Handbook on Peacekeeping and International Relations 1839109920, 9781839109928

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HANDBOOK ON PEACEKEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Handbook on Peacekeeping and International Relations Edited by

Han Dorussen Professor of Government, Department of Government, University of Essex, UK

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Han Dorussen 2022

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2022946034 This book is available electronically in the Political Science and Public Policy subject collection http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781839109935

ISBN 978 1 83910 992 8 (cased) ISBN 978 1 83910 993 5 (eBook)

EEP BoX

Contents

List of figuresvii List of tablesix List of contributorsx Prefacexiii List of abbreviationsxiv 1

Peacekeeping as rule-based interventions in international relations Han Dorussen

PART I

1

THE DEPLOYMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

2

Mandating peacekeeping operations and international law Emily Helms

12

3

Peacekeeping financing Katharina P. Coleman

27

4

Consent in peacekeeping Timothy Passmore, Johannes Karreth and Jaroslav Tir

46

5

The composition of UN peacekeeping missions Vincenzo Bove, Chiara Ruffa and Andrea Ruggeri

60

6

Naming names: UN Security Council Resolution sentiment in civil wars Michelle Benson and Colin Tucker

74

7

Mediation, political missions, and peacekeeping Han Dorussen

88

8

Non-UN peacekeeping Corinne Bara

PART II

102

WHAT PEACEKEEPERS DO

9

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and peacekeeping operations Dylan Herrera and Andrea González Peña

10

Peacekeeping, security sector reform, and the rule of law Robert A. Blair

134

11

Public information and strategic communications in peace operations Kseniya Oksamytna

148

v

118

vi  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations 12

Civilian components in peace operations Jaïr van der Lijn and Sabine Otto

163

PART III PEACEKEEPING EFFECTIVENESS 13

Peacekeeping and conflict resolution Evgenija Kroeker and Andrea Ruggeri

182

14

Peacekeeping and the geographic diffusion and containment of conflict Bernd Beber

196

15

Peacekeeping and the protection of civilians Lisa Hultman, Jacob D. Kathman and Megan Shannon

210

16

Peacekeeping and electoral violence Hannah Smidt

225

17

Peacekeeping operations and women’s security Louise Olsson

242

PART IV CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING PEACEKEEPING 18

Peacekeeping and the problem of sexual and gender-based violence Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley

19

The material impact of peace operations on the environment and cultural heritage Mathilde Leloup and Lucile Maertens

20

Peacekeeping and postwar violence Jessica Di Salvatore

286

21

Hazards of peacekeeping: peacekeepers as targets of violence Sara Lindberg Bromley

300

22

The local perception of peacekeepers Han Dorussen and Marian de Vooght

314

23

The political economy of peacekeeping: unemployment, violence, and trust towards peacekeepers. Evidence from Somalia Prabin B. Khadka and Anup Phayal

24

Peacekeeping operations: the endgame Richard Caplan, John Gledhill and Maline Meiske

PART V 25

256

270

327 343

CONCLUSIONS

State of the art of research on peacekeeping Paul F. Diehl

360

Index373

Figures

1.1

Number of UN peacekeepers and peacekeeping operations

3

2.1

Distribution of military activity over operational objectives

18

3.1

UN financing model: total approved peacekeeping expenditures, 2009–21

29

3.2

NATO financing model: ISAF and OEF costs, 2008–12

31

3.3

AU financing model: AMISOM financing sources, 2017–20

33

5.1

Unpacking a peace mission

62

5.2

Number of UN troops and contributing countries, 1991–2018

63

5.3a

Contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping, 1991

64

5.3b

Contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping, 2018

64

5.4

Average number of contributing countries per mission

65

6.1

Count of civil conflict resolutions and active civil conflicts

77

6.2

Percentage of resolutions containing sentiment

79

6.3

Number of government-sentiment resolutions during UN peacekeeping operations in civil conflict countries

80

6.4

Number of rebel-sentiment resolutions during UN peacekeeping operations in civil conflict countries

80

7.1

Number of diplomatic, technocratic, political development, and peacekeeping missions per year

92

7.2

Deployment of political and peacekeeping missions before, during and after conflict

97

8.1

Number of UN and non-UN missions vs number of personnel deployed

105

9.1

Peacekeeping operations and DDR in the conflict curve

123

12.1

Deployment of civilian and uniformed personnel to peace operations, 2008–19 166

12.2

International civilian personnel in peace operations deployed by the EU, OSCE, and UN, 2008–20

167

12.3

Proportion of national civilian personnel in peace operations deployed by the UN, 2000–2018

168

vii

viii  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations 12.4

Women’s participation in civilian components of UN peace operations, 2012–20169

15.1

Active UN peacekeeping operations by protection mandate

212

16.1

Mandated election support in peacekeeping operations in Africa

225

17.1

Political violence targeting women, by type of violence

245

18.1

Proportion of conflict actors reported as perpetrators of sexual violence

257

18.2

Number of SEA allegations by age of victim

260

18.3

Per capita SEA allegations by military, police, and civilian personnel

261

20.1

UN peacekeeping personnel types before and after peace

293

20.2

UN peacekeeping personnel types before and after peace

294

21.1

MINUSMA casualties by outcome type, 2017–19

302

21.2

Violence-outcomes recorded for peacekeepers in sub-Saharan Africa, 1989–2009304

21.3

Peacekeeping deployments and violence against peacekeepers in the DRC, 2005–06

305

22.1

Exposure and approval of UN across departments in Haiti

318

22.2

Approval of UN for supporters of different political parties in Haiti

320

23.1

Past survey response carried out by the UN in 2014 and 2016

331

23.2

Comparing local trust on AMISOM, Somali Police, and United Nations, 2020 survey

332

23.3

Mediation model of associations between unemployment/HH economic well-being and level of trust in AMISOM’s ability to provide security via the perception of insecurity

333

23.4a

Impact of economic conditions on trust in AMISOM peacekeepers, OLS results 334

23.4b

Impact of economic conditions on trust in Somali Police, OLS results

335

23.4c

Impact of economic conditions on insecurity, OLS results

336

24.1

Modes of withdrawal and follow-on arrangements

349

Tables

4.1

Distribution of peacekeeping operations across 200 ceasefires from 1947 to 2011 according to type of consent given

51

5.1

Mechanisms of peacekeeping effectiveness

67

6.1

Sentiment language

78

7.1

Political and peacekeeping missions

91

8.1

Replication results 

110

10.1

Empirical evidence on UN peacekeeping and the rule of law

140

12.1

Roles of substantive and mission support sections/divisions in UN peace operations

165

13.1

Types of conflict changes and consequences

190

14.1

Notable data collections

200

15.1

New peacekeeping operations since October 1999 and POC mandates

213

15.2

Protection of civilian mandates and the number of peacekeeping personnel within missions

214

16.1

Peacekeeping and actual or perceived electoral security

236

19.1

Material impact of UN peacekeeping missions, 2019

273

23.1

Summary statistics, 2020 survey

332

23.2

Economic conditions and trust in AMISOM peacekeepers

336

23.3

Economic conditions and trust in Somali Police

337

23.4

Local economy and citizens’ trust towards peacekeepers in Somalia. Robustness tests

338

ix

Contributors

Corinne Bara, Assistant Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden Kyle Beardsley, Professor, Department of Political Science, Duke University, USA Bernd Beber, Senior Researcher at RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, Germany Michelle Benson, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University at Buffalo, State University of New York, USA Robert A. Blair, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations and Public Affairs, Brown University, USA Vincenzo Bove, Professor of Political Science, Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS), University of Warwick, UK Richard Caplan, Professor of International Relations, Department of Politics and International Relations, Fellow of Linacre College, University of Oxford, UK Katharina P. Coleman, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Canada Jessica Di Salvatore, Associate Professor in Political Science and Peace Studies, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK Paul F. Diehl, Independent scholar of international relations, Henning Larsen Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Ashbel Smith Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Texas-Dallas, USA Han Dorussen, Professor of Government, Department of Government, University of Essex, UK John Gledhill, Associate Professor of Global Governance, Department of International Development, Fellow of St Cross College, University of Oxford, UK Andrea González Peña, Lecturer, Department of Economics, Universidad Central, Bogotá, and Team Leader of data analytics, Comisión de la Verdad, Bogotá, Colombia Emily Helms, PhD, Department of Government, University of Essex, UK Dylan Herrera, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland Lisa Hultman, Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden Sabrina Karim, Hardis Family Assistant Professor, Department of Government, Cornell University, USA x

Contributors  xi Johannes Karreth, Associate Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations, Ursinus College, Collegeville, PA, USA Jacob D. Kathman, Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations, Department of Political Science, University at Buffalo, State University of New York, USA Prabin B. Khadka, Lecturer, Department of Government, University of Essex, UK Evgenija Kroeker, DPhil Candidate in International Relations, Department of Politics and International Relations, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, UK Mathilde Leloup, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université Paris 8 Vincennes-St Denis, and Researcher at CRESPPA (Sociology and Politics Research Center Paris)/LabTop (UMR 7217), France Jaïr van der Lijn, Director of the Peace Operations and Conflict Management Programme and Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden, and Associate Fellow at the Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands Sara Lindberg Bromley, Post-Doctoral Researcher, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden Lucile Maertens, Senior Lecturer, CRHIM (Center of International History and Political Studies of Globalization), University of Lausanne, Switzerland Maline Meiske, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, UK Kseniya Oksamytna, Lecturer, Department of International Politics, City, University of London, and Visiting Research Fellow at King’s College London, UK Louise Olsson, Senior Researcher and Research Director of the Global Politics, Norms and Society Department, Peace Research Institute Oslo, Norway Sabine Otto, Assistant Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, and Senior Researcher in Political Science, University of Greifswald, Germany Timothy Passmore, Assistant Professor, Department of International Studies and Political Science, Virginia Military Institute, USA Anup Phayal, Assistant Professor, Department of Public and International Affairs, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, USA Chiara Ruffa, Professor, Centre for International Studies, Sciences Po Paris, France Andrea Ruggeri, Professor of Political Science and International Studies, Department of Politics and International Relations, Director of the Centre for International Studies, Fellow of Brasenose College, University of Oxford, UK Megan Shannon, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, USA

xii  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Hannah Smidt, Head of the research area International Security, Peace and Conflict, Department of Political Science, University of Zürich, Switzerland Jaroslav Tir, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, USA Colin Tucker, Research Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University at Buffalo, State University of New York, USA Marian de Vooght, Visiting Fellow, Department of Government, University of Essex, UK

Preface

My personal interest in peacekeeping as an area for research was triggered when Birger Heldt convened a small meeting in London in 2005. Here, Birger introduced his idea for the Working Group on Peacekeeping as part of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden. From these humble beginnings – the original meeting was only attended by Michael Gilligan, Ismene Gizelis, Kristian Gleditsch, Birger Heldt and myself – the FBA Research Working Groups proved highly effective in connecting researchers with a shared interest in peacekeeping and a stimulus for a variety of empirically oriented research projects on peacekeeping. A lot of the research surveyed in this Handbook at some point benefited from these activities, and they stimulated a network with leading and emerging scholars in the field of peacekeeping. Many of them agreed to contribute to this Handbook, for which I am grateful. Further, I would like to thank Marian de Vooght for her assistance as managing editor in finalizing the Handbook. Also, thank you to Hendrikje Dorussen for providing the artwork for the cover; the original picture I took as part of my fieldwork in Timor-Leste in 2013, but it definitely needed some artistic license.

xiii

Abbreviations

A4P AFISMA AMIB AMISOM AU BINUH CIS DDR ECCAS ECOMOG ECOWAS ESDP EU EULEX EUMM FIB FPU HIPPO ICJ IFOR INTERFET IPI IPU IR ISAF KFOR MINUCI MINUJUSTH MINURCA MINURCAT MINURSO

Action for Peacekeeping African-led International Support Mission to Mali African Union Mission in Burundi African Union Mission in Somalia African Union United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti Commonwealth of Independent States disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration Economic Community of Central African States Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States European Security and Defence Policy European Union European Union Rule of Law in Kosovo European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia Force Intervention Brigade Formed Police Unit High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations International Court of Justice Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina International Force East Timor International Peace Institute Individual Police Unit International Relations International Security Assistance Force (in Afghanistan) Kosovo Force United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic United Nations Mission in The Central African Republic and Chad United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

xiv

Abbreviations  xv MINUSCA MINUSMA MINUSTAH MISAHEL MISCA MONUC MONUSCO MOU NATO OAS OCHA ODA OECD OHCHR OLS ONUB ONUC ONUCA ONUMOZ ONUSAL OSCE OSV PAR PKO POC R2P ROE SADC SEA SFOR SMM SRSG SSR

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali United Nations Organization Mission in Haiti African Union Mission in Mali and Sahel African Union Mission in the Central African Republic United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Memorandum of Understanding North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organization of American States United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Official Development Assistance Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Ordinary Least Squares United Nations Mission in Burundi United Nations Operation in the Congo United Nations Observer Group in Central America United Nations Operation in Mozambique United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe one-sided violence Peacekeepers at Risk peacekeeping operation Protection of Civilians Responsibility to Protect rules of engagement Southern African Development Community sexual exploitation and abuse Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine Special Representative of the Secretary-General security sector reform

xvi  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations TCC UN UN DFS UN DOS UN DPA UN DP(K)O UN DPPA UNAMA UNAMET UNAMID UNAMIR UNAMSIL UNAVEM UNDP UNEF UNEP UNESCO UNFICYP UNGA UNHCR UNICEF UNIFIL UNIOSIL UNIPSIL UNISFA UNITAMS UNMEE UNMIBH UNMIK UNMIL UNMIN UNMIS UNMISET UNMISS UNMIT UNMOGIP

troop contributing countries United Nations United Nations Department of Field Support United Nations Department of Operational Support United Nations Department of Political Affairs United Nations Department of Peace(keeping) Operations United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan United Nations Mission in East Timor African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur United Nations Mission for Rwanda United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone United Nations Angola Verification Mission United Nations Development Programme United Nations Emergency Force United Nations Environmental Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus United Nations General Assembly Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (Sudan and South Sudan) United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United Nations Mission in Liberia United Nations Mission in Nepal United Nations Mission in the Sudan United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor United Nations Mission in South Sudan United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

Abbreviations  xvii UNMOT UNOCI UNOMIG UNOSOM UNPOL UNPOS UNPREDEP UNPROFOR UNSC UNSG UNSMIL UNSMIS UNSOM UNSOS UNTAC UNTAG UNTAES UNTAET UNTEA UNTSO

United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia United Nations Operation in Somalia United Nations Police United Nations Political Office for Somalia United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) United Nations Protection Force (in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) United Nations Security Council United Nations Secretary-General United Nations Support Mission in Libya United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia United Nations Support Office in Somalia United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia United Nations Transition Assistance Group United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (West Irian) United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (in the Middle East)

1. Peacekeeping as rule-based interventions in international relations Han Dorussen

Peacekeeping is best understood in the context of international politics, and the study of peacekeeping therefore within International Relations research. Yet, compared to topics such as alliances, balance of power, arms races, or even the democratic peace and diplomacy, scholars have started paying serious attention to the study of peacekeeping only fairly recently.1 It is helpful to distinguish theoretical, practical, and data-driven concerns as plausible explanations for the late emergence of peacekeeping as a field of study in International Relations as well as the current “boom” in academic output as reflected in this Handbook. International Relations (IR) theory and peacekeeping  Peacekeeping was unlikely to draw major scholarly attention as long as IR theory remained firmly committed to analyzing power as the main feature of inter-state relations embedded in an anarchical international system. In contrast, peacekeeping is defined as consent-based, impartial interventions with limited military capability. Furthermore, peacekeeping operations derive their legitimacy from how they are authorized and mandated with, since the end of the Second World War, a central role for the United Nations Security Council. In short, peacekeeping is an example of a rule-based intervention in international politics. Studying peacekeeping operations implies an implicit acknowledgement that international organizations matter – also in how they promote norms in international politics – that states pursue interests that go beyond maximizing power, and that they are, at least occasionally, willing to restrict their sovereignty. Unsurprisingly, earlier studies of peacekeeping tended to focus on the role of the Security Council, in particular the Permanent Five members (China, France, UK, USA, and USSR/ Russia), in failing to authorize peacekeeping operations, or to provide them with effective mandates and sufficient resources. Liberal approaches to IR create more space for studying peacekeeping. Firstly, they allow for a broader definition of power. In Power in Peacekeeping, Howard (2019) identifies six ways in which peacekeepers can influence outcomes based on their access to information, their expert knowledge, their referent – relationship-based – and legitimate power, along with their power to provide incentive and to coerce. Liberal IR theories have also drawn attention to the role of domestic and transnational audiences and institutions in explaining political decisions, including decisions on deploying peacekeepers. Consequently, expanding beyond traditional state security, they also consider economic and normative concerns as relevant state interests. Moreover, peacekeeping itself has been defined as a part of a Liberal agenda promoting inclusive democratic institutions and “good governance” internationally. Conceptualizing the Liberal approach to peacebuilding, Doyle and Sambanis (2000; 2006) introduce the “Peacebuilding Triangle,” identifying the political space or effective capacity for building peace along three dimensions: international capacity, the legacy of conflict, and local capacity. Accordingly, mandated operations indicate international commitment to a sustainable peace: ‘[i]nternational commitment (or lack thereof) interacts with local capacities and factional 1

2  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations hostility to shape the triangular space; few peacebuilding plans work unless regional neighbors and other significant international actors desist from supporting war and begin supporting peace’ (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, p. 781). Empirically, they find indeed that multidimensional peacekeeping operations contribute to an inclusive peace; in their words, ‘while the UN is very poor at “war,” imposing a settlement by force, it can be very good at “peace,” mediating and implementing a comprehensively negotiated peace’ (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, p. 5). Increased scholarly interest in peacekeeping, however, has also highlighted failures and unintended consequences of peacekeeping. Weinstein (2005) and Herbst (2003) offer critiques of the Liberal governance agenda focused on the inability of external interventions, such as peacekeeping operations, to build peace in the absence of endogenous processes that underpin it. Paris (1997; 2004) also questions the relevance of Liberal interventions for post-conflict countries with historically weak states. In particular, the claim of the Liberal Peace that the international community and peacekeeping operations (PKOs) create and sustain norms regarding human rights and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have come under intense scrutiny (among others, Hayner 2018). Instead, scholars have highlighted “neo-imperialist” practices of international interventions (Cunliffe 2012; Charbonneau 2014). The relevance of norms for peacekeeping has also motivated comparative empirical studies; for example, Gilligan and Stedman (2003) explore whether UN Security Council decisions on the deployment of peacekeeping operations align with normative principles, while Hultman et al. (2013; 2014) examine whether peacekeeping operations meet their mandate to protect civilians. Arguably, the Bargaining Model of War (Fearon 1995; Wagner 2000; Reitner 2003) has provided the strongest theoretical impetus for recent studies of peacekeeping. Understanding how wars end is no longer seen as a separate question – often of secondary importance – from understanding the causes of war. Instead, the initiation, continuation, and termination of the use of coercion in conflict are all considered part of a single bargaining process. Fearon’s (1995) seminal contribution highlights private information regarding military capabilities and difficulties to credibly commit to a possible agreement as key reasons for bargaining failure. Rather than drawing a clear distinction between intra- and interstate conflicts, the same factors are seen as relevant for explaining the use of coercion across different types of conflict (Walter 2001). The Bargaining Model of War also suggests theoretical reasons for why peacekeeping may work. Starting with Fortna (2008), the ability of peacekeepers to provide (impartial) information is presented as crucial for effective peacekeeping. Ruggeri et al. (2013; 2017), among others, reason that the presence of peacekeepers can deter (former) belligerents from restarting hostilities, and thus helps them to credibly commit to a peace agreement. Dorussen and Gizelis (2013) argue that successful peacebuilding can remove any incentives for parties to renegotiate earlier agreements even given changes in relative capabilities. Even though several scholars have questioned the logic of bargaining models as applied to peacekeeping (for example, Smith and Stam 2003; Greig and Diehl 2005), it is invoked in nearly all studies examining the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Change and contestation in the practice of peacekeeping  Regardless of the broader theoretical implications, research on peacekeeping has remained largely motivated by one key question: does peacekeeping work (Fortna 2008)? As the scope and depth of peacekeeping has increased over time, the question has remained pertinent. Until the end of the Cold War, with some notable exceptions such as the first UN peacekeeping mission to the Congo (ONUC) between July 1960 and June 1964, UN peacekeeping operations were deployed predominantly to (former) interstate wars. As shown in Figure 1.1, during this period, the UN deployed

Peacekeeping as rule-based interventions in international relations  3 a small number (generally less than ten) of peacekeeping operations as so-called observer missions with limited mandate and size (for most years below 10 000 troops deployed). Some of these PKOs have also been remarkably long-lasting; in particular, UNTSO deployed in the Middle East since 1948, UNMOGIP deployed in the Jammu and Kashmir regions since 1949, UNFICYP in Cyprus since 1964.

Source: UN DPO (accessed April 1, 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​en/​open​-data​-portal), with thanks to Birger Heldt and Jacob Kathman for additional data, and Delfi Dorussen for research assistance.

Figure 1.1

Number of UN peacekeepers and peacekeeping operations

Since 1990, there have been notable changes in the practice of UN peacekeeping. The number of PKOs nearly doubled, and many of these “new” or “transformative” peacekeeping operations were mandated with an increasing set of tasks (or “missions”) requiring more personnel. As shown in Figure 1.1, the maximum number of uniformed personnel (observers, military troops, and police) deployed reached more than 100 000 by 2010 but has decreased since. The UN deployed PKOs increasingly to civil wars with on-going hostilities and fragile state institutions. Peacekeepers were tasked with protecting civilians, organizing elections, promoting the rule of law, and counter-terrorist activities, among others. In order to achieve their mandate under often difficult circumstances, so-called robust PKOs were authorized and equipped to use force; for example, MONUSCO, deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘has been authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.’2 Peacekeeping has thus become an important tool for the UN to promote “peace and security” which is, however, costly – requiring a significant amount ($6.38 billion in 2021–22)3 of the UN annual budget – and with significant risks. Peacekeeping failures, for example in

4  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Bosnia 1992 and in Rwanda in 1994, have drawn widespread public attention, and regular accusations of sexual misconduct by peacekeepers keep undermining trust in the UN. The rapid transformation of peacekeeping as well as notable failures have stimulated several key policy reviews; most notably the Brahimi report in 2000 (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000) reflected on peacekeeping failures in the 1990s and called for more robust peacekeeping. The Capstone Doctrine (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2008) emphasized the need for integrated peacekeeping, basically to better coordinate PKOs internally as well as externally given the presence of multiple mandates and actors. Since then, the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO) (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2015) reconfirmed that peacekeeping must be seen as part of a political process, and the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P/A4P+)4 highlighted the accountability of PKOs. In short, peacekeeping has become a commonly used instrument to legitimize interventions aimed at stabilizing (post‑)conflict countries. Given the scope and depth of peacekeeping activities, and the dire consequences of its failures, it has rightly received a lot of attention from policymakers. This has also spurred academic interest in a broader set of questions that still predominantly relate to a fundamental concern with the effectiveness of peacekeeping. As reflected in the chapters contained in this Handbook, academic research tries to understand when peacekeeping missions are deployed, what motivates countries to supply peacekeepers, as well as to evaluate the impact of their various activities. Research has also become more attuned to distinctions between UN- and non-UN-led peacekeeping, the specific mandates under which peacekeeping operates, and the different roles of military, police and civilian peacekeepers. Finally, it is now recognized that peacekeeping does not take place in a vacuum but must engage with other regional and country-led intervention forces, political missions and non-military developmental and humanitarian agencies. Since it is often impossible – and at least irrelevant – to maintain a strict delineation between mediation, peacekeeping, peace-making and peacebuilding, academic research has also become increasingly interdisciplinary involving expertise from Law, International Relations, Political Science and Development Economics, as well as Geography and Ethnography. For example, based on extensive fieldwork in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Autesserre (2010) focuses on notable failures of peacekeeping and -building which she attributes to a lack of attention to their impact on local circumstances and a continued “top-down” rather than “bottom-up” approach. Peacekeeping data  Starting with the seminal studies by Diehl (1994), Doyle and Sambanis (2000; 2006) and Fortna (2008), the study of peacekeeping has become increasingly comparative in nature. Rather than relying on a relatively small number of case studies, researchers started systematically collecting data on key features of PKOs; for example, Heldt and Wallensteen (2007), Williams with Bellamy (2021), and SIPRI5 provide data on UN and non-UN operations. The UN system has become a source of highly detailed information on its operations which has unwittingly steered the focus of peacekeeping research into examining United Nations peacekeeping. Based ultimately on UN information, the International Peace Institute (IPI) and Jacob Kathman6 provide access to monthly data on the size and composition of UN operations, and the contributions by troop-contributing countries.7 The Peacekeepers at Risk (PAR) data (Lindberg Bromley 2018) collates data on peacekeeper casualties. UN reports and, in particular, the regular reports of the UN Secretary General to the Security Council, provide a further source of information on mission mandates and tempo-

Peacekeeping as rule-based interventions in international relations  5 rally as well as geographically disaggregated data on peacekeeper deployment and activities. The PKO Location Event Data (PKOLED) codes when and where UN peacekeepers were directly involved in either cooperative or conflictual events in host countries (Dorussen and Ruggeri 2017). The PKO Governance (PKOGOV) data code similar events with a focus on transformative peacekeeping and the engagement of UN peacekeepers with local, rebel, and government authorities in the host country (Dorussen and Gizelis 2013). Using information on troop contributions and the deployment maps provided regularly in the reports of the UN Secretary data, several datasets estimate the subnational deployment of peacekeepers; for example, PKODEP (Dorussen and Ruggeri 2017), Geo-PKO (Cil et al. 2020), and RADPKO (Hunnicutt and Nomikos 2020).8 The Peacekeeping Operations Corpus (PKOC)9 (Amicarelli and Di Salvatore 2021) collects the reports of the UN Secretary-General on PKOs between 1994 and 2020 in machine-readable form.10 The mandate given to operations by the UN Security Council provides crucial information on the tasks assigned to peacekeepers and thus on the intentions behind the deployment of specific types of missions. Here, available data have evolved from broad classification of different mission types (for example, Hegre et al. 2019) to detailed information on UN decisions (for example, Beardsley and Schmidt 2012), specific tasks within peacekeeping (Diehl and Druckman 2018), to the evolution of PKO mandates in the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset (Di Salvatore et al. 2022). Extending beyond peacekeeping operations, the UN Peace Initiatives (UNPI) dataset (Clayton et al. 2021) identifies all UN-mandated political initiatives and peacekeeping operations since 1946. The availability of detailed data on peacekeeping helps ‘to identify where peacekeepers are deployed, what they do, with whom they interact, as well as the quality of the interaction’ (Dorussen and Ruggeri 2017, p. 32). Moreover, these peacekeeping data can be linked with survey data (for example, Mvukiyehe and Samii 2021) on the experiences of host communities with peacekeepers as well as conflict data on hostilities between armed factions or the use of violence against unarmed civilians (such as the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander 2013) or the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010). Previously, I have argued the promise of such research to overcome ‘the contrast between quantitative, comparative studies and case studies in their assessment of the effectiveness of peacekeeping’ (Dorussen 2014, p. 2). So far, however, there remains a stark division between the overall assessment from both approaches, as illustrated by the opposing points of view expressed in The Astonishing Success of Peacekeeping (Walter et al. 2021a) and The Crisis of Peacekeeping (Autesserre 2019).11 Based on the review of the quantitative literature, Barbara Walter, Lise Howard, and Page Fortna conclude that PKOs have been remarkably effective in addressing the most difficult civil conflicts (Walter et al. 2021b). Yet, based on ethnographic research and reflecting the experiences of many people engaged in peacekeeping and -building, Autesserre (2010; 2014; 2019; 2021) maintains that peacekeeping is under-resourced, overambitious and strategically misguided.

OVERVIEW OF THE HANDBOOK The Handbook aims to provide an overview of recent developments in the peacekeeping literature with an emphasis on comparative empirical studies, and to highlight key theoretical insights and the main empirical findings as well as identify open questions. The various con-

6  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations tributors have often led in developing the research agenda thematically and were encouraged to reflect on their own research. The four main parts of the Handbook are organized around four themes. Part I considers questions broadly relating to the deployment of peacekeeping operations. Chapter 2 (Helms) examines the determinants of peacekeeping mandates, while Chapter 6 (Benson and Tucker) reviews the effects of impartial versus biased mandates. Consent of host countries is often seen as a key element of peacekeeping and is discussed in Chapter 4 (Passmore et al.). Chapter 3 (Coleman) reviews the financing and burden sharing of PKOs contrasting the budgeting models of the UN, AU, and NATO. The comparison of PKOs where the UN takes the lead with regional- or country-led operations is further explored in Chapter 8 (Bara). Chapter 7 (Dorussen) discusses the literature on multiple missions and whether political and peacekeeping initiatives function as either complements or substitutes. Chapter 5 (Bove et al.) reviews research on the composition of PKOs; does it matter what countries contribute to PKOs and how does PKO leadership influence their effectiveness? Part II focuses on the policies and range of activities undertaken by PKOs; in other words, on what peacekeepers do. Demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) are reviewed in Chapter 9 (Herrera and Gonzáles Peña) and Chapter 10 (Blair), respectively. In Chapter 10, SSR is discussed as part of rule-of-law promotion and gives specific attention to the activities undertaken by UN police. Increasingly, research is looking into the activities of civilian rather than uniformed personnel. Chapter 11 (Oksamytna) evaluates public information campaigns and strategic communication, while Chapter 12 (van der Lijn and Otto) evaluates the contributions of civilians and civil affairs officers to peacekeeping. The chapters in Part III present research on the effectiveness of peacekeeping. An important development in peacekeeping research is the use of a broader definition of effectiveness (Diehl and Druckman 2010). Chapter 13 (Kroeker and Ruggeri) discusses the role of PKOs in conflict resolution, while Chapter 14 (Beber) evaluates findings on the geographic contagion and diffusion of conflict. Apart from conflict resolution, the ability of peacekeepers to fulfill protection-of-civilians mandates has come under scrutiny. Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon have been leading this research field and contribute Chapter 15. Rather than a narrow “negative” peace definition, increasingly attention is being paid to the extent to which PKO can provide a “positive” peace. Key aspects of this research agenda are covered in Chapter 16 (Smidt) on the role of peacekeepers in democratization and controlling electoral violence, while Chapter 17 (Olsson) evaluates research on peacekeeping and the protection of women. Research is also giving more attention to the unintended consequences of peacekeeping as well as to areas where peacekeepers could (and possibly should) have an impact. Moreover, the evidence on any effect of peacekeeping often remains inconclusive. Part IV presents research surrounding these “controversies” of peacekeeping. Chapter 18 (Karim and Beardsley) presents research on the impact of peacekeeping on gender-based violence. Chapter 19 (Leloup and Maertens) discusses the environmental impact of PKOs as well as the impact on cultural heritage. An important insight of recent research is that when peacekeepers succeed in halting the fighting, the post-conflict situation can still be extremely insecure with high levels of criminal violence. Di Salvatore presents research on peacekeeping and post-conflict crime in Chapter 20. Every year, peacekeepers die in the line of duty and the risks to peacekeepers are an important element of the A4P/A4P+ agenda. Using the new Peacekeepers at Risk database, Lindberg Bromley (Chapter 21) presents recent findings on the hazards of peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping as rule-based interventions in international relations  7 Chapter 22 (Dorussen and de Vooght) and Chapter 23 (Khadka and Phayal) present emerging research on the relation between peacekeepers and host communities with particular attention to the extent that locals trust peacekeepers. PKOs have a definite, but largely unintended, impact on the economy of host countries; original research on its effects on local trust in peacekeepers in the Somali case are presented in Chapter 23. The longevity of PKOs is commonly commented upon, and Chapter 24 (Caplan et al.) discusses the ending of PKOs in terms of closure, down-scaling, and transition of missions. In the concluding chapter (Chapter 25), Diehl evaluates the state of the art of current peacekeeping research and identifies opportunities for future research.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES The Handbook also reflects important methodological developments. As noted earlier, the study of peacekeeping has become more and more comparative in nature. Researchers have collated new and more detailed data on peacekeeping, and now commonly apply geospatial models and event analysis. Further interesting methodological developments include using instrumental variables and matching to address selection bias, and field experiments/surveys to identify causal processes. The contributions to this Handbook indeed show the diversity of approaches in research on peacekeeping. The research discussed in Chapters 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 17, 19, and 24 is predominantly oriented towards developments in policy and guidance within the UN system. Regularly, the focus in research is on comparing PKOs, where Chapters 3, 8 and 12 draw attention to comparing UN and non-UN operations, while Chapters 5, 7, 10, 11–18, 20, and 21 primarily review research on UN missions. Research reviewed in these chapters mainly relies on quantitative data which have become more detailed (geographically and temporally specific); see, for example, Chapter 14 (Beber), but Chapters 13, 15, and 16 also report on research that relies on subnational data. Finally, Chapters 22 and 23 discuss research using field surveys and field experiments. Admittedly, the focus of this Handbook on comparative empirical research means that less attention is given to “other” approaches, such as case studies (see Koops et al. 2015), ethnographic research (see Millar 2018), and critical approaches (see Oksamytna and Karlsrud 2020). There can be no doubt that research on peacekeeping continues to benefit from a variety of multi- and interdisciplinary approaches. Peacekeeping is also important enough – and when it goes wrong it has potentially devasting consequences – that it needs to be approached with an open and critical mind. At the same time, the comparative empirical research highlighted in this Handbook is a coherent and exciting research agenda that has contributed to our understanding of PKOs and challenged many negative preconceptions about the impact of peacekeepers on (post‑)conflict situations.

NOTES 1. Paul Diehl makes a similar observation in Chapter 25 in this Handbook. 2. MONUSCO Fact Sheet, accessed March 28, 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​en/​mission/​ monusco. 3. Based on information on UN Peacekeeping website, accessed April 1, 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​ .un​.org/​en/​how​-we​-are​-funded.

8  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations 4. Introduction to A4P and A4P+, accessed April 1, 2022 at https://​www​.un​.org/​en/​A4P/​. 5. SIPRI’s Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed March 31, 2022 at http://​www​.sipri​.org/​ databases/​pko. 6. IPI Peacekeeping Database, accessed March 31, 2022 at https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​providing​-for​ -peacekeeping​-database, and Kathman’s United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Data Project, accessed March 31, 2022 at https://​kathmanundata​.weebly​.com. 7. See also the Peace Security Data Hub, hosted by the UN, accessed April 4, 2022 at https://​psdata​.un​ .org. 8. Geo-PKO, accessed March 31, 2022 at https://​www​.pcr​.uu​.se/​data/​geo​-pko/​, and RADPKO data, accessed March 31, 2022 at https://​dapp​-lab​.org/​radpko/​. 9. PKOC, accessed March 31, 2022 at https://​dataverse​.harvard​.edu/​dataverse/​pkoc. 10. See also the contributions in Clayton et al. (2017). 11. Di Salvatore and Ruggeri (2017) and Gizelis et al. (2022) present further surveys of the recent quantitative research on peacekeeping.

REFERENCES Amicarelli, Elio and Jessica Di Salvatore (2021), ‘Introducing the PeaceKeeping Operations Corpus (PKOC)’, Journal of Peace Research, 58 (5), 1137–48. Autesserre, Séverine (2010), The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Autesserre, Séverine (2014), Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and Everyday Politics of International Interventions, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Autesserre, Séverine (2019), ‘The Crisis of Peacekeeping. Why the UN Can’t End Wars’, Foreign Affairs, 98 (1), 101–16. Autesserre, Séverine (2021), The Frontlines of Peace: An Insider’s Guide to Changing the World, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Beardsley, Kyle and Holger Schmidt (2012), ‘Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945–2002’, International Studies Quarterly, 56 (1), 33–49. Charbonneau, Bruno (2014), ‘The Imperial Legacy of International Peacebuilding: The Case of Francophone Africa’, Review of International Studies, 40 (3), 607–30. Cil, Deniz, Hanne Fjelde, Lisa Hultman, and Desirée Nilsson (2020), ‘Mapping Blue Helmets: Introducing the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (GEO-PKO) Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 57 (2), 360–70. Clayton, Govinda, Han Dorussen, and Tobias Böhmelt (2021), ‘United Nations Peace Initiatives 1946–2015: Introducing a New Dataset’, International Interactions, 47 (1), 161–80. Clayton, Govinda (ed.), Jacob Kathman, Kyle Beardsley, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, Louise Olsson, Vincenzo Bove, Andrea Ruggeri, Remco Zwetsloot, Jaïr van der Lijn, Timo Smit, Lisa Hultman, Han Dorussen, Paul F. Diehl, Laura Bosco, and Christina Goodness (2017), ‘The Known Knowns and Known Unknowns of Peacekeeping Data’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (1), 1–62. Cunliffe, Philippe (2012), ‘Still the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons Between Peacekeeping and Imperialism in Peacekeeping Studies Today’, International Peacekeeping, 19 (4), 429–42. Di Salvatore, Jessica, Magnus Lundgren, Kseniya Oksamytna, and Hannah Smidt (2022), ‘Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) Dataset’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, accessed March 3, 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1177/​00220027211068897. Di Salvatore, Jessica and Andrea Ruggeri (2017), ‘Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations’, in William R. Thompson (ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, accessed March 23, 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​acrefore/​9780190228637​.013​.586. Diehl, Paul F. (1994), International Peacekeeping: With a New Epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia, Baltimore, MD, USA and London, UK: Johns Hopkins University Press. Diehl, Paul F. and Daniel Druckman (2010), Evaluating Peace Operations, Boulder, CO, USA: Lynne Rienner.

Peacekeeping as rule-based interventions in international relations  9 Diehl, Paul F. and Daniel Druckman (2018), ‘Multiple Peacekeeping Missions: Analysing Interdependence’, International Peacekeeping, 25 (1), 28–51. Dorussen, Han (2014), ‘Peacekeeping Works, or Does It?’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 20 (4), 527–38. Dorussen, Han and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2013), ‘Into the Lion’s Den: Local Responses to UN Peacekeeping’, Journal of Peace Research, 50 (6), 693–708. Dorussen, Han and Andrea Ruggeri (2017), ‘Peacekeeping Event Data: Determining the Place and Space of Peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (1), 32–8. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis (2000), ‘International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis’, American Political Science Review, 94 (4), 778–801. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis (2006), Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton, NJ, USA, and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Fearon, James D. (1995), ‘Rationalist Explanations for War’, International Organization, 49 (summer), 379–414. Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman, and Desirée Nilsson (2019), ‘Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians’, International Organization, 73 (1), 103–31. Fortna, V. Page (2008), Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Gilligan, Michael and Stephen J. Stedman (2003), ‘Where Do Peacekeepers Go?’, International Studies Review, 5 (4), 37–54. Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene, Han Dorussen, and Marina Petrova (2022), ‘Research Findings on the Evolution of Peacekeeping’, in William R. Thompson (ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, accessed October 25, 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​ acrefore/​9780190228637​.013​.25. Greig, J. Michael and Paul F. Diehl (2005), ‘The Peacekeeping–Peacemaking Dilemma’, International Studies Quarterly, 49 (4), 621–46. Hayner, Priscilla (2018), The Peacemaker’s Paradox: Pursuing Justice in the Shadow of Conflict, New York, NY, USA: Routledge. Hegre, Håvard, Lisa Hultman, and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård (2019), ‘Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing Effect of UN Peacekeeping Operations’, The Journal of Politics, 81 (1), 215–32. Heldt, Birger and Peter Wallensteen (2007), Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2004, Stockholm, SE: Folke Bernadotte Academy. Herbst, Jeffrey (2003), ‘Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice: Implications for Policy’, in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Howard, Lise Morjé (2019), Power in Peacekeeping, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2013), ‘United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War’, American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 875–91. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2014), ‘Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting’, American Political Science Review, 108 (4), 737–53. Hunnicutt, Patrick and William G. Nomikos (2020), ‘Nationality, Gender, and Deployments: Introducing the RADPKO Dataset’, International Peacekeeping 27 (4), 645–72. Koops, Joachim A., Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen, and Paul D. Williams (eds) (2015), The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Lindberg Bromley, Sara (2018), ‘Introducing the Peacemakers at Risk Dataset, sub-Saharan Africa 1989–2009’, Journal of Peace Research, 55 (1), 122–31. Millar, Gearoid (2018), ‘Engaging Ethnographic Peace Research: Exploring an Approach’, International Peacekeeping, 25 (5), 597–609. Mvukiyehe, Eric and Cyrus Samii (2021), ‘Peacekeeping and Development in Fragile States: Micro-level Evidence from Liberia’, Journal of Peace Research, 58 (3), 368–83. Oksamytna, Kseniya and John Karlsrud (eds) (2020), United Nations Peace Operations and International Relations Theory: An Introduction, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Paris, Roland (1997), ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, International Security, 22 (2), 54–89.

10  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Paris, Roland (2004), At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen (2010), ‘Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset: Special Data Feature’, Journal of Peace Research, 47 (5), 651–60. Reitner, Dan (2003), ‘Exploring the Bargaining Model of War’, Perspectives on Politics, 1 (1), 27–43. Ruggeri, Andrea, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2017), ‘Winning the Peace Locally: UN Peacekeeping and Local Conflict’, International Organization, 71 (1), 163–85. Ruggeri, Andrea, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Han Dorussen (2013), ‘Managing Mistrust: An Analysis of Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping in Africa’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57 (3), 387–409. Ruggeri, Andrea, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Han Dorussen (2018), ‘On the Frontline Every Day? Subnational Deployment of United Nations Peacekeepers’, British Journal of Political Science, 48 (4), 1005–25. Smith, Alastair and Allan Stam (2003), ‘Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of Civil and Interstate War’, International Studies Review, 5 (4), 115–35. Sundberg, Ralph and Erik Melander (2013), ‘Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 50 (4), 523–32. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support (2008), ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’, accessed March 9, 2022 at https://​www​.un​.org/​ruleoflaw/​ files/​Capstone​_Doctrine​_ENG​.pdf. UN General Assembly and Security Council (2000), ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’ (‘Brahimi Report’), A/55/305 and S/2000/809, accessed March 8, 2022 at https://​undocs​ .org/​A/​55/​305. UN General Assembly and Security Council (2015), ‘Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People’ (‘HIPPO’), A/70/95 and S/2015/446, accessed March 8, 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​795940​?ln​=​ en. Wagner, R. Harrison (2000), ‘Bargaining and War’, American Journal of Political Science, 44 (3), 469–84. Walter, Barbara F. (2001), Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Walter, Barbara F., Lise Morjé Howard, and V. Page Fortna (2021a), ‘The Astonishing Success of Peacekeeping: The UN Program Deserves More Support—and Less Scorn—From America’, Foreign Affairs, November 29, accessed March 28, 2022 at https://​www​.foreignaffairs​.com/​articles/​world/​ 2021​-11​-29/​astonishing​-success​-peacekeeping. Walter, Barbara F., Lise Morjé Howard, and V. Page Fortna (2021b), ‘The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace’, British Journal of Political Science, 51 (4), 1705–22. Weinstein, Jeremy (2005), ‘Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective’, Working Paper 57, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, USA. Williams, Paul D. with Alex J. Bellamy (2021), Understanding Peacekeeping, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

PART I THE DEPLOYMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

2. Mandating peacekeeping operations and international law Emily Helms

INTRODUCTION Peace operations are a hallmark enterprise of the United Nations, though not explicitly provided for in the UN Charter. They are established and outlined by individual mandates that set out operational objectives as well as means of pursuing them, including guidelines on use of force. The very right of the UN to authorize them was settled by the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Reparation decision, which affirms that establishing peace operations is an implied power of the organization because it ‘must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties’ (International Court of Justice 1949, p. 182). While this decision confirms the UN’s prerogative to establish peace operations, it offers no guidance as to their nature or the scope of their authorities. The organization and its membership are equally reluctant to define them. This is consistent with Tharoor’s observation that affixing a definition to peacekeeping ‘would be to impose a straitjacket on a concept whose flexibility made it the most pragmatic instrument at the disposal of the world organisation’ (1995, p. 4). Reluctance to overprescribe and steadfastly define peace operations is understandable. As such, peace operations are spoken of as an obscure collective, though neither composition nor ambition are consistent among all. On the whole, this has produced precisely the flexibility necessary to produce mandates that charge operations with doing the tasks that are needed. Once established as a task or objective in one operation, language is often replicated to produce similar results in subsequent operations’ mandates. Precedent is crucial for the evolution of UN mandates. The overwhelming majority of mandates originate with the Security Council (SC), but this is more a function of political habit than legal requirement. While authorizing peace operations is an outcropping of Articles 24 and 25 (Chapter V, UN Charter), which pertain exclusively to the SC, the 1950 Uniting for Peace resolution political stalemate necessitated the formulation of a loophole that could outsource this responsibility to the General Assembly (GA) under certain circumstances. The 1950 Uniting for Peace resolution provides this possibility, stating that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security … the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making recommendations to Members for collective measures, including … the use of armed force when necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in an emergency special session … [which] shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members or by the vote of a majority of the Members of the United Nations. (UN General Assembly 1950, p. 10)

12

Mandating peacekeeping operations and international law  13 The SC has used this mechanism to call the GA to two emergency special sessions concerning peace operations. In the first instance, the SC referred the question of sending a UN operation to confront the Suez Crisis in 1956, after the United Kingdom and France vetoed the Security Council resolution that would do so. The resultant meeting produced the UN Emergency Force, which was the first UN peacekeeping operation mandated to act beyond a purely interpositional observer function. The Uniting for Peace Resolution was used for a second time in 1960 when the USSR vetoed the authorization of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). While scant use has been made of the Uniting for Peace resolution since—particularly with respect to peace operations, calls to resurrect its usage echoed in 2005 with the passing of the Responsibility to Protect principle by the General Assembly, and in the report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (UN General Assembly 2005, para. 139; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, pp. 159–60). It is worth noting this mechanism in the context of the mandating process because of the important role that precedent has played in the evolution of peace operation doctrine—and the possibilities that its existence represents. As Carswell explains, ‘the Uniting for Peace resolution holds significant modern potential as a safety valve capable of temporarily shifting the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security from a blocked Council to the world’s fully inclusive conference of states, the General Assembly’ (2013, p. 456). Whichever bodies shoulder the responsibility of authorizing peace operations, the mandates assume certain common characteristics. They communicate operational objectives, designate which means may be used to achieve them, and ascribe priorities for resource allocation. Mandates are either a component part of the authorizing resolution text or incorporated by reference to another document—usually a Secretary General’s report. They are subject to review and renewal at various intervals, from a few days to typically not more than one year. Mandates also serve as blueprints for operations’ internal legal architectures on the use of force: the rules of engagement (ROE).1 ROE ‘provide authorization for and/or limits on, among other things, the use of force, the positioning and posturing of forces, and the employment of certain specific capabilities. In some nations, ROE have the status of guidance to military forces; in other nations, ROE are lawful commands’ (Cole et al. 2009, p. 1). Importantly, pursuant to Article 25 of the UN Charter, mandates authorized by the Security Council are legally binding on all member states. Whether sanctioned as guidance or command, the influence of mandates on ROE makes them an important explanatory factor in operational outcomes. Operations have been studied empirically using a variety of methods for several decades, with the practice taking off in the early 2000s. Because mandates designate the tasks, objectives, and authorities to use force, it follows that scholars should account for them when modeling operations (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hegre et al. 2019; Hultman et al. 2013; Kreps and Wallace 2009). Yet, as I will argue, the indicators for mandates used in empirical research are often inconsistent and even misaligned. The consequence of these inconsistent indicators is conflicting conclusions about the role of mandates, or the general dismissal of mandates as influential variables in understanding successes and failures in peacekeeping. This chapter examines the prominence of mandates in the literature on peace operations. Having described their origins and the process by which they are drafted above, the next section provides an overview of mandate evolution over the last 70 years, considers what marks contemporary mandates, and recalls what trends in mandate taxonomy are emergent. The section that follows concerns how these mandate typologies are employed in the reper-

14  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations toire of empirical literature on peace operations. While this chapter largely concerns social science, the importance of mandates as legal tools is not overlooked. As such, I draw attention to discrepancies between legal and empirical usage of terminology that may influence the interpretation of findings. The chapter ends with a summary of these observations.

MANDATE TYPES AND THE AUTHORITY TO USE FORCE Mandates can be categorized in several ways. Operational objectives and authorities to use force are serviceable criteria for this task, as they weigh heavily on the scope of an operation’s activities, responsibilities, and limitations. The Chapter of the UN Charter under which an operation is authorized can be a useful proxy. UN mandates are generally understood as authorized under either Chapter VI or Chapter VII. This designation has a profound influence on the capacities of operations in the field. Chapter VI concerns the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, and Article 33 thereof suggests that settlements be pursued by the following: ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice’ (United Nations 1945, Art. 33). Unlike contemporary operations, the earliest missions were often unarmed and fit squarely within these parameters, with the aim of maintaining an extant peace and preventing escalation to violence. They were charged with observing a ceasefire or monitoring the withdrawal of troops. Few operations have fit this mold since. Most draw at least in part on authorities most readily recognizable as within the purview of Chapter VII, which concerns Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. Chapter VII permits the use of coercive measures when a threat to international peace and security is levied (United Nations 1945, Articles 39–42). Owing to the ‘contradiction between the rejection of war and the need to keep peace by force’ (Sartre 2011, p. 2), Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld suggested that peacekeeping should be understood to be a ‘Chapter VI-and-a-half’ endeavor (Durall 2013). To contain this contradiction, Hammarskjöld introduced what Bellamy et al. (2010) term the ‘holy trinity’ of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate (United Nations 2008, pp. 31–43; Bellamy et al. 2010, pp. 173–4).2 These have proved versatile tenets and are subject to continuous reinterpretation as conflict—and the international community’s role in responding to it—evolves. An important and related distinction that the UN makes is between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. For instance, the UN Capstone Doctrine describes peacekeeping as ‘[a]ction undertaken to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved’ (United Nations 2008, p. 97). In contrast, peace enforcement is described as ‘[c]oercive action undertaken … to maintain or restore international peace and security’ (United Nations 2008, p. 97). Although the former relies on an extant peace, the UN’s repertoire is replete with instances of operations equipped with a peacekeeping mandate deployed to destinations where peace is chimerical. Weary of too boldly pursuing an enforcement agenda without the experience or resources necessary to realize it, a middle ground between traditional conceptions of peacekeeping and enforcement emerged: robust peacekeeping. According to the Capstone Doctrine, robust peacekeeping entails ‘[t]he use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the tactical level … to defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk

Mandating peacekeeping operations and international law  15 undermining the peace process’ (United Nations 2008, p. 98). This is in contrast to the use of force at the strategic level that Chapter VII entails. The authority to use force at the tactical level requires that an event or series of events trigger a situational response; the use of force is not part of an operation’s overarching strategy or a mechanism for pursuing objectives beyond the defensive. Importantly robust peacekeeping still requires consent of the main parties to the conflict—though this is usually sought (and acquired) before the deployment of operations under Chapter VII as well. The task of categorizing mandates according to the Chapter under which an operation is authorized is further complicated by the increasingly common partial invocation of Chapter VII. This first occurred in reference to civilian protection in Resolution 1590, which authorized UNMIS ‘[a]cting under Chapter VII’ to protect UN personnel and facilities, ensure freedom of movement of humanitarian and other civilian personnel, and to protect civilians facing an imminent threat of violence in Sudan (UN Security Council 2005). Protection of civilians continues to be the main area to which Chapter VII provisions make a special and limited appearance. Interestingly, the addition of Chapter VII does not actually add to the powers of a peace operation to protect civilians. In fact, the Brahimi Report, which details the humanitarian role of peace operations, affirms the rights of peacekeepers to assume responsibility for civilian protection as a matter of upholding the organization’s integrity: ‘peacekeepers—troops or police—who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles’ (Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000, p. 11). This proclamation does a lot of heavy lifting. While it does not require that UN troops intervene, it makes clear that all UN operations have the authority to do so. This does not obviate the significance of writing civilian protection into a mandate. Rather, the inclusion serves as an insurance policy for troops that they are justified in using force for the purpose of civilian protection—and even as a signal to hostile parties that the UN is prepared to engage those seeking to victimize civilians in their prosecution of armed conflict. Clarification of the UN’s position on peacekeepers’ roles in such situations paved the way for the first Protection of Civilians (POC) mandate. In Resolution 1270 (1999), the Security Council ‘[a]cting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the necessary action … to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’ (UN Security Council 1999, p. 3). UNAMSIL, the peace mission in Sierra Leone, is largely seen as a victory for civilian protection, and this language has been echoed in mandates—verbatim in many cases—two decades onward. POC mandates now make up the bulk of mandates authorized. The POC mandate marks a significant development not only because it finally encoded this responsibility into the mandate of a peace operation, making it legally binding, but also shifts the onus from a reactive to a proactive responsibility. This is pivotal because the protection of civilians was not a role originally envisaged for UN operations. For one, it was not assumed that peacekeepers would be deployed to situations where hostilities were ongoing. For another, peacekeeping was then wedded to a now outdated mode of impartiality. In the same way that the POC mandate permits peace operations to procure a proactive footing, “stabilization” missions have placed peace operations in a more offensive posture. But this development is a long time in the making, and a product of a convenient ambiguity surrounding the term. Karlsrud (2019, p. 2) describes the “stabilization” concept as a ‘discursive tool to engage with different audiences and for different purposes.’ The outcome of this is that donors or potential political rivals can all get behind their own version of what they believe

16  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations “stability” encapsulates. The benefit is that by talking past each other, agreement is easier to achieve. This is a long-established tactic of the Security Council and extends beyond peace operations.3 As de Coning (2018, pp. 87–8) explains, ‘it is not in the interest of these permanent members of the Security Council [France, the UK, or the USA], nor the UN bureaucracy, to try to define what stabilization means in the UN context.’ He continues, there is value in keeping the concept vague and undefined … it allows them to start using a new concept, and perhaps to introduce a new approach towards UN peace operations without having to say so explicitly. So in this way they avoid other members of the Security Council, troop contributing countries (TCCs) and other UN member states debating the development openly. (2018, p. 88)

The drawback of course is a general lack of consensus concerning what “stabilization” should look like in practice and what constitutes successful implementation. The three most recent stabilization mandates share an overt Chapter VII recourse to use of force. The deviation from the Chapter VI-and-a-half status quo is evident in the clear authority to take up arms not only in self-defense or defense of mandate but against a particular party: it permits the use of force to secure the will of the SC—a strategic rather than tactical employ. The first instance of this type of language was applied to the creation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), a subgroup of MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.4 The resolution authorized the use of force at the strategic level to […] carry out targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade … in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner … to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security. (UN Security Council 2013a, p. 7)

Until Resolution 2098 (2013) such a mandate was theoretically possible, but politically implausible. The mandate is distinctive in that it places a peace operation beyond the remit of Chapter VI entirely by permitting a subset of the operation to use force not only in support of one party to the conflict, but explicitly against another. This gives the FIB an unambiguous enforcement mandate, under the rather nebulous guise of “stabilization.” The SC was equally explicit in the exceptional nature of this provision at the outset, asserting that the FIB was established “without creating a precedent.” However, similar language was issued in the revised MINUSMA mandate days later. Again, under the configuration of a “stabilization” mission, the SC aligned the UN operation with the state authority, and mandated it under Chapter VII of the Charter, ‘[i]n support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilise the key population centres … to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas’ (UN Security Council 2013b, p. 7). Similar parameters were devised in the case of MINUSCA for the Central African Republic, which was authorized under Chapter VII to ‘adopt urgent temporary measures on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent and without prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping operations … to maintain basic law and order and fight impunity’ (UN Security Council 2014, pp. 12–13). Although vague at the outset, MINUSCA’s authority to use force at the strategic level was clarified two years later, when the Security Council determined ‘that MINUSCA’s strategic objective is to support the creation of conditions conducive to the sustainable reduction of the presence of, and threat posed by, armed groups through a comprehensive approach

Mandating peacekeeping operations and international law  17 and a proactive and robust posture without prejudice to the basic principles of peacekeeping’ (UN Security Council 2016, p. 10). Although still muted in comparison to MONUSCO or MINUSMA in terms of its disposition towards armed groups, Labuda (2019, n.p.) explains: ‘there is little doubt that references to “proactive” and “robust” in MINUSCA’s mandate give UN peacekeepers very broad authority in CAR.’ These excerpts also demonstrate the diversity within these relatively superficial functional categories. In addition to being “stabilization” mandates, they are also POC. This section shows that while objectives and provisions for use of force are meaningful criteria for classifying peace operations, they are neither straightforward nor mutually exclusive categories themselves. In the next section I review how researchers have grappled with the problem of representing these varied and oft-inconsistent operation-types.

MEASURING MANDATES The text and authorities of mandates depend on the circumstances that the operations intend to address and the environments in which they will operate.5 These factors, and the resulting mandates, all contribute to the level of success operations achieve. Means of approximating many of the pertinent qualitative factors, such as conflict type, region, and terrain (Buhaug et al. 2009) are now well-established in quantitative conflict research (Braithwaite 2010; Gleditsch et al. 2002). Other important contributors to operational outcomes are inherently quantifiable.6 The number of peacekeeping troops (Hultman et al. 2013), geographic spread (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015), and fatalities (Raleigh et al. 2010; Sundberg and Melander 2013) are all quantitative indicators. Owing to the chaotic nature of conflict, which is synonymous with inconsistent coverage of events and reporting bias, these measurements are commonly made with a high level of uncertainty (Ball and Price 2019). Approximating mandates quantitatively poses a different set of challenges. For one, the text and objectives of a mandate do not readily lend themselves to quantification. But, owing to the important role of mandates in understanding the effectiveness of peace operations, considerable research has gone into developing means of representing mandates quantitatively. A prominent means of representing mandates is through categorization by type. For instance, after establishing that ‘simple UN involvement is not enough to strengthen a peaceful transition,’ Doyle and Sambanis (2000, p. 84) code operations in four ways: observer missions, enforcement missions, traditional missions, or multidimensional peacekeeping. They posit that all peace operations improve peacebuilding outcomes for civil conflicts, but that the degree of impact will vary according to the mandate type. While they do find this to be the case, it is also evident that mandate-types have different effects on peacebuilding.7 They find that while all mandate types improve peacebuilding outcomes, only multidimensional efforts bear statistically significant results. And furthermore, the results of multidimensional operations dwarf those of any other mandate type. Acknowledging the complexity of the relationship between mandate type and peacebuilding outcomes, they conclude that ‘the operation’s mandate is critical’ (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, p. 789). Fortna also uses these categories. She expands the timeframe and her universe of cases to include both interstate and civil conflicts, finding that peacekeeping does improve the durability of peace following civil (Fortna 2003; 2004) and inter-state wars (Fortna 2003). She posits that ‘consent-based peacekeeping’—particularly after the Cold War—secures a more

18  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations stable peace than do operations authorized under Chapter VII (2003, p. 108; 2004, p. 278). But this dichotomy between operating with consent and operating under Chapter VII is not at all straightforward. For one, as Ratner (1995, p. 433) points out, ‘Chapter VI nowhere suggests any limitation of Council recommendations to those with which the parties agree. The “peaceful” settlement of disputes does not equate with the “passive” settlement of disputes; it means their settlement short of the enforcement processes of Chapter VII.’ The mechanism of consent as implied by mandate chapter is further strained by the scarcity with which any operation— Chapter VII or otherwise—is deployed without consent, at least of the host nations (Durall 2013, p. 18). Rather, the more crucial and explicit difference between Chapter VI and Chapter VII is the authority to use force beyond self-defense and defense of the mandate. Whatever the mechanism, both Fortna (2004) and Doyle and Sambanis (2000) are clear in their finding that peace is a function of more than deployment: mandate is of material importance to the durability of peace. Another source used to study peace operations is the Pickering and Kisangani (2009) International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset. The IMI codes all military interventions between 1989 and 2005, including—but not limited to—peace operations. Because only a small fraction of the interventions coded are peace operations, it follows that mandates are not explicitly coded. However, a network of the variables that are used can effectively approximate them. One of these is troop activity, which can take on six values, three of which are used to code UN interventions: negotiate/observe, patrol/guard/defend, and combat. Beyond this, several dummy variables are included that give the data more depth. These include whether operations have any of the following objectives: affecting policies, providing social protection, offering economic protection, strategic intervention, humanitarian intervention, territorial intervention, and diplomatic intervention. The IMI also allows for the attribution of multiple objectives to a single operation. This is consistent with the multiple tasks that peace operations are assigned. When taken in conjunction, the distribution of strength across objectives can be discerned, as represented in Figure 2.1.

Source: Kisangani and Pickering (2008).

Figure 2.1

Distribution of military activity over operational objectives

Mandating peacekeeping operations and international law  19 This is not the case for military activity. Only the highest level of military activity assigned at any point, and for any duration, is coded in the IMI. This is in part attributable to the unit of observation, which lacks a temporal dimension. The IMI uses the operation-country as a single observational point. Intra-operational changes are therefore lost in the observational unit. This is an important limitation to trying to glean the role and impact of an operation’s mandate using the IMI data. Operations are portrayed as singular and stagnant entities when, in fact, their capabilities, authorities, and objectives are adjusted over the course of deployment. Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) use the IMI data to study the effect of operations on conflict containment but make subtle changes. They aggregate identified UN operations into “robust” and “observation” categories, such that operations populated by more than 1000 troops are categorized as “robust,” while the remaining are characterized as “observation” operations. But “robust” and “observation” also have formal definitions in the context of peace operations and, outside of this study, their meanings are a function of mandate rather than troop size. As defined in the previous section, “robust” has a formal meaning in policy, such that it permits the use of force at the tactical level in self-defense and in defense of the mandate (United Nations 2008, p. 98). In fact, the inclusion (or not) of specific mandate language is crucial for determining whether or not an operation is “robust.” A “robust” status is assigned to mandates that expressly permit an operation to use ‘all means necessary’ (or some derivative thereof) in defense of the mandate (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations n.d.). The categorization scheme that Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) employ does not reflect this and presupposes that more troops are necessarily a function of a stronger and more permissive mandate. Conversely, it suggests that larger operations yield a wider authority to use force than smaller ones do. Troop size, however, is often also a function of the size of the territory to which an operation is deployed and the variety of tasks mandated. Political interests and conflict severity may also inflate or decrease the number of troops likely to be provided, regardless of the mandate language. This does not change the tasks or responsibilities of those deployed under the mandate but will likely decrease an operation’s capacity to successfully meet them. For this reason, the level of linguistic sensitivity employed in the service of quantifying mandates should be high. Walter (2002, p. 67) dispatches a similar strategy to approximate “commitment” using a hierarchical variable based on mandate specificity, type, and the size of the authorized force. The dataset includes formal and informal interventions. Specificity therefore pertains to whether the intervening force is articulated in a treaty or resolution. At the point of publication, and covering only interventions authorized between 1940 and 1992, mandate “type” differentiated verification from armed peacekeeping missions—a remnant of the far more limited scope of types in use in the time period covered. “Size” dichotomized both type variables, distinguishing verification missions consisting of a minimum of 500 observers from those with less. Armed peacekeeping operations were likewise divided into categories of more or less than 5000 troops. While not explicitly accounting for the text of the mandate, by differentiating armed operations from those not armed, Walter (2002) does capture more of the mandate’s texture than those that singularly approximate strength from troop size. Hultman et al. (2013) study more recent development in UN mandate typology: civilian protection. Their research uses personnel (observers, police, and soldiers) counts as the focal variable for explaining the protective outcomes, arguing that the greater the size of the force deployed, the better the civilian population is protected. The argument stands regardless of mandate and is based on the assumption that personnel count is a function of mandate strength,

20  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations such that stronger mandates are afforded more troops (p. 878). In the supplementary material, Hultman et al. (2013) address the potential influence of mandates on civilian protection by distinguishing “robust” from “protection” mandates, and they include the respective dummy variables in their model as robustness checks. This process reveals that the mandate type reduces civilian casualties, and that the findings are statistically significant in models of all civilian killings and killings of civilians by the government. However, this schematic casts peace operations as either “robust” or not, or “POC” or not, and overlooks the potential impact of “robust POC” operations, which may be more or less effective than the sum of their parts. Importantly, the combination is also far more prevalent than either type independently. In fact, exactly 247 of the observations included in the dataset can be classified as both “robust” and “POC,” in contrast to the 53 observations of one or the other being singled out. Thus, 80 percent of the cases are only partially represented in the model. Like Hultman et al. (2013), Bove and Ruggeri (2016, p. 14) identify mandate as one of the ‘most salient features of a mission,’ along with mission size. They also use personnel counts to control for mandate and size simultaneously. While actual personnel counts are inherently appropriate indicators of mission size, they are less reliable approximations of mandates. There are several reasons for this. First, the number of troops versus police versus observers only gives a very peripheral view as to what are the objectives with which the operation is tasked. All three categories of personnel may be charged with different responsibilities under different authorities while still serving in the same position. Also important is that objectives change over the course of an operation, and this cannot be inferred by the number of a given personnel-type. Conclusions about the role of the mandate cannot be drawn. Rather, approximating a mandate quantitatively requires room for nuance. Diehl and Druckman (2018) employ a more sensitive mandate categorization scheme. Their mandate variable is coded from the mandate text according to the functions assigned. An operation can fall into any one, or several, of the following eleven groups: traditional, humanitarian assistance, election supervision/democratization, preventive deployment, DDR, pacification/ coercive peacekeeping, human rights protection/protect threatened groups, local security/ law and order, promoting rule of law/civil society, local governance/government services, and restoration/reconciliation. This is a thorough schematic that captures the variety and complexities of operational assignments. One shortcoming, however, is the lack of information concerning the authorities granted to pursue the objectives—as well as the weight the SC places on their respective achievements. Compared to the more rudimentary mandate proxies described earlier, Diehl and Druckman (2018) use a very comprehensive approach. But Di Salvatore et al. (2022) posit that even this schematic is too aggregated. They also problematize the inattention to the prioritization of tasks reflected in the data. Di Salvatore et al. (2022) produce a new dataset as remedy. In the Peacekeeping Mandates Dataset (PEMA), operation types are further disaggregated into 39 categories, each of which is coupled with a modifier such that each mandated task is designated as ‘monitoring,’ ‘assisting,’ or ‘securing’ (p. 13). Of course, this level of disaggregation increases the likelihood that trends will be difficult to discern owing to too many categories with too few observations, so a narrow application is important. For instance, Di Salvatore et al. (2022) replicate Hultman et al.’s (2013) study, which focuses explicitly on protection of civilians, using PEMA POC data. POC mandates can be represented by three different values in the PEMA: a generic POC dummy akin to Hultman et al.’s (2013) POC mandate, a passive POC dummy that represents mandates ‘that involve monitoring others’ protection

Mandating peacekeeping operations and international law  21 activities or simply encourage the operation to engage in POC,’ and an active POC dummy (Di Salvatore et al. 2022, p. 20). The latter category represents mandates that have been charged with participating in protective activity. Whereas Hultman et al.’s (2013) model shows that POC language reduces violence against civilians, supplementing the POC mandate variable with the active and passive POC variables reveals that active POC mandates not only reduce violence, but that passive POC mandates actually correspond to an increase in such violence (Di Salvatore et al. 2022, pp. 19–20). The PEMA data are successful at demonstrating that variation even in similar mandates can go some way in explaining divergent outcomes. The dataset further shows that a high level of detail is achievable and that important information can be gleaned from it. Holt et al. (2009) explore the POC mandate using case studies in a report commissioned jointly by the UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. They go further than other scholars to date in examining the variation within this mandate type. They use case studies of operations in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, and the UN–AU hybrid mission in Darfur (Sudan) to study the mandate language, its evolution, and influence on the planning phases and outcomes over the course of operational deployments. The UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)’s legacy is a primer in the dynamism that marks an operation’s relationship to its mandate, and in turn, to civilian protection. It is particularly illustrative of Holt et al.’s (2009) overall findings because of the many mandates, mandate types, and authoritative shifts MONUC underwent—and continues to undergo since being renamed.8 MONUC was originally conceived of as an observation and monitoring operation under Chapter VI. Following the conclusion of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, with some trepidation the SC expanded the mandate months later to include a POC element under Chapter VII. Despite this adjustment, neither the Secretary General’s concept of operation, nor MONUC’s conduct in the field reflected the change. In fact, it was not until the entire operation faced a crisis of credibility in the wake of multiple failures to protect that tangible results materialized. Holt et al. (2009) do not suggest that this case dismisses mandate language as unimportant. They surmise that MONUC’s failures at civilian protection had multiple origins: ‘some were due to the complexity of its mandate; some due to inadequate resources; and some due to poor application of those resources’ (p. 286). Failures to protect do not render mandates unimportant to the conduct of an operation in the field but emphasize the need for a cogent rather than piecemeal approach to mandate drafting, interpretation, and implementation. They cite MONUC’s response to criticism in the wake of a massacre as evidence, which was to point out the dilemma inherent in its mandate ‘to protect civilians, to minimize to the full the impact of military operations on civilians, as well as to help the legitimate DRC government to weaken and neutralize the FDLR [Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda]’ (p. 286). Failures to comply with the mandate do not signal that mandates are unimportant or irrelevant, rather that administrative and budgetary failures to match these complex mandates with the requisite resources constrain operations’ abilities to achieve their mandated objectives. They determine that clarity and consistency is required of the SC in its authorization of POC operations and that resources provided should be commensurate with the expectations stated in the mandate. Each of the subsequent case studies substantiate this position. Shesterinina and Job (2016) also take a qualitative approach but focus on particular aspects of protection increasingly stipulated in POC mandates. Mandates tend to authorize general protection and subsequently eke out particular groups. It is not suggested in mandates that

22  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations these groups should be “better” protected. The intention is to highlight groups most vulnerable to specific kinds of violence. For instance, women are often singled out as beneficiaries of protection from rape and sexual violence, and children from forced recruitment. Shesterinina and Job (2016) look at how this language manifests in protection across the whole population in contrast to the groups singled out. They use case studies of operations in Somalia and Côte d’Ivoire to illustrate a ‘typology of particularised protection’ using two dimensions (2016, p. 241). The first of these dimensions concerns whether mandates are ‘actively’ protective; that is, whether or not an operation is authorized under Chapter VII to protect civilians, or whether the operation is ‘urged’ or ‘called upon’ to do so in more casual terms (2016, p. 243). The second dimension concerns who is to be protected. The authors determine that mandate protections pertain to different subsets of the civilian population in a ‘declaratory’ capacity if the UN ‘calls on’ the operation to protect subsets of the civilian population (2016, p. 243). Mandate protections likewise pertain to different subsets in a ‘designated’ capacity if the SC ‘authorizes’ the operation to protect civilian groups (2016, p. 243). The classifications of the two dimensions go further than differentiating by Chapter or “robust” language. They rely also on the invocation of thematic resolutions in the mandate. This is perhaps the most linguistically detailed and legally sensitive methodology. Their findings show that the active designation of protection of civilian groups leads to less protection of the general civilian population. The “stabilization” mission is the newest operational type, as explained in the theoretical portion of this chapter, and is appearing more regularly in academic study of peace operations. Lacking formal guidance on how the term should be interpreted, academic discussions of stabilization missions are more prevalent in law and focus more on what should be expected from them. Where studies exist in political science, their examination is largely qualitative. Karlsrud (2018) takes the position that the increasing tendency towards “stabilization” often overlaps with counterterrorism tactics. He uses the UN and AU operations in the Sahel to build this theory. He concludes that the more suggestive these mandates are of counter insurgency, the less likely they are to yield secure states in the long-term. Demonstrated above are the myriad of ways that mandates are accounted for in empirical peacekeeping literature. Some attempt to ally with or reflect the UN’s own descriptions (Diehl et al. 1998; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Pickering and Kisangani 2009; Di Salvatore et al. 2022), while others approximate mandate using other means (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015; Bove and Ruggeri 2016; Walter 2002), or employ a combination of both approaches (Hultman et al. 2013). The struggle with accounting for mandates in empirical studies is that there is considerable variation within the UN’s own categorization. This means that using seemingly straightforward categories such as “enforcement” is complicated by difficulties differentiating them from the “multidimensional” or “stabilization” operations, many of which are authorized under Chapter VII and are charged with some degree of enforcement responsibility. These are increasingly the norm. Importantly, peace operations are believed to benefit from precisely this flexibility (Tharoor 1995). Aggregating the multitude of mandate components into complex typologies risks hiding rather than exposing the elements of peace operation mandates that make the operations work (or not). Di Salvatore et al. (2022) break with the long-standing tradition of imposing a taxonomy, favoring a disaggregated approach that holds the most promise for accurately reflecting the role of mandates in peace operation performance. This trajectory seems particularly promising since it will allow researchers to embrace the complexity of operations and will help them to understand the many moving parts of which peace operations are comprised.

Mandating peacekeeping operations and international law  23

CONCLUSIONS Mandates represent a multidimensional problem for empirical studies of peace operations. They are at once a set of objectives and expectations for UN operations in the field and a proxy for the international community’s commitment to the operation. They also reflect limitations and preferences of Security Council members. Furthermore, they are often vague. This itself is a political tool in many cases—and often essential to see authorizing resolutions passed at all. But vagueness has consequences, the most apparent of which is lack of consistency in interpretation across missions and lack of clarity within them. This chapter began with an explanation of the different mandate components and types that could be expected to influence peace operation outcomes. It then surveyed quantitative and qualitative literature to amass the different means by which mandates are approximated. Strengths and weaknesses were all the while assessed. It was observed that much of the earlier peace operation literature used basic indicators to account for a very complex factor in peace operation outcomes. Sensitivity to the role and influence of mandates is growing, and more nuanced schemas are emerging. The importance of mandates cannot—and should not—be taken to overshadow the importance of conduct in the field. At the same time, researchers cannot continue to look to personnel counts or use of force independently to represent the wide range of tasks assigned to UN peace operations. Doing so minimizes the great scope of the challenge with which peace operations are charged and risks overstating the role of other pieces of the peace operation puzzle.

NOTES 1. Any standing Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) or Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) also inform the composition of ROE (Cole et al. 2009, p. 17). 2. Although these principles are well-established and the changing dynamics of conflicts to which operations are sent has meant an evolution in interpretation, there are growing calls—including from within the UN—for a redefinition of the principles. See dos Santos Cruz et al. (2017, p. 5). 3. Henry Kissinger is credited for designating this tactic ‘constructive ambiguity.’ This strategy is based on the expectation that ‘ambiguously worded text can create opportunities for advancing the interests of both parties to a negotiation’ (Elgindy 2014). 4. Importantly, the FIB is not a legally separate entity. And it is in this fact that some of the confusion and contestation regarding MONUSCO’s standing in the conflict is derived. 5. The political disposition of the SC towards the conflict in question is also influential to the drafting of mandates and oversight of operations, but this is beyond the scope of the present chapter. See Lowe et al. (2010) and Allen and Yuen (2014). 6. Casualties and fatalities, for instance, are certainly absolute, but owing to the nature of conflict this figure is seldom certain. 7. DS2006 use ‘strict’ and ‘lenient’ definitions of peacebuilding in their work. ‘Strict’ peacebuilding requires peace two years after the end of the war and a minimum standard of democracy, while the ‘lenient’ definition centres on an absence of violence (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, p. 738). 8. In 2010, the Security Council renamed the operation the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). See SC Resolution 1925 (UN Security Council 2010).

24  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations

REFERENCES Allen, Susan Hannah and Amy T. Yuen (2014), ‘The politics of peacekeeping: UN Security Council oversight across peacekeeping missions’, International Studies Quarterly, 58 (3), 621–32. Ball, Patrick and Megan Price (2019), ‘Using statistics to assess lethal violence in civil and inter-state war’, Annual Review of Statistics and Its Application, 6, 63–84. Beardsley, Kyle and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2015), ‘Peacekeeping as conflict containment’, International Studies Review, 17 (1), 67–89. Bellamy, Alex J., Paul D. Williams, and Stuart Griffin (2010), Understanding Peacekeeping, Cambridge, UK and Maldon, MA, USA: Polity Press. Bove, Vincenzo and Andrea Ruggeri (2016), ‘Kinds of blue: diversity in UN peacekeeping missions and civilian protection’, British Journal of Political Science, 46 (3), 681–709. Braithwaite, Alex (2010), ‘MIDLOC: introducing the militarized interstate dispute location dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 47 (1), 91–8. Buhaug, Halvard, Scott Gates, and Paivi Lujala (2009), ‘Geography, rebel capability, and the duration of civil conflict’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 (4), 544–69. Carswell, Andrew J. (2013), ‘Unblocking the UN Security Council: the Uniting for Peace Resolution’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 18 (3), 453–80. Cole, Alan, Philip Drew, Rob McLaughlin, and Dennis L. Mandsager (2009), Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, accessed October 9, 2021 at https://​iihl​.org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2017/​11/​ROE​ -HANDBOOK​-ENGLISH​.pdf. de Coning, Cedric (2018), ‘Is stabilization the new normal? Implications of stabilization mandates for the use of force in UN peacekeeping operations’, in P. Nadin (ed.), The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping, Abingdon, UK and New York, NY, USA: Routledge, pp. 85–99. Di Salvatore, Jessica, Magnus Lundgren, Kseniya Oksamytna, and Hannah Smidt (2022), ‘Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, accessed March 3, 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1177/​00220027211068897. Diehl, Paul F. and Daniel Druckman (2018), ‘Multiple peacekeeping missions: analysing interdependence’, International Peacekeeping, 25 (1), 28–51. Diehl, Paul F., Daniel Druckman, and James Wall (1998), ‘International peacekeeping and conflict resolution: a taxonomic analysis with implications’, International Peacekeeping, 42 (1), 33–55. dos Santos Cruz, Carlos A., William R. Phillips, and Salvator Cusimano (2017), ‘Improving security of United Nations peacekeepers: we need to change the way we are doing business’, accessed August 4, 2021 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​improving​_security​_of​_united​_nations​ _peacekeepers​_report​.pdf. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis (2000), ‘International peacebuilding: a theoretical and quantitative analysis’, American Political Science Review, 94 (4), 779–801. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis (2006), Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Durall, Júlia Gifra (2013), ‘United Nations peacekeeping under Chapter VII: exception or widespread practice?’, Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2, accessed September 2, 2020 at https://​revista​.ieee​.es/​article/​view/​339/​570. Elgindy, Khaled (2014), ‘When ambiguity is destructive’, accessed March 13, 2021 at https://​www​ .brookings​.edu/​opinions/​when​-ambiguity​-is​-destructive/​. Fortna, V. Page (2003), ‘Inside and out: peacekeeping and the duration of peace after civil and interstate wars’, International Studies Review, 5 (4), 97–114. Fortna, V. Page (2004), ‘Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war’, International Studies Quarterly, 48 (2), 269–92. Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002), ‘Armed conflict 1946–2001: a new dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 39 (5), 615–37. Hegre, Håvard, Lisa Hultman, and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård (2019), ‘Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations’, The Journal of Politics, 81 (1), 215–32. Holt, Victoria, Glyn Taylor, and Max Kelly (2009), Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges, New York, NY, USA: United Nations.

Mandating peacekeeping operations and international law  25 Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2013), ‘United Nations peacekeeping and civilian protection in civil war’, American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 875–91. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, ON, Canada: International Development Research Centre. International Court of Justice (1949), Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations: Advisory Opinion, accessed September 4, 2020 at http://​www​.worldcourts​.com/​icj/​eng/​ decisions/​1949​.04​.11​_reparation​_for​_injuries​.htm. Karlsrud, John (2018), ‘Are UN peacekeeping missions moving toward “Chapter Seven and a Half” theglobalobservatory​ .org/​ 2018/​ 02/​ peacekeeping​ operations?’, accessed May 15, 2021 at https://​ -chapter​-seven​-half/​. Karlsrud, John (2019), ‘United Nations stabilization operations: chapter seven and a half’, Ethnopolitics, 18 (5), 494–508. Kisangani, Emizet F. and Jeffrey Pickering (2008), ‘International military intervention, 1989–2005’, ICPSR 21282, accessed February 24, 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.3886/​ICPSR21282​.v1. Kreps, Sarah E. and Geoffrey L. Wallace (2009), ‘Just how humanitarian are interventions? Peacekeeping and the prevention of civilian killings during and after civil wars’, paper presented at the American Political Science Association 2009 Annual Meeting, Toronto, September 9, accessed February 2, 2022 at https://​papers​.ssrn​.com/​sol3/​papers​.cfm​?abstract​_id​=​1450574. Labuda, Patryk (2019), ‘How much force is necessary to protect civilians?’, accessed February 22, 2020 at https://​theglobalobservatory​.org/​2019/​09/​how​-much​-force​-necessary​-protect​-civilians/​. Lowe, Vaughan, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum (2010), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945, London, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000), Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305, S/2000/809, New York, NY, USA: United Nations, accessed October 7, 2021 at https://​www​.un​.org/​en/​ga/​search/​view​_doc​.asp​?symbol​=​A/​55/​305. Pickering, Jeffrey and Emizet F. Kisangani (2009), ‘The International Military Intervention dataset: an updated resource for conflict scholars’, Journal of Peace Research, 46 (4), 589–99. Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen (2010), ‘Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset: special data feature’, Journal of Peace Research, 47 (5), 651–60. Ratner, Steven R. (1995), ‘Image and reality in the UN’s peaceful settlement of disputes’, European Journal of International Law, 6, 426–44. Sartre, Patrice (2011), ‘Making UN peacekeeping more robust: protecting the mission, persuading the actors’, New York, NY, USA: International Peace Institute, accessed October 9, 2021 at https://​www​ .ipinst​.org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​publications/​ipi​_epub​_robustpeacekeeping​.pdf. Shesterinina, Anastasia and Brian L. Job (2016), ‘Particularized protection: UNSC mandates and the protection of civilians in armed conflict’, International Peacekeeping, 23 (2), 240–73. Sundberg, Ralph and Erik Melander (2013), ‘Introducing the UCDP georeferenced event dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 50 (4), 523–32. Tharoor, Shashi (1995), ‘Should UN peacekeeping go “back to basics”?’, Survival, 37 (4), 52–64. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (n.d.), ‘Principles of peacekeeping’, accessed June 2, 2018 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​en/​principles​-of​-peacekeeping. UN General Assembly (1950), Uniting for Peace A/RES/377(V), accessed October 7, 2021 at https://​ undocs​.org/​en/​A/​RES/​377(V). UN General Assembly (2005), ‘World summit outcome’, A/RES/60/1, accessed June 2, 2020 at https://​ www​.un​.org/​en/​development/​desa/​population/​migration/​generalassembly/​docs/​globalcompact/​A​ _RES​_60​_1​.pdf. UN Security Council (1999), Resolution 1270, S/RES/1270 (1999), accessed 29 July 2022 at https://​ documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​GEN/​N99/​315/​02/​PDF/​N9931502​.pdf​?OpenElement. UN Security Council (2005), Resolution 1590, S/RES/1590 (2005), accessed October 7, 2021 at https://​ digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​544317​?ln​=​en. UN Security Council (2010), Resolution 1925, S/RES/1925 (2010), accessed October 7, 2021 at https://​ digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​685883​?ln​=​en.

26  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations UN Security Council (2013a), Resolution 2098, S/RES/2098 (2013), accessed October 7, 2021 at https://​ digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​747650​?ln​=​en. UN Security Council (2013b), Resolution 2100, S/RES/2100 (2013), accessed October 7, 2021at https://​ undocs​.org/​S/​RES/​2100(2013). UN Security Council (2014), Resolution 2149, S/RES/2149 (2014), accessed 29 July 2022 at https://​ documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​GEN/​N14/​295/​81/​PDF/​N1429581​.pdf​?OpenElement. UN Security Council (2016), Resolution 2301, S/RES/2301 (2016), accessed October 7, 2021at https://​ undocs​.org/​S/​RES/​2301(2016). United Nations (1945), Charter of the United Nations, accessed October 7, 2021 at https://​www​.un​.org/​ en/​about​-us/​un​-charter/​full​-text. United Nations (2008), United Nations Peace Operations: Principles and Guidelines, New York, NY, USA: United Nations, accessed October 9, 2021 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​ capstone​_eng​_0​.pdf. Walter, Barbara F. (2002), Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.

3. Peacekeeping financing Katharina P. Coleman

Peacekeeping operations generate a wide range of expenses. Peacekeeping troops and, where applicable, police have to be mustered, trained, equipped, transported to their area of operations, and – typically – paid deployment bonuses. Civilian staff must be recruited, relocated to the mission area if they are international, and paid. A vast range of equipment – including military, medical, communications, transport, construction and sustainment – has to be procured, transported and maintained. Supplies such as fuel, rations and office staples must be purchased, and mission infrastructure (office space, accommodation, warehouses, airfields …) acquired or built and maintained. Total costs vary widely by mission type and by institutional framework. In 2020, the smallest United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation, the Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, deployed 118 personnel and had a yearly budget under $10 million (UN 2020). Multidimensional UN operations in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and Mali (MINUSMA) deployed 16 000–19 000 peacekeepers each and had annual budgets of over $1 billion. African Union (AU) mission annual costs have ranged from $134 million in Burundi (AMIB, under 3500 personnel) to $1.2 billion in Somalia (AMISOM, 22 000 troops) (AU 2016, p. 8). Cost estimates for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missions are far higher, largely because these missions often involve significant combat operations and because NATO members typically spend more on their contingents’ compensation, equipment and maintenance than standardized UN reimbursement rates envision (GAO 2018). In 2008, the USA spent an estimated $8.2 billion per brigade team (9000 troops) deployed in NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (Belasco 2009, p. 54). At its 2011 peak, with over 130 000 deployed troops, ISAF is estimated to have cost almost $129 billion (Solmirano and Hallgren 2013). By comparison, total approved UN peacekeeping expenditures peaked at $8.5 billion in 2015, for 125 000 peacekeepers deployed across 16 operations (UN 2015). Yet cross-institutional comparisons are complicated by differences in how costs are calculated. This chapter begins with an overview of the seven sources from which contemporary peacekeeping operations are financed. Fully comprehensive – and thus comparable – cost estimates should take all seven sources into account. In practice, however, there are profound differences in the relative weighting of these sources across different institutional settings that – along with data availability issues – shape the data practitioners and scholars focus on. This chapter’s second section considers the UN, NATO and AU financing models, both because these are among the most prominent international organizations currently engaged in peacekeeping and because they illustrate three fundamentally different ways of financing peace operations. The third section demonstrates that these distinct financing models engender different kinds of burden-sharing debates among diplomats and academics, which nevertheless share important commonalities. In all cases, states and scholars cogently use quantitative methodologies to determine proportionality – or “fairness” – in burden-sharing. Yet, ultimately, contention in each case is rooted in deeply political questions about whose good peace 27

28  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations operations (most) serve and how financial and non-financial contributions should be weighted. The chapter ends by considering gaps in our current knowledge about peacekeeping financing that future research might address.

SEVEN SOURCES OF PEACEKEEPING FINANCING The total cost of a peacekeeping operation can be defined as the sum of additional expenses generated through the deployment, activities, sustainment/maintenance and eventual repatriation of all peacekeeping personnel and equipment. This definition is conservative in excluding personnel and equipment costs not directly tied to the peacekeeping deployment (for example, troops’ regular salaries and training) and expenses incurred in diplomatic efforts to support the operation. Nevertheless, it is unusually expansive in focusing on what a deployment costs rather than what a specific set of actors (such as a mission’s troop contributors) pays for it. Defining costs by source carries the risk of underreporting because peacekeeping operations are financed from up to seven distinct sources (adapted from Coleman and Williams 2017, p. 5). This section reviews these sources. The next section discusses their different relative weights across the UN, NATO, and AU financing models. Source 1  Individual troop and/or police contributing countries (T/PCCs) may fully or partially assume the additional costs of their personnel deployments. This is the residual category of peacekeeping financing: any costs that are not covered by the other sources and cannot be avoided (for example, by not paying deployment bonuses) fall upon the T/PCC. Source 2  Individual T/PCCs may receive bilateral assistance from other states. For example, the USA and the UK helped finance Ethiopia’s and Mozambique’s deployment to the 2003–04 AU Mission in Burundi (Coleman and Williams 2017, p. 18). “Deployment subsidies” can be important coalition-building tools and may take the form of bilateral payments or foreign aid, in-kind support, or payment for contractor services (Boutton and D’Orazio 2020; Coleman and Williams 2017; Henke 2016; 2019a; 2019b). Source 3  Within a peace operation, some T/PCCs – often but not always the “lead state” – may provide logistic support for others, effectively subsidizing them. For example, Nigeria provided petrol, oil and lubricants to all TCCs in the 1990–97 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mission in Liberia (Coleman 2007, p. 85). Germany provided air transport support for Hungary’s ISAF deployment (Marton and Wagner 2017, p. 155). Source 4  Some peace operations receive funding from the host states in which they are deployed. Egypt and Israel each pay almost one-third of the annual budget for the Multinational Force and Observers deployed in the Sinai since 1981 (MFO 2020). Cyprus pays one-third of the budget for the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and makes additional voluntary in-kind contributions (UNGA 2020b, p. 30). Source 5  If a peace operation has been launched through an international organization, that “umbrella IO” may use resources generated from its membership to pay for the operation’s “common costs,” for example expenses such as operational headquarters, in-theater medical support (such as field hospitals) and mission infrastructure (such as helipads) that serve the mission as a whole. The EU has developed the Athena mechanism for this purpose (EC n.d.) and NATO and the UN also provide “common cost” funding (see below). Source 6  The umbrella IO may pay for individual contingents’ deployment costs, either by directly assuming some expenses or by reimbursing T/PCCs. The UN provides the most

Peacekeeping financing  29 prominent example, paying directly for contingents’ rations and fuel (Coleman and Williams 2017, p. 8) and reimbursing T/PCCs for other troop and equipment deployment costs through a set of standardized rates (Coleman 2014, p. 10). Source 7  Umbrella IOs may receive funding or in-kind support for a peace operation from other IOs or non-member states. Trust funds were created for ECOWAS missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the African-led International Support Mission in Mali, and the AU mission in Central African Republic. However, trust funds rely on voluntary contributions, which are often limited and/or have restrictions on their use (Williams and Dersso 2015, p. 15). Donor IOs can also use assessed (mandatory) contributions from their members to support the beneficiary operation. As discussed below, AMISOM has had direct financing from the EU and substantial logistic support packages from the UN. Finally, a peacekeeping operation may receive in-kind support (for example, force protection) from a parallel deployment by a state or another international organization.

THREE CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF PEACEKEEPING FINANCING The UN, the AU (and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity) and NATO are among the most prominent umbrella IOs for contemporary peacekeeping operations, respectively deploying 55, 20, and 9 of the 150 peace operations launched since 1990 (Williams with Bellamy 2021, Appendix) including the largest and costliest missions. They also provide three distinctive models of peacekeeping financing that differ sharply in the relative weight accorded to the seven potential funding sources.

Source: UN Secretary-General, Notes on Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period [annually] from 1 July [...] to 30 June [...], annually from 2010 to 2020.

Figure 3.1

UN financing model: total approved peacekeeping expenditures, 2009–21

30  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations The UN model relies heavily on Sources 5 and 6, using assessed contributions from UN member states to finance both common and T/PCC costs.1 Figure 3.1 illustrates the evolution of approved UN peacekeeping expenditures since 2000,2 which primarily reflect yearly budgets for individual missions.3 These budgets are proposed by the Secretary-General, scrutinized by the expert Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, negotiated in the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee and approved by the plenary General Assembly. Approved expenses are then distributed among UN member states based on a scale of assessment reviewed triennially by the General Assembly, which for 2020–21 ranges from 27.89 percent (for the USA) to 0.0001 percent for the least affluent states (UNGA 2018b). Figure 3.1 also illustrates the UN’s main peacekeeping budget categories. Civilian personnel costs and operational requirements (such as facilities and infrastructure, air operations, medical) largely indicate common costs funding (Source 5). The UN pays some of these directly (for example, civilian salaries) and others indirectly (such as reimbursing a T/PCC for deploying a field hospital). “Military and police personnel costs” include direct support to contingents and T/PCC reimbursements (Source 6). Most reimbursements occur at standardized rates, including for uniformed personnel deployments (in 2020, $1428 per person per month) and hundreds of major equipment and self-sustainment items (UNGA 2020a). Most other funding sources are less prominent in the UN model. Bilateral support to TCCs (Source 2) occurs as declared temporary equipment loans enabling a state to deploy, which modestly reduce UN reimbursement expenses, and as permanent equipment or financial donations to TCCs (Henke 2016; 2019a), which are not visible in UN budgets. In-kind support among TCCs enables some smaller troop contributions (Coleman 2013, p. 62; Daniel et al. 2015, p. 8) but is typically subject to UN reimbursement and thus does not constitute separate Source 3 financing. Among current host states (Source 4), only Cyprus offers substantial financial contributions (see above). Other voluntary financial or in-kind contributions (Source 7) are typically limited. Greece pays $6.5 million annually towards UNFICYP (Coleman and Williams 2017, p. 9) and Morocco and Algeria have contributed to the UN mission in Western Sahara, in 2019 paying $235 000 and $284 000, respectively (UNGA 2019a, p. 28). There are, however, examples of states deploying significant military operations in parallel to UN missions (such as the UK in Sierra Leone, France in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali). Neither the costs of such operations nor the value of support provided to UN operations are included in UN budgets. The EU has also deployed – more briefly – in support of the UN (for example in the Democratic Republic of Congo). Beyond this, inter-IO financial support is rare: for example, when the UN mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA) took over headquarters previously used by the EU, it had to pay $11.9 million for this asset (Coleman and Williams 2017, p. 12). However, TCC self-financing (Source 1) remains relevant in the UN Model for three main reasons. First, T/PCCs bear the full cost of any investments they make in training personnel towards UN peacekeeping standards and risk only partially recouping UN-specific equipment procurement costs (Coleman 2013, p. 17). Second, T/PCCs assume their deployment costs until the UN reimburses them, which may be delayed if member states do not pay their assessed contributions on time. In December 2019, T/PCCs were owed $928 million in delayed equipment and troop cost reimbursements (UNGA 2020c, p. 6). Third, if a TCC’s personnel or equipment expenses exceed standardized UN reimbursement rates (for example, by providing higher deployment bonuses, better accommodation, or more advanced equipment), it must absorb the additional cost. The more TCCs are in this position – an increasing likelihood given

Peacekeeping financing  31 political pressure to limit reimbursement rate increases and growing costs in many T/PCCs (Coleman and Nyblade 2018) – the more the UN model relies on self-financing and the greater the probability of UN budgets underreporting the costs of a peacekeeping operation. The NATO Model is characterized by heavy reliance on TCCs, as is evident from the distribution of estimated ISAF costs in Figure 3.2. NATO does not reimburse TCCs for their deployment costs (Source 5). Given the affluence of NATO members, moreover, Alliance operations do not tend to attract funding from other IOs (Source 7) or host states (Source 4). NATO thus depends significantly on TCC self-financing (Source 1). However, two factors mitigate this reliance.

Source: Carina Solmirano and Jakob Hallgren, ‘Assessing the cost of military operations in Afghanistan and juxtaposing them to the assessed costs of humanitarian assistance (2008–2012)’, Table 1.1. Draft paper available at http://​devinit​.org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2013/​11/​Costs​-of​-military​-operations​-and​-humanitarian​-aid​-Afghanistan​.pdf, data used with permission.

Figure 3.2

NATO financing model: ISAF and OEF costs, 2008–12

First, NATO provides some common costs funding for Alliance operations (Source 4). NATO has three budgets, financed by Alliance members based on a negotiated “cost share formula” that in 2020 ranged from 0.027 percent (Montenegro) to 22.12 percent (USA). The Civil Budget only funds NATO’s operating costs and civilian staff, but a portion of the Military Budget – 19.6 percent in 2019, roughly $313 million – can be spent on operational requirements for Alliance missions, such as theater headquarters and communications systems (NATO 2019, p. 107). Moreover, the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) can support ‘major construction and command and control system investments . . . [including] military headquarters . . . for deployed operations, and critical airfield, fuel systems and harbour facilities needed in support of deployed forces’ (NATO 2020). Funded at $780 million annually, in 2019 six percent of NSIP’s expenditure served to ‘conduct/sustain Alliance operations and missions’ and 26 percent to ‘provide logistic support & sustainment capability

32  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations for deploying forces’ (NATO 2019, p. 108). NATO operations may also create ad hoc shared logistics arrangements that mitigate TCCs’ costs, such as ISAF’s fuel acquisition and distribution system (Johnston 2019, p. 22). Second, NATO operations can feature very significant in-kind inter-TCC support (Source 3) and bilateral TCC financing (Source 2), typically from other TCCs rather than third parties. Within ISAF, the USA spent $9.4 billion through its Coalition Support Fund and Lift and Sustain program in 2010–15 and ‘subsidized the large bulk of Eastern European countries that participated’ (Henke 2019b, pp. 148–9). In addition, lead nations of ISAF’s five Regional Commands tended to support other TCCs in the area, as Germany’s support to Hungary (noted above) illustrates. Similarly, France ‘fully funded’ the Moroccan contingent in NATO’s Kosovo Force (Henke 2019b, p. 149). The AU Model features a heavy dependence on external partners (Source 7), as Figure 3.3 illustrates. The AU aspires to provide both common and TCC cost financing (Sources 5 and 6) for its operations through its Peace Fund. Since 2017, moreover, the AU explicitly includes AU operations in its budget, whose expenses are distributed among member states through a negotiated scale that in 2020 ranged from 7.53 percent (for Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa) to 0.12 percent for São Tomé and Príncipe (AU 2020a, pp. 215–16). The AU has also developed a standardized T/PCC reimbursement system, initially drawing on the UN model (AU 2003, Annex F). In practice, however, the AU has struggled to generate sufficient resources from assessed member state contributions to implement its reimbursement policies. Thus, most participants at a 2015 AU Logistics Forum ‘agreed that the AU [contingent-owned equipment] policy is mostly irrelevant since it does not provide reimbursement’ (ACSS 2015, p. 12). To remedy this weakness, the AU introduced a 0.2 percent levy on eligible imports from outside Africa in 2016, aiming to generate $400 million for its Peace Fund by 2020 (AU 2016, p. 8). To date, however, the levy has been only partially implemented (see below) and even full implementation was never expected to cover major operations such as AMISOM (AU 2016, p. 7). Without sufficient Source 5 and 6 funding, the AU relies partly on TCC self-financing (Source 1): ‘Contributions in kind and those provided from TCC national budgets are not routinely captured, yet they constitute a core element of the financing of AU-led [operations]’ (AU 2016, p. 7). Yet given TCCs’ limited willingness and/or ability to self-finance – or to provide in-kind support subsidizing other TCCs (Source 3) – the AU also depends heavily on external partners to finance its peace operations. Some TCCs receive direct support from non-AU states (Source 2). For example, the USA and the UK supported Uganda’s AMISOM deployment (Henke 2019b; Williams 2018, p. 213). The AU also relies heavily on non-member states and other IOs providing funding for its operations (Source 7). Some AU missions have drawn support from parallel state deployments, such as France’s Operation Sangaris in Central African Republic. Moreover, as Figure 3.3 illustrates, AU budgets themselves distinguish between costs member states assume and (much larger) contributions sought from international partners. Thus, the EU spent €1.7 billion on AMISOM personnel salaries and allowances between 2007 and 2018 (EC 2018). In addition, the UN may provide a separate logistical support package (Williams and Dersso 2015, p. 4): funding for the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA, later UNSOS) has surpassed $500 million/year since 2015. In 2016, international partners provided 98 percent of budgeted funding for AU peace and security initiatives (AU 2016, p. 3). For 2020, the AU budgeted that 97 percent of its

Peacekeeping financing  33

Source: AU budget data from African Union budget decisions, 2017–20. UNSOS/UNSOA data from UN Secretary-General, Notes on Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period [annually] from 1 July [...] to 30 June [...], annually from 2017 to 2020. Overall cost estimate: ICG 2020, 13.

Figure 3.3

AU financing model: AMISOM financing sources, 2017–20

expected peace operations expenditure would be ‘solicited from International partners’ (AU 2020a, p. 211).

BURDEN-SHARING DEBATES Financing mechanisms in IOs inevitably give rise to debates about burden-sharing both within the organization – where they periodically escalate into financial crises – and among scholars. One common focus of contention is the formal mechanism by which organizational costs are distributed among member states. Beyond this, however, the UN, NATO and AU financing models give rise to very different types of burden-sharing debates. In all of them, quantitative methods play a prominent role in enabling a comparison of the relative contributions of various states. They cannot, however, dispense with foundational debates about what constitutes a “fair” distribution of burdens and what contributions are, and are not, counted as burdens. Burden-sharing in the UN model  Since the UN model relies heavily on the organization paying for common and (many) TCC costs (Sources 5 and 6), the burden-sharing debate revolves centrally around what constitutes a fair distribution of these expenses among UN member states. This is a long-standing diplomatic debate within the UN, which the organization seeks to address using quantitative methodologies but has only partially resolved. The UN has a separate scale of assessment for peacekeeping expenses, created in 1973 after states’ refusal to

34  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations pay for operations in Egypt (UNEF) and Congo (ONUC) through regular budget assessments plunged the organization into financial crisis (Mills 1989, pp. 6–15). The regular budget scale envisions a fair cost distribution as based largely on capacity to pay (captured by states’ gross national income, GNI, adjusted for debt and per capita income), with a minimum assessment rate to enshrine universal contribution and a “ceiling” of 22 percent set after the USA’s refusal to pay its 25 percent share precipitated another financial crisis in the 1990s (Mir 2019, pp. 6–7). The peacekeeping scale modifies the regular one by offering rate discounts to poorer states (20–90 percent, based on per capita GNI)4 that are financed by a surcharge on the five permanent Security Council members (P5). It justifies this redistribution with reference to poorer states’ ‘capacity to contribute’ and the P5’s ‘special responsibilities’ and, implicitly, power (UNGA 2019b, p. 2). Peacekeeping costs thus fall more heavily on affluent states than regular budget expenses: in 2020, the ten top contributors (USA, China, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Russia, Canada, Korea) were responsible for 80.5 percent of UN peacekeeping expenses (UNGA 2018a, Annex). Despite formal agreement on the distribution principles, triennial scale review negotiations in the General Assembly engender heated debate on both the regular scale methodology (for example, regarding eligibility for debt relief) and elements of the peacekeeping scale (such as the ceiling). These debates are not purely financial – UN peacekeeping is relatively cheap, even for the USA (GAO 2018) – but reflect political disagreements about what constitutes proportionate burden-sharing. The USA in particular has often argued that it ‘bears an unfair cost burden’ (for example, White House 2017). Exploitation of large states is also a core concern in the academic literature on UN peacekeeping financing. It arises from viewing UN peacekeeping through an (impure) public goods paradigm, as pioneered by Bobrow and Boyer (1997) and Khanna et al. (1998), drawing on Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). Collective action theory suggests that if UN peacekeeping delivers public benefits (international peace and security) as well as private ones (furthering individual states’ economic and security interests), it risks being undersupplied by states focused only on the latter. Moreover, smaller states are likely to free-ride on larger ones with greater private stakes in systemic stability. Assessment scales provide a partial bulwark against this under-provision by institutionalizing cost-sharing (see also Shimizu 2005), but this mechanism is imperfect since states retain de facto discretion over whether (and when) to pay their contributions (Bobrow and Boyer 1997, p. 736; Khanna et al. 1998, p. 180). This strand of scholarship thus investigates whether the actual financial burden disproportionately falls on larger states, typically by comparing (via Spearman rank order correlations) states’ rankings on financial contributions to UN peacekeeping to their GDP ranking. Bobrow and Boyer (1997) argued that within the “small club” created by the peacekeeping assessment scale smaller states do not free-ride on larger ones. However, Khanna and Sandler (1997) and Khanna et al. (1998) found evidence for the exploitation of larger states in the post-Cold War era and confirmed this finding in a series of update and extension articles (Sandler 2017; Shimizu and Sandler 2002; 2010). Yet the exploitation hypothesis is open to two challenges. The first hinges on the extent to which UN peacekeeping is indeed a public good (albeit an “impure” one), which underlies the claim that proportionate burden-sharing entails each state contributing according to its capacity to pay, operationalized as relative economic size. The most radical counterargument arises from the notion of “imperial peacekeeping” (Cunliffe 2012): if UN peacekeeping serves primarily to extend the liberal world order, it is entirely proportionate for the states most benefiting from that order to shoulder most of the costs. Yet Gaibulloev et al. (2009, p. 845) find

Peacekeeping financing  35 no evidence of contributor-specific benefits (operationalized as trade with and distance from the host state) affecting UN peacekeeping contributions, and Beardsley and Schmidt (2011) find that UN interventions are best predicted by the severity of a crisis. They do, however, also find a significant effect for Security Council members’ “parochial” interests, and especially overlapping P5 interests. Much depends, then, on how interests are measured – with the added complication that Council members may benefit from dispatching a UN operation to countries where they have no major interest because it allows them to avoid intervening in other, more costly, ways. Avoiding the difficulty (and potential circularity) of defining interests, a more moderate version of this critique simply suggests that the power inequalities governing UN peacekeeping decisions are appropriately reflected in the distribution of costs, echoing the UN justification for the P5 surcharge in the peacekeeping assessment scale. The second challenge to the exploitation hypothesis questions its identification and relative weighting of the relevant burdens. On the one hand, financial contributions are not only burdens but also sources of influence over UN peacekeeping (Coleman 2020a, pp. 7–11; Shimizu and Sandler 2002, p. 666). China has embraced its peacekeeping assessment rising from 2 percent in the early 2000s to over 15 percent in 2020 as cementing its status within the UN (Coleman and Job 2021, p. 1455). Japan and Germany have gained access to the Security Council as major financial contributors (Hurd 2008, p. 118). Russia insisted on doubling its assessment rate in the early 2000s to avoid falling further behind China (Laurenti 2018, p. 257). The exploitation hypothesis ignores these political benefits by considering financial contributions purely as burdens. On the other hand, proponents of the exploitation hypothesis tend to exclude personnel contributions from their burden-sharing metric. The rationale is typically that countries that are not major financial contributors – that is, poorer countries – generally have per-soldier military expenditures below UN troop cost reimbursement rates. Instead of making a Source 1 financial contribution, therefore, these states derive a financial profit from deploying peacekeepers (Bove and Elia 2011; Gaibulloev et al. 2015; Sandler 2017, p. 1882). Yet reimbursement delays and limited reimbursement rate increases over time (see above) limit the profitability of UN personnel contributions. Coleman and Nyblade (2018) highlight flaws in the quantitative evidence for the “peacekeeping for profit” narrative and argue that fewer TCCs can financially benefit from peacekeeping contributions than is often assumed. A different objection is that excluding personnel contributions problematically truncates the burden-sharing debate. Western states sharply reduced their UN troop contributions after peacekeeping failures in the 1990s, continuing to pay for operations but leaving poorer states to furnish the personnel. In May 2020, states receiving discounts in the peacekeeping assessment scale paid only 5.5 percent of UN peacekeeping costs but furnished 90.6 percent of uniformed peacekeepers, while the ten top financial contributors deployed only 6.8 percent of the personnel. Regardless of financial profitability, personnel deployments entail significant risks, especially given the increasingly ambitious and dangerous missions mandated by the Security Council (Boutellis 2020; Williams 2020). For many TCCs, focusing the burden-sharing debate exclusively on financial contributions is thus fundamentally misleading. Burden-sharing in the NATO model  NATO, like the UN, regularly reviews its cost share formula. In 2019, Allies agreed to reduce the US share from 22 percent to 16 percent, a reform NATO’s Secretary-General characterized as ‘an important demonstration of Allies’ commitment … to fairer burden-sharing’ (NATO 2019, p. 106). However, since the NATO Model of peacekeeping financing relies heavily on TCC self-financing and inter-TCC support

36  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations (Sources 1, 2 and 3), the cost share formula is a minor issue in NATO’s burden-sharing debate. For NATO, the key indicator of burden-sharing has long been how much Allies invest in their own military capabilities, typically operationalized as defense spending as a share of GDP. Concern that European NATO Allies may free-ride on the USA predates NATO’s engagement in peacekeeping by several decades. During the Cold War, US policymakers frequently called on European states to ‘provide a greater share of their own defense’ (CBO 2001, p. vii). To enable systematic comparison, NATO began publishing data on member states’ annual defense expenditures in 1963. Yet expenditures remained uneven: in 1985, the USA spent 6.7 percent of its GDP on defense, European Allies collectively 3.5 percent (CBO 2001, p. 10). After briefly subsiding in the early post-Cold War years, NATO’s burden-sharing debate resurged as the Alliance contemplated enlargement and began undertaking peace operations, initially in the Balkans (CBO 2001; Chalmers 2001). In 2006, NATO members committed to spending at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense, a goal NATO has since tracked. By 2019, however, only 9 of 29 Allies had reached this target (NATO 2019, p. 6). In the post-Cold War context, non-military burden-sharing measures such as foreign economic aid and new military ones including troop contributions to peace operations were increasingly championed, not least by states seeking indicators that favored them (Chalmers 2001; Hartley and Sandler 1999). Burden-sharing within NATO operations became the focus of sharp contestation as disparities emerged: unequal ISAF commitments led the USA to protest against a “two-tier alliance” (Garamone 2011), a charge renewed after the 2011 Libya intervention (Daalder and Stavridis 2012, pp. 6–7). Scholarly concern about unequal NATO burden-sharing followed a similar trajectory, beginning during the Cold War (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966) and focusing more specifically on peacekeeping from the late 1990s onwards. A key concern was escalating “exploitation of the rich by the poor,” as out-of-area peace operations were argued to present greater incentives and opportunities for free-riding than collective defense investments (Khanna and Sandler 1997; Sandler and Shimizu 2014). As in the UN context, however, the exploitation hypothesis raised questions about whose interests are most served by NATO peace operations. Early post-Cold War studies envisaged NATO operations as supplementing UN peacekeeping in pursuit of the global public good – world peace – and argued that disparities within NATO reinforced the disproportionality of UN burden-sharing (Khanna et al. 1998, pp. 190–91; Shimizu and Sandler 2002, p. 652). Subsequent studies relinquished the assumption of NATO operations serving a global public good and instead focused on the public good of alliance members. They suggested, however, that because NATO operations rely on voluntary member state contributions – Sources 1, 2 and 3 financing – they are only feasible when they serve significant private interests. Thus, ‘UN missions [are] for global public benefits [but] non-UN missions for peacekeeper-specific benefits’ (Gaibuilloev et al. 2009, p. 827; Sandler 2017, p. 1888). Relevant benefits may be material and crisis-specific (Sandler and Shimizu 2014) but can also include cementing security guarantees by proving a good ally (Ringsmose 2010, p. 320) or bolstering a transatlantic approach to European security (Becker and Malesky 2017). However defined, interest-driven contributions complicate (dis)proportionality assessments: interest-based burden-sharing is only “unfair” if states can reasonably be chastised for not having the appropriate interests. While this may be the implicit claim in some US critiques of NATO allies, a perhaps more academically tenable alternative is to simply investigate determinants of contributions and

Peacekeeping financing  37 move beyond the (fair) burden-sharing paradigm. Thies, for example, suggests a ‘bargaining and burden-shifting’ perspective (2003, pp. 262–3). NATO burden-sharing studies also echo UN debates in featuring contestation about how burdens are defined and measured. Some scholars advocate more fine-grained measures of financial investment in military capacities than the defense expenditure to GDP ratio. Bove and Cavatorta (2012, p. 285) distinguish spending on military salaries from investments in equipment and infrastructure vital to NATO missions. Becker and Malesky (2017) stress Operations and Management expenditure as a share of GDP as a key indicator of resources available for NATO activities. For peacekeeping burden-sharing, troop contributions have emerged as a key indicator. Following Source 1 logic, troop contributions multiplied by per-personnel defense spending have been used to measure financial burden-sharing for NATO operations (Shimizu and Sandler 2002; 2020; Gaibulloev et al. 2009). The absence of a NATO mechanism to reimburse deployment costs (Source 6) and, arguably, limited data on bilateral subsidies to troop contributors (Source 2, but see Henke 2019a; 2019b), have largely forestalled the charges of “peacekeeping for profit” seen in the UN context. Increasingly, however, NATO troop contributions have been interpreted as a more direct measure of (military) burden-sharing. Measurement debates persist, including over whether absolute deployment numbers or proportional data (such as deployed troops as a share of active-duty military personnel or national population) best capture burden-sharing (Zyla 2015; 2016). With ISAF, however, analytical focus shifted from quantity to quality of troop deployments, notably the operational restrictions (“caveats”) placed on contingents (Auerswald and Saideman 2014, p. 228). Thus, within NATO ‘the burden-sharing agenda has been dominated by risk-sharing issues’ (Ringmose 2010, p. 321). In stark contrast to UN debates, within NATO risk assumption tends to eclipse financial contributions: ‘[If] one country is absorbing casualties, while others are not, the acceptance of other burdens including financial support … is marginalized. Regardless of their other contributions, countries that refuse to place troops in the field do not accept a full share of the burdens’ (Cimbala and Forster 2017, p. 121). Burden-sharing in the AU model  The AU’s scale of assessment for member state budget contributions is explicitly designed to reduce the organization’s dependence on its wealthiest member states. The current scale, introduced in 2015, divides AU members into three tiers based on GDP growth and sets a ceiling on Tier 1 contributions that has decreased from 12 percent in 2015 to 7.525 percent for 2020–22 (AU 2020a, p. 214). In part to manage the impact of the corresponding increase in Tier 2 and 3 assessments, AU member states decreed a $32 million regular budget reduction from 2019 to 2020 (AU 2020a, p. 28). However, these innovations have been overshadowed by the AU’s continued dependence on external funders (Source 7), especially for its peace operations. The core burden-sharing debate in the AU model currently revolves around the AU’s relationship with the UN. Regional organizations’ potential contributions to international peace and security are acknowledged in the UN Charter, and they have engaged in peacekeeping since the Cold War (Williams with Bellamy 2021). The 1990s saw an increase in regional peacekeeping and launched a gradual transformation in regional organizations’ relationship with the UN, which recognized its growing dependence on regional bodies as disasters in former Yugoslavia and Somalia led to a sharp contraction in UN peacekeeping (UNGA and SC 1995, p. 20). Initially, sub-regional organizations (notably ECOWAS) led the surge in regional peacekeeping in Africa, with the continental Organization of African Union serving a legitimation role (Coleman 2007) and fielding some observer missions (Williams with Bellamy 2021). The

38  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations 2000s and 2010s saw a stronger continental role with the AU’s creation in 2000, the 2002 establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council, the gradual building of the African Peace and Security Architecture, and multiple AU peace operations including in Sudan, Somalia, Mali, and Central African Republic. The AU also cooperated in the hybrid AU–UN operation in Darfur and endorsed multilateral coalitions against Boko Haram, the Lord’s Resistance Army, and in the Sahel. Yet, as noted, the AU lacked the capacity to fully fund these operations, relying on a variety of UN logistic support packages and EU financing. By the 2000s, moreover, African actors were distancing themselves from costly long-term regional peacekeeping, instead favoring interim regional missions succeeded by UN peacekeeping operations (Coleman 2011, p. 519). In parallel, UN peacekeeping resurged, especially in Africa, with large new missions (some succeeding regional deployments) in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Central African Republic and Mali. Yet the UN also recognized its limitations, including for rapid deployment and peace enforcement. Thus, by 2015 the UN Secretary-General acknowledged a new ‘era of “partnership peacekeeping”’ and a particular need for cooperation with the AU, including ‘a shared understanding of the options for, and limitations to, the provision of support to African Union peace operations’ (UNSC 2015, pp. 17–18). That shared understanding has proved elusive, with debate over appropriate financial burden-sharing deadlocked on the issue of moving from ad hoc measures to more predictable funding from UN-assessed contributions. In 2015, building on multiple UN and expert reports, the AU formally proposed that the UN should commit to covering 75 percent of the costs of UN-mandated AU operations (Coleman 2017, pp. 112–15). The AU’s 2016 announcement of its 0.2 percent levy on imports into Africa was partly intended to demonstrate its capacity to pay the remaining 25 percent (Coleman 2017, p. 115; ICG 2020, p. 12). However, while the Security Council welcomed the proposal in November 2016, the UN has not yet endorsed it and important barriers remain, including questions around the credibility of the AU’s 25 percent financing commitment, AU human rights and humanitarian law compliance and financial transparency, and command and control of AU-deployed but largely UN-funded troops (Coleman 2017, p. 117; ICG 2020, p. 11). This debate has attracted less academic attention than UN and NATO burden-sharing debates, but provides an instructive complement to these for three reasons. First, in contrast to the NATO case, AU peacekeeping has moved towards rather than away from the claim of serving the global public good. The slogan of “African solutions to African problems” has been nuanced by an insistence that African conflicts are not just African problems: ‘African peace operations represent local responses to global problems and effective African peace operations thus represent a significant contribution to the global common good’ (AU 2015, p. 9). In particular, UN-mandated AU operations assume ‘a portion of the peace and security burden that the UN would otherwise have had to carry on its own’ (de Coning 2017, pp. 154–5). From the AU’s perspective, this underpins the case for predictable financial burden-sharing with the UN: ‘when [the AU] intervenes in conflict and crisis situations on the continent, it is doing so on behalf of the UNSC and … therefore, in the case of AU-led missions that are authorized by the UNSC, the UN has a duty to provide UN assessed contributions’ (AU 2015, p. 2). To date, however, members of the UN Security Council have rejected attempts to systematically link UN mandates for AU – and potentially other regional organizations’ – peace operations to guaranteed access to UN financing.

Peacekeeping financing  39 Second, as in the UN and NATO, the AU burden-sharing debate raises issues about the relative valuation of financial and military burdens assumed by different actors. One example is the AU’s 2018 proposal that African troop contributions to AU operations should be counted as in-kind contributions towards its 25 percent cost share (ICG 2020, p. 7). Such troop contributions – if self-financed – might constitute Source 1 funding, but their introduction in negotiations about AU (Sources 5 and 6) and UN (Source 7) burden-sharing heightened UN actors’ skepticism about the AU’s capacity to pay its 25 percent share and raised suspicion that African diplomats were trying to “scam” their counterparts (ICG 2020, p. 9). More fundamentally, UN actors have insisted that any formal financial burden-sharing mechanism with the AU would have to include provisions for UN influence over AU missions. In part, this reflects concerns that funding a regional peace operation creates legal responsibilities for the UN (Pergantis 2016). The UN also insists on transparency about the AU’s use of its resources (Coleman 2017, p. 115; ICG 2020, p. 17). The most basic issue, however, is primacy and control. UN diplomats emphasize Security Council primacy in international peace and security matters. Permanent Council members in particular have long argued that ‘cooperation cannot be on the basis that the regional organization independently decides the policy and that United Nations Member States simply bless it and pay for it. There can be no blank check, either politically or financially’ (UNSC 2012, p. 15). The AU, however, has insisted on its autonomy and sought a more equal relationship to the UN in African conflict management (Lotze 2018). AU diplomats are thus apt to see UN insistence on oversight as both offensive and disproportionate given the nature of each organization’s contributions: ‘For the AU … the insistence by [Security] Council members that the UN wield considerable control suggests an insensitivity to the fact that it will be African soldiers putting their lives at risk. “Basically, we go fight and they [the UN] make the decisions”, was how an AU official put it’ (ICG 2020, p. 17). Finally, the AU levy suggests a potential eighth source of financing for contemporary peace operations. To lessen its dependence on external IO contributions (Source 7) despite its inability to provide financing from internally assessed contributions (Sources 5 and 6) and without falling back on greater TCC self-financing (Source 1), the AU is attempting to (indirectly) draw resources from private actors by mandating member states to impose a special tax on imports into Africa and transfer these funds to the AU. The initiative is not entirely unprecedented – ECOWAS established a Community Levy in 2003 (ECOWAS 2016) and private sector revenue raising has (unsuccessfully) been proposed for the UN (for example by d’Orville and Najman 1995) – but represents an ambitious experiment on a continental scale. To date, its success remains unclear, given concerns about its compatibility with states’ World Trade Organization obligations, uneven political commitment from AU members, and implementation by only 17 of 55 AU member states in 2020 (Apiko and Miyandazi 2019; AU 2020b). Nevertheless, the innovation is significant, particularly at a time when state willingness to finance UN peacekeeping appears to be diminishing (Coleman 2020b; de Coning 2020).

