examples are coherent with the idea (promoted by SI) that new services are needed in response to social needs. Moreover, for the majority of the population (with the exception of social housing) housing is a private investment, and can be used as a resource to fund public investment and expenditure in LTC coherently with the paradigm of SI that calls for integration between public and private resources and new ways of funding. Also, housing is a field where community engagement is a relevant issue. Housing can be for one person but also for several; therefore, collective solutions directed towards an older population might benefit from the implementation of shared solutions.

204  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Senior housing (Jolanki, 2021) and ageing in place (a concept clarifying that ageing and housing are interrelated due to places features, social networks and personal characteristics, Pani-Harreman et al., 2021) are a good example of merging SE&L and SI approaches. The two are related to personal, conscious decisions to remain in particular accommodation for as long as it is possible with the guarantee that it may include adding supplementary services to facilitate living conditions and maintain quality of life while ageing. These are private individually financed solutions, oriented to silver clients (therefore consistent with S&LE) which integrate community services and connect with public welfare LTC provision. The idea is that residents opt to move in while young or before any LTC needs emerge. The reasons to move are several and related to the SI and S&LE paradigms: ● Choices relating to managing personal wealth and using assets ● Preferences related to social, cultural life, etc. ● Housing features in terms of accessibility and safety, e.g., the transition from bath to shower to reduce the risk of falling ● Preparing for and adapting to life changes such as changes in physical and clinical conditions ● Improving connections with LTC settings and access to important services, such as acute care and social care. Appropriate housing is part of a high quality of life itself, since it includes leisure and community activities. While senior housing is widespread in the US, it is rather new in Europe. This reflects not only differences in LTC policies between different countries, but also cultural issues relating to housing, social and family ties, and perceptions of ageing (Huang, 2012). For example, in Italy housing provision for older people is limited to LTC services, such as nursing homes. However, after the pandemic and since 2020 the LTC traditional sector has witnessed some shocks and significant changes (Notarnicola et al., 2021); new providers, oriented to the private market and different target clients, have stepped onto the scene. Some of these are tending towards senior living, trying to integrate private housing designed for silver cohorts with more familiar LTC solutions. Among many others is the case of “Vivere OVER”,2 a new Italian company established in 2021. This targets a particular demographic: older citizens who are questioning whether their house is still appropriate for their changing needs. They are still capable of living alone but are experiencing the first signs of dependency. The idea is to focus on a group that is completely forgotten by public policies, but for whom early interventions and monitoring can help avoid a deterioration in health. The needs of this group are not met by private providers: they are considered to be too young to need care services; they have already gone through different stages of life; and it is assumed that they are settled and they won’t move any more. The senior housing is oriented towards singles or couples looking for flexibility, sustainability and tailored provision. The business model offers accommodation of different sizes located in residences, villas or community solutions, where residents can access common services and activities. The rent paid is all-inclusive and mainly dedicated to renting and facility costs. Full-day surveillance and a concierge trained in healthcare and related needs is available so that tenants have access to personal assistance. Further services are available on request, such as healthcare treatment or transport, personal shopping, leisure activities and others. These are provided by local partners to sustain connections with the local community and offer affordable prices. A trained consultant is available to check on residents’ needs and

Social policy, social innovation and older people  205 activate public welfare services where necessary. This happens only when long-term care needs emerge and is possible thanks to preliminary agreements between public institutions and the company. Technology is used in a precautionary way and monitor residents’ wellbeing. This case, which has been applied in some other countries,3 is useful to show how particular concepts have been implemented. On the one hand, it introduces a model of intervention for older people that is not centred on long-term care. Starting from housing needs, it applies the model of S&LE to offer an innovative solution to different aspects of the everyday lives of ageing citizens. On the other hand, it is an example of integrating public and private resources: it re-orients private expenditure towards a setting in which public interventions can be activated more easily under an agreed framework. In this respect, the possibility of placing many users in appropriate housing and contexts will lead to more efficient and effective public interventions. One possible limitation of these solutions is linked to the extent of private investment that is needed. The initial investment and cost per month (in case of rent) might be high and considered expensive by some citizens, with the risk of being unfair.

TECHNOLOGY AS A LEVER TO FOSTER SERVICE INNOVATION Technology plays a crucial role in modern societies. The “baby boomer” generation is marked by a higher digital divide compared to younger cohorts. Yet the Covid-19 pandemic exposed everyone to greater interaction with digital solutions and using internet access in response to confinement and social distancing measures. Since 2020, European populations have experienced greater interaction with digital solutions to social challenges. Eurostat (2021b) found that in 2020, 60% of individuals aged 65 to 74 in the EU area accessed the internet in the 3 months prior to the survey, ranging from 25% in Bulgaria to 94% in Denmark. In addition to the internet, older generations are increasingly closing the digital divide (Eurostat, 2021a), and becoming more familiar with technology, especially with virtual voice assistants (IPSOS, 2022). The potential of digital innovation can be expressed either in relation to welfare services, or more generally to the whole ageing process, consistently with the S&LE approach. In relation to the former, despite the widespread presence of digital innovation, welfare services for older persons lag behind other industries. The potential of digital innovation has shown concrete results and impact in a plurality of sectors, where the use of new technologies has been able to reshape entire industries (e.g., banking, food, etc.) and transform how users and service providers interact. Currently we cannot affirm that the same revolution has happened in the welfare sector. However, the decrease in care workers, combined with the increasing preference to live as much as possible in one’s own house while maintaining a good quality of life, makes digital innovation a crucial ally. Research has shown how rooting technology in older persons’ everyday life at home provides an important opportunity to support people’s independence. Nonetheless, so far, there have been mostly fragmented pilot projects rather than methodical development and assessment of the potential of technology in relation to specific stakeholders (Keeling, 2014). These pilots are developing in mainly four domains: smart-home technology, to ensure a safe and adequate home environment during ageing (Ghazal and Al-Khatib, 2015); AI, Artificial Intelligence (Pollack, 2005); assistive technology monitoring the care of older people or their

206  Handbook on social innovation and social policy quality of life (Miskelly, 2001); and the use of virtual reality as a tool to promote physical activity (Syed-Abdul et al., 2019). All these experiences, as well as several contributions in the scientific literature, have emphasized the main benefits of these kinds of solutions. In both urban and rural settings, digital innovations enhance the ability to deliver care at a distance and/or to promote active ageing by allowing the user to be remotely advised and supported. Moreover, family members can feel reassured, and professional caregivers are relieved from low-level monitoring tasks, optimizing their working time (Turner, 2012). Some studies further investigate how ICT in these settings can be used for communication (i.e., telehealth, telemedicine); in this regard, they resulted in more frequent type interaction between patients and a variety of professional service providers (Lindberg et al., 2013). Regarding the wider interaction between ageing and technology, we might observe interesting experiences from the UK. The UK Government included ageing as one of the 4 Grand Challenges tackled by its Industrial Strategy4 for 2035, with the goal of harnessing the power of innovation to help meet the needs of an ageing society. The Key Performance Indicator for this goal is quite ambitious: to ensure that people enjoy at least five extra healthy, independent years of life by 2035, while narrowing the gap between the experience of the richest and poorest. Increasing government attention to the role of technology in supporting healthy ageing is visible in research centres in the UK, such as the National Innovation Centre for Ageing, whose mission is to “enable businesses to harness the opportunities related to longevity economies through human experience, ethics, data, collaboration, emerging technologies & innovative business models.”5 The centre is devoted to supporting organizations understand how and why to serve a population currently off their market radar. We had the opportunity to interview the Centre director,6 who identified three areas where technology is boosting innovation to better serve an ageing population: (1) Biotech: to study the ageing process and possible solutions to slow it down; (2) Devices: to investigate how the use of the Internet of Things, Virtual Reality, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning might enable the re-design of services; and (3) Business models: especially oriented towards enabling the connection between frail and younger people and corporate volunteers favouring inter-generational exchange.7 To illustrate a concrete example of how digital innovation might foster SI while promoting an S&LE approach, we will consider the case of Isidora, an online platform developed by a third-sector organization (Cooperativa La Meridiana) in the north of Italy during the first wave of the pandemic.8 Initially the platform was conceived as a way to provide online day-care services to older persons forced to stay at home due to movement restrictions. The closing of social services forced many older people into social isolation, with related behavioural problems, which in turn were affecting caregivers’ wellbeing, since they could not intervene promptly to support their relatives. The primary target of Isidora were its daycentres’ users, who were partially dependent on support. To overcome the pandemic limitations, the Cooperativa La Meridiana developed a platform installed on a 10 inch tablet that was delivered to the older person’s home. Each tablet is equipped with anti-theft protection and with a 4G Wi-Fi connection, thanks to a partnership with the Vodafone Foundation. When turned on, the tablet is set so the user is only able to see and navigate in Isidora. The platform has four main components: ● A dedicated TV channel, in streaming mode ● A library of contents

Social policy, social innovation and older people  207 ● The electronic health record ● A single and group videoconference tool. Delivering the tablet was an opportunity to train older people in online safety and in how to use the device, which has a straightforward design. Isidora puts older persons and care workers in contact on a daily basis, and serves multiple objectives. For older persons, the platform is a tool to reduce the risk of social isolation, to enable contact with care workers, relatives and caregivers, and to monitor their health parameters. For the Cooperativa and the health and social care system, Isidora functions as both a monitoring tool of medical and social factors, and also as a way to promptly and easily transfer medical data to General Practitioners (GPs) so that they can monitor suspicious symptoms and promptly intervene in case of Covid-19 or other illnesses. In terms of method, Isidora adds daily videocalls and group activities to the TV channel to keep sociality high, and weekly videocalls with both nurses and the case manager. In addition, relatives can install the Isidora application in their smartphone to monitor the older persons’ health status and videocall him/her easily. Relatives can also access the Isidora library and find a content selection devoted to training and support for caregivers. The TV channel functions every day from 9 am to 6 pm and broadcasts multiple activities registered by the Cooperativa personnel, including gymnastics, art activities and exercises to train cognitive capabilities. If older people are unable to see activities on the TV channel, they can find them registered in the library section, which offers more than 400 videos and is updated on a monthly basis. In addition, Isidora is equipped with a simplified videocall instrument, which allows users to take part in conversation with up to six people simultaneously. Calls are launched either by the Cooperativa personnel or from the older person’s relatives; in both cases, a sound captures the person’s attention, and the call can be easily accepted through a button on the screen. Lastly, the system reminds older persons about aspects of their daily routines, including taking their medications. An important component of Isidora is related to the monitoring of health parameters. At present, older people using the platform receive a professional pulse oximeter that is connected to the tablet through Bluetooth technology. The pulse oximeter can automatically monitor blood saturation, heartbeats, body temperature and pressure, and blood sugar. All data are digitally recorded in the electronic health record and transferred to the cooperative care workers, who monitor the parameters’ status and alert the user’s GP if these reach alarming values. The GP, too, can reach the older person through a videocall in Isidora, using the data he/she received from the system. All actions performed by care workers and the GP are recorded in the system and visible to all professionals, so that everyone is instantly informed about any interventions directed towards the older person. The monitoring and storage of personal data related to health raise risks of e-control of sensitive data and undesirable business opportunities created by app operators who might leverage those data, as problematized by scholars interested in surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2019). In the case of Isidora, we currently do not have evidence of privacy violation or exploitation attempts, but this will certainly be under scrutiny in future developments of the project. Shortly after the release of the platform to its daycentre users, the Cooperativa was contacted by multiple providers in the territory with a request to adopt Isidora. Isidora is currently available in several organizations besides Cooperativa La Meridiana, supporting other service providers to keep in touch with users and monitor their social and healthcare status. The tool has proved useful after daycentres reopened, since multiple older people who were used to

208  Handbook on social innovation and social policy attending daycentres daily decided to reduce their weekly attendance and rely on Isidora for the remaining days. Considering the success of Isidora among both older people and service providers, Cooperativa La Meridiana is now ready to launch a more ambitious project. In particular, it aims at making Isidora a community platform that functions as a marketplace where service providers offer their services to users relying on high-performing technology. The ambition is to move beyond care and offer a variety of services relevant to silver cohorts. This case shows how social innovation might respond to contingent and dramatic social changes. It also illustrates how a strong value proposition combined with deep knowledge of social needs and a strong partnership can support the scaling up of an innovation. In this case, technology is not the ultimate goal of the cooperative; rather, it is the lever to foster service re-design. Lastly, this case is oriented towards targeting different generations of current and future older generations, consistent with the S&LE perspective.

CONCLUSIONS Traditionally, ageing has been strictly associated with long-term care interventions and policies. Yet, over the past few years a different interpretation of ageing and the related resources and needs is emerging. Consistently, evidence examined in this chapter has shown how the ageing population can no longer be considered through traditional means, requiring new interpretative lenses. The Silver and Longevity Economy advances a different perspective over ageing-related phenomena, focusing on their social and economic reflection, and paving the way for innovation processes in how advanced societies will face ageing in the incoming years. In this view, a generation-based perspective supports a new approach to ageing, which treats demographic information from a different perspective. More precisely, the S&LE approach recognizes different dimensions of life among the older population and their expression in different fields: housing, transportation, care, etc. Economic-, financial-, technological-, housing-, healthcare-, social-, cultural-related aspects are intertwined to provide a more profound comprehension of people’s lives, of their resources and of the emerging needs in the process of ageing. Social innovation is the frame where we can find initiatives devoted to “the creation of new solutions that are able, simultaneously, to meet and respond to social needs more effectively than existing solutions, leading to new or improved skills and relationships and to a better use of assets and resources” (Caulier-Grice et al., 2012, p. 18), and is consistent with opportunities offered by S&LE, since both paradigms are devoted to needs detection to develop new skills, new service models, new patterns of stakeholder engagement. The experiences shown in this chapter, which leverage older people’s resources and on a clear definition of needs, make the case for the rise of social innovation processes that can create value both in policy making and in society-wide interventions to cope with ageing. To sum up, in this chapter we made the case for merging the social innovation paradigm with that of the Silver and Longevity Economy, to strengthen the voice of older people and promote solutions to support an ageing population. We did so by reviewing the principal factors that define the S&LE and its area of application, followed by illustrating the common features shared by S&LE and Social Innovation. We illustrated two fields where these two constructs can together create more effective services, namely housing and digital solutions.

Social policy, social innovation and older people  209 The main focus of such innovative processes is the home, which is the place where people experience needs and resources, and where there is the greater need for innovation processes. Technologies represent an extraordinary and powerful tool for service re-design; yet detecting need is still the crucial starting point to foster social innovation. These cases provide concrete examples of inter-sectoral cooperation, both in funding schemes and the actors involved, and an orientation towards innovative ways to respond to a pressing social need. Considering the structural trend of population ageing and the shortage of effective public responses, we believe that a generation-based approach to service innovation might lead to more dynamic and effective interventions.

NOTES 1. First published in 1928, “Das Problem der Generationen”. 2. The authors are thankful to Elisa Bianco and Mariuccia Rossini from OVER for their time and support in building up this case. More info at: https://​vivereover​.it/​(accessed 25 July 2022). 3. See for example SeniorVal in Sweden, https://​seniorval​.se/​seniorboende/​stockholm (accessed 25 July 2023). 4. At https://​www​.gov​.uk/​government/​publications/​industrial​-strategy​-the​-grand​-challenges/​ industrial​-strategy​-the​-grand​-challenges (accessed 25 July 2022). 5. At https://​uknica​.co​.uk/​(accessed 22 November 2023). 6. The authors are thankful to Nicola Palmarini from the UK National Innovation Centre for Ageing for his time and support in building up this section. 7. See for example the case of BeOnHand in the UK. 8. The authors are thankful to Matteo Mauri from Cooperativa La Meridiana for his time and support in building up this case.

REFERENCES Baker, K., Baldwin, P., Donahue, K., Flynn, A., Herbert, C., La Jeunesse, E. & Will, A. (2014). Housing America’s Older Adults: Meeting the Needs of an Aging Population. Cambridge: Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. Callahan Jr, J. J. (ed.). (2019). Aging in Place. Abingdon: Routledge. Caulier-Grice, J., Davies, A., Patrick, R. & Norman, W. (2012). Defining Social Innovation. A Deliverable of the Project: The Theoretical, Empirical and Policy Foundations for Building Social Innovation in Europe (TEPSIE). European Commission–7th Framework Programme, Brussels: European Commission, DG Research. European Commission. (2018). The silver economy. Available at: https://​op​.europa​.eu/​en/​publication​ -detail/​-/​publication/​a9efa929​-3ec7​-11e8​-b5fe​-01aa75ed71a1 (accessed 22 November 2023). Eurostat. (2021a). Ageing Europe – statistics on social life and opinions. Available at: https://​ec​.europa​ .eu/​eurostat/​statistics​-explained/​index​.php​?title​=​Ageing​_Europe​_​-​_statistics​_on​_social​_life​_and​ _opinions​#Education​_and​_digital​_society​_among​_older​_people (accessed 14 February 2023). Eurostat. (2021b). How popular is internet use among older people? Available at: https://​ec​.europa​.eu/​ eurostat/​web/​products​-eurostat​-news/​-/​edn​-20210517​-1 (accessed 14 February 2023). Ghazal, B. & Al-Khatib, K. (2015). Smart home automation system for elderly and handicapped people using XBee. International Journal of Smart Home, 9(4), 203–210. Gilleard, C. & Higgs, P. (2010). Aging without agency: Theorizing the fourth age. Aging & Mental Health, 14(2), 121–128. Huang, H. C. (2012). Factors influencing intention to move into senior housing. Journal of Applied Gerontology, 31(4), 488–509.

210  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Ianculescu, M. & Alexandru, A. (2016). Silver digital patient, a new emerging stakeholder in current healthcare: ProActiveAgeing: a case study. Studies in Informatics and Control, 25(4), 461–468. IPSOS. (2022). What the future: Aging. Available at: https://​www​.ipsos​.com/​sites/​default/​files/​What​ -The​-Future​-Aging​.pdf (accessed 14 February 2023). Jolanki, O. H. (2021). Senior housing as a living environment that supports well-being in old age. Frontiers in Public Health, 8, 914. DOI: https://​doi​.org/​10​.21837/​pm​.v21i26​.1271 Keeling, D. I. (2014). Home care user needs from the perspective of the patient and carers: A review. Smart Home Care Technology and TeleHealth, 2014(2), 63–76. Lindberg, B., Nilsson, C., Zotterman, D., Söderberg, S. & Skär, L. (2013). Using information and communication technology in home care for communication between patients, family members, and healthcare professionals: A systematic review. International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications. DOI: 10.1155/2013/461829 Llena-Nozal, A., Martin, N. & Murtin, F. (2019). The economy of well-being: Creating opportunities for people’s well-being and economic growth. OECD Statistics Working Papers 2019/02. Available at: https://​www​.oecd​-ilibrary​.org/​docserver/​498e9bc7​-en​.pdf​?expires​=​1700064829​&​id​=​id​&​accname​=​ oid009613​&​checksum​=​55​7DCD6B47E0147338BDEE461FBE35F9 (accessed 22 November 2023). Miskelly, F. G. (2001). Assistive technology in elderly care. Age and Ageing, 30(6), 455–458. Notarnicola, E., Perobelli, E., Rotolo, A. & Berloto, S. (2021). Lessons learned from Italian nursing homes during the COVID-19 outbreak: A tale of long-term care fragility and policy failure. Journal of Long-Term Care, 221–229. Available at: https://​journal​.ilpnetwork​.org/​articles/​10​.31389/​jltc​.73 (accessed 22 November 2023). Pani-Harreman, K. E., Bours, G. J., Zander, I., Kempen, G. I. & van Duren, J. M. (2021). Definitions, key themes and aspects of ‘ageing in place’: A scoping review. Ageing & Society, 41(9), 2026–2059. Pollack, M. E. (2005). Intelligent technology for an aging population: The use of AI to assist elders with cognitive impairment. AI Magazine, 26(2), 9–24. Syed-Abdul, S., Malwade, S., Nursetyo, A. A., Sood, M., Bhatia, M., Barsasella, D. … & Li, Y. C. J. (2019). Virtual reality among the elderly: A usefulness and acceptance study from Taiwan. BMC Geriatrics, 19(1), 1–10. Turner, K. J. (Ed.). (2012). Advances in Home Care Technologies: Results of the MATCH Project (Vol. 31). Chicago, IL: IOS Press. United Nations (2021). Global issues: Ageing. Available at: https://​www​.un​.org/​en/​global​-issues/​ageing (accessed 25 July 2022). Varnai, P., Simmonds, P., Farla, K. & Worthington, H. (2018). The silver economy. Final report for the European Commission DG Communications Networks, Content & Technology by Technopolis and Oxford Economics. Vespa, J., Engelberg, J. & He, W. (2020). Old housing, new needs: Are US homes ready for an aging population? Current Population Reports, 23–217. Available at: https://​ www​ .researchgate​ .net/​profile/​Wan​-He​-5/​publication/​344138655​_Old​_Housing​_New​_Needs​_Are​_US​_Homes​_Ready​ _for​_an​_Aging​_Population​_Current​_Population​_Reports/​links/​5f54e​f5e299bf13​a31a52b2c/​Old​ -Housing​-New​-Needs​-Are​-US​-Homes​-Ready​-for​-an​-Aging​-Population​-Current​-Population​-Reports​ .pdf (accessed 22 November 2023). Zuboff, S. (2019). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. London: Profile Books.

17. Social innovation and migration Simone Baglioni

INTRODUCTION Human mobility and the settlement of people in countries other than those in which they were born is a phenomenon dating back to the origin of humanity, yet the scale and the issues it raises occupy a central place in a time of globalization. People’s mobility has increased in a globalized world due not only to a cross-border labour market integration, a new global division of labour that encourages cross-globe mobility of both high-qualified (‘talent’, in the jargon of human resources) and low–medium-qualified workers, but also to policies favouring human mobility for study and education. People’s mobility has also been pushed by political upheavals, such as the spread of non-democratic regimes restricting fundamental freedoms or the retrenchment of democracy (as measured by The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (2023) annual ‘Democracy Index’), wars, and also climate change and its consequences on environmental liveability. Using the most recent available data from mid-2020, the UN estimated the number of international migrants to be 280.6 million (UN DESA 2020). This number has constantly increased in the past decades: the same source indicates that in 1990 there were 153 million people moving across borders. Therefore, the number of international migrants has almost doubled in three decades. The share of migrants as a percentage of the total world population has increased by only one percentage point during the same period (2.7% in 1990, 3.7% in 2020). Yet, within this share there has been a dramatic increase in the number of refugees (cross-border migrants seeking refuge and safety from violence, persecution, war, climate or natural disasters) and displaced people (those who move for the same reasons of refugees but remain within the borders of their country of origin). This reached 89.3 million at the end of 2021 and estimates for 2022 take it over 100 million, which, compared to the 42.7 million of a decade earlier, makes for a dramatic increase (UNHCR 2023). The arrival of newcomers is always a challenge for both sides of society, those who arrive and those who are receiving them. Both have an interest in finding a mutually satisfactory way to accommodate each other’s needs and aspirations, yet such an accommodation does not always come without problems. Some of these problems are related to the conditions of the immigrants, e.g. whether or not they speak the language, or have social connections in the country of settlement are factors that make a difference in their ‘accommodation’ capacities. Others are related to the socio-economic and political characteristics of the receiving society, e.g. if they have a labour market absorbing workers and providing jobs for immigrants, if they have services to support newcomers’ settlement, if their policy makers support or obstruct rhetorically and practically immigration, etc. are all factors making a difference (Baglioni and Calò 2023). To mitigate challenges and to ease immigrants’ inclusion (understanding inclusion as a bidirectional process, in which both newcomers and the host society take action to facilitate mutual understanding and living together), civil society, immigrants, the private and the public 211

212  Handbook on social innovation and social policy sector have created a range of socially innovative solutions, a sample of which is presented and discussed in this chapter. Our societies have produced plentiful initiatives where local communities and civil society groups mobilize to support people in need, including immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Such initiatives remind us of the creative potential communities have in using tangible and intangible resources to solve problems, very often the result of new problem-solving scenarios combining existing tools with new ideas and applications. Very often in the migration field, however, such a problem-solving creativity occurs within a dystopic ecosystem where national governments adopt restrictive migration policies and anti-immigrant narratives (Federico and Baglioni 2021; Maggini 2021) that, nevertheless, do not prevent immigrants from reaching Europe. Therefore, civil society and the third sector, along with the private sector and local governments, must fill the policy vacuum, sometimes with the instrumental economic and legal support of the European Union. It is, therefore, at the local level that a virtuous circle might be developed (Caponio and Borkert 2010), which, in contrast with many national policies but with the support of local and supranational governments and their resources, realize social innovation processes that aim to empower both people in need and local communities alike. The chapter unfolds as follows. The next section presents examples of social innovation (SI) in migrants’ integration, respectively targeting migrants seeking better life opportunities through work, and then those moving to analyse migrants escaping violence and persecution (refugees and asylum seekers). It then discusses the ‘politics’ of SI to which such cases point; finally it presents some concluding considerations.

SOCIAL INNOVATION AND THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS Social innovations in the field of migration address the needs created by global migration fluxes, either by focusing on supporting socio-economic inclusion within receiving societies or by addressing migrants’ needs related to their vulnerable situation, as in the case of refugees. Therefore, SI in this field can be distinguished in two macro-categories of action: the first concerns migrants who have moved in search of better economic opportunities or for seeking employment; the second concerns those who have moved to find refuge or to escape violence and persecution. We consider SI in relation to each of these respective groupings. Social Innovations for Socio-Economic Inclusion Starting with examples of SI focused on socio-economic integration, we can consider initiatives aimed at facilitating successful economic inclusion of migrants, and those where migrants’ economic needs are coupled with broader societal objectives, such as processes of urban regeneration aimed at revitalizing the social and economic fabric of particular places (Hillman 2008; Lintner 2019). An interesting case of SI that combined migrants’ integration with urban regeneration was initiated in Berlin in the 1990s. In this case, migrants’ economic integration was promoted by, on the one hand, harnessing newcomers’ entrepreneurial skills and, on the other hand, establishing a constellation of socio-economic and political actors to promote this entrepreneurship as a means to revitalize derelict or neglected urban areas (Hillman 2008). At that time, migrants’ entrepreneurship was considered almost as synonymous with informal work

Social innovation and migration  213 or labour marginality, according to which, people excluded from mainstream labour market opportunities were left to find ways to earn their own income as best they could (Bonacich 1973; Kim 1981). Due to this characterization, migrants’ entrepreneurship was neither promoted nor facilitated by institutions or policies. However, from the mid-2000s the role of migrants’ entrepreneurship clearly changed to become regarded as a vector of social inclusion and a source of social innovation. Migrants proved that their economic ‘animal spirits’ could lead to viable business initiatives that not only catered to the needs of some ethnic minorities, but also reanimated places regarded as forgotten neighbourhoods (as was the case for Turkish traders and grocers), and transport nodes, like train and underground stations (which the entrepreneurial skills of Vietnamese immigrants turned into lucrative locations for selling flowers). Such economic successes – occurring in city areas that were considered unattractive or unsuitable for socio-economic ventures – fostered the development of a new imaginary about how to bring development into urban spaces while also promoting social inclusion. The socially innovative nature of these actions stems from migrants’ entrepreneurship empowering individuals by allowing them to earn an income while also responding to their needs to live a better life, and serve to the broader societal need to salvage urban areas from social and economic decline. This example from Berlin is also useful for demonstrating how SI in the field of migration can occur when there is a constellation of actors striving in the same direction. Hillman illustrates how actors such as the Chamber of Commerce, Turkish community lobby groups and business associations started making the case for migrant entrepreneurs to be better supported, and how the local government followed suit by making use of EU programmes and funding (e.g. EQUAL). As a result, within a decade these actors managed to create an ecosystem helping newcomers to develop businesses. Such action was promoted also by marketizing the city as a business hub while contributing to the diffusion of migrants’ culture by the ‘festivalization’ of the city to appeal to the touristic side of Berlin. Hillman concludes that the socially innovative function of migrants’ business unfolded thanks to a supportive, multi-level, policy ecosystem. European and local policy makers, along with migrants’ lobbies and business associations, understood that harnessing migrants’ entrepreneurial skills and capacity could serve both to revitalize or to keep alive urban areas that would otherwise lose vital services (e.g. neighbourhoods’ shops), and provide a viable economic opportunity to people at risk of marginalization. As such, they have funded and created a policy infrastructure. Yet, the whole process had more far-reaching outcomes – bringing ‘ethnicity’ as ‘one element of urban diversity, into mainstream society’ (Hillman 2008: 112), contributing to increased multiculturalism in the German society. Other studies have underlined the socially innovative role of entrepreneurship. For example, Lintner (2019) illustrates the case of migrants’ entrepreneurship in South Tyrol, Italy, to show how migrants regard entrepreneurship not as a form of informal or marginal economic activity but as an opportunity for agency and self-realization. In this case, the ‘socially innovative’ character of entrepreneurial activities stems from the capacity to create ‘possibilities for change in social relations and working arrangements’ (ibid.: 270) where immigrants become owners of their work and their time, valuing the freedom provided by self-employment and the opportunities it offers to stimulate creativity and increase economic satisfaction. Hence, Lintner shows that SI is realized by entrepreneurship due to immigrants’ capacity to turn challenges and problems into opportunities and is therefore testimony to migrants’ agency. A different form of labour market SI aiming at the inclusion of migrants is the role of social enterprises and in particular work insertion social enterprises (WISEs). These are

214  Handbook on social innovation and social policy instrumental to SI, given their nature as business operations that place people at the centre of their activities. WISEs were initially founded in Italy as providers of work opportunities for vulnerable people, such as disabled persons and former convicts who could not find employment through conventional labour market processes (Defourny and Nyssens 2010; Nicholls 2006). Therefore, WISEs meet the otherwise unmet need of supporting vulnerable people in finding a job, empowering them through employment and earned income, and in some cases (when social enterprises take the form of cooperatives) putting them at the command of their employing organization. An interesting case is presented by Kraff and Jernsand (2021), who analyse the social innovative functions of WISEs operating in the tourism sector in Sweden. They show how placing immigrants at the centre of activities that combine tourism with ethnic food production has led to their empowerment, and in particular it has strengthened migrant women’s self-confidence and social capital. These initiatives have given immigrant women the opportunity to use their recipes to broaden the cultural boundaries of the host community, while also increasing the tourist appeal of the local area. Mixing local Swedish delicatessens with those of other countries, such as Syria, and providing immigrants with opportunities to practise speaking Swedish outside a school context, increased migrants’ confidence about the value of their own culture and offered them an opportunity to be proud of their contribution to multiculturalism. Kraff and Jernsand (2021) provide evidence of a social innovation that is generated by using WISEs as instruments of economic and social inclusion. A different type of SI that supports the inclusion of migrants has emerged as an unintended consequence of welfare state retrenchment that followed the austerity policies enacted in European countries following the 2008 financial and economic crisis. The gap left by the withdrawal of public resources and services has been partly filled by civil society organizations and bottom-up initiatives that combine meeting basic needs (such as learning the host country language) with the provision of new services co-produced with beneficiaries. Public policies supporting those in need (including newcomers) have taken a neoliberal complexion and put increased onus on individuals to develop the skills and acquire the competences required to live decently. In response, these individuals, along with local civil and commercial actors, have made of a necessity a virtue. For example, in the UK, an initiative called ‘Multikulti’ that was designed to increase awareness of rights among immigrants and minority ethnic communities developed an online platform providing information on health, education, housing, debt and employment in a range of languages, involving immigrants as co-producers of this information, but also as translators and proof-readers (Cullen 2017: 468). Similarly, in Germany, a web-based TV series called Roots and Routes has become a tool for young immigrants and ethnic minorities to create media output and have their voices heard by a broader audience. Cullen (ibid.) argues that these examples of SI, which support social inclusion though language learning, generate several benefits. They not only increase motivation and engagement in education, and strengthen digital and media competences (and therefore also potential employability); they also reduce social isolation by increasing opportunities of social interactions. Developing a better knowledge of the local language is both an asset used by migrants in their everyday activities and social interactions, and a necessary competence for understanding their rights, and consequently to access welfare and education services, and employment opportunities.

Social innovation and migration  215 Social Innovations Aiming at Refugees’ Support and Integration Miledù is a word that means ‘being together’ in Togo, a West African country, and it is the name that in 2019 a group of people based in the Como Lake area, in Northern Italy, have chosen for their newly established social enterprise. Miledù (2023) brings together locals and refugees and asylum seekers to revitalize local agricultural traditions and promote environmental restoration while also valuing asylum seekers’ skills, which often remain unrecognized (Federico and Baglioni 2021; Lillie, Bontenbal and Ndomo 2023). The organization started working by restoring dry stone walls. These are a traditional agricultural feature in a very steep landscape such as the Como region; however, the knowledge required to maintain them is disappearing due to depopulation of rural areas and local economic changes. By revitalizing these walls, Miledù is not only preserving vital local knowledge but also curating the local environmental and economic heritage. It shows how asylum seekers can play a useful cultural and economic role, contrasting with the negative propaganda promoted by some right-wing parties. After dry stone walls, the social cooperative also restored abandoned walking paths and started the production of honey and edible flowers in what have become ‘regenerated’ fields. In April 2023, it restored a traditional stone house in a nearby remote village and turned it into a guest house to be co-managed by asylum seekers and locals. Hence, a small initiative born from the shared desire of local people and newcomers to create employment opportunities, stimulate local development and raise awareness about the value of migration has expanded into a series of economic and social activities that testifies to the vitality of civil society, leading to social and economic change for the common good. Refugees and asylum seekers have been empowered not only by earning a wage but also by crafting a socially useful economic role and by becoming part of a wide net of social connections. Miledù has offered opportunities for labour empowerment to both locals and immigrants while providing a solution to an unmet need, restoring economic and social value to abandoned landscapes at the same time as making a local community more inclusive towards newcomers. Social innovation in support of refugees and asylum seekers has often taken the form of ICT-based solutions. An example comes from WORKEEN, a mobile phone app jointly developed by academics, app developers, civil society organizations working with refugees, and refugees themselves. Created in 2019, thanks to EU research funding, it was conceived as part of a study investigating how to facilitate the labour market integration of newcomers. The research highlighted several barriers obstructing labour market inclusion, including migrants’ lack of information about the written and unwritten labour market rules in the host society. Hence the app, which is free for download on Google Play, focuses on strengthening newcomers’ knowledge of such rules by engaging them in a game that tests both their hard and soft skills. The app was piloted with refugees who suggested improvements and is now part of the employment induction programmes of civil society organizations. It is an instrument that helps newcomers to meet their knowledge needs and supports their economic empowerment. Information technology was also instrumental in another example of SI focused on refugees. This innovation reformed a programme that facilitated the resettlement of refugees in Canada by redesigning the system to allow citizens to sponsor the settlement of refugees. To support reaching the goal of raising Can$270,000 to host 10 Syrian refugee families (and contribute to the wider goal of hosting 1,000 Syrians in the greater Toronto area in response to the surge in Syrian refugees escaping the war in 2015/16), academics at Ryerson University launched a crowdsourcing appeal and tapped into the volunteering potential of students to support

216  Handbook on social innovation and social policy the settlement of refugees and the management of the programme. The ‘Ryerson University Lifeline Syria Challenge’ was extremely successful, raising Can$4.7 million and engaging large numbers of student volunteers. It also recruited private sector collaborators, which are pivotal in finding jobs for refugees. The initiative succeeded because it was organized as ‘private sponsorship collectively executed’ (Cukier and Jackson 2017: 33). This initiative also constitutes an example of social innovation ‘by eroding silos and traditional “ways of doing”, and bringing together new partners, new processes, new resources and leveraging technologies to address the humanitarian crisis’ (ibid.).

DISCUSSION The cases presented above are just a few examples of the range of SIs in the field of migration. Although diverse, all such innovations aim at promoting newcomers’ integration into the societies that are receiving them. Given the political saliency of migration, we cannot avoid some further considerations of the politics of SI in this field. Migration has become a major political fault line in contemporary politics, an issue that divides public opinions and politicians everywhere. In Europe, it has been one of the crucial symbolic struggles that led to Brexit, the most important European political event of the first two decades of the 2000s (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017). Politicians on the right or far right build their popular support primarily by emphasizing what they portray as the threats newcomers bring to host societies. Their claims include ‘ethnic replacement’ (newcomers are alleged to replace local populations, subverting local cultural and religious traditions); social and salary dumping (migrants ‘steal jobs’ due to their willingness to undertake low-paid work); an increase in crime (migrants are portrayed as higher risk and more crime prone than ‘locals’); and that some of the migrant communities segregate women (usually Muslims). Opposing this, politicians and social movements respond by emphasizing how migrants rejuvenate otherwise ageing societies, how they fill otherwise unmet workforce vacancies, and the virtues of multicultural societies. Therefore, we could wonder whether SI, as a series of actions aiming at newcomers’ support and integration, is a form of politics by other means; rather, does it contribute to de-politicizing a complex social phenomenon by delegating (and relegating) to civil society actions that should be public and state concerns? As presented in this chapter, SI seems to involve people resisting the dehumanizing purpose and effect of (anti)migration policies and discourses. It therefore appears to be a very political activity that takes a clear stance in a polarized field – favouring migrants’ incorporation rather than expulsion from the body of the society. However, SI also seems to be a pragmatic response to the neoliberalization of welfare and to social policies that fail to meaningfully address migrants’ needs. The combination of anti-migration policies and retrenchment and/or neoliberalization of the welfare state produces migration policies that either take a purely emergency-driven approach or comprise residual one-size-fits-all models that do not suit the heterogeneity of migrant populations nor their needs. In both cases, migrants’ chances of inclusion depend more on their own characteristics, goodwill and networks, and on the social fabric (including SI) of the receiving societies than on public policies. In these circumstances, SI brings to the fore the needs of people in vulnerable circumstances while trying to promote social cohesion and solve problems. The SIs discussed here contrast with populist anti-migration policies, which

Social innovation and migration  217 are presented as a way to restore the cohesion supposedly threatened by alien incomers. Social innovation becomes a pragmatic action to ‘take care of others’, which often starts from the fortuitous meeting between these ‘others’ and locals, including local authorities, often involving collaboration with societal actors and supportive European funding.