CONCLUSION Peacekeeping is costly and international organizations launching peace operations differ significantly in how they finance them. The UN relies heavily on assessed contributions from all its member states, NATO depends on self-financing troop contributors and inter-TCC support,

40  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations and AU operations require significant support from external partners. These financing models shape how policymakers and academics track and debate cost distribution in various institutional settings. Yet many cost estimates are partial, focusing only on the most dominant financing mechanisms (for example, UN budgets) and facing data challenges as information about state deployment costs and bilateral financial subsidies or in-kind support is not systematically available. Full comparability across institutional settings requires revised cost estimates that consider all seven potential sources of peacekeeping financing: self-financing, bilateral funding of TCCs, inter-TCC support, host state contributions, umbrella IO common costs financing and TCC reimbursements, and financial or in-kind support to the umbrella international organization from non-member states or other international organizations. Without such estimates, conclusions about relative costs and cost effectiveness are necessarily tentative. One clear commonality across different financing models are debates about burden-sharing. Concerns about smaller and/or poorer states exploiting larger contributors abound, rooted in public good theory and a recognition of voluntary peacekeeping contributions as especially vulnerable to free-riding unless contributor-specific benefits exist (Sandler 2017). There are two main types of reply. One focuses on the public good assumption and examines the extent to which peace operations serve particular or global interests. The other focuses on the identification of burdens. In addition to measurement debates – in which practitioners typically advocate metrics favoring their state – intense contestation focuses on the relative valuation of financial and troop contributions, particularly as the latter increasingly involve not only a (Source 1) financing contribution but also an assumption of human and political risk. Beyond burden-sharing debates, peacekeeping financing raises a wide range of further research questions. At the mission level, one set of questions connects financing to the burgeoning literature on peacekeeping effectiveness.5 How debilitating are apparent weaknesses in financing models such as dependence on partners (AU), limited common cost funding (NATO), or standardized reimbursement (UN)? To what extent do particular strengths (for example, widespread burden-sharing) or larger total financing availability enhance peacekeeping effectiveness? On balance, which financing model is most (cost) effective? At the state and unit level, the impact of financing mechanisms on actor behavior warrants further investigation. Beyond basic (and increasingly contested) “peacekeeping for profit” narratives, what role do reimbursements play in enabling and/or motivating troop contributions? How does the structure of reimbursement payments affect the types of contributions states are willing to make? The UN has experimented with a key enabling capacities premium, modest rapid deployment incentives and most recently, a Gender-Strong Unit premium, but it is not yet clear whether these can significantly shape states’ contributions. Meanwhile, at the unit and individual level, we know financing influences the risk of coups or mutinies in TCCs (Lundgren 2018; Schiel et al. 2020) while budget cuts can demoralize civilian peacekeepers (Coleman 2020b). Further research may yield additional insights into how financing affects peacekeeper performance, willingness to take risks, and/or participation in corruption or other acts of malfeasance.

NOTES 1. In some instances, states provide voluntary contributions to missions beyond their assessed contributions.

Peacekeeping financing  41 2. Totals exclude UNTSO and UNMOGIP, small observer missions funded through the UN’s regular budget. 3. Funding for the UN Logistics Base, Regional Service Centre and Support Account constituted 6.7 percent of total approved expenditures in 2019/20. 4. Five affluent states receive a 7.5 percent discount based on historical developing state status. 5. The literature examining various dimensions of peacekeeping effectiveness is covered by Chapters 13–17 in this Handbook.

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Peacekeeping financing  43 GAO [US Government Accountability Office] (2018), UN Peacekeeping: Cost Estimate for Hypothetical U.S. Operation Exceeds Actual Costs for Comparable UN Operation, GAO-18-243, accessed 22 November 2020 at https://​www​.gao​.gov/​assets/​gao​-18​-243​.pdf. Garamone, John (2011), ‘Gates: NATO has become a two-tiered alliance’, NATOSource, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​www​.atlanticcouncil​.org/​blogs/​natosource/​gates​-nato​-has​-become​-twotiered​ -alliance/​. Hartley, Keith and Todd Sandler (1999), ‘NATO burden-sharing: past and future’, Journal of Peace Research, 36 (6), 665–80. Henke, Marina E. (2016), ‘Great powers and UN force generation: a case study of UNAMID’, International Peacekeeping, 23 (3), 468–92. Henke, Marina E. (2019a), Constructing Allied Cooperation: Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions, Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press. Henke, Marina E. (2019b), ‘Buying allies: payment practices in multilateral military coalition-building’, International Security, 43 (4), 128–62. Hurd, Ian (2008), After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. ICG [International Crisis Group] (2020), ‘The price of peace: securing UN financing for AU peace operations’, Africa Report No. 286, 31 January, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​www​.crisisgroup​ .org/​africa/​286​-price​-peace​-securing​-un​-financing​-au​-peace​-operations. Johnston, Seth (2019), ‘NATO’s lessons from Afghanistan’, Parameters, 49 (3), 11–26. Khanna, Jyoti and Todd Sandler (1997), ‘Conscription, peace-keeping and foreign assistance: NATO burden-sharing in the post-Cold War era’, Defence and Peace Economics, 8 (1), 101–22. Khanna, Jyoti, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Shimizu (1998), ‘Sharing the financial burden for U.N. and NATO peacekeeping, 1976–1996’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42 (2), 176–95. Laurenti, Jeffrey (2018), ‘Financing’, in Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Lotze, Walter (2018), ‘Challenging the primacy of the UN Security Council’, in Katharina P. Coleman and Thomas Tieku (eds), African Actors in International Security: Shaping Contemporary Norms, Boulder, CO, USA: Lynne Rienner, 219–39. Lundgren, M. (2018), ‘Backdoor peacekeeping: does participation in UN peacekeeping reduce coups at home?’, Journal of Peace Research, 55 (4), 508–23. Marton, Péter and Péter Wagner (2017), ‘Hungary’s partnering in foreign military missions: a different kind of regionalism’, Defence Review, 148 (Special Issue 2017/1), 148–58, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​honvedelem​.hu/​images/​media/​5f​58c08caa97​8795005192​.pdf. MFO [Multinational Force & Observers] (2020), ‘MFO financial information’, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​mfo​.org/​financial​-information. Mills, Susan (1989), ‘The financing of UN peacekeeping operations: the need for a sound financial basis’, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper No. 3, New York, NY, USA: International Peace Academy. Mir, Wasim (2019), ‘Financing UN peacekeeping: avoiding another crisis’, IPI Issue Brief April, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​2019/​04/​financing​-un​-peacekeeping​-avoiding​ -another​-crisis. NATO (2019), The Secretary-General’s Annual Report 2019, accessed 23 July 2020 at https://​www​.nato​ .int/​nato​_static​_fl2014/​assets/​pdf/​2020/​3/​pdf​_publications/​sgar19​-en​.pdf. NATO (2020), Funding NATO, accessed 16 June 2020 at https://​www​.nato​.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​topics​ _67655​.htm. Olson, Mancur and Richard Zeckhauser (1966), ‘An economic theory of alliances’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 48 (3), 266–79. Pergantis, Vassilis (2016), ‘UN–AU partnerships in international peace and security and issues of responsibility allocation in cases of UN support to regional missions’, International Organizations Law Review, 13 (1), 74–99. Ringsmose, Jens (2010), ‘NATO burden-sharing redux: continuity and change after the Cold War’, Contemporary Security Policy, 31 (2), 319–38. Sandler, Todd (2017), ‘International peacekeeping operations: burden sharing and effectiveness’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61 (9), 1875–97.

44  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Sandler, Todd and Hirofumi Shimizu (2014), ‘NATO burden sharing 1999–2010: an altered alliance’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 10 (1), 43–60. Schiel, Rebecca, Jonathan Powell, and Ursula Daxecker (2020), ‘Peacekeeping deployments and mutinies in African sending states’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 16 (3), 251–71. Shimizu, Hirofumi (2005), ‘An economic analysis of the UN peacekeeping assessment system’, Defence and Peace Economics, 16 (1), 1–18. Shimizu, Hirofumi and Todd Sandler (2002), ‘Peacekeeping and burden-sharing, 1994–2000’, Journal of Peace Research, 39 (6), 651–68. Shimizu, Hirofumi and Todd Sandler (2010), ‘Recent peacekeeping burden sharing’, Applied Economics Letters, 17 (15), 1479–84. Solmirano, Carina and Jakob Hallgren (2013), ‘Assessing the cost of military operations in Afghanistan and juxtaposing them to the assessed costs of humanitarian assistance (2008–2012)’, accessed 8 February 2022 at http://​devinit​.org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2013/​11/​Costs​-of​-military​-operations​-and​ -humanitarian​-aid​-Afghanistan​.pdf. Thies, Wallace (2003), Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO, Armonk, NY, USA: M. E. Sharpe; published (2015) in Abingdon, UK and New York, NY, USA: Routledge. UN (2015), Fact Sheet: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 31 May, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​reliefweb​.int/​sites/​reliefweb​.int/​files/​resources/​pk​_factsheet​_5​_15​_e​.pdf. UN (2020), Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet, 30 November, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​ peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​peacekeeping​_factsheet​_11​_2020​_english​_1​.pdf. UNGA (2018a), Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236, A/73/350/Add.1, 24 December, accessed 23 March 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​1657181​?ln​=​en. UNGA (2018b), Rates of reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries, A/C.5/72/L.33, 5 July, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​LTD/​N18/​207/​01/​ PDF/​N1820701​.pdf . UNGA (2019a), Budget for the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara for the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020, A/73/737, 12 February, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​ documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​GEN/​N19/​038/​77/​pdf/​N1903877​.pdf. UNGA (2019b), Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of United Nations peacekeeping operations A/RES/73/272, 3 January, accessed 2 July 2020 at https://​documents​-dds​-ny​.un​ .org/​doc/​UNDOC/​GEN/​N18/​465/​61/​pdf/​N1846561​.pdf. UNGA (2020a), Manual on Policies and Procedures concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions, A/75/121, 31 August, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​ GEN/​N20/​157/​83/​pdf/​N2015783​.pdf. UNGA (2020b), Budget for the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus for the period from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021 A/74/693, 12 February, accessed 23 March 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​ record/​3856176​?ln​=​en. UNGA (2020c), Financial Situation of the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General: Addendum, A/74/501/Add.1, 11 May, accessed 23 March 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​3861614​?ln​ =​en. UNGA and SC (1995), Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January, accessed 23 March 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​168325​?ln​=​en. UNSC (2012), Provisional Record, 6702nd Meeting, 12 January 2012, UN Document S/PV.6702, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​www​.s​ecuritycou​ncilreport​.org/​atf/​cf/​%7B65BFCF9B​-6D27​ -4E9C​-8CD3​-CF6E4FF96FF9​%7D/​RO​%20S​%20PV​%206702​.pdf. UNSC (2015), Partnering for Peace: Moving Towards Partnership Peacekeeping, S/2015/229, 1 April, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​GEN/​N15/​090/​33/​pdf/​ N1509033​.pdf​?OpenElement. White House (2017), Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 19 September, accessed 7 February 2022 at https://​trumpwhitehouse​.archives​.gov/​briefings​ -statements/​remarks​-president​-trump​-72nd​-session​-united​-nations​-general​-assembly/​. Williams, Paul D. (2018), Fighting for Peace in Somalia, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.

Peacekeeping financing  45 Williams, Paul D. (2020), ‘The Security Council’s peacekeeping trilemma’, International Affairs, 96 (2), 479–99. Williams, Paul D. with Alex J. Bellamy (2021), Understanding Peacekeeping, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Williams, Paul D. and Solomon A. Dersso (2015), Saving Strangers and Neighbors: Advancing UN–AU Cooperation on Peace Operations, New York, NY, USA: International Peace Institute. Zyla, Benjamin (2015), Sharing the Burden?: NATO and Its Second-Tier Powers, University of Toronto Press. Zyla, Benjamin (2016), ‘Who is free-riding in NATO’s peace operations in the 1990s?’, International Peacekeeping, 23 (3), 416–41.

4. Consent in peacekeeping Timothy Passmore, Johannes Karreth and Jaroslav Tir

INTRODUCTION In September 2007, amid widespread armed attacks by rebel groups against civilians in eastern Chad and the Central African Republic, the UN Security Council approved the establishment of a peacekeeping mission, MINURCAT, aimed at curbing the violence and strengthening the rule of law. Significant UN resources were directed toward the mission, including an authorized strength of over 6000 uniformed and civilian personnel, and total estimated expenses amounting to $1.39 billion (UN Department of Peace Operations n.d.). Yet, after less than three years, the government of Chad indicated its desire for the UN to completely withdraw, which was completed by the end of 2010. From the perspective of the UN and the international community, the mission was considered a failure, where only limited successes were achieved in carrying out the operational mandate. From the outset, the government of Chad had agreed to the mission only reluctantly and subsequently sought to restrict the capacity of the mission to deliver peace. This resulted in both a mission devoid of a political mandate that would be essential to procuring a resolution to the conflict, as well as a host state highly resistant to the mission’s presence (Johnstone 2011, p. 171). The mission to Chad is just one example of a common problem faced by the UN and other peacekeeping entities when seeking to intervene in conflicts: securing the consent of the warring parties (the government and rebels) to a political process that seeks peace and political stability. Not obtaining consent – and ideally robust consent – of the parties may lead to major obstructions to the fulfillment of the mission’s mandate, or a demand for complete withdrawal as occurred in Chad. Such outcomes pose major threats to the peacekeeping operation (PKO) providers, where mission objectives are thwarted, peacekeepers are put at risk, and the mission is drawn into a long and expensive deployment with no clear exit strategy (Sebastian and Gorur 2018, p. 5). Beyond this, the reputation of the PKO providers is challenged, seen as ineffective at addressing global conflicts and humanitarian crises. The UN has faced prominent crises of consent in a number of missions, including those in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, and Sudan. This chapter will address questions relating to consent in peacekeeping and consider the varied answers offered. Such questions include: how often and under what conditions is consent obtained for a peacekeeping intervention? Does consent make peacekeeping more likely to be successful? Why does consent often deteriorate and how does this impact a peacekeeping deployment? The chapter is divided into three sections. First, we explore the nature and dynamics of consent to peacekeeping in civil war settings. We then survey relevant findings and debates on the subject. Finally, we discuss future directions in studying consent.

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Consent in peacekeeping  47

CONSENT IN PEACEKEEPING An often-overlooked aspect of international peacekeeping is the extent to which the warring parties agree to be ‘peacekept’ (Fortna and Martin 2009, p. 87). Much of the research instead focuses on supply-side determinants of peacekeeping, such as the conflict’s intensity (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2008; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Ruggeri et al. 2017) or strategic state interests (O’Neill 1996; Stojek and Tir 2015) and thus assumes that the warring parties are mere ‘passive recipients of peacekeeping’ (Duursma 2021, p. 4). Yet, the very presence, and subsequent impact of peacekeeping efforts, is heavily dependent on the willingness of the belligerents to accept such an interposition. This willingness is commonly referred to as “consent.” Consent in peacekeeping is most closely associated with interventions conducted by the United Nations, although its importance as a conduit for effective peacekeeping gives it relevance to non-UN peace operations also. Consent broadly defined involves the acceptance of peacekeepers by warring parties to oversee the implementation of a peace agreement, finding its legal basis in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. However, consent can vary in many ways. In some instances, it may be given by all parties to a conflict, while in others only one (usually the government) will extend such an invitation. Consent may be given unreservedly and robustly, while in other cases it may be only partial, favoring a more limited intervention. Consent is also more than mere words of acknowledgment before an operation deploys. Rather, it is a persistent and dynamic activity undertaken by the parties on a daily basis reflecting their willingness to cooperate with the peace process and the peacekeepers’ role therein. Understanding how consent is achieved and subsequently impacts peacekeeping and conflict resolution is therefore a complex and important research endeavor. Consent has historically been a hallmark of UN peacekeeping operations, comprising one of its three core principles alongside impartiality and limited use of force. The first UN operation, UNEF I in 1956, was established contingent on Egypt’s consent during the Suez Crisis (the operation was not deployed to Israel, however, which did not extend consent) (Tsagourias 2006, p. 467). After that, consent was a bedrock of all UN interventions and was reaffirmed in major peacekeeping doctrines such as the 1992 Agenda for Peace and the 2000 Brahimi Report. Such operations, characterized as “first-” and “second-generation” peacekeeping, largely involved overseeing the implementation of ceasefires and peace agreements between warring states, where the interpositional nature of the operation was not only less substantial (missions would typically consist of dozens or hundreds of peacekeepers), but also presented few threats to the sovereignty of the host states. Moreover, since interstate war is less susceptible to the same kind of credible commitment problems observed in civil wars (Fearon 1995; Walter 2002), such missions could more clearly interpret the parties’ commitment to peace as genuine. In the post-Cold War era, peacekeeping underwent a major shift to focusing primarily on civil conflict. Of the 58 United Nations missions established after 1988, only five were sent to interstate conflicts. Peacekeepers would now be tasked not only with overseeing peace, but procuring and enforcing it in many instances. The tasks of monitoring ceasefires and separating combatants would be supplemented or replaced by protection of civilians, direct engagement of force, and complex post-conflict peacebuilding programs. Such conditions have spawned a new generation of peacekeeping that must often operate without the consent of one or more of the belligerents, or where any consent given is highly tenuous. These operations

48  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations must instead rely on Chapter VII “enforcement” authorization to procure peace, which has produced dubious results and greatly stretches the resources and capacity of the peacekeepers (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008; Howard and Dayal 2018). Several factors explain the dilemma of consent in modern peacekeeping. First, the nature of civil war is such that parties cannot simply be separated by an interpositional peacekeeping force, but instead rebel forces must be disarmed and reintegrated into society. Since the government can do little to credibly commit to not subsequently punishing those individuals, agreeing to lay down weapons is inherently difficult for rebels (Walter 2002). Second, conflict states are typically loath to accept outside interference that challenges their sovereignty and limits their ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations in a manner of their choosing. Peacekeepers can therefore either be refused, or accepted with conditions that are often obstructive to the operational mandate. Third, shifting circumstances and interests during a peacekeeping mission, combined with limited leverage of the peacekeeping organization to compel the conflict state since its presence largely depends on consent, makes the likelihood of a breakdown in consent and failure of the mission significantly more likely. These problems have renewed debates over the importance of consent for effective peacekeeping, how to secure and recognize robust, genuine consent, and what to do when consent to peacekeeping deteriorates.

EXISTING FINDINGS AND DEBATES A wealth of research has emerged in recent years addressing the determinants and impact of peacekeeping (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Howard 2008; 2019; Hegre et al. 2019; Hultman et al. 2019, Walter et al. 2021). This agenda complements a robust literature on civil war bargaining (e.g., Fearon 1995; Walter 2002; Powell 2006). However, little attention has been paid to the intersection of these agendas, specifically in the role combatants play in the establishment and success of peacekeeping (Fortna and Howard 2008, p. 294). Here, we address existing research and debates on matters such as the occurrence of consent, the effect of consent on peacekeeping outcomes, and the problems associated with consent while a mission is operational. When does consent-based peacekeeping occur?  In recent years, the study of peacekeeping has been informed by the fact that operations are not sent to all conflicts, nor are they randomly assigned. Rather, there are conditions that make deployment of a PKO more or less likely (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005; Fortna 2008; Aydin 2010; Stojek and Tir 2015; Binder and Golub 2020). One factor that almost invariably leads to a PKO deployment is a request for such by the belligerents. Fortna (2008, p. 22) states that the international community will rarely refuse an operation where all sides to the conflict desire one. However, it is often the case that the parties do not universally desire peacekeeping. Where one or more is opposed, the decision to deploy becomes more complicated as the probability of a longer and costlier deployment rises. In seeking to understand when belligerents will consent to peacekeeping, several possible scenarios have been offered. First, and most obviously, is when both sides desire peace. This usually occurs when the parties have reached a so-called “hurting stalemate” (Zartman and Berman 1982) where the costs of ongoing fighting outweigh those of pursuing peace. Such was the case, for example, in El Salvador, where protracted fighting convinced both sides that

Consent in peacekeeping  49 outright victory would be impossible and a peace agreement overseen by the UN was the only path forward (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, p. 201). Similarly in Mozambique, the widespread destruction caused by war in the 1980s and 1990s with no clear advances for either side was instrumental in the eventual acceptance of outside intervention (Howard 2008, pp. 184–5). Thus, if one side has acquired an outright victory in the conflict, or has significant odds of success, there is either no peace to implement or no likelihood of conflict resumption that would necessitate peacekeepers. Peacekeeping is therefore only likely when the conflict remains unresolved. Calculations of relative strength also play a role in the desire for peacekeeping. Fortna (2008) argues that rebels are likely to desire peacekeeping whether they are relatively stronger or weaker than the government, since it will offer them greater legitimacy and protection from the abuses of government forces. The government will likely have divergent preferences based on its relative strength. A government weaker than the rebels will have a strong desire for peacekeeping to help prevent power being wrested away. However, a stronger government will desire peacekeeping less in order to protect its sovereignty and deter outside interference. Peacekeeping may be seen as a legitimization of the rebel groups and may also prevent the government from using its desired methods to obtain victory. Studies show that the UN is less inclined to intervene where the government is in a position of relative strength, particularly where it has a greater military capacity (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2008). The reasons for inviting peacekeepers may go beyond the desire for peace. Parties will often perceive private interests from an intervention, which likely creates a shaky foundation for the mission from the start. In such instances, the parties may either have an inaccurate understanding of the mission’s purpose, or they may cease to support the mission’s presence once they have achieved certain benefits from its presence. The former of these was evident in Chad, where a relatively stronger government welcomed peacekeeping since it believed the mission would be pro-government and help it consolidate its authority. Upon the realization that the mission’s pursuit of impartiality both gave legitimacy to the rebels and refrained from showing favoritism to the government, the MINURCAT mission was asked to leave (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011, p. 460). While the likelihood of consent depends heavily on the belligerents’ strategic positions relative to one another or expectations of the mission’s benefits, the decision may also be influenced by certain external actors. Neighboring or major power states may exert pressure on the parties to pursue peace and accept a peacekeeping intervention, as might various international organizations. East Timor provides an illustration of such a phenomenon. As international support for East Timorese independence from Indonesia gathered pace in the late 1990s, states applied increasing pressure to the Indonesian government to pursue peace after years of violence perpetrated against the independence movement. Regional players such as Australia, Japan, and New Zealand were central in pushing for peace and provided both the diplomatic and financial backing for an initial non-UN force tasked with bringing an end to the violence (Howard 2008, p. 270). While the resulting operation – INTERFET – was approved by the UN Security Council with Chapter VII enforcement capacity, the leading states insisted upon receiving consent from the Indonesian government, which had been largely resistant to such an intervention. With the eventual capitulation of the government to this pressure, INTERFET was deployed and would eventually make way for UNTAET, one of the most ambitious peacekeeping operations in UN history and one that would effectively oversee the transition of East Timor to an independent state (Howard 2008, p. 260). Doyle and Sambanis

50  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations (2006) argue that such external leverage is often key to the successful establishment and execution of peacekeeping, where the otherwise limited capacity and scarce resources of the UN may face challenges in securing consent. They point to the concept of the “Friends of the Secretary-General”: an ad hoc coalition of states that supports the UN’s push for peace with financial and diplomatic resources. Such coalitions were central to the establishment of peacekeeping in Cambodia and El Salvador, for example (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, pp. 306–7). Does consent matter?  It is important to address whether or not consent is central to the success of peacekeeping. With the advent of more robust, enforcement peacekeeping in recent years, one may argue that having the consent of the parties is irrelevant to operational outcomes. Certainly, emerging research shows the positive effects of peacekeeping even in ongoing conflict situations, suggesting that large enforcement operations that employ the use of force and lack party consent can still be effective (Beardsley 2011; Ruggeri et al. 2013; 2017; Hultman et al. 2013; 2014; Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015; Johansson and Hultman 2019; Kathman and Benson 2019). However, when longer-term outcomes such as enduring peace are considered, studies show that consent is of critical importance. Fortna (2008) finds that consent gives even small, less militarized operations about the same degree of effectiveness in producing lasting peace as robust enforcement missions. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) go further to assert that consent-based missions are more effective than enforcement missions for creating self-sustaining peace. They argue that, ‘[C]onsent needs to be won if the peace enforcers are ever to exit with their work done’ (p. 56). Howard (2008, p. 10) asserts that consent of the warring parties is the most decisive factor in ending wars. Most recently, Yuen (2019) considers the degree of consent given, finding that peace is no less likely to fail when partial (not all parties) or restricted (limited scope) consent is given than if no consent is given at all. Peace is only likely to last longer when unrestricted consent is extended. Consent to peacekeeping impacts operational outcomes in numerous ways. Most obviously, it creates a legitimate presence for the peacekeepers, where otherwise a mission may not be authorized, or authorization rests on a Chapter VII enforcement mission that promises to face significant opposition from at least one of the warring parties. More important for success, however, is that consent serves as a costly signal between the belligerents of a commitment to a peaceful outcome, where such signals are otherwise difficult to give credibly (Walter 2002; Fortna and Martin 2009). The positive effect of consent may therefore be found less in the subsequent activities of the peacekeepers and more in reaching a decision to pursue peace. This would explain why consent-based missions have shown to be effective even with smaller deployment sizes (Fortna 2008). It should be noted, however, that consent alone – even if robust and given by all parties – does not guarantee success in peacekeeping. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) find that consent-based missions with more limited mandates such as monitoring may be as ineffective as enforcement missions unless there is low hostility and high local capacity (p. 112). They subsequently favor a combination of consent-based peacekeeping with enforcement capacity to deal with any spoilers that arise, what they refer to as ‘transformational’ missions (p. 198). They also argue that consent is largely irrelevant if the underlying agreement to which they are consenting lacks sufficient quality. The consent to the UN’s UNAMIR mission in Rwanda illustrates this, where the ‘flimsy’ nature of the agreed peace rendered the acceptance of the mission by all parties irrelevant as the mission quickly collapsed (pp. 284–5). Beyond the conflict parties, the lack or withdrawal of consent has major implications for the peacekeepers also. If the mission relies on Chapter VII enforcement authorization, whether

Consent in peacekeeping  51 Table 4.1

Distribution of peacekeeping operations across 200 ceasefires from 1947 to 2011 according to type of consent given

 

 

 

 

Peacekeeping provider

None

 

Source: Yuen (2019).

Consent Given None

Partial

Restricted

105

5

0

8

UN

0

6

19

24

Regional org.

0

5

7

7

Ad hoc by state

0

5

6

3

105

21

32

42

 

Unrestricted

from the outset or after consent is retracted, it faces the prospect of a long, expensive, and dangerous deployment that takes the form more of a counterinsurgency operation (Sebastian and Gorur 2018, p. 5). Direct engagement with combatants in conflict zones places peacekeepers at risk, while the mission has no clear exit strategy short of abandonment. Securing and sustaining consent is therefore of paramount importance if the mission is to be successful. Robust and sustained consent  While attention is typically paid simply to the question whether or not consent is given at the outset of a peacekeeping operation, it is important to remember that consent is more than a mere binary concept existing at a single point in time. It would be incorrect to assume that the presence of any form of consent equates with full and unrestricted consent. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) point out that, ‘[A]uthentic and firm consent in the aftermath of severe civil strife … is rare’ (p. 314). It is therefore necessary to understand the various forms and facets of consent. First, initial consent is given in degrees. Yuen (2019) classifies four types of initial consent: none; partial, where not all parties offer consent; restricted, where all parties give consent but at least one places restrictions on the operation’s scope; and unrestricted, given by all parties with no restrictions. Distribution of these dimensions of consent in past operations is shown in Table 4.1. In addition, initial consent might also be conceptualized in terms of sincerity: the actors may feign consent for particular benefits of the deployment, with little intention of sustaining cooperation once the mission is deployed. Such was the case in Angola (Howard 2008, p. 38). Second, consent is dynamic: beyond just assenting to the mission at the outset, the belligerents must uphold that consent as the mission is carried out. This is where the problems faced by peacekeepers are most likely, as the parties decide whether to affirm or erode that consent based on changing situations during the life of the mission. Consent should therefore be thought of not only as time-varying, but composed of the actions of the parties as well as mere words. A key research task is therefore to understand why consent breaks down and how this might be prevented. Such a trajectory is driven by several factors. First, the belligerents have assumptions and expectations about the role the mission will play in bringing about certain objectives. These expectations often do not line up within the other belligerents, or indeed the peacekeepers (Clapham 1998). Such information gaps may result from problems of interpreting peace agreements or the operational mandate of the PKO, particularly if unforeseen gaps appear in such interpretation (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, p. 314). In those instances, one or both warring parties may see the presence of a PKO as exclusively beneficial for its cause.

52  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations For the government, this may be providing support to and legitimation of the regime against rebel encroachment. For the rebels, it could be offering them a seat at the negotiating table or preventing government assaults on rebel-held communities. The presence of the mission will therefore be seen as a way to improve the current position of the respective party. Consent will likely deteriorate when such expectations are proven to be inaccurate and as the mission hampers the parties’ strategies. A second factor driving changes in consent during a mission concerns relative power shifts between the parties. As Fearon (1995) argues, actors often cannot credibly commit to conflict avoidance since a change in their relative power position down the road may alter their perceived payoffs from conflict, and thus reignite fighting. In the case of a peacekeeping mission, a conflict party may gain from the presence of the mission (or due to unrelated circumstances), at which point it will no longer perceive the benefits of the mission’s presence and either reduce or completely withdraw its consent for the mission. Such shifts become problematic for peacekeeping agents like the UN, which enjoys little bargaining power with which to sustain conflict party consent. Any attempts by the peacekeeping organization to challenge the non-cooperation of that actor may incite rejection of the mission altogether. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, when Joseph Kabila’s presidency was legitimized through the 2006 presidential election, he began to consolidate his power. He thus saw the presence of the UN’s MONUC mission as an obstacle to his strategy. However, his increasing control of government and popular support left the UN reluctant to challenge him on counts of increasing use of widespread violence against civilians for fear of being sidelined or pushed out altogether (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011, pp. 462–3). Consent should therefore be thought of as a complex and dynamic feature of a peacekeeping intervention. As such, conflict parties can retract consent at any time of their choosing. Moreover, a retraction does not need to be explicit and total. Rather, the parties have a range of formal and informal options for withdrawing or reducing consent. Most obvious is an explicit statement that it no longer desires the mission’s presence in the conflict. This has occurred in Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and Eritrea. More common are incremental and informal retractions of consent through small and repeated obstructions to the mission’s completion of its mandate (Sebastian and Gorur 2018, pp. 23–4). At a higher level, the mission might gradually be excluded from negotiations and limited to an assistance role. In Côte d’Ivoire, as President Laurent Gbagbo became more skeptical of the interposition of the UN in its civil war, he sought to move it to the sidelines in favor of a domestically driven peace process. UNOCI’s role was subsequently reduced to one of merely providing financial and technical support to the peace process and the elections (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011, p. 455). A third explanation for the breakdown of consent to a mission after deployment relates to the dilemma faced by many conflict state governments. Duursma (2021) identifies divergent incentives for governments during civil wars. On the one hand, the government seeks external sovereignty by fostering international confidence that it is sufficiently and appropriately addressing its domestic turmoil. Such can be achieved by accepting an international intervention. On the other hand, the government may be loath to relinquish control over its own attempts to suppress rebellion, typically enacted through counterinsurgency operations. These operations often target civilians (Kalyvas 2006; Downes 2011; Toft and Zhukov 2015; Sullivan and Karreth 2019; Karreth et al. 2020; Balcells and Stanton 2021) and as such conflict with the increasingly prominent focus of peacekeeping on civilian protection. Such counterinsurgency tactics are therefore largely restricted as a requirement of an international intervention. In

Consent in peacekeeping  53 order to address this dilemma, Duursma argues that governments accept PKOs, but undertake widespread obstruction of their operations to ensure their own agenda is not compromised. Only in instances where the government depends on the peacekeepers for strengthening its authority will it be less likely to subvert the operation (Duursma 2021, pp. 10–11). The volatility of the conflict parties’ consent to be peace-kept subsequently has major implications for the effectiveness of the mission. Yet the difficulty of guaranteeing sustained consent creates for the peacekeeping actors a dilemma of their own – to intervene or not to intervene. Having the consent of the warring parties is not only a foundational premise of peacekeeping but is also considered a major predictor of the success of a mission, alongside having the requisite capacity to fulfill the mandate (Langholtz 2010, p. 32). Lacking such consent therefore risks partial or monumental failure of the mission. Thus, for peacekeeping to be effective and successful, it is vitally important to not only secure consent, but to do so with the knowledge that that consent is likely to be sustained throughout the mission. Yet, since the UN and other peacekeeping organizations have few internal mechanisms to evoke and maintain credible consent from the conflict parties, they must often expect to have only a limited impact in civil war resolution. As observed in the cases of Chad and Côte d’Ivoire, when the operational mandate conflicts with the host state’s own desires, it can be either undermined or forced out completely. The PKO would prefer not to enact an enforcement mechanism to ensure its sustained presence and effectiveness, or alternatively to face the resource and reputational losses of the costs it has sunk into the endeavor. It may thus be forced to concede to the state and restrict its scope of activity. While the peacekeeping literature does not focus a great deal on the explicit nature of consent during the life of a mission, it does offer plenty of insights into how peacekeepers are received by domestic parties as well as how operations are either supported or undermined by those actors. From this, lessons can be learned as to how the UN and other peacekeeping actors can improve the likelihood of sustained consent through varied steps. Much hangs on the credibility of the intervention. Factors that enhance credibility include quick and robust deployment of peacekeepers, a signal of international political will and commitment to peace in that country (Walter 2002; Coleman et al. 2021; Lundgren et al. 2021). Ledgerwood (1994) highlights the problems faced in establishing the credibility of UNTAC in Cambodia after slow deployment of resources. She writes: ‘[S]ome have argued that the Khmer Rouge decided not to lay down their arms because they saw how slowly UN troops were being deployed and decided UNTAC was not taking control of the situation’ (Ledgerwood 1994, p. 8). The mission’s credibility can also be made or broken by the peacekeepers themselves, whether through their interactions with combatants or civilians. Regarding combatants, Bove and Ruggeri (2019) find that peacekeepers with greater geographic or cultural proximity to the combatants correspond with reductions in violence. Haass and Ansorg (2018) point to the quality of training among peacekeepers as a key determinant of effectiveness, and thus a signal of efficacy among the local parties. Among civilians, perceptions of peacekeepers can be critical for sustaining support for the operation’s presence (Pouligny 2006). Increasing attention has been paid to peacekeepers’ gender, where female peacekeepers have been shown to play important roles in offering support and fostering trust in local communities (Bridges and Horsfall 2009; Sion 2009; Karim and Beardsley 2013; 2016). Others argue that the mission’s credibility can be curtailed by improper conduct of peacekeepers, such as involvement in sexual violence, human rights abuses, or corruption (Mendelson 2005; Beber et al. 2017).

54  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Howard (2008) addresses the need to create and maintain robust consent from an institutional perspective. She argues that PKOs must engage in “organizational learning” to increase efficacy both within individual missions and to learn best practices for future ones. Failures of organizational dysfunction learned in such conflicts as Somalia and Angola contributed to difficulties in sustaining consent (Howard 2008, p. 50). However, lessons learned from these failures gave rise to more effective organizational processes later in Mozambique’s ONUMOZ mission, where consent was effectively cultivated and sustained (pp. 179–80). Should the mission’s presence become unpopular, various factors may indicate the deterioration of consent. Most obviously, the warring parties may explicitly demand the reduced role or complete removal of the operation, such as in Chad, Rwanda, Côte d’Ivoire, and Eritrea. More commonly are incremental obstructions to peacekeeping activities on the ground. Duursma (2021) identifies actions, such as ‘[R]efusing to provide visas for UN personnel, stalling the import of supplies and equipment from abroad, the destruction of property, the hijacking of vehicles, obstructing peacekeeping patrols at checkpoints, disarming peacekeepers, refusing access to staff that monitor human rights, declaring key staff in UN peacekeeping operations personae non gratae, or putting restrictions on air travel’ (p. 4). More significant opposition to missions may take the form of direct violence perpetrated against peacekeepers themselves (Fjelde et al. 2016; Lindberg Bromley 2018). Such attacks may create greater resilience of the mission, as seems to have occurred with MINUSMA in Mali, where 133 UN peacekeepers died as a result of “malicious acts” between October 2013 and June 2020 (United Nations n.d.). Violence against peacekeepers may also be viewed as an unnecessary cost by the international community, which could subsequently affect support for those missions. However, existing research shows that personnel contributors do not seem to be deterred by the increased risk of violence against their peacekeepers (Bove and Elia 2011). An unaddressed area of research – that of when and why states choose to withdraw troops from PKOs – would shed more light on how violence against peacekeepers (as well as other factors) affect states’ commitments to peacekeeping.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN STUDYING CONSENT While consent to peacekeeping has received increasing attention in literature, much remains to be understood about the phenomenon. Here, we identify three potential areas of inquiry: how consent impacts deployment and resourcing decisions, the role played by external actors in procuring consent, and understanding the dynamic nature of consent throughout the life of a PKO. This discussion highlights ways in which both theoretical development and advances in data collection can better illuminate the matter of consent in peacekeeping. Establishing and resourcing operations  Little is known of what effect consent might have on the decision to first authorize peacekeeping operations, and subsequently what structure that mission should take. Research on where peacekeeping operations are deployed has often overlooked the role of the warring parties themselves and focused instead either on the perceived necessity of peacekeeping (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005; Fortna 2008) or narrow strategic interests of other states (Mullenbach 2005; Diehl and Balas 2014; Stojek and Tir 2015). Investigation into the deployment of operations based on dynamics between the belligerents has been sparse and has proved inconclusive. For example, no systematic evidence has been found that peacekeeping is more likely where a peace agreement

Consent in peacekeeping  55 has been signed (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005; Fortna 2008; Perkins and Neumeyer 2008). This lack of attention is puzzling, given the common understanding that consent matters for peacekeeping outcomes. Moreover, as the demand for peacekeeping has increased in recent years, and with it the need for significant resources, the UN faces pressures to allocate resources effectively and where success can likely be achieved. Further inquiry should consider how consent – in its various forms – affects decisions at all levels of the operation, starting with the content of the operational mandate and the authorization of personnel and resources for that mission. External actors and belligerent consent  As peacekeeping has become more complex and multidimensional, actors beyond the peacekeeping force have come to play a greater role, including states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-government organizations (NGOs). With a more diverse group of stakeholders, the risks of collapsed consent have repercussions beyond just the peacekeeping agent. We might thus expect such actors to play a role in securing and sustaining consent from the warring parties. Some studies have considered the role of actors functioning alongside the peacekeeping mission (Smith and Stam 2003; Beardsley et al. 2019), while others address individual state interests, in particular PKOs (Stojek and Tir 2015). However, little is systematically known of how such external parties interact with entities like the UN in creating and carrying out peacekeeping. Regarding the role played by external actors in fostering civil war termination, work by Tir and Karreth (2018) shows that certain intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) with leverage over civil war parties can reduce conflict escalation and enhance the likelihood of a peaceful settlement. This argument has not been extended to peacekeeping activities, however, despite evidence that states and IGOs have regularly played a role in pushing conflict parties to accept peacekeepers (as in East Timor, for example). In fact, a key argument in Dayal (2021) is that material benefits from actors other than the UN may lead conflict parties to seek peacekeeping assistance even in light of prior peacekeeping failures. Future work in this area might consider the specific role of other third parties in peacekeeping, particularly the work of NGOs, other departments within the UN, or co-deployed forces from individual states or regional entities such as the African Union. Consent as continuous and dynamic  As discussed previously, consent should be thought of as more than a mere binary outcome at the outset of a peacekeeping deployment. Rather, it involves multiple parties, is offered in degrees and with varying sincerity, and exists throughout the life of the deployment. While the first two of these have been addressed in empirical measurement by Yuen (2019), only cursory attention has been paid to the third. Subverting the work of peacekeepers may take a seemingly endless number of forms. Some are more overt and easily recognized, such as direct attacks on peacekeepers, while others are much more subtle. However, these challenges should not inhibit attempts to understand how permissive the environment is made for peacekeepers by the belligerents. Future investigation should focus on measuring consent in this more fluid way in order to promote deeper understanding of how consent varies, can be protected, or ultimately contributes to failed peacekeeping outcomes.

56  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations

CONCLUSION Ample evidence shows that peacekeeping is most effective when the warring parties accept and support the presence of the mission and its operational mandate. Therefore, the widespread deterioration of consent across multiple operations and the continued reliance on enforcement capacity suggests much remains to be learned about how to effectively gain and keep consent to peacekeeping. Shifting interests, disingenuous intentions, and inaccurate expectations among the combatants appear to stack the odds against the peacekeepers from the get-go. It is therefore all the more important to understand how to not only gain acceptance of the warring parties at the outset of a peacekeeping mission, but to lock in that commitment for the duration in order to avoid severe and unexpected costs. A better understanding of consent can lead to more effective deployment decisions up front in terms of the mandate and allocated resources and can enhance the likelihood of successful peacekeeping. Conversely, a lack of consent promises only to commit the UN, with its depleted resources and only modest reputation for successful conflict resolution, to more and greater peacekeeping fiascos.

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Consent in peacekeeping  57 Diehl, Paul. F. and Alexandru Balas (2014), Peace Operations, Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA, USA: Polity Press. Downes, Alexander B. (2011), Targeting Civilians in War, Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis (2006), Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Duursma, Allard (2021), ‘Pinioning the peacekeepers: sovereignty, host-state resistance against peacekeeping missions, and violence against civilians’, International Studies Review, 23 (3), 670–95. Fearon, James D. (1995), ‘Rationalist explanations for war’, International Organization, 49 (3), 379–414. Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman, and Sara Lindberg Bromley (2016), ‘Offsetting losses: bargaining power and rebel attacks on peacekeepers’, International Studies Quarterly, 60 (4), 611–23. Fortna, V. Page (2008), Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Fortna, V. Page and Lise Morjé Howard (2008), ‘Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 283–301. Fortna, V. Page and Lisa L. Martin (2009), ‘Peacekeepers as signals: the demand for international peacekeeping in civil wars’, in Helen V. Milner and Andrew Moravcsik (eds), Power, Interdependence and Nonstate Actors in World Politics, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, pp. 87–107. Gilligan, Michael J. and Ernest J. Sergenti (2008), ‘Do UN interventions cause peace? Using matching to improve causal inference’, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 3 (2), 89–122. Gilligan, Michael and Stephen John Stedman (2003), ‘Where do the peacekeepers go?’, International Studies Review, 5 (4), 37–54. Haass, Felix and Nadine Ansorg (2018), ‘Better peacekeepers, better protection? Troop quality of United Nations peace operations and violence against civilians’, Journal of Peace Research, 55 (6), 742–58. Hegre, Håvard, Lisa Hultman, and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård (2019), ‘Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations’, The Journal of Politics, 81 (1), 215–32. Howard, Lise Morjé (2008), UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Howard, Lise Morjé (2019), Power in Peacekeeping, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Howard, Lise Morjé and Anjali Kaushlesh Dayal (2018), ‘The use of force in UN peacekeeping’, International Organization, 72 (1), 71–103. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2013), ‘United Nations peacekeeping and civilian protection in civil war’, American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 875–91. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2014), ‘Beyond keeping peace: United Nations effectiveness in the midst of fighting’, American Political Science Review, 108 (4), 737–53. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2019), Peacekeeping in the Midst of War, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Johansson, Karin and Lisa Hultman (2019), ‘UN peacekeeping and protection from sexual violence’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (7), 1656–81. Johnstone, Ian (2011), ‘Managing consent in contemporary peacekeeping operations’, International Peacekeeping, 18 (2), 168–82. Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2006), The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Karim, Sabrina and Kyle Beardsley (2013), ‘Female peacekeepers and gender balancing: token gestures or informed policymaking?’, International Interactions, 39 (4), 461–88. Karim, Sabrina and Kyle Beardsley (2016), ‘Explaining sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions: the role of female peacekeepers and gender equality in contributing countries’, Journal of Peace Research, 53 (1), 100–115. Karreth, Johannes, Patricia Lynne Sullivan, and Ghazal Dezfuli (2020), ‘Explaining how human rights protections change after internal armed conflicts’, Journal of Global Security Studies, 5 (2), 248–64. Kathman, Jacob D. and Michelle Benson (2019), ‘Cut short? United Nations peacekeeping and civil war duration to negotiated settlements’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (7), 1601–29. Langholtz, Harvey J. (2010), Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations, New York, NY, USA: Peace Operations Training Institute.

58  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Ledgerwood, Judy L. (1994), ‘UN peacekeeping missions: the lessons from Cambodia’, Analysis from the East West Center, 11, March, 1–10. Lindberg Bromley, Sara (2018), ‘Introducing the UCDP Peacemakers at Risk dataset, sub-Saharan Africa, 1989–2009’, Journal of Peace Research, 55 (1), 122–31. Lundgren, Magnus, Ksenyia Oksamytna, and Katharina P. Coleman (2021), ‘Only as fast as its troop contributors: incentives, capabilities, and constraints in the UN’s peacekeeping response’, Journal of Peace Research, 58 (4), 671–86. Mendelson, Sarah E. (2005), Barracks and Brothels: Peacekeepers and Human Trafficking in the Balkans, Washington, DC, USA: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Mullenbach, Mark J. (2005), ‘Deciding to keep peace: an analysis of international influences on the establishment of third-party peacekeeping missions’, International Studies Quarterly, 49 (3), 529–55. O’Neill, Barry (1996), ‘Power and satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40 (2), 219–37. Perkins, Richard and Eric Neumayer (2008), ‘Extra-territorial interventions in conflict spaces: explaining the geographies of post-Cold War peacekeeping’, Political Geography, 27 (8), 895–914. Piccolino, Giulia and John Karlsrud (2011), ‘Withering consent, but mutual dependency: UN peace operations and African assertiveness’, Conflict, Security & Development, 11 (4), 447–71. Pouligny, Beatrice (2006), Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People, London, UK: Hurst and Company. Powell, Robert (2006), ‘War as a commitment problem’, International Organization, 60 (1), 169–203. Ruggeri, Andrea, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2017), ‘Winning the peace locally: UN peacekeeping and local conflict’, International Organization, 71 (1), 163–85. Ruggeri, Andrea, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Han Dorussen (2013), ‘Managing mistrust: an analysis of cooperation with UN peacekeeping in Africa’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57 (3), 387–409. Sebastián, Sofía and Aditi Gorur (2018), UN Peacekeeping and Host-State Consent: How Missions Navigate Relationships with Governments, Stimson Center, accessed 30 March 2022 at https://​www​ .stimson​.org/​wp​-content/​files/​file​-attachments/​UN​-P​eacekeepin​gAndHostSt​ateConsent​.pdf. Sion, Liora (2009), ‘Can women make a difference? Female peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 47 (4), 476–93. Smith, Alastair and Alan Stam (2003), ‘Mediation and peacekeeping in a random walk model of civil and interstate war’, International Studies Review, 5 (4), 115–35. Stojek, Szymon M. and Jaroslav Tir (2015), ‘The supply side of United Nations peacekeeping operations: trade ties and United Nations-led deployments to civil war states’, European Journal of International Relations, 21 (2), 352–76. Sullivan, Patricia Lynne and Johannes Karreth (2019), ‘Strategies and tactics in armed conflict: how governments and foreign interveners respond to insurgent threats’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (9), 2207–32. Tir, Jaroslav and Johannes Karreth (2018), Incentivizing Peace: How International Organizations Can Help Prevent Civil Wars in Member Countries, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Toft, Monica Duffy and Yuri M. Zhukov (2015), ‘Islamists and nationalists: rebel motivation and counterinsurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus’, American Political Science Review, 109 (2), 222–38. Tsagourias, Nicholas (2006), ‘Consent, neutrality/impartiality and the use of force in peacekeeping: their constitutional dimension’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 11 (3), 465–82. UN Department of Peace Operations (n.d.), ‘MINURCAT Facts and Figures’, accessed 21 November 2020 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​mission/​past/​minurcat/​facts​.shtml. United Nations (n.d.), Peacekeeper Fatalities, accessed 21 November 2020 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​ .org/​en/​peacekeeper​-fatalities. Walter, Barbara F. (2002), Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Walter, Barbara F., Lise Morjé Howard, and V. Page Fortna (2021), ‘The extraordinary relationship between peacekeeping and peace’, British Journal of Political Science, 51, 1705–22. Yuen, Amy (2019), ‘Negotiating peacekeeping consent: information and peace outcomes’, Journal of Peace Research, 57 (2), 297–311.

Consent in peacekeeping  59 Zartman, I. William and Maureen R. Berman (1982), The Practical Negotiator, New Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press.

5. The composition of UN peacekeeping missions Vincenzo Bove, Chiara Ruffa and Andrea Ruggeri

INTRODUCTION About 90 000 multinational troops, the so-called Blue Helmets, are currently deployed all around the world in UN peacekeeping operations, each with the mandate to keep or enforce peace. UN peace operations have often made the headlines for failing to protect civilians from atrocities, or even worse, for allegations of serious misconduct among peacekeepers in episodes of sexual abuse and exploitation of local individuals. Yet, despite notable and tragic failures, and notwithstanding a chronic lack of resources, UN peacekeeping is indeed effective at stopping atrocities, even when deployed in the most difficult and trying contexts – such as the Democratic Republic of Congo or the Central African Republic (Dorussen 2014; Hultman et al. 2013; Ruggeri et al. 2017). To protect civilians and reduce violence, missions have become larger, more robust, and increasingly complex. In 2018, 123 states deployed 80 000 peacekeepers across 14 UN peacekeeping missions, but less than 20 000 troops just 30 years ago. As the mission demands have grown, so too has the level of heterogeneity among participants with recent peace operations in Mali and South Sudan deploying troops from more than 40 contributing countries. As we will argue in the next section, this high level of diversity is not unique to these two operations. Overall, today more than 120 national states contribute troops to peace operations (see Figure 5.2, discussed below). This has brought new organizational challenges and coordination problems at the operational level that, if not addressed, can hamper the capacity of the operation. To illustrate, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), established in 2011 following the independence of the Republic of South Sudan, is the second largest UN peacekeeping mission and has a challenging multidimensional mandate that includes civilian protection, creating conditions for aid delivery and preventing human rights abuses. In July 2016, in Juba (South Sudan), three days of intense fighting resulted in the death of many civilians and two peacekeepers, and the almost collapse of a fragile peace agreement. UNMISS Force Commander, Lt Gen. Johnson Ondieki from Kenya, had tasked the Chinese contingent of the mission to protect civilians and NGO workers. However, the contingent failed to protect them, even though peacekeepers’ deployment was very close to where the violent attacks happened. The UN Secretary General fired the Force Commander and an internal UN investigation highlighted that an unfortunate combination of multiple factors could explain the disaster; in particular, the presence of 14 000 peacekeepers from 62 different national contingents translated into a very high heterogeneity in terms of training, language, and military practices, which in turn led to systematic misunderstandings and coordination problems within the mission. Other examples, however, suggest that diversity of mission composition is a great asset, signaling the commitment of the United Nations to facilitate conflict resolution and prevent atrocities. For instance, in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, the presence of a pool of contributors from a variety of countries was perceived to be positive: a UN official working in the mission told us: ‘they all come in with their special traits (…) and taken together that 60

The composition of UN peacekeeping missions  61 should help to reassure the Lebanese and keep Hezbollah quiet’ (Bove et al. 2020, p. 60). A key question is whether a more diverse pool of contributing countries can improve a mission’s effectiveness or, conversely, undermine it. Recent studies, reviewed in this chapter, show that diversity of mission composition is important for peacekeeping effectiveness. Diversity across all dimensions, however, is not equally beneficial. To anticipate, diversity among the Blue Helmets is beneficial and has direct and observable implications for peacekeeping effectiveness. Yet, a large distance – along different dimensions such as linguistic or religious – between peacekeepers and local populations can hamper or jeopardize UN mission effectiveness (see, for example, Bove et al. 2020). We elaborate further later in this chapter. Peace operations today are very complex and multifaceted social endeavors, with soldiers having a variety of cultural origins and perspectives and complex linkages with host societies. As of yet, however, mission composition has not taken a central stage. Extant quantitative literature on the impact of UN peacekeeping missions has typically focused on three features of a mission: the presence or absence of a peace mission (Fortna 2004); the range of activities permitted in the UN peacekeeping mission mandate (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008); and the force size of a UN peace mission (Di Salvatore 2019; 2020; Hultman et al. 2013; 2014; 2019). The question of whether cosmopolitan peacekeepers, even with their inefficiencies, can actually build peace has primarily been under severe scrutiny in qualitative research highlighting the importance of some specific dimensions of mission composition (Bellamy and Williams 2013). However, large-N studies have only recently started to investigate the importance of mission composition for the protection of civilians and the reduction of hostilities between combatants (Bove et al. 2020; Bove and Ruggeri 2016; 2019; Goldring and Hendricks 2018; Haass and Ansorg 2018). In this chapter, we focus on three important dimensions of composition: who the peacekeepers are, how they are combined, and whom they interact with. Figure 5.1 displays in an intuitive way these dimensions of mission composition by unpacking a typical UN mission into two components – the peacekeepers and the host country – to explore the effects of cultural/ political/linguistic diversity and distance between and within them. On the left-hand side, the nationality of the troop contributing countries (TCC, who) and their relative size (how) determine the internal diversity of a mission. At the same time, the relative composition of a UN mission vis-à-vis the local population constitutes what we can call the horizontal distance. In the remainder of this chapter, we first discuss how diversity in mission composition has dramatically changed in recent years, using several descriptive statistics and trends across peacekeeping operations, focusing particularly on the nationality of peacekeepers. Second, we outline why we should expect diversity to shape the performances of the mission on the battlefield and why diversity and effectiveness are systematically related in UN peacekeeping. In doing so, we identify key mechanisms of peacekeeping effectiveness and explore how diversity matters. Third, we take stock of the existing empirical literature on the relation between peacekeeping and diversity and summarize the key findings. Fourth, we discuss the policy implications for ongoing peacekeeping missions that can be derived based on existing research and promising avenues for future research.

62  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations

Source: Compiled by the authors.

Figure 5.1

Unpacking a peace mission

WHO IS KEEPING THE PEACE? ON MISSION COMPOSITION What are the key trends and transformations in the composition of UN peacekeeping? Since the 1990s, UN peacekeeping missions have undergone profound changes in their make-up. In practice, they have become bigger, more complex, and more diverse. There are at least four key features that help us appreciate the extent to which UN peacekeeping missions today are more complex endeavors than in the past: first, missions have seen a sharp increase in the number of military personnel deployed; second, the number of countries supplying peacekeepers has steadily increased; third, and related to the last point, there has been an important change in the pool of countries from which the UN can draw soldiers; and finally, there has been an increase in the average number of troop-contributing countries per mission. Starting with the first two trends, Figure 5.2 shows the number of UN peacekeepers deployed (dotted black trend lines) and the number of countries contributing soldiers to the UN (vertical bars) between 1991 and 2018. We can see that both the number of “boots on the ground” – that is, soldiers from national armies – as well as the number of TCCs have gradually increased. Whereas in 1991 there were 50 countries contributing a total of less than 11 000 troops, in 2018 almost 80 000 Blue Helmets were deployed from 123 states in missions based in 21 countries. These contributions are not all of equal size and the increase in the number of TCCs is also driven by the rise of “token” troop contributors, countries deploying less than 40 – or even ten – military personnel to gain prestige. This is a ‘deliberately chosen and distinctive mode of participation’ which can pose issues for UN force generation by challenging UN efforts to expand the organization’s base of peacekeeping contributors (see Coleman 2013, p. 2). It is worth noting that, although military personnel make up the bulk of the presence on the ground, the UN also deploy police officers alongside military personnel; the number is also quite significant, about 11 000 police officers were deployed in 2018. International police units offer training and support to local police departments to enforce the rule of law. Karim and Gorman (2016) offer recent investigations of the role of police forces in UN peacekeeping. Belgioioso et al. (2021) analyze the role of normative and experience diversity of the UN

The composition of UN peacekeeping missions  63 mission police component explaining non-violent political contention among local actors. Moreover, more than 14 000 civilian staff members serve in UN peacekeeping operations around the world. They perform a variety of mandated tasks of peacekeeping operations such as ‘promoting and protecting human rights, helping strengthen the rule of law, fostering political and reconciliations processes, promoting mine-awareness, and serving as public information officers who explain and build support for the peace processes and the work of the UN’ (UN Peacekeeping n.d.).1 We exclude police officers and civilian peacekeepers from the current analysis and focus instead on military troops. Given the relatively smaller size of UN observers, we do not discuss diversity in terms of observers.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the International Peace Institute Peacekeeping Database (available online: https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​providing​-for​-peacekeeping​-database).

Figure 5.2

Number of UN troops and contributing countries, 1991–2018

In addition to the major increase in both numbers of peacekeepers and TCCs, there has also been a major geographical shift in terms of where peacekeepers come from. Figure 5.3a shows how contributing countries in the aftermath of the Cold War were mostly stemming from the “global North,” such as Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Three decades later, countries from the “global South” have become top TCCs, ranging from Asian countries such as Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal, and Pakistan to African countries, such as Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana, Rwanda, and Tanzania (Bove and Elia 2011; Cunliffe 2013) (Figure 5.3b). As the UN attempts to recruit peacekeepers from a larger number of countries, Western countries continue to contribute troops that are deployed alongside soldiers from the global South. Yet, note that these are often “strategic” token contributions that allow Western countries to mitigate critiques that they are not adequately supporting UN peacekeeping (Coleman 2013).

64  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations This often generates organizational challenges and coordination problems. At the same time, one might expect also that the right mix of complementary perspectives, skills, and solutions can clearly benefit the operation as a whole and its operational capacity.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the International Peace Institute Peacekeeping Database (available online: https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​providing​-for​-peacekeeping​-database).

Figure 5.3a

Contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping, 1991

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the International Peace Institute Peacekeeping Database (available online: https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​providing​-for​-peacekeeping​-database).

Figure 5.3b

Contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping, 2018

This consideration takes us to the last trend: the variation in the average number of contributing countries per mission over time. As we can see from Figure 5.4, in the last two decades there has been a growth in the average number of troops per mission, from 13 in 1991 to 28 in 2018. One would expect that variations in the level of heterogeneity within missions should, all else equal, affect peacekeeping effectiveness. Taken together, these trends lead us to an important puzzle: are diverse missions more capable of protecting civilians from atrocities and reducing violence between belligerents? This is the issue considered next.

The composition of UN peacekeeping missions  65

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the International Peace Institute Peacekeeping Database (available online: https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​providing​-for​-peacekeeping​-database).

Figure 5.4

Average number of contributing countries per mission

COMPOSITION, DIVERSITY, AND MECHANISMS OF PEACEKEEPING EFFECTIVENESS The quantitative literature on peacekeeping has tested a plethora of theories on peacekeeping effectiveness but relied on the same sets of mechanisms, which are rarely tested and remain still relatively undertheorized. Two key tenets within the conflict resolution literature paved the way to a more systematic understanding of how and when peacekeeping works: asymmetric information and commitment problems (Fearon 1995; Kydd 2010). Extant studies by-and-large build on these two mechanisms by arguing that the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission as such, or the scale of its deployment, should determine mission effectiveness. In her recent book, Power in Peacekeeping, Howard (2019) highlights the importance of additional material and non-material mechanisms and argues that peacekeepers can be effective in three ways: first, via persuasion, which works mainly verbally, as in the UN mission in Namibia; second, by inducement, which is mostly a financial tool as shown in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon; and finally, by coercing the combatants via deterrence, surveillance, and arrest, which were found to prevail in the specific case of the UN mission in the Central African Republic. Whereas all mechanisms seem to be important, the offensive use of force is the only tool that did not seem to lead to more effectiveness. Although the above channels are useful to understand how the presence and size of a mission can shape mission performances in the fields, they are less suitable when one wants to explain the role of mission composition in protecting civilians and stopping the belligerents because they assume homogeneity of mission composition. Bove et al. (2020) put forward four

66  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations new mechanisms that help overcome this important limitation: informative trust, informative communicability, resolve deterrence, and skilled persuasion. Informative trust addresses the following question: are the Blue Helmets able to gain relevant information due to building trust? Here, diversity matters as social, economic, and cultural diversity should affect the extent to which peacekeepers can collect vital information from the local populations. To illustrate, one would expect that sharing similar norms and cultures with the local population should enhance trust and facilitate information flows. At the same time, internal diversity can lead to more effective monitoring capacities among national contingents and their capacity to contain peacekeepers’ misbehavior. Informative communicability addresses the issue of whether Blue Helmets can indeed understand the very context they are embedded in, given extant similarities in norms and culture with locals. As information asymmetry is a major hurdle to conflict resolution, and information is not necessarily fungible, this second form of informative capacity also assumes that who is deployed matters for effective communication with locals and a correct understanding of the environment. Resolve deterrence focuses on peacekeepers’ ability to exercise deterrence; it implies that more heterogeneous compositions – that is, when Blue Helmets stem from many nations – signal to local actors the resolve of the UN and international community to put an end to the conflict. Higher diversity is in fact an effective signaling device to deter local actors from wrongdoing and a lack of commitment. Skilled persuasion speaks to the issue of how to affect local preferences through a skill portfolio of peacekeepers and their daily practices. This mechanism is based on nonmaterial power that affects the preferences of the actors involved as well as their intentions. Persuasion, a crucial nonmaterial form of power (Howard 2019), is enhanced when peacekeepers possess the right mix of relevant skills such as mediation and communication, as well as norms including risk propensity, situational awareness, and adaptability. And persuasion can also modify local actors’ incentives and actions. Table 5.1 summarizes the mechanisms that might influence peacekeeping effectiveness via diversity and highlights key assumptions and their limitations in the extant literature, along with a summary of what the new mechanisms imply. The above mechanisms of peacekeeping effectiveness pertain to both the internal heterogeneity of a UN mission as well as its relative composition vis-à-vis the local population (see Figure 5.1). In other words, to assess the importance of those mechanisms, we should look at where the peacekeepers come from – which gives information on the range of skills and resources available to the mission – and their relative distance with the local population – which tells us how these skills can be best used given the local context. What do we know about the effect of mission composition on mission performances? As mentioned above, the quantitative literature on mission composition is relatively recent and we still do not know much about the substantive effect of composition on mission outcomes.2 In this section, we review recent large-N studies on how UN military component heterogeneity in terms of nationalities and its relationships and interactions with the local population affect operational outcomes in the field. Bove and Ruggeri (2016) is the first quantitative study to explicitly ask the question whether for a given number of troops in a peace operation, the UN should recruit peacekeepers from a single or a variety of TCCs. They recall Horwitz and Horwitz’s (2007) dilemma when establishing the merit of team diversity for team outcomes. Diversity is in fact described as a “double-edged sword.” On the one hand, heterogeneity can create a positive organizational

Previous mechanisms

Informative fungibility

Muscular deterrence

Analytical domain

Commitment problem of size and mandate

conflict actors

local preferences

daily practices affect

peacekeepers and their

Skill portfolio of

community

UN and international

costs is only a function

costs of misbehavior by

Skilled persuasion

signals resolve of

The capacity to impose

Peacekeepers can impose

High levels of diversity

understand local context

improve ability to

access to information Resolve deterrence

and culture with locals

not be sufficient to gain

Similarities in norms

trust

Yet, the presence of

populations

Informative communicability

diversity can increase

presence and size.

information with local peacekeepers alone may

economic, and cultural

as mere function of

uncertainty, sharing

Low levels of social,

New mechanisms Informative trust

Limitations Information gathering

Assumptions Peacekeepers minimize

Mechanisms of peacekeeping effectiveness

Asymmetric information

Table 5.1

The composition of UN peacekeeping missions  67

68  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations synergy, thus resulting in positive outcomes. Higher degrees of heterogeneity can improve the performance of operations when soldiers from different backgrounds contribute their various skills, experiences, and abilities to day-to-day interactions. A diverse set of technical capabilities and experiences within the operation can facilitate effective work and the appropriate management of difficult situations. When operations are composed by multiple nationalities, peacekeepers are more likely to monitor each other’s (mis)behavior. By encouraging a bottom-up and mutual monitoring, diversity can reduce the odds that national contingents are complicit and silent in misconduct. On the other hand, different and at times divergent expertise and experience can give rise to coordination problems due to the presence of linguistic barriers, different cultures, diverse training, or legal systems. National armies may also have different rules of engagement, operational caveats, and military cultures, which make some contingents less likely to abide by the common modus operandi of a mission as was the case of the NATO mission in Afghanistan (Auerswald and Saideman 2014; Ruffa 2018). All these potential barriers between countries can create significant misunderstanding and miscommunication or lack of trust and thus reduce the capabilities of a mission. As both the positive and negative channels can be present at the same time, the net effect of diversity on performances can be considered as an empirical question. Using monthly data on peace operations in Africa between 1991 and 2008, Bove and Ruggeri (2016) find that UN missions’ internal diversity in the nationality of Blue Helmets – operationalized through indexes of fractionalization and polarization – improves the capacity to protect civilians from violence. Interestingly, they find that introducing linguistic distance into the measure of diversity leads to similar results. In a similar vein, recent work has explored the role of troop quality as an important dimension of mission composition. To illustrate, Haass and Ansorg (2018, p. 743) argue that mission-level variation in troop quality – the ‘technical and personal capability of a peace operation as well as its political support to fulfil its mandate independently of troop size’ – should reduce the level of civilian victimization. They argue that peacekeepers who have better diplomatic support, more advanced equipment and better intelligence are more capable of deterring violence by inflicting higher costs on combatants who target civilians, particularly when they can access remote locations. Troop quality also improves peacekeepers’ capacity to create buffer zones between combatants and monitor ceasefires. Measuring the quality of deployed peacekeeping troops is a challenging task. To capture it, Haass and Ansorg (2018) consider a TCC’s overall military capabilities computed as the relationship (ratio) between a TCC’s annual military expenditure and its number of armed personnel, that is, its military spending per capita. They recognize that this is an input measure, whereas military capabilities are an output measure; as of yet, however, there are no reliable data to translate a country’s input measures into actual military outcomes. They find that military spending per soldier is indeed associated with lower levels of one-sided violence. Material capabilities thus matter, and a contingent with low levels of capability could be unable to effectively protect civilians and might lead to a deterioration in the overall level of security. Whereas Bove and Ruggeri (2016) and Haass and Ansorg (2018) focus on the internal composition of a mission, that is, within the peacekeepers, Bove and Ruggeri (2019) and Goldring and Hendricks (2018) ask how interactions and diversities between peacekeepers and local populations affect operational outcomes. As Blue Helmets interact, daily and locally, with local populations, their everyday practices, habits, and cultures can affect the effectiveness of a mission. Furthermore, peacekeepers of different nationalities often behave differently from

The composition of UN peacekeeping missions  69 each other in their respective areas of operation, despite being deployed under an identical mandate (Ruffa 2018). When peacekeepers deploy to a mission, their beliefs, norms, and doctrines – including the propensity to use force – deploy with them, together with some preconceived ideas about the locals themselves. Similarly, when the locals see foreign peacekeepers arrive in their country, they most likely have their own preconceptions about such troops, based on their previous experiences, relations, pre-existing colonial ties, and linguistic or religious proximity. In case of multiple or prolonged deployments, local populations also develop clear impressions of the different nationalities over time which contribute to their reputations. As such, the extent of cultural, social, and economic differences between peacekeepers and host populations can create a visible barrier and discourage cooperation. This is highly consequential as continuous interaction with local populations is the primary mode of gathering reliable intelligence for the mission, a proper understanding of local conditions, and to get any type of substantive local support. These types of support would be severely constrained if locals did not trust the peacekeepers. To investigate the heterogeneity of a mission in relation to the local population, Goldring and Hendricks (2018) use the percentage of peacekeepers from proximate countries whereas Bove and Ruggeri (2019) sum up the dyadic distance between each contributor to the operation and the host country, weighted by the proportion of peacekeepers belonging to each TCC. Given the stark difference in the operationalizations of distance, the two studies reach different conclusions. Goldring and Hendricks suggest that proximity boosts the effectiveness of peacekeepers and their capacity to protect civilians. On the contrary, Bove and Ruggeri find that average geographic proximity of Blue Helmets with local populations leads to higher violence. However, they also find that higher linguistic or religious distances correspond to higher levels of violence. Hence, Bove and Ruggeri highlight that what seems to be beneficial for the UN missions’ purpose is the cultural proximity of Blue Helmets with local populations. Finally, Bove et al. (2020) employ a mixed methodology strategy through the investigation of three case studies and the application of statistical analysis of all UN missions since the end of the Cold War. Using three qualitative case studies – the UN missions in Lebanon (UNIFIL II), Mali (MINUSMA), and the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) – they first validate qualitatively the connection between configurations of practice and general mechanisms of peacekeeping effectiveness. They then turn to the empirical quantitative analysis to estimate the relation between UN missions’ diversity and conflict reduction. They find that high levels of diversity within peacekeepers on the ground help to keep the peace. As peacekeepers come from different countries, they have distinct attitudes and approaches to peacekeeping, between those more population-focused, like the Ghanaians in the UN mission in Lebanon, and those more operations-focused, like the French in the same mission. At the same time, cultural and normative diversity between Blue Helmets and the local population is crucial. In particular, linguistic and normative proximity between local populations and peacekeepers is related to low levels of hostility and casualties. For example, in the Central African Republic, Cameroonian peacekeepers were highly appreciated because they were close to the locals, displayed empathy, and were motivated to protect them, despite the deployment’s chronic lack of resources. This example stands in sharp contrast to common refrains which suggest Blue Helmets should hail from far-flung countries with little or no stake in the conflict. Another important component which nuances the findings is related to how the actual performance and behavior of troops on the ground is not only strictly influenced by distance. In fact, depending on the performance and behavior of peacekeepers deployed, regardless of distance, the local

70  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations population may update its expectations based on performance. Qualitatively, Bove et al. (2020) find quite strong support for a learning effect as well as the fact that locals update their information, thereby transcending mere considerations of distance. Distance is an important starting point, but further research should investigate the conditions under which distance interacts with actual performance and behavior on the ground. This chapter focuses on and tackles key dimensions of mission compositions, related to the variation of national armies composing the military component of a UN mission and, therefore, the relative variations in languages, norms, training, and cultures. However, other components of mission composition are of crucial importance too and have attracted growing scholarly attention. We mention them in passing and hope that future research can enhance our understanding of how different types of mission composition compound each other and influence peacekeeping performance. For instance, gender diversity within peacekeeping composition seems to increase mission effectiveness and performance (Karim and Beardsley 2017; Olsson and Gizelis 2014; Olsson et al. 2020).3 Along somewhat similar lines, the composition of police personnel may be another important dimension of mission composition as recent work suggests (Belgioioso et al. 2021).

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH The studies and findings we reviewed in this chapter push us to reflect upon the role of UN mission composition and its diversity; we suggest that who is part of a mission, how they are combined and whom they interact with are not just mere logistical and bureaucratic issues. These relational features are critical components of the conflict resolution process and how a UN peace operation can be effective in protecting civilians and stop the belligerents fighting. Therefore, UN mission composition should be considered as a substantive aspect of UN policies and we develop hereafter some policy implications. First, UN peacekeeping missions should make good use of diversity. At the mission level, systematic knowledge regarding troop strength needs to be shared at both headquarter and sector levels to ensure that synergies and opportunities of coordination are identified. This is already partly being done through the Uniformed Capability Requirements for United Nations Peacekeeping, but more should be done having in mind the potential positive effects of diversity. Perhaps more radically, at the mission level, we could envisage how a mission structure might be a site for innovation – to avoid problems relating to the current “single country, single Area of Responsibility” approach. High levels of field diversity could be “created” in each Area of Responsibility, with company- or even platoon-sized units from different countries working together. Some member states are already proposing co-deployments, similar to the concept of composite units as was the case for Sweden and Ireland in the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Yet, more could be done so that co-deployment happens among states that are very different from each other. Second, troop contributing countries should see diversity as an asset. At the national level, the key to improving the management of diversity is transforming state militaries. More efforts should be expended transforming military organizations into learning institutions that can adapt more flexibly in cooperation with other military organizations. While within certain multinational organizations – such as NATO or the African Union – interoperability and

The composition of UN peacekeeping missions  71 cooperation are enhanced through training and common procedures, more could be done to enhance cross-regional cooperation. This should be done by including multinational coordination explicitly and systematically in training templates. In order to work with a diverse set of troops, peacekeepers need to become more adaptable generally. Relatedly, peacekeepers are drawn from state militaries, which, unsurprisingly, mostly train their members for war. Peacekeeping operations require special kinds of training, ones in which specific traits, such as diversity in multinational training, are emphasized. Third, the United Nations should make good use of mission composition. The UN should create a task force on diversity whereby common drivers and effects of mission composition are openly discussed. The 2015 Report of the Independent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations – best known as HIPPO – referred only tangentially to diversity at the leadership level (UN 2015, p. 82; see also Oksamytna et al. 2021) but made no mention of how diversity should be managed, where else in the mission it might be valuable, or how to optimize it. The UN should develop a plan on how to take diversity into account at all levels of the organization and how to mainstream it. This may also mean including a “diversity advisor” at the Department of Peace Operations level and at the mission level. The UN should not relegate the topic of mission composition as merely an artifact of logistics or politics among state members and should take a more central stage within the Force Generation Service at the Office for Military Affairs. Mission composition is a core factor for the conflict resolution process and the UN ought to think systematically and critically about composition as a crucial policy issue. The United Nations should also think explicitly about alternative ways of allocating peacekeeping forces and try to better match peacekeeping forces skills with their desired goals, along the lines of what has been done within Uniformed Capability Requirements for United Nations Peacekeeping – importantly, this may include revisiting the possibility of more integrated multinational architectures. Furthermore, we believe that the research agenda related to the role of UN mission composition and diversity has some fruitful future avenues of research. Recent quantitative studies, based on large-N datasets with monthly data on peacekeeping deployments, have helped us make significant leaps in the direction of gaining a more comprehensive understanding of whether mission composition matters. Yet, multiple steps along different lines must be taken to further elaborate this research agenda. First, despite considerable efforts to mitigate issues of selection bias, existing work on diversity, which is mostly based on cross-country relationships, does not firmly establish causation. There is the issue of reverse causality: perhaps the condition on the battleground causes the peacekeeping contribution – the presence and size of each national contingent – rather than the other way round. Then, and more importantly, there is the potential for omitted variable bias. We cannot exclude that there are covariant factors with mission diversity. So far, direct causal evidence about the influence of mission composition on peacekeeping effectiveness has remained elusive. For instance, studies exploring the subnational variations of diversity within UN missions would be very welcome. Moreover, future projects focusing on field- or survey-experiments could help to validate possible causal claims between mission diversity and its effectiveness. Second, diversity can be expressed and conceptualized in different ways. Besides national origins and gender diversity, future research could explore more systematically diversity in terms of training and military cultures. They would need to be measured with more direct proxies, implying new coding and data. The role of emotions, especially empathy and indigna-

72  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations tion, among different individual peacekeepers could be a further field for the study of diversity and overall mission success. Third, analytical levels of interactions based on diversity of mission composition have just started to be unpacked; however, there are many other levels to be explored. How does the role of local leadership, both among rebels and government, matter? The composition and diversity of the UN boots on the ground could interact and cause different reactions from the local leadership and, in turn, affect the conflict resolution process. Moreover, these relational features as explanatory factors of variation in effectiveness could be extended to many other levels and actors: UN leadership with national leaders, distances with NGOs, diversity and composition of UN agencies. To conclude, UN peace mission composition matters and its consequences are indeed important for both theory and policy. Missions should, and can, be managed and even leveraged as a strength. Such management must strive to minimize coordination problems and misunderstandings, turning diversity into a “force multiplier.” The reality of a UN army keeping the peace all around the world is closer than ever and diversity should be one of its core strengths.4

NOTES 1. 2.

Available online at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​en/​civilians. Bove et al. (2020) discuss more systematically how qualitative literature started considering the role of diversity in UN missions much earlier than studies using quantitative methods. 3. See also Chapter 17 by Olsson in this Handbook. 4. We thank Katharina Coleman and Han Dorussen for their helpful comments and suggestions.

REFERENCES Auerswald, David P. and Stephen M. Saideman (2014), NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, accessed 17 September 2020 at https://​www​.jstor​.org/​stable/​j​.ctt4cgbc2. Belgioioso, Margherita, Jessica Di Salvatore, and Jonathan Pinckney (2021), ‘Tangled up in blue: the effect of UN peacekeeping on nonviolent protests in post-civil war countries’, International Studies Quarterly, 65 (1), 1–15. Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams (eds) (2013), Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Bove, Vincenzo and Leandro Elia (2011), ‘Supplying peace: participation in and troop contribution to peacekeeping missions’, Journal of Peace Research, 48 (6), 699–714. Bove, Vincenzo, Chiara Ruffa, and Andrea Ruggeri (2020), Composing Peace: Mission Composition in UN Peacekeeping, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Bove, Vincenzo and Andrea Ruggeri (2016), ‘Kinds of blue: diversity in UN peacekeeping missions and civilian protection’, British Journal of Political Science, 46 (3), 681–700. Bove, Vincenzo and Andrea Ruggeri (2019), ‘Peacekeeping effectiveness and blue helmets’ distance from locals’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (7), 1630–55. Coleman, Katharina P. (2013), ‘Token troop contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations’, in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (eds), Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press, pp. 47–67.

The composition of UN peacekeeping missions  73 Cunliffe, Philip (2013), Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South, illustrated edition, London, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd. Di Salvatore, Jessica (2019), ‘Peacekeepers against criminal violence—unintended effects of peacekeeping operations?’, American Journal of Political Science, 63 (4), 840–58. Di Salvatore, Jessica (2020), ‘Obstacle to peace? Ethnic geography and effectiveness of peacekeeping’, British Journal of Political Science, 50 (3), 1089–109. Dorussen, Han (2014), ‘Peacekeeping works, or does it?’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 20 (4), 527–37. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis (2006), Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Fearon, James D. (1995), ‘Rationalist explanations for war’, International Organization, 49 (3), 379–414. Fortna, V. Page (2004), ‘Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war’, International Studies Quarterly, 48 (2), 269–92. Fortna, V. Page (2008), Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Goldring, Edward and Michael Hendricks (2018), ‘Help is close at hand? Proximity and the effectiveness of peacekeepers’, Research & Politics, 5 (4), 1–9, accessed 17 September 2020 at https://​journals​ .sagepub​.com/​doi/​10​.1177/​2053168018805612. Haass, Felix and Nadine Ansorg (2018), ‘Better peacekeepers, better protection? Troop quality of United Nations peace operations and violence against civilians’, Journal of Peace Research, 55 (6), 742–58. Horwitz, Sujin K. and Irwin B. Horwitz (2007), ‘The effects of team diversity on team outcomes: a meta-analytic review of team demography’, Journal of Management, 33 (6), 987–1015. Howard, Lise Morjé (2019), Power in Peacekeeping, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2013), ‘United Nations peacekeeping and civilian protection in civil war’, American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 875–91. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2014), ‘Beyond keeping peace: United Nations effectiveness in the midst of fighting’, American Political Science Review, 108 (4), 737–53. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2019), Peacekeeping in the Midst of War, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Karim, Sabrina and Kyle Beardsley (2017), Equal Opportunity Peacekeeping: Women, Peace, and Security in Post-conflict States, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Karim, Sabrina and Ryan Gorman (2016), ‘Building a more competent security sector: the case of UNMIL and the Liberian National Police’, International Peacekeeping, 23 (1), 158–91. Kydd, Andrew H. (2010), ‘Rationalist approaches to conflict prevention and resolution’, Annual Review of Political Science, 13 (June), 101–21. Oksamytna, Kseniya, Vincenzo Bove, and Magnus Lundgren (2021), ‘Leadership selection in United Nations peacekeeping’, International Studies Quarterly, 65 (1), 16–28. Olsson, Louise and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2014), ‘Advancing gender and peacekeeping research’, International Peacekeeping, 21 (4), 520–28. Olsson, Louise, Angela Muvumba Sellström, Stephen Moncrief, Elisabeth Jean Wood, Karin Johansson, Walter Lotze, Chiara Ruffa, Amelia Hoover Green, Ann-Kristin Sjöberg, and Roudabeh Kishi (2020), ‘Peacekeeping prevention: strengthening efforts to preempt conflict-related sexual violence’, International Peacekeeping, 27 (4), 517–85. Ruffa, Chiara (2018), Military Cultures in Peace and Stability Operations: Afghanistan and Lebanon, Philadelphia, PA, USA, University of Pennsylvania Press. Ruggeri, Andrea, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2017), ‘Winning the peace locally: UN peacekeeping and local conflict’, International Organization, 71 (1), 163–85. UN (2015), ‘Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on peace operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people’, A/70/95–S/2015/446. New York, USA: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. UN Peacekeeping (n.d.), ‘Civilians’, accessed 31 January 2022 at https://​ peacekeeping​ .un​ .org/​ en/​ civilians.

6. Naming names: UN Security Council Resolution sentiment in civil wars Michelle Benson and Colin Tucker

THE IMPORTANCE OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS United Nations (UN) peacekeeping is among the most important international tools of civil conflict mitigation. Since the end of the Cold War, the intensity of UN peacekeeping operations, especially in civil conflicts, has expanded rapidly (de Jonge Oudraat 1996; Diehl 2008). Most recent work has pointed to the positive impacts of peacekeeping missions on civil conflict outcomes (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004; 2008a; 2008b; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Hultman et al. 2013; 2014). For example, conflicts that receive UN peacekeeping missions are associated with decreased civilian deaths, reduced battlefield violence, lower levels of sexual violence, and shorter times to negotiated settlements (Hultman et al. 2013; 2014; Johanssen and Hultman 2019; Kathman and Benson 2019). It is important to note, however, that before the UN can send peacekeeping troops to conflicts, it must first authorize the use of force through the passage of a Security Council (SC) resolution (Ziring et al. 2005). These resolutions establish, expand, modify, and terminate UN peacekeeping actions. They also are required to authorize many of the UN’s non-force-bearing, conflict mitigation tools, such as fact-finding operations or economic sanctions. Further, these resolutions have the additional purpose of allowing the UN to establish or clarify its interest in and/or position on a particular conflict or conflict disputant. They may be straightforward – almost factual in nature – or they may employ standardized language indicating approval or disapproval of the government, rebel groups, or outside actors. In summary, UNSC resolutions are important in that they (1) formally establish the UN’s attention to a conflict, (2) implement the UN’s actions within a conflict, and (3) indicate the UNSC’s sentiment towards disputants in a conflict. While the first two of these items have received consideration in the quantitative literature, relatively little empirical work has been conducted on the sentiment exhibited by UNSC resolutions towards conflict actors.1 Positive sentiment, based upon the standard vocabulary used in UN resolutions (e.g., applauds, welcomes, commends, approves, affirms, acknowledges, notes with appreciation, and pays tribute to) lauds a conflict actor and/or its actions. Negative sentiment condemns actors or actions (e.g., deplores, condemns, denounces, indignant of, deeply disturbed by, expresses concern). While sentiment denotes feeling, it need not be associated with bias towards a particular side in a conflict.2 As noted by Heldt and Wallensteen (2007), a peacekeeping operation should have a neutral stance towards conflict actors but need not be impartial towards the behavior of said actors. While only a minority of UNSC resolutions focus on peacekeeping operations, there is an expectation that the UN should behave similarly in all its recommendations and conflict management tools (Diehl 1993). An understanding of the distribution of resolutions both within 74

Naming names  75 and across conflicts – especially those containing sentiment – should be a critical component in the examination of how the UN has attempted to manage conflicts across time. It is worth noting that the specific language used in UNSC resolutions is purposeful and may even be the result of logrolling within the UNSC (Kuziemko and Werker 2006). Indeed, UNSC agreements and resolutions are the result of multilateral compromises between Security Council members (Voeten 2001) and, we argue, can be seen as a latent indicator of security council member preferences. While it is fair to say that the UN is able to correctly identify both positive and negative actions in conflict, given Security Council member preferences, it does not always choose to name the perpetrator of those actions, nor does it always respond to conflict actions in a consistent manner. Only through an understanding of all UNSC resolutions pertaining to a particular conflict class (that is, civil conflict) can researchers begin to understand the extent of UN impartiality and/or neutrality both within and across conflicts. Some important work on UNSC resolutions has examined the language of resolutions based upon a particular conflict topic (for example, Gruenberg 2009), coded all UNSC resolutions based on their target (Beardsley 2013), and examined UNSC resolutions on civil wars (Cockayne et al. 2010). However for a more complete understanding of the UN’s response to civil war it is essential to begin with the population of all civil conflicts and then identify all relevant UNSC resolutions. Benson and Kathman (2014) provide an initial look at the impact of UNSC resolutions on a sample of all African civil conflicts. Benson and Tucker (2022) extend this work by replicating Hultman et al.’s (2013) research design in an article examining the effects of peacekeeping on civilian casualties in the presence of resolutions with sentiment. Both papers find that the presence of sentiment in UNSC resolutions significantly affects UN actions and UN effectiveness in civil wars. In this chapter, we further describe the nature, process, and dimensions of UNSC resolutions. Using an original dataset on UNSC resolutions paired with UCDP/PRIO data on civil conflicts (Gleditsch et al. 2002), we provide information on the distribution of UNSC resolutions across time and civil conflict countries. Finally, we illustrate how resolutions vary in terms of UNSC sentiment towards conflict actors. These data, we suggest, can provide insight into latent preferences among members of the UNSC as well as help us understand how actors may respond to UN initiatives.

THE PROCESS OF RESOLUTION-MAKING UNSC resolutions are formal expressions stating the will of the Security Council and are a necessary condition for almost all substantive UN actions on conflict outside the offices of the Secretary-General. Resolutions are passed by obtaining at least nine affirmative votes of the 15-member Security Council. This vote must further be without any vetoes from the five permanent (P5) Security Council members – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. Thus, at least four of the 10 non-permanent members of the Security Council must vote in the affirmative. These 10 non-permanent members are elected for two-year terms by the UN General Assembly based on rotating geographic regions. Additionally, with permission, non-Security Council members of the UN may take part in Security Council debate if their interests are affected by the issue under discussion. However, only permanent and non-permanent elected SC members have the power to vote on resolutions, and thus the ability

76  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations to alter the specifics and tenor of resolutions, and most consequentially, to send UN forces to a conflict. Given that the votes of non-permanent members are a necessary condition for resolution passage, membership on the Security Council is often a valued commodity that is preceded by lobbying among UN general membership. Security Council membership is not only valued for its potential to affect global affairs and access to high-level security briefings, but also for its associated increases in both multilateral aid and direct aid from P5 members (Kuziemko and Werker 2006). The resolutions that implement the UNSC’s conflict management tools almost always derive their legal authority from Chapter VII of the UN Charter by virtue of explicit references to the Chapter in the body of resolution text. Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which was ratified by all UN members, establishes the UN’s ability to determine ‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’ (UN 1945, Ch. VII, Title). Passing a resolution referring to Chapter VII is largely understood to be a legal decision ‘virtually equivalent to a legislative act by a municipal law-making authority’ (Castles 1968, p. 71). Chapter VII makes it clear that there is a defined procedure of actions that the UNSC can utilize in addressing conflict.3 The first level of actions, described in Article 40, are almost exclusively verbal in nature, where the council may ‘call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable’ (UN 1945, Ch. VII, Art. 40). The second level of actions that may proceed from requests are discussed in Article 41, which includes the ‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations’ (UN 1945, Ch. VII, Art. 41). If the measures above are deemed to be insufficient to address the conflict, Article 42 provides for the use of force, including ‘demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations’ (UN 1945, Ch. VII, Art. 42). However, the UNSC is not restricted to this sequence of actions; for example, the UNSC may choose to ignore a conflict, or conversely, immediately authorize the use of military force.4 More importantly, the UNSC often engages in mitigation techniques not explicitly prescribed by this instruction, but nonetheless are found within resolutions. For example, the UNSC frequently takes on investigative roles by establishing fact-finding panels of experts, deploying “advance teams” to conflict zones, and forming working committees made up of council members. Further, the UNSC engages in diplomacy through the establishment of its “good-offices,” offers of mediation, and formal requests for humanitarian aid from the global community of donors. Finally, the UNSC’s decision to confer legitimacy to third-party military operations, along with its invocations of specific UN mandates, carries its own influence as an expression of the international community. For example, it is not uncommon for the UNSC to engage in coordination or collaboration with military deployments led by regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) – like the African Union, European Union, or NATO – and to express its affirmation of such operations.5 The level of action in UNSC resolutions may vary considerably not only across conflicts, but within a conflict over time. Many consider that the most important resolutions are those that authorize the use of force or establish peacekeeping operations in conflict. However, all resolutions send important signals about the level of multilateral cooperation that can be expected in addressing a conflict, as well as on the level of consensus regarding how such conflicts should be addressed, how quickly they should be acted upon, and what type of

Naming names  77 orientation should be adopted towards conflict disputants. While researchers have previously generated datasets on UNSC resolutions (Beardsley 2013; Cockayne et al. 2010), we have expanded upon their efforts and created a novel dataset of our own (Benson and Tucker 2022). Using this dataset, we provide important insights in the following sections on the nature of UNSC resolutions during civil conflicts.6

UNSC RESOLUTIONS DURING CIVIL CONFLICT It is important to note that a normative consensus has developed that all conflicts fall under the domain of the UN (Barnett and Weiss 2008; Bellamy 2011). However, at its inception, the domain of the UN was largely focused on direct breaches of international peace in interstate wars (Diehl and Balas 2014). Over the last several decades, the notion that the UN has a vested interest in the maintenance of peace within nations has gained support from much of the international community and through the grudging acceptance of the less interventionist members of the Security Council, namely Russia and China (Zhongying 2005). This change is evident by the general shift of resolutions focusing on international conflicts to those that focus on civil wars. It is further reflected by the observation that most modern peace operations have addressed civil wars rather than international conflicts (Diehl 2008). Using our original dataset, we project the temporal distribution of civil conflict resolutions over the number of active civil conflicts in Figure 6.1.

Source: Benson and Tucker (2022).

Figure 6.1

Count of civil conflict resolutions and active civil conflicts

Figure 6.1 illustrates that the frequency of resolutions addressing civil conflict has dramatically increased in the post-Cold War era. The UNSC passed 181 civil conflict resolutions in the 46 years beginning with its inception in 1946 and ending with the collapse of the Soviet

78  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Union in 1991. In contrast, 951 resolutions were passed in the 24 years following the Cold War between 1992 and 2015. Yet, even if the ratio of resolutions to conflicts has clearly risen in the post-Cold War period, there are numerous civil conflicts in any given year that do not meet the threshold for UN attention. Given that all civil wars could be addressed by the United Nations, why have only a minority of conflicts received formal UNSC attention? Indeed, according to our data, approximately one out of every three civil conflicts in the post-Cold War era experienced a UNSC resolution. This is an area ripe for analysis at both the large- and small-N level. While research has considered the factors determining UN peacekeeping (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Gilligan and Stedman 2003), the few studies that exist seeking to explain when UNSC resolutions are issued suggest that the most important motivating factors for UNSC resolutions on civil conflicts are the interests of the P5 members and a conflict’s severity (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Benson and Satana 2008). P5 members play an especially strong role in this calculus; through the threat or use of their veto power, P5 members are able to prevent the formal passage of resolutions on conflicts in which they seek to avoid international interference. Nevertheless, no single P5 member can obtain a resolution or UN action on a conflict on their own. However, Voeten (2001) argues persuasively that resolutions and high-level UN action are more likely when a P5 member can convincingly indicate that unilateral action is credible and when other members would desire influence in the management of the conflict. This logrolling means that UNSC resolutions may be considered in many ways to be the lowest common denominator of agreement on whether or how a conflict should be addressed multilaterally through the UN.

NAMING NAMES: RESOLUTION SENTIMENT One important feature of resolutions is their ability to both condemn and praise the actions of civil conflict disputants – what we coin as resolution “sentiment.” Resolution sentiment is often directed towards specific actors, including both the government and rebel factions, in response to actions the UNSC views as in defiance of peace efforts. Given the standardized vernacular of resolutions over time, these sentiments are easily cataloged. In Table 6.1, we present some of the words found in resolution text that are indicative of this sentiment. In our examination of resolutions, sentiments come in four primary forms: pro-government, pro-rebel, anti-government, and anti-rebel. However, these labels are not mutually exclusive; sometimes the UNSC can both praise and condemn the same faction within the same Table 6.1

Sentiment language

Praising

Condemning

Applauds

Condemns

Welcomes

Deplores

Commends

Denounces

Approves

Indignant of

Affirms

Deeply disturbed by

Acknowledges

Expresses concern by

Notes with appreciation Pays tribute to

Source: Benson and Tucker (2022).

Naming names  79 resolution. Further, resolutions do not necessarily have to praise one faction and condemn the other. Indeed, sometimes a resolution praises or condemns both factions simultaneously. Importantly, we catalog sentiments only by their presence or absence within a resolution; we do not count the number of sentiments expressed within a resolution. Below we show an example of this sentiment being expressed in UNSC Resolution 2164 (UN Security Council 2014, p. 2), addressing one of Mali’s civil conflicts: Pro-government Sentiment Welcoming the appointment by the Malian President on 23 April 2014 of a High-Representative for the Inter-Malian Inclusive Dialogue and his initial efforts to consult with national and international actors on the peace process […] Anti-rebel Sentiment Condemning strongly the violent clashes in Kidal on 17 and 18 May 2014 in the context of the Malian Prime Minister’s visit, which resulted in the death of Malian Defence and Security Forces personnel, as well as eight civilians, including six Government officials, the unacceptable seizure by the armed groups, notably the Mouvement national de Libration de l’Azawad (MNLA), of administrative buildings […] Beyond the main factions of conflict, there are also two secondary forms of sentiment: “pro-all” and “anti-all.” These are cases where the target of the sentiment is ambiguous and encompasses all parties to a conflict.7 In our examination of all UNSC resolutions from 1946 to 2015, we find that resolution sentiment is abundant. In Figure 6.2, we display the percentage of resolutions containing different forms of sentiment. First, we find that three out of every four resolutions contain some form of

Source: Benson and Tucker (2022).

Figure 6.2

Percentage of resolutions containing sentiment

80  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations

Source: Benson and Tucker (2022).

Figure 6.3

Number of government-sentiment resolutions during UN peacekeeping operations in civil conflict countries

Source: Benson and Tucker (2022).

Figure 6.4

Number of rebel-sentiment resolutions during UN peacekeeping operations in civil conflict countries

sentiment. Of these different forms, the most frequent is “anti-all,” where the UNSC condemns all parties in conflict. This is exhibited in one out of every two resolutions. This is followed by pro-government (one out of every three resolutions) and anti-rebel (one out of every four resolutions) sentiment. Taken together, this suggests that the UNSC is not afraid to “name

Naming names  81 names” in calling out wrongful actions. Another implication may be that there is a status quo “bias,” where the UNSC carries a prediction that favors governments over rebels. Both the positive and negative language in UNSC resolutions is of interest to those who wish to understand the full range of UNSC sentiment pertaining to civil conflict actors. Yet, a thorough reading of the body of UNSC resolutions leads to a presumption that negatively oriented resolutions are more consequential. Indeed, when one conceptualizes the “naming of names,” it is largely in reference to calling out bad actions and/or bad actors. Anti-government resolutions might therefore be of special interest given the relative difficulty of the UNSC to send and maintain peacekeeping operations without governmental support. Of course, the UNSC has strenuously condemned and explicitly acted against government forces, as in the case of the United Nations Mission in the Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). For good or ill, these actions can bring the UN to the level of a regime change facilitator rather than a pure peacemaker or peacekeeper. These anti-governmental resolutions consequently deserve special consideration in future research. An important additional inquiry that may be answered through an examination of all types of UNSC resolutions is how UN peacekeeping efforts are impacted by the presence and timing of resolutions with sentiment. The variation across resolution sentiment in civil conflicts is pronounced and potentially important. In Figures 6.3 and 6.4, we display the number of government and rebel sentiments among an exhaustive sample of civil conflict countries that the UN deployed peacekeeping operations to. As noted above, given that UN peacekeeping requires consent from countries hosting peacekeeping missions, it is not surprising that the UNSC adopts higher frequencies of pro-government and anti-rebel resolutions, as illustrated here. It is especially interesting to note the cases where almost exclusively anti-government resolutions (for example, South Africa, Syria, Mozambique) or pro-rebel resolutions (for example, Tajikistan) are adopted. Similarly, the absence of such resolutions in the cases of Somalia and the Central African Republic are of note. Going further, future research might consider explanations for the variation in sentiment frequency across civil conflict countries and why sentiment is notably absent or lacking in some cases. For example, are certain political factors or relationships among P5 members influential in steering the Council away or towards the use of harsh rhetoric towards conflict host-country regimes? Further, does the Council increase its use of praise to help cement the political power of its preferred disputants? Finally, does the Council take measures to monitor its own reputation for action, and thus censor its use of condemnation when it knows its goals are out-of-reach? Exploration of these questions through this data would prove worthwhile in understanding UNSC behavior and its impact on conflict outcomes.

WHY RESOLUTION SENTIMENT MATTERS While our efforts in collecting this data are recent, our research strongly suggests that these sentiments are not trivial regarding their impact on conflict. We find that they signal the UNSC’s consensus in considering which actors in conflict are supporters of peace or which are proponents of subversion. Without this consensus, the logrolling and gridlock of the UNSC can be difficult to surmount, preventing effective and rapid responses to events on the ground (Allen and Yuen 2014). When the UNSC labels bad actors in the presence of peacekeepers, it is signaling a commitment to counteract their transgressions in the future, whether it be

82  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations increasing peacekeeping force levels, expanding a mission’s mandate in time or scope, or incorporating more of the arsenal of peacekeeping tools – such as the imposition of sanctions and embargoes, and the authorization of outside uses of military force. One of the most important questions pertaining to UN sentiment in resolutions, is whether this “naming of names” is viewed as biased behavior by conflict actors and if such perceptions might affect UN conflict management and peacekeeping effectiveness. The potential for bias in UN peacekeeping  Among the three core principles that distinguishes UN peacekeeping is impartiality, as worded in the ‘Principles of Guidelines’ document (UN Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 33): Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate. … Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds.

In other words, the UN idealizes fairness in its dealings with disputants, but also pledges to not be inactive in its pursuit of peace. Yet, the presence of sentiment leaves open the door for the UNSC to be perceived as biased among conflict disputants. While it is well-known that the UNSC decides to engage the most challenging conflicts around the world, little is known about when and why the UNSC decides to condemn and praise the actions of disputants during conflicts. A cursory examination of resolution sentiment text does corroborate the “referee” role that the UNSC casts itself in; the UNSC broadly praises the actions of disputants in adhering to peace processes and condemns those who re-engage in hostilities and maim civilians. However, there are numerous instances where the UNSC’s voice is notably absent, particularly during instances of widespread human rights abuses and high levels of battlefield fatalities. The impact of bias and sentiment in UN peacekeeping  Notwithstanding the potential for bias, it is contested as to whether impartial conflict management is most effective in promoting peaceful outcomes. Failure to sustain an image of impartiality ‘may undermine the peacekeeping operation’s credibility and legitimacy, and may lead to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties’ (UN Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 33). Under such circumstances, a UN Peacekeeping Operation ‘risks becoming a party to the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its fundamental role of keeping the peace’ (UN Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 32). While it is understandable for the UN to want to avoid enforcement action in which it might be perceived as having a preferred outcome, some research suggests that bias has no significant impact on conflict management outcomes (Gent and Shannon 2011). Kydd (2003) takes this argument further in suggesting that biased mediators are more effective because they are better able to remove the uncertainty of disputants’ resolve to fight. Information asymmetries on resolve are a well-established cause of war; if rivals are unaware of their respective reservation points, and thus find it more difficult to propose acceptable settlements to their opponents, negotiated peace is unlikely to occur. This ultimately leaves war as the remaining solution to the existing stalemate (Fearon 1995). Kydd (2003) argues that unbiased mediators are incentivized to over-represent the resolve of all disputants by suggesting concessions are required from all sides for a settlement. However, impartial mediators

Naming names  83 will make these statements even if they are untrue because the absence of war is their main priority. As a consequence, the reliability of their messaging is subject to doubt, resulting in rivals thinking they can obtain a better settlement than what a mediator has proposed. Unlike unbiased mediators, biased mediators seek peace, but also the most favorable outcome for their ally.8 Consequently, they are more reliable in conveying the opponents’ resolve to fight, which subsequently increases their likelihood of obtaining concessions from their ally with the purposes of reaching a peaceful settlement. Kydd (2006) moderates this argument somewhat in noting that moderately biased mediators may be successful primarily if they are perceived as honest. He argues (2006, p. 460) that organizations such as the UN therefore have an especially strong incentive to establish a reputation for honesty in their long-term conflict management operations. Alternatively, Favretto (2009) suggests that biased mediators are better equipped to mediate conflict because their preference for outcomes that advantage their favored disputant makes their threats to enforce an outcome more credible. Thus, it is not that they are better able to obtain concessions from their ally – as suggested by Kydd (2003) – but from their opponent because of their threat of military intervention. Finally, Regan (2002) suggests that biased military interventions may alter the balance of capabilities between government and rebel forces. Interventions in support of government forces may empower them to squash their opposition, while interventions in support of rebels may better leverage them to demonstrate staying power and acquire political concessions from governments. In light of these explanations, generalized empirical studies of conflict appear to corroborate these claims, where “biased” interventions and mediators result in greater likelihoods of negotiated settlements (Savun 2008), more successful and democratic settlements (Svennson 2009), and shorter conflict durations (Regan 2002). An alternative question, of course, is if UN intervention paired with targeted resolutions might make things worse for conflict resolution, battlefield violence, and civilians caught in the path of the conflict. This would especially be of concern if UN peacekeepers were seen as a party to the conflict (as noted above), rather than as a “referee,” as desired by the organization. To our knowledge, an empirical investigation of whether biased UN interventions (1) exist and (2) are conducive to peace has not occurred. However, with the advent of resolution data cataloging UNSC sentiment data, these important questions can be soon answered. The limited research on resolution sentiment and peacekeeping suggests that sentiment does appear to have a significant, empirical relationship with UN peacekeeping. An initial publication finds that sentiment presence is associated with higher levels of force commitments in UN peacekeeping operations (Benson and Kathman 2014). Specifically, when the UNSC’s “preferred” side sustains fatalities in conflict, in accordance with these sentiments, the UNSC is more likely to increase troop deployments (Benson and Kathman 2014). This aligns with previous research indicating the UNSC’s stalwart determination to see its missions succeed (Bove and Elia 2011; Binder 2015; Mullenbach 2005). Thus, UNSC resolutions can provide an indication of when and for which side of the conflict this help might be forthcoming when prior resolutions point to support for specific conflict actors (for example, Benson and Kathman 2014). Elsewhere, research suggests that peace operations have an important impact in improving conflict outcomes (Fortna 2008a; Hultman et al. 2013; 2014, Johanssen and Hultman 2019). Among the most well-known of these findings is that peacekeeping operations with high levels of troops significantly decrease the level of civilian casualties (Hultman et al.

84  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations 2013). In a recent extension of this work, Benson and Tucker (2022) find that high levels of troops, when paired with resolutions exhibiting sentiment, have an added impact in reducing civilian casualties. Specifically, UNSC civil conflict resolutions with anti-rebel sentiments are associated with lower levels of rebel one-sided violence during active peacekeeping operations. Anti-government resolutions, in contrast, do not significantly decrease civilian victimization. This asymmetry in the impact of UNSC resolution sentiment is likely a fruitful avenue of future research. For example, Svensson (2007) notes that mediator nations with pro-government preferences increase the likelihood of negotiated settlements. If this finding transfers to the UN, then perhaps anti-rebel resolutions may not have significantly negative effects on conflict outcomes.

CONCLUSIONS While it may be tempting to think that UNSC resolutions are cheap talk, a growing body of research suggests that they are indeed consequential to civil conflict management. Besides being reflective of UNSC consensus, they also exhibit an exogenous effect on conflict. When paired with prior research on peacekeeping effectiveness, information on the frequency, level, and tenor of UNSC resolutions can provide a more nuanced understanding of UN conflict management. At the same time, the record of UNSC resolutions addressing civil conflict can provide answers to important questions that remain unanswered. For example: why do not all civil wars receive attention from the UNSC in the form of a resolution? For those conflicts that are targeted by the UNSC, why do some receive resolutions filled with UNSC commentary, condemning the actions of conflict disputants (for example, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and Bosnia), but others receive relatively few despite similar or worse levels of atrocity (for example, Rwanda)? As the necessary condition of some of the United Nations’ most impactful civil conflict management tools – including the use of force, UNSC resolutions may help to predict and explain UN peacekeeping dynamics. The variation in UNSC resolutions both between and within conflicts is substantial in terms of their frequency and sentiment. The figures presented above illustrate that the UN is willing to name names in many civil conflicts. Understanding the determinants of these resolutions might also help to predict when UN peacekeeping will be deployed, extended, or expanded in order to raise costs on combatants seeking to fight their enemies or maim civilians (Cil et al. 2020; Fjelde et al. 2019; Hultman et al. 2013; 2014; Kathman and Wood 2016). We now understand that when robust peacekeeping is paired with “anti-rebel” UNSC resolutions, there is a significant likelihood that the UN will be able to deter rebel-led violence against civilians (Benson and Tucker 2022). The sequencing of resolutions with specific UNSC conflict actions is also an area ripe for future research. It would also be useful to know if other post-conflict management tools, such as blockades, sanctions and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) are more or less impactful when paired with the historical UNSC sentiment towards conflict actors.

Naming names  85

NOTES 1.

2.

3.

4. 5.

6. 7. 8.

For our purposes, we define sentiment following the standard Cambridge Dictionary (2022) definition of ‘a thought, opinion, or idea based on a feeling about a situation, or a way of thinking about something.’ We thank Paul Diehl for suggesting the use of this term for the purpose of describing such language in our resolution dataset. The presence or lack of sentiment in some conflicts (and not others) and towards some actors (but not others) in similar situations may, however, be an indication of bias as denoted by shared preferences for a particular conflict outcome as defined by Kydd (2003). In this chapter, we do not focus on whether the presence or absence of sentiment is biased towards any particular conflict actor. Equally important to the UN’s legal authority in conflict management is Chapter VI, which provides the foundation for the UNSC to investigate issues having the potential to endanger the maintenance of international peace and to recommend courses of action to peacefully settle disputes. However, none of resolutions make direct reference to Chapter VI. Moreover, Chapter VI does not lay out in explicit terms the tools available to the UNSC in managing conflict – as found in Chapter VII. Thus, our focus turns to Chapter VII in this chapter. See also Chapter 2 (Helms) in this Handbook. In addition, the UNSC often references powerful UN mandates, such as its “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine that calls for the protection of civilians in war or its burgeoning mandates to aid children and protect women from sexual violence. On the relevance of multiple missions, see Chapter 7 (Dorussen) and, on UN versus non-UN missions, see Chapter 8 (Bara) in this Handbook. To access this dataset, including a codebook describing its methodology and variables, go to https://​ dataverse​.harvard​.edu/​dataverse/​unscresolutions. For full details on our methodology in recording sentiment, please view our codebook at https://​ dataverse​.harvard​.edu/​dataverse/​unscresolutions. Of course, this assumes that such mediators seek to ‘help the parties reach an acceptable outcome’ (Bercovitch 1991, p. 3) and are not a disputant themselves.

REFERENCES Allen, Susan H. and Amy T. Yuen (2014), ‘The Politics of Peacekeeping: UN Security Council Oversight Across Peacekeeping Missions’, International Studies Quarterly, 58 (3), 621–32. Barnett, Michael and Thomas G. Weiss (2008), ‘Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present’, in Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (eds), Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, and Ethics, Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press, pp. 1–48. Beardsley, Kyle (2013), ‘The UN at the Peacemaking-Peacebuilding Nexus’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 30 (4), 369–86. Beardsley, Kyle and Holger Schmidt (2012), ‘Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945–2002’, International Studies Quarterly, 56 (1), 33–49. Bellamy, Alex J. (2011), ‘The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’, International Affairs, 87 (4), 825–50. Benson, Michelle and Jacob D. Kathman (2014), ‘United Nations Bias and Force Commitments in Civil Conflicts’, Journal of Politics, 76 (2), 350–63. Benson, Michelle and Nil S. Satana, (2008), ‘Choosing Sides: UN Resolutions and Non-Neutrality’, in Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner (eds), International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings, New York, NY, USA: Taylor and Francis, pp. 135–52. Benson, Michelle and Colin Tucker (2022), ‘The Importance of UN Security Council Resolutions in Peacekeeping Operations’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, accessed 1 March 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​ 10​.1177/​00220027211044205. Bercovitch, Jacob (1991), ‘International Mediation’, Journal of Peace Research, 28 (1), 3–6. Binder, Martin (2015), ‘Paths to Intervention: What Explains the UN’s Selective Response to Humanitarian Crises?’, Journal of Peace Research, 52 (6), 712–26.

86  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Bove, Vincenzo and Leandro Elia (2011), ‘Supplying Peace: Participation in and Troop Contribution to Peacekeeping Missions’, Journal of Peace Research, 48 (6), 699–714. Castles, Alex C. (1968), ‘Legal Status of UN Resolutions’, Adelaide Law Review, 3 (1), 68–83. Cil, Deniz, Hanne Fjelde, Lisa Hultman, and Desirée Nilsson (2020), ‘Mapping Blue Helmets: Introducing the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 257 (2), 360–70. Cockayne, James, Christoph Mikulaschek, and Chris Perry (2010), ‘The United Nations Security Council and Civil War: First Insights from a New Dataset’, International Peace Institute, accessed 1 March 2022 at https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​publications/​ipi​_rpt​_unsc​_and​_civil​_war​ _epub​.pdf. de Jonge Oudraat, Chantal (1996), ‘The United Nations and Internal Conflict’, in Michael E. Brown (ed.), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, pp. 489–536. Diehl, Paul F. (1993), International Peacekeeping, Baltimore, MD, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. Diehl, Paul F. (2008), Peace Operations, Cambridge, MA, USA: Polity Press. Diehl, Paul F. and Alexandru Balas (2014), Peace Operations, 2nd edition, New York, NY, USA: Wiley Press. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis (2006), Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Favretto, Katja (2009), ‘Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Mediation, Coercion, and Bias’, American Political Science Review, 103 (2), 248–63. Fearon, James D. (1995), ‘Rationalist Explanations for War’, International Organization, 49 (3), 379–414. Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman, and Desirée Nilsson (2019), ‘Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians’, International Organization, 73 (1), 103–31. Fortna, V. Page (2004), ‘Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects’, World Politics, 56 (4), 481–519. Fortna, V. Page (2008a), Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Fortna, V. Page (2008b), ‘Peacekeeping and Democratization’, in Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peace-building, New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39–79. Gent, Stephen E. and Megan Shannon (2011), ‘Bias and the Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict Management Mechanisms’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 28 (2), 124–44. Gilligan, Michael J. and Ernest J. Sergenti (2008), ‘Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference’, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 3 (2), 89–122. Gilligan, Michael J. and Stephen J. Stedman (2003), ‘Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?’, International Studies Review, 5 (4), 37–52. Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002), ‘Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 39 (5), 615–37. Gruenberg, Justin (2009), ‘An Analysis of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions: Are All Countries Treated Equally?’, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 41, 469–511. Heldt, Birger and Peter Wallensteen (2007), ‘Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2004’, 3rd edition, Folke Bernadotte Academy Publications, accessed 1 March 2022 at https://​papers​.ssrn​.com/​sol3/​papers​.cfm​?abstract​_id​=​1899505. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2013), ‘United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil Wars’, American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 875–91. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2014), ‘Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting’, American Political Science Review, 108 (4), 737–53. Johansson, Karin and Lisa Hultman (2019), ‘UN Peacekeeping and Protection from Sexual Violence’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (7), 1651–81. Kathman, Jacob D. and Michelle Benson (2019), ‘Cut Short? United Nations Peacekeeping and Civil War Duration to Negotiated Settlements’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (7), 1601–29. Kathman, Jacob D. and Reed M. Wood (2016), ‘Stopping the Killing During the “Peace”: Peacekeeping and the Severity of Postconflict Civilian Victimization’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 12 (2), 149–69.

Naming names  87 Kuziemko, Ilyana and Eric Werker (2006), ‘How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations’, Journal of Political Economy, 114 (5), 905–30. Kydd, Andrew (2003), ‘Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation’, American Journal of Political Science, 47 (4), 597–611. Kydd, Andrew (2006), ‘When Can Mediators Build Trust?’, American Political Science Review, 100 (3), 449–62. Mullenbach, Mark J. (2005), ‘Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions’, International Studies Quarterly, 49 (3), 529–55. Regan, Patrick M. (2002), ‘Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46 (1), 55–73. Savun, Buruc (2008), ‘Information, Bias, and Mediation Success’, International Studies Quarterly, 52 (1), 25–47. Svensson, Isak (2007), ‘Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace’, Journal of Peace Research, 44 (2), 177–94. Svensson, Isak (2009), ‘Who Brings Which Peace? Neutral Versus Biased Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 (3), 446–69. UN (1945), ‘Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice’, accessed 1 March 2022 at https://​www​.un​.org/​en/​about​-us/​un​-charter. UN Peacekeeping Operations (2008), ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and peacekeeping​ .un​ .org/​ en/​ Guidelines – “Capstone Doctrine”’, accessed 1 March 2022 at https://​ principles​-of​-peacekeeping. UN Security Council (2014), ‘Resolution 2164’, S/RES/2164, 25 June, accessed 1 March 2022 at https://​ digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​773580​?ln​=​en. Voeten, Erik (2001), ‘Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action’, American Political Science Review, 95 (4), 845–59. Zhongying, Pang (2005), ‘China’s Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping, 12 (1), 87–104. Ziring, Lawrence, Robert Edwon Riggs, and Jack C. Plano (2005), The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics, Belmont, CA, USA: Cengage Learning.

7. Mediation, political missions, and peacekeeping Han Dorussen

INTRODUCTION Peacekeeping is rarely, if ever, the “only game in town.” The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, known as the “Brahimi Report” (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000), identified the need for integration of various peacekeeping tasks and agencies surrounding UN peacekeeping as key to improve peacekeeping effectiveness. At the start of the High-Level Debate on Peacekeeping in 2018, UN Secretary General Guterres emphasized the importance of political engagement to push for an inclusive peace process alongside and in support of peacekeeping missions. The Action for Peacekeeping (A4P and its follow-up A4P+) highlights the primacy of politics and the importance of a ‘collective coherence behind a political strategy.’ Here, peacekeeping operations are portrayed as a convening power for the many actors, ‘including regional organizations, Member States, international financial institutions, and UN agencies, funds and programmes’1 that support and shape a country’s political trajectory. Improved internal strategic and operational coherence is presented as a goal in tandem with increased political coherence with external partners. There is indeed a broad spectrum of activities and actors that operate either under the umbrella of or alongside peacekeeping operations and that try to shape a country’s conflict resolution trajectory. Peacekeeping is part of a political process commonly involving political mediation by external parties, with the UN Security Council and the Secretary General – and their political envoys – often taking center stage. Further, the boundaries between peacemaking, -keeping, and -building have become increasingly blurred – as reflected in the term integrated peacekeeping – and UN peacekeeping operations involve an ever-increasing set of mandates (Blair et al. 2021; Di Salvatore et al. 2022) and missions (Diehl and Druckman 2018). UN peacekeeping operations encompass military, police and civilian components each tasked with specific tasks. The mandates of UN peacekeepers further overlap with activities of other humanitarian UN agencies, such as UNHCR for refugee care, OCHA for humanitarian assistance, UNDP and UNICEF for development, as well as human rights and political affairs offices. Finally, UN peacekeeping and political missions commonly operate alongside non-UN interventions, including regional operations deployed by the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS), or NATO-ISAF in Afghanistan. Individual countries, such as France in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), and even private mercenaries, such as the Russian-backed Wagner group in CAR and Libya, have become pertinent actors that can either align with (or distance themselves from) UN peacekeeping operations.2 It has thus become increasingly relevant – and difficult – to distinguish political from peacekeeping missions, and a particular issue is that there is no consensus on key terminology. The UN defines its special political missions as ‘civilian missions that are deployed for a limited 88

Mediation, political missions, and peacekeeping  89 duration to support Member States in good offices, conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding. They have been grouped in three main categories, or clusters, namely, special envoys; sanctions panels and monitoring groups; and field-based missions’ (UN Secretary General 2015). Below, I will largely follow the UN definition of political missions, but also use the term to include diplomatic initiatives by other international organizations and countries. The distinction between civilian-led political missions and military-led peacekeeping missions is particularly helpful, but it is important to remain aware of the relevance of civilian-led elements of peacekeeping, such as civil affairs, as well as the fundamentally political mandates commonly assigned to peacekeeping operations, for example, mediating local conflicts. The recognition that peacekeeping is not a unitary treatment taking place in a vacuum not only has important policy implications but is also highly relevant for peacekeeping research. Firstly, it suggests several germane research questions: How to measure the internal strategic and operational coherence and to evaluate its impact, if any, on peacekeeping effectiveness (Rietjens and Ruffa 2019; Blair et al. 2021; Druckman et al. 2022)? Are the activities of peacekeepers and other external actors indeed complementary? Are there relevant temporal and spatial dynamics to the division of labor? How to understand the “handing over” between different types of missions, for example, from peacekeeping to political missions, or from special political missions to UN country teams (Sarfati 2021)? To summarize, it becomes relevant to understand who does what, where, and when in peacekeeping. Secondly, there are methodological implications. Research on peacekeeping typically uses the deployment of a peacekeeping operation (PKO) as the key independent variable ignoring the notable variation in what is actually measured. Models for peacekeeping effectiveness generally do not – or at best incompletely – control for the presence of other actors, including non-UN peacekeeping forces, and thus risk omitted variable bias. The baseline for comparison is commonly a broad and poorly understood reference category of “no peacekeeping” (Dorussen et al. 2022, p. 43). Yet simply including “other” activities or actors is insufficient since it still ignores important interdependencies, for example, when a peacekeeping mission is deployed as part of a mediated political agreement where future deployment made the agreement possible (Kathman and Benson 2019), while at the same time the terms of the agreement influence how likely the peacekeeping operation is to succeed (Joshi and Quinn 2015; DeRouen and Chowdhury 2018). The remainder of this chapter starts by reviewing existing literature that recognizes that peacekeeping operations do not take place in a vacuum. The discussion focuses on three relevant dimensions: (1) identification of initiatives relevant to peacekeeping, (2) the sequencing of the initiatives, and (3) the coordination (or integration) of these initiatives within the UN and/or across different actors and agencies. Apart from recognizing different relevant actors, research has debated the complementarity of their relevant efforts to attain and sustain peace. Here, some key insights are illustrated using the United Nations Peace Initiatives (UNPI) data (Dorussen and Clayton 2018; Clayton et al. 2021; Dorussen et al. 2022). The chapter concludes with outlines for future research.

IDENTIFYING MULTIPLE MISSIONS It is commonly recognized that peacekeeping mandates have evolved and arguably expanded over time (for example, see data from Di Salvatore et al. 2022). Examining the peacekeeping

90  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Rietjens and Ruffa (2019) note that a broad set of mandates combined with multinational involvement provides challenges to mission coherence. Blair et al. (2021) similarly observe that mandate fragmentation undermines mandate implementation. The political dimension of peacekeeping has also been noted for some time, and UN envoys and mediators have typically been involved in reaching political agreements that have paved the way for the deployment of peacekeepers. Rather than starting with the (UN) peacekeeping operation as the unit of observation, several scholars have found it helpful to focus on the array of initiatives that broadly fall under the UN Charter to “maintain international peace and security” and to define political and peacekeeping missions accordingly. Table 7.1 summarizes different typologies of initiatives based on their activities, or strategies towards conflict resolution. Frazier and Dixon (2006, pp. 394–7) identify verbal appeals to an end of violence and offers to mediate as the low-cost forms of political engagement. Diehl et al. (1996) and Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) similarly distinguish between passive and active diplomacy. As instances of active diplomacy, Clayton et al. (2021, p. 168) accordingly define diplomatic missions as ‘individuals, groups, or bodies that aim to assist the belligerent parties in resolving their incompatibility through negotiation or dialogue’ which at the UN include special and personal envoys, advisers, and representatives to the Secretary General, mediators and good offices. Active diplomatic initiatives further include inquiries and fact-finding missions, for example, sanctions monitoring teams and panels of experts, which Clayton et al. (2021, p. 169) include among technocratic missions. Political-development missions are in-country operations that support, strengthen, and develop the political and governance capabilities of a state. Political-development or peacebuilding missions are mandated to provide, among others, temporary administration, humanitarian assistance, election monitoring, disarmament inspection, and repatriation (Frazier and Dixon 2006). Because diplomatic, technocratic, and political-development missions rely primarily on civilian personnel, they are all examples of political missions. Political missions are commonly – although not exclusively – managed by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), whereas UN peacekeeping missions fall under the remit of UN Department of Peace Operations (UN DPO).3 Peacekeeping operations are defined by their more military presence and either observe or physically manage the interactions between hostile armed factions and provide humanitarian protection. In Figure 7.1 based on the UNPI data, the total number of different types of political missions are stacked and contrasted with the number of peacekeeping missions (indicated by a line). Figure 7.1 shows that UN political missions have always outnumbered peacekeeping missions, initially because of the large number of technocratic missions created following the establishment of the Special Committee on Decolonization in 1961. Starting in the mid-1980s and continuing in the post-Cold War period, the number of political missions has grown dramatically, while the number of peacekeeping missions has remained relatively stable after an initial jump from about 10 to 20 operations. The number of diplomatic and political-development missions has exceeded the number of peacekeeping missions since 2005, which shows the increasing importance given by the UN to its political initiatives. Typically, missions are classified based on their most prominent mandate while recognizing that peacekeeping operations commonly also develop diplomatic initiatives, provide technical and administrative expertise, as well as monitor developments. Proposing an alternative conceptualization, Diehl and Druckman (2018, p. 30) disaggregate operations into multiple missions, each defined by ‘coherent categories of tasks designed to achieve given purposes or

administration/

monitoring, disarmament inspection, repatriation

deployment

Military involvement

Inter-positionary peacekeeping, humanitarian protection

Source: Adapted from Dorussen et al. (2022, p. 29).