CONCLUSION Civil society and people’s creativity are often deployed in great measure and to good effect when it is a matter of helping people in need, and the needs of migrants are not an exception. This chapter has presented some examples of innovative actions responding to needs as diverse as economic inclusion, finding employment, improving language proficiency, finding a safe refuge from persecution and violence, and restoring self-confidence and capabilities. Such actions have been invented and realized by people and organizations aiming to fill a gap left by political and sometimes wider societal immobility. They have done so thanks to fortuitous combinations of people, ideas and funding. While people and ideas act within a specific place or spatial dimension – frequently a city or neighbourhood (but often a refugee camp) – the economic resources necessary to implement their ideas and innovations very often come from supranational bodies such as, in the European case, EU programmes aiming at social and economic inclusion, urban regeneration or local development. Although much of the social innovation occurring in this field comprises small-scale initiatives, and may therefore only be expected to generate relatively limited impact, the multitude of such activities and the constellations of actors they mobilize sends a message about the vibrant capacity of societies to take care of those whose needs are either not addressed or are poorly addressed. This involves bypassing, complementing or sometimes fully replacing public action. Whether such innovative actions are leading to a change of paradigm in social policy is an issue that deserves to be scrutinized in further research drawing upon a larger set of activities, and by adopting a comparative, cross-country, but also cross-temporal, perspectives. This is an agenda for collaboration and an opportunity for shared learning between social innovation and social policy with considerable theoretical potential and practical value.

REFERENCES Baglioni, S., and Calò, F. (eds.) (2023), Migrants and Refugees in Europe: Work Integration in Comparative Perspective. Bristol: Policy Press. Bonacich, E. (1973), ‘A Theory of Middleman Minorities’, American Sociological Review, 38(5): 583–594. Caponio, T., and Borkert, M. (eds.) (2010), The Local Dimension of Migration Policy Making. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Cukier, W., and Jackson, S. (2017), ‘Welcoming Syrian Refugees to Canada Technology-Enabled Social Innovation’, in 2017 IEEE Canada International Humanitarian Technology Conference (IHTC). New York: IEEE. Cullen, J. (2017), ‘Migrants and the Language of Instruction: Is the EU Policy Deficit Driving New Innovations in Social Inclusion?’, International Review of Education, 63(4): 453–474. https://​doi​.org/​ 10​.1007/​s11159​-017​-9635​-4 Defourny, J., and Nyssens, M. (2010), ‘Conceptions of Social Enterprise and Social Entrepreneurship in Europe and the United States: Convergences and Divergences’, Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, 1(1): 32–53.

218  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Economist Intelligence Unit (2023), Democracy Index (2022), available at: https://​www​.eiu​.com/​n/​ campaigns/​democracy​-index​-2022/​(last accessed on 2 May 2023). Federico, V., and Baglioni, S. (eds.) (2021), Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Seekers’ Integration in European Labour Markets: A Comparative Approach to Legal Barriers and Enablers. Cham: Springer. Goodwin, M., and Milazzo, C. (2017), ‘Taking Back Control? Investigating the Role of Immigration in the 2016 Vote for Brexit’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19: 450–464. Hillman, F. (2008), ‘How Socially Innovative is Migrant Entrepreneurship? A Case Study of Berlin’, in D. MacCallum, F. Moulaert, J. Hillier and S. Vicari-Haddock (eds.), Social Innovation and Territorial Development. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, pp. 101–114. Kim, I. (1981), The New Urban Immigrations: Korean Immigrants in New York City. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kraff, H., and Jernsand, E. M. (2021), ‘The Roles of Social Enterprises in a Swedish Labour Market Integration Programme: Opportunities and Challenges for Social Innovation’, Social Enterprise Journal, 17(2): 203–219. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1108/​SEJ​-12​-2019​-0092 Lillie, N., Bontenbal, I., and Ndomo, Q. (2023), ‘Welfare Regimes and Labour Market Integration Policies in Europe’, in S. Baglioni and F. Calò (eds.), Migrants and Refugees in Europe: Work Integration in Comparative Perspective. Bristol: Policy Press, pp. 55–82. Lintner, C. (2019), ‘The Other Entrepreneurs: Migrant Economies as Spaces for Social Innovation?’, Migration Letters, 16(2): 265–271. https://​doi​.org/​10​.33182//​ml​.v16i2​.742 Maggini, N. (2021), ‘Between Numbers and Political Drivers: What Matters in Policy Making’, in V. Federico and S. Baglioni (eds.), Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Seekers’ Integration in European Labour Markets: A Comparative Approach to Legal Barriers and Enablers. Cham: Springer, pp.19–48. Miledù (2023), Siamo, available at: https://​www​.miledu​.org/​chi​-siamo/​(last accessed on 20 April 2023). Nicholls, A. (2006), Social Entrepreneurship: New Models of Sustainable Social Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) (2020), International Migrants Stock Data. New York: United Nations. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2023), UNHCR Data Portal, available at: https://​www​.unhcr​.org/​unhcr​-data (last accessed on 3 April 2023).

18. Top-down funded employment integration programmes: promoting bottom-up social innovation to empower the disadvantaged Richard Hazenberg and Claire Paterson-Young

INTRODUCTION Entrenched social disadvantage is one of society’s wickedest problems globally and manifests itself in numerous ways, one of which being long-term unemployment. The impacts of long-term unemployment are well understood, including significant impacts on an individual’s psychological wellbeing, alongside the economic deprivation and familial problems that it can also cause (Karsten and Moser, 2009). However, despite decades of policy activity in this area, the issue of long-term unemployment is still prevalent in many societies today. The stubbornness of this problem requires us to focus on socially innovative solutions to unemployment, to identify innovations that can empower individuals, improve their wellbeing and consequently gain them employment. This can be a virtuous circle of impact, as in gaining employment, individuals can then further bolster their wellbeing through work. However, the question of whether these innovations could be driven through top-down funding and policy mechanisms or produced organically within communities themselves, remains unanswered. This is critical, given that it can be argued that the most impactful SIs are those that empower individuals and are co-created with beneficiary groups (Mulgan, 2019). This chapter explores this question through use of data gathered in an employment integration programme delivered in England by a work-integration social enterprise. The research was mixed methods in design, with survey data gathered from 244 individual participants, exploring demographic variables, self-efficacy and wellbeing, as well as employment outcomes. Qualitative data in the form of semi-structured interviews was also gathered from 22 participants exploring their experiences of the employment programme, specifically in relation to how they were empowered. The analysis reveals that whilst the participants experienced enhanced wellbeing and self-efficacy, this did not often translate to positive employment outcomes. The authors posit that this ‘failure’ is attributable to the top-down structures embedded by the funding body, and entrenched policy around unemployment that seeks to ‘other’ disadvantaged individuals. This is framed within a theoretical approach arguing that impactful social innovation must be focused on place-based empowerment, rather than broad funding and policy mechanisms. The Covid-19 pandemic has placed severe economic and social pressures on society globally and across the UK, exacerbating a decade of austerity that followed the 2008 financial crash. UK unemployment stood at 4.5% in June–August 2021 from a peak during Covid in October–December 2020 of 5.2% (ONS, 2021a). Whilst the furlough scheme has helped to keep increases in unemployment lower than anticipated,1 the ending of this combined with the still-ongoing pandemic and uncertain economic forecast globally means that future unem219

220  Handbook on social innovation and social policy ployment levels are hard to forecast. This is even more worrying when taken alongside the significant reduction in GDP that the UK has endured (-9.7%) (ONS, 2021b) since 2019 due to Covid, and the fact that 2.8% of the workforce were on zero-hours contracts in 2021 (ONS, 2021) and a further 15.5% of workers were employed in insecure, low-paid work (Jaccarini and Krebel, 2020). The UK therefore faces significant problems regarding unemployment, as well as many people experiencing multiple disadvantages. The chapter begins with an exploration of social disadvantage and unemployment, followed by a discussion of the role of work-integration social enterprises (WISEs) in supporting the disadvantaged and unemployed. In seeking to understand constructs that can be used as indicators of disadvantage and exclusion, there is a focus on individual self-efficacy and wellbeing as traits that are negatively impacted by multiple disadvantage and experiences of long-term unemployment. This discussion is framed within a theoretical framework centred on social innovation and empowerment (the former of which is only explored in brief due to the focus presented on it earlier in the book). It then moves on to discuss the methodological approach to the research, followed by a discussion of the results generated from the quantitative and qualitative data. Finally, a summary of the findings and limitations of the research are discussed. The chapter makes a contribution to the debate concerning how bottom-up SI can reduce multiple-disadvantaged persons, crucially identifying the limiting role played by current employment policies in the UK.

DISADVANTAGE AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION Disadvantage is a multidimensional social construct that includes experiences of poverty, social exclusion, limited access to public services, poor education, health and the disadvantaged experienced by some minority ethnic group (Saunders, Naidoo and Griffiths, 2007; Gordon et al., 2000; de Haan and Maxwell, 1998; Burchardt, Grand and Piachaud, 2002; Yaojun and Heath, 2020). In the UK, the government utilises the Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) to categorise relative disadvantage across local postcode areas,2 ranking geographic areas in relation to relative income, employment, education, health, crime, barriers to housing and living environment (DLHC, 2021). Whilst such databases are useful in allowing exploration of trends around disadvantage and employment, they can be problematic as they do not account for social connectivity (i.e., the relationships around an individual). Indeed, research by Vandecasteele and Fasang (2021) has shown that it is one’s social embeddedness (the extent that individual actions and behaviour exist within social attachments) within an area that is a greater predictor of unemployment, rather than the specific locale in which one lives. This can mean that disadvantage may be ‘inherited’ across generations, especially in regard to vulnerability to unemployment, lower educational attainment and welfare dependency (Vauhkonen et al., 2017). In effect, this means that in predicting unemployment likelihood it is more important where your friends and family live than the address of your own residence. Unemployment itself can worsen experiences of disadvantage, trapping the individual in a downward spiral, as unemployment increases their social disadvantage, which in turn makes it harder for them to reengage with the labour market. Prior research has identified links between unemployment and poor health, both in terms of contributing to an individual losing their job and then the experience of unemployment worsening their health (Korpi, 2001). Further, mental health is also impacted by unemployment, with negative impacts on

Top-down funded employment integration programmes  221 depression, anxiety, hopelessness, self-esteem, confidence and self-efficacy (Murphy and Athanasou, 1999; Jahoda, Lazarsfeld and Zeisel, 1972; Creed, Muller and Machin, 2000; Karsten and Moser, 2009), whilst there was also negative stigma placed upon individuals who feel ‘othered’ by society (Danckert, 2017). It is these impacts on self-efficacy and wellbeing that the analysis within this chapter seeks to explore, in order to demonstrate the role that socially innovative programmes can have in reducing disadvantage. Self-efficacy in particular has been linked to employability (Eden and Aviram, 1993; Creed, Bloxsome and Johnson, 2001; Hazenberg, Seddon and Denny, 2014) and is a psycho-social construct that is bolstered through positive mastery experiences and also from learning from those around you (Bandura, 1977). Increasing an individual’s self-efficacy and wellbeing can therefore act as a means to empower them, and when this support is delivered through localised, coproduced interventions designed to reduce unemployment, such support can be viewed as highly impactful, bottom-up SI.

SOCIAL INNOVATION, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND UK POLICY As outlined earlier in this chapter (and the book), social innovation can be articulated as a process of empowerment for disadvantaged individuals (Mulgan, 2019), whereby disadvantaged individuals have their ‘collective power resources’ improved, alongside their ‘economic and social performance’ (Heiscala, 2007: 59). Social innovations are often characterised by localised, co-created interventions delivered within communities (Mulgan, 2019); one organisational type that has been traditionally linked with SI is social enterprises, and in the case of employability programmes there are work-integration social enterprises (Hazenberg et al., 2014). WISEs can include many different organisational types, including worker co-ops, social firms, community businesses, intermediate labour-market organisations and commercial integration organisations3 (see Aiken, 2007). WISEs can therefore provide short-term support to beneficiaries or more long-term employment, depending upon their structure. WISEs are a particular response to reconfiguring support for disadvantaged individuals and can support people, even through low-skilled work, by meeting them ‘where they are at’ (Farmer et al., 2021: 103). Research by Nyssens and Platteau (2006) has demonstrated that WISEs seek to augment beneficiaries’ social and human capital. More specifically, participation in WISEs helps improve skills and experience, thus acting to bolster self-efficacy (Bowen and Drysdale, 2017; Smigiel, Macleod and Stephenson, 2015). Engagement with WISEs also has the potential to reduce stigma (Krupa, Sabetti and Lysaght, 2019), a significant benefit when dealing with multiple disadvantage and long-term unemployment. This is developed not just through the employment opportunities that emerge, but through access to social connections, a sense of purpose and social cohesion that engagement with the WISE provides individuals (Joyce et al., 2021). However, the success of these WISE interventions is closely related to the systems that surround them (ibid.), with top-down centralised funding structures potentially limiting localised, embedded support. Unemployment policy in the UK has traditionally been characterised by a flux between what Aiken (2007) labelled the ‘pile ’em high’ and ‘to boldly go’ types, set within a neoliberal policy paradigm. What characterises both of these policy approaches is a high degree of centralisation, with large-scale providers and targets for reducing unemployment (irrespective of whether unemployment is at historically low or high levels). This policy approach has been

222  Handbook on social innovation and social policy exacerbated since the 2008 financial crash and more recently with the Covid-19 pandemic, with unemployment rising and many workers furloughed (as shown by the figures at the start of this chapter). When embedded within a neoliberal policy paradigm, such policies can constrain and threaten the social missions of WISEs (Rantisi and Leslie, 2021). Such an approach does not allow for the emergence of localised, co-created support for the unemployed, which is tailored to the needs of the areas of multiple disadvantage in which they often reside (certainly when discussing multiple disadvantages and long-term unemployment). This is what Aiken (2007) termed the ‘tapestry’ approach, and would include integrated support for disadvantaged persons, urban regeneration and a focus on community cohesion, and social value creation, which is often best delivered by community-embedded organisations such as social WISEs (Hazenberg 2021). Unemployment and its social consequences (and causes), therefore remains one of those ‘wicked problems’ identified by Rittel and Webber (1973), which is both multidimensional and contingent (Caddy and Mortimer, 2013). Certainly, research is suggesting that the solutions to supporting people to achieve employment can be found at the local level, in helping individuals identify local opportunities for employment as well as overcome personal and local barriers to employment, despite the fact that we still see too many large-scale national and regional programmes in society (ibid.). These larger-scale programmes, such as the recently launched Restart programme targeting Universal Credit claimants (Department for Work and Pensions 2022), will no doubt persist and grow as the world moves on from the (still-continuing) Covid-19 pandemic. However, a central argument of this chapter is that over the medium- to long term, persistent, multiple disadvantage and unemployment can only be solved through localised ‘social innovation’ programmes that seek to empower beneficiaries and that undertake holistic, bottom-up approaches to solving these issues. The Covid-19 pandemic has compounded the challenges for unemployed and economically inactive individuals with new emerging needs coupled with limited opportunities for employment (Paterson-Young, 2021). These challenges are not without opportunity, with WISEs presented with opportunities for adapting existing programmes through innovation.

METHODOLOGY Design Quantitative research was conducted through self-reported online surveys distributed to participants by the organisation delivering the programme. Online surveys were completed by participants on joining the programme (T1) and on completing the programme or at a point between 3 and 6 months from joining the programme (T2). The survey collected demographic information (gender, age and ethnicity) and included validated questionnaires on the General Self-efficacy scale (GSE) (Schwarzer and Jerusalem, 1995), which consists of 10 statements that participants rate themselves against in relation to a 4-point Likert scale (responses from 1, not true at all, to 4, exactly true) and a wellbeing scale (Warwick–Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale, 2006). Qualitative research was conducted through semi-structured interviews with delivery partners and participants.4 Delivery partner interviews focused on partners’ (1) understanding of the support that currently exists for programme participants and how this support is both complementary and/or overlapping; and (2) perception of partici-

Top-down funded employment integration programmes  223 pants’ needs and whether these needs are so far being met by the project. Participant interviews focused on participants’ (1) needs and whether these needs are met by the programme; and (2) perception of the currently existing support for individuals like themselves and how this support fulfils their needs. Sample Overall, 244 individual participants (93.5% of programme participants) completed the self-reported survey, with 49 participants completing the survey at T2, giving a longitudinal retention rate of 20.1%. Survey participants were primarily male (N=167, 68.4%), with 53 (21.7%) female and 24 (9.4%) not disclosing their gender.5 Participants were aged between 16 and 64 years, with the average participant aged 32.22 (SD = 11.9) years old. Participants originated from five major ethnic groups, with the majority identifying as White British or White (N=168, 68.9%). The majority (N=158, 64.8%) of participants were educated up to GCSE/O-Level grades A–C and professional/vocational equivalent (NVQ Level 2) level or below. The time participants had been with the organisation ranged from less than 1 month to more than 12 months, with most participants having been with the organisation for less than 1 month (84.3%) at the time of completing the survey. The expected intervention length ranged from less than 1 month to more than 12 months. Participants considered identification with programme target groups,6 with most participants selecting the target group for unemployed (N=194, 79.5%), followed by ex-offenders (N=54, 22.1%), not working but not claiming benefits (N=29, 11.9%) and having learning needs (N=17, 7.0%). Participants completing semi-structured interviews were aged between 18 and 58 years. Most were male (87.5%), with the remaining participants female (12.5%). Semi-structured interviews were conducted remotely with eight delivery partners and fourteen participants between November and September 2020. Analysis Surveys were analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), version 26.0. Descriptive statistics allowed for the exploration of participants’ demographic background, whilst paired-sample t-tests allowed for the exploration of longitudinal changes in participant’s self-efficacy, wellbeing, and employment outcome (T1-T2). As noted above, this sample is statistically small, and caution should be exercised in interpreting results; however, the triangulation of the survey with semi-structured interviews provides useful insight into the experiences of individuals engaged on the employability programme. Semi-structured interviews were analysed using thematic analysis, which enabled an interactive process (Braun and Clarke, 2006) to analyse the data. The data were organised in NVivo 11.4.0 and analysed using a six-phase process (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Clarke and Braun, 2017; Braun and Clarke, 2020) – ‘data familiarisation’; ‘data coding’; ‘theme development’; ‘theme review and development’; ‘theme refinement and naming’; and ‘reporting’. Data familiarisation involves a thorough review of transcripts to enable data coding (the identification of codes). Codes are interrogated to identify patterns and themes (theme development), which are refined and reviewed through theme review and development. Themes are refined and named, with core themes identified – ‘Addressing participant needs’, ‘Motivation and self-efficacy’, ‘Wellbeing’, and ‘Empowerment and support’.

224  Handbook on social innovation and social policy

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION The emergent themes from the qualitative data analysis are explored here, with the quantitative data related to GSE, wellbeing and employment outcomes used to support these findings. The data are analysed with regard to the prior literature and the theoretical focus on social innovation and empowerment. Addressing Participant Needs Experiencing disadvantage and deprivation has a negative impact on mental health, wellbeing and confidence (Packard et al., 2012; Bandura, 1977). Participants engaged on the programme had previously experienced multiple disadvantage (Paterson-Young and Hazenberg, 2022), which creates challenges in accessing education, training and employment. I was in a bad place before and really struggled with mental health. I try to keep busy to deal with it by joining groups and stuff like that but it’s not always easy. It can be really difficult, you feel alone and being around people really helps. I used to be part of a local group but had to leave because I was in a really bad place, health wise. It spirals from there and you end up in an even worse place. I then heard about [the programme] and realised it was something I really wanted to do. I was always interested in music and mixing music, but it wasn’t nothing I had the confidence to do myself. Then, I heard about [the programme] and it has changed my life. – Sarah (Participant)

Several participants on the programme experienced mental ill health, noting feelings of loneliness and uncertainty. Addressing the issues facing participants is challenging, with problems ranging from mental ill health to experience in the criminal justice system. I was in and out of trouble as a teenager and I spent some time behind bars because of that and from that point I’ve struggled to get into work and get along with life really. – James (Participant)

Experience in the criminal justice system resulted in challenges to participants in gaining employment, which creates a cycle of health and wellbeing problems. This was reiterated by delivery partners, who noted, You’ve got the people that have come out of prison that think there’s no second chance. It doesn’t matter what they’ve done, we’re not here to judge …. People make mistakes in life, we’re not all angels. So, when they come here, you’ve got to understand – what we instil in all of our staff is you can’t judge people. – Kevin (Delivery Partner)

The barriers and disadvantages experienced by participants in education, training and employment led to their involvement in the programme. Furthermore, experiencing barriers often results in long-held negative attitudes to employment that delivery partners need to change to support participants into employment. Some participants experienced new emerging needs as a direct result of the Covid-19 pandemic: I’ve worked all my life to be honest, I’ve never been out of work. But due to Covid-19, most restaurants have cut their staff. I’ve been a chef for 13 years so unfortunately, I’ve had to go on the dole. And then they offered this Goodwill Solutions to me and I’d take anything really at this point just to better myself as a person. So, I came down and they said they offered you a wide range of qualifica-

Top-down funded employment integration programmes  225 tions and I thought great, if we were to go into lockdown again I’ve learned a new trade, I could be still a key worker and I’d still be able to earn money in this horrible crisis. – Felix (Participant) The support is incredible. You can ask anyone questions and they will help you. That’s one of the really important parts of the programme – support. I feel like I can do anything. The environment is so positive, and you meet these incredibly talented people in the music industry who believe in you. They tell you that you can do it. They tell you about the challenges. It’s real. – Sarah (Participant)

Offering a flexible and innovative approach to addressing participants’ existing and emerging needs is essential for service continuity (Paterson-Young, 2021), especially for participants experiencing multiple disadvantages and barriers to employment, education and training. Delivering this at a local level in a manner that can recognise and support individuals’ complex needs, is critical in the empowerment of individuals (Mulgan, 2019). Indeed, Haugh and O’Carroll (2019) emphasise the strong link between empowerment and social innovation, particularly around freedom of choice, personal agency, access to resources and personal achievements. In failing to offer localised flexibility in government employment programmes that allow for tailored support, UK policy is in effect limiting the ability of social innovators to reduce unemployment, and creating an ecosystem that drives certain types of organisational behaviour that are not conducive to empowering people. Indeed, it is actively doing the opposite of what Heiscala (2007) identifies as the main feature of SI: empowering the collective capacity, economic and social resources of disadvantaged individuals. This has important implications for social innovators operating in the work-integration space globally and policy-makers looking to support SI in disadvantaged communities. Motivation and Self-efficacy Disadvantage is complex, with research (Saunders et al., 2007; Gordon et al., 2000) on the multidimensional nature of disadvantage leading to the identification of a range of factors, including income poverty, social exclusion, access to public services, education gap and health outcomes (de Haan and Maxwell, 1998; Burchardt et al., 2002). This impacts upon wellbeing across geographic locations and amongst certain social groups (both disadvantaged), which in turn leads to what is termed in the SI literature ‘disaggregation’ in experience (Mulgan, 2019); that is, that traditional aggregate measures of societal progress (i.e., GDP) are less relevant as inequality increases, as the benefits of overall growth are not evenly spread. What is actually required are more disaggregated measures, such as localised wellbeing to understand differences in experience between advantaged and disadvantaged areas respectively (ibid.). The disadvantage experienced by programme participants had a domino effect on personal development, motivation and confidence, with programme participants reporting medium general self-efficacy on joining the programme (Scale Item X̄ = 2.99; SD = 0.57; scale from one to four). This mean self-efficacy subsequently increased following engagement with the programme (p < .05; Scale Item X̄ = 3.33; SD = 0.62; t = 2.55) (Schwarzer and Jerusalem, 1995).7 The data therefore reveal that GSE was significantly improved over time for all participants who completed the programme. Confidence and self-efficacy are built through experiential learning, with programme participants reflecting on the role of the training environment in the promotion of confidence. I think it’s eight months now I’ve been unemployed…. [Being here has] made me more confident, motivating, which gets me out of the flat, because I live in a flat. I think it will help me if I get work,

226  Handbook on social innovation and social policy so they tell me which time or place I need to go…. The people who work in the warehouse, in the canteen, they’re nice and they just say ‘hi’ to each other, talk about some topics. – Joe (Participant)

Experiencing unemployment, coupled with disadvantage, has a negative impact on participants’ sense of self and confidence, further damaging wellbeing across disadvantaged areas and social groups and driving the need for disaggregated support/measures (Mulgan, 2019). In so doing, people are effectively having their collective power reduced and therefore their ability to engage in positive social action (for themselves or others) diminished (Heiscala, 2007; Weber, 1947). This need to build confidence and empower people was reiterated by delivery partners: All of these things [services] are about building confidence and just giving somebody that extra information on how they need to present themselves, the passion that they could have when they are trying to secure employment. – Morgan (Delivery Partner) If you know instantly they’re a bit scared or a bit shy you don’t put them with the whole group of staff that we’ve got, you’ll let them work with an individual that you know is a bit quieter than most of our other staff. Then over the course of days you start putting them in with everybody else and get their confidence that way. – Jasper (Delivery Partner)

Involvement in work-integrated training programmes helps augment confidence and self-efficacy, which helps individuals on their journey to employment (Bowen and Drysdale, 2017; Smigiel et al., 2015; Paterson-Young and Hazenberg, 2022). Confidence and self-efficacy in introducing routine and structure to the lives of individuals who have been stuck in a revolving cycle was a core aspect of the programme, and speaks to a social innovation process of empowering the individual and supporting their development (Mulgan, 2019; Haugh and O’Carroll, 2019). I feel glad to be doing something active after a year of doing absolutely nothing. It’s nice to get back into a routine and having stuff to do…. It’s great to be part of a team, having something to get up in the morning to do, it’s great. At the end of the day you go home, and you are knackered, but you enjoy it. – Roy (Participant)

Participants’ determination to access support and achieve employment, despite challenges and past experiences, illustrates the importance of the motivation and support offered by the programme. Prior research has demonstrated the ethics of care that social enterprise embeds in its human resource management (Magrizos and Roumpi, 2020), and the data reported here suggest that this transfers through to unemployed individuals on training programmes delivered by WISEs. Indeed, by embedding people within this ‘team’ environment, the WISE is engaging in the very ‘empowerment’ processes that are central to SI, and supporting wellbeing through a form of collaboration in disadvantaged areas (Mulgan, 2019). This enables the WISE to maintain the intense emotional commitment that is required to empower individuals and drive social innovation (George et al., 2019). Another aspect of personal development and change relates to developing networks: Oh… I don’t know how to explain it, but I have become more, more able to speak to people and socialise. I used to socialise and engage with people through social groups and stuff but that changed when my mental health started to suffer. [The programme] has given me back the life I lost, well, it hasn’t just given me it back – it’s made it better. I get to be with all these incredible talented people

Top-down funded employment integration programmes  227 and learn new skills. I feel like it has set me on a path, and I am really wanting to push myself. – Sarah (Participant)

The increase in confidence can translate to employment (Bowen and Drysdale, 2017; Smigiel et al., 2015). Of the 49 participants completing the survey on leaving the programme, 31 reported entering employment (63.3%) and 18 reported leaving the programme for other reasons, including unexpected family illness, moving out of the area, independent job-searching and mental ill health. Overall, the organisation delivering the programme reported that 44 participants (16.9%) entered employment upon leaving it.8 A one-way ANOVA was used to investigate the relationships between employment (factor) and GSE (dependent variable) for those individuals who completed the programme. Analysis showed that there was a difference9 in GSE scores (p > .05; F = 2.45) for individuals obtaining employment, with employed participants reporting a GSE score of +0.32 higher than those not in employment. Therefore GSE, whilst higher for those in employment, was seemingly not a critical factor in explaining whether or not participants secured employment, given the non-statistically significant nature of the result.10 Health and Wellbeing The challenges experienced by programme participants result in lower levels of wellbeing, which can compound the problems associated with unemployment (Dolan, Peasgood and White, 2008; Green, 2011). Research shows that unemployment can result in distress and anxiety, thus reducing subjective wellbeing and self-esteem (Paul and Moser, 2009; Griep et al., 2016). In this study, health and wellbeing were measured as general wellbeing, defined as one’s perception of their satisfaction of life and life stability. Participants on the programme were invited to answer questions in relation to their wellbeing (Warwick–Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale, 2006), with programme participants reporting average wellbeing on joining the programme (Scale Item X̄ = 3.26; SD = 0.64; scale from one to five). This mean wellbeing subsequently increased following engagement with the programme (p < .01; Scale Item X̄ = 3.67; SD = 0.69)11 for those who completed the programme. The data therefore reveal that wellbeing was significantly improved over time for all participants who completed the programme, thus acting as a form of empowerment through the socially innovative intervention (Mulgan, 2019; Haugh and O’Carroll, 2019). Participants joining the programme reflected on health and wellbeing issues and the programme’s role in helping participants: [W]hat we’re doing now has certainly helped with my mental health. It’s great getting out there and knowing that you can still do a bit, muck in with the lads, get the work done. It’s alright, feels, good. I feel better now inside of myself. I know the body may ache a bit, but it feels great inside to be able to do what we’re doing. – Oliver (Participant)

Health and wellbeing are essential to change, with positive life experiences and confidence central to improving wellbeing. Programme participants discussed the challenges, such as limited finances and debt, that impacted on their wellbeing. In doing so, the narrative provided by participants acknowledged the role that softer outcome factors like wellbeing can have on wider social problems, such as financial problems (and vice versa), as well as the wider implications of structural issues such as inequality on individual wellbeing.

228  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Let’s say, all that time I was unemployed I was supporting myself. And last month I was supposed to get money from the Job Centre and actually at the last minute they said, ‘You are not getting it, you are only getting £139’. And I ended up with debts with the place I live… they own the place. I owe them hundreds, something, and they’re doing my head in with it. Plus, how the hell you can live with £130, and then a month coming? – Sam (Participant)

A one-way ANOVA was used to investigate the relationships between employment (factor) and wellbeing (dependent variable). Analysis showed that there is a difference12 in wellbeing scores (p > .05; F = 3.23) for individuals obtaining employment, with employed participants reporting a wellbeing scale-item mean score of 0.45 higher than those not in employment. Whilst this illustrates the benefit of flexible and innovative support in improving wellbeing and its possible links to employment, the non-statistically significant results mean that a causal relationship cannot be inferred. Support and Empowerment Tailored support, addressing programme participants’ needs and the ultimate goals of moving to employment, are key components of the programme. The support offered on the programme was described by participants as flexible and innovative, with delivery partners adapting interventions to ensure participants received appropriate support. Actually, I’m glad I found the Programme; I really am glad I found it through the Job Centre because it’s wonderful. There’s a lot of people in need of help. Not me – obviously yes, I need help, but there’s a lot of people worse than me and they can use that kind of things, morally, mentally, everything. Because there’s a lot of people, especially the young generation, they’re really down and the Job Centre is really, really hard. – Sam (Participant) Doing this for, especially the younger generation that are coming into work, it gives them the opportunity to learn something so they’re not going straight onto benefits or anything like that. They are coming in, learning trade and then hopefully moving forward, finding employment. – Felix (Participant)

The benefits of this flexible support and innovative approach were evident from interviews, with participants highlighting the support that delivery partners offer in addressing issues and challenges (e.g., finances); obtaining work clothes; and pursuing individual passions (e.g., developing female-focused services): It’s been said by many people before, but young women need role models, they need to see women doing what they want to do. Otherwise they think they can’t do it, so if they see women behind the decks they think, ‘I can do that.’ So, I wanted to do something to say there’s lots of great music out there made by women, and here it is. So, I do a mix in the first hour which is just that, music made by women. Or it could be music made by a woman in conjunction with a man, it’s not an anti-male show. – Pam (Participant)

Delivering tailored support to individuals experiencing multiple disadvantage is challenging, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic. ‘Lockdown’ restrictions, introduced to reduce the spread of Covid-19, led to closures in various sectors (i.e., hospitality, retail, factories), which created new challenges for individuals experiencing unemployment (Petts et al., 2021). Furthermore, the lockdown restrictions led individuals to experience increased isolation from family and friends (van Lancker and Nieuwenhuis, 2020; Power, 2020). Participants receive

Top-down funded employment integration programmes  229 tailored support from staff. However the funding body, and their top-down structures/reporting, mean that the WISE had restrictions on who is entitled to receive funding (e.g., funding for courses). Obtaining funding for individual participants is a long process, with the WISE completing extensive paperwork and waiting for authorisation before fully engaging with participants. This bureaucratic process creates long wait periods that disempower participants, impacting on their engagement and damaging their wellbeing and self-efficacy. This limits the ability to maintain the emotional commitment that is central to empowerment, and hence social innovation (George et al., 2019). In this position, the interventions effectively lead to the reinforcement of disadvantage for participants, who are placed into systems where the power to make decisions and provide funding, comes from the societal structures that have helped to create the very disadvantage(s) the WISE is seeking to solve. Accountability to those with power effectively trumps delivering support to those without it. I guess there’s just so much bureaucracy and I wish that was a bit less. And then all the financial claims paperwork, I have to do everything twice. So, say it’s for participant costs, I would have already uploaded it on the participant’s file. Then I have to upload everything again in the financial folder. So, it’s a lot of duplication of work. – Karen (Delivery Partner)

Another issue resulting from the top-down structure prescribed by the funding body is the burden of paperwork and administration activities. The WISE explained that excessive paperwork reduces the resources and time dedicated to participants. This therefore places the WISE in a situation where it is responding to top-down pressures, rather than engaging in bottom-up-led collaboration with beneficiaries based upon their needs; this ultimately stifles empowerment and hence social innovation (Mulgan, 2019; Haugh and O’Carroll, 2019). This is evident from delivery partners’ concerns that administrative burdens reduce the time that could be invested in participants. It’s just lots and lots of paperwork and the time that could be invested in more productive, working with the client, we end up in paperwork. Now we have the [software name] which sometimes – as technology can be good and bad – it sometimes takes us double the time. […] So, my staff… wanted to upload the documents and there was some issue with [software name]. So, the whole day got wasted. – Karen (Delivery Partner)

Covid-19 creates challenges for participants in accessing support (i.e., access to digital devices). However, the funder has been explicit that the WISE was not able to fund digital devices, which meant that participants were unable to engage fully in the programme (i.e., unable to participate in activities, and look for jobs): I’ve been trying to get funding for some of my participants to get funding to have a digital device and get them online. I had to go for funding for the difference and I’ve asked [the funder] if they would fund it and they won’t fund digital devices. So, I think that is a barrier. I think going forward that is something that the project needs to address because I think with this pandemic, it has highlighted the fact that a lot of things are being delivered online. So, it’s about being able to adapt. I’m adapting but the Project and some of the rules around it haven’t adapted. – Thomas (Delivery Partner)

The funding body, and their top-down structures and reporting requirements, ultimately impacted on the WISE’s ability to provide flexible and holistic support, which in turn disempowered participants.

230  Handbook on social innovation and social policy

SUMMARY Social innovation is a globally normative construct (Do and Fernandes, 2020) that has applicability around the world in solving social problems. The data presented in this chapter suggest that this is certainly relevant in the work-integration field, as although the case study was based in the UK, we believe that the trends observed around empowerment, wellbeing and the building of the social and economic resources of individuals, in order to solve unemployment, are universal. Certainly, they align with what the literature has observed around the key tenets of SI around the world, in which power, collective resources and the enabling of positive social action amongst disadvantaged groups is central (Mulgan, 2019; Heiscala, 2007; Weber, 1947). Without it, social innovations fail the ‘power test’ (Mulgan, 2019: 64) and, as a result, struggle to solve societal problems. The UK model for work integration is far from unique, being replicated in other countries with neoliberal welfare states. Despite decades of policy support in this area, the issue of long-term unemployment is still prevalent. The Covid-19 pandemic compounded the challenges for unemployed and economically inactive individuals with new emerging needs coupled with limited opportunities for employment (Paterson-Young, 2021). These challenges are not without opportunity, with WISEs presented with opportunities to adapt existing programmes through SI, identified here through attempts to personalise support and increase self-efficacy and wellbeing. Developing socially innovative programmes that build emotional and place-based attachments for participants experiencing disadvantage can aid positive employment outcomes (Paterson-Young and Hazenberg, 2022). This investment in individualised support and encouragement provides a wider social impact, whereby the ‘revolving doors’ phenomena of unsustainable employment and training can be avoided. Certainly, our findings offer support to the notion that high-quality SIs emerge when the focus of social innovators is on delivering local empowerment and resilience (Kruse et al., 2019). However, it should be noted that although these findings suggest WISE programmes contribute to improved wellbeing and self-efficacy, whilst helping participants feel good about themselves, develop positive relationships and see a better future, this did not lead to positive employment outcomes for all. Indeed, the majority of the participants did not complete the WISE programme, but dropped out. It is the authors’ opinion that the source of this failure was the funding body and their top-down structures and reporting, which constrained the WISE programme’s flexibility and individuality, and ‘othered’ disadvantaged individuals. In this instance, when combined with the Covid-19 pandemic, this led to high rates of drop-out and only limited employment success. These constraints prevented the WISE from adopting an individual approach to delivery that would enable it to meet individuals at their level (Farmer et al., 2021), rather than having to deliver a one-size-fits-all programme with high throughput to satisfy funder requirements. This points to one of the key challenges inherent in public- and third-sector collaborations to drive SI, that of ‘goal congruence’ and the ability to build contracts that support ‘collective action for the collective good’ (George et al., 2019: 18). Our data suggest that even within WISEs, existing policy and funding around unemployment interventions are still aligned with Aiken’s (2007) ‘pile ’em high’ approach. Such approaches do not empower beneficiaries nor enable them to either leave long-term unemployment nor reduce their multiple disadvantage. Instead, existing policy and funding regimes limit social innovation by reducing the ability of organisations like WISEs to empower their beneficiaries (Mulgan, 2019; Haugh and

Top-down funded employment integration programmes  231 O’Carroll, 2019) and instead re-embedding the societal structures that are the cause of the social disadvantage to begin with.

NOTES 1. At the time of writing, there remain 1.3 million people furloughed through the Job Retention Scheme (HMRC, 2021). 2. Equivalent to US ZIP codes. 3. The intervention programme focused on in this chapter was delivered by a hybrid ILMO/CIO. 4. Pseudonyms were randomly assigned to participants. 5. There were 12 (4.9%) missing responses for gender. 6. Identification with multiple groups was allowed. 7. Comparison made using paired-sample t-tests. This change over time was statistically significant. 8. Some of these participants had not completed the T2 survey. There was also no statistically significant difference found between GSE at T1 and programme completion. 9. This difference was not statistically significant. 10. Albeit caution needs to be applied given the low sample-sizes. There was also no statistically significant difference found between wellbeing at T1 and programme completion. 11. Comparison made using paired-sample t-tests. This change over time was statistically significant. 12. This difference was not significant (p = .08).

REFERENCES Aiken, M. (2007) What is the Role of Social Enterprise in Funding, Creating and Maintaining Employment for Disadvantaged Groups? January. London: Cabinet Office. Bandura, A. (1977) Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioural change. Psychological Review, 84(2): 191–215. Bowen, T., and Drysdale, M. T. B. (eds) (2017) Work-integrated learning in the 21st century: Global perspectives on the future. International Perspectives on Education and Society, V32. Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing. Braun, V., and Clarke, V. (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2): 77–101. Braun, V., and Clarke, V. (2020) One size fits all? What counts as quality practice in (reflexive) thematic analysis? Qualitative Research in Psychology. DOI: 10.1080/14780887.2020.1769238 Burchardt, T., Grand, J. L., and Piachaud, D. (2002) Introduction. In Hills, J., Grand, J. L., and Pichaud, D. (Eds.), Understanding Social Exclusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–12. Caddy, I., and Mortimer, D. (2013) Unemployment and social disadvantage: A tale of five cities. International Employment Relations Review, 19(2): 4–23. Clarke, V., and Braun, V. (2017) Thematic analysis. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 12(3): 297–298. Creed, P., Muller, J., and Machin, M. (2000) The role of satisfaction with occupational status, neuroticism, financial strain and categories of experience in predicting mental health in the unemployed. Personality and Individual Differences, 30: 435–447. Creed, P. A., Bloxsome, T. D., and Johnston, K. (2001) Self-esteem and self-efficacy outcomes for unemployed individuals attending occupational skills training programs. Community, Work & Family, 4(3): 285–305. Danckert, B. (2017) Facing unemployment: Personal and vicarious unemployment experiences general favourable perceptions of unemployed people. European Sociological Review, 33(6): 779–790. de Haan, A., and Maxwell, S. (1998) Poverty and social exclusion in north and south. IDS Bulletin, 29: 1–9.

232  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities (DLHC) (2021) English Indices of Deprivation 2021. Available from https://​www​.gov​.uk/​government/​collections/​english​-indices​-of​-deprivation (accessed 12 October 2021). Department for Work and Pensions (2022) How the Restart Scheme will work, Policy Paper, 22 April. Available from https://​www​.gov​.uk/​government/​publications/​restart​-scheme/​how​-the​-restart​-scheme​ -will​-work (accessed 22 April 2022). Do, A., and Fernandes, C. (2020) Social innovation: A systematic literature review and future agenda research. International Review on Public and Non-Profit Marketing, 17(1): 23–40. Dolan, P., Peasgood, T., and White, M. (2008) Do we really know what makes us happy? A review of the economic literature on the factors associated with subjective well-being. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29(1): 94–122. Eden, D., and Aviram, A. (1993) Self-efficacy training and speed of reemployment: Helping people to help themselves. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78: 352–360. Farmer, J., De Cotta, T., Kilpatrick, S., Barraket, J., Roy, M., and Munoz, S. A. (2021) How Work Integration Social Enterprises help to realize capability: A comparison of three Australian settings. Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, 12(1): 87–109. George, G., Baker, T., Tracey, P., and Joshi, H. (2019) Inclusion and innovation: A call to action. In George, G., Baker, T., Tracey, P., and Joshi, H. (Eds.), Handbook of Inclusive Innovation. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 2–22. Gordon, D., Levitas, R., Pantazis, C., Patsios, D., Payne, S., Townsend, P., and Williams, J. (2000) Poverty and Social Exclusion in Britain. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Green, F. (2011) Unpacking the misery multiplier: How employability modifies the impacts of unemployment and job insecurity on life satisfaction and mental health. Journal of Health Economics, 30(2): 265–276. Griep, Y., Kinnunen, U., Nätti, J., De Cuyper, N., Mauno, S., Mäkikangas, A., and De Witte, H. (2016) The effects of unemployment and perceived job insecurity: A comparison of their association with psychological and somatic complaints, self-rated health and life satisfaction. International Archives of Occupational and Environmental Health, 89(1): 147–162. Haugh, H., and O’Carroll, M. (2019) Empowerment, social innovation and social change. In George, G., Baker, T., Tracey, P., and Joshi, H. (Eds.), Handbook of Inclusive Innovation, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 486–502. Hazenberg, R. (2021) The role of social enterprise in developing skills and creating employment opportunities in the UK, State of the Art Review No. 50, Enterprise Research Centre & The Women’s Organisation, University of Warwick. Available from https://​ www​ .enterpriseresearch​ .ac​ .uk/​ wp​ -content/​uploads/​2021/​04/​No50​-The​-role​-of​-social​-enterprise​-in​-developing​-skills​-and​-creating​ -employment​-opportunities​-in​-the​-UK​-R​.​-Hazenberg​.pdf (accessed 1 November 2021). Hazenberg, R., Seddon, F., and Denny, S. (2014) Investigating the outcome performance of work-integration social enterprises (WISEs): Do WISEs offer ‘added value’ to NEETs? Public Management Review, 16(6): 876–899. Heiscala, R. (2007) Social innovations: Structural and power perspectives. In Hamalainen, T. J., and Heiscala, R. (Eds.), Social Innovations, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 52–79. HMRC (2021) Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme statistics: 7 October 2021, Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs. Available from https://​www​.gov​.uk/​government/​statistics/​coronavirus​-job​-retention​ -scheme​-statistics​-7​-october​-2021/​coronavirus​-job​-retention​-scheme​-statistics​-7​-october​-2021 (accessed 1 November 2021). Jaccarini, C., and Krebel, L. (2020) Tackling Insecure Work is Vital for any Meaningful Recovery from Crisis. New Economics Foundation, 19 June 2020, available from https://​neweconomics​.org/​2020/​06/​ why​-tackling​-insecure​-work​-is​-an​-important​-partof​-any​-meaningful​-recovery​-from​-crisis (accessed 1 July 2021). Jahoda, M., Lazarsfeld, P., and Zeisel, H. (1972) The Sociography of an Unemployed Community Marienthal. London: Tavistock Publications. Joyce, A., Elmes, A., Campbell, P., Moussa, B., Suchowerska, R., Barraket, J., and Carey, G. (2021) The health and well-being impacts of a Work Integration Social Enterprise from a systems perspective. Health Promotion International, 37(1): daab052.

Top-down funded employment integration programmes  233 Karsten, P., and Moser, K. (2009) Unemployment impairs mental health: Meta-analysis. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 74: 264–282. Korpi, T. (2001) Accumulating disadvantage: Longitudinal analyses of unemployment and physical health in representative samples of the Swedish population. European Sociological Review, 17(3): 255–273. Krupa, T., Sabetti, J., and Lysaght, R. (2019) How Work Integration Social Enterprises impact the stigma of mental illness. Social Enterprise Journal, 15(4): 475–494. Kruse, D. J., Goeldner, M., Eling, K., and Herstatt, C. (2019) Looking for a needle in a haystack: How to search for bottom-up social innovations that solve complex humanitarian problems. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 36(6): 671–694. Magrizos, S., and Roumpi, D. (2020) Doing the right thing or doing things right? The role of ethics of care and ethics of justice in human resource management of social enterprises. Strategic Change, 29: 485–496. Mulgan, G. (2019) Social Innovation: How Societies Find the Power to Change. Bristol: Policy Press. Murphy, G., and Athanasou, J. (1999) The effect of unemployment on mental health. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 72: 83–99. Nyssens, M., and Platteau, A. (2006) Profiles of workers and net effects of Belgian WISEs. In Nyssens, M. (Ed.), Social Enterprise. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, pp. 222–234. ONS (2021) EMP17: People in employment on zero hours contracts, Office for National Statistics, 17 August. Available from https://​www​.ons​.gov​.uk/​employ​mentandlab​ourmarket/​peopleinwork/​ employm​entandempl​oyeetypes/​datasets/​emp​17peoplein​employment​onzerohour​scontracts (accessed 20 October 2021). ONS (2021a) Unemployment rate (aged 16 and over, seasonally adjusted), Office for National Statistics Labour-market Statistics Time Series, 12 October, Office for National Statistics, 29 October. Available from https://​www​.ons​.gov​.uk/​employ​mentandlab​ourmarket/​peoplenotinwork/​ unemployment/​timeseries/​mgsx/​lms (accessed 1 November 2021). ONS (2021b) Gross Domestic Product: Chained volume measures – Seasonally adjusted £m, UK Accounts Bluebook Time Series. Available from https://​www​.ons​.gov​.uk/​economy/​gros​sdomesticp​ roductgdp/​timeseries/​abmi/​bb (accessed 1 November 2021). Packard, C., Cavanagh, J., McLean, J., McConnachie, A., Messow, C., Batty, D., Burns, H., Deans, K., Sattar, N., Shiels, P., Velupillai, Y., Tannahill, C., and Millar, K. (2012) Interaction of personality traits with social deprivation in determining mental wellbeing and health behaviour. Journal of Public Health, 34(4): 615–624. Paterson-Young, C. (2021) Covid-19: Emerging needs for unemployed and economically inactive individuals. Community, Work & Family, 24(5): 507–511. DOI: 10.1080/13668803.2021.1931032 Paterson-Young, C., and Hazenberg, R. (2022) Does the past dictate the future? Exploring the impact of employability programmes on adults experiencing multiple disadvantage. Journal of Education and Work, 35(5): 521–539. DOI: 10.1080/13639080.2022.2092603. Paul, K. I., and Moser, K. (2009) Unemployment impairs mental health: Meta-analyses. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 74(3): 264–282. Petts, R. J., Carlson, D. L., and Pepin, J. R. (2021) A gendered pandemic: Childcare, homeschooling, and parents’ employment during COVID-19. Gender, Work & Organization, 28(S2): 515–534. https://​doi​ .org/​10​.1111/​gwao​.12614 Power, K. (2020) The COVID-19 pandemic has increased the care burden of women and families. Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy, 16(1): 67–73. Rantisi, N. M., and Leslie, D. (2021) In and against the neoliberal state? The precarious siting of Work Integration Social Enterprises (WISEs) as counter-movement in Montreal, Quebec. Environment and Planning, 53(2): 349–370. Rittel, H., and Webber, M. (1973) Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sciences, 4: 155–169. Saunders, P., Naidoo, Y., and Griffiths, M. (2007) Towards New Indicators of Disadvantage: Deprivation and Social Exclusion in Australia. Sydney: Social Policy Research Centre. Schwarzer, R., and Jerusalem, M. (1995). Generalized self-efficacy scale. In Weinman, J., Wright, S., and Johnston, M. (Eds.), Measures in Health Psychology: A User’s Portfolio. Causal and Control Beliefs. Windsor, UK: NFER-Nelson, pp. 35–37.

234  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Smigiel, H., Macleod, C., and Stephenson, H. (2015) Managing competing demands in the delivery of work integrated learning: An institutional case study. In Kennedy, M., Billett, S., Gherardi, S., and Grealish, L. (Eds.), Practice-Based Learning in Higher Education. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 159–172. van Lancker, W., and Nieuwenhuis, R. (2020) Conclusion: The next decade of family policy research. In Nieuwenhuis, R., and van Lancker, W. (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Family Policy. London: Springer International Publishing, pp. 683–706. Vandecasteele, L., and Fasang, A.E. (2021) Neighbourhoods, networks and unemployment: The role of neighbourhood disadvantage and local networks in taking up work. Urban Studies, 58(4): 696–714. Vauhkonen, T., Kallio, J., Kauppinen, T. M., and Erola, J. (2017) Intergenerational accumulation of social disadvantages across generations in young adulthood. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 48: 42–52. Warwick–Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale (WEMWBS) (2006) NHS Health Scotland, University of Warwick and University of Edinburgh. Available from https://​www2​.uwe​.ac​.uk/​services/​Marketing/​ students/​pdf/​Wellbeing​-resources/​well​-being​-scale​-wemwbs​.pdf (accessed 1 July 2021). Weber, M. (1947). The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation. New York: Oxford University Press. Yaojun, L., and Heath, A. (2020) Persisting disadvantages: A study of labour market dynamics of ethnic unemployment and earnings in the UK (2009–2015). Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46(5): 857–878.

19. Social innovation and collaborative governance: the case of surplus food redistribution Benedetta De Pieri and Francesca Caló

INTRODUCTION Collaborative governance processes have been increasingly analysed in recent years as potential solutions to societal challenges. They are intended as “a strategy used in planning, regulation, policy making, and public management to coordinate, adjudicate, and integrate the goals and interests of multiple stakeholders” (Ansell, 2012, p. 1), often involving non-profit and for-profit organisations. By enhancing collaboration between different stakeholders, and dealing with a wide variety of societal challenges, they can be included in the wide range of initiatives regarded as social innovations (SIs). At the moment we know relatively little about how non-profit and for-profit organisations are involved in collaborative governance and what kind of enablers and barriers facilitate or impede their involvement (Gazley & Guo, 2015). In this chapter, we focus on surplus food recovery and redistribution processes as an example of collaborative governance involving both non-profit and for-profit organisations. Initiatives geared towards the recovery of unsold but still edible food for redistribution to those in need are forms of SI, as they serve the joint purpose of meeting unmet needs while enhancing social assets and capabilities (Baglioni et al., 2017). Some of these initiatives involve collaborative governance, as they activate public-sector actors as well as non-profit and for-profit organisations in designing, coordinating and integrating their processes and objectives to implement food recovery strategies (Ansell & Gash, 2008). In the first part of the chapter, we explore the SI and collaborative governance literature. We then focus on the context of food recovery and food redistribution, providing details on the enablers and barriers faced by the different organisations involved. Next, we will reflect on a particular case – the Milan Food Hub, using secondary data to examine one example of how collaborative governance can be developed in the field of food recovery and redistribution. We conclude by highlighting the contribution of this chapter in relation to research, policy and practice.

SOCIAL INNOVATION AND COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE Over the last decades, social innovation has been increasingly promoted in public policy debates as a vehicle to develop novel and efficient solutions to address societal needs (De Pieri & Teasdale, 2021). In this context, SI has often been presented as a potential response to the crisis of national welfare systems (Steiner et al., 2021) and as a way to promote collaboration between citizens, non-profit organisations and public actors to improve the design and delivery 235

236  Handbook on social innovation and social policy of public services (Vanderhoven et al., 2020). In 2009 in the United States, former president Obama established the Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation within the White House to engage citizens and civil society in finding new ways to solve social problems. In Europe, SI cuts across a range of policy areas, and has been developed as a theme under the Social Innovation Initiative with the aim to mainstream SI policies through the Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe strategic framework for research and innovation (Ayob et al., 2016; Brandsen et al., 2016; Steiner et al., 2021). SI has also attracted growing academic interest. Although the concept remains fuzzy, the lack of a universally agreed definition has not deterred a volume of scholarly contributions (Ayob et al., 2016). Scholars suggest that the novelty of the concept makes SI interpretation and practice vary according to the context (Marques et al., 2018). Acknowledging the wealth of definitions of SI, in this chapter we take a pragmatic approach and consider SI to be a normative concept that involves collaborative actions and participatory processes that satisfy social needs, achieve common desires and aspirations, and thus help improve society (Moulaert & MacCallum, 2019). Among SI initiatives, collaborative governance processes have been identified as one of the instruments to rethink the role of the public sector in addressing some of the complex challenges faced in the twenty-first century (Bryson et al., 2014). Collaborative governance shares many features with SI processes, particularly concerning the potential benefits of involving different sectors in collaborative processes to design and implement programmes or services addressing social aims (Ziegler, 2017). According to Ansell and Gash (2008, p. 543), collaborative governance “brings multiple stakeholders together in common forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision making.” Collaborative governance stresses the importance of including a wide-ranging network of stakeholders in public management and using arrangements that facilitate and encourage partnership and co-operation between the public sector, businesses and non-profit organisations to further certain public policy agendas (Osborne, 2006). Among the various actors engaged in such processes, the involvement of non-profit organisations – understood as organisations capable of connecting to and learning from different voices within civil society (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2016) – has been identified as one of the best ways to ensure the representation of citizens’ interests, and a plurality of voices in the governance and delivery of public services (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010). Researchers are working to understand how collaborative governance processes emerge, what makes them work, and whether they are producing their intended effects (Andrews and Entwistle, 2010). However, literature on the barriers and enablers of the involvement of the private sector (both non-profit and for-profit organisations) in these processes is underdeveloped (Cheng, 2019). Most of the literature focuses on the drivers and mechanisms of collaborative governance, aiming to explore and understand which factors lead to collaboration and how it is achieved (Emerson et al., 2012). The literature that focuses on the role of non-profit organisations in collaborative governance has explored the exchange of resources (financial and non-financial) that might potentially lead to better services (Gazley & Guo, 2015), or the importance of non-profit organisations in representing the voices of communities (Mazzei et al., 2020). However, the existing literature does not focus on understanding enabling and hindering factors that support collaboration among different actors. In this chapter, we explore the key factors that made collaborative governance work when non-profit and for-profit organisations are included alongside public-sector organisations to address the challenge of surplus food and food poverty.

Social innovation and collaborative governance  237

FOOD RECOVERY AND REDISTRIBUTION AS A SOCIAL INNOVATION Food waste has become a salient issue at the global level, related to both environmental and social concerns. Food waste refers to the waste that takes place during industrial processing, distribution and final consumption (BCFN, 2012). According to Barilla Center for Food and Nutrition, every year over 20% of food produced in the European Union is wasted and each European citizen produces on average 58 kg of food waste, amounting to about 88 million tons of food wasted (BCFN, 2021). This waste has an economic cost of 143 billion Euros and accounts for 6% of the total emission of greenhouse gasses in the EU (BCFN, 2021). The picture of food waste is at odds with the available evidence on food insecurity, a different and (at least in part) independent issue. Food security is defined as a situation when “all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food” (FAO, 2021, p. 190). According to the FAO, in 2020 hunger shot up in both absolute and proportional terms, and undernourishment is a reality for 9.9% of the world’s population (FAO, 2021). Bridging food security and food waste questions does not imply any understatement of the food security challenge. The authors of this chapter share the view that food security is an inherently complex issue and demands coherent global and local strategies. Our research contributes to the academic and policy debates about food poverty by focusing on one particular lever: surplus food policy and management, a strategy that serves the goal of food security while also reducing food waste. Several different ways to address the waste of edible food have been proposed and implemented addressing different stages of the food chain, from production to retail and consumption. Surplus food is “edible food that is produced, manufactured, retailed, or ready to be served, but which for various reasons is not sold to, or consumed by, its intended customers” (Baglioni et al., 2016, p. 2033). Surplus food generation occurs at different stages of the food chain. In low-income countries, it is concentrated at post-harvest and processing levels, while in high-income countries it mainly occurs at the retail and consumer levels (Baglioni et al., 2016). Whenever possible, preventing the generation of surplus food is the priority. However, when prevention is neither technically nor economically feasible, the collection and redistribution of surplus food are important options. The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed an explicit use hierarchy to define how surplus food should be reused. They give first place to feeding humans, followed by feeding animals, recycling, and finally composting (EPA, 2012). Although surplus food redistribution to the people in need cannot alone be an effective tool to tackle food poverty globally, it has been considered by many to be a valuable solution to tackle food waste at the global level and to contribute to diminishing food poverty (FAO, 2021; BCFN, 2012). At the local level in particular, many different strategies have emerged in recent years, involving both private organisations (profit and non-profit) and public actors. Initiatives geared towards the recovery of unsold but still edible food for redistribution to those in need can include a plethora of different actors (for-profit, non-profit, local municipalities) collaborating, first in consensus decision making and second in organising and delivering collaborative interventions (Penco et al., 2021). As illustrated in Figure 19.1, the process of food recovery and redistribution involves public authorities and policy makers defining the policy and regulatory framework in which the whole process takes place (see Baglioni et al., 2017), as

238  Handbook on social innovation and social policy well as in co-designing and supporting (financially and with human capital resources) projects and/or interventions that manage and deliver those processes. Private companies are involved both in designing and delivering the food chain processes as they are responsible for managing the surplus food generated through different strategies, that may include (but are not limited to) its donation to people in need (Sert et al., 2018). The actual recovery and redistribution of the surplus food are then generally managed by other types of organisations: non-profit organisations with varied characteristics, services and activities (Bazerghi et al., 2016). Some of these organisations are involved only in the logistic process (‘Logistic’ in Figure 19.1): they organise the recovery and redistribution of food to local organisations, which then deliver food to the final users. These local organisations are the actual front-line organisations (‘Front-line’ in Figure 19.1) with a direct relationship with the people in need, and are in charge of distributing the food through, for example, food banks, canteens, food parcels and solidarity markets (Baglioni et al., 2017). In some cases, non-profit organisations assume both roles (‘Hybrid’ in Figure 19.1) and the logistic and the front-line distribution processes are implemented by the same organisation or by a network of public and private organisations.

Figure 19.1

Food Surplus Model (adapted from Baglioni et al., 2017)

The collaboration among these actors emanates from patterns of interaction among a constellation of actors whose interests may sometimes appear divergent (Baglioni et al., 2017). For this reason, these relationships have been defined as SI practices (see for example Hebinck & Oostindie, 2018; Penco et al., 2021) and can also be considered examples of collaborative governance processes due to their interaction in designing processes to tackle specific societal needs. Food business industry operators, on the one hand, usually prioritise profit maximisation and economic efficiency, while non-profit organisations or charities focus on their impact on the individuals and communities benefiting from their services. Public actors, such as local

Social innovation and collaborative governance  239 or national governments, on the other hand, have to pursue the general interest, although they also need to mediate between competing demands and expectations (Galli et al., 2019). These organisations are brought together to engage in a consensus-oriented decision-making process that influences how the redistribution of food surplus works at the local level. They need to find a consensus to reduce the potential tensions deriving from divergent interests, designing a collaborative process that can enable effective processes. Each one of these organisations faces different barriers in the process of recovering and/ or donating the surplus food, while at the same time they need to exploit enabling variables. Regarding companies working in the food chain, Melacini et al. (2017) and Sert et al. (2018) identified four internal enablers for efficient management of surplus food towards donations. First, companies could include some measurement procedures for surplus food by establishing a management control system that facilitates decisions about the destination of the surplus. Second, organisational procedures can help support the donation process by collecting data about the specific cause(s) of surplus food generation. Third, the level of coordination among functions (for instance, a formal coordination procedure) is also important to manage surplus food effectively, while the development of a proactive donation process that defines the products to be donated and their quantity with a detailed schedule is important in establishing better synergies. Bramanti et al. (2017) identified several internal barriers in not-for-profit organisations that hinder the process of effectively redistributing food surplus. First, the instability of food supply associated with a system reliant on charitable donations can affect the quality of the food distributed to beneficiaries and whether they appropriately address nutritional needs. Therefore, non-profit organisations involved in food recovery activities must somehow establish some stability in donations to satisfy the demand for assistance and meet the needs of their beneficiaries. Second, non-profit organisations face logistic constraints due to the need to guarantee food safety (Garrone et al., 2014). This concerns not only their ability to collect and manage surplus food according to health and safety standards, but also their ability to appropriately handle donated products and establish adequate logistic infrastructures (e.g., refrigerators, insulated vehicles) and cold chain management processes (Garrone et al., 2014). Finally, organisational factors, such as eligibility criteria of the beneficiaries, opening times and location of the food distribution, can discourage beneficiaries from using the programmes, reducing the effectiveness of interventions. In the context of collaboration between non-profit and for-profit organisations, the public sector at the national and supranational levels is a key player. Both supranational and national policies play pivotal roles in creating an environment conducive to surplus food recovery and redistribution (De Pieri et al., 2017). The EU’s “Food Distribution programme for the Most Deprived Persons of the Community (MDP)”, superseded by a new scheme in March 2014 called the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD), was an example of the role played by public policies. A set of rules was adopted for releasing public stocks of agricultural products to the Member States to be used as food aid for the most deprived in their communities. Food safety and complex hygiene regulations hinder corporate donation (Schneider, 2013) as companies feel that hygiene cannot be guaranteed once food has left their premises. Consequently, this method of food waste prevention is often under-used because of concerns about possible legal liability (Schneider, 2013). The legal requirements might also affect the quantity of excess food recovered for human consumption. For example, some countries

240  Handbook on social innovation and social policy prohibit companies from offering food products once they have reached their “best before” or “use by” dates, while other countries (e.g., Austria and Germany) allow such products to be donated (Schneider, 2013). Indeed, at the national level, norms and regulations can also be seen as enablers of food surplus donation. They can act as drivers of donations of food and grocery products by companies and private donors to food charities and social welfare organisations. In the US, for instance, the “Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act”, signed in 1996, protects donors from liability when they donate to a non-profit organisation, and from civil and criminal liability if a product that was donated in good faith later causes harm to a beneficiary (Schneider, 2013). A similar law known as “La Legge del Buon Samaritano” was approved in Italy in 2003; this encourages donations by reducing donors’ responsibility for the health and safety of products given to charitable organisations (Tarasuk & Eakin, 2005). A more complete legislative framework was established in Italy in 2016 thanks to the Law n.166 (known as Legge Gadda), which regulates liability for donors but also fiscal regulations and hygiene procedures for the donation of food, and further incentivises the donation of surplus food.

FOOD REDISTRIBUTION AS AN EXAMPLE OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF MILANO FOOD HUB Actors from the state, the economy and the civil society spheres have taken multifaceted action to address the policy and ethical dilemmas of securing access to nutritious food for all persons, while also avoiding food waste (Baglioni et al., 2017). This section introduces one such case, based in Milan, Italy, that involves various actors, including public authorities and private organisations, both for-profits and non-profits, and represents collaborative governance at the local level. The Milano Food Hub originated from an alliance established in 2016 involving various stakeholders in the municipality of Milan: the local council, a university (Politecnico di Milano), the association of the local entrepreneurial system (Assolombarda) and a foundation (Fondazione Cariplo). A public consultation was launched to understand how the local food system could be improved (Resilient City Network, 2021). The first memorandum of understanding was created among the organisations, “aiming at reducing food waste and innovating ways of recovering food for the people in need, designing and experimenting a model of collection and redistribution of food surplus, based on local neighbourhood network” (Milan Urban Food Policy Pact, 2015). The first hub was established in 2019 as a pilot project, involving the regional branch of the largest Italian food bank (Banco Alimentare Lombardia), 24 non-profit organisations and for-profit companies (20 local retailers and 4 companies’ canteens). A free location was made available by the local council for the collection, storage and distribution of surplus food from supermarkets to local non-profit organisations. While a higher education institution (Politecnico of Milan) developed a feasibility study of the logistic model, Assolombarda engaged several local companies, and two non-profit organisations managed relations with the local communities and the day-to-day operations. The municipality and a bank foundation (Fondazione Cariplo) in collaboration with other non-profit organisations launched an additional programme to recover and redistribute surplus food from the local central market. In the same year, the local council introduced a 20% waste tax break for any food businesses donating their surplus food

Social innovation and collaborative governance  241 to charities and food banks, and it developed a cross-departmental working group including environmental, fiscal and food policy staff to develop facilitating policies. In 2020, immediately after the first lockdown due to the Covid-19 pandemic, a second food hub was opened in a different neighbourhood. The hub was also managed by Banco Alimentare and the physical space was provided by one non-profit organisation (AVIS Milano) and refurbished thanks to a contribution from a local cooperative bank (BCC Milano). A third hub was opened in 2021. In this case, besides the collection and distribution of surplus food, educational activities and support for women and children in need were also provided. The hub was opened with the contribution of an Italian foundation (Fondazione Milan) and is managed by a non-profit organisation (Terres des Hommes). A fourth hub is planned in a fourth neighbourhood of the city, again with the support of Banco Alimentare and thanks to the contribution of another philanthropic foundation (Fondazione SNAM). At the same time, the municipality is planning to open the fifth one, and a co-design process has been launched to involve local actors in its design and implementation. The hubs contribute to tackling two different problems with one solution: on the one hand, they recover surplus food from supermarkets and companies’ canteens, thus fighting food waste in the city area; on the other hand, they distribute food surplus, including fresh products and complete meals, to those most in need, thus tackling food poverty. With three active hubs, the city can recover on average 10 tonnes of food per hub each month (estimated as about 20,000 meals equivalent per month) with an economic value of about 30,000 €/month of food donated (Milan Urban Food Policy Pact, 2015). A variety of actors were involved in the establishment of the hubs. First of all, the municipality was a key player in supporting the collaborative process through the development of a co-design experiment involving local organisations and a local university, which acted as the developer of a feasibility plan. The municipality of Milan started to work on its food policy some years before the launch of the hubs. Since the World Expo 2015, which was based in Milan, the city developed a food policy that involves public agencies, food banks, charities, NGOs, universities and private businesses. The objectives of this food policy were elaborated through a public consultation on the adoption of a City Council Resolution, outlining the five priorities of the Milan Food Policy: (1) ensuring healthy food and water for all citizens; (2) promoting sustainability of the food system; (3) promoting Food Education; (4) fighting against food waste; and (5) supporting the scientific research in agrifood sectors. Local companies were also involved as donors, mainly supermarkets and companies’ canteens, to recover surplus food. Companies in the logistic sector were involved, e.g., by donating refrigeration trucks to address safety concerns in food redistribution. Funding came from different sources, depending on the local contexts: in some cases, the project was funded by philanthropic foundations, while in one case funding for the refurbishment of the space came from a bank. Finally, grassroots organisations were involved in the redistribution of the collected food. It is important to note that the model of the hub is not just replicated in different neighbourhoods; it is adapted to the local needs and resources. For instance, as was mentioned above, new and different actors have been involved in each of the local hubs, and in some of them new services are delivered (e.g., in one a support service for women and children in need has been created beside the food recovery and donation system). While data still need to be collected to understand how the collaborative governance process has worked, it is possible to conclude that only through building networks at the local level that combine organisations from differ-

242  Handbook on social innovation and social policy ent fields, with different characteristics and with different missions is it possible to generate sustainable solutions that address complex problems such as food poverty and reducing waste.

CONCLUSION While our study is an initial attempt to connect collaborative governance and SI, it opens up reflections for developing further studies and for informing policies and practices. Our research contributes to the academic and policy debates about food poverty by focusing on one particular factor, surplus food policy and management, a strategy that addresses the goal of food security while reducing food waste. Our chapter reflects upon the enablers and hindering factors that can affect the establishment of collaborative governance processes, in particular focusing on for-profit and non-profit organisations involved in food surplus and food recovery. We have considered the internal barriers and enablers that different organisations face in managing social innovation initiatives. Our findings highlight that the establishment of clear, measured and bespoke processes can facilitate collaboration among actors with divergent interests. Future studies could further explore these results, focusing more on the mechanisms that lay at the heart of collaboration processes. It would be important, for example, to focus on the potential tensions faced by collaborative governance initiatives and how different actors work to reduce these. The case of the Milan Local Hub could be a paradigmatic case study analysed through this lens. Collecting primary data from all stakeholders involved in this initiative might reveal patterns of collaborations or specific mechanisms that reduce potential tensions that could be useful to understand if and how collaborative governance processes work. Our chapter also initiated reflections on the intersection between collaborative governance processes (which has been mainly explored by Public Administration scholars) and the SI literature (which has been explored by a wider range of disciplines). Continuing to reflect upon and explore the intersection between these two streams can inform the research community, enriching theoretical frameworks in both fields, and also inform policy and practice. Finally, our chapter can provide useful information for policy and practice. In terms of policy, it has recently become clearer that to tackle complex issues, such as food waste and poverty, it is essential to develop networks of actors that can achieve public value and address future societal challenges through collaboration. Our findings reinforce this point, showing that only through the collaboration of a wide variety of stakeholders is it possible to start to tackle food poverty and food waste. To do so, it is fundamental to invest both financial and non-financial resources in collaborative governance processes and initiatives,. Policy makers should establish systems that can incentivise as well as coordinate those initiatives, facilitating a real sharing of resources, time and knowledge. Both for-profit and non-profit organisations should also be ready to become involved and establish new ways to combine potentially divergent interests to meet chronic, new and pressing social challenges and fulfil human needs.