Operational

involvement

demobilization monitoring, mine sweeping

deployment

Military

Operational

deployment

Military observation, preventive peacekeeping,

assistance

Civil

Temporary administration, humanitarian assistance, election

Operational

Enforcement

Peacekeeping

Observer mission

deployment

administration/ assistance

Sanctions Observer mission

– Operational

–

–

Civil

–

Active diplomacy

Sanctions

process

Legal/judicial

diplomacy

approaches

Active diplomacy

Boundary demarcation

Arbitration, judicial settlement, war crimes tribunals

Active

Diplomatic

diplomacy

approaches

Inquiry/fact finding

Active

Diplomatic

Good offices, mediation, conciliation

Passive diplomacy

Verbal

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping

development

Political

Technocratic

Technocratic

Technocratic

Technocratic

Diplomatic

High

High

Medium

Medium

–

–

Low/medium

Low/medium

Low

4

4

3

3

–

–

2

2

1

Schmidt 2012)

1996) –

2021)

2022)

(Beardsley and

(Diehl et al.

to facilitate negotiations or mediate

Appeals to ceasefire, negotiations, or troop withdrawal; offer

2006) Passive diplomacy

(Dorussen et

(Melin 2015)

(Owsiak 2015;

4

4

3

2

2

2

2

1

–

al. 2022)

Escalation

Escalation

Costliness

(Dorussen et al.

Type of UN

Type of mission

(Frazier and Dixon intervention involvement

Type of UN

Overall category

(Frazier and Dixon 2006)

Political and peacekeeping missions

Specific strategy

Table 7.1

Mediation, political missions, and peacekeeping  91

92  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations

Source: Clayton et al. (2021), with thanks to Delfi Dorussen for research assistance.

Figure 7.1

Number of diplomatic, technocratic, political development, and peacekeeping missions per year

mandates.’ They observe the increased complexity of peacekeeping operations: ‘In the cold war period […], peace operations had an average of 2.11 missions, whereas post-cold war operations […] had a mean of 4.88 missions’ (Diehl and Druckman 2018, p. 32).4 Diehl et al. (1996), Beardsley and Schmidt (2012), and the UNPI data (Clayton et al. 2021; Dorussen et al. 2022) code exclusively UN-led initiatives. Yet several studies collate information on non-UN political and peacekeeping missions; for example, mediation efforts are coded in the International Conflict Management data (Bercovitch et al. 1991), the Civil War Mediation data (DeRouen et al. 2011), while the Managing Intrastate Low-level Conflict (MILC) (Melander et al. 2009) and the Managing Intrastate Conflict (MIC) (Melander and von Uexkull 2011) code a wide variety of third-party interventions. Heldt and Wallensteen (2007), SIPRI (n.d.) and Bara and Hultman (2020) present and analyze data on peacekeeping missions by actors other than the UN, but still authorized by the UN Security Council.5

SEQUENCING POLITICAL AND PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS Political and peacekeeping missions often represent distinct but interdependent initiatives as part of a conflict management trajectory (Owsiak 2014; 2015; 2021). As Diehl and Regan (2015) argue, they can be seen as evolving responses to ongoing hostilities and/or represent distinct approaches to different phases of a conflict. For example, initial political approaches can set the scene for future operations and allow for learning about what initiatives are most suitable in the context of a specific conflict. Accordingly, political missions typically aim to facilitate (mediate) an agreement that ends ongoing hostilities, and – as their name suggests, peacekeeping operations could then be deployed to “keep the peace.” In practice, the sequenc-

Mediation, political missions, and peacekeeping  93 ing of different types of missions is less straightforward since peacekeepers are commonly deployed while fighting is ongoing or has reignited after a period of relative calm. In these cases, mediation attempts to reach a peace agreement may follow – or continue after – the deployment of peacekeepers (see also Figure 7.2 below). It is well established that peacekeepers tend to be deployed to so-called “hard cases” (de Jonge Oudraat 1996; Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017). Contrasting civil wars without or with the deployment of peacekeepers, the latter tend to be longer lasting and to have witnessed more violence. It is also the case that political missions are – at least initially – typically deployed to “easier” cases but this is partly because very few conflicts do not witness any external involvement at all. Therefore, a more germane question is whether more extensive engagement correlates with the severity of the conflict. To determine the level of engagement of different initiatives, Melin (2011), Owsiak (2014; 2015; 2021), and Dorussen et al. (2022) rank mission types based on their relative costs. As shown in Table 7.1, they all broadly agree that diplomatic, technocratic, political-development, and peacekeeping missions rank from least to most costly. Melin (2015) identifies three mechanisms to explain escalation of international conflict management. Firstly, escalation can be a response to the failure of early initiatives. Owsiak (2015, p. 57) similarly focuses on the information that is revealed by each intervention where failure may signal the need to scale up the effort made. Aduda (2019) demonstrates that when earlier mediation attempts have failed, new mediation initiatives not only become less likely but also less likely to succeed. However, successful earlier initiatives may also lead to more extensive involvement since they may show what more the international community could be doing. Escalation here partly results from an assumed preference of third parties to ‘want peace for the lowest possible price’ (Owsiak 2014, p. 66; see also Owsiak 2021). Initially, political missions are indeed more likely when conflicts have not (yet) escalated, and more time has passed since a previous confrontation (Dorussen et al. 2022). Shifts in the conflict dynamics provide a second mechanism; basically, escalation in conflict management can be a response to increased hostilities providing more urgency, or alternatively, because a temporary lull in the fighting may create opportunities for successful intervention. Thirdly, pre-existing and evolving relationships with the disputants may encourage third parties to escalate their attempts to resolve the conflict. ‘A willingness to try multiple intervention techniques reveals information about the third-party commitment to resolving the conflict, as third parties with a strong desire to peacefully resolve a conflict are more willing to employ multiple intervention techniques’ (Melin 2015, p. 30). Clearly, third parties do not randomly intervene in conflict; rather, ‘involvement is the result of actors making strategic decisions based on their anticipation of the consequences of those decisions’ (Melin 2011, p. 693). This also means that earlier involvement can create future commitments; for example, when the UN successfully mediates a peace agreement, it will make them more likely to deploy a peacekeeping operation (Tiernay 2013). Focusing on political and peacekeeping missions, Dorussen et al. (2022) find evidence for an “escalatory logic,” meaning that it is more likely that a more extensive (that is, costly) follow-up mission will be deployed when less costly interventions fail to end the conflict. Their analysis shows that ‘[l]ess costly missions tend to set the framework and requirements for costlier efforts in the future’ (Dorussen et al. 2022, p. 44). Diplomatic initiatives tend to be the starting point of UN interventions, and they increase the probability of subsequent technocratic or political-development missions.6 Technocratic missions make subsequent

94  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations political-development missions more likely. Diplomatic initiatives also make it more likely that there will be a follow-up peacekeeping mission, but there is no evidence that the same is true for technocratic or political-development missions.7 Although Dorussen et al. (2022) demonstrate the internal dynamics of escalation, their research sheds little light on what external factors lead to escalation. Much less is known about de-escalation processes; for example, Dorussen et al. (2022, p. 42) find that peacekeeping missions are unlikely to lead to subsequent political missions, which would have shown de-escalation. Sarfati (2021, p. 6) argues that the “drawdown” of political and peacekeeping missions requires ‘a common understanding of the “end state”— the conditions that must be met in order for the mission to leave.’ Sarfati also highlights that in their transition to UN Country Team, the civilian-led political missions are even more reliant on local or regional providers to solidify any gains and to avoid a relapse into political insecurity.8 Interestingly, Owsiak (2021, p. 51) identifies mediation as a threshold beyond which most third countries are unwilling to take on (and sustain) more costly interventions. These findings would suggest a tendency towards de-escalation of intervention.

INTERDEPENDENCIES BETWEEN POLITICAL AND PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS Since conflict management commonly involves multiple and interlinked initiatives, a key concern is how different initiatives may contribute to the overall resolution of a conflict or whether they possibly undermine each other. Are different initiatives complements or substitutes? Here, most attention has been paid to possible spillover effects between mediation and peacekeeping. Since peacekeepers are also deployed to conflicts where parties have yet to reach a negotiated settlement, or any provisional agreement has broken down while they are deployed, it becomes germane to question how peacekeeping may assist mediation attempts but also how mediation may support peacekeeping. At the same time, mediation is not the only form of conflict management applied. So far, there has been little research on the effectiveness of technocratic and political development missions, or other initiatives such as humanitarian interventions by non-state actors. Does peacekeeping support mediation?  The promise to deploy peacekeepers after a peace agreement is reached can help to address the time inconsistency problem of mediation (Beardsley 2008) and allow belligerents to commit to a peace agreement (Walter 2001). In contrast, Greig and Diehl (2005) consider the possible impact of the deployment of peacekeepers before an agreement is in place, and they outline several mechanisms by which peacekeeping may help or hinder mediators in their efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. They identify as a key concern that peacekeeping prolongs a military stalemate and thus limits the flow of credible information about the relative strength of belligerents. A stalemate with low-level hostilities also reduces the urgency of reaching an agreement not only for parties directly involved in the conflict but also for third parties.9 Grieg and Diehl’s (2005) empirical analysis of peacekeeping and mediation in interstate wars and crises finds indeed that peacekeeping makes it less likely that a negotiated settlement is reached.10 The same conclusions do not necessarily hold for intrastate conflicts (or civil wars). Kathman and Benson (2019) find that the deployment of peacekeepers is associated with reaching a negotiated – that is, generally mediated – settlement more quickly. In contrast to

Mediation, political missions, and peacekeeping  95 interstate wars, developments on the battlefield may well provide less useful information in intrastate conflicts, which often take the form of wars of attrition with civilians as much targets as soldiers (see Clayton and Dorussen 2021, pp. 5–6). Kathman and Benson (2019, p. 1601) argue that peacekeepers support mediation because they ‘increase the costs of combat, improve information sharing between belligerents, and provide security guarantees.’ Clayton and Dorussen (2021) similarly argue that peacekeepers help mediation attempts by stabilizing the situation on the battlefield. Peacekeepers further provide valuable information in support of mediation attempts. Peacekeeping missions monitor the activities of (former) belligerents and report whether they are in line with any preliminary agreement, for example whether a ceasefire holds. The field reports of peacekeeping operations contextualize these observations and provide valuable information to the UN Secretary General and support the work of envoys, diplomats, and good offices. Does mediation support peacekeeping?  There is also evidence that mediators not only set the stage for peacekeeping missions, but that ongoing political engagement is important for effective peacekeeping. Bearsdley et al. (2019) find that peacekeeping reduces the number of battlefield casualties also in ongoing intrastate conflicts even if they do not end the war. Crucially, they observe that ‘mediation and peacekeeping have a conditional effect wherein the presence of both leads to a greater reduction in battlefield fatalities. […] this interaction is driven primarily by mediation and peacekeeping occurring simultaneously rather than by a sequencing in which mediation precedes peacekeepers’ (Beardsley et al. 2019, p. 1684). Diplomatic initiatives matter because they reduce barriers to bargaining where even partial or incomplete agreements reduce the number of armed groups actively engaged in combat. Joshi and Quinn (2015) and DeRouen and Chowdhury (2018) also examine the interaction of peacekeeping and mediation and note their complementarity in avoiding the recurrence of civil wars and decreasing the amount of violence post-agreement. Clayton and Dorussen (2021) outline several ways in which continuing political engagement of third parties supports ongoing peacekeeping missions. Effective peacekeeping relies on progress in the broader political process which is commonly facilitated by mediators. UN diplomatic initiatives, such as the good offices of the UN Secretary General, also ensure that the UN peacekeeping mission is represented at the highest levels of power in a country. UN diplomats can make sure that the concerns of peacekeepers are communicated to the central government and key rebel leaders. Empirically, Clayton and Dorussen (2021) examine the relative contribution of mediation and peacekeeping on halting hostilities for the period since the Second World War and considering both inter- and intrastate wars. They report largely complementary effects of peacekeeping and mediation, where mediation, however, is more important for halting hostilities while peacekeeping on its own only has a minimal effect. For the post-Cold War period, they find support for the ability of transformative peacekeeping missions to increase the effectiveness of mediation in halting hostilities.

AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON POLITICAL MISSIONS AND PEACEKEEPING Third parties regularly attempt to intervene in conflict situations, and the interdependencies between these initiatives are increasingly recognized. Research has benefited from conceptualizing conflict resolution as “trajectories” (Owsiak 2014; 2015; 2021), from identifying

96  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations missions as interrelated units of which peacekeeping operations are composed (Diehl and Druckman 2018), and from better data on the full spectrum of political initiatives taking place alongside peacekeeping (Melander and von Uexkull 2011; Dorussen et al. 2022). As discussed above, this has allowed for a better understanding of (a) the selection of specific initiatives – when are political missions rather than peacekeeping missions deployed? When is the UN the primary actor and when are individual countries or regional organization the primary actors? – (b) the sequencing of different initiatives in particular as they relate to their relative costs and learning, and (c) the complementarity of different initiatives. At the same time, several key questions remain largely unanswered. So far, research has focused primarily on factors endogenous to political and peacekeeping missions to explain their selection, with most attention given to the relative costs of different types of missions (Melin 2011; 2015; Owsiak 2021). For example, Dorussen et al. (2022) identify relative costs based on costliness of securing authorization of a particular mission, the costs involved in funding and supplying a mission, and the relative difficulties of obtaining consent from the host country. Owsiak (2021, pp. 34–46) similarly focuses on costs to explain the selection of a type of mission assuming a preference for low-cost missions as well as an upper threshold on the costs that parties are willing to take on. Likewise, “escalation” towards more costly missions is explained mainly endogenously, namely as resulting from an initial decision to engage with a particular conflict. It remains largely unclear what, if any, the exogenous determinants of escalation are. Owsiak (2021, pp. 49–50) finds no evidence for learning from previous failure. Dorussen et al. (2022) examine escalation of conflict management initiatives while the conflict lasts, but do not find any support for other exogenous factors such as previous experience with war or the number of years since the last conflict. Figure 7.2 shows that political and peacekeeping missions are regularly deployed prior to the onset of hostilities, but also during conflict and following the end of fighting. This simple observation belies any straightforward linear model of how missions evolve – for example, that peacekeeping would necessarily follow from diplomatic initiatives. At the same time, it highlights the importance of understanding what exogenous factors could explain the selection and sequencing of different initiatives. Owsiak et al. (2021, p. 6) identify as possible factors the features of a conflict within which multiple initiatives are applied, temporal factors and conflict dynamics, and the impact of spatial and temporal interdependencies within the external environment on the strategic choices made by (potential) interveners. So far, little progress has been made in identifying what are the main empirical determinants for selection and sequencing of missions. Regarding the effectiveness of conflict management, most attention has been paid to the effectiveness of either mediation or peacekeeping, or (but less commonly) on possible complementarity between mediation and peacekeeping. Even within this quite limited scope for research, several issues remain undecided. First of all, what are suitable indicators of the effectiveness of diplomatic initiatives and peacekeeping? Understandably, research on mediation effectiveness has paid most attention to agreement on a negotiated solution (for example, Greig and Diehl 2005; Kathman and Benson 2019), while peacekeeping effectiveness has primarily evaluated hostilities (Beardsley et al. 2019) or conflict recurrence (Fortna 2004; Joshi and Quinn 2015; DeRouen and Chowdhury 2018). Notably, however, little attention has been paid to the effectiveness of diplomatic initiatives, such as mediation, to protect civilians, which is a key indicator of peacekeeping effectiveness (Hultman et al. 2013; 2014; Kathman and Wood 2016) but would seem equally relevant for mediation. Clayton and Dorussen (2021,

Mediation, political missions, and peacekeeping  97

Source: Clayton et al. (2021), with thanks to Delfi Dorussen for research assistance.

Figure 7.2

Deployment of political and peacekeeping missions before, during and after conflict

p. 3) justify their choice for stopping of fighting as indicator for peacekeeping and mediation effectiveness as follows: Negotiated settlement and conflict recurrence not only focus on different (but related) aspects of ‘stopping the fighting’, but also suggest distinct theoretical mechanisms. Settlements are more directly associated with mediation, while peace duration is more associated with peacekeeping. Since we are analyzing the relative contributions of mediation and peacekeeping, it is appropriate to select a dependent variable to which both mediation and peacekeeping may contribute without giving an obvious primacy to one over the other.

Regardless, it remains eminently reasonable to take an alternative approach. Useful indicators of effectiveness may follow from the specific mandate given to mediators or peacekeepers (Di Salvatore et al. 2022) where distinguishing between missions, related to specific mandates, within an operation would seem appropriate (Diehl and Druckman 2018). Indicators can also vary depending on different stages of the conflict, for example, successful initial mediation may secure a ceasefire and possibly humanitarian access, with subsequent interventions focused on securing (and implementing) a comprehensive peace agreement. Similarly, protection of civilians against one-sided violence from rebels or government can indicate peacekeeping success even while fighting is ongoing (Hultman et al. 2013; 2014), while protection against criminal violence is a relevant indicator if open hostilities have ceased (Di Salvatore 2019). Peaceful political transition via elections can indicate success for peacekeeping as well as diplomatic missions.11 Apart from mediation, very little is known about the effectiveness of political missions, such as technocratic and political-development missions, or even what would constitute appropriate and comparable indicators of mission effectiveness in these cases. For example,

98  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations the UN Verification Mission in Colombia is a special political mission mandated to assist the Colombian government in the implementation of the peace agreement with FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) with a special focus on the demobilization and reintegration of former rebel combatants, but also with a more general remit to provide security and protection to communities most affected by the conflict, or to advance the so-called “territorial peace” addressing socioeconomic insecurity in conflict-affected regions.12 So far, research has mainly examined multiple missions either in the context of multiple UN missions with a specific peace-and-security mandate, or collaboration between UN missions and peacekeeping missions from regional organizations, in particular the African Union, as seen as a form of so-called “hybrid peacekeeping.”13 There remain, however, important avenues for further research on the interdependencies between multiple missions. Firstly, UN missions commonly operate alongside interventions by (groups of) countries where the UN is very much a minor party; for example, the UN Assistance Mission (UNAMA) and Personal Envoy of the Secretary General for Afghanistan and Regional Issues, operating alongside the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The decision of individual countries to intervene militarily in advance of or alongside peacekeeping forces – for example, the USA in Haiti, Australia in Timor-Leste, the UK in Liberia, and France in Mali and CAR – also shapes the specific contributions that peacekeeping forces can make (Howard 2019). Secondly, UN political and peacekeeping missions regularly operate alongside humanitarian organizations. The concept of “integrated peacekeeping” as advocated in the Capstone Doctrine (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2008, p. 14) emphasizes the need to coordinate activities from a UN peace and security mandate (the ‘black’ UN) with the developmental and humanitarian work of UN missions (the ‘blue’ UN). Humanitarian agencies, moreover, encompass many international and local non-governmental organizations, among them long-established and highly respected organizations such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The relation between the UN and humanitarian agencies has received more attention recently. From a policy perspective, several scholars (for example, Abiew and Keating 1999; Eckroth 2010; Metcalfe 2012) discuss the continued relevance of the so-called “principle of distinction.” Framing peacekeeping as part of broader humanitarian and developmental intervention, Autesserre (2014; 2019) provides a pessimistic assessment of the contribution peacekeepers make to ending wars. Hoelscher et al. (2017) and Zhang and Dorussen (2022) explore the possible contributions of peacekeepers to the assistance provided by humanitarian agencies. The findings from these comparative analyses are rather inconclusive. Hoelscher et al. (2017, p. 556) find that peacekeeping operations may well increase attacks on humanitarian aid workers, even after controlling for plausible selection effects. Zhang and Dorussen (2022), however, note that humanitarian aid in itself leads to more violence against civilians but report that peacekeeping moderates these conflict-enhancing effects. To summarize, understanding peacekeeping as only one element of a conflict management process that is fundamentally political radically modifies how to approach the central question, namely, how peacekeeping contributes to conflict resolution. Rather than having an absolute effect, peacekeeping is most likely to make a relative contribution that is complementary to and interdependent with other efforts. Research so far has started to unpack the “black box” of conflict management, but the study of multiple missions still faces important open questions.

Mediation, political missions, and peacekeeping  99

NOTES 1. See https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​a4p​_background​_paper​.pdf (accessed 30 September 2021). 2. The various elements of multiple missions are also discussed in other chapters in this Handbook; for example, Chapter 5 (Bove et al.) on the composition of PKOs, Chapter 8 (Bara) on UN and non-UN PKOs, and Chapter 25 (Diehl) on the conceptual distinction between “missions” and “operations.” 3. UN DPPA manages Special Political Missions (SPMs) when they are field offices engaged in conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding, and advises traveling envoys and special advisors to the Secretary General; see https://​dppa​.un​.org/​en/​dppa​-around​-world (accessed 3 March 2022). 4. Chapter 25 (Diehl) provides a more detailed discussion of multiple missions as distinct from multiple operations. 5. See also Chapter 8 (Bara) in this Handbook. 6. Heldt (2013) examines different diplomatic initiatives, such as mediation, direct talks, and good offices, but fails to observe a trajectory or clear sequence. His conclusion is that peacemaking processes tend to be largely uncoordinated. 7. Blair et al. (2021) consider peacebuilding tasks as separate from security tasks within peacekeeping operations. They find that mandate fragmentation as well as ongoing violence undermines peacebuilding but not necessarily the implementation of security tasks. This suggests that also within a peacekeeping operation, security tasks are being prioritized (Blair et al. 2021, pp. 4–5). 8. See Chapter 24 (Caplan et al.) in this Handbook on the conclusion of peacekeeping missions. 9. The future deployment of peacekeepers can address the time inconsistency problem of mediation (Beardsley 2008) and allow belligerents to commit to a peace agreement (Walter 2001). 10. Smith and Stam (2003) deduce that the information that mediators and peacekeepers have generally does not help belligerents to resolve their conflict. Under rather restrictive conditions, however, mediators and peacekeepers may be able to provide incentives or coerce belligerents to halt hostilities. 11. See also Chapter 20 (Di Salvatore) and Chapter 16 (Smidt) in this Handbook. 12. See https://​dppa​.un​.org/​en/​mission/​un​-verification​-mission​-colombia (accessed 7 March 2022). 13. For example, see Chapter 8 (Bara) in this Handbook.

REFERENCES Abiew, Francis K. and Tom Keating (1999), ‘NGOs and UN peacekeeping operations: strange bedfellows’, International Peacekeeping, 6 (2), 89–111. Aduda, Levke (2019), ‘Failed agreements and their impact on subsequent mediation onset and success in intrastate conflicts’, International Interactions, 45 (5), 893–916. Autesserre, Séverine (2014), Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and Everyday Politics of International Interventions, New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Autesserre, Séverine (2019), ‘The crisis of peacekeeping: why the UN can’t end wars’, Foreign Affairs, 98 (1), accessed 23 March 2022 at https://​www​.foreignaffairs​.com/​crisis​-peacekeeping. Bara, Corinne and Lisa Hultman (2020), ‘Just different hats? Comparing UN and non-UN peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping, 27 (3), 341–68. Beardsley, Kyle (2008), ‘Agreement without peace? International mediation and time inconsistency problems’, American Journal of Political Science, 52 (4), 723–40. Beardsley, Kyle, David E. Cunningham, and Peter B. White (2019), ‘Mediation, peacekeeping, and the severity of civil war’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (7), 1682–709. Beardsley, Kyle and Holger Schmidt (2012), ‘Following the flag or following the charter? Examining the determinants of UN involvement in international crises, 1945–2002’, International Studies Quarterly, 56 (1), 33–49.

100  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Bercovitch, Jacob, J. Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette L. Wille (1991), ‘Some conceptual issues and empirical trends in the study of successful mediation in international relations’, Journal of Peace Research, 28 (1), 7–17. Blair, Robert A., Jessica Di Salvatore, and Hannah M. Smidt (2021), ‘When do UN peacekeeping operations implement their mandates?’, American Journal of Political Science, July, accessed 23 March 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1111/​ajps​.12650. Clayton, Govinda and Han Dorussen (2021), ‘The effectiveness of mediation and peacekeeping for ending conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, 19 May, accessed 23 March 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​ .1177/​0022343321990076. Clayton, Govinda, Han Dorussen, and Tobias Böhmelt (2021), ‘United Nations peace initiatives 1946–2015: introducing a new dataset’, International Interactions, 47 (1), 161–80. de Jonge Oudraat, Chantal (1996), ‘The United Nations and internal conflict’, in Michael Brown (ed.), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, pp. 489–536. DeRouen, Karl, Jacob Bercovitch, and Paulina Pospieszna (2011), ‘Introducing the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 48 (5), 663–72. DeRouen, Karl and Ishita Chowdhury (2018), ‘Mediation, peacekeeping and civil war peace agreements’, Defence and Peace Economics, 29 (2), 130–46. Di Salvatore, Jessica (2019), ‘Peacekeepers against criminal violence—unintended effects of peacekeeping operations?’, American Journal of Political Science, 63 (4), 840–58. Di Salvatore, Jessica, Magnus Lundgren, Kseniya Oksamytna, and Hannah Smidt (2022), ‘Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, accessed 3 March 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1177/​00220027211068897. Di Salvatore, Jessica and Andrea Ruggeri (2017), ‘Effectiveness of peacekeeping operations’, in William R. Thompson (ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, accessed 23 March 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​acrefore/​9780190228637​.013​.586. Diehl, Paul F. and Daniel Druckman (2018), ‘Multiple peacekeeping missions: analysing interdependence’, International Peacekeeping, 25 (1), 28–51. Diehl, Paul F. and Patrick Regan (2015), ‘The interdependence of conflict management attempts’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 32 (1), 99–107. Diehl Paul F, Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul R. Hensel (1996), ‘United Nations intervention and recurring conflict’, International Organization, 50 (4), 683–700. Dorussen, Han, Tobias Böhmelt, and Govinda Clayton (2022), ‘Sequencing United Nations peacemaking: political initiatives and peacekeeping operations’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 39 (1), 22–48. Dorussen, Han and Govinda Clayton (2018), ‘Political initiatives and peacekeeping: assessing multiple UN conflict resolution tools’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 24 (4), 2018-0026. Druckman, Daniel, Grace Mueller, and Paul F. Diehl (2022), ‘Exploring the compatibility of multiple missions in UN peace operations’, International Peacekeeping, 29 (1), 85–114. Eckroth, Karoline R. (2010), ‘Humanitarian principles and protection dilemmas: addressing the security situation of aid workers in Darfur’, Journal of International Peacekeeping, 14 (12), 86–116. Frazier, Derrick V. and William J. Dixon (2006), ‘Third-party intermediaries and negotiated settlements, 1946–2000’, International Interactions, 32 (4), 385–408. Fortna, V. Page (2004), ‘Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war’, International Studies Quarterly, 48 (2), 269–92. Greig, J. Michael and Paul F. Diehl (2005), ‘The peacekeeping–peacemaking dilemma’, International Studies Quarterly, 49 (4), 621–46. Heldt, Birger (2013), ‘The lack of coordination in diplomatic peacemaking’, The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs, 2 (1), 9–16. Heldt, Birger and Peter Wallensteen (2007), Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2004, Stockholm, SE: Folke Bernadotte Academy. Hoelscher, Kristian, Jason Miklian, and Håvard M. Nygård (2017), ‘Conflict, peacekeeping, and humanitarian security: understanding violent attacks against aid workers’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (4), 538–65. Howard, Lise Morjé (2019), Power in Peacekeeping, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Mediation, political missions, and peacekeeping  101 Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2013), ‘United Nations peacekeeping and civilian protection in civil war’, American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 875–91. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2014), ‘Beyond keeping peace: United Nations effectiveness in the midst of fighting’, American Political Science Review, 108 (4), 737–53. Joshi, Madhav and J. Michael Quinn (2015), ‘Is the sum greater than the parts? The terms of civil war peace agreements and the commitment problem revisited’, Negotiation Journal, 31 (1), 7–30. Kathman, Jacob D. and Michelle Benson (2019), ‘Cut short? United Nations peacekeeping and civil war duration to negotiated settlements’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (7), 1601–29. Kathman, Jacob D. and Reed M. Wood (2016), ‘Stopping the killing during the “peace”: peacekeeping and the severity of postconflict civilian victimization’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 12 (2), 149–69. Melander, Erik, Frida Möller, and Magnus Öberg (2009), ‘Managing intrastate low-intensity armed conflict 1993–2004: a new dataset’, International Interactions, 35 (1), 58–85. Melander, Erik and Nina von Uexkull (2011), ‘Sustained third party engagement and conflict termination: an introduction of the UCDP Managing Intrastate Conflict (MIC) dataset’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal. Melin, Molly M. (2011), ‘The impact of state relationships on if, when, and how conflict management occurs’, International Studies Quarterly, 55 (3), 691–715. Melin, Molly M. (2015), ‘Escalation in international conflict management: a foreign policy perspective’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 32 (1), 28–49. Metcalfe, Victoria (2012), ‘Protecting civilians? The interaction between international military and humanitarian actors’, HPG Working Paper, accessed 7 March 2022 at https://​www​.refworld​.org/​ pdfid/​523ad6f24​.pdf. Owsiak, Andrew P. (2014), ‘Conflict management trajectories in militarized interstate disputes: a conceptual framework and theoretical foundations’, International Studies Review, 16 (1), 50–78. Owsiak, Andrew P. (2015), ‘Forecasting conflict management in militarized interstate disputes’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 32 (1), 50–75. Owsiak, Andrew P. (2021), ‘Conflict management trajectories: theory and evidence’, International Interactions, 47 (1), 23–55. Owsiak, Andrew P., J. Michael Greig, and Paul F. Diehl (2021), ‘Making trains from boxcars: studying conflict and conflict management interdependencies’, International Interactions, 47 (1), 1–22. Rietjens, Sebastiaan and Chiara Ruffa (2019), ‘Understanding coherence in UN peacekeeping: a conceptual framework’, International Peacekeeping, 26 (4), 383–407. Sarfati, Agathe (2021), ‘Transitions from UN special political missions to UN country teams’, International Peace Institute, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​2021/​04/​transitions​ -from​-un​-special​-political​-missions​-to​-un​-country​-teams. SIPRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute] (n.d.), SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed 30 June 2021 at https://​www​.sipri​.org/​databases/​pko. Smith, Alastair and Allan Stam (2003), ‘Mediation and peacekeeping in a random walk model of civil and interstate war’, International Studies Review, 5 (4), 115–35. Tiernay, Michael (2013), ‘Which comes first? Unpacking the relationship between peace agreements and peacekeeping missions’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 32 (2), 135–52. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support (2008), UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, accessed 9 March 2022 at https://​www​.un​.org/​ruleoflaw/​files/​ Capstone​_Doctrine​_ENG​.pdf. UN General Assembly and Security Council (2000), ‘Report of the panel on United Nations peace operations (Brahimi Report)’, A/55/305 and S/2000/809, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​undocs​ .org/​A/​55/​305. UN Secretary General (2015), ‘United Nations political missions: report of the Secretary-General’, accessed 21 March 2022 at https://​p​eaceoperat​ionsreview​.org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2015/​07/​united​ _nations​_report​_secretary​_general​.pdf. Walter, Barbara F. (2001), Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Zhang, Shenghao and Han Dorussen (2022), ‘Peacekeeping, aid and violence: the integrated effect of humanitarian aid and UN peacekeeping’, paper presented at the 2022 meeting of the Network of European Peace Scientists, London.

8. Non-UN peacekeeping Corinne Bara

INTRODUCTION The practice of peacekeeping is strongly associated with the United Nations, and mention of peacekeeping usually conjures up images of blue helmets, the hallmark of UN personnel on the ground. The UN, however, has never been the only actor who deploys impartial forces to maintain or restore peace between conflict parties. Ever since the UN’s existence, regional organizations, coalitions of states or even individual states have practiced peacekeeping independently or in cooperation with the UN. In fact, non-UN bodies have deployed more peace operations than the UN each year since the turn of the millennium (Bara and Hultman 2020). This chapter offers an overview of what we know about these non-UN peace operations, with a focus on scholarship that systematically compares UN and non-UN peacekeeping. In the following section, I describe what I mean by non-UN peacekeeping and discuss why it can be harder to distinguish between peacekeeping and one-sided military intervention if a mission does not operate under the UN flag. I then review existing research on non-UN peacekeeping as an explanandum and an explanans: What factors influence the deployment of non-UN missions, and what impact do such missions have on peace and stability in conflict environments? The latter question on the effectiveness of non-UN peacekeeping has received particularly little attention in comparative research due to a lack of data. I therefore make use of a new dataset by Bara and Hultman (2020) to assess whether some of the most prominent findings on the impact of UN peacekeepers can be extended to non-UN missions. Finally, I propose a number of research avenues relating to non-UN peacekeeping that would strengthen our knowledge of peacekeeping more generally and overcome the near-exclusive focus on the UN in the existing quantitative-comparative scholarship.

DEFINING NON-UN PEACEKEEPING Non-UN peace operations are peace operations that are conducted by actors other than the United Nations.1 They are often mandated or at least expressly welcomed by the UN, but they are not managed by the UN at an operational level (Bellamy and Williams 2015). Scholars frequently use the term regional peacekeeping operations, but this term is ambiguous. Some regional organizations, such as NATO or the EU, operate well beyond their own neighborhood, and not all non-UN missions are run by regional organizations (Williams 2017, p. 124). Instead, regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions of states, and even single countries run these operations. Among regional organizations, the EU and the AU (and its predecessor, the OAU) have conducted the most non-UN peace operations in the post-Cold War period, but ECOWAS and NATO have also been active peacekeeping actors. The USA and Australia have led multiple coalitions of states in making or keeping the peace, for example in Haiti, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea. France, on the other hand, stands out as the country with 102

Non-UN peacekeeping  103 most single-state operations in parallel or in support of UN missions, such as in Côte d’Ivoire (Operation Licorne) or the Central African Republic (Operation Sangaris).2 Beyond this simple definition, the challenge lies in deciding when a non-UN mission is really peacekeeping as opposed to a one-sided military intervention with the aim of supporting one of the conflict parties.3 Peacekeeping is generally defined as the deployment of uniformed personnel by a third party with the aim to keep or restore the peace (for example, Rost and Greig 2011; Bellamy and Williams 2015). UN peacekeeping missions specifically are distinguished from military interventions by the three principles of consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense (or in defense of the mandate), whereas military interventions take place against the will of the belligerents, take sides, and are barely restricted in their use of force (Howard 2019, p. 129). Even if these peacekeeping principles are increasingly stretched in newer UN missions (de Coning et al. 2017; de Coning 2018), there is a second element that endows these missions with legitimacy: a mandate by the UN Security Council. This is because the Security Council is conservative: Single states or coalitions can at best veto peacekeeping missions but cannot get them authorized without the consent of most members and all permanent members of the Council. This is a safeguard against regional powers militarily intervening in a country under the guise of “peacekeeping.”4 By extension, this legitimacy is also bestowed upon the many non-UN missions that receive a Security Council mandate. When this safeguard is missing in the case of non-UN operations that are not authorized by the UN, the purpose of the mission and its adherence to the peacekeeping principles comes under scrutiny, and the line between peacekeeping and biased military intervention can become a thin one. Operation Boleas in Lesotho by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an example. In this operation in 1998, South Africa and Botswana deployed their militaries to prevent a coup, with South Africa’s desire to secure strategic resources as a possible ulterior motive (Likoti 2007). Some datasets (Mullenbach 2013; Jetschke and Schlipphak 2020) include this as a peace operation, following South Africa’s claim that it was conducted on behalf of a multilateral body (the SADC), and only after having been invited by the host state.5 Others (Coleman 2011; Bellamy and Williams 2015) consider this a one-sided military intervention to help the host state suppress an insurgency.6 As such, it violates the peacekeeping principle of impartiality. Two additional factors complicate the assessment of whether a non-UN mission should be considered peacekeeping. The first is that ulterior motives by the deploying body are not enough to disqualify an operation as a peace operation, as there is always a modicum of self-interest in the decision to contribute to peacekeeping, also in UN missions (Neack 1995; Sandler 2017). The second is that a violation of peacekeeping principles is not always by design. Missions at times turn awry and peacekeepers are drawn into a war against one side, losing their status as an impartial arbiter. Again, this is a risk that UN missions face as well (Bullion 1994, p. 155). The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990 illustrates some of these challenges. Most datasets include the IPKF as a peace operation (Mullenbach 2013; Bellamy and Williams 2015; Jetschke and Schlipphak 2020). Though India pursued strategic and political interests by intervening in Sri Lanka, the mission was initially deployed to implement an accord expected to resolve the war (Bullion 1994; Crenshaw 2000). However, the accord that arguably made this a consent-based operation was never signed by the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), and it was surmised that India would guarantee the Sri Lankan regime’s survival, which would question the impartiality principle (Pfaffenberger

104  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations 1988; Rupesinghe 1988). Eventually, the IPKF was drawn into a war with the LTTE, dropping both the principles of impartiality and minimum use of force (Bullion 1994). These examples are not meant to suggest that non-UN peace operations are always concealed military interventions. Most non-UN missions have an unambiguous peacekeeping character, and the vast majority of them are authorized or at least recognized by the UN (see Bellamy and Williams 2015). But the difficulty in distinguishing peace operations from military interventions when there is no UN mandate explains why lists and datasets of non-UN missions differ between sources. It also means that disagreements on border cases will be an inherent aspect of the study of non-UN peacekeeping.

EXPLAINING NON-UN PEACEKEEPING Since the early 2000s, non-UN peace operations account for the majority of missions globally (Diehl 2014, pp. 485–6; Bara and Hultman 2020). Figure 8.1 (left-hand side) shows that while the number of UN missions has remained relatively stable since the end of the Cold War, the number of non-UN missions has gradually increased. The many missions by the EU since the launch of its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 explain part of this trend. If we look beyond the number of missions and take into account their size (Figure 8.1, right-hand side), a more nuanced pattern emerges. In terms of people on the ground, non-UN bodies already carried a heavy peacekeeping burden during the 1990s, when UN peacekeeping went through a crisis after a series of failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia (Cottey 2008; Fortna and Howard 2008, p. 284). When the UN began to increase its peacekeeping commitments again, the number of non-UN peacekeepers declined.7 Apart from the enormous number of NATO troops in Afghanistan, the UN has been the dominant peacekeeping actor in terms of people on the ground for quite a while, even as non-UN bodies deploy more missions. This is because UN missions are on average larger than non-UN missions: The median UN mission has three times as many people on the ground as the median non-UN mission (Bara and Hultman 2020, p. 353). The observation that non-UN bodies now deploy more missions at the same time as the UN remains the key provider of peacekeeping raises a number of questions. The first is about the time trend: What explains why regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions of states increasingly deploy peacekeeping missions of their own? The second is about the decision to provide peacekeeping: What explains whether a conflict receives a UN or a non-UN mission, or no mission at all? And finally, the third question is about whether UN and non-UN missions differ in terms of states’ willingness to contribute to these missions financially and with troops. To explain the increase in non-UN missions over time, a common argument focuses on the supply side.8 The end of the Cold War forced states and regional organizations to reshape their international security strategy and find a new role in the changed international scenario (de Guttry 2011). NATO, for instance, transformed from a Cold War defense alliance to a collective security organization with peacekeeping as one of its central tasks (Cottey 2008, p. 440). However, non-UN peacekeeping is not just a post-Cold War phenomenon as has been suggested (for example, Koops and Tardy 2015, p. 61). Of 47 pre-1990 peacekeeping missions listed by Bellamy and Williams (2015), more than half were non-UN missions, and most of these were neither authorized nor recognized by the UN. What changed since the end of the Cold War is the sheer number of different actors active in peacekeeping, their ambition

Non-UN peacekeeping  105

Source: Created by author using data from Bara and Hultman (2020).

Figure 8.1

Number of UN and non-UN missions vs number of personnel deployed

in terms of mission complexity, and the fact that more non-UN missions are authorized by the UN (Bellamy and Williams 2015). This last point touches on the demand-side explanation for the increase in non-UN missions, namely that the UN needed regional organizations to step up and help carry an increasingly heavy peacekeeping burden created by multiple simultaneous civil wars that required a robust peacekeeping response (Barnett 1995; Heldt 2004; Koops and Tardy 2015). As the UN and other actors are increasingly sharing the peacekeeping burden, questions about the determinants of peacekeeping gain new relevance. What explains whether a conflict receives a UN or a non-UN mission? Specifically, is there evidence that non-UN missions deploy to different types of conflicts than UN missions? From research so far (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2004; 2008; Mullenbach 2005; Hultman 2013), we know that UN missions are usually sent to particularly difficult cases – wars with high death tolls and atrocities against civilians, long wars, and complicated wars with many factions. We know less about whether this is also the case for non-UN peacekeeping. Descriptive statistics in Bara and Hultman (2020) show that UN missions on average enter into more violent contexts in terms of battle fatalities and civilian targeting than non-UN missions, even though non-UN peacekeepers are often deployed as first responders before a UN mission takes over. Fortna (2004) and Mullenbach (2005) are two studies that systematically compare the determinants of UN and non-UN missions. They test different explanations and are rather dated (the analyses end in 1999 and 2002, respectively), but the general conclusion one can draw from these two studies is that there are more differences than similarities between UN and non-UN missions with regard to the factors that influence whether or not a peacekeeping mission is established. Another strand of peacekeeping research, the scholarship on burden-sharing (for a review, see Sandler 2017),9 only indirectly touches on the question why UN and non-UN missions deploy to some places but not others. Instead, burden-sharing scholars examine the conditions

106  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations that influence states’ financial and troop contributions to missions. This research offers the most systematic comparisons of UN and non-UN missions in quantitative peacekeeping research. The theoretical premise is that peacekeeping yields three different types of benefits (Shimizu and Sandler 2002; Ward and Dorussen 2016): First, pure public goods in the form of global peace and human security; second, impure public goods that benefit some nations more than others (for instance neighboring states who are more affected by conflict externalities); and third, private benefits such as the compensation a country gets for sending peacekeepers, or the in-field experience the deployed troops gain. Because financial and troop contributions are organized differently in UN and non-UN missions, the distribution of benefits for a participating country also differs between UN and non-UN missions. In the case of the UN, all member states have to pay for peacekeeping based on their income, while troop contributions are voluntary and are financially compensated. For burden-sharing scholars, this cost structure yields two expectations (see Gaibulloev et al. 2009): First, UN missions will be more likely where need is greatest, that is, authorized according to the logic of public benefits. This is because the mandatory payments by member states make the UN less dependent on states’ national interests to authorize a mission. Second, troop contributions to missions follow the logic of private benefits. Poorer countries, especially those with large militaries, have an incentive to send troops to UN missions as they make a net financial gain from this contribution (Gaibulloev et al. 2015; Ward and Dorussen 2016; Sandler 2017). While this latter proposition has been widely accepted (but see Coleman and Nyblade 2018), scholars disagree more strongly on whether public benefits are really the driver of UN action. Skeptical voices (for example, Neack 1995; Boulden 2006) contend that the interests of the most powerful states – especially the five permanent members (P-5) of the Security Council – are decisive in whether the UN sends a mission to a conflict. Most empirical analyses, however, suggest that while the interests of the P-5 certainly matter, public benefits in the form of reduced human suffering and global peace drive the UN’s decision to authorize missions as much, if not more (Jakobsen 1996; Fortna 2008; Gaibulloev et al. 2009; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). In the case of non-UN missions, both financial and troop contributions are voluntary, and those who send troops usually pay for them, with the exception of some ECOWAS and AU operations for which the US and EU partially reimburse participation costs (Tardy 2013; Sandler 2017).10 Because of this, burden-sharing scholars envision that self-interest plays a greater role in the decision to deploy a non-UN mission than it does for UN missions (Sandler 2017, p. 1888). Regional stability in particular is an impure public good that benefits some nations more than others; hence states will be more likely to burden the costs of financing and contributing to a non-UN mission if a conflict is a national security or economic concern to them. Empirical evidence indeed shows that states are ready to pay for (and thus enable) non-UN missions if they are closer to the conflict region, or if states have trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) interests in the conflict region (Gaibulloev et al. 2009). For peacekeeping by single states or ad hoc coalitions of states – that is, working outside international or regional organizations – Rost and Greig (2011) show that trade ties, but also ethnic and colonial links, are important in determining whether countries send peacekeepers. In line with these findings, there is some evidence that richer industrial countries are more likely to deploy troops to non-UN missions – missions which tend to take place where these countries have strategic and economic interests (Gaibulloev et al. 2015). These differences in the determinants of financial and troop contributions to UN and non-UN missions suggest that it is not equally likely that a conflict or country will receive

Non-UN peacekeeping  107 a UN or non-UN mission. The implications of this are disputed. Scholars of peacekeeping burden-sharing point out that as rich countries increasingly deploy their troops in NATO or EU missions, their troop contributions to UN peacekeeping decline (Gaibulloev et al. 2015; Sandler 2017). This then leaves lower-quality UN troops to deal with conflicts in which rich Western countries have no stakes. Others argue the other way around, namely that if the UN selectively leaves some conflicts to regional organizations to solve, these conflicts may get lesser-quality (regional) peacekeeping, or no peacekeeping at all (see Bellamy et al. 2010; Gizelis et al. 2016). The latter is particularly likely in regions that have no organizations willing or able to conduct peacekeeping operations, such as Asia.11 Behind these differing assessments appears to be the question to which the next section turns, namely whether non-UN missions are equally, less, or even more effective in keeping and restoring the peace than their UN counterparts.

EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-UN PEACEKEEPING How effective are non-UN peace operations in keeping or restoring peace? For UN missions, there is a wealth of research showing that they are on average effective in keeping the peace once obtained and in mitigating multiple forms of violence during and after war (for a review, see Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017).12 The question of whether the same is true for non-UN peacekeeping has received little attention. In their review of the literature on non-UN peacekeeping, Bara and Hultman (2020, pp. 344–5) discern three sets of arguments on the relative effectiveness of UN and non-UN (mostly regional) peacekeeping. A first set of arguments focuses on the cultural and political closeness of regional missions to their host countries. Shared languages, cultural, or political experiences may entail advantages in engaging with the conflict parties, who in turn may be more willing to cooperate with regional peacekeepers than outsiders interfering in their own region (Diehl 2007, p. 541). Those that are more skeptical about such arguments point out that the homogeneity of regions tends to be overestimated and that regional peacekeepers may be perceived as less impartial about conflicts taking place in their own backyard (Heldt 2004; Heldt and Wallensteen 2007). A second set of arguments centers on efficiency and risk tolerance. It has been argued that non-UN operations can deploy more quickly than UN missions, which are slowed down by their organization’s bureaucracy, and that regional peace operations also deploy to areas where the UN does not let their peacekeepers go (Bellamy and Williams 2005, p. 195; de Coning et al. 2016, p. 2; Lindberg Bromley 2018, p. 128). However, rapid deployment and an offensive posture in contested areas bear risks for peacekeepers. If they are attacked and drawn into violence with the warring parties, this has consequences for their ability to fulfill the mandate and protect civilians in the affected areas (Akpasom 2016, p. 112; Fjelde et al. 2016, p. 621). The third set of arguments presented in Bara and Hultman (2020, pp. 344–5) pertains to capacity. Regional organizations cannot match the UN’s experience, organizational processes, equipment, training, financial capacities, and logistics for peacekeeping (Lotze 2016; Williams 2017, p. 128). Missions by NATO or coalitions of states led by some of the world’s powerful militaries form an exception, at least in terms of military capacity. However, given their multidimensional mandates, UN missions are more diverse in terms of personnel deployed. Especially large non-UN missions consist mainly of troops, while even large robust UN missions usually have sizable police contingents (Bara and Hultman 2020, p. 354). UN

108  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations police, in turn, have been shown to mitigate certain types of war and postwar violence that military troops have difficulty containing (Bara 2020; Di Salvatore 2019). This capacity differential between the UN and most regional missions is so widely accepted that many scholars have a clear expectation that UN missions should be more effective in mitigating war violence than non-UN missions. This, however, has rarely been systematically tested. There are case studies on individual non-UN missions that offer detailed accounts of particular operations and sometimes of their achievements and failings (examples are Bullion 1994; Freear and de Coning 2013; Smith and Jarvis 2018), but such case studies lack a counterfactual of what would have happened if no mission had been present, or if a UN mission could have achieved more (or less). There is also research on the various organizations that now conduct peacekeeping missions (examples are Mackinlay and Cross 2003; Francis 2009; Keohane 2011; Tavares 2013; de Coning et al. 2016), but rarely with a systematic focus on comparing the relative effectiveness of missions by different actors. In terms of quantitative comparisons of the effectiveness of non-UN missions compared to UN missions, there are a few older studies that found either no difference in effectiveness, or that only UN missions mitigate violence (Heldt 2004; Heldt and Wallensteen 2007; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2007; Fortna 2008; 2004; Nilsson 2008; Hultman 2010). These studies base their findings on simple binary variables of peacekeeping presence and absence and do not account for the size and strength of missions. However, Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2007) make the argument that all types of peace operations should have a positive effect if they have sufficient capacities to respond to the challenges of the conflict context. Until recently, it was not possible to test this general argument due to a lack of detailed data on non-UN missions. While scholars of UN peacekeeping have long had access to monthly data on the amount of troops, police, and observers deployed to any mission (Kathman 2013; International Peace Institute 2019), available datasets on non-UN peace operations (Mullenbach 2013; Jetschke and Schlipphak 2020) did not contain such information. A recently published dataset by Bara and Hultman (2020) enables scholars to systematically compare whether UN and non-UN missions are equally effective at comparable strength and personnel composition. The dataset reports the approximate monthly number of troops, police, and observers deployed by the UN, regional organizations, and coalitions of states to civil conflicts globally between 1993 and 2016. These data are compiled and consolidated from annual numbers provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2020) and then interpolated to generate monthly estimates. In an application of the new data, Bara and Hultman (2020) show that a greater number of troops and police in both UN and regional missions is associated with lower levels of violence against civilians by governments during war. However, when it comes to rebel one-sided violence, only UN troops and police are associated with fewer civilian fatalities, while regional peacekeepers have no observable effect. This differential ability to influence the behavior of governments and rebels, respectively, is a finding in need of an explanation, with the authors offering some first thoughts on the possible sources of this difference for further research.

Non-UN peacekeeping  109

GENERALIZING FINDINGS OF UN PEACEKEEPING EFFECTIVENESS This section expands on the analyses in Bara and Hultman (2020) to take a first cut at the question of whether conclusions drawn about the effectiveness of UN operations are applicable to those organized by other actors. Looking at a broad set of effectiveness measures including war and peace duration, battle intensity, and the levels of postwar and criminal violence, three questions are asked: First, do previous findings on the effectiveness of UN missions still hold when we control for non-UN peacekeeping? Second, do the findings extend to all peacekeeping operations independent of the organizing body? And third, do non-UN peacekeepers have the same effect as UN peacekeepers? To answer the above questions, findings from six studies on the effectiveness of UN missions studying diverse outcomes are replicated, adding information on the number of non-UN troops, police, and observers to the original models.13 These are exact replications, that is, no changes are made to the authors’ original data and models except adding the non-UN variables. In some cases, the time period under study is shortened because the Bara and Hultman (2020) data is only available from 1993 onwards.14 In all replicated studies, the original results hold for the shortened time period. Table 8.1 reports the findings of these replications. A “SAME” effect indicates that the findings are statistically significant and go in the same direction as in the original study, though the strength of the relationship may differ. An “UNCERTAIN” effect simply means that unlike in the original studies, the estimates on non-UN personnel are not statistically significant (and may or may not go in the same direction). The first question is whether previous findings change when we account for the total number of non-UN peacekeepers present in conflict contexts. In about a third of peacekeeping cases, a UN and non-UN mission are present in the same conflict at the same time (Bara and Hultman 2020, p. 355). Examples are the EU force in Chad/Central African Republic deployed to protect civilians alongside MINURCAT, or the NATO SFOR mission deployed at the same time as UNMIBH in Bosnia. Failing to account for these non-UN missions could lead to biased estimates of the UN’s effectiveness. We may mistakenly attribute effects stemming from non-UN (or joint) peacekeeping to the UN alone, especially if the non-UN mission is much stronger and more robust than its UN counterpart. The NATO SFOR mission in Kosovo, for instance, numbered tens of thousands of troops, while the UN Mission in Kosovo had no troops but a few thousand police. As the fourth column in Table 8.1 shows, however, none of the UN findings change if we account for non-UN peacekeeping. Ignoring non-UN peacekeeping in previous statistical analyses has therefore not been much of a problem in terms of biased UN estimates on the effectiveness of UN personnel. The second question is whether we can generalize findings generated by studying UN missions to say something about the effectiveness of peacekeeping overall. Are the results the same if we include all peacekeeping personnel in our models, without distinguishing between UN and non-UN missions? The fifth column in Table 8.1 shows mixed results. Specifically, the finding that peacekeeping troops mitigate civilian targeting in the postwar period (Kathman and Wood 2016) and that peacekeeping troops speed up the time to a negotiated settlement (Kathman and Benson 2019) is only significant for UN missions, not for all missions. Even in cases in which the original studies (UN) and the replications (all missions) produced comparable findings, this does not necessarily mean that non-UN peacekeeping has similar effects but

110  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Table 8.1 Original finding

Replication results Authors

Time period

UN effect

(shortened)

controlling

Effect of all missions Effect of non-UN missions

for non-UN personnel UN troops reduce risk Hultman et al.

1989–2010

SAME

SAME

SAME

SAME

SAME

UNCERTAIN

SAME

SAME

UNCERTAIN

SAME

SAME

UNCERTAIN

SAME

SAME

–a

SAME

UNCERTAIN

UNCERTAIN

SAME

UNCERTAIN

UNCERTAIN

(1993–2010)

of war recurrence (in

(2016)

Africa)

(Table 2, Mod. 2)

UN troops reduce

Hultman et al.

1992–2011

battle deaths during

(2014)

(1993–2011)

ongoing war (in

(Table 1, Mod. 1)

Africa) UN police reduce

Bara (2020)

1991–2016

postwar violence

(Table 1, Mod. 1)

(1993–2014)

generally (old and new actors) UN troops increase

Di Salvatore (2019) 1995–2012

homicide levels in

(Table 1, Mod. 3)

war and postwar countries UN police reduce

Di Salvatore (2019) 1995–2012

homicide levels in

(Table 1, Mod. 3)

war and postwar countries UN troops reduce

Kathman and

1992–2010

postwar OSVb (in

Wood (2016)

(1993–2010)

Africa)

(Table 2, Mod. 2)

UN troops shorten

Kathman and

1992–2014

war duration to

Benson (2019)

(1993–2014)

negotiated settlement

(Table 2, Mod. 1)

Note: a No estimate, as non-UN police were omitted from the replication model, likely due to the small number of observations with non-UN police, among which there was not much variation in terms of the numbers deployed. b OSV stands for ‘one-sided violence’.

could indicate that UN missions might be driving the results. Generalizing from UN findings to peacekeeping by all organizations is thus not warranted. The third question, then, specifically asks whether non-UN peacekeeping has similar or different effects as UN peacekeeping. To answer that, the UN variables in the original models are replaced with information on non-UN troops, police, and observers, while controlling for the total number of UN personnel. As the final column in Table 8.1 shows, the data do not support the conclusion that non-UN personnel have similar effects as UN personnel. The results do suggest that both UN and non-UN troops reduce the risk of war recurrence if deployed to a postwar context. For all other findings, the estimates on the equivalent personnel type (troops or police) in non-UN missions were not statistically significant.15 Is non-UN peacekeeping therefore less effective than UN peacekeeping? We cannot conclude that, for three reasons. First, the results on non-UN peacekeeping were not statistically significant. The only conclusion the data supports at this stage is that we have to remain uncertain about how effective non-UN personnel is with regard to the tested relationships.

Non-UN peacekeeping  111 Second, the original studies were designed to permit causal inference on UN missions, not on missions by other organizations. The original authors accounted for factors that shape whether a conflict receives a UN mission and that may at the same time influence the outcome studied. If non-UN missions go to different types of conflicts – and the review of existing research in this chapter suggests they do – scholars need to account for that, or else results on non-UN peacekeeping will be biased. Third, and with this point firmly in mind, the replications did reveal statistically significant violence-mitigating effects for non-UN missions, but primarily for non-UN police.16 This is not reflected in the table, because the focus was on replicating previous significant findings on UN missions. It is a surprising result because the number of police in non-UN missions is usually low, but the EU has several dedicated pure police missions, whose effect may defy their numbers. This points to one area of future research, with further research avenues on non-UN peacekeeping outlined in the following section.

THE WAY FORWARD The analyses above have demonstrated that we cannot just infer from what we know about UN peacekeeping to peacekeeping by other actors. Instead, more research is needed about missions by regional organizations, coalitions of states, and single states. With new data on the personnel strength and composition of non-UN missions, there is now a unique chance to catch up on this front. The analyses in the previous section are a first cut at the question of how effectively non-UN missions contain violence compared to UN missions. In moving forward, however, scholars should resist the temptation to simply “add non-UN missions and stir.” Non-UN missions ought to be studied in their own right and with research carefully designed to permit causal inference on such missions. Specifically, we need to know more about the factors that shape whether a non-UN mission is deployed to a conflict. This is valuable knowledge on its own, and crucial to evaluate the effectiveness of these missions. Such an effort to systematically analyze the determinants of non-UN peacekeeping is also a chance to re-examine the dominant assumptions about where UN missions go, which are based on few and by now quite dated studies (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2004; 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). Importantly, future empirical work comparing UN and non-UN peacekeeping would profit from more solid theoretical foundations. What Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl have noted in 2007 is still true, namely that there is a dearth of arguments specifying exactly why and how non-UN missions should differ from UN missions, followed by systematic tests of these arguments. This theoretical groundwork will have to grapple with the heterogeneity of non-UN missions (see Bara and Hultman 2020, p. 363). Of course, UN missions are likewise diverse and range from small observer missions like UNMOT in Tajikistan to massive and robust stabilization missions such as MINUSMA in Mali. And yet this diversity is nowhere as large as among non-UN missions. This raises the question of whether small and specialized EU missions that deploy primarily non-military staff such as police, border guards, monitors, judges and administrators (Keohane 2011) are even comparable to missions like the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan with more than 100 000 troops on the ground. As of now, non-UN missions are defined by what they are not (not UN), but this may not be their most distinguishing feature. The dataset by Bara and Hultman (2020), for instance, also distinguishes non-UN missions by whether they are regional or international missions.

112  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Missions are defined as regional if they are either run by a regional organization in their own region, or by an ad hoc coalition of states primarily from the region. International missions are missions run by regional organizations or state coalitions outside their region (such as the EU in Africa or NATO in Afghanistan). This allows scholars to contrast regional missions on the one hand to UN and international missions on the other hand and study whether peacekeeping by “neighbors” differs from peacekeeping by “outsiders” (Bara and Hultman 2020). Another research avenue is to start distinguishing missions by their mandate and scope again, independent of or in addition to distinguishing between UN and non-UN missions. This was common before the arrival of ever more detailed peacekeeping data (for example, Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008), but has gone out of fashion since. If we stick to the binary distinction between UN and non-UN missions, one of the most important research avenues to study is how they together manage to keep or restore the peace. A 2015 UN Secretary General report describes partnership peacekeeping – the engagement of regional partners in peacekeeping alongside UN operations – as crucial to respond to the “challenging crises of tomorrow” (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2015). Partnership peacekeeping is usually either sequential, in which case a UN mission takes over after a non-UN mission or vice versa, or parallel, in which case UN and non-UN missions are deployed at the same time, often with a certain division of labor (Brosig 2010). While there is value in studying how effective UN and non-UN missions are on their own, the implicit hope in partnership peacekeeping is that the collaboration of UN and non-UN missions is more than the sum of its parts. An empirically challenging but fundamentally interesting research avenue would therefore be to study whether UN and non-UN missions enable each other to achieve more than what one alone could achieve.

NOTES 1. In the last section, I problematize the negative term “non-UN peacekeeping” as a residual category of everything the UN is not, but the chapter adopts the term to reflect common usage (for example, Fortna 2004; 2008; Heldt and Wallensteen 2007; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2007; Gaibulloev et al. 2015; Bara and Hultman 2020). 2. Based on data in Bara and Hultman (2020). For France’s role in UN peacekeeping, see also Tardy (2016). 3. See also Heldt and Wallensteen (2007, pp. 9–11). 4. See also Rost and Greig (2011, p. 173). 5. Though at the time of deployment the intervention was not even consistent with SADC rules; see Likoti (2007). 6. See Coleman (2011) on the tradition of such solidarity deployments in sub-Saharan Africa. 7. Around the same time, the UN started the practice of re-hatting, that is, the transfer of personnel from a non-UN mission to a succeeding UN mission. Some of the trend in Figure 8.1 (UN personnel increasing at the same time as non-UN personnel is decreasing) reflects the fact that the UN took over responsibility from regional missions and re-hatted some of their personnel into UN peacekeepers. Examples are the re-hatting of ECOWAS troops in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire into UN missions, or the transition from INTERFET (International Force East Timor) to UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) in Timor-Leste. See UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (2018); UN Department of Peackeeping Operations et al. (2005). 8. See also Meiske and Ruggeri (2017). 9. See also Chapter 3 (Coleman) in this Handbook. 10. See also Dorussen et al. (2009) on cost sharing in the EU’s security governance, including EU peace operations.

Non-UN peacekeeping  113 11. For Asia, Bellamy and Williams (2005) argue that the relative paucity of peacekeeping missions is not only due to weak regional arrangements, but also the region’s commitment to the principle of non-interference; hence, both UN and non-UN missions are unlikely in this region. 12. Since the “third wave” of peacekeeping research (Fortna and Howard 2008), this research has been predominantly quantitative-comparative. 13. The criteria for selecting these studies were that they use UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program) data to make them compatible with the new non-UN dataset, and that the number of UN troops, police and/or observers were the main explanatory variables of the original studies. The code for the replications is available on the author’s website: https://​www​.corinnebara​.net. 14. Also, from 2015 onwards, SIPRI does not distinguish between troops and observers, but combines both personnel categories into a “military” category. To compare to previous results on UN studies that make this distinction, I use data only until 2014. 15. The direction of the estimated effects was the same as in the original studies for the claim that troops reduce battle deaths during ongoing war (Hultman et al. 2014), but increase homicide levels (Di Salvatore 2019). It was in the opposite direction for the claim that police reduce postwar violence (Bara 2020), and that troops reduce postwar civilian targeting (Kathman and Wood 2016), and time to negotiated settlement (Kathman and Benson 2019). 16. Specifically, non-UN police were associated with a decrease in battle deaths during war, a reduction in postwar civilian targeting, and a shorter time to negotiated settlement.

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114  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Cottey, Andrew (2008), ‘Beyond humanitarian intervention: the new politics of peacekeeping and intervention’, Contemporary Politics, 14 (4), 429–46. Crenshaw, Martha (2000), ‘Democracy, commitment problems and managing ethnic violence: the case of India and Sri Lanka’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 12 (3–4), 135–59. de Coning, Cedric (2018), ‘Is stabilization the new normal? Implications of stabilization mandates for the use of force in UN peace operations’, in Peter Nadin (ed.), The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping, Abingdon, UK and New York, NY, USA: Routledge, pp. 85–99. de Coning, Cedric, Chiyuki Aoi, and John Karlsrud (2017), ‘Introduction: addressing the emerging gap between concepts, doctrine and practice in UN peacekeeping operations’, in Cedric de Coning, Chiyuki Aoi, and John Karlsrud (eds), UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilisation, Protection and New Threats, Abingdon, UK and New York, NY, USA: Routledge, pp. 1–30. de Coning Cedric, Linnéa Gelot, and John Karlsrud (2016), ‘Towards an African model of peace operations’, in Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot, and John Karlsrud (eds), The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram, London, UK: Zed Books, pp. 1–19. de Guttry, Andrea (2011), ‘Recent trends in peacekeeping operations run by regional organisations and the resulting interplay with the United Nations system’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 11 (3), 27–52. Di Salvatore, Jessica (2019), ‘Peacekeepers against criminal violence—unintended effects of peacekeeping operations?’, American Journal of Political Science, 63 (4), 840–58. Di Salvatore, Jessica and Andrea Ruggeri (2017), ‘Effectiveness of peacekeeping operations’, in William R. Thompson (ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, accessed 30 March 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​acrefore/​9780190228637​.013​.586. Diehl, Paul F. (2007), ‘New roles for regional organizations’, in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, Washington, DC, USA: USIP Press, pp. 535–52. Diehl, Paul F. (2014), ‘Behavioural studies of peacekeeping outcomes’, International Peacekeeping, 21 (4), 484–91. Dorussen, Han, Emil J. Kirchner, and James Sperling (2009), ‘Sharing the burden of collective security in the European Union’, International Organization, 63 (Fall), 789–810. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis (2006), Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman, and Sara Lindberg Bromley (2016), ‘Offsetting losses: bargaining power and rebel attacks on peacekeepers’, International Studies Quarterly, 60 (4), 611–23. Fortna, V. Page (2004), ‘Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war’, International Studies Quarterly, 48 (2), 269–92. Fortna, V. Page (2008), Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Fortna, V. Page and Lise Morjé Howard (2008), ‘Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11 (1), 283–301. Francis, D. J. (2009), ‘Peacekeeping in a bad neighbourhood: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in peace and security in West Africa’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 9 (3), 87–116. Freear, Matt and Cedric de Coning (2013), ‘Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2 (2), 1–11. Gaibulloev, Khusrav, Justin George, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Shimizu (2015), ‘Personnel contributions to UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions: a public goods approach’, Journal of Peace Research, 52 (6), 727–42. Gaibulloev, Khusrav, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Shimizu (2009), ‘Demands for UN and non-UN peacekeeping: nonvoluntary versus voluntary contributions to a public good’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 (6), 827–52. Gilligan, Michael J. and Ernest J. Sergenti (2008), ‘Do UN interventions cause peace? Using matching to improve causal inference’, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 3 (2), 89–122.

Non-UN peacekeeping  115 Gilligan, Michael J. and Stephen John Stedman (2003), ‘Where do the peacekeepers go?’, International Studies Review, 5 (4), 37–54. Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene, Han Dorussen, and Marina Petrova (2016), ‘Research findings on the evolution of peacekeeping’, in William R. Thompson (ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, accessed 20 March 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​acrefore/​9780190228637​ .013​.25. Heldt, Birger (2004), ‘UN-led or non-UN-led peacekeeping operations?’, IRI Review 9, 113–39, accessed 30 March 2022 at https://​papers​.ssrn​.com/​sol3/​papers​.cfm​?abstract​_id​=​2248391. Heldt, Birger and Peter Wallensteen (2007), Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2004, Stockholm, SE: Folke Bernadotte Academy. Howard, Lise Morjé (2019), Power in Peacekeeping, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Hultman, Lisa (2010), ‘Keeping peace or spurring violence? Unintended effects of peace operations on violence against civilians’, Civil Wars, 12 (1–2), 29–46. Hultman, Lisa (2013), ‘UN peace operations and protection of civilians: cheap talk or norm implementation?’, Journal of Peace Research, 50 (1), 59–73. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2014), ‘Beyond keeping peace: United Nations effectiveness in the midst of fighting’, American Political Science Review, 108 (4), 737–53. Hultman Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2016), ‘United Nations peacekeeping dynamics and the duration of post-civil conflict peace’ Conflict Management and Peace Science, 33 (3), 231–49. International Peace Institute (2019), IPI Peacekeeping Database, accessed 9 March 2022 at https://​www​ .ipinst​.org/​providing​-for​-peacekeeping​-database. Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (1996), ‘National interest, humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace enforcement after the Cold War?’, Journal of Peace Research, 33 (2), 205–15. Jetschke, Anja and Bernd Schlipphak (2020), ‘MILINDA: a new dataset on United Nations-led and non-United Nations-led peace operations’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 37 (5), 605–29. Kathman, Jacob D. (2013), ‘United Nations peacekeeping personnel commitments, 1990–2011’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 30 (5), 532–49. Kathman, Jacob D. and Michelle Benson (2019), ‘Cut short? United Nations peacekeeping and civil war duration to negotiated settlements’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (7), 1601–29. Kathman, Jacob D. and Reed M. Wood (2016), ‘Stopping the killing during the “peace”: peacekeeping and the severity of postconflict civilian victimization’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 12 (2), 149–69. Keohane, Daniel (2011), ‘Lessons from EU peace operations’, Journal of International Peacekeeping, 15 (1–2), 200–217. Koops, Joachim and Thierry Tardy (2015), ‘The United Nations’ inter-organizational relations in peacekeeping’, in Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams (eds), The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press, pp. 60–72. Likoti, Fako Johnson (2007), ‘The 1998 military intervention in Lesotho: SADC peace mission or resource war?’, International Peacekeeping, 14 (2), 251–63. Lindberg Bromley, Sara (2018), ‘Introducing the UCDP Peacemakers at Risk dataset, sub-Saharan Africa, 1989–2009’, Journal of Peace Research, 55 (1), 122–31. Lotze, Walter (2016), ‘Mission support to African peace operations’, in Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot, and John Karlsrud (eds), The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram, London, UK: Zed Books, pp. 76–89. Mackinlay, John and Peter Cross (2003), Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping, Tokyo, JP: United Nations University Press. Meiske, Maline and Andrea Ruggeri (2017), ‘Peacekeeping as a tool of foreign policy’, in William R. Thompson (ed.), The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, accessed 20 March 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​acrefore/​9780190228637​.013​.462. Mullenbach, Mark J. (2005), ‘Deciding to keep peace: an analysis of international influences on the establishment of third-party peacekeeping missions’, International Studies Quarterly, 49 (3), 529–55. Mullenbach, Mark J. (2013), ‘Third-party peacekeeping in intrastate disputes, 1946–2012: a new data set’, Midsouth Political Science Review, 14, 103–33.

116  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Neack, Laura (1995), ‘UN peace-keeping: in the interest of community or self?’, Journal of Peace Research, 32 (2), 181–96. Nilsson, Desirée (2008), ‘Partial peace: rebel groups inside and outside of civil war settlements’, Journal of Peace Research, 45 (4), 479–95. Pfaffenberger, Bryan (1988), ‘Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian intervention and resurgence of the JVP’, Asian Survey, 28 (2), 137–47. Rost, Nicolas and J. Michael Greig (2011), ‘Taking matters into their own hands: an analysis of the determinants of state-conducted peacekeeping in civil wars’, Journal of Peace Research, 48 (2), 171–84. Rupesinghe, Kumar (1988), ‘Ethnic conflicts in South Asia: the case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF)’, Journal of Peace Research, 25 (4), 337–50. Sambanis, Nicholas and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl (2007), ‘Evaluating multilateral interventions in civil wars: a comparison of UN and non-UN peace operations’, in Dimitris Bourantonis, Kostas Ifantis, and Panayotis Tsakonas (eds), Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalization, Abingdon, UK and New York, NY, USA: Routledge, pp. 252–87. Sandler, Todd (2017), ‘International peacekeeping operations: burden sharing and effectiveness’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61 (9), 1875–97. Shimizu, Hirofumi and Todd Sandler (2002), ‘Peacekeeping and burden-sharing, 1994–2000’, Journal of Peace Research, 39 (6), 651–68. SIPRI (2020), SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed 31 January 2022 at https://​www​ .sipri​.org/​databases/​pko. Smith, Claire Q. and Tom Jarvis (2018), ‘Ending mass atrocities: an empirical reinterpretation of “successful” international military intervention in East Timor’, International Peacekeeping, 25 (1), 1–27. Tardy, Thierry (2013), ‘Funding peace operations: better value for EU money’, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief Issue 38, November, accessed 31 January 2022 at https://​www​.iss​.europa​ .eu/​content/​funding​-peace​-operations​-better​-value​-eu​-money. Tardy, Thierry (2016), ‘France: the unlikely return to UN peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping, 23 (5), 610–29. Tavares, Rodrigo (2013), ‘The participation of SADC and ECOWAS in military operations: the weight of national interests in decision-making’, African Studies Review, 54 (2), 145–76. UN Department of Peackeeping Operations, DFS, DPET, Policy and Best Practice Service (2005), ‘Re-hatting’ ECOWAS Forces as UN Peacekeepers, PK/G/2005, accessed 31 January 2022 at http://​ dag​.un​.org/​handle/​11176/​400580. UN General Assembly and Security Council (2015), Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people (HIPPO), accessed 31 January 2022 at https://​www​.globalr2p​.org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2020/​01/​2015​-UNGA​ -HIPPO​-Report​.pdf. UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (2018), Evaluation of re-hatting in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), accessed 31 January 2022 at https://​oios​.un​.org/​file/​7697/​download​?token​=​wi7​_C22S. Ward, Hugh and Han Dorussen (2016), ‘Standing alongside your friends: network centrality and providing troops to UN peacekeeping operations’, Journal of Peace Research, 53 (3), 392–408. Williams, Paul D. (2017), ‘Global and regional peacekeepers: trends, opportunities, risks and a way ahead’, Global Policy, 8 (1), 124–9.

PART II WHAT PEACEKEEPERS DO

9. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and peacekeeping operations Dylan Herrera and Andrea González Peña

INTRODUCTION This chapter reviews how disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) has become an important element of current peacekeeping operations (PKOs). First, we present the conceptual and practical evolution of DDR. Then, its role within PKO is examined, especially regarding the challenges brought by new warfare dynamics in the twenty-first century. The scope of DDR has evolved from a specific military to a comprehensive approach to post-conflict transitions (Giustozzi 2012; McMullin 2013). In 2004, a high-level panel at the United Nations General Assembly highlighted that, ‘[d]emobilizing combatants is the single most important factor determining the success of peace operations. Without demobilization, civil wars cannot be brought to an end and other critical goals – such as democratization, justice and development – have little chance for success’ (UN General Assembly 2004, p. 61). Military units are usually in charge of dismantling or demobilizing armed groups as well as reducing weapon stocks. The core components of DDR as well as of security sector reform (SSR) emerged from these customary practices.1 The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia (1989–90) was the first peacekeeping mission to include DDR components (Muggah 2005b; 2008). Despite not being specifically labeled as such, it addressed the disbanding of ethnic armed forces and paramilitary forces (UN Security Council 1989a; 1989b). Disbanding can be seen as an early version of what later would become the demobilization phase. The mandate of the ONUCA peacekeeping operation in Central America in March 1990 has the first official reference to demobilization (UN DPKO 2010a, p. 3). Demobilization was included within ONUCA’s mandate in Nicaragua, referred to as the ‘addition of new tasks’ in Security Council resolution S/RES/653 (UN Security Council 1990, p. 15). Reinsertion and reintegration also appeared with ONUCA as shown in resolution A/RES/48/149 (UN General Assembly 1994). Reinsertion is understood as a humanitarian “bridge” phase between demobilization and the reintegration program. Alongside the innovations on DDR, security zones for combatant and population assistance were also later used in other missions in the Great Lakes area and the Balkans. Traditionally, UN PKOs were characterized by an interposition of force between warring factions (Hatto 2013), and the implementation of DDR components in Namibia and Central America were considered to add value to those interventions. Besides separating the warring factions to reduce violence, usually within a brokered peace agreement, there was also a need to de-escalate the conflicts by decreasing the availability of weapons (disarmament), reducing the number of organized violent groups (demobilization) and offering an alternative pathway 118

DDR and peacekeeping operations  119 into civilian life (reintegration). ‘In many respects, the range of activities that fall under the heading of “disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)” is as wide as the global scope of the United Nations system itself. […] In the last few years, we have also seen that DDR is just as crucial for peacebuilding, as reflected by the increasing references to DDR tasks in integrated peacebuilding missions’ (UN DPKO 2010a, p. 2). Understanding the importance of DDR within peacekeeping operations is key to evaluating peacekeeping efforts since 1989, understanding current challenges, and exploring future changes needed both in DDR and peacekeeping. After the end of the Cold War, the deployment of PKOs was a frequent response from the international community to conflicts around the world: ‘[b]etween 1988 and December 2012, the United Nations (UN) set up fifty-four operations to restore or maintain peace’ (Hatto 2013, p. 496), and DDR programs became a significant element in shaping peace following armed conflict. The information collected by González (2018) on 107 peace negotiations completed between 1975 and 2012 shows that most included one or more DDR provisions. Although 32 did not have DDR provision, 13 had one provision – seven included disarmament, three demobilization, and three reintegration – and 19 had two provisions.2 Notably, 43 of the 107 peace processes included all provisions. Peacekeeping operations were mentioned in 68 peace processes, where 46 (43 percent) also included DDR provisions and 22 cases (20.5 percent) did not have any DDR component. Similarly, Högbladh’s (2019) data on 355 peace agreements concluded between 1975 and 2018, show that 29 (8 percent) had DDR and peacekeeping support, 83 (23.3 percent) had DDR but did not have PKO, 17 (4.7 percent) did not have DDR but had a PKO, while 226 (64 percent) had neither DDR nor PKO. Therefore, of all peace agreements that call for the deployment of a PKO, 63 percent include DDR provisions (compared with 27 percent without a PKO), while 26 percent of peace agreements with DDR provisions have a PKO (compared to 7 percent without DDR). When the information is classified into active (244 cases) and not active (111 cases) conflicts, we find that in 20 of 244 (8 percent) active conflicts and 9 of 111 (also 8 percent) inactive conflicts, the peace agreements call for DDR as well as a PKO. Yet, 33 (30 percent) inactive and 51 (21 percent) active conflicts have DDR provisions but do not have a PKO. In sum, these data indicate that DDR provisions are common across peace agreements and regularly associated with the deployment of a PKO. However, we still lack evidence confirming the effectiveness of DDR provisions for maintaining peace. Gonzáles (2018) and Högbladh (2019) only measure DDR and PKO at one specific point in time. For this reason, they cannot properly consider the long-run effects of (gradual) implementation of DDR and (continuing) deployment of PKO on peace. Research by Joshi et al. (2015) examines the level of implementation of 51 provisions in 34 comprehensive peace agreements negotiated in civil wars since 1989, and they find that the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force was agreed in 12 accords and implemented in 9 (75 percent). Disarmament was included in 28 peace accords, but only fully implemented in 10 (36 percent), while demobilization was called for in 25 and implemented in 13 (52 percent), and reintegration was agreed in 27 but achieved in 13 (48 percent) cases. To summarize, the development of DDR provisions has been dynamic with an increasing scope that overlaps with agendas of security, development, and peacebuilding. During the early twenty-first century, DDR has further extended its range of actions and has even been implemented in situations with no armed conflict but high levels of violence. This “Second Generation” DDR was piloted in Haiti as part of the MINUSTAH peacekeeping operation (UN DPKO 2010b) and shows a potential for DDR to be relevant for different types of conflict.

120  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations However, there remains a concern about the implementation of DDR as part of peacekeeping in places lacking the necessary conditions for DDR to succeed; for example, when there is not yet a peace agreement or even a foreseeable ceasefire, creating new challenges for the PKO, the combatants, and the population in those areas.

THE EVOLUTION OF RESEARCH ON DDR AND PEACEKEEPING DDR can been defined as a mechanism designed to disband or demilitarize armed groups which are either official or non-state armies, to control and reduce the use of arms, and to placate former combatants by providing security and supporting them in the pursuit of legal incomes (González 2018). Initial research on the role of DDR as part of peacekeeping focused on two lines of inquiry. First, it aimed to define and understand the implementation of DDR as a technical tool, and to examine the different outcomes of economic and social reintegration in post-conflict scenarios (Colletta et al. 1996). Second, research identified the risks of incomplete disarmament for increasing local violence and arms trafficking, and for a return to armed confrontation following peace agreements (for example, Berdal 1996). In early implementations of DDR, the lack of a clear doctrine hampered the understanding of its boundaries; for example, Pugel (2009) mentions that in Liberia, rehabilitation was included in the peace agreement but left undefined. In the absence of guidelines or standards, it is difficult to understand DDR as something more than a mechanical, sequenced implementation of operative actions (Sharif 2018). Early evaluations of peacekeeping operations deployed around the world evidenced contributions of DDR to agendas such as development, social capital and reconciliation (Colleta and Cullen 2000). However, these evaluations lacked a clear and consistent approach on how to establish or measure the impact of DDR on post-conflict transitions and long-term peace. Seeking to fill the gap regarding guidelines and DDR doctrine, and because DDR was considered to enhance the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in conflict situations around the world, the United Nations Security Council requested ‘clear terms for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including the safe and timely disposal of arms and ammunition’ (UN Security Council 1999, p. 1). The UN report on The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (UN Security Council 2000) expanded the research horizon on DDR to missions in the Balkans, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Burundi, and Côte d’Ivoire. Knight and Özerdem (2004) and Muggah (2005b) innovated discussions on DDR by treating disarmament no longer as a military technicality but as a social contract between the state and the ex-combatants and rethinking post-conflict orthodoxies. They advocated paying attention to the psychological aspects of DDR as part of social reintegration and new approaches to cantonments in DDR. Doing DDR outside of cantonment sites would become an important referent for the reintegration of urban and support structures of illegal armed groups and become useful in future processes of reintegrating foreign fighters back into civilian life. Despite these developments, in the late 1990s and early 2000s several “best practice” documents and manuals were published, leaving a notion of a standardized post-conflict intervention with DDR as a technical part of a stabilization and reconstruction strategy. Complementary to the research above, the sustainability of economic reintegration (Body 2005) and models of cash payments and economic assistance (Colletta et al. 1996; Knight and

DDR and peacekeeping operations  121 Özerdem 2004) were also key research areas due to their perceived importance in long-term peacebuilding. Unfortunately, programs of economic reintegration were often short-term with deficiencies in monitoring and evaluation. Consequently, most studies in the early 2000s were limited to describing the payments and subsidies as well as vocational training programs. They could neither measure indicators beyond the actual program, nor examine the impact of economic reintegration or its sustainability in the medium and longer term. Until the early 2000s, literature on DDR consisted exclusively of case studies and policy documents. The flexibility of DDR and the uniqueness of each post-conflict intervention was seen as limiting the usefulness of compiling data across different missions (Molloy 2008). It also made it difficult to standardize the implementation of DDR for practitioners, especially for missions that involved multiple actors (such as peacekeeping forces, governments, NGOs, and donors). Consequently, various international actors engaged in DDR tried to find common ground to identify lessons learned and to unify data and methodologies for DDR interventions (see, for example, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden 2006; Nilsson 2005). Regarding the specific contributions of DDR to post-conflict transitions, Spear (2006) and Edloe (2007) evaluate DDR in terms of recidivism of ex-combatants or the end of conflict. In 2006, the first edition of the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) was launched by the UN Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) on DDR, providing common indicators to evaluate DDR and its impact on peacebuilding (see UN DPKO 2010b). Parallel to the launch of the IDDRS, there was a renewed interest in measuring the outcomes of DDR as part of peacekeeping (for example, Humphreys and Weinstein 2005). Kingma and Muggah (2009) and Tajima (2009) highlighted the need to create indicators to measure the effects of DDR. Through a case study on Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein (2005) explored possible determinants for successful DDR and how to measure them. Alongside these more quantitative approaches, qualitative evaluations continued to emphasize the importance of understanding DDR as a process and the necessity to evaluate DDR success from the perspective of the intended beneficiaries (Muggah 2005a). As noted by Sharif (2018) and Torjesen (2013), the methodological discrepancies of these various evaluations made it difficult to devise a united theoretical framework for the evaluation of DDR. The updated version of the IDDRS and its operational guide (see UN DPKO 2010b, p. 9) reflects the expansion and renewal of DDR provisions (Kilroy 2008) by including specific indices such as disability (Mehreteab 2007), gender (Douglas et al. 2004; Nilsson 2005) and youth (Verhey 2001). Other elements that played a fundamental role within the renewal of DDR was the strengthening of a community-based approach to reintegration (Caramés 2008) and access to justice (Annan and Patel 2009; Moratti and Sabic-El-Rayess 2009). Not only the UN but also other regional partners and national governments have implemented DDR programs, including in conflict-affected countries without UN peacekeeping missions (for example, in Colombia – see Herrera and González 2013). Pietz (2007) analyzes the challenges of UN missions when there is no regional coordination with implementing partners or nationally owned DDR programs. Lack of coordination creates implementation gaps, especially between the demobilization and reintegration phases (Özerdem and Podder 2008; Pietz 2007). As mandates assumed more tasks regarding security and even state-building, the review of the results regarding security sector reform (SSR) became a subject of specific interest within DDR research. The premise was that failed SSR would have a negative impact on DDR or even lead to failed interventions when security measures were not provided for combatants

122  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations and communities (Knight 2010; Muggah 2010). From a security perspective, further relevant topics for research into DDR are recidivism (Themnér 2011; González and Dorussen 2021) and partial disarmament (Knight 2010; Swarbrick 2007). The discussion around recidivism concerns identifying the triggers for the return to illegal activities such as organized crime (Moratti and Sabic-El-Rayess 2009; Strazzari et al. 2015) or other manifestations such as vigilantism and renewal of armed confrontation (Kaplan and Nussio 2018; Themnér 2011). Regarding disarmament, research has challenged the belief that full disarmament of structures was fundamental for implementing SSR and DDR. Giustozzi (2012) and Sharif (2018) show that full disarmament is not very realistic within a post-conflict transition because there is never a certainty of how many weapons irregular armed groups hold and thus when exactly disarmament is completed. DDR assessments from both policymakers and academics proliferated after 2005, probably due to the end of the second decade of DDR within peacekeeping operations and as a part of evaluating peacebuilding models inside and outside UN interventions. Assessments like Specker (2008) encouraged revisions of DDR policies (CIDDR Technical Secretariat 2009; UN DPKO 2010a) which eventually led to the formulation of the second generation DDR pilot (UN DPKO 2010b) for scenarios without armed conflict but with a high level of armed violence such as Haiti. Additionally, socioeconomic contexts began to gain more importance within DDR interventions (Colletta and Muggah 2009). Despite having a set of standards (IDDRS) with suggested indicators since 2006, there are few country-level reports of DDR implementations within these parameters; one of the few cases is Colombia (Herrera and González 2013). Evaluations of DDR programs in the Great Lakes3 like Alusala (2011) and World Bank (2010), as well as the report of the Salvadoran government on the living conditions of demobilized ex-combatants 20 years after the peace agreements (Gobierno de El Salvador 2012) show the need for generating monitoring and evaluation data that could allow DDR programs to have feedback of their interventions as well as show the importance of post-DDR evaluation. Despite the numerous single-country and regional case studies of DDR, there remains a need to measure the impact of DDR and its achievements for long-term peace (Muggah 2005b; Sharif 2018). A significant element to the discussion has been the final evaluation of the World Bank intervention in the Great Lakes region. World Bank (2010) identifies the necessity of DDR programs to devise responsible exit strategies that connect with other agendas in the places of intervention and foster sustainable peacebuilding. After 20 years of DDR implementation in nearly 60 peace initiatives, the report by the UN General Assembly (2011) converged with a new stage of assessments of DDR and peacekeeping operations. UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2012) highlighted the need for identifying and measuring the effect of DDR in PKOs, and in peacebuilding during complex interventions. Through a review of interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and Nepal, the report evidenced the challenges that both DDR and PKOs were facing in the field regarding security, multi-actor cooperation, as well as limited funding in the long-term reintegration initiatives and peacebuilding efforts.

DDR and peacekeeping operations  123

THE ROLE OF DDR IN CONTEMPORARY PEACEKEEPING DDR and peacekeeping operations emerged as mechanisms to ensure peace and security but without clear definitions (at least in the initial stages), which can be seen as a positive element that has allowed peacekeeping and DDR to be flexible responses. Both peacekeeping and DDR have undergone, and are undergoing, revisions conducive to face current threats to world stability. “Third-generation” peacekeeping evolved from cease-fire monitoring and separation of forces, to encompass DDR, humanitarian, and even state-building mandates. “Second-generation” DDR was piloted in scenarios with high levels of violence but no armed conflict, while “third-generation” DDR has been implemented to counter terrorism and extremism (Piedmont 2015). For DDR programs to succeed, arguably, some basic conditions need to be met, such as completed peace settlement – or at least the political will to reach an agreement needs to exist – including the cessation of hostilities. Nevertheless, deployments in non-favorable circumstances are becoming more common, affecting the success of PKOs and undermining the implementation of DDR programs (Cockayne and O’Neil 2015). Figure 9.1 shows the intervention logic for peacekeeping and DDR within the conflict curve, both in theory and as an approximation of some of the challenges met in practice. In practice, of course, conflict dynamics are often not linear and do not necessarily follow the different stages as seen in the left panel of Figure 9.1 in a predetermined order. Similarly, the different phases of DDR are not always implemented sequentially, and a well-defined exit strategy is commonly absent.4

Source: Compiled by the authors.

Figure 9.1

Peacekeeping operations and DDR in the conflict curve

The right panel of Figure 9.1 shows some of the challenges DDR programs face, but also the deployment of various violence-mitigation tools even in the absence of a peace agreement or other suitable conditions. The different phases of DDR programs commonly overlap in the field, especially because aiming for a complete disarmament requires sustained efforts

124  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations that include the community, and because peacebuilding has increased the objectives of reintegration, such as by adding transitional justice and sustainability. After 2001, Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) and other tools have been used alongside DDR in an effort to de-escalate violence to and create conditions for brokered peace agreements. In the right panel of Figure 9.1, the dotted line in the conflict curve represents collateral violence that is generated by interventions where a peace agreement does not (yet) exist. In some of the early twenty-first-century scenarios, peacekeepers became targets of one or several armed parties, faced rejection by the population, and faced the emergence of rogue armed groups, among other obstacles (Cockayne and O’Neil 2015). Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010) showed the limitations of DDR evaluations as well as the challenge of perceiving DDR as a sequence. It is fundamental for DDR to have flexibility to allow for overlap of different stages of DDR, for example, or even bolder options such as reintegrating before disarmament and demobilization, a proposal that was later known as RDD (CIDDR Technical Secretariat 2009; Dudouet 2011; Munive and Stepputat 2015). Critics argue that DDR is commonly mainly a managerial and technocratic tool (Berdal and Ucko 2013) that does not fully achieve an engagement with the context where the intervention takes place and therefore is not able to provide the expected results and needs reinvention (Muggah and O’Donnell 2015; Munive and Stepputat 2015; Seethaler 2016). Furthermore, recent DDR interventions have been criticized for being deployed in scenarios with no conditions for peacebuilding and no peace agreements (Cockayne and O’Neil 2015; Molloy 2013). In such cases, DDR can be perceived not as an impartial peacekeeping tool but instead as a non-neutral counter-insurgency program, which can make peacekeepers a target for peace spoilers.

“NEW WARS,” PEACEKEEPING, AND DDR A consensus is emerging that there have been significant changes in the way of waging war (Kaldor 2012). Even though conflicts themselves have not necessarily changed (Kalyvas 2001), new warfare dynamics are creating considerable challenges for peacekeeping and DDR, especially regarding interventions within asymmetrical war (Cockayne and O’Neil 2015; van der Lijn et al. 2015; van der Lijn 2017). The challenges include having to face new ways combatants are recruited and armed, increased usage of mercenaries, and new technologies (Steenken 2017). Peacekeepers are also more often targeted by armed groups (Cockayne and O’Neil 2015), are expected to deal with organized crime (Strazzari et al. 2015), to counter extremism (Horgan et al. 2020), and to fight terrorism (Cockayne and O’Neil 2015; Piedmont 2015). Strazzari et al. (2015, p. 12) observe that ‘[o]f the 28 UN missions underway in 2013, 10 had organized crime in their mandate.’5 These changed circumstances necessarily reflect in current interpretations of DDR. UN PKOs have been adapted to create more robust and tailored interventions (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2015). Robust PKOs generally include DDR mandates, but also bring new challenges to implementing DDR programs. Robust peacekeeping operations are usually deployed in states with institutional weaknesses and assume additional tasks during post-conflict transitions. This is a crucial period in the conflict timeline where failures could lead to a renewed confrontation and robust deployments could help prevent such crises (see van der Lijn et al. 2015). Nevertheless, such deployments also bring along numerous threats for the post-conflict transition period and the implementation of DDR. Assuming tasks outside

DDR and peacekeeping operations  125 of peacekeeping and DDR in long-term interventions, especially in places without any peace to be kept, can turn DDR provisions, peacekeepers, and civilians into a military target of armed groups. Delimiting DDR can also contribute to delimiting robust peacekeeping mandates. This takes us back the question raised in Figure 9.1: where do both DDR and peacekeeping operations end? The exit strategy of robust mandates is complex to establish due to the volume and scope of the activities assigned. Neither DDR nor peacekeeping operations should, in the medium or long term, replace the state in assuming functions regarding national agendas – such as defense, education, and access to justice – that are usually assumed when attending to ex-combatants, victims, and host communities. Robust mandates are assigning tasks that are beyond the scope of both DDR and peacekeeping operations. Accepting these tasks can portray missions as non-neutral or as counterinsurgency. For example, neither DDR nor peacekeeping operations were conceived to combat organized crime, yet they are doing so in the field (Giustozzi 2012). The impact of peacekeeping was criticized in the mid-1990s due to the limited mandates given to PKOs, and holistic intervention emerged as a response to an expanding concept of peace (Hatto 2013). In a matter of a few years, we have passed from limited mandates to robust, endless ones.

RETHINKING INDICATORS OF DDR DURING PEACEKEEPING After the launch of the IDDRS the components of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration became standardized. Even though procedures for disarmament and the management of weapons and war material could be considered as a mechanical sequence that is mainly military (Hagman and Nielsen 2002; Steenken 2017), their successes or failures have a significant impact on peacekeeping operations and post-conflict transitions (Berdal 1996; Raevsky 1996). Strategies such as arms for cash (ICCT 2021; Knight and Özerdem 2004) and community engagement in disarmament (UN DPKO 2010b) have been implemented to improve disarmament in a post-conflict transition and to avoid post-conflict violence (Suhrke and Berdal 2012; González and Dorussen 2021). DDR literature regarding disarmament has gravitated towards weapon collection and management (Steenken 2017; UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 2001), public policy strategies (Mehra et al. 2021; UNIDIR 2008), and the illegal traffic and criminal use of weapons (ICCT 2021). All these fields have challenges that have been persistent since the 1990s, evidencing that despite the advances, the discussion on disarmament is far from over. Technological changes in weaponry can bring new elements to the discussion such as the more common use of unarmed vehicles (UAV) by both state and non-state actors. Some recent works, such as Steenken (2017), have started to highlight UAV control as an emerging challenge for PKOs and DDR programs. Mehra et al. (2021) analyze the effectiveness of DDR programs to disarm terrorist groups. New technology with military applications, new weaponry and the presence of extremist terrorist groups are causing important changes in confrontation, evidencing the obligation of extending the traditional procedures of disarmament within DDR and peacekeeping operations. Demobilization is a planned or controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups and includes services that could be provided within or outside a cantonment site. Literature on demobilization such as Knight and Özerdem (2004) focuses on considerations regarding the cantonment sites and preliminary services for ex-combatants. However, the scope of demobilization, as well as of disarmament, goes far beyond a sequence

126  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations of mechanical actions to be performed. Having a disengagement approach starting at the demobilization phase could provide ex-combatants with more tools that make them less prone to re-recruitment and reduce the personal challenges during reintegration, such as a sense of isolation, stigma, and rejection. Demobilization could imply a total break with the collectivity (understood as community or camaraderie component of the group), but full disengagement with the armed unit should not necessarily be the prime objective of demobilization. Complete disengagement with the troops usually happens within DDR for deserters (Cockayne and O’Neil 2015; Nussio 2018). In collective DDR processes it is more common to see a continued relationship with the collectivity – no longer as an armed group but as a civilian or political community (Dudouet et al. 2016; Söderström 2013). Whether there is a break with a group or not, an expected outcome of demobilization is that ex-combatants would not re-engage in violence with their former structures or any other armed group. Current literature on de-radicalization, like Horgan et al. (2020), points out that the work with the individual should focus on fostering disengagement rather than on seeking a drastic change in political or religious beliefs or affinity with the armed group. As Cockayne and O’Neil (2015) mention, when missions and DDR programs are perceived to be fostering change in political or religious beliefs, they lose the feature of neutrality and may be seen as counterinsurgency instead of a peacekeeping or peacebuilding tool. In Colombia and Somalia for example, DDR programs have been perceived as taking sides within the conflict, therefore becoming a counterinsurgency tool more than a peacebuilding one, making implementing organizations one more actor involved in the confrontation. Regarding reintegration, the return of foreign combatants has been a task within DDR, since its beginnings in Namibia, Central America, or more recently in the DRC. Dealing with foreign combatants has relied on giving basic assistance and then ensuring repatriation. Once repatriation has taken place, the fate of those combatants is out of reach of the DDR program or peacekeeping operation. Globalization has also increased foreign recruitment, and combatants are increasingly joining conflicts outside of their countries, by conviction or by contract. The numerous foreign combatants currently held in camps in Syria and Iraq as well as the high number of returnees in the last years, might catalyze change within DDR. Until now, DDR has been conceived as a program implemented in countries in post-conflict transition or during conflict itself, but should foreign combatants undergo similar programs of demobilization and reintegration in their countries of origin? Since the end of World War II, the need for assistance for combatants who return from war has been highlighted. In developed countries, these kinds of assistance for war veterans have been perceived as different from DDR. As McMullin (2013, p. 45) points out: ‘[c]hallenges also tend to be located only in the post-conflict spaces of the global south; meanwhile, assistance programs for veterans in, e.g., the US and UK, are discursively walled off as irrelevant to and separate from ex-combatant reintegration.’ However, the difference has not only been in conceiving of DDR and veteran assistance as two separate processes; they have also not been implemented equally. While Western programs for veterans are thought of as long-term assistance that implies big costs for states, the DDR interventions in conflict-affected states are implemented as less costly short-term programs. Combatant returnees have become a big challenge for Western countries (Holmer and Shtuni 2017). European countries have been monitoring ex-combatants who were not imprisoned at their return, but not necessarily implementing elements of reintegration along with their de-radicalization and Counter Violent Extremism programs. If we assume that combat-

DDR and peacekeeping operations  127 ants who are returning differ from the veterans that these countries have usually assisted, could this be an opportunity to apply elements of demobilization and reintegration in the West? DDR has been tested already in countries without armed conflict but high levels of violence (“second-generation” DDR) (UN DPKO 2010b) and currently the third generation of DDR is being employed in ongoing conflicts with weak rule of law (ICCT 2021, p. 71; Mehra et al. 2021; Piedmont 2015). Could the consideration of DDR programs for foreign combatants in their country of origin imply a fourth-generation DDR? Such programs could address risks of re-recruitment, radicalization, or even recidivism in criminal activities. As Horgan et al. (2020) point out, CVE and the reintegration component of DDR have much in common. Both seek to facilitate rehabilitation and prevent future engagements in violence from ex-combatants and their immediate social networks. The challenges of current de-radicalization programs and the lessons of the last decades of DDR could fill not only the theoretical vacuum surrounding de-radicalization and CVE, but also lead the way to integrate the work that has been done in the conflict-affected countries with post-veteran and post-incarceration programs in the Western world, concerning the challenges returnees are posing to those societies.

CONCLUSIONS Our purpose was to highlight the current interdependent relationship between DDR and peacekeeping. We presented a general frame of the evolution of DDR within peacekeeping as well as some of the current challenges both DDR and peacekeeping are facing. DDR’s intervention not only contributes to security but can also build confidence among warring parties. Thus, DDR is a crucial aspect of any peace settlement; its greatest challenge is to present a program and a strategy that convinces all parties involved that they have guarantees for surrender and disbanding, and that their vulnerability and negotiated terms will be respected. A well-planned and flexible reintegration process can be a key element to restore social capital and promote the viability of long-term peace if adequate conditions are given. In that order of ideas, the UN has highlighted that without tools such as DDR, civil wars cannot end. Nonetheless, still not all peace agreements include DDR provisions. We highlight therefore, that including DDR within a peace agreement, especially a reintegration program, has a positive impact on the process of peace consolidation. However, DDR is no miracle-maker and demobilized combatants run the risk of returning to war or crime if they are not provided with vocational skills, placement in employment initiatives, and reintegrated into society successfully. Unfortunately, the most recent interventions are being done in scenarios with no peace to keep and no basic conditions for deployment, bringing multiple challenges both for peacekeeping operations and DDR programs. Nonetheless, if in these scenarios we do not deploy any peacekeeping missions or DDR programs, then what can be done to avoid the escalation of warfare? We point out that peacekeeping mandates as well as DDR need to be flexible to cope adequately with the conflict that is being intervened. Neither peacekeeping operations nor DDR are meant to be linear processes that are generically set into “one size fits all”; on the contrary, their main virtue and also complexity is their “tailor-made” design. Operations and programs of such complexity have generated several discussions in the practitioner and academic realm. Our review of the relationship between peacekeeping and DDR helps us to identify the vulner-

128  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations abilities and challenges in each stage of the process. Despite having been implemented since 1990 as part of PKOs, there is still much to be reflected upon regarding program planning, community engagement, peacekeeping mandates, exit strategy, and convergence with other peace and development agendas. DDR programs are milestones towards lasting peace, but not necessarily solutions for the roots of a conflict. Although DDR is considered a highly technical methodology, it does not necessarily always work smoothly in the field. Further, the ways in which wars are being waged are changing and, consequently, DDR needs to be adapted to the conflict dynamics in current and future circumstances of intervention. Finally, the growth in the scope of DDR is increasing the costs for both DDR and peacekeeping operations. It also blurs the exit strategy, especially in contexts where the intervention has no specific peace to keep, and no stable local institutions or partners present themselves to support the transition because it risks permanent interventions that do not build capacity nor mitigates armed violence permanently. This situation not only leaves open the question of where peacekeeping and DDR end but is also creating new threats and challenges that remain to be solved.

NOTES 1. On the role of security sector reform as part of peacekeeping, see Chapter 10 (Blair) in this Handbook. 2. Six operations had disarmament and demobilization, four had disarmament and reintegration, and nine had demobilization and reintegration (González 2018). 3. The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) was a DDR program for the DRC, Angola, Republic of Congo, CAR, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda. The Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) was a follow-up initiative, and it took place in the DRC, CAR, Mali, and South Sudan. Some of the lessons learned were extended to Yemen. 4. See also Chapter 24 (Caplan et al.) on ending PKOs in this Handbook. 5. See also Chapter 20 (di Salvatore) on peacekeeping and post-conflict crime, Chapter 21 (Lindberg Bromley) on peacekeeping hazards, and Chapter 2 (Helms) on evolving peacekeeping mandates in this Handbook.

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130  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations www​.usip​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​2017​-03/​sr402​-returning​-foreign​-fighters​-and​-the​-reintegration​ -imperative​.pdf. Horgan, John, Katharina Meredith, and Katarina Papatheodorou (2020), ‘Does deradicalization work?’, in Derek M. D. Silva and Mathieu Deflem (eds), Radicalization and Counter-radicalization, Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance, vol. 25, Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing, pp. 9–20. Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein (2005), Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, Working Paper 69, Center for Global Development, accessed 7 March 2022 at https://​www​.cgdev​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​4155​_file​_WP​_69​_0​.pdf. ICCT (2021), Cashing in on Guns: Identifying the Nexus between Small Arms, Light Weapons and Terrorist Financing, International Centre for Counter Terrorism, March, accessed 7 March 2022 at https://​icct​.nl/​app/​uploads/​2021/​03/​SALW​-Report​.pdf. Joshi, Madhav, Jason Quinn, and Patrick Regan (2015), ‘Annualized implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords, 1989–2012’, Journal of Peace Research, 52 (4), 551–62. Kaldor, Mary (2012), New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 3rd edition, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2001), ‘“New” and “old” civil wars: a valid distinction?’, World Politics, 54 (1), 99–118. Kaplan, Oliver and Enzo Nussio (2018), ‘Explaining recidivism of ex-combatants in Colombia’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62 (1), 64–93. Kilroy, Walt (2008), ‘Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) as a participatory process: involving communities and beneficiaries in post-conflict disarmament programs’, paper presented at the International Peace Research Association biennial global conference, University of Leuven, BE, accessed 7 March 2022 at http://​doras​.dcu​.ie/​2204/​1/​Participatory​_DDR​_(ECPR)​_(Walt​_Kilroy)​.pdf. Kingma, Kees and Robert Muggah (2009), ‘Critical issues in DDR: context, indicators, targeting, and challenges’, paper presented at the International Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Congress (CIDDR) in Cartagena, CO. Knight, Mark and Alpaslan Özerdem (2004), ‘Guns, camps and cash: disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion of former combatants in transitions from war to peace’, Journal of Peace Research, 41 (4), 499–516. Knight, W. Andy (2010), ‘Linking DDR and SSR in post conflict peace-building in Africa: an overview’, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 4 (1), 29–54. McMullin, Jaremey R. (2013), Ex-Combatants and the Post-Conflict State: Challenges of Reintegration, London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Mehra, Tanya, Méryl Demuynck, Colin Clarke, Nils Duquet, Cameron Lumley, and Matthew Wentworth (2021), ‘The suitability of DDR programmes to disarm terrorist groups’, in ICCT, Cashing in on Guns: Identifying the Nexus between Small Arms, Light Weapons and Terrorist Financing, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, pp. 69–80, accessed 7 March 2022 at https://​www​.jstor​ .org/​stable/​resrep31915​.7. Mehreteab, Amanuel (2007), ‘Assistance to war wounded combatants and individuals associated with fighting forces in disarmament, remobilisation and reintegration programmes’, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​au​.int/​sites/​default/​files/​documents/​39024​ -doc​-21​.​_mehreteab​_2007​_assistance​_to​_war​_wounded​_combatants​_in​_drr​.pdf. Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden (2006), Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration: Final Report, accessed 7 March 2022 at https://​reliefweb​.int/​report/​world/​stockholm​ -initiative​-disarmament​-demobilisation​-reintegration​-final​-report. Molloy, Desmond (2008), ‘DDR: a shifting paradigm & the scholar /practitioner gap’, Pearson reliefweb​ .int/​ sites/​ Peacekeeping Centre Occasional Paper 1, accessed 7 March 2022 at https://​ reliefweb​.int/​files/​resources/​43​27FDD97C8A​374FC12577​13004C19BF​-Full​_Report​.pdf. Molloy, Desmond (2013), ‘An unlikely convergence: evolving disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) theory and counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine’, PhD thesis, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, accessed 7 March 2022 at http://​repository​.tufs​.ac​.jp/​bitstream/​10108/​77602/​1/​dt​-ko​ -0170​.pdf. Moratti, Massimo and Amra Sabic-El-Rayess (2009), ‘Transitional justice and DDR: the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Research Brief, International Center for Transitional Justice, June, accessed

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132  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Specker, Leontine (2008), ‘The r-phase of DDR processes: an overview of key lessons learned and practical experiences’, Clingendael Institute, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​www​.clingendael​.org/​ sites/​default/​files/​pdfs/​20080900​_cru​_report​_specker​.pdf. Steenken, Cornelis (2017), Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): A Practical Overview, Peace Operations Training Institute, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​cdn​.peaceopstraining​ .org/​course​_promos/​ddr/​ddr​_english​.pdf. Strazzari, Francesco, John Karlsrud, Lilly Muller, and Niels Nagelhus Schia (2015), ‘New issues in peacekeeping’, in Mateja Peter (ed.), United Nations Peace Operations: Aligning Principles and Practice, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), pp. 12–16, accessed 8 March 2022 at http://​www​.jstor​.org/​stable/​resrep08088​.6. Suhrke, Astrid and Mats Berdal (eds) (2012), The Peace In Between: Post-War Violence and Peacebuilding, London, UK: Routledge. Swarbrick, Peter (2007), ‘Avoiding disarmament failure: the critical link in DDR: an operational manual for donors, managers and practitioners’, Working Paper 5, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​reliefweb​.int/​sites/​reliefweb​.int/​files/​ resources/​77​94E1E2FF38​0C6A432575​D10044E36D​-SmallArms​_Feb2007​.pdf. Tajima, Yuhki (2009), ‘Background paper on economic reintegration’, paper presented at the International Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Congress (CIDDR) in Cartagena, CO. Themnér, Anders (2011), Violence in Post-conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilizers and Relationships, New York, NY, USA: Routledge. Torjesen, Stina (2013), ‘Towards a theory of ex-combatant reintegration’, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2 (3), 63, 1–13. UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (2001), A Destruction Handbook: Small Arms, Light Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​reliefweb​.int/​report/​world/​destruction​ -handbook​-small​-arms​-light​-weapons​-ammunition​-and​-explosives. UN DPKO (2010a), ‘DDR in peace operations: a retrospective’, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​ peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​ddr​_retrospective102010​.pdf. UN DPKO (2010b), ‘Second generation disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) practices in peace operations: a contribution to the new horizon discussion on challenges and opportunities for UN peacekeeping’, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​2gddr​ _eng​_with​_cover​.pdf. UN General Assembly (1994), ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly’, 7 March, A/RES/48/149, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​GEN/​N94/​122/​56/​PDF/​ N9412256​.pdf​?OpenElement. UN General Assembly (2004), ‘A more secure world: our shared responsibility. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’, A/59/65, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​www​.un​.org/​ en/​ga/​search/​view​_doc​.asp​?symbol​=​A/​59/​565. UN General Assembly (2011), ‘Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration’, A/65/741, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​700920​?ln​=​en. UN General Assembly and Security Council (2015), ‘Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people (HIPPO)’, A/70/95-S/2015/446, accessed 7 March 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​795940​?ln​=​en. UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2012), ‘Thematic review of DDR contributions to peacebuilding and the role of the Peacebuilding Fund’, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​www​.un​.org/​peacebuilding/​ sites/​www​.un​.org​.peacebuilding/​files/​documents/​ddr​_pbf​_thematic​_review​.pdf. UN Security Council (1989a), Resolution 640, 29 August, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​ .un​.org/​record/​72140​?ln​=​en. UN Security Council (1989b), Resolution 643, 31 October, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​ digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​76973​?ln​=​en. UN Security Council (1990), Resolution 653, 20 April, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​ .un​.org/​record/​88520​?ln​=​en. UN Security Council (1999), ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’, S/PRST/1999/21, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​GEN/​N99/​202/​64/​PDF/​ N9920264​.pdf​?OpenElement.

DDR and peacekeeping operations  133 UN Security Council (2000), ‘The role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration’, S/2000/101, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​407791​ ?ln​=​en. UNIDIR (2008), ‘Disarmament forum: engaging non-state armed groups’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​ www​ .unidir​ .org/​ files/​ publications/​pdfs/​engaging​-non​-state​-armed​-groups​-en​-326​.pdf. van der Lijn, Jaïr (2017), ‘Asymmetric threats to peace operations’, in Jaïr van der Lijn, Rob de Rave, Timo Smit, and Rianne Siebenga, Progress on UN Peacekeeping Reform, Clingendael Report, October, Clingendael Institute, pp. 27–34, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​www​.jstor​.org/​stable/​ resrep17337​.9. van der Lijn, Jaïr, Luc van de Goor, Jan Rood, and Rosa Dinnissen (eds) (2015), Peacekeeping Operations in a Changing World, The Hague, NL: Clingendael Institute, accessed 7 March 2022 at https://​www​.clingendael​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​pdfs/​Peacekeeping​%20operations​%20in​%20a​ %20changing​%20world​.pdf. Verhey, Beth (2001), The Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers: El Salvador Case Study, World Bank Group, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​web​.worldbank​.org/​archive/​website00523/​ WEB/​PDF/​ELSALVAD​.PDF. World Bank (2010), MDRP Final Report: Overview of Program Achievements, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​mdrp​.org/​ PDFs/​MDRP​_Final​_Report​.pdf.

10. Peacekeeping, security sector reform, and the rule of law Robert A. Blair

The rule of law is widely viewed as indispensable for good governance, economic growth, and the protection of human rights (Rajagopal 2008). It is also crucial for sustained peace and stability, especially in countries recovering from civil war. Where the rule of law is strong, citizens can seek redress for grievances through equitable laws enforced by effective, legitimate security and justice institutions – police forces, courts, prisons – rather than the use of violence. Citizens can also engage in social, political, and economic life without fear that they will be targeted by state security forces for capricious or purely political reasons. Brutality by state security forces and other violations of the rule of law can ‘inflame the grievances’ that motivate civilians to rebel (World Bank Group and United Nations 2018, pp. 166–7). Strengthening the rule of law is thus one of the most important ‘preventive actions’ that the international community can take to reduce the risk of civil war (Carnegie Corporation of New York 1997, p. xviii). For all these reasons, the rule of law is now seen as integral to peacekeeping, statebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction more generally (Kaspersen et al. 2004). Perhaps no international organization has embraced this idea more wholeheartedly than the United Nations (UN). While I will discuss rule of law promotion by other international (and domestic) actors in this chapter, I will focus primarily on the role of UN missions. Foreign donors, international organizations (like the World Bank), and regional peacekeeping operations (like ECOMOG in West Africa) may intervene in ways that help restore the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict settings, but most play narrow advisory roles and limit their efforts to countries with intact (if dysfunctional) security and justice institutions (Trenkov-Wermuth 2010, p. 10). Regional peacekeeping operations also tend to have more “traditional” mandates focused on security provision (Heldt and Wallensteen 2011), and tend to prioritize military intervention over other forms of engagement (World Bank Group and United Nations 2018, pp. 92, 238). The UN takes a much more intensive and comprehensive approach. Indeed, only the UN has been mandated to establish new legal and political regimes ‘virtually from the ground up’ (Trenkov-Wermuth 2010, p. 10). Establishing the rule of law is a multidimensional and multilevel problem. At the national level, new laws and constitutions must be written, and existing ones must be amended. Police officers, soldiers, judges, defense attorneys, prison wardens, and other state security and justice personnel must be recruited and trained. Police stations, courts, and prisons must be built or refurbished. But these national-level efforts are often just the ‘tip of the iceberg’ (Manning 2003, p. 36). At the local level, citizens and other non-state actors must learn to trust and rely on the state to intervene when crimes are committed or violence occurs. They also must refrain from adjudicating disputes in ways that violate state laws and rule of law principles – for example, through the use of mob justice or trial by ordeal. In this sense, the rule of law is more than just a set of rules and procedures. It is also a ‘normative system that resides in the minds’ of citizens (Carothers 2006, p. 20). The rule of law thus depends on more than just 134

Peacekeeping, security sector reform, and the rule of law  135 the integrity of state officials and the quality of state laws and institutions at the macro level. It also depends on the attitudes and behaviors of citizens at the micro level, and of religious authorities, traditional (or customary) leaders, warlords, vigilante groups, and other non-state actors at the meso level. In some cases, these authorities may cooperate with states and international organizations to co-produce security and justice; in other cases, they may compete with the state, adjudicating crimes and resolving disputes in ways that usurp state jurisdiction. Either way, they play a crucial role in the rule of law. In this chapter, I begin by defining the rule of law as it is typically understood among policymakers and practitioners, especially within the UN system. I then describe the evolving role of security sector reform (SSR) and rule of law promotion within the international community’s peacebuilding agenda, providing empirical examples to illustrate this evolution. I focus on SSR because this remains by far the most prominent feature of the UN’s rule of law agenda, though as I have argued elsewhere (Blair 2020), legal, justice sector, and corrections reform are arguably just as important. Most scholars are skeptical of the prospects for SSR and rule of law reform in the world’s weakest and most war-torn states. I summarize these skeptical perspectives, then provide an overview of the (limited) existing evidence on the efficacy of SSR and rule of law programming, focusing again on the UN. I conclude by suggesting a path forward for future research.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND RULE OF LAW PROMOTION IN PRACTICE According to a 2008 Guidance Note from the UN Secretary-General, the rule of law is best understood as a set of principles according to which all actors in a society are held accountable to laws that are ‘publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated,’ and which are ‘consistent with international human rights norms and standards’ (UN Secretary-General 2008, p. 1). Establishing the rule of law thus requires ensuring ‘adherence to the principle of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency’ (UN Secretary-General 2008, p. 1). This conceptualization echoes prominent definitions of the rule of law from legal and political theory (Sannerholm et al. 2012). While the importance of these principles is now widely acknowledged, the idea that the international community should even attempt to restore the rule of law in post-conflict settings is a relatively recent innovation. In 1996, the UN Security Council passed its first resolution that explicitly mentioned the phrase “rule of law” as a goal to which post-conflict countries should aspire (UN Security Council 1996). The 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, known as the Brahimi Report, advocated for a ‘doctrinal shift’ in the UN’s approach to rule of law promotion, which would involve the deployment of larger and more integrated teams of legal, judicial, and corrections officers as a part of all multidimensional peacekeeping operations (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000, p. 7). To that end, a Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS) was established at UN headquarters in 2003, consisting of Justice, Corrections, and Policy teams. In 2007, the UN Secretary-General convened an Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force in order to develop an ‘integrated, holistic, and coherent’ approach to SSR (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

136  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations 2012, p. 19). Also in 2007, the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) was established within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and a Standing Police Capacity (SPC) was created to provide ‘start-up’ policing capabilities for UN missions (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2013, p. 6). A Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity (JCSC) was introduced in 2011 to complement the SPC. From a practical perspective, most rule of law programming by the UN and other international actors is designed to target the host state’s “justice chain”: police forces, courts, and prisons, and (to a lesser extent) laws themselves (Sannerholm et al. 2012). Police reform is the most prominent of these activities and was among the first to appear on the UN’s agenda for building peace in post-conflict societies. The first mission to engage in police reform in a serious, sustained way was the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG). UNTAG police officers attempted to impart principles of ‘even-handed,’ ‘non-discriminatory,’ and ‘democratic’ policing to their Namibian counterparts, which they reinforced through joint patrols and co-deployments in the field (Howard 2019, p. 69). UNTAG’s police contingent also tracked the progress of politically sensitive cases through the criminal justice system. Other missions have followed UNTAG’s lead, and police reform has since become a ‘central and often successful’ component of many UN mandates (Trenkov-Wermuth 2010, p. 3). Police reform falls under the more general category of SSR, which also includes military (or defense) reform. Much of military reform involves activities that are unlikely to contribute to the rule of law in a direct way – for example, training newly recruited soldiers to eliminate enemy combatants on the battlefield. However, military reform can also entail enhancing civilian oversight, restructuring the relationship between the armed forces and other security providers, and increasing accountability for members of the armed services who are implicated in abuses against civilian populations within the host state’s own borders. These activities can be important for restoring the rule of law. The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), for example, was mandated to help the Salvadoran government establish a clearer separation of powers and responsibilities between the police and military, with the goal of limiting the latter’s previously dominant (and predatory) role in maintaining internal security. Under ONUSAL’s guidance, the Salvadoran government reduced the size of the army by more than half, purged 100 high-ranking officers for human rights abuses committed as part of counterinsurgency operations, and introduced a new system of civilian oversight. These are generally regarded as some of the mission’s more enduring accomplishments (Howard 2008, p. 114). While military reform was historically understood to be a largely independent process, in recent years it has been reconceptualized as part of a multifaceted set of reforms spanning not just the military and the police, but the courts, prisons, and civil society as well. Compared to the UN’s relatively promising early experiences with military and police reform, legal, correctional, and (especially) judicial reform have proven more challenging, and occupied a less central place in the UN’s strategic repertoire. In some cases, host governments have objected to any attempt to reform these sectors in more than superficial ways; in other cases, the UN’s efforts have simply proven too shallow and perfunctory to change the status quo. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), for example, was mandated to help the Cambodian government implement judicial reform in advance of national elections scheduled for 1993. As part of this process, UNTAC drafted a new penal code and issued new rules in specific areas of Cambodian law (Howard 2008, p. 150). But UNTAC’s

Peacekeeping, security sector reform, and the rule of law  137 efforts were not commensurate with the severity of the dysfunction in the Cambodian judiciary, and the results were ‘disappointing’ and ‘inconsequential’ (Trenkov-Wermuth 2010, p. 3). Nor was UNTAC’s experience unique. As the Brahimi Report lamented, ‘the United Nations has faced situations in the past decade where the Security Council has authorized the deployment of several thousand police in a peacekeeping operation but has resisted the notion of providing the same operation with even 20 or 30 criminal justice experts’ (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000, p. 7). A 2006 report similarly warns that ‘UN investment in police reform has often been undermined by a lack of corresponding and coherent support to the judicial system’ (Carlson 2006, p. 2). While this situation has improved somewhat in the years since the latter report was published, SSR continues to dominate the UN’s rule of law agenda, with legal, correctional, and judicial reform occupying a secondary role. Of the approximately $7.1 billion devoted to peacekeeping operations in 2014, for example, just 0.4 percent was spent on justice sector personnel, and another 0.4 percent on corrections personnel. These constituted 0.28 percent and 0.35 percent, respectively, of the approximately 120 000 personnel deployed to UN missions worldwide (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2014). It is perhaps not surprising that underinvestment in these areas has led to underwhelming results. The reform processes described above all focus on the performance of state actors and institutions at the macro level. But equally important are the attitudes and behaviors of citizens and non-state actors at the micro and meso levels. Historically, international interveners have typically assumed that ‘local level action could be deferred for years while national state structures were being recreated’ (Sisk and Risley 2005, p. i). In recent years, however, the UN has begun to engage citizens more directly in the process of restoring the rule of law. During Liberia’s constitutional review process of 2013, for example, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) distributed over 20 000 copies of the Liberian constitution, alongside civic education materials designed to inform Liberian citizens about the review process and their role in it (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2014). UNMIL also disseminated information about ongoing legal, judicial, and security sector reforms via UN radio, pamphlets, workshops, and other mechanisms (UN Security Council 2004), and conducted nationwide school- and village-based ‘community policing awareness campaigns’ to encourage citizen cooperation with the police and emphasize the importance of police/community relations for crime prevention (UN Security Council 2010, p. 13). Similarly, in Namibia, UNTAG mounted skits and plays illustrating ‘how citizens should expect to be treated by a legitimate police force’ and ‘how to register complaints,’ among other themes, and organized the distribution of some 600 000 T-shirts, pins, and other paraphernalia communicating the mission’s messages about security, democracy, and the rule of law (Howard 2019, pp. 66–7). UN missions also attempt to facilitate sustained, mutually respectful contact between civilians and security and justice personnel through joint patrols and co-location with their state counterparts. These activities are designed in part to provide stability and prevent a relapse into civil conflict. But they are also and equally importantly intended to repair historically adversarial relations between civilians and the state (Blair 2019). Indeed, this is explicit in the UN’s own policies. For example, the UN’s 2014 Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions explains that joint patrols not only instill a sense of security, but also ‘contribute to creating an environment for the host state to begin reasserting its sovereign authority and re-establishing ties to local communities’ (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field

138  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Support 2014, p. 7). The policy goes on to explain that UN police officers, through their ‘independence, impartiality, commitment to UN values, and compliance with international human rights,’ may be able to ‘create strong positive expectations of host state police, foster popular confidence in the police, and engender legitimacy in the eyes of local populations’ (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2014, pp. 6–7) – all of which should help advance rule of law principles. In general, however, most scholars and many policymakers are skeptical of the notion that third-party SSR and rule of law reform can even begin to overcome the many challenges to effective, legitimate security and justice provision in conflict and post-conflict states. Critics have accused the international community of adopting a ‘breathtakingly mechanistic approach’ to rule of law promotion (Carothers 2006, p. 21), and of pursuing ‘cookie cutter’ reforms with an almost ‘template-like quality’ (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010, p. 288). Even the (apparently) more successful elements of the international community’s rule of law agenda are sometimes criticized as inadequate or incomplete. For example, while the UN has relatively comprehensive protocols in place for military reform, these are rarely enacted as smoothly as anticipated, and implementation is often plagued with coordination problems (Boucher 2009). While scholars have long argued that peacekeeping is an effective mechanism for protecting civilians and preventing a relapse into civil war, they are generally more dubious of the UN’s ability to rebuild states and repair their damaged relationships with citizens. In countries recovering from prolonged periods of conflict, restoring the rule of law can sometimes seem to be a ‘Sisyphean task’ (Haggard and Tiede 2013, p. 465).

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON PEACEKEEPING, SECURITY, SECTOR REFORM, AND THE RULE OF LAW Despite this prevailing pessimism, and despite ‘exploding practical interest’ in rule of law promotion in conflict and post-conflict settings, empirical research on the topic remains ‘surprisingly limited’ (Haggard and Tiede 2013, p. 406). Theoretically, most studies of international intervention focus on the ways that UN (and non-UN) peacekeeping operations mitigate commitment problems and information asymmetries between armed actors (for example, Doyle and Sambanis 2000; 2006; Hultman et al. 2016; Walter 1997). As important and informative as these studies have been, they are more relevant to the short-term goal of preventing conflict recurrence than the longer-term task of rehabilitating state security and justice institutions and restoring the rule of law. Empirically, most studies focus on a relatively narrow range of outcomes, most of them related to violence of one sort or another (for example, Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004; 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Hultman 2010; Hultman et al. 2013; Kreps and Wallace 2009; Ruggeri et al. 2017). Few address the rule of law per se. This lack of empirical evidence is apparent even within the UN system itself, which typically relies on retrospective anecdotal studies of particular missions or projects, and which lacks a coherent strategy for measuring the impact of rule of law programming (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2012, p. 5). As a result, there is a risk that ‘assumptions, isolated observations, and anecdotal accounts are elevated to the status of facts’ about the efficacy of SSR and rule of law reform by the UN and other international actors (Sannerholm et al. 2012, p. 11).

Peacekeeping, security sector reform, and the rule of law  139 Macro-level evidence  To my knowledge, only three published studies have tested the relationship between international intervention and the rule of law cross-nationally, at the macro level. In an analysis of all civil wars that ended between 1970 and 1999, Stephen Haggard and Lydia Tiede find that the presence of a UN mission is correlated with stronger constraints on the host state executive branch. They speculate that this improvement may be a function of ‘explicit constitutional engineering on the part of outside parties’ (Haggard and Tiede 2013, p. 414). But they also find that UN presence is not correlated with other potential proxies for the rule of law, including Freedom House indices of political rights and civil liberties. As the authors note, however, their results are ‘preliminary’ (Haggard and Tiede 2013, p. 413). Estimating the impact of international intervention on the rule of law requires resolving ‘complex issues of endogeneity especially in regard to the influence of UN intervention’ – issues that Haggard and Tiede by their own account do not attempt to address (Haggard and Tiede 2013, p. 414). Blair (2020; 2021) extends Haggard and Tiede’s analysis, examining all conflict and post-conflict African countries between 1989 and 2016. Rather than focus on the presence or absence of a UN mission, Blair operationalizes peacekeeping using four different proxies: the number of (1) uniformed and (2) civilian personnel deployed to each UN mission in Africa, (3) the number of personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks (for example, police reform), and (4) the extent of actual engagement in rule of law-related activities in the field (for example, efforts to retrain police officers). He measures the rule of law using multiple proxies, including indices from the World Bank, Freedom House, Polity IV, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, and Linzer and Staton (2015). Blair finds that the rule of law improves as the number of personnel deployed to a UN mission increases, but that the magnitude of the correlation is smaller for uniformed personnel than for civilian personnel or personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks. These latter two categories of personnel tend to be more intimately involved in rule of law reform. The rule of law also improves when UN missions actually pursue rule of law-related activities in the field, but the magnitude of the correlation is larger when peacekeepers engage host states in the process of reform, rather than bypassing them altogether. These correlations are weak or negative in countries experiencing ongoing civil wars, but consistently positive in countries that have enjoyed at least one year of peace. While Blair’s results are associational rather than causal, he argues that UN missions tend to expand in size and scope during the “hardest” moments for rule of law reform, suggesting that the correlations may understate the true causal effect of UN personnel and activities on the rule of law. Table 10.1 summarizes these and other studies of the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law (and related outcomes). Several other studies provide evidence that is suggestive of a positive relationship between UN intervention and the rule of law cross-nationally, even though they do not address SSR or rule of law reform explicitly. In a cross-country quantitative analysis covering all civil wars from 1945 to 1999, Doyle and Sambanis (2006, pp. 73, 131–2) find that multidimensional peacekeeping operations not only reduce the risk that civil war will recur, but also promote ‘participatory’ peace, characterized by a ‘minimum level of political openness.’ They argue that this effect is due to the ‘institutional development that UN missions foster in the immediate postwar period.’ While they do not test this hypothesis in a direct way, it seems possible that institutional development might be beneficial not just for peace and democracy, but for the rule of law as well. Heldt (2012) and Steinert and Grimm (2015) reach similar conclusions.

140  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Table 10.1

Empirical evidence on UN peacekeeping and the rule of law

Author

Level of Analysis

Summary

Andreas 2008

Micro

UN peacekeepers in Bosnia permit and in some cases participate in an illicit economy that emerged during the 1992–95 battle for Sarajevo, prolonging the conflict by creating lucrative business opportunities for black marketeers

Barnett et al. 2014

Micro, meso

UN peacekeepers reproduce the status quo relationship between citizens and local and national elites in host countries; the result is “compromised peacebuilding” rather than liberal democratic reform

Beber et al. 2017

Micro

Blair 2019

Micro, meso

UN peacekeepers in Liberia increase the prevalence of transactional sex among women and girls in the capital city of Monrovia UN peacekeepers in Liberia increase citizens’ reliance on state over non-state authorities, and increase non-state authorities’ reliance on legal over illegal mechanisms of dispute resolution

Blair 2020

Micro, meso, macro

UN peacekeepers in Liberia increase citizens’ reliance on state authorities but also increase citizens’ perceptions of state corruption in the short term; UN peacekeepers improve African countries’ performance on rule of law indices, but only during periods of peace

Blair 2021

Macro

UN peacekeepers in Africa improve countries’ performance on rule of law indices after civil war termination; this relationship is driven in particular by civilian personnel, and is strongest when UN missions engage host states in the process of reform

Di Salvatore 2019

Micro, macro

UN military deployments around the world and in South Sudan exacerbate homicide rates in host states, while UN police deployments mitigate them; the discrepancy is due to UN police contingents’ greater involvement in capacity building, patrolling, and law enforcement

Haggard and Tiede

Macro

2013 Howard 2008

UN peacekeepers around the world strengthen constraints on the executive but have no effect on other potential proxies for the rule of law

Micro, macro

UN peacekeepers around the world promote legal, constitutional, and institutional reforms (including SSR) when they maintain the consent of the host state and engage in first-level organizational learning, and when the UN Security Council is actively but only moderately interested in their operations

Howard 2019

Micro, macro

UN peacekeepers in Namibia, Lebanon, and Central African Republic promote legal, constitutional, and institutional reforms (including SSR) through a combination of persuasion, inducement, and coercion

Mvukiyehe 2018

Micro

UN peacekeepers in Liberia increase citizens’ participation in national but not local politics, and increase citizens’ willingness to contact government officials for assistance, while decreasing their willingness to contact traditional leaders

More directly, Howard (2008; 2019) finds that UN missions can, under certain conditions, build state institutions that are strong and legitimate enough to endure even after peacekeepers withdraw. She uses a method of ‘structured focused comparison’ to evaluate ‘the extent to which institutions that the UN attempted to monitor, reform, or create continued to function after UN guidance was withdrawn’ (Howard 2008, pp. 7–8). Her sample includes ten of the 35 UN peacekeeping operations deployed in the post-Cold War period, selected for being the most multidimensional (p. 4). Of these ten, she codes five as successes, one as a ‘mixed success,’ and four as failures (p. 9). While she does not address the rule of law per se, several

Peacekeeping, security sector reform, and the rule of law  141 of the proxies that she uses to evaluate success are relevant to rule of law processes – for example, the introduction of ‘important policing reforms,’ or the creation of a ‘new constitution and/or legal system’ (Howard 2008, pp. 4, 353). Howard (2019) expands on these ideas, showing how UN missions promote institutional reform through a combination of persuasion, inducement, and coercion. Beyond these more systematic studies, there is a large and growing array of edited volumes, policy reports, and case studies on SSR and rule of law promotion by both UN and non-UN actors. Of particular note are two reports by researchers at the Folke Bernadotte Academy, both of which draw on original descriptive data on the UN’s rule of law agenda as it has evolved over the past several decades (Folke Bernadotte Academy 2019; Sannerholm et al. 2012). These reports illustrate how rule of law promotion has ‘rapidly grown from virtually nothing in 1989 to something almost all peace operations are currently engaged in’ (Folke Bernadotte Academy 2019, p. 5). The reports also document the ways that rule of law promotion varies in practice, both across settings and over time. Researchers at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) have published widely on the topic of SSR in particular (for example, Ebo and Hänggi 2020), drawing on the perspectives of both scholars and practitioners. Trenkov-Wermuth (2010) offers perhaps the most comprehensive history to date of UN rule of programming. In many cases these reports include the accounts of policymakers who have devoted much of their careers to advancing SSR and rule of law priorities in conflict and post-conflict settings. Micro-level evidence  All of the studies cited above focus first and foremost on the role that peacekeepers play in improving the quality of state security and justice provision, in particular by restructuring state institutions and recruiting, retraining, and monitoring the actions of state security and justice personnel. Ultimately, however, restoring the rule of law requires a change not just in the performance of the state, but also in the attitudes and behaviors of citizens and non-state actors. As Chesterman (2007, p. 19) rightly observes, the ‘heart of the problem’ for rule of law reform is ‘to whom people turn for solutions to problems that would normally be considered legal. What would a woman do if her property were stolen – go to the police? Or what would a man do if his brother were murdered?’ The rule of law depends crucially on the answers to these questions. Improving the quality of state security and justice provision is, of course, a key component of any effort to restore state/society relations in the wake of civil war. But it is not sufficient. The rule of law at the micro and meso levels cannot be manufactured by the ‘simple expedient of creating formal structures and rewriting constitutions and statutes’ (Brooks 2003, p. 2285). As I have argued elsewhere, citizens’ willingness to trust and rely on state security and justice institutions does not simply “trickle down” from efforts to reform those institutions at the national level (Blair 2019; 2020; Blair and Morse 2021). It emerges over time, through repeated interactions between civilians and state actors at the local level. The UN itself increasingly recognizes this reality. As the 2012 Civil Affairs Handbook rightly notes, ‘in order to restore the state’s authority it is necessary to restore its legitimacy and this can only be achieved when the government and the society are engaged in an open and responsive dialogue’ (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Policy and Best Practices Service 2012, p. 191). As with the macro level, empirical evidence on rule of law reform at the micro level remains scant. At least two studies have tested the relationship between peacekeeping and local-level proxies for the rule of law in a direct and systematic way. Using an original survey and survey experiment in Liberia, Blair (2019) shows that exposure to UN patrols, public works, and

142  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations interventions to resolve disputes increases citizens’ reliance on state over non-state actors to address the most serious incidents of crime and violence, and increases non-state actors’ reliance on legal over illegal mechanisms of dispute resolution – in particular, trial by ordeal. In Liberia, as in many other post-conflict settings, non-state actors play a key role in adjudicating crimes and resolving conflicts in areas where the state is absent. In some cases, state and non-state actors develop a symbiotic relationship; in other cases, non-state actors usurp state authority, creating ‘uncertainty or jeopardy’ for disputants who ‘cannot be sure in advance which legal regime will be applied to their situation’ (Tamanaha 2008, p. 410). Blair’s results suggest that UNMIL’s presence helped rationalize the relationship between state and non-state actors in Liberia, creating a more clearly delineated division of legal labor between them. Blair (2019) also finds that exposure to UNMIL may have exacerbated Liberians’ perceptions of state corruption and bias in the short term, but that these apparently adverse effects dissipated over multiple waves of survey data collection. Blair uses a variety of identification strategies to support a causal interpretation of his results, including an instrumental variables strategy that leverages as-if random variation in the intensity of exposure to UNMIL induced by the killing of seven peacekeepers in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, which provoked a plausibly exogenous surge of UNMIL activity on the Liberian side of the border. Blair (2020) expands on these findings and adds excerpts from extensive qualitative interviews to complement and contextualize the quantitative results. Other studies have tested the relationship between peacekeeping and outcomes related to (albeit distinct from) the rule of law at the micro level. Also in Liberia, Mvukiyehe (2018) finds that exposure to UN personnel boosts participation in national (but not local) politics, and increases citizens’ willingness to contact government officials for assistance, while decreasing their willingness to contact traditional leaders. Combining cross-national and sub-national evidence across multiple contexts, Di Salvatore (2019) shows that UN police deployments reduce the prevalence of homicides and other violent crimes in post-conflict settings, while UN military deployments have the opposite effect. She argues that the adverse effect of UN troop presence is a result of the opportunities for organized crime that local peacekeeping economies sometimes create. Andreas (2008) makes a similar point about international intervention and organized crime in Bosnia. With the exception of Andreas (2008), all of the within-country studies cited above rely on quantitative research designs, and all reach (generally) optimistic conclusions about the impact of international intervention on outcomes related to the rule of law. Qualitative researchers tend to be much less sanguine. Focusing on the Congo, Autesserre (2010) argues that UN presence actually exacerbated state/society relations and undermined the goals of SSR by increasing the capacity of Congolese security forces to prey on civilian populations. Pouligny (2006) similarly argues that peacekeepers in Haiti have focused too much attention on reforming state laws and institutions. She describes a ‘divide between legality and daily life’ in Haiti, in which state laws are perceived as ‘at best useless, and at worst in the service of the strongest’ (p. 102). By strengthening the state at the expense of civil society (broadly defined), Pouligny claims that peacekeepers have only exacerbated this problem. Qualitative scholars argue that SSR and rule of law programming can have adverse unintended consequences at the macro, micro, and meso levels simultaneously. Veit (2011, p. 17) argues that UN peacekeepers have tended to ‘strengthen, reconstruct, or modify rather than transcend patterns of indirect rule,’ which Veit characterizes as ‘illiberal,’ since it ‘creates subjects rather than citizens and is based on interpersonal connections rather than judicial rights.’

Peacekeeping, security sector reform, and the rule of law  143 The problem, Veit argues, is that UN missions must seek the consent of non-state actors before implementing reforms. These non-state actors then leverage their bargaining position to solidify illiberal rule – a point echoed by Barnett, Fang, and Zürcher (2014). Veit also notes that overly intrusive international interventions can have the perverse effect of weakening the very same state institutions they are ostensibly mandated to strengthen, reducing host governments to ‘implementing bureaucracies’ (p. 44). Lake (2010; 2016) makes a similar point. Also to this point, Dorussen and Gizelis (2013) argue that host governments are less likely to cooperate with peacekeepers when their actions replace rather than improve state capacity.

WAYS FORWARD FOR RESEARCH How should researchers advance the literature on peacekeeping, SSR, and the rule of law moving forward? I conclude by offering three suggestions. First, researchers should treat the rule of law in general, and the performance of state security and justice institutions specifically, as outcomes worthy of study. The rule of law is widely believed to be essential for stability, democracy, human rights, and economic development, especially in conflict and post-conflict settings (Rajagopal 2008, p. 1348). It has been described as the ‘foundation of a civilized society,’ even ‘the nearest we are likely to approach to a universal secular religion’ (Bingham 2011, pp. 171–4). As Carothers (1998, p. 95) wryly observed over two decades ago, ‘one cannot get through a foreign policy debate these days without someone proposing the rule of law as a solution to the world’s troubles.’ This has become only more true in the intervening years. Peacekeepers are increasingly mandated to restore the rule of law in the world’s weakest and most war-torn states. But scholarship has not kept pace with practice. Researchers should treat the rule of law as a key dependent variable in and of itself, distinct from (albeit related to) peace and democratization. Second, researchers should continue disaggregating peacekeeping personnel and activities in order to generate richer, more specific insights into the ways that peacekeepers (attempt to) promote the rule of law. This recommendation applies to both quantitative and qualitative research, though it is perhaps most applicable to the former. Early peacekeeping research disaggregated missions by mandate type – for example, enforcement vs. multidimensional (for example, Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004). More recent research has distinguished between different categories of uniformed personnel, for example, troops vs. police officers vs. Military Observers (for example, Hultman et al. 2013; 2014). But more can be done. Across countries, Blair (2020; 2021) draws on UN budget requests, budget performance reports, and UN Secretary-General progress reports to code the number of civilian personnel deployed to each UN mission in Africa, the number of personnel assigned specifically to rule of law-related tasks, and the extent of actual engagement in rule of law-related activities. Dorussen and Gizelis (2013), Ruggeri et al. (2011), and Smidt (2017; 2021) similarly use UN Secretary-General progress reports to code concrete peacekeeping activities on the ground, as well as the level of engagement in those activities. There is a wealth of publicly available information on peacekeeping operations. Scholars should use that information to continue disaggregating peacekeeping in these and other ways. Within countries, scholars have begun using surveys and other modes of data collection to operationalize more specific peacekeeping activities at the micro level. Blair (2019; 2020) tests the impact of UN patrols, public works projects, and interventions on citizens’ adherence

144  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations to rule of law principles in Liberia. Also in Liberia, Mvukiyehe (2018) distinguishes between seeing UN patrols and speaking with UN staff. Gordon and Young (2017) disaggregate peacekeeping in Haiti into security provision and delivery of humanitarian relief; they also study abuses by peacekeeping personnel. In a similar vein, Beber et al. (2017) estimate the incidence of transactional sex with UN personnel in Monrovia, Liberia’s capital city. Smidt (2020) studies the impact of UN civic education in Côte d’Ivoire; Mvukiyehe and Samii (2017) study UN security committees in Liberia. UN missions typically exercise more discretion over these activities than over the contents of their mandates or the number of personnel they receive. Disaggregating peacekeeping is thus especially likely to generate actionable policy recommendations for peacekeepers in the field. Research in this area will be especially illuminating if it expands to cover more countries, rather than the relatively small number of countries (notably Liberia and DRC) that have dominated micro-level studies to date. Finally, researchers should test the relationship between peacekeeping, SSR, and the rule of law both within and across countries simultaneously. Most peacekeeping research is either entirely cross-national or entirely sub-national, though some quantitative cross-national studies also include qualitative chapters on specific countries, typically based on secondary sources (for example, Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Cross-national studies may yield more generalizable results, but they tend to rely on coarse proxies for both their dependent and independent variables, and often require strong (and sometimes implausible) assumptions about the comparability of different country contexts. Sub-national studies typically use more granular proxies and minimize contextual differences, but they may lack external validity, as results from one setting may fail to generalize to others. At least two recent studies attempt to overcome these limitations by combining cross-country and within-country research designs to answer the same research question (Blair 2020; Di Salvatore 2019). This strikes me as a promising direction for future peacekeeping scholars to pursue.

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Peacekeeping, security sector reform, and the rule of law  147 Trenkov-Wermuth, Calin (2010), United Nations Justice: Legal and Judicial Reform in Governance Operations, Tokyo, JP: UN University Press. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2012), ‘The United Nations SSR Perspective’, accessed 6 March 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​ssr​_perspective​_2012​.pdf. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2013), UN Police Magazine, United Nations, 11th edition, July, accessed 6 March 2022 at https://​police​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​unpolmag​_11​.pdf. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2014), ‘Justice & Corrections Update’, December, accessed 6 March 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​cl​jasnewslet​terfinalen​.pdf. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support (2014), ‘DPKO/DFS Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions’, Ref. 2014.01, accessed 6 March 2022 at https://​police​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​sgf​-policy​-police​-2014​.pdf. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Policy and Best Practices Service (2012), United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support Civil Affairs Handbook, New York, NY, USA: United Nations. UN General Assembly and Security Council (2000), ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’ (‘Brahimi Report’), A/55/305-S/2000/809, accessed 6 March 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​ .un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​a​_55​_305​_e​_brahimi​_report​.pdf. UN Secretary-General (2008), ‘Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance’, accessed 6 March 2022 at https://​www​.un​.org/​ruleoflaw/​blog/​document/​guidance​-note​ -of​-the​-secretary​-general​-un​-approach​-to​-rule​-of​-law​-assistance/​. UN Security Council (1996), Resolution 1040, S/RES/1040, accessed 6 March 2022 at https://​ digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​203117​?ln​=​en. UN Security Council (2004), ‘Fifth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia’, S/2004/972, accessed 6 March 2022 at https://​documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​ UNDOC/​GEN/​N04/​645/​85/​PDF/​N0464585​.pdf​?OpenElement. UN Security Council (2010), ‘Twenty-first Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia’, S/2010/429, accessed 6 March 2022 at https://​documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​ doc/​UNDOC/​GEN/​N10/​475/​99/​PDF/​N1047599​.pdf​?OpenElement. Veit, Alex (2011), Intervention as Indirect Rule: Civil War and Statebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Frankfurt, DE: Campus Verlag. Walter, Barbara F. (1997), ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’, International Organization, 51 (3), 335–64. World Bank Group and United Nations (2018), Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, accessed 6 March 2022 at http://​hdl​.handle​.net/​10986/​28337.

11. Public information and strategic communications in peace operations Kseniya Oksamytna

INTRODUCTION Public information and strategic communications play a crucial role in contemporary peace operations. Information specialists explain the mission’s mandate, manage expectations, dispel misconceptions, and promote peace, human rights, and reconciliation. They use a variety of channels to reach their audiences, like radio, television, print materials, social media, and even theater and dance. Until the mid-2010s, the UN referred to this function as “public information,” while the recent shift to the term “strategic communications” underlines the ambition to make engagement more interactive and connect it firmly with the organization’s political strategies. In many UN peacekeeping missions, units dealing with information and communications have been among the largest civilian components. Notwithstanding the consensus on the crucial role of public information and strategic communications in peace operations (Howard 2019; Lehmann 1999), this function has until recently remained under-researched. Public information and strategic communications in peace operations have gained in importance over time for two reasons. First, peace operations are increasingly deployed in contexts where they face asymmetric threats and become targets of hostile propaganda by armed factions. While this is by no means a new problem, it has been particularly acute in several recent missions, such as the African Union’s (AU) operation in Somalia (Williams 2018). Second, expanding access to new technologies, particularly mobile phones, has allowed rumors to spread faster than ever before, creating a pressing need to counter disinformation (Sherman and Trithart 2021). This chapter provides an overview of existing and ongoing research on public information and strategic communications in peace operations. It begins by providing a brief history of this issue’s trajectory in UN peacekeeping and outlines how other international organizations have used communication strategies in their operations. It proceeds to examine theoretical perspectives on the contribution of information and communications to the success of peace operations. It then summarizes findings from the academic and policy literature on the characteristics of effective communications strategies. It ends with a discussion of future research avenues.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLIC INFORMATION AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS Peace operations communicate with several audiences. First, they communicate with the population in their area of deployment. This is the most familiar aspect of such work, which entails disseminating information about the mission and its mandate in the local language(s). 148

Public information and strategic communications in peace operations  149 Such communications are additionally aimed at diasporas. Second, peace operations communicate with stakeholders on whom they rely for support, ranging from international diplomats stationed in the host state to the public in countries that contribute troops, police, or finances to the operation. This type of communication seeks to demonstrate that human and material resources invested in the mission are delivering results. Third, peace operations communicate with internal audiences – their uniformed and civilian personnel. It keeps them updated about the mission’s work, promotes esprit de corps, and can serve, as von Billerbeck (2020) argues, self-legitimation purposes. Public information activities in UN peacekeeping date back to the organization’s early days (Oksamytna 2018). The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC, 1960–64) produced radio broadcasts and leaflets explaining its mandate and role. The UN Temporary Executive Authority in West Irian (UNTEA, 1962–63) used posters and discussion groups to explain to the population how the territory’s administration would be transferred from the Netherlands to Indonesia. However, the rapid development of public information in UN peacekeeping took place in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG, 1989–90) was the first operation to run a full-fledged information campaign. It produced radio and television programs, had a slogan (‘UNTAG – Free and Fair Elections in Namibia’), and distributed stationery, posters, bumper stickers, and T-shirts (Lehmann 1999). The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992–93) implemented an even more ambitious information campaign using print media, videos, and community outreach. It also broke new ground by establishing its own radio station. UNTAC information officials and the head of mission had to do a lot of convincing because the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, was initially opposed to the idea (Oksamytna n.d.). Radio UNTAC played an integral role in encouraging almost 90 percent of Cambodians to vote in a difficult political and security environment. The UN radio reassured Cambodians of the ballot’s secrecy and gave political parties equal airtime to explain their manifestos (Findlay 1995). It was also a foray into two-way, interactive communications: the station established ‘a sense of connection with the audience by, among other things, reading letters from listeners on the air and playing request songs’ (Marston 1996, p. 227). Despite its universal popularity, Radio UNTAC stirred controversy, highlighting the sensitive nature of information and communications in peacekeeping. Some Cambodians complained that its popular song dedication program, where listeners could request a song for their romantic interest, endangered traditional norms and ‘triggered the break-up of families’ (Zhou 1994, p. 129). This was the early indication of the importance of making information and communications strategies appropriate for the local circumstances. Throughout the 1990s, UN peace operations had varying degrees of success with their communications activities. The UN Protection Force in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR, 1992–95) struggled in this regard due to a limited understanding of the local dynamics, the lack of resources in the initial stage, and errors of judgment by the mission leadership (Oksamytna 2018). In contrast to UNPROFOR, the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES, 1996–98) was more successful, mostly because the head of the mission made public relations a priority (Lehmann 1999; Thompson 2000). During the post-1999 peacekeeping surge, public information started attracting more consistent attention in UN peacekeeping. The 2000 Brahimi Report called it ‘an operational necessity’ (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000, p. 25). In 2006, the UN formalized Policy and Guidance for Public Information in UN Peacekeeping Operations,

150  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations which superseded the 1997 Provisional Guidelines for Public Information Components in UN Peacekeeping and Other Field Missions. The policy was updated in 2016 and renamed Strategic Communications and Public Information Policy. Most twenty-first-century UN peacekeeping operations have received Security Council mandates mentioning public information, voter education, and sometimes media development (Di Salvatore et al. 2022). The number of staff working on the issue has steadily increased, with several missions employing more than 100 information specialists (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2011). In the mid-2010s, the emphasis shifted to ‘strategic communications,’ defined as ‘a comprehensive effort to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or maintain conditions favorable for the advancement of the mission’s interests, policies, and objectives’ (Birnback 2019, p. 4). UN peacekeeping operations have started to explore digital and interactive means of communication, such as social media channels ranging from Twitter to YouTube. Still, the 2015 High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations stressed that the ‘outdated public information approach … must be transformed into more dynamic communications efforts that reinforce the overall political approach and the role of the mission’ (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2015, p. 92). The issue of strategic communications has been made a priority in the most recent round of peacekeeping reforms, the so-called A4P+, or the 2021–23 stage of the ‘Action for Peacekeeping’ (A4P) agenda (UN Peacekeeping 2021). Besides the UN, other international organizations that deploy peace operations have undertaken information and communications activities. In Afghanistan, NATO’s communications efforts were aimed at sustaining the support for the intervention in the contributor countries while trying to convince the local population to turn away from the Taliban. Its biweekly free newspaper, ISAF News, had the highest circulation of all Afghan newspapers (Peters 2010). The two EU operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), deployed in 2003 and 2006 in support of UN peacekeepers, were considered successful examples of strategic communications. In the 2003 mission, the ‘leadership attributed great value to its public information team,’ which helped create an image of seamless EU–UN cooperation (UN DPKO 2004). In the 2006 mission, the information campaign was even more advanced and included radio broadcasts, brochures, and a weekly newspaper (Tull 2009). In Kosovo, the EU established a press office for its mission, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which produced television ads and organized an interactive roadshow (Peters 2010). The AU, due to its limited civilian capacities, has relied on external support in the field of information and communications. For example, the UK’s Department for International Development contracted a private company, Albany Associates, to develop a communications campaign about the Darfur peace process on behalf of the AU mission (and subsequently the UN–AU mission, UNAMID, 2007–20). The same company became part of a private consortium that was hired to support the AU mission in Somalia and the UN political mission there through the so-called AU–UN Information Support Team (Williams 2018). Among all the organizations mentioned above, the UN has the most experience with information and communications activities in peace operations, and the remainder of the chapter will focus on the UN.

Public information and strategic communications in peace operations  151

INFORMATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS According to Alan Doss, who served as the head or deputy head of the UN operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and the DRC, in each of those contexts, ‘UN radio stations were literally worth their weight in gold’ (Doss 2020, p. 276). There are four mechanisms through which public information and strategic communications contribute to peacekeeping success: transparency and early warning, legitimacy, behavior change, and capacity-building. Transparency and early warning  Lindley (2004; 2007) investigates how UN information staff can promote transparency and, in turn, strengthen peace. Peacekeeping – at the very least, UN peacekeeping – works through enhancing trust between the factions by reassuring them that all participants in the peace process honor their commitments (Fortna 2008; Ruggeri et al. 2013; 2017). Monitoring and reporting on non-compliance with peace agreements have traditionally been the responsibility of military observers, while senior mission leaders undertake high-level engagement with factions’ top brass. Yet information and communications staff play a key role in reassuring rank-and-file (former) combatants, as well as their families and supporters, that their opponents are disarming or transforming themselves into non-violent actors, such as political parties. Information and communications staff can also contribute to early warning through media monitoring. Even during the Cold War, peacekeeping operations were responsible for ‘sending a summary of the day’s local press reports, especially as they concerned the mission, to the peacekeeping office in New York’ (Thornberry 2004, p. 64). Over the years, this function has become more sophisticated. In contemporary operations, information specialists engage in media monitoring ‘to track the local political landscape, enrich political analysis, and feed into operational planning and security assessments’ (Birnback 2019, p. 11). Monitoring local media, including social media, can enable peacekeepers to detect and counter hate speech. For example, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) has public information assistants ‘dedicated to 24-hour social media monitoring and response’ (UN Secretary-General 2018, p. 21). In 2020, MONUSCO created a working group on countering hate speech under the leadership of its human rights office, and the Public Information Division is its crucial participant (MONUSCO and UN Joint Human Rights Office in the DRC 2021). Legitimacy   To implement their mandate, especially the ambitious peacebuilding dimensions of it, peacekeepers need the cooperation (or at a minimum, the acceptance) of the local population. For this reason, peacekeepers seek to create and sustain the perception that their authority is legitimate. UN peace operations have two main sources of legitimacy: procedural legitimacy, stemming from compliance with UN principles and norms, and output legitimacy, stemming from efficient performance (von Billerbeck 2017). Regarding procedural legitimacy, one of the central, albeit heavily contested, UN peacekeeping norms is impartiality (Laurence 2019). Peacekeepers’ communications therefore stress impartiality – a principle that has evolved from the earlier principle of neutrality (Paddon Rhoads 2016). For example, UNTAC’s communications strategy ‘spoke directly to the people, countering factional propaganda and demonstrating the operation’s political and ideological neutrality in the field’ (Whalan 2013, p. 138). Information staff can enhance the perceptions of peacekeepers’ impartiality in several ways. They can highlight that the mission engages with all stakeholders in an even-handed manner by publicizing peacekeeping leaders’ meetings both with the government and the opposition. .

152  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations They can assure that the mission reports on human rights violations by all sides. They can show that peacekeeper-provided material assistance (for example, Quick Impact Projects) benefits all communities equally (Oksamytna n.d.). The role of information staff can be particularly important because not all UN peacekeeping personnel are equally willing to perform neutrality. For example, a recent audit noted that some peacekeepers displayed religious symbols in their offices, while a number of contingents engaged in outright proselytizing, yet the peacekeeping department had no authority to regulate external expressions of religion by mission personnel (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2021). Another key set of UN principles and norms relates to conduct and discipline. Sexual exploitation and abuse cause irreparable damage to peacekeepers’ reputations.1 Despite decades of attention to this issue, ensuring accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse – for example, at the level of mission leaders – remains a challenge for the UN (Lundgren et al. 2022). Information staff play a dual role here. First, in cooperation with conduct and discipline colleagues and mission leadership, they engage in internal communications to emphasize peacekeepers’ legal and ethical obligations. The 2015 UN Policy on Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Missions mentions ‘raising awareness, including through public communication’ as an element of prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (UN DPA, DPKO, and DFS 2015, p. 4). Second, in terms of outward communications, information staff can promptly acknowledge failings, outline remedial steps taken, and reassure the population that measures are implemented to address the problem. While missions might be disinclined to admit misconduct, delayed communications in crisis situations (or, worse, silence and cover-up) exacerbates the matter in the long run. The tardiness and prevarication with which the UN admitted its role in the 2010 cholera epidemic in Haiti is an example. The epidemic was caused by sewage from the Nepalese peacekeeping camp that had been dumped in a nearby river by a subcontractor, a local waste management company. The camp housed soldiers who had arrived from the Nepalese capital that was at the time experiencing an outbreak of cholera, caused by a strain of the bacteria hitherto unknown in Haiti. The ensuing epidemic killed almost 10 000 Haitians, yet the UN tried to avoid attributing blame (Frerichs 2016). This episode also highlights the key role played by an understudied category of actors in peace operations – contractors delivering essential services for peacekeepers, as well as administrative staff in charge of such contracts and overall compliance. Regarding output legitimacy, delivering on key mandated tasks, such as security and the protection of civilians, is an important component (von Billerbeck 2017). As Müller (2020, p. 780) observes, ‘when failing to fulfil expected protection needs, be they reasonable or not, a mission’s legitimacy and acceptance by local actors is easily put into jeopardy.’ For example, from late 2019 onward, the local population has demanded MONUSCO’s departure because of its perceived inefficiency in protecting civilians, resorting to such tactics as protests, roadblocks, and, on one occasion, setting fire to a MONUSCO base and a local town hall. In response, MONUSCO information staff stressed the difficulties of protecting civilians in the dense jungle, noted that destroying UN bases or local government buildings complicated peacekeepers’ work, and explained that MONUSCO was there at the invitation of the host government and could not itself decide whether and when to leave (Al Jazeera 2021; Mahamba 2019). Behavior change  A significant proportion of peacekeepers’ communications go beyond informing about their mandate and activities: they seek to change attitudes and behaviors.

Public information and strategic communications in peace operations  153 This is what Howard (2019) identifies as persuasion, one of the three types of power that peacekeepers exercise, along with coercion and inducement. While there are different kinds of persuasion that both military and civilian peacekeepers use in their day-to-day work, one of them – outreach and public information – is the domain of UN communications staff. Naturally, all peace operations seek to discourage violence and promote understanding and conciliation. It is sometimes called ‘propaganda for peace’ (Spicer 1994), yet the UN is careful to avoid such language. In fact, the UN tries to create a perception that its information and communications strategies are not aimed at “winning hearts and minds.” While national militaries frequently use information strategically, and sometimes deceptively (Sherman and Trithart 2021), the UN has ‘distanced itself from the language of psychological or information operations as these carry distinctly negative connotations’ (Hunt 2006, p. 50). In reality, strategic communications in peace operations are aimed precisely at shaping opinions, attitudes, and behaviors, although they need to remain truthful and above board. The language of information operations has already made it into some recent UN documents on the protection of civilians (UN DPO 2020). Information and communications in peace operations can contribute to behavior change directly or indirectly. Indirectly, they can do so by encouraging local actors to participate in peacekeepers’ initiatives. For example, communications campaigns can assist with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration by ‘encouraging fighters to come out of hiding to surrender their weapons [and] extolling the advantages and incentives of a return to civilian life’ (UN DPKO 2003, p. 47; emphasis mine). The ability of MONUC (1999–2010, renamed MONUSCO, 2010–ongoing) to repatriate tens of thousands of ex-soldiers and dependents from the eastern DRC to Rwanda was facilitated by the mission’s information unit that ran a program featuring accounts by returnees and messages from families urging rebels to come back (Domeniconi 2004). There are other examples of how communications can support peacekeepers’ work. In order to assist with the protection of civilians, communications staff can do at least three things: conduct human rights promotion campaigns that enable civilians to recognize and report abuses; sensitize potential perpetrators on their legal obligations and remind them of the existence of national and international criminal accountability mechanisms; and inform civilians about mission’s protection tools, such as community liaison assistants and community alert networks (UN DPO 2020). Information staff also attempt to change attitudes and behaviors directly. They promote the idea of peaceful coexistence: ‘programming to promote social cohesion’ and ‘[i]nterviews with moderate community voices’ are examples of how peacekeepers seek to dissuade violence (UN DPO 2020, p. 73). Information programs can help with ‘weakening hard-line factions in election campaigns’ (Thompson and Price 2003, p. 190). On a broader scale, UN information staff’s ability to ‘generate support for national reconciliation’ is mentioned as one of their key contributions to mandate implementation in the so-called UN Capstone Doctrine (UN DPKO 2008, p. 83). Since peacekeepers need to build trust not only between different societal groups but also between the society and the state (de Coning et al. 2015), information staff try to generate interest in politics, equip the population with the knowledge necessary for holding the authorities accountable, and engage politicians in a dialogue with citizens, for example, through radio talk shows. Mvukiyehe (2017) demonstrates that access to peacekeeping missions’ radio programmes in Liberia increased women’s political participation. Peacekeeping information

154  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations outlets can also target specific segments of the population whose education or mobilization can increase the chances for peace. For example, MONUSCO, in partnership with the UN Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), launched a dedicated radio station for children, Okapi Enfant, in 2020. Capacity-building   Information staff in peacekeeping missions build the capacity of the local media sector, implicitly or explicitly. Implicitly, by hiring local journalists, producers, and videographers, mission outlets enable them to gain skills. Explicitly, the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT, 2006–12) and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS, 2011–ongoing) received mandates to assist with developing local media. The UN Secretariat proposed media development as a mandated task, which was approved by the Security Council (Oksamytna and Lundgren 2021). Media development includes not only training, but also advice on the ways to strengthen legislative protection of press freedom or increase journalists’ access to public institutions (Orme 2019). Support can also entail material assistance. For instance, peacekeepers can use Quick Impact Projects – small grants for which mission sections and external actors can apply – for that purpose. An example is a local branch of MONUSCO’s Public Information Division in Kalemie, eastern DRC, which used Quick Impact Projects funds to build a production studio for a community radio station (MONUSCO 2016). Finally, upon departure, missions can transform their radio (and sometimes television) stations into national public broadcasters (like in Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone), international public broadcasters (like in Liberia where the peacekeeping radio station is now run by the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS), independent commercial broadcasters (like in the Central African Republic after the departure of the peacekeeping operation in 1998), or stations run by charitable foundations (like in Côte d’Ivoire) (Oksamytna n.d.). In some cases (East Timor and the Central African Republic), the transition has taken several years, with assistance from a Swiss media development NGO, Fondation Hirondelle. This NGO has also partnered with several UN peace operations in establishing radio stations, including in Sudan/South Sudan and the DRC. In 2014, however, both missions ended their partnership with the NGO and went on to manage their radio stations, Radio Miraya and Radio Okapi, on their own. Peacekeeping outlets face a tension between their dual role as a mission mouthpiece and a public service broadcaster: they strive to be ‘genuinely free, fair and transparent’ while ‘following the political will of New York … and the mission head’ (Betz and Papper 2015, p. 173). The effect of this tension on the credibility of peace operations’ messages is discussed in the following section.

EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS IN PEACE OPERATIONS Public information and strategic communications are undoubtedly integral to peacekeeping success, yet as Williams (2018, p. 1) notes, ‘[t]here is very little scholarly literature on how to design and implement effective strategic communications for peace operations.’ This section reviews the factors that contribute to the effectiveness of information and communications strategies in peace operations. Accessibility and credibility of the message  The effectiveness of information efforts depends on whether the message is received, understood, and believed. Peacekeeping operations may encounter difficulties with each of these elements. In order for peacekeepers’

Public information and strategic communications in peace operations  155 messages to be received, the local population needs to have the means to hear UN radio broadcasts or watch its television programs. While political barriers to message dissemination are discussed below, infrastructural barriers are also formidable. While radio is considered the best way of reaching populations, only one-third of Liberians had regular access to radio in rural areas in 2007, four years after the end of the civil war (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2017). This issue can often be addressed only if external actors provide material assistance, such as Japan’s donation of hundreds of thousands of radios and batteries to Cambodians, which has allowed Radio UNTAC to have its effect (Brocades Zaalberg 2006). When material assistance is not forthcoming or insufficient, information and communications staff in peace operations need to seek out innovative ways to overcome such obstacles. For example, the UN mission that prepared the referendum on East Timor’s independence (UNAMET, June 1999–October 1999) faced the challenge of low rates of radio set ownership among the population. To overcome it, peacekeepers drove around in cars that had loudspeakers in their front doors, stopped in village centres, and played tapes with UNAMET’s radio programmes at full volume with their cars’ front doors open, which enabled many Timorese to listen to the mission’s messages (Wimhurst 2002). Messages also need to be understood and accepted, which requires cultural and contextual sensitivity. A lack of cultural understanding can lead to major gaffes: in 1992, a US-led intervention in support of the struggling UN operation in Somalia dropped leaflets from planes that read ‘slave nations have come to help you’ (instead of ‘United Nations’), which was ‘a simple translation oversight … [with] serious repercussions’ (Lewis 1993; as cited in Duffey 2000, p. 160). It is no secret that UN peace operations often replicate approaches from past missions, which can stand in the way of tailoring messages to the local context. Some of UNPROFOR’s information staff had previously worked in Cambodia, where Radio UNTAC was a sensation in part because the media landscape was so underdeveloped. By contrast, the listeners of UN information programs in the Balkans ‘were skilled and skeptical dissectors of media messages,’ so most of UNPROFOR’s programs came across as ‘comically simplistic’ (Thompson 2000, p. 76). Missions should anticipate how their messages are likely to be received. While peacekeepers are under pressure to comment on unfolding events, disseminating unverified information is particularly risky. For example, in the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA, 2013–ongoing), information officials reported that almost 100 civilians were massacred, only to revise the figure down to 35 following a human rights investigation. The population found it suspicious, and rumors started to circulate about the mission’s ‘complicity, which consolidated public beliefs in MINUSMA’s uselessness’ (Sandor 2020, p. 931). Any communications mistake can be vastly damaging to the mission’s reputation. In UNPROFOR, a ‘terminological slip’ in a memo drafted by an inexperienced member of its Division of Information made it appear as if the mission recognized the self-proclaimed Serb entity on Croatia’s territory, attracting ire from the Croatian authorities (Baker 2021, p. 16). To be seen as a trustworthy source of information, the mission should not only extoll its virtues and highlight achievements but also admit mistakes. However, the question of whether UN communications ‘may be allowed to be self-critical’ divides opinions (Loewenberg 2006, p. 32). Additionally, peacekeeping outlets often need to dare to be critical of the mission’s closest partners – the host authorities. This is not always easy: as Doss (2020, p. 276) recalls, ‘[e]ven in UN-friendly Sierra Leone and Liberia, the authorities occasionally took exception to stories that criticized the government.’ If a UN outlet shies away from denouncing the national

156  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations authorities where it is warranted, the mission’s credibility will suffer. Yet if it goes too far in its criticism, it can lead to a breakdown in the relations with the host government, as discussed below. Relations with the host government and parties to the conflict  Parties to the conflict and the host government can create significant barriers for the dissemination of UN’s messages. For example, UNPROFOR did not establish its own radio and television outlets but relied on local stations to air its broadcasts, which sometimes refused to accept UN materials or tried to delay and censor them. The proposals for Radio UNPROFOR were made only in early 1994, two years after the mission’s start, yet the operation decided to focus on the production of television materials instead. This, however, did not solve the problem of local stations’ non-cooperation, even though the Security Council demanded that the parties provide ‘suitable radio broadcasting frequencies and television broadcasting slots at no cost to the United Nations’ (Baker 2021, p. 19). As a result, the most pessimistic assessment was that ‘the mission’s output of radio and television programmes was a waste’ (Thompson 2000, p. 21). Host state’s obstruction created difficulties for public information staff in Angola and Rwanda in the 1990s (Oksamytna 2018), and the problem has persisted in the twenty-first century. For example, in the early 2000s, the government of Eritrea suspended broadcasts of the peacekeeping radio station, sought to vet the contents of the mission’s news magazine, and ordered the closure of a UN outreach center, accusing it of distributing materials that were allegedly unfit for minors. In reality, the center distributed copies of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the Tigrinya language, otherwise unavailable in Eritrea (Cammaert and Sugar 2015; Loewenberg 2006). Several years later, the Sudanese government prevented UNAMID from establishing a radio station. For two years, a local contractor had refused to print UNAMID’s magazine, Voices of Darfur, without the government’s approval. The government also confiscated 600 000 copies of UNAMID’s comic book (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2017a). MONUSCO’s radio station, Radio Okapi, had 20 million listeners in 2010, more than any other station in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa (Essoungou 2010). While it made an immeasurable contribution to peace – the first head of the DRC mission has credited Radio Okapi with helping ‘electronically to destroy the front line in the Congolese war’ (Deutsche Welle 2015) – its popularity has made the national authorities uneasy. In 2012, the DRC government temporarily suspended Radio Okapi, and local journalists believed that the reason was the government’s displeasure at an interview with a rebel commander aired by the station (Committee to Protect Journalists 2012). During the 2011 electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, the administration of the defeated incumbent jammed the frequencies of the UN radio station after it stayed on air in defiance of the government’s ban (Cook 2011). These examples illustrate the political role that mission outlets play. In light of the host governments’ ability to derail message dissemination, peace operations need to find reliable ways of communicating in the face of possible obstruction. To find creative solutions to such problems, the UN needs competent and fearless staff. Yet the UN has not always been able to deploy sufficient information and communications expertise, as discussed in the next subsection. Strategic communications expertise   The deployment of information and communications experts has often been slow, especially in difficult missions. For example, the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT, 2007–20) aired its first radio program almost two years after the mission’s start because an international radio producer

Public information and strategic communications in peace operations  157 arrived late and there were no skilled local applicants. It took another half a year to start video broadcasts due to the delayed recruitment of a video producer (UN Secretary-General 2009). To give another example, the mission in South Sudan struggled to fill the position of the Chief of Public Information for more than two years (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2017b). In late 2010, the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004–17) had a 26 percent vacancy rate in the information unit, and an audit noted in particular that the ‘absence of national professional officers had a significant adverse impact on the effective delivery of public information services’ (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2011, p. ii). Some missions struggle to attract national staff because media work in a peace operation can be dangerous. Almost in every mission, national staff face disproportionate risks as compared with international staff (Oksamytna and von Billerbeck 2022), and information specialists can be especially vulnerable. For instance, in South Sudan, a Radio Miraya journalist has been detained for almost three years without charge (Bior 2017). In the DRC, two Radio Okapi journalists have been murdered, possibly by state agents and in retaliation for their investigative work (Reporters Without Borders 2017). To deliver their messages effectively, peace operations need to ensure that they have sufficient communication expertise. They also need to ensure that all colleagues, especially national staff, are adequately protected, which is essential for their ability to report without fear. Coordination and coherence  Information and communications staff in peace operations need to coordinate message delivery with New York, other mission components, and external partners. At New York headquarters, two structures support information units in the field: first, the Strategic Communications Section (which was created only in 2007 and used to be called the Public Affairs Section until 2018), a resource shared by the peace operations department and the political and peacebuilding department; and second, the Peace and Security Section in the communications department, which disseminates information about peacekeeping as one of UN’s activities to global audiences. Unsurprisingly, this situation has occasionally led to turf wars and unclear responsibilities (Oksamytna n.d.). Within missions, information staff work together with different components including civil affairs, human rights, electoral assistance, and political affairs. Sometimes, information officials work in support of other sections: for instance, when the electoral assistance division develops voter education materials, the strategic communications unit helps disseminate them. At other times, information officials take the lead: civil affairs components, for example, are expected to support strategic communications colleagues ‘by providing information about the attitudes and perceptions of different groups at the local level, and providing input into the design of messages that are delivered to the population through the media’ (UN DPKO and DFS 2012, p. 40). In practice, however, cooperation between units in a peacekeeping mission is not always seamless due to the differences in organizational (sub)cultures (Oksamytna et al. 2022). Additionally, information units in peacekeeping missions need to coordinate with other UN entities. Spokespersons of peacekeeping missions chair the so-called UN Communications Group at the country level – a platform that includes all communications officials working for UN agencies, such as the UN Development Programme or UNICEF, in a certain country. In some peacekeeping operations, information staff coordinate across borders: for example, MONUSCO and UNMISS worked together to disseminate messages that encourage defections from the Lord’s Resistance Army, an extremist group active in both the DRC and South

158  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Sudan (UN Secretary-General 2012). Effective coordination at all levels is essential for making the UN (and the international community in general) appear committed and consistent.

RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS It is not an easy task for either researchers or peace operations staff to evaluate the effectiveness of public information and strategic communications activities. There are at least two reasons for that. First, in academic settings, the effects of media exposure are studied through controlled experiments, which are difficult to conduct in conflict-affected environments for ethical and logistical reasons. Second, it is practically impossible to distinguish beliefs and opinions shaped by missions’ information programs from those formed by the population on the basis of everyday encounters with peacekeepers. However, scholars are working on mapping UN radio station coverage (Smidt 2021), measuring the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping radio broadcasts (Di Salvatore 2018), and analyzing the use of social media by peacekeepers (Leib 2021; El Kady and Peter 2021). These are promising research directions. Public information and strategic communications have remained an essential activity of peace operations for many decades and will grow in importance if peacekeepers continue to deploy in environments where some actors seek to undermine their work.

NOTE 1.

See also Chapter 17 (Olsson), Chapter 18 (Karim and Beardsley), and Chapter 22 (Dorussen and de Vooght) in this Handbook.

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Public information and strategic communications in peace operations  161 Sherman, Jake and Albert Trithart (2021), ‘Strategic Communications in UN Peace Operations: From an Afterthought to a Core Mandate’, International Peace Institute, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​ www​.ipinst​.org/​2021/​08/​strategic​-communications​-in​-un​-peace​-operations. Smidt, Hannah (2021), ‘Peacekeeping and People: Spatially Disaggregated Data on the Infrastructure of People-Centred Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1995–2020’, Folke Bernadotte Academy Approved Research Grants, abstract accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​ fba​.se/​contentassets/​982​7291c834a4​c738099eb5​107e26ae7/​approved​-research​-grants​-2021​.pdf. Spicer, Keith (1994), ‘Propaganda for Peace’, New York Times, 10 December, 23. Thompson, Mark (2000), Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo International Assistance to Media, Vienna, Austria: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Thompson, Mark and Monroe E. Price (2003), ‘Intervention, Media and Human Rights’, Survival, 45 (1), 183–202. Thornberry, Cedric (2004), A Nation Is Born: The Inside Story of Namibia’s Independence, Windhoek, Namibia: Gamsberg Macmillan. Tull, Denis M. (2009), ‘EUFOR RD Congo: A Success, But Not a Model’, in Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (eds), The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations, Berlin, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft Politik, Deutsches Institut Internationale Politik Sicherheit [German Institute for International and Security Affairs], pp. 46–56. UN DPA, DPKO, and DFS (2015), ‘Policy on Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Missions’, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​conduct​.unmissions​.org/​file/​2365/​download​?token​=​ w​_3IetV2. UN DPKO (2003), ‘Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations’, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​peacekeeping​-handbook​_un​ _dec2003​_0​.pdf. UN DPKO (2004), Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force, New York, NY, USA: United Nations. UN DPKO (2008), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​peacekeeping/​en/​capstone​_eng​.pdf. UN DPKO and DFS (2012), ‘Civil Affairs Handbook’, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​ .un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​civil​_affairs​_handbook​.pdf. UN DPO (2020), ‘Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Handbook’, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​dpo​_poc​_handbook​_final​_as​_printed​ .pdf. UN General Assembly and Security Council (2000), ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)’, A/55/305 and S/2000/809, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​undocs​ .org/​A/​55/​305. UN General Assembly and Security Council (2015), Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People (HIPPO), A/70/95 and S/2015/446, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​undocs​.org/​A/​70/​95. UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (2011), ‘Audit Report: Public Information Function in MINUSTAH’, AP2010/683/07, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​apublica​.org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​ 2011/​10/​Public​-information​-function​-in​-MINUSTAH​.pdf. UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (2017a), ‘Audit of the Public Information Programme in the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur’, AP2016/634/08, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​oios​.un​.org/​file/​6695/​download​?token​=​FwYGUgzx. UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (2017b), ‘Audit of the Public Information Programme in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan’, AP2017/633/09, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​oios​.un​.org/​file/​6854/​download​?token​=​vaGz​-gcS. UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (2021), ‘Evaluation of the Organizational Culture in Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services’, A/75/803, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​oios​.un​.org/​file/​8954/​download​?token​=​0xmURdax. UN Peacekeeping (2021), ‘A4P+: Priorities for 2021–2023’, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​ peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​a4p​_background​_paper​.pdf.

162  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations UN Secretary-General (2009), ‘Performance Report on the Budget of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad for the Period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009’, A/64/556, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​undocs​.org/​A/​64/​556. UN Secretary-General (2012), ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2012/65, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​undocs​.org/​S/​2012/​65. UN Secretary-General (2018), ‘Budget for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019’, A/72/784, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​undocs​.org/​A/​72/​784. von Billerbeck, Sarah (2017), ‘UN Peace Operations and Conflicting Legitimacies’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 11 (3), 286–305. von Billerbeck, Sarah (2020), ‘“Mirror, Mirror On the Wall”: Self-Legitimation by International Organizations’, International Studies Quarterly, 64 (1), 207–19. Whalan, Jeni (2013), How Peace Operations Work: Power, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Williams, Paul D. (2018), ‘Strategic Communications for Peace Operations: The African Union’s Information War Against al-Shabaab’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 7 (1), Art. 3, 1–17. Wimhurst, David (2002), ‘Preparing a Plebiscite under Fire: The United Nations and Public Information in East Timor’, in Monroe E. Price and Mark Thomspon (eds), Forging Peace: Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space, Bloomington, IN, USA: University of Indiana Press, pp. 296–9. Zhou, Mei (1994), Radio UNTAC of Cambodia: Winning Ears, Hearts, and Minds, Bangkok, Thailand: White Lotus.

12. Civilian components in peace operations Jaïr van der Lijn and Sabine Otto

INTRODUCTION In the decades following the Cold War, the mandates of United Nations (UN) and non-UN multilateral peace operations have become increasingly complex and multidimensional.1 Policymakers and scholars alike refer to multidimensional peace operations that combine military and civilian activities as flagships in international conflict resolution. Such missions combine political, security, humanitarian, rule of law, human rights, and institution-building efforts to promote long-lasting peace. Much of the specialized expertise required for these tasks can only be found in the civilian domain. Thus, the success and failure of many peace operations depend on the performance of uniformed and civilian personnel (Coleman 2020). Despite the proliferation of civilian personnel and civilian functions in peace operations, we know little about whether and how they contribute to peace operations’ effectiveness (Otto 2019a; Wiharta and Blair 2010). To date, a lack of comprehensive data has restricted the systematic study of the civilian side of peace operations (van der Lijn and Smit 2017). Consequently, the number of large-N studies and comparative case studies is limited. While existing research provides rich insights on the civilian dimension of peace operations, they are often limited to either specific activities or single missions. Therefore, whether and in what way civilians contribute to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) has not yet been fully captured. This chapter sheds light on the role of civilian personnel in peace operations and how they affect peacekeeping effectiveness – broadly understood as mitigating violence and contributing to durable peace. It first provides an overview of civilian personnel’s typical tasks in peace operations and empirical patterns of civilian personnel deployments in peace operations since 1989. Next, it reviews the existing literature concerning whether and what type of attention scholars have paid to civilian personnel, their activities, and their impact. Finally, it concludes with several avenues for future research.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN PEACE OPERATIONS Peace operations routinely deploy civilian personnel to perform various tasks, including human rights promotion, assisting the organization of elections, providing humanitarian assistance, and strengthening local institutions. This chapter defines civilian personnel as the international and national non-uniformed personnel working in peace operations (Otto 2019a; Wiharta and Blair 2010). While UN member states always second uniformed personnel (military or police), civilian personnel are often contracted directly by peace operations.2 In contrast to uniformed personnel, who are generally not provided by the host countries, civilian personnel are recruited internationally and locally from the host country.3 Generally, civilian personnel fulfill three roles: (i) leading and managing the operation, (ii) implementing sub163

164  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations stantive roles related to the mandated core tasks, and (iii) providing administrative and other support to the peace operation (Coleman 2020; Eckhard 2018). Depending on mandate and budget, the number and type of civilian personnel differ across peace operations. First, civilian personnel take on crucial leadership and management positions. According to Coleman (2020, p. 705), in 2018, 6 percent of all personnel in UN peacekeeping operations held executive positions. Civilian personnel head recently established UN peace operations. In integrated peacekeeping operations, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) is the overall head of the peace operation. They lead the peace operation with one or two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSGs), a political DSRSG, and a triple-hatted DSRSG who also holds the resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator positions. The SRSG coordinates the international efforts on the ground, leads the ongoing national mediation efforts, and serves as the primary liaison between local and international actors (de Coning 2010). Even though the number of personnel in leadership positions is small, they fulfill essential roles in shaping the course of the mission. By interpreting the mandate, they pave the way for actions at lower levels (for example, Felix da Costa and Karlsrud 2013; Karlsrud 2013). In addition, civilians in these positions help ensure communication with other mission components to achieve effective mandate implementation (for example, D’Souza 2020). Additional management positions refer to the senior positions in civilian sections and divisions – for example, senior political affairs officers – or to context-specific appointments – for example, MONUSCO’s Senior Adviser on the Protection of Civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or UNSOM’s Senior Adviser on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) in Somalia (D’Souza 2020). International and nationally recruited staff support these types of positions. Second, civilian personnel work in substantive sections related to the core tasks of the mandate. In 2018 this totaled some 20 percent of all UN peacekeeping operations’ positions (Coleman 2020, p. 706). Table 12.1 provides an overview of the roles of civilian personnel in substantive sections in UN peace operations, which include but are not limited to civil affairs, electoral affairs, human rights, humanitarian affairs, political affairs, rule of law, public information, and social affairs. Table 12.1 focuses on UN peacekeeping operations because they deploy the largest number of civilian personnel, cover the broadest spectrum of civilian tasks, and serve as a model for other deploying organizations. While each section is concerned with different subfields of civilian tasks, all civilian personnel regularly interact with stakeholders at the national and/or local level, including government officials, non-governmental organizations, conflict parties, and the local population. One of the core strengths of civilian personnel are their soft skills: supporting, advising, persuading, promoting, and negotiating within their fields of expertise. For example, MINUSMA’s civil affairs officers have organized workshops in Mali where communal and traditional leaders discuss peaceful solutions to overcome ethnic tensions (UN Civil Affairs Team et al. 2017). Another example is the work of UNMISS’s Communications and Public Information Section in South Sudan. To manage expectations, they collaborated with national artists to promote and explain the mission’s mandate in an engaging way. Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) are locally recruited staff working in the Civil Affairs section. Among other tasks, they join the military personnel (for example, in MONUSCO, UNMISS, and MINUSMA) to explain the local context, formulate adequate responses, and build trust (Kullenberg 2016). While civilian personnel in peace operations often cooperate with uniformed personnel or may rely on security or logistical support of the

Civilian components in peace operations  165 Table 12.1

Roles of substantive and mission support sections/divisions in UN peace operations

Common substantive sections/divisions Section

Core tasks

Civil affairs

- connecting the mission and local authorities - conflict management

Electoral affairs

- supporting the organization of elections - coordinating mission activities with local authorities and communities during election periods

Human rights

- promoting human rights - monitoring, investigating, and reporting human rights violations

Humanitarian affairs

- facilitating humanitarian operations

Political affairs

- supporting national and regional stakeholders to design and implement peace processes

Public information

- communication on behalf of peace operation before media, the general public, and within the organization

Rule of law

- supporting national counterparts to strengthen the rule of law and security institutions, including security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and justice and corrections

Social affairs

- mainstreaming and promoting gender equality, children’s rights and protection, and raising HIV/AIDS awareness

Common mission support sections Sections: Administration, aviation, engineering, finance, gender, human resources, information management, legal affairs, logistics, medical, management & program analysis, procurement, security, and transport

Note: The list is not exhaustive. Roles and sections differ within and across missions. In particular, “rule of law” and “social affairs” are often divided into several separate sections. Source: Own compilation based on the different organigrams, budgets, and websites of current and closed missions, and on UN Careers (n.d.).

military component if needed, their activities neither require the threat nor the use of force (Felix da Costa and Karlsrud 2013). Third, in UN peacekeeping operations in 2018, 74 percent of civilian personnel worked in peace operation support sections (Coleman 2020, p. 706) and provided different types of support to the uniformed and non-uniformed personnel. The mission support sections are responsible for dealing with human resource issues, IT support, organizing transport, finances, communication, and legal issues. Field Service staff (in UN peace operations) are internationally recruited to support the mission administratively, technically, and logistically. The services and the job categories range from secretary to technical specialist (UN General Assembly 2006). While often in the background, the performance of support staff also affects mission effectiveness. For instance, UNMISS’s civil engineering section was responsible for constructing fences around the protection sites. As it was inadequately set up, UN uniformed personnel could not control effectively who entered and exited the protection sites (Murphy 2017, p. 380). Locally recruited staff work primarily as drivers and translators. They are crucial for international personnel to communicate with local stakeholders and provide insights into cultures and customs (Pouligny 2006). In addition, they often serve as gatekeepers generating and distributing local knowledge to the international civilian personnel (Eckhard 2018). Figure 12.1 shows the number of personnel deployed to multilateral peace operations between 2008 and 2019. While the data includes all peace operations that fit the SIPRI definition outlined above, the numbers are restricted to the deployment of international civilian

166  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations personnel (middle panel) because not all peace operations or deploying organizations provide information on locally and internationally recruited civilian personnel. In 2008, some 7200 civilian personnel were deployed to peace operations. This number increased sharply to 10 000 at the start of 2009. It remained relatively stable until the end of 2011, after which it steadily declined to roughly 8000 by the end of 2019. As shown in the upper panel of Figure 12.1, military personnel are still by far the largest portion of the personnel deployed in peace operations. The number of military personnel increased during the first half of the 2010s – starting at 171 500 in 2008, peaking at around 255 500 between 2010 and 2012, and declining to 130 000 in 2019. This increase reflects the large numbers of military personnel deployed to ISAF in Afghanistan.

Note: Upper panel: number of uniformed personnel (military and police). Middle panel: number of international civilian personnel. Lower panel: percentage of international civilian personnel of the total number of personnel deployed to peace missions between 2008 and 2019. Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (n.d.), SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database.

Figure 12.1

Deployment of civilian and uniformed personnel to peace operations, 2008–19

The lower panel shows the percentage of civilian personnel of the total number of personnel deployed in peace operations. In 2008, 4 percent of all personnel were civilian. While the share peaked at 5.2 percent in 2009, as military personnel in ISAF surged, it reached its minimum in 2011 (c. 3.8 percent) and stabilized at the end of 2013. After 2014 the share of civilian personnel sharply increased again and reached its highest percentage to date in 2020 at 5.8 percent. It is worth noting that a few operations, particularly those deployed by the EU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Organization of American States

Civilian components in peace operations  167 (OAS), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), have civilian personnel only (SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database n.d.; Smit et al. 2020). Figure 12.2 shows the number of international civilian personnel deployed by the three leading organizations deploying such personnel: EU, OSCE, and UN for the period 2008–20. In 2019, the number of civilian personnel deployed by all other organizations combined was roughly 300, according to the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database.4 The UN deploys the most international civilian personnel. In 2008, it had approximately 6000 international civilian personnel in peace operations in the field. One year later, this number peaked at roughly 6750, plateauing for several years, only to slowly decrease after 2012. The year 2020 saw the smallest number of civilian personnel in peace operations deployed by the UN in this period, roughly 5750. This moderate decline continued after the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report, which underlined the importance of the civilian capacity of UN missions (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2015, p. 41). In 2008, the EU deployed only 500 international civilian personnel in its peace operations, but this number increased sharply to 2500 with the establishment of the EUMM in Georgia in 2008 and EULEX Kosovo in 2009. Like the UN, figures for civilian personnel deployed by the EU started to decline in 2012 and stabilized at around 1000 international personnel from 2016. The OSCE deployed about 500 international civilian personnel in peace operations between 2008 and 2014. In contrast to the downward trends of the UN and EU, the number of civilian personnel deployed by the OSCE increased with the establishment of the SMM in Ukraine. It doubled in 2016, remaining stable until 2020.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (n.d.), SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database.

Figure 12.2

International civilian personnel in peace operations deployed by the EU, OSCE, and UN, 2008–20

Figure 12.3 shows the proportion of nationally recruited civilian personnel in UN peace operations between 2000 and 2018. While not all organizations deploying peace operations in the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database sample publish the number of nationally recruited staff, the UN does. Figure 12.3 shows how the share of national personnel fluctuates over time. While in 2000, nearly 71 percent of all civilian personnel were locally recruited, the percentage drops to 65

168  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (n.d.), SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database.

Figure 12.3

Proportion of national civilian personnel in peace operations deployed by the UN, 2000–2018

percent in 2006 before it peaks, with a slight bump in 2009, to 71 percent in 2011. Since then, the proportion of nationally recruited personnel has been declining to 65 percent in 2018. The share of locally recruited staff differs, however, across organizations. For example, between 2000 and 2016, the OSCE deployed on average 75 percent, the UN 58 percent, and the EU 34 percent locally recruited staff (Eckhard 2018). Increasing the representation of women in peace operations has become an essential aim of policymakers (Smit and Tidblad-Lundholm 2018). Figure 12.4 shows the share of women among civilian personnel in UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions between 2012 and 2020. The difference between the two is that the first is deployed by the Department of Peace Operations and the latter by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The proportion of women in international civilian personnel in UN peacekeeping operations has been stable during the past decade at around 28 to 29 percent. The representation of women in international civilian personnel of special political missions, by contrast, increased from roughly 27 percent in 2011 to 33 percent in 2020. Women representation among civilian personnel is considerably higher than among military personnel (5.4 percent in 2020) and police personnel (15 percent in 2020) (van der Lijn and Smit 2020). Nevertheless, the stagnation of women representation in UN peacekeeping operations during the last decade may indicate a ceiling effect.

ARE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND THEIR ACTIVITIES EFFECTIVE? The literature on peace operations and their effectiveness has grown steadily since the beginning of the 1990s (Fortna and Howard 2008). While effectiveness can be measured in various ways (Diehl and Druckman 2010), violence mitigation, respect for human rights, and democ-

Civilian components in peace operations  169

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (n.d.), SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database.

Figure 12.4

Women’s participation in civilian components of UN peace operations, 2012–20

ratization are common points of reference to evaluate peace operations’ effectiveness, especially among analysts employing quantitative research methods. While much of the attention has focused on the military effectiveness of peace operations (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017), we know little about the extent to which the civilian components of peace operations influence the situation in the host country and which civilian factors make mission success more likely. This section reviews the literature on civilian components and their role in peace operation effectiveness in terms of violence mitigation, human rights, and democratization. Next, this section looks at two factors for success and failure that are especially prominent in qualitative research (for example, Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network 2019; van der Lijn 2009) and policy circles (for example, UN General Assembly and Security Council 2015). Violence mitigation  Ending conflicts and promoting sustainable postwar peace requires a military presence and civilian capacities to mediate and build peace and viable institutions. Earlier quantitative research shows that multidimensional peace operations, especially consent-based ones, more effectively transform conflict-ridden countries into peaceful societies than traditional peacekeeping operations (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008a). Qualitative studies have similar findings. For example, van der Lijn (2006) compares four UN missions and finds that different civilian tasks in peace missions contribute to durable peace. Diplomatic efforts are particularly successful if the parties are committed to the peace process, but a lot depends on the civilian mission leadership. In addition, institution- and capacity-building promote peace, but their effects may shrink after mission exit.

170  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Relying on descriptive data, Otto (2019a) does not find a clear indication of whether more civilian personnel in UN peace missions reduce the risk of targeting civilians by government forces. Whether this null-finding is due to selection bias or the challenge in identifying how civilian personnel can constrain government violence is up for future research. Brosig and Sempijja (2017) show descriptively a weak positive relationship between the size of the civilian component in UN missions and personal safety. Kirschner and Miller (2019) argue that civilian personnel contribute to developing institutional and cultural norms that curb sexual violence. Compared to military personnel, civilian personnel are especially effective at reducing sexual violence by rebel groups. Conflict management, risk analysis, and confidence-building at the local level by civil affairs and human rights officers and mediation efforts by the civilian mission leadership may contribute to violence mitigation and promote peaceful norms. A UN evaluation report investigates the relationship between the activities of the Civilian Affairs Division and violence mitigation in South Sudan based on descriptive statistics. The results indicate that such activities are related to reducing local conflict (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2019). Along similar lines, Smidt (2019) explores the link between UN civilian personnel’s engagement in local conflict resolution processes and communal violence in Côte d’Ivoire. To address selection effects, she uses a recursive bivariate probit model and matching techniques. She finds strong evidence that locations where the UN have engaged in local intergroup dialogue are at lower risk of experiencing communal violence than locations without the benefit of such engagement. Civilian activities such as election assistance and election education also correlate negatively with election-related violence in Côte d’Ivoire (Smidt 2020). Human rights  The promotion and protection of human rights is a key purpose and guiding principle of the United Nations (UN 1945). For more than 30 years, UN peace operations have been mandated to monitor and promote human rights in the host countries. Such activities are predominantly undertaken by civilian personnel and in UN peace operations, in particular by their Human Rights Divisions. Quantitative research has focused so far on the correlation between civilian mandate characteristics and human rights violations. While Murdie and Davis (2010) find that peace operations can harm political rights – especially empowerment rights – missions with a strong humanitarian purpose positively impact physical integrity rights. Murdie (2017) shows that UN and non-UN peace operations with a mandate aligned with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) improve future performance in human rights. In addition to quantitative studies that link civilian personnel and their activities directly to missions’ effectiveness, comparative and single case studies also identify the conditions under which civilian activities may be successful. The success of the civilian activities to promote and protect human rights is dependent on the local political support for the human rights-based structures supported by Human Rights Divisions of peace operations (Opie 2001). It also depends on whether human rights are part of a peace agreement, the readiness of the parties to accept interference, the level of attention for human rights provisions in the mandate, and the priority human rights promotion receives from mission leadership (van der Lijn 2006). Evidence from single case studies underlines that peace operation leaderships’ political will to prioritize human rights promotion by the Human Rights Division appears to play an essential role in establishing human rights institutions successfully. For instance, in the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) (García-Saydn 1994) and UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) (Sprik 2019), human rights were prioritized. The absence of such political will can undermine a mission’s

Civilian components in peace operations  171 ability to improve human rights, as evidenced by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (Asia Watch 1993; McNamara 1995). A contested aspect concerns the timing of some human rights activities. Some practitioners and scholars emphasize the need for Human Rights Divisions and peace operation leadership to name and shame human rights violators to improve human rights records in the short term. Others claim that perpetrators often need to be kept at the table to maintain the peace process. They argue that successful mediation efforts of Political Affairs Divisions would in the long run guarantee a better human rights environment (Hannum 2006; Montgomery 1995; Paddon Rhoads 2019). Democratization  The impact of the civilian components of peace operations on democratization has been widely researched, with conflicting findings. While military personnel may be involved in the short-term securing of elections, Electoral Assistance Divisions and other civilian sections of UN peace operations are also responsible for the long-term and broader democratization tasks within multilateral peace operations. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) find a positive relationship between the presence of UN peace operations and democratization; multidimensional operations are especially effective. Brancati and Snyder (2011) specify that particularly elections assisted and monitored by multilateral peace operations may strengthen peace. However, Fortna (2008b) shows that this effect is absent for multidimensional peace operations after one year. Yet, measured after two years and five years, multidimensional peace operations positively impact democratization, while monitoring and traditional peacekeeping operations do not. On the other hand, Fortna and Huang (2012) and Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) find that UN peace operations do not affect democratization, or even have a negative impact. Fortna’s (2008b) results indicate that UN peacekeeping efforts do not perform better and sometimes perform even worse at democratization than non-UN missions. One reason for these contradicting findings might be that scholars rely on aggregated measures such as the presence or absence of multidimensional peace operations. Some multidimensional peace operations have dedicated Electoral Assistance Divisions that assist host countries in holding credible and legitimate elections, contribute to election monitoring and education. Other missions’ substantive sections have been tasked to build effective and legitimate electoral institutions, while some missions have had more limited electoral mandates (Lindenmayer et al. 2012). In addition, conflicting mechanisms may be at play. Fortna (2008b) points to the dilemma that external intervention may be needed to achieve stable peace but that this external assistance may also thwart domestic democratization processes. Researchers have recently started to delve into the micro-mechanisms of peace operations’ democratization efforts by going beyond the mere presence or absence of multidimensional peace operations. For instance, different forms of voter education seem crucial for political participation, which is a fundamental pillar of democracy. Studying Liberia, Mvukiyehe (2018) shows that respondents exposed to UNMIL’s media outlets and its voter and civic education have higher political participation levels than households without such exposure. In general, there is a lack of theoretical understanding and empirical analysis on how and how much civilian personnel and their activities may mitigate violence and promote human rights and democratization – especially concerning non-UN missions. Due to data limitations, scholars have relied on aggregated measures such as the presence or absence of multidimensional missions or specific mandate characteristics (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008a; 2008b; Murdie and Davis 2010), which do not distinguish between military and civilian personnel and their activities. These measures obscure which types of civilian activities are fostering peace and democratization and reducing violence. So far, there is hardly any large-N

172  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations comparative research on how the variations among missions in terms of civilian personnel and civilian sections help to explain the variation in peace operations’ effectiveness in terms of violence mitigation, human rights, and democratization. While more recent studies have started to address this aggregation challenge by focusing on different types of civilian personnel (Kirschner and Miller 2019; Otto 2019a), they remain theoretically vague and methodologically underdeveloped. Qualitative comparative and single case studies, in contrast, delve into the civilian mechanisms to promote peace or human rights (García-Saydn 1994; van der Lijn 2006). Case studies, however, only allow for limited generalizability, and they usually do not compare countries with peace operations to countries without them. While statistical case studies indeed compare locations with civilian activities to locations without such intervention (Mvukiyehe 2018; Smidt 2019), they do not deal sufficiently with the extent to which their findings travel to other contexts. In addition, most of the studies have in common that they implicitly assume that peace operations work coherently – that the different mission components work hand in hand and coordinate their activities as well as that the local communities and stakeholders cooperate with mission personnel. However, the following section shows that these assumptions rarely hold in reality.

FACTORS FOR SUCCESS OR FAILURE Civil components often play an essential role in the factors that account for the success and failure of peace operations. This section focuses on the role civilian components and personnel play in (a) coordination and coherence of mission efforts and (b) the relationship with local populations. Coordination and coherence  The level of coherence between the civilian, military, and police components of peace operations varies depending on the extent of strategic consistency and the extent of coordination between their activities. For example, civilian components have been responsible for mediating local and national cease-fires and peace agreements and nurturing such peace processes. Without such mediation efforts of the political and civil affairs sections, military components may not even have any cease-fires to monitor. On the other hand, electoral affairs sections may assist with organizing elections but often rely on the military and police components of missions to secure them. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) argue that diversity in terms of different types of personnel and military and civilian activities increases the chances of success. Even if some aspects fail, others will not and can continue the peace process. Such diversity, however, implies a degree of coherence and coordination between activities to prevent internal conflicts and contradictions. Blair et al. (2021) underline that culture clashes, turf battles, and coordination problems between and within civilian and uniformed components may undermine the coherence of their efforts. Without coherence, fragmented mandate implementation may reduce peace operations’ effectiveness. De Coning and Friis (2011) developed a framework to outline the different levels of policy coherence between civilian and other components of peace operations. Still, comparative and quantitative research on coordination and coherence is scarce. Instead, research on the topic is dominated by qualitative research and has focused mainly on applying integrated and comprehensive approaches in single case studies. The NATO operation ISAF in Afghanistan,

Civilian components in peace operations  173 in particular, has received a lot of attention. These studies show that while coherence is indeed essential: (a) it is challenging for different civilian and military parts of missions to reach the required common understanding, as civilian approaches are often more long-term and process-oriented, while military approaches often emphasize more the short-term and outputs; (b) integration between certain parts of missions may negatively affect the integration with other organizational units. For example, integrating humanitarian sections into military missions may affect their integration with the broader humanitarian sector; and (c) integration may reduce attention to or impact of particular civilian aspects, such as human rights and humanitarian affairs, due to securitization (for example, van der Lijn 2015; Williams 2011). Research on coherence and the integrated approach in UN operations is even more limited. Rietjens and Ruffa’s (2019) research on MINUSMA is a notable exception. They find that low levels of strategic, cultural, and operational consistency lead to frictions within peace missions and risk undermining operational effectiveness. Apart from case studies, most attention regarding the UN’s integrated approach sheds light on thematic issues such as integrated or mission-wide planning, and the risks of shrinking humanitarian space as a result of coherence (for example, Boutellis 2013; Metcalfe et al. 2011). Relationship with local populations  Next to the military component, the civilian component and its personnel play an essential role in engaging with the local population and how their interactions and presence shape locals’ perceptions. In capitals, civilian personnel are the most visible part of missions. They support national ministries and agencies, drive in white UN vehicles, and their presence can impact parts of the economic sector and prices, such as in housing and restaurants. Due to their visibility, civilian personnel shape the public perception of the mission in the capital, but as a consequence often also in the national debate (Carnahan et al. 2007; Lemay-Hébert 2011). Outside capitals, although military camps and vehicles are most visible, many of missions’ mandated activities in the field are performed by civilian personnel – for example, electoral, humanitarian, development, and local mediation tasks.5 In perception surveys, the public perception of the civilian activities and the civilian personnel undertaking them seems to be intertwined with the perceptions of actions by the military component and are therefore often difficult to separate. However, many peace operations are unpopular with their beneficiaries, who often see them as impotent or abusive. This is also shaped by the results and activities of civilian personnel (for example, Johnstone 2006). For example, in 2019 in Mali, 60.3 percent of the Mali Mètre survey (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2020) was very dissatisfied with MINUSMA, 17.6 percent was dissatisfied to some extent, and only 16 percent was to some extent or very satisfied. MINUSMA is seen by large parts of the population as impotent, as the civilian components talk with and support what are considered “terrorists” instead of the military component fighting them (van der Lijn et al. 2019a). Similarly, one of the main criticisms of MINUSCA heard among local communities is about the inclusion of several rebel groups in the peace process and agreement co-mediated by MINUSCA’s political affairs division (van der Lijn et al. 2019b). Although perception surveys often do not distinguish between the civilian and military activities of operations, their findings indicate that increased exposure of local communities to military, police, and civilian activities of a peace operation improves perceptions. Gordon and Young (2017), based on surveys in Haiti and van der Lijn et al. (2019b) using focus groups in Mali, emphasize the relevance of relief and development activities by civilian components to local populations’ perceptions of missions. Talentino (2007) points out two perception

174  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations challenges that may explain changes in populations’ perceptions concerning civilian efforts. First, although local communities may generally support the aims of the civilian component, the fact that the component seems to be enforced from the outside may cause resentment and obstruction. Second, local communities often feel that civilian components promise more than they actually deliver, which may lead to mistrust and resentment. Consequently, initial support for civilian activities is often high, but it decreases over time as disappointment rises. Particularly in case study and ethnographic research, scholars argue that peace operations lack responsiveness to local challenges and circumstances, which would undermine cooperation with the local population. Autessere (2014; 2019), for example, outlines several criticisms that equally apply to the uniformed as well as civilian personnel: top-down approaches; a focus on quick elections (one of the main civilian tasks); limited interactions with local populations due to bunkerization as civilian personnel are also increasingly protected in fortified compounds, behind blast walls, barbed wire, and guards; and template approaches – think of civilian tasks such as the organization of elections as the approach to political transition. Pouligny (2006) shows that locals’ interpretation of what peace operations should do often differs from what civilian personnel feel is their mandate. Local populations may have very different priorities than those set by civilian sections. The latter would, for example, focus on technical approaches to reform the security sector, while the former prefer more attention to development aspects or sometimes retribution. Van der Lijn et al. (2019b) show the complexity of how and when populations’ desires and peace operations’ mandates overlap and diverge. In a qualitative study based on street interviews and focus groups in CAR and DRC, they show that the populations’ desire for peace operations and their civilian components to build formal state systems is very much in line with the respective missions’ objectives. However, while the mandate proposes an inclusive state system, respondents prefer to exclude groups that are considered foreign. So far, there is only a limited understanding of how coherence between civilian and military components can best be reached. In addition, research is struggling to translate the concept of coherence into empirical indicators to compare the different levels of integration of civilian and uniformed components and understand under which conditions coherence contributes to peace operation success. Thus, despite the significant attention given to coherence and coordination, very little is known about whether and how it works and what role civilians best play in it. Similar to coordination and coherence, very little is known about how much a people-centered approach impacts mission effectiveness, how it works and what role civilians can best play in it. While a few surveys investigate local populations’ perceptions, they come with three caveats. First, they focus on single countries with limited comparative research. Second, most existing research on the relationship between peace operations and local populations does not explore specifically how civilian personnel and their activities affect these relationships. Third, we know very little empirically about why perceptions may change over time. As such, there is a gap between the prominence of people-centered approaches and evidence-based research.

CONCLUDING REMARKS Peace operations are staffed with civilian personnel to perform civilian tasks to promote conflict resolution and build sustainable peace. Despite the crucial activities civilian personnel

Civilian components in peace operations  175 are involved in, the research landscape on the topic is somewhat limited and fragmented. This chapter concludes with recommendations for two main avenues of research. Lack of comparative studies  In general, there is a need for more quantitative and qualitative comparative research to better understand the contribution of civilian personnel to violence mitigation, human rights promotion, and democratization. A lack of fine-grained data hampers rigorous quantitative analysis. However, several data collections are forthcoming, which allow researchers to overcome the problem of aggregated measures of previous studies (for example, presence or absence of multidimensional peace missions) and the generalizability challenge of small-N and single case studies. For instance, Otto (2019a) has analyzed SIPRI data on civilian personnel in all UN peace operations between 2000 and 2018 on a monthly basis. Other exciting data collections are based on UN resolutions (Di Salvatore et al. 2022) and reports of the Secretary-General (Blair et al. 2021) containing information on more than 35 mandated and implemented activities in Africa. To prevent a bias in the UN peace operations literature, Otto (2019b) is currently updating the Peacekeeping Activity Data used by Blair et al. (2021), which focuses on peace operations in Africa to include peace operations elsewhere. While these data collection efforts are essential steps, further fine-grained data would be fruitful on issues such as the geo-location of civilian personnel and their activities or the recruitment of civilian personnel. The ‘Data Strategy of the Secretary General for Action by Everyone, Everywhere with Insight, Impact and Integrity’ (UN 2020) announced in May 2020 gives hope that the UN, but maybe also other organizations, will make such data available for researchers and practitioners. On the other hand, there is a need for more qualitative, comparative studies to better understand the mechanisms of how civilian personnel and activities contribute to peace and security. One challenge rarely addressed in small-N studies is comparing peace operation cases to non-peace operation cases. Limited methodological and theoretical diversity and cross-fertilization  Another useful step would be to overcome quantitative/qualitative or positivist/constructivist divisions. Rietjens and Ruffa’s (2019) paper on coherence is a refreshing example of combining in-depth conceptual work on coherence with rigorous empirical strategies. Another area of research where this would be fruitful is to identify and empirically research the factors under which civilian personnel and their activities are successful. A meta-study on the numerous single case studies could help to systematize the factors for peace operations’ success and failure. Such knowledge would help to guide small- and large-N comparative studies and data collections. Data and methodological diversity are also crucial to enrich existing theoretical frameworks. Most recent quantitative research stands in the rationalist explanation of war tradition and theorizes how peace operations contribute to overcoming commitment problems and information asymmetries between the conflict parties (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017). Lindberg Bromley et al. (2022) argue convincingly how the reliance on such a dominant theoretical framework restricts our understanding of what peacekeepers do and which mechanisms drive peacekeeping effectiveness. How civilian personnel and their activities shape peacekeeping effectiveness may require different theoretical perspectives overall. Otto (2019a), for instance, argues that civilian personnel’s core competencies are activism, negotiation, and persuasion, which speak rather to constructivist than rationalist theories. Blair’s (2021) work is a stimulating example of combining constructivist theories with rigorous statistical analyses to explain UN peace operations’ abilities to improve rule of law performance in the host country. As such, broad-

176  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations ening the theoretical horizon and curiosity about different methods and theoretical approaches in future research should be encouraged.6

NOTES 1. Hereafter, we shorten multilateral peace operations to peace operations. This chapter applies the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) broad definition of multilateral peace operations to capture the wide variety of peace operations. It includes operations conducted either by the UN, regional organizations, or ad hoc coalitions sanctioned by the UN to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements, support peace processes, or assist conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts (https://​www​.sipri​.org/​databases/​pko/​methods, last accessed 30 June 2021). As such, this definition includes peace operations that perform various tasks and are carried out by different types of organizations. It includes operations consisting of only uniformed or civilian personnel, as well as a combination of both. 2. The recruitment of international civilian personnel differs across deploying organizations. Civilian personnel in UN peace operations, for example, are often drawn from a roster system, while in EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, civilian personnel are both contracted and seconded by member states. The different recruitment strategies and the related challenges go beyond the scope of this chapter. 3. Locally recruited staff are not always involved in substantive roles. While this is the case for UN peace operations and OSCE field operations, in EU CSDP missions locally recruited staff only perform support tasks (Eckhard 2018). 4. All other organizations captured in the SIPRI database area: African Union (AU), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of American States (OAS), Pacific Island Forum (PIF), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Arab League, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and ad hoc coalitions of states. 5. See also Chapter 22 (Dorussen and de Vooght) in this Handbook. 6. We would like to thank Herman Wieselgren for excellent research assistance.

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Civilian components in peace operations  177 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and George Downs (2006), ‘Intervention and democracy’, International Organization, 60 (3), 627–49. Carnahan, Michael, Scott Gilmore, and William Durch (2007), ‘New data on the economic impact of UN peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping, 14 (3), 384–402. Coleman, Katharina (2020), ‘Downsizing in UN peacekeeping: the impact on civilian peacekeepers and the missions employing them’, International Peacekeeping, 27 (5), 703–31. de Coning, Cedric (2010), ‘Mediation and peacebuilding: SRSGs and DSRSGs in integrated missions’, Global Governance, 16 (2), 281–99. de Coning, Cedric and Karsten Friis (2011), ‘Coherence and coordination: the limits of the comprehensive approach’, Journal of International Peacekeeping, 15 (1–2), 243–72. Di Salvatore, Jessica, Magnus Lundgren, Kseniya Oksamytna, and Hannah Smidt (2022), ‘Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, online first, accessed 3 March 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1177/​00220027211068897. Di Salvatore, Jessica and Andrea Ruggeri (2017), ‘The effectiveness of peacekeeping operations’, in William R. Thompson (ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, accessed 3 March 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​acrefore/​9780190228637​.013​.586. Diehl, Paul and Daniel Druckman (2010), Evaluating Peace Operations, Boulder, CO, USA: Lynne Rienner. Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis (2006), Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. D’Souza, Ryan (2020), A Reoriented Approach to Atrocity: Prevention in UN Peace Operations, White Papers series, Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​elac​.web​.ox​.ac​.uk/​sites/​default/​files/​elac/​documents/​media/​a​_reoriented​_approach​_to​ _atrocity​_prevention​_in​_un​_peace​_operations​_dsouza​.pdf​?time​=​1591798580367. Eckhard, Steffen (2018), ‘Comparing how peace operations enable or restrict the influence of national staff: contestation from within?’, Cooperation and Conflict, 54 (4), 445–65. Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (2019), ‘Methodological framework for EPON case studies’, unpublished document. Felix da Costa, Diana, and John Karlsrud (2013), ‘“Bending the rules”: the space between HQ policy and local action in UN civilian peacekeeping’, Journal of International Peacekeeping, 17 (3–4), 293–312. Fortna, V. Page (2008a), Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Fortna, V. Page (2008b), ‘Peacekeeping and democratization’, in Anna Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (eds), From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39–79. Fortna, V. Page and Lise Morjé Howard (2008), ‘Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11 (1), 283–301. Fortna, V. Page and Reyko Huang (2012), ‘Democratization after civil war: a brush-clearing exercise’, International Studies Quarterly, 56 (4), 801–8. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2020), Mali-Mètre Survey: Enquête d’opinion politique, “Que pensent les Malien(ne)s?”, Bureau Bamako, No. 11, 12–26 November 2019, accessed 18 February 2022 at https://​library​.fes​.de/​pdf​-files/​bueros/​mali/​10100/​2020​-11​.pdf. García-Saydn, Diego (1994), ‘Human rights and peace-keeping operations’, University of Richmond Law Review, 29 (41), 41–65. Gordon, Grant and Lauren Young (2017), ‘Cooperation, information, and keeping the peace: civilian engagement with peacekeepers in Haiti’, Journal of Peace Research, 54 (1), 64–79. Hannum, Hurst (2006), ‘Peace versus justice: creating rights as well as order out of chaos’, International Peacekeeping, 13 (4), 582–95. Johnstone, Ian (2006), ‘Dilemmas of robust peace operations’, in Ian Johnstone, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2006, Boulder, CO, USA and London, UK: Lynne Rienner, pp. 1–18. Karlsrud, John (2013), ‘Special Representatives of the Secretary-General as norm arbitrators? Understanding bottom-up authority in UN peacekeeping’, Global Governance, 19 (4), 525–44. Kirschner, Shanna and Adam Miller (2019), ‘Does peacekeeping really bring peace? Peacekeepers and combatant-perpetrated sexual violence in civil wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (9), 2043–70.

178  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Kullenberg, Janosch (2016), ‘Community liaison assistants: a bridge between peacekeepers and local populations’, Forced Migration Review, 53, 44–7. Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas (2011), ‘The bifurcation of the two worlds: assessing the gap between internationals and locals in state-building processes’, Third World Quarterly, 32 (10), 1823–41. Lindberg Bromley, Sara, Chiara Ruffa, and Sabine Otto (2022), ‘What do peacekeepers do, really? A research note about activities in UN peacekeeping’, paper presented at IB research colloquium at University of Greifswald, 17 January 2022. Lindenmayer, Elisabeth, Derek Carnegie, Marie Doucey, Sara Jacobs, Aaron Pangburn, and Inbok Rhee (2012), The Role of Peacekeeping Operations in Electoral Processes, report presented at Capstone Workshop, Spring, Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs, 26 June, accessed 18 February 2022 at https://​www​.sipa​.columbia​.edu/​file/​3187/​download​?token​=​DwX2afa8. McNamara, Dennis (1995), ‘The protection and promotion of human rights’, in Nassrine de Rham-Azimi, The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC): Debriefing and Lessons. Report and Recommendations of the International Conference Singapore, August 1994, London, UK, The Hague, NL, and Boston, MA, USA: Kluwer Law International, pp. 165–9. Metcalfe, Victoria, Alison Giffen, and Samir Elhawary (2011), UN Integration and Humanitarian Space: An Independent Study Commissioned by the UN Integration Steering Group, Humanitarian Policy Group-Stimson Center, accessed 18 February 2022 at https://​odi​.org/​documents/​295/​7526​.pdf. Montgomery, Tommie Sue (1995), ‘Getting to peace in El Salvador: the roles of the United Nations Secretariat and ONUSAL’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 37 (4), 139–72. Murdie, Amanda (2017), ‘R2P, human rights, and the perils of a bad human rights intervention’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 9 (3), 267–93. Murdie, Amanda and David Davis (2010), ‘Problematic potential: the human rights consequences of peacekeeping interventions in civil wars’, Human Rights Quarterly, 32 (1), 49–72. Murphy, Ray (2017), ‘The United Nations Mission in South Sudan and the protection of civilians’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 22 (3), 367–94. Mvukiyehe, Eric (2018), ‘Promoting political participation in war-torn countries: microlevel evidence from postwar Liberia’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62 (8), 1686–726. Opie, Rachel (2001), ‘International human rights promotion and protection through peace operations: a strong mechanism?’, International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations, 7, 99–151. Otto, Sabine (2019a), ‘The civilian side of peacekeeping: new research avenues’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 25 (4), 1–6. Otto, Sabine (2019b), ‘The civilian dimension of peacekeeping operations and human rights promotion’, research project, accessed 30 June 2021 at https://​pcr​.uu​.se/​research/​research​-themes/​human​-rights/​ the​-civilian​-dimension​-of​-peacekeeping​-operations​-and​-human​-rights​-promotion/​. Paddon Rhoads, Emily (2019), ‘Putting human rights up front: implications for impartiality and the politics of UN peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping, 26 (3), 281–301. Pouligny, Béatrice (2006), Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People, Bloomfield, CT, USA: C. Hurst & Co. Rietjens, Sebastiaan and Chiara Ruffa (2019), ‘Understanding coherence in UN peacekeeping: a conceptual framework’, International Peacekeeping, 26 (4), 383–407. Smidt, Hannah (2019), ‘United Nations peacekeeping locally: enabling conflict resolution, reducing communal violence’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 64 (2–3), 344–72. Smidt, Hannah (2020), ‘Mitigating election violence locally: UN peacekeepers’ election-education campaigns in Côte d’Ivoire’, Journal of Peace Research, 57 (1), 199–216. Smit, Timo, Sofía Sacks Ferrari, and Jaïr van der Lijn (2020), ‘Peace operations and conflict management’, in SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 45–62. Smit, Timo and Kajsa Tidblad-Lundholm (2018), Trends in Women’s Participation in UN, EU and OSCE Peace Operations, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 47, SIPRI, accessed 18 February 2022 at https://​ www​.sipri​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​2018​-10/​sipripp47​_pko​_gender​_data​.pdf. Sprik, Lenneke (2019), ‘UN peacekeeping and local rule of law initiatives in the Central African Republic, European Society of International Law’, The Rule of Law in International and Domestic

Civilian components in peace operations  179 Contexts Synergies and Challenges, Conference Paper Series, No. 15/2019, ESIL Annual Research Forum, Göttingen 4–5 April. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (n.d.), SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed 30 June 2021 at https://​www​.sipri​.org/​databases/​pko. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (n.d.), ‘Definitions and methodology’, in SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed 30 June 2021 at https://​www​.sipri​.org/​ databases/​pko/​methods. Talentino, Andrea (2007), ‘Perceptions of peacebuilding: the dynamic of imposer and imposed upon’, International Studies Perspectives, 8 (2), 152–71. UN (1945), ‘Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice’, accessed 4 February 2022 at https://​treaties​.un​.org/​doc/​publication/​ctc/​uncharter​.pdf. UN (2020), ‘Data Strategy of the Secretary-General for Action by Everyone, Everywhere with Insight, Impact and Integrity 2020–22’, May, accessed 18 February 2022 at https://​www​.un​.org/​en/​content/​ datastrategy/​images/​pdf/​UN​_SG​_Data​-Strategy​.pdf. UN Careers (n.d.), ‘Working in the field’, accessed 18 February 2022 at https://​careers​.un​.org/​lbw/​home​ .aspx​?viewtype​=​WINF​&​lang​=​en​-US. UN Civil Affairs Team, Policy and Best Practices Service (PBPS), Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET), DPKO/DFS (2017), Civil Affairs Newsletter 2017, No. 6, accessed 18 February 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​civil​_affairs​_2017​_newsletter​.pdf. UN General Assembly (2006), ‘Investing in people: report of the Secretary-General, addendum reforming the field service category: investing in meeting the human resources requirements of United Nations peace operations in the twenty-first century’, A/61/255/Add.1, 22 August, accessed 18 February 2022 at https://​documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​GEN/​N06/​475/​66/​PDF/​N0647566​ .pdf​?OpenElement. UN General Assembly and Security Council (2015), ‘High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people’ (‘HIPPO’), A/70/95–S/2015/446, 17 June, accessed 3 March 2022 at https://​undocs​.org/​A/​70/​95. UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (2019), ‘Evaluation of the contribution of the UNMISS Civil Affairs Division to the reduction of local conflict in South Sudan, Inspection and Evaluation Division’, accessed 18 February 2022 at https://​oios​.un​.org/​file/​7754/​download​?token​=​ydlPIt3r. van der Lijn, Jaïr (2006), Walking the Tightrope: Do UN Peacekeeping Operations Actually Contribute to Durable Peace?, Amsterdam, NL: Rozenberg. van der Lijn, Jaïr (2009), ‘If only there were a blueprint! Factors for success and failure of UN peace-building operations’, Journal of International Peacekeeping, 13 (1–2), 45–71. van der Lijn, Jaïr (2015), ‘Comprehensive approaches, diverse coherences: the different levels of policy coherence in the Dutch 3D approach in Afghanistan’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 26 (1), 72–89. van der Lijn, Jaïr, Noura Abouelnasr, Md Tofayel Ahmed, Linda Darkwa, Tobias von Gienanth, Fiifi Edu-Afful, John Karlsrud, and Natasja Rupesinghe (2019a), Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, accessed 18 February 2022 at https://​effectivepeaceops​.net/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2019/​11/​EPON​-MINUSMA​ -Report​.pdf. van der Lijn, Jaïr, Tim Glawion, and Nikki de Zwaan (2019b), Towards Legitimate Stability in CAR and the DRC: External Assumptions and Local Perspectives, SIPRI, accessed 18 February 2022 at https://​ www​.sipri​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​2019​-09/​0919​_policy​_report​_cardrc​.pdf. van der Lijn, Jaïr and Timo Smit (2017), ‘Challenges and opportunities for peace operations data collection: experiences from the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (1), 23–8. van der Lijn, Jaïr and Timo Smit (2020), Women in Multilateral Peace Operations in 2020: What’s the State of Play?, SIPRI, accessed 18 February 2022 at https://​www​.sipri​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​2020​-10/​ women​_in​_multilateral​_peace​_operations​_in​_2020​_small​.pdf. Wiharta, Sharon and Stephanie Blair (2010), ‘Civilian roles in peace operations’, in SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 87–106.

180  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Williams, Michael (2011), ‘Empire lite revisited: NATO, the comprehensive approach and state-building in Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping, 18 (1), 64–78.

PART III PEACEKEEPING EFFECTIVENESS

13. Peacekeeping and conflict resolution Evgenija Kroeker and Andrea Ruggeri

INTRODUCTION Since the beginning of the 2000s, whether and how peacekeeping works has become one of the most important questions studied by quantitative scholars. Ever since Doyle and Sambanis’ (2000) seminal article on the impact of United Nations (UN) peace operations on civil conflict resolution, the peacekeeping effectiveness literature has grown in quantity and in quality (Walter et al. 2021). In terms of quantity, scholars now study a wide range of conflict-related and non-conflict-related outcomes to assess whether peacekeeping works. These include the ability of peace operations to resolve civil conflicts – that is, to curb violence, increase the duration of post-conflict peace, or prevent the recurrence of conflict. Scholars also examine whether peacekeepers contain conflicts geographically, protect civilians, or prevent electoral as well as sexual violence. More recent research even looks at the ability of peacekeepers to positively affect democratization processes post-conflict, the observance of the rule of law, and economic development.1 In terms of quality, the measures by which scholars try to gauge the impact of peacekeeping as an explanatory variable have substantially improved over time. While earlier studies used simple binary indicators on the presence or absence of peace operations, as well as categorical measures of different forms of peace operations, subsequent research introduced disaggregated data on the number and type of UN personnel. More contemporary work employs even more fine-grained explanatory variables capturing which tasks peacekeepers are mandated to fulfill on the ground.2 By and large, the quantitative literature on peacekeeping effectiveness finds that the deployment of peacekeepers to civil conflicts has a positive impact on the multitude of outcomes used by scholars to evaluate whether peacekeeping works. This chapter focuses on the ability of UN peacekeepers to successfully settle civil conflicts and seeks to shed more light on three categories of outcomes that are often thought to be intricately linked to the concept of conflict resolution: conflict intensity, peace duration, and conflict recurrence. First, we present a systematic summary of the impact of UN peace operations on these three dimensions and explain how and through which mechanisms peacekeepers can affect conflict intensity, peace duration, and conflict recurrence. Then we critically examine whether thinking about conflict as something that can be resolved by decreasing fatality counts, prolonging post-conflict peace, or preventing renewed conflict risks constraining our understanding of peacekeeping effectiveness. We argue that what can at first sight be claimed as the resolution of a conflict can mean very different things empirically. In cases where we observe an absence of, or a decline in, violence, we can face problems of equifinality because different trajectories with different implications for conflict resolution might produce the same outcome.

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Peacekeeping and conflict resolution  183

THREE DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION To evaluate whether peacekeepers perform well at resolving civil conflicts, the scholarly community most frequently looks at three indicators: conflict intensity, peace duration, and conflict recurrence. Peacekeepers are deemed successful in settling civil wars if they can reduce their severity (mostly in terms of fatality counts), increase the duration of peace once wars have ended, and prevent conflicts from recurring. The commonality of these three indicators is their focus on the reduction or elimination of (armed) violence, which is often thought to be a necessary first step in creating an environment that allows for negotiations and talks between warring factions to take place to resolve their underlying grievances. Hence, whether peacekeepers are effective at resolving conflicts is most often evaluated in terms of their ability to prevent the (re‑)emergence of violence in the context of civil war. The following sections provide more detail on how researchers have operationalized conflict intensity, peace duration, and conflict recurrence as outcomes of interest, how they have measured peacekeeping as an explanatory variable, and what their findings are on the relation between UN peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Conflict intensity  Doyle and Sambanis (2000) first introduced conflict intensity as an indicator in their analysis of the role of UN peacebuilding initiatives in resolving civil conflicts. For them, peace operations are effective if they are associated with the absence of (or low level of) violence within two, five, or ten years after the end of a civil conflict. Building on their work, subsequent studies have extended the temporal domain of Doyle and Sambanis’ definition to not only include scenarios where peacekeepers are sent to conflicts that have already ended but also those that are still ongoing. Additionally, they have introduced a standardized way of measuring conflict intensity, namely by counting the number of battle-related deaths (Beardsley et al. 2019; Cil et al. 2020; Hultman et al. 2014), the number of civilians killed (Bove and Ruggeri 2016; Di Salvatore 2020; Fjelde et al. 2019; Hultman 2010; 2013; Hultman et al. 2013; Kathman and Wood 2016), or a combination of both counts (Bove and Ruggeri 2019; Costalli 2014; Kathman 2013). Although most researchers employ Doyle and Sambanis’ operationalization of conflict intensity, some studies also use the duration of a conflict, either in days (Arı and Gizelis 2020), months (Kathman and Benson 2019) or years (Ruggeri et al. 2017), to evaluate the effectiveness of peace operations. Overall, the presence of UN peace operations has mixed effects on conflict intensity. Kathman (2013), for example, finds that peacekeepers increase levels of violence, while Costalli (2014) observes that the UN mission deployed to Bosnia, UNPROFOR, had no effect on the intensity of the civil war. Yet other studies note that the presence of peacekeepers can decrease violence – under certain conditions. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) highlight that the presence of peacekeepers only has an intensity-reducing effect when a peace treaty between the warring parties is in place and the country experiencing civil conflict has high levels of socioeconomic development. Furthermore, they find that peacekeeping makes an even greater difference in conflicts with high death tolls and high numbers of displaced people. Similarly, Gizelis (2009) ascertains that the ability of peacekeeping to curb conflict intensity is enhanced by higher levels of gender empowerment in conflict-ridden countries. In contrast, the presence of peacekeepers seems to significantly reduce the duration of civil conflicts. Ruggeri et al. (2017), as well as Arı and Gizelis (2020), find that conflict episodes last for shorter periods of time when UN

184  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations peacekeepers are present – especially when they are deployed to conflict-prone locations and when a high number of competing actors are involved in the civil war. Looking at the presence or absence of peace operations is a convenient and quick way to get a first impression regarding whether peacekeeping reduces the intensity of civil conflict. However, empirical findings are mixed and oftentimes point to different directions of effect when using simple binary indicators to control for peacekeeping. To correct for these shortcomings scholars have also worked with more disaggregated data on mission characteristics to improve their understanding of the relation between peace operations and conflict intensity. Two dimensions have been most used for this purpose: the type of peace operation (traditional, observer/monitoring, multidimensional, enforcement), as well as the size of a peacekeeping contingent and its composition in terms of personnel (armed troops, police, observers).3 In general, scholars find that only certain types of missions – multidimensional and enforcement – can reduce conflict intensity. Doyle and Sambanis (2000), for example, notice that, overall, the stronger and more extensive the mandate of a peacekeeping mission, the more likely it is that there will be an end to civil conflict violence. They find that monitoring or observer missions, traditional operations, as well as enforcement missions, do have a positive association with lower levels of violence, but that this relationship is not significant. Only multidimensional missions, that is, those that fulfill a multitude of functions ranging from the implementation of peace agreements to government capacity building and institutional transformation, significantly decrease levels of violence. Hegre et al. (2019) also find that multidimensional missions can curb violence – and even prevent conflict escalation. The authors additionally observe that enforcement missions are significantly associated with lower levels of violence as well, whereas observer and traditional missions are not. Costalli (2014), on the other hand, observes that neither the presence of UN peacekeepers nor their monitoring activities, or even more active forms of involvement, such as protecting civilians or engaging with warring parties, influenced the intensity of local violence in the Bosnian civil war. When it comes to the size of a peacekeeping contingent, a general finding is that the larger the mission, the better it is at curbing conflict intensity. Beardsley et al. (2019), for example, observe that increasing numbers of UN peacekeepers are associated with lower numbers of battlefield casualties, and this effect is even stronger when peacekeeping is combined with direct UN mediation that is aimed at facilitating and organizing face to face talks between warring factions. In contrast, Cil et al. (2020) find that larger peacekeeping contingents do not have an independent violence-reducing effect when examining deployments at the subnational level. Rather, increasing numbers of peacekeepers only seem to reduce battle deaths in areas with high road density, which means that the effect of larger contingents on levels of violence is conditional on peacekeepers’ access to paved roads. On the other hand, Ruggeri et al. (2017) note that increasing numbers of peacekeepers have a positive effect on conflict duration: conflict episodes are shorter when more peacekeepers are deployed to conflict-prone locations inside a country. Although the size of a peace operation is mostly correlated with a reduction in conflict intensity, only certain types of personnel produce this effect: whereas armed troops are effective at reducing the intensity of a conflict, police and observers are not, and sometimes even lead to increases in conflict intensity. Concordant results show that increasing numbers of troops can reduce levels of civil war violence, including the number of civilian killings and battle-related deaths (Bove and Ruggeri 2019; Hultman et al. 2013; 2014), mitigate adverse effects of actor fragmentation on battlefield fatalities (Arı and Gizelis 2020), and even increase

Peacekeeping and conflict resolution  185 the probability that a civil war will end via negotiated settlement rather than the victory of either side (Kathman and Benson 2019). By contrast, scholars find that increasing numbers of police personnel either have no effect on levels of violence (Hultman et al. 2014), decrease civilian killings and battlefield fatalities (Hultman et al. 2013), or even increase the extent of civilian suffering and battle-related deaths (Bove and Ruggeri 2019). Although Smidt (2020) finds that neither police nor troops are significantly associated with lower levels of communal violence, Bara’s (2020) study suggests that the ability of either personnel type to positively affect conflict intensity is dependent on the particular stage the conflict is at. She finds that UN troops are not effective in mitigating levels of organized collective violence perpetrated by (foreign) governments, rebel groups, militias, and armed groups in post-civil war environments, while UN police personnel can be. Taken together, troops seem to be good at reducing the intensity of a civil conflict while it is still ongoing, but bad at doing so once a conflict has ended, whereas it is the other way around for police personnel. Observers, on the other hand, are not effective at curbing conflict intensity, either during or post-conflict (Bara 2020; Hultman et al. 2014; Kathman and Benson 2019), and are sometimes even associated with higher levels of civil war violence (Hultman et al. 2013). Peace duration  Peace duration was first prominently used in two studies by Fortna (2003; 2004), in which she examines the impact of peacekeeping on the duration of post-conflict peace after inter-state and intrastate wars. For her, peacekeeping works if it can prolong ‘[…] the time between the termination of fighting and the start of another war, if any, between the same parties’ (Fortna 2003, p. 103). The author uses the number of days in her analysis, while subsequent studies also use the number of months (Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Hultman et al. 2016; Kim et al. 2020) or the number of years (Jo 2006; Joshi 2013) to measure the duration of peace. Regardless of the temporal unit of analysis chosen, all of these scholars find a positive relationship between the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission and the duration of post-conflict peace. Once an intrastate war terminates and violence declines, the presence of a peace operation can significantly help to extend the time between the end of a conflict and the outbreak of another one between the same warring parties. Scholars also observe that only certain types of peace operations increase the duration of peace after civil war. Multidimensional missions are not only good at curbing conflict intensity but also at prolonging post-conflict peace, whereas enforcement missions perform well when it comes to reducing violence but are not effective at “keeping the peace”. While Fortna (2004) finds that all types of peace operations increase the duration of peace post-conflict, albeit only after the end of the Cold War, Fortna (2003) notes that only consent-based peace operations authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (traditional, observer, multidimensional) prolong post-conflict peace, while non-consent-based missions authorized under Chapter VII (enforcement) do not. Jo (2006) also observes that monitoring and multidimensional missions increase the duration of peace, while enforcement or traditional missions have no effect. In the same vein, Kim et al. (2020) find that traditional and multidimensional missions are good at maintaining post-conflict peace, whereas the strength of enforcement missions lies in their ability to effectively end conflict, rather than prolong peace duration. And, lastly, Joshi (2013) notes that powerful multidimensional peace operations authorized under Chapter VII have an indirect but significant effect on peace duration: these missions help accelerate democratic progress and create access to peaceful conflict resolution tools for former opponents after conflict, which in turn leads to a more durable peace.

186  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations As for conflict intensity, the size of a peacekeeping contingent, as well as its composition in terms of personnel, also has important implications for the duration of post-conflict peace. Hultman et al. (2016), for example, find that only larger numbers of UN troops can extend the duration of peace significantly and prevent a return to conflict. The same finding does not hold for police personnel or observers: while neither of them shows a significant association with peace duration, the coefficient for police is negative, meaning that the deployment of more police personnel can even shorten the duration of post-conflict peace. Refining these results, Kim et al. (2020) observe that the ability of different types of personnel to prolong the duration of peace is mediated by different conflict phases. The authors observe that troops are good at shortening the duration of conflict, as well as prolonging the duration of post-conflict peace. Police, on the other hand, are effective at ending conflicts more quickly but do not fare well as regards maintaining peace once conflict ends. And observers neither decrease conflict duration nor increase the time between the end of fighting and the start of another war between the same parties; if anything, they might even marginally decrease the duration of peace once a conflict comes to an end. Conflict recurrence   Conflict recurrence has also been added by various other scholars to the literature on peacekeeping and civil conflict resolution, as a logical extension to the concept of peace duration (Beardsley 2013; DeRouen and Chowdhury 2018; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Jo 2006; Kim et al. 2020; Ruggeri et al. 2017).4 Although the temporal and geographical units of analyses vary between these research projects, they are aligned in their endeavor of assessing whether peace operations can decrease the risk of a conflict relapse once civil war violence has come to a halt. Similar to conflict intensity, the findings on the impact of peacekeeping on conflict recurrence are not clear-cut. Some scholars find that the presence of UN peace operations decreases the likelihood of conflict recurrence (Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Jo 2006), while others posit that it does not (Ruggeri et al. 2017), and yet others observe that peacekeeping only has a positive effect on conflict recurrence under certain conditions. DeRouen and Chowdhury (2018) find that peace operations generally increase the risk of conflict recurrence. Only if they are coupled with mediation efforts do they prevent the renewal of conflict – a finding that is corroborated by Clayton and Dorussen (2021), who show that only transformative peace operations are key for positively impacting conflict dynamics, and only if coupled with mediation. In the same vein, Beardsley (2013) observes that peacekeeping only reduces the probability of armed conflict recurrence when the UN Security Council also authorizes sanctions while the conflict is still ongoing, and when peace operations are authorized to use force under Chapter VII. Findings on the significance of different types of peace operations also suggest that multidimensional missions are most effective and perform best at preventing the return to conflict once peace has been established, whereas the picture is less clear for other types of missions. Jo (2006), for instance, finds that monitoring missions, as well as multidimensional peace operations, significantly reduce the risk of civil war recurrence, while traditional peacekeeping missions and enforcement operations do not. Neither of the two latter mission types seem to be significantly associated with conflict recurrence – traditional missions even display a tendency to accelerate the return to conflict. Kim et al. (2020) also observe that multidimensional missions are good at preventing conflict recurrence, whereas enforcement missions do not perform well at this task, but rather perform well at ending wars more quickly. In contrast to Jo (2006), the authors find that observer and traditional missions are just as effective as multidimensional missions at reducing the likelihood that civil war will resume.

Peacekeeping and conflict resolution  187 In terms of the ability of different types of UN personnel to prevent conflict recurrence, Kim et al. (2020) show that more troops on the ground have two important effects: they significantly reduce the risk of renewed conflict, and they considerably shorten the duration of civil wars. Larger numbers of police personnel, on the other hand, only seem to be effective at ending conflicts more swiftly, but not at preventing conflict recurrence. Observers are neither able to shorten the duration of conflicts, nor do they seem to be good at preventing the renewal of conflict; on the contrary, the deployment of an increased number of observers may even marginally increase the risk of conflict recurrence.

PEACE OPERATIONS AND MECHANISMS Having discussed the most important findings on the relation between peacekeeping and conflict intensity, peace duration, and conflict recurrence, in this section we introduce a selection of mechanisms through which (uniformed) peacekeepers can impact conflict resolution, focusing specifically on commitment problems, information asymmetry and changes in preferences.5 The majority of quantitative studies on peace operations provide correlational analyses and it could (erroneously) seem that their explanations of conflict-related outcomes are only concerned with single factors or variables. A pitfall risk we need to be aware of (and avoid) is the one Coleman warned about, whereby ‘[…] statistical association between variables has largely replaced meaningful connection between events as the basic tool of description and analysis’ (Coleman 1986, pp. 1327–8). Therefore, as Elster puts it, ‘to explain an event is to give an account of why it happened. Usually […] this takes the form of citing an earlier event as the cause or the event we want to explain […] . [But] to cite the cause is not enough: the causal mechanism must also be provided, or at least suggested’ (Elster 1989, pp. 3–4). Mechanisms are those elements of our theories that explain the co-occurrence of phenomena providing causal links and narratives. Giving more attention to mechanism-based explanations can help quantitative scholars studying peace operations to become more and more aware of the need to analytically clarify and identify mechanisms through which the deployment and actions of peacekeepers can influence conflict dynamics (Bove et al. 2020; Ruggeri et al. 2017). The two most common mechanisms that scholars refer to when theorizing about how peacekeepers affect conflict resolution are deterrence and information balancing. These mechanisms are intimately linked to two core issues emphasized by rationalist explanations of conflict: commitment problems and information asymmetry (Fearon 1995). When a negotiated settlement, such as a ceasefire or peace agreement, cannot be fully implemented in a civil conflict because at least one warring party has an incentive to renege on its terms, commitment problems are at play. One avenue through which peacekeepers can tackle such situations is deterrence: that is, to increase the costs a warring party would incur if it chose to continue fighting over implementing the terms of a settlement (Schelling 1966). However, it should be noted that another mechanism can be at play, such as inducement, which involves providing benefits to resolve commitment problems, rather than threatening with the imposition of costs; this can be a powerful mechanism (see Howard 2019). Another avenue through which peacekeepers can engage in conflict resolution is information balancing. In cases where warring parties do not have access to private information about each other’s capabilities and intentions, the asymmetry of information hampers the parties’ ability to reach a mutually preferable settlement to

188  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations the conflict. Through impartial monitoring, peacekeepers can observe and report on the behavior of the warring parties and conflict processes at large, thus reducing the uncertainty around each actor’s actions and intentions, containing defection and spurring cooperation, particularly in areas where UN personnel are stationed. According to Fortna (2008), the presence of peacekeepers can reduce the chance of renewed fighting by increasing the costs of war or the benefits of peace. Peacekeeping can disrupt the spiral of fear and resolve security dilemmas by reducing belligerents’ uncertainty about each other’s actions and intentions. It can prevent accidents among belligerents from occurring, or it can help to control them, thus avoiding conflict escalation. Finally, it can deter or prevent one side from reneging on political settlements and excluding certain factions from power. Ruggeri et al. (2017), studying the local effectiveness of peacekeepers’ deployment, stress that peacekeeping deterrence helps prevent conflicts from spilling over into non-combatant areas, thus reducing and limiting violence. Additionally, because ceasefires provide opportunities for government and rebel authorities to increase their bargaining power, the local presence of peacekeepers matters because it commits leaders to follow previously agreed rules, including the interdiction on the presence of combatants in civilian areas. Finally, information flows can be crucial, as government and rebel leaders often lack information about the relative strength of their opponent. By providing such information, peacekeepers can assist the peace process. Vital information is obtained thanks to interactions and socialization with locals (Bove and Ruggeri 2019). Moreover, signaling commitment and the willingness to punish violations by deploying large military contingents is key for the success of peace missions (Ruggeri et al. 2013). Building on Howard’s work (2019), the recent study by Bove et al. (2020), for example, elaborates an additional mechanism of peacekeeping based on the centrality of persuasion. It should be noted that persuasion aims to change preferences, whereas the two previous mechanisms relate to costs, benefits and information: ‘Persuasion is a social process of interaction wherein one entity changes the behavior of another, in the absence of material inducement or coercion’ (Howard 2019, p. 35). Bove et al. (2020) argue that the ‘capacity of peacekeepers, given by the diversity in their skills, training, and culture cultivated through variations in military training, can affect the capacity to resolve commitment problems,’ thanks to skilled persuasion (Bove et al. 2020, p. 39). This mechanism thus mostly influences preference formation via interactions and socialization, and ultimately can even affect information and commitment issues. Overall, deterrence, inducement, informative balancing, and persuasion seem to be the mechanisms that are most often referred to – implicitly and explicitly – by scholars studying the conflict resolution capacity of peace operations.