REFERENCES Andrews, R., & Entwistle, T. (2010) Does cross-sectoral partnership deliver? An empirical exploration of public service effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 20(3), 679–701. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​jopart/​mup045

Social innovation and collaborative governance  243 Ansell, C. (2012) Collaborative governance. In The Oxford Handbook of Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​oxfordhb/​9780199560530​.013​.0035 Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008) Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4), 543–571. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​jopart/​mum032 Ayob, N., Teasdale, S., & Fagan, K. (2016) How social innovation ‘came to be’: Tracing the evolution of a contested concept. Journal of Social Policy, 45(4), 635–653. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1017/​ S004727941600009X Baglioni, S., De Pieri, B., & Tallarico, T. (2016) Surplus food recovery and food aid: The pivotal role of non-profit organisations. Insights from Italy and Germany. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 28, 2032–2052. Baglioni, S., Calò, F., & Garrone, P. (eds) (2017) Food Saving in Europe: At the Crossroad of Social Innovation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bazerghi, C., McKay, F. H., & Dunn, M. (2016) The role of food banks in addressing food insecurity: A systematic review. Journal of Community Health, 41(4), 732–740. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1007/​s10900​ -015​-0147​-5 BCFN, Barilla Center for Food and Nutrition (2012) Food Waste: Causes, Impacts and Proposal. Milan: Codice Edizioni. BCFN, Barilla Center for Food and Nutrition (2021) L’Europa e il cibo. Available at: https://​www​ .barillacfn​.com/​it/​pubblicazioni/​l​-europa​-e​-il​-cibo/​index​.html [accessed 05.05.2022]. Bramanti, V., Coeli, A., Ferri, L., Fiorentini, G., & Ricciuti, E. (2017) A model for analysing non-profit organisations in the food recovery, management, and redistribution chain. In Baglioni, S., Calò, F., & Garrone, P. (eds) (2017), Foodsaving in Europe: At the Crossroad of Social Innovation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 99–130. Brandsen, T., Cattacin, S., Evers, A., & Zimmer, A. (2016) Social Innovations in the Urban Context. Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London: Springer. Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Bloomberg, L. (2014) Public value governance: Moving beyond traditional public administration and the new public management. Public Administration Review, 74(4), 445–456. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1111/​puar​.12238 Cheng, Y. (Daniel). (2019) Exploring the role of nonprofits in public service provision: Moving from coproduction to cogovernance. Public Administration Review, 79(2), 203–214. https://​doi​.org/​10​ .1111/​puar​.12970 De Pieri, B., & Teasdale, S. (2021) Radical futures? Exploring the policy relevance of social innovation. Social Enterprise Journal, 17(1), 94–110. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1108/​SEJ​-11​-2020​-0111 De Pieri, B., Tallarico, T., Baglioni, S., Lulkievicz, U., & Ricciuti, E. (2017) European policy for food security: The surplus food redistribution option. In Baglioni, S., Calò, F., & Garrone, P. (eds), Foodsaving in Europe: At the Crossroad of Social Innovation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 131–160. Emerson, K., Nabatchi, T., & Balogh, S. (2012) An integrative framework for collaborative governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 22(1), 1–29. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​jopart/​ mur011 EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) (2012) Putting Surplus Food to Good Use. Washington, DC: EPA. FAO (2021) The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021, Rome. Available at: https://​ www​.fao​.org/​documents/​card/​en/​c/​cb4474en [accessed 05.05.2022]. Galli, F., Cavicchi, A., & Brunori, G. (2019) Food waste reduction and food poverty alleviation: A system dynamics conceptual model. Agriculture and Human Values, 36(2), 289–300. https://​doi​ .org/​10​.1007/​s10460​-019​-09919​-0 Garrone, P., Melacini, M., & Perego, A. (2014) Opening the black box of food waste reduction. Food Policy, 46, 129–139. Gazley, B., & Guo, C. (2015) What do we know about nonprofit collaboration? A comprehensive systematic review of the literature. Academy of Management Proceedings, 2015(1), 15409. https://​doi​ .org/​10​.5465/​ambpp​.2015​.303 Hebinck, P., & Oostindie, H. (2018) Performing food and nutritional security in Europe: Claims, promises and limitations. Food Security, 10(6), 1311–1324. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1007/​s12571​-018​-0853​-9

244  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Marques, P., Morgan, K., & Richardson, R. (2018) Social innovation in question: The theoretical and practical implications of a contested concept. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 36(3), 496–512. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1177/​2399654417717986 Mazzei, M., Teasdale, S., Calò, F., & Roy, M. J. (2020) Co-production and the third sector: Conceptualising different approaches to service user involvement. Public Management Review, 22(9), 1265–1283. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1080/​14719037​.2019​.1630135 Melacini, M., Rasini, M., & Sert, S. (2017) Surplus food redistribution: A conceptual framework. In Baglioni, S., Calò, F., & Garrone, P. (eds), Foodsaving in Europe: At the Crossroad of Social Innovation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 51–68. Milan Urban Food Policy Pact (2015) Available at: milanurbanfoodpolicypact.org [accessed 22.11.2023]. Moulaert, F., & MacCallum, D. (2019) Advanced Introduction to Social Innovation. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Osborne, S. P. (2006) The new public governance? Public Management Review, 8(3), 377–387. https://​ doi​.org/​10​.1080/​14719030600853022 Penco, L., Ciacci, A., Benevolo, C., & Torre, T. (2021) Open social innovation for surplus food recovery and aid during COVID-19 crisis: The case of Fondazione Banco Alimentare Onlus. British Food Journal (ahead-of-print). https://​doi​.org/​10​.1108/​BFJ​-02​-2021​-0116 Resilient City Network (2021) Rethinking Milan’s approach to food waste. Available at: case-study-milan-01-.pdf (resilientcitiesnetwork.org) [accessed 12.05.2022]. Salamon, L. M., & Sokolowski, S. W. (2016) Beyond nonprofits: Re-conceptualizing the Third Sector. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 27(4), 1515–1545. Schneider, F. (2013) The evolution of food donation with respect to waste prevention. Waste Management, 33(3), 755–763. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1016/​j​.wasman​.2012​.10​.025 Sert, S., Garrone, P., Melacini, M., & Perego, A. (2018) Corporate food donations: Altruism, strategy or cost saving? British Food Journal, 120(7), 1628–1642. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1108/​BFJ​-08​-2017​-0435 Steiner, A., Barraket, J., Calo, F., Farmer, J., & Teasdale, S. (2021) The role of governments and public policies in social innovation processes. Social Enterprise Journal, 17(2), 157–164. Tarasuk, V., & Eakin, J. M. (2005) Food assistance through ‘surplus’ food: Insights from an ethnographic study of food bank work. Agriculture and Human Values, 22, 177–186. https://​doi​.org/​10​ .1007/​s10460​-004​-8277​-x Vanderhoven, E., Steiner, A., Teasdale, S., & Calò, F. (2020) Can public venture capital support sustainability in the social economy? Evidence from a social innovation fund. Journal of Business Venturing Insights, 13, e00166. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1016/​j​.jbvi​.2020​.e00166 Ziegler, R. (2017) Social innovation as a collaborative concept. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 30(4). https://​doi​.org/​10​.1080/​13511610​.2017​.1348935

20. Between green economy and reformism: an exploration of circular economy and social economy policy convergence in Quebec Rafael Ziegler, Eléonore Compère, Emmanuel Raufflet and Martine Vézina

INTRODUCTION Quebec is a pioneer in both social economy and social innovation (Wright, 2010; Bouchard, 2013) as well as in circular economy (Sauvé et al., 2016; Teigiero et al., 2018). In this chapter, we explore how social economy and circular economy policies accompany the transition towards a just and sustainable circular economy, identify areas of convergence, and draw lessons for both research and policy. The province of Quebec is part of the Canadian federation that has a vast territory with a relatively small population, often located in urban centres of the southern part of the country. As a so-called natural resource-producing country, the circular economy prima facie faces the barriers of an extractive economy that is less concerned with scarcity and the costs of resources than with potential barriers to their exploitation and exportation, how these might affect resource-producing rural zones, and the challenges facing a country with high material consumptions habits (CCA, 2021, pp. 42–46). The energy systems of Canadian provinces are diverse. Quebec is a hydro-power province, whereas other provinces rely much more on fossil fuels. Understanding transitions in the direction of the circular economy and sustainability requires a focus on provinces and not just the national level (Meadowcroft, 2016). Quebec has a long social economy history that views social innovation as a vector of change towards an economy based on ideals of democratic governance and collective entrepreneurship (Bouchard, 2013). Circular economy, by contrast, focuses on the optimization and transformation of systems of production and consumption. It tends to be associated with a technological perspective on production and consumption: reduce resource extraction and redesign products, extend product life, improve product use, and recycle and restore the materials used in production and consumption. In this way, the promise is, the economy can reduce pressure on the environment and move towards a more sustainable economy. The model remains a promise since actual circularity (i.e., the rate of recycled and reused materials in the economy) in Quebec is estimated at 3.5% (below the Canadian and global average), and material resources use and waste production are expected to increase (CCA, 2021). A transition to circular economy requires real economic changes, which inevitably will affect some more than others and produce winners and losers. Understanding the relations between circular economy, social economy, and social innovation is therefore particularly important. In the Quebec case, these relations are developing with practical effect, particularly since social economy organization participated in a consultation of the Quebec approach to circular economy (Jagou, 2021). This consultation defined the circular economy as “a production, exchange, and consumption 245

246  Handbook on social innovation and social policy system which aims to optimize resource use at every stage in the life cycle of a product or service through a circular approach, reduce the environmental footprint and contribute to the well-being of individuals and communities” (ibid., p. 35). Following a brief introduction of our methods, the next sections of this chapter will sketch the emergence of circular economy and social economy policies in Quebec, as part of the multi-level governance of the Federation of Canada. This is followed by an exploration of evidence of areas of convergence and tensions between the two approaches. We also discuss the discourses associated with these policies, in particular the prevalence of green economy and reformism, as well as the importance of social innovation intermediaries for shaping discourses and policies. The final section concludes with suggestions for further research and reflections on the implications for policy.

EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT CIRCULAR ECONOMY POLICY We have documented policies related to social economy and the circular economy at the municipal, provincial, and federal levels in Canada. We interpret these policies in a wide way, to include the laws that constrain and enable what can be done, as well as regulations and programmes that government advances to put these laws into practice. We focus on the level of the Canadian federation, on Quebec, and on the municipal level on Montreal, the largest municipality of Quebec with arguably the most-developed circular economy policies. We label circular economy policies as “explicit” if they refer directly to circular economy and as “implicit” if they pursue circular economy goals or refer to a circular strategy in all but name; for example, a regulation on recycling. We attributed “implicit” status by drawing on the four main objectives of circular economy and 12 associated strategies, as defined in the Quebec definition of the circular economy (EDDEC, 2021): 1. consuming fewer resources and preserving ecosystems that generate those resources, which implies rethinking production and product design, 2. intensifying product use, 3. extending the life of products and components, and 4. giving resources a new life. Subsequent sections introduce social economy policies, examining convergence with circular economy policies. The focus is on social economy policies that include explicit or implicit circular economy goals (as described above). Our analysis does not aim to be complete, but it attempts to identify the major policies and, based on this, to identify areas of convergence and potential tensions. One limitation of our approach is that some prior versions of policies presented below were no longer available for analysis. For the analysis of results, we make a distinction between policies and the actor networks that shape and influence policies, that adopt and resist policies in different ways. We also distinguish between policies and the cognitive frames that actors use to make sense of, interpret, and legitimate policies (Beckert, 2010). These cognitive frames refer us to the discourses on social economy and circular economy. Circular economy research (Calisto Friant et al., 2020, p. 11) distinguishes four circular economy discourses, based on their respective assumptions about capitalism, normative goals for society and the environment, as well as ideas for achieving these goals. We will return to these discourses in our discussion section.

An exploration of circular economy and social economy policy convergence in Quebec  247 Canada’s approach to natural resource management is based on the idea of a shared responsibility between the federal and provincial levels of governments (Baril, 2018). The provinces claim competence for natural resources on their territory, while the federal government has competence over environmental issues that are international and/or touch on more than one province (climate being the most obvious candidate, but migrating species is another example). Municipalities have specific responsibility for meeting needs in relation to public transportation, housing, and use of land and water. We focus on all three levels below. The division of responsibility is contested in practice. This governance scheme is also contested in a further way: it has historically implied the expropriation of First Nations, Métis, and Inuit populations, yet the importance of indigenous peoples for sustainable economies is well documented (IPBES, 2019). We return to this point in the discussion.

CIRCULAR ECONOMY POLICIES This section introduces major explicit and implicit circular economy policies at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels. Figure 20.2 provides an overview. The explicit policies are highlighted on the graph, represented in grey in Figure 20.1, and are briefly introduced in this section. At the federal level, we find the Green Municipal Fund (GMF). This was established in 2000 by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities to help local governments pursue sustainable practices with a mix of funding, resources, and training, which aim to give municipalities the tools to build resilience and create better lives for Canadians. The fund also offers help sectors that are particularly relevant to sustainability, such as energy, land use, transportation, and waste. Moreover, it aims to grow local and inclusive economies. In 2021, it offered a programme to accelerate circular economy measures through peer-to-peer learning between cities (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2021). Another strategy that explicitly promotes the circular economy at the federal level is the Canada-wide Strategy on Zero Plastic Waste, established in 2018. The government of Canada aims to work with all levels of government, industries, non-governmental organizations, academia, and Canadians to act to reduce plastic waste and pollution. Attached to the strategy is the Ocean Plastics Charter. The Charter is a framework for actions and a strategy using the circular economy model to tackle plastic waste to create a more sustainable way to produce, use, and manage plastics (CCME, 2018). Implicit policies at the federal level focus on waste reduction and pollution, including climate policies. For example, in 2009, the Action Plan for Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) was initiated. The plan aims to work towards the development and implementation of EPR programmes to provide guidance for the use of EPR as a tool to manage environmental risks, and harmonize programmes across the country (CCME, 2009). The plan’s objectives are: the adoption by the producers of cost accounting for the full lifecycle of their products, to shift the expenses of product end-of-life management from taxpayers to producers and consumers, and to reduce the amount of waste generated and disposed of. Finally, the plan aims to reduce the toxicity and environmental risks from products and their waste, and to improve the lifecycle performance of products (CCME, 2009). At the provincial level, the Environmental Quality Act, adopted in 1987, is a central explicit policy “that calls for taking into account basic principles of the circular economy” in the

248  Handbook on social innovation and social policy context of the management of residual materials and extended producer responsibility. More generally, the Act aims to protect the environment and the living species inhabiting it. It also promotes the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and it allows to take into consideration issues related to the protection of human health and safety as well as the realities of the territories and the communities living in them (MELCC, 2021a). Most of the public policies related to the circular economy in Quebec develop in the context of this overarching act. An important circular economy policy deriving from the Environment Quality Act is the Quebec Residual Materials Management Policy. It focuses on the disposal of residual materials, on creating a no-waste society via the use of intelligent management and ensuring that the only residual material disposed of in Quebec is “ultimate waste”, i.e., waste that cannot be recycled or used for energy production. It aims to stop wasting resources and to empower and hold accountable all actors in the management of residual materials, creating a strong base to implement a circular economy. The associated Quebec Residual Materials Management Policies 2019–2024 Action Plan explicitly refers to circular economy as a central goal for recyclable materials as well as the recovery of organic materials. The plan also aims to contribute to the deployment of the circular economy by consolidating territorial symbiosis (Recyc-Québec, 2019). For the latter, so-called facilitators are financed that enable cooperation of local enterprises on a territory so that for example the “waste” of one company can become the “resource” of another one (Chiasson, 2021). In 2021 Bill 65 was passed – an Act to amend the Environment Quality Act with respect to deposits and selective collection. The bill aims to advance the extended producer responsibility (EPR) approach, drawing on the principles of the circular economy (National Assembly of Quebec, 2021). The bill gives power to the Government to require any person from an industrial or commercial establishment who generates residual materials to develop and implement a selective collection system and a deposit system for certain materials. The Government also has the power to regulate the development, implementation, and financing of the selective collection and deposit system, and to mandate a non-profit body to take on the responsibility for developing, implementing, and financing the operation of the systems. This new system aims at the modernization of kerbside recycling (Eco Enterprises Quebec, 2021). The implementation of penalties, sanctions, and transitional provisions is also part of the bill. In 2006, the Act on Sustainable Development was initiated by the Ministry of Environment and Fight against Climate Change. The act does not explicitly mention the circular economy; however, it includes a governmental environmental strategy. The current strategy is the Government Sustainable Development Strategy 2015–2020 (because the overall review of it has been deferred until 2022, the year in which the chapter was finalised). The strategy aims to implement the circular economy to move towards a green and sustainable economy. More generally, it offers visions, orientations, issues, and goals to guide the public administration towards a sustainable development (MDDELCC, 2015). In 2020, the Quebec Plan for the Development of Critical and Strategic Minerals 2020–2025 was published. In partnership with local and indigenous communities, the goal of the plan is for Quebec to become a leader in the production, transformation, and recycling of critical and strategic minerals (CSMs) (MERN, 2020). The plan calls for a circular economy scheme for the recovery and recycling of critical and strategic minerals, and to reuse or recycle tailings (i.e., residues in the preparation of a product) or goods components (MERN, 2020). Also in that year, the Quebec Plan for a Green Economy 2030 was initiated. It primarily focused on electrification and climate change policy. Developing the circular economy is one of the

Figure 20.1

Timeline of the policies in circular economy

An exploration of circular economy and social economy policy convergence in Quebec  249

Figure 20.2

Circular economy policies repertory

Note: The figure demonstrates a repertory of explicit circular economy policies in grey and implicit circular economy policies in white. Policies with solid borders refer to the municipal level, policies with dotted border to the provincial level, and dashed borders to the federal level. MELCC = Ministry of Environment and Fight against Climate Change; MDDELCC = Ministry of Sustainable Development, of Environment and Fight against Climate Change; MERN = Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources; MEI = Ministry of Economy and Innovation; NRCan = Department of Natural Resources Canada; AAFC = Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada; DFO = Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada; ECCC = Department of Environment and Climate Change Canada; CCME = The Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment.

250  Handbook on social innovation and social policy

An exploration of circular economy and social economy policy convergence in Quebec  251 goals of the plan via the creation of synergies between enterprises from the same region, efficiency increase, development of products with a low carbon footprint, and the creation of local revenues. Developing such an economy would also favour local consumption and procurement (MELCC, 2020a). Moreover, the Ministry of Economy and Innovation published its Sustainable Development Action Plan 2020–2022, which has a mission to support the economic development and sustainability of all regions of Quebec. One of the six actions of the plan is to stimulate the growth of circular economy through investment and financial support to favour the transition towards a green and responsible economy (MEI, 2020a). Finally, the Governmental Action Plan in the Social Economy 2020–2025 was also published in 2020, with the circular economy as one of the plan’s four priorities for the future (MEI, 2020b). The Ecoleader fund, initiated in 2019 by the Ministry of Economy and Innovation, supports businesses in adopting eco-responsible practices and clean technologies. It offers financial support to companies to hire experts to implement environmentally responsible practices or help prepare for the acquisition of clean technologies. The circular economy is one of the explicit objectives of the fund (Fonds Ecoleader, 2021). Another fund is the Circular Economy Fund, established in 2021. It finances and supports new businesses across Quebec and works in partnership with municipalities. It aims to accelerate ecological transition by reducing the production of residual materials as well as supporting their recovery and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The three focus areas of the fund are: (1) agri-food, (2) recycling and revaluating resources, and (3) eco-construction (Fondaction, 2021a). At the municipal level, recent action plans are explicitly committed to circular economy measures. The Sustainable Montreal 2016–2020 plan aimed at four priority areas, one of them being the “transition to an economy that is green, circular and responsible” (Beauschesne et al., 2016). This plan has been continued with the most recent Climate Plan 2020–2030 of the city of Montréal. The Plan’s top priority is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in support of the 2050 carbon neutrality goal. It contains 46 measures, one of which supports enterprises with the implementation of circular economy (City of Montreal, 2020). In addition, the Acting Now to Prepare Recovery Plan, published in 2021, proposes 10 measures, with a one-year span to support sectors that appeared to be particularly fragile during the crisis of the pandemic of COVID-19 (City of Montreal, 2021). One of the measures relates to circular economy by helping organizations move towards ecologically responsible business practices and initiating projects to reduce their carbon footprint. The measure also supports the transition to models of circular economy, as well as “sustainable mobility” initiatives for getting to work (City of Montreal, 2021). Part of the plan is a Social Economy Challenge: Acting to support the ecological transition. It provides financing to projects that reduces the amount of waste ending up in landfill via circular economy strategies. In sum, there is policy support across federal, provincial, and municipal levels for circular economy. This support appears to have increased in recent years. Implicit circular economy support, especially at the provincial level, can be traced back for at least three decades. Explicit and implicit policy has emerged across levels, ministries, and associated sectors. However, there is currently no integration of these policies, and this is perceived as a major barrier to circular economy in Canada (CELC and GLOBE, 2020).

252  Handbook on social innovation and social policy

SOCIAL ECONOMY POLICIES Quebec is recognized as a pioneer of public policy and support for the development of the social economy (Arsenault, 2018). Quebec has more than 11,200 social economy enterprises that represent a total of $47.8 billion in sales. These enterprises provide employment to more than 220,000 people (ISQ, 2019). In 2013, the Social Economy Act was passed in Quebec and since 2014 the Ministry of Economy and Innovation has overseen its coordination (MEI, 2021). The Act determines the role of government in the social economy and recognizes the contribution of the social economy for the socio-economic development of the province across sectors and territories. This political recognition by the Quebec government with laws (on cooperatives), policies, and public programmes supports the actions of cooperatives, mutuals, and social economy associations. It is the outcome of a longer process dating back to the beginning of the 20th century (Lévesque & Peticlerc, 2008). The Quebec social economy eco-system is made up of development support organizations, financial tools co-developed within the framework of a network of solidarity-based financial partners, public corporations, research centres and transfer organizations, employment development organizations, and social movements (unions, feminist, environmentalist), neighbourhood tables (organizations that bring together local stakeholders with the aim of fostering their collective capacity for tackling neighbourhood challenges), etc. At both the provincial and municipal levels, the public sector, through various types of support for the deployment of the social economy in Quebec, is central for this social innovation eco-system. The Social Economy Act recognizes the Chantier de l’économie sociale (Le Chantier) and the Conseil québécois de la coopération et de la mutualité (CQCM) as the province’s primary interlocutors regarding the social economy (MEI, 2021). These consultation, support, and lobbying organizations for cooperatives, mutuals, and social economy associations are a driving force behind the Quebec Government’s Action Plan in Social Economy (PAGES, or Plan d’Action Gouvernemental en Économie Sociale), whose latest programme has been issued in 2020. The Quebec social economy eco-system is historically the strongest voice in favour of social innovation (Lévesque, 2002). Social innovation is viewed as a vector of institutional change initiated by social actors to meet aspirations and need, provide opportunities for action, change social relations, and provide new cultural directions (Bouchard, 2013). At the heart of this vision are collectively organized, autonomous organizations. In recent years, the federal government has recognized social innovation in the form of an investment programme. The Chantier de l’économie sociale has been mandated to implement this federal programme in Quebec. Elsewhere in Canada, other actors, notably private foundations with a more private business-oriented vision of social innovation, have been mandated to distribute the funds from the federal social innovation programme to social purpose organizations (SPOs). It is in this context of co-construction of public policies in the social economy that the intersection between social economy and the circular economy should be analysed in our case. The social economy has in fact been mobilized to support the circular economy for several years. These reflections and experiments in the circular economy benefited from public funding from social economy programmes not dedicated to the circular economy. On this basis, actors of the social economy eco-system brought the issue to the attention of public authorities, and circular economy is now one (of four) priority areas of the governmental action plan in social economy (PAGES). As an organized field, the social economy is likely to push for further evolution of

An exploration of circular economy and social economy policy convergence in Quebec  253 circular economy policies as both the Chantier de l’Économie sociale and the Conseil québécois de la coopération et de la mutualité have made this issue one of their priorities in their latest respective strategic planning. Figure 20.3 illustrates the points of convergence between circular economy and social economy policies on a timeline. The policies that explicitly exemplify convergence are highlighted in bold in the graph and coloured in grey in Figure 20.4. At the federal level, we do not find any policy explicitly aimed at both the circular and social economy. As Figure 20.4 also shows, in white, there are explicit social economy policies with implicit support for circular economy. A special case are the work employment programmes, which support people with disabilities, young people, and seasonal workers, and play a role for social economy organizations (about 3% of the social economy organizations of Quebec are so-called work-insertion organizations). Likewise, the Social Economy Act does not refer to circular economy. However, its objective is to “facilitate access, for social economy enterprises, to the Administration’s measures and programs” (objective 2.3). Thus, it is of indirect, transversal importance to facilitate and legitimate the role of social economy organizations, and therefore has also been included here. At the provincial level, the Environment Quality Act refers explicitly to the circular economy and the social economy. The division on residual materials management of the Act states that the circular economy measure for the recovery and reclamation of residual materials should consider the social economy. The Quebec Residual Materials Management Policy thus represents a point of convergence. It explicitly aims at a circular economy, and the Government of Quebec collaborates with social economy enterprises, especially those oriented towards reuse to work on the residual material management in the implementation of the policy (MELCC, 2021b). This convergence is enabled by the Social Economy Act, which demands that governments include social economy enterprises in its programmes, as well as by the Government of Quebec programme of wage subsidy for employment integration, to help employers integrate various target groups (people with disabilities, youth, seasonal workers).1 The Government Sustainable Development Strategy 2015–2020 explicitly mentions the circular economy and the social economy as objectives to support the development of practices and business models that are green and sustainable. It also mentions the social economy as a way to promote social inclusion and reduce social and economic inequalities in Quebec (MDDELCC, 2015). As previously stated, the Ecoleader fund offers financial support to companies that implement environmentally responsible practices, such as circular economy strategies. Social economy organizations are eligible if at least 40% of their revenue is market based (Fonds Ecoleader, 2021). The Circular Economy Fund, established in March 2021, is the first Canadian investment fund dedicated to the circular economy. It aims to accelerate ecological transition by supporting Quebec companies to reduce the production of residual materials, to support their recovery, and to reduce GHG emissions. The fund aims at a capitalization of C$30 million. It was initiated by Fondaction in partnership with the Quebec government, through its agency Recyc-Québec, as well as the City of Montreal. Fondaction is an independent labour-sponsored fund created in 1995 at the initiative of a Quebec union federation and enabled by a special provincial law. The fund’s constitution requires investment in Quebec SMEs with a focus on sustainable development; cooperatives and other organization forms conducive to worker participation are in the intervention focus of the fund (Fondaction, 2021b).

Figure 20.3

Timeline of the points of convergence of the policies in circular economy and social economy

Note: Employment Integration came into effect in the 1980s. There is no specific year (Fontaine & Richard, 1997).

254  Handbook on social innovation and social policy

Figure 20.4

Points of convergence in social economy and circular economy policies repertory

Notes: The figure demonstrates points of convergence between explicit social economy policies and explicit circular economy policies in grey, and explicit social economy policies and implicit circular economy policies in white. Policies with solid borders indicate the municipal level, policies with dotted borders the provincial level, and dashed borders the federal level. MELCC = Ministry of Environment and Fight against Climate Change; MDDELCC = Ministry of Sustainable Development, of Environment and Fight against Climate Change; MEI = Ministry of Economy and Innovation; ESDC = Department of Employment and Social Development Canada; AAFC = Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.

An exploration of circular economy and social economy policy convergence in Quebec  255

256  Handbook on social innovation and social policy The Governmental Action Plan in Social Economy 2020–2025 defines the social economy enterprises as important actors in the socio-economic vitality of Quebec and promotes explicitly the circular economy. Social economy organizations are singled out in recognition of their ability to respond sustainably to individual and community needs. For example, the social enterprise Recyclage Vanier has facilitated the employment integration of 1,375 people and has produced more than 65,000 tons of recycled paper since its creation in 1984 (MEI, 2020b). At the municipal level, the Acting Now to Prepare Recovery Plan and the Climate Plan 2020–2030 (previously the Sustainable Montréal 2016–2020) mention the circular economy and the social economy. In the first plan, social economy enterprises are seen as key players in recovery. The plan describes, for instance, the need to support the development of projects addressing the challenges of the ecological transition and social inclusion, and to reinforce support for social economy businesses (City of Montreal, 2021). The Social Economy Challenge, which is part of that plan, explicitly represents circular economy projects and provides financing exclusively to non-profit social economy organizations or community organizations. The Climate Plan 2020–2030 also aims to develop a charter to connect stakeholders for the development of the City of Montreal and to encourage them to innovate in the development of living environments. This includes the social and circular economy, mobility, energy, social inclusion, urban agriculture and greening, management of residual materials, etc. (City of Montreal, 2020).

DISCUSSION Convergence: A Work in Progress Our analysis points to an initial convergence between the circular economy and social economy policy via the “downstream” entry of social enterprise in residual waste management. More recently, we see the emergence of areas of convergence at all levels of government, particularly at the municipal and provincial levels. The City of Montreal continues to expand domains of convergence, already emerging in its sustainable development plans (up to 2020), through the Climate Plan 2020–2030, the Action Now to Prepare Recovery plan, and programmes such as the Social Economy Challenge. Also at the provincial level, programmes such as the Ecoleader Fund and the new PAGES action plan support social economy enterprises across upstream and downstream circular economy strategies. The Circular Economy Fund, moreover, shows collaboration between the two levels enabled by an “older” innovation of the Quebec social economy, the Fondaction. In general terms, increased synergies between the circular economy and social economy benefit from the recent increase in circular economy policies, and the important role of cities as centres of circular economy experimentation (CCA, 2021). It is too early to tell whether the more recent programmes will firmly establish social enterprises in relation also to more upstream circular economy strategies. In the background, such convergence was supported by the inclusion of social economy actors in the consultation process that established Quebec’s definition and circular economy and strategies (Jagou, 2021). However, “convergence” here is used in a modest way, indicating a “coming together”. That is, while convergences are found, we could not find evidence for a coordinated circular economy and social economy policy strategy. Convergence therefore also includes tension and

An exploration of circular economy and social economy policy convergence in Quebec  257 contestation, and these can be expected to increase with new policies focusing on the circular economy only. For example, there is well-known concern with the efficiency and effectiveness of EPR. The EPR might counter the objectives of the waste hierarchy of the 4Rs (Reduction, Reuse, Recycling, Recovery), if financing and incentives yield a focus on recycling and recovery before reduction and reuse. Bill 65, an Act to amend the Environment Quality Act with respect to deposits and selective collection (i.e., the collection of household waste pre-sorted by users or producers, such as glass and paper), in part represents this issue. Aiming at more control of producers over the recycling and recovery process, and the creation of a designated management organization for this, the impact of the Bill on social economy enterprises in recycling and refurbishing remains to be seen. There is a need for public discussion of the intersection between the social and circular economies with respect to such critical policies. Policies and Circular Economy Discourses Following from the last critical point, this section considers the cognitive frames that guide the interpretation and legitimation of circular economy policies in the Quebec case. Calisto Friant et al. (2020, p. 11) distinguish four circular economy discourses: 1. Fortress circular economy aims at resource security and earth-system stability, drawing on capitalism along with a top-down implemented, national pursuit of migration controls and resource security policies. 2. Technocentric circular economy aims at sustainable human progress, also drawing on capitalism but with an emphasis on technological innovation as a driver for decoupling economy and environmental resource and sink requirements. In other words, it tries to foster economic development without an increase in resource extraction, greenhouse gas emissions and other pollution. 3. Reformist circular society aims at economic prosperity and human well-being within planetary boundaries but focuses on reform of capitalism and technology that enables social innovation. 4. Transformational circular society aims at conviviality and frugal abundance achieved via local production and transcending capitalism. Revisiting our policy results with these circular economy discourses, we find evidence of reformism at the municipal level with some policies (such as Climate Plan 2020–2030 and the Acting Now Recovery Plan) explicitly targeting social economy actors for economic and social well-being within planetary boundaries. This is also supported via federal programmes such as the Green Municipal Fund as well as more recent partnerships with the province (Circular Economy Fund). We also find evidence for reformism at the provincial level, notably via the Environmental Quality Act and its subsequent policies and their explicit recognition of the social economy. Reformism is also in evidence in the Sustainable Development Act and its pursuit of “social equity and solidarity”, though mainly with a focus on public administration. Finally, the Quebec definition of circular economy (as introduced above) indicates a reformist discourse with its focus on the well-being of individuals and communities. It is supported by the Quebec social economy tradition that recognizes social economy intermediaries in explicit and implicit circular economy policies and established actors such as Fondaction that now play a role in

258  Handbook on social innovation and social policy creating new circular economy programmes, such as the Circular Economy Fund, based on its mandate to support sustainable development and worker participation in Quebec. In addition, much of the provincial policies also exhibit a spirit of technocentric circular economy, notably via the emphasis on EPR in the Environmental Quality Act, as well as the more recent focus on “green economy” in action plans (e.g., Quebec Residual Materials Management Policies), funds (e.g., Electrification and Climate Change Fund), and the Plan for a Green Economy 2030. At the federal level, we identify an emphasis on the technocentric circular economy, notably via various funding schemes (e.g., Clean Growth Fund, Food Waste Reduction Challenge, Low Carbon Economy Fund, Low Carbon Economy Challenge). There is some support for the social economy in the Low Carbon Economy Challenge (but much less than for other activities), and the Food Waste Reduction Challenge is open for social economy organizations, although in practice it seems to attract business start-ups. We find little evidence for either the fortress circular economy or the transformation circular economy across these policies and levels. In our interpretation, the main emphasis is on technology, driven by a green economy focus. However, notably at the municipal level and also via the Environmental Quality Act on the provincial level, there are opportunities for social economy actors, supported in turn by Quebec’s social economy tradition and its intermediaries. Such policies indicate a support for a reformist, mixed economy with private and social enterprise, but fall short of a transformational discourse changing the private sector as such. Moreover, the focus on provincial-level policies underscores the importance of “territory”, not in the fortress sense but rather as relating to the changes needed in land use (such as decontamination and pollution reduction), which objectively are important across all discourses, although they might resonate especially with the emphasis on territory as community in reformist and transformational discourses. Social Innovation (Policy) Policies depend not only on cognitive frames but also on actors and social networks that implement policies (one way or the other) and the push for change in policies. In this respect, our case points to the importance of intermediaries for the development of policies at the intersection of circular economy and social economy. The Chantier de l’économie sociale and the Conseil québécois de la coopération et de la mutualité participate in the development of relevant policies (such as PAGES), and they offer support services to organizations introducing circular economy in their practices. The thinking about the circular economy – as a security issue, as a technological innovation challenge, as an opportunity for reform, or as part of a transformation of the economy as such – in these intermediaries not only plays a role in the development of the circular economy discourse, definitions, and strategies, but also influences the diffusion, adaption, and implementation of policies and programmes. Moreover, we have seen that a focus on sustainability and work participation gives rise to actors, such as the Fondaction; these in turn create new funding mechanisms for the circular economy that are sensitive to social economy actors. Paraphrasing a distinction from social innovation policy research (Nicholls & Edmiston, 2019), we can distinguish between (1) policy promoting initiatives at the intersection of social economy and circular economy, and (2) policies as social innovation. The former policies can help to better recognize organizational challenges and needs, and put an emphasis on

An exploration of circular economy and social economy policy convergence in Quebec  259 changing practices rather than “just” technologies. As our discourse analysis shows, such policies remain frequently framed within green economy discourse, favouring a focus on technology-enabled change in consumption rather than a focus on democratic organization and critique of capitalism. By contrast, policies as social innovation denote policy entrepreneurship. The Quebec case suggests that a key area of such policy entrepreneurship is the role and voice of social economy actors and intermediaries in policy-making. Circular Economy and Indigenous Peoples Another important area of policy as social innovation is due to the history of exclusion of First Nations, Métis, and Inuit populations from democratic decision-making. In recognition of their rights to self-determination, this requires government to recognize past and ongoing wrongs, while supporting urgently required sustainability policies. An example from Inuit policy-making illustrates this point. Circular economy principles, such as sustainable use of renewable resources and minimal to zero waste, resonate with Inuit culture (Ocean North, 2021). The National Inuit Climate Change Strategy, initiated in 2019 by the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK, 2019), the national representative organization for Inuit in Canada, calls inter alia to “advance Inuit capacity and knowledge in climate decision-making.” The strategy expresses a willingness to work collaboratively with Canadian and international bodies and institutions to address climate impacts. According to the ITK, a successful partnership on this topic will require a shared understanding of Inuit governance and decision-making and the principles and expectations Inuit view as fundamental and significant for collaborations (ITK, 2019). On this basis, important topics of circular economy can be promoted, such as the reduction of (energy) waste and a focus on repair and maintenance of homes and infrastructures highlighted in the strategy. This point is further explored in the Inuit Nunangat Food Security Strategy (ITK, 2021), the first Inuit Strategy to tackle access barriers to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food based on an Inuit vision of values, well-being, and food sovereignty. The strategy highlights inter alia the challenge of food waste, and in relation to this, the need to create and repair local infrastructure for harvesting and storing food. It insists on federal, territorial, and provincial governments working together with the Inuit. Collaboration among actors is a familiar opportunity and challenge of social innovation (Ziegler, 2017). Policy as social innovation in our case shows the importance of thinking and studying this challenge in the future also as a matter of collaboration between multi-level nation states and indigenous populations.

CONCLUSION Our Quebec case study has identified some convergence (in a modest sense) between circular economy and social economy policy. This occurs first with a downstream focus on the synergies between residual waste management and social economy enterprises, and then more recently with the emergence of more full-blown circular economy programmes and funds at all levels of government. However, it is too early to tell whether this more recent wave of interest will more firmly and fully integrate circular economy and social economy policies. There is currently no coordination nor integration of these policies and given the material requirements of achieving a circular economy that reduces resource extraction and waste

260  Handbook on social innovation and social policy production in absolute terms, tensions, controversies, and conflicts are to be expected. In this light, research conducted both at universities and circular economy and social economy intermediaries, has an important role to play in “connecting the dots”, and identifying conflicts, tensions, and synergies early on. Interpreting these convergence possibilities in terms of discourses, our analysis suggests some evidence for the inclusion of social economy actors in the so-called technocentric circular society: social enterprises are given some place in pre-specified technical programmes (such as waste management), and discover their niche, such as labour-intensive recycling with work-insertion social enterprises. There is also evidence of a reformist discourse. It is due to the relatively recent interest of social economy intermediaries in understanding and promoting circular economy. They add a focus on social innovation to promote socio-economic change (Bouchard, 2013), and for this link the discussion of the circular economy to questions of organizational governance, networks between organizations, and how they interact on a territory and its citizens and communities. As partners in circular economy policy-making, they contribute to policy as social innovation. There are many opportunities to further develop the topics discussed here. First, our results for Quebec could be compared with those of other provinces as well as internationally, and policy discourse could also be compared with subsequent budgets and actions. As noted, Quebec is recognized as a circular economy policy leader, but the circularity rate is low. Second, there is a different but also important sense of the implicit–explicit distinction from that used here: arguably local social economy has long been “circular” in an implicit sense: avoiding costly resource use, designing for lasting and shared use, and reducing waste are driven by necessity in less materially affluent households, enterprises, and communities, even without any explicit talk of circular economy strategies. Consider, for an example, water provision by a municipal waterworks or a cooperative run by citizens that uses a regenerating natural capital for local economic and social uses. It would be interesting to explore how the explicit policies suggested here affect such implicit practices. Third, the transformative circular economy discourse (in the sense introduced above) is present in alternative communities and niches, and in this sense arguably tends to receive less focus in a chapter that focuses on policies. However, policy alternatives complementing and changing those considered here would be an interesting possibility for further research. A transformative impact might also result from the dialogue with indigenous peoples. Circular economy resonates with indigenous traditions of living with the land (CCA, 2021) and, even if marginalized, embody alternative practices that coexist on the “territory” discussed here.

NOTE 1. We could not find statistics on this relation. A research project of the TIESS (Territoires innovants en économie sociale et solidaire) singled out 26 social economy organizations perceived as potentially transformative at the social economy – circular economy intersection. In total, 50% of these sample organizations used employment integration (Ziegler et al., 2021).

An exploration of circular economy and social economy policy convergence in Quebec  261

REFERENCES Arsenault, G. (2018) L'économie sociale au Québec: une perspective politique. Collection “Politeia”. Quebec: Presses de l’université du Québec. Baril, J. (2018) “Guide citoyen du droit québécois de l’environnement”, Ecosociété, Montreal. Available at: https://​ecosociete​.org/​livres/​guide​-citoyen​-environnement (accessed 30 July 2022). Beauschesne, N., Côté, M., Gauthier, I., Philibert, C., & Planchenault, M. (2016) Montréal Durable 2016–2020: Ensemble pour une metropole durable. City of Montreal. Available at: https://​portail​-m4s​ .s3​.montreal​.ca/​pdf/​plan​_montreal​_durable​_2016​_2020​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Beckert, J. (2010) “How do fields change? The interrelations of institutions, networks, and cognition in the dynamics of markets”, Organization Studies, 31(5), 605–627. doi: https://​doi​.org/​10​.1177/​ 0170840610372184 Bouchard, M. J. (2013) Innovation and the Social Economy: The Quebec Experience. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Calisto Friant, M., Vermeulen, W. J., & Salomone, R. (2020) “A typology of circular economy discourses: Navigating the diverse visions of a contested paradigm”, Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 161. doi: https://​doi​.org/​10​.1016/​j​.resconrec​.2020​.104917 Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) (2009) Canada-wide Action Plan for Extended Producer Responsibility. Available at: https://​ccme​.ca/​en/​res/​cap​-epr​_e​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) (2018) Strategy on Zero Plastic Waste. Available at: https://​ccme​.ca/​en/​res/​strate​gyonzeropl​asticwaste​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). CELC & GLOBE (Circular Economy Leadership Coalition) (2020) Advancing a Circular Economy in Canada: Tackling the Barriers Sector by Sector to Move the Dial. Ottawa, ON: CELC. Chantier de l’Économie Sociale (2019) Économie sociale et économie circulaire: freins & leviers. Available at: https://​chantier​.qc​.ca/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2019/​05/​%C3​%89conomieSociale​_​%C3​ %89conomieCirculaire​_FreinsLeviers​_vf​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Chiasson, E. (2021) “Recy-Québec accorde un soutien de 3,3 M$ à des projets d’économie circulaire”. Available at https://​www​.quebeccirculaire​.org/​articles/​h/​recyc​-quebec​-accorde​-un​-soutien​-de​-3​-3​-m​ -a​-des​-projets​-d​-economie​-circulaire​.html (accessed 30 July 2022). City of Montreal (2020) Plan climat Montréal: objectif carboneutralité d’ici 2050. Available at: https://​ portail​-m4s​.s3​.montreal​.ca/​pdf/​plan​_climat​_20​-12​-09​-sommaire​-simple​-vf​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). City of Montreal (2021) Agir Maintenant pour Préparer la Relance: Mesure de soutien économique 2021. Available at: https://​portail​-m4s​.s3​.montreal​.ca/​pdf/​ville​_montreal​_plan​_relance​_phase​_2​ _2020​_reduit​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Council of Canadian Academies (CCA) (2021) Turning Point. The Expert Panel on the Circular Economy in Canada, Ottawa. Available at: https://​cca​-reports​.ca/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2021/​11/​ Turning​-Point​_digital​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Eco Entreprises Québec (2021) Curbside Recycling Modernization. Available at: https://​www​.eeq​.ca/​en/​ modernization/​#:​~:​text​=​Companies​%20are​%20at​%20the​%20heart​,one​%20to​%20an​%20integrated​ %20one (accessed 30 July 2022). EDDEC (2021) Économie circulaire – Stratégies de circularité. Institut EDDEC. Available at: https://​ www​.quebeccirculaire​.org/​static/​strategies​-de​-circularite​.html (accessed 30 July 2022). Federation of Canadian Municipalities (2021) Green Municipal Fund. Available at: https://​www​.fcm​.ca/​ en/​programs/​green​-municipal​-fund (accessed 30 July 2022). Fondaction (2021a) Fondaction lance le Fonds économie circulaire avec ses partenaires RECYC-QUÉBEC et la Ville de Montréal. Available at: https://​www​.fondaction​.com/​nouvelles/​ lancement​-fonds​-economie​-circulaire/​ (accessed 30 July 2022). Fondaction (2021b) Mission. Available at: https://​www​.fondaction​.com/​mission​.php​?​_​_cf​ _chl​_managed​_tk​_​_​=​PClpqNYqsSygOVM8​.IsKznRCYwWcHBA​_7aO1pWRWRX0​-1642773224​ -0​-gaNycGzNCdE (accessed 30 July 2022). Fonds Ecoleader (2021) Financement du Fonds Ecoleader. Available at: https://​www​.fondsecoleader​.ca/​ (accessed 30 July 2022).

262  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Fontaine, A., & Richard, J. M. (1997) Le travail de rue: de l’oral à l’écrit. Refuge La Piaule du Centre du Québec Drummondville. Available at: http://​www​.pactderue​.org/​_upload/​pptgjc​_bo1iug​_Oral​_​%C3​ %89crit​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Institut de la Statistique du Québec (ISQ) (2019) L’économie Sociale au Québec: Portrait Statistique 2016. Government of Quebec. Available at: https://​statistique​.quebec​.ca/​fr/​fichier/​economie​-sociale​ -au​-quebec​-portrait​-statistique​-2016​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) (2019) National Inuit Climate Change Strategy. Available at: https://​ www​.itk​.ca/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2019/​06/​ITK​_Climate​-Change​-Strategy​_English​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) (2021) Inuit Nunangat Food Security Strategy. Available at: https://​ www​.itk​.ca/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2021/​07/​ITK​_Inuit​-Nunangat​-Food​-Security​-Strategy​_English​.pdf (accessed 22 November 2023). IPBES (Intergovernmental Panel for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services) (2019) Summary for Policymakers of the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. Bonn: IPBES. Jagou, S. (2021) Transitioning to a Circular Economy: Learning from the Quebec Experience 2014–2020. Quebec: Québec Circulaire & Smart Prosperity Institute. Available at: https://​www​ .quebeccirculaire​.org/​data/​sources/​users/​5777/​20210519201748​-quebec​-circul​airecerepo​rtfinalmay​ 192021tiny​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Lévesque, B. (2002) “Les entreprises d’économie sociale, plus porteuses d’innovation sociale: Quelques éléments de problématique”, Économie et solidarités, 37(2), 13–48. Lévesque, B., & Peticlerc, M. (2008) “L’économie sociale au Québec à travers les crises structurelles et les grandes transformations (1850–2008)”, Économie et solidarités, 39(2), 14–37. Meadowcroft, J. (2016) “Let’s Get This Transition Moving!”, Canadian Public Policy, 42(S1), S10–S17. doi: https://​doi​.org/​10​.3138/​cpp​.2015​-028. Ministère de l’Économie et de l’Innovation (MEI) (2020a) Plan d’Action de Développement Durable 2020–2022. Government of Quebec. Available at: https://​cdn​-contenu​.quebec​.ca/​cdn​-contenu/​adm/​ min/​economie/​publications​-adm/​plans​-action/​PL​_plan​_action​_developpement​_durable​_MEI​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Ministère de l’Économie et de l’Innovation (MEI) (2020b) Plan d’Action Gouvernemental en Économie Sociale 2020–2025: La force du collectif. Government of Quebec. Available at: https://​chantier​.qc​.ca/​ wp​-content/​uploads/​2019/​05/​PL​_plan​_action​_economie​_sociale​_MEI​_2020​-2025​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Ministère de l’Économie et de l’Innovation (MEI) (2021) Social Economy Act. Government of Quebec. Available at: http://​legisquebec​.gouv​.qc​.ca/​en/​document/​cs/​E​-1​.1​.1 (accessed 30 July 2022). Ministère de l’Énergie et des Ressources Naturelles (MERN) (2020) The Québec Plan for the Development of Critical and Strategic Minerals 2020–2025. Government of Quebec. Available at: https://​cdn​-contenu​.quebec​.ca/​cdn​-contenu/​ressources​-naturelles/​Documents/​PL​_resume​_critical​ _strategic​_minerals​.pdf​?1604003084 (accessed 30 July 2022). Ministère de l’Environnement et de la Lutte contre les Changements Climatiques (MELCC) (2020a) Le rôle des acteurs de l’économie sociale dans la consigne élargie et la collecte sélective. Government of Quebec. Available at: https://​chantier​.qc​.ca/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2019/​05/​M​%C3​%A9moire​-PL65​ -Chantier​-de​-l​%C3​%A9conomie​-sociale​-1​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Ministère de l’Environnement et de la Lutte contre les Changements Climatiques (MELCC) (2020b) Plan pour économie verte 2030 – Politique cadre d’électrification et de lutte contre les changements climatiques. Government of Quebec. Available at: https://​cdn​-contenu​.quebec​.ca/​cdn​-contenu/​adm/​ min/​environnement/​publications​-adm/​plan​-economie​-verte/​plan​-economie​-verte​-2030​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Ministère de l’Environnement et de la Lutte contre les Changements Climatiques (MELCC) (2021a) Environment Quality Act. Government of Quebec. Available at: http://​legisquebec​.gouv​.qc​.ca/​en/​ document/​cs/​Q​-2​%20/​ (accessed 30 July 2022). Ministère de l’Environnement et de la Lutte contre les Changements Climatiques (MELCC) (2021b) Environment Quality Act, Québec Residual Materials Management Policy. Government of Quebec. Available at: https://​www​.environnement​.gouv​.qc​.ca/​matieres/​pgmr/​presentation​_en​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022).

An exploration of circular economy and social economy policy convergence in Quebec  263 Ministère du Développement durable, de l’Environnement et de la Lutte contre les changements climatiques (MDDELCC) (2015) Stratégie gouvernementale de développement durable 2015–2020. Government of Quebec. Available at: https://​cdn​-contenu​.quebec​.ca/​cdn​-contenu/​adm/​min/​ environnement/​publications​-adm/​developpement​-durable/​strategie​-dd​-2015​-2020​.pdf​?1582816783 (accessed 30 July 2022). National Assembly of Quebec (2021) Bill 65 – An Act to amend mainly the Environment Quality Act with respect to deposits and selective collection. Government of Quebec. Available at: http://​www2​ .​publicatio​nsduquebec​.gouv​.qc​.ca/​dynamicSearch/​telecharge​.php​?type​=​5​&​file​=​2021C5A​.PDF (accessed 30 July 2022). Nicholls, A., & Edmiston, D. (2019) “Social innovation policy in the European Union”, in A. Nicholls & R. Ziegler (eds), Creating Economic Space for Social Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 268–299. Ocean North (2021) Towards a Waste-Free Arctic. Available at: https://​www​.oceansnorth​.org/​wp​ -content/​uploads/​2021/​03/​Towards​-a​-Waste​-Free​-Arctic​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Recyc-Québec (2019) Politique québécoise de gestion des matières résiduelles: Plan d’action 2019–2024. Available at: https://​www​.recyc​-quebec​.gouv​.qc​.ca/​sites/​default/​files/​documents/​plan​ -action​-2019​-2024​-pqgmr​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Sauvé, S., Normandin, D., & McDonald, M. (2016) Économie circulaire – Une transition incontournable. Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur le cycle de vie des produits, procédés et services. Montreal: Les presses de l’Université de Montréal. Teigiero, S., Solar-Pelletier, L., Bernard, S., Joanis, M., & Normandin, D. (2018) Circular Economy in Quebec: Economic Opportunities and Impacts (English version). Polytechnique Montreal. Available at: https://​www​.cpq​.qc​.ca/​workspace/​uploads/​files/​circular​-economy​-in​-quebec​-study​.pdf (accessed 30 July 2022). Wright, E. O. (2010) Envisioning Real Utopias. London: Verso. Ziegler, R. (2017) “Social Innovation as a collaborative concept”, Innovation, 30(4), 388–405. https://​doi​ .org/​10​.1080/​13511610​.2017​.1348935 Ziegler, R., Bellemare, M., Behrang, K., Poirier, C., & Raufflet, E. (2021) “Who owns the circular economy? An exploration of the intersection of social economy and circular economy in Quebec”, in E. Martinetti-Chiappero (ed.), Social Justice in a Global Society: Towards New Forms of Economic Democracy for a Sustainable Development. Milan: Feltrinelli, pp. 291–314.

21. Alternative platforms? On the dilemmas of policy and innovation in digital infrastructure Richard Pfeilstetter1

INTRODUCTION “Alternatives to big tech”: that was the topic my students in Spain chose to work on in the undergraduate seminar on Anthropology of Development that I taught at the University of Seville in 2020. What was problematic about using Apple iOS, the Google search engine or WhatsApp messaging was not clear to everyone when we started our discussion. But the e-commerce boom had been on everyone’s minds after many months of lockdown. Local shops and restaurants were closing while a few online retailers went from being big to massive. Thus, when someone found that a small rural community outside Seville had created an “alternative to Amazon”, we were all excited. We thought we had found our development project to learn from and engage with collaboratively throughout the rest of the semester. But after the first interviews and background research, disillusionment grew. To what extent was using a Facebook site for promoting local shops innovative? Why did the project compare itself with Amazon when posting orders directly or sending products anywhere beyond the municipality was not possible? Given the considerable local media coverage of the project and its municipality-driven character, was the hype more a reflection of local partisan politics than a true community development project? My classroom experience illustrates three particular issues of social innovation and social policy in relation to digital platforms that I address in this chapter. How and why do social problems, in this case concerns about platform capitalism or “techlash”, enter the social arena? What makes certain responses to this problem “innovative”? Finally, what appropriate analytic measures may be applied to assess the effectiveness of these attempted changes? There is rising interest among regulators, activists and business in alternatives to mainstream tech platforms. The outbreak of the global pandemic intensified the growth of large platforms. The stock values of Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft (GAFAM) hit new records. Citizens largely depend upon the basic infrastructures these corporations provide, like information, consumption and communication. While in the early years of big tech, admiration was the most common reaction, more recently European citizens and governments in particular feel increasingly uncomfortable with the concentrations of power and money (that is, data), in the hands of the big five. Platform monopolies are more and more viewed as a social problem. Nevertheless, some of the effects of this monopoly are under closer observation than others. For example, in Spain the working conditions of food deliverers (riders) are now firmly on the agendas of politicians, the media and the courts, while conditions of other e-commerce workers, for example in warehouses or retail, receive less attention. Second, platformization, or the increased channelling of internet traffic through a handful of digital ecosystems gradually imposing their standards onto every wired operation, has produced a serious of reactions from civil society, administrations and market actors. In the case 264

On the dilemmas of policy and innovation in digital infrastructure  265 of the riders, examples are employee-owned cooperatives such as Mensakas in Barcelona and the 2021 “rider law” passed by the Spanish left-wing coalition government. This law is aimed at protecting the labour rights of deliverers, especially by putting their status as self-employed into question and forcing businesses to create permanent positions. The extent to which such developments might be regarded as innovative is a central concern of the scholarship on alternative organizations discussed in this chapter. I will argue that the answer largely depends on how the digital platform is defined, and I put forward a reading of core digital platforms as infrastructures, opposed to those still operating under certain market logic. Third, measuring the effectiveness or impact of any of these developments depends on our epistemological premises. If platforms are indeed equivalent to earlier infrastructure, such as railroads or power-grids, then innovation-driven solutions to the social issues produced by them face serious limitations. Instead of bottom-up solutions, I will suggest that top-down regulation has a more promising future. Restoring or overcoming the market are two potential premises from which legislation might improve digital social welfare and justice, even if antitrust law or private public service regulation may not initially be considered social policies. I will discuss both issues, relating them to the local Amazon project from Andalusia and the 2022 EU Digital Markets Act. Understanding social policy and innovation in the field of digital platforms needs to consider expertise from several areas of research, because there are political, technical, economic and cultural implications to the platformization of society (Poell, Nieborg and van Dijck 2019). Among others, in this chapter I discuss research in philosophy (Ferretti 2020; Reijers and Ossewaarde 2018), geography (Lynch 2020, 2021), sociology (Sandoval 2020), political science (Micheli et al. 2020), business studies (Ridley-Duff and Bull 2021) and software development (Diniz et al. 2021). As an anthropologist and social worker, I regard it as important to contrast these considerations with the everyday experiences of ordinary people, places and organizations, without necessarily claiming to present ethnographic data or collaborative social interventions. Still, by considering the viewpoints of activists, founders, students, academics and officials in relation to a local Amazon project in southern Spain, I aim to add a culturally grounded local perspective to the global issues discussed. Given the speed of technological change and the impact of the recent Covid pandemic, I focus on papers published recently, many in the two years before the time of writing. Regarding the geopolitical focus of my contribution, most of my observations are concerned with European reactions – both small and large – to the ongoing expansion of US-based platforms. I therefore do not account for the increasing importance of Chinese platforms, state-sponsored or criminal hacking, or the overall influence of new and old global powers in the mobile internet devices dominating at the global margins (Donner and Locke 2019), all of which is beyond the scope of this chapter.

THE PLATFORM INFRASTRUCTURE In this section I want to examine two related ways of understanding (digital) platforms. These are, first, the platform as a limited set of services evolving into a transnational infrastructure; and second, the platform as a metaphor nurturing new imaginations of society and the market writ large. Both understandings are crucial for grasping platformization or datafication – that is, an ever-increasing number of devices using sensors to track our behaviour, often without our knowledge – as emergent social issues. Following Srnicek, I favour a definition of plat-

266  Handbook on social innovation and social policy forms as infrastructures mediating between user groups (2017: 48). Such a definition posits the importance of scale or power over that of the more technical considerations favoured by most economists, for example in the definition as two-sided (buyer–seller) markets (Poell, Nieborg and van Dijck 2019). Econometric models of platform performance tend to downplay the extent to which users at both ends of the platform, those who offer and those who consume, are actually locked in (Rys and Sobolewski 2020: 21). In contrast, I suggest that public versus private ownership or theoretical assumptions about how markets operate are less relevant than questions about who has the power to dictate the rules that govern the online world today. But differently to gatekeepers or arbitrators (see below), infrastructure focuses on the system, not its actors. It is their dominant or systemic position that characterizes platforms. As Hoeyer argues, all “public data” are today outsourced, run or maintained by private businesses, transforming this very distinction largely into a tool for organizations to obtain legitimacy, but with little practical implications (2020: 4). As far as digital platforms are imagined as “private” and infrastructures as “public”, this definition might help to untangle some of the misleading market rhetoric surrounding the digital infrastructures of today’s tech world. If this is so, several social problems arise as a consequence. Just like non-digital infrastructures, platforms create both possibilities for and limits to interaction. For instance, in many cities and countries, transportation infrastructure promotes private transport over public, just like discriminatory language and idealized body images on social media are much likelier to spread than polite discussions and real-body representations. Note that in these examples the users choose (within a limited set of possibilities), but algorithms reward, punish and promote certain choices, which then become dominant and again work upon limiting the space for future choices. Thus, once a platform bundles a critical mass of users, network effects lead to a monopoly position making any radical alternative for economic, social or cultural reasons unfeasible. For instance, not using WhatsApp in Spain cuts you off from the bulk of ordinary private or professional communication. Such concentration of power and subsequent lack of control or competition opens the door for abuses. Gamification of apps makes people addictive to their devices (Ferretti 2020). Nudging techniques lead consumers to make bad choices (Micheli et al. 2020). Algorithm bias mistakes majority positions as the “truth” (Fejerskov 2021). And Datafication propels the unlimited tracking of our everyday behaviour by third parties (Poell, Nieborg and van Dijck 2019). The extent to which such developments are perceived (or not) as social problems – and thus enter the stage of policy or innovative interventions – is a question of digital literacy (knowledge) and technological culture (values). For instance, dystopian techlash novels such as Egger’s The Circle (Sommer 2017) or how optimistic–rational tech workers are reacting to outside critique (Su, Lazar and Irani 2021) structure the ways in which problems are perceived and socially processed. The idealistic opposition to and the pragmatic assumption of monopoly platforms are thus two sides of the same coin. For example, responses from a representative sample of 762 navigation app users in Poland suggest a high level of concern with unauthorized use of location data by third parties (Sobolewski 2021). Simultaneously, 70% of the respondents reported that they gave explicit consent or were unaware of the location data settings of their app (Sobolewski 2021: 7). This suggests that at the emotional level, the disenchantment with selling our private lives to strangers is in full swing, while at the level of daily routines, not having control over private data is assumed as an unavoidable feature of contemporary life. Following this reasoning, anthropologists have theorized about the platform as a new cultural imaginary, replacing the free market, neoliberalism or capitalism as templates

On the dilemmas of policy and innovation in digital infrastructure  267 for making sense of the contemporary economy (Guyer 2016: 112). While infrastructures and markets convey the two complementary ideas about state- and business-sustained material environments – the railroad, the stock market – platforms insinuate a loose ground for interaction, where components and people are selectively aggregated and disaggregated. I do not conceive the platform metaphor as a more accurate concept when compared to “neoliberalism” – as Guyer (2016) suggests – nor as a less moralizing one when compared to the “sharing economy”, as Ferretti (2020) argues. What has concerned me in this section are the terms in which the platform has become to be conceived of as a social problem. Once a problem is raised, experiments with potential remedies start to appear.

DELINEATING THE ALTERNATIVE SPACE This section examines how social innovation and policing of platforms can be differentiated from business or politics as usual. That means exploring ways to analytically distinguish between apparent and genuine alternatives. The language used to describe and the strategies to articulate alternatives are discussed in the literature covered in this section. The key terms range from digital community platforms (Diniz et al. 2021), platform co-operativism (Scholz 2016), digital commoning (Kostakis 2018), technological sovereignty (Lynch 2020), data governance (Micheli et al. 2020) or common pool resource institutions (Ridley-Duff and Bull 2021). Authors focus on different types of intervenors, such as social movements (Lynch 2020), state regulators (Ferretti 2020), social businesses (Scholz 2016) or public–private partners (Micheli et al. 2020). The sectors discussed (often through case studies of varying degrees of depth) are app stores (Poell, Nieborg and van Dijck 2019), hospitality (Kostakis 2018), mobility (Ferretti 2020), wireless networks (Lynch 2021), cryptocurrencies (Diniz et al. 2021), music streaming (Sandoval 2020), software development (Ridley-Duff and Bull 2021), to name but a few. What is common to all these experiences is that they use egalitarian adjectives to describe alternatives, such as community, cooperative, solidarity, pooling, sharing, peer-to-peer, etc. Given the conceptual, organizational and sectorial complexity of the platform’s “alternative scene”, commentators (and the practitioners they describe) often engage in boundary work (who is and who is not part of the alternative club?). Other models are critiqued as less efficient, not radical enough, or incoherent. For example, co-operativism is portrayed as capitalist co-optation, because it nudges social movements into market-oriented activities (Sandoval 2020). Power imbalances are seen to undermine public–private “partnerships” because dominant corporation impose their agenda onto the projects (Micheli et al. 2020: 7, 10). State regulation of private companies faces legal–ethical dilemmas in liberal market societies because the problem – corporate dominance over people – is solved by adding a new problem, state dominance over people (Ferretti 2020). In all three cases scholars argue that the supposed “alternatives” – cooperatives, public–private cooperation, legislation – are not so alternative at all. I contribute to this debate between “true or false” alternatives by adding some complexity to the definition of social innovation in this field. To do so, I have identified three issues that are largely missing from the literature. First, if innovation in the field of digital infrastructure is conceptualized as alternative to capitalist values of competition and individualism – as many of the authors discussed here do – then a critical discussion of all moral arguments against capitalism is needed. This would include those arguments from the far-right “alt-tech” movement.

268  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Second, it needs to be explained why abandoning the platform as a cultural–technological tool altogether – digital abstinence or detox – is not considered an alternative to big tech. Third, building on my definition of the platform as infrastructure in the previous section, a distinction can be made between overcoming private ownership and restoring market competition. Such a distinction is crucial to account for the limits to social innovation in this field and why it is not surprising that scholars have tended to focus on case studies of platform alternatives in less infrastructural domains, such as hospitality or wireless networks, instead of app stores or e-commerce. One current blind spot of research into platform alternatives is deliberate non-platform interaction. This is largely because platform dependence or abstinence might be seen as a consequence of structural constraints and facilitators. Platforms are endemic. For example, those who use or do not use the internet, online food delivery or WhatsApp, seem to be driven by generational habits, place of residence or employment status. Notions such as digital detox indicate temporary, not sustained, abstinence, and this is a term discussed mainly outside the social sciences in health-related disciplines. Nevertheless, a second buzzword – “techlash” – captures a sense of exhaustion and discontent with forced technology immersion, indicating that many people judge offline interaction as a qualitatively superior type of social interaction. The crucial question here is the extent to which technology itself is perceived as the main cause of the social problems outlined in the previous section, as opposed to locating the discontents in how technology is used. For instance, some think that the technological architecture behind cryptocurrencies is “naturally” in line with the social values underpinning community currencies, including collaboratives and openness, decentralization and non-state regulation (Diniz et al. 2021). While deepening this line of inquiry is beyond the scope of my chapter, I do want to pinpoint the gap in the literature and the potential value of research into the social innovations of deliberately offline communities or organizations. The rise of innovative, new or transformative platforms may not always be a desirable development for everyone, particularly when the flaws of the current state of affairs are not improved or may even be worsened with the supposed remedy. On the one hand, across many of the social sciences, the argument that a market-driven system might sometimes, under certain conditions, foster access to affordable products and services for the least well-off, is not even regarded as a possible line of argument. On the other hand, the fact that Facebook and other social media platforms amplify fake news, hate speech or discrimination, does not mean that these would disappear in a more fragmented social media landscape. The recent political pressure for more legal obligations to moderate content on social media platforms has led to a proliferation of alternative platforms that enable posts of racist thinking more easily (Forbes Magazine 2021). Thus, it is not only liberal or progressive-minded voices that talk about the “tyranny of big tech”, but also Donald Trump and others who have started to create their own parallel platform universe (The Guardian 2021). What can be learned from alternative platforms that we might dislike is that moral reasoning is both constitutive of and problematic to the definition of social innovation. While improvement is the implicit promise of innovation, competing notions over its very substance exist in any given society. Romantic ideas of community and egalitarianism as a supposedly universally valid measurement of the good resonate with concepts such as platform co-operativism, digital commoning, technological sovereignty and peer-to-peer software. In “The Ends of Egalitarianism” (2020), the anthropologists Natalia Buitron and Hans Steinmüller argue that classifying groups as egalitarian, like the hunter–gatherer communities anthropologists used to

On the dilemmas of policy and innovation in digital infrastructure  269 study, paradoxically promotes a hierarchical idea and praxis – the imposition of a unique scale of measurement. Following their line of argument, from an anthropological vantage point it is problematic to presuppose that groups and organizations experimenting with innovations and alternatives to current mainstream platforms have only one common purpose and follow one unitarian principle of equality. With the fundamental act of measuring equality, egalitarianism organically produces its “evil twin” – hierarchy (Buitron and Steinmüller 2020). Given the theoretical limits of egalitarianism and the existence of extremist alt-tech platforms, it is problematic to equate social innovations developed in response to mainstream digital platforms as an ex-ante positive development.

INFRASTRUCTURAL INNOVATIONS? Having identified some blind spots and pitfalls in this field of research, I want to propose how social innovation regarding platform capitalism might be conceptualized. If we follow the definition of digital platforms as infrastructures proposed earlier, then specific platforms – for example, Amazon, Uber, Airbnb – may be viewed as fitting more or less smoothly with that definition. Amazon (or Alibaba) is clearly much more “infrastructural” to e-commerce than Uber to online vehicle hiring or Airbnb to hospitality. Distinguishing between the big five and the rest might be one way of assessing the main relevant difference. Regarding particular fields of activity as having more natural infrastructural tendencies (such as e-advertising, e-commerce, app stores, cloud computing) is another (Poell, Nieborg and van Dijck 2019). This second way of reasoning is more in line with the infrastructure definition, as far as a systems logic works beyond the intentions of the players or the size of a company. For example, messaging apps tend to concentrate users more than music apps, because network effects are stronger for communication than consumption. Using or creating alternatives to Spotify may be expensive, arduous and have disadvantages, but in most countries it is impossible to abandon WhatsApp. Exploring this distinction is important because it reveals that case studies described in the literature as “alternatives” nearly always fall into the less infrastructural category. For instance, community network providers (Lynch 2021) act within a market with a certain, albeit small, possibility for competition, as do ethical music streamers (Sandoval 2020) or free open software developers (Ridley-Duff and Bull 2021). Thus, social innovation operating at the grassroots or market level, is not feasible for the core monopolies of the platform infrastructure, such as operating systems and app stores, advertising or cloud computing. However, there seems to be one exception. Wikipedia is often used as an example of how non-investor-owned platforms can displace and substitute effectively even large and dominant investor-owned corporations (Kostakis 2018; Sandoval 2020). Yet, in my view, it is the network effect that placed this and other organizations in an unbeatable monopoly position. As the winner takes all, it is the first player to reach a critical mass of users and/or suppliers who ends up concentrating all the traffic, independently of the organizational model underpinning the platform. In the case of Wikipedia, Encyclopaedia Britannica and other encyclopaedias came too late. What is new about this problem is that network effects are increasingly responsible for putting organizations into a position of being first in other fields. For instance, web analytics, monitoring users and competitors, led Facebook to buy WhatsApp (The New York Times 2019). This means that if big data analytics and large corporate data-storage platforms

270  Handbook on social innovation and social policy would have existed in the early days of Wikipedia, these would probably have noticed or predicted first the exponential growth of the new platform and would have effectively undermined, copied or bought this competitor. How can we analytically frame civil society or market-driven innovations in the field of digital platforms? Following the infrastructural line of argument discussed in this chapter, it is hard to see grassroots approaches as serious alternatives in the core areas of contemporary platform capitalism. Thus, future research in this field needs to be much more explicit about the difference between markets and quasi-governmental monopoly infrastructures (Poell, Nieborg van Dijck 2019). This does not mean that the wide field of social experimentation with alternative forms of running the digital economy is futile or counterproductive, channelling resistance into the false direction. But perhaps instead of excessive enthusiasm with digital commoning and platform co-operativism (Reijers and Ossewaarde 2018; Sandoval 2020), or more broadly with the entrepreneurial ability of today’s digital youth (Kozorog 2021), scholars should conceive the limits and struggles of these organizations as crucial empirical insights to reveal the necessary structural adjustments to the public and decision makers. In a forthcoming case study of the alternative rider platform Mensakas in Barcelona, Raquel Alquézar shows how political activism and transformative business may often mutually hinge on each other. Viewing platforms as infrastructures or networks makes social activism and policy the more promising way to tackle its social downsides. In the next section, I look at two different political approaches to the social problem of platformization.

PLATFORM POLICY: OVERCOMING OR RESTORING THE MARKET There are two basic logics of digital platform policing. One would aim at changing the property regimes underpinning dominant platforms, and the other would promote alternative organizations. One could say that the first strategy lies in overcoming and the second in restoring platform markets. This distinction is similar to what Ferretti (2020) calls mitigating the negative effects of platforms versus changing the organizations running them. Lina Khan has famously outlined both scenarios in the case of Amazon in the US. She explains how restoring competition through modernizing anti-trust regulations would involve banning platforms from buying competitors and tightening control on predatory pricing (2017: 791–797). Consider, for example, that Google buys a company every week and that cross-subsidization and investor money in a world with overproduction makes growth over profit a core principle of platforms, offering services below cost (Srnicek 2017: 48, 59). Another key issue here is the total lack of data portability, preventing data from being transferred from one platform to another. This is a particular problem for reputational data from suppliers (Ferretti 2020: 70). The second approach – considering current platform giants as public utility providers – would require public control over secure non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure they provide. In Europe, digital infrastructure as a public good would include public and/or user ownership over the data produced (Micheli et al. 2020; Scholz, Kley and Parycek 2020). Innovators pushing such developments include Max Schrems and his NGO None of Your Business, whose complaints against Facebook transferring personal data to the US is putting pressure on lawmakers to comply with existing legal principles.

On the dilemmas of policy and innovation in digital infrastructure  271 Nevertheless, serious platform policing – overcoming or restoring the market – has not yet been implemented. Consider the General Data Protection Regulation of the EU and the practical consequence of the “I do (not) accept” buttons from the infrastructural viewpoint. If the service is indispensable, no personal “I” decisions can be realistic. Infrastructure as metaphor is again illustrative as we do not choose railroads, waterways or streets nor determine their conditions at an individual user level. Collective, “We” decisions are needed here. On the contrary, it might be argued that the pop-up buttons are getting users accustomed to saying yes or signing whatever large corporations put before our noses (later replicated also by offline organizations, such as banks), turning these supposed “decisions” into just another unpleasant and unreflected part of our daily routines. Meanwhile, SMEs face even more legal difficulties to enter an already unfair market, as they struggle to comply with the requirements to build “user-decisions” into their web presentations. However, new lawsuits, anti-trust and competition regulations in the US, China and Europe are on their way (The Economist 2021), such as the EU Digital Service and Market Acts. But instead of overcoming or restoring the market, perhaps the principal aim is to retain control and benefits of European data in Europe for geopolitical considerations (Micheli et al. 2020). Tommaso Valletti, member of an economic expert panel revising the legislative proposal (Cabral et al. 2021), explained in a recent workshop that it falls short of merger regulation and that current anti-trust law has not prohibited one sole (killer) acquisition from tech businesses. Paul Heidhues, part of the same panel, complained that only about 80 people are working on the new regulation for the EU. Meanwhile, according to the European Union’s transparency register, the big five have spent twice as much money on lobbying than the seven principal car manufacturers (El País 2021). Distorting these new regulations as much as possible can be the expected aim of the 19 million Euros invested. The big data, including that of the politicians, courts, academics and officials involved, and the analytics to know how to disrupt political interventions most effectively, remain with the platforms. If traditional market regulation has proven futile, maybe it is time to conceive controlling digital platforms as social policy?

CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS A LOCAL AMAZON? When pandemic lockdown further accelerated the e-commerce monopoly, some local administrations and businesses were trying to formulate economic and political responses. Besides the many examples discussed in the academic literature above, in the introduction to this chapter I also briefly presented the case of a rural municipality in southern Spain announcing the creation of a local rival to Amazon. This example provides an interesting empirical illustration of some of the issues raised in this chapter. Publicity surrounding the project was positive, perhaps because the media – like my students and I – reacted positively to a slogan that was replicating or mocking the utopian exaggerations of big tech. Beyond sales, as a local shop owner told one student, this publicity was positive for the visibility of the town and its businesses. In the introduction, I described the platform as a new infrastructure and imaginary. Comparing traditional local businesses to the workings of a disruptive global commercial model, is a way to reimagine the identity of place-based businesses. Instead of positing themselves as different to the platform in terms of a non-digital, non-global, non-corporate alternative, local organizations were exploring alternative ways of integrating into or identifying with the platform model. The promoters

272  Handbook on social innovation and social policy were exploring niches for subsistence, coexistence or replication of platforms. It might also be argued that the municipality had put the infrastructure perspective into practice. A cultural worker was assigned the delivery of goods a few times per week using the public municipal vehicle, as one of my students reported. Thus, there was at least some awareness that the public administration would have to provide support if any “competition” with Amazon would be feasible. However, providing a public platform infrastructure for local businesses was perhaps a way to imagine or experiment with the future, rather than a coherent alternative economic model. In terms of the moral grounds on which imaginations of platform innovations rest – see my discussion on the delineation of the alternative space – a typical feature evident in this example was scale as a legitimizing device of alternatives. Unfair competition, political interference or ideological sectarianism that may also come (or not go away) with alternative tech platforms were not considered by the media. My students encountered one local critical voice, but his viewpoints expressed conflicts that were neither generated nor alleviated by the alternative platform experiment. At the logistic and technical level, the powerlessness of a municipality of a few thousand residents against the infrastructure of a multinational corporation is obvious. Online, the project was basically a Facebook Page, which is today a standard online advertising platform for most small organizations, a sort of Yellow Pages 2.0. Thus, if Amazon served as a model for imagining a new economy, Facebook was the main digital infrastructure on which the experiment rested at the digital operations level. In fact, as one of my students reported, the forerunner of the project was a WhatsApp group of local businesses. Yet, turning Facebook into a pseudo-online shopping platform is incomplete. Payment procedures and interaction were left to the contracting parties. Super-regional shipping was not possible. The search engine as a key user experience (and way to perform consumer analytics) was unavailable. Most importantly, the range of products and prices was necessarily limited, as was dissemination among a large group of users. Thus, the Facebook page produced consumer data, network effects and automated profits primarily for Facebook rather than for local business. I have addressed this conundrum of being trapped – both imaginatively and operatively – in the big five universe in terms of platform policy overcoming or restoring capitalism. On the basis of this example, two interventions might be imagined. If Amazon is a critical infrastructure provider, equal and democratic access at reasonable cost should be expected: for instance, an externally overseen Amazon search engine that guarantees local business visibility and access, public scrutiny of user/provider data and production, or pricing systems that charges complementors according to sales. These kinds of interventions would gradually overcome the exclusively private, capital-owned character of the organization and move it towards a co-governed public–private infrastructure provider. A second type of intervention would involve anti-trust regulations aiming at fostering genuinely feasible competition. Splitting the seller from the marketplace provider is one of the best-known suggestions. Preventing cross-subsidization and growth-over-profit by imposing minimum prices for products would be another (probably extremely unpopular) intervention. A long-term effect might be suspected by prohibiting acquisitions. Nevertheless, I cannot see how any of such interventions “restoring the market” would put this rural community in a position to build a more resilient and effective organization, as this approach has only indirect effects. But “overcoming the market” interventions eventually would have empowering effects on this municipality. For example, by providing fairer conditions for local businesses to access and profit from the Amazon marketplace.