PEACEKEEPING: RESOLVING CONFLICT, ENABLING PEACE? In this section we try to critically examine whether focusing on the three dimensions of conflict resolution reviewed at the beginning of this chapter is sufficient to deduce whether peacekeepers are good at resolving civil conflicts. The goal is not to evaluate whether these three dimensions are sound and apt concepts (or proxies) linked to peace or peacekeeping effectiveness;6 rather, we want to explore whether thinking about conflict as something that can be resolved by decreasing fatality counts, prolonging post-conflict peace, or preventing renewed conflict risks constrains our thinking, and whether we should extend our analyses

Peacekeeping and conflict resolution  189 and scrutinize additional dynamics of conflict resolution. This should not be taken just as an attempt to establish a research agenda, though we believe that reconceptualization and the identification of related proxies could be beneficial for our future research; rather, we suggest that our exercise could also be useful analytically and retrospectively to reassess and connect previous empirical findings.7 We argue that what can at first sight be claimed as the resolution of a conflict can actually mean very different things empirically. For example, the deployment of peacekeepers might lead to a reduction in violence in one place but also to increases in violence in places where peacekeepers are absent. Warring parties might stop killing civilians when large peacekeeping contingents are deployed but instead resort to other violent means. In cases where we observe the absence of, or a decline in, violence, we can face problems of equifinality because different trajectories with different implications for conflict resolution might produce the same outcome. Politics is about conflict: it is about the allocation and redistribution of material and ideational resources (Lasswell 1950). Those who claim that conflict can be eliminated are either dangerous or ignorant (and ignorant is dangerous); what can be eliminated, however, is the violent aspect of conflict. To provide some conceptual housekeeping, we can broadly define political violence as the use of violence to obtain a political goal: for example, a change in the actual power relations between actors and their relative policies. Hence, political actions, even violent ones, aim to change or preserve the social and institutional relations within a community or a polity. As put forth by Schelling, ‘to study the strategy of conflict is to take the view that most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations’ (Schelling 1960, p. 5). A political act challenges the power relations among social actors and conflict is in fact a disagreement about policies – policies which are based on preferences over resource allocations that affect utility or status. However, according to Weber (1978 [1922]), while social conflict might be inevitable, it does not necessarily have to be harmful. In fact, if appropriately channeled and managed, social conflict can indeed fulfill important functions – not least creating links between citizens and groups, and producing a fertile ground for constructive (as opposed to disruptive) change. Our focus here is on violent conflict, and peace operations can remove the violent dimensions from conflictual dynamics, or mitigate them. Peace operations cannot resolve all aspects of conflict, and we need to understand under what conditions the resolution towards non-violent conflict can happen. Using Charles Tilly’s words, ‘by no means [does] all contentious politics generate violence; our problem is precisely to explain when contention takes a violent turn. But all collective violence involves contention of one kind or another’ (Tilly 2003, p. 68). However, Kalyvas (2019) suggests that collective political violence is characterized by different phenomena and tactics. There is a broad landscape of violent conflicts: for instance, civil wars, passing through mass atrocities, and also the use of terrorism. And these phenomena can be interconnected. Conflict, in its violent forms, is not just a mere repertoire of violent means (Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2017); violent conflict can change and adjust, involving different actors and targets. Recent works on peace operations have started to explore how the mere absence of belligerents as pairs of rebels/government does not imply conflict resolution, and, therefore, how we should start thinking not just about a landscape of political violence but also about a landscape of conflict resolution. For example, Di Salvatore (2019) explores the dynamics of conflict substitution and explains how organized crime and its violent repertoires can replace organized political violence perpetrated by rebels because the presence of peacekeepers can provide these actors with unintended windows of opportunity. Studying other

190  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Table 13.1

Types of conflict changes and consequences

Conflict change

What changes?

How?

So what?

Displacement

Where violent conflict

The costs of using violence

Violence has been removed from

occurs

increase for certain locations but

the place where it was happening;

Substitution

not for others

however, it has started elsewhere

The repertoire of violence

The cost of using a particular

The modalities of violence have

and/or core actors and

repertoire of violence increases and changed; violence remains

targets

makes other violent means more

Current violence stops

Using violent means is deterred

Violence does not occur, but the

by peace operation; however, the

absence of it is due to exogenous

motivation not to use violence is

factors; violence will reinitiate

convenient Freezing

Postponing

Mitigating

Current violence stops

not resolved

after operation’s exit

Violence has stopped because its

The involved parties will

current use is not beneficial; this is

resume the use of violence when

a strategic absence of violence

opportunities are more favorable

The level of violence

Procedures of mitigation

Conflict could occur but mostly

declines, or violence stops

(e.g., repayments, transfers, or

not with violent means

redistributions) modify the logics of local actors Mediating

The level of violence

Conflict is structured and

Escalation towards violent means

declines, or violence stops

organized via non-violent

is avoided using institutional

procedures and modalities

devices

instances of unintended consequences, Di Salvatore et al. (2022) show how the deployment of a peace operation can alter the power relations between rebels and a government. Rebels that used to be relatively stronger before the arrival of UN peacekeepers could enlarge their repertoire of violence by adding terrorism as a tactic. Alternatively, violent conflict can be postponed and can change into forms of electoral violence when peace operations do not have the ability and mandate to properly organize elections (Smidt 2021). Furthermore, post-conflict situations, even when peace operations are deployed, can still be violent – and especially so for civilians if a mission is lacking police personnel (Bara 2020). Consequently, the key point we will need to tackle analytically and empirically in a deeper fashion in future research is that peace operations cannot resolve conflict per se; instead, they must transform and channel it through non-violent mechanisms. To avoid committing the ‘mission accomplished’ fallacy (or sin), in our studies we therefore need to disentangle whether actual violent conflict remains just latent in certain instances, whether it has modified its practices, or whether it has lost its violent dimensions. In Table 13.1 we provide a first attempt at systematically disentangling different types of conflict resolution. Of course, these different forms of conflict changes might need different conflict management policies.8 For instance, violent mitigation may open the opportunity for peace talks, whereas displacement of violence may – as a worst-case scenario – lead to reduced trust in the mission, and therefore less opportunity for the UN to mediate the conflict. However, this chapter does not aim to also unpack the possible and related conflict management repertoire. Displacement moves the violent conflict from one spatial area to another. It has been shown that peace operations can contain violence geographically (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015)

Peacekeeping and conflict resolution  191 and work studying conflict dynamics at the subnational level shows that, at least for African UN missions, subnational displacement of violence is not an issue (Ruggeri et al. 2017). Yet we should always test if the resolution of a conflict is due to a geographical displacement of violence, rather than its non-violent resolution. Substitution is another case where we could observe a decline in one type of violence – for instance, battle deaths – but an increase in other types of violence – for instance, terrorism – or a change in the targets of, or the actors perpetrating, violence. The complexity of strategic interdependencies and changes in repertoires of violence in conflict, even if unintentionally caused by peace operations, is a research agenda that needs a more thorough development. Violent conflict can also be frozen rather than transformed. In this case, local actors are deterred from using violent means. Notice that freezing a conflict is not a failure per se of a peace operation; often, it is the first step towards subsequent transformations of conflict modalities. However, just freezing a violent conflict does not resolve it: external actors, such as UN peacekeepers, that deter the use of violent means while on the ground, need to leave the conflict theater at a certain point.9 We can also observe a temporary decline in violent actions when local actors strategically decide to postpone the use of violent means (Metternich 2011). In this case the absence of violence is merely strategic, and it should not be understood as a resolution of violent conflict. Actors may decide to wait or change the modalities of violence (for instance, switching to electoral violence) to maximize their benefits conditional on their capabilities. The last two categories we propose in Table 13.1 are those that can enable a lasting peace. Clearly, they cannot be guaranteed only by uniformed personnel in peace operations. Blair (2020), for instance, shows lucidly how the transformation from violent to non-violent conflict is related to the creation of institutional devices, such as a judicial system, when peace operations are deployed. Hence, violent conflict can be mitigated based on transfers or repayments but also mediated via institutions that structure, absorb, and regulate non-violent conflict according to rules (Przeworski 2011, p. 150).

CONCLUSION Since the early 2000s, the academic community studying peace operations has produced a tremendous amount of work, not just in terms of quantity but also in terms of quality (Walter et al. 2021). We have moved through different waves of research emphases (Fortna and Howard 2008) and have accumulated solid and consistent evidence about the effects of peace operations. The first part of our chapter systematically reviewed research on the effects of peace operations on conflict intensity, peace duration, and conflict recurrence. We paid particular attention to the different ways in which peacekeeping has been measured to date, including UN operations’ deployment, different categories of peace operations, the size of mission contingents, as well as different types of peacekeeping personnel. After our review of the main empirical quantitative findings on the conflict resolution capacity of peace operations, we focused on theoretical mechanisms – deterrence, informative balancing, and persuasion – that explain why peace operations should affect different facets of violent conflict. We concluded the chapter by, hopefully, providing some analytical innovations and pointing out possible issues to be investigated in future research. We have tried to tackle and unpack different phenomena that tend to be conflated under the term “conflict resolution”. An observable decline in violence, when peace operations are deployed, can be due to different phenomena, such as displacement, freezing, postponement, and substitution, but also mitigation and medi-

192  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations ation. Writing about violent conflict, Kalyvas suggests that there is an ‘extremely varied and fragmented landscape of research on political violence,’ and he proposes ‘a way to unify the study of its various manifestations in a way that is tractable, consistent, and analytically fruitful’ (Kalyvas 2019, p. 11). Following this advice, we have tried to provide a stepping stone for further analytical and empirical debate on the landscape of conflict resolution and peace operations.10

NOTES 1. See Chapter 14 (Beber) in this Handbook on containing conflict geographically, Chapter 15 (Hultman et al.) on protection of civilians, Chapter 16 (Smidt) on preventing electoral violence, Chapter 18 (Karim and Beardsley) on prevention of sexual violence, Chapter 10 (Blair) on UN mission and rule of law, and Chapter 23 (Khadka and Phayal) on economic development. For a more thorough review of the broad spectrum of peacekeeping effectiveness research, see also Di Salvatore and Ruggeri (2017), Fortna and Howard (2008), Sandler (2017), and Walter et al. (2021). 2. See, for example, Blair et al. (2021). 3. Information on mission composition and diversity in terms of the cultural and socioeconomic distance between countries contributing personnel have recently been used to better understand under which conditions peacekeeping works; see, for example, Bove et al. (2020), Bove and Ruggeri (2016; 2019), and Clayton et al. (2017). See also Chapter 5 (Bove et al.) in this Handbook. 4. Note that Diehl et al. (1996) also look at conflict recurrence; however, their focus is on interstate conflict rather than intrastate conflict. 5. This is, of course, not an exhaustive list; however, the three mechanisms we focus on in this section are by far the most commonly referred to. For a more detailed review of mechanisms referred to in the peacekeeping literature, see Bove et al. (2020). Furthermore, we do not discuss how civilian components of peace operations can influence the conflict resolution process. For more information on this important research agenda, see Otto (2019), as well as Chapter 12 (van der Lijn and Otto) in this Handbook. 6. See Di Salvatore and Ruggeri (2017) for a more thorough discussion of these aspects. 7. Lisa Hultman helped us to articulate this point. 8. Another excellent point that was triggered by Lisa Hultman’s suggestions. 9. There is a growing literature studying the effect of an exit of peace operations (see Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2020; Dorussen 2015). However, these studies need to consider the trajectory and modalities of conflict resolution – for instance, frozen versus mitigated – to gauge the effects of a withdrawal of peace operations. 10. We thank Han Dorussen, Marian de Vooght, and Lisa Hultman for their comments and suggestions.

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Peacekeeping and conflict resolution  193 Blair, Robert A., Jessica Di Salvatore, and Hannah M. Smidt (2021), ‘When Do UN Peacekeeping Operations Implement Their Mandates?’, American Journal of Political Science, 66 (3), 664–80. Bove, Vincenzo, Chiara Ruffa, and Andrea Ruggeri (2020), Composing Peace: Mission Composition in UN Peacekeeping, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Bove, Vincenzo and Andrea Ruggeri (2016), ‘Kinds of Blue: Diversity in UN Peacekeeping Missions and Civilian Protection’, British Journal of Political Science, 46 (3), 681–700. Bove, Vincenzo and Andrea Ruggeri (2019), ‘Peacekeeping Effectiveness and Blue Helmets’ Distance from Locals’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (7), 1630–55. Cil, Deniz, Hanne Fjelde, Lisa Hultman, and Desirée Nilsson (2020), ‘Mapping Blue Helmets: Introducing the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 57 (2), 360–70. Clayton, Govinda and Han Dorussen (2021), ‘The Effectiveness of Mediation and Peacekeeping for Ending Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, 59 (2), 150–65. Clayton, Govinda (ed.), Jacob Kathman, Kyle Beardsley, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, Louise Olsson, Vincenzo Bove, Andrea Ruggeri, Remco Zwetsloot, Jaïr van der Lijn, Timo Smit, Lisa Hultman, Han Dorussen, Paul F. Diehl, Laura Bosco, and Christina Goodness (2017), ‘The Known Knowns and Known Unknowns of Peacekeeping Data’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (1), 1–62. Coleman, James S. (1986), ‘Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action’, American Journal of Sociology, 91 (6), 1309–35. Costalli, Stefano (2014), ‘Does Peacekeeping Work? A Disaggregated Analysis of Deployment and Violence Reduction in the Bosnian War’, British Journal of Political Science, 44 (2), 357–80. DeRouen, Karl and Ishita Chowdhury (2018), ‘Mediation, Peacekeeping and Civil War Peace Agreements’, Defence and Peace Economics, 29 (2), 130–46. Diehl, Paul F., Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul R. Hensel (1996), ‘United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict’, International Organization, 50 (4), 683–700. Di Salvatore, Jessica (2019), ‘Peacekeepers against Criminal Violence—Unintended Effects of Peacekeeping Operations?’, American Journal of Political Science, 63 (4), 840–58. Di Salvatore, Jessica (2020), ‘Obstacle to Peace? Ethnic Geography and Effectiveness of Peacekeeping’, British Journal of Political Science, 50 (3), 1089–109. Di Salvatore, Jessica, Sara M.T. Polo, and Andrea Ruggeri (2022), ‘Do UN Peace Operations Lead to More Terrorism? Repertoires of Rebel Violence and Third-party Interventions’, European Journal of International Relations, 28 (2), 361–85. Di Salvatore, Jessica and Andrea Ruggeri (2017) ‘Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations’, in William R. Thompson (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations, Oxford University Press, accessed 25 February 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​acrefore/​9780190228637​.013​.586. Di Salvatore, Jessica and Andrea Ruggeri (2020), ‘The Withdrawal of UN Peace Operations and State Capacity: Descriptive Trends and Research Challenges’, International Peacekeeping, 27 (1), 12–21. Dorussen, Han (2015), ‘Security Perception after the Completion of UN Peacekeeping in Timor-Leste,’ Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 21 (4), 453–8. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis (2000), ‘International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis’, American Political Science Review, 94 (4), 779–801. Elster, Jon (1989), Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Fearon, James D. (1995), ‘Rationalist Explanations for War’, International Organization, 49 (3), 379–414. Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman, and Desirée Nilsson (2019), ‘Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians’, International Organization, 73 (1), 103–31. Fortna, V. Page (2003), ‘Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars’, International Studies Review, 5 (4), 97–114. Fortna, V. Page (2004), ‘Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War’, International Studies Quarterly, 48 (2), 269–92. Fortna, V. Page (2008), Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Fortna, V. Page and Lise Morjé Howard (2008), ‘Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 283–301.

194  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Gilligan, Michael J. and Ernest J. Sergenti (2008), ‘Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference’, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 3 (2), 89–122. Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene (2009), ‘Gender Empowerment and United Nations Peacebuilding’, Journal of Peace Research, 46 (4), 505–23. Gutiérrez-Sanín, Francisco and Elisabeth Jean Wood (2017), ‘What Should We Mean by “Pattern of Political Violence”? Repertoire, Targeting, Frequency, and Technique’, Perspectives on Politics, 15 (1), 20–41. Hegre, Håvard, Lisa Hultman, and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård (2019), ‘Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing Effect of UN Peacekeeping Operations’, The Journal of Politics, 81 (1), 215–32. Howard, Lise Morjé (2019), Power in Peacekeeping, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Hultman, Lisa (2010), ‘Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace Operations on Violence against Civilians’, Civil Wars, 12 (1–2), 29–46. Hultman, Lisa (2013), ‘UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm Implementation?’, Journal of Peace Research, 50 (1), 59–73. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2013), ‘United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War’, American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 875–91. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2014), ‘Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting’, American Political Science Review, 108 (4), 737–53. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2016), ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Dynamics and the Duration of Post-civil Conflict Peace’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 33 (3), 231–49. Jo, Jung In (2006), ‘The UN’s Effectiveness in Post Civil War Peace Durability’, Journal of International and Area Studies, 13 (1), 23–35. Joshi, Madhav (2013), ‘United Nations Peacekeeping, Democratic Process, and the Durability of Peace after Civil Wars’, International Studies Perspectives, 14 (3), 362–82. Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2019), ‘The Landscape of Political Violence’, in Erica Chenoweth, Richard English, Andreas Gofas, and Stathis N. Kalyvas (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press, pp. 11–33. Kathman, Jacob D. (2013), ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Commitments, 1990–2011’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 30 (5), 532–49. Kathman, Jacob D. and Michelle Benson (2019), ‘Cut Short? United Nations Peacekeeping and Civil War Duration to Negotiated Settlements’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (7), 1601–29. Kathman, Jacob D. and Reed M. Wood (2016), ‘Stopping the Killing During the “Peace”: Peacekeeping and the Severity of Postconflict Civilian Victimization’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 12 (2), 149–69. Kim, Wukki, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Shimizu (2020), ‘A Multi-Transition Approach to Evaluating Peacekeeping Effectiveness’, KYKLOS, 73 (4), 543–67. Lasswell, Harold D. (1950), Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, New York, NY, USA: P. Smith. Metternich, Nils W. (2011), ‘Expecting Elections: Interventions, Ethnic Support, and the Duration of Civil Wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55 (6), 909–37. Otto, Sabine (2019), ‘The Civilian Side of Peacekeeping: New Research Avenues’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 25 (4), 1–6. Przeworski, Adam (2011), ‘Divided We Stand? Democracy as a Method of Processing Conflicts: The 2010 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 34 (2), 168–82. Ruggeri, Andrea, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2017), ‘Winning the Peace Locally: UN Peacekeeping and Local Conflict’, International Organization, 71 (1), 163–85. Ruggeri, Andrea, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Han Dorussen (2013), ‘Managing Mistrust: An Analysis of Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping in Africa’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57 (3), 387–409. Sandler, Todd (2017), ‘International Peacekeeping Operations: Burden Sharing and Effectiveness’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61 (9), 1875–97. Schelling, Thomas Crombie (1960), The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA, USA and London: Harvard University Press. Schelling, Thomas Crombie (1966), Arms and Influence, New Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press. Smidt, Hannah (2020), ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Locally: Enabling Conflict Resolution, Reducing Communal Violence’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 64 (2–3), 344–72.

Peacekeeping and conflict resolution  195 Smidt, Hannah (2021), ‘Keeping Electoral Peace? Activities of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Their Effects on Election-Related Violence’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 38 (5), 580–604. Tilly, Charles (2003), The Politics of Collective Violence, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Walter, Barbara F., Lise Morjé Howard, and V. Page Fortna (2021), ‘The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace’, British Journal of Political Science, 51 (4), 1705–22. Weber, Max (1978 [1922]), Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Berkeley, CA, USA: University of California Press.

14. Peacekeeping and the geographic diffusion and containment of conflict Bernd Beber

INTRODUCTION Much of the quantitative research concerning the effects of peacekeeping missions on violence reduction finds reason to be sanguine. In their recent summary, Walter, Howard, and Fortna describe an ‘extraordinary relationship between peacekeeping and peace’ (Walter et al. 2021, p. 1705). “Peacekept” places in or emerging from conflict appear to suffer less violence than those that fail to attract a peacekeeping mission. Researchers, however, have only relatively recently begun to ask whether the same relationship holds locally, within peacekeeping missions, and collected spatially disaggregated data that would permit answers to this question. It turns out that these answers inject a certain sense of complication into the emerging consensus regarding peacekeepers’ efficacy. Peacekeeping deployments are directed toward particularly conflictual places—the “hard” cases, in a sense—as is true in cross-national comparisons. But their conflict-reducing effects appear much more circumscribed. This poses a puzzle: Why would local-level effects differ from mission-wide outcomes? Is it plausible that a mission as a whole can amount to more than the sum of its parts? I argue that this is an important, exciting research agenda, but that progress will require, first, continued efforts to improve and expand access to intra-mission data, and second, a new analytic, evaluative approach. As Walter et al. (2021) write, the question going forward is not whether peacekeeping “works” globally, but rather which components, approaches, troop configurations, and deployment patterns are most efficacious. In this chapter, I first briefly discuss armed conflicts as location-bound occurrences, and I note that disaggregated spatial data has been used to study a number of aspects of these conflicts. The analysis of peacekeeping missions has lagged somewhat behind, not the least because of a dearth of high-resolution peacekeeping data. I next outline several reasons for why the study of peacekeeping missions in particular stands to benefit from a spatially disaggregated approach; I describe a core set of important data collection efforts that have been undertaken in this area, and present my understanding of key insights that these datasets have generated. I then turn to challenges that remain, in particular in terms of data availability, and conclude with a set of emergent research priorities. The chapter focuses on operations of the United Nations (UN), the single most important source of peacekeepers, but notes related efforts and data sources when indicated.

196

Peacekeeping and the geographic diffusion and containment of conflict  197

THE NEED FOR DISAGGREGATION IN PEACEKEEPING RESEARCH Armed conflicts are spatially complicated phenomena. Their presence and intensity vary with characteristics of the local geography and population, perhaps leaving civilians in one region targeted but largely unaffected elsewhere. They interact with neighboring localities, as violence in one place might spark violence in another or draw fighters from elsewhere (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Rustad et al. 2011). And these linkages shift over time, as frontlines change and troops move. High-resolution analyses of these processes have made tremendous leaps in the last few years, as spatially disaggregated conflict data has become available and widely used. This trend includes ambitious cross-national efforts such as the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010) and the Georeferenced Event Dataset, GED (Sundberg and Melander 2013).1 It also includes theater-specific compilations such as the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center’s Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS).2 In tandem with the growth of these collections, micro-level theories explaining variation in violence exposure in times of war have also burgeoned (Berman et al. 2011; Justino 2009; Kalyvas 2006; Verwimp et al. 2019). Studies using spatially disaggregated, subnational data have investigated how conflict occurs, endures, or spreads as a function of climactic factors (von Uexkull et al. 2016), poverty (Hegre et al. 2009), population concentrations (Raleigh and Hegre 2009), peripherality (Buhaug 2010), road density (Salvi et al. 2020; Zhukov 2012), cell phone coverage (Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013), radio signal strength (Yanagizawa-Drott 2014), types of foreign aid expenditures (Karell and Schutte 2018), and battlefield losses (Kibris 2021). The effects of counterinsurgent compensation for wrongfully detained civilians (Blair 2020) have been studied, as have the effects of indiscriminate violence (Lyall 2009; Schutte 2017). High-resolution quantitative analyses of peacekeeping missions, meanwhile, still remain comparatively sparse. A substantial quantitative literature on peacekeeping has developed over the course of the last two decades or so. This literature has focused primarily, but not exclusively on UN missions—perhaps not surprisingly, given that the UN has been and remains the world’s most prolific operator of peacekeeping missions. But until recently, much of its generally optimistic insights have relied almost exclusively on country-year (or sometimes mission-year) data on peacekeepers (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004; Fortna and Howard 2008; Gilligan 2008). We have learned from this literature that peacekeeping is indeed associated with prolonged spells of peace—that is, peace kept. But the black box approach that prevailed in statistical studies of peacekeeping until just a few years ago, born of necessity given the paucity of fine-grained data, left many questions frustratingly unanswered: Do peacekeepers actually act to suppress conflict where it is threatening to erupt? How do they contain trouble spots? Where and when do they confront and engage those that threaten violence? Early work on the effects of peacekeeping across geographic space still used country-year data. For example, Beardsley (2011) documented that peacekeeping can ameliorate the risk of cross-border conflict contagion, and Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) noted that the geographic range of violent events appears reduced when a (robust) peacekeeping mission is deployed, while themselves indicating that their analysis is limited by the absence of georeferenced peacekeeping details.3 Several data collection efforts have improved matters since then, and

198  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations I will turn to a review and analysis of these relatively recent endeavors in a moment. But, first, why does the study of peacekeeping missions in particular stand to benefit from spatially disaggregated data? I believe there are at least six reasons. Sparse deployments  Despite their political prominence, most peacekeeping missions amount to no more than a very limited, sparse physical presence across a host country’s territory. Take the example of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), a country roughly the size of France or Afghanistan. When civil war rocked the country in early 2014, UNMISS had troops stationed in just 17 locations.4 Imagining peacekeeping as a diffuse, omnipresent feature in this kind of conflict landscape can be misleading. In reality, most peacekeeping missions are a punctuated phenomenon—vast stretches of territory dotted with islands of UN activity. Disaggregated data allows us to appreciate this fact analytically and move away from heroically assuming spatially undifferentiated deployments. We need disaggregated data to know where peacekeepers are physically located in relation to trouble spots and whether they are in fact as proximate as casual observers might expect. Spatial contingencies  High-resolution data on the spatial position of troops allows us not only to see connections to collocated occurrences, but also linkages to conflict and peacekeeping events elsewhere. In fact, an event in one place can have one set of consequences locally and an entirely different and opposite set of consequences elsewhere (Schutte 2017). If peacekeepers do target perpetrators of violence, a strategy of combatant mobility and conflict displacement are natural concerns (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015). Spatially undifferentiated mission-level data leaves us in the dark concerning such externalities and spillover dynamics. Modern mandates  Peacekeeping troops continue to be deployed along international borders (Townsen and Reeder 2014), but much more commonly the focus of contemporary peacekeeping missions is on the protection of civilians and the reduction of violence within conflict theaters. In a traditional peacekeeping mission, such as UNFICYP in Cyprus, force is appropriately concentrated along a narrow buffer zone of possible confrontation. The protection of civilians, in contrast, frequently requires flexible and sustained projection of force across large areas. In order to assess the efficacy of such modern comprehensive mandates, we need to know when and where peacekeepers in fact project force as intended. Theory testing  A classic theoretical narrative underpinning claims of peacekeeper efficacy centers on the UN as a security guarantor, in particular in cases of post-peace agreement missions. Parties to a conflict may be unable to credibly commit by themselves to implement their part of a bargain, so international peacekeepers are deployed to ensure that settlement violations are punished, which in turn makes it possible that the settlement gets signed in the first place. But this popular explanation implies that peacekeepers would act to stop conflict from recurring. Anecdotally, it is not clear that they do. Activists and journalists frequently lament the inconsistent or lackluster responsiveness of UN troops. In order to speak to this issue more systematically and comprehensively, we need disaggregated peacekeeping deployment data.5 Knowledge accumulation  The dearth of high-resolution, high-velocity data has meant that the question of how UN peacekeeping missions actually operate on the ground has often been overlooked by quantitative researchers. Qualitative researchers and policy practitioners, meanwhile, have long written about the inner workings of peacekeeping missions. A bifurcated scholarly discourse has been the result, with a distinct gap in terms of typical assessments of efficacy. Highly critical qualitative case studies stand in contrast to a body of quantitative literature that presents peacekeeping deployments in a mostly positive, if not downright exuberant

Peacekeeping and the geographic diffusion and containment of conflict  199 light.6 The differences in scope and level of observation have made it difficult to accumulate knowledge across methodological approaches, and fine-grained quantitative data will perhaps help resolve some of the discrepancies in how quantitative and qualitative researchers understand peacekeeping. Practitioner support  While high-level policy debates and mandated objectives are often articulated at the country level, practitioners are well aware that missions vary tremendously within a given context. From their perspective, disaggregated data may be particularly helpful for the purposes of predictive analysis (Duursma and Karlsrud 2019). But aside from this, academic analyses that reflect within-mission variation are likely relatively more useful to a broader set of practitioners than broad-brush, country-level summary results. Practitioners would in this sense also benefit from peacekeeping scholars’ access to disaggregated data.

SPATIALLY DISAGGREGATED DATA COLLECTIONS As the need for spatially disaggregated peacekeeping data became apparent over the last decade or so, several data collection projects were launched.7 Table 14.1 summarizes five important initiatives, which produced the Peacekeeping Location Event (PKOLED) and Peacekeeping Operations Deployment (PKODEP) datasets, the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) dataset, the Robust Africa Deployments of Peacekeeping Operations (RADPKO) dataset, and Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) data.8 This list features data sources that have been used in quantitative, academic work. This is why JMAC data is included here, but other internal UN resources that are available to some or all peacekeeping missions are not. Duursma (2021) provides a helpful recent summary of these resources. All of these data sources rely on UN reporting in one form or another. PKOLED, the first of these efforts, coded and georeferenced named locations that appear in the texts of the UN Secretary-General’s reports on peacekeeping missions. This is a time-consuming process and prone to challenges associated with coder reliability, notwithstanding recent developments in automated text analysis that could offer solutions (Amicarelli and Di Salvatore 2021). It also yields data of varying precision, depending on the level of the administrative unit used to describe any particular incident. This led the PKOLED investigators and others to focus on UN-generated maps of mission-specific peacekeeping deployments. These maps provide information for an entire mission, as opposed to describing one deployment event at a time; contain details concerning the locations of bases, types of units, and nationalities present at a base; and follow a common template that has been relatively stable for decades. Maps underpin the data collections for PKODEP, Geo-PKO, and RADPKO, but even so there are differences across these datasets. Fjelde et al. (2019) note a correlation of 0.85 between their coding and the one by Ruggeri et al. (2017) for overlapping cases. Aside from variation in coverage, the maps themselves are subject to some interpretation: The UN only publishes map images, with troop strength and locations indicated symbolically and approximately. And research teams differ in how they employ auxiliary data to improve accuracy and precision. In particular, both PKODEP and RADPKO cross-check data against monthly mission-level deployment reports, and the latter uses them to construct additional variables (for example, gender composition) and interpolate data when maps are irregular.

200  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Table 14.1

Notable data collections

Name

Data source

Coverage

Data publicly

Reference

available Peacekeeping Location

Event descriptions in

Post-Cold War UN

Event Data (PKOLED)

UN Secretary-General

peacekeeping missions,

(SG) reports

primarily in Africa

Peacekeeping

Deployment maps from

Major UN peacekeeping

Operations Deployment

SG reports, plus force

missions in Sub-Saharan

Data (PKODEP)

contribution data

Africa, 1991-2006b

Geocoded Peacekeeping Digitally published UN

All UN peacekeeping

Operations (Geo-PKO)

deployment maps

missions, 1994-2020

Robust Africa

Deployment maps from

All sub-Saharan Chapter VII

Deployments of

mission reports to SG,

UN deployments, 1999-2018

Peacekeeping

plus monthly force

Operations (RADPKO)

contribution data from

Noa

Dorussen and Ruggeri (2017)

Yesc

Ruggeri et al. (2017; 2018)

Yesd

Cil et al. (2020)

Yese

Hunnicutt and Nomikos (2020b)

DPO Joint Mission Analysis

UN-native field mission

Principally all UN

No, proprietary UN

Duursma and Read

Centre (JMAC) data

information

peacekeeping missions since

intelligence

(2017) use data from

2006

Darfur, 2008–09f

Notes: a PKOLED data for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, 1992–95, is publicly available as part of the replication files for Costalli (2014) at http://​dx​.doi​.org/​doi:​10​.1017/​S0007123412000634. PKOLED data was also used, for example, in Powers et al. (2015), and Townsen and Reeder (2014), without publicly available replication files. b Ruggeri et al. (2017; 2018) note that coverage extends to 1989. The publicly available data extends to 1991. c The dataset is available at https://​www​.aruggeri​.eu/​data. d An interactive dashboard and the data are available at https://​geopko​.shinyapps​.io/​GeoPKODashboard. e The dataset is available at https://​dataverse​.harvard​.edu/​dataset​.xhtml​?persistentId​=​doi:​10​.7910/​DVN/​BQU5VD (Hunnicutt and Nomikos 2020a). f See also Duursma and Karlsrud (2019) for a discussion of the JMAC data, including a set of event descriptions.

The UN maintains a more complete record of deployment than is shown on sporadically published mission maps, or at least it has in more recent years with the advent of Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMAC) located in New York and at mission headquarters. However, this data is not usually available to researchers, and unfortunately Duursma and Read’s (2017) use of it in the case of UNAMID may well remain an exception.

INSIGHTS ON DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS AND PEACEKEEPER EFFICACY What have we learned from these relatively recent improvements in intra-mission peacekeeping data? Recall that the general consensus of the quantitative literature, primarily based on mission-level data, is that peacekeeping works—it diminishes violence and prolongs spells of peace. The evidence emerging from analyses of fine-grained spatial data, however, paints a somewhat more complicated picture. Let’s take two sets of empirical questions in turn. First, where do peacekeepers go? Are peacekeeping units in fact deployed to where violence strikes? Second, once in place, do peacekeepers prevent or reduce future bloodshed? Most research agrees at least to some extent that UN peacekeeping missions send personnel to areas that have experienced violence. They are, in this important sense, mandate-compliant.

Peacekeeping and the geographic diffusion and containment of conflict  201 In their analysis of PKODEP data, Ruggeri et al. (2018) find that peacekeepers tend to be deployed to conflict sites, although long delays are common. Using yearly grid data, they find a typical two-year gap until deployments have been significantly effectuated. They also find that a “logic of convenience” can constrain deployment decisions, as troops are more likely to be deployed to accessible areas. Similarly, Fjelde et al. (2019) find—in their analysis of data that would later be released as part of the Geo-PKO dataset—that peacekeepers respond to instances of violence against civilians, in particular if committed by rebel forces. Battle intensity does not predict peacekeeping deployments in their analysis. They also see delays, but note that deployments tend to increase in the space of six months after instances of one-sided violence. Finally, Hunnicutt and Nomikos (2020b) report, on the basis of their RADPKO data, that peacekeepers go where violence has occurred. They indicate that the UN can be highly responsive, but in their illustrative case the violence that the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is quickly acting to tamp down, is violence against MINUSMA peacekeepers themselves. Country-specific studies largely concur. Costalli (2014) uses PKOLED data for Bosnia to argue that peacekeepers deployed to areas that had experienced particularly severe violence. Townsen and Reeder (2014) observe similar patterns in PKOLED data for the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC), 1999–2005, with UN troops deployed to sites of one-sided violence and government–rebel clashes (while steering clear of rebel groups fighting one another). Powers et al. (2015) term this deployment strategy “hot spot peacekeeping” and find some evidence for it using PKOLED data from the DRC (2000–2005), Angola (1995–98), Ivory Coast (2003–05), and Sierra Leone (1998–2001). Their results point toward some heterogeneity in mission-level deployment decisions, as conflict intensity is sometimes positively and more infrequently negatively associated with peacekeeping deployments. Still, the weight of the evidence indicates that peacekeepers go where they must and are mandated to go. The evidence concerning the local-level security-improving effects of peacekeeping deployments is much more mixed, by comparison. Ruggeri et al. (2017) find no clear effect on the onset of local violence using the PKODEP data, but suggest that deployments shorten the duration of conflict episodes. Cil et al. (2020), using Geo-PKO data for all UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, 1994–2014, see no first-order association between a lagged troop presence and battle deaths, but a conditional reduction of battlefield violence where roads are dense. Concerning civilian deaths, Fjelde et al. (2019), using data for missions in Africa with civilian protection mandates in the years 2000–2011, find that local peacekeeping contingents can protect civilians against rebels, but not government forces. Hunnicutt and Nomikos (2020b, p. 647), with their RADPKO dataset, replicate the negative association between peacekeeping deployments and rebel violence in the relevant subset of cases, but find that the result either ‘washes out or is reversed when we use the entire sample of missions’—while a UN presence is positively correlated with government forces beginning to commit atrocities against civilians. Perhaps these ambiguous results simply reflect a considerable amount of effect heterogeneity. While Peitz and Reisch (2019) find violence-reducing effects in the DRC, Costalli (2014) does not in Bosnia, and neither do Mvukiyehe and Samii (2021) for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Phayal (2019) finds that the presence, but not the capacity, of UN troops correlates with a reduction in civilian fatalities in Darfur. Meanwhile, Peitz and Reisch (2019) note that deployments with helicopters, airplanes, or marine units tend to outperform infantry units in the DRC. There may also be heterogeneity in the effects of UN compared to non-UN missions,

202  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations which are studied far less frequently, with the analysis of the African Union (AU) effort in Somalia by Elfversson et al. (2019) an exception. How one reads these results might also depend on the view one takes on issues of selection and endogeneity that affect all of these analyses. Can we reasonably attribute the absence of violence-reducing effects to selection bias, or should we rather be wary of any evidence in favor of such effects? A popular argument, articulated for example by Fjelde et al. (2019), contends that the apparent fact that peacekeepers are deployed to violent areas should, if anything, bias researchers against any finding of peacekeeper efficacy. It is easy to see why this is an attractive argument, but it makes an assumption that usually is not fully recognized, namely that violence will persist locally, all other things being equal. This may not be a well-founded assumption for internal wars, where attacks and clashes often move from one place to another (and violent areas can see mean reversion). If a flare-up of violence is just that—a surge followed by subsidence—then a deployment of peacekeepers some months later will induce a misleadingly optimistic correlation between their presence and an absence of violence. That is, deployment dynamics could bias researchers toward a finding of peacekeeper efficacy. Given the lead times involved in relocating peacekeeping units, especially if a base needs to be newly set up as opposed to expanded, deployments do not necessarily target “hard cases” in the present, but cases that were hard. This is not as much of an issue for the equivalent argument concerning the mission-level record of peacekeeping activity (Fortna 2004), because conflicts are not as spatially mobile across international borders. The Sudanese civil war, say, would not have suddenly disappeared in Sudan and reconstituted itself anew in Ethiopia. Internationalization is of course a common feature of civil wars, but generally not in the sense of a conflict being entirely displaced across borders. By contrast, fronts shift easily within armed conflicts, especially in modern insurgencies where “frontlines” are often diffuse to begin with. In this case, what looks like peacekeepers having a violence-abating impact may in reality be a deployment that puts boots on the ground once violence has already moved elsewhere. This dislocation of violence could be a strategic response to a looming peacekeeper deployment on the part of combatants—Peitz and Reisch (2019) describe such a process of conflict displacement using data from the eastern DRC for 2000–2014—but it could also simply reflect non-strategic mean reversion. This is not to say that conflict displacement is necessarily more common than peacekeeping-induced containment. A reading of Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) or Ruggeri et al. (2017) could suggest the opposite. But one important task for future research on subnational peacekeeping deployments will be to better understand these dynamics of conflict spillovers. Much of the relevant literature does not explicitly identify spillover effects, notwithstanding exceptions such as Peitz and Reisch (2019) and Duursma and Read (2017). Currently researchers commonly analyze high-resolution spatial data by aggregating up either within political-administrative units or within grid cells. Alternative analytical approaches over continuous space as in Kelling and Lin (2020) are rare. The grid-based approach dominates—and how grid cells relate to one another is often left entirely unstructured. As spatial data, for example, fine-grained information on road networks or physical obstacles such as swamps and mountains, and our ability to use it, continues to improve, we should have a better sense of how conflict can be displaced, how peacekeeping missions can project power, and why some missions appear to have positive effects while others do not.9

Peacekeeping and the geographic diffusion and containment of conflict  203 Finally, note that an absence of a violence-reducing effect at the intra-mission level need not necessarily imply that peacekeeping missions as a whole are ineffective (Levin 2015). Even if a local peacekeeping presence does not appear to reduce violence compared to other areas, this can be entirely consistent with the larger peacekeeping mission as a whole improving the security situation for everyone—or at least leading to a better security situation than the country would face in the counterfactual scenario lacking a peacekeeping mission. It is not clear that mission-level success can and should in fact be simply understood as the sum of local-level incidents and effects, and at this point we only have a limited understanding of how micro-level developments link up to shape macro-level outcomes in this arena (Autesserre 2014).

PERSISTENT DATA LIMITATIONS A fundamental challenge of the existing spatial data collections—as impressive and laudable as they are—is that they rely on UN deployment maps. Maps are published at best on a monthly basis, but more typically quarterly, with many quarters or longer stretches of time lacking maps. Maps for two consecutive months are rare. As Hunnicutt and Nomikos (2020b) note, maps are not missing at random. They tend to be available with greater frequency at the beginning and the end of missions. It is not even clear if a month without a digitally available map can be properly characterized as a month for which a map is “missing,” because we do not know if a map was ever generated for that particular mission-month—the UN does not provide a list of all maps that were at some point generated, whether for public release or otherwise. The fact that the raw map data is so sparse means that, first, we can still not be entirely certain about how many peacekeepers have been stationed where, most of the time. Second, analyses can become sensitive to how the data is interpolated—if there is a change between deployment maps, it is not clear when exactly and how gradually or quickly the change took place. Another well-known issue with UN deployment maps is that they generally show mission-assigned, not actual deployment levels. Missions are commonly understaffed, especially after their initial Security Council authorization and after any subsequent mandate expansions. This means that a battalion that is symbolically indicated as such on a deployment map may not in fact be operating at this level of strength. PKODEP and in particular RADPKO attempt to fix this issue by also using mission-level contributing country deployment totals, but their corrections can only be approximate. Deployment maps also lack information about patrols or other activities that allow peacekeepers to project force across populations and territories. Patrols are a key component of missions, as they try to prevent violence through deterrence, physically disrupt threats to civilians, respond to protection-related incidents, or enforce ceasefires and other local and national agreements. Maps that offer snapshots of base locations and their associated troop strength cannot capture these activities and the relationships with local actors that they imply. As Dorussen and Ruggeri (2017) point out in Clayton et al. (2017), we could easily expect a peacekeeping presence to have heterogeneous effects depending on the type and quality of these interactions—but we will not be able to explore these questions using data based on deployment maps alone. This raises the question what kind of data could help answer these questions, and at what level of granularity we might be able to obtain such data. But it raises an even more fundamen-

204  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations tal question: At what level of detail does the UN, or more specifically the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) or the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) at UN headquarters, possess this data, and for which historical and contemporary missions (Bosco 2017)? Geolocated daily base deployment figures likely do exist, also for a substantial portion of the historical record, although this is not publicly known and these records are in any case not likely to be standardized or maintained with an eye toward analysis across missions and time. The situation concerning patrols and other off-base activities is surely worse. The fragmentary orders upon which patrols are carried out are generally supposed to be archived, but historically no cross-mission retention scheme has been in place for them. Patrol totals are regularly reported by missions, but detailed information about patrols is often inconsistently or selectively recorded—precisely because they form such a central mission output, and troop-contributing countries face strong incentives to report patrol activities that are just as mandated. While incidents are often reported with geographic coordinates, routine patrols are not, and political challenges and sensitivities surround them as they do other geospatial UN data (Convergne and Snyder 2015). While room for improvement remains, the UN has made substantial progress with respect to its data collection practices in peacekeeping operations in general and geospatial data retention and analysis in particular (Duursma 2021). Joint Operations Centers (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMAC) were first initiated by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 2005, and now play a central role in systematic information acquisition and analysis (Duursma 2017), and the Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE) database was introduced as a way to log incidents and actions, replacing daily situation reports. The rollout of SAGE has not been without problems: Data collection is not automated, remains focused on events and incidents, and imposes additional entry burdens on missions, which was arguably a reason why its UNMISS launch initially failed (Laurence 2019). Still, it has the potential to be transformative as it centralizes and standardizes data capture for peacekeeping operations, but remains out of reach for academic researchers. For non-UN missions, data collection and availability vary, but are not generally any better. The SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, for example, which is the largest database of non-UN peacekeeping missions, does not include any detailed spatial data (van der Lijn and Smit 2017). Troop-contributing countries often maintain separate, confidential records of their activities, with the level of detail commensurate with their capacity, but these also are usually inaccessible to scholars.

CONCLUSION Where does this leave scholars of peacekeeping? Commendable strides have been made in terms of the spatially disaggregated data that has been collected by several teams of researchers. We know that peacekeepers tend to go where violence has occurred, and that they can help prevent further suffering—at least sometimes. Yet much remains unknown: Geolocated strength figures for most mission days, information on when exactly and how quickly site-specific deployments change, details for patrols and other force projection activities, and how all of this affects the strategic interplay between combatants, civilians, and peacekeeping troops.

Peacekeeping and the geographic diffusion and containment of conflict  205 I will conclude with four forward-looking remarks. First, in the absence of additional UN data releases, it seems at this stage difficult to imagine any comprehensive data collection effort that will substantially improve our knowledge of peacekeeping deployment sites, as it stands given available maps. But there does seem room for data collections around these missions, or efforts to carefully link additional existing data that describes features of the conflict landscape as it responds to the presence of peacekeepers. For example, civilians are rarely appreciated as strategic actors in empirical analyses of peacekeepers’ effects on them, but they can choose to gather around deployment sites to seek protection, avoid such sites if they fear becoming a target, and in general condition their movements on their expectations in the context of a peacekeeping mission (Sundberg 2020). Better, high-resolution data on such movements, or corridors for combatant troop movements, or other standardized facets of the conflict setting could in turn broaden what researchers can accomplish with available peacekeeping location data. Second, as the UN improves its processes by which it gathers information about peacekeeping operations, it should allow qualified non-UN researchers to access at least a subset of this data. This need not entail releasing data, for example, from SAGE, publicly. UN DPO could provide access to a secure, freestanding system at headquarters, where researchers would be able to run their statistical models; or the department could publish a description of the data structure, allow researchers to submit analysis code, run the code for researchers, and return the output only. This is a common procedure that permits researchers to work, for example on personally identifiable sensitive employment data, and it seems sensitive mission data could be protected in the same fashion. Returned outputs could in fact be mission-neutral, that is, only results based on multiple missions could be returned. Third, UN peacekeeping operations should consider building modern monitoring and evaluation systems, and draw on the expertise of outside researchers when designing impact evaluations (Gorur 2019). The fact that quantitative analyses across missions largely agree that UN peacekeeping can reduce conflict, while the intra-mission correlation between deployments and diminished violence is far from clear, only goes to show that the story of peacekeeping efficacy is perhaps not as straightforwardly told as one might have thought. There is still much to be learned about what exactly makes a mission a success, both locally and at the mission level. Fourth, by the same reasoning, the academic research agenda should move toward being comparatively evaluative, as recently suggested by Walter et al. (2021). What exactly makes peacekeeping “work”? Which type of units, with what kind of personnel, employing which practices where, in response to what contextual factors, have the highest likelihood of reducing violence?10 These kinds of questions ought to inspire many more years of vibrant peacekeeping research and disaggregated geolocated data should be one of its central elements.

NOTES 1. Others include the Event Data on Armed Conflict and Security, EDACS (Chojnacki et al. 2012), and—a predecessor to them all—the Kansas Event Data System, KEDS (Schrodt 2006; Schrodt et al. 1994). 2. See e.g., Bove and Gavrilova (2014). Other examples are the Significant Activity (SIGACT) database for Afghanistan (Karell and Schutte 2018) and the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) and Combat Air Activities File (CACTA) for Vietnam (Kocher et al. 2011).

206  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations 3. Another approach to dealing with this limitation has been to rely on individual-level survey data to construct indicators of peacekeeping exposure (Beber et al. 2017; 2019). 4. See the UNMISS deployment map from March 2014 available at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​ record/​3843916​?ln​=​en. 5. For a discussion of whether peacekeeping effects hold up at the ground level, and how they may or may not aggregate from the bottom up, see Autesserre (2014). 6. Dorussen (2014) also notes this discrepancy, and Walter et al. (2021) have a helpful summary of this debate. Examples of critical case studies include Autesserre (2010) with respect to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Müller and Bashar (2017) concerning the African Union–UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and Day et al. (2019) concerning the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). 7. Temporal disaggregation of mission-year peacekeeping data preceded spatial disaggregation. Hultman et al. (2013) and Hultman et al. (2014) used monthly deployment information to link peacekeeping missions to decreases in civilian casualties and battlefield fatalities, respectively. Ruggeri et al. (2011) and Dorussen and Gizelis (2013) present quantitative analyses of event data, without reference to specific georeferenced locations. 8. Peitz and Reisch (2019) separately coded deployment maps for UN activities in the DRC, as did Phayal (2019) for UNAMID. Levin (2015) also coded a georeferenced dataset of subnational peacekeeping deployments in eight African post-Cold War conflicts. 9. See Beck et al. (2006), and also note their more technical point that autoregressive spatial models tend to outperform models with spatially lagged errors. 10. See Blattman et al. (2021) for an example of evaluative work in an extraordinarily challenging, violence-prone setting.

REFERENCES Amicarelli, Elio and Jessica Di Salvatore (2021), ‘Introducing the PeaceKeeping Operations Corpus (PKOC)’, Journal of Peace Research, 58 (5), 1137–48. Autesserre, Séverine (2010), The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Autesserre, Séverine (2014), ‘Going Micro: Emerging and Future Peacekeeping Research’, International Peacekeeping, 21 (4), 492–500. Beardsley, Kyle (2011), ‘Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict’, The Journal of Politics, 73 (4), 1051–64. Beardsley, Kyle and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2015), ‘Peacekeeping as Conflict Containment’, International Studies Review, 17 (1), 67–89. Beber, Bernd, Michael J. Gilligan, Jenny Guardado, and Sabrina Karim (2017), ‘Peacekeeping, Compliance with International Norms, and Transactional Sex in Monrovia, Liberia’, International Organization, 71 (1), 1–30. Beber, Bernd, Michael J. Gilligan, Jenny Guardado, and Sabrina Karim (2019), ‘The Promise and Peril of Peacekeeping Economies’, International Studies Quarterly, 63 (2), 364–79. Beck, Nathaniel, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Kyle Beardsley (2006), ‘Space Is More than Geography: Using Spatial Econometrics in the Study of Political Economy’, International Studies Quarterly, 50 (1), 27–44. Berman, Eli, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter (2011), ‘Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq’, Journal of Political Economy, 119 (4), 766–819. Blair, Christopher (2020), ‘Restitution or Retribution? Detainee Payments and Insurgent Violence’, SSRN Electronic Journal, accessed 7 March 2021 at https://​www​.ssrn​.com/​abstract​=​3613437. Blattman, Christopher, Donald Green, Santiago Tobón, and Daniel Ortega (2021), ‘Place-Based Interventions at Scale: The Direct and Spillover Effects of Policing and City Services on Crime’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 19 (4), 2022–51. Bosco, Laura (2017), ‘UN Peacekeeping Data’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (1), 44–54.

Peacekeeping and the geographic diffusion and containment of conflict  207 Bove, Vincenzo and Evelina Gavrilova (2014), ‘Income and Livelihoods in the War in Afghanistan’, World Development, 60, 113–31. Buhaug, Halvard (2010), ‘Dude, Where’s My Conflict? LSG, Relative Strength, and the Location of Civil War’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 27 (2), 107–28. Buhaug, Halvard and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2008), ‘Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space’, International Studies Quarterly, 52 (2), 215–33. Chojnacki, Sven, Christian Ickler, Michael Spies, and John Wiesel (2012), ‘Event Data on Armed Conflict and Security: New Perspectives, Old Challenges, and Some Solutions’, International Interactions, 38 (4), 382–401. Cil, Deniz, Hanne Fjelde, Lisa Hultman, and Desirée Nilsson (2020), ‘Mapping Blue Helmets: Introducing the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 57 (2), 360–70. Clayton, Govinda (ed.), Jacob Kathman, Kyle Beardsley, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, Louise Olsson, Vincenzo Bove, Andrea Ruggeri, Remco Zwetsloot, Jaïr van der Lijn, Timo Smit, Lisa Hultman, Han Dorussen, Paul F. Diehl, Laura Bosco, and Christina Goodness (2017), ‘The Known Knowns and Known Unknowns of Peacekeeping Data’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (1), 1–62. Convergne, Elodie and Michael R. Snyder (2015), ‘Making Maps to Make Peace: Geospatial Technology as a Tool for UN Peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping, 22 (5), 565–86. Costalli, Stefano (2014), ‘Does Peacekeeping Work? A Disaggregated Analysis of Deployment and Violence Reduction in the Bosnian War’, British Journal of Political Science, 44 (2), 357–80. Day, Adam, Charles T. Hunt, He Yin, and Liezelle Kumalo (2019), Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, (UNMISS), Oslo, NO: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Dorussen, Han (2014), ‘Peacekeeping Works, or Does It?’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 20 (4), 527–37. Dorussen, Han and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2013), ‘Into the Lion’s Den: Local Responses to UN Peacekeeping’, Journal of Peace Research, 50 (6), 691–706. Dorussen, Han and Andrea Ruggeri (2017), ‘Peacekeeping Event Data: Determining the Place and Space of Peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (1), 32–8. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis (2000), ‘International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis’, The American Political Science Review, 94 (4), 779–801. Duursma, Allard (2017), ‘Counting Deaths While Keeping Peace: An Assessment of the JMAC’s Field Information and Analysis Capacity in Darfur’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (5), 823–47. Duursma, Allard (2021), ‘Mapping Data-Driven Tools and Systems for Early Warning, Situational Awareness, and Early Action’, PAX Protection Series 2021/01, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​p​ rotectiono​fcivilians​.org/​report/​mapping​-data​-driven​-tools​-and​-systems​-for​-early​-warning​-situational​ -awareness​-and​-early​-action/​. Duursma, Allard and John Karlsrud (2019), ‘Predictive Peacekeeping: Strengthening Predictive Analysis in UN Peace Operations’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 8 (1), 1–19. Duursma, Allard and Róisín Read (2017), ‘Modelling Violence as Disease? Exploring the Possibilities of Epidemiological Analysis for Peacekeeping Data in Darfur’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (5), 733–55. Elfversson, Emma, Sara Lindberg Bromley, and Paul D. Williams (2019), ‘Urban Peacekeeping under Siege: Attacks on African Union Peacekeepers in Mogadishu, 2007–2009’, Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 4 (2–3), 158–78. Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman, and Desirée Nilsson (2019), ‘Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians’, International Organization, 73 (1), 103–31. Fortna, V. Page (2004), ‘Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War’, International Studies Quarterly, 48 (2), 269–92. Fortna, V. Page and Lise Morjé Howard (2008), ‘Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11 (1), 283–301. Gilligan, Michael J. (2008), ‘Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference’, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 3 (2), 89–122.

208  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Gorur, Aditi (2019), ‘The Need for Monitoring and Evaluation in Advancing Protection of Civilians’, IPI Global Observatory, 2 October, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​theglobalobservatory​.org/​2019/​ 10/​the​-need​-for​-monitoring​-evaluation​-in​-advancing​-protection​-of​-civilians/​. Hegre, Håvard, Gudrun Østby, and Clionadh Raleigh (2009), ‘Poverty and Civil War Events: A Disaggregated Study of Liberia’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 (4), 598–623. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2013), ‘United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War’, American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 875–91. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2014), ‘Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting’, American Political Science Review, 108 (4), 737–53. Hunnicutt, Patrick and William Nomikos (2020a), RADPKO: The Robust Africa Deployments of Peacekeeping Operations Dataset, Harvard Dataverse, V4, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​ dataverse​.harvard​.edu/​dataset​.xhtml​?persistentId​=​doi:​10​.7910/​DVN/​BQU5VD. Hunnicutt, Patrick and William G. Nomikos (2020b), ‘Nationality, Gender, and Deployments at the Local Level: Introducing the RADPKO Dataset’, International Peacekeeping, 27 (4), 645–72. Justino, Patricia (2009), ‘Poverty and Violent Conflict: A Micro-Level Perspective on the Causes and Duration of Warfare’, Journal of Peace Research, 46 (3), 315–33. Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2006), The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Karell, Daniel and Sebastian Schutte (2018), ‘Aid, Exclusion, and the Local Dynamics of Insurgency in Afghanistan’, Journal of Peace Research, 55 (6), 711–25. Kelling, Claire and YiJyun Lin (2020), ‘Analysis of Conflict Diffusion Over Continuous Space’, in Emanuel Deutschmann, Jan Lorenz, Luis G. Nardin, Davide Natalini, and Adalbert F. X. Wilhelm (eds), Computational Conflict Research, Computational Social Sciences, Cham, CH: Springer, pp. 201–23. Kibris, Arzu (2021), ‘The Geo-Temporal Evolution of Violence in Civil Conflicts: A Micro Analysis of Conflict Diffusion on a New Event Data Set’, Journal of Peace Research, 58 (5), 885–99. Kocher, Matthew Adam, Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Stathis N. Kalyvas (2011), ‘Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War’, American Journal of Political Science, 55 (2), 201–18. Laurence, Marion (2019), ‘What Are the Benefits and Pitfalls of “Data-Driven” Peacekeeping?’, Centre for International Policy Studies, Policy Brief No. 35: 10, December, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​www​.cips​-cepi​.ca/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2020/​01/​policy​-brief​-marion​-laurence​-1​.pdf. Levin, Andrew (2015), ‘Peacekeeping Effectiveness in Civil War: National and Sub-National Analyses’, Ph.D. dissertation (AAI3709499), University of Pennsylvania. Lyall, Jason (2009), ‘Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 (3), 331–62. Müller, Tanja R. and Zuhair Bashar (2017), ‘“UNAMID Is Just Like Clouds in Summer, They Never Rain”: Local Perceptions of Conflict and the Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Missions’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (5), 756–79. Mvukiyehe, Eric and Cyrus Samii (2021), ‘Peacekeeping and Development in Fragile States: Micro-Level Evidence from Liberia’, Journal of Peace Research, 58 (3), 368–83. Peitz, Laura and Gregor Reisch (2019), ‘Violence Reduction or Relocation? Effects of United Nations Troops Presence on Local Levels of Violence’, Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 8 (2), 161–81. Phayal, Anup (2019), ‘UN Troop Deployment and Preventing Violence Against Civilians in Darfur’, International Interactions, 45 (5), 757–80. Pierskalla, Jan H. and Florian M. Hollenbach (2013), ‘Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa’, American Political Science Review, 107 (2), 207–24. Powers, Matthew, Bryce W. Reeder, and Ashly Adam Townsen (2015), ‘Hot Spot Peacekeeping’, International Studies Review, 17 (1), 46–66. Raleigh, Clionadh and Håvard Hegre (2009), ‘Population Size, Concentration, and Civil War: A Geographically Disaggregated Analysis’, Political Geography, 28 (4), 224–38. Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen (2010), ‘Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset: Special Data Feature’, Journal of Peace Research, 47 (5), 651–60.

Peacekeeping and the geographic diffusion and containment of conflict  209 Ruggeri, Andrea, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2017), ‘Winning the Peace Locally: UN Peacekeeping and Local Conflict’, International Organization, 71 (1), 163–85. Ruggeri, Andrea, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2018), ‘On the Frontline Every Day? Subnational Deployment of United Nations Peacekeepers’, British Journal of Political Science, 48 (4), 1005–25. Ruggeri, Andrea, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Han Dorussen (2011), ‘Events Data as Bismarck’s Sausages? Intercoder Reliability, Coders’ Selection, and Data Quality’, International Interactions, 37 (3), 340–61. Rustad, Siri Camilla Aas, Halvard Buhaug, Åshild Falch, and Scott Gates (2011), ‘All Conflict Is Local: Modeling Sub-National Variation in Civil Conflict Risk’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 28 (1), 15–40. Salvi, Andrea, Mark Williamson, and Jessica Draper (2020), ‘On the Beaten Path: Violence Against Civilians and Simulated Conflict Along Road Networks’, in Emanuel Deutschmann, Jan Lorenz, Luis G. Nardin, Davide Natalini, and Adalbert F. X. Wilhelm (eds), Computational Conflict Research, Computational Social Sciences, Cham, CH: Springer, 183–99. Schrodt, Philip A. (2006), ‘Twenty Years of the Kansas Event Data System Project’, The Political Methodologist, 14 (1), 2–6. Schrodt, Philip A., Shannon G. Davis, and Judith L. Weddle (1994), ‘Political Science: KEDS—A Program for the Machine Coding of Event Data’, Social Science Computer Review, 12 (4), 561–87. Schutte, Sebastian (2017), ‘Violence and Civilian Loyalties: Evidence from Afghanistan’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61 (8), 1595–625. Sundberg, Ralph (2020), ‘UN Peacekeeping and Forced Displacement in South Sudan’, International Peacekeeping, 27 (2), 210–37. Sundberg, Ralph and Erik Melander (2013), ‘Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 50 (4), 523–32. Townsen, Ashly Adam and Bryce W. Reeder (2014), ‘Where Do Peacekeepers Go When They Go?’, Journal of International Peacekeeping, 18 (1–2), 69–91. van der Lijn, Jaïr and Timo Smit (2017), ‘Challenges and Opportunities for Peace Operations Data Collection: Experiences from the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (1), 23–8. Verwimp, Philip, Patricia Justino, and Tilman Brück (2019), ‘The Microeconomics of Violent Conflict’, Journal of Development Economics, 141, 102297. von Uexkull, Nina, Mihai Croicu, Hanne Fjelde, and Halvard Buhaug (2016), ‘Civil Conflict Sensitivity to Growing-Season Drought’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113 (44), 12391–6. Walter, Barbara F., Lise Morje Howard, and V. Page Fortna (2021), ‘The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace’, British Journal of Political Science, 51 (4), 1705–22. Yanagizawa-Drott, David (2014), ‘Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129 (4), 1947–94. Zhukov, Yuri M. (2012), ‘Roads and the Diffusion of Insurgent Violence’, Political Geography, 31 (3), 144–56.

15. Peacekeeping and the protection of civilians Lisa Hultman, Jacob D. Kathman and Megan Shannon

INTRODUCTION From the perspective of many policymakers and analysts, the United Nations is a futile organization. Such sentiments are often expressed both within and outside the UN. The UN has been disparaged by former United States President Donald Trump as an ‘underperformer’ (Trump 2016), while Nikki Haley, former US Ambassador to the UN, described the UN’s management of the politics surrounding human rights as a ‘cesspool’ (Koran 2018).1 Former UN Assistant Secretary General Anthony Branbury has claimed that the UN is ‘failing’ to meet its mission ‘thanks to colossal mismanagement’ (Reuters 2016). And Max Boot (2000, p. 143), Senior Fellow for National Security at the Council on Foreign Relations, has described the UN as ‘paving the road to hell’ in its expanding international commitments. Even casual observers are skeptical of the UN’s competence.2 It is reasonable to believe that the UN’s reputation is in no small part the product of notable peacekeeping failures to protect civilians from violence in conflict environments. In the early 1990s, the UN was accused of standing by in the face of genocidal violence in Bosnia and Rwanda and of complacency during the humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia. In the 2000s, UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to civil wars in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were undermined by savagery on the part of the combatants towards civilians. More recently, a hapless mission in Syria stood little chance of shielding defenseless civilians from brutality. Indeed, the UN’s own personnel have abused civilians, including the use of sexual violence in the Central African Republic, the DRC, and Haiti. It is therefore unsurprising that a common perspective of the UN is that it is unable to protect civilians from harm. While the notable cases above may serve as examples of the UN’s failures to protect noncombatants in unstable environments, are they the norm? The question provides an opportunity for the scholarly community to assess the UN’s civilian protection efforts in a systematic, rigorous way. The scientific literature on civil war, civilian victimization, and peacekeeping has not spoken entirely with one voice, though there is a growing accumulation of research to suggest that the UN has a substantial ability to protect civilians from violence in its peacekeeping efforts. As such, there is strong evidence to belie popular sentiment of peacekeeping ineffectiveness in protecting vulnerable populations. In the pages that follow, we review the literature on civilian protection and UN peacekeeping. We first describe civilian protection mandates and trends in their development and implementation in UN peace operations. We then summarize and assess the growing literature on UN peacekeeping in protecting civilians. Finally, we conclude with additional questions that open avenues of research and challenge scholars to continue their investigations.

210

Peacekeeping and the protection of civilians  211

MANDATED TO PROTECT Protection of civilians is a concept developed within UN peacekeeping doctrine. While UN resolutions conceptualize and discuss protection of civilians in broad terms, Protection of Civilians (POC) mandates refer specifically to the protection of civilians under threat of physical violence. The UN Policy on Protection of Civilians specifies that ‘missions with a POC mandate are typically authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use all necessary means, including, where necessary, the use of force, up to and including deadly force, to protect civilians under threat of physical violence’ (UN DPO 2019, p. 3). Even though the formulation is often similar across mission mandates, protection of civilians still comes with significant normative ambiguity with the consequence that peacekeepers may interpret these mandates in many different ways (Bode and Kalrsrud 2019).3 Civilian protection is often one of many tasks that missions are mandated to do. Some missions have a long list of mandated tasks, including assisting the implementation of peace agreements, facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), monitoring arms embargoes, collecting weapons, supporting humanitarian assistance, assisting in security sector reform, and supporting the organization of free and fair elections.4 These tasks reflect a move towards multidimensional missions with a wider agenda than security-related objectives. Fragmented mandates (Blair et al. 2022) with numerous and dissimilar tasks pose a challenge since missions are often not supplied with resources sufficient for their effective implementation (Williams 2020). However, civilian protection is a priority within peacekeeping. According to the official POC policy: ‘In mandated missions, POC must be prioritized in decisions regarding the allocation and use of available capabilities and resources’ (UN DPO 2019, p. 6). Assessing the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping in protecting civilians thus evaluates the ability of missions to carry out their core tasks. POC mandates also come with caveats, such as “within the capabilities of the mission” and “within the area of operation.” This means that UN operations with larger force deployments with more substantial capabilities that are able to cover greater geographic areas are important features for enabling effective civilian protection. This is an issue that has been highlighted in the comparative peacekeeping literature, which we return to in the next section. Trends in POC efforts  The first POC mandate was authorized in 1999 for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and civilian protection has since become common practice within UN peacekeeping. Figure 15.1 shows the number of active UN peacekeeping missions per year between 1948 and 2020, as well as the number of operations with a POC mandate. In more recent years, a majority of operations have had a POC mandate. Additionally, if we look at the current number of personnel employed across the world, more than 95 percent of all peacekeepers work under a POC mandate, indicating that almost all of the UN’s peacekeeping resources are in some way associated with the task of protecting civilians.5 Table 15.1 lists all new peacekeeping operations since October 1999 when UNAMSIL was established.6 Out of the 21 operations, 15 have received a POC mandate, while six have not. Among the POC missions, UN investment in operational efforts has been substantial. Over time, the UN has made increasingly large personnel commitments including missions to South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and the Central African Republic that ranged between 13 000 and 19 000 personnel. This suggests an emphasis on the part of the UN to more fully outfitting missions for the purpose of civilian protection. Only a few missions

212  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations

Source: Data compiled by the authors using information provided by the UN Department of Peace Operations (http://​peacekeeping​.un​.org) and UNSC Resolutions.

Figure 15.1

Active UN peacekeeping operations by protection mandate

have excluded formal POC mandates, and even among these, civilian insecurity was central to conflict processes and UN peace efforts. For instance, in the three missions to Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor), civilian protection was not mandated despite high levels of violence against civilians in the preceding conflict. UNSMIS, the brief observer mission to Syria that had to withdraw in the face of escalating hostilities and brutal anti-civilian violence, is also among the non-POC missions. While not originally mandated by the initial observer mission to Côte d’Ivoire, the more robust and expansive mission that followed was mandated to protect civilians. While increasing the use of POC mandates in peacekeeping, the UN has also increased its emphasis on protecting women and children from violence. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, passed in 2000, was a critical effort by the UN to specifically incorporate women in peace processes as well as to recognize that conflict violence uniquely affects women and children. As part of 1325, the UN pledged to train peacekeepers to specifically address the needs of women and children during conflict (Karim and Beardsley 2017). Since 2001, explicit provisions on child protection have been included in 13 peacekeeping mandates and peace agreements. Many missions also have advisors for child and women’s protection.7 The increasing UN effort in POC can be understood as a reaction to peacekeeping tragedies in the mid-1990s, including the aforementioned missions to Rwanda and Bosnia that failed to impede mass killings of civilians. The UN’s emphasis on POC has also developed in parallel with the principle of Responsibility to Protect (Hunt 2019; Paddon Rhoads and Welsh 2019), as international norms have evolved with regard to defending against the most egregious human rights abuses. Qualitatively, the emphasis on civilian protection can be seen in the gendered language that is often used to justify the decision to authorize a mission (Carpenter

Peacekeeping and the protection of civilians  213 Table 15.1

New peacekeeping operations since October 1999 and POC mandates

Mission name

Location

Start year

POC mandate

UNAMSIL

Sierra Leone

1999

Yes

UNTAET

Timor-Leste and East Timor

1999

No

MONUC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

1999

Yes (in 2000)

UNMEE

Ethiopia and Eritrea

2000

No

UNMISET

East Timor

2002

No

MINUCI

Côte d’Ivoire

2003

No

UNMIL

Liberia

2003

Yes

UNOCI

Côte d’Ivoire

2004

Yes

MINUSTAH

Haiti

2004

Yes

ONUB

Burundi

2004

Yes

UNMIS

Sudan

2005

Yes

UNMIT

Timor-Leste

2006

No

UNAMID

Darfur, Sudan

2007

Yes

MINURCAT

Central African Republic and Chad

2007

Yes

MONUSCO

Democratic Republic of the Congo

2010

Yes

UNISFA

Abyei (Sudan and South Sudan)

2011

Yes

UNMISS

South Sudan

2011

Yes

UNSMIS

Syria

2012

No

MINUSMA

Mali

2013

Yes

MINUSCA

Central African Republic

2014

Yes

MINUJUSTH

Haiti

2017

Yes

Source: Compiled by the authors.

2005), and in the Security Council discussions that make entreaties to the responsibility of the UN to protect vulnerable populations. To a great extent, POC also goes hand in hand with increasingly common robust mandates that authorize the use of force beyond self-defense under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Howard and Dayal (2018) argue that the perpetual use of “robust mandates” is the result of a political compromise among the Security Council members. However, another reason for this trend is that most new missions in the last two decades have confronted complex conflict situations where active violence is ongoing. As demonstrated by Hultman et al. (2019), a majority of the missions are deployed to civil conflicts in which one-sided violence or battle-related violence persists.8 In the period 2000–14, 13 out of 16 new missions deployed to such hostile environments. For peacekeeping efforts to be effective in these contexts, mission deployments require large contingents of armed personnel and strong mandates focusing on establishing security and protecting civilians from physical harm. As such, this is one reason POC mandates have engendered larger deployments. Numbers from Hultman et al. (2019) demonstrate that the average number of uniformed personnel is more than double in missions that have a POC mandate relative to missions without a protection mandate. Table 15.2 reports deployment data across different personnel categories in missions with and without a POC mandate. The number of police, in particular, is substantially higher in missions with a protection component. The fact that protection mandates are more fully resourced is important to successful mandate implementation. While there is often an unwillingness of member states to contribute sufficient personnel once a mission has been authorized (Passmore

214  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Table 15.2

Protection of civilian mandates and the number of peacekeeping personnel within missions

 

POC mandate

Mean number of troops

9920

No POC mandate 4668

Mean number of police

1147

305

Mean number of observers

301

114

Source: Hultman et al. (2019).

et al. 2018), as we will present below, the number of troops and police play an important role in reducing violence in conflicts. Responding to violence  A related question that the literature has addressed is whether the UN responds to violence against civilians specifically by authorizing peacekeeping operations to deploy personnel to more violent areas once a mission is in place. Studies suggest that the UN has adopted its peacekeeping practices in line with the protection norm, and so conflicts with large-scale violence against civilians should be more likely to receive a peacekeeping operation authorized by the Security Council. Indeed, evidence suggests that the UN shows a stronger willingness to respond to violence against civilians since the introduction of POC mandates in 1999 (Hultman 2013). Further, with UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 and the associated Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, more attention has also been given to protection (primarily of women) from systematic sexual abuse in conflict situations (Krause 2015). Wartime sexual violence by the warring actors triggers the UNSC to issue more resolutions on the related conflict (Benson and Gizelis 2020), making the authorization of new peacekeeping operations more likely (Hultman and Johansson 2017). Further, previous work demonstrates that UN missions are sent to the “hardest” cases (e.g., Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Melander 2009), and with the increasing emphasis on protection of civilians, the hard cases are those where civilians are at greatest risk as a product of political instability, violence, and rampant civilian targeting. Once an operation has been authorized, there is still much flexibility as to where a mission positions its peacekeepers. Recent studies have used geo-referenced data on the location of peacekeeping bases to explore the UN’s geographic deployment decisions. Costalli (2014) shows that the UN’s blue helmets deployed to locations in the Bosnian war with most severe combat and civilian targeting violence. Subsequent studies confirm this tendency across a wider set of cases, including deployments to areas where there is active conflict (Ruggeri et al. 2018) and where civilians are targeted (Powers et al. 2015). Hence, it seems that even deployment practices within operations are consistent with the protection norm. Recent studies, however, reveal nuance in deployment dynamics. For instance, the UN appears to have greater willingness to deploy to areas where civilians are targeted by rebel groups relative to government forces (Fjelde et al. 2019; Phayal and Prins 2020). Fjelde et al. (2019) explain that this is a consequence of PKO dependence on host government consent for an operation’s continued deployment. Thus, operations have incentives to refrain from challenging host state governments, since doing so could risk the withdrawal of consent.

Peacekeeping and the protection of civilians  215

ACCUMULATED KNOWLEDGE: FINDINGS FROM EXISTING RESEARCH If peacekeeping has evolved to focus more on civilian protection, as we argue in the previous section, how well do UN operations fare in reducing violence directed against civilian populations? Until recently, very few studies systematically explore the ability of UN peacekeepers to protect civilians (Hultman et al. 2013). Yet, a growing body of research has tackled these issues with varying theoretical and methodological approaches. Measuring whether peacekeeping missions are successful in protecting civilians is a challenge. UN mandates emphasize protection from physical violence, rather than structural violence.9 Any measure of the physical protection of civilians should consequently reflect this mandated task. In civil war contexts, Hultman et al. (2013; 2019) conceptualize physical violence as the monthly number of civilian fatalities committed by the combatant parties. To assess peacekeeping effectiveness in accordance with POC, Hultman et al. seek to determine whether UN PKOs reduce the number of such fatalities in their protection efforts. They find that as the UN deploys a larger number of armed personnel to its operations, civilian killings decline. Since peacekeepers are more likely to be deployed to situations of ongoing conflict, where civilians are at risk, there is a bias towards finding a positive correlation between armed peacekeeping personnel commitments and violence. The finding that increasing troop levels is associated with fewer civilians killed indicates peacekeeping effectiveness in protecting civilians from violence. Concerning the mechanisms by which peacekeeping can contribute to protection, there are multiple pathways. Warring actors may target civilians for a variety of reasons, from strategic attempts to gain relative power to more opportunistic motivations to gain resources. These varying incentives for violence are important to theorizing about the ways in which peacekeepers influence violence dynamics. For instance, strategic theories of violence against civilians suggest that it is carried out to achieve conflict objectives.10 Peacekeeping operations can manipulate such strategic incentives by increasing the costs of such tactics for the perpetrator. Civilian abuse may also be understood more as a practice that is tolerated, not ordered, by military leadership. Violence may then be motivated by individual opportunistic incentives or spurred by group-level dynamics to enhance military unit cohesion (Cohen 2013; Wood 2018). Violence may also be the result of indiscipline and lack of strong social networks within armed groups (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). In such instances, peacekeeping needs to address these dynamics more directly, such as policing behind the frontlines to impede combatant opportunities to abuse civilians. Below, we summarize some of the main arguments from the literature in terms of how peacekeeping works to protect civilians, including the limitations of this research. Troops: military strategies for protection  For most missions, peacekeepers are composed primarily of military troops.11 These troops perform important functions that limit the level of territorial contestation and movement of armed actors in civil wars, such as creating buffer zones, overseeing ceasefires, and providing security guarantees (Walter et al. 2021). This is important for protection purposes when violence against civilians is spurred by competition for territorial control, combat dynamics, and military losses (e.g., Hultman 2007; Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2014). Armed troops that patrol in hostile environments increase the cost of continued violence against the civilian population. Even if UN peacekeepers do not use offensive force in their

216  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations interactions with armed actors, their presence can serve as a form of passive deterrence. If an actor targets civilians, UN troops have a mandate to intervene in the situation or monitor the armed actor more intently going forward. This increases the costs to the belligerent group for trying to take new territory or using force. A UN military presence also decreases the risk that atrocities go unreported – and such naming of violence may lead to a loss of legitimacy for some actors and constitutes a significant political cost that reduces the incentives for violence against civilians (Fjelde et al. 2019). UN troops are also active in disarmament processes, reducing the capacity and opportunity of armed actors to engage in violence against civilians. These mechanisms require substantial deployments of UN troops. A number of studies demonstrate that larger armed deployments are associated with lower levels of violence against civilians, despite their selection into the hardest cases (e.g., Bara and Hultman 2020; Bove and Ruggeri 2015; Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020; Fjelde et al. 2019; Haass and Ansorg 2018; Hultman et al. 2013; 2019). Larger deployments allow missions to patrol areas where civilians are at risk, while at the same time performing other tasks to establish civilian protection, such as disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating combatants into peaceful society. Examples from UN missions serving in complex conflicts also reveal the difference that capacity makes on the ground (Hultman et al. 2019). Failures to protect civilians often stem from poor capacity that limits the presence of a mission or its willingness to confront escalations of violence. Similarly, increases in operational military capacity are often followed by improved security situations for the civilian population. MONUC, the UN Mission to the DRC (1999–2010), is one such example of an understaffed mission – especially in relation to the size of the conflict area – that was unable to effectively manage escalating violence (Holt and Berkman 2006, p. 155). Only when the UNSC responded by increasing the overall capacity of the mission was it able to confront militias responsible for hostilities, contain the violence, and more effectively protect civilians (Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020; Hultman et al. 2019, p. 163). Recent studies also highlight a number of other characteristics that enhance the protection capacity of UN peacekeeping. One such aspect is the quality of troops. Not all peacekeeping units are equally effective in protecting civilians. However, it is not clear what unit qualities are relevant for improving protection. Haass and Ansorg (2018) suggest that the average military capacity of the troop-contributing countries is an important factor that, in addition to the sheer number of troops, improves the violence-reducing effect of peacekeeping. Peitz and Reisch (2019) similarly focus on the importance of military capacity, pointing to the type of military units deployed to a particular location and its force projection capacity as significant factors for improving protection. Military culture is another factor that may play an important role in explaining different approaches to peacekeeping across contributor countries’ military units, which may then have downstream consequences for the fulfillment of humanitarian mandates (Ruffa 2017). One way in which culture matters is the “distance” between the peacekeepers and the local population. In order to effectively conduct peacekeeping operations, UN forces must establish relationships with local civilian populations. Bove et al. (2020) find that blue helmets can do this more capably when the cultural distance between the deployed force and the local population is smaller. The diversity of the troop-contributing countries themselves may also contribute to improving the protection capacity of peacekeeping operations (Bove and Ruggeri 2015).

Peacekeeping and the protection of civilians  217 As such, while physical military capacities of UN missions matter for civilian protection, qualitative aspects of their composition are also relevant for defending vulnerable populations. Policing and protection  We have highlighted the promise of military troops in enhancing civilian protection. However, there are limits to what military troops can achieve in conflict situations. Many civil wars lack clear frontlines, and violence is rarely limited to the contested areas. Governments, militia, and rebel forces sometimes use violence behind the frontlines to clear political opponents (Balcells 2010), forcibly recruit new members (Gates and Reich 2010), or extract resources from the civilian population (Azam 2006). In civil war countries, security sector institutions deteriorate and the quality of law and order declines, leaving civilian populations particularly vulnerable. UN police are often better trained than indigenous security forces to deal with these abuses against civilians. They are trained in law enforcement methods and practices, which increases to combatants the costs of civilian abuse. Peacekeeping practices include apprehending and imprisoning abusive militia and rebel soldiers, as demonstrated by UNAMET police in East Timor (Smith and Dee 2006). UN police are also often tasked with more specific protection tasks, such as patrolling population centers, monitoring cantoned soldiers, escorting humanitarian aid, and providing security to internally displaced people (Holt et al. 2009, p. 166). Further, UN police are involved in security sector reform processes, such as training and equipping indigenous police forces to engage in law enforcement responsibilities. In doing so, UN police may serve as a force multiplier such that local law enforcement capabilities expand as the commitment of UN police resources increases. Finally, UN police help build and enhance institutions to re-establish the rule of law after conflict (Blair 2021), which can further ensure civilian protection. These benefits of police deployments have been demonstrated to enhance civilian protection (Hultman et al. 2019). In specific situations, the role of the police may be particularly important. Post-conflict societies often experience a shift in the organization of violence and violent actors. New actors, including organized criminal syndicates, militias, and armed communal groups, may emerge and new tactics employed. While UN troops may not be equipped or sufficiently mandated to focus on violence by these actors, police have the specific training needed to deal with such dynamics of violence (Bara 2020). Similarly, criminal violence may flourish in civil war situations as the rule of law deteriorates. Military troops may not only be incapable of managing criminal activity, they may even spur such dynamics; UN police, by contrast, are able to moderate such negative effects (Di Salvatore 2019). Conditional protection  Cross-national studies demonstrate an average effectiveness of peacekeeping when it comes to protecting civilians. Several single-case studies also show that these effects can be found within conflicts, such as the DRC (Peitz and Reisch 2019), Darfur, and Sudan (Phayal 2019). Nevertheless, some cases are more challenging than others. For example, in a systematic analysis of the effects of peacekeeping deployments on forced displacement in South Sudan, Sundberg (2020) finds no discernible ability of peacekeepers to reduce the flows of displaced people. It may be that South Sudan is a particularly difficult case, or that UNMISS struggles more than other missions to offer protection. It is also possible that peacekeeping only works under certain local conditions. Di Salvatore (2020), for example, demonstrates how the ethnic composition of the local population has consequences for whether or not peacekeepers contribute to civilian protection. Protection of civilians may also be politicized by the UNSC, in that groups of civilians that are important to the UN or member states receive preferential treatment over other groups (Shesterinina and Job 2016).

218  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations One question in the literature is whether UN peacekeeping is effective in protecting civilians from all violence by all armed actors equally, particularly when distinguishing between violence by the government and non-state actors. Hultman et al. (2019) explore the impact of peacekeeping on violence against civilians within the context of active civil war and the first 24 months of the post-conflict period, to capture protection of civilians also in the transition from war to peace. The outcome variable focuses on violence by actors directly participating in the conflict, thus excluding certain militias and criminal groups. At the same time, it captures all conflict actors and not only those mentioned in the UNSC mandate, assuming that the mission should be able to protect against violence from all organized groups involved in the conflict, regardless of whether the violence has been explicitly acknowledged by the UNSC or not. Importantly, the analysis supports the idea that peacekeepers reduce violence by both governments and rebel groups. This is affirmed by Bara and Hultman (2020), who find that UN peacekeepers curb civilian targeting by both governments and non-state actors, whereas regional peacekeeping operations only mitigate violence against civilians by governments.12 However, local dynamics within UN peacekeeping missions reveal more complex relationships between peacekeepers and the various armed actors. Using sub-national data on peacekeeping deployments and violence against civilians, Fjelde et al. (2019) show that peacekeepers protect civilians from rebels – but not governments – in the areas where they are deployed. Moreover, the study also demonstrates that the UN is more likely to deploy troops to areas where rebels target civilians, but not where the government does so. The article suggests a bias in civilian protection as a result of the UN’s dependence on host government consent. One possible interpretation of these findings from both mission-level and sub-national dynamics is that peacekeepers influence governments more through strategic considerations. For example, the government may pay greater heed to the political costs of targeting civilians in the presence of a peacekeeping mission. The potential bias of peacekeeping missions and how it relates to civilian protection is an area of research worth considering, as some work indicates that impartiality of UN missions is important for troop deployment decisions (Benson and Kathman 2014) and preventing communal violence (Nomikos 2021).

REMAINING QUESTIONS AND CHALLENGES FOR FUTURE WORK The research on civilian protection has grown significantly in recent years, but there are still many issues to explore in future work. While not an exhaustive list of potentially fruitful areas of research, we highlight general areas that are ripe for additional investigation by scholars of peacekeeping processes and civilian protection. First, there is as yet much opportunity to untangle the relationship between the UN’s declaration of mandates for its operations to protect civilians and the effectiveness of those operations in the defense of civilians. Conceivably, POC mandates should be important to operational protection efforts, as deployed blue helmets only engage in activities that are permitted according to the authority conferred by their mission mandates. However, this does not necessarily mean that (1) the passage of POC mandates by the UNSC will improve protection as an independent component of PKOs, nor that (2) PKOs without an explicit protection mandate should be exempt from judgment on effectively protecting civilians.

Peacekeeping and the protection of civilians  219 With regard to the first issue above, how relevant is a POC mandate to protection on the ground? Should we expect the presence of a POC mandate to improve protection? Initial evidence suggests that mandate selection can be consequential for protecting civilians on the ground (Lloyd 2021). Yet, POC mandates often come with language that allows deployed personnel to retreat from their protection efforts when the defense of civilians threatens the safety of blue helmets or is beyond the functional capability of an operation. Is it thus more important that missions be given a protection mandate, or equipped with sufficient capacity to confront threats to civilians? The missions to Sierra Leone and Syria may be instructive. Both conflicts were defined by extreme brutality, and the operations deployed to these conflicts eventually received protection mandates. The Sierra Leone mission bolstered its POC mandate with a significant expansion of thousands of UN troops on the ground, equipped to resist physical threats to civilians. This then coincided with a reduction of violence and, ultimately, an end to Sierra Leone’s civil war. By contrast, the mission in Syria deployed a small contingent of unarmed observers and never included troops or police. It was weak in the face of violence, unable to restrain the combatants, and withdrew soon after arriving in Syria when civilians were widely targeted. Initial quantitative research by Hultman et al. (2019, pp. 201–4) matches this anecdotal pattern, revealing that POC mandates do not have an independent effect on the level of anti-civilian violence in conflict states, whereas increasingly large UN troop and police deployments reduce targeted civilian killings independent of POC authorization. While this does not suggest that mandates are irrelevant, it does seem to warrant additional research to determine the boundaries of mandates in affecting violence. On the second issue above, while POC mandates authorize the defense of civilians, should PKOs without such authorization be judged in line with an expectation of protection? Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld contended that even when mandated only for self-defense, blue helmets could never justify allowing atrocities to occur unchallenged (see Wills 2009, pp. 267–72). As such, a good case can be made for judging the success and failure of all UN peace efforts on the civilian protection dimension (see Hultman et al. 2019). But should non-POC and POC-mandated PKOs be evaluated equivalently? Do they engage in the same operational activities, receive similar resource commitments, and confront violence with similar resolve? Answers to these questions may inform the ways in which we judge PKOs in terms of their ability to achieve their peacekeeping goals. Many additional questions arise from the above discussion of mandates. How does the UNSC determine which missions receive protection mandates? Has protection of civilians become a norm of operation authorization irrespective of conditions in the conflict state? Or is the UNSC selective in how it assigns such mandates? How does the Council determine the resource allocations and force capacities to operations with and without protection mandates? And to what extent and under what conditions are other mandated activities paired with POC mandates? Another fruitful area of future research includes questions of consent from the host government. While consent is not required for the intervention of a peace operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN often seeks to acquire and maintain the host government’s consent for its operations in line with the UN’s founding principle of sovereignty for each of its member states. However, a preference for consent could affect peacekeeping efforts in practice. Research might investigate the types of peacekeeping mandates authorized and tactics employed when consent is and is not secured. If consent affects peacekeeping in this way, efforts to obtain and maintain consent may affect the relative success of peacekeeping oper-

220  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations ations in protecting civilians. As Fjelde et al. (2019) argue, issues of consent may restrict the willingness of PKOs to respond forcefully to government abuse of civilians. Paddon Rhoads (2019) also shows how the government of South Sudan uses the threat of withdrawing consent to limit the reach of peacekeepers. This speaks to questions of impartiality in protection efforts and to ethical indiscretions in the application of POC mandates. This is especially consequential in civil war contexts, as research indicates the importance of violence against civilians for the strategic benefit of the perpetrator in achieving its conflict goals (Downes 2008; Kalyvas 2006; Valentino et al. 2004). If protection is not impartially applied, the consequence may be that the UN tacitly supports the abusive faction. Future research could explore the ways in which practices and outcomes of peacekeeping are associated with seeking and maintaining consent. Building upon this concern for impartiality, future work can further investigate the relative beneficiaries of protection, including any gendered, ethnic, or geographic groupings of civilians for whom protection is more fully prioritized or effective. Such patterns would surely inform future peacekeeping efforts in improving the provision of protection to civilians indiscriminately in line with the POC norm.

NOTES 1. More specifically, Haley’s remarks pointed to her sense of political bias on the UN Human Rights Council and the poor human rights records of those countries on the Council. 2. Survey results from the United States provide one example of skepticism of the UN. In answering the annual Gallup Poll question ‘Do you think the United Nations is doing a good job or a poor job in trying to solve the problems it has had to face?’ (Gallup 2020), the high watermark for assessing UN performance came in the early 2000s. Yet, even here, American perceptions of the UN doing a “good job” barely broke 50 percent. Coincidentally, this period corresponded with an era in which the UN’s peacekeeping commitments across the globe were at their lowest level since the end of the Cold War. As UN peacekeeping efforts expanded thereafter, public perceptions concomitantly declined; poll responses that assessed the UN as doing a “good job” dipped as low as 26 percent and rarely broke a 40 percent threshold. 3. We focus here on UN peacekeeping, where the concept of POC has been developed. Other security organizations that engage in peacekeeping, such as the European Union and the African Union, have also adopted the language of protection of civilians, but the organizations differ in how POC is carried out at the operational level (Dembinski and Schott 2013). 4. Recent studies classify the mandates of peacekeeping missions (Diehl and Druckman 2018; Di Salvatore et al. 2022; Lloyd 2021). For example, Diehl and Druckman (2018, p. 30) delineate 10 different missions that UN peacekeeping operations undertake, defined as ‘coherent categories of tasks designed to achieve given purposes or mandates.’ Several additional studies also classify the activities of peacekeeping operations (Blair 2020; Blair et al. 2022; Ruggeri et al. 2011; Smidt 2016). 5. See the UN Peacekeeping website: https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​en/​protecting​-civilians, accessed November 6, 2020. 6. These are all missions defined as peacekeeping operations by the UN itself; thus including observer missions (such as UNSMIS in Syria) but excluding political missions (such as UNMIN in Nepal). 7. Three new datasets, PEMA (Di Salvatore et al. 2022), TAMM (Lloyd 2021), and UN Peace Mission Mandates (UNPMM, see https://​www​.peacemissions​.info/​dataset), on peacekeeping mandates contain information on missions that mandate the protection of women and children. 8. According to Hultman et al. (2019), these environments are defined as having 25 or more fatalities in the first 12 months of the mission, a violence threshold commonly employed in extant conflict data gathering efforts.

Peacekeeping and the protection of civilians  221 9. For instance, POC mandates tend not to target structural violence that often comes in the form of more generalized repression and social, political, or cultural injustice. 10. See, for example, a summary by Schwartz and Straus (2018). 11. See Chapter 5 (Bove et al.) in this Handbook. 12. The reasons for the varying effectiveness of regional peacekeeping versus UN peacekeeping is a topic that requires further scrutiny. Another question is how enforcement missions by other actors, for example, former colonial powers operating alongside the UN, affect the situation. Howard (2019) suggests that such parallel operations may benefit UN peacekeeping, but how this influences POC efforts remains poorly understood. See also Chapter 8 (Bara) in this Handbook.

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Peacekeeping and the protection of civilians  223 Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325, Abingdon, UK and New York, NY, USA: Routledge, pp. 99–115. Lloyd, Gabriella (2021), ‘New Data on UN Mission Mandates 1948–2015: Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM)’, Journal of Peace Research, 58 (5), 1149–60. Melander, Erik (2009), ‘Selected to Go Where Murderers Lurk? The Preventive Effect of Peacekeeping on Mass Killings of Civilians’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 26 (4), 389–406. Nomikos, William G. (2021), ‘Peace is in the Eye of the Beholder: How Perceptions of Impartiality Shape Peacekeeping Outcomes’, SocArXiv, accessed 7 February 2022 at https://​osf​.io/​preprints/​ socarxiv/​q5snx/​. Paddon Rhoads, Emily (2019), ‘Putting Human Rights up Front: Implications for Impartiality and the Politics of UN Peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping, 26 (3), 281–301. Paddon Rhoads, Emily and Jennifer Welsh (2019), ‘Close Cousins in Protection: The Evolution of Two Norms’, International Affairs, 95 (3), 597–617. Passmore, Timothy J. A., Megan Shannon, and Andrew F. Hart (2018), ‘Rallying the Troops: Collective Action and Self-interest in UN Peacekeeping Contributions’, Journal of Peace Research, 55 (3), 366–79. Peitz, Laura and Gregor Reisch (2019), ‘Violence Reduction or Relocation?: Effects of United Nations Troops Presence on Local Levels of Violence’, Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 8 (2), 161–81. Phayal, Anup (2019), ‘UN Troop Deployment and Preventing Violence Against Civilians in Darfur’, International Interactions, 45 (5), 757–80. Phayal, Anup and Brandon C. Prins (2020), ‘Deploying to Protect: The Effect of Military Peacekeeping Deployments on Violence Against Civilians’, International Peacekeeping, 27 (2), 311–36. Powers, Matthew, Bryce W. Reeder, and Ashly Adam Townsen (2015), ‘Hot Spot Peacekeeping’, International Studies Review, 17 (1), 46–66. Reuters (2016), ‘Ex-Official Accuses United Nations of “Colossal Mismanagement”’, 18 March, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​www​.reuters​.com/​article/​us​-un​-mismanagement/​ex​-official​ -accuses​-united​-nations​-of​-colossal​-mismanagement​-idUSKCN0WK2VV. Ruffa, Chiara (2017), ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment in Peace Operations’, Security Studies, 26 (3), 391–422. Ruggeri, Andrea, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2018), ‘On the Frontline Every Day? Subnational deployment of United Nations Peacekeepers’, British Journal of Political Science, 18 (4), 1005–25. Ruggeri, Andrea, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Han Dorussen (2011), ‘Events Data as Bismarck’s Sausages? Intercoder Reliability, Coders’ Selection, and Data Quality’, International Interactions, 37 (3), 340–61. Schwartz, Rachel A. and Scott Straus (2018), ‘What Drives Violence Against Civilians in Civil War? Evidence from Guatemala’s Conflict Archives’, Journal of Peace Research, 55 (2), 222–35. Shesterinina, Anastasia and Brian L. Job (2016), ‘Particularized Protection: UNSC Mandates and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’, International Peacekeeping, 23 (2), 240–73. Smidt, Hannah (2016), ‘What Do Peacekeepers Do, Where and How? New Data on UN Peace-building Activities during Election Times’, working paper, accessed 8 February 2022 at https://​www​.unige​ .ch/​sciences​-societe/​speri/​files/​8314/​5294/​7680/​Hannah​_Smidt​_​-​_Hannah​_Smidt​_​-​_New​_Data​_on​ _UN​_Peace​-Building​_Activities​_during​_Election​_Times​.pdf. Smith, Michael G. and Moreen Dee (2006), ‘East Timor’, in William J. Durch (ed.), Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations, Washington, DC, USA: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 389–466. Sundberg, Ralph (2020), ‘UN Peacekeeping and Forced Displacement in South Sudan’, International Peacekeeping, 27 (2), 210–37. Trump, Donald (2016), Twitter post @realDonaldTrump, December 26, 2016, 1:41PM, http://​www​ .twitter​.com. UN DPO (2019), ‘Policy: Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping’, Ref. 2019.17, accessed 7 February 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​poc​_policy​_2019​_​.pdf. Valentino, Benjamin A., Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay (2004), ‘Draining the Sea: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare’, International Organization, 58 (2), 375–407.

224  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Walter, Barbara F., Lise Morjé Howard, and V. Page Fortna (2021), ‘The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace’, British Journal of Political Science, 51, 1705–22. Williams, Paul D. (2020), ‘The Security Council’s Peacekeeping Trilemma’, International Affairs, 96 (2), 479–99. Wills, Siobhan (2009), Protecting Civilians: Obligations of Peacekeepers, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Wood, Elisabeth J. (2018), ‘Rape as a Practice of War: Toward a Typology of Political Violence’, Politics & Society, 46 (4), 513–37. Wood, Reed M. (2014), ‘From Loss to Looting: Battlefield Costs and Rebel Incentives for Violence’, International Organization, 68 (4), 979–99.

16. Peacekeeping and electoral violence Hannah Smidt

INTRODUCTION Since the end of the Cold War, elections have become a prominent feature of war-to-peace transitions and often a “core business” of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. According to the Capstone Doctrine, a high-level guideline for contemporary peacekeeping operations, peaceful elections are a benchmark for peacekeeping success and a pre-condition for handing over peacebuilding responsibilities to post-war governments (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, pp. 87–9). Indeed, Figure 16.1 shows that since the turn of the twenty-first century more than half of the mandates of the peacekeeping operations in Africa (including initial mandates and those mandates that extend or modify the initial mandates) have included election support tasks.

Source: Di Salvatore et al. (2022).

Figure 16.1

Mandated election support in peacekeeping operations in Africa

There are good reasons to support elections in war-torn countries. After years of marginalization and abuse, ordinary citizens can regain political voice in post-war electoral processes. In addition, elections may support the establishment of political order by providing legitimacy to post-war governments, establishing a mechanism for holding political personnel accountable, and creating incentives for good governance (Wantchekon 2004; Reilly 2008). Yet, election times are also particularly dangerous periods in war-torn countries. They introduce competition between former warring parties and sometimes trigger electoral violence, that is, coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process. Violent elections hamper peacebuilding processes by polarizing society (Gutiérrez-Romero 225

226  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations 2014), reducing government legitimacy (Collier and Vicente 2012) or even triggering renewed fighting (Brancati and Snyder 2013). Thus, it is crucial to investigate peacekeepers’ effectiveness in guaranteeing peace during elections in war-torn societies: Do UN peacekeeping operations reduce electoral violence and, if so, how? As detailed by Höglund (2009), electoral violence is distinct from violence during war, in particular in terms of the timing and targets: In the pre-election period, violence often targets voters, for instance, to depress their turnout or change their vote choice. Electoral violence also aims at election candidates, for example, to hamper campaigns and reduce competition or even to eliminate rivals. Beyond voters and candidates, the electoral infrastructure, for example, polling stations or tabulations centers, can become targets of electoral violence. In the post-election period, electoral violence often takes the form of violent protest and riots to contest the victory of a rival party. Such contention can trigger coercive repression by government agents. Since electoral violence is distinct from wartime violence, we cannot infer the effects of peacekeeping deployments on electoral security from their track record in preventing war. Electoral violence poses new challenges to peacekeepers (Fjelde and Smidt 2021). This chapter summarizes research findings on peacekeepers’ impact on peace during election times. First, the chapter details different types of election assistance activities by UN peacekeeping operations. Second, the chapter reviews existing knowledge on the relationship between peacekeeping and electoral violence. On average, peacekeepers have a violence-reducing effect on electoral violence, especially when they provide electoral security, help organize the elections, and assist with voter education. Third, the chapter summarizes research findings on violence-inducing side-effects of peacekeepers’ election support: Peacekeepers’ assistance to elections potentially exacerbates the goal conflict between facilitating democratization and maintaining stability because it can stoke fears of losing power among unpopular incumbents and minority group rebels, crowd out domestic initiatives, and re-introduce competition too early after the end of war. Finally, these caveats notwithstanding, the chapter concludes that peacekeepers’ election support can generally help build peace and democracy simultaneously and offers four avenues for future research on this topic.

WHAT DO PEACEKEEPERS DO IN SUPPORT OF POST-WAR ELECTIONS? When we think of peacekeeping operations, the blue helmets may spring to mind first. The blue helmets are UN military and police personnel and they can contribute to peaceful elections by providing electoral security assistance. UN military and police forces patrol at polling stations and election rallies, secure the transport of election materials, deploy to violence-prone electoral districts, intervene in election-related conflicts (for instance, among supporters of rival political parties), provide on-the-spot mediation, and train domestic security forces in electoral security operations (Carnegie et al. 2012, pp. 46–7). This ability to provide electoral security is what makes peacekeeping operations distinct from other international agencies that can assist elections (Smidt 2021). Moreover, although not directly related to elections, uniformed peacekeepers also engage in programmatic activities that reduce opportunities for organizing electoral violence. These activities include disarming and demobilizing of combatants, collecting small arms and light weapons, and facilitating the reintegration of fighters in civilian communities, for instance through community work programs (Fjelde and Smidt 2021).

Peacekeeping and electoral violence  227 Beyond providing electoral security, peacekeepers also provide technical, material, and logistical assistance to the organization of elections. Among other things, peacekeepers advise and train members of the electoral commission, procure sensitive election materials, organize voter registration, set-up polling stations, and transport ballots to tabulation centers (Smidt 2021). Oftentimes, peacekeeping mission personnel also use the “good offices” of the mission, such as mediation and other diplomatic efforts, to persuade high-level political leaders to adhere to the electoral processes (Howard 2019, p. 32ff.). In order to organize electoral assistance, peacekeeping operations usually include a specialized division or unit responsible for this type of support. Moreover, the Electoral Assistance Division in the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs often works closely with the UN Department of Peace Operations in planning and managing electoral assistance activities (UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs 2020). Many other international actors also contribute to electoral assistance, such as other UN system agencies, international organizations, foreign states, and NGOs. In war-torn countries, UN peacekeeping operations are usually responsible for coordinating these efforts. Beyond assisting the government with electoral security provision and the organization of elections, peacekeeping operations support elections by targeting citizens with voter education campaigns. Voter education campaigns inform citizens on how and where to cast their vote. They also help citizens understand their political rights and civic duties and intend to persuade them to opt for peaceful participation. For this purpose, the public information unit in collaboration with the electoral division in the UN peacekeeping operation produces films and print materials (Oksamytna 2018). Civilian personnel in UN peacekeeping operations distribute these films and print materials during election education events organized for ordinary citizens, civil society activists, and local leaders in specific villages and towns (Smidt 2020). Moreover, radio is an important means for peacekeeping operations to engage in voter education in countries where persistent insecurity prevents traveling and thus face-to-face voter education events. Election support organized by UN peacekeeping operations thus targets the security environment, electoral institutions, political elites, civil society, and voters. Yet, there is variation in peacekeepers’ level of investment in election support due to differences in peacekeepers’ mandates, capacity, and priorities. The following sections examine the consequences of this variation for electoral security in peacekeepers’ host countries.

VIOLENCE-REDUCING EFFECTS OF PEACEKEEPING IN ELECTIONS A nascent body of quantitative research suggests that UN peacekeeping operations, on average, effectively mitigate violence associated with elections. When peacekeepers are deployed during first post-conflict elections, then there is a lower risk of war recurrence after the elections (Flores and Nooruddin 2012, p. 563; Brancati and Snyder 2013). Focusing on electoral violence specifically, three recent studies testify to peacekeepers’ security-enhancing effects during electoral periods. Fjelde and Smidt (2021) show that sub-national deployments of UN military reduce the risk of electoral violence at the local level. Analyzing cross-national data, Fjelde and Höglund (2022) demonstrate that military peacekeepers also reduce the intensity of electoral violence (measured by the number of fatalities) across countries, although

228  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations peacekeepers are not able to prevent electoral violence from occurring altogether. Another cross-national study by Smidt (2021) shows, however, that peacekeeping operations can prevent the occurrence of electoral violence causing civilian deaths, but only if they actively engage in election support activities. Drawing on this latter finding, the subsequent sections investigate the consequences of peacekeepers’ engagement in election support activities, particularly in electoral security provision, election organization assistance, and voter education efforts, and detail the mechanisms through which peacekeepers enhance electoral security. Electoral security assistance  Arguments for the effectiveness of peacekeepers’ electoral security assistance often start from the assumption that electoral violence is rational and strategic behavior by electoral stakeholders, for example, candidates in the elections or armed groups that may gain or lose from a particular election outcome. These electoral stakeholders use violent tactics to maximize their electoral gains, that are usually votes for themselves or their preferred candidates and political parties. By consequence, studies of peacekeeping effectiveness in elections tend to focus on electoral violence that is organized rather than spontaneous and that involves agents specialized in coercion rather than ordinary citizens. Existing research suggests that peacekeepers mitigate organized electoral violence by lowering the expected benefits of coercive electoral strategies, notably through raising the costs associated with violence during election periods (Fjelde and Smidt 2021, for this argument). Electoral security assistance allows peacekeepers to increase the implementation costs for disrupting or manipulating elections with force. For instance, peacekeepers conduct patrols at sensitive election sites, such as polling stations and election rallies, so that they can restrain and retaliate against perpetrators of electoral violence. Peacekeepers may also intervene in election-related clashes between rival political groups and de-escalate tensions, for instance through mediation. Moreover, UN peacekeepers help dismantle the infrastructure of coercion and reduce the supply of agents of violence, for instance, through pre-election disarmament and demobilization programs. Overall, peacekeepers’ electoral security assistance increases the implementation costs associated with coercive electoral strategies and thus incentivizes electoral stakeholders to accept elections peacefully (Fjelde and Smidt 2021). Moreover, peacekeepers monitor, document, and expose incidents of electoral violence, for example through sending regular reports on the security environment to UN headquarters. In so doing, they can raise the reputation cost for electoral stakeholders that sponsor coercive electoral strategies. Reputation costs can be international, including aid cuts and trade restrictions. For example, Matanock (2017) shows that international election monitoring helps enforce post-conflict peace because electoral violence and other violations of electoral integrity will be exposed and thus can be sanctioned by the international community. Reputation costs can also be domestic. The exposure of coercive electoral strategies may lead voters to sanction violent candidates, for instance, by casting their vote for more moderate and peaceful parties (Gutiérrez-Romero and LeBas 2020). Overall, these international and domestic costs associated with the monitoring and reporting activity of peacekeepers likely deter electoral stakeholders from sponsoring electoral violence (Fjelde and Smidt 2021). Several case studies testify to the effectiveness of electoral security assistance. Sisk (2008, p. 216) finds that in Liberia in 2005 ‘both rounds of elections went off peacefully, in no small measure attributable to … the ability of the UNMIL force to provide security.’ For the elections in Haiti in the mid-1990s, Susan Nelson (1998, p. 86) also highlights the ‘importance of external peacekeepers. UNMIH peacekeepers provided a secure environment … Their presence throughout the election cycle encouraged the peaceful transfer in power.’ Reviewing

Peacekeeping and electoral violence  229 post-conflict elections in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Cambodia that were accompanied by UN peacekeepers in the 1990s, Krishna Kumar (1998, p. 9) concludes: ‘These [peacekeeping] forces are crucial to successful elections. Their presence gives a sense of security to the citizenry and has a moderating influence upon those who have not reconciled to a peaceful settlement.’ Quantitative cross-national studies support the hypothesis that emerges from qualitative accounts: Peacekeeping forces can help reduce electoral violence by providing electoral security assistance. Using evidence from a global sample of national elections held during intrastate armed conflict or within two years after the end of hostilities in the 1990–2011 period, Fjelde and Höglund (2022) demonstrates that the number of UN military personnel is negatively correlated with fatalities in electoral violence within countries. However, they also show that UN military deployment only mitigates the intensity of this violence but does not entirely prevent its occurrence (Fjelde and Höglund 2022, p. 26). Smidt (2021) provides a possible explanation for the latter finding: Peacekeepers only prevent electoral violence if they are actually engaged in electoral security assistance.1 Her analyses of 603 elections in a global sample of civil war-affected countries in the 1989–2012 period shows that if peacekeepers are not explicitly tasked with securing elections, then their presence is no longer associated with a reduction in the risk of electoral violence. To explain this result, she suggests that peacekeeping operations without election-related tasks shift their resources and attention away from elections and toward other peacebuilding priority areas. Thus, only if UN military personnel are explicitly tasked with supporting electoral security can they address the distinct nature of electoral violence. While these cross-national findings provide first insights into how peacekeepers may mitigate electoral violence, national-level deployment of peacekeepers occurs in tandem with a host of other international efforts to spearhead political change, all of which may influence the overall level of electoral violence. By holding national factors constant, sub-national analyses can isolate the impact of variation in UN military deployments. Fjelde and Smidt (2021) thus examine the risk of electoral violence across sub-national units in all sub-Saharan African countries that hosted a UN peacekeeping operation in the 1994–2017 period. Their findings suggest that the UN military presence in a sub-national unit reduces the average incident risk of electoral violence in this unit. This study brings the analysis closer to the actual activities of peacekeepers on the ground, such as patrols at polling stations or deployments to election violence hotspots, and it also validates cross-national findings showing benefits of peacekeeping deployment for electoral security. Beyond peacekeeping effectiveness in terms of reducing actual incidents of electoral violence, peacekeepers’ electoral security activities may also affect ordinary people’s feelings of security and their capacity for political participation during electoral periods. Mvukiyehe (2017) assesses the impact of the patrols and presence of peacekeepers during the 2011 Liberian elections. He finds that people living in locations that hosted a peacekeeping base and people that had seen or talked to a peacekeeping patrol show greater levels of political participation, including voting in elections. His finding suggests that politicians may indeed face a more mobilized electorate and higher domestic reputation costs from sponsoring electoral violence in places where peacekeepers are deployed. Overall, uniformed peacekeepers discourage coercive strategies during the election season by providing electoral security assistance. These benefits notwithstanding, security activities by peacekeepers do not change the motives underlying electoral stakeholders’ use of coercive

230  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations electoral strategies. The next two sections examine what we know about peacekeepers’ ability to tackle these motives. Election organization assistance  In order to understand how peacekeepers’ assistance with organizing elections contributes to peaceful elections, it is important to note that the literature on electoral violence identifies the manipulation of electoral processes as a consistent precursor of violent elections (Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Daxecker 2012; Beaulieu 2014). Incumbent politicians are often the main perpetrators of election rigging such as buying votes and miscounting ballots because of their privileged access to state resources (Schedler 2002; Collier and Vicente 2012). If elections are rigged, opposition groups may resort to protest and rioting to express their grievances (Hafner-Burton et al. 2014). Moreover, as electoral manipulation closes channels for effective political participation, opposition groups may resort to coercive tactics as a strategic substitute for electoral campaigning (Höglund 2009, p. 423; Dunning 2011; Collier and Vicente 2012; Brancati and Snyder 2013, p. 844). In addition, the exposure of electoral fraud likely serves as a focal point for opposition mobilization and a catalyst for anti-government protest (Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Daxecker 2012). Opposition protests tend to escalate into electoral violence if governments employ repression (Hafner-Burton et al. 2014; Smidt 2016). Considering these findings, peacekeepers’ election organization assistance may help reduce organized and spontaneous electoral violence by preventing fraud. Engagement in the election organization allows peacekeepers to gain oversight over the electoral process and behavior of electoral stakeholders. Much like electoral observers, peacekeepers can thus monitor, document, and expose fraud. In so doing, peacekeepers augment the reputational costs for committing fraud and possibly deter this behavior. Peacekeepers engaged in election organization assistance may also provide technical assistance to sensitive parts of the electoral process, such as procurement of election materials or vote tabulation. As such, peacekeepers help protect the elections from political interference and manipulation. Overall, peacekeepers may reassure all electoral stakeholders that political opponents cannot cheat them out of electoral victory. Consequently, peacekeepers’ election organization assistance decreases incentives for electoral violence (Smidt 2021). Empirical studies confirm this theoretical expectation. Several case studies highlight instances where peacekeepers’ election organization assistance help de-escalate conflict associated with elections (Kumar 1998). For instance, Fortna (2008, p. 100) suggests that ‘extensive international monitoring by peacekeepers of voter registration, campaigning and polling can help deter electoral fraud, and at least as important, reassure both sides that elections will be free and fair.’ By monitoring, she argues, peacekeepers prevent belligerent parties from returning to fighting over alleged political abuse. She provides evidence for her argument from Mozambique in 1994 and Sierra Leone in 2002, where peacekeepers’ support for organizing elections helped stabilize the peace process. Case evidence also suggests that peacekeepers’ assistance to the election organization helps prevent violent demonstrations and riots by making elections more acceptable to all sides (Atuobi 2009, p. 25, for evidence from Sierra Leone). Logistical and material support by peacekeepers may even reduce spontaneous electoral violence. For example, when electronic voter tablets did not properly function in some polling stations in Côte d’Ivoire, some voters suspected fraud. The peacekeeping operation promptly delivered paper ballots and thus de-escalated the tensions (Smidt 2021). Cross-national evidence confirms the expected benefits of peacekeepers’ election organization assistance for electoral security. The analysis of 630 elections in conflict-affected

Peacekeeping and electoral violence  231 countries in the 1989–2012 period shows that if peacekeepers provide technical, material, and logistical support to the election organization, the risk of electoral violence drops substantively (Smidt 2021). It is important to note, however, that UN peacekeepers usually assist with both electoral security arrangements and the election organization, simultaneously. Thus, the statistical finding that election organization assistance works independently of security provision (and vice versa) draws on a rather small number of cases (Smidt 2021). Yet, other cross-national studies also find that assistance to the organization of elections by UN agencies – including UN peacekeeping operations, the UN Development Program and other UN system entities – effectively contributes to electoral security in fragile countries (Birch and Muchlinski 2018; von Borzyskowski 2019). Moreover, Matanock (2017) shows that international election organization assistance in the aftermath of civil war can lower the risk of recurrent fighting. All these results thus corroborate the empirical evidence for the electoral security benefits of UN peacekeepers’ assistance with the election organization. Voter education  Peacekeepers also contribute to voter education efforts targeting ordinary citizens and communities in war-torn countries. While systematic cross-national evidence on peacekeepers’ voter education is missing, several case studies suggest that these efforts help strengthen civilian resistance against violence-inciting disinformation and coercive electoral strategies, for instance through stimulating peaceful political participation and decreasing support for violence. In this way, voter education can even reduce actual incidents of electoral violence sponsored by politicians (Mvukiyehe 2017; Mvukiyehe and Samii 2017; Smidt 2020). Mvukiyehe and Samii (2017) investigate the impact of a nine-month civic education intervention administered by the UN peacekeeping operation in Liberia (UNMIL) in partnership with the national electoral commission and civil society organizations. The program provided training on election procedures and a forum for monthly discussions of governance issues. Analyzing data from a survey conducted after the 2011 elections in Liberia, the authors demonstrate that exposure to this civic education program increased voters’ willingness to report manipulation, violent intimidation, and threats. Another study by Mvukiyehe (2017) adds that a human rights education program by the peacekeeping operation in Liberia induced local and national political participation, augmented citizens’ interest in politics and increased their civic orientation. These shifts in political interests, attitudes and perceptions have important implications for the prevention of electoral violence: Research suggests that politically mobilized citizens are less likely to submit to electoral intimidation and may even withdraw support from politicians that employ coercive means (Collier and Vicente 2014). These domestic reputation costs may deter politicians from using coercive electoral campaign strategies (Fjelde and Smidt 2021). In fact, a recent study of elections in Côte d’Ivoire held in the 2010–15 period corroborates the plausibility of the expectation that voter education supports the peaceful conduct of elections. Analyzing both events and survey data, this study indicates that, conditional on people’s trust in the peacekeeping operation, peacekeepers’ voter education efforts correlate with more trust in state institutions, less fear of electoral violence, and less support for violence. Outside strongholds of the main Ivorian opposition party, whose members tend to mistrust the peacekeeping operation, election education initiatives also helped mitigate the risk of violent protests and riots (Smidt 2020). Yet, voter education is not a silver bullet in electoral violence prevention efforts. First, as the study of voter education in Côte d’Ivoire reveals, the effectiveness of education initiatives hinges on people’s trust in the senders of information, that is, the peacekeepers. In

232  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations many war-torn host countries, however, those segments of the population that mistrust the peacekeepers or find their presence to be illegitimate are often the ones with grievances and motives to support violent groups (Macdonald 2016, p. 47; Smidt 2020). Relatedly, education events may only have limited effects because they are designed and implemented by international peacekeepers who often lack relevant local knowledge and sensitivity to local contexts (Autesserre 2014). Second, civic education campaigns may only marginally reduce electoral violence because these civilian-focused strategies fail to target the main organizers and perpetrators of electoral violence: state or non-state elites and armed groups, respectively (Claes 2016). On average, however, peacekeepers’ voter education efforts evidently reduce electoral insecurity. Overall, research thus demonstrates a variety of ways in which peacekeepers may help mitigate violence associated with post-war elections. The next section discusses the caveats of peacekeepers’ election support with a focus on potential, violence-inducing side effects.