On the dilemmas of policy and innovation in digital infrastructure  273 In a liberal–egalitarian society there are legal–ethical limits to both types of interventions (Ferretti 2020), but also limits to state power over US or Chinese multinationals (Scholz, Kley and Parycek 2020). Khan’s example of the scrutiny and regulations of banks illustrates how conflicts of interest were tackled, however imperfectly, in previous times and in other industries (2017). I share the reservations expressed by many authors with the cooperative platform model. This is the social business/innovation approach to the problem (Srnicek 2017; Reijers and Ossewaarde 2018; Sandoval 2020; Micheli et al. 2020). Yet, this chapter has exemplified how social innovators expose the real-world experiences of the limits and challenges of the current system. These allow scholars to elaborate empirically grounded insights for (social) policy. If argued the other way around, social innovators could (and often do) criticize the futile nature of social research in their field. I have elaborated on the platform infrastructure as an analytical frame. Among the advantages of this deliberate exaggeration is forcing research to discriminate more carefully between more-of-a-market and more-of-a-hierarchy scenarios. No sector anywhere is equally prone to or indeed dominated by a digital oligarchy just because it is called or imagined as a “platform”. While the definition of a threshold for “gatekeepers” in the EU Digital Markets Act seems to be in line with the “infrastructure” definition proposed in this chapter, it still holds on to the viewpoint of the digital sphere as if it was a market and not a network gravitating naturally to concentration. Thus, more research on when and why a tipping point of no return is reached for a specific platform (not a particular company) would clarify whether we can continue to address certain organizations as “private” or services as “markets”. Following the moral philosopher Carissa Véliz (2020), our democracies urgently need alternatives to big tech, and these must come both from the bottom and from the top.

NOTE 1. This research is supported through the Spanish national research framework: grant PID2019-106757GA-I00 (Ecoembeddedness) funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. I would like to thank the undergraduate students attending the 2020 Anthropology of Development seminar at the University of Seville for discussing their experiences. Whenever data used in this chapter were produced by students, I have made this visible in the text. Thanks to Stephen Sinclair, Sara Sama, Raquel Alquézar and Alfonso Socrates for reading and commenting on this paper.

REFERENCES Alquézar, R. C. (forthcoming). La democratización de los medios de producción en la economía de plataformas: El caso de Mensakas. Revista Española de Sociología. Buitron, N., and Steinmüller, H. (2020). The ends of egalitarianism. L’homme, 236(3), 5–44. Cabral, L., Haucap, J., Parker, G., Petropoulos, G., Valletti, T., and Van Alstyne, M. (2021). The EU Digital Markets Act. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Diniz, E., Cernev, A., Rodrigues, D., and Daneluzzi, F. (2021). Solidarity cryptocurrencies as digital community platforms. Information Technology for Development, 27(3), 524–538. Donner, J., and Locke, L. (2019). Platforms at the margins. In: M. Graham (Ed.), Digital Economies at Global Margins. Cambridge: MIT Press, 39–41. El País. (2021). El escándalo de las filtraciones de Facebook aviva el debate sobre cómo limitar el poder de las grandes tecnológicas, 7 November. Fejerskov, A. (2021). Algorithmic bias and the (false) promise of numbers. Global Policy, 12(S6), 101–103.

274  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Ferretti, T. (2020). A liberal egalitarian perspective on the platform economy: Mitigating its distributive effects or changing the organizations running it? Journal of Social Philosophy, 51(1), 54–79. Forbes Magazine. (2021). The far-right is flocking to these alternate social media apps: Not all of them are thrilled, 14 January. Guyer, J. (2016). Legacies, Logics, Logistics: Essays in the Anthropology of the Platform Economy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Hoeyer, K. (2020). Data promiscuity: How the public–private distinction shaped digital data infrastructures and notions of privacy. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 7, 37. At https://​www​ .researchgate​.net/​publication/​342986070​_Data​_promiscuity​_how​_the​_public​-private​_distinction​ _shaped​_digital​_data​_infrastructures​_and​_notions​_of​_privacy (accessed on 23 November 2023). Khan, L. M. (2017). Amazon’s antitrust paradox. The Yale Law Journal, 126(3), 710–805. Kostakis, V. (2018). In defense of digital commoning. Organization, 25(6), 812–818. Kozorog, M. (2021). The making of coworking spaces in Slovenia: Spatialization by and of youth as (not) trusting them. Studia ethnologica Croatica, 33(1), 97–120. Lynch, C. (2020). Contesting digital futures: Urban politics, alternative economies, and the movement for technological sovereignty in Barcelona. Antipode, 52(3), 660–680. Lynch, C. (2021). Internet infrastructure and the commons: Grassroots knowledge sharing in Barcelona. Regional Studies, 55(12), 1868–1877. Micheli, M., Ponti, M., Craglia, M., and Berti Suman, A. (2020). Emerging models of data governance in the age of datafication. Big Data & Society, 7(2), 205395172094808. Poell, T., Nieborg, D., and van Dijck, J. (2019). Platformisation. Internet Policy Review, 8(4). DOI: 10.14763/2019.4.1425 Reijers, W., and Ossewaarde, M. (2018). Digital commoning and its challenges. Organization, 25(6), 819–824. Ridley-Duff, R., and Bull, M. (2021). Common pool resource institutions: The rise of internet platforms in the social solidarity economy. Business Strategy and the Environment, 30(3), 1436–1453. Rys, P., and Sobolewski, M. (2020). Two-sided Platforms: Dynamic Pricing and Multiple Equilibria. European Commission, Seville, JRC123533. Sandoval, M. (2020). Entrepreneurial activism? Platform cooperativism between subversion and co-optation. Critical Sociology, 46(6), 801–817. Scholz, R. W., Kley, M., and Parycek, P. (2020). Digital Infrastructure as a Public Good: A European Perspective. Kompetenzzentrum Öffentliche IT, Das Fraunhofer-Institut für Offene Kommunikation. Scholz, T. (2016). Platform Cooperativism: Challenging the Corporate Sharing Economy. New York, NY: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Sobolewski, M. (2021). Measuring consumer well-being from using free-of-charge digital services: The case of navigation apps. Information Economics and Policy, 56, 100925. Sommer, R. (2017). Beware the siren servers: How techlash novels like Dave Eggers’s The Circle and Jarett Kobek’s I Hate the Internet make the need for change feel real. StoryWorlds, 9(1), 51–70. Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. Su, N., Lazar, A., and Irani, L. (2021). Critical affects: Tech work emotions amidst the techlash. Proceedings of the ACM on Human–Computer Interaction, 5(CSCW1), 1–27. The Economist. (2021). Antitrust regulators face vibrant competition – with each other, 8 November. The Guardian. (2021). A “non-cancellable” community: The “truth” about Trump’s social media platform, 12 October. The New York Times. (2019). The roots of big tech run disturbingly deep, 7 June. Véliz, C. (2020). Privacy is Power: Why and How You Should Take Back Control of Your Data. London: Penguin.

22. Design thinking for social innovation Victoria Ciudad-Real and Gary Painter

INTRODUCTION Definitions of Social Innovation (SI) have evolved over the past 20 years. Early definitions linked SI to producing novel solutions to addressing social needs (Mulgan, 2006; Marquest et al., 2018; Murray, Caulier-Grice, & Mulgan, 2010). Some definitions consider SI a product or service, such as the definition advanced by Phills, Deiglmeier, and Miller (2008), which views it as ‘a novel solution to a social problem that is more effective, efficient, sustainable, or just than existing solutions and for which the value created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather than private individuals’ (p. 36). Other definitions focus on SI as a process by which solutions emerge (Mulgan, 2006). Additional research notes that the aforementioned definitions can be viewed as technocratic and not centered on solutions that address issues of social justice (Montgomery, 2016; Ayob, Teasdale, & Fagan, 2016) and democratic values (e.g., Moulaert et al., 2005). These definitions all highlight the purpose of SI, but they do not fully explicate the characteristics of the process of SI. Beckman, Painter, and Rosen (2020) advance a definition highlighting that SI is an iterative, inclusive process that intends to generate more effective and just solutions to solve complex social problems. Compared to traditional problem-solving approaches, SI is an ‘iterative process of concurrent problem identification, design, implementation, and evaluation of pilot programs and other test strategies.’1 Social Innovation can identify and diffuse solutions for social issues through policy and systems change. Within this non-linear process, Co-Production is a critical component of SI.2 Co-Production uses long-term engagement, resources and capacity building to allow community expertise to guide interventions. This results in more inclusive and equitable processes and outcomes (Rosen & Painter, 2019). Figure 22.1 illustrates the SI model adopted in this chapter. In this chapter, we argue that Co-Production within SI should include tools from Design Thinking (DT) methods. DT engages end-users in the design process and has been used to spur innovations within the private, nonprofit, and public sector (Brown & Wyatt, 2010; Beckman & Barry, 2007; Clark & Smith, 2008; Mintrom & Luetjens, 2016). DT is aimed to be user-centered and therefore can be a useful model to meaningfully engage citizens in tackling social policy problems. In the next section, we will describe the Design Thinking method, how it has been applied in private and public sectors, and what the necessary characteristics are required to operationalize DT for co-production within social innovation. Finally, we present a case study to illustrate how Design Thinking can be used within an SI process that identifies employment opportunities for historically excluded communities such as individuals with criminal histories.

275

276  Handbook on social innovation and social policy

Source: Author.

Figure 22.1

Social innovation process

WHAT IS DESIGN THINKING? Design Thinking is a tool that incorporates individuals and communities who are end-users of a product or service into the design process (Brown & Wyatt, 2010). Proponents of DT consider it as both a process and a mindset for solving problems (Luka, 2014). DT has emerged as a popular concept that embraces testing and learning in order to spur innovation and solutions. Due to the intentional involvement of consumers within the Design Thinking model, solutions are developed from the ground-up as opposed to top-down. Also known as human-centered design, DT builds empathy among designers by requiring them to involve end-users and inquire how design features are received and used by consumers. This process allows for creative thinking to develop interventions (Selloni & Corubolo, 2017). One way this is accomplished is by identifying ‘positive deviants’, which are examples of practices that have been proven successful in local contexts and have the potential to be adapted and scalable (Brown & Wyatt, 2010; Murray, Caulier-Grice, & Mulgan, 2010). The DT process promotes solution-identifying behavior by leveraging the experience of end-users and designers, which emphasizes the importance of diverse perspectives (Razzouk & Shute, 2012; Selloni & Corubolo, 2017). Design Thinking Processes Design Thinking was first introduced through the field of artificial intelligence. The process included seven stages of DT: define, research, ideate (i.e., brainstorm), prototype, choose, implement, and learn (Luka, 2014; Simon, 1969). However, Design Thinking has gained more popularity through an approach proposed by Brown (2008). This DT model was influenced by work with IDEO, a design and consulting firm, and is described as a ‘system with overlapping

Design thinking for social innovation  277 spaces.’ The IDEO model from Brown and Wyatt (2010) indicates an iterative flow between the three spaces of Inspiration, Ideation, and Implementation in the IDEO model (Brown & Wyatt, 2010). In these spaces, activities focus on observing, telling stories, synthesizing knowledge, brainstorming, creating and refining prototypes, experimentation, and diffusion. Rather than a sequence of steps, Design Thinking moves between these three spaces and activities within and across the spaces. The design process typically starts with the inspiration space to derive a problem or opportunity. Traditionally, problems may be quickly and ill defined; however, Design Thinking encourages designers to ‘go out into the world and observe the actual experiences of others’ to more carefully understand the nature of a problem (Brown & Wyatt, 2010, p. 33). For this reason, it is also important to include local partners to assist in a deeper understanding of the issue, strengthen credibility, and make key introductions (Brown & Wyatt, 2010). The ideation space is where potential solutions or opportunities for change are identified. These solutions are ranked through the group’s shared assessment of criteria such as feasibility, resource availability, and potential impact. During the implementation space, these top ideas from ideation become action plans and prototypes for testing. During the prototype process, implementation challenges can be identified to ensure long-term success. Throughout the process, DT requires designers to factor in availability of resources, potential constraints, and opportunities in order to develop plausible solutions that can be tested (Tschimmel, 2012). Another notable DT philosophy was developed by the Institute of Design at Stanford, known as the d.School. The d.School adopts a similar non-linear and iterative process with five ‘modes’ (Luka, 2014; Plattner, Meinel, & Weinberg, 2009). These include: (1) empathize, (2) define, (3) ideate, (4) prototype, (5) test. As with other DT approaches, designers are encouraged to iterate between modes in order to refine the design. The model also underscores the importance of starting with empathy as a core tenant to guide the problem definition, ideas, and solutions.3 Other Design Thinking approaches have emerged in an attempt to refine the model for different contexts. In 2009, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation commissioned IDEO to create a human-centered design toolkit for non-governmental organizations and social enterprises to more easily involve design thinking in their problem-solving processes.4 The kit uses a three-step phase known as ‘Hear’, ‘Create’, and ‘Deliver’. A typical Design Thinking session will include tools such as Brainstorming, Example scenarios, Mind maps, In-depth interviews, Personas, and Storyboards (Tschimmel, 2012). The goal of this model is to make DT more accessible and integrated into everyday services and programs aimed at addressing social needs and issues. Design Thinking in Practice: Private Sector Private-sector actors, such as companies and corporations, have been motivated to use Design Thinking to increase efficiency and tackle business challenges. The approach has also been used to better understand and engage their own consumers (Dunne, 2018; Liedtka, 2014). Internally, companies have employed DT to address communication challenges, refine services, increase productivity, conduct assessments, and develop skills and management training for employees (Liedtka, 2014). DT encourages companies to use emotional and experiential intelligence, in addition to considering important factors such as their bottom-line profits (Clark & Smith, 2008). Engaging in prototyping through this method enables companies to

278  Handbook on social innovation and social policy tolerate failure in the name of learning, which can provide companies an edge when navigating globalized markets with new consumers and competitors (Kolko, 2015). One case of private-sector Design Thinking innovation is Bank of America’s popular ‘Keep the Change’ savings program. The service was created after modeling people’s real-life penny-saving behavior. Through this program, customers round up their purchases and automatically transfer the change into their savings account, just as one would accumulate physical change at the end of the day in a coin jar (Brown, 2008). Design Thinking has also been used to refine services within other industries. For example, Stanford University’s Health Care team has used interviews, simulations, and design workshops with staff, patients, and their families to re-design cancer nursing units in a new campus hospital (Wykes, 2016). The process allowed the end-users to express their needs to facilitate service delivery and inform the unit’s layouts. Design Thinking in Practice: Public Sector Design Thinking has also been implemented by the public sector to tackle issues and generate solutions. DT uses skills and creativity that typical policy-making processes may overlook (Mintrom & Luetjens, 2016; Lewis, McGann, & Blomkamp, 2020). In the public sector, citizens are often the end-users of services, programs, and policies (Voorberg, Bekkers, & Tummers, 2015). Internationally, different governments have hosted ‘Design Thinking labs’ where public-sector actors and other stakeholders meet to discuss issues and collaborate under the DT model to generate new ideas around addressing a particular issue. Often the issue is centered on service delivery innovations. These DT labs allow participants to consider ideas that challenge bureaucratic structures that perpetuate the status quo. However, solutions from these sessions can be limited (McGann, Blomkamp, & Lewis, 2018). For example, DT labs can sometimes overemphasize generating ideas and spend less time considering testing and implementing the ideas that emerge. Through the Design Thinking process, barriers are revealed that inhibit real change in the public sector (Hillgren, Seravalli, & Emilson, 2011). Additionally, change in the public sector can require longer timelines to re-design systems, build relationships and address issues in the long term (Hillgren, Seravalli, & Emilson, 2011). While there are several public-sector cases, most studies reflect on the DT process rather than the impacts of measurable outcomes (Liedtka et al., 2020). An early case study of Design Thinking in the public sector is the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The ATO oversees the majority of the country’s federal tax collection and revenue, employing thousands of staff and servicing millions of individual taxpayers and businesses (Body, 2008). The ATO’s Design Thinking approach was prompted when the organization was struggling to implement recommendations for strategic growth and when a new tax system was established in Australia in 2000. The ATO’s goal was to streamline tax processes to ensure taxpayer compliance and build organizational ‘sustainability capability’ to use design as a tool for ongoing problem solving (Body, 2008). In this initiative, ATO deployed various techniques to achieve these goals, such as research, testing, prototyping, co-design, and workshops with both staff and citizens (Body, 2008). As a result, the ATO developed taxpaying processes that were more personalized, cost-effective, and easier for users to navigate. The ATO also experienced an increase in Design Thinking culture and capacity throughout the organization to continuously refine its systems and processes.

Design thinking for social innovation  279

DESIGN THINKING FOR SOCIAL INNOVATION As explored in the previous section, Design Thinking has been used to meet unique needs and circumstances within the private and public sectors. In a similar way, DT can offer a method for operationalizing the beginning and testing stages of the social innovation process. SI is initiated with the emergence of ideas to meet needs that are not already being adequately met (Mulgan, 2006). This is followed by applying ideas in practice, refining these solutions and learning from failures. These solutions are forged under a variety of circumstances, but they can be fostered by adopting DT into co-production. As Mulgan (2006, p. 156) describes, ‘Innovation is therefore easier where the risks are contained; where there is evident failure; where users have choice … and where expectations are carefully managed.’ Design Thinking tools and exercises provide these parameters required to cultivate new ideas, while also testing and prototyping potential solutions. It can build empathy in the policy process, offer new engagement tools and processes to explore ideas, and provide flexibility (Bennett & McWhorter, 2019; Selloni & Corubolo, 2017; Kolko, 2015). Importantly, DT gives opportunities for diverse voices and actors to be involved in co-creating interventions (Liedtka, 2018). However, DT methodology requires certain considerations to be applied within the SI process. One limitation of private-sector Design Thinking is that the end-users are not the true ‘owners’ of the idea or process; instead, the final product belongs to the product designers, who are often the company (Melles, de Vere, & Misic, 2011). In contrast, social innovation is specifically concerned with ‘meeting a social need … through organizations whose primary purposes are social’, rather than for profit maximization (Mulgan, 2006, p. 146). Similarly, while DT can be a powerful innovation tool, private-sector organizations face challenges when attempting to integrate the process into their organizational infrastructure. Dunne (2018) identified that organizations successful in adopting DT often had high-level leaders promote the approach, proving to be ‘critical to establishing the [design thinking] program and protecting it’ (p. 9). Without employee buy-in, design thinking is not easily deployed at the organizational level (Liedtka, 2018). Similarly, traditional company structures, which reinforce slow incrementalism over iterative Design Thinking and implementation, can be difficult to overcome (Dunne, 2018). Co-Production and Design Thinking To create shared ownership, promote buy-in, and encourage flexibility to overcome systemic issues, we suggest that co-production provides the appropriate framework to orient Design Thinking tools for social innovation. The concept of co-production refers to the ‘process through which inputs used to produce a good or service are contributed by individuals who are not “in” the same organization’ (Ostrom, 1996, p. 1073). As this definition suggests, developing interventions through a co-production model involves several stakeholders, but particularly citizens, to ‘transform’ and inform the planning, implementation, and ongoing evaluation of a good or service. To identify and test social solutions requires engaging citizens, who are end-users of this innovation, as co-producers of the intervention (Voorberg, Bekkers, & Tummers, 2015; Ostrom et al., 1978). Therefore, in co-production the solution is both ‘owned by the user and [by] their community’ (Melles, de Vere, & Misic, 2011, p. 149). Co-production also calls for an ‘evolving participation model’ that ‘continually refine[s] strategies toward more equitable processes’ (Rosen & Painter, 2019, p. 335). Engaging

280  Handbook on social innovation and social policy the public and stakeholders for SI is crucial because the process can itself address core issues of distrust and lack of representation that resulted in the original social need being unmet (Murray, Caulier-Grice, & Mulgan, 2010). DT is suited for the SI process through co-production because it is focused on iterating towards a product, as well as the process by which the product is developed with end-users. DT uniquely asks policy-makers and designers to understand the experiences of citizens (Mintrom & Luetjens, 2016). Design Thinking ensures that users/humans are embedded in the process and are active rather than passive participants in the solution-making process (Lewis, McGann, & Blomkamp, 2020).

CASE STUDY: INCLUSIVE HIRING PRACTICES FOR JUSTICE-INVOLVED YOUTH IN LOS ANGELES In 2019, the USC Sol Price Center for Social Innovation partnered with LeadersUp, a national nonprofit focused on ending the youth unemployment crisis in the USA – to launch the Accelerating Fair Chance Project. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2008 the unemployment rate for justice-involved individuals was five times higher than rates for the public (Coulotte & Kopf, 2018). However, only 5% of American Human Resource professionals and 5% of American managers report that their companies actively attempt to recruit individuals with criminal records (Society for Human Resource Management, 2019). The purpose of the Fair Chance project was to address unemployment among young people who have been involved in the criminal justice system by identifying employer-led solutions in the Los Angeles region. By leveraging the expertise of employers and adapting the Design Thinking model, the project offers a case study for how to engage employers in an iterative process to re-imagine new hiring structures that expand employment opportunities for justice-involved individuals. This project was unique in that it brought together employers who would be ‘end-users’, as well as public-sector departments, and organizations that work with jobseekers from the justice-involved population. Jobseekers’ perspectives were included through persona exercises in DT sessions. Given that few approaches to reducing employment barriers for this population include employer interventions, for the purposes of this project employers were considered the ‘end-users’ as their organizations would be implementing shifts in recruitment strategies. Additionally, based on prior experience, the research team found benefit in creating separate spaces for different stakeholders to more openly share their ideas and concerns, which would allow for ideation (Rosen & Painter, 2019). The lead project team also consisted of researchers from the University and representatives from LeadersUp, who co-led sessions and provided their expertise based on their experience with employers and justice-involved jobseekers (Ciudad-Real et al., 2021a).5 In the United States, having a criminal record negatively impacts upon an applicant’s likelihood of receiving a job offer, particularly if the applicant is Black (Pager, Western, & Sugie, 2009). Nationally, people with criminal records have higher rates of unemployment than the general public (Pager, 2003; Coulotte & Kopf, 2018). Employers are less willing to interview and hire jobseekers with justice involvement on their record, resulting in longstanding barriers to meaningful employment (Holzer, 2007; Holzer, Raphael, & Stoll, 2004). Thus, building a more inclusive workforce for justice-involved youth is a pressing social issue. Before ‘Ban the Box’ or Fair Chance policies were implemented by the state of California and local municipalities, employers could deny job applicants a position simply because of their criminal

Design thinking for social innovation  281 Table 22.1

Fair Chance project roles

Project team

Participants

● Price Center Researchers

● Employers – Representatives from industries in education, construc-

● LeadersUp Chief of Staff & CEO

tion, logistics, transportation, food and services, technology and health, as well as large and small business ● State of California Workforce Development Board ● Los Angeles County Workforce Development, Aging and Community Services ● Service providers who worked with justice-involved youth jobseekers ● Workers with justice-involved backgrounds

record, and were not required to explain why an applicant’s records affected their candidacy for the position (Avery, 2019; Ciudad-Real et al., 2021c). While Fair Chance laws have been helpful in providing legal guidance to businesses, early studies suggest that employers often lack familiarity and support when the laws go into effect (Ciudad-Real et al., 2021b). Given these implementation challenges, the project team found a gap in employer involvement in actively engaging in employment solutions for this population. The project team adopted an iterative approach using DT tools to facilitate co-production. Throughout the project the team engaged stakeholders, with the understanding that employers would be the focused end-users. As a result, the project team reflected after each engagement touch point to inform the next stage of engagement. Throughout the process, the project team took learnings from their conversations with employers and related stakeholders to constantly refine everything from the questions asked to the language that was being used to communicate with employers (Table 22.1). At the beginning of the project, to understand Fair Chance hiring from an employer’s perspective, the Price Center first conducted a survey of employer understanding of Fair Chance hiring policies, their challenges, and their hiring practices. Responses from the survey indicated that there was positive support among employers to hire justice-involved individuals, but certain barriers such as stigma, skill matching, and lack of education on justice involvement were reasons employers often failed to draw talent from this population. Additionally, several employers were unfamiliar with Fair Chance hiring best practices and recommendations put forth by governmental agencies and community groups (Ciudad-Real et al., 2021a). Based on these initial exploratory results, the project team identified a need to adopt a holistic approach to advance Fair Chance hiring practices, more broadly by identifying more inclusive employer-led solutions. To engage employers as key ‘end-users’, the project team developed two Innovation Labs to inform potential strategies and offer an ‘Ideation Space’. This first session convened employers from the public and private sectors, for a listening session. The main topics discussed included exploring current hiring practices by employers and identifying key barriers to hiring this population. It was found that among employers the terms ‘Fair Chance’ and ‘justice involvement’ were obscure. While some participants associated the expression ‘justice involved’ solely with incarceration, others used the term to identify people with criminal convictions while still others did not. Additionally, some employers associated ‘fair chance’ with the US term ‘equal opportunity’, which is a regulation used for specific protected classes such as gender, race, age, but not justice-involved individuals (Ciudad-Real et al., 2021a). The insights from this innovation lab enabled the project team to

282  Handbook on social innovation and social policy

Figure 22.2

Fair Chance project co-production process

further refine the problem statement and underscored the need to provide clear definitions and employer education in order to begin strategizing potential solutions (Figure 22.2). The second Design Thinking session convened another set of employers to take a deeper dive and attempt to identify new talent acquisition strategies that expand employment opportunities for justice-involved youth. During the second session, employers explored specific recruitment challenges, engaged in a scenario exercise, and discussed hiring processes. Throughout both sessions, employers identified challenges that made it difficult for their companies to expand employment opportunities to justice-involved youth. Employers also brainstormed potential solutions to address the identified challenges within the hiring process, which were subsequently ranked based on their level of support and feasibility based on their organizational knowledge. Table 22.2 summarizes the proposed intervention strategies (Ciudad-Real et al., 2021a). While some employers immediately changed their hiring practices as a result of their participation in the Design Thinking labs, the project team found a substantial decrease in capacity among employers as the COVID-19 pandemic emerged. Managers described the pandemic as disruptive to their normal recruitment processes, with in-person hiring slowing down or coming to a complete halt as companies attempted to navigate the precarious public health circumstances in the workplace. This interruption prevented the opportunity to pilot some

Design thinking for social innovation  283 Table 22.2

Fair Chance project Design Thinking ideas

Intervention area

Strategy description

Job postings

● Use inclusive language (i.e., person-first language) that signals openness to working with people who might have justice-involved backgrounds ● Ensure posting focuses on skills not credentials, proposed language included terms such as ‘Entry-level position’ or ‘We’ll teach you’/‘Open to training’ ● Remove automatic disqualifications for people with records including removing ambiguous language

Recruitment

● Diversify recruitment platforms and events, evaluate recruitment sources for identifying talent and potential jobseekers ● Create or strengthen partnerships with local organizations that work with justice-involved youth to establish talent pipeline

Interviewing

● Inform candidates they are not obligated to self-disclose their background information in order to be hired for certain positions ● Develop simple protocols for hiring managers to reduce potential bias ● Centralize hiring efforts across big companies to allow for candidates to be recommended or transferred to interview to other positions that could be a better match ● Invest in implicit bias hiring software or training to create cultural change and reduce stigma around people with justice-involvement.

of these ideas in the near term, but we anticipate engaging in the piloting process in the near future. The co-production process did not lead to a singular output like a pilot or pilots to test. In addition, the lead participants in the process were able to develop educational resources and a user-friendly framework for employer audiences to identify the unique opportunities of hiring among justice-involved individuals within their own organizations. Instead of a one-size-fits-all approach, the guide allowed for employers to evaluate and adapt their own hiring practices and to strategize potential inclusive talent solutions with the goal of accelerating employment opportunities to justice-involved youth. This framework provided employers with the language and education on Fair Chance hiring to empower employers to apply tailored strategies that consider these differences and meet the unique structure of the company.

CONCLUSION This chapter demonstrates how design thinking can be incorporated into the processes of Social Innovation. While Design Thinking workshops and ideation is of value in itself, we show that it can be more effective when imbedded in broader frameworks. Importantly, successful incorporation of DT approaches requires adherence to key principles of co-production (Rosen & Painter, 2019). By subscribing to co-production values, DT facilitates empathy and power sharing in order to re-imagine structures, processes, and relationships that are required for tackling deep-seeded social problems such as bias. It is worth noting that Design Thinking approaches in more general social policy can be improved by adhering to more inclusive and iterative processes. As noted in the literature, too often DT in the public sector has served as a one-off event. While useful ideas have emerged in these Design Thinking sessions, refining these ideas has typically been done by limited stakeholders, often primarily members of the public sector. We would argue that refinement

284  Handbook on social innovation and social policy would improve by re-engaging stakeholders that were involved in DT sessions, even if there is no intention to employ a social innovation process. While the case demonstrates how DT methods can be applied to innovation around challenges of re-entry populations, employment, and bias, it can also be applied to other social policy arenas. The case study referenced in this chapter provided a blueprint for how DT can be incorporated into co-production processes for social innovation. The result is a process that defines and refines problems, barriers, and solutions through continual engagement. These solutions are co-produced through an approach that includes broad stakeholder engagement and which is informed by the expertise of those who know and understand the issues intimately. The type of engagement co-production calls for is not limited to certain phases but instead asks for transparency and accountability on behalf of citizens from their institutions. The product of DT through co-production is a shared sense of ownership, authentic relationships, and a space where new ideas can emerge – all of which challenge the status quo and bring forth social innovation. The case study reported in this chapter addresses the problem of barriers to employment faced by workers with some kind of criminal background. But there remains much work to be done for solutions to emerge to eliminate these barriers in policy and practice. As Figure 22.1 notes, it is anticipated that as we learn from pilots and from programs operating at scale, we will need to refine the programs through further Design Thinking sessions. In order for social innovation processes to identify promising solutions, we must be willing to learn rapidly and re-design, often before solutions can be diffused into systems. Further, it is critical to maintain the broad stakeholder engagement throughout the process of piloting and scaling in order to maximize what is learned through evaluation and re-design. Otherwise, the model of design thinking for social innovation might fall prey to the criticism we levied against the current DT processes in the public sector: of being disconnected from the broader processes of social change. When applied with co-production principles, design thinking can be a promising tool for fostering social innovation to address social policy issues.

NOTES 1.

At https://​socialinnovation​.usc​.edu/​about​-the​-price​-center/​what​-is​-social​-innovation/​ (accessed on 14 December 2023). 2. Reference should be made to Chapter 23 in this Handbook, written by Peter Beresford 27: ‘Social innovation and citizen participation: the crucial coupling’. 3. At https://​web​.stanford​.edu/​~mshanks/​MichaelShanks/​files/​509554​.pdf https://​www​.ideo​.com/​ journal/​design​-kit​-the​-human​-centered​-design​-toolkit (accessed on 14 December 2023). 4. At https://​www​.ideo​.com/​journal/​design​-kit​-the​-human​-centered​-design​-toolkit (accessed on 14 December 2023). 5. For more details on the project, please visit: socialinnovation​.usc​.edu/​fairchance (accessed on 14 December 2023).

REFERENCES Avery, B. (2019). Ban the Box: U.S. Cities, Counties, and States Adopt Fair Hiring Policies to Advance Employment Opportunities for People with Past Convictions. National Employment Law Project.

Design thinking for social innovation  285 Ayob, N., Teasdale, S. & Fagan, K. (2016). How social innovation ‘came to be’: Tracing the evolution of a contested concept. Journal of Social Policy, 45(4): 635–653. Beckman, C., Painter, G. & Rosen, J. (2020). The social innovation process. Retrieved on September 14, 2020, from https://​socialinnovation​.usc​.edu/​research/​social​-innovation/​ Beckman, S. L. & Barry, M. (2007). Innovation as a learning process: Embedding design thinking. California Management Review, 50(1): 25–56. Bennett, E. E. & McWhorter, R. R. (2019). Social movement learning and social innovation: Empathy, agency and the design of solutions to unmet social needs. Advances in Developing Human Resources, 21(2): 224–249. Body, J. (2008). Design in the Australian taxation office. Design Issues, 24(1): 55–67. doi:10. 1162/ desi.2008.24.1.55 Brown, T. (2008). Design Thinking. Harvard Business Review, June: 84–92. Brown, T. & Wyatt, J. (2010). Design Thinking for social innovation. Development Outreach, 12(1): 29–43. Ciudad-Real, V., Cornelius, K., Vidal, J., Bhalla, C., Painter, G. & Roberson, J. (2021a). Accelerating fair chance hiring among Los Angeles employers finding report. USC Price Center for Social Innovation. Ciudad-Real, V., Cornelius, K., Bhalla, C., Painter, G. & Roberson, J. (2021b). Literature review: U.S. fair chance legislation. USC Price Center for Social Innovation. Ciudad-Real, V., Vidal, J., Bhalla, C., Painter, G. & Roberson, J. (2021c). Policy brief: Fair Chance policy impacts. USC Price Center for Social Innovation. Clark, K. & Smith, R. (2008). Unleashing the power of design thinking. Design Management Review, 19(3): 8–15. Coulotte, L. & Kopf, L. (2018). Out of Prison & Out of Work. Prison Policy, July. Retrieved on September 14, 2020, from https://​www​.prisonpolicy​.org/​reports/​outofwork​.html Dunne, D. (2018). Implementing design thinking in organizations: An exploratory study. Journal of Organization Design, 7(1): 1–16. Hillgren, P. A., Seravalli, A. & Emilson, A. (2011). Prototyping and infrastructuring in design for social innovation. CoDesign, 7(3–4): 169–183. Holzer, H. J. (2007). Collateral Costs: The Effects of Incarceration on the Employment and Earnings of Young Workers. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3118. Holzer, H. J., Raphael, S. & Stoll, M. A. (2004). How willing are employers to hire ex-offenders. Focus, 23(2): 40–43. Kolko, J. (2015). Design Thinking comes of age. Harvard Business Review, 93(9): 66–69. Lewis, J. M., McGann, M. & Blomkamp, E. (2020). When design meets power: Design thinking, public sector innovation and the politics of policymaking. Policy & Politics, 48(1): 111–130. Liedtka, J. (2014). Innovative ways companies are using design thinking. Strategy & Leadership, 40–45. Liedtka, J. (2018). Why design thinking works. Harvard Business Review, 96(5): 72–79. Liedtka, J., Sheikh, A., Gilmer, C., Kupetz, M. & Wilcox, L. (2020). The use of design thinking in the US federal government. Public Performance & Management Review, 43(1): 157–179. Luka, I. (2014). Design thinking in pedagogy. The Journal of Education, Culture, and Society, 5(2): 63–74. Marques, P., Morgan, K., & Richardson, R. (2018). Social innovation in question: The theoretical and practical implications of a contested concept. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 36(3), 496–512. McGann, M., Blomkamp, E. & Lewis, J. M. (2018). The rise of public sector innovation labs: Experiments in design thinking for policy. Policy Sciences, 51(3): 249–267. Melles, G., de Vere, I. & Misic, V. (2011). Socially responsible design: Thinking beyond the triple bottom line to socially responsive and sustainable product design. CoDesign, 7(3–4): 143–154. Mintrom, M. & Luetjens, J. (2016). Design thinking in policymaking processes: Opportunities and challenges. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 75(3): 391–402. Montgomery, T. (2016). Are social innovation paradigms incommensurable? Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 27(4): 1979–2000. Moulaert, F., Martinelli, F., Swyngedouw, E. & Gonzalez, S. (2005). Towards alternative model(s) of local innovation. Urban Studies (Edinburgh, Scotland), 42(11): 1969–1990. Mulgan, G. (2006). The process of Social Innovation. Innovations, 1(2): 145–162.

286  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Murray, R., Caulier-Grice, J. & Mulgan, G. (2010). The Open Book of Social Innovation (Vol. 24). London: Nesta. Ostrom, E. (1996). Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy, and development. World Development, 24(6): 1073–1087. Ostrom, E., Parks, R. B., Whitaker, G. P. & Percy, S. L. (1978). The public service production process: A framework for analyzing police services. Policy Studies Journal, 7: 381–389. Pager, D. (2003). The mark of a criminal record. American Journal of Sociology, 108(5): 937–975. Pager, D., Western, B. & Sugie, N. (2009). Sequencing disadvantage: Barriers to employment facing young black and white men with criminal records. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 623(1): 195–213. Phills, J. A., Deiglmeier, K. & Miller, D. T. (2008). Rediscovering social innovation. Stanford Social Innovation Review, 6(4): 34–43. Plattner, H., Meinel, C. & Weinberg, U. (2009). Design-thinking. Landsberg am Lech: Mi-Fachverlag. Razzouk, R. & Shute, V. (2012). What is design thinking and why is it important? Review of Educational Research, 82(3): 330–348. Rosen, J. & Painter, G. (2019). From citizen control to co-production: Moving beyond a linear conception of citizen participation. Journal of the American Planning Association, 85(3): 335–347. Selloni, D. & Corubolo, M. (2017). Design for social enterprises: How design thinking can support social innovation within social enterprises. The Design Journal, 20(6): 775–794. Simon, H. A. (1969) The Sciences of the Artificial. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Society for Human Resource Management. (2019). Getting Talent Back to Work Toolkit, Society for Human Resource Management. Retrieved on 14 December 2023 from https://​www​.get​tingtalent​ backtowork​.org/​learn​-more/​ Tschimmel, K. (2012). Design Thinking as an effective toolkit for innovation. In ISPIM Conference Proceedings. The International Society for Professional Innovation Management (ISPIM). Voorberg, W. H., Bekkers, V. J. & Tummers, L. G. (2015). A systematic review of co-creation and co-production: Embarking on the social innovation journey. Public Management Review, 17(9): 1333–1357. Wykes, S. (2016). Design thinking as a way to improve patient experience. Stanford Medicine. Retrieved on 14 December 2023 from https://​med​.stanford​.edu/​news/​all​-news/​2016/​06/​design​-thinking​-as​-a​ -way​-to​-improve​-patient​-experience​.html

23. Social innovation and citizen participation: the crucial coupling Peter Beresford

INTRODUCTION We live in an age of complex change where ideology is not necessarily explicit and we may not always be sure of the reasons why policy and politics adopt new directions of travel. This particularly applies where one set of values involved may be at odds with another – which, as we shall see, can be often. It is certainly the case in the context of moves towards social innovation at a time of increasing interest in participatory approaches to public policy and politics. It is these two issues and their interrelations that are the focus of this chapter, while the book provides a context for better understanding social innovation (SI) more generally. Each of these ideas – social innovation and participation – is difficult to define, complex and ambiguous. While the focus of my work has long been citizen participation, I cannot claim the same familiarity with thinking about social innovation – except where the two concepts intersect. However, in this case, standing to one side of expert discussion and addressing it in relation to the much broader discourse about involvement – which has drawn in many people with personal as well as professional investments – may be a helpful way of opening up and reappraising the expert discussion. Certainly, that is my goal, and I hope I can be helpful in deciphering these complex discussions, especially in as highly ideological times as the present.

THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY In my view it is important to make this point clear. While it appears that many people have little understanding of or familiarity with ideology and related concepts, as I learned in my earlier exploration of participatory ideology (Beresford, 2021), these undoubtedly impact significantly on all our lives. Neoliberalism, with its emphasis on reducing supportive state spending and intervention and deregulating the market, is the dominant ideology in several western societies such as the UK. But its reach and impact in association with globalization as an economic policy, is truly global. No discussion of socio-political developments can helpfully ignore this powerful context, even if it is one that tends to be played down by its proponents and not necessarily fully recognized by those on the receiving end of it. Critiques of neoliberalism (and since the international economic disasters of 2008 onwards, even those of its friends have been more astringent) highlight its major consequences as rising levels of inequality, poverty, ill health, early mortality, social division, internal and external conflict, and regressive redistribution. This is not the place to explore how such a damaging ideology, widely seen to benefit only a tiny minority of people, has regularly gained international electoral support from the majority. But this question certainly needs to be remembered, 287

288  Handbook on social innovation and social policy in trying to analyze and make sense of understandings, implementation, and the progress of both SI and participation.

THE IDEOLOGICAL RELATIONS OF SOCIAL INNOVATION If we take participation essentially to mean increasing the influence, say and involvement that people can have, then social innovation at face value is about bringing about change in new ways. This could signify an unhelpful fetish with the new. However, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) offers a straightforward lay definition of SI that tells us more, as: the design and implementation of new solutions that imply conceptual, process, product, or organisational change, which ultimately aim to improve the welfare and wellbeing of individuals and communities. (OECD, undated)

Thus, participation and SI are potentially overlapping rather than mutually exclusive ideas. However, in the UK, the latter has been primarily associated with the ‘third way’ politics of New Labour, the think tank Nesta, branded as ‘the UK innovation agency for social good’, a quango floated off by government as a registered charity. Nesta is a grant funder specializing in funding innovation. It came in for heavy criticism for giving big grants to the then Prime Minister David Cameron’s would-be big idea, the ‘Big Society Network’, which was itself heavily criticized by the National Audit Office for failing to achieve its goals (Ainsworth, 2014). Similarly, Nesta was challenged by Private Eye magazine following its purchase of Behavioural Insights Limited – otherwise known as the ‘nudge unit’ – for the exorbitant charges it imposed on government departments (MrWeb, 2021). While the talk from the social innovators is of ‘empowering people’, as yet, their adoption of more participatory approaches towards achieving this may be called into question. Yet it is difficult to see how people’s empowerment is to be achieved in any way other than through their own central involvement in the process, as we have learned since the pioneering days of the Black Civil Rights movement from the 1960s onwards. In addition, bearing in mind that the logic of the ‘nudge’ idea is to get people to change their behaviour, without even realizing the pressure that is being applied to them to do so, it is also difficult to see how much involvement and informed consent can actually play a part in all aspects of any associated policy and practice. This issue of change can be seen as the point of intersection between the ideas of social innovation and participation. But while obviously innovation is at the heart of participatory concepts, participation is not necessarily at the heart of SI. While innovation is clearly a concept that might have many and varied ideological relations, what is significant is that, in its current iteration, it has been developed in the context of all-pervasive neoliberal ideology by formal interests often associated with that ideology. That is not to say that there aren’t and haven’t been more participatory approaches to SI in the UK or internationally, but rather that its more powerful and strongly based associations have been those supported by governments and policymakers and in line, as we have seen, with dominant discourse and ideology. Yet as we have also seen in the latest writings from the social policy academic Fiona Williams, it is difficult to see a way forward for radical renewal in public policy that is not based on both individual and collective involvement (Williams, 2021).

Social innovation and citizen participation: the crucial coupling  289 While as we might expect, the word ‘new’ is strong in the currency of social innovation developments, it tends, as we might expect in its top-down government-funded and -inspired iterations, to reflect prevailing interest in non- and anti-state approaches to public policy. Thus, the newness of initiatives is often bound up with their departing from reliance on state intervention and instead being based on interventions from other sectors. Again, the development of more participatory approaches to SI does not seem to have been a significant characteristic of either debates or programmes of implementation around the idea. It is not least for this reason that it is helpful to look much more closely at the related history and development of initiatives and understanding in the context of participation for insights to link with social innovation. That is the central aim of this chapter.

THE IDEOLOGICAL RELATIONS OF PARTICIPATION There are direct links between modern approaches to participation in policy and practice and pioneering developments in the UK and beyond more than half a century ago. These were associated with land use and development planning, and for the first time offered people a direct voice in local planning processes. This was followed by provisions for local involvement in community development and anti-poverty initiatives, which also related to the US anti-poverty programme and schemes to support Black empowerment (Beresford and Croft, 1993). Early on, however, different approaches to such regeneration work and the participation that went with them began to emerge, based on conflicting ideological approaches. This ideological parting of the ways has typified work on user involvement and participation ever since, and is an important issue for those interested in advancing participatory approaches to social innovation to recognize and address.

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS Community-based approaches varied from closely structured, state and professionally led schemes operating locally and around issues, to much more autonomous approaches encouraging independent collective action in neighbourhoods, developing ideas of ‘empowerment’ and ‘conscientization’. All highlighted participation, but there has been a tendency in both towards increasing professionalization and state control (Craig et al., 2011; Ledwith, 2016). In the UK, the state-led Community Development Projects (CDPs), running from the 1960s to the late 1970s, and the Education Priorities Areas (EPAs) both sought to target help on particular individuals and groups (including women, young people, Black and minoritized groups, and poor people) and areas (highlighting inner city areas) identified as deprived and disadvantaged. They sought to ‘involve’ the people they were working with, although they were generally professionally led. They aimed to raise people’s consciousness, abilities and ‘cultural capital’. All placed an emphasis on support, out-reach and developmental work, to help make this possible. But all equally came under attack for their ambiguity. Competing strands were identified in their work, some more consensual and others conflict based; some clearly operating within ruling political ideology and others determinedly challenging it (CDP, 1977; Loney, 1983). Local involvement was often limited, tokenistic and paternalistic.

290  Handbook on social innovation and social policy

THE EXPANSION TO HEALTH AND CARE A further phase of interest in participation, still as a high-profile phenomenon, is much more closely linked with health and social care and the groups particularly associated with this. It is also related to particular pressures for change in health and social care policy and provision. It is reflected in the emergence of specific requirements for user involvement in UK health and social care reform in the 1990s, which was especially linked with moves to market-led thinking and privatization. In England this was associated with the passing of the National Health Service and Community Care Act and its implementation in 1993. There were equivalent developments in all the UK countries and similar reforms in Europe and North America (Topol, 2015). Indeed, while timings varied, this participatory turn can be seen as at least an international, if not a global development. The participation offered in the UK through health and social care reforms gave people the right to comment, complain and to have a say in the management or running of services. There was also a growing emphasis and interest in involvement in monitoring and evaluation, audit and review, developing quality, standard setting, and ‘outcome measures’ in randomized controlled trials and systematic reviews – that is to say, in organizational issues. This reflected the consumerist/managerialist ideology significantly underpinning such state or service system-driven schemes for involvement, increasingly rooted in market-sector thinking, with involvement effectively being at the level of market research or consultation. While the right to complaint, for example in the English Children Act (1989), as well as the NHS and Community Care Act (1990), represented an innovation, it only operated when things had already gone wrong and tended to be experienced as an individualizing and stressful measure (Beresford and Croft, 1993). What is particularly significant about this phase of interest in participation, is that it had at least two major sources – and that these were very different in origin and aim. This should remind us of both the complexity of pressures towards participation and their ideological relations, and the potential ambiguity of interest in public and user participation and its relevance to innovation.

TWO COMPETING PRESSURES The two developments associated with this phase of interest in citizen and user participation were, first, the international political shift to the right and the emergence of the New Political Right from the 1970s (culminating in the emergence of neoliberal ideology) and, second, the development of new social movements, whose origins could be seen in the 1960s. These movements included the Black civil rights, women’s, the gay and lesbian – later lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer plus (LGBTQ+) movements – and other movements associated with identity, as well as the green/environmental, animal rights and anti-nuclear/peace movements (Jordan and Lent, 1999; Todd and Taylor, 2004). A distinction can be drawn between these new social movements and traditional ‘pressure group’ or ‘interest group’ politics. This development – which has a long history and international character – has mainly been concerned with advancing the interests of powerful rather than powerless groups. In the context of social policy and social problems, such pressure groups have tended to be dominated by non-service users, campaigning and speaking on behalf

Social innovation and citizen participation: the crucial coupling  291 of service users, rather than service users speaking and acting for themselves (Richardson, 1993; Beresford, 2016). If service system and state-based pressure for participation has been concerned with seeking and listening to people’s views, the pressure from new social movements has been for political and personal change and their direct involvement and say in making this happen. If traditional social movements took as their starting point economic and material concerns, new social movements have highlighted issues of human and civil rights, identity and experience in post-industrial society. In the context of health and social care, this has been most powerfully exemplified by the international disabled people’s movement.

THE DISABLED PEOPLE’S MOVEMENT: A CASE STUDY The UK disabled people’s movement challenged traditional understandings of disability, rejected conventional interpretations of it in individualized terms of ‘personal tragedy’ and developed instead a new social model of disability, which highlighted the discriminatory social responses to impairment that ‘disabled’ people encounter in society. Thus such international ‘user movements’ have not just been concerned with resistance to oppressive policies and politics, but also with the formulation of their own alternatives (Randle, 1994; Charlton, 1998). Disabled campaigners called for a new approach to understanding, policy and provision based on a philosophy of ‘independent living’, which challenged disabling barriers and supported people with impairments – physical, sensory or intellectual, to live on as equal terms as possible to non-disabled people (Oliver, 1983, 1990; Charlton, 1998). They placed an emphasis on people speaking for themselves (‘self-advocacy’), on collective action to support their empowerment through developing their own disabled people’s user-led organizations (DPULOs), and on enabling broader social and political change. Other emerging movements, like that of older people, people with learning difficulties, people living with HIV/AIDS and mental health service users/survivors framed their demands in comparable terms, demanding a direct say in policies and services affecting them, pressing for their own participation in making change.

COMPETING IDEOLOGIES However, the shared language of involvement of these two often competing and conflicting pressures for participation – consumerist and democratic – conceal fundamental differences between them, which have blurred and confused the issues. While the emergence of service user movements and development of neoliberalism can be seen as having some common origins – notably a reaction against paternalistic top-down state welfare systems – in many other senses they sit at opposite ends of an ideological spectrum. Pressures for privatization and a reduced role for the state bear little relation to service users’ calls for democratization and empowerment. The consumerist concerns of the neoliberal state and service system do not sit comfortably with the quest for democratization and empowerment of service users and their allies. Instead, they have left many service users feeling that state-led schemes for participation are often tokenistic and ineffectual. Consequently, service users have instead developed

292  Handbook on social innovation and social policy their own focuses for involvement, which they see as more effective and productive than the prevailing concern with consultation and ‘quality control’.

DIVISIVE AND EXCLUSIONARY PRESSURES Neither the quest for increased involvement and participation nor the quest for social innovation for the betterment of all operates in isolation. The continuing dominance of neoliberal ideology and formal politics imposes powerful pressures against both. As we have seen, this has created a complex arena of ambiguity overshadowing and confusing efforts to advance both. Even as these efforts continue, there are powerful and broader pressures operating against and seeking to incorporate them and it is important not to understate nor ignore these. Thus, we see people routinely marginalized and divided in several ways: ● As service workers and users; in neoliberal contexts that are more and more disempowering for both (Giroux, 2008; Crouch, 2011). ● As practitioners and middle managers in increasingly controlling structures (Doolin and Lawrence, 1997; Kirkpatrick et al., 2005). ● As service users and family carers, where frequently one is put in the position of speaking for the other and the needs of the two are conflated (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2014). ● As general public and service users, as if the latter aren’t part of the former and should be conceived as a negative cost on it, with insidious propaganda about the scrounging and dependence of disabled people and other groups of service users (Beresford, 2016; Garthwaite, 2016). ● Between so-called ‘expert’ professional or research-based knowledge and the lived experience of people as service users, with the latter devalued as biased, unscientific, subjective and unreliable; and user-controlled research that gives value to it, similarly devalued in relation to the traditional valuing of conventional randomized controlled trials and systematic reviews (Beresford, 2013; Rose, 2018). ● Between us – on the basis of issues of diversity in relation to age, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, disability, class, culture and belief, so that some groups facing discrimination in society also find that schemes for participation frequently reflect and reinforce these experiences (Williams, 1989; Beresford, 2013). The current trend in public policy has been to reinforce these divisions and exclusions through the pressure under neoliberalism to increased poverty and inequality. While the post-war UK welfare state increasingly struggled to overcome such inequalities, the tendency of later and current neoliberal policy and politics has instead been to reinforce them, with its modern rhetoric dividing us into ‘scroungers’ and ‘strivers’; the employed and unemployed; ‘hard working’ and ‘troubled families’; citizens and non-citizens; ‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ (O’Hara, 2014; Beresford, 2016). To counter these developments, service users, disabled people, and our organizations and movements have identified key areas for challenge. All of these have resonance for more participatory approaches to social innovation. They include: 1. Working for inclusive involvement. 2. Involving service users in occupational and professional learning and education.

Social innovation and citizen participation: the crucial coupling  293 3. Valuing different forms of knowledge equally. Working for Inclusive Involvement A UK government-funded study by the user-led organization and network Shaping Our Lives, evidenced the way in which diverse involvement in policy is restricted. It identified barriers in the way of five major groups, but also out-reach and anti-discriminatory strategies to overcome them. Such groups of service users tend to be excluded on the basis of: ● Equality issues: according to gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class, culture, belief, age, disability, and so on. ● Where they live: if they are homeless, travellers, Roma or Gypsies, in prison, in welfare institutions, refugees, and so on. ● Communicating differently: they do not speak the prevailing language, it is not their first language, they are (D)deaf and use sign language, and so on. ● The nature of their impairments: where these are seen as too complex or severe to mean they could or would want to contribute. ● Where they are seen as unwanted voices: they do not necessarily say what authorities wanted to hear, are seen as a problem, disruptive, and so on. These include neuro-diverse people and people affected by dementia (Beresford, 2013). Involving Service Users in Occupational and Professional Learning and Education Involving service users (and family carers) in professional and occupational education and training has long been seen as one of the most effective ways of improving the nature and culture of social work and other helping forms of practice and services. PowerUs, a partnership of social work educators and service users and their organizations, within and beyond Europe, has sought to develop methods of mutual learning in order to change social work practice to be more effective in supporting the empowerment of marginalized and discriminated against groups in society (http://​powerus​.eu). The ‘gap-mending’ process, which began at Lund University in Sweden in 2005, is a method of learning that brings service users and social work students together to work together on as equal terms as possible. The idea is about bridging divisions between the two groups in their learning through new approaches to user involvement. It also represents an alternative approach to the increasing emphasis under neoliberal politics on graduate and elite/fast-track approaches to social work education, giving value to ‘user knowledge’ rather than just academic qualifications. People ‘meet as people’ on gap-mending courses; service users get formal recognition and accreditation for the skills they offer as well as the skills they gain. Social work students who also have ‘lived experience’ as service users are valued for it and can share it if they wish. Perhaps most important is the building of trust and understanding between service users and would-be social workers, which is likely to have a profound effect on future relations and practice between them. Key gaps that the approach has identified include between needs and resources; the priority social work demands and the priority it is given; service users and providers; ‘expert’ and experiential knowledge; social work education and practice; and researchers and research subjects (Askheim et al., 2017).

294  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Equally Valuing Different Forms of Knowledge Research has been the locus of one of the most complex and contentious struggles between service users and neoliberal ideology. Its origins lie in the struggles first of feminists and then of disabled people, to challenge the ‘epistemic violence’ and exclusion that means they are devalued as ‘knowers’ and to regain control over their ‘experiential’ knowledge – the knowledge that comes from people’s individual and collective lived experience. They called into question the values of distance, neutrality and objectivity of traditional positivist research, highlighting that these devalue their lived or subjective experience and act as a further layer of discrimination imposed upon them, invalidating their understandings of the world. They have questioned the independence of mainstream/conventional research, seeing it as frequently following from government/commercial priorities and ideology for funding and often tied to the values and assumptions of the service system. The UK disabled people’s movement rejected existing disability research in the 1970s as biased and siding with the service system that controlled their lives. To counter this, they developed their own ‘emancipatory disability research’, which prioritized the equalizing of research relationships, the empowerment of disabled people, and the achievement of social change to support their rights and needs (Barnes and Mercer, 1999). The survivor movement developed survivor research along the same lines. At the same time, existing research structures began to show an increasing interest in involving research subjects in the research process, framed in the UK in terms of ‘public, patient involvement’ or PPI, and elsewhere in similar terms. For some time, there appeared to be some convergence between these two developments. There are reports from the mainstream of the progress being made in patient and public involvement in health research, with, for example, the development of a global network (Staniszewska et al., 2018). But, increasingly, tensions have emerged between the consumerist/managerialist aims of such involvement in much mainstream psychiatric and other health research under neoliberalism, and the emancipatory goals of mental health service users/survivors (Rose et al., 2018). Thus, PPI has come under increasing attack as ‘centered on a construction of the abstract, rational, compliant, and self-managing patient’ under neoliberalism (Madden and Speed, 2017).

CONCLUSION This chapter ends by looking at what we may need to do if we want to advance social innovation beyond the boundaries of the ruling ideology and politics, and enable it to benefit from the experience, ideas, rights, interests and needs of all of us. Drawing on the lessons learned from developments in participation, it will be helpful to: ● strengthen the funding basis of user-led organizations (ULOs), which have played a key role in user involvement innovation to ensure that they are viable and sustainable; ● ensure that both ULOs and service-led schemes for user involvement/PPI are adequately resourced to be more inclusive and address diversity with greater equality; ● equalize access to funding for user-controlled research, particularly within ULOs, to support the development of service user experiential knowledge and to challenge the traditional dominance of so-called ‘expert’ or professional knowledge.

Social innovation and citizen participation: the crucial coupling  295 In this way, instead of continuing as essentially separate developments, participation and social innovation in public policy will have a real chance to gain from and build on the benefits each has achieved and to converge in their overlapping aims.

REFERENCES Ainsworth, D. (2014), Former trustee criticises Nesta review saying it was not forced to fund Big Society Review, Civil Society News, 20 November. Available online at https://​www​.civilsociety​.co​.uk/​news/​ former​-trustee​-criticises​-nesta​-review​-saying​-it​-was​-not​-forced​-to​-fund​-big​-society​-network​.html, accessed 16 May 2022. Askheim, O. P., Beresford, P., and Heule, C. (2017), ‘Mend the gap’ – strategies for user involvement in social work education. Social Work Education, 36, 128–140. doi: 10.1080/02615479.2016.1248930 Barnes, C., and Mercer, G. (eds.) (1999), Doing Disability Research, Leeds: The Disability Press, University of Leeds. Beresford, P. (2013), Beyond the Usual Suspects: Towards Inclusive User Involvement: Research Report, London: Shaping Our Lives. Beresford, P. (2016), All Our Welfare: Towards Participatory Social Policy, Bristol: Policy Press. Beresford, P. (2021), Participatory Ideology: From Exclusion to Involvement, Bristol: Policy Press. Beresford, P., and Croft, S. (1993), Citizen Involvement: A Practical Guide for Change, Basingstoke: Macmillan. CDP (1977), Gilding the Ghetto: The State and the Poverty Experiments, Nottingham: Community Development Inter-Project Editorial Team. Charlton, J. I. (1998), Nothing About Us Without Us: Disability, Oppression and Empowerment, Oakland, CA: University of California Press. Craig, G., Mayo, M., Popple, K., Shaw, M., and Taylor, M. (eds.) (2011), The Community Development Reader: History, Themes and Issues, Bristol: Policy Press. Crouch, C. (2011), The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism, Cambridge: Polity Press. Doolin, B., and Lawrence, S. (1997), Managerialism, information technology and health reform in New Zealand. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 10, 108–122. doi: 10.1108/09513559710156742 Garthwaite, K. (2016), Hunger Pains: Life Inside Foodbank Britain, Bristol: Policy Press. Giroux, H. (2008), Against the Terror of Neoliberalism: Politics Beyond the Age of Greed, Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. Jordan, T., and Lent, A. (eds.) (1999), Storming the Millennium: The New Politics of Change, London: Lawrence & Wishart. Kirkpatrick, I., Ackroyd, S., and Walker, R. (2005), The New Managerialism and Public Service Professions: Change in Health, Social Services and Housing, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Ledwith, M. (2016), Community Development in Action: Putting Friere into Practice, Bristol: Policy Press. Loney, M. (1983), Community Against Government: British Community Development Project, 1968–78 (Studies in Social Policy and Welfare), London: Heinemann Educational Books. Madden, M., and Speed, E. (2017), Beware zombies and unicorns: Toward critical patient and public involvement in health research in a neoliberal context. Frontiers in Sociology, 2:7. doi: 10.3389/ soc.2017.00007 MrWeb (2021), Nesta buys ‘nudge unit’ behavioural insights, Daily Research News, 16 December, https://​www​.mrweb​.com/​drno/​news32568​.htm, accessed 16 May 2022. OECD (undated), Social Innovation, Organisation for Cooperation and Development, https://​www​.oecd​ .org/​regional/​leed/​social​-innovation​.htm, accessed 16 May 2022. O’Hara, M. (2014), Austerity Bites: A Journey to the Sharp End of Cuts in the UK, Bristol: Policy Press. Oliver, M. (1983), Social Work and Disabled People, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Oliver, M. (1990), The Politics of Disablement, Basingstoke: Macmillan and St Martin’s Press. Randle, M. (1994), Civil Resistance, London: Fontana Press. Richardson, J. J. (ed.) (1993), Pressure Groups, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

296  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Rogers, A., and Pilgrim, D. (2014), A Sociology of Mental Health and Illness, 5th Edn, Maidenhead: Open University Press; McGraw Hill Education. Rose, D. (2018), Renewing epistemologies: Service user knowledge, in Social Policy First Hand: An International Introduction to Participatory Social Welfare, eds P. Beresford and S. Carr, Bristol: Policy Press, pp. 132–141. Rose, D., Carr, S., and Beresford, P. (2018), Widening cross-disciplinary research for mental health: What is missing from the Research Councils’ UK mental health agenda? Current Issues in Disability and Society, 33, 476–481. doi: 10.1080/09687599.2018.1423907 Staniszewska, S., Denegri, S., Bagley, H., Hickey, G., and Morley, R. (2018), Moving Forward With Global Patient and Public Involvement in Research, Cochrane Community Blog, Cochrane Community. Available online at: https://​community​.cochrane​.org/​news/​moving​-forward​-global​ -patient​-and​-public​-involvement​-research, accessed 17 May 2022. Todd, M. J., and Taylor, G. (eds.) (2004), Democracy and Participation: Popular Protest and New Social Movements, London: Merlin Press. Topol, E. J. (2015), The Patient Will See You Now: The Future of Medicine Is In Your Hands, New York, NY: Basic Books. Williams, F. (1989), Social Policy: A Critical Introduction, Issues of Race, Gender and Class, Cambridge: Polity Press. Williams, F. (2021), Social Policy: A Critical and Intersectional Analysis, Cambridge: Polity Press.

24. Conclusion: the future of social innovation and social policy Stephen Sinclair and Simone Baglioni

The principal purposes in a concluding chapter of an edited volume such as this are to highlight key themes, sum up the cumulative learning from the contributions and suggest potential next steps. These are never easy tasks, but there are particular challenges in this Handbook. As the introductory chapter noted and contributions have demonstrated, social innovation (SI) remains a developing and disputed field; there is no agreement over either its boundaries or its definition. This might qualify recommending the idea to Social Policy analysts. However, although conceptual exactitude is helpful and consensus perhaps desirable, these are not measures of the value of a contribution to social inquiry or policy. The value of an endeavour or field of study is what impact it makes and what insights it provides into issues of interest. In this respect, we believe that the chapters in this Handbook demonstrate that there is much to recommend SI to Social Policy analysts. The world faces daunting and unprecedented challenges, and there are many ideas circulating about how to respond to them. This book would probably sell better and be referenced by the commentariat if it could be reduced to a soundbite or single solution. There is a ready market for Big Ideas and simple solutions that can be conveyed in eye-catching slogans and soundbites. Unfortunately (or not) the world is both more complex and more interesting than that. The lessons that may be taken from analysing SI are not readily reduced to a headline. SI is not itself a ‘solution’ to social problems, as if there ever could be any permanent solution to dynamic social challenges. SI is an orientation and an approach to social challenges. It involves analysing a situation to identify the possibilities within people and imagine how they can be helped to devise responses to transform their world and ours. There is no single or simple way of doing this. However, we are not entirely in the dark. As this Handbook shows, applying Social Policy analysis to SI reveals the outlines of promising future paths as well as some pitfalls. The chapters in this Handbook document a remarkable range of activity and issues raised by the study of SI. What emerges from surveying the contributions, and the challenges and developments they discuss, is the essence of innovation as discussed by Schumpeter (1942) – the possibilities and new futures created by the imagination and restless energy of change makers. There are as many potential responses to social challenges as there are innovative human beings and communities. What Social Policy analysis can contribute is empirically grounded assessments and comparisons of these alternatives. The practical orientation of Social Policy analysis means that part of our duty is to offer constructive, evidence-based critical commentary on policy. In this spirit, this Conclusion reflects on some of the implications for SI and Social Policy from the insights and lessons evident from the contributions in this Handbook.

297

298  Handbook on social innovation and social policy

THE POTENTIAL OF SOCIAL INNOVATION AND SOCIAL POLICY This is a period of contentiousness and discord, and this fractious condition underlies the analyses provided in this Handbook. In 2022, the Word of the Year in the Collins Dictionary was ‘permacrisis’: a situation of rapidly successive compounding major challenges and risks to economic, political or social stability (Turnbull, 2022). Gramsci’s frequently quoted diagnosis in his Prison Notebooks never seemed more apt: ‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’ (1971: 556). This could become the worst of times, but we have an opportunity to make it the best of times, as there is at least some awareness of current and looming hazards, and we have an unprecedented capacity to make the necessary changes not only to adapt and cope but to flourish in the future. However, new policy ideas and models are required as social risks become simultaneously more urgent, acute and chronic and threaten the viability of established welfare policies and systems (Taylor-Gooby, 2006). SIs have developed partly in response to these conditions and challenges and, if harnessed to Social Policy analysis, offer potential ways to address the symptoms and effects of the depletion of social capital, intensifying alienation and disorienting anomie that threaten social cohesion. The Covid pandemic illustrated some of these issues and how innovation and new opportunities can arise from threats. Covid was a salutary reminder of the vulnerability of what appeared to be robust social systems, and revealed both the positive features and limitations of the socially innovative responses that emerged. Among the strengths of SI highlighted by responses to the pandemic were the speed and agility of community initiatives and third-sector projects. Innovative partnerships between government and civil society organisations were rapidly developed to deliver food to vulnerable households, deliver education and other services in new ways, and distribute millions of vaccines (Moscibrodzki et al., 2021). Covid unleashed in many societies – for a while at least – a wellspring of solidarity and community goodwill. This was combined with an imaginative can-do commitment to getting things done, which rapidly overcame what were previously regarded as immovable impediments. But the pandemic also revealed some of the limitations to SI, which should temper uncritical enthusiasm. Many of the responses to Covid were viable only in an emergency and would be unsustainable over the longer term. Some were ineffective and/or inefficient – duplicating provision or missing their intended targets. Others were unsystematic and arbitrary in how discretion was applied. Another compelling lesson from the pandemic was that only governments possess the capacity and authority to ensure that those in need have access to essential services, protection and health care. These experiences should inform thinking about how to frame effective responses to future social risks. They also resonate with findings discussed in several chapters in this Handbook. One recurring theme in the Handbook is the importance of participation and empowerment to effective social policies. Many public welfare policies and bureaucracies impose conditions upon lower-income and less-powerful people, which would not be countenanced for those who are richer and possess political capital. Such measures reflect the view that the role of service providers is to repair the deficiencies of and police the needy rather than deliver citizens’ rights (Fletcher and Wright, 2017). In contrast, SI is about doing things with rather than to people, or enabling people to do things themselves. ‘[S]ocial innovations aim at activating, fostering, and utilising the innovation potential of the whole society. Involving target groups and empower-

Conclusion  299 ing beneficiaries, increasing their capacities to meet social needs and giving them “agency” is an indispensable component of social innovation’ (Howaldt and Hochgerner, 2018: 20). As so many SIs emerge from the work of community groups and the imagination of social movements, central to it are respect for the expertise acquired by experience and a commitment to co-production. The participatory essence of SIs corresponds with the increasing prominence within Social Policy analysis of user involvement, pioneered by the work of Beresford, among others, and outlined in his chapter in this book. This shared interest means that SI and Social Policy could collaborate to explore and develop welfare services and systems that combine the democratic essence of SI and the security provided by the state. For example, one area of innovation that Social Policy analysis could learn from and contribute to is how open source design models could be applied to create genuinely user-directed services (Raworth, 2017: 196). The only feasible way to respond to an unknowable future is to enable innovation by liberating the creative synergies between experts by experience, practice and study. However, applying co-creation principles and practice to mainstream welfare services challenges the power of existing decision-making. As several chapters in this Handbook testify, this poses its own challenges and risks. In essence, innovation is a practical endeavour – concerned with doing things better. Consequently, effective innovations must be grounded in practical reality, even as they seek to transform it. Principal among these are political realities. Several chapters in this Handbook demonstrate how SIs cannot operate outside dominant political ideologies or institutional infrastructures, but are shaped and sometimes thwarted by these conditions. SIs may be created by a spirit of radical departure and aspire to advance new principles and ways of being, but in practice they often lack the capacity to challenge existing systems. Instead, they must effect what change they can from within. At best, some may be able to modify but not overthrow the status quo. However, it is often the case that SIs become conditioned by and compelled to comply with existing power interests. One example of this, and a potential risk of SI, is the appropriation of the empowerment discourse. Measures ostensibly fashioned to delegate autonomy can be used to justify governments disengaging from responsibility for welfare; promoting ‘self-help’ can become a case of ‘you are on your own’. Critical Social Policy analyses have shown that promoting agency is not necessarily a progressive development. Ideas of ‘active citizenship’ have been used as part of a neoliberal strategy to shift responsibility for care and welfare provision to independent service consumers (Williams, 2016). Social Policy analysis is concerned with both dimensions of the Sociological Imagination – personal troubles and social issues (Mills, 2000). That is to say, Social Policy analysis operates at two levels: (i) micro-analyses and evaluations of particular interventions; and (ii) macro-analyses of welfare services and regimes. This distinction highlights the difference between the value of particular innovations and SI as a transformative social force. It is evident from the contributions in this Handbook that there are numerous examples of valuable SIs that have improved the lives of many people. But it is also clear that SI has not itself made a transformative impact at the macro scale. This reflects the limited scale at which many SIs operate. It means that there is a disconnection between SI and Social Policy. SI is not much interested in systems thinking or structural power differences (Logue, 2019). In turn, there is a world of macro Social Policy analysis largely untouched by and uninterested in the study of SI. Social innovation is the worthy aspiration of doing things differently and better. But doing so beyond the individual project level requires combining technical proficiency with politics.

300  Handbook on social innovation and social policy A theme that recurs across several chapters in this Handbook is that SIs need to be attached to political forces – such as social movements – to become institutionalised and have transformative effects. Social Policy analysis could contribute to SI by examining how to combine the components for social reform outlined by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development: ‘innovative policies, which are informed by solid evidence and grounded in normative values such as social justice and sustainability, need to be forged through inclusive political processes, new forms of partnership, multilevel governance reforms and increased state capacity’ (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2016: 4). Wicked problems will only be solved by disrupting the status quo. There is both an urgent need and an opportunity to build the world anew. While it is not possible to specify precise targets outcome, several required features are identifiable, and these combine central features of Social Innovation and Social Policy. The imagination and energy of social innovators is indispensable, but ‘innovation is a means to an end rather than a goal in itself’ (Brown, 2021: 755). Good intentions and interesting ideas are not enough – they must be matched with rigorous practicality and an understanding of how to effect political change. SI could be the applied dimension of political activism, and Social Policy analysis a practical guide to its realisation. Social Policy analysis devotes so much time focusing on problems and policy technicalities (particularly their limitations) that it is sometimes easy to forget that the discipline has a history of radical reimagining. But without that utopian quality and the vision of moral entrepreneurs and social reformers, there would have been no welfare state at all. The British National Health Service is just one example of such a practical utopia. It was built from the imagination of pioneering thinkers, combined with social pressure, political leadership, and practical attention to policy design and implementation. It was, in effect, SI harnessed with Social Policy analysis. The inspirational dynamism of SI may provide other examples to which Social Policy can contribute reasoned critique. For that possibility alone, Social Innovation merits the attention of Social Policy analysis.

REFERENCES Brown, R. (2021) ‘Mission-oriented or Mission Adrift? A Critical Examination of Mission-oriented Innovation Policies’, European Planning Studies, 29(4): 739–761. Fletcher, D., and Wright, S. (2017) ‘A Hand Up or a Slap Down? Criminalising Benefit Claimants in Britain via Strategies of Surveillance, Sanctions and Deterrence’, Critical Social Policy, 38(2): 323–344. Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks (edited and translated by Hoare, Q., and Nowell Smith, G.). London: Lawrence & Wishart. Howaldt, J., and Hochgerner, J. (2018) ‘Desperately Seeking: A Shared Understanding of Social Innovation’, in Howaldt, J., Kaletka, C., Schröder, A., and Zirngiebl, M. (eds), Atlas of Social Innovation: New Practices for a Better Future. Dortmund Sozialforschungsstelle, TU Dortmund University, pp. 18–21. Logue, D. (2019) Theories of Social Innovation. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Mills, C.W. (2000) The Sociological Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press (40th anniversary edition). Moscibrodzki, P., Li, J., and Peeling, R.W. (2021) ‘Social Innovation in Health: A Critical but Overlooked Component of the COVID-19 Pandemic Response’, BMJ Innovations, 7: 523–525. Raworth, K. (2017) Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st Century Economist. London: Penguin.

Conclusion  301 Schumpeter, J. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Routledge. Taylor-Gooby, P. (2006) Risk in Social Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Turnbull, N. (2022) ‘Permacrisis: What It Means and Why It’s Word of the Year for 2022’, The Conversation, 11 November. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (2016) Policy Innovations for Transformative Change: Implementing the 2020 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Geneva: UNRISD. Williams, F. (2016) ‘Critical Thinking in Social Policy: The Challenges of Past, Present and Future’, Social Policy & Administration, 50(6): 628–647.