VIOLENCE-INDUCING SIDE-EFFECTS OF PEACEKEEPERS’ ELECTION SUPPORT While research shows that peacekeepers can overall mitigate electoral violence, several research projects have also pointed to detrimental side effects of international election support in war-affected countries (Fjelde and Höglund 2011). These studies tend to start from the premise that there is a basic goal conflict between building democracy and maintaining stability in societies emerging from war (Diamond 2006; Jarstad and Sisk 2008). Democratization re-distributes power, while stability usually requires maintaining the status quo power distributions that incentivized the warring parties to stop fighting in the first place. While competitive elections are a stepping-stone to democracy, they potentially disrupt the power balance and encourage violence to avoid or contest electoral defeat (Paris 2004; Reilly 2008, pp. 159–61).2 Introducing elections in war-torn societies can thus be a dangerous business. There is anecdotal evidence for purported violence-inducing side effects of peacekeepers’ election support. For instance, the UN peacekeeping operation in Angola in 1992 (UNAVEM II) monitored and logistically assisted the country’s first elections after decades of war. While the peacekeeping operation approved the elections as free and fair, the losing party contested the rightfulness of its defeat. Within a few days after the election, Angola was back at war (Ottaway 1998). Similarly, in Cambodia in 1993, the peacekeeping operation (UNTAC) saw elections as the “holy grail” of the peacebuilding process. While several parties and former belligerents forcefully disrupted elections, the peacekeeping operation pushed ahead and prioritized election support over other crucial peacebuilding tasks, such as disarmament and demobilization (Stedman 1997, p. 35). Despite organizing a campaign of ‘low-level terror’ during the electoral period, the incumbent party was devastatingly defeated at the polls. It consequently rejected the results as fraudulent, declared secession of its stronghold region and orchestrated mass rioting (Stedman 1997, pp. 32–3). In both Angola and Cambodia, peacekeepers’ pressure and support for elections may have contributed to new violence. The examples illustrate that election support activities by peacekeeping operations may fall prey to the goal conflict between democratization and stability (Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Reilly 2008). Under certain conditions, peacekeeping operations face a dilemma, that is, the choice between two undesirable alternatives: holding elections may bring instability and violence,

Peacekeeping and electoral violence  233 while delaying elections may perpetuate illegitimate and potentially authoritarian governance. Through their support for (i) electoral integrity and majority rule, (ii) greater efficiency in organizing elections, and (iii) an early date of elections after the end of the war, peacekeepers may exacerbate the consequences of this dilemma and introduce incentives for violent contestation on the part of domestic stakeholders. In the following, these three points are discussed in turn. Potential side effects of improving electoral integrity and introducing majority rule  Peacekeepers’ support for electoral integrity can sometimes trigger electoral violence by incumbent governments because this support reduces incumbents’ control over the electoral process and increases the risk of their electoral defeat (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011; Lührmann 2019). Fair elections introduce a threat to incumbents’ hold on power and the spoils that come with office, such as rent-seeking opportunities or immunity. In response, they may obstruct peacekeepers’ electoral activities. Using evidence from the 2010 Sudanese elections Lührmann (2019) demonstrates that government leaders employ coercive and non-coercive strategies to undermine international election assistance if credible elections yield few benefits for them. If obstruction is not successful and incumbents fear losing elections, they may also use force to disrupt the electoral process or organize violence to challenge an unfavorable outcome as in Cambodia in 1993 or Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011). Consequently, government-sponsored obstruction and violence during elections may not only undermine stability but also democracy.3 Moreover, peacekeepers’ support for electoral integrity and, by extension, majority rule could trigger violent conflict because it reduces the credibility of non-democratic power-sharing commitments. Drawing on the conflict bargaining literature, Metternich (2011) argues that leaders of ethnic minority rebel groups in peacekeepers’ host countries likely know that their numerical weakness does not allow them to win elections in the foreseeable future. These rebel group leaders therefore have incentives to spoil elections and continue fighting for a better deal. Prospective election winners could offer a power-sharing arrangement to avoid fighting. Yet, the presence of a peacekeeping operation with a mandate to support democracy and elections signals an international preference for majority rule, which hampers prospective election winners’ ability to credibly commit to a non-democratic power-sharing agreement with ethnic minority rebels. More generally, when intervening third parties have preferences for political arrangements that result in power constellations that are different from the equilibrium outcomes of the original conflict, they may trigger renewed violence (Cunningham 2010; Dorussen and Gizelis 2013). Thus, if international election support signals the introduction of majority rule and the impossibility of power sharing with actors that fear losing out under this democratic political arrangement, then peacekeepers’ engagement in elections may provoke electoral violence. Potential side effects of making the organization of elections more efficient  Furthermore, peacekeepers may increase the efficiency of the election organization at the expense of domestic ownership of the elections. Consequently, electoral rules and procedures fail to match domestic preferences and potentially trigger violent conflict. As the Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on Democracy (Ban 2009, p. 5) puts it: ‘Ill-conceived and poorly conceptualized programs, and the promotion of inappropriate foreign models, also have the potential to endanger democratic transitions and, in some cases, they have even contributed to enhanced societal violence and conflict.’ Focusing on the national level, Reilly (2008, p. 174) argues that international peacebuilders tend to neglect expert advice on electoral

234  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations system design in the interest of organizing elections more quickly and efficiently. For instance, for Iraq’s crucial 2005 elections, it was decided to fall back on a single, nationwide district and proportional representation, because the more complex electoral system favored by national experts would have required a national census. Yet, the simpler electoral system encouraged ethnic polarization and alienation of minority groups (see Fortna 2008, on peacekeepers crowding out local democratization efforts). Turning to the local level, Béatrice Pouligny (2000, pp. 31–2) argues that international peacekeepers usually employ standard templates for democracy promotion activities and thereby ignore local institutions. The new rules and procedures introduced by peacekeepers likely ‘compete with and weaken those that exist.’ Peacekeepers’ focus on efficiency may jeopardize local cooperation and potentially introduce violent contention against elections by marginalized local actors (see also Diamond 2006, p. 112; Autesserre 2014). Potential side-effects of enabling “early” elections after war  The final set of arguments centers on the structural conditions in war-torn countries rather than the agency of domestic electoral stakeholders. Peacekeepers’ election support facilitates the holding of elections shortly after the end of war during a period in which most post-conflict governments would not be able to organize elections without external support. In these “early” elections, state weakness and economic destruction exacerbate the stakes in elections and consequently also the risk of violent election-related conflict (Paris 2004; Flores and Nooruddin 2012; Brancati and Snyder 2013). In post-conflict societies, there are usually demands for “early” elections to fill the legitimacy gaps in post-war governance arrangements (for example, replace an appointed transitional government with a popularly elected one) and to respond to citizens’ demands for political participation. The deployment of a peacekeeping operation may add to these pressures for holding elections shortly after war because ‘the promise of early elections is often essential in getting commitments from major powers to deploy peacekeepers and fund post-war reconstruction’ (Reilly 2008, p. 161). Peacekeeping deployment can also lead to hastily organized elections because the international community wishes to create an elected government, to which they can hand over costly peacekeeping responsibilities (Lyons 2002; Reilly 2008, p. 167). Moreover, peacekeepers’ logistical, technical, material, and security assistance to elections enables countries to go to the polls shortly after the end of civil war and before the start of post-war state-building and economic recovery. Indeed, cross-national evidence shows that a peacekeeping presence is associated with an earlier timing of post-conflict elections (Brancati and Snyder 2011). Perhaps unsurprisingly, researchers demonstrate that elections held early after the end of war likely trigger war recurrence because the period before elections was too short to establish the institutional, social, political, and economic conditions conducive to peaceful elections. For instance, state institutions are not strong enough yet to prevent future incumbents from exploiting the opposition. Consequently, the stakes of early post-conflict elections become too high and election losers are unable to accept defeat (Flores and Nooruddin 2012; Brancati and Snyder 2013). Moreover, in early elections, armed groups masquerading as political parties may compete along the lines of the wartime cleavage and employ violence-inciting electoral campaign strategies, such as outbidding and intimidation (Manning 2007; Ban 2009, p. 3). Overall, peacekeepers’ presence and election support indirectly and unintendedly may contribute to raising the risk of election-related violent conflict by sponsoring premature elections in violence-prone contexts.4

Peacekeeping and electoral violence  235 Despite these violence-inducing side effects associated with election-related activity of UN peacekeeping operations, research suggests that peacekeepers on average reduce incidents of electoral violence. How can we make sense of these seemingly contradictory findings? One explanation might be that those studies that warn against negative side effects of peacekeepers’ support to elections are largely qualitative studies that focus on one or a few selected countries. These countries are likely different from the average case in large-N studies, which have so far found either null effects or a security-enhancing impact of peacekeepers during elections. Relatedly, the UN enacted several peacekeeping reforms to address the dangers associated with elections. Specifically, it started to leverage peacekeeping to advocate for inclusive electoral systems, the postponement of elections to a less volatile period, and locally owned solutions (Ban 2009; UN Department of Political Affairs 2016). Many (but not all) studies discerning detrimental side effects of peacekeeping on electoral security focus on the pre-reform era in the 1990s, where the UN more uncritically embraced democracy promotion activities (for example, Pouligny 2000). Finally, research demonstrates that detrimental side-effects of peacekeepers’ support for elections only manifest themselves under certain conditions, for instance, if minority rebel groups fear losing power in elections (Metternich 2011) or elections are held early after the end of the war (Brancati and Snyder 2013). Thus, the average effect of election support by peacekeepers can still be positive. The next section discusses the consequences of these findings for our understanding of how peacekeeping may help contribute to peace and democracy simultaneously and concludes with avenues for future research.

CONCLUSION: BUILDING PEACE AND DEMOCRACY SIMULTANEOUSLY Both scholars and practitioners embraced liberal peacebuilding strategies, including support for democracy through elections, in the early 1990s. Yet, the pendulum has swung back. A decade later, peacekeepers’ support for post-war elections has come under considerable criticism. Some scholars even suggest that a liberal peacebuilding approach and, specifically, election support by peacekeepers have done more harm than good (Paris 2010, for an overview). The review of research findings in this chapter suggests that this critique may have gone too far. As summarized in Table 16.1, the presence and activities of peacekeeping operations – electoral security provision, election organization assistance and voter education – do more good than harm. Elections in countries that host peacekeeping operations are less likely to trigger war recurrence than elections in countries without peacekeeping operations (Flores and Nooruddin 2012; Brancati and Snyder 2013). Across both sub-national units and countries, the presence of peacekeepers either has no effect or positively contributes to electoral security (Fjelde and Smidt 2021; Fjelde and Höglund 2022), especially if the operations engage in electoral security provision and election organization assistance (Smidt 2021). When it comes to election-related violent protests and riots involving ordinary citizens, peacekeepers contribute to reducing these threats through voter education efforts (Mvukiyehe 2017; Mvukiyehe and Samii 2017; Smidt 2020). Although elections are certainly not to be equated with democracy, elections are a centerpiece of any democratization process. Thus, as peacekeepers enable peaceful elections, they may contribute to building democracy and peace simultaneously (see Blair et al. 2022).

236  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Table 16.1

Peacekeeping and actual or perceived electoral security

Authors

Main finding

Time period

Sample

Fjelde and Smidt

Subnational UN military presence is negatively

1994–2017

16 elections in sub-Saharan

(2021)

associated with the risk of electoral violence

African host countries of UN peacekeeping operations

locally Fjelde and Höglund

UN military personnel numbers are negatively

(2022)

associated with fatalities in electoral violence

1990–2011

National elections in all countries in the world

across countries, but not the occurrence of electoral violence Mvukiyehe (2017)

UN military presence and patrols increase local

2011

and national political participation Mvukiyehe and Samii

Civic education administered by civil society

(2017)

organizations in partnership with the UN

Nationally representative sample of individuals in Liberia

2011

Nationally representative sample of individuals in Liberia

peacekeeping operation makes individuals more likely to report fraud and electoral violence, stimulates electoral participation, and produces a shift from parochial to national candidates Smidt (2020)

Election education by UN peacekeepers is

2010–15

Subnational locations and

negatively associated with events of violent

a nationally representative sample

protest and riots. At the individual level, election

of individuals in Côte d’Ivoire

education is positively associated with trust in state institutions and negatively related to fear and support for violence Smidt (2021)

The presence of UN peacekeeping operations

1989–2012

National elections in all armed

correlates negatively with the risk of deadly

conflict-affected countries in the

electoral violence if peacekeepers engage in

world

electoral security and election organization assistance

While a general critique of the liberal peacebuilding approach might not be warranted, existing research points to important challenges. First, power-hungry government leaders can (violently) obstruct peacekeepers’ efforts to improve elections (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011; Lührmann 2019). In the worst case, authoritarian incumbents can misuse peacekeepers’ support to strengthen their hold on power (von Billerbeck and Tansey 2019). Peacekeeping operations should remain attentive to this detrimental side-effect when they support electoral processes in war-torn countries. Relatedly, peacekeepers’ support for elections and democracy may spark resistance by armed group leaders that represent minority ethnic groups and fear exclusion under majority rule (Metternich 2011). Thus, peacekeeping operations may consider supplementing their democracy promotion activities with mechanisms enabling power sharing and minority rights guarantees. Second, maintaining local and national ownership of the electoral process is important for avoiding electoral violence (Pouligny 2000). Autesserre (2014) provides excellent guidance on how peacekeepers can fulfill this ambition, for instance, by hiring more staff with country expertise and rewarding peacekeepers’ willingness to reach out to domestic stakeholders. Finally, premature elections are not helpful. As Paris (2004) reminds us, progress in rebuilding state institutions and economic recovery may reduce the stakes in elections and make them less contentious. If postponing elections to a later stage in the peace process is deemed infeasible, peacekeeping operations may advocate for intermediate solu-

Peacekeeping and electoral violence  237 tions such as ‘phasing in the return to democracy, so that local elections come first and national elections may be deferred until the political conditions are more suitable’ (Diamond 2006). This chapter points to several avenues for future research on peacekeeping operations, their impact of elections, and their ability to promote peace and democracy simultaneously. First, most studies on how peacekeepers affect electoral violence focus on aggregate counts or incident risks (for example, Smidt 2021). To understand when and how peacekeepers can secure elections in conflict-affected countries, it is fruitful to disaggregate election violence by target and perpetrators (Fjelde and Smidt 2021). In this vein, future research may also examine peacekeepers’ impact on intermediate variables. For instance, can peacekeepers’ election organization assistance indeed improve election quality? Answering this question would shed light on the pathway through which peacekeepers’ election support contributes to electoral peace. Second, while many post-war countries host non-UN peacekeeping operations, their impact on electoral security remains unknown. Do regional peacekeeping operations contribute to securing elections? Do their roots in the region help motivate local and national ownership of electoral processes? Moreover, UN peacekeeping operations often intervene after regional peacekeeping operations (tried to) create a minimum level of stability (for example, Liberia 1997 and Central African Republic 2014). Some UN peacekeeping operations also “outsource” stabilization and counterinsurgency efforts to regional peacekeeping organizations and national armies (for example, Mali 2013). How do these forms of burden-sharing affect the outcomes of peacekeepers’ assistance to elections? Are UN peacekeeping operations better able to safeguard their legitimacy in processes of liberal peacebuilding if regional organizations take over the use of military force? Answering these under-researched questions seems important for improving peacekeeping policy. Third, researchers are largely silent on burden-sharing between peacekeeping operations and other international actors, such as international non-governmental organizations, regional organizations, and foreign state agencies. These actors work in the same conflict-affected environments at the same time, and sometimes even conduct the same types of election-related activities as peacekeepers (such as election monitoring, technical election assistance and voter education). Yet, the literatures on international election monitoring (for example, Daxecker 2012), technical assistance (for example, Lührmann 2019) and peacekeepers’ election support (for example, Smidt 2021) remain largely separate from each other (see von Borzyskowski 2019, for an exception). It would be interesting and policy-relevant to investigate systematically how these different types of actors can coordinate and create synergies for the benefit of electoral processes in their host countries. Finally, the chapter suggests that peacekeepers’ choice of activities is fundamentally important. Peacekeepers’ engagement in electoral security provision, election organization assistance, and voter education activities explain why the UN helps safeguard electoral peace in war-torn countries. This finding resonates with the growing scholarly interest in the substantive content of peacekeeping operations, that is, their mandated tasks and their activities on the ground (Diehl and Druckman 2018; Blair et al. 2021; Di Salvatore et al. 2022). Beyond tasks and activities related directly to elections, peacekeepers also tend to engage in other areas of democracy promotion. Examining how other democracy promotion activities carried out by UN peacekeepers help create an enabling environment for peaceful elections would be a relevant topic for future research. For instance, given that political-party strength influences whether elections turn violent (Fjelde 2020), it would be interesting to investigate whether

238  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations peacekeepers’ engagement in rebel-to-party transformation contributes to peaceful elections (Söderberg Kovacs 2008). Findings presented in this chapter relate to an important debate on the impact of peacekeeping deployments on post-war democratization: Some scholars find a positive impact of peacekeeping presence on the quality of democracy, while others show null or even negative effects (see Fortna and Huang 2012, for a summary of findings). This chapter highlights consequential variation in the content of peacekeeping: Some operations assist with elections, while others refrain from this type of involvement. Studying whether variation in peacekeepers’ engagement with elections can help explain differences in the quality of post-war democracy is thus a logical and policy-relevant next step.

NOTES 1. Another explanation for this null finding might be non-random peacekeeping deployment. Since the UN may send more military troops to more violence-prone elections, correlational analyses underestimate the benefit of peacekeeping for reducing electoral insecurity. 2. Flawed elections in post-war contexts may have other detrimental outcomes, such as cementing ethnic cleavages or undermining the credibility of democratic processes writ large (Reilly 2008, p. 158). 3. These arguments are based on the premise that domestic elites try to maximize the benefits that they can obtain from an international peacekeeping operation, while minimizing the potential menace that “liberal peace”-style peacebuilding may pose to their rule (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011). 4. The correlation between peacekeeping and “premature” elections is often treated as a selection problem, namely, peacekeepers select to deploy in the hardest cases for achieving peaceful elections (Smidt 2020).

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Peacekeeping and electoral violence  239 Carnegie, Derek, Marie Doucey, Sara Jacobs, Aaron Pangburn, and Inbok Rhee (2012), ‘The Role of Peacekeeping Operations in Electoral Processes’, paper prepared for the Columbia University Capstone Workshop, Spring 2012. Claes, Jonas (2016), ‘Findings and Conclusion’, in Jonas Claes (ed.), Electing Peace: Violence Prevention and Impact at the Polls, Washington, DC, USA: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 195–220. Collier, Paul and Pedro C. Vicente (2012), ‘Violence, Bribery, and Fraud: The Political Economy of Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Public Choice, 153 (1–2), 117–47. Collier, Paul and Pedro C. Vicente (2014), ‘Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria’, The Economic Journal, 124 (574), F327–F355. Cunningham, David E. (2010), ‘Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars’, Journal of Peace Research, 47 (2), 115–27. Daxecker, Ursula E. (2012), ‘The Cost of Exposing Cheating: International Election Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-Election Violence in Africa’, Journal of Peace Research, 49 (4), 503–16. Di Salvatore, Jessica, Magnus Lundgren, Kseniya Oksamytna, and Hannah Smidt (2022), ‘Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) Dataset’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, accessed 3 March 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1177/​00220027211068897. Diamond, Larry J. (2006), ‘Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States Lessons and Challenges’, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 2 (2), 93–116. Diehl, Paul F. and Daniel Druckman (2018), ‘Multiple Peacekeeping Missions: Analysing Interdependence’, International Peacekeeping, 25 (1), 28–51. Dorussen, Han and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2013), ‘Into the Lion’s Den: Local Responses to UN Peacekeeping’, Journal of Peace Research, 50 (6), 691–706. Dunning, Thad (2011), ‘Fighting and Voting: Violent Conflict and Electoral Politics’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55 (3), 327–39. Fjelde, Hanne (2020), ‘Political Party Strength and Electoral Violence’, Journal of Peace Research, 57 (1), 140–55. Fjelde, Hanne and Kristine Höglund (eds) (2011), Building Peace, Creating Conflict? Conflictual Dimensions of Local and International Peacebuilding, Lund, SE: Nordic Academic Press. Fjelde, Hanne and Kristine Höglund (2022), ‘Introducing the Deadly Electoral Conflict Dataset (DECO)’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 66 (1), 162–85. Fjelde, Hanne and Hannah Smidt (2021), ‘Protecting the Vote? Peacekeeping Presence and the Risk of Electoral Violence’, British Journal of Political Science, early view, accessed 28 February 2022 at  https://​doi​.org/​10​.1017/​S0007123421000132. Flores, Thomas Edward and Irfan Nooruddin (2012), ‘The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction’, The Journal of Politics, 74 (2), 558–70. Fortna, V. Page (2008), Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Fortna, V. Page and Reyko Huang (2012), ‘Democratization after Civil War: A Brush-Clearing Exercise’, International Studies Quarterly, 56 (4), 801–8. Gutiérrez-Romero, Roxana (2014), ‘An Inquiry into the Use of Illegal Electoral Practices and Effects of Political Violence and Vote-Buying’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58 (8), 1500–27. Gutiérrez-Romero, Roxana and Adrienne LeBas (2020), ‘Does Electoral Violence Affect Vote Choice and Willingness to Vote? Conjoint Analysis of a Vignette Experiment’, Journal of Peace Research, 57 (1), 77–92. Hafner-Burton, Emily M., Sudan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski (2014), ‘When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?’, British Journal of Political Science, 44 (1), 149–79. Höglund, Kristine (2009), ‘Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 21 (3), 412–27. Howard, Lise Morjé (2019), Power in Peacekeeping, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Jarstad, Anna K. and Timothy D. Sisk (2008), ‘Introduction’, in Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–14. Kumar, Krishna (ed.) (1998), Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance, Boulder, CO, USA and London, UK: Lynne Rienner.

240  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Kuntz, Philipp and Mark Thompson (2009), ‘More than Just the Final Straw: Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers’, Comparative Politics, 41 (3), 253–72. Lührmann, Anna (2019), ‘United Nations Electoral Assistance: More than a Fig Leaf?’, International Political Science Review, 40 (2), 181–96. Lyons, Terrence (2002), ‘The Role of Postsettlement Elections’, in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder, CO, USA and London, UK: Lynne Rienner, pp. 215–35. Macdonald, Geoffrey (2016), ‘Bangladesh: Political Intransigence and Weak Prevention’, in Jonas Claes (ed.), Electing Peace: Violence Prevention and Impact at the Polls, Washington, DC, USA: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 31–59. Manning, Carrie (2007) ‘Party-building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo and Mozambique’, Democratization, 14 (2), 253–72. Matanock, Alia M. (2017), Electing Peace: From Civil Conflict to Political Participation, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Metternich, Nils W. (2011), ‘Expecting Elections: Interventions, Ethnic Support, and the Duration of Civil Wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55 (6), 909–37. Mvukiyehe, Eric (2017), ‘Promoting Political Participation in War-torn Countries: Microlevel Evidence from Postwar Liberia’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62 (8), 1686–726. Mvukiyehe, Eric and Cyrus Samii (2017), ‘Promoting Democracy in Fragile States: Field Experimental Evidence from Liberia’, World Development, 95, 254–67. Nelson, Susan (1998), ‘Haitian Elections and the Aftermath’, in Krishna Kumar (ed.), Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance, Boulder, CO, USA and London, UK: Lynne Rienner, 71–86. Oksamytna, Kseniya (2018), ‘Policy Entrepreneurship by International Bureaucracies: The Evolution of Public Information in UN Peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping, 25 (1), 79–104. Ottaway, Marina (1998), ‘Angola’s Failed Elections’, in Krishna Kumar (ed.), Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance, Boulder, CO, USA and London, UK: Lynne Rienner, pp. 133–51. Paris, Roland (2004), At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Paris, Roland (2010), ‘Saving Liberal Peace’, Review of International Studies, 36 (2), 337–65. Piccolino, Giulia and John Karlsrud (2011), ‘Withering Consent, But Mutual Dependency: UN Peace Operations and African Assertiveness’, Conflict, Security & Development, 11 (4), 447–71. Pouligny, Béatrice (2000), ‘Promoting Democratic Institutions in Post-conflict Societies: Giving Diversity a Chance’, International Peacekeeping, 7 (3), 17–35. Reilly, Benjamin (2008), ‘Post-war Elections: Uncertain Turning Points of Transitions’, in Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 157–82. Schedler, Andreas (2002), ‘The Menu of Manipulation’, Journal of Democracy, 13 (2), 36–50. Sisk, Timothy D. (2008), ‘Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence’, paper presented at the ISA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, March 24–8. Smidt, Hannah (2016), ‘From a Perpetrator’s Perspective: International Election Observers and Post-Electoral Violence’, Journal of Peace Research, 53 (2), 226–41. Smidt, Hannah (2020), ‘Mitigating Election Violence Locally: UN Peacekeepers’ Election-Education Campaigns in Côte d’Ivoire’, Journal of Peace Research, 57 (1), 199–216. Smidt, Hannah (2021), ‘Keeping Electoral Peace: The Impact of UN Peacekeeping Activities on Election-Related Violence’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 38 (5), 580–604. Söderberg Kovacs, Mimmi (2008), ‘When Rebels Change Stripes: Armed Insurgents in Post-war Politics’, in Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 133–56. Stedman, Stephen John (1997), ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, International Security, 22 (2), 5–53. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2008), ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines – “The Capstone Doctrine”’, accessed 9 February 2022 at https://​www​.un​

Peacekeeping and electoral violence  241 .org/​ruleoflaw/​blog/​document/​united​-nations​-peacekeeping​-operations​-principles​-and​-guidelines​-the​ -capstone​-doctrine/​. UN Department of Political Affairs (2016), ‘Preventing and Mitigating Election-related Violence’, Policy Directive, 1 June, Ref. FP/01/2016, accessed 9 February 2022 at https://​dppa​.un​.org/​sites/​ default/​files/​ead​_pd​_preventing​_mitigating​_election​-related​_violence​_20160601​_e​.pdf. UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (2020), ‘Elections’, accessed 21 June 2020 at https://​dppa​.un​.org/​en/​elections. von Billerbeck, Sarah and Oisín Tansey (2019), ‘Enabling Autocracy? Peacebuilding and Post-conflict Authoritarianism in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, European Journal of International Relations, 25 (3), 698–722. von Borzyskowski, Inken (2019, The Credibility Challenge: How Democracy Aid Influences Election Violence, Ithaca, NY, USA and London, UK: Cornell University Press. Wantchekon, Leonard (2004), ‘The Paradox of “Warlord” Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation’, American Political Science Review, 98 (1), 17–33.

17. Peacekeeping operations and women’s security Louise Olsson

INTRODUCTION During the 1990s, a rising number of women’s organizations from conflict areas pushed to have their security concerns acknowledged on more equal terms with men’s security, in part captured in the mantra that “women’s rights are human rights” (United Nations 1996; Olsson 2000; Davies and True 2019). In parallel, peacekeeping failures in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, situations which displayed high levels of both lethal violence and sexual violence deliberately targeting women, started to shake the foundations of an existing belief that violence against women was to be considered primarily as an unfortunate side-effect rather than an integral part of a conflict (Gizelis and Olsson 2015). As a result of the changes in both priority and understanding around women’s security, conflicts with massive violence targeting women became more likely to see a peacekeeping operation deployed by the UN Security Council (Benson and Gizelis 2020). With the advent of UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security (henceforth UNSCRs on WPS) in 2000, peacekeeping mandates increasingly became explicit in recognizing the impact of war on women and the role of their participation in the work for peace and security (for example, Davies and True 2019). Since the 2008 adoption of UNSCR 1820, the second UNSCR on WPS, further progress on addressing women’s security concerns has been made, specifically through explicitly mandating peacekeeping operations to contribute to protection by addressing conflict-related sexual violence (Kreft 2017; Johansson 2020; Moncrief and Wood 2020). That said, almost 30 years after the developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda underlined the necessity of explicitly including the improvement of women’s security in peacekeeping responsibilities, this remains an underdeveloped dimension in many operations (Olsson et al. 2020). Research indicates two principal impediments to progress. First, for peacekeeping operations to effectively contribute to protection, there is a need to further nuance our understanding of women as political actors and their security concerns during war. In particular, there is a need to expand responsibilities on protection beyond that of preventing conflict-related sexual violence to incorporate security threats rooted in the complexity of how violence is used to restrain women’s agency, and threats that stem from the societal impacts of war, such as those related to health. Greater nuance is important to avoid fortifying stereotypical assumptions of “women” as a cohesive group and reinforcing ideas of the need for a protective culture in which women’s agency and power are belittled (Karim and Beardsley 2017; Kreft 2017). As pointedly discussed by Hultman and Muvumba Sellström (2019), this need for nuance becomes apparent where the normative area of protecting civilians meets that of the UNSCRs on WPS: that is, explicitly in preventing and addressing conflict-related sexual violence and implicitly in (mis)conceptions of civilians as “women and children.” The normative dissonances that exist between these frameworks are argued to partly stem from both frameworks operating with oversimplified understandings of women/gender and war, diverging conceptions on “men as actors” and “women as victims,” and stereotypical ideas of 242

Peacekeeping operations and women’s security  243 masculinity and femininity. These are assumptions and ideas that research emphatically underlines we need to modify and review. The oversimplifications hide that men are vulnerable to a much higher extent than we tend to assume and, equally, that women’s roles and agency are more varied and nuanced in both war and peace (Carpenter 2005; Bjarnegård et al. 2015; Kreft 2017; Thomas and Wood 2017; Kishi et al. 2019; Marks and Chenoweth 2020). In fact, research by Kishi et al. (2019) and Marks and Chenoweth (2020) underscores that violence targeting women varies substantially between conflict and region and is often connected to women engaged in different forms of political action. As such, violence targeting women frequently takes the form of regular attacks or confrontations in the public space, while there is a tendency in peacekeeping to focus on sexual violence against civilians or to classify violence against women as social rather than political. While continuing to improve the capacity of peacekeeping to prevent conflict-related sexual violence remains key, research does suggest that a more nuanced approach is required to ensure that operations can address a broader span of women’s security concerns (see Kishi et al. 2019). Notably, we have yet to grasp the role of regular peacekeeping assignments for limiting the broader negative impacts of war, which constitutes a core aspect of the first resolutions on WPS. Research by Gizelis and Cao (2021) demonstrates that there can be a peacekeeping dividend for women and girls’ security when a peacekeeping operation works to halt conflict violence and establish freedom of movement. An improved understanding of women’s security concerns must then be elevated to an explicit core dimension and a priority in peacekeeping mandates on protection (Olsson et al. 2021). Second, prioritized mandate assignments on protection need to be accompanied by an improved peacekeeping capacity. In fact, even though demands to adapt peacekeeping implementation processes to ensure that women obtain the same level of support and security from UN efforts as men increased from the late 1990s onwards, capabilities remain limited (Olsson 2000; 2009; Karim and Beardsley 2017; Olsson et al. 2020). Progress has been riddled with the same challenges that affect peacekeeping in general, such as lacking sufficient human and material resources (Johansson and Hultman 2019). In addition, studies argue that efforts to improve women’s security face specific challenges, such as conceptual limitations in the understanding of peacekeeping responsibilities, and practical limitations in training and the gathering of intelligence and analysis. The existing normative dissonances between the frames of protection of civilians and WPS potentially also create challenges for combining peacekeeping efforts to support women’s agency with protective measures (Johansson and Hultman 2019; Olsson et al. 2020). Moreover, some of the existing peacekeeping approaches, such as those focusing on the contributions of women peacekeepers, or those which overly rely on specific measures such as the deployment of Women Protection Advisers (WPA), have received increasing criticism. For example, focusing on the “added value” of women personnel for improving women’s security is argued to add burdens on these peacekeepers outside of their regular tasks and distracts from the more substantial peacekeeping reforms needed. WPAs are argued to form important parts of the solution, but an overreliance on this measure risks sidelining women’s security from the core of the mandate implementation (Karim and Beardsley 2017; Olsson et al. 2020; Wilén 2020). While significant lacunas remain, the research field has seen considerable development over time. Feminist contributions led the way by identifying central gaps and conceptual limitations. Not least, research has highlighted a neglect in considering the negative consequences of peacekeeping related to militarism and sexual exploitation and abuse (see discussions in Whitworth 1998; Agathangelou and Ling 2003; Olsson and Gizelis 2019; and Chapter 18

244  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations (Karim and Beardsley) in this Handbook). Closely following this, early comparative and statistical studies focused on the role of women’s participation and peacekeeping design effects on women’s security (for example, Miller and Moskos 1995; Olsson and Tryggestad 2001; Karim and Beardsley 2017). As an initial lack of access to sex-disaggregated statistics was overcome, and with the more advanced use of methods and collection of data, the latter systematic empirical approach to women’s security and peacekeeping has since grown substantially. This has also resulted in issues related to gender being increasingly examined in the context of other key questions in peacekeeping research (see discussions in Olsson and Gizelis 2014; Karim and Beardsley 2017; Gizelis 2018; Hultman and Muvumba Sellström 2019; Karim et al. 2020). While drawing on the broader critical debate on gender, women’s security, and peacekeeping, this chapter will discuss three interrelated trends in systematic empirical research that address the discussed impediments related to nuance, priority, and capability: (i) the participation–protection nexus, (ii) protection of civilians from conflict-related sexual violence, and (iii) the broader impact of war and peacekeeping dividends. The chapter thereby complements other chapters in this Handbook which address participation in peacekeeping (Chapter 5 by Bove et al.), sexual exploitation and abuse (Chapter 18 by Karim and Beardsley), and protection of civilians (Chapter 15 by Hultman et al.). The chapter concludes by discussing some ways forward for future research.

THE PARTICIPATION–PROTECTION NEXUS Two recurring criticisms of existing peacekeeping protective measures are (a) that they risk reinforcing narratives of women as one cohesive group of victims (Kreft 2017), and (b) that there is an overemphasis on the risks of sexual violence in comparison to other forms of political violence targeting women (see Davies and True 2019, and Kishi et al. 2019 for a discussion). Emerging research based on a more advanced collection and analysis of gender-disaggregated data substantiates this critique and supports the argument that we do not fully understand women’s agency in conflict areas. For example, a dataset by Nilsson and Svensson (2020) shows that women’s organizations were active agents in peacemaking efforts in almost 50 percent of all armed conflicts involving civil society organizations in the Americas and in Africa between 1989 and 2019. Thomas and Wood (2017) present a global dataset of women fighters that shows that about 41 percent of all rebel groups between 1979 and 2009 recruited women to different forms of positions, including combat roles. The recruitment of women is increasingly considered to play a central role in the strategy of armed actors (see, for example, Manekin and Wood 2020), where Marks and Chenoweth’s (2020, p. 3) data indicates that women’s participation in violent and nonviolent campaigns make the campaigns ‘more likely to succeed’ as, other things being equal, women’s greater presence can make campaigns ‘more effective by adding numbers, legitimacy, and tactical innovation.’ This dynamic appears to be reflected in changes in existing power and resource distributions between men and women. A principal study by Webster et al. (2019), using cross-national data between 1900 and 2015, shows how women’s political rights tend to improve during armed conflict due to social change and women’s mobilization, but that such positive changes do not last unless the institutionalization of women’s rights are promoted by the peace process and through international support. Set in this context, advancing peacekeeping efforts to improve women’s security must

Peacekeeping operations and women’s security  245 build on the understanding of women’s agency, as underlined by Karim and Beardsley (2017), to avoid further contributing to a “protective culture” that prevents the perception of women as actors in hazardous environments (see also Karim and Henry 2018). If women do not constitute one cohesive group but rather a complex category of actors that can engage politically in a range of ways, including in military organizations (Goldstein 2001; Bjarnegård et al. 2015), this brings with it that women can be the potential targets of a large spectrum of political violence. That is, there is a connection between forms of participation and the forms of security threats that women face. Supporting this suggestion, data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project (ACLED) released in 2019 and onwards show how political violence, such as attacks targeting women, is utilized (Kishi et al. 2019). The data demonstrate that different geographical areas see substantial variation in types of political violence, as displayed in Figure 17.1.

Source: Created by and used with permission of Roudabeh Kishi, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), http://​www​.acleddata​.com.

Figure 17.1

Political violence targeting women, by type of violence

In addition, Bardall et al. (2020) suggest that we need to carefully consider under what circumstances political violence targeting women should be thought of as gendered. On some occasions, women and men can be targeted with political violence for the same reasons, for example because they represent an opinion under contestation. At other times, gender does play a role. For example, political violence can be considered gendered in cases where women are targeted while trying to enter a male-dominated space, or in terms of how violence impacts their lives more long-term, such as in the wake of sexual violence. To capture this complexity, the authors argue that political violence can be gendered in terms of motives, forms, and/ or impact. Analyzing how and why violence targets women and if and how it is gendered in a specific operational context is central if the right form of protective peacekeeping response is to be adopted. This more nuanced understanding of the participation–protection nexus is starting to change the preparation of peacekeeping operations and existing policies. In 2020, the UN Secretary-General called for an analysis which uses sex-disaggregated data to understand what forms of security threats women face and to adapt the implementation of peacekeeping operations based on these facts. This call also further articulates the demand for peacekeeping to better support women’s engagement in political processes (UN Secretary-General 2020). The nexus between protection and participation is currently most clearly articulated by women human rights defenders from around the world who have increasingly demanded that the international community should seek to contribute to their safety to enable them to promote women’s rights in post-war communities (Kishi and Olsson 2019). Furthermore, the work on

246  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations improved protection needs to recognize the different forms that women’s participation can take in armed movements. For example, research on peacekeeping contributions to demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration processes has identified the need for considering the specific security concerns of women fighters as compared to male fighters. This includes cantonment facilities, health and counseling programs, and circumstances during reintegration (Basini 2013, p. 542). In addition, the demobilization of male soldiers is argued to potentially affect women’s security. Therefore, a lack of attention to local women’s security during demobilization and security reform processes is a potential factor that could explain why a number of surveys have found that women are more negative towards peacebuilding than men (Brounéus et al. 2017; see also Huber and Karim 2018).

PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS FROM CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE Hultman and Muvumba Sellström (2019) observe that the normative area of protecting civilians meets that of the UNSCR’s on WPS explicitly in the area of conflict-related sexual violence, and outline the need to more clearly articulate the complementarity as well as the tensions within and between these frameworks. In fact, research suggests that a key challenge to improving the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in addressing protection of civilians overall is the different interpretations and priorities of such mandate tasks, which result in inconsistent implementation between missions (Hultman and Muvumba Sellström 2019, pp. 599–600). A dissonance between frameworks has existed from the outset. While the UN began to pay attention to sexual violence during the 1990s (Benson and Gizelis 2020), it was only after the adoption of UNSCR 1820 in 2008 that UN peacekeeping operations specifically came under increasing pressure to explicitly protect civilians from this form of violence. The push to adopt UNSCR 1820 had gained strength from the ongoing parallel debate on protection of civilians, but the resolution text immediately came under fire for emphasizing protection over the importance of women’s agency (Hultman and Muvumba Sellström 2019). This critique has remained, but there has also been progress as the framework on protection has been consistently developed in subsequent UNSCRs on WPS. By 2020, mandate language on protection appears to more often be actionable and prioritized (Gizelis and Olsson 2015; Kreft 2017; Olsson et al. 2021). At the practitioner level, peacekeeping forums progressively discuss how to clarify and advance military, police, and civilian responsibilities and tasks to improve protection (for example, Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations 2020; United Nations 2020). In parallel, research on conflict-related sexual violence has rapidly progressed. While this research has not always considered the role of peacekeeping, the results are argued to be important for improving peacekeeping protection (see Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013; Olsson et al. 2020). Importantly, and while recognizing the difficulty of accurately capturing this form of violence in statistics (Krüger and Nordås 2020), leading research increasingly takes issue with some of the core axioms guiding peacekeeping’s protective approaches. That is, the perception that sexual violence is an inevitable consequence of war, that it is always strategic, or that promoting gender equality can prevent further violence (Johansson 2020; Moncrief and Wood 2020). Research has increasingly found that ‘[t]here is no evidence suggesting that rape and sexual violence is an inevitable consequence of war’ (Johansson and Hultman 2019, p. 1658).

Peacekeeping operations and women’s security  247 Notably, the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset,1 which has become the principal tool for progressing a more systematic study, shows that of the 129 active conflicts involving 625 armed actors in the period 1989–2009, 43 percent of the individual conflicts had no reports of this form of violence (Cohen and Nordås 2014, p. 423). While violence can be strategic in some settings, factors related to recruitment policies and group cohesion, the ability of leadership to uphold discipline and control over personnel, and preventive policies adopted by local forces are more likely to explain a substantial degree of variation in this form of violence; that is, it is more a practice than a tactic (Moncrief and Wood 2020). Importantly, the use of this form of violence can also vary between groups operating in the same conflict area, something which entails that gender inequality in an area is unlikely to explain a large part of the appearance of sexual violence (Johansson and Hultman 2019 drawing on Wood 2009; Hoover Green 2012; Cohen 2013; Cohen and Nordås 2014; Muvumba Sellström 2020). In addition, men are argued to be the target of such violence to a higher extent than expected (Sivakumaran 2007). For example, by re-examining torture and detention records in the conflicts of Peru, Leiby (2009) reveals a higher-than-expected degree of sexual violence against men. Combined, these research results indicate that when planning for peacekeeping prevention, we have to perceive of sexual violence in war as multifaceted – for example, we have to determine whether the violence in a specific operating area is opportunistic, a practice by a military organization, or whether it is strategic – and how it targets women and men (Olsson et al. 2020). An oversimplified understanding of sexual violence could be part of the explanation for why research finds that peacekeeping operations are less successful in addressing it than they are at preventing and stopping other lethal forms of violence against the civilian population (see also Chapter 15 by Hultman et al. in this Handbook). To address that puzzle, research has begun to look closer at the specific conditions which can influence a peacekeeping operation’s success in protecting civilians from conflict-related sexual violence. In a forum in International Peacekeeping, Muvumba Sellström argues that this is important as current peacekeeping approaches have been shaped by extreme instances of sexual violence, and have not sought to learn from the experiences of many local security forces which actively work to prevent such behavior by their personnel (Olsson et al. 2020). In one of the first systematic studies, Johansson and Hultman (2019) also find that while a protective mandate for troops does not contribute to a lower risk of violence, a mandated and substantial number of UN police can reduce the risk of sexual violence conducted by rebels. A higher number of peacekeeping troops deployed in environments where the government and rebel forces have functional internal control, however, can substantially decrease the risk of sexual violence as internal control makes the warring parties able to respond to pressure from the peacekeeping operation (Johansson and Hultman 2019, pp. 1675–6). Kirschner and Miller (2019), studying what they call combatant-perpetrated sexual violence, note that we can expect warring parties to respond differently to civilian and security-focused initiatives. Overall, however, they argue that peacekeeping can contribute to deterring sexual violence by increasing the costs of such actions and by supporting institutional and cultural shifts (2019, p. 2044). Ruffa (2020) argues that research on military sociology can contribute to an improved understanding of the pathways to creating such shifts as she finds that a majority of military organizations globally have not considered preventing or halting conflict-related sexual violence as a military responsibility. Hence, she argues, there is little conceptual framing or capacity to draw on when deployed to a peacekeeping operation. That

248  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations said, military-to-military exchange and interactions between local forces and peacekeeping components can be very useful for relaying expectations, and, hence, improving professional conduct. The latter is a point strengthened by Hoover Green (2020), who argues that exchanges on issues of discipline and training are areas where peacekeeping operations could even more effectively work to prevent or halt conflict-related sexual violence. Combined, these findings suggest that the limited effects of peacekeeping protection stem from underdeveloped capacities on the international side. This includes the collection of intelligence to better analyze the warring parties’ internal organization. Both formal and informal indicators are needed to strengthen a peacekeeping operation’s collection of information to estimate the risk that a local security force will perpetrate sexual violence. Formal indicators include adopted codes of conduct, political education messaging, or documentation to name and shame, while informal indicators seek to ‘capture social norms which can involve what can be construed as sexual misconduct’ or ‘socialization among peers that promotes sexual cultures of consent and stigmatizes sexual predators’ (Olsson et al. 2020, p. 523). In terms of halting sexual violence through approaches that address structural, or so-called root causes, research agrees with policymakers that promoting gender equality is important as a goal in itself. Nevertheless, research questions the ability of such measures to directly protect civilians from further sexual violence by local security actors, at least in the short term, as they do not appear to get at the organizational factors causing such violence (see Olsson et al. 2020 for a discussion). This does not mean that it is not central to consider women’s agency and gender equality when designing protective measures. The reasons are similar to those discussed in the section on the protection–participation nexus; there is a need to ensure that the protective measures address women’s own identified security concerns, and that the measures contribute to a more positive long-term trajectory in women’s rights. Both are central to avoid the risk of reducing women to only victims and for recognizing local women’s mobilization against violence (see, for example, Agerberg and Kreft 2020). Finally, a growing trend in research suggests that improving the capacity of a peacekeeping contingent to analyze the causes and uses of sexual violence by warring actors active in its area also yields additional information about the conflict dynamic that can improve the peacekeeping ability to operate effectively. For example, Nagel and Doctor (2020), using a global dataset covering 1989 to 2014, find that rebel groups which are guilty of sexual violence are more likely to fragment. This is because the use of sexual violence increases group cohesion at the battalion level, meaning that lower-level military leaders seeking to break away can be more confident that their troops will follow. Nagel (2019) also finds that rebel groups guilty of sexual violence are more likely to be able to pressure the government into a mediated outcome, as the use of sexual violence clearly shows that the government is unable to protect its population. Johansson and Sarwari (2019) find that when a state is challenged by a rebel group supported by an external military intervention, this increases the likelihood that the state forces start perpetrating sexual violence. This is due to the need to utilize forceful recruitment methods to meet increased personnel demands.

IMPACT OF WAR AND PEACEKEEPING DIVIDENDS While it is important to avoid stereotypical assumptions, it is still essential to observe that on an aggregate level, political violence and armed conflict tend to target and affect men and women

Peacekeeping operations and women’s security  249 in somewhat different ways. This is due to variations in the distributions of labor, gender roles, and stereotypical assumptions. Men, in particular young men, still tend to constitute the majority of combatants, and, consequently, remain the majority of those killed in battle (Carpenter 2005; Bjarnegård et al. 2015; Agerberg and Kreft 2020). As peacekeeping contributes effectively to peace by reducing lethal violence (Walter et al. 2021), this directly affects population safety and, primarily, the safety of “military-aged men” due to the distribution of labor during war (Olsson 2009; Hoeffler 2019; Kirschner and Miller 2019). According to Kirschner and Miller (2019), we also need to consider the broader effects of war on quality-of-life-related aspects of security. When doing so, the impact of war on women becomes more visible. This includes the impact of war on health infrastructure and on access to water and food (Agerberg and Kreft 2020). Notably, Plümper and Neumayer (2006) have found that armed conflict tends to result in the deaths of more women than men. Potential reasons for this can be the effects of war on maternal and infant health and malnutrition. The importance of considering women’s security in terms of maternal mortality has since been underlined in research that increasingly demonstrates that this is one of the most common forms of excess death in women during war (Urdal and Che 2015; Kotsadam and Østby 2019). With an increased focus on people-centered peacekeeping and on the UNSCR’s on WPS, such aspects of population safety are becoming more visible. A significant contribution to this development was made by Gizelis and Cao (2021), who build on the insights that ‘health facilities, schools, and roads are often destroyed during conflicts’ (Gizelis and Cao 2021, quoting Plümper and Neumayer 2006, p. 729). Taking these aspects into consideration, Gizelis and Cao argue that there exists a potential for a ‘peacekeeping dividend’ for women’s security stemming from regular peacekeeping tasks. As such tasks can reduce a broader set of risks in a society than those directly expressed in the mandate, peacekeeping operations contribute to ‘signal that fighting has subsided,’ which they argue ‘allows for improved infrastructure’ and ‘safer access to medical facilities and other services such as schools’ (Gizelis and Cao 2021, p. 2). Combining a difference–indifference analysis across 45 African countries with within-country variations in three of these countries, they find support for a greater reduction of maternal mortality and that women in areas with peacekeeping deployment had improved access to public services. That said, they argue, as these effects on women’s security do not form an explicit part of the measured effects of peacekeeping, the dividends are not preserved when an operation withdraws. There is therefore a need for coordination between the efforts of the peacekeeping operation and the rebuilding of state capacities to ensure long-term effects (Gizelis and Cao 2021). Similarly, Kim (2017) finds that UN operations tend to improve infant health in post-civil war situations. Both Kim (2017) and Gizelis et al. (2017), however, point to the challenge of international support where peacekeeping and international civil society contribute to filling the gaps in health care provisions without necessarily connecting this support to the host state’s efforts to rebuild its infrastructure. Thereby, there is a risk of increased insecurity when the peace operation and international presence withdraws. That said, Kim (2017) and Hoeffler (2019) note the fact that peace operations tend to bring with them resources for rebuilding, as an operation is often combined with international aid efforts, which can contribute to overcoming the gaps over time. On the more “negative-dividend” side, peacekeeping deployment can have unintended security effects for women in that they are associated with human trafficking and sexual exploitation and abuse. These issues have been increasingly discussed in research since the 1990s, spurred on by events during the operations in Cambodia and Kosovo (see Jennings

250  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations 2019 for a discussion and also Chapter 18 (Karim and Beardsley) in this Handbook). In addition, the observed increase in organized crime and homicide rates under large-scale military peacekeeping deployments can be expected to affect young men’s security negatively, as they tend to constitute the main target for such violence. The deployment of police components to handle the space opened for non-political violent actors during peacekeeping operations is central for reducing this risk, as well as risks stemming from the peacekeeping economy related to transactional sex (Di Salvatore 2019). In addition, the UN has strengthened its institutional response to sexual exploitation and abuse and adopted a specific Security Council resolution, UNSCR 2272, in 2016.

CONCLUSIONS This chapter has sought to contribute to, and nuance, the debate on peacekeeping protection and women’s security by highlighting how research proposes (a) the need to address a broader span of security concerns, and (b) that there is a need for context-specific data and analysis of women’s agency and security in specific operational environments to design effective localized protective measures. Research has also urged the reconsideration of approaches that risk treating women as one cohesive group, or sidelining efforts to address women’s security concerns as separate from mainstream peacekeeping efforts. For example, approaches that over-rely on either smaller specialized peacekeeping functions or units, or on individual women peacekeepers. Research particularly questions the latter approach, as women peacekeepers often face their own challenges, such as harassment or discrimination. Demanding that they should contribute to local women’s security is considered as placing an added burden on women peacekeepers while taking focus away from the substantial peacekeeping reforms needed to create a more equal peace (Karim and Beardsley 2017; Karim et al. 2020; Wilén 2020). To contribute to further progress, this chapter has identified several areas for future research. First, there is a need to clarify the role of peacekeeping in the intersection and tensions between the normative frameworks of protection of civilians and the UNSCR’s on WPS. For example, this can involve more carefully tracing and analyzing developments in WPS language in peacekeeping mandates and their connection to effects from peacekeeping protection measures (Olsson et al. 2021). Second, there is a need to more systematically probe the role of regular peacekeeping practices – such as patrolling, escorting, intelligence gathering, and support to strengthen codes of conduct and discipline – and the effects of specific peacekeeping measures or WPS undertakings – such as Women Protection Advisers, gender training, and specific tracks for monitoring and reporting – on women’s security. Various types of responses appear to have different strengths and weaknesses. In such analyses, effects need to be examined in relation to the broader span of security concerns for women that this chapter has outlined, and which relate to women’s agency, conflict-related sexual violence, and the impacts of war. Third, there is a need to further expand the use and analysis of sex-disaggregated data in peacekeeping research. Such an approach also makes it possible to answer Bardall et al.’s (2020) call to examine under what conditions and how violence should be thought of as gendered, and what such distinctions mean for improving peacekeeping practice. Fourth, and finally, an area of particular importance for future research is the need to examine the role of peacekeeping protection for women’s agency in a conflict resolution process more explicitly

Peacekeeping operations and women’s security  251 (Webster et al. 2019; Joshi and Olsson 2021). Notably, in the Action for Peacekeeping and in assessments taken to reform peacekeeping, the UN Secretary-General has called for a gender data revolution, in the sense that conflict assessments should use sex-disaggregated information, and that we will need to reconsider the effectiveness of existing practices to realize the UNSCR’s on WPS (UN Secretary-General 2020). As has been observed in this chapter, research concurs that there is room for improvement in peacekeeping approaches and strongly agrees with policy on an overarching conclusion: we need to better understand peacekeeping protection in the context of the broader dynamics of war and gender inequality.2

NOTES 1. To capture such dynamics, SVAC builds on the International Criminal Court’s definition, which understands conflict-related sexual violence to include a broad span of violence: from rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, and forced pregnancy, to forced sterilization/abortion. SVAC then also incorporates data on sexual mutilation and sexual torture, based on research results from Wood (2009) and others (for example, Cohen et al. 2019). 2. I would like to express a warm thank you to Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, Han Dorussen, Kristian Berg Harpviken, Angela Muvumba Sellström, Sabrina Karim, Gee Berry, and Nora Stai for their support and for comments and suggestions when developing this chapter.

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PART IV CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING PEACEKEEPING

18. Peacekeeping and the problem of sexual and gender-based violence Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley

INTRODUCTION Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and the related problem of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) are significant threats to peace and human security surrounding peacekeeping missions worldwide. This chapter considers the scope of the problem of CRSV in the context of armed violence, and how peace operations can play a best-case role in attenuating CRSV or a worst-case role in exacerbating SGBV as perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) in the communities the missions should be protecting. We also consider the various challenges of addressing SEA perpetration by peacekeeping personnel. Building on existing scholarship, this chapter provides two key innovations. First, it highlights how different types of personnel might affect levels of CRSV and SEA in different ways, bringing civilian peacekeepers into the discussion of CRSV and SEA. We show, contrary to expectations, that it is not solely the militarization of peace operations that is responsible for the perpetration of SEA among host populations. Second, due to the variation in SEA perpetration by civilian and uniformed personnel, we highlight the importance of using multiple approaches by which UN peace operations can mitigate problems of CRSV and SEA. In doing so, we suggest that solely focusing on increasing the participation of women in peace operations fails to recognize the sources of the SEA problem.

SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN ARMED CONFLICT The United Nations’ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) defines gender-based violence as ‘violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately.’1 This includes acts that inflict physical, mental, or sexual harm or suffering, the threat of such acts, coercion, and other deprivations of liberty. Usually, the term SGBV is only used when the perpetrator is the government or an organized armed actor such as a rebel or insurgent group. When peacekeepers perpetrate sexual or gender-based violence against the civilian population, it is referred to as sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). Despite SEA fitting within the definition of SGBV, it is rarely included as a part of the definition. In this chapter, we use SGBV to include both CRSV and SEA. In order to assess how peacekeepers help or exacerbate SGBV, we consider CRSV distinctly from SEA. For the former, peacekeepers take active roles to prevent armed actors from perpetrating sexual violence through civilian protection mandates. In the latter, peacekeepers are themselves potential perpetrators of sexual violence (or sexual abuse and exploitation). 256

Peacekeeping and the problem of sexual and gender-based violence  257 The problem of CRSV in armed conflict  The UN defines CRSV as referring to ‘rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage, trafficking in persons when committed in situations of conflict for the purpose of sexual violence/exploitation and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict.’2 Figure 18.1 presents data from the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) data (Cohen and Nordås 2014) and shows that between 10 percent and 25 percent of armed groups in conflict in any given year perpetrate sexual violence. Although wartime sexual violence is tragically common, it is not ubiquitous, as many other armed groups are not associated with allegations of CRSV (Wood 2006; 2009).

Source: Created by authors using data from Cohen and Nordås (2014).

Figure 18.1

Proportion of conflict actors reported as perpetrators of sexual violence

Since the early 2000s, UN peace operation mandates have reflected an increased attention to the protection of civilians, including CRSV. This is in recognition of the reality that during major episodes of armed violence and even after they have ended, civil wars leave behind broken state and local institutions that would otherwise be important for reducing vulnerabilities to sexual predation and exploitation. Armed actors, including agents of the state, too often have the means to commit violence against the civilian population. The motivations for the violence vary (Wood 2006). Cohen (2013; 2016) and Cohen and Nordås (2015) have shown that dynamics around rebel recruitment and socialization are important to explaining variation in CRSV. Sawyer et al. (2021) have found that rebel structures of leader accountability are important in shaping their potential to be involved in CRSV. Whitaker et al. (2019) connect rebel perpetration of CRSV to their dependence on natural resource extraction, and Nagel (2021) argues that when rebels perpetrate sexual violence in inactive periods it indicates an ongoing mobilization effort on the part of rebels. Kreft (2020) also points to CRSV as a mani-

258  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations festation of patriarchal norms. While the characteristics of armed groups explain the variation of CRSV, UN peacekeeping operations could play a role in mitigating its occurrence. Role of UN peace operations to reduce CRSV  That there is substantial variation in CRSV from conflict to conflict, hints at the potential for CRSV to be preventable. Scholars and advocates for peace have considered how UN peace operations can reduce rates of CRSV in conflict zones. Indeed, Benson and Gizelis (2020) find that higher rates of CRSV lead to a greater likelihood of the UN Security Council taking action. More generally, recent scholarship has considered under what conditions the presence of UN peacekeeping operations reduces rates of civilian victimization in conflict (Bove et al. 2020; Hultman et al. 2013; 2019). This research has shown that peacekeeping troops and police have the potential to protect civilians, primarily through mechanisms of information and physical protection. Specific to protecting civilians from CRSV, the practice of peacekeeping has paid increasing attention to this problem. UN Security Council Resolution 1888 (2009) – which builds on UN Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008)3 – specifically focused on the problem of CRSV and decided that all peacekeeping mandates should include language about how the peace operation can address the problem of CRSV, and it requested that the Secretary-General include in regular reports to the Security Council information on the progress of the peace operations in addressing CRSV. The resolution also created the position of the Special Representative to the Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC). The SRSG-SVC is responsible for providing coherent leadership in addressing CRSV across the UN agencies, and to engage in advocacy efforts among conflict parties and civil society. UNSC Resolution 1888 (2009) also highlights the important role that peace operations can have in reporting information about CRSV, so that adequate responses can be formulated. Toward the objectives laid out in the resolution, peace operations use the position of the Senior Women’s Protection Advisor (SWPA) to, inter alia, monitor issues related to CRSV and to prioritize CRSV in the mission planning process. The UN also partnered with the Norwegian government to develop a Handbook for United Nations Field Missions on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, which establishes best practices for UN peace operations to take a “do no harm” and “survivor-centered” approach to addressing issues related to CRSV.4 Female ratio balancing of peace operations has been considered as a means to the reduction of CRSV (Bridges and Horsfall 2009). For example, UNSC Resolution 1888 (2009) specifically recognized the potential for victims of CRSV to report the abuse to female peacekeepers. A number of studies, however, caution against expecting that an increase in the participation of women on peacekeeping missions will do much to reduce SGBV in host countries or SEA committed by peacekeepers (Carreiras 2010; Karim and Beardsley 2017; Pruitt 2013; 2016; Simić 2010). The women deployed on peace operations are likely to be socialized into masculine-dominant institutional norms of their security forces, they face stark limitations in their roles and their abilities to engage with local communities, and they are sometimes likely to be perceived as outsiders to the members of the local communities due to cultural and racial differences. As a result, female peacekeepers are not always well equipped or positioned to address problems related to CRSV (Karim 2017).5 Aside from increasing the participation of women in peace operations, peace operations can make additional adjustments to better address CRSV. These preventative mechanisms vary by the type of deployment – military, police, and civilian. For the military, the civilian protection mechanisms of physical protection undoubtedly help protect some civilians from rape (as

Peacekeeping and the problem of sexual and gender-based violence  259 well as from being killed) by separating them from armed actors. Troops are best equipped to separate civilians from armed actors by creating civilian protection zones. Second, the recent increase in the use of UN Police personnel in peace operations especially can strengthen the presence of security forces which can protect victims of CRSV, help engage in information gathering or help local criminal investigations about leaders who sanction CRSV, and they can train and build local law enforcement capacity to address CRSV in general. Furthermore, UN peacekeepers could help re-shape the post-conflict security apparatus to model gender-equal beliefs. For example, Huber and Karim (2018) have found that the presence of peacekeeping forces, usually police, increases the potential for a host country to adopt gender reforms to their security sectors. Finally, the civilian protection mechanism of information can help hold armed groups leaders accountable. If armed groups use rape as a means to socialize recruits, UN civilian, police, and military observers can play a role in recording information about the groups and leaders who engage in such activities. The naming and shaming of such actors may serve as a deterrent. “Gender-responsive peacebuilding”6 programming by civilians in peace operations and more intentional training and empowering of peacekeeping interactions with local populations – consistent with the priorities laid out in UNSC Resolution 1888 and the mandates of the SRSG-SVC and SWPAs – can help reshape peacekeeping forces to be more attuned to and better equipped to address CRSV (Karim and Beardsley 2017). Role of UN peace operations in SEA  Although the leadership of the UN envisions the potential for UN peace operations to have a positive effect in reducing CRSV in particular, Johansson and Hultman (2019) do not find much evidence that UN peace operations reduce rates of CRSV, even when they have protection mandates. The reality is also that in many cases the UN peacekeepers are part of the problem. We consider the potential for peacekeeping personnel to be perpetrators of SEA against civilians in the host country. Sexual abuse is defined as ‘the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions. All sexual activity with a child (under 18 years of age) is considered as sexual abuse,’ and sexual exploitation is defined as ‘any actual or attempted abuse of position of vulnerability, differential power or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. This includes acts such as transactional sex, solicitation of transactional sex, and exploitative relationships.’7 Instances of SEA are not only harmful as a source of trauma to the victims, but they also have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of peace operations (Grady 2010; Higate 2003) and reify norms of gender power imbalances at a time when social norms and institutions have an opportunity to be reconfigured around gender equality (Anderson 2016; Webster et al. 2019). Figure 18.2 reports SEA allegations by civilian populations against UN peacekeepers over time.8 These allegations originate from the victims, witnesses, and victims’ advocacy groups. They are almost certainly reflective of drastic underreporting because of the reluctance of victims of sexual violence to report their abuse (Traunmüller et al. 2019), such that the number of actual instances is considerably higher. One alarming finding seen in Figure 18.2 is the extent to which children are victims of alleged SEA perpetrated by peacekeepers. If the personnel with mandates to protect civilians are actually predating on the most vulnerable members of the population (children), then this should create pause in relying on peace operations to implement mandates of civilian protection. In addition to issues related to sexual abuse, transactional sex by peacekeepers is also a widespread problem.9 Beber et al. (2017), for example, found that over half of a represent-

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Source: Created by authors with SEA data from https://​conduct​.unmissions​.org/​sea​-data​-introduction (accessed February 21, 2022).

Figure 18.2

Number of SEA allegations by age of victim

ative sample of women in Monrovia between the ages of 18 and 30 engaged in transactional sex, with over three-quarters of those women reporting that the transactional sex was with a member of UNMIL, the peacekeeping force deployed to Liberia at the time. Despite the UN’s “zero-tolerance” policy for such relationships, these sobering results reflect that peacekeeping personnel do exploit vulnerable populations for sexual benefit. The ramifications of this type of behavior are enormous (Jennings 2010). Many of these relationships have led to the birth of children, the vast majority of whom will be raised without the involvement of their fathers – UNMIL has completed its mission, and, in general, peacekeeping personnel are invariably repatriated after their tours of service. Moreover, the expectation of an exchange of resources for sex with international peacekeepers among vulnerable populations can perpetuate dominant-subordinate relationships that are at the heart of gender power imbalances. Relatedly, Lee and Bartels (2020) explored the role of poverty in contributing to the potential for peacekeepers to father children among Haitian women. With the promise of needed money, peacekeepers are able to have sexual relations with local women, but the expatriation of the peacekeepers eventually contributes to further impoverishment of the women who are left behind (Lee and Bartels 2020).10 This dynamic also points to the potential for SEA to go unchecked and unreported, as local women depend on the continued deployment of the peacekeepers and are not willing to see the sources of needed income, and the fathers of their children, repatriated. Scholars have recently argued that mission personnel characteristics are important for explaining the variation in SEA.11 We address two types of personnel characteristics in particular: the type of personnel and the sex of the personnel. First, it is possible that personnel type – military, police, or civilian – affects the likelihood of engaging in SEA. Most of the scholarship on SEA has focused on the military and police as perpetrators (Karim and Beardsley

Peacekeeping and the problem of sexual and gender-based violence  261 2017) but doing so misses important dynamics of perpetration. Indeed, it is tempting to reduce the problem of SEA related to peace operations to a problem of militarized masculinity. The logic is that as male peacekeepers are socialized to be warriors but then placed into a context in which lethal force is considered a last resort, their frustrations might become manifest in heightened aggression and assertion of masculine dominance (Higate and Henry 2004). While this logic may explain some of the instances of peacekeeper misconduct, it misses the problem of SEA committed by civilian personnel.

Source: Created by authors using SEA data from https://​conduct​.unmissions​.org/​sea​-data​-introduction (accessed February 21, 2022); personnel data from https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​en/​data (accessed February 21, 2022).

Figure 18.3

Per capita SEA allegations by military, police, and civilian personnel

Figure 18.3 shows the per capita rates of SEA allegations across all peace operations, broken down by personnel type.12 While allegations against military personnel are more common than the other types – in 2021, there were 52 allegations against military personnel, 9 against police, and 14 against civilians – it is important to consider the allegations on a per capita basis.13 Across most years since 2016, SEA is a bigger problem for civilian personnel. Indeed, in all years for which we have data, there have been fewer per capita allegations made against military personnel than against civilian personnel. One explanation for the higher per-capita rates of SEA allegations against civilian personnel relates to the greater access that civilian personnel have to the host populations. The military personnel of peace operations are often confined to their bases, with little opportunity to socialize with members of the local population. In contrast, civilian personnel – and also police personnel, which have had a few years with higher per capita allegations of SEA – have much more frequent interactions with local members of society. They are not subject to the strict regulations of military and police personnel, who are often not allowed to leave the base. Moreover, they often have access to vehicles and live outside of compounds among the civilian population.

262  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Another explanation could relate to the role that hierarchical discipline and training in military and police forces has in instilling norms of appropriate conduct. While misconduct by military and police personnel is still troublesome, it is also possible that the military and police personnel have had more extensive training at home and in peacekeeping training centers than the civilian personnel. Because of the hierarchical structure of the military and police, it is also likely that military and police personnel would face steeper consequences for being found guilty of misconduct than civilian personnel, given that civilian personnel are likely less dependent on promotion in a hierarchical ladder for advancement in their careers. It is also important to note that women’s participation in civilian personnel is higher than their participation in military and police personnel. Currently, nearly 30 percent of all civilian personnel are women, while about 5 percent of troops and about 10 percent of formed police units are women. These comparisons raise the question of whether attempts to increase the participation of women in peace operations will do much to enhance the ability for peace operations to address CRSV or reduce the rates of SEA abuses against the local population. The sex of the personnel may have little to do with their ability to prevent CRSV and SEA. Indeed, in our previous work (Karim and Beardsley 2017), we argue that while greater women’s participation in peace operations is an important end in itself, it is not likely to move the needle much as a means toward the reduction of SEA. It is especially challenging for women’s participation to make much of a difference in addressing issues of CRSV in host countries when the women get sent to the safest missions (Karim and Beardsley 2013). Gender power imbalances go much deeper than simply an asymmetry in representation, which is a symptom that if corrected does not necessarily cure the underlying problems contributing to gender inequality. Gender power imbalances relate to not just the privileging of male bodies over female bodies, but also the privileging of masculinities and femininities that accord well with a male-dominant order. If women are recruited such that they have equal representation, they will still struggle to have their voices heard along with men, and they will be judged based on how well they demonstrate characteristics that are associated with militarized masculinity. In these ways, they will have to work harder to justify their equal participation and the legitimacy of their participation at each step of the way (Stiehm 1997; Wilén 2020). Moreover, female peace operations personnel are likely to be quite aware of the incentives to support the male-dominant institutional norms, which would make it challenging for them to hold their colleagues accountable for misconduct (Carreiras 2010; Heinecken 2015). The pressures on women to be team players are enormous, and it is likely to be a bridge too far to expect them to find it worthwhile to monitor and report on the misbehavior of their colleagues (Simić 2010). Focusing on issues of imbalance of women’s representation is not likely to produce extensive gains related to addressing CRSV or SEA. Indeed, the empirical evidence does not support the notion that greater women’s participation in armed groups reduces the extent to which those groups perpetrate CRSV (Loken 2017). It also makes little sense to focus on increasing the participation of women as a means to reducing CRSV or SEA as a matter of principle. Although women are perpetrators of CRSV (Cohen 2013; Sjoberg 2014), most perpetrators of CRSV and SEA are men. An argument that sees greater women’s participation as a key path to reducing CRSV and SEA because women will help police their male colleagues places an unfair expectation on the women. It is unfair to place the burden of fixing the problems of CRSV and SEA onto the shoulders of female personnel when most of the problem lies with the men on mission.

Peacekeeping and the problem of sexual and gender-based violence  263 By uncovering that the type of peacekeeper likely correlates with differential levels of SEA – civilians have the highest rate of perpetration per capita – we can also argue that the sex of the peacekeeper may not much affect levels of SEA. Indeed, the “adding women” to missions seems to do little to solve the SEA problem. Instead, we believe that a focus on other factors that affect civilian peacekeepers as much as they do military and peace personnel will do more to reduce an individual’s willingness to engage in SEA. We turn to these factors next.

ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES: MORE THAN PARTICIPATION If simply increasing the proportion of women deployed on peace operations – an objective that is simple in conception but not in execution – is not likely to move the needle much in attenuating SEA or CRSV, then what will move the needle? We focus on three objectives that could prove fruitful in reducing the abuse that civilian populations experience from civilian, military, and police peacekeepers.14 Focus on beliefs about gender equality among all personnel   Gender norms or beliefs about gender equality are important for preventing SEA. We have shown previously (Karim and Beardsley 2016) that the composition of personnel based on the gender norms in the contributing countries can explain some of the variation in allegations of SEA across peace operations. Missions with personnel from countries with poorer records regarding gender equality tend to be associated with higher rates of SEA allegations. We did not include civilian personnel in our analysis (due to a lack of data). Despite our exclusion, there is likely to be variation among civilian personnel in their beliefs about gender equality. Gender norms or beliefs about gender equality vary from country to country. Additionally, while it is possible that soldiers and police officers may hold more rigid views about gender equality than civilians, civilians, soldiers and police officers from the same country are likely to be more similar on the belief spectrum than soldiers from one country to another. For example, Peruvian civilians, police officers, and soldiers are more likely to share beliefs about gender equality than a Peruvian soldier and a Chinese soldier. This means that countries should include civilians in the same trainings and standards as police or soldiers. The connections between gender inequalities in contributing countries and SEA allegations suggest that gender equality reforms in contributing countries (including reforms for participating civilian personnel) could lead to the contributions of peace operations personnel which have been socialized to see SEA misconduct as inappropriate. This might lead to individual restraint of misconduct. Moreover, with a heightened socialization to recognize the problem of SEA, personnel on a mission will be able to better identify and report abuses by colleagues, thus enhancing accountability and incentives for personal restraint. Reforms could include ensuring that beliefs about gender equality are taken into consideration when choosing civilians, soldiers, and police personnel. It also means ensuring that systems of promotions incorporate gender equality into their evaluations. Personnel could also be tested for implicit biases, as well as for a more balanced set of skills that reflect not only the “harder,” masculine-dominated characteristics of missions (shooting, computer skills, and driving), but also feminine-associated traits such as listening, cooperation, and conflict resolutions skills. While wholesale reforms in the overall norms surrounding gender power imbalances in contributing countries do not constitute a feasible policy lever, however desirable, there are some feasible reforms that could be done in contributing countries, to ensure that they send

264  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations personnel who understand the severity and inappropriateness of SEA. Reforms to the recruitment and training of civilians, soldiers, and police officers who are deployed could ensure that personnel who are sent to peace operations have had the concerns for SEA drilled into them from early in their professional experiences. Moreover, more rigorous screening by contributing countries and the UN to prioritize personnel who are assessed on the basis of their prior training and current understanding of the importance of SEA could help to reduce the unequal norms surrounding SEA among peace operations personnel. Better accountability  Ever since the media started to report on SEA scandals,15 the UN has slowly developed mechanisms to hold soldiers and police officers accountable for their misconduct. This “Zero Tolerance Policy” includes creating a conduct and discipline unit, making data on SEA transparent, naming and shaming countries, and mandating extensive training on SEA and gender equality. While the UN has made great strides in holding states accountable, most of the efforts are directed at police and military personnel. Policies should not only be targeted at the military and police personnel, but at civilians too. The current means of holding perpetrators of misconduct to account relies too heavily on the contributing countries (Kanetake 2010), and there is no standard policy for civilians. While the socialization and training in UN missions is an important part of reducing SEA (Moncrief 2017), the UN has little ability to self-police the personnel on its missions, and little recourse for confirmed misconduct. When allegations of SEA perpetrated by uniformed personnel (military or police) are reported to the UN missions, it is the sole responsibility of the contributing country’s contingent to investigate and discipline any offenses. While the contributing country’s investigative teams may work with UN teams, they do not have to. Once allegations have been substantiated, it remains the responsibility of the contributing countries to discipline their personnel, although the UN does have the ability to repatriate and ban offending individuals. It is rare for contributing countries to pursue criminal trials against personnel for violating their own state’s laws around SEA offenses. For example, when France investigated members of its contingent to the Central African Republic for allegations that they were responsible for sexual abuse of children from 2013 to 2014, the members were acquitted in part because the trial was conducted in France with major challenges in being able to hear from witnesses where the alleged crimes occurred.16 The disciplinary process is less clear with civilians, as there is no clear chain of command to monitor and sanction their actions. The UN agencies are responsible for the discipline of civilian personnel, but again the possible discipline only includes reprimands, dismissal, or financial penalties. Criminal misconduct is again referred to the individual’s national jurisdiction. In reality, there is minimal information about civilians who violate UN policies. To address the weak accountability, a rethinking of national jurisdiction should be considered. Yet there is an important tradeoff here, in which the UN depends on the willingness of contributing countries to send adequate numbers of troops, police, and civilians. Attempts to subject their personnel to the legal jurisdiction of another country will likely reduce the willingness of states to contribute their personnel. The reluctance to recognize the jurisdiction of external judicial bodies can be seen in the fact that few of the top contributing countries are parties to the Rome Statute, which is the foundation of the International Criminal Court – for example, India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Rwanda are not parties to the treaty. One path forward then would be for the top contributing countries to negotiate standard procedures for due process and accountability, including incarceration, in cases in which there are allegations of criminal conduct by their personnel. If such an agreement were possible, host

Peacekeeping and the problem of sexual and gender-based violence  265 countries could decide whether to allow peace operations personnel to be included on missions if the sending countries have not ratified an agreement or otherwise reached a separate Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the host country regarding how criminal conduct would be investigated and prosecuted. Another means to enhance the willingness of contributing countries to self-police could be to increase the extent to which perpetrators of SEA are named and shamed, and the extent to which states with strong accountability are named and praised. In a different context but informative to this point, Loken et al. (2018) find that some governments may pursue accountability for wartime CRSV when doing so would enhance their political legitimacy. To the degree that the UN’s messaging can speak to international and domestic audiences about whether a country’s personnel operate with impunity, this could increase the incentives of the contributing countries to investigate and prosecute individual perpetrators of SEA on mission. Gender-responsive peacebuilding in times of upheaval  The above reforms pertain to the problem of SEA perpetrated by UN peace operations, and there are also potential reforms to peace operations that could have implications for a reduction in CRSV – sexual violence related to conflict but that does not involve UN personnel. Existing work has shown that in the aftermath of war, there are opportunities for gains to be made in women’s equality (Tripp 2015; Webster et al. 2019; Yadav 2021). Kreft (2019) has also shown that CRSV during civil war is especially related to women’s political mobilization. As societies are shaken, social roles are reconsidered, regimes are toppled, laws are rewritten, and constitutions are constructed, there are opportunities to strengthen protections for gender equality. The periods during which wars are resolved provide a “window of opportunity” for important gains (Anderson 2016), even if there are challenges to maintaining those gains in the long run (Berry 2018; Webster et al. 2019). There is already evidence that gender-responsive peacebuilding can lead to reforms related to gender inequality in host countries. Peksen (2011) has also shown that multilateral interventions can help improve women’s rights. To the extent that peace operations can encourage and enable host countries to pursue reforms that reduce gender power imbalances, continued efforts by peace operations could lead to reductions in CRSV. Peace operations can play an important role in taking advantage of those windows of opportunity while also securing the gains into the medium term. As part of the multidimensional mandates that peace operations have, gender equality has the potential to infuse the reconstruction of the political, legal, and security institutions of the host country (Basini 2013; Gizelis and Pierre 2013; Nduka-Agwu 2009; Olsson 2000). Civilian peacekeepers help implement programming on women’s inclusion and women’s rights, and programs to mitigate harm to women in the aftermath of war. These efforts place emphases on women’s participation, as the reform efforts can enhance the ability for gains in women’s participation to affect wholesale changes in institutional structures insofar as how they produce and reproduce gender power imbalances. Bell (2013) and Ellerby (2013) highlight the importance of women’s involvement in peace processes that could have tremendous societal implications. Police peacekeepers help training the local police forces to be more sensitive when it comes to gender (Karim et al. 2018), both by including women in the police force, as well as gender divisions meant to minimize harassment within the police force, and by creating units to address CRSV (Huber and Karim 2018). Peacekeeping soldiers help monitor and enforce peace agreements that increasingly have provisions about preventing CRSV. Moreover, Pruitt (2012) makes the case for the UN-sponsored Women’s Police Service (UNWPS) to help catalyze important gains in reducing CRSV in host countries.

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CONCLUSION We have shown how peacekeepers both help and exacerbate SGBV. On the one hand, they have the tools and resources to help mitigate CRSV, but on the other hand, they are often perpetrators of SEA. In our discussion, we showed the importance of including civilian peacekeepers in the analysis, as they help host governments develop programming around preventing CRSV, but also are more prone to being perpetrators of SEA, compared to deployed police and soldiers. This discovery shifts the focus away from militarized masculinity and away from women’s inclusion in peace operations, to one of gender equality, accountability, and gender-responsive peacebuilding among not only police and military personnel, but civilian personnel as well. Moving forward, we suggest a research agenda on peacekeeping that includes civilian personnel. Do civilians hold the same beliefs about gender equality as military and police personnel? How are they held accountable for misconduct? And, what role do civilian peacekeepers play in preventing CRSV? A comprehensive, and robust research agenda that focuses on integrating civilian peacekeepers alongside military and police peacekeepers will not only shed light on how peacekeeping affects the causes and consequences of SGBV, but it will also highlight how UN peacekeeping can secure peace more broadly.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

See UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2017, p. 2). This definition comes from UN Security Council (2021, p. 3). See also UN Security Council Resolution 1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013). See Norway in the UN (2020). See also Chapter 5 (Bove et al.) and Chapter 17 (Olsson) in this Handbook. See Shepherd (2017, pp. 72–87) for a discussion of how ‘gender-responsive peacebuilding,’ rather than ‘gender mainstreaming,’ has more potential to cultivate a bottom-up transformative approach to peacebuilding. 7. See United Nations (2022). 8. See Nordås and Rustad (2013) for an analysis of why some missions have more SEA than others. 9. The UN counts transactional sex as exploitation under its Zero Tolerance Policy. See UN Secretariat (2003, p. 2). 10. See also Chapter 22 (Dorussen and de Vooght) in this Handbook. 11. See special issue by Olsson et al. (2020). 12. The personnel data come from the November Peacekeeping Fact Sheets, except for 2016, when only the December Fact Sheet is available. See https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​en/​data. 13. Military personnel include troops, military observers, and staff officers. Civilian personnel include international and local civilians. 14. See Westendorf and Searle (2017) for additional discussion about ways to address the underlying roots of SEA. 15. Also depicted in popular culture; see, for example, the movie The Whistleblower (2010, dir. Larysa Kondracki). 16. See https://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2017/​01/​06/​world/​africa/​french​-peacekeepers​-un​-sexual​-abuse​-case​ -central​-african​-republic​.html.

Peacekeeping and the problem of sexual and gender-based violence  267

REFERENCES Anderson, Miriam J. (2016), Windows of Opportunity: How Women Seize Peace Negotiations for Political Change, New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Basini, Helen S. A. (2013), ‘Gender mainstreaming unraveled: the case of DDRR in Liberia’, International Interactions, 39 (4), 535–57. Beber, Bernd, Michael J. Gilligan, Jenny Guardado, and Sabrina Karim (2017), ‘Peacekeeping, compliance with international norms, and transactional sex in Monrovia, Liberia’, International Organization, 71 (1), 1–30. Bell, Christine (2013), Women and Peace Processes, Negotiations, and Agreements: Operational Opportunities and Challenges, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, Policy Brief, accessed 16 February 2022 at https://​noref​.no/​Publications/​Themes/​Gender​-and​-inclusivity/​Women​-and​-peace​ -processes​-negotiations​-and​-agreements​-operational​-opportunities​-and​-challenges. Benson, Michelle and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2020), ‘A gendered imperative: does sexual violence attract UN attention in civil wars?’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 64 (1), 167–98. Berry, Marie (2018), Women, War, and Power: From Violence to Mobilization in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Bove, Vincenzo, Chiara Ruffa, and Andrea Ruggeri (2020), Composing Peace: Mission Composition in UN Peacekeeping, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Bridges, Donna and Debbie Horsfall (2009), ‘Increasing operational effectiveness in UN peacekeeping: toward a gender-balanced force’, Armed Forces & Society, 36 (1), 120–30. Carreiras, Helena (2010), ‘Gendered culture in peacekeeping operations’, International Peacekeeping, 17 (4), 471–85. Cohen, Dara Kay (2013), ‘Explaining rape during civil war: cross-national evidence (1980–2009)’, American Political Science Review, 107 (3), 461–77. Cohen, Dara Kay (2016), Rape During Civil War, Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press. Cohen, Dara Kay and Ragnhild Nordås (2014), ‘Sexual violence in armed conflict: introducing the SVAC dataset, 1989–2009’, Journal of Peace Research, 51 (3), 418–28. Cohen, Dara Kay and Ragnhild Nordås (2015), ‘Do states delegate shameful violence to militias? Patterns of sexual violence in recent armed conflicts’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59 (5), 877–98. Cohn, Carol (ed.) (2013), Women and Wars, Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA, USA: Polity Press. Ellerby, Kara (2013), ‘(En)gendered security? The complexities of women’s inclusion in peace processes’, International Interactions, 39 (4), 435–60. Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene and Nana Afua Pierre (2013), ‘Gender equality and postconflict reconstruction: what do we need to know in order to make gender mainstreaming work?’, International Interactions, 39 (4), 601–11. Grady, Kate (2010), ‘Sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers: a threat to impartiality’, International Peacekeeping, 17 (2), 215–28. Heinecken, Lindy (2015), ‘Are women “really” making a unique contribution to peacekeeping? The rhetoric and the reality’, Journal of International Peacekeeping, 19 (3–4), 227–48. Higate, Paul (2003), Gender and Peacekeeping, ISS Monograph 91, Institute for Security Studies, accessed 17 February 2022 https://​issafrica​.org/​research/​monographs/​monograph​-91​-gender​-and​ -peacekeeping​-paul​-higate. Higate, Paul and Marsha Henry (2004), ‘Engendering (in)security in peace support operations’, Security Dialogue, 35 (4), 481–98. Huber, Laura and Sabrina Karim (2018), ‘The internationalization of security sector gender reforms in post-conflict countries’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 35 (3), 263–79. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2013), ‘United Nations peacekeeping and civilian protection in civil war’, American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 875–91. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2019), Peacekeeping in the Midst of War, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA, Oxford University Press. Jennings, Kathleen M. (2010), ‘Unintended consequences of intimacy: political economies of peacekeeping and sex tourism’, International Peacekeeping, 17 (2), 229–43. Johansson, Karin and Lisa Hultman (2019), ‘UN peacekeeping and protection from sexual violence’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (7), 1656–81.

268  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Kanetake, Machiko (2010), ‘Whose zero tolerance counts? Reassessing a zero tolerance policy against sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers’, International Peacekeeping, 17 (2), 200–214. Karim, Sabrina (2017), ‘Reevaluating peacekeeping effectiveness: does gender neutrality inhibit progress?’, International Interactions, 43 (5), 822–47. Karim, Sabrina and Kyle Beardsley (2013), ‘Female peacekeepers and gender balancing: token gestures or informed policymaking?’, International Interactions, 39 (4), 461–88. Karim, Sabrina and Kyle Beardsley (2016), ‘Explaining sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions: the role of female peacekeepers and gender equality in contributing countries’, Journal of Peace Research, 53 (1), 100–115. Karim, Sabrina and Kyle Beardsley (2017), Equal Opportunity Peacekeeping: Women, Peace, and Security in Post-Conflict States, New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Karim, Sabrina, Michael J. Gilligan, Robert Blair, and Kyle Beardsley (2018), ‘International gender balancing reforms in pos-conflict countries: lab-in-the-field evidence from the Liberian national police’, International Studies Quarterly, 62 (3), 618–31. Kreft, Anne-Kathrin (2019), ‘Responding to sexual violence: women’s mobilization in war’, Journal of Peace Research, 56 (2), 220–33. Kreft, Anne-Kathrin (2020), ‘Civil society perspectives on sexual violence in conflict: patriarchy and war strategy in Colombia’, International Affairs, 96 (2), 457–78. Lee, Sabine and Susan Bartels (2020), ‘“They put a few coins in your hand to drop a baby in you”: a study of peacekeeper-fathered children in Haiti’, International Peacekeeping, 27 (2), 177–209. Loken, Meredith (2017), ‘Rethinking rape: the role of women in wartime violence’, Security Studies, 26 (1), 60–92. Loken, Meredith, Milli Lake, and Kate Cronin-Furman (2018), ‘Deploying justice: strategic accountability for wartime sexual violence’, International Studies Quarterly, 62 (4), 751–64. Moncrief, Stephen (2017), ‘Military socialization, disciplinary culture, and sexual violence in UN peacekeeping operations’, Journal of Peace Research, 54 (5), 715–30. Nagel, Robert U. (2021), ‘Conflict-related sexual violence and the re-escalation of lethal violence’, International Studies Quarterly, 65 (1), 56–68. Nduka-Agwu, Adibeli (2009), ‘“Doing gender” after the war: dealing with gender mainstreaming and sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peace support operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone’, Civil Wars, 11 (2), 179–99. Nordås, Ragnhild and Siri C. A. Rustad (2013), ‘Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers: understanding variation’, International Interactions, 39 (4), 511–34. Norway in the UN (2020), Handbook for United Nations Field Missions on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, accessed 9 March 2022 at https://​www​.norway​.no/​en/​missions/​ UN/​statements/​other​-statements/​2020/​launch​-crsv​-handbook/​. Olsson, Louise (2000), ‘Mainstreaming gender in multidimensional peacekeeping: a field perspective’, International Peacekeeping, 7 (3), 1–16. Olsson, Louise, Angela Muvumba Sellström, Stephen Moncrief, Elisabeth Jean Wood, Karin Johansson, Walter Lotze, Chiara Ruffa, Amelia Hoover Green, Ann Kristin Sjöberg, and Roudabeh Kishi (2020), ‘Peacekeeping prevention: strengthening efforts to preempt conflict-related sexual violence’, International Peacekeeping, 27 (4), 517–85. Peksen, Dursun (2011), ‘Foreign military intervention and women’s rights’, Journal of Peace Research, 48 (4), 455–68. Pruitt, Lesley (2012), ‘Looking back, moving forward: international approaches to addressing conflict-related sexual violence’, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, 33 (4), 299–321. Pruitt, Lesley J. (2013), ‘All-female police contingents: feminism and the discourse of armed protection’, International Peacekeeping, 20 (1), 67–79. Pruitt, Lesley J. (2016), The Women in Blue Helmets: Gender, Policing, and the UN’s First All-Female Peacekeeping Unit, Oakland, CA, USA: University of California Press. Sawyer, Katherine, Kanisha D. Bond, and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham (2021), ‘Rebel leader ascension and wartime sexual violence’, The Journal of Politics, 83 (1), 396–400. Shepherd, Laura J. (2017), Gender, UN Peacebuilding, and the Politics of Space: Locating Legitimacy, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Peacekeeping and the problem of sexual and gender-based violence  269 Simić, Olivera (2010), ‘Does the presence of women really matter? Towards combating male sexual violence in peacekeeping operations’, International Peacekeeping, 17 (2), 188–99. Sjoberg, Laura (2014), Gender, War, and Conflict, Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA, USA: Polity Press. Stiehm, Judith Hicks (1997), ‘Peacekeeping and peace research: men and women’s work’, Women & Politics, 18 (1), 27–51. Traunmüller, Richard, Sara Kijewski, and Markus Freitag (2019), ‘The silent victims of sexual violence during war: evidence from a list experiment in Sri Lanka’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (9), 2015–42. Tripp, Aili Mari (2015), Women and Power in Post-conflict Africa, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2017), ‘General recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19’, CEDAW/C/GC/35, accessed 9 March 2022 at https://​documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​GEN/​ N17/​231/​54/​PDF/​N1723154​.pdf​?OpenElement. UN Secretariat (2003), ‘Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse’, ST/SGB/2003/13, 9 October, accessed 9 March 2022 at https://​ documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​GEN/​N03/​550/​40/​PDF/​N0355040​.pdf​?OpenElement. UN Security Council (2021), ‘Report of the Secretary-General: Conflict-Related Sexual Violence’, S/2021/312, 30 March, accessed 9 March 2022 at https://​documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​ GEN/​N21/​069/​02/​PDF/​N2106902​.pdf​?OpenElement. United Nations (2020), Handbook for United Nations Field Missions on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, accessed 25 October 2022 at https://​peacemaker​.un​.org/​sites/​ peacemaker​.un​.org/​files/​United​%20Nations​_CRSV​%20Handbook​.pdf. United Nations (2022), ‘Conduct in UN field missions glossary’, accessed 9 March 2022 at https://​ conduct​.unmissions​.org/​glossary. Webster, Kaitlyn, Chong Chen, and Kyle Beardsley (2019), ‘Conflict, peace, and the evolution of women’s empowerment’, International Organization, 73 (2), 255–89. Westendorf, Jasmine-Kim and Louise Searle (2017), ‘Sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations: trends, policy responses and future directions’, International Affairs, 93 (2), 365–97. Whitaker, Beth Elise, James Igoe Walsh, and Justin Conrad (2019), ‘Natural resource exploitation and sexual violence by rebel groups’, Journal of Politics, 81 (2), 702–6. Wilén, Nina (2020), ‘Female peacekeepers’ added burden’, International Affairs, 96 (6), 1585–602. Wood, Elisabeth Jean (2006), ‘Variation in sexual violence during war’, Politics & Society, 34 (3), 307–42. Wood, Elisabeth Jean (2009), ‘Armed Groups and sexual violence: when is wartime rape rare?’, Politics & Society, 37 (1), 131–61. Yadav, Punam (2021), ‘Can women benefit from war? Women’s agency in conflict and post-conflict societies’, Journal of Peace Research, 58 (3), 449–61.

19. The material impact of peace operations on the environment and cultural heritage Mathilde Leloup and Lucile Maertens

INTRODUCTION United Nations peace operations can have both positive and negative, intended as well as unintended, impacts on their deployment area (Aoi et al. 2007). Aside from mandate implementation, their physical presence on the ground may benefit the host country by improving access to safe water and sanitation for instance (Bakaki and Böhmelt 2021). Yet it may also (inadvertently) contribute to environmental degradation and damage to cultural heritage sites. This phenomenon recently became more important with the rise of new multidimensional peace operations. Their large contingents increase the risk of aggravating their environmental and cultural impact. However, they may also attempt to reduce their own footprint through specialized and dedicated units since their mandates encompass a broad range of issues, including environmental and cultural heritage protection. In 2009, the United Nations Departments of Peace Operations (DPO) and of Operational Support (DOS)1 adopted the Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions, in a context of growing concerns regarding the consequences of peacekeeping activities on the environment. This policy addresses the ecological footprint of UN peace operations and the need for their staff to manage ‘water, energy, solid and hazardous wastes, wastewater, wildlife and the management of cultural and historical sites’ (UNEP 2012, p. 8). Four years later, the UN Security Council adopted the first resolution referring to the protection of the environment within the mandate of a mission, creating the first (and only) mission with a mandated task on cultural heritage protection. Through Resolution 2100, it requested the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to ‘assist the transitional authorities of Mali, as necessary and feasible, in protecting from attack the cultural and historical sites in Mali, in collaboration with UNESCO’ (UN Security Council 2013, p. 8). In paragraph 32, it asked ‘the Secretary-General to consider the environmental impacts of the operations of MINUSMA when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context, encourages MINUSMA to manage them […] and to operate mindfully in the vicinity of cultural and historical sites’ (UN Security Council 2013, p. 11). On the ground, the unit Environment and Culture carried out both tasks under the authority of the Director of Mission Support (DMS) in the civilian component of MINUSMA. Despite apparent concerns about peace operations’ footprint on the ground, the institutionalization of environmental and cultural heritage protection may appear surprising at a time of growing skepticism about the multiplication of tasks within UN multidimensional integrated missions’ mandates, even called “Christmas tree” mandates by UN staff (Andersen and Egedal 2013, p. 27; Oksamytna and Lundgren 2021). The aim of this chapter is two-fold: first, it assesses the scope of UN peace missions’ material impact; second, based on our own research, it suggests different ways to study such impact while contributing to a better understanding of institutional practices and power dynamics within UN peace operations. To do so, it proposes 270

Impact of peace operations on the environment and cultural heritage  271 to jointly explore the protection of the environment and of cultural heritage as two items included in the same UN policies yet addressing different types of practices and challenges. The first section reviews the rather scarce academic work on the UN peacekeeping’s material impact and analyzes UN publications and think tanks’ reports providing concrete information on the footprint of peacekeepers. The second section draws on international relations literature, mostly institutionalist approaches and critical security studies. Both sections also build on data generated through ethnographic fieldwork,2 respectively carried out in 2013 and 2016 in the DPO/DOS Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET) as part of our PhD dissertations,3 interviews conducted with UN staff in headquarters and field missions, and qualitative content analysis of gray literature.

DEFINING AND ASSESSING THE MATERIAL IMPACT OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS There is no agreed term to capture the multiple concrete consequences of the UN peacekeeping presence on the ground. Echoing the growing interest in materiality in international relations, we refer to the “material impact” to address the tangible consequences of peacekeeping on the material world surrounding their deployment, usually known as their economic, environmental, and cultural “footprint.” In contrast, the “immaterial impact” relates to the broader social impact of UN peace missions. Material and immaterial impacts are often entangled especially when, for instance, the economic consequences of the UN peacekeepers’ presence generate social exclusion (Lemay-Hébert 2018). While punctually mentioning such intricacy, we mainly concentrate in this chapter on the concrete consequences of UN peacekeepers on the environment, including the use of natural resources, waste management, and energy consumption, and on cultural heritage, including sites and artifacts. In this section, we first address the scope of the UN peace missions’ material impact providing key information on the peacekeepers’ ecological and cultural footprint. We then discuss how the material impact connects to broader issues of legitimacy and efficiency before retracing the decisions and policies implemented to reduce the material impact. Delimiting and measuring the peacekeepers’ material impact  While the material impact of the UN peace missions has been mostly measured by the UN itself, the ecological footprint of UN peacekeeping has captured the attention of practitioners and think tank experts assessing unintended consequences of peacekeeping on the environment (Liljedahl and Waleij 2014; Liljedahl et al. n.d.; UNEP 2012). In 2007, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon enjoined UN entities to “go green” launching what would become the Greening the Blue project.4 This initiative committed UN bodies to move toward climate neutrality and to estimate their environmental impact, first reporting their greenhouse gas emissions, and more recently providing data on their waste production and water consumption. UN peace operations participate in this initiative acknowledging the large scope of their environmental impact. The page on ‘Environmental Risk and Performance Management’ on the UN Peacekeeping website indicates that peacekeeping deployment requires ‘a large amount of logistical support’ emitting greenhouse gases, potentially causing soil pollution, generating ‘a lot of solid waste (hazardous and non-hazardous)’ and wastewater: ‘These waste products, if not handled correctly, can negatively impact the host country’s

272  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations environment.’5 Data for the year 2019 are reported in the 2020 annual report Greening the Blue (UNEP 2020) and summarized in Table 19.1.6 In 2019, UN peace operations’ greenhouse gas emissions accounted for 41 percent of the total emissions of the UN system (UNEP 2020, p. 9), with 48 percent related to the missions’ facilities and 39 percent to air travel. Meeting the commitment taken by heads of the UN organizations in 2015 to be climate neutral by 2020, these emissions are offset (UNEP 2020). When it comes to waste, UN peace missions produced more waste per capita (632 kg/person/ annum) than the average waste generated by the UN system (457 kg/person/annum). Stressing that peace operations’ waste generation ‘includes living quarters’ the report indicates that the average waste would be 227 kg/person if peace operations were excluded (UNEP 2020, p. 11). The water consumption of the UN peace operations represents more than a third of the overall UN system consumption of 13 160 890 m3, with only 45 percent of the water recycled (UNEP 2020). UN peace operations are often criticized for their use of resources. For example, the ‘UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and humanitarian actors dramatically increased demand for water and wood in the region, leading to deforestation, which became “a source of tension with local communities”’ (Maertens and Shoshan 2018, p. 8). Such data show that the overall environmental footprint of UN peace operations is significant, especially in comparison with that of the local populations. For instance, a 2018 study states that ‘the average Malian generates 237.3 kilograms of waste per year, while a UN peacekeeper produces 677 kilograms’ (Maertens and Shoshan 2018, p. 6). While the UN intends to develop new indicators to capture the impact of its entities on biodiversity (UNEP 2020, p. 17), not all the dimensions of the material impact can be quantified. Part of the “Wider impact” pillar of the Department of Operational Support (UN DOS) Environment Strategy for Field Missions that came into effect in January 2017, the cultural impact pertains to the aim of leaving a ‘long-term positive legacy’ based on the following approach: ‘A more responsible presence will involve better forward planning, through the development of appropriate methodologies to assess environmental impact on natural and cultural resources that are tailored to the context of peace operations’ (UN DOS 2019a, p. 3). The cultural footprint therefore encompasses the impact of UN peace operations’ staff on tangible property, be they movable like the ‘products of archaeological excavations,’ ‘antiquities,’ ‘objects of ethnological interest’ (UNESCO 1970), or immovable encompassing the ‘monuments, groups of buildings and sites’ (UNESCO 1972), but also on intangible property, such as ‘practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills’ (UNESCO 2003). As in the case of the environment, cultural heritage can be positively and negatively, intentionally or unintentionally impacted by UN peace operations. Yet, the impact of peacekeepers on cultural sites has not yet been the subject of a systematic and quantified study and the information below could only be found through participant observation and archives. In the past, UN Blue Helmets have been guilty of intentional acts of vandalism or illicit trafficking. In 1974 for instance, members of UNFICYP in Cyprus contributed to the illicit trafficking of cultural objects (UNESCO 1974). In 2008, peacekeepers from the UN mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO) made graffiti with their initials on Paleolithic caves in Lajuad, dating back to 6000 bc (Merrill 2011, p. 63). Yet, during the conflicts in Cyprus and in Kosovo, UNFICYP (deployed in 1964) and UNMIK (launched in 1999) – KFOR staff also carried out the physical protection of cultural and religious sites, respectively the Halan Sultan Tekke Mosque in Cyprus and the Decani Monastery in Kosovo.7 At that time, both sites were directly ‘connected to the issue the warring parties [were] fighting over’ as “conflict goals” (Brosché

Source: https://​www​.greeningtheblue​.org/​reports/​greening​-blue​-report​-2020.

212 838

5 667 001

17

12

(%)

(%)

Recycled water, m3

3

open

Incinerated -

closed

Incinerated -

39

4

% of water recycled

0

(%)

Landfilled

13

Other travel

Air travel

8.0

Share of total emissions (%)

(tCO2eq/personnel)

Water use, m3

Water use and management

632

annum)

Waste per capita (kg/person/

Reused/recycled/composted/recovered (%)

831 189

104 540

Waste production and management

Total emissions (tCO2eq)

Number of personnel

Per capita emissions

Material impact of UN peacekeeping missions, 2019

Greenhouse gas emissions

Table 19.1

Facilities

67

(%)

disposal

Controlled

48

1

Other (%)

Impact of peace operations on the environment and cultural heritage  273

274  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations et al. 2017, p. 248) – the warring parties in this case were Turks and Greeks in Cyprus and Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. In this situation, ‘attacking such symbolic property can serve to destroy the enemies’ “thread of continuity” (Stanley-Price 2007) by harming their sense of belonging to a certain area, with the expectation that if the opponents’ affiliation decreases it may be easier to attain control over it’ (Brosché et al. 2017, p. 252). By protecting these sites, UNFICYP and UNMIK–KFOR staff countered the belligerent strategy of erasing each other’s history. The destruction of mausoleums and manuscripts in Timbuktu where the UN mission (MINUSMA) was later deployed, can be considered as ‘signalling attacks’ (Brosché et al. 2017, p. 248). Indeed, the terrorist group Ansar Dine prioritized targeting World Heritage sites, because of their highly symbolic value: ‘there are reasons to suspect that cultural property may be particularly at risk of being used for signalling in irregular conflicts. […] the symbolic nature of what is considered cultural heritage makes it a target that is likely to warrant a lot of attention’ (Brosché et al. 2017, p. 254). As a response, the UN Security Council mandated MINUSMA staff to ‘protect […] from attack the cultural and historical sites in Mali’ (UN Security Council 2013, p. 8). Eventually, the Environment and Culture civilian unit of MINUSMA was not charged with physically protecting these sites (as in Cyprus and Kosovo) but with contributing to their reconstruction and with training MINUSMA staff to respect them, in accordance with the UN Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions. The delimitation and measurement of peacekeepers’ material impact is therefore determined by the data available in the literature produced by the UN itself or by think tanks and academia. Yet, another way to evaluate the material impact is also to consider its consequences on the UN legitimacy and efficiency of the missions. Legitimacy and efficiency at stake  Major scandals faced by the UN since the early 2010s have to do with the impact of its peacekeepers on the ground. In the field of the environment, the role of MINUSTAH in the outbreak of the cholera pandemic in Haiti in 2010 as a result of poor wastewater management – despite the 2009 environmental policy setting guidelines to avoid such disaster – has led to local protests (UNEP 2012, p. 8) as well as legal action to compel the UN to acknowledge its responsibility and offer compensation (Freedman and Lemay-Hébert 2020; UN General Assembly 2016). While the epidemic has been directly linked to the deployment of Nepalese peacekeepers who were trained in Kathmandu at the time of a cholera outbreak right before their arrival (UN General Assembly 2016), we argue that the whole UN peacekeeping system is to blame for the disaster. The mismanagement of wastewater in the Mirebalais camp illustrates the non-application of the environmental policy adopted in UN Headquarters, the lack of funding to ensure the implementation of its own environmental and “do no harm” policies and the poor oversight mechanisms to verify their implementations. In this case, the material impact of UN peace operations affected UN reputation and legitimacy justifying the policies and guidelines set up to address the environmental and cultural footprint of peacekeepers. These broader effects have been documented by the literature focusing on the consequences of UN peacekeeping on the host communities and the work assessing the missions’ efficiency. When it comes to the cultural impact of peacekeeping operations, scholars have described a “cultural clash” between both military and civilians and between the different nationalities that encompass the peacekeeping operations’ contingents (Greene et al. 2010; Rubinstein 2008). This literature emphasizes the need to raise awareness of peacekeeping mission staff to cultural traditions to avoid causing misperception and resistance of local populations. Rubinstein, for instance, recalls the example of the first UN operations in the field, the United Nations

Impact of peace operations on the environment and cultural heritage  275 Emergency Force (UNEF) that fired on a minaret because its soldiers interpreted the muezzin call as an appeal to civil disorder (2008). Likewise, Pouligny (2006) stresses the cultural indifference of some peacekeepers towards local populations’ culture in Somalia, Cambodia and Bosnia and the ensuing problems.8 The policy-oriented literature dedicated to the environmental footprint of armed forces (Waleij 2022), and more precisely of peace operations (Liljedahl and Waleij 2014; Maertens and Shoshan 2018; UNEP 2012; Waleij et al. 2016), emphasizes two dimensions: Environmental degradation can fuel local grief and environmental mismanagement can lead to ecological and human disasters while the use of scarce natural resources can contribute to tensions between the missions and the host country. In both cases, the mission’s legitimacy is at stake, potentially affecting its ability to achieve its mandate. Taking environmental and cultural issues into account can be a way for the UN to restore its legitimacy and, in this way, to ensure the security of its staff on the ground. In the case of MINUSMA, for instance, Leloup (2019, p. 412) showed that the civilian unit “Environment and Culture” implemented quick impact projects (QIPs) with UN staff aiming to “win hearts and minds” of the local population. In the environmental field, QIPs allowed the evacuation of waste in Kidal, the repair of the bin lorry for household waste collection in the urban commune of Timbuktu, the construction of a water supply system in Koni-Gogouna (Mopti), the improvement of the sanitary and environmental conditions of the detention center for women in Bollé, the construction of latrines at the Ecole Fondamentale and of a borehole, a water tank and a storage facility in Ntomikorobougou (Bamako) (MINUSMA 2014–15). In the cultural field, MINUSMA implemented the rehabilitation of four private libraries (UN Secretary-General 2014, p. 10), the delimitation of the archaeological site of Saneye to protect it against pillaging (UN Secretary-General 2015, p. 12) and the re-equipment of the Songhoy Star Orchestra in Gao (MINUSMA 2016, p. 16). It also contributed to the revitalization of local crafts in the Timbuktu region, through training and equipping artisans in dyeing and tanning. In turn, these projects contributed to the acceptance of the military component on the ground and to its broader ‘stabilization mandate’ (Leloup 2019, p. 410). The impact of the deployment of UN missions on their material and cultural environment has significant consequences for their legitimacy and effectiveness, and therefore justifies measures to reduce peacekeepers’ environmental and cultural footprint. Reducing the UN footprint  Environmental and weather conditions have always affected military strategy; yet ecological concerns mainly grew during the Vietnam War with the widespread use of chemicals impacting both ecosystems and human health. In recent years, the number of casualties occurring during the transportation and delivery of fuel has further motivated military staff to find alternative energy sources. Cultural heritage has also long been intimately linked to military action with a long history of cultural heritage destruction and armed conflicts from Antiquity to the Second World War (Viejo-Rose and Sørensen 2015, p. 282). Yet armed forces only began to consider protecting cultural property during conflicts in the 1980s (Schipper et al. 2010). While in the 1990s archaeologists produced no-strike lists to avoid damaging cultural sites during operations in Iraq and Kuwait, many acts of illicit trafficking, pillaging, and intentional destruction have, however, still been occurring (Green 2010, p. 109). Despite the fact that the use of natural and cultural resources has long been intrinsically linked to armed conflicts, this only began to produce issues of concern for the UN in the 2000s. After a series of interventions on wastewater and the drafting of guidelines and environmental standards in headquarters, DPO and DOS adopted the Environmental Policy for UN Field

276  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Missions in 2009. The policy (an internal document) focuses on a wide range of issues including ‘water, energy, solid and hazardous wastes, wastewater, wildlife and the management of cultural and historical sites’ (UNEP 2012, p. 8). Together with the Environmental Guidelines for UN Field Missions (Ravier et al. 2016, p. 198), it requests each UN peace operation to establish its own environmental policy through an environmental baseline study, an environmental action plan, and an emergency preparedness plan. In 2012, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) released the report Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources and UN Peacekeeping Operations, based on a two-year project with the support of DPO and DOS looking at different peacekeeping missions – MINUSTAH (Haiti), MONUSCO (DRC), UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire), UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNMIL (Liberia), UNAMID (Darfur), and UNMISS (South Sudan) – to gather best practices and lessons learned to reduce the environmental footprint of future peacekeeping operations (UNEP 2012). As part of the “best practices,” the report mentions the use of soil blocks to reduce deforestation pressures in Darfur (UNAMID) and South Sudan (UNMISS); the launch of environmental training for peacekeeping staff in DRC (MONUSCO); water infrastructure improvements in Liberia (UNMIL); investment in renewable energy in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), waste management in Darfur (UNMIS) and recycling in Haiti (MINUSTAH); the launch of a comprehensive management plan (including energy, waste management, protection of cultural sites) in Lebanon (UNIFIL); and also the prevention of environmental crime in DRC (MONUSCO) (UNEP 2012, pp. 20–39). In this latter case, the MONUSCO Force Commander and Environmental unit recommended to mission staff to ‘avoid or minimize using firewood in all mission locations’ as part of the mission’s Environmental Guidelines (UNEP 2012, p. 37). In collaboration with Interpol, MONUSCO staff also opposed the gorilla smuggling by airlifting them to sanctuary (UNEP 2012, p. 37). In the field of cultural heritage protection, the only “lesson learned” gathered by this report is the case of UNIFIL in Lebanon, which also carried out this task as part of the UN Environmental Policy. Firstly, the Environmental Guidelines for UNIFIL adopted in 2010 recommend that UN Blue Helmets take historical and cultural sites on their deployment areas into account. The Environmental Pocket Guide for UNIFIL Contingents, distributed to UN Blue Helmets before their deployment, addresses protection of cultural resources as well as environmental protection. The guide stipulates: ‘respect and do not damage burial, historical, archaeological sites and religious sites’ and ‘be aware that the respect of local traditions is very important in rural areas of the country’ (UNIFIL–EMU (Environmental Management Unit) 2010, p. 3). This pocket guide uses the same categories as the 2009 Environmental Policy but adapts it to the theater of operation. Secondly, the mission also undertook the protection of the Naqoura cemetery located in its security perimeter by ensuring its maintenance, as well as the continuation of visits by families (UNEP 2012, pp. 38–9). A few years later, in 2015, the report of the Independent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) introduced the concepts of “responsible presence” and “community engagement,” in the global perspective of a more “people-centered peacebuilding.” “Responsible presence” consists in two kinds of tasks: carrying out environmental impact assessments to ensure compliance with the Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions as well as with the United Nations’ broader efforts to mitigate climate change, on the one hand, and local procurements, on the other hand, to ‘strengthen both the economy and national capacities by sourcing their goods and services requirements locally to the extent possible’ (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2015, pp. 77–8). “Community engagement”

Impact of peace operations on the environment and cultural heritage  277 for its part, can be understood as a shift from ‘merely consulting with local people to actively including them in their work,’ in order ‘to monitor and respond to how local people experience the impact of peace operations’ (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2015, pp. 66–7). These two concepts aim to reduce the material impact of UN peace operations and to transform their negative impact into a positive one. The same year, DOS adopted a Waste Management Policy for UN Field Missions and one year later, a team was created within the Office of the Under-Secretary-General at the head of DOS dedicated to the environment (Maertens 2019, p. 312). Since 2017, a lesson on “Environment and Natural Resources” has been included in Module 3.5 of the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials, available in the UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub (Lesson 3.5, p. 12),9 which mentions the ‘vandalism of ancient cave paintings’ by MINURSO as a ‘case to avoid.’ The ‘Rehabilitation of Timbuktu Library’ by MINUSMA for its part, is regarded as a ‘case to promote’ (see also, Lesson 3.5, p. 12). In November 2016, DOS launched its environmental strategy aspiring to implement the following vision by June 2023: ‘responsible missions that achieve maximum efficiency in their use of natural resources and operate at a minimum risk to people, societies and ecosystems; contributing to a positive impact on these whenever possible’ (UN DOS 2019a, p. 1). It suggests a timetable and performance indicators for five pillars: energy, water and wastewater, solid waste, wider impact, and environmental management system. As mentioned earlier, the protection of cultural heritage is included in the wider impact pillar through the promotion of ‘do-no-harm provisions in relation to wildlife, littering, cultural heritage and other areas’ (UN DOS 2019a, p. 3). The Environment Strategy (internal document) is considered to be ‘a living document, updated as progress is made and approaches evolve’ (UN DOS 2019a, p. 1); in other words, it approaches the reduction of the UN footprint as a learning process to be improved gradually. In its 2019 executive summary, DOS continues asserting that there is ‘a long way to go’ (UN DOS 2019a, p. 1) despite monitoring progress so far (UN DOS 2019b) and disseminating “good practices” (see UN DFS 2017; UN DOS 2018; UN DOS 2020). Member states are increasingly vocal in their support of these initiatives: the Security Council issued a press statement in December 2017 underscoring ‘the importance that peacekeeping operations endeavor to minimize their impact on the sustainability of the ecosystems where they are deployed, based on sound consideration of the risks, benefits and costs’ (UN Security Council 2017b), and a Group of Friends Leading on Environmental Management in the Field, co-chaired by Bangladesh and Italy, was established in 2018 (Maertens and Shoshan 2018, pp. 7–8). All these online-available documents provide an overview of the currently accessible data assessing the missions’ material impact and the programs set up to reduce such footprint.

LEARNING FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE MATERIAL IMPACT OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS Deepening the comparison between the ecological and cultural footprint of UN peace operations, this section shows what we can learn about peacekeeping from such analysis. Indeed, the issue of material impact can help us draw broader conclusions by exposing power dynamics within the UN system and around the construction of security problems relevant to peacekeepers and by shedding light on institutional processes which illustrate dynamics of mission creep and bureaucratization.

278  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Power dynamics around the construction of new peacekeeping issues Building on critical security studies, we first explore the social construction of the environment and cultural heritage as security issues through a process of securitization; then we show how the material impact of peacekeepers highlights the uneven share of responsibilities between member states as well as the power relations within the system of peace operations. To become part of the peacekeeping agenda, the environment and cultural heritage have both been labeled as security issues, or securitized (Buzan et al. 1998). In her work on the integration of environmental concerns in the mandates of UN peace operations, Maertens (2019) highlights the different securitizing moves within the UN which establish natural resources as a cause of conflicts and climate change as a threat multiplier, justifying peacekeepers’ involvement in environmental matters. Furthermore, she shows that the securitization of the environment within the UN cannot be fully understood without paying attention to a parallel process of environmentalization of security which ‘establishes security activities as part of environmental norms and policies’ (Maertens 2019, pp. 307–8). In other words, she demonstrates that the focus on the ecological footprint of peacekeepers contributes to a broader process of securitization of the environment. This appears clearly in the work of UNEP which used the less political subject of the ecological footprint of the missions to advance the more controversial agenda on natural resources and conflicts (Maertens 2018; 2019). The protection of cultural heritage by the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) from 2013 to 2017 also results from a process of securitization. After the destruction of the World Heritage sites of Timbuktu in Mali in 2012 by the terrorist group Ansar Dine, UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova transformed the issue of cultural heritage protection into a ‘security and humanitarian imperative’ (Bokova 2015, p. 3, translation by Mathilde Leloup). In 2015, as a reaction to the destruction of World Heritage sites in Iraq (Hatra) and Syria (Palmyra) by ISIS, she strengthened her advocacy efforts by qualifying the terrorist groups’ strategy of “cultural cleansing.” This notion, coined by Robert Bevan, creates a link between the destruction of cultural heritage and the persecution of local populations (Bevan 2016, p. 53). Drawing on this notion in her speeches as well as in the infographics of the campaign Unite4Heritage, Bokova and her communication advisers performed a double securitization process, both textually and visually (Hansen 2011) reinforcing the legitimacy of attributing cultural heritage protection mandate to ongoing and future peace operations.10 In both cases, protection of the environment and of cultural heritage has been constructed as a relevant peacekeeping issue. However, our work also shows that these processes have diluted the political character of these topics through their integration into the mandates of peace operations. Cultural heritage, according to Critical Heritage studies, is the result of a political “heritage-ization” process, which ‘identifies those things and places that can be given meaning and value as “heritage”’ (Smith 2006, p. 3). From this perspective, the protection of cultural heritage by MINUSMA as part of the UN Environmental Policy reduces cultural resources to a logistical (and apolitical) issue, managed by DOS rather than as a strategic (and political) issue, managed by DPO. The institutionalization of the peacekeepers’ role in protecting cultural heritage can therefore be considered as negating the “heritage-ization” process, and therefore, the political nature of heritage (Leloup 2021, pp. 93–101). Yet by denying the political nature of heritage, peacekeeping actors might be less prone to pay attention to what Rosén named the “dark side” of cultural heritage protection. According to him ‘the more we talk about cultural heritage and its value and the importance of protecting it, the more interesting it becomes for some groups to target it’ (Rosén 2020, p. 495). In other words, considering the

Impact of peace operations on the environment and cultural heritage  279 protection of cultural heritage as a support activity does not erase its essential political dimension. In the case of the environment, the “environmentalization” of peacekeeping through the adoption of environmental policies also tends to depoliticize environmental matters, reducing them to technical issues to be dealt with “best practices” based on “lessons learned” (Louis and Maertens 2021; Maertens 2018). Pragmatically addressing the protection of the environment and of cultural heritage may also avoid debating over the priority given to these over the protection of populations in the mandate on UN peacekeeping operations. Indeed, the focus on the logistical dimension of the peacekeepers’ action in favor of cultural sites and the environment sidesteps the debate over the usefulness of protecting these, potentially at the expense of the protection of civilians.11 While such an approach also helps bypass the reluctance of member states like Russia opposed to the adoption of ‘environmental standards for contingent-owned equipment, especially under the UN material reimbursement system and the procurement principles for selecting vendors’ (Maertens 2020, p. 166), it inadvertently denies power dynamics around the definition of environmental problems. Finally, the study of the peacekeepers’ protection of cultural heritage and of the environment reveals the power relations between member states within the UN system. For instance, the integration of cultural heritage in the mandate of MINUSMA through Resolution 2100, triggered debates between member states behind the official session of the UN Security Council. France, the penholder of the Resolution as for all resolutions dealing with Western Africa, defended the integration of subparagraph (f) of Article 16 of the resolution dealing with ‘support to cultural preservation’ with the other members of the ‘permanent 3’ (P3, the USA and UK). The reason for France to support this new mandated task was mainly historical, as it presents itself as a country having a specific role in defending culture (Leloup 2020, p. 104). France, the USA and UK rapidly encountered the opposition of Russia (Leloup 2020, p. 99). Russia did not oppose the incorporation of cultural heritage as a new task for MINUSMA in itself, but as the symbol of the robustness and multiplication of tasks in the mandate of new multidimensional peace operations. Subparagraph (f) was finally agreed upon because of careful wording proposed by France, which establishes the role of MINUSMA as a ‘support’ to UNESCO (Leloup 2020, p. 103). In 2017 however, because of a lack of support, this new task disappeared completely, having been regarded since 2014 as an “additional task” less important than other “priority tasks” like the protection of civilians (UN Security Council 2014). Article 32 of Resolution 2100, which affirms the necessity for MINUSMA staff to take both environmental and cultural issues into account as part of the environmental footprint of the mission, was drafted by a member of DOS (UN Security Council 2013, p. 11). The construction of environmental and cultural impacts of UN peace operations as security problems logically paved the way for their institutionalization, embodying the two tendencies of path dependency and mission creep proper to the integration of new issues in the UN agenda. Institutionalizing new peacekeeping activities  The protection of environmental and cultural resources also illustrates the growing institutionalization of new peacekeeping activities. Unpacking this process helps understand the evolution of UN peacekeeping more broadly, the role of member states and the UN bureaucracy in the trajectories of both issues in the UN agenda, and finally the process of translation by UN mission officials in charge of implementing UN resolutions and policies on the ground. Building on historical institutionalism, the analysis of the growing attention to the material impact of peacekeepers reveals a form of path dependency in the broadening of peacekeeping

280  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations mandate and layering strategy progressively adding more and more activities (Hanrieder 2015). This is the case in the adoption of Resolution 2100 that launched MINUSMA in Mali and which can be interpreted as a result of a broadening of Article 39 (Chapter VII) of the UN Charter. Indeed, subparagraph (f) (Article 16) of Resolution 2100 gave the protection of cultural heritage the same importance as the ‘stabilization of key populations centres,’ the ‘implementation of the transitional map,’ the ‘protection of civilians,’ the ‘promotion and protection of human rights’, and the ‘support for humanitarian assistance’ (UN Security Council 2013, pp. 7–9). As with these “traditional” tasks, ‘support for cultural preservation’ was placed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which entails a possibility for MINUSMA’s Blue Helmets to use force in order to implement them. In this resolution, however, the protection of the environment has not been acknowledged as an obligation under Chapter VII, but as a request from the UN Security General to ‘consider the environmental impact of the operations of MINUSMA […] and to operate mindfully in the vicinity of cultural and historical sites’ (UN Security Council 2013, p. 11). Despite these differences, Resolution 2100 followed the growing trend to expand peacekeeping missions adding new activities for peacekeepers by a process of layering and building on previous decisions. The management of environmental and cultural resources as part of the UN peace operations’ footprint also shows the significant influence of various actors in the establishment of a new task: member states within the UN Security Council, bureaucracy within the UN Secretariat, and individual actors involved in UN peace operations on the ground. Building on scholarship on international organizations, our case studies show the tension between the tendency of international organizations to ‘exhibit mission creep’ wandering ‘to new terrains and territories’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 2) and the residual functionalist separation between technical and political matters (Mitrany 1948) at the scale of both the multilateral system and UN peace operations. Firstly, the institutionalization of environmental and cultural heritage protection implies coordinating action between the missions and the UN bodies in charge of these topics. According to the functionalist division of labor, environmental and cultural heritage protection are often considered as technical tasks respectively managed by a specialized agency (UNESCO) and a program (UNEP). After the adoption of the Resolution 2100, both tasks were acknowledged as being political and managed by the UN Security Council and Secretariat. Therefore, it changed the relationship between the UN and UNESCO/UNEP and contributed to repositioning these two international organizations within the ‘hierarchy of multilateralism’ (Leloup 2021, p. 507). Secondly, comparing the institutionalization of the protection of the environment and that of cultural heritage sheds light on the way new issues are categorized as either part of the substantive or support mandate of peacekeepers and how the affiliation to one category can evolve in practice. During our participant observations within DPO/DOS,12 we discovered that the issues of the environment and cultural heritage revealed a division of labor between the two departments: DPO deals with “substantive” issues while DOS manages “support” issues. In this division of tasks, UN staff play a key role in categorizing items as “high politics” or “low politics” depending on the availability of human and financial resources but also on their anticipation of the best way for this task to contribute to the success of the mission. Both environmental and cultural heritage protection can be regarded as “high politics” issues, since they can be the causes and targets of conflicts and therefore be considered as strategic by the UN mission. They can also be seen as “low politics” issues or logistical matters to be taken into account by UN mission staff. For them, the environment and cultural heritage therefore illus-

Impact of peace operations on the environment and cultural heritage  281 trate ‘the tension between low politics, with few stakes and often related to technical aspects and regulations, and high politics, with policies considered as being of the utmost importance’ (Maertens 2019, pp. 319–20). In Resolution 2100, cultural heritage appears as a “substantive” issue, as subparagraph (f) of Article 16 on “support for cultural preservation” is placed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and as a “support issue” in Article 32. The environment is, however, only considered as a “support issue” in Article 32 dealing with the environmental impacts of the MINUSMA’s actions. This article, while reaffirming the need for protecting the environment and cultural and historical sites, also provides a way for the military component overburdened with tasks to delegate it to the Environment and Culture unit in the civilian part of the mission. To become integrated within the mandate of UN peace operations, new issues like cultural and environmental protection are thus frequently reduced to their logistical (and low-politics) dimension, at the expense of their strategic (and high-politics) dimensions. When studying the institutionalization of new tasks for peacekeepers, scholars should therefore pay attention to the categorization as support or substantive mandate and the subsequent consequences for the issue at stake. The case of the peacekeepers’ material footprint also highlights the role of individuals connecting to the literature on international practices (Autesserre 2014). While individuals in headquarters play a key role in setting guidelines, policies, and standards – such as the DOS environmental officer in the late 2000s/early 2010s who facilitated the adoption of the environmental policy (Maertens 2020, p. 311) and the drafting of MINUSMA’s mandate (Leloup 2020, p. 106) – in the field, the reduction of the environmental and cultural footprint of UN peace operations is mainly initiated by the environmental officers, often in the context of QIPs. For instance, the Environment and Culture unit of MINUSMA in Mali, encompassing an environmental officer and a UN volunteer specialized in Culture, was in charge of ‘the training of all civil, military and police personnel to raise their awareness of Malian cultural heritage,’ the ‘support to the programme coordinated by UNESCO and the Ministry of Culture to rehabilitate the damaged heritage sites in the North of Mali’, and the ‘support for the resumption of cultural events in the northern regions of Mali, contributing to the transmission of intangible heritage and social cohesion’ (MINUSMA n.d.a). This unit was also charged with controlling the compounds and the installations of the mission in terms of ‘water, electricity supply and waste management,’ ensuring the use of renewable energy to reduce their dependence on fuel, training the UN staff on environmental management in Bamako, Douentza, Gao, Kidal, Mopti, and Timbuktu, and conducting environmental visits to check the management of ‘solid and dangerous waste, energy, water, wastewater, flora and fauna, as well as the protection of historical and cultural sites’ (MINUSMA n.d.b). In 2018, ten UN missions dedicated a unit to environmental issues: the “Environment and Occupational Health and Safety” in MINUSCA (CAR), and UNSOS (Somalia); “Environment” in MINUJUSTH (Haiti), MINUSMA (Mali), UNISFA (Abyei), and UNMIL (Liberia); “Environmental Compliance” in UNAMID (Darfur) and UNMISS (South Sudan); “Environmental Protection” in MONUSCO (DRC); and “Environmental Management” in UNIFIL (Lebanon) (Maertens and Shoshan 2018, p. 13). Several other missions also implemented projects aiming ‘at environmental improvement, ranging from tree planting to awareness raising to clean-up events involving staff’ (UN DFS 2017, p. 1). Future research should further explore the concrete practices through which UN peacekeepers intend to reduce their material impact, contributing to the literature addressing the discrepancy between peacekeeping norms and their application (Laurence 2019).

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CONCLUSION In conclusion of this chapter, we would like to highlight one contribution, one challenge, and one avenue for research. This chapter makes an original contribution to the peacekeeping literature by drawing attention to the (often neglected) issue of the material impact of UN peace missions and by building on the comparison between the protection of the environment and of cultural heritage to unpack broader institutional processes and reveal transversal power dynamics within the UN system. Yet, one major challenge in studying this topic concerns the data available to assess the environmental and cultural footprint of peacekeepers. Data so far have been almost exclusively gathered by the UN itself. Consequently, not only do scholars face obstacles in producing data without relying on the UN’s own inventory in terms of access and resources, but an independent analysis would also require an interdisciplinary team able to count CO2 emissions, as well as identify significant cultural sites and work in collaboration with the UN. Such endeavor would also need to reflect on the different measurable and non-measurable indicators relevant to produce independent data assessing the environmental and cultural footprint of peacekeepers. Calling for more empirical work jointly addressing the support side of missions and the substantive mandate of peacekeepers, we see the rising concerns about climate change and peacekeeping as an important avenue for research. Indeed, not only do we already observe similar processes as the ones analyzed in this chapter in terms of agenda-setting in tension between low and high politics, but climate change is also increasingly debated at the UN Security Council as a major concern for international security and has the potential to change the nature of peacekeepers’ interventions.

NOTES 1. At the time, Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and of Field Support (DFS). 2. As intern and volunteer, we wrote two recommendation reports: an Executive Senior Management Team Paper (ESMTP) dealing with ‘Environment, natural resources and peacekeeping’ in 2013 and a desk review on ‘responsible presence’ in 2016. 3. While this chapter proposes an original comparison, part of the results of each study can be found in different publications (Leloup 2019; 2020; 2021; Maertens 2019; 2020; Maertens and Shoshan 2018). 4. See https://​www​.greeningtheblue​.org/​history​-greening​-un. 5. See https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​en/​environmental​-risk​-and​-performance​-management. 6. Data for the year 2020 are available in the report published in 2021. They are, however, less representative of the usual material footprint of the UN since the Covid-19 pandemic slowed down much of its activities. 7. This physical protection was carried out by the military component of UNFICYP and by the Italian contingents of the KFOR, considered as the “sword arm” of UNMIK in Kosovo. 8. On the local perception of PKOs, also see also Chapter 22 (Dorussen and de Vooght) and Chapter 23 (Khadka and Phayal) in this Handbook. 9. See UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub, accessed 26 March 2022 at http://​research​.un​.org/​ revisedcptm2017; specifically, Lesson 3.5 ‘Environment and Natural Resources’, accessed 26 March 2022 at http://​dag​.un​.org/​bitstream/​handle/​11176/​400596/​FINAL​%20Lesson​%203​.5​ %20SA100517​.pdf​?sequence​=​85​&​isAllowed​=​y. 10. See, for example, UN S/RES/2347 (UN Security Council 2017a). 11. For an overview of the debate regarding the priority given to the protection of civilians and to the protection of cultural heritage, see Leloup (2021). 12. Participant observation by Lucile Maertens within DPKO and DFS – Policy, Evaluation

Impact of peace operations on the environment and cultural heritage  283

and Training Division, Unit Policy Planning, New York, 17 October 2012–1 February 2013, and participant observation by Mathilde Leloup within DPKO and DFS – Civil Affairs, Unit Policy Planning, New York, 1 February–30 April 2016.

REFERENCES Andersen, Luise Riis and Peter Emil Egedal (2013), ‘Blue Helmets and Grey Zones: Do UN Multidimensional Peace Operations Work?’, DIIS Report 2013:29, accessed 21 February 2022 at https://​www​.diis​.dk/​files/​media/​publications/​import/​extra/​rp2013​-29​_lan​_blue​-helmets​_web​.pdf. Aoi, Chiyuki, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Chandra Thakur (eds) (2007), Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations University, accessed 21 February 2022 at https://​ digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​601874​?ln​=​en. Autesserre, Séverine (2014), Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Bakaki, Zorzeta and Tobias Böhmelt (2021), ‘Can UN peacekeeping promote environmental quality?’, International Studies Quarterly, 65 (4), 881–90. Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004), Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press. Bevan, Robert (2016), The Destruction of Memory: Architecture at War, Second Expanded Edition, London, UK: Reaktion Books. Bokova, Irina (2015), ‘Address by Irina Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO, on the occasion of the opening of the 39th Session of the World Heritage Committee’, Bonn, 28 June. Brosché, Johan, Mattias Legnér, Joakim Kreutz, and Akram Ijla (2017), ‘Heritage under attack: motives for targeting cultural property during armed conflict’, International Journal of Heritage Studies, 23 (3), 248–60. Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998), Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO, USA: Lynne Rienner. Freedman, Rosa and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert (2020), ‘The Security Council in practice: Haiti, cholera and the elected members of the Security Council’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 33 (1), 157–76. Green, Paul (2010), ‘Cultural resources data for heritage protection in contingency operations’, in Laurie Rush (ed.), Archaeology, Cultural Property, and the Military, Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, pp. 108–16. Greene, Talya, Joshua Buckman, Christopher Dandeker, and Neil Greenberg (2010), ‘The impact of culture clash on deployed troops’, Military Medicine, 175 (12), 958–63. Hanrieder, Tine (2015), International Organization in Time: Fragmentation and Reform, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Hansen, Lene (2011), ‘Theorizing the image for security studies: visual securitization and the Muhammad cartoon crisis’, European Journal of International Relations, 17 (1), 51–74. Laurence, Marion (2019), ‘An “impartial” force? Normative ambiguity and practice change in UN peace operations’, International Peacekeeping, 26 (3), 256–80. Leloup, Mathilde (2019), ‘Heritage protection as stabilization: the emergence of a new “mandated task” for UN peace operations’, International Peacekeeping, 26 (4), 408–30. Leloup, Mathilde (2020), ‘Négocier l’élargissement de la sécurité à l’ONU, le patrimoine culturel dans les opérations de maintien de la paix’, Négociations, 34, 95–109. Leloup, Mathilde (2021), Défendre l’humanité en protégeant son patrimoine. Un nouveau mandat pour les opérations de paix onusiennes, Paris, France: Dalloz. Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas (2018), ‘Living in the yellow zone: the political geography of intervention in Haiti’, Political Geography, 67, 88–99. Liljedahl, Birgitta and Annica Waleij (2014), ‘Assessing the cumulative environmental footprint in crisis and conflict situations’, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), FOI Memo 4895 (on file with authors). Liljedahl, Birgitta, Annica Waleij, Åsa Scott Andersson, Russ Doran, Bhatta, Moha, and Svante Olsson (n.d.), ‘Environmental impact assessment in peacekeeping missions: challenges and opportuni-

284  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations ties’, accessed 23 July 2021 at https://​community​.apan​.org/​cfs​-file/​_​_key/​docpreview​-s/​00​-00​-00​-06​ -49/​424​_2D00​_Liljedahl​_2D00​_Environmental​_2D00​_Impact​_2D00​_Assessment​_2D00​_in​_2D00​ _peace​.pdf. Louis, Marieke and Lucile Maertens (2021), Why International Organizations Hate Politics: Depoliticizing the World, London, UK: Routledge. Maertens, Lucile (2018), ‘Depoliticisation as a securitising move: the case of the United Nations Environmental Programme’, European Journal of International Security, 3 (3), 344–63. Maertens, Lucile (2019), ‘From blue to green? Environmentalization and securitization in UN peacekeeping practices’, International Peacekeeping, 26 (3), 302–26. Maertens, Lucile (2020), ‘Critical security studies’, in Kseniya Oksamytna and John Karlsrud (eds), United Nations Peace Operations and International Relations Theory, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, pp. 149–75. Maertens, Lucile and Malkit Shoshan (2018), Greening Peacekeeping: The Environmental Impact of UN Peace Operations, IPI, Providing for Peacekeeping no. 17, April, accessed 22 February 2022 at https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2018/​04/​1804​_Greening​-Peacekeeping​.pdf. Merrill, Samuel Oliver Crichton (2011), ‘Graffiti at heritage places: vandalism as cultural significance of conservation sacrilege’, Time and Mind: The Journal of Archaeology, Consciousness and Culture, 4 (1), 59–75. MINUSMA (n.d.a), ‘Cultural heritage’, accessed 26 March 2022 at https://​minusma​.unmissions​.org/​en/​ cultural​-heritage. MINUSMA (n.d.b), ‘Environment’, accessed 26 March 2022 at http://​minusma​.unmissions​.org/​en/​ environment. MINUSMA (2014–15), ‘Completed QIPs overview’, stabilization & recovery, accessed 26 March 2022 at https://​minusma​.unmissions​.org/​en/​file/​4669/​download​?token​=​Em0ed​-​_B. MINUSMA (2016), ‘S’unir pour la paix, S’unir pour l’avenir’, MINUSMA 2 ANS Edition spéciale, accessed 21 July 2021 at https://​minusma​.unmissions​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​minusma​_2ans​_lr​_1​.pdf. Mitrany, David (1948), ‘The functional approach to world organization’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–), 24 (3), 350–63. Oksamytna, Kseniya and Magnus Lundgren (2021), ‘Decorating the “Christmas tree”: the UN Security Council and the Secretariat’s recommendations on peacekeeping operations’, Global Governance, 27 (2), 226–50. Pouligny, Béatrice (2006), Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People, London, UK: Kumarian Press. Ravier, Sophie, Anne-Cécile Vialle, Russ Doran, and John Stokes, J. (2016), ‘Environmental experiences and developments in United Nations peacekeeping operations’, in Carl Bruch, Carroll Muffett, and Sandra S. Nichols (eds), Governance, Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, pp. 195–206. Rosén, Frederik (2020), ‘The dark side of cultural heritage protection’, International Journal of Cultural Property, 27 (4), 495–510. Rubinstein, Robert A. (2008), Peacekeeping under Fire: Culture and Intervention, Boulder, CO, USA: Paradigm Publishers. Schipper, Friedrich, Franz Schuller, Karl von Habsburg-Lothringen, Holger Eichberger, Erich Frank, and Norbert Furstenhofer (2010), ‘Cultural property protection in the event of armed conflict – Austrian experiences’, in Laurie Rush (ed.), Archaeology, Cultural Property and the Military, Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, pp. 145–57. Smith, Laurajane (2006), Uses of Heritage, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Stanley-Price, Nicholas (2007), ‘The Thread of Continuity: Cultural Heritage in Post-war Recovery’, in Nicholas Stanley-Price (ed.), Culture Heritage in Post-war Recovery. Papers from the ICCROM Forum held on October 4–6, 2005, Rome, Italy: ICCROM, pp. 1–16. UN DFS (2017), ‘Environmental good practice’, accessed 22 February 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​ .org/​sites/​default/​files/​171117​_environmental​_strategy​_good​_practices​.pdf. UN DOS (2018), ‘DOS environment strategy for field missions’, accessed 22 February 2022 at https://​ operationalsupport​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​190228​_dos​_environment​_strategy​_execsumv4​.pdf. UN DOS (2019a), ‘Environment strategy for field missions’, accessed 22 February 2022 at https://​ peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​6​.​_environment​_​-​_1​_dos​_environment​_strategy​.pdf.

Impact of peace operations on the environment and cultural heritage  285 UN DOS (2019b), ‘Progress so far. 2019 environment strategy for field missions’, accessed 22 February 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​6​.​_environment​_​-​_2​_progress​_so​_far​.pdf. UN DOS (2020), ‘Environmental good practice: implementation of the DOS environment strategy for field missions’, accessed 22 February 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​2020​ _good​_practice​_2020​_implementation​_of​_the​_environment​_strategy​_for​_field​_missions​.pdf. UN General Assembly (2016), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights’, A/71/367, https://​documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​GEN/​N16/​271/​19/​PDF/​N1627119​ .pdf​?OpenElement. UN General Assembly and Security Council (2015), ‘Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations peace operations: uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people’ (‘HIPPO’), A/70/95, S/2015/446, 16 June, accessed 17 March 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​ record/​795940​?ln​=​en. UN Secretary-General (2014), ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’, S/2014/943, 23 December, accessed 20 February 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​785883​?ln​=​en. UN Secretary-General (2015), ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’, S/2015/732, 22 September, accessed 20 February 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​804372​?ln​=​en. UN Security Council (2013), ‘Resolution 2100’, S/RES/2100, 25 April, accessed 20 February 2022 at http://​unscr​.com/​en/​resolutions/​doc/​2100. UN Security Council (2014), ‘Resolution 2164’, S/RES/2164, 25 June, accessed 22 February 2022 at http://​unscr​.com/​en/​resolutions/​doc/​2164. UN Security Council (2017a), ‘Resolution 2347’, S/RES/2347, 24 March, accessed at http://​unscr​.com/​ en/​resolutions/​doc/​2347. UN Security Council (2017b), ‘Press statement on environmental management of peacekeeping operations’, SC/13134-ENV/DEV/1830-PKO/700, 21 December, accessed 26 March 2022 at https://​www​ .un​.org/​press/​en/​2017/​sc13134​.doc​.htm. UNEP (2012), ‘Greening the Blue Helmets: environment, natural resources and UN peacekeeping operations’, accessed 20 February 2022 at https://​wedocs​.unep​.org/​bitstream/​handle/​20​.500​.11822/​8840/​ UNEP​_greening​_blue​_helmets​.pdf​?sequence​=​3​&​amp​%3BisAllowed​=​. UNEP (2020), ‘Greening the Blue Report 2020: The UN System’s Environmental Footprint and Efforts to Reduce It’, accessed 25 October 2022 at https://​wedocs​.unep​.org/​bitstream/​handle/​20​.500​.11822/​ 34468/​GBR20​.pdf​?sequence​=​3​&​isAllowed​=​y. UNESCO (1970), ‘Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property’, accessed 22 July 2021 at http://​portal​.unesco​.org/​en/​ev​ .php​-URL​_ID​=​13039​&​URL​_DO​=​DO​_TOPIC​&​URL​_SECTION​=​201​.html. UNESCO (1972), ‘Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage’, accessed 22 July 2021 at: https://​whc​.unesco​.org/​en/​conventiontext/​. UNESCO (1974), ‘Rapport sur la situation du patrimoine culturel dans l’île de Chypre après les évènements de l’été 1974’, UNESCO Archives (B7S1.18-67/ 243). UNESCO (2003), ‘Convention for the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage’, accessed 22 July 2021 at https://​ich​.unesco​.org/​en/​convention. UNIFIL–EMU (2010), Environmental Pocket Guide for UNIFIL Contingents, internal document (on file with authors). Viejo-Rose, Dacia and Marie Louise Stig Sørensen (2015), ‘Cultural heritage and armed conflict: new questions for an old relationship’, in Emma Waterton and Steve Watson (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Heritage Research, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 281–96. Waleij, Annica (2022), ‘Gestion des risques environnementaux et empreinte environnementale des forces armées’, Les Champs de Mars, 35, 227–45. Waleij, Annica, Timothy G. Bosetti, Russ Doran, and Birgitta Liljedahl (2016), ‘Environmental stewardship in peace operations: the role of the military’, in Carl Bruch, Carroll Muffett, and Sandra S. Nichols (eds), Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, pp. 223–48.

20. Peacekeeping and postwar violence Jessica Di Salvatore

INTRODUCTION Contemporary UN mission goals are not limited to reducing ongoing violence, but also entail supporting and securing peace-building processes in the aftermath of wars. However, the difference between in-civil war and post-civil war phases is not limited to differences in the intensity of violence and insecurity. Put otherwise, while it is true that peacekeepers operate in active conflict more than they used to do in the past, post-civil war settings present important and distinct challenges for blue helmets. In fact, postwar violence ‘transmutes and reappears in different forms − i.e. criminal violence, youth violence, domestic violence − permeating social life to the point at which perceptions of post-conflict insecurity render peace as a paradox’ (Kofi Annan Foundation 2018, p. 20). This chapter moves for the observation that UN peacekeepers operate in post-conflict settings that are, in practice, just postwar rather than truly post-violence settings. We know that violence is persistent and lingers in the aftermath of a civil war. At the same time, this does not make the postwar setting a simple continuation of the civil war – it presents its own specific challenges that are not trivial to the approach and success of UN missions. In fact, there is evidence that peacekeepers curb violence that lingers in the postwar phase as well (Hultman et al. 2016; Kathman and Benson 2019), so this violence does not pose major problems to the mission. As argued in this chapter, the postwar challenges peacekeepers face are not simply related to the lingering presence of violence linked to the past civil war.1 This chapter highlights and focuses on two main changes in the dynamics of violence that peacekeeping missions need to adjust to in the postwar phase, namely (i) the emergence of new violent actors missions are not designed to tackle, and (ii) the risks of violent urban disorders involving civilians. First, postwar violence can take new forms, the most prominent and common being criminal violence. Criminal violence is strongly associated with the presence and competition among criminal groups. Guatemala is a commonly cited example of a country that experienced more violence after rather than during the civil war. The conditions that sustain war economies remain in the aftermath of civil war, with the additional advantage of a weak central authority and a more predictable environment. In the context of the Colombian peace process, the combination of these two factors was described as territorial peace without territorial governance (Eaton 2021).2 The latter is particularly important because illicit markets necessitate some degree of stability to function. Sometimes criminal groups buy protection from other criminal actors (Gambetta 1996), but the end of the conflict itself significantly contributes to reducing the risks of disruption. Furthermore, criminal groups can also seek ways to recruit among “violence professionals” when non-state armed groups are being demobilized, disarmed but unsuccessfully reintegrated back to their communities and the legal economy.3 In some cases, the wartime networks are purportedly criminalized by former commanders who have accumulated “criminal capital” (Nussio 2018), and are converted to criminal purposes (Daly et al. 2020). Historically, peacekeepers rarely have had mandates that enabled them to tackle 286

Peacekeeping and postwar violence  287 criminal actors directly, thus ultimately leaving weakened postwar state authorities alone in fighting criminal violence. UN deployments may provide the needed security space for criminal activities and even create opportunities for criminal entrepreneurs within so-called peacekeeping economies. The resulting competition among criminal groups tends to produce much higher levels of homicidal violence. Second, the postwar setting involves some degree of political contention, especially around first elections. Interestingly, not only the timing but also the geography of violence changes in the postwar phase. As noted by Elfversson et al. (2019a), postwar violence tends to concentrate in urban spaces. Cities become important political spaces in the aftermath of wars for several reasons. For example, opposition parties or former-militant groups willing to participate in elections mostly recruit in urban settings to reach more people, thus making cities an arena for political competition. Urban areas also often host high numbers of forcibly displaced people as well as marginalized groups living in slums. Finally, peacekeepers are often deployed in urban spaces or in their proximity, and it is not rare for the local population to organize and protest against the UN presence or activities, demanding the UN to leave.4 Hence, cities’ transformation into ‘hubs for different forms of contestation,’ violent and nonviolent, is peculiar to the postwar setting (Sampaio 2019, p. 1). Research shows that peacekeepers may also enable and foster participation in peaceful demonstrations in the postwar phase (Belgioioso et al. 2021), but managing urban unrest and public disorder has become an increasingly relevant challenge peacekeepers face in postwar urban settings. The UN approach to peacekeeping does not seem to respond particularly well to these postwar challenges. To be sure, peacekeepers are able to maintain peace between former belligerents (Hultman et al. 2016). However, blue helmets are ineffective at reducing violence perpetrated by non-state armed actors beyond former belligerents (Bara 2020) and by criminal actors (Di Salvatore 2019). While peacekeepers keep performing well against the violence they were originally deployed to curb, in the postwar setting they are unable to face the postwar violence that takes different forms. This chapter proceeds with a more in-depth discussion of the challenges posed by new forms of violence in the postwar setting, with a particular focus on criminal violence and urban unrest.5 These two types of violence are not unique to the postwar setting, but the relative stability that the aftermath of conflict termination entails (whether durable or not) may in fact favor both the emergence of criminal actors and increasing levels of public mobilization. In addition, the capacity-building effect of peacekeeping that should strengthen state institutions only starts in the aftermath of conflict and even timid results take time. Criminal groups are particularly problematic because of the direct challenge they represent to state capacity. If missions focus on long-term statebuilding without tackling the short-term challenges criminal actors pose to state capacity, this can divert or even subvert statebuilding goals by opening up opportunities for criminal actors to thrive and, possibly, even permeate institutions. Then, the chapter illustrates whether and how the UN reconfigures missions’ composition (that is, UN troops vs UN police) and mandates in postwar scenarios. It concludes by discussing the increasingly relevant role of the UN police (UNPOL) as a component of peacekeeping operations for maintenance of postwar order, given that this unit is better equipped to deal with urban disturbances and criminal violence than regular UN troops.

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HOW CRIME THRIVES IN POSTWAR SETTINGS Before understanding why crime and criminal violence emerge in postwar settings, it is important to describe how conflict itself opens up space for crime. Lack of state capacity and the weakening of a state’s monopoly of violence are ideal conditions for the emergence of new criminal groups and for the flourishing of existing ones. While civil wars destroy physical infrastructure and human capital upon which the formal economy is based, some actors still profit from the war economy. To be sure, Goodhand (2004) argues that the war economy is based on three different sets of informal economies, namely the combat, the shadow and the coping economies. The fundamental difference across these economies is that the combat economy serves the purpose of sustaining the political struggle of insurgents, often at the expense of poor populations who strive to survive with alternative coping mechanisms (for example, relying on remittances and subsistence agriculture). Shadow economies, however, mostly involve those who profit from the conflict and the conditions it has created. Thus, shadow economies rely largely on illicit activities that are facilitated by the absence of state control. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, the shadow economy was dominated by the opium economy and cross-border smuggling. The case of drug production and smuggling in the Afghan war economy is a good example showing how the shadow economy interacts with the combat and the coping economies: drug smuggling was one of the numerous illicit activities used to financially support the conflict and, at the same time, poor farmers converted or leased their lands for poppy cultivation in order to survive (Goodhand 2004, p. 161). Although there is a multiplicity of non-state armed actors involved in criminal activities, including rebel groups, it can be argued that a fundamental difference exists between those actively fighting the government and those who prioritize business and profit. While the former usually aim at overthrowing and replacing the state, economic entrepreneurs involved in illicit activities (i.e. criminal actors) prefer to operate in under-governed rather than ungoverned spaces (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010). Hence while criminal groups benefit from state absence, they cannot operate in unpredictable environments where anarchy and violence pose a challenge. A bare minimum level of stability is necessary for criminals. In fact, more structured and organized criminal groups are sometimes able to provide that security to themselves, and also to sell it to other groups and the local population. For example, mafia-like criminal groups have the provision of protection as their distinctive feature and main source of profit (Gambetta 1996; Varese 2006). Most criminal groups, however, do not have structures and resources to simultaneously carry out their business and protect themselves from external threats. In most cases, they either need more stable environments or they need to get protection from another, more powerful group. Why do postwar settings experience levels of criminal violence higher than the civil war violence? The immediate aftermath of a civil war may provide exactly the ideal conditions for criminal groups to thrive as, first, the state is still weak, hence unlikely to be able to persecute and punish and, second, large-scale violence has ceased (at least in the short term). These factors are associated with lower costs for crimes. In addition to lowering costs, it should be noted that postwar settings provide very few opportunities for legal livelihoods, especially for former combatants. In fact, former combatants are the most vulnerable to criminal networks as the lack of marketable skills may push them to reinvest their expertise in violence for criminal purposes (Muggah 2009; Patel et al. 2009). Former high- and mid-ranking commanders of rebel groups are also likely to re-mobilize wartime networks for criminal purposes (Daly et al.

Peacekeeping and postwar violence  289 2020; González and Dorussen 2021; Nussio 2018). Besides inducing perceptions of insecurity, the flourishing of criminal groups and the competition over illicit markets actually increases levels of criminal violence and, relatedly, homicide rates. While not all criminal groups interact with each other using violence, this is in fact the most likely form of competition especially when groups lack structure, strong territorial control, and are mostly business-oriented formations with opportunistic memberships (Abadinsky 2007; UN Office on Drugs and Crime 2005). Intuitively, one would expect peacekeepers’ military presence to deter all armed non-state actors, including rebels and criminal groups. However, the picture is more complex and, in fact, peacekeepers’ capacity to effectively deter criminal violence is quite limited. Peacekeeping missions may inadvertently create conditions that are even more conducive to criminal violence (Di Salvatore 2019). Three main mechanisms plausibly explain this unexpected and undesirable outcome. First, moving from the assumption that criminal groups require intermediate stability or protection, UN troops may provide them with exactly this as blue helmets successfully curb rebel-perpetrated violence (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017; Hultman et al. 2014; Ruggeri et al. 2017). Second, peacekeepers’ presence is associated with the emergence of so-called peacekeeping-economies – informal economies based on black markets that are fueled by UN staff involvement (Andreas 2008) and demand for sex workers, resulting in more transactional sex and human trafficking (Bell et al. 2018; Jennings and Nikolić-Ristanović 2009).6 Hence, peacekeeping economies are ripe with new business opportunities for criminal groups, who will compete violently to dominate or access them. While creating these favorable conditions for criminal entrepreneurs, peacekeeping missions can do very little to directly target them. There have been only two cases where missions were authorized an executive mandate by the Security Council, namely a mandate that allowed them to carry out policing and law enforcement tasks. These are usually considered prerogatives of host states. Not only do missions rarely have executive mandates that would allow them to deter criminal actors, but host states also lack sufficient capacity to establish effective rule of law. Civil wars curtail state authority and reach, which is why UN missions often have mandates to support states in reforming and rebuilding their security sector.7 However, this is a lengthy process that, ultimately, leaves governments unable to guarantee minimal levels of order and criminal groups unchallenged by both the state and the peacekeeping mission. Nonetheless, even if most missions lack executive powers, they can help states in fighting criminal violence. In fact, while the primary responsibility for law and order remains with the sovereign state, its police forces are assisted or trained by UNPOL. The UNPOL includes both Individual Police Units (IPUs) and Formed Police Units (FPUs), each carrying out activities that contribute to reducing homicide rates (Di Salvatore 2019). UNPOL carries out high-visibility patrolling (FPUs) and community patrolling (IPUs) that signal presence and may act as a deterrent; UNPOL also works on building the capacity of national police to conduct operations against criminal groups, thus acting as an indirect incapacitation force. As I discuss in the next section, all this suggests the potential of UNPOL to play a crucial role in postwar settings, probably more prominently than has been the case up until now. Missions with more significant UNPOL contingents are better equipped to deal with the post-conflict challenges, not only because they can contribute to reducing criminal violence in the aftermath of civil wars, but also for to managing urban disorders that require capacity to de-escalate and manage crowds.

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MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER IN POSTWAR CITIES While it has been noted that trends in population growth and urbanization have forced conflicts to move to the urban space (Kilcullen 2013), cities remain important settings in the postwar context as well, not least because they are hubs of political, military and symbolic power (Büscher 2018). Hence, postwar cities often experience violence in the postwar phase that is a legacy of the civil war (for example, involving the same actors and unsolved grievances) but also violence that is either perpetrated by other rebel groups or by non-rebel violent actors such as criminal actors. In addition, as cities become the arena for the political competition of first postwar elections, urban locations are also likely to be theaters for both violent and non-violent contestation by ordinary citizens (that is, riots and protests). This section does not focus on how peacekeeping activities are shaped and challenged in urban settings,8 but rather how the postwar context magnifies the importance of cities and fosters forms of collective action that peacekeepers are ill-equipped to deal with. While the issue of criminal violence has already been discussed, this section focuses on another challenge that peacekeeping missions face in the postwar setting – urban unrest. Postwar settings are commonly associated with higher levels of contention especially when elections are held for the first time (Flores and Nooruddin 2012). The aftermath of civil wars presents the possibility for citizens to participate in the political development of their country, not least because of the expectation that violence has stopped, and a peace process has started. The legacy of the civil war itself and the impact of past violence seems to be associated with higher levels of political participation. Contrary to what one would intuitively expect, exposure to violent conflict does not discourage political participation; in fact, analyses of survey data show that individuals that experienced or witnessed more violence during the civil war are more likely to vote and participate in community life (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009), and this effect is more pronounced in postwar settings (De Luca and Verpoorten 2015). However, there are different avenues for citizens to express their preferences and to participate outside of election cycles. Protest becomes the primary mobilization form for citizens to express their dissent toward peace agreements or ongoing negotiations that are not inclusive (Dudouet and Lundström 2016). Thus, high levels of participation in public demonstrations as a form of political participation and expression of dissent are not unusual in postwar settings. Of course, protests do not necessarily involve or turn violent. In fact, when violence actually ceases and perceptions of physical security are enhanced, citizens are more likely to join peaceful demonstrations as the cost of such mobilization is reduced. Nonetheless, the normalization of violence established through the experience of civil war increases the risk that even peaceful protests may turn violent. Indeed, research shows that while physical security matters for the feasibility of non-violent mobilization, the promotion of non-violence as a tactical innovation for expressing dissent is also an important enabling factor for peaceful activism. In a global analysis of postwar societies between 1990 and 2011, Belgioioso et al. (2021, p. 12) argue and show how peacekeeping missions can exactly provide ‘enhanced public security from large-scale conflict and state repression, coupled with promotion of norms of nonviolence’ that enable peaceful demonstrations. However, the challenge for peacekeepers is not only the promotion of non-violence as a norm but also the actual management of public order when demonstration occurs. Public order management and crowd control require specific training that substantially differs

Peacekeeping and postwar violence  291 from military training. Notably, the aim of public order management is not at all secondary to other mission goals as it ultimately aims at ‘[facilitating] the population’s exercise of fundamental rights without disturbance or unjustified hindrance and to reconcile the right to peaceful assembly with public safety’ (UN DPKO and DFS 2015, p. 22). In the absence of peacekeeping missions, these functions are carried out by the national police. When peacekeepers are deployed, a mission’s contingent may include FPUs that are specifically trained for public-order management. FPUs are expected to mostly support the national police, although they may carry out executive functions independently. As in the case of criminal actors, policing is arguably a key state function, and the involvement of external actors in this specific domain can be considered an example of shared sovereignty (Ciorciari 2020). But putting aside the controversial issue of sovereignty, what makes public order management so problematic for peacekeeping missions? First, there are different types of public gatherings and peacekeepers need to be able to discern a crowd from a mob, the latter being more difficult to manage than the former because it exhibits elements of agitation (from physical violence against individuals to looting of private property). Second, when dispersal of the gathering is necessary, peacekeepers may need to use coercion. This is, in principle, the last resort and the level of force deemed appropriate in these circumstances is supposed to be minimum. Third, some individuals or groups may intentionally provoke violence, and the role of peacekeepers in these scenarios should be to contain escalation. As FPUs receive training on these matters, a policy implication deriving from this would suggest the need to refocus missions toward UNPOL contingents in the postwar setting. This does not mean taking away resources from the UN troops, but at least to consider a prominent role for UNPOL at the strategic (that is, mandate) and operational level. The impact that urban disorders may have on postwar security should not be underestimated. In 2003, UNMISET was planning to downsize its police and troops levels. When civil unrest started erupting in Dili and surrounding areas, the former Secretary-General Annan urged to delay the downsizing as the scale of civil disturbance was threatening ‘the fragility of what has been achieved early.’9 Indeed, the mission had made significant progress with security in East Timor, and a survey revealed that, overall, the local population had positive opinions on the contribution of the mission (Dorussen 2015). But the fragility of those achievements became evident as civil disturbances reached worrisome levels. The difficulties in managing public order feature in several accidents involving peacekeeping personnel, thus ultimately eroding trust toward the mission and its perceived legitimacy. A notable example is the lack of response from MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during protests against the extension of the mandate of President Kabila. Amnesty International reported that the national security forces confronted peaceful demonstrators ‘using unnecessary, excessive and sometimes lethal force’ against them (Amnesty International 2017, n.p.). The organization also condemned MONUSCO for not adequately protecting civilians (Amnesty International 2017). In other instances, UN peacekeepers themselves have been involved in the killing of protesters during violent unrests. In Haiti, the killing of a protester by MINUSTAH resulted in other protests demanding the UN to leave the country (BBC 2010). Similarly, in the Central African Republic demonstrators not only demanded the same after MINUSCA killed people protesting against the mission, but also laid the corpses of the victims outside UN’s headquarters in Bangui (The Telegraph 2018). The cases of MINUSTAH and MINUSCA also illustrate an additional challenge that missions need to face, namely, how to manage protests that are directed against them. In Beni (DRC), citizens had been protesting against MONUSCO and

292  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations its inaction in protecting them against rebels’ violence, in accordance with its mandate. In November 2019, protesters managed to storm the MONUSCO headquarters in Beni, set vehicles on fire and looted the compound (Al Jazeera 2019). The criticality of public order in postwar urban settings appears even more concerning when we examine patterns in existing data on attacks against peacekeepers (Lindberg Bromley 2018). These attacks are, of course, a subset of events involving interactions between citizens and peacekeepers and do not allow us to establish the extent to which peacekeepers fail or succeed at ensuring public order. They also are a subset of urban unrest instances, which do not always involve peacekeepers as targets. Furthermore, the data only includes sub-Saharan countries from 1989 to 2009. Keeping these caveats in mind, two points are worth highlighting. First, more than 8 percent of attacks against peacekeepers that can be attributed to any actor or group involves mobs or civilians.10 Seven out of twelve countries in the sample have at least one instance of an attack against blue helmets involving civilians or a mob. Second, there seems to be an asymmetry in the lethality of the encounter when this is initiated by civilians instead of rebel groups. More specifically, the data record more than two civilian deaths for each peacekeeper’s death,11 with the mission side often reporting zero fatalities. In comparison, rebel fatalities are twice as high as civilians, but the key difference is that there are numerous events where deaths are only reported for the mission. Certainly, attacks against peacekeepers perpetrated by organized non-state armed actors have different features that make them more lethal and efficient at crippling missions, compared to violence that may well be spontaneous and unorganized. Not to mention that rebels are likely to directly target peacekeepers with the premeditated intent to kill them. The point that this comparison tries to highlight concerns the importance that tactics of de-escalation and public order may play in contemporary peacekeeping operating in urban settings, and the reputational costs at stake for the UN when missions fail at this. In sum, the last two sections have argued that postwar settings are pernicious to UN peacekeeping effectiveness not only because of the continuation of conflict-related violence, which missions are prepared to tackle, but also because of additional public security challenges related to crime and urban disorders. But while there is scholarly evidence supporting this position, one may wonder whether the UN, and the Security Council in particular, envision different roles and functions for UN missions operating in postwar settings. For example, we would not expect the UN to withdraw its military simply because a peace agreement has been signed, but we would expect to see changes in the mandates authorized by the Security Council. The next section explores this point by asking to what extent the postwar settings make any difference to the design of UN peacekeeping missions.

UN PEACEKEEPING IN POSTWAR SETTINGS This section describes and compares the configuration of UN peacekeeping missions during civil wars and in peace times along two key dimensions, namely (i) the composition of the mission in terms of personnel types (UN troops and UN police) and (ii) the composition of the mission’s mandates, more specifically its number of tasks and the prevalence of peacebuilding or security-related tasks.12 Figure 20.1 illustrates the composition of UN mission personnel measured as average number of UN troops, average number of UNPOL (total and by type), and the ratio between

Peacekeeping and postwar violence  293 UNPOL and UN troops. The averages are shown for conflict years (in dark gray) and peace years (in light gray) in African countries from 1999 to 2017 in order to include the most recent generation of peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, FPUs were deployed in 1999 in Kosovo for the first time, hence earlier statistics on UNPOL would not allow any disaggregation.13

Source: Compiled by the author using data on mission personnel from the International Peace Institute database (IPI n.d.).

Figure 20.1

UN peacekeeping personnel types before and after peace

Not surprisingly, Figure 20.1 shows that missions operating in conflict years have approximately 700 more UN troops than those operating in peace years. There is important variation within periods, with missions such as MINURCA, UNAMSIL and MONUC/MONUSCO deploying more than 10 000 soldiers in peace years. Indeed, keeping the peace does require the presence of a sizeable contingent that deters spoilers and signals commitment to the peace process by the international community. Similarly, the size of UNPOL is on average lower in peace years. However, it is clear that the decrease in UNPOL presence is mostly due to reduced presence of IPUs, while FPUs (that is, armed, specialized police units) remain similar in size before and after conflict. FPUs’ relative prevalence thus makes UNPOL more militarized in peacetime than in wartime. Even though it is difficult to tell what may be driving this increase, it is possible that FPUs in particular are considered a more important type of personnel to deploy for activities carried out in the postwar setting, and for this reason should be a key component of the UNPOL total personnel. FPUs are very specialized armed units carrying out specific tasks, so it is reasonable to speculate that their relevance in the postwar phase is not just a desirable policy, but already a reality in UN peacekeeping. Finally, it is also useful to compare how many UNPOL are deployed for each UN troop during and after civil wars. Interestingly, this figure provides additional nuance to the previous two plots as it shows a striking increase in the ratio of UNPOL to UN troops in peace times. On average, the ratio of UNPOL to troops doubles, and again it is interesting to see how this varies across

294  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations missions. For example, toward the end of its mandate, UNMIL had more than 700 UNPOL deployed along with 1800 UN troops, thus having more than 25 percent of its personnel from police units. Are the changes in deployed personnel also linked to substantial re-orientation of missions’ goals? How do mandates change between conflict and peace periods? Figure 20.2 uses new data on UN peacekeeping mission mandates to visualize changes in the total number of tasks that require a mission to assist the government, the ratio between assistance and monitoring tasks, and the ratio between peacebuilding and security-related tasks in African missions from 1999 to 2017.

Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Peacekeeping Mandate dataset (Di Salvatore et al. 2022).

Figure 20.2

UN peacekeeping personnel types before and after peace

First, it seems that the overall number of tasks included in a mandate are higher in the postwar phase. Relatedly, the mission is requested to perform slightly more assistance than monitoring tasks by the Security Council after the conflict. This is in line with the expectation that UN missions support the peacebuilding phase and do not only act as stopgaps for violence. Accordingly, we would also expect to see changes in the orientation of mandated goals, not only in the level of engagement of the mission. In other words, peacekeepers should not simply play a more active role by assisting the government, but also do this in capacity and institution-building domains. If this is the case, mission mandates should be more focused on peacebuilding tasks than on security tasks as civil wars terminate.14 From Figure 20.2, it is difficult to assess the extent to which this is a valid claim. There does not appear to be a clear difference between the ratio of peacebuilding-to-security tasks between conflict and peacebuilding years. In absolute terms, in-conflict mandates have 7.5 peacebuilding tasks, against 10 for mandates in postwar years. On the other hand, security tasks are, on average, 3.7 during conflict and 4.7 during peace.

Peacekeeping and postwar violence  295 In sum, patterns in the data suggest that UN peacekeeping slightly differs when operating in active civil wars and in their aftermath, though most adaptation seems to take place at the level of deployment. Missions’ overall strategic goals as set up in their mandates do not change significantly, neither in the way the mission is expected to engage with the government (assisting vs monitoring it) nor in the specific policy areas it is requested to operate (security vs peacebuilding). The fact that some missions still perform reasonably well in managing criminal violence and public disorder may be the result of an operational adaptation that, however, does not directly benefit from strategic reorientation of the mandate. Possibly the starkest difference in war and postwar missions is the composition of their personnel, more specifically the increasing ratio of UNPOL to UN troops. Indeed, the role of UNPOL within UN missions has become much more relevant since the creation of the UN Police Standing Capacity. Not only has the absolute number of UNPOL increased steadily since 2005, but so has the ratio of UNPOL to troops. It is not the case that missions are simply getting larger – more UNPOL are in fact being deployed to each mission. Proportionally, there are fewer IPUs but the number of FPUs does not change much in peace time. Overall, these trends illustrate that the way postwar insecurities are tackled in UN peace missions does not conform with policy suggestions following existing research. In other words, whether UN missions are currently equipped and mandated under the best circumstances to tackle postwar violence remains very debatable.

CONCLUSIONS This chapter builds on the idea that postwar phases are rarely devoid of violence and that the forms violence takes in these settings may be particularly challenging for UN peacekeeping missions. I identified and discussed two main challenges that UN peacekeeping contingents are often unprepared to face in postwar settings, namely rising levels of criminal violence and urban disorders, that is, protests and violent contestation that can also target peacekeepers themselves. I explained how these forms of violence are not unique to the postwar settings but can be exacerbated in these transitional phases. Then, I have illustrated the extent to which UN mission compositions and mandates differ between conflict and peace time, finding more evidence indicating a possible operational adaptation in types of deployed personnel, more specifically with a greater focus on UNPOL (FPUs in particular) than regular troops. There is an important connection to draw here between the evolution of peacekeeping and the encouraging findings of recent research on its impact on postwar settings. UNPOL is becoming a force distinct from UN troops, with its specific role, pre-deployment training and professional standards (Greener 2014). One may wonder whether this policy shift is desirable or ultimately uninfluential for missions’ performances. As mentioned, research shows that the higher the number of UN troops deployed, the lower the risk of conflict reoccurrence (Hultman et al. 2016). Notably, though, other personnel types, such as UNPOL, are reported to have no discernible effect on postwar violence. However, two pertinent findings qualify this important result. First, when we distinguish violence perpetrated by actors that were initially involved in the terminated conflict from violence perpetrated by other rebel groups, UN troops can only reduce the former (Bara 2020). Violence that is perpetrated by actors not directly targeted by a mission’s mandate, including gangs or rebel groups that were not former belligerents, remains within the responsibility of the state. According to Bara, UNPOL’s role in capacity-building and in filling public security gaps explains its ability to curb postwar

296  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations violence. She also argues that the lack of clear guidelines on how UNPOL should implement its mandated functions may in fact enable it to be more flexible in addressing complex postwar dynamics compared to UN troops.15 Second, when we consider violence perpetrated by actors proliferating in the postwar phase, such as criminal actors, UNPOL again performs better than UN troops against these potential peace spoilers. Di Salvatore (2019) posits that UNPOL is needed to tackle criminal violence not only because its functions involve public order but, more importantly, because UNPOL counterbalances the increase in criminal violence that UN troops’ activities (for example, DDR and stabilization) may inadvertently sustain. Hence, when we consider organized violence perpetrated by non-state actors, there is a clear policy implication based on research that UNPOL plays a central rather than supporting role to troops and should be the focus of UN operations in postwar settings. Regarding its support for maintaining public order more generally, unfortunately we lack evidence on potentially violent interactions between peacekeepers and citizens protesting against the government or the mission itself. While UNPOL is found to be an important transmission channel for non-violent participation (Belgioioso et al. 2021), the extent to which they should be tasked with protecting demonstrators and managing crowds in urban settings is open to future research. As Hills notes, FPUs may indeed work well at controlling crowds and also improve perceptions of how local police are performing by supporting them; however, for their constabulary nature, FPUs ‘are paramilitary and their composition and operations blur police/military boundaries’ (Hills 2009, p. 80), which should invite a more careful reflection of the consequences of militarizing UNPOL in postwar societies where the demilitarization in ongoing (Greener 2014). This is not only important to safeguard peacekeepers’ perceived legitimacy among the population, but also to support successful transitions from the civil war to a truly post-violence phase.

NOTES 1. Postwar violence can also be perpetrated by non-state armed groups that pursue political goals but were not involved officially in the previous conflict. Bara finds that these groups are more difficult to tackle for peacekeeping missions, even though they heighten post-conflict insecurities and disproportionally target civilians (Bara 2020). 2. I am grateful to Han Dorussen for suggesting a parallel with the concept. 3. In the case of Colombia, González Peña and Dorussen (2021) show that participation in reintegration programs reduces the impact of crime that may be associated (directly or indirectly) with former combatants. 4. See Chapter 22 (Dorussen and de Vooght) on the local perception of peacekeeping in this Handbook. 5. I exclude electoral violence here as this is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 16 (Smidt) of this Handbook. 6. Andreas (2009) illustrates how the relationship between the UNPROFOR and illicit activities in Bosnia was in fact symbiotic rather than predatory in the sense that some missions’ goals were, to some extent, served by the existence of illicit exchanges. Notice, though, that Andreas’ argument focuses on illicit markets (which civilians could access for survival) rather than criminal actors. 7. See Chapter 10 (Blair) in this Handbook on security sector reform and rule of law promotion in peacekeeping. 8. For a discussion of how cities make some activities operationally more challenging to carry out for peacekeepers, see, for example, Elfversson et al. (2019b). 9. Kofi Annan, cited in https://​reliefweb​.int/​report/​timor​-leste/​citing​-security​-needs​-annan​-calls​-hold​ -un​-force​-cutbacks​-timor​-leste. 10. More specifically, 54 events are attributed to civilians or mobs out of 648 events where the attacker is not coded as “unknown.”

Peacekeeping and postwar violence  297 11. This ratio excludes one important outlier, that is, the event involving ECOMOG in Sierra Leone in 1999 which resulted in the death of 182 civilians. When this is included as well, the ratio of civilian-to-peacekeeper deaths is 4.6, hence even higher than the ratio involving non-civilian actors. 12. See also Chapter 5 (Bove et al.) in this Handbook. 13. Notice also that before 2009, the statistics for UNPOL are not available by IPUs and FPUs but only as “civilian police.” 14. I follow the distinction defined in UN training manuals and used in Blair et al. (2021). The following are identified as security tasks: disarmament and demobilization, reintegration, control of small arms and light weapons, demilitarization, arms embargo assistance, civilian protection, ceasefire assistance, and peace deal assistance. Peacebuilding tasks are defined as: police reform, military reform, justice sector reform, transitional justice, prison reform, border control, demining, natural resource management, extension of state authority, democratization, electoral assistance, voter education, political party assistance, civil society assistance, media assistance, assistance to reconciliation processes, economic development, humanitarian relief, public health, refugee assistance, and legal reform. 15. For a discussion on the need for UNPOL to have more clear doctrinal guidance, see Sebastián (2015).

REFERENCES Abadinsky, Howard (2007), Organized Crime, Belmont, CA, USA: Thomson Wadsworth. Al Jazeera (2019), ‘Angry demonstrators storm UN camp in DRC after deadly attack’, 25 November, accessed 31 August 2020 at https://​www​.aljazeera​.com/​news/​2019/​11/​killed​-rebel​-attack​-dr​-congo​ -city​-beni​-191125105346272​.html. Amnesty International (2017), ‘Report 2016/2017 – Democratic Republic of the Congo’, accessed 25 February 2022 at https://​www​.refworld​.org/​docid/​58b03407a​.html. Andreas, Peter (2008), Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo, Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press. Andreas, Peter (2009), ‘Symbiosis between peace operations and illicit business in Bosnia’, International Peacekeeping, 16 (1), 33–46. Bara, Corinne (2020), ‘Shifting targets: the effect of peacekeeping on postwar violence’, European Journal of International Relations, 26 (4), 979–1003. BBC (2010, November 16), ‘Haiti protester shot dead by UN peacekeepers’, accessed 31 August 2020 at https://​www​.bbc​.co​.uk/​news/​world​-latin​-america​-11761941. Belgioioso, Margherita, Jessica Di Salvatore, and Jonathan Pinckney (2021), ‘Tangled up in blue: the effect of UN peacekeeping on nonviolent protests in post-civil war countries’, International Studies Quarterly, 65 (1), 1–15. Bell, Sam R., Michael E. Flynn, and Carla Martinez Machain (2018), ‘U.N. peacekeeping forces and the demand for sex trafficking’, International Studies Quarterly, 62 (3), 643–55. Bellows, John and Edward Miguel (2009), ‘War and local collective action in Sierra Leone’, Journal of Public Economics, 93 (11–12), 1144–57. Blair, Robert, Jessica Di Salvatore, and Hannah Smidt (2021), ‘When do UN peacekeeping operations implement their mandates?’, American Journal of Political Science, July, accessed 25 February 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1111/​ajps​.12650. Blattman, Christopher (2009), ‘From violence to voting: war and political participation in Uganda’, American Political Science Review, 103 (2), 231–47. Büscher, Karen (2018), ‘African cities and violent conflict: the urban dimension of conflict and post conflict dynamics in Central and Eastern Africa’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 12 (2), 193–210. Ciorciari, John D. (2020), ‘Sharing sovereignty in the streets: international policing in fragile states’, International Peacekeeping, 27 (5), 732–59. Clunan, Anne L. and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds) (2010), Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, Stanford, CA, USA: Stanford University Press.

298  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Daly, Sarah Zuckerman, Laura Paler, and Cyrus Samii (2020), ‘Wartime ties and the social logic of crime’, Journal of Peace Research, 57 (4), 536–50. De Luca, Giacomo and Marijke Verpoorten (2015), ‘Civil war and political participation: evidence from Uganda’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 64 (1), 113–41. Di Salvatore, Jessica (2019), ‘Peacekeepers against criminal violence—unintended effects of peacekeeping operations?’, American Journal of Political Science, 63 (4), 840–58. Di Salvatore, Jessica, Magnus Lundgren, Kseniya Oksamytna, and Hannah Smidt (2022), ‘Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, online first, accessed 3 March 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1177/​00220027211068897. Di Salvatore, Jessica and Andrea Ruggeri (2017), ‘Effectiveness of peacekeeping operations’, in William R. Thompson (ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, accessed 25 February 2022 at https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​acrefore/​9780190228637​.013​.586. Dorussen, Han (2015), ‘Security perception after the completion of UN peacekeeping in Timor-Leste’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 21 (4), 453–8. Dudouet, Véronique and Stina Lundström (2016), ‘Post-war political settlements: from participatory transition processes to inclusive state-building governance’, Berghof Foundation, accessed 25 February 2022 at https://​berghof​-foundation​.org/​library/​post​-war​-political​-settlements​-from​ -participatory​-transition​-processes​-to​-inclusive​-state​-building​-and​-governance. Eaton, Kent (2021), ‘Territorial peace without territorial governments: the centralising logic of the 2016 Colombian peace accord’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 16 (2), 194–208. Elfversson, Emma, Ivan Gusic, and Kristine Höglund (2019a), ‘The spatiality of violence in post-war cities’, Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 4 (2–3), 81–93. Elfversson, Emma, Sara Lindberg Bromley, and Paul D. Williams (2019b), ‘Urban peacekeeping under siege: attacks on African Union peacekeepers in Mogadishu, 2007–2009’, Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 4 (2–3), 158–78. Flores, Thomas Edward and Irfan Nooruddin (2012), ‘The effect of elections on postconflict peace and reconstruction’, The Journal of Politics, 74 (2), 558–70. Gambetta, Diego (1996), The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection, Cambridge, MA, USA and London, UK: Harvard University Press. González, Andrea Peña and Han Dorussen (2021), ‘The reintegration of ex-combatants and post-conflict violence: an analysis of municipal crime levels in Colombia’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 38 (3), 316–37. Goodhand, Jonathan (2004), ‘From war economy to peace economy? Reconstruction and state building in Afghanistan’, Journal of International Affairs, 58 (1), 155–74. Greener, Beth K. (2014), ‘Policing of peacekeeping’, in Gerben Bruinsma and David Weisburd (eds), Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice, New York, NY, USA: Springer, accessed 25 February 2022 at https://​0​-doi​-org​.serlib0​.essex​.ac​.uk/​10​.1007/​978​-1​-4614​-5690​-2​_223. Hills, Alice (2009), Policing Post-conflict Cities, London, UK and New York, NY, USA: Bloomsbury. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2014), ‘Beyond keeping peace: United Nations effectiveness in the midst of fighting’, American Political Science Review, 108 (4), 737–54. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2016), ‘United Nations peacekeeping dynamics and the duration of post-civil conflict peace’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 33 (3), 231–49. IPI [International Peace Institute] (n.d.), ‘IPI peacekeeping database’, accessed 25 February 2022 at https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​providing​-for​-peacekeeping​-database. Jennings, Kathleen M. and Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović (2009), ‘UN peacekeeping economies and local sex industries: connections and implications’, MICROCON Research Working Paper 17, accessed 24 February 2022 at https://​papers​.ssrn​.com/​sol3/​papers​.cfm​?abstract​_id​=​1488842. Kathman, Jacob D. and Michelle Benson (2019), ‘Cut short? United Nations peacekeeping and civil war duration to negotiated settlements’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (7), 1601–29. Kilcullen, David (2013), Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla, London, UK: Hurst & Company. Kofi Annan Foundation (2018), ‘Challenging the conventional: making post-violence reconciliation succeed’, accessed 25 February 2022 at https://​www​.kofiannanfoundation​.org/​transitions​-to​-peace/​ challenging​-the​-conventional​-reconciliation​-report/​.

Peacekeeping and postwar violence  299 Lindberg Bromley, Sara (2018), ‘Introducing the UCDP Peacemakers at Risk dataset, sub-Saharan Africa, 1989–2009’, Journal of Peace Research, 55 (1), 122–31. Muggah, Robert (ed.) (2009), Security and Post-conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War, Abingdon, UK and New York, NY, USA: Routledge. Nussio, Enzo (2018), ‘Ex-combatants and violence in Colombia: are yesterday’s villains today’s principal threat? Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 3 (1), 135–52. Patel, Ana Cutter, Pablo de Greiff, and Lars Waldorf (eds) (2009), Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-combatants, New York, NY, USA: Social Science Research Council. Ruggeri, Andrea, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2017), ‘Winning the peace locally: UN peacekeeping and local conflict’, International Organization, 71 (1), 163–85. Sampaio, Antônio (2019), ‘The role of power for non-state armed groups in cities: marginalised spaces and transitions from armed conflict’, Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 4 (2–3), 179–200. Sebastián, Sofía (2015), ‘The role of police in UN peace operations: filling the gap in the protection of civilians from physical violence’, Civilians in Conflict Policy Brief 3, Stimson Center, accessed 25 February 2022 at http://​stimson​.org/​wp​-content/​files/​file​-attachments/​CIC​-Policy​-Brief​_3​_Sept​-2015​ -Web​-REVISED​_Jan2016​_0​.pdf. The Telegraph (2018), ‘Central African Republic demonstrators lay corpses in front of UN mission’, 11 April, accessed 31 August 2020 at https://​www​.telegraph​.co​.uk/​news/​2018/​04/​11/​central​-african​ -republic​-demonstrators​-lay​-corpses​-front​-un/​. UN DPKO and DFS (2015), ‘Guidelines: police operations in United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions’, Ref. 2015.25, accessed 25 February 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​ .org/​sites/​default/​files/​4​.​_rule​_of​_law​_​-​_8​_police​_operations​.pdf. UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2005), ‘Transnational organized crime in the West African region’, United Nations, accessed 25 February 2022 at https://​www​.unodc​.org/​pdf/​transnational​_crime​_west​ -africa​-05​.pdf. Varese, Federico (2006), ‘How mafias migrate: the case of the ’Ndrangheta in Northern Italy’, Law & Society Review, 40 (2), 411–44.

21. Hazards of peacekeeping: peacekeepers as targets of violence Sara Lindberg Bromley

INTRODUCTION A degree of risk to peacekeepers’ safety and security is inherent to the practice of peacekeeping. During deployment, peacekeeping personnel may, for instance, suffer disease, experience accidents or fall victim to crime. While omnipresent, risks are compounded by the combined experience of armed conflict, poverty and stalled development characterizing many contexts where peacekeepers are needed. On top of this come risks associated with the threat of deliberate acts of violence. Ambushes, abductions, violent protests, roadside bombings and more have targeted peacekeeping personnel in diverse settings. In December 2017, 15 peacekeepers deployed to the United Nations (UN) mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were killed and many more injured in a rebel attack on a peacekeeping base at Semuliki (UN News 2017). Both UN peacekeepers in Mali and African Union (AU) peacekeepers in Somalia have, ever since deployment, faced challenging security environments, characterized by regular attacks (UN General Assembly 2016; Williams 2015). Indeed, violent attacks constitute a common feature of much current-day peacekeeping; well over a quarter of the total 103 UN peacekeeper fatalities recorded in 2019 were due to so-called “malicious acts” (UN Peacekeeping 2021). Such incidents can carry grave personal costs for those affected, but also for vulnerable conflict-affected communities, by often adversely impacting peacekeepers’ presence and performance. Concerns of rising threats have led to growing attention to peacekeepers’ safety and security in policy circles, culminating in the UN delivering an action plan detailing sets of efforts to make its personnel safer (UN Peacekeeping 2018). The UN Security Council has since passed resolution 2518 calling on states hosting peacekeeping operations to fulfill their obligations both in allowing peacekeepers unimpeded access and to prosecute perpetrators of attacks (UN Security Council 2020). Concomitantly, scholars have begun to directly address this important dimension of conflict and intervention in several policy-oriented analyses (Henke 2016; van der Lijn and Smit 2015; Willmot et al. 2015). Why peacekeepers become the targets of attack in the first place and with what impacts for the conduct of international peacekeeping, however, remains under-studied with only more recent efforts specifically theorizing and systematically tracking the deliberate targeting of peacekeepers. A rise in interest among scholars and policy audiences alike warrants a stocktaking of findings to date. This chapter outlines what we have learned in particular from comparative, empirical research, and highlights remaining gaps. The remainder of the chapter is organized into three parts. The first section outlines parameters relevant for the study of violence against peacekeepers. The second section reviews existing studies, distinguishing two sets of research on the topic: one set oriented toward exploring patterns and trends, and one devoted to explana300

Hazards of peacekeeping: peacekeepers as targets of violence  301 tion. Finally, a concluding discussion provides the basis for a continued research agenda on the topic by identifying possible directions for future research.

WHAT CONSTITUTES VIOLENCE AGAINST PEACEKEEPERS? In order to approach violence against peacekeepers as a distinct phenomenon, it is helpful to first outline parameters relevant to concept and measurement. First is to consider who, precisely, the peacekeepers are that may become targets. Peacekeeping refers to a set of third-party interventions to conflict contexts, deploying international personnel with an aim to maintain or restore peace and security (Fortna and Howard 2008, p. 285). Reflecting a broader tendency in the literature, research on violence against peacekeepers revolves chiefly around UN interventions – ostensibly owing to ease of definition and data availability – even though peace operations conducted by regional actors and other coalitions and partnerships make up the majority.1 Below the mission-level, peacekeepers may be all personnel attached to a peace operation – civilian, military or police – including also locally contracted staff, such as civilian experts working in substantive functions, drivers and guards. A second step is to delimit the acts or outcomes of interest to distinguish violence against peacekeepers from other forms of potential threat or risk. This entails first differentiating harm to peacekeepers by “malicious” as opposed to other causes. The UN’s own security agenda distinguishes between peacekeepers’ safety and security. The former focuses on protection from harmful but accidental events, such as traffic accidents and illness. The security agenda typically reflects acts of ‘intentional violence of political, criminal, or of undetermined hostile origin’ (Seet and Burnham 2000, p. 599) and perpetrated through a ‘deliberate act, by a malevolent actor’ (Rogers and Kennedy 2014, p. 660). The UN’s own data notes fatalities from malicious acts including crime make up just over a quarter of all peacekeeper fatalities recorded between 1948 and 2019 (UN Peacekeeping 2021).2 Purposely targeted attacks may, further, be conceived as distinct from violence impacting peacekeepers incidentally, such as in crossfire. Violence against peacekeepers can thus be understood as encompassing deliberate attacks that target peacekeepers specifically. Such incidences are not only likely to carry their own distinct logic but also be particularly salient for the conduct of peace operations, thus motivating separate study. Another dimension concerns the outcomes of interest. To date, most studies have focused on peacekeeper fatalities alone, a focus likely more driven by data limitations (van der Lijn and Smit 2017) than by theoretically motivated design. Focusing only on fatalities risks overlooking key dynamics and dimensions relevant for understanding violence against peacekeepers. First, it misses serious outcomes from attacks short of fatalities, such as injuries. Focusing on the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Figure 21.1 displays news media reported numbers of both peacekeeping fatalities (solid line) and injuries (dashed line) to illustrate how much information and potentially relevant variation may be lost from a narrower focus on fatalities. While an expansion to much earlier work, tracking such serious non-fatal violence-outcomes still captures only a slice of what could be understood as a broader phenomenon. Omitted are various types of incidences, such as threats, harassment or sabotage, or sexual violence leveled against peacekeepers that may be interlinked and equally relevant for some research questions. Findings from the aid worker security literature underscore the importance and impact of often present “everyday violence” (Fast 2014). A promising set of studies does better to capture

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Source: Collated from news media reports.

Figure 21.1

MINUSMA casualties by outcome type, 2017–19

a fuller continuum onto which fatal violence falls on one end. Focusing on the case of Darfur, Duursma (2019) argues that acts of resistance, such as intimidating and obstructing peacekeepers, serve as less costly ways to achieve the impacts of violent attacks. Dorussen and Gizelis (2013) also reflect a wider spectrum of local actor–peacekeeper interaction, in which violent acts serve as one set of “negative” (conflictual or hostile) responses to peacekeepers. A focus that hinges on violence-outcomes may thus entail an unnecessary truncation for several research purposes. As not all attacks are “successful” in harming peacekeepers, such a focus may not fully reflect perpetrators’ intent. It also neglects factors that influence whether peacekeepers perish or not. Medical advances over time may, for instance, mean peacekeepers are better able to respond to attacks and avoid death (Henke 2016; see also Fazal 2014). Properly trained and equipped peacekeepers should be better able to prevent or repel violence in the first place (Haas and Ansorg 2018). Taken together, attacks not resulting in casualties may indicate the same – or different but also relevant – hostile intent and carry equally important strategic or operational effects. Finally, more considered conceptual reflection should factor in peacekeepers’ own use of force, and attendant impacts for risks they face. Peacekeepers deployed with robust mandates and more pronounced roles for the use of force may experience greater risk owing either to their participation in clashes (see also Fjelde et al. 2016) or, argue some, from reluctance to use force when authorized and necessary (Cruz et al. 2017). Having outlined key parameters related to concept and measurement, I turn next to review existing research on the topic.

PEACEKEEPERS AS TARGETS: A REVIEW OF EXISTING WORK Peacekeepers’ experience with violence and risk is a recurring feature in much peacekeeping literature, indicative of its importance for peacekeeping performance and outcomes. Detailed

Hazards of peacekeeping: peacekeepers as targets of violence  303 case-studies track drivers of and challenges posed by attacks in diverse contexts such as Sierra Leone (Olonisakin 2008), the Balkans (Honig and Both 1997) and then-Congo in the 1960s (Tullberg 2012), and mainstream frameworks for evaluating peacekeeping outcomes include peacekeeper casualties as an indicator (Bratt 1996; Druckman and Diehl 2013, p. 22). Yet as a dedicated field of research it remains limited and systematic study on the topic has been sparse. Recent years have, however, seen a growing scholarly interest.3 A first set of studies have oriented to descriptive approaches, dedicated chiefly to the study of patterns and trends. A second strand has moved toward systematic approaches to develop, isolate and test arguments relevant to attacks as a specific form of violence. I discuss each strand of work in turn. Exploring empirical patterns and trends  A first set of studies has focused on patterns and trends to track developments in risk over time. A core aim has been to ascertain whether UN peacekeeping is, in fact, getting more dangerous. A first quantitative study showed that, although later years display a higher proportion of fatalities from hostile causes, an observed rise in the absolute number of all deaths recorded for UN peacekeepers in the post-Cold War period did not reflect a rise in relative fatality rates (Seet and Burnham 2000). In other words, when taking into account the number and scale of UN missions deployed since 1990, peacekeepers were not found to be at greater risk of dying during deployment. Yet the perception that international intervention is becoming more fraught with risk remains widely held. Indeed, the report of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations remarks that ‘United Nations personnel, both civilian and uniformed, are increasingly the direct targets of intentional attacks’ (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2015, p. 90). Spawned by the advent of new, more expansive UN peacekeeping, concerns of rising threats have reinvigorated this debate. Notwithstanding the view that the ‘UN flag no longer offers “natural” protection’ (Cruz et al. 2017, p. 4), also more recent analyses cast doubt on the notion that peacekeeping is becoming more dangerous. In fact, while on an upwards trend in absolute terms, studies show that risks of suffering lethal attacks have not increased for UN peacekeepers over time (Henke 2019; van der Lijn and Smit 2015), which seems to dispel the simple association between mandates allowing for robust action and risks facing peacekeepers (Bellamy 2014). Several points are important for reconciling these perspectives. First, given UN peacekeeping’s growth over time, we can only learn so much from trends in absolute terms. Drawing on monthly data on UN peacekeeper fatalities from hostile causes between 1948 and 2015 (Henke 2019), and monthly data on mission composition (Kathman 2013), Henke (2016) calculates fatality ratios accounting for the fluctuating size of peacekeepers’ deployment. Among her key findings is that overall fatality ratios for UN personnel decline over time, including from malicious acts. A similar trend is discernible also when accounting for a wider set of both UN and non-UN peace operations deployed to Africa and considering non-fatal violence-outcomes recorded for peacekeepers (Figure 21.2) (Lindberg Bromley 2018). The figure moreover reflects that such violence is sensitive to spikes, with trend-lines typically driven by a few particularly violence-affected interventions (see also Blood et al. 2001). Important for understanding patterns and trends is also to recognize how constraints related to data-availability impact findings.4 Most comparative studies draw on the UN’s own fatality data, thus limiting both the scope of findings and our ability to draw comparisons with other peacekeeping actors. Mappings suggest that UN operations may be less hazardous than their regional counterparts (Lindberg Bromley 2018; van der Lijn and Dundon 2014), yet accessing information on violence is particularly challenging for many non-UN peace operations. Certain

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Source: Lindberg Bromley (2018, p. 126).

Figure 21.2

Violence-outcomes recorded for peacekeepers in sub-Saharan Africa, 1989–2009

violence-affected missions in particular are characterized both by uneven record-keeping and contributing states’ reluctance to release sensitive data on fatalities (see Williams 2015). As discussed previously, finally, analyses on violence-outcomes such as fatalities alone provide only a rough measure of risks facing peacekeepers, with consequences for how we understand developments over time. If peacekeepers are, for instance, becoming better equipped and prepared to counteract or defend against attack, they may be increasingly targeted without it being reflected in fatality statistics. A UN report intimates this point, describing a rising number of attacks on UN premises, yet fewer fatalities recorded for its personnel (UN General Assembly 2015). Relatedly, casualty tolls also depend on how proactive peacekeepers are in pursuit of their mandates and how willing to take on risk-laden activities. While findings call into question the simple narrative that current-day peacekeeping is more fraught with risk, it is important to note that even seemingly divergent accounts by scholars and policymakers are not necessarily contradictory. Notwithstanding recent advancements, studies have omitted several dimensions that may also be relevant for advancing understanding of this phenomenon. The UCDP Peacemakers at Risk dataset (PAR 2018) goes some way toward meeting these gaps, expanding the conception of violence to track also some non-fatal outcomes to peacekeepers, as well as recording information on a range of relevant dimensions related to timing, location and perpetrating actor (Lindberg Bromley 2018).5 Figure 21.2, for instance, displays potentially salient variation both over time and across different types of violence-outcomes that may warrant closer examination. Recognizing peacekeeping’s often local effects, scholars are devoting greater attention to the location of peacekeeper deployments and their subnational effects (see Fjelde et al. 2019; Ruggeri et al. 2018). For illustrative purposes, Figure 21.3 provides a visualization of the UN’s

Hazards of peacekeeping: peacekeepers as targets of violence  305 then-mission to the DRC (MONUC), overlaying PAR data on violence incidents which record casualties for peacekeepers (PAR 2018) on locations with peacekeeper deployments from the Geo-PKO dataset (Cil et al. 2020). The maps suggest that peacekeepers experience violence in some but not all deployment locations, pointing to the potential utility of geographically disaggregated data for exploring whether certain localities, peacekeeping units or types of on-the-ground operations are associated with greater risk.

Source: PAR (2018).

Figure 21.3

Peacekeeping deployments and violence against peacekeepers in the DRC, 2005–06

Knowing what actors perpetrate attacks on peacekeepers, further, is central for understanding their underlying logic. In the PAR dataset, known and organized armed actors account for a vast majority (circa 96 percent) of all peacekeeper fatalities recorded. Less than 2 percent of all incidents recorded are directly attributable to a government actor, suggesting violence involving peacekeepers is mainly a non-state group phenomenon. On the non-state side, in turn, PAR records events for 60 distinctly identified armed groups, reinforcing the point that although a few interventions are over-represented in terms of the number and scale of attacks, such violence is a broader phenomenon and not reducible to a particular group, conflict or peace operation. Risk also exhibits important within-mission variations, such as regarding the nationalities of violence-affected peacekeepers. Observers note an emerging “Blue Helmet caste-system” in the UN, whereby poorer countries increasingly carry the human costs of peacekeeping (Lynch 2013; Williams 2020), raising critical ethical questions. Recent experiences in Mali suggest that in high-threat missions where Western countries also deploy military personnel, other countries still carry a heavier burden in terms of casualties (Albrecht et al. 2017). Different personnel types may also associate with different vulnerabilities. While troops are most exposed to attacks, observers note that as UN peacekeeping grows more militarized, perpetrators may increasingly target non-uniformed peacekeeping personnel, missions’ so-called

306  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations “soft underbelly” (Karlsrud 2015). Locally contracted staff may, further, experience types of risk that UN protocols are less adapted or responsive to (Müller 2020). Capturing a subset of mostly civilian UN peacekeeping personnel, a recent compilation shows that female staff are less affected by incidents overall but make up all incidences of sexual assault (UN General Assembly 2020), suggesting the sex of targeted peacekeepers may be a relevant dimension. We are only beginning to study empirical patterns in relation to these additional, relevant parameters. Studies oriented toward explanation  Scholars have only recently begun to probe in systematic ways questions related to why peacekeepers become the targets of attacks, and with what consequences. Recent advances owe much to the growing availability of fine-grained data. This section synthesizes and presents central streams of research oriented toward explanation. What has research suggested as the main determinants of violence against peacekeepers? Earlier studies oriented toward patterns and trends highlighted plausible explanations, noting factors both at the mission-level and related to the conflict environment as important. Seet and Burnham (2000), for instance, found that missions oriented to peace enforcement and providing humanitarian assistance were associated with more hostile fatalities. Blood et al. (2001, p. 14) proposed factors such as an intervention’s size, duration and ‘some measure of animosity toward the deployed force’ as important for predicting casualties. Mission type or mandate remain dominant themes for explaining violence against peacekeepers. Within the UN, a move to authorize missions with mandates providing for more pronounced roles for use of force including – such as in the DRC, Mali and the Central African Republic – offensive or even counterinsurgency-like applications (Karlsrud 2015), has fed concerns for peacekeepers’ own security. First, such interventions should be likelier to pursue military action, placing also peacekeepers at risk. Second, more expansive and robust mandates are believed to call into question peacekeepers’ role as impartial arbiters; indeed, loss of impartiality is thought to associate with increased risks for peacekeepers (Howard and Dayal 2018; Hunt 2017), including by the UN itself (UN General Assembly 2015). A subtler, general UN shift toward stabilization logics adds to risks by ‘aligning peacekeepers more closely with contestable political objectives’ (Bellamy and Hunt 2015, p. 1287). In some contexts, peacekeepers enter the conflict militarily in support of one party, typically the government, which may make peacekeepers legitimate targets by others (Fjelde et al. 2016; Pouligny 2006, p. 255). Peacekeepers’ security also hinges on missions being appropriately staffed and adequately equipped. The UN notes how assets such as armored vehicles, access to technological tools, training and medical care are critical for protecting peacekeepers (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2015, p. 22). Medical assets, including for evacuation, specifically, are thought essential for force protection purposes and for optimizing peacekeepers’ performance (Johnson 2016; Willmot et al. 2015), providing they can access them (Connolly and Johansen 2017). But better equipped and capable missions may also be less susceptible to attacks. Troops that deploy willing and able to use force may, argue some, see an enhanced deterrent effect by discouraging would-be perpetrators (Cruz et al. 2017). Morgan (2015) suggests more cohesive UN missions – here, missions made up of organizationally similar personnel – should suffer fewer fatalities because they are better able to coordinate their efforts and deter attacks. Pointing to important within-mission variation, accounts suggest that better-equipped uni-

Hazards of peacekeeping: peacekeepers as targets of violence  307 formed mission personnel likely are better prepared for and protected in the event of an attack but may also be less likely to experience attack in the first place.6 A second set of explanatory factors relates to the conflict environment into which peacekeepers deploy. A prevalent expectation is that they should be at greater risk where there is “no peace to keep” and armed conflict continues in their presence. Echoing a wider finding that peacekeepers tend to be sent to the toughest cases (for example, Fortna 2008; Ruggeri et al. 2018), the UN’s own figures reflect its personnel increasingly operate in ‘substantially’ or ‘extremely dangerous’ contexts (UN General Assembly 2014, p. 8), often with no comprehensive settlement in place and where transnational terrorist groups are also present (Hunt 2017). Studies do point to an association between conflict intensity and the targeting of peacekeepers; specifically, showing conflicts with greater casualties overall to also see higher numbers of peacekeeper fatalities (Bove and Elia 2011; Cordell et al. 2021; Fjelde et al. 2016). Yet what explains the targeting of peacekeepers, specifically? A number of recent studies develop and test arguments related to the targeting of peacekeepers, and the impact thereon of conflict-related factors. A guiding view is that peacekeeping does not happen in a vacuum and that peacekeepers, with their presence, ‘manipulate the post-agreement interaction among the domestic actors’ in important ways (Ruggeri et al. 2013, p. 390). Armed actors may therefore opt to target peacekeepers to try and reduce or shape an intervention’s influence. For instance, armed groups may have strategic incentives to target peacekeepers to effectuate operational restrictions or even their withdrawal (Salverda 2013), including to prevent peacekeepers’ access to specific localities (Duursma 2019). Attacks may also serve as an alternative strategy for non-state actors seeking to undermine a government opponent, to show strength and signal commitment to continued fighting (Fjelde et al. 2016), or to inhibit local community support (Nomikos and Hunnicutt 2019). Salverda (2013) finds that relatively stronger rebel groups are more likely to target UN peacekeepers, as they may view the intervention as an obstacle to their aim of defeating the government (see also Ruggeri et al. 2013). Such incentives may, however, vary as the balance of power between conflict parties shifts over the course of the intervention. In that vein, Fjelde et al. (2016) show that rebels suffering losses in clashes with the government are more likely to target peacekeepers, ostensibly to offset such losses. Taken together, recent studies point to the importance of understanding attacks in the context of the broader, dynamic conflict environment in which peacekeeping occurs. A separate strand of research focuses instead on the consequences of attacks, examining violence against peacekeepers as an independent variable. Particularly in relation to UN operations, attacks are widely expected to associate with a range of adverse consequences, impacting both force generation and on-the-ground operations. Contributing countries are differently accepting of costs associated with harm to its personnel in UN missions (Bellamy and Hunt 2015; Haass and Ansorg 2018); moreover, avoiding or reducing risks for peacekeepers is viewed as a key UN peacekeeping objective (Cruz et al. 2017). Focusing first on strategic-level considerations, several studies on the so-called sender- or supply-side dimensions of peacekeeping reflect expected or actual risk for peacekeepers as potentially influencing countries’ willingness to participate. Given that contributions are voluntary, countries engage in a cost–benefit calculus to determine whether it is in their interest to deploy personnel to particular missions. Greater risk for peacekeeping personnel is one factor that may hamper countries’ willingness to contribute (Bove and Elia 2011) or stay involved (Levin 2021). Results from analyses that reflect risk as one of multiple factors relevant to

308  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations deployment decisions have, however, been mixed. The impact of risk on decisions to contribute may, for instance, differ for UN and non-UN missions (Bove and Elia 2011; Gaibulloev et al. 2015), and for differently developed or wealthy sending countries (Du Bois et al. 2015; Levin 2021). Counter to intuition, and although it is unlikely that risk is driving such decisions, some studies find that greater numbers of fatalities associate with more peacekeeping engagement, whether on behalf of specific contributors (Raes et al. 2019), or overall, in terms of mandate renewals (Allen and Yuen 2014) or the authorization of new missions (Cordell et al. 2021). Attacks on peacekeepers often also carry more direct and operational impacts at the level of the mission. Peacekeeping failures in Somalia and Rwanda in the 1990s, both with catastrophic consequences for civilian communities, also featured egregious attacks on peacekeepers. In Rwanda, an incident in which ten Belgian peacekeepers were brutally killed led to the withdrawal of the entire Belgian contingent, leaving the UN mission poorly positioned to curtail the unfolding genocide (Kathman 2013; Power 2001). Short of withdrawal, more common is rather that attacks carry adverse consequences for peacekeepers’ performance. Actual or perceived risk often leads to adaptations to keep peacekeepers safe, restrictive security policies and peacekeepers devoting much of their efforts to force protection (Pouligny 2006, p. 250). Efforts taken to minimize or evade risk often curtail peacekeepers’ mobility, limit their span of movement, lead to a scaling back of activities or introduction of caveats, and increase the degree of separation between peacekeepers and host communities, as such posited to reduce peacekeepers’ ability to operate effectively (Autesserre 2014, pp. 55–6, 226–30; Hunt 2017). Illustrative is the UN’s mission to Mali, where peacekeepers deployed outside of the capital now largely reside in a few, heavily fortified, compounds. Certain phases in a mission’s lifespan may be especially susceptible or sensitive to armed confrontations, such as during its start-up phase (Coleman et al. 2021). Upon arrival in Somalia, for instance, AU troops came under immediate attack, delaying the establishment of new bases and initially conducting few patrols, as well as hampering force generation to authorized strength (Elfversson et al. 2019). In such and other ways, attacks are expected to negatively impact peacekeepers’ performance and may make them less able to accomplish core aims, yet we lack systematic assessments on the precise impacts of violence on wider mission outcomes.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH Recent studies have advanced understanding of under what circumstances, why and with what consequences peacekeeping personnel become the targets of violence, yet important gaps remain. I propose three areas in need of further attention, constituting promising avenues for future research. First, further effort should be devoted to developing and testing dedicated theory on the topic. Building on recent examples, theorizing conflict-level determinants of attacks holds particular promise with two entry-points being potentially fruitful: linking attacks to specific perpetrators and leveraging their precise timing. Recognizing that a peacekeeping presence re-shapes local power dynamics and relationships, it follows to connect the targeting of peacekeepers to broader conflict context. For instance, what armed actors opt to target peacekeepers and how does it fit into their broader repertoires of violence? Focusing on timing allows for

Hazards of peacekeeping: peacekeepers as targets of violence  309 linking attacks to important junctures in a conflict’s war-to-peace transition or a mission’s life cycle, which may unlock important insights on explanations. A second avenue for future research is continuing efforts to access or collect comprehensive and detailed data on violence against peacekeepers. As noted in this chapter, most analyses to date build on data of limited or narrow scope, such as focusing overwhelmingly on UN peace operations. A focus limited to fatal outcomes recorded for peacekeepers, further, omits a wider set of potentially related and relevant hostile actions. As a result, we likely capture only a subset of the phenomenon of interest (see Duursma 2019), and in case other forms of hostile expression are “precursors” to more severe violence we may also miss opportunities to diagnose intervention contexts and predict attacks. There is thus a case for continuing recent efforts to better link violence against peacekeepers to related phenomena both conceptually and through better data. Finally, there is opportunity for scholars to probe dominant assumptions surrounding attacks on peacekeepers that may be outdated or have yet to be corroborated. Scholars’ contributions to understanding trends over time constitute a promising example, contributing to debunk popular yet likely over-simplified perceptions regarding the increasing dangers of intervention (Bellamy 2014; Henke 2016). Yet important disconnects remain. First is a tendency to focus on idiosyncratic features related to specific contexts or interventions at the expense of more generally applicable explanations, even when recent work shows that targeted attacks are more widely occurring and exhibit much variation (Lindberg Bromley 2018). Another tendency is to propose wider, imprecise explanations related to static features such as mandate or mission-type. If the UN deploys all robust missions by habit (Howard and Dayal 2018), and missions implement their mandates differently, then mandates are a blunt tool for understanding this phenomenon. Factors such as peacekeepers’ use of force and impartiality may be central for understanding attacks, but we need to study their impact in more precise and fine-grained ways. Findings from a recent UN review suggests that concerns for peacekeepers’ safety and security may propel a shift toward more robust and offensive approaches (Cruz et al. 2017), raising the stakes for scholars’ engagement on questions of high policy relevance. In addition to promoting further in-depth focus on violence against peacekeepers through more dedicated theory, comprehensive data, and greater engagement with policy-relevant questions on the topic, I suggest there is also a case for considering breadth of application. Risks facing peacekeepers may be relevant to a range of topics related to peacekeeping deployment, performance and effectiveness (such as in Haass and Ansorg 2018). It also provides a lens with which to understand processes at the international level that explain where peacekeepers go and who deploys them (Williams 2020). As such, it may serve as a relevant frame for understanding many other, broader processes of conflict, cooperation and peace.7

NOTES 1. See Chapter 8 (Bara) in this Handbook. 2. Other hazards such as accidents and illnesses thus account for a larger share of UN fatalities. Fatalities from illness have seen a rise (Rogers and Kennedy 2014), including in recent times from Covid-related causes (UN Secretary-General 2021). 3. Attacks on aid workers have seen more academic study (Fast 2014; Hoelscher et al. 2017; Narang and Stanton 2017).

310  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations 4. Publicly available data-sources include UN fatalities data (UN Peacekeeping 2021; see also Henke 2019), UCDP PAR dataset (Lindberg Bromley 2018), and SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (available on file from SIPRI). Relevant data also features in, for example, ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010) and Mullenbach (2013). The UN tracks a wider set of security incidents at the mission level for internal use, to enhance situational awareness and force protection. Efforts are underway to streamline and centralize UN-procedures for collecting, collating and sharing data within the organization in tandem with a move toward greater data transparency in general (see Duursma and Karlsrud 2019). Mission-level reports of the Secretary-General now often contain dedicated sections for presenting patterns of attacks on peacekeepers during the reporting period. Yet only fatalities data is publicly available in a disaggregated format, now provided with more incident-level detail and through an improved interface (UN Peacekeeping 2021). 5. PAR (2018) focuses on UN and non-UN peace operations deployed to conflict-affected countries in sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2009, and tracks violence against – but also leveled by – peacekeepers, drawing on publicly available sources such as news media. 6. Interview by author with MINUSMA official, Bamako, September 2016. 7. The author would like to thank Anna Marie Obermeier for her valuable research assistance, and Paul D. Williams and Timothy J. A. Passmore for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. This research was supported by the Folke Bernadotte Academy and the Swedish Research Council.

REFERENCES Albrecht, Peter, Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde, and Rikke Haugegaard (2017), African Peacekeepers in Mali, report 2017:02, Danish Institute for International Studies, accessed 26 February 2022 at https://​ pure​.diis​.dk/​ws/​files/​762381/​DIIS​_RP​_2017​_2​_WEB​.pdf. Allen, Susan Hannah and Amy T. Yuen (2014), ‘The politics of peacekeeping: UN Security Council oversight across peacekeeping missions’, International Studies Quarterly, 58 (3), 621–32. Autesserre, Séverine (2014), Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention, New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Bellamy, Alex J. (2014), ‘Are new robust mandates putting UN peacekeepers more at risk?’, IPI Global Observatory, 29 May, accessed 26 February 2022 at http://​theglobalobservatory​.org/​2014/​05/​new​ -robust​-mandates​-putting​-un​-peacekeepers​-at​-risk/​. Bellamy, Alex J. and Charles T. Hunt (2015), ‘Twenty-first century UN peace operations: protection, force and the changing security environment’, International Affairs, 91 (6), 1277–98. Blood, Christopher G., Jinjin Zhang, and G. Jay Walker (2001), Implications for Modeling Casualty Sustainment during Peacekeeping Operations, report 01-27, Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, CA, accessed 26 February 2022 at https://​apps​.dtic​.mil/​sti/​citations/​ADA400155. Bove, Vincenzo and Leandro Elia (2011), ‘Supplying peace: participation in and troop contribution to peacekeeping missions’, Journal of Peace Research, 48 (6), 699–714. Bratt, Duane (1996), ‘Assessing the success of UN peacekeeping operations’, International Peacekeeping, 3 (4), 64–81. Cil, Deniz, Hanne Fjelde, Lisa Hultman, and Desirée Nilsson (2020), ‘Mapping blue helmets: introducing the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (GEO-PKO) dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 57 (2), 360–70. Coleman, Katharina P., Magnus Lundgren, and Kseniya Oksamytna (2021), ‘Slow progress on UN rapid deployment: the pitfalls of policy paradigms in international organizations’, International Studies Review, 23 (3), 455–83. Connolly, Lesley and Håvard Johansen (2017), Medical Support for UN Peace Operations in High-Risk Environments, International Peace Institute (IPI), 11 April, accessed 26 February 2022 at https://​www​ .ipinst​.org/​2017/​04/​medical​-support​-un​-peace​-ops​-in​-high​-risk​-environments. Cordell, Rebecca, Thorin Wright, and Paul F. Diehl (2021), ‘Extant commitment, risk, and UN peacekeeping authorization’, International Interactions, 47 (1), 135–60. Cruz, Carlos Alberto dos Santos, William R. Phillips, and Salvator Cusimano (2017), Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business, independ-

Hazards of peacekeeping: peacekeepers as targets of violence  311 ent report, 19 December, accessed 26 February 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​en/​improving​ -security​-of​-united​-nations​-peacekeepers​-independent​-report. Dorussen, Han and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2013), ‘Into the lion’s den: local responses to UN peacekeeping’, Journal of Peace Research, 50 (6), 691–706. Druckman, Daniel and Paul F. Diehl (2013), Peace Operation Success: A Comparative Analysis, Leiden, NL: Koninklijke Brill and Martinus Nijhoff. Du Bois, Cind, Caroline Buts, and Steffi Raes (2015), ‘Post-Somalia syndrome: does it exist?’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 21 (4), 515–22. Duursma, Allard (2019), ‘Obstruction and intimidation of peacekeepers: how armed actors undermine civilian protection efforts’, Journal of Peace Research, 56 (2), 234–48. Duursma, Allard and John Karlsrud (2019), ‘Predictive peacekeeping: strengthening predictive analysis in UN peace operations’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 8 (1), 1–19. Elfversson, Emma, Sara Lindberg Bromley, and Paul D. Williams (2019), ‘Urban peacekeeping under siege: attacks on African Union peacekeepers in Mogadishu, 2007–2009’, Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 4 (2–3), 158–78. Fast, Larissa (2014), Aid in Danger: The Perils and Promise of Humanitarianism, Philadelphia, PA, USA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Fazal, Tanisha M. (2014), ‘Dead wrong? Battle deaths, military medicine, and exaggerated reports of war’s demise’, International Security, 39 (1), 95–125. Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman, and Sara Lindberg Bromley (2016), ‘Offsetting losses: bargaining power and rebel attacks on peacekeepers’, International Studies Quarterly, 60 (4), 611–23. Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman, and Desirée Nilsson (2019), ‘Protection through presence: UN peacekeeping and the costs of targeting civilians’, International Organization, 73 (1), 103–31. Fortna, V. Page (2008), Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Fortna, V. Page and Lise Morjé Howard (2008), ‘Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11 (1), 283–301. Gaibulloev, Khusrav, Justin George, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Shimizu (2015), ‘Personnel contributions to UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions: a public goods approach’, Journal of Peace Research, 52 (6), 727–42. Haass, Felix and Nadine Ansorg (2018), ‘Better peacekeepers, better protection? Troop quality of United Nations peace operations and violence against civilians’, Journal of Peace Research, 55 (6), 742–58. Henke, Marina E. (2016), Has UN Peacekeeping Become More Deadly? Analyzing Trends in UN Fatalities, International Peace Institute, Providing for Peacekeeping 14, accessed 26 February 2022 at https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2016/​11/​1612​_Peacekeeping​-Fatalities​.pdf. Henke, Marina E. (2019), ‘UN fatalities 1948–2015: a new dataset’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 36 (4), 425–42. Hoelscher, K., J. Miklian and H. M. Nygård (2017), ‘Conflict, peacekeeping, and humanitarian security: understanding violent attacks against aid workers’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (4), 538–65. Honig, Jan Willem and Norbert Both (1997), Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, New York, NY, USA: Penguin Books. Howard, Lise Morjé and Anjali Kaushlesh Dayal (2018), ‘The use of force in UN peacekeeping’, International Organization, 72 (1), 71–103. Hunt, Charles T. (2017), ‘All necessary means to what ends? The unintended consequences of the “robust turn” in UN peace operations’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (1), 108–31. Johnson, Ralph J. (2016), ‘A literature review of medical aspects of post-cold war UN peacekeeping operations: trends, lessons learnt, courses of action and recommendations’, Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, 162 (4), 250–55. Karlsrud, John (2015), ‘The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali’, Third World Quarterly, 36 (1), 40–54. Kathman, Jacob D. (2013), ‘United Nations peacekeeping personnel commitments, 1990–2011’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 30 (5), 532–49. Levin, Andrew (2021), ‘Peacekeeper fatalities and force commitments to UN operations’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 38 (3), 292–315.

312  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Lindberg Bromley, Sara (2018), ‘Introducing the Peacemakers at Risk dataset, sub-Saharan Africa 1989–2009’, Journal of Peace Research, 55 (1), 122–31. Lynch, C. (2013), ‘The blue helmet caste system’, Foreign Policy, 11 April. https://​foreignpolicy​.com/​ 2013/​04/​11/​the​-blue​-helmet​-caste​-system/​. Morgan, Michael A. (2015), ‘Structure matters: how organizational characteristics affect military efforts’, 13, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Kentucky, accessed 26 February 2022 at http://​ uknowledge​.uky​.edu/​polysci​_etds/​13/​. Mullenbach, Mark J. (2013), ‘Third-party peacekeeping in intrastate disputes, 1946–2012: a new dataset’, The Midsouth Political Science Review, 14, 103–33. Müller, Tanja R. (2020), ‘Protection of civilians mandates and “collateral damage” of UN peacekeeping missions: histories of refugees from Darfur’, International Peacekeeping, 27 (5), 760–84. Narang, Neil and Jessica A. Stanton (2017), ‘A strategic logic of attacking aid workers: evidence from violence in Afghanistan’, International Studies Quarterly, 61 (1), 38–51. Nomikos, William G. and Patrick Hunnicutt (2019), ‘Non-combatants or counterinsurgents? The strategic logic of violence against UN peacekeeping’, unpublished paper. Olonisakin, ’Funmi (2008), Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL, Boulder, CO, USA: Lynne Rienner. PAR (2018), Peacemakers at Risk (PAR) dataset, accessed 24 March 2022 at PRIO Replication Datasets (JPR 55-1), https://​www​.prio​.org/​journals/​jpr/​replicationdata. [Future versions will be published at www​.pcr​.uu​.se/​data/​.] Pouligny, Béatrice (2006), Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People, Bloomfield, CT, USA: Kumarian Press. Power, Samantha (2001), ‘Bystanders to genocide’, The Atlantic Monthly, 288 (2), 84–108. Raes, Steffi, Cind Du Bois, and Caroline Buts (2019), ‘Supplying UN peacekeepers: an assessment of the body bag syndrome among OECD nations’, International Peacekeeping, 26 (1), 111–36. Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen (2010), ‘Introducing ACLED: an armed conflict location and event dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 47 (5), 651–60. Rogers, James I. and Caroline Kennedy (2014), ‘Dying for peace? Fatality trends for United Nations peacekeeping personnel’, International Peacekeeping, 21 (5), 658–72. Ruggeri, Andrea, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2018), ‘On the frontline every day? Subnational deployment of United Nations peacekeepers’, British Journal of Political Science, 48 (4), 1005–25. Ruggeri, Andrea, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Han Dorussen (2013), ‘Managing mistrust: an analysis of cooperation with UN peacekeeping in Africa’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57 (3), 387–409. Salverda, Nynke (2013), ‘Blue helmets as targets: a quantitative analysis of rebel violence against peacekeepers, 1989–2003’, Journal of Peace Research, 50 (6), 707–20. Seet, Benjamin and Gilbert M. Burnham (2000), ‘Fatality trends in United Nations peacekeeping operations, 1948–1998’, Journal of the American Medical Association, 284 (5), 598–603. Tullberg, Andreas (2012), ‘We are in the Congo now’: Sweden and the trinity of peacekeeping during the Congo crisis 1960–1964’, Doctoral Dissertation, Lund University, accessed 27 February 2022 at https://​lucris​.lub​.lu​.se/​ws/​portalfiles/​portal/​4042936/​3941179​.pdf. UN General Assembly (2014), ‘Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’, Report of the Secretary-General, A/69/642, 9 December, accessed 27 February 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​786752​?ln​=​en. UN General Assembly (2015), ‘Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel’, Report of the Secretary-General A/70/383, 21 September, accessed 27 February 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​806075​?ln​=​en. UN General Assembly (2016), ‘Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’, Report of the Secretary-General, A/71/587, 31 October, accessed 27 February 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​849757​?ln​=​en. UN General Assembly (2020), ‘Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel’, Report of the Secretary-General, A/75/246, 21 September, accessed 27 February 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​3889100​?ln​=​en. UN General Assembly and Security Council (2015), ‘The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations’,

Hazards of peacekeeping: peacekeepers as targets of violence  313 A/70/357 and S/2015/682, 2 September, accessed 27 February 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​ record/​802167​?ln​=​en. UN News (2017), ‘DR Congo: over a dozen UN peacekeepers killed in worst attack on “blue helmets” in recent history’, 8 December, accessed 27 February 2022 at https://​news​.un​.org/​en/​story/​2017/​12/​ 638812​-dr​-congo​-over​-dozen​-un​-peacekeepers​-killed​-worst​-attack​-blue​-helmets​-recent. UN Peacekeeping (2018), ‘Summary of the action plan to implement the report on improving security of peacekeepers’, January, accessed 27 February 2022 at https://​peacekeeping​.un​.org/​en/​action​-plan​-to​ -implement​-report​-improving​-security​-of​-peacekeepers. UN Peacekeeping (2021), ‘United Nations peacekeeper fatalities’, accessed 26 February 2022 at https://​ peacekeeping​.un​.org/​en/​peacekeeper​-fatalities. UN Secretary-General (2021), ‘Secretary-General’s remarks at the Annual Memorial Service to honour United Nations Personnel who lost their lives in the line of duty in 2020’, 6 May, accessed 26 February 2022 at https://​www​.un​.org/​sg/​en/​content/​sg/​statement/​2021​-05​-06/​secretary​-generals​-remarks​-the​ -annual​-memorial​-service​-honour​-united​-nations​-personnel​-who​-lost​-their​-lives​-the​-line​-of​-duty​ -2020​-delivered. UN Security Council (2020), ‘Resolution 2518’, S/RES/2518, 30 March, accessed 27 February 2022 at https://​digitallibrary​.un​.org/​record/​3856398​?ln​=​en. van der Lijn, Jaïr and Jane Dundon (2014), ‘Peacekeepers at risk: the lethality of peace operations’, SIPRI Policy Brief, February, accessed 27 February 2022 at https://​www​.sipri​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​ files/​misc/​SIPRIPB1402​.pdf. van der Lijn, Jaïr and Timo Smit (2015), ‘Peacekeepers under threat? Fatality trends in UN peace operations’, SIPRI Policy Brief, September, accessed 27 February 2022 at https://​www​.sipri​.org/​sites/​ default/​files/​files/​misc/​SIPRIPB1509​.pdf. van der Lijn, Jaïr and Timo Smit (2017), ‘Challenges and opportunities for peace operations data collection: experiences from the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (1), 23–8. Williams, Paul D. (2015), ‘Special report: how many fatalities has the African Union mission in Somalia suffered?’, IPI Global Observatory, 10 September, accessed 27 February 2022 at https://​ theglobalobservatory​.org/​2015/​09/​amisom​-african​-union​-somalia​-peacekeeping/​. Williams, Paul D. (2020), ‘The Security Council’s peacekeeping trilemma’, International Affairs, 96 (2), 479–99. Willmot, Haidi, Scott Sheeran, and Lisa Sharland (2015), Safety and Security Challenges in UN Peace Operations, International Peace Institute, Providing for Peacekeeping 10, accessed 27 February 2022 at https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2015/​07/​IPI​-E​-pub​-Safety​-and​-Security​-in​-Peace​-Ops​ .pdf.

22. The local perception of peacekeepers Han Dorussen and Marian de Vooght

INTRODUCTION Peacekeepers prefer to portray themselves as a force for good welcomed by the local population. Their public-relations efforts highlight peaceful and relaxed interactions of the “blue helmets” with civilians with an abundance of pictures of friendly peacekeepers engaging with smiling women and children. All of this contrasts starkly with news reports of peacekeepers coming under attack, for example, the Blackhawk Down incident in Mogadishu (1993), the killing of Belgian peacekeepers and the subsequent withdrawal of peacekeepers in Rwanda (1994), or the failure of Dutch peacekeepers to protect civilians in Srebrenica (1995), as well as persistent reports of sexual abuse by peacekeepers (Bell et al. 2018; Lee and Bartels 2020).1 The carefully curated public image and sobering revelations largely hide the often complex and inconsistent relations between peacekeepers and the local population. A relatively small but rapidly increasing body of literature is exploring these relations in an attempt to provide an evaluation of peace operations as “seen from below” (Pouligny 2006). Pertinently, Diehl and Druckman include knowledge of and support for a peace operation among the local population as indicators for operational effectiveness and observe that ‘[s]ecurity is related to the popularity of the mission and is also indicated by the frequency of attacks on peacekeepers: more popular missions are likely to be more secure’ (2010, p. 51). They note that some missions have begun to commission surveys collecting information on public support, but also acknowledge the costs and practicalities of fielding surveys given often challenging circumstances. There is an increasing number of studies using event and survey data to analyze the perceptions and experiences of the peacekept (e.g., on UNOCI, Mvukiyehe and Samii 2008; on UNMIL, Mvukiyehe and Samii 2010;2 on UNMIK, Kelmendi and Rabin 2018; on MINUSTAH, Gordon and Young 2017). Alongside surveys, UN field reports provide an important source of information on local responses to UN peacekeeping (Dorussen and Gizelis 2013; Amicarelli and Di Salvatore 2021).3 Apart from reviewing their key findings, we will present more detailed information from two such surveys held in Timor-Leste in 2013 (Dorussen 2015a; 2015b) and Haiti in 2019 (Bakaki and Dorussen 2021; Dorussen et al. 2021), respectively, below.4 Although not central to this review, it needs to be noted that most studies of the peacekept still rely primarily on ethnographic fieldwork (Pouligny 2006; Autesserre 2010; 2014; 2021; Sabrow 2017). These studies broadly share with critical studies of peacekeeping an interest in the so-called “local turn in peacebuilding” (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Leonardsson and Rudd 2015) advocating a more prominent role for local agency and local solutions to conflict. The main argument is that local perception of peacekeepers is often negative because of their top-down – foreign and elite-oriented – approach to peacebuilding. Population surveys that systematically collect information on how locals perceive peacekeepers are, however, important to provide better understanding of how specific peacekeeping activities affect popular perception. 314

The local perception of peacekeepers  315 As the first to coin the term, Clapham (1998, p. 303) defines the peacekept as ‘the parties to the conflict which peacekeepers seek to resolve, and the populations whose aspirations the conflict parties claim (often meretriciously) to represent.’ Fortna (2008, p. 8) limits the peacekept to ‘decision makers within the government and rebel organizations,’ but arguably protection-of-civilians or human-rights mandates also render civil society organizations (CSOs), (local) nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and even local populations as relevant foci of peacekeeping. These various local actors are not only likely to differ in their support for a mission, but any support is also conditional on the perceived effectiveness of specific peacekeeping activities for them. Notably, transformative peacekeeping not only expands the peacekeeping mandate but has made peacekeeping more robust and interfering. There is a marked difference between peacekeepers mainly observing a contested border as, for example, UNFICYP in Cyprus or UNMOGIP deployed to the Kashmir border between India and Pakistan, in comparison to transitional government missions such as UNTAET and UNMIT in Timor-Leste. Transformative peacekeeping affects more people and it does so more directly, visibly, and intrusively. Based on event coding of the UN Secretary General reports, Dorussen and Gizelis (2013, p. 692) study accordingly ‘which actors are more/less willing to cooperate, what policies are more/less controversial, and in which role the UN peacekeepers are best received’ (emphasis added). The evolution from traditional to transformative (or multidimensional) peacekeeping has impacted all three dimensions. Consequently, the dynamics of local support have become more complex but also more relevant for the (continued) success of peacekeeping missions. So far, there is no consensus on how to measure the local perception of peacekeepers. Dorussen and Gizelis (2013) and Ruggeri et al. (2013) code instances of cooperation between the peacekept and UN peacekeepers. Most surveys rely on questions asking respondents to evaluate the effectiveness of peacekeepers based on their confidence in peacekeepers’ ability to prevent violence. Sabrow (2017) makes an interesting distinction between pragmatic and ideological legitimacy which recognizes that performance on the ground can deviate from the perceived right to intervene. Mvukiyehe and Samii (2010) distinguish between preventing fighting between armed groups and protection of civilians. Relatedly, respondents are asked whether peacekeepers should be credited for ending the war, their contribution to the peace process, or, conversely due to poor performance, whether they should leave (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2008; 2010; Dorussen 2015a; Leib and Ruppel 2021). Kelmendi and Rabin (2018) query satisfaction with the UN missions, while Gordon and Young (2017) distinguish between beliefs about the peacekeepers’ effectiveness, benevolence, and abusiveness, and the impact of these beliefs on willingness to cooperate with peacekeepers by sharing information and reporting crime. Bakaki and Dorussen (2021) and Dorussen et al. (2021) use perception of the effectiveness, inclusiveness, and integrity as dimensions of (political) trust in peacekeepers and other peacebuilding organizations.5 Regardless, across a broad spectrum of missions, surveys generally report high levels of local support for peacekeeping missions. For example, the local population credited peacekeepers for supporting the independence of Timor-Leste, where Dorussen (2015a) reports that 96 percent of the respondents expressed gratitude for the UN mission. Mvukiyehe and Samii note that in Liberia ‘[t]he overwhelming majority of respondents in the household sample credited UNMIL with helping to end the war’ (2010, p. 3). Leib and Ruppel (2021, pp. 15–20) report that 99 percent of the respondents agree that UNMIL had been very or somewhat important for the peace process and 94 percent of respondents stated that the contribution of

316  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations UNAMSIL to the peace process in Sierra Leone had been excellent or good. In both cases, UN peacekeepers were evaluated more positively than other peacebuilders. Also in the Ivory Coast, respondents were generally positive about UNOCI and recognized its role in preventing the renewal of hostilities (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2008). In Haiti, Gordon and Young observe that ‘respondents generally hold a positive view of MINUSTAH’ (2017, p. 72). At the same time, these high levels of general support for peacekeeping operations (PKOs) hide notable spatial-temporal variation leaving a lot of uncertainty about who supports (or disapproves of) what specific peacekeeping activities. The conditionality and heterogeneity of local support are discussed further in the next sections. The final section considers whether peacekeeper engagement with the local population is key to increasing and maintaining support for operations as argued in bottom-up peacekeeping (Autesserre 2010; 2021). Alternatively, local support for peacekeeping could be more indirect and depend on the overall record of the mission in stabilizing the situation (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2021).

THE DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL SUPPORT FOR PEACEKEEPING Most of the peacekept share with peacekeeping missions an interest in the provision of security and relief services. Peacekeepers can reasonably expect the local population to support their efforts to secure a peace agreement, avoid a return of hostilities, protect civilians, and provide humanitarian relief. In that sense, high levels of public support for the aims of a peacekeeping mission should not come as a surprise. At the same time, public support cannot be taken for granted. First of all, people need to be aware of the peacekeeping mission. Approval is likely conditional on exposure to peacekeeping: does the mission have a presence locally and is the local population aware of what peacekeepers are doing? Peacekeepers frequently struggle to be visible given the large area of land with often limited infrastructure that they are expected to patrol (Pouligny 2006, pp. 27–30). Missions also need to be seen as relevant; in other words, to make a real difference. This requires that enough peacekeepers are deployed in a timely manner to effectively respond to disturbances. The local population – or significant portions of them – may well remain uncertain about what the peacekeeping mission is trying to achieve and the benefits the mission will bring to them. Finally, the experience of the local population with peacekeepers counts. It matters with whom peacekeepers engage – or are seen to interact – and how the interaction unfolds. Autesserre (2010) argues that limited knowledge of local conditions among peacekeepers and lack of opportunities for meaningful interactions between peacekeepers and local population are hindrances to effective peacebuilding. Abusive behavior of peacekeepers, or already credible stories about such behavior, are also likely to undermine public support.6 Exposure  Based on the UN self-reporting for PKOs in sub-Saharan Africa, Dorussen and Gizelis (2013) code peacekeeping events as interactions between UN peacekeepers and different local actors, specifically national and local government authorities, and rebel groups. They observe that peacekeepers are more likely to engage with central government authorities than with rebel actors, and that events involving the former are also more often reported as cooperative, which suggests that there is a positive association between exposure and cooperation. Only a small number of the events involved local authorities directly, which may reflect a neglect of local power dynamics by UN peacekeepers but may also result from reporting bias when interactions with local actors are considered relatively unimportant by the UN.

The local perception of peacekeepers  317 In their survey in Haiti, Gordon and Young (2017, p. 74) also report that the visibility of peacekeepers matters: exposure to peacekeeping actions to improve security or provide relief increases the willingness of locals to share information and to report criminal activities to the mission. Mvukiyehe and Samii (2008; 2010; 2021) and Blair (2021) use the distance from peacekeeping bases as an indication of variation in exposure to peacekeeping, allowing them to control for the non-random assignment of peacekeeping activities. In Liberia, Blair (2021, pp. 190–96) finds that exposure to UNMIL makes respondents more willing to rely on UNMIL as well as formal state institutions – while less dependent on informal institutions – to provide security and justice. Even without direct interactions, locals can be aware of the presence of peacekeepers. In Timor-Leste, following the departure of UNMIT, 48 percent of the respondents recalled seeing a UN police officer and nearly 40 percent saw an international military officer on duty at least nearly every month (Dorussen 2015a). There is further evidence that the visibility of peacekeepers matters: respondents who had more regularly observed UN Police (UNPOL) were less likely to believe that local police performed better without UNPOL assistance. However, a similar pattern was not observed regarding military peacekeepers. Bakaki and Dorussen’s (2021) representative survey covering all regions of Haiti also shows more nuanced results: of the 70 percent of respondents who were aware of the UN only 27 percent had noticed their presence. Where peacekeepers are deployed within Haiti is also germane, for example, in the Ouest Department, which includes the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince, 90 percent of respondents were aware of the UN and 52 percent of them had noticed the presence of UN peacekeepers, while in the Department of Nord-Ouest only 34 percent were aware of the UN and 31 percent of them had noticed their presence. Figure 22.1 contrasts mean exposure and approval of the UN across departments in Haiti and shows only a weak positive association (r = 0.41; p = 0.2). At the individual level, there is no evidence to suggest that exposure to UN activities leads to approval (r = −0.003; p = 0.9). Relevance  For several reasons, peacekeepers are not always seen as relevant. Research has highlighted the failure to deploy enough peacekeepers in a timely manner undermining their ability to make a real difference.7 Examining UN peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa, Ruggeri et al. (2018) and Powers et al. (2015) find that peacekeepers are deployed to areas that experience more conflict and, moreover, that ‘this relationship grows the longer the PKO missions are in the civil war-torn country’ (Powers et al. 2015, p. 60). If peacekeepers are deployed – with sufficient strength and in a timely manner – to areas with more severe violence, this is likely to mediate the effect of exposure on local perception. Contrasting these generally positive assessments, Costalli (2014) finds that peacekeepers were deployed to localities in Bosnia with higher levels of conflict, but also that the failure of UN peacekeepers to deploy in a timely manner to conflict hotspots limited their ability to make a meaningful difference. Similarly, in Liberia, Mvukiyehe and Samii (2010) and Mvukiyehe (2018) find it difficult to demonstrate a direct impact of peacekeepers on improved security locally because the situation generally had already improved prior to the deployment of peacekeepers. Secondly, the size of the mission matters. Given often limited infrastructure and large areas of terrain to cover, small peacekeeping missions will be severely constrained to demonstrate their relevance. Only larger missions will have the resources to effectively implement their mandate; Hultman et al. (2013) find that increasing the number of UN military and police personnel prevents civilian killings. Fjelde et al. (2019, p. 104) demonstrate that a sizable local presence protects civilians against rebel attacks but not necessarily against abuse by

318  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations

Note: Exposure is an index of awareness and observing UN activities from 0 to 5. Approval is an index of the number of positive terms associated with the UN on a scale from 0 to 11. Source: Dorussen et al. (2021).

Figure 22.1

Exposure and approval of UN across departments in Haiti

government actors: ‘the more peacekeeping forces deployed to a location, the less likely that rebel groups will carry out attacks in these areas. We do not find the same encouraging results for the government side: local peacekeeping deployment does not decrease the risk of abuse by government actors.’ There is some evidence suggesting more cooperation with larger, presumably more relevant, missions; for example, Ruggeri et al. (2013, p. 399) observe more cooperation with larger UN peacekeeping missions, conditional on rebel groups being weak relative to government forces. The duration of a mission may further affect its perceived relevance. A mission that has recently been established may not have been able to demonstrate its relevance, but the longer a mission is deployed it may become increasingly perceived as no longer needed. Longer-lasting missions may also demonstrate problems in achieving the original – possibly overly ambitious – mandate. So far, the temporal dynamics of local support in peacekeeping missions have not yet been extensively researched. Ruggeri et al. (2013, p. 400) provide some evidence suggesting a nonlinear relation between the duration of and support for a mission. They find that cooperation with missions increases in the first four-and-a-half years after deployment but decreases after this time indicating that a mission may overstay its welcome. A survey held in Timor-Leste provides a clear indication of local wariness of the UN missions: ‘following 13 years of peacekeeping and the final withdrawal of the mission, the survey reports that 74 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that the UN helped Timor-Leste to become independent even though the mission should have ended earlier’ (Dorussen 2015a, emphasis added). Whereas 23 percent wished that the mission had not yet concluded, nearly 70 percent agreed that the mission had many problems and that they were happy that it had left.

The local perception of peacekeepers  319 Experience  First- and second-hand experiences with peacekeepers can sway the opinion of the peacekept. As already observed, when couched in general terms, support for missions tends to be (very) high, but surveys also find that support varies depending on the evaluation of specific peacekeeping activities and policies. Following Ratner (1996, p. 41), Dorussen and Gizelis (2013, p. 699) distinguish between policies to re-establish central authority (including the provision of security), democratization and national reconciliation, human rights, and humanitarian relief. They observe that ‘policies that strengthen government authorities, such as security matters and reform of central authority, are significantly less likely to lead to protests and more likely to be associated with cooperation’ (2013, p. 701). In contrast, policies promoting human rights are more likely to provoke conflict and less likely to lead to cooperation between the UN and various local actors. Blair (2021) finds only small differences between specific UNMIL activities, such as patrols or interventions, and increased public reliance on UNMIL and formal institutions to provide security and justice. In contrast, UNMIL’s role in public works ‘weakened preferences for UNMIL, both in absolute terms and relative to formal authorities’ (p. 192). Similarly, comparing experiences with peacekeeper security (patrols and arrests) and relief (food distribution) policies, Gordon and Young (2017) observe little difference in beliefs about the effectiveness, abusiveness, or benevolence of MINUSTAH in Haiti. Exposure to either security or relief activities increases the willingness of Haitians to share information or report crime. Rightly so, the UN is particularly concerned about abusive behavior of peacekeepers towards the local population and has implemented a policy of zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse (UN DPA, DPKO and DFS 2015) in response to extensive and well-documented accusations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers (Annan 2005). Regardless, Beber et al. (2017), based on a survey of households in Monrovia, report that transactional sex with UNMIL peacekeepers is commonplace. They note that this could be an unintended (and undesirable) consequence of the ease and frequency of interaction between peacekeepers and locals in Liberia: ‘In Monrovia’s dense metropolitan environment, it is relatively easy for foreigners to interact with local residents without arousing suspicion, which could result in high rates of transactional sex compared to what we might expect in more remote locations where UN personnel may be stationed in camps that are physically removed from local settlements’ (Beber et al. 2017, p. 25). At the same time, little is known about the effect of sexual improprieties and abusive behavior by peacekeepers in their relations with locals. Beber et al. (2017) do not report whether engaging in transactional sex affected the opinion about peacekeepers. There is some evidence regarding Haiti where allegations linking peacekeepers to sexual exploitation have also been made (Colum 2005; Lee and Bartels 2020). Here, Gordon and Young find that negative experience with peacekeepers such as witnessing them stealing, unjustly using force, abusing women, or paying for sex, leads to more negative beliefs about peacekeepers, but only ‘has a small and statistically insignificant relationship with willingness to cooperate’ (2017, pp. 74–5).8

PEACEKEEPING AND LOCAL CONFLICT DYNAMICS Although there is now plenty of evidence that local populations perceive peacekeeping missions as legitimate and support the general objectives of a mission, in particular their efforts to secure peace, peacekeepers cannot take public support for granted when it comes to the details

320  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations of their mandate and interventions. ‘Whereas the international community mainly appreciates the opportunity of comprehensive peace to create value, local actors may be concerned with opportunities for claiming value’ (Dorussen and Gizelis 2013, p. 692). Local conflict dynamics thus remain relevant for the reception of peacekeepers, since the “peace” that is to be kept is not always value neutral. Accordingly, locals disagree in their evaluation of the peace agreement where some will perceive the costs of necessary compromises more keenly than others, which may affect their support for the peacekeepers.9 The diversity of interests among the local population has received some attention recently. Kelmendi and Rabin (2018) argue that local satisfaction with a mission depends on the perceived willingness and ability of a mission to advance the wartime political agenda of a particular social group. In their study of UN peacekeeping in Kosovo, they find that (dis) satisfaction of the Albanian Kosovars with UNMIK varied over time. Albanian Kosovars became more satisfied with UNMIK as they started to accept the outcome that Kosovo would exist as an independent country – the solution advocated by UNMIK – rather than unified with Albania, the solution initially preferred by most of them. Frustration with the peacekeeping mandate, especially considering the sacrifices made for the wartime ambitions, may also explain the pattern observed by Dorussen and Gizelis (2013, p. 701) that peacekeepers are more likely to get a hostile response from rebels while government authorities are more willing to cooperate.10 Figure 22.2 shows that a similar pattern can be observed in Haiti where approval for UN peacekeepers is significantly higher among supporters of the Tèt Kahle Party linked to incumbent president Jovenel Moïse than among supporters of other parties (Dorussen et al. 2021).

Note: Party political support is measured as ‘What Party is best for Haiti right now.’ Other = other political party; None = none of the above. Source: Dorussen et al. (2021).

Figure 22.2

Approval of UN for supporters of different political parties in Haiti

The local perception of peacekeepers  321 In contrast, when the peacekeeping mandate closely aligns with the objectives of much of the population, it becomes difficult to observe any heterogeneity in support. For example, UN peacekeeping missions secured the independence of Timor-Leste in line with overwhelming (78.8 percent) support expressed in the referendum held on August 30, 1990. Unsurprisingly, public support for the UN peacekeeping mission was widespread, with the voice of the small Indonesian minority largely lost in survey responses (Dorussen 2015a; 2015b). Peacekeepers are part of a peace process that is fraught with uncertainty and controversy which provides further reasons for local conflict dynamics to affect local support for peacekeeping. Autesserre (2010, pp. 158–76) details for the Eastern DRC that even the successful implementation of a mandate may lead to tensions down the line; for example, when refugees or demobilized combatants return to their home communities. Yet, such tensions do not necessarily affect local support for peacekeeping missions. In fact, there is some evidence suggesting that vulnerability increases, rather than decreases, local support for peacekeeping. In Timor-Leste, respondents who had been more exposed to violence were less happy with the ending of the UN mission (Dorussen 2015b). Ex-combatants are often in a precarious position, and Mvukiyehe and Samii (2010, p. 3) report that: ‘[s]imilar to their civilian counterparts, a large majority of ex-combatants stated that they were confident that UNMIL was capable of both preventing fighting among armed groups and protecting civilians.’ In South Sudan, Phayal et al. (2015) also find that ex-combatants are more satisfied with their DDR program when the UN has a large presence in their area, while concerns about political instability and an abundance of firearms make them less satisfied. Finally, Ruggeri et al. (2013) find that when rebel groups are relatively weak compared to the national government, they are more willing to cooperate with UN peacekeepers. They conclude that ‘a crucial role of peacekeepers appears to be to manage mistrust among local actors and particularly the rebels. The UN can assist local actors to overcome commitment problems and enhance the levels of cooperation. However, for missions to “succeed” they need to establish a clear presence on the ground’ (Ruggeri et al. 2013, p. 403).