Index

Accelerating Fair Chance Project 280–83 accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCAs) 136 Acheson Report (1998) 176 Acting Now to Prepare Recovery Plan (2021) 251, 256, 257 action research 78, 81–2, 84–5 Adaptable Program Loan (APL) 147 ‘adopt-a-school’ programme 150–51 adoption of innovation 21, 62, 94, 124 affordability, water and sanitation, SSA 135 Africa 43, 76, 159, 160–61 see also Middle East and North Africa (MENA); Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) ageing 10, 199–201, 202 agency 51, 52, 192, 194, 213, 225, 299 agriculture 151, 215 Aiken, M. 221, 222, 230 Al Gharaibeha, F. 155 Al-Nakeeb, A. 155 Alcock, P. 66 Alma Ata Declaration 176 Alquézar, R.C. 270 alternative platforms 264, 267–9 altruism 4, 42, 46 Amazon 264, 265, 269, 270, 271, 272 Ansell, C. 236 antenarratives 81 anti-trust law 265, 270, 271, 272 Arab Gulf Countries 144, 149, 153 Arab Human Development Report 147 artificial intelligence 110 arts-based interventions 178 Ashoka 16, 149, 152 asset investment 138–9 asset-based clubs 136–7 asset-based welfare SI 66 association 41, 46 asylum seekers 10, 212, 215 Australia 17, 177, 179, 182 Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 278 Ayob, N. 51 ‘baby boomer’ generation 200, 205 Baldwin, P. 24 Banerjee, S. 3, 31, 159 Bangladesh 16, 43 Barilla Center for Food and Nutrition 237 Baruah, B. 113

basic income 19, 180–81 Battilana, J. 97 Beckman, C. 275 Belgium 66, 69, 123–4 BEPA 50 Beveridge, W. 26, 32 Bibars, I. 149, 155 bifocal innovation 145, 146, 149, 152, 153 big data 110, 269–70, 271 Big Noise, Sistema Scotland 178 Bill 65 (2021) 248, 257 Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act (1996) 240 Bitrán, R.A. 133 Black Report (1977) 176 Bodini, R. 145 Bonifacio, M. 146 Borzaga, C. 145 bottom-up approaches 9, 10, 49, 53, 57, 67, 162, 164, 165, 214, 219–31 Bramanti, V. 239 Brandsen, T. 65, 68 Braun, J.V. 164 brokers, innovation through 139–40 Brown, T. 276, 277 Brundtland report (1987) 120 Buitron, N. 268–9 bureaucracy 193, 229, 278, 298 burial societies 138–9 Butera, J.D. 134 Cairney, P. 177 Calisto Friant, M. 257 Callorda Fossati, E. 114 Canada 20, 63, 67, 179, 195, 215–16, 245–60 capability(ies) 3, 29, 54, 99 capability perspective 49, 50–52, 54–5 capacity/capacity-building 3, 19–20, 42, 52, 54, 55 Capital in the 21st Century 42 capitalism 44, 46, 100, 267 care 57, 112, 113, 290 see also childcare; healthcare; long-term care cargo bikes 124 Caritas 154 caste system 160 Castro-Arroyave, D. 123 Chambers, R. 161 Chambon, J.-L. 55

302

Index  303 Chancel, L. 40, 44 Chantier de l’économie sociale 252, 253, 258 chatbots 110 Chemouni, B. 134 childcare 57, 58, 111, 115, 167 children 66, 134, 148, 150, 155, 160–61, 162, 167, 168, 178 China 17, 21, 159, 271 Chiroro, C. 136 Churchman, C. 163 Ciccia, R. 111 circular economy 11, 245–6 policy, Quebec see Quebec Circular Economy Fund 251, 253, 256, 257, 258 citizen engagement 52, 53, 214, 275, 279 see also co-production(s); participation citizen science 111 citizen-led SI 52, 55 citizenship 28, 29, 30, 49, 111 civic crowdfunding 17, 95–7 civil society 19, 20, 45, 46, 53, 57, 100, 112, 139, 146, 212, 214, 236, 264 clearinghouse centers 190 climate change 44, 122, 211 Climate Plan 2020–2030 (Quebec) 251, 256, 257 The Clothing Bank (South Africa) 123 Cloward, R. 66 co-create impact, in research 84–5 co-funding 96 co-production(s) 26, 49, 51, 53, 54, 97, 155, 165, 169, 187, 194–5, 275, 279–80, 281, 282, 283 coercive welfare 32, 33 collaboration 68, 93, 99, 147, 189, 216, 259 collaborative governance 11, 235–42 food recovery and redistribution as a SI 237–40 conclusion 242 Milano Food Hub 240–42 social innovation and 235–6 collaborative research 81, 82, 85–6 collective action 38, 165, 230, 289, 291 collective challenges, meeting 31–2 collective empowerment 51, 52, 54 collective solutions 50, 203 Community Development Projects (CDPs) 289 community engagement 169, 203 community gardens 69 community health nursing (CHN) 190, 195–6 community platforms, digital 208, 267 community-based health insurance 134–5 community-based initiatives/projects 31, 34, 66–7, 151, 162, 177–8, 178–9 community-based participation 289

comparative perspective, social policy and SI 25–6 competition 66, 193, 194, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272 confidence, WISE participants 225–6 Conseil Québécois de la coopération et de la mutualité (CQCM) 252, 253, 258 conservative corporate welfare model 111 Constant, S. 144, 149, 155 consumers/consumerism 53, 193, 194, 266, 276, 290, 291, 294 contextuality, in research 80 Cools, P. 69 cooperation 106, 127, 209, 248, 267 Cooperative La Meridiana 206–8 cooperatives 64, 214, 215, 252, 260 corporate social responsibility (CSR) 12, 41, 148, 149, 153 COVID-19 pandemic 20, 43, 116, 159, 176, 205, 219, 224, 229, 230, 264, 282 Cox, D. 164–5 credit unions 31, 180 crises 1, 42, 115, 116 crises ecosystem 7–8, 42–4 critical perspective 6–7 Cullen, J. 214 cultural norms 153, 160, 162 culture(s) 8, 16, 56, 65, 69, 73, 75–6, 77, 80, 84, 85, 153, 204, 214, 265, 266 Dafuleya, G. 138 Dahlgren, G. 173, 174, 175 Dalits/Scheduled Castes 160, 161–2, 163, 166 Danziger, S.H. 63 data portability 270 De Smedt, H. 66 death, covering costs of, SSA 137–9 debt, and health 180 defamilialism 113 Degavre, F. 114 degenderisation 113 Deiglmeier, K. 275 deliberate social innovations 62–70 democracy 96 democratic deficit 30 democratic/radical SI 3, 7 democratisation 49, 53, 55, 291 design and handicraft-based enterprises 151 design thinking (DT) 12, 275–84 case study 280–83 conclusion 283–4 defined 276–8 for social innovation 279–80 desirable social innovation 146 Die Chemie und ihrer Anwendung 120 diffusion of innovation 124

304  Handbook on social innovation and social policy digital abstinence/detox 268 digital assistants 110 digital platforms 11–12, 214, 264–73 alternative 264, 267–9 infrastructure 96–7, 264, 265–7, 269–70 as a new cultural imaginary 266–7 overcoming or restoring the market 270–72 policing 270–71 and service innovation 206–8 and social enterprises, MENA 151, 152–3 social finance 43, 95–7 towards a local Amazon 271–3 Digital Service and Markets Act (EU) 271, 273 digital social innovation 18–19 Directorate, General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) 121 Disabled People’s Movement 291, 294 disadvantage/disadvantaged bureaucracy and reinforcement of 229 failure of welfare 28 and participation 289 and SIs 150 and unemployment 219, 220–22, 230 discrimination 105, 106, 107, 108, 112, 160, 161, 162, 164, 268, 294 discursive resonance 190, 192–3, 195 Disease Management Programs (DPMs) 193 disempowerment 63, 76, 229 disruptive innovation 3, 53, 66, 105, 114–15, 188 dissemination of innovation 127–8, 147 diversity, gender and 104, 107, 110, 111 Donnison, D.V. 25 Dunne, D. 279 Ecoleader Fund 251, 253, 256 economic crises 116 economic inequality 42, 182, 253 economic resilience 109, 110, 116 Economist Intelligence Unit 211 ecosystems 7–8, 42–4, 122, 124, 127, 128, 165–8, 189, 190, 213, 252 education access to 160–61 gender inequality, India 162 service user involvement 293 and SI 52, 57, 147, 150–51, 166, 167–8, 168–9 Education Priority Areas (EPAs) 289 efficacy, of SIBs 94 egalitarianism 268–9 Egypt 144, 149, 151, 152 emancipatory practices 54 emancipatory research 82, 294 embedded social innovations 10, 189–90, 191–3

embodied practice, in research 74, 77, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85 emotional knowing, in research 77 employability 214, 221, 280–83 employment 151, 256 see also labour market; unemployment; work insertion social enterprises (WISEs) employment guarantee scheme, India 161–2, 163–4, 166 Employment and Social Innovation Programme 153 empowerment 29, 291 female 107, 116, 151–2 in healthcare provision 194 and participation 288 place-based 219 SIs and 7, 33, 49, 50–52, 53, 58, 63, 123, 214, 215, 221, 225, 226, 228–9 technologies and 109 enabler role, state 54 end users, in design thinking 275, 276, 278, 279, 280, 281 energy efficiency initiative 125 enfleshed’ matrix’ 77–8 entrepreneurship see migrant entrepreneurship; social enterprises/entrepreneurship Environment Protection Agency (EPA) 237 Environmental Quality Act (1987) 247–8, 253, 257, 258 epistemic justice 169 epistemicide 44 equality 4, 29, 40 see also gender equality; income equality Espai Familiars (Barcelona) 57 Esping-Anderson, G. 38, 111 ethical foundation, Titmus’ approach to welfare 46 Ethiopia 138–9 ethnic replacement 216 ethnography 78, 79–80 ethnomethodology 78–9 European Commission (EC) 16, 18, 115, 120, 121, 146, 200, 201 European Green Deal (EC) 120 European Union (EU) food recovery and distribution 239 food waste 237 gender equality 106, 107, 108 migration 215 platform policing 270, 271 policy discourse 146–7 public policy 18, 19 social enterprise ecosystem 42 sustainability/sustainable development 121, 122, 128

Index  305 see also individual countries Eurostat 205 evaluative bias 76, 85 evidence-based policy and practice 19, 188, 193 EX-IN project (EU) 126 exchange, social mission platforms 96 experiential knowledge 293, 294 experimental research 81–2 Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) 247, 248, 257, 258 Facebook 95, 264, 268, 269, 270, 272 facial recognition software 110 familialism 112 family(ies) 56, 57, 112 Family by Family 17 Farmer, P.E. 135 Fasang, A.E. 220 feminist analysis 8, 111–15 Ferretti, T. 267, 270 Feynman, R.P. 34 fieldwork 80 finance and women’s empowerment 110 see also funding financial inclusion 179–80 financial risk protection 134 financialisation 93, 95, 99 Finland 20, 182, 195 Fondaction (Quebec) 253, 256, 257–8 food insecurity 134, 151, 237 food recovery and redistribution 11, 237–42 food security 166, 237, 242, 259 food surplus 11, 237, 238 food waste 237, 259 foodbanks 63, 66 fortress circular economy 257, 258 France 17, 18 Fraser, N. 113 functionings 50–51 funding 17, 18, 21, 132, 203 MENA 147, 149, 150, 153 Quebec 251, 253, 256, 257, 258 refugee support 215–16 WISE programmes 229, 230 see also asset investment; social finance funeral insurance 138 G8 Taskforce, on impact investing 98 ‘gap-mending’ process 293 Gash, A. 236 gatekeepers 266, 273 Gatzweiler, F.W. 165 gender, and health 179 gender blindness 111, 113

gender equality 8–9, 104–116 social innovation 104–5, 114 gender equality policies reversal 107 social innovation in the context of 107–110 technological 110–111 social policy 105–7 Gender Equality Strategy (EU) 107 gender inequality 105, 106, 112, 113, 116, 162 gendered innovation 108, 109 General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 271 general wellbeing 227 generation perspective, of ageing 200–201 Generation Z 200, 201 Germany 20, 32, 124, 125, 126–7, 128, 190, 191–2, 196, 212–13, 214 Gestel, N. van 3 Ghys, T. 123–4 Gibson, L. 155 Giedion, U. 133 The Gift Relationship 42 Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (2019) 122 global perspective, social policy and SI 25–6 global population 199 share of migrants as percentage of 211 Global South 9, 26, 163 goal congruence 230 The Good Samaritan parable 34 governance, and funding 91, 97 government(s) enquiries, on health inequalities, UK 176 and SI implementation 69 social finance 92, 93, 95 support for innovation, MENA 149, 152 Government Sustainable Development Strategy 2015–2020 (Quebec) 248, 253 Governmental Action Plan in the Social Economy 2020–2025 (PAGES, Quebec) 251, 252, 256, 258 grand societal challenges 26–7, 29 green economy 248–51, 258 Green Municipal Fund (GMF) 247, 257 GreenHouse Project, South Africa 139–40 Greenwald, D. 144, 149, 155 Greve, B. 38 Grimes, M. 96–7 Grotenbreg, S. 3 Guidebook for the Preparation of Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) for SDGs Roadmaps (UN) 121 Guyer, J. 267 Haugh, H. 225

306  Handbook on social innovation and social policy health nudges 194 research, ‘public, patient involvement’ 294 social determinants of 173, 174, 175, 181 WISE programmes and 227–8 see also ill-health; mental health Health in All Policies (HiAP) 176–7, 182 health equity 177 health fee waivers 133, 134 health grants 133 Health Impact Assessments (HIAs) 177 health inequalities 181, 182 in the UK see United Kingdom (UK) Health Lens Analysis 177 health security, Africa 134 healthcare accessing, SSA 133–5 consumers 193, 194 empowerment in 194 participation 290 social innovations 10, 125–7, 147, 151–2, 187–9, 195–6 Heiscala, R. 225 hermeneutic understanding 82, 84–5 hidden resources, mobilisation of 53 high-income countries 145, 176, 180, 181, 237 high-tech strategy (Germany) 128 Hillman, F. 213 Hoeyer, K. 266 holistic approaches 114, 151, 167, 176, 187, 222, 229, 281 horizontal interventions 177 hospice movement 192–3 housing 67, 123, 203–4 Howaldt, J. 42 Hulgård, L. 165, 169 Human Rights Watch 136, 167 human-centered design see design thinking (DT) hybridity 3, 8 ideation space, in design thinking 277, 280, 281 IDEO model 276–7 ideology 6, 287–9, 290, 291–2 see also neoliberalism ill-fare 39, 40, 41 ill-health 174, 175, 220, 224 Illich, I. 193 immersive research 80 impact investing 97–9, 152 implementation of innovations 69 implementation space, in design thinking 277 inclusion see financial inclusion; social inclusion income equality 113 income inequality 40, 156 independent assessors, SIBs 92

independent living 291 India 9–10, 38–9, 41, 159–69 social policy role in addressing marginalities 161–5 and SI ecosystem 165–8 Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 220 indigenous people, circular economy and 259, 260 individual empowerment 51 Industry 4.0 and Industry 5.0 revolutions 19, 121 inequality(ies) crisis ecosystem and 42, 43, 44 and exclusion 159 Latin America 74 policy response and 38 reduction in welfare and 53 SI and creation of new 52 within-country and between-country 40 see also economic inequality; gender inequality; health inequalities; income inequality informal markets/economy 8, 73–4, 75, 155 research see Latin America information and communications technology (ICT) 206, 215 innovation incubators 18–19, 139, 149, 152, 153–4, 156 innovation labs and hubs 16–17, 149, 152, 281 innovation policies 15, 18, 19, 108, 121, 124, 128, 147 innovation ranking (World Bank) 147 inspiration space, in design thinking 277 Institute of Design (d.School) 277 institutional contexts, and innovation transfer 67 institutional infrastructure (platform) 96–7 institutional innovation 3 institutional mobility, SI as resistance against 55 institutional theory, and social finance 99, 100 institutional-redistributive welfare state 39–40, 45 social innovation in 41–2 institutionalisation 33, 40, 55, 57, 58, 156, 160, 163, 193 institutional–reciprocal welfare state, social innovation in 44–6 integral research approach 86–7 inter-being, in research 77 inter-knowing, in research 74, 77, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86 intermediaries, SIBs 92 International Center for Research on Women 109 International Labour Organisation (ILO) 161 internationalist, egalitarian political mobilization 40 interpretation, in research 80, 85, 86

Index  307 intersectionality 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 116, 159, 160, 165, 169 intersectoral policy-making, health inequalities, UK 176–7 Inuit policy-making 259 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) 259 IPSOS report (2002) 202 Iraq 155 irre menschlich initiative 124, 125–7 Irurita, M.I. 123 Isidora (platform) 206–8 Islamic finance 152 Islamic philanthropy 149 Islamic principles, and CSR 153 Italy 56, 204–5, 206–8, 213, 214, 215, 240–42 iterative design thinking 277, 279, 280, 281, 283 Jamali, D. 148, 149 Jeong, S. 149, 153 Jernsand, E.M. 214 Johnston, H.W. 137 Johnston, M.T. 181 Jones, W. 135 Jung, J. 149, 153 Kaletka, C. 42 Kandlik Eltanani, M. 176 ‘Keep the Change’ savings program 278 Khan, L. 270, 273 Kjaer, M. 43 Klimczak, J. 106, 112 knowledge 6, 169, 293, 294 see also inter-knowing knowledge economy 9, 147, 148 Kraff, H. 214 Kudumbashree 43–4 La Legge del Buon Samaritano 240 labour market 111, 112, 115, 125 see also employment Lanteri, A. 148 large-scale initiatives 31, 33, 41 Latin America, social inclusion research 8, 73–87 methodological biases 75–6 methodological resilience 76–8 guidelines for 83–6 learning from established inquiries 78–82 need for empirical, qualitative research 74–5 Latour, B. 44 leadership 20 learning 1, 109, 114, 293 Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL) 147 Lebanon 144, 149, 151, 152, 153, 155 Lee, M. 97 Legacy Borehole Drilling Trust 136–7

legislation/legal context 17, 20, 29, 106, 239–40, 247–8, 252, 253, 257, 258, 265, 267, 270, 271, 272, 290 legitimacy, social mission platforms 96 Lemsafa 139 Lewin, K. 81 Liebig, J. von 120 lifestyle drift 174 lifestyle shifts 123 Limits to Growth 120 Lindberg, M. 108, 113 Lintner, C. 213 listening, in research 81 Lister, R. 113 livelihood 161 living body, in research 79 living conditions, improving 179–80 living stories, in research 81 local embeddedness 190, 191 local welfare policy 8, 49, 53–4, 55 Locaste, J.P. 136 Logue, D. 96–7 Lombardo, E. 104 long-term care 201, 203, 204 long-term unemployment 219, 230 longevity housing and 203 see also Silver and Longevity Economy (S&LE) low -and middle-income countries 116, 133, 144, 145–8, 151, 159, 237 low-income households, energy saving check initiative 125 low-income markets see informal markets/ economy MacCallum, D. 41 McCoy, J. 44 macro-oriented approach, to welfare 38 macro-policies, and health 180–81 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) 161–2, 163–4, 166 Mair, J. 94 male breadwinner model 56, 112 Malhotra, A. 109 marginalisation/marginalised 292 South Asia and India 10, 159, 160, 168 role of social policy in counteracting 161–5 market(s) 45, 46, 57, 93, 98, 99–100, 162–3 market rhetoric, digital platforms 266 market-driven policies 106, 290 marketization 94–5, 188, 193, 213 Marmot Review (2010) 176

308  Handbook on social innovation and social policy Marshall, T.H. 28 Masabo, J. 135 medical innovations 188 medical model of ill health 174 mega-innovation 39–41, 46 Melacini, M. 239 Men’s Sheds 178–9 Mensakas 265, 270 mental health 105, 126–7, 180, 220–21, 224, 227 Merleau-Ponty, M. 77 methodological biases 75–6 methodological resilience 8, 73, 76–86 micro- and meso-level approach, to welfare 38 microfinance/microcredit 5, 31, 43, 110, 151, 179–80 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 9, 144–56 social innovation assessing nature and scope for social policy 154–5 condition and development of 148–52 factors determining nature and scope of 152–4 for policy in low-and middle-income countries 145–8 migrant entrepreneurship 212–13 migrants/migration 10–11, 211–17 estimated numbers 45, 211 politics of SI 216–17 social innovation and integration of 211–16 Milano Food Hub 240–42 Miledù 215 milieu, in discussions of SI 146 Miller, D.T. 275 Ministry of Community Development (UAE) 152–3 Mkandawire, T. 156 mobilisation-participation processes 51 mobility, global 211 mobility practices 124 modernity 44 modernization 193–4 Moedas, C. 18 Monroy, M.C. 123 Morocco 144, 149, 150 mother tongue-based bilingual systems 168 motivation 225–7 Moulaert, F. 41, 53, 163, 190 Mulgan, G. 279 Multikulti 214 MYC4 microcredit platform 43 Myrdal, G. and A. 39 narrative research 78, 80–81, 85 National Education Policy 2020 (India) 166, 167–8, 168–9

National Health Service and Community Care Act (1990) 290 National Health Service (NHS) 173, 174, 175, 188 National Innovation Centre for Ageing (UK) 206 National Inuit Climate Change Strategy 259 National Planning Commission (India) 165 National Rural Livelihood Mission (NRLM) 166–7 needs life and evolution of different 200 see also social needs neighbourhood health centres (Belgium) 123–4 neoliberalism 21, 32, 40, 50, 106–7, 115, 154, 162, 168, 214, 216, 221–2, 267, 287–8, 290, 291, 292 Nesta 288 networks 18–19, 20, 34, 53, 70, 95, 96, 98, 123, 136, 141, 154, 189, 226–7 new social movements 290, 291 new social risks (NSRs) 26, 29, 56 Nicholls, A. 3, 30, 146 Nino, A. 31 non-disruptive innovation 188 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 17, 20, 74, 153, 156 non-platform interaction 268 non-profit organisations (NPOs) 91, 92, 93, 95, 132–3, 139, 140, 235, 236, 238, 239, 240, 256 Nordic countries 20, 39, 182, 195, 205 see also Finland; Sweden novelty 3, 4, 163 nudges/nudging 194, 266, 267, 288 Nunagat Food Security Strategy (ITK) 259 Nyssens, M. 221 Obama, B. 20, 128, 236 O’Carroll, M. 225 Ocean Plastics Charter 247 Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation 20, 128, 236 Øland, T. 39 old social risks (OSRs) 26, 29 older people 10, 199–209 social innovation and housing 203–5 technology 205–8 see also ageing; Silver and Longevity Economy (S&LE) Oliver, K.L. 81 ‘one-crisis-at-a-time’ approach 43 ontological bias 75–6, 84 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 18, 201, 288

Index  309 organisations and funding 91 MENA 153, 154–5 see also non-governmental organisations (NGOs); non-profit organisations (NPOs) Ottawa Charter (WHO) 192, 194 outcomes 51, 94, 105, 146, 173 Padovan-Özdemir, M. 39 paid/unpaid work 112, 166 Painter, G. 275 Palladium Group 114 Palme, O. 40 Parahoo, S. 155 participant observation 79, 80 participation 12, 26, 29, 50, 58, 165 competing ideologies 291–2 competing pressures 290–91 and democratisation of welfare 53 Disabled People’s Movement 291 divisive and exclusionary pressures 292–4 early developments 289 and empowerment 51 ideological relations 289 in local policy 53–4 and SI 288 social mission platforms 96, 97 see also citizen engagement; co-productions(s) participatory action research 82 partnership(s) 39, 46, 92, 135, 152, 206, 248, 259, 267, 280, 293 Patel, P. 109 Pathé, D.F. 134 patterns, in ethnography 80 Peckham Health Centre 187–8 Pel, B. 190 people-centred SI 3, 7, 10, 44, 164–5, 169 permacrisis 27, 298 person-based strategies 177, 178 personal development, WISE programmes and 225–6 Petesch, P. 109 Pettersson, K. 113 phenomenography 80 philanthropy 20, 149 Phills, J.A. 275 Piketty, T. 40, 42, 44 Piven, F. 66 place-based empowerment 219 place-making programmes 34 platform cooperativism 206–8, 265, 267, 268, 270, 273 platform logic 96

platformization 264–5 Platteau, A. 221 Pol, E. 57, 146, 149, 152 Polanyi, K. 44, 45 polarization 44–5 policy impact 8, 63–5 Policy Innovations for Transformative Change (UNRISD) 27 policy reform 7, 9, 11, 28, 195 policy transfer 8 defined 62 social innovation and key themes in analysis of 65–8 what is gained 68–70 politics inescapability of 27–8 and participation 290, 292 of social innovation 216–17 positive deviants 276 post-industrial society 57 poverty 159 evaluative bias 76 high rate of 63 India 160, 161, 166 and informal markets 73–4 poverty reduction 63, 64–5, 66, 69, 151, 159, 162 power 28, 31, 38, 266, 267, 283 power relations 6, 9, 26, 51, 104, 106, 109, 187 power structures 7, 162, 163, 164 PowerUs 293 Press, B. 44 pressure groups 290–91 private sector collaborators, migrant integration 216 design thinking in 277–8, 279 food recovery and redistribution 238 investors, social finance 17, 92, 93, 95 privatisation 30, 40, 54, 97, 106, 154, 168, 290, 291 problem-solving 34, 82, 114, 151 process evaluators, SIBs 92 professional–user interactions 194 proto-native understanding, in research 80, 85 prototyping 277–8 psychosis seminars 126 public bodies SI relationship with 52 step-back as service providers 57 public policy(ies) association of ageing and illness 201–2 migration 214 social innovation and 7, 15–22 collective empowerment 51 common challenges 20–21 diversity across countries 16–20

310  Handbook on social innovation and social policy intrinsic relationship between 41 lessons for 54–5 move into 16 relevance for local 53–4 resilience 52 visibility in 15 public sector design thinking 278 food recovery and redistribution 238–9 innovation 2, 18, 148, 155 role, SI and welfare 57 public utility providers, platforms as 270 public-private partnerships 92, 267 public–private funding 203 qualitative research, informal markets see Latin America quality criteria, in research 80, 81, 83, 85–6 Quebec 245–60 circular economy policies explicit and implicit 246–7, 247–51, 260 and social economy policy, convergence 11, 256–60 social economy policies 252–6 Quebec Plan for the Development of Critical and Strategic Minerals 2020-2025 (2020) 248 Quebec Plan for a Green Economy 2030 (2020) 248–51 Quebec Residual Materials Management Policy 248, 253, 258 Quijano, A. 84 R&D 18 Raftopoulos, B. 136 rainbow model of health 174, 175 re-use centres 69 reciprocity 41, 42, 45, 46, 80 see also institutional-reciprocal welfare state redistribution 45, 46, 156 see also food recovery and redistribution; institutional-redistributive welfare state reflective strategies, in research 80, 81, 85 reformist circular economy 257, 260 refugees 10, 116, 151, 211, 212, 215–16 relational bias 76, 84, 85 relational configurations, social finance and new 94, 95, 99 relational processes, in qualitative research 77–8 religion 56, 149 religious welfare organisations 154–5 (re)institutionalisation 70 resistance against institutional immobility 55 to innovation 69

resources, empowerment and 51 Responsible Finance lenders 180 return on investment, in SIBs 92 Reuters report (2016) 149 Ridde, V. 135 riders/rider platform 264–5 right to complaint 290 rights, recognising 28–30 rights-oriented policy (India) 166 risk-pooling funds 138 risks 26–7, 29, 56 Rittel, H. 222 Roots and Routes 214 Rosen, J. 275 rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) 136 Rwanda 134–5 Sainsbury, D. 111 Samaritan organisations 34 Santos, B. de S. 44 Saska, S. 113 Saska-Crozier, S. 109 Saudi Arabia 149 Saunders, C. 192 Saussey, M. 114 savings groups, Zimbabwe 136–7 scale/scaling digital infrastructure 266 social impact bonds 94 school meals 134 Schreiner, K. 149, 153 Schröder, A. 42 Schulte, J. 109 Schultz, N. 44 Schumpeter, J. 146 Schwab Foundation 16, 149 science 18 Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) policy 120 Scotland 176–7, 178, 179 sectoral initiatives 19 Seelos, C. 94 self-efficacy 219, 221, 225–7, 229 self-help/groups 9, 30, 126, 134, 136, 140–41, 166–7, 189, 191–2, 193, 299 Sen, A. 51, 160 Sender, J. 160 senior housing 204–5 Sert, S. 239 service satisfaction, healthcare, Africa 134 Shajahan, P. 165, 169 Shaping Our Lives 293 Sidani, Y. 148, 149

Index  311 Silver and Longevity Economy (S&LE) 199, 200, 208 defining 201–2 social innovation 202–3 Sistema Scotland, Big Noise 178 Skoll Foundation 16, 149 small-scale initiatives 30, 31, 133, 140, 189, 217 Smith, A. 99 Smith, K.E. 176, 177 social attitudes 109 social change 3, 7, 38, 45, 46, 51, 123, 187 people-centred, India 159–69 social citizenship 28, 29, 111 social cohesion 123, 147, 151, 177, 221 social contract 154, 156 social democratic welfare model 38, 39, 40, 45–6, 111 social determinants of health 173, 174, 175, 181 Social Economy Act (2013, Quebec) 252, 253 Social Economy Challenge (Quebec) 251, 256 social economy policies, Quebec see Quebec social embeddedness, and unemployment 220 social enterprises/entrepreneurship 3, 9, 16, 42, 43, 46, 98, 99, 214, 252 and gender 114 MENA 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150–52, 153, 156 social environment, and SI transfer 68 social exclusion 159, 160, 161, 162, 220–21 social finance 8, 17, 91–100 impact investing and social stock exchanges 97–9, 152 organizational and governance landscape 91 social impact bonds 30, 92–5, 99 social mission platforms and crowdfunding 95–7 theorizing implications 99–100 see also micro-finance/microcredit social impact bonds (SIBs) 17, 30, 92–5, 99 social inclusion mental health initiative 125–7 of migrants 211–12 in policy 112, 293 research, Latin America see Latin America youth offenders and employment 280–83 social innovation(s) Africa see Middle East and North Africa (MENA); Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) capability perspective 49, 50–52 collaborative governance 235–42 crises ecosystem 42–4 definitions 1–4, 31, 50–52, 275, 288 design thinking for 279–80 embedded 10, 189–90, 191–3 empirical research 123

feminist analysis 113–15 funding see funding in the health sector 133–5, 151–2, 177–81, 187–9, 195–6 ideological relations of 288–9 migration/migrants 212–16, 216–17 not culminating in a movement 193–5 and policy see gender equality policies; public policy(ies); social policy; social policy analysis Silver and Longevity Economy (S&LE) 202–3 socio-economic biases of 49, 52–3 with structural potential 70 sustainable development 63, 122–7, 151, 153 systemic nature 146 ‘tapestry’ approach 222 unreasonableness of 30 welfare states 41–2, 44–6, 55–8 Social Innovation Exchange (SIX) 1–2, 21 Social Innovation Fund (Ireland) 17 social innovation triad 146 social insurance 32 social investment funds 17, 152 social mission platforms 95–7 social model of disability 291 social needs, and SI 5, 50, 52, 58, 63, 64, 202, 214, 215, 224–5, 235, 280–83 MENA 144, 149, 154, 155, 156 social norms 110, 116, 153, 160, 162 social policy 1 applied 4 discipline of 5, 24, 25 feminist analysis 111–13 funding see funding gender equality 105–7 health inequalities, UK 173–7 India role in addressing marginalities 161–5 and SI ecosystem 165–8 mobility practices 124 social innovation Africa see Middle East and North Africa (MENA); Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) critical perspective 6–7 dialogue and disagreements 4–6 the future of 297–300 the gap and the climate 21 as indispensable to 27 relationship, India 162–4 as a response to challenges of 1 Titmus 38 see also local welfare policy; policy impact; policy reform; policy transfer

312  Handbook on social innovation and social policy social policy analysis social finance mechanisms 91 and social innovation 5, 6, 7, 24–34 developing the dialogue 33–4 learning from 1, 2 lessons 27–33 pragmatism and practicality 24–5 a shared agenda 25–7 and specific social problems 62, 63 social problem(s) digital platforms as 264, 266, 267 innovations and depoliticisation of 30 social impact bonds 94 and structural reduction of 63, 64 and transfer of 66–7 social policy analysis 62 social policy and 1, 5, 8 technology as 268 and welfare regimes 45 social protection 25, 29, 154, 166, 199 social relations digital platforms 95 in research 76, 77, 81, 84, 85 and SI 50, 51, 54, 68, 69, 98, 108, 164, 165, 213, 288–9 and welfare provision 24 social restaurants 69 social security 32, 111–13, 176, 202 social status 111, 160, 161, 162, 166 social stock exchanges 97–9 social transformation 3, 51, 169, 199 social value(s) 2–3, 4, 98, 99, 159, 165, 215, 222, 268 socialism 40 society, markets and 99–100 socio-ecological transitions 120, 121–2, 123, 128 socio-economic biases, of SI 49, 52–3 socio-economic integration, of migrants 212–14 socio-economics, feminist 114 Sol Price Center for Social Innovation 280, 281 solidarity 4, 33, 38, 41, 45, 46, 134, 167 solutionism 21 solutions, innovations and transfer of 66–7 Somer, M. 44 South Africa 98, 123, 133, 136, 137, 138, 139–40 South Asia 9–10, 159, 161 Southern European welfare states, SI in 55–8 Sovacool, B.K. 128 space, transfer of innovations over 66 space between, in research 79 Spain 56, 57, 264, 265, 270 spiral of action research 82, 84 Srnicek, N. 265 state

enabler role 54 responsibility to provide rights 30 and SI, MENA 146 state-market dichotomy, India 162–3 Steinmüller, H. 268–9 strategic approach, to SI as social policy 62, 70 Strategy on Zero Plastic Waste (Canada) 247 Stromsparcheck 123, 124, 125 strong SI tradition 51, 53, 54 structural transformations 121 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 9, 132–41, 159 social innovation in accessing health services 133–5 in accessing water 135–7 conclusions 140–41 through brokers 139–40 to cover costs of death 137–9 social policy 132, 133, 134, 135, 140 societal and environmental challenges 132–3 subjectivity (researcher) 79 subsidies 135 support, WISE programmes and 228–9 sustainability discourse 121 need for SIs 122 potential of SI to address 120 of SIs 4, 28–9, 93 sustainable development 9, 120–28 challenges, South Asia 161 policies 120 social innovation 63, 122–8, 151, 153 Sustainable Development Act (2006, Quebec) 248, 257 Sustainable Development Action Plan 2020–2022 (Quebec) 251 Sustainable Development Goals (UN) 18, 97, 104, 107, 120, 123, 125, 127, 134 Sustainable Livelihoods Approach 161, 166 Sustainable Montreal 2016–2020 plan 251 Sweden 20, 39, 40, 182, 214 Sweet, E. 180 TACSI 17 Taiwan 18 techlash 266, 268 technocratic circular economy 257, 258, 260 technocratic SI 3 technological innovations 3, 110–111, 122 technology and gender equality 104, 109–110, 116 medical innovation 188 and social innovation 18–19, 205–8, 215 see also digital platforms theory and practice 87 time, transfer of innovative concepts over 66

Index  313 Titmuss, R. 6, 7, 38, 39, 40–41, 42, 45, 46 top-down approaches 11, 45, 162–3, 289, 291 tourism 151, 213, 214 traditional welfare model 56 transformational circular economy 257, 260 transformational impact/change 12, 27, 31, 32, 50, 55, 109, 164 transformative platforms 268 transformative power 93, 191–3 transgender and gender non-conforming (TGNC) young people 105, 106 translocal connectivity 190, 191–2, 195 transparency, of SIBs 93 Tregenna, F. 138 trust 9, 68, 98, 191, 293 Tuncel, O. 44 Tunisia 147, 149, 151, 152 Turkey 17, 149, 151, 152, 153 Ubudehe system 135 understanding, in research 80, 81, 82, 84–5, 86 ‘undoing gender’ 108, 109 unemployment social disadvantage and 219, 220–22, 230 social innovations 125, 280–83 and unemployment policy, UK 219–21 UNICEF 107, 108, 133, 160 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 18, 144, 148, 149, 151, 152–3, 154, 155, 156 United Kingdom (UK) 32, 63, 66, 67, 69, 173–83, 287 health inequalities social innovations 177–81 social policy 173–7 integration of migrants 214 participation 288, 289, 290, 291, 293, 294 public policy and social innovation 16, 17, 19, 20 technology and ageing 206 unemployment 219–20 unemployment policy 221–2, 225 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 45, 135, 152 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) 27, 31 United Nations (UN) 74, 105, 107, 144, 147, 211 United States (US) 19, 20, 39, 63, 66, 115, 128, 204, 236, 240, 280–83 universal breadwinner model 112–13 universal health coverage 182 universal welfare 38–9 universities 20, 152, 168, 169, 196 unsustainability 120–21 upstream–downstream analogy, and health behaviour 174, 181

urban planning, gender dimension in 110–111 Urban, S. 135 US Department of Agriculture (USDA) 237 user-centered innovations 194 user-led innovations 111 utopia(s) 34, 44, 188, 271, 300 validation, in research 81, 85–6 Vandecasteele, L. 220 Verloo, M.M.T. 104 vertical interventions 177–8 Village Savings and Loans (VSLs) 136 Ville, S. 57, 146, 149, 152 Vivere OVER 204–5 volunteerism 43, 68, 69, 215–16 Vranken, J. 66 Warde, P. 120 water and sanitation, in SSA 132, 135–7 weak SI tradition 51 Webb, B. and S. 6, 32 Webber, M. 222 Weber, M. 44 welfare democratisation of 49, 53, 55 India 165 reduction/retrenchment 53, 56, 57, 214, 216 social innovation, MENA 154–5, 156 social policy analysis and SI 28, 32–3 universal 38–9 see also local welfare policy welfare regimes 5, 38, 56, 57, 111, 112 welfare state(s) 24–5 feminist analysis of 111–13 interrelated capacity 42 lack of, and the need for SI 25–6 neoliberalism and migration policies 216 responding to risks 26–7 SI in Southern European 55–8 as a social mega-innovation 39–41 social policy 5 see also institutional-redistributive welfare state; institutional–reciprocal welfare state wellbeing 4, 29, 34, 57, 105, 123, 180, 203, 219, 221, 224, 225, 227–8, 229 Westley, F. 31 Whitehead, M. 173, 174, 175, 177 wicked problems 4, 146, 163, 202, 219, 222, 300 Wikipedia 269 Williams, F. 288 Wódz, K. 106, 112 women empowerment 107, 116, 151–2 exclusion/marginalisation, India 160, 166–7

314  Handbook on social innovation and social policy integration of migrant, Sweden 214 lack of welfare, Southern Europe 57 SI, targeting, MENA 151 status in society 111 see also gender equality; gender inequality work insertion social enterprises (WISEs) 11, 213–14, 230 neoliberalism and undermining of 222 research methodology 222–3 results and discussion 224–9 role in disadvantage and unemployment 221 WORKEEN 215 workhouses 63 working conditions, improving 179–80 World Bank 107, 133, 144, 147

World Economic Forum 16, 98 World Health Organization (WHO) 107, 126, 134, 135, 176, 192 World Population Prospects (UN, 2019) 199 World Social Report (UN, 2020) 26–7 Wright, G.H. von 46 Wyatt, J. 277 Young Foundation 3, 21 youth offenders 280–83 Yunus, M. 46 Zibagwe, S. 138 Zimbabwe 136–7