CONCLUSIONS: THE RELEVANCE OF BOTTOM-UP PEACEKEEPING Most studies surveyed above explore what factors determine the local perception of peacekeepers and thus treat local perception as the main dependent variable. Yet the interest in how locals evaluate peacekeepers is generally motivated by the expectation that local support is an important determinant for the success of a mission; in other words, local perception is considered a key independent variable. Understanding how peacekeepers engage with and are perceived by locals may provide an insight into “how peacekeeping works”: can peacekeepers assist in building peace from the bottom up, or is their primary role to implement locally, or top-down, a “peace” that has been agreed centrally? So far, it has proven difficult to establish a direct link demonstrating that more positive local perception increases the effectiveness of peacekeeping, which is unsurprising given the problem with endogeneity.11 Nevertheless, it is helpful to examine the impact of specific peacekeeping activities. UN peacekeepers are increasingly involved in conflict resolution at the local level where these activities are mainly implemented by civilian (rather than military) staff and often in coordination with other UN agencies and NGOs.12 Several studies examine the effectiveness of

322  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations UN-sponsored conflict resolution at the local level reporting a positive impact, at least in the short run. Blattman et al. (2014) study the effectiveness of mass education campaigns promoting alternative conflict resolution and show that these campaigns helped to resolve land disputes and lessened violence in Liberia. These programs were implemented by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and an NGO: the Peace and Justice Commission. Focusing on Ivory Coast, Smidt (2019) examines the impact of institution-building activities at the local level implemented as part of the UN peacekeeping mission UNOCI and shows that strengthening local institutions lowers the risks of intercommunal violence. Duursma (2021) demonstrates that local mediation efforts under the auspices of the UN missions in Darfur led to longer periods of peace locally. Mironova and Whitt (2017) find that third-party enforcement of the peace agreement by NATO peacekeeping forces support intercommunity trust between Albanian and Serbian Kosovars. Finally, Nomikos (2020) reports similar positive impact of peacekeeping presence on intercommunity trust in Mali, where these findings pertain specifically to UN peacekeepers, who are seen as unbiased. Yet the involvement of multiple actors, as well as the variety of programs involved, makes it rather difficult to assign the specific contributions of UN peacekeepers. Clearly, (UN) peacekeepers are often only one among the many internal and external peacebuilding organizations present on the ground, and they are not necessarily seen as the most important. Mvukiyehe and Samii (2017) and Mvukiyehe (2018) report on democracy-promoting projects in Liberia in 2011. Interestingly, they evaluate the impact of civil education programs organized by the National Election Committee, a Liberian civil society organization, as well as security programs that ‘sought to enhance UNMIL’s visibility in rural areas during the election season as a third-party security guarantor’ (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2017, p. 256). Using a variety of indicators, they find the impact of the latter to be relatively modest: We found that the civic education and town halls program increased enthusiasm for electoral participation and generated a coordinated shift from parochial to national candidates, while possibly increasing levels of contestation within communities and heightening citizens’ willingness to report intimidation. The security committee program caused modest reduction in parochial voting through increases in diversity of vote choice and preferences for national candidates. We found no evidence of synergy between the programs. (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2017, p. 264)

Using a survey experiment where respondents are asked to evaluate a (hypothetical) quick impact project, Bakaki and Dorussen (2021) contrast political trust in the UN, international NGOs, and local community organizations.13 They observe political trust in international organizations, specifically the UN, to be the lowest. So far, any evidence that peacekeepers are perceived as effective in peacebuilding is therefore inconclusive at best. Empirical research at the macro level has convincingly established a link between peacekeeping and the reduction of violence. The deployment of peacekeepers makes it easier and quicker for armed groups to agree to peace and to refrain from further hostilities against each other as well as unarmed civilians. These findings seem to hold at the national as well as the subnational level. Therefore, at the micro level, evidence for public support for peacekeeping missions can be seen as a recognition of the generally positive impact of peacekeepers. However, it has proven more difficult to establish a connection between specific peacebuilding activities and political stability. At the micro level, the evidence that peacekeepers are recognized for their peacebuilding work also remains inconclusive. For peacekeepers, therefore, it

The local perception of peacekeepers  323 is not only difficult to build peace from the bottom up but even more so to get recognition for trying.

NOTES 1. See Chapter 21 (Lindberg Bromley) on the hazards of peacekeeping and Chapter 18 (Karim and Beardsley) on sexual abuse in this Handbook. 2. Some of these surveys have been commissioned by the UN; for example, Mvukiyehe and Samii (2008) was funded via the Inspection and Evaluation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services of the UN, which also partly funded Mvukiyehe and Samii (2010) with further support from the Folke Bernadotte Academy. 3. See also Chapter 23 (Khadkha and Phayal) in this Handbook which reports on economic conditions and trust in peacekeepers in Somalia. 4. Both surveys were supported with grants from the British Academy: Haiti, SRG18R1\181293 and Timor-Leste, SG121877, with additional support from the Kikawada foundation. 5. Mayer et al.’s (1995) distinction between ability, integrity, and benevolence as dimensions of trust motivates Gordon and Young (2017) as well as Dorussen et al. (2021). 6. Allen et al. (2020) apply a similar theoretical framework in their analysis of public support in countries hosting US military deployments. 7. Lundgren et al. (2021) discuss various constraints on troop-contributing countries hampering timely deployment. 8. The UN mission to Haiti also became controversial because it accidentally introduced a new strain of cholera into the country, for which the UN originally refused to accept responsibility. 9. Locals may well have a unique understanding of peace, and what indicators signify peace. Firchow’s (2018) everyday peace indicators is an interesting proposal to systematically identify local indicators of peace. 10. Based on interviews with stakeholders, Mamiya (2018) details the challenges and opportunities UN peacekeepers face when engaging with non-state armed actors. 11. It is highly plausible that peacekeepers are perceived more positively if they are more effective which limits the usefulness of one-shot surveys. 12. In Liberia, Adveenko and Gilligan (2015) and Fearon et al. (2015) evaluate Community Driven Development programs sponsored by the World Bank and UK government, and International Rescue Committee, respectively, while Wong (2016) evaluates World Bank-sponsored Agricultural Business Unit programs in Sierra Leone. The studies all find a positive impact of these programs on intercommunity trust, but do not consider any impact on local support for peacebuilding organizations. 13. Based on a survey of NGO personnel, Dorussen and de Vooght (2018) report that NGOs are generally critical of quick impact projects (QIPs) as implemented by the UN. Short-term QIPs are seen as wasteful and distorting. Instead, they argue that community engagement projects should be well prepared and long-term with a clear understanding of the local situation.

REFERENCES Adveenko, Alexandra and Michael J. Gilligan (2015), ‘International Interventions to Build Social Capital: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Sudan’, American Political Science Review, 109 (3), 427–9. Allen, Michael A., Michael E. Flynn, Carla Martinez Machain, and Andrew Stravers (2020), ‘Outside the Wire: U.S. Military Deployments and Public Opinion in Host States’, American Political Science Review, 114 (2), 326–41. Amicarelli, Elio and Jessica Di Salvatore (2021), ‘Introducing the PeaceKeeping Operations Corpus (PKOC)’, Journal of Peace Research, 58 (5), 1137–48.

324  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Annan, Kofi (2005), ‘Letter dated 24 March 2005 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly’, United Nations General Assembly, A/59/710, accessed 18 January 2021 at https://​undocs​.org/​pdf​?symbol​=​en/​a/​59/​710. Autesserre, Séverine (2010), The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Autesserre, Séverine (2014), Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and Everyday Politics of International Interventions, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Autesserre, Séverine (2021), The Frontlines of Peace: An Insider’s Guide to Changing the World, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Bakaki, Zorzeta and Han Dorussen (2021), ‘Peacebuilding and Political Trust: A Survey Experiment on Political Trust in Haiti’, paper presented at the 20th Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference, 30 June. Beber, Bernd, Michael J. Gilligan, Jenny Guardado, and Sabrina Karim (2017), ‘Peacekeeping, Compliance with International Norms, and Transactional Sex in Monrovia, Liberia’, International Organization, 71 (1), 1–30. Bell, Sam R., Michael E. Flynn, and Carla Martinez Machain (2018), ‘U.N. Peacekeeping Forces and the Demand for Sex Trafficking’, International Studies Quarterly, 62 (3), 643–55. Blair, Robert A. (2021), Peacekeeping, Policing, and the Rule of Law after Civil War, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Blattman, Christopher, Alexandra C. Hartman, and Robert A. Blair (2014), ‘How to Promote Order and Property Rights under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior through Community Education’, American Political Science Review, 108 (1), 100–120. Clapham, Christopher (1998), ‘Being Peacekept’, in Oliver Furley and Roy May (eds), Peacekeeping in Africa, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 303–19. Colum, Lynch (2005), ‘UN Faces More Accusations of Sexual Misconduct: Officials Acknowledge “Swamp” of Problems and Pledge Fixes Amid New Allegations in Africa, Haiti’, Washington Post, 13 March, A22, accessed 16 July 2021 at https://​www​.washingtonpost​.com/​archive/​politics/​2005/​03/​13/​ un​-faces​-more​-accusations​-of​-sexual​-misconduct/​6b2470dc​-4adf​-4660​-8eb8​-96f3307bd736/​. Costalli, Stefano (2014), ‘Does Peacekeeping Work? A Disaggregated Analysis of the Deployment and Violence Reduction in the Bosnian War’, British Journal of Political Science, 44 (2), 357–80. Diehl, Paul F. and Daniel Druckman (2010), Evaluating Peace Operations, Boulder, CO, USA: Lynne Rienner. Dorussen, Han (2015a), ‘Security Perception after the Completion of UN Peacekeeping in Timor-Leste’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 21 (4), 45–58. Dorussen, Han (2015b), ‘After the Peacekeepers Left: List Experiments on the Perception of Security in Timor-Leste’, paper presented at the 56th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, 18 February. Dorussen, Han, Zorzeta Bakaki, and Athena Kolbe (2021), ‘Challenges of Using Collaborative Methodologies in Surveying Political Trust in Haiti’, PS: Political Science & Politics, 54 (3), 570–74. Dorussen, Han and Marian de Vooght (2018), ‘Putting Civilians First: NGO Perceptions and Expectations of UN Peacekeeping’, Folke Bernadotte Academy Brief 01/2018, accessed 4 August 2021 at https://​ fba​.se/​en/​about​-fba/​publications/​putting​-civilians​-first​-ngo​-perceptions​-and​-expectations​-of​-un​ -peacekeeping/​. Dorussen, Han and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2013), ‘Into the Lion’s Den: Local Responses to UN Peacekeeping’, Journal of Peace Research, 50 (6), 693–708. Duursma, Allard (2021), ‘Making Disorder More Manageable: The Short-Term Effectiveness of Local Mediation in Darfur’, Journal of Peace Research, 58 (3), 554–67. Fearon, James D., Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M. Weinstein (2015), ‘How Does Development Assistance Affect Collective Action Capacity? Results from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia’, American Political Science Review, 109 (3), 450–69. Firchow, Pamina (2018), Reclaiming Everyday Peace: Local Voices in Measurement and Evaluation After War, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman, and Desirée Nilsson (2019), ‘Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians’, International Organization, 73, 103–31.

The local perception of peacekeepers  325 Fortna, V. Page (2008), Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Gordon, Grant M. and Lauren E. Young (2017), ‘Cooperation, Information, and Keeping the Peace: Civilian Engagement with Peacekeepers in Haiti’, Journal of Peace Research, 54 (1), 64–79. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2013), ‘United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War’, American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 875–91. Kelmendi, Pellumb and Andrew Rabin (2018), ‘Unsatisfied? Public Support for Postconflict International Missions’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62 (5), 983–1011. Lee, Sabine and Susan Bartels (2020), ‘“They Put a Few Coins in Your Hand to Drop a Baby in You”: A Study of Peacekeeper-Fathered Children in Haiti’, International Peacekeeping, 27 (2), 177–209. Leib, Julia and Samantha Ruppel (2021), ‘The Dance of Peace and Justice: Local Perceptions of International Peacebuilding in West Africa’, International Peacekeeping, 28 (5), 783–812. Leonardsson, Hanna and Gustav Rudd (2015), ‘The “Local Turn” in Peacebuilding: A Literature Review of Effective and Emancipatory Local Peacebuilding’, Third World Quarterly, 36 (5), 825-39. Lundgren, Magnus, Kseniya Oksamytna, and Katharina P. Coleman (2021), ‘Only as Fast as Its Troop Contributors: Incentives, Capabilities, and Constraints in the UN’s Peacekeeping Response’, Journal of Peace Research, 58 (4), 671–86. Mac Ginty, Roger and Oliver P. Richmond (2013), ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace’, Third World Quarterly, 34 (5), 763–83. Mamiya, Ralph (2018), ‘Engaging with Non-state Armed Groups to Protect Civilians: A Pragmatic Approach for UN Peace Operations’, International Peace Institute, accessed 4 August 2021 at https://​ www​.ipinst​.org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2018/​10/​1810​_Engaging​_with​_NSAGs​.pdf. Mayer, Roger C., James H. Davis, and F. David Schoorman (1995), ‘An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust’, The Academy of Management Review, 20 (3), 703–34. Mironova, Vera and Sam Whitt (2017), ‘International Peacekeeping and Positive Peace: Evidence from Kosovo’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61 (10), 2074–104. Mvukiyehe, Eric (2018), ‘Promoting Political Participation in War-torn Countries: Microlevel Evidence from Postwar Liberia’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62 (8), 1686–726. Mvukiyehe, Eric and Cyrus Samii (2008), ‘Laying a Foundation for Peace? A Quantitative Impact Evaluation of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’, accessed 5 May 2021 at https://​ secureservercdn​.net/​45​.40​.148​.147/​w1v​.805​.myftpupload​.com/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2013/​08/​ics2008​ _report081218​.pdf. Mvukiyehe, Eric and Cyrus Samii (2010), ‘Quantitative Impact Evaluation of the United Nations Mission in Liberia’, accessed 5 May 2021 at https://​secureservercdn​.net/​45​.40​.148​.147/​w1v​.805​ .myftpupload​.com/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2013/​08/​unmil​_final100209​.pdf. Mvukiyehe, Eric and Cyrus Samii (2017), ‘Promoting Democracy in Fragile States: Field Experimental Evidence from Liberia’, World Development, 95, 254–67. Mvukiyehe, Eric and Cyrus Samii (2021), ‘Peacekeeping and Development in Fragile States: Micro-level Evidence from Liberia’, Journal of Peace Research, 58 (3), 368–83. Nomikos, William G. (2020), ‘Peacekeeping and the Enforcement of Intergroup Cooperation: Evidence from Mali’, Empirical Studies of Conflict, ESOC Working Paper 20, accessed 4 August 2021 at http://​ esoc​.princeton​.edu/​wp20. Phayal, Anup, Prabin B. Khadka, and Clayton N. Thyne (2015), ‘What Makes an Ex-Combatant Happy? A Micro-Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in South Sudan’, International Studies Quarterly, 59 (4), 654–68. Pouligny, Béatrice (2006), Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People, Bloomfield, CT, USA: Kumarian Press. Powers, Matthew, Bryce W. Reeder, and Ashly Adam Townsen (2015), ‘Hot Spot Peacekeeping’, International Studies Review, 17 (1), 46–66. Ratner, Steven R. (1996), The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War, New York, NY, USA: St Martin’s Press. Ruggeri, Andrea, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Han Dorussen (2013), ‘Managing Mistrust: An Analysis of Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping in Africa’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57 (3), 387–409.

326  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Ruggeri, Andrea, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Han Dorussen (2018), ‘On the Frontline Every Day? Subnational Deployment of United Nations Peacekeepers’, British Journal of Political Science, 48 (4), 1005–25. Sabrow, Sophia (2017), ‘Local Perception of the Legitimacy of Peace Operations by the UN, Regional Organizations and Individual States: A Case Study of the Mali Conflict’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (1), 159–86. Smidt, Hannah (2019), ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Locally: Enabling Conflict Resolution, Reducing Communal Violence?’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 64 (2–3): 344–72. UN DPA, DPKO and DFS (2015), ‘Policy on Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Missions’, REF 2015.10, accessed 4 August 2021 at https://​unmil​.unmissions​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​ policy​_on​_accountability​_for​_conduct​_and​_discipline​_in​_field​_missions​_30​-07​-2015​.pdf. Wong, Pui-Hang (2016), ‘How Can Political Trust Be Built After Civil Wars? Evidence from Post-conflict Sierra Leone’, Journal of Peace Research, 53 (6), 772–85.

23. The political economy of peacekeeping: unemployment, violence, and trust towards peacekeepers. Evidence from Somalia Prabin B. Khadka and Anup Phayal

INTRODUCTION What are the conditions at the local level that determine why some individuals support peacekeepers more than others? How is their support towards the peacekeepers affected by their perception of security? In particular, are the poor who make the majority in conflict settings where resources are scarce likely to support peacekeepers more, or less? This research aims to build on the recent literature on the question of effectiveness in peacekeeping by focusing on how conditions such as an individual’s economic status lead to trust and support towards peacekeepers.1 Peacekeeping operations require trust and participation of the local population for them to be sustainable, and a pressing challenge that peacekeepers face on top of containing violence is the deteriorating economic livelihoods as a result of armed conflicts and the job scarcities that follow. Considering these circumstances, a person’s financial well-being resulting from peace is often an incentive for support towards peacebuilding efforts – especially their support towards peacekeepers. Micro-level empirical research on peacekeeping operations is beginning to focus on the impact of peacekeeping operations on the socioeconomic aspects of the communities and individuals. They suggest that the presence of peacekeepers can increase the local economy by creating local security bubbles (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2021), increasing agricultural products (Caruso et al. 2017), using information technology (Martin-Shields and Bodanac 2018), increasing individual household consumption, and improving subjective well-being (Bove et al. 2021). The aim of this chapter is to examine the relationship between the local economy and support towards the peacekeepers. We emphasize two factors: respondents’ economic status and their perceived insecurity. We theorize that relatively poorer citizens express stronger support for peacekeepers. In war-torn or post-conflict societies, unemployed and financially impoverished citizens are more sensitive to economic changes in the local economy than others (Ćumurović and Hyll 2019). They are therefore more likely to value the stable, peaceful, and secure environment. When peacekeepers are deployed in such areas, this group is more likely to support and trust the external interveners, whose mere presence marks the commitment to peace. We examine our hypotheses with a survey of 700 Somali citizens across the three cities of Somalia: Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Baidoa in South Central Somalia, where the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been deployed to fulfill the Protection of Civilians (POC) mandate for more than a decade.2 In particular, we evaluate how perceptions about economic conditions and local security shape their trust towards peacekeepers and other local security institutions in these Somali cities. Our results indicate that trust towards peace327

328  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations keepers is more substantive among unemployed individuals, who are in a relatively worse off economic situation and harbor perceived fear about the local insecurity. We argue that unemployed individuals tend to bear the financial brunt because of the insecurity in their communities. Therefore, these Somali citizens’ are more supportive of the deployed peacekeepers, as they expect the interveners to help their economic well-being. Citizens perceive peacekeepers capable of providing stability which in turn is seen as a source of income and employment. On the flip side, our findings also mean that the support towards host security institutions, such as the police, is low among the unemployed. Upon further examination, we find that poor individuals attribute their security guarantee to the peacekeepers more than the government security institution. Our findings do not discount AMISOM’s contribution in establishing the Somali National Police Force since the local police, to some extent, have gained recognition and acceptance, and contribute to the positive narrative in Somalia’s transition. By examining peacekeeping from the local economic perspective, this study helps demarcate the baseline conditions and factors shaping locals’ trust towards peacekeepers. The following section examines past studies on peacekeeping and local security, its impact on the local economy, and how the interaction of these factors shapes local opinion on peacekeepers. After a brief review of recent works on these topics, we elaborate on our argument. We then introduce the survey design in Somalia to test our conjectures. Results and their implications are discussed next, followed by conclusion.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PEACEKEEPERS The focus of the extant economic literature on peacekeeping has mostly centered around peacekeeping budgets and expenditures and their subsequent impact on peacekeeping operations (Gaibulloev et al. 2015). A detailed analysis of the impact of peacekeeping on different economic research agendas is a relatively new phenomenon (Beber et al. 2019), which is surprising given that peacekeepers are also known to have positive impacts beyond security, such as in the area of the rule of law (Blair 2021) and other peacebuilding efforts directly targeting the management of former combatants (Phayal et al. 2015). Even when peacekeepers do not use coercive force, monitoring and reporting alone can deter aggressors and lower violence against civilians at the local level (Phayal 2019), which the local citizens seem to be aware of (Müller and Bashar 2017). While the literature overwhelmingly agrees that peacekeepers positively impact local security and the rule of law (Di Salvatore 2019; Hultman et al. 2013; 2014; Nomikos 2022; Ruggeri et al. 2017), empirical works examining the socioeconomic impact of peacekeepers point to mixed results. Sambanis (2008) and Collier et al. (2008) do not find a long-term economic impact of peacekeeping operations, with effects most substantial only in the first few years. Ernst et al. (2014) also do not find evidence that peacekeeping operations impact GDP growth rate. But in their survey of 39 conflict-afflicted countries between 1980 and 2010, they find that peacekeeping operations increase GDP per capita by nearly 2 percent in relatively high-income countries. Others point to peacekeeping operations helping to stimulate a country’s economy locally by providing a secure environment for business. Carnahan et al. (2006) argue that peacekeeping operations boost economic activities at the local level. In particular, the authors discuss the positive impact of peacekeeping due to spending by international and national staff, local procurement, and the labor market when recruiting national staff. They

The political economy of peacekeeping  329 further posit that peacekeeping provides stimulus to the local economy through these mechanisms and helps check the widespread inflation, despite some negative consequences such as rises in price and wages of the scarce-skilled labor in the country. Peacekeeping can also affect the local economy indirectly. Caruso et al. (2017) discuss the indirect effects of peacekeeping in increasing agricultural products in South Sudan, thus contributing to the country’s economy. In another study, Martin-Shields and Bodanac (2018) use theoretical models to show that peacekeepers’ use of information technology helps boost the local economy of the host nation. Using the World Bank Survey data in South Sudan, Bove et al. (2021) show that the proximity of peacekeepers’ military bases correlates with improved security perception, which helps to revitalize the local economy and individual subjective well-being. However, Beber et al. (2019) caution that such a boost may not be sustainable since demands are mainly in the low-skill service sectors. Another strand of literature looks at the impact of peacekeeping on the economy through cooperation among local actors. According to Ruggeri et al. (2013), rebels and government are more likely to cooperate in the presence of large UN peacekeeping forces, thus helping build local-level peace and economy. Mvukiyehe and Samii (2021) also posit that peacekeeping operations help to create local security bubbles and revitalize the local economy. Yet, despite the extant literature showing a robust positive association between peacekeeping and enhanced security or better socioeconomic outcomes, the mechanism and drivers behind this association are still unclear. For instance, prior reports using panel surveys carried out in Somalia indicate that despite improvement in the local security because of AMISOM’s presence, citizens’ trust and support towards the AMISOM peacekeepers have been weak or have become worse over time (Williams 2018a, p. 291). On the one hand, citizens’ expectations of peacekeepers might be low initially, and support might gradually increase over time. On the other hand, contrary to expectations, peacekeepers might fail to fulfill their mandate, causing public support to wane over time. Ruggeri et al. (2013) show that the number of cooperative events among belligerent parties tends to decrease when peacekeepers deploy in a mission for 4.5 years or longer. Dorussen (2015), using a survey with almost 300 Timorese, found that concerns related to the exit of peacekeepers were mostly driven by respondents who had security and safety worries. As much as the increase or decrease in support might be a function of security, what is less known is citizens’ expectations from the stabilization that peacekeepers are mandated to bring. As noted by Walter et al. (2021), a pressing challenge that exists in the extant peacekeeping literature is identifying the mechanism behind how and why it works. Employment, local security, and trust in peacekeepers  The legitimacy and the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions among host-nation populations deemed essential for UN operations hinges on local trust. In the absence of local trust, peacekeepers can face challenges ranging from lack of cooperation to outright hostility (Gordon and Young 2017; UN DPKO 1999). In other words, to study the effectiveness of peacekeeping, it is essential that we first look at the relationship between individual economic dynamics and individual security and how this relationship affects citizens’ support towards the peacekeepers. Studying citizens’ trust and support for peacekeeping is essential, even though local trust, in general, is low in post-conflict contexts, where armed violence has been the norm. Despite the low average trust level, there is significant variation in how individuals trust deployed peacekeepers. A study by Bove and Ruggeri (2019) helps demarcate the baseline conditions and factors that shape local trust in peacekeepers. The authors find that the peace-

330  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations keepers’ cultural and linguistic closeness with the locals can help generate some level of cooperation. We build on this recent attempt to look at trust and support towards peacekeepers but argue that the difference between the employed and unemployed individuals in a post-conflict context substantively impacts this relationship since they are likely to value peace and stability differently. Our primary hypothesis is that economic opportunity arising from peace and stability is much greater for the unemployed. We should, therefore, expect these individuals to express more support and trust towards deployed peacekeepers.

CASE STUDY: AMISOM PEACEKEEPERS IN SOMALIA The African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) case provides a unique opportunity to extend the inquiry on the relationship between employment and support towards peacekeepers. AMISOM is mandated under the UN Security Council Resolution 2297 to provide security and stability to Somalia’s fragile government. The AMISOM peacekeeping operation has approximately 22 000 military troops provided by the African Union, logistically supported by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). The mission has three fundamental functions, (1) to fight terrorism and al-Shabaab, (2) to provide support and protection to the Somali government in Somalia, and (3) to foster peace, reconciliation, and political stability (AMISOM 2017). The AMISOM peacekeepers and Somali Army troops fight side by side to combat al-Shabaab terrorists who have begun a relentless campaign of violence in South Central Somalia since 2007. Qualitative work suggests that AMISOM, despite many internal and external challenges, may have had greater success in stabilizing the security situation in Somalia than a traditional UN peacekeeping mission does typically. Some of the notable achievements that can be directly attributed to AMISOM are its success in preventing al-Shabaab topple the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) after the Ethiopian withdrawal in January 2009, its success in pushing al-Shabaab not only from Mogadishu but from every major urban area in South Central Somalia by 2014, and its contribution to the two electoral processes that produced new Somali federal governments in 2012 and 2017 (Williams 2018b; Williams 2018c). The UN carried out two extensive surveys in Somalia to gauge the support level for AMISOM. The surveys look at the Somali citizens’ support for AMISOM peacekeepers across five cities in 2014 (n = 1976) and 2016 (n = 2306) to track public opinion security, governance, gender, and democratization process in Somalia. In the surveys, Somali citizens were asked to rate how much support they had for AMISOM on a four-point scale: “a lot of support,” “some support,” “no support at all,” and “indifferent.” Results from the survey are presented in Figure 23.1. As shown in the upper panel, the overall support towards AMISOM declined significantly from 64 percent in 2014 to only 28 percent in 2016. Likewise, the lower panel indicates that Somali citizens perceived that the general economic conditions in 2016 also did not improve compared to 2014. The economic condition got worse for 52 percent in 2014, and then in 2016, relative to this lower baseline of economic condition, things got worse still for twice as many Somalis as had experienced improvements in 2016 (33 percent vs. 17 percent). These descriptive results indicate a real dip in both AMISOM support (since the modal response went from “a lot of support” in 2014 to “no support at all” in 2016) and the economic conditions. These results, however, do not reveal a clear association between the dwindling economic conditions and peacekeeper support. We therefore carried out a survey in

The political economy of peacekeeping  331 2020 in order to specifically explore a possible association between economic conditions and support for peacekeepers.

Note: Exact numbers from the report Citizens Perceptions of Peace and Stabilization Initiatives in Somalia, a joint study by the UNSOM and AMISOM offices in Somalia. A sample of 2000 Somali citizens were interviewed across four cities in a 2014 baseline survey whereas a total of 2306 Somali citizens were interviewed across five cities in 2016. Source: UNSOM and AU (2016).

Figure 23.1

Past survey response carried out by the UN in 2014 and 2016

332  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Table 23.1

Summary statistics, 2020 survey

City

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

Observations

Kismayo

0.32

0.46

0

1

723

Baidoa

0.32

0.46

0

1

723

Mogadishu

0.35

0.48

0

1

723

Age

31.40

8.96

18

75

719

Dominant Clan

0.76

0.42

0

1

723

Education

1.59

1.00

0

3

723

Male

0.44

0.49

0

1

723

Employment

0.43

0.49

0

1

723

HH Economic Status

2.00

0.41

1

3

723

Personal Security

2.38

0.83

1

4

723

AMISOM valign:​top;align:​left;Trust

1.91

0.99

1

4

689

Somali Police Trust

3.01

0.86

1

4

706

Demographics

Outcomes

Source: Authors’ survey (2020).

Data and research design  Our primary data source for this study is an original and recent survey of 723 subjects carried out in 2020 across 75 communities in the three cities of South Central Somalia: Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Baidoa. We present the descriptive statistics of the dataset in Table 23.1.

Source: Authors’ 2020 survey.

Figure 23.2

Comparing local trust on AMISOM, Somali Police, and United Nations, 2020 survey

The political economy of peacekeeping  333 Descriptive statistics from our 2020 survey data show a greater distrust with AMISOM that they will carry out their duties (Figure 23.2), which is in line with the past UN survey. Trust towards AMISOM is only 27 percent which closely resembles the 28 percent support for AMISOM in the 2016 UN survey. However, we find more trust towards the Somali Police in 2020 (72 percent), much higher than the 67 percent support expressed in 2016. We observe that the mean level of trust for AMISOM (out of 1–4) is only 1.91 compared to the mean trust of 3.01 for the Somali Police Force. Likewise, 8.5 percent in our 2020 sample say that their household (HH) economic condition is relatively better than others in their community, while 83.5 percent say it is the same. Only 8 percent say it is relatively worse than others in the community. Trust in United Nations seems higher in 2020 at 52 percent compared to only 43 percent support expressed in 2014. As highlighted in the previous section, citizens’ trust and support towards AMISOM peacekeepers appear comparable in the UN 2014–16 surveys and our 2020 survey. However, the trend suggests that the level of satisfaction with AMISOM’s performance was much lower in the 2016 and 2020 surveys compared to 2014. It also indicates that the general economic conditions have slightly improved in recent years. Can this improved economic condition at the household level be attributable to the peace dividend in Somalia due to the AMISOM peacekeepers’ security operations? Also, how might a respondent’s economic condition shape their support for AMISOM peacekeepers or the local police? To explore these questions, we rely on a mediation analysis that examines how individual perception of insecurity mediated the relationship between unemployment and trust towards AMISOM and local police in their ability to provide security.

Figure 23.3

Mediation model of associations between unemployment/HH economic well-being and level of trust in AMISOM’s ability to provide security via the perception of insecurity

334  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Figure 23.3 shows the intuition behind our empirical approach, where the total effect (path c) of an independent variable (IV) on a dependent variable (DV) consists of a direct effect (path cʹ) and an indirect effect (path a × b) via a proposed mediator. Path a represents the effect of the IV on the mediator, and path b represents the mediator’s effect on the DV. In our analyses, “unemployed” or not having a job is the IV,3 and respondents’ “level of trust in AMISOM’s ability to provide security” is the DV.4 The mediating variable is the perception of “insecurity – personal and family security not guaranteed.”5 6 The 95 percent confidence interval (CI) is estimated using bootstrapping with 1000 sampling replications, a method considered preferable to the Sobel tests for testing the significance of indirect effects because it does not assume a normal distribution and therefore reduces the likelihood of type 2 error (Shrout and Bolger 2002). We use the sgmediation command in STATA, which calculates total, direct, and indirect effects and tests the significance of the indirect effect using the Sobel test (Baron and Kenny 1986; Sobel 1982). A 95 percent CI that does not include 0 indicates a significant indirect effect at p < 0.05 (Preacher et al. 2007). For robustness, we also ran mediation models using perceived personal household economic situation relative to others in the community as the IV. AMISOM support, poverty and security  This section presents a preliminary analysis of the three variables discussed in Figure 23.3, using OLS regression, before presenting the results from the mediation analysis. The OLS results are shown in Figures 23.4a, b, and c where Figure 23.4a shows coefficient plots for the impact of unemployment status on the DV “level of trust in AMISOM’s ability to provide security.”7 For robustness, we additionally include results using two other IVs­­– respondents’ perceived “HH economic situation” (poverty) and “education level” (illiteracy).

Note: The figure above shows the results of mediation analyses, depicting the correlation between the three variables used in the mediation analyses. Results include controls and city fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the community level. Source: Authors’ 2020 survey.

Figure 23.4a Impact of economic conditions on trust in AMISOM peacekeepers, OLS results

The political economy of peacekeeping  335 Figure 23.4a shows that those unemployed are 24 percent more likely to support AMISOM (β = 0.239; s.e. = 0.076; p = 0.002). Similarly, those who perceive that their household economic situation is relatively poorer than other households are 20 percent more likely to support AMISOM than others (β = 0.205; s.e. = 0.105; p = 0.051). We also use formal education attainment as our IV since education positively influences income level (De Gregorio and Lee 2002). Results indicate that if respondents are illiterate, they are 21 percent more likely to express support towards AMISOM (β=0.214; s.e. = 0.104; p = 0.040).

Source: Authors’ 2020 survey.

Figure 23.4b Impact of economic conditions on trust in Somali Police, OLS results For comparison, Figure 23.4b shows coefficient plots for the impact of unemployment status on the second DV, “Somali Police Performance Satisfaction.” We notice that all three coefficients, in this case, are negative, suggesting that poorer (wealthier) individuals tend to have lower (higher) support towards the Somali Police Force. Figure 23.4c depicts coefficient plots (from OLS results) of the relationship between the IV and the mediating variable “security guarantee.” It shows that economically destitute respondents tend to have a negative perception of their security guarantee and feel less secure in their communities. Mediation analysis  Table 23.2 presents the main results from the mediation analysis shown in Figure 23.3 (path c, path cʹ, and indirect effects).8 It shows that there is a significant indirect and positive effect of the IV unemployment via the mediator perceived insecurity on the DV, level of trust on AMISOM (β = 0.037; s.e. = 0.014; 95% CI 0.070; 0.066). The effect ratio indicates that perceived individual and family insecurity explains just under 20 percent of the total positive effect of unemployment on trust towards AMISOM, which is statistically significant at p < 0.05. There was also a direct and positive effect of unemployment on trust, but not statistically significant. The findings are similar when we use poverty or perceived HH economic status instead of unemployment in our model, indicating a statistically significant and positive indirect effect of poverty when mediated by perceived insecurity (our mediating variable) (β = 0.038; s.e. = 0.017; 95% CI 0.005; 0.087). The indirect effect of poverty is also

336  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations

Source: Authors’ 2020 survey.

Figure 23.4c Impact of economic conditions on insecurity, OLS results Table 23.2

Economic conditions and trust in AMISOM peacekeepers

 

Coeff.

SE

p*

Bootstrap 95% CI

Effect ratio –

Unemployment Total effect (path c)

0.222

0.075

.004

–

Direct effect (path cʹ)

0.190

0.075

.012

–

–

Indirect effect (via mediator)

0.037

0.014

.011

[0.070; 0.066]

0.193 –

Poverty Total effect (path c)

0.229

0.078

.003

–

Direct effect (path cʹ)

0.191

0.094

.042

–

–

Indirect effect (via mediator)

0.038

0.017

.023

[0.005; 0.087]

0.199

Notes: Models testing mediation of the associations between Unemployment/Poverty and Level of Trust in AMISOM’s Performance via Perception of Insecurity. * p values shown for indirect effects are derived from the Sobel test for consistency with the total and direct effects; however, bootstrap 95% confidence intervals provide a more robust indication of significant mediation.

nearly 20 percent of the total effect and reaches the conventional level of statistical significance. These results suggest that poorer and unemployed respondents whose perception of security is comparatively lower tend to trust AMISOM peacekeepers more. We also ran the mediation analysis to examine the local trust in the performance of the Somali Police. Table 23.3 summarizes the results of the analyses. It shows a statistically significant, indirect, and negative effect of unemployment on the level of trust towards Somali Police performance, mediated by perceived insecurity (β = –0.070; s.e. = 0.024; 95% CI −0.116; −0.024). The effect ratio indicates that perceived individual and family insecurity explains just over 60 percent of the total negative effect of unemployment on trust towards Somali Police performance. The direct effect of the variable is also negative but at p < 0.1 (β

The political economy of peacekeeping  337 Table 23.3

Economic conditions and trust in Somali Police

 

Coeff.

SE

p*

Bootstrap 95% CI

Effect ratio

Total effect (path c)

−0.182

0.065

.005

–

–

Direct effect (path cʹ)

−0.112

0.061

.068

–

–

Indirect effect (via mediator)

−0.070

0.024

.004

[−0.116; −0.024]

0.629

Total effect (path c)

−0.236

0.080

.003

–

–

Direct effect (path cʹ)

−0.160

0.075

.034

–

–

Indirect effect (via mediator)

−0.076

0.030

.009

[−0.147; −0.005]

0.478

Unemployment

Poverty

Notes: Models testing mediation of the associations between Unemployment/Poverty and Level of Trust in Somali Police Force Performance via Perception of Insecurity. * p values shown for indirect effects are derived from the Sobel test for consistency with the total and direct effects; however, bootstrap 95% confidence intervals provide a more robust indication of significant mediation.

= –0.112; s.e. = 0.061). We observed similar results when using variable poverty instead of unemployment in our model. As shown in the table, when mediated by perceived insecurity, poverty has a statistically significant and negative indirect effect on trust towards police (β = –0.076; s.e. = 0.030; 95% CI −0.147; −0.005), which explains around 48 percent of the total effect. Poverty also has a direct negative effect on trust towards police at p < 0.05 (β = –0.160; s.e. = 0.075). These results paint a unique picture of the micro-level mechanism of trust towards peacekeepers in Somalia. When the unemployed and the poorer respondent in Somalia perceive insecurity in their communities, they are less trustworthy towards Somali Police but are more likely to trust AMISOM peacekeepers. Since our mediation analyses indicate that around 20 percent of the association of poverty with trust towards peacekeepers passes through the perceptions of physical insecurity, we can infer that the poor in Somalia seem to appreciate peacekeepers’ attempt to lift Somalis out of poverty – that the support of the poor towards AMISOM is about much more than physical security. Perhaps by improving security, AMISOM enables improved mobility, access to services, and better health and education for the poor. Unsurprisingly, the poor also express less support towards the local police. Studies indicate that the higher poverty level leading to higher distrust in local police is common in other parts of Africa (Boateng 2018; Fry 2013). But the findings in this study unveil an interesting possibility for future studies to delve into: the lack of trust towards police among the economically poor likely explains their tendency to turn towards foreign peacekeepers when they perceive insecurity. Robustness check  We conduct a separate robustness test to investigate respondents’ trust level on AMISOM’s ability to carry out their duties and responsibilities to establish peace in Somalia but using two different explanatory variables instead of employment. We hypothesized that the level of poverty and individual insecurity indicates the economic risk, in the face of which individuals are more trustworthy towards the peacekeepers. In our robustness check, we operationalize and test this concept by directly using two indicators: respondents’ perceived economic challenge and the actual physical risk they face in their surroundings. The first explanatory variable for the robustness check comes from a survey instrument asking respondents’ perceptions of the current biggest challenge Somali citizens face. The variable is coded as 1 if they mention that the country’s economy is the biggest challenge.9 We use the ordered logit model to test our argument since the DV, trust towards AMISOM, is on the ordinal scale. In Table 23.4, models (1) and (3) show results with and without various control

338  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Table 23.4

Local economy and citizens’ trust towards peacekeepers in Somalia. Robustness tests

    Biggest challenge economy Biggest challenge foreign intervention Violence index (30 days) Gender Age City dummy (Mogadishu) City dummy (Baidoa) Cut 1

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4) 0.884***

AMISOM valign:​top;align:​center;trust 0.361*

0.175

0.849***

(0.189)

(0.187)

(0.203)

(0.202)

−0.823***

−0.902***

−0.579***

−0.533**

(0.299)

(0.234)

(0.223)

(0.220)

 

0.266*

 

0.754**

 

(0.144)

 

(0.308)

 

 

0.188

0.165

 

 

(0.143)

(0.143)

 

 

−0.001

−0.001

 

 

(0.009)

(0.009)

 

 

−0.726***

− 1.347***

 

 

(0.157)

(0.319)

 

 

−1.397***

−1.730***

 

 

(0.276)

(0.233)

−1.550***

−0.149

−1.470***

−0.621**

(0.262)

(0.104)

(0.425)

(0.296)

Cut 2

−0.371

0.969***

−0.210

0.630**

(0.237)

(0.106)

(0.414)

(0.292)

Cut 3

1.194***

2.526***

1.398***

2.249***

(0.209)

(0.146)

(0.402)

(0.296)

AIC

1658

1693

1602

1605

BIC

1685

1720

1647

1650

Observation

689

689

685

685

Note: Above results are from the ordered logit model and the dependent variable is “trust” that AMISOM peacekeepers can carry out their duties and responsibilities to establish peace in Somalia: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

variables. Model (3) in the table, which is the main model, shows that individuals who feel that the country’s economy is the biggest challenge are also more likely to express trust towards the peacekeepers. The main explanatory variable is positive in both models and statistically significant at p < 0.05. However, those who feel that external or foreign intervention is the biggest challenge are less likely to trust peacekeepers. Second, to test this further, we proxy respondents’ insecurity and economic outlook with their exposure to actual violence. We create an index of violence using ACLED data, which captures the summation of the inverse of distances from each respondent’s survey location to all violent incidents in the country within the past 30 days since the survey. A higher index value represents a greater number of violent events occurring closer to the respondent’s location. Results are displayed in Table 23.4, models (2), (3), and (4). Similar to our previous results, and as expected, we find that the coefficient of the index is positive and statistically significant for model (2) at p < 0.1 and model (4) at p < 0.05. These results suggest that individuals who live physically closer to violent events within the last 30 days since the survey are more likely to express trust towards the peacekeepers. In other words, citizens are more likely to express trust towards the peacekeepers when they feel more physically insecure about their well-being. The other significant variables are the location dummies, which indicate variations by cities on trust towards peacekeepers. Respondents in Kismaayo, the baseline city, tend to

The political economy of peacekeeping  339 trust peacekeepers more than the other two cities. But despite controlling for these variables, the overall results in Table 23.4 indicate that host-nation citizens’ trust towards deployed peacekeepers is driven primarily by their economic outlook but mediated through their insecurity and vulnerability.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION This study asks whether citizens’ economic condition shapes their trust towards peacekeepers in conflict-torn communities where peacekeepers operate. Using a survey and a mediation analysis, we find that the unemployed are driving support towards peacekeepers as they perceive the need for more security. It should, therefore, be no surprise that Somali citizens’ support towards AMISOM peacekeepers hinges on their hopes that the peacekeepers will guarantee citizens’ safety and economic well-being. After all, a perceived security guarantee is tied to citizens’ expectations for improved economic conditions at the household level (Bove and Elia 2011). In a context like Somalia, trust levels are generally low among the populace, reflecting the unstable political and economic outlook and the prevailing anxiety due to uncertainty. When asked if most people can be trusted, only 14 percent agree that they can, while 81 percent mention that one needs to be very careful.10 When comparing it to the World Values Survey of 2017–20, 41 percent of citizens in select European countries agree,11 while 57 percent mention that they need to be very careful in trusting others. In sum, trust, in general, is low in the context of armed conflict, which is not surprising. The positive relationship between personal wealth and a number of indicators such as happiness and well-being is undisputed in the literature (Howell et al. 2008). Also, empirical research has consistently demonstrated that higher economic status is associated with several desirable outcomes, such as increased life expectancy, reduced malnutrition, and lower infant mortality (Moya and Carter 2014; Welsch 2008). But the main finding in this study showed that unemployed individuals, who perceive greater insecurity in their surroundings, are more likely to express support for peacekeepers. This finding indicates positive expectations among this group of citizens vis-à-vis peacekeeping units deployed in nearby areas. The results dovetail nicely with other recent studies focusing on peacekeepers’ need for local legitimacy and support (Gippert 2016; Whalan 2017). For instance, Whalan (2017, p. 313) posits ‘fragmented local audiences’ as the key reason for the difficulty in legitimizing peacekeepers. But rather than fragmentation along social environment and identity, our results indicate that an individual’s unemployment status and perception of insecurity play an essential role in shaping the level of local support for peacekeepers. The study also raises several questions that future research could explore. Are we likely to find local support for peacekeepers wane as post-conflict societies become more peaceful and economically prosperous? Is the finding in this study showing the inverse correlation between local support for police and foreign peacekeepers generalizable to peacekeeping missions beyond Somalia? If so, should peacekeepers strive to achieve high local support for police before their exit from a country?

340  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Webster’s Dictionary defines “trust” as “the belief that someone or something is reliable, good, honest, effective, etc.” (see https://​www​.merriam​-webster​.com/​dictionary/​trust), which we use as a proxy for “support” towards peacekeepers. This study is approved under University of Essex IRB (ETH2021-0163). Captured in a dummy outcome: 1 or 0 in response to the question “Do you hold a job that guarantees you some kind of daily/weekly or monthly payment?” Captured in a scale from 1 to 4 (least to highest level of trust) in response to the question “How much do you trust in AMISOM in its ability to provide security in your community?” Response to the question “To what extent do you feel that your own personal, as well as your family’s safety and security, are currently ensured?” (fully ensured, ensured, not ensured, not ensured at all). In our mediation model represented in Figure 23.3, an alternative way of understanding support towards AMISOM (our outcome DV) could also be understood as unemployment as the mediating variable in the association between insecurity and support towards AMISOM. However, the primary hypothesis of interest in our mediation analysis is to see whether the effect of our independent variable (treatment) – “unemployment” on the outcome “support towards AMISOM” can be mediated by a change in the mediating variable “security perception.” For ease of interpretation, we just present the figure for key variables and do not include the full table associated with the figure. Mediation analyses results presented without controls. Results with controls are almost identical. Exact question is: “What is the biggest challenge facing your community today?” The response included a number of pressing issues related to politics, security, and economics. Five percent either do not know or give no answer. Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the UK.

REFERENCES AMISOM (2017), ‘AMISOM Mandate’, accessed 15 February 2022 at https://​amisom​-au​.org/​amisom​ -mandate/​. Baron, Reuben M. and David A. Kenny (1986), ‘The Moderator–Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51 (6), 1173–82. Beber, Bernd, Michael J. Gilligan, Jenny Guardado, and Sabrina Karim (2019), ‘The Promise and Peril of Peacekeeping Economies’, International Studies Quarterly, 63 (2), 364–79. Blair, Robert A. (2021), ‘UN Peacekeeping and the Rule of Law’, American Political Science Review, 115 (1), 51–68. Boateng, Francis D. (2018), ‘Police Legitimacy in Africa: A Multilevel Multinational Analysis’, Policing and Society, 28 (9), 1105–20. Bove, Vincenzo, Jessica Di Salvatore, and Leandro Elia (2021), ‘UN Peacekeeping and Households’ Well-Being in Civil Wars’, American Journal of Political Science, accessed 15 February 2022 at https://​onlinelibrary​.wiley​.com/​doi/​pdfdirect/​10​.1111/​ajps​.12644. Bove, Vincenzo and Leandro Elia (2011), ‘Supplying Peace: Participation in and Troop Contribution to Peacekeeping Missions’, Journal of Peace Research, 48 (6), 699–714. Bove, Vincenzo and Andrea Ruggeri (2019), ‘Peacekeeping Effectiveness and Blue Helmets’ Distance from Locals’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (7), 1630–55. Carnahan, Michael, William Durch, and Scott Gilmore (2006), ‘Economic Impact of Peacekeeping’, United Nations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, accessed 15 February 2022 at https://​www​.stimson​ .org/​wp​-content/​files/​file​-attachments/​EIP​_FINAL​_Report​_March2006doc​_1​.pdf. Caruso, Raul, Prabin Khadka, Ilaria Petrarca, and Roberto Ricciuti (2017), ‘The Economic Impact of Peacekeeping: Evidence from South Sudan’, Defence and Peace Economics, 28 (2), 250–70.

The political economy of peacekeeping  341 Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom (2008), ‘Post-Conflict Risks’, Journal of Peace Research, 45 (4), 461–78. Ćumurović, Aida and Walter Hyll (2019), ‘Financial Literacy and Self-Employment’, Journal of Consumer Affairs, 53 (2), 455–87. De Gregorio, José and Jong-Wha Lee (2002), ‘Education and Income Inequality: New Evidence from Cross-Country Data’, Review of Income and Wealth, 48 (3), 395–416. Di Salvatore, Jessica (2019), ‘Peacekeepers against Criminal Violence—Unintended Effects of Peacekeeping Operations?’, American Journal of Political Science, 63 (4), 840–58. Dorussen, Han (2015), ‘Security Perception after the Completion of UN Peacekeeping in Timor-Leste’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 21 (4), 453–8. Ernst, Brandon, Rajeev Sooreea, Gigi Gokcek, and Diara Spain (2014), ‘The Economic Impacts of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Growth Versus Level Effects’, International Journal of Public Policy, 10 (1–3), 100–117. Fry, Lincoln (2013), ‘Trust of the Police in South Africa: A Research Note’, International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences, 8 (1), 36. Gaibulloev, Khusrav, Justin George, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Shimizu (2015), ‘Personnel Contributions to UN and non-UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Public Goods Approach’, Journal of Peace Research, 52 (6), 727–42. Gippert, Birte (2016), ‘The Sum of Its Parts? Sources of Local Legitimacy’, Conflict and Cooperation, 51 (4), 522–38. Gordon, Grant M. and Lauren E. Young (2017), ‘Cooperation, Information, and Keeping the Peace: Civilian Engagement with Peacekeepers in Haiti’, Journal of Peace Research, 54 (1), 64–79. Howell, Andrew J., Nancy L. Digdon, Karen Buro, and Amanda R. Sheptycki (2008), ‘Relations Among Mindfulness, Well-Being, and Sleep’, Personality and Individual Differences, 45 (8), 773–7. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2013), ‘United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War’, American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 875–91. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2014), ‘Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting’, American Political Science Review, 108 (4), 737–53. Martin-Shields, Charles P. and Nicolas Bodanac (2018), ‘Peacekeeping’s Digital Economy: The Role of Communication Technologies in Post-Conflict Economic Growth’, International Peacekeeping, 25 (3), 420–45. Moya, Andrés and Michael Carter (2014), ‘Violence and the Formation of Hopelessness and Pessimistic Prospects of Upward Mobility in Colombia’, NBER Working Paper 20463, accessed 15 February 2022 at https://​ideas​.repec​.org/​p/​nbr/​nberwo/​20463​.html​#. Müller, Tanja R. and Zuhair Bashar (2017), ‘“UNAMID Is Just Like Clouds in Summer, They Never Rain”: Local Perceptions of Conflict and the Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Missions’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (5), 756–79. Mvukiyehe, Eric and Cyrus Samii (2021), ‘Peacekeeping and Development in Fragile States: Micro-Level Evidence from Liberia’, Journal of Peace Research, 58 (3), 368–83. Nomikos, William G. (2022), ‘Peacekeeping and the Enforcement of Intergroup Cooperation: Evidence from Mali’, Journal of Politics, 84 (1), 194–206. Phayal, Anup (2019), ‘UN Troop Deployment and Preventing Violence Against Civilians in Darfur’, International Interactions, 45 (5), 757–80. Phayal, Anup, Prabin B. Khadka, and Clayton L. Thyne (2015), ‘What Makes an Ex-Combatant Happy? A Micro-Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in South Sudan’, International Studies Quarterly, 59 (4), 654–68. Preacher, Kristopher J., Derek D. Rucker, and Andrew F. Hayes (2007), ‘Addressing Moderated Mediation Hypotheses: Theory, Methods, and Prescriptions’, Multivariate Behavioral Research, 42 (1), 185–227. Ruggeri, Andrea, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2017), ‘Winning the Peace Locally: UN Peacekeeping and Local Conflict’, International Organization, 71 (1), 163–85. Ruggeri, Andrea, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Han Dorussen (2013), ‘Managing Mistrust: An Analysis of Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping in Africa’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57 (3), 387–409. Sambanis, Nicholas (2008), ‘Short- and Long-term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations’, The World Bank Economic Review, 22 (1), 9–32.

342  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Shrout, Patrick E. and Niall Bolger (2002), ‘Mediation in Experimental and Nonexperimental Studies: New Procedures and Recommendations’, Psychological Methods, 7 (4), 422–45. Sobel, Michael E. (1982), ‘Asymptotic Confidence Intervals for Indirect Effects in Structural Equation Models’, Sociological Methodology, 13, 290–312. UN DPKO (1999), ‘Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent Experience’, April, accessed 15 February 2022 at https://​archive​.globalpolicy​.org/​security/​peacekpg/​lessons/​lesson​.htm. UNSOM and AU (2016), ‘Citizens Perception of Peace and Stabilization Inititative in Somalia’, UNSOM and AU Mid-line Report, August (on file with authors). Walter, Barbara F., Lise Morjé Howard, and V. Page Fortna (2021), ‘The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace’, British Journal of Political Science, 51 (4), 1705–22. Welsch, Heinz (2008), ‘The Social Costs of Civil Conflict: Evidence from Surveys of Happiness’, Kyklos, 61 (2), 320–40. Whalan, Jeni (2017), ‘The Local Legitimacy of Peacekeepers’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 11 (3), 306–20. Williams, Paul D. (2018a), Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Williams, Paul D. (2018b), ‘Subduing al-Shabaab: The Somalia Model of Counterterrorism and Its Limits’, The Washington Quarterly, 41 (2), 95–111. Williams, Paul D. (2018c), ‘Strategic Communications for Peace Operations: The African Union’s Information War against al-Shabaab’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 7 (1), 3.

24. Peacekeeping operations: the endgame Richard Caplan, John Gledhill and Maline Meiske

INTRODUCTION All peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are, in theory, temporary arrangements but when, why and how do PKOs end? The actual experience of ending peacekeeping operations can vary significantly. Closure may be partial or complete, gradual or rapid. It may reflect the attainment of mandated goals or failure to achieve those goals. It may be informed by broad strategic considerations or by the narrow interests of authorizing bodies, troop-contributing countries or host states. A PKO may follow a predecessor operation or it may be followed by a successor operation, led either by the same international organization or by a different actor. Some longstanding PKOs have not ended at all. The varieties of experience are considerable. In view of the potential implications of peacekeeping closure for the host country, the wider region and beyond, these experiences warrant careful examination. This chapter reflects on these experiences with the aim of identifying the characteristics of peacekeeping closure and the international community’s ongoing peacebuilding efforts after mission closure. We first consider what it means to “end” a PKO. We then document the evolution of thinking and practice regarding the closure of peacekeeping missions. The subsequent section identifies factors that inform decisions to end PKOs. Next, we outline various modes of mission closure and transitions to new peacekeeping operations, giving particular attention to transitions between UN and regional peacekeeping missions. We conclude by highlighting the importance of factoring transition and eventual mission closure into planning when PKOs are first devised and deployed.

ENDING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES How do scholars and policy actors understand the ending of peacekeeping operations? With some important exceptions (for example, contributions to Caplan 2012a), academic studies of peacekeeping have tended to treat the closure of PKOs as finite moments—end points—that are marked by the conclusion of mandated missions and the withdrawal of peacekeepers. This approach has a functional logic; researchers who wish to study the effects of peacekeeping need clear and replicable bases for identifying when peacekeeping “treatments” are applied and when those treatments end.1 Mandated start and end dates of PKOs offer such clarity. For policy actors engaged in peacekeeping, however, the precise moment at which an operation ends is only one step in a much broader set of drawdown actions that precede exit and an equally broad set of peace support efforts that follow mission closure. Recognizing this, the United Nations, in particular, has increasingly adopted a process-based understanding of ending PKOs whereby drawdown, withdrawal, mission closure and follow-on arrangements are seen as constituent parts of a peacekeeping transition and, more broadly, a reconfiguration 343

344  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations of the UN’s presence and its peacebuilding strategy (Caplan 2012b; Hirschmann 2012; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2013; Zaum 2012). The idea of transition implies movement and, ontologically, the ending of PKOs can involve a shift from international support for peacekeeping, in which security and relief efforts are paramount, towards greater emphasis on peacebuilding, where the consolidation of positive peace and development are prioritized (Caplan 2012b, p. 5; Ponzio 2012, p. 303). To realize these longer-term goals, international actors (including the United Nations and its agencies) may remain on the ground after PKOs have ended, albeit in a restructured way. Thus, the idea of reconfiguring the international community’s presence and restructuring the relationship between international and local actors has also become central to understandings of what it means to end a peacekeeping operation (Day 2019; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2013; Wilton Park 2019). If ending a peacekeeping operation is indeed a process, then that process can be conceptualized by identifying the core activities that ordinarily form part of a peacekeeping transition. The first is planning of (a) the political, programmatic, financial and logistical steps that are needed to ensure a smooth PKO exit and (b) the nature of any continued international presence after PKO closure (see discussion of cases in Forti and Connolly 2018; Price and Titulaer 2013). Alongside (and possibly in response to) planning, there may be an incremental downsizing of peacekeeping troops in advance of full withdrawal, if conditions on the ground allow. The number of civilian staff may also be reduced, with some international staff moving (back) into the UN system, while the PKO may support its national hires—often with limited success—to find onward gainful employment (Coleman 2020; Landgren 2020). At a given point in time, the UN Security Council (or equivalent body for other peacekeeping providers) will discuss and debate closing a mission before ultimately taking a decision to end a PKO on a particular date. As the mandated end date draws near, an outgoing mission will commence liquidation (Forti and Connolly 2018, p. 26) such as closing field offices, managing mission records and reallocating assets and hardware, either to the host state or to another peacekeeping operation (Landgren 2020; OECD 2020, p. 41). The outgoing PKO may also conduct an information campaign, with a view to informing the host state public of pending mission closure and the nature of any follow-on peacebuilding arrangements that will be supported by the international community (Forti and Connolly 2018, pp. 27–8; Forti and Connolly 2019, p. 6). The formal ending of a PKO comes at the point of mission closure when local actors and any reconfigured international peace and security presence are given responsibility for continued peacebuilding efforts.

THE EVOLUTION OF THINKING AND PRACTICE The thinking and practice of ending PKOs has evolved over time, particularly within the UN system. Historically, UN thinking in this regard has been underdeveloped, and practice has tended to be ad hoc (Day 2019, p. 4). While there have been established procedures pertaining to the drawdown and withdrawal of UN personnel and equipment, for a long time there was little strategic thinking underpinning UN peacekeeping transitions (UN Security Council 2000, pp. 11–12). Even the landmark 2000 review of UN peace operations—known as the Brahimi Report—had very little to say about exit strategies (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000). The reason for this paucity of attention is, arguably, that until the end

Peacekeeping operations: the endgame  345 of the Cold War, the nature of peacekeeping operations did not require very much strategic thinking regarding closure. As missions were typically deployed to conventional armed conflicts between states, and mission objectives were concerned primarily with monitoring the implementation of ceasefire or disengagement agreements, the mandates were limited, which made exit strategies relatively easy to articulate (UN Security Council 2000, p. 12). As conflict environments became more complex, and peacekeeping operations along with them, thinking about transition initially remained rather limited, with the holding of elections often considered to be the central plank of an exit strategy (Chesterman 2004, ch. 7; UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000, para. 20, p. 4). But as UN operations in Angola, Cambodia and elsewhere in the 1990s would demonstrate, elections were not always a reliable basis for exit in the absence of a stable peace (Guyot and Vines 2015; Whalan 2013). Indeed, elections sometimes inflamed tensions and spurred renewed violence (Flores and Nooruddin 2012), although there were notable exceptions (for example, Namibia, Mozambique and El Salvador).2 Moreover, because UN officials are required to work with incumbent national authorities, elections sometimes made it difficult for the United Nations to take the priorities of an incoming administration into consideration. There thus emerged growing recognition within the organization of the need for more strategic thinking about transition strategies. In November 2000, the Dutch government initiated a discussion about UN Security Council decision-making on mission closure and mission transition. The debate led to the publication of a report in April 2001 by the UN Secretary-General titled ‘No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (UN Security Council 2001). The report represented the first systematic attempt by the United Nations to identify factors that the Security Council should consider when deciding to close or significantly alter a UN peacekeeping operation. Among these factors was the need for early transition planning, a joined-up approach that includes all relevant actors both within and outside the UN system, the continuous review of circumstances in-country leading up to significant adjustments to an operation and sensitivity to the effects of any adjustments on the host country. The report drew on a range of peacekeeping experiences and was noteworthy for its candid analysis of the organization’s own shortcomings. With heightened interest in managing peacekeeping transitions more effectively, various departments within the United Nations undertook to adopt policies and practices that would help to strengthen the capacity of the organization in this regard. Prominent among these was the introduction of benchmarking. In 2002, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) became the first UN peacekeeping operation to employ benchmarks to inform decision-making about troop drawdown (UN Security Council 2002). Noting ‘with satisfaction’ innovations in UNAMSIL’s methods of operation that might prove useful best practice, ‘including an exit strategy based on specific benchmarks for drawdown,’ the Security Council began to prescribe the use of benchmarking more widely (UN Security Council 2005, p. 1). By April 2014, seven out of 17 UN peacekeeping operations had introduced benchmarking, although not all of them for the purpose of managing transitions (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2014; Caplan 2019, pp. 57–9). Other new practices followed. Early planning for transition, incorporated into UN guidance in 2013 (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2013), became more widespread. The UN peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), Mali (MINUSMA), Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and South Sudan (UNMISS), for instance, have all been required to develop transition strategies

346  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations well before the expected conclusion of their operations (Day 2019, p. 12). Recognizing the importance of host buy-in for any successful transition, the United Nations has also required mission leadership to ensure the participation of national governments in the planning of transitions, alongside ‘a broad and representative range of national stakeholders’ (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2013, para. 10). Agreeing a common approach has not always been feasible, however, given that the interests of national authorities can be at odds with those of the United Nations (Day 2019, p. 12). The Secretariat has thus also been encouraging effective use of communications to manage expectations in host states. Additionally, emphasis has been placed on ‘the development of relevant national capacities … to ensure an effective and sustainable handover of mission responsibilities to national partners’ (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2013, para. 10). Admittedly some of these policies, and others, have been more aspirational than real. As the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture has observed, ‘transitions … are frequently poorly timed and poorly managed’ (United Nations 2015, para. 126); and UN member states, leaders and staff still all too often focus on mission departure as the end point instead of a broader transition process in their understanding and practices. It is clear, nonetheless, that there has been an evolution in thinking and practice that reflects appreciation of the fact that ending peacekeeping operations is a process of transition rather than a single moment or event; that transition requires careful planning and coordination among all relevant parties; that any transition plan needs to be predicated on the peacebuilding requirements of the host country and include a realistic plan for ongoing peacebuilding support by the UN Country Team; and that credible, impartial analysis of the current context and the threats to sustainable peace is crucial to an understanding of peacebuilding requirements.

FACTORS INFORMING THE DECISION TO END A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION Numerous factors have a bearing on decisions over when and how to end peacekeeping operations. We can distinguish broadly between factors relating to (a) the implementation of an operation’s mandate and (b) political considerations on the part of the UN Security Council or other authorizing agents, the troop-contributing countries and the host countries. Implementation of the mandate  Where PKOs have had a mandate to organize elections, these have often been viewed as a critical moment in the peacekeeping operation—evidence of acceptance by the belligerents of the primacy of the ballot over the bullet—and an indication that the operation therefore might take steps to draw down and withdraw (UN Security Council 2000). It is still the case that elections are seen to mark a turning point but, increasingly, the tendency has been to view elections as just one element of a broader transition strategy rather than as the focal point of a transition. ‘Peace processes do not end with a ceasefire, a peace agreement or an election,’ the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) observed in its 2015 report. ‘Such events constitute merely a phase, rather than the conclusion, of a peace process’ (UN Security Council 2015c, para. 131). Yet while there is recognition that the requirements for a self-sustaining peace are more complex, the United Nations and other organizations do not always possess mechanisms and clear criteria for assessing progress towards the achievement of a stable peace (Caplan 2019).

Peacekeeping operations: the endgame  347 Notwithstanding calls for prioritizing the achievement of mandate objectives (“end states, not end dates”), the termination of peacekeeping operations is sometimes governed by deadlines. One reason for this is because UN Security Council resolutions authorizing the establishment of peacekeeping operations often contain “sunset clauses” that necessitate periodic renewal of the operations by the Security Council. In the absence of an agreement to renew an operation, the operation will be brought to an end. Deadlines may also be written into the political agreement that the peacekeeping operation is designed to support. The Erdut Agreement between Croatian Serbs and the Government of Croatia, for instance, limited the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) to 12 months renewable for another 12 months (UN General Assembly and Security Council 1995). The disadvantage of a deadline is that it may encourage belligerents to wait out the peacekeepers and resume hostilities once they have left. However, deadlines may also generate buy-in from the parties to a conflict: the Croatian government only accepted the deployment of UNTAES because it knew that it would not be a mission of indefinite duration (unlike the predecessor UN peacekeeping operations on its territory). Fixed timetables can also facilitate planning: with the knowledge that the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) would close in 24 months, the UN devised a Mandate Implementation Plan (MIP) that was meant to guide UNMIBH in the completion of its mandate. Benchmarking is a form of evaluation that uses specified standards to help ascertain the extent to which an operation’s objectives have been achieved (United Nations 2010). For instance, the reduction and the elimination of militia threats from a region may be a benchmark for the establishment of a secure environment. If done properly, benchmarking can introduce greater rigor and precision into assessments and allow for monitoring progress towards achieving a stable peace. As indicated above, benchmarking has been employed widely in UN (and other) peacekeeping operations and has assisted in transition planning (Landgren 2020), although the Security Council and other authorizing bodies may interpret benchmarks in different ways and according to their own interests. While benchmarks have varied depending on the mandate of a given mission, the Security Council has tended to concentrate on five main areas: (1) political dialogue and elections; (2) stability and security; (3) governance and the rule of law; (4) human rights; and (5) the extension of state authority (Day 2019; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2014). Since 2018, the UN has begun to rely on a more comprehensive and systematic assessment tool known as the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS) to inform mission planning, including drawdown and withdrawal (United Nations 2020). The decision to end a peacekeeping operation may be taken because of a failure to fulfill a mandate. The two UN operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II), from 1992 to 1995, both failed to complete their mandates, which included facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, monitoring of a ceasefire agreement, the disarmament of all local armed forces and preventing the resumption of violence, among other tasks (Williams 2015a; 2015b). The UN operation in Rwanda (UNAMIR I), which was mandated to help ensure security during a period of political transition, proved to be ill-equipped to prevent the genocide that would claim hundreds of thousands of Rwandan, mainly Tutsi, lives (Melvern 2015). In these and other cases, the UN Security Council, having concluded that the operations were not meeting their objectives, decided to terminate them. However, termination did not mark the end of all UN engagement in these countries.

348  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Political considerations  Decisions about when and how to end a peacekeeping operation are made not only in consideration of the foregoing options; they are also made on the basis of the national interests of Security Council members and troop-contributing countries (UN Security Council 2000). Indeed, the decision to engage, the nature of the engagement and the duration of the engagement are in many respects political decisions which may be subject to domestic pressures, budgetary concerns and competing strategic considerations. When China vetoed renewal of the UN’s preventive peacekeeping operation in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) in 1999, it was not because of careful consideration of the quality of the peace in the former Yugoslav republic, which in fact would succumb to violent conflict two years later; rather, it was seen as a reaction against Macedonia’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Partos 1999). Similarly, when the deployment of Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone in support of ECOMOG (the regional peacekeeping force) became a domestic political issue in Nigeria in 1999, the newly elected President Olusegun Obasanjo took the decision to withdraw his country’s forces, leading ultimately to the withdrawal of ECOMOG from Sierra Leone (Bah 2012). Host countries, too, may press for the termination of an operation if the government perceives that its national interests—or its own narrow political interests—are not being served by the continued presence of a UN peacekeeping operation. The termination and exit of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) in December 2010, for instance, was instigated at the request of the government of Chad which, contrary to the views of the UN Security Council, maintained that it no longer needed the peacekeeping operation for the purpose of helping to protect civilians (Karlsrud 2015; Price and Titulaer 2013). Sometimes the threat of expulsion by a national government can prompt a peacekeeping operation to consider withdrawal or reconfiguration. Soon after winning the presidency of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2006, Joseph Kabila began to sideline the UN mission (MONUC) there and push for its drawdown, leading to the reconfiguration of the mission (renamed MONUSCO) with a focus on stabilization (Day et al. 2020, p. 25).

MODES OF TRANSITION AND OUTCOMES OF WITHDRAWAL While factors that inform decisions of the UN Security Council or equivalent bodies to end peacekeeping operations evidently have an impact on when and why PKOs withdraw, they also inform how withdrawal will take place; that is, they inform the mode and pace of the transition process, as well as the nature of any follow-on arrangements that may succeed peacekeeping operations. Rapid exit  Peacekeepers (both military/police forces and civilian staff) may draw down and withdraw from host states in short time, albeit under quite varied circumstances. In one scenario, rapid exit immediately follows the fulfillment of mission mandates and goals. Where this is the case, a relatively large-scale peacekeeping presence is maintained until a specific mandated activity is realized—such as the supervision of elections—and peacekeepers withdraw soon thereafter. This was the case in Mozambique, for example, where ONUMOZ troops remained on the ground in large numbers until shortly after elections were held and a newly elected government was installed in late 1994 (Berdal 2015, p. 422). A similar dynamic was seen in Cambodia, where large numbers of UNTAC troops were drawn down over a few

Peacekeeping operations: the endgame  349 months and then exited in late 1993, after overseeing an electoral process (Widyono 2015, p. 400). Other cases of rapid withdrawal do not follow fulfillment of mission goals but, instead, come as swift responses to signals from host state governments that they no longer welcome the presence of a peacekeeping operation. In 2010, for example, MINURCAT exited on a relatively short timeline following the Chadian government’s call for withdrawal (Figure 24.1) (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011; Price and Titulaer 2013). The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), similarly, was terminated from one day to the next in mid-2008 and the mission was compelled to exit at speed after Eritrea signaled its ongoing discontent with the mission by placing a series of restrictions on the operation that severely impeded its functioning (Cammaert and Sugar 2015, pp. 678–80).

Source: Figure created by the authors; data based on Kathman (2013) and IPI Peacekeeping Database (n.d.) and cross-checked with data provided by UNDPO.

Figure 24.1

Modes of withdrawal and follow-on arrangements

350  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Phased withdrawal  While peacekeeping operations may move from peak deployment to closure in short time, the drawdown and ending of PKOs often occurs more gradually, in phases—partly to allow sufficient time for transition plans to be formulated and operationalized but also to gauge the effects of drawdown and, if necessary, to adjust the nature and timing of withdrawal accordingly. Benchmarking and other performance measures set by the PKO can also inform the pace of drawdown. One advantage of a phased approach is that responsibility for security, governance and other roles can be gradually transferred to local authorities (and other follow-on actors) but, at the same time, peacekeepers can remain on the ground in some form to provide resource support, technical assistance and back-up to local actors, as needed. This was the case in Liberia, where UNMIL incrementally reduced troop numbers over ten years (see Figure 24.1), before handing over responsibility for security to Liberian forces in 2016, some two years before the peacekeeping operation closed (Forti and Connolly 2018, pp. 4, 8). Gradually reducing the overall size of the international presence may also limit the economic shock that can otherwise accompany mission closure and the exit of peacekeepers, whose presence boosts local demand for goods and services but whose exit can, equally, leave a gap in market demand (see Beber et al. 2019; OECD 2020). Reconfigurations of the international presence: Follow-on arrangements  Peacekeeping transition and withdrawal processes not only vary in pace; they also vary in terms of outcome, where that term is understood not as mission closure and exit but, rather, as a reconfiguration of the international peacebuilding presence through the deployment of various Security Council-mandated “follow-on” arrangements (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2013). The aim of such arrangements is to provide a degree of institutional support so that the gains of PKOs can be maintained following the end of support from peacekeeping missions for security, governance and development (Caplan 2012b, p. 5). For the United Nations, the extent of its follow-on presence runs along a broad continuum, with the maximal approach taking the form of a successor UN peacekeeping operation that retains a troop deployment. On occasion such a succession can simply involve rebranding an existing mission with the provision of a new mandate (for example, the transition from MONUC to MONUSCO in the DRC, see Figure 24.1) (Doss 2015). However, the deployment of another peacekeeping operation can also be part of a gradual drawdown of the overall peacekeeping effort and, where that is the case, the successor operation will be more limited in size and scope (for example MINUJUSTH in Haiti after the closure of MINUSTAH in 2017, see Figure 24.1) (Di Razza 2018). When the UN wishes to bring its peacekeeping presence to an end altogether but retain a high-profile peacebuilding presence, the Security Council may choose to deploy a political mission or an integrated office (Day 2019, p. 6), which are civilian operations that can provide good offices and technical assistance in support of peacebuilding and development efforts. This is also a way for the UN and member states to retain analytical and early warning capacity throughout the country. Examples of such arrangements include UNIOSIL in Sierra Leone (following UNAMSIL) (Price and Titulaer 2013, pp. 19–21) and BINUH in Haiti (following MINUJUSTH). However, since political missions are funded out of the UN’s regular budget and they demand political attention by the Security Council, Council members may be reluctant to deploy these missions unless there is a strong case for doing so (Forti and Connolly 2019, p. 8). Instead, the United Nations may reconfigure its presence under the organizational banner of its UN Country Team, which would have already been deployed alongside the peacekeeping mission. In this arrangement, the UN Development

Peacekeeping operations: the endgame  351 Programme (UNDP) is likely to play a key role in delivering UN peacebuilding programs but it will work alongside a large suite of UN agencies and regional actors, as has been the case, for instance, in Liberia, Timor-Leste, Chad and Côte d’Ivoire since the closure of the UN PKOs there (Forti and Connolly 2018, pp. 28–9).

ENDING AS TRANSITIONING BETWEEN UN AND REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS As discussed in the previous section, follow-on operations are a common mode of ending PKOs. These transitions do not only occur from one UN peacekeeping operation to another but increasingly between operations conducted by the UN and those conducted by other, oftentimes regional, actors engaged in peacekeeping. Indeed, of all UN PKOs with a follow-on operation between 1947 and 2018, 22 percent were followed by non-UN operations. Conversely, 25 percent of operations that were established with the ending of a regional PKO were conducted by the UN.3 While cooperation between the UN and regional organizations is already envisaged in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, increased regional engagement and enhanced cooperation have only become important factors in peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War (UN Security Council 2001, para. 35, p. 7). Since then, various types of cooperation have emerged between the UN and its regional partners, above all the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) (UN Security Council 2015b, para. 2, p. 1). Bah and Jones (2008), for instance, differentiate between three types of UN–regional partnerships: sequential, parallel and hybrid operations. Hybrid peacekeeping operations are arrangements in which two organizations join commands and plan and conduct all activities together, as with the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). In parallel operations, different organizations deploy independently to the same (post‑)conflict zone at the same time, focusing on different functional or regional areas, such as the simultaneous involvement of UNMIBH and NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and, later, its Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sequential operations are cases where several organizations intervene at different stages of a response, following one another. Two subtypes of sequential PKOs can be distinguished: bridging and handover operations (Balas 2011, p. 394). A bridging operation is deployed rapidly for a brief period of time, usually with a clear end date, until a successor operation can take over. In the case of a handover operation, one organization ends its PKO, often after a longer period of deployment, and another organization comes in to take over its responsibilities. Examples include the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), which was taken over by the UN operation in Mali (MINUSMA), and the handover of rule of law tasks from the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). The type of cooperation most widely used and institutionalized has been that of sequential/ bridging operations, which involve transitioning from a regional, mostly AU- or EU-led, operation to a UN operation (Bah and Jones 2008, p. 23; UN Security Council 2015b, para. 24, p. 7). This sequencing frequently occurs in situations where there is an urgent need to deploy a robust force (De Guttry 2015, p. 18). Regional organizations are commonly identified as the most rapid way to intervene due to presumed deployment advantages, such as knowledge of the local circumstances, enhanced legitimacy, additional (robust) resources, greater consensus

352  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations within the organization, proximity to the crisis and a focus on rapid deployment capabilities (Bellamy et al. 2010, pp. 310–13; Bures 2006). The AU and EU even have designated rapid response forces—the African Standby Force and the EU Battlegroups— although to date none of these forces has seen military action. EU and AU bridging operations generally follow different patterns based on their respective comparative advantages (Meiske 2019, pp. 53–128). EU bridging operations are usually small in scale and deployed to fill a functional gap or niche activity left by the UN, or to a specific region until the UN can strengthen its forces (Brosig 2014). The 2003 EU Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, was mandated ‘to be deployed on a strictly temporary basis to allow the Secretary-General to reinforce MONUC’s presence in Bunia’ (UN Security Council 2003, para. 2, p. 2). AU bridging operations, on the other hand, are often larger in terms of size and mission scope, and act as a first responder to stabilize challenging security situations and prepare the ground for UN operations (Coleman 2011, pp. 522–6). Examples include the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which was deployed as an interim operation until the conditions were favorable for the establishment of the UN operation (ONUB); or the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was mandated in 2007 to ‘be deployed for a period of six (6) months, aimed essentially at contributing to the initial stabilization phase in Somalia, with a clear understanding that the mission will evolve to a United Nations operation’ (AU Peace and Security Council 2007, para. 9, p. 2). As of today, however, AMISOM has still not transferred authority to the UN. This underlines the importance of developing a clear exit strategy for bridging operations, consisting of a designated timetable or benchmarks for assessing when it is appropriate to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation, as was done in the 2013 and 2015 joint AU–UN benchmarking reviews for a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia (Williams 2018, pp. 157–64, 322–42). Successful transitions from one organization to another further require ‘common strategic objectives, political coherence and a clear division of responsibilities,’ as was noted in a 2015 lessons-learned exercise on the transitions from AU to UN peacekeeping operations in Mali and the Central African Republic conducted by the UN Secretary-General in collaboration with the AU (UN Security Council 2015a, p. 8). The lessons learned emphasize that a smooth transition starts with close cooperation between the regional organization and the UN from the very beginning of the regional PKO, including consultations on the development of respective mandates, the active participation of dedicated UN officers in operational planning of the regional operation, the early introduction of a transition plan and team, and the establishment of a Joint Operations Centre. One of the central elements of the transition process is the re-hatting of military and police contingents of the previous operation to the successor operation, often in significant numbers. Notwithstanding additional training activities and efforts to upgrade equipment, the capabilities of the re-hatted contingents, their equipment, human rights record, and command and control structures are sometimes below UN standards, as was the case with the AU operations AFISMA in Mali and MISCA in the Central African Republic. Similarly, the transfer of civilian capacities to implement strategies related to human rights and the protection of civilians requires harmonization of standards and working methods. Once the UN operation replaces the regional operation, sustained regional engagement in the post-transition phase, such as the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), can further contribute to a coherent strategy and smooth transition. All things considered, to be effective, a transition must

Peacekeeping operations: the endgame  353 occur between one well-functioning, operationally robust operation and another (De Guttry 2015; UN Security Council 2015a).

AFTER PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HAVE ENDED While the UN and policy-oriented think tanks, such as the International Peace Institute (IPI),4 have given considerable attention to peacekeeping transitions, there have been few attempts to document and study conditions on the ground in former host states after missions have ended and the international peacebuilding presence has been reconfigured (partial exceptions include Doyle and Sambanis 2006, and Howard 2008). As such, we have limited understanding of (a) the short-term impacts (if any) of mission closure on peace and development in former host states immediately after peacekeeping operations end; and (b) the long-term legacies of peacekeeping interventions (possibly decades after PKOs have closed) for states that have previously hosted missions (Gledhill 2020). For organizations that provide peacekeeping, the limited attention given to post-exit outcomes is, perhaps, unsurprising; international political attention and resources tend to focus on ongoing or future PKOs rather than past missions, though former host states do stay on the radar of the UN Security Council and General Assembly when they have follow-on political missions and/or sit on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (Bellamy 2010; Forti and Connolly 2019, p. 8). For academics, the limited attention given to post-exit outcomes partly mirrors the limited attention of policy actors, but it may also be due to methodological challenges that are associated with studying post-exit outcomes (see Caplan 2020). One such challenge relates to data; there is simply little comprehensive and reliable data on trends in security, the economy, and governance in states that have previously hosted PKOs. A second challenge relates to causal inference; even when data are available, it is difficult to isolate the lasting impact of peacekeeping interventions— after exit—in the face of causal “noise” generated by domestic and international dynamics that play out after PKOs have withdrawn (Diehl and Druckman 2015, p. 97). While the study of post-exit outcomes has been limited, it is an important area of investigation. After all, we can only really assess whether peacekeeping efforts contribute to a sustainable peace if we examine what happens after PKO support structures are removed. Recognizing this, there have been several recent efforts to investigate post-exit trends in formerly “peacekept” states. Di Salvatore and Ruggeri (2020), for example, have looked at cross-national quantitative indicators of state capacity over ten years following the closure of UN PKOs. While they identify positive trends on a number of fronts after exit, they also observe large variation in the post-exit trajectory of cases in their sample, which limits their confidence in their generalized findings. Other studies have explored more finite outcomes, in specific cases. Dorussen (2015), for example, has investigated perceptions of security in Timor-Leste after the closure of UNMIT in 2012, finding broadly positive views on that front among participants in a survey (albeit one with a small sample size). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in partnership with the UN Transitions Project, meanwhile, produced a study on ‘Financing a Sustainable Peace’ (OECD 2020). Drawing on data gathered from four countries where UN PKOs have recently closed, or will soon close, the study investigates, among other things, economic challenges and responses that can arise in the wake of PKO closure. Thompson (n.d.) has delved into these issues in relation to the

354  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Liberian case, in particular, arguing that the impact of UNMIL’s withdrawal on the local economy should not be overstated. Alongside these studies, the authors of this chapter are working with an international team of researchers to investigate the impact of PKO withdrawal on state capacity and service delivery in former host states.5 Our aim is to assess whether the end of peacekeeping operations and the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces is associated with any immediate change (improvement or decline) in security, governance and economic conditions of states that have hosted large-scale UN peacekeeping operations. In an effort to manage some of the challenges of studying post-exit outcomes, we are employing diverse and complementary research methods at two levels of analysis. At the cross-national level we are investigating (primarily through quantitative analysis) whether there are common trends in the trajectories of former host states over the five years following PKO mission closure. Recognizing that there may be significant case-specific variation in post-exit outcomes, we are also documenting perceptions of conditions on the ground in specific countries in which UN PKOs have recently closed, notably Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti. This work involves a combination of public perception surveys and qualitative interviews.

CONCLUSION The ending of peacekeeping operations poses a number of challenges. New or unanticipated threats to the establishment of a stable peace may emerge late in the day. National capacity to maintain the peace following exit may be limited. Coordination with any follow-on missions will be required. Sufficient funding will need to be available to help ensure mitigation of the adverse effects of drawdown and withdrawal and to support future economic development. These and related challenges all require careful and continuous transition planning from the outset of an operation. As is evident from the foregoing, there has been an evolution in thinking and practice with respect to the ending of peacekeeping operations. As policy actors have come to appreciate increasingly that the ending of these operations is a process rather than an endpoint, they have made significant strides towards managing the challenges of transition. There is growing understanding that successful transitions are vital to consolidating any gains that a peacekeeping operation may have achieved.

NOTES 1. For an overview of literature that addresses the impacts and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, see Di Salvatore and Ruggeri (2017). 2. On electoral violence, see also Chapter 16 (Smidt) in this Handbook. 3. In total, 42 percent of UN PKOs and 27 percent of regional PKOs that have ended between 1947 and 2018 were followed by another operation in the same/next month. Data and calculations are based on MILINDA (Jetschke and Schlipphak 2020). Note that the data do not indicate an explicit successor operation but only an operation deployed in the same country at the same time that a previous operation ended. 4. See the IPI project on ‘Peacekeeping Transitions’: https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​program/​peace​-operations​ -and​-sustaining​-peace/​peacekeeping​-transitions (accessed 9 December 2020).

Peacekeeping operations: the endgame  355 5.

For an overview of the project, which is supported by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), along with further support from the Folke Bernadotte Academy and Oxford University’s John Fell Fund, see https://​afterexit​.web​.ox​.ac​.uk.

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358  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations UN Security Council (2015a), ‘Letter Dated 2 January 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’, S/2015/3, 5 January, accessed 22 December 2020 at https://​undocs​ .org/​en/​S/​2015/​3. UN Security Council (2015b), ‘Partnering for Peace: Moving Towards Partnership Peacekeeping’, S/2015/229, 1 April, accessed 31 July 2018 at https://​undocs​.org/​en/​S/​2015/​229. UN Security Council (2015c), ‘Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People’ (‘HIPPO’), A/70/95–S/2015/446, 17 June, accessed 22 December 2020 at https://​undocs​.org/​A/​70/​95. United Nations (2010), ‘Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners’ Guide to Benchmarking’, accessed 22 December 2020 at https://​www​.un​.org/​peacebuilding/​sites/​www​.un​.org​ .peacebuilding/​files/​documents/​monitoring​_peace​_consolidation​.pdf. United Nations (2015), ‘The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture’, 29 June, accessed 22 December 2020 at https://​www​.un​.org/​pga/​wp​-content/​uploads/​sites/​3/​2015/​07/​300615​_The​-Challenge​-of​ -Sustaining​-Peace​.pdf. United Nations (2020), ‘Comprehensive Planning and Assessment System (CPAS)’, Briefing Note, June (copy on file with authors). Whalan, Jeni (2013), ‘Evaluating Peace Operations: The Case of Cambodia’, in Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman (eds), Peace Operation Success: A Comparative Analysis, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 29–54. Widyono, Benny (2015), ‘United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)’, in Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams (eds), The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press, pp. 395–407. Williams, Paul D. (2015a), ‘United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)’, in Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams (eds), The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press, pp. 408–15. Williams, Paul D. (2015b), ‘United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)’, in Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams (eds), The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press, pp. 429–42. Williams, Paul D. (2018), Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Wilton Park (2019), ‘Report: Improving UN Transitions’, Wilton Park, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the United Nations Transition Project, accessed 22 December 2020 at https://​www​ .wiltonpark​.org​.uk/​wp​-content/​uploads/​WP1719​-Report​.pdf. Zaum, Dominik (2012), ‘Exit and International Administrations’, in Richard Caplan (ed.), Exit Strategies and State Building, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press, pp. 137–58.

PART V CONCLUSIONS

25. State of the art of research on peacekeeping Paul F. Diehl

Research on peacekeeping operations has a relatively short history, at least relative to other conflict subjects such as war, alliances, and deterrence. The first peacekeeping operation (for which there is the most consensus), the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) dates only to 1948, and the Cold War period experienced a small number of operations, disproportionately in one region (Middle East). Early research on the subject was dominated by recollections and analyses by UN officials and peacekeeping force commanders (e.g., Rikhye 1984) and single case studies of particular operations (e.g., Abi-Saab 1978). These tended to have a “problem-solving” orientation (Paris 2000) rather than one designed to generate empirical or theoretical generalizations. Behavioral and quantitative studies of peacekeeping – which form the heart of contributions to this volume – were relatively late to the game. Some of this was a function of limited data (Diehl 2014), but scholars in this tradition tended to focus on the dynamics of the conflicts (e.g., civil wars, interstate wars) involved and disputant behavior rather than conflict management.1 Seminal works (such as Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008) jump-started data-based work on peacekeeping. Nevertheless, most subsequent work emphasized a single outcome, and therefore a single dependent variable, of peace operations: their ability to mitigate or prevent violent conflict, most often measured in terms of “peace duration” (time until the next war) or fatalities. The most recent generation of peacekeeping research, evidenced by the chapters in this collection, represent dramatic shifts in the foci and data. In this concluding chapter, I note six changes in peacekeeping research represented by these newer works, contrasting them with prior practice and offering some extensions for further research in these areas. The chapter concludes with a discussion of three pieces of unfinished business for peacekeeping research: the quest for theory, units of analysis, and the presence of multiple actors, respectively.

EVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN PEACEKEEPING RESEARCH Different forms of violence  In the primary, even almost exclusive, concentration on violence mitigation, peacekeeping scholars had narrowed their focus even further, considering only violence occurring between organized disputants in a war. Accordingly, success was indicated by the longer intervals before war renewal or small numbers of battle-related casualties in clashes between the primary protagonists. This concentration also reflected the availability of conflict data that was collected for studies of war (Diehl 2017), and the dearth of data specific to peacekeeping. The post-Cold War shift from interstate to (internationalized) civil conflict as the context for peacekeeping operations made an exclusive focus on disputant violence untenable. Killing and associated violence were no longer confined (if it ever was) to that between organized military forces separated by designated cease-fire lines. The mandates of peace operations expanded 360

State of the art of research on peacekeeping  361 accordingly, now prominently including charges for civilian protection. As demonstrated in the chapters here, peacekeeping research now considers a range of different kinds and victims of armed conflict and other violence. The role of peace operations in cease-fire monitoring between conflict parties is still important (see Chapter 13 by Kroeker and Ruggeri in this Handbook), as is the spread or diffusion of traditional conflict (see Chapter 14 by Beber). Nevertheless, the impact of peacekeeping on civilians is now a major focus, with cutting-edge research on one-sided killing and civilian casualties as outcomes that define peacekeeping success (see Chapter 15 by Hultman et al.). In addition, the sexual abuse from violations committed during peace operations, including by the peacekeepers themselves, is an extension of concern to beyond the conflict parties and their actions (see Chapter 17 by Olsson, and Chapter 18 by Karim and Beardsley). Other violence targets directly related to the operations are peacekeeping soldiers, and there is a growing body of research on peacekeeper casualties (see Chapter 21 by Lindberg Bromley). Finally, there are what might be seen as secondary effects or different forms of violence, namely urban violence and crime (see Chapter 20 by Di Salvatore), as well as what has been termed as “structural violence,” in this case unemployment (see Chapter 23 by Khadka and Phayal). As research moves into its next phase, violence is likely to continue to be a focus, and there is ample room for deeper investigations into the extensions noted above. One further extension is considering which actors are responsible for the violence that does occur. Mere body counts reveal the breakdown of peace, but they do not necessarily indicate who decided to break cease-fires, kill civilians, or perpetrate various forms of violence – and most importantly, why they did so. The list of possible suspects includes not only the host government, but various militia or rebel groups as well as external actors. Of particular interest are so-called “spoilers,” those parties that were not part of any peace or cease-fire agreement and had incentives to challenge the peace operation. A better understanding of peacekeeping success and failure in its core goal of violence abatement requires better understanding of those who challenge the operation. Multiple missions  As noted above, the modal focus for peacekeeping research has been on the goal of operations to mitigate violence. Yet, the number of missions has expanded to include a broad range of activities.2 Diehl and Druckman (2018) constructed a taxonomy of 11 different missions (e.g., promoting the rule of law, humanitarian assistance) and investigated the extent to which those missions were performed by UN peace operations through 2016. Although the traditional peacekeeping mission (i.e., mitigating violence) was carried out by 80 percent of the operations, UN peacekeepers do far more than this set of tasks. Indeed, the average operation has 4.2 missions, and the post-Cold War era involves more than twice as many missions as its predecessor. Whereas past research largely ignored these other missions, contributors to this Handbook reveal that scholars now direct their attention to the processes and outcomes of many other missions. This involves paying closer attention to mandates given to operations (Chapter 2 by Helms), and the associated tasks that peacekeepers are asked to perform (Blair et al. 2021). Newer missions include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration or DDR (Chapter 9 by Herrera and Gonzáles Peña), rule of law (Chapter 10 by Blair), election supervision (Chapter 16 by Smidt), and aspects of human rights (Chapter 15 by Hultman et al.). Other missions, such as security sector reform (SSR) and reconciliation (justice and conflict transformation) have drawn the attention of scholars (e.g., Schroeder et al. 2014; Shaw 2007). These

362  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations are welcome changes in peacekeeping research in that there is a greater concordance between research and what peace operations are asked to do. Most of the research on different missions, however, suffers from a continuing myopia in that studies concentrate on one of those missions and ignore how they might intersect or influence one another (see also Chapter 7 by Dorussen). There are several fundamental research questions that emerge when considering how missions are interdependent. The first concerns how multiple missions are chosen. When and how does the international community choose the different missions that encompass a given operation? There are few or no distinct patterns (much less an explanation) in the configuration of different peace missions or goals (Diehl and Druckman 2018). Are there patterns in mandates with respect to how additional missions and tasks are added over the course of an operation (Blair et al. 2021)? How does success or failure in one mission (e.g., traditional peacekeeping) influence the outcomes of other missions (e.g., humanitarian assistance)? What can we learn about the success of those individual missions (e.g., humanitarian aid deliveries) especially in the longer term? Do “security first” or stabilization strategies, which now hold primacy on the ground, support other missions (e.g., human rights protection, reconciliation and justice, economic development) or are those sacrificed when security concerns crowd them out or undermine them? (For an early test, see Mueller et al. 2021.) The UN (A4P 2018) and other institutions (e.g., International Peace Institute et al. 2019) have become concerned with proper sequencing of missions as peace operations have expanded their scope of activities. Is there an optimal sequencing or trajectory of missions that promotes success in all the components? How do peace operations intersect with other conflict management efforts, especially as the latter regularly occur simultaneously or in combination with peace operations? Current research lays the groundwork for addressing these questions, and there are numerous paths for future inquiry once one recognizes that peacekeepers do more than monitor cease-fires. Expanding the dependent variables  The exploration of multiple missions necessitates moving beyond violence-related outcome variables, even as different forms of violence beyond traditional war are now being considered. The success of missions such as the rule of law means evaluating them on their own terms, rather than lumping them together with traditional cease-fire missions or those protecting civilians from harm. As multiple missions increasingly become subjects of scholarly scrutiny, there will be changes in what peacekeeping impacts and the associated indicators are examined. Diehl and Druckman (2010) identified 13 missions in peace operations and then compiled 140 indicators of success/failure across those missions. Few of these could necessarily stand alone as single indicators of success/failure for a given mission. For example, quantitative measures of judicial independence are readily available, but this addresses only one aspect of the rule of law mission, and indeed just one element of the judicial component of that mission. DDR is really three different, albeit interrelated, processes (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) and thus need to be evaluated separately and with different dependent variables; it is conceivable that a given peace operation could be successful in one part of DDR but not the others. The Diehl and Druckman indicator list also includes other pieces of evidence that are not easily transferable to quantitative indicators (e.g., assessments made by NGOs about humanitarian assistance delivery). Given these limitations, holistic assessments drawn from multiple pieces of evidence or dimensional evaluations from different indicators might need to be made in the course of moving away from the single indicators (peace duration, casualties) that have dominated studies of violence as dependent variables.

State of the art of research on peacekeeping  363 Looking at other dependent variables does not have to be confined to outcomes directly tied to particular missions. Pioneering work (Aoi et al. 2007) raised the prospect of many different effects from peacekeeping, grouping these under the rubric of “unintended consequences.” Such outcomes do not necessarily have to be unexpected, but a range of different impacts can be subjects of research even if they are not specifically laid out in operation mandates. Contributors to this Handbook have considered how peacekeeping affects women (Chapter 17 by Olsson), the environment and culture (Chapter 19 by Leloup and Maertens), and the local economy (Chapter 23 by Khadka and Phayal). Additional impacts to examine from peacekeeping might include other UN millennium goals such as those related to poverty, disease eradication, and various health-related targets. For countries experiencing war, almost inevitably there will be a decline in achieving those goals during the war period and some upswing thereafter. The test, however, is not merely whether the peace operations can restore past gains, but also to alter the long-term trajectory as a result of peacebuilding efforts. As analysts assess these and other different effects from peacekeeping, there are several considerations. First, peacekeeping’s impact on such dependent variables is likely to be indirect, at least in comparison to its effects on limiting violence. Peacekeeping might influence economic growth, but beyond some direct infusions of cash and related employment during the operations, longer-term impacts will come from stability provided by the force, peacebuilding projects improving the infrastructure, and the like. From the perspective of causal inference, it might be problematic in tying the peacekeeping operation and the outcomes together, even if there are empirical associations. Second, health, economic, and other effects are the products of complex processes with multiple influences. Understanding peacekeeping’s place in those processes and accounting for those other factors will be essential. Merely adding a peace operation variable to existing equations is likely to be insufficient, both theoretically and statistically. Finally, long-term impacts on the environment, health, and the economy are perhaps the ones most of interest to scholars and policymakers alike. Yet long-term assessments of peacekeeping are vulnerable to the impact of intervening variables, which are magnified with the distance between the end of the peace operations and the outcome unit under observation. Although tempting to analyze peacekeeping’s effects on a wide range of phenomena over a broad period of time, scholars need to resist the urge to do so in the absence of compelling theoretical expectations. Authorization  Peacekeeping research now reflects an increasing concern with what might be described as elements of the authorization processes for peace operations. One traditional concern was force composition, specifically which states contributed how many troops to operations. Much of this work was descriptive or narrowly analytical, the latter evidenced by a series of single country studies in journals such as International Peacekeeping. There were some broader attempts at developing generalizations (e.g., Bellamy and Williams 2013), but generally few large-N analyses. The next step in studies of force composition goes beyond even explaining force configurations. Who provides troops and the troop identity (such as, nationality and gender) are not merely intrinsic subjects for explanation, but how answers to those questions affect other elements of peace operations is critical. The size of the peacekeeping force influences peacekeeping’s ability to protect civilians (Hultman et al. 2019; Chapter 15 by Hultman et al.). Force composition, specifically its diversity and heterogeneity along a series of dimensions (e.g., capabilities) provides a more nuanced way of looking at a UN peacekeeping force, rather than treating it as an amorphous aggregate. It also opens up

364  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations research questions and findings (Bove et al. 2020; Chapter 5 by Bove et al.) that bring together composition and operation outcomes. Early works by peacekeeping commanders and various UN reports raised the issue of force coordination between different national units and other types of micro problems concerning force structures. It was easy to dismiss those as anecdotal and subordinate to other factors in determining peacekeeping success. Now, systematic research is demonstrating that some of these concerns have import in peacekeeping effectiveness, not merely efficiency. There is also room to explore whether changes in the patterns of contributions (e.g., the rise of China as a major troop supplier) is just a consequence of changing patterns of influence in international relations or whether it has effects on that influence. Studies centered on the concept of burden sharing (for a review, see Sandler 2017) represent a niche milieu in peacekeeping research. Drawing on public goods theory and previous studies of alliances, scholars have sought to explain patterns in the financing and troop contributions made to peace operations. In some ways, however, such studies were greater contributors to the public goods literature than to peacekeeping, and focus was on contributing states rather than operation itself. More recent research (Chapter 3 by Coleman) has delved more deeply into financing models that extend beyond the formulas used in the UN. Still to be determined is whether the financing and troop-contribution levels affect performance. By most standards (especially in comparison to defense budgets), the costs of peacekeeping are relatively low, and sometimes criticized as suboptimal. As noted above, research has demonstrated that force size matters, but left unexplored is whether additional resources (whether within the UN peacekeeping budget or that of its sister UN agencies) would also enhance success, especially in peacebuilding missions such as the rule of law and security sector reform. Among the most encouraging developments in peacekeeping research is greater attention given to the initial authorization of peacekeeping operations. Path-setting studies (e.g., Gilligan and Stedman 2003) were not necessarily followed by analyses that looked more closely at when and where the international community decided to deploy forces. New research (Cordell et al. 2021) considers the impact of existing financial and troop commitments as well as the ability to “subcontract” operations to regional organizations as influences on the decisions. We still do not know enough about why and, just as importantly, when in a conflict cycle agents decide to authorize a peace operation (and equally important, why some conflicts are ignored). In addition, a decision to terminate an operation is in actuality an authorization decision, or at least a decision not to reauthorize the operation for another fixed term. Peacekeeping operations are relatively short (Wright and Greig 2012), and there is criticism that the UN in particular is prone to leaving too early (especially after elections). Future research might explore reauthorization decisions – positive and negative – for insights not merely on where peacekeepers go, but where they stay or leave. Consent by host states was for many years one of the three legs of the so-called “holy trinity” (Williams and Bellamy 2021), and thus a prerequisite or requirement for peacekeeping authorization. In that sense, its existence was of little interest as there was no variation across operations. As peace operations function increasingly in civil conflict contexts and semi-failed states, as well as encounter multiple actors beyond nation states, consent can no longer be assumed. The movement toward robust peacekeeping and stabilization operations has also altered the need and conditions for consent. Thus, consent has moved beyond a concern for legal discourse, and is now a variable for understanding peace operations. Research is still in its nascent stage, but Chapter 4 (by Passmore et al.) outlines a compelling research agenda in

State of the art of research on peacekeeping  365 which consent could have effects on multiple aspects including force composition and mission success. During much of Cold War peacekeeping, authorizing resolutions for peace operations were relatively simple, even vague, in light of complicated Security Council politics. Mandates for peace operations were also limited, largely to traditional tasks associated with cease-fire monitoring and conflict containment. Thus, the resolutions themselves were usually uninteresting, and mandate renewals at six-month intervals were routine without much change in the charges given the force. This has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, with authorizing resolutions increasingly adopting Chapter VII of the UN Charter justifications (Howard and Dayal 2018) and undergoing substantial revisions in renewals according to changes on the ground. Research on what peace operations are asked to do is attracting scholarly scrutiny, and mandates elucidated in resolutions (see Chapter 2 by Helms; Blair et al. 2021) are a central focus. There are some caveats though in moving forward on this. First, not all tasks or activities mandated in such resolutions or associated documents are necessarily carried out (Blair et al. 2021), although which ones are not and why is an interesting question itself. Second, peacekeepers might perform other functions or missions (or assist other actors in them) even if they are not fully specified in the resolutions. Moving beyond missions and activities in authorizing resolutions, there are new avenues for research in the content and language of resolutions even given the necessary vagaries that come with political compromise. With more detailed resolutions comes signaling of partisanship and blame toward one or more parties in the conflict (Chapter 6 by Benson and Tucker). This perhaps represents a challenge to a different leg of the holy trinity – impartiality. As with many of these changes, the subjects of new authorization research can be ends in themselves – accounting for decisions to deploy, mandates, bias, contributions, and the like. Each can also then serve as independent variables in predicting and explaining various peace outcomes, most notably success/failure. As research moves in this latter direction, taking into account endogeneity will be essential. That is, the authorization and reauthorization of peace operations, and their configurations, are influenced by the initial and then evolving conditions on the ground. As conditions change and missions succeed/fail, how many troops are deployed will also change as will what mandates are added or withdrawn, among other relationships. Good theory (more on this below) will be essential, as solutions cannot be confined to methodological fixes. Stakeholders and the “local turn”  Most behavioral research on peacekeeping has focused on disputant behavior in the conflict, specifically on their calculations to renew war or take action in opposition to the peace operation. This is a logical focus when the outcomes of interest concern violence. Nevertheless, there are a variety of “stakeholders” (Diehl and Druckman 2010) in peace operations – the international community, neighboring states, major powers, and the local population. Their interests are not necessarily convergent. For example, stopping the fighting might be in the interests of the UN, but not necessarily a local population when a cease-fire leaves it facing an oppressive government or occupying force. In the broader research community of peace studies, there has been the so-called “local turn,” namely a concentration on how peace operations affect everyday life and the local population of the areas where they are deployed. Much of this comes from the perspective of critical theory, whose avowed goal is “emancipation” in peacekeeping (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). The priority given to rights, justice, and related matters naturally flows to a focus on individuals and groups affected by the peace operation.

366  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Ethnographic research (most notably Autesserre 2014; 2021) has also produced new insights and policy relevant recommendations for peacekeeping forces, with the involvement and impact on the local population as the centerpieces. Behavioral research has been slow to pivot in the direction of the local turn. Some of this might have been a function of the lack of suitable data, although the Everyday Peace Initiative (e.g., Firchow 2018) demonstrates that indicators can be constructed at this level of analysis. Some of the shifts in the dependent variables noted above move scholars to different stakeholders and closer to the local level – unemployment, crime, women’s rights, and other concerns reveal various actors who are impacted by the peace operation. There is an emerging research set on local perceptions of peacekeeping, reflected in this Handbook in Chapter 22 (by Dorussen and de Vooght). Yet this still places the object as the peacekeeping force, rather than examining how the peace operation affects others. Among the next steps for quantitative research needs to be one in the direction of the local turn. This does not mean adopting the normative orientation of critical theorists, but rather examining how peace operations influence the lives of those in the country where peacekeepers are sent. This is more than looking at violence and its effects on different stakeholders. Peacebuilding is predicated not just on stemming violence, but on creating and enhancing conditions that promote the development of society. Reflecting these goals in the assessment of peacekeeping would allow analysts to provide a more nuanced look at the impact of operations. Looking at impacts at the local or everyday level suggests not being wedded to the liberal peacebuilding model (democracy, markets, rule of law) that examines aggregate phenomena and is not necessarily indicative of local effects. Non-UN operations and other configurations  Most peacekeeping research has been conducted on one or more United Nations operations. On the one hand, this makes empirical sense in that the UN has been the most common agent in organizing and deploying peace operations since the late 1940s. Less defensible on theoretical or empirical grounds is that data availability for UN operations far exceeds that for operations conducted by regional organizations or multinational coalitions. Data limitations have often driven research design choices on what cases to examine – the focus of many studies on African cases after 1989 was driven by the detailed data available in ACLED3 and other collections. Although the concentration on UN operations might be understandable, it does not reflect the full range of peace operations, especially in the post-Cold War period. Taking a liberal definition, as well as including political missions, there are upwards of 200 peace operations (Diehl and Balas 2014, updated by author) since the UNTSO in 1948. A plurality of operations are UN led, but that means that a majority have been conducted by others. There has long been a series of case studies of African and other peacekeeping efforts, but behavioral research had not often done systematic, large-N analyses. As reflected in this Handbook, non-UN operations (Chapter 8 by Bara) and political missions (Chapter 7 by Dorussen) are now on the research radar. The expansion in cases points to several research directions. The most fundamental is whether the research results from studies of UN operations apply equally well to regional or multinational ones. There are many reasons to suspect that this is not the case. Non-UN operations are organized, financed, and composed differently than UN operations, and thus the patterns and explanations elucidated in authorization studies are likely to be different. There is also debate about whether non-UN operations, specifically those carried out by regional organizations, are more or less effective than UN peacekeeping (Williams and Bellamy 2021).

State of the art of research on peacekeeping  367 Even as the conflict context might be the same or similar, variations across organizing agents in terms of impartiality, experience, credibility, and other dimensions suggest some expected variation in outcomes as well. There has been a tendency to consider peacekeeping operations as independent of one another, whether they are organized by the UN or another agent. In reality, operations are closely related to one another in terms of sequencing as hybrid operations or deployed simultaneously within the same conflict contexts (Balas 2022). Research agenda items that follow from these arrangements are numerous. These include investigating how these configurations come about and whether missions within the operations are more specialized. Consistent with the primary concern of peacekeeping research to date – how do these intersect in terms of success and failure?

NEW DIRECTIONS There has been tremendous progress in peacekeeping studies since the advent of the first works on the subject. The range of topics and the innovations in research represented in this Handbook are encouraging signs for the future. Nevertheless, there remain several lacunae that inhibit further progress as peacekeeping studies become a mature research milieu in international relations scholarship. In this section, I identify three areas that offer fruitful avenues. Theory  Scholars have long decried the lack of theory that directly addresses peacekeeping (Fetherston 1994), attributable to the “problem-solving” orientation of early peacekeeping work (Paris 2000), which has had a long-term impact on how peacekeeping research has been conducted. Much of that theoretical gap persists today in peacekeeping studies. Theoretical arguments on peacekeeping effectiveness first emerged as the field moved away from single case studies and anecdotal accounts from peacekeeping officials. In doing so, however, there was a tendency to adopt extant conflict theory approaches and apply them to peacekeeping. Fortna (2008) gives explanations for success, contending that peacekeepers make attacks more difficult, take away the element of surprise, and raise the international costs of aggression. Such accounts are embedded in “credible commitment” arguments (e.g., Walter 2002) from the literature on civil war. In these conceptions, peacekeeping in the role of third-party actors provides assurance that cease-fires will be honored and terms of peace agreements will be implemented; simple promises between enemies are not enough for the disputants to accept an agreement given the mistrust between them. More in line with deterrence arguments, however, is that the presence of peacekeepers signals a commitment and willingness to punish violations and that the military presence serves the purpose of stopping or deterring “spoilers” who might wish to break the peace (Ruggeri et al. 2017). Similarly, studies of peacekeeping allocations borrow extensively from public goods theory and burden sharing in alliances (see Sandler 2017). Credible commitment models are related to the general bargaining model of war (Reiter 2003), in the rational choice framework (e.g., Smith and Stam 2003). Explanations focus on the conflict dynamics between the disputants and the role of information, among others, in why peacekeeping forces are deployed and what might make them succeed or fail. Although purportedly a theory of peacekeeping, such treatments are essentially theories of war as applied to peacekeeping cases. There is little or no agency for the UN or other peacekeeping providers. Furthermore, these approaches are largely exclusive to the violence-mitigating

368  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations properties of traditional peacekeeping, and their applicability to the missions and purposes of contemporary peacebuilding or stabilization operations are suspect. To move peacekeeping research forward and away from an endeavor of largely empirical associations, there needs to be greater attention to a so-called “theory of peacekeeping.” Nevertheless, such a pursuit is not as simple as has been implied. When peacekeepers were primarily tasked with cease-fire monitoring, then theoretical formulations could concentrate on its violence-mitigating properties and looking at the situation from the perspective of the disputants made sense. As peacekeeping and the associated research on it expands, this becomes less tenable. Peacebuilding missions have a different dynamic than more traditional monitoring missions (e.g., DDR, election supervision) and it is unlikely that a one-size-fits-all approach to peacekeeping theory will be useful. Furthermore, as the scope of peacekeeping research is expanded to include authorization and longer-term consequences, the theoretical formulations are also likely to be more numerous and varied. Unlike studies of war, grand theory is unlikely to be a starting point for derivations that can be applied to peacekeeping. Realism is limited by its state-centric focus and inability to capture peacebuilding processes. The liberal peacebuilding model is best understood as a set of preferred policy outcomes rather than something that can provide an explanation for the outcomes that result. Accordingly, the quest for peacekeeping theory, at least in the short run, might be directed toward middle-level theories and perhaps one level below. There, theoretical arguments would be given for different peacekeeping processes with the hope in the long run that these could be integrated at a later time, although this might prove illusory. Units of analysis  For the prototypical peacekeeping study, scholars begin with a set of peacekeeping cases and then examine how those were formed or what consequences (along an expanding set of dependent variables) followed in those operations. Although the focus might be the operation itself or monthly and yearly observations (e.g., civilian casualties), the centerpiece is still a unit of analysis defined by the operation. This is most evident in the underlying assumption that two peace operations in the same conflict are independent of one another. The case selection of peace operations as units of analysis is not merely a research design choice; it has consequences for theory and knowledge building as well. This research strategy means that peacekeeping research becomes semi-divorced from broader conflict studies and from understanding its impact in conjunction with or vis-à-vis other conflict management approaches (such as, for example, mediation – see Chapter 7 by Dorussen). Shifting the unit of analysis (not exclusively) from the peace operation to the conflict in which it is embedded could produce a number of desirable consequences. First, by looking at the war or serious conflict from its origins, analysts could get a better understanding of when and why peace operations are deployed in that conflict cycle; multiple peace operations become not independent entities, but part of a time-series sequence in the same conflict and therefore perhaps presenting a better understanding on their authorization and impact. Second, looking at the conflict allows scholars to make appropriate before, during, and after comparisons to detect the impact of peace operations, thereby providing several and more valid baselines (Diehl and Druckman 2010) for evaluation. Looking at the conflicts as a whole, rather than just at the peace operations, permits one to look at their intersection with other conflict management approaches. Indeed, peace operations are relatively few in comparison to other conflict management approaches, especially in internationalized civil conflicts (Diehl et al. 2021), the locus of 21st-century peace operations. Frequently, these different approaches intersect, not only temporally but also by explicit coor-

State of the art of research on peacekeeping  369 dination. This raises a series of important research questions about the synergistic effects (both positive and negative) of peace operations and other conflict management actions, as well as in what sequence or combination peace operations might be best deployed with those other approaches. Looking at the conflict as a whole also allows analysts to compare effectiveness of different approaches as the deployment of a peace operation in a conflict comes from a longer menu of choice than merely peace operation or nothing. Multiple actors  A final gap in peacekeeping research involves the intersection of the peacekeeping force with other third parties in the conflict and operation activities. A peacekeeping operation is not alone in carrying out its missions. Even in the most straightforward operations – cease-fire monitoring and maintaining local security – peacekeeping soldiers can be supplemented by civilian police (CIVPOL) and research has recognized the impact of these different personnel (e.g., Hultman et al. 2019 on civilian protection). Yet as missions fall more under the peacebuilding rubric, the number and types of other actors involved increase. Humanitarian assistance delivery, for example, brings in other UN agencies (such as the Department of Humanitarian Affairs) as well as a variety of non-governmental organizations (e.g., Red Cross and various charitable relief services). Peacebuilding activities, such as building the rule of law and facilitating local governance, involve numerous actors, both local and transnational (e.g., the World Bank). Other actors, perhaps arguably, have a greater effect on outcomes in peacebuilding activities than does the peacekeeping force. To consider only the peacekeepers and their actions in assessments is not only myopic, but misleading and prone to invalid inferences about effectiveness. Equally relevant is the prospective interactive effect of the peacekeeping force and its coordination with those other actors. Indeed, the interconnection of different actors in the domain of peace operations is perhaps best conceptualized in a network fashion (Braithwaite and Campbell 2020). This lays out a fruitful agenda for research and one that could lead to new insights on peacekeeping performance, but also more broadly on the factors and processes involved in the phenomena (such as democracy and security sector reform) under scrutiny. Illustrative of this is Braithwaite and Campbell’s (2020) yet to be tested hypotheses about network diversity and peace operation centrality in peacebuilding outcomes.

CONCLUSIONS Mature research programs share a number of synergistic characteristics, and these can be used as benchmarks to assess the progress of peacekeeping research over the last several decades and as reflected in this Handbook. First is the transition from largely descriptive treatments of a phenomenon to causal analyses that seeks to account for variations in that phenomenon. Peacekeeping studies successfully achieved this shift early on as both policymaking and scholarly studies focused on conditions for success and failure even as their scope (often single cases) was sometimes narrow. A second characteristic of more advanced research programs is having a myriad set of research questions and foci that extend beyond the original concerns that launched the field. Peacekeeping research was slow to make this change, constrained for decades by only looking at success/failure and by defining these almost solely in terms of limiting violence. Nevertheless, the contributions to this Handbook, and research on peacekeeping more broadly, reveal a dramatic upswing in new research on a variety of peacekeeping topics. Although, as noted above, there is still some ground to travel, peacekeeping studies

370  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations now examine multiple dependent variables and different stages of the conflict management process (e.g., authorization, termination). A third element, at least in the quantitative social sciences, is the development of data sets that are specific to the core phenomenon under study. There has been an explosion of new peacekeeping data sets and discussions about such data gathering (see Clayton et al. 2017; Mac Ginty 2017) in the last decade. The peacekeeping research milieu is now well positioned to answer many of the questions that were only sources of speculation or anecdote previously, and such answers can now come from systemic analyses that seek broad generalizations. The final characteristic of a mature research enterprise is theoretical, developing coherent explanations for the causal associations discovered in empirical analyses. It is perhaps this component where peacekeeping studies are most underdeveloped and an area to which substantial attention should be devoted in the future.

NOTES 1.

Exceptions include the voluminous works on mediation and negotiation. For a summary, see Greig et al. (2019). 2. One characteristic of peacekeeping research has been the unfortunate conceptual muddle around a series of terms. By “peace operations,” I refer to the general peacekeeping efforts performed in (a) given state(s) during a designated time period. “Missions” are subsumed under operations and involve coherent categories of tasks designed to achieve given purposes or mandates; for example, election supervision and promoting democracy are missions. 3. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, accessed 22 March 2022 at https://​acleddata​ .com/​#/​dashboard.

REFERENCES Abi-Saab, Georges (1978), The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960–1964, International Crises and the Role of Law, vol. 4, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Aoi, Chiyuki, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur (eds) (2007), Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, Tokyo, JP: United Nations University Press. Autesserre, Séverine (2014), Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Autesserre, Séverine (2021), The Frontlines of Peace: An Insider’s Guide to Changing the World, New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Balas, Alexandru (2022), Sharing the Burden of Peace: Inter-Organizational Cooperation in Peace, Bern, CH: Peter Lang Publishing. Bellamy, Alex, and Paul Williams (eds) (2013), Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Blair, Robert, Jessica Di Salvatore, and Hannah Smidt (2021), ‘When Do UN Peacekeeping Operations Implement Their Mandates?’, American Journal of Political Science, July, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​onlinelibrary​.wiley​.com/​doi/​pdfdirect/​10​.1111/​ajps​.12650. Bove, Vincenzo, Chiara Ruffa, and Andrea Ruggeri (2020), Composing Peace: Mission Composition in UN Peacekeeping, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Braithwaite, Jessica Maves, and Susanna Campbell (2020), ‘Who Keeps the Peace?: Reconceptualizing Peacebuilding Through Networks of Influence and Support’, Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law, accessed 12 October 2021 at https://​www​.kpsrl​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​2020​-12/​Braithwaite​ _Campbell​_112020​.pdf.

State of the art of research on peacekeeping  371 Clayton, Govinda (ed.), Jacob Kathman, Kyle Beardsley, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, Louise Olsson, Vincenzo Bove, Andrea Ruggeri, Remco Zwetsloot, Jaïr van der Lijn, Timo Smit, Lisa Hultman, Han Dorussen, Paul F. Diehl, Laura Bosco, and Christina Goodness (2017), ‘The Known Knowns and Known Unknowns of Peacekeeping Data’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (1), 1–62. Cordell, Rebecca, Thorin Wright, and Paul F. Diehl (2021), ‘Extant Commitment, Risk, and UN Peacekeeping Authorization’, International Interactions, 47 (1), 135–60. Diehl, Paul F. (2014), ‘Behavioural Studies of Peacekeeping Outcomes’, International Peacekeeping, 21 (4), 484–91. Diehl, Paul F. (2017), ‘Peacekeeping Research with Non-Peacekeeping Data’, International Peacekeeping, 24, (1), 38–43. Diehl, Paul F. and Alexandru Balas (2014), Peace Operations, 2nd edition, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Diehl, Paul F. and Daniel Druckman (2010), Evaluating Peace Operations, Boulder, CO, USA: Lynne Rienner. Diehl, Paul F. and Daniel Druckman (2018), ‘Multiple Peacekeeping Missions: Analysing Interdependence’, International Peacekeeping, 25 (1), 28–51. Diehl, Paul F., Andrew Owsiak, and Gary Goertz (2021), ‘Managing International–Civil Militarized Conflicts (I-CMC): Empirical Patterns’, Civil Wars, 23 (3), 343–70. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis (2006), Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Fetherston, A. Betts (1994), Toward a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping, New York, NY, USA: St. Martin’s Press. Firchow, Pamina, (2018), Reclaiming Everyday Peace: Local Voices in Measurement and Evaluation After War, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Fortna, V. Page (2008), Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. Gilligan, Michael and Stephen Stedman (2003), ‘Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?’, International Studies Review, 5 (4), 37–54. Greig, J. Michael, Andrew Owsiak, and Paul F. Diehl (2019), International Conflict Management, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Howard, Lise and Anjali Dayal (2018), ‘The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping’, International Organization, 72 (1), 71–103. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon (2019), Peacekeeping in the Midst of War, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. International Peace Institute, the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report (2019), ‘Prioritizing and Sequencing Peacekeeping Mandates in 2019: The Case of UNMISS’, Meeting Note, February, accessed 29 August 2020 at https://​www​.ipinst​.org/​2019/​02/​prioritizing​-and​-sequencing​-peacekeeping​ -mandates​-the​-case​-of​-unmiss. Leonardsson, Hanna and Gustav Rudd (2015), ‘The “Local Turn” in Peacebuilding: A Literature Review of Effective and Emancipatory Local Peacebuilding’, Third World Quarterly, 36 (5), 825–39. Mac Ginty, Roger (2017), ‘Peacekeeping and Data’, International Peacekeeping, 24 (5), 695–705. Mac Ginty, Roger and Oliver Richmond (2013), ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace’, Third World Quarterly, 34 (5), 763–83. Mueller, Grace, Paul F. Diehl, and Daniel Druckman (2021), ‘Juggling Several Balls at Once: Multiple Missions in MONUC’, Global Governance, 27 (4), 493–516. Paris, Roland (2000), ‘Broadening the Study of Peace Operations’, International Studies Review, 2 (3), 27–44. Reiter, Dan (2003), ‘Exploring the Bargaining Model of War’, Perspectives on Politics, 1 (1), 27–43. Rikhye, Indar Jit (1984), The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping, New York, NY, USA: St. Martin’s Press. Ruggeri, Andrea, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2017), ‘Winning the Peace Locally: UN Peacekeeping and Local Conflict’, International Organization, 71 (1), 163–85. Sandler, Todd (2017), ‘International Peacekeeping Operations: Burden Sharing and Effectiveness’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61 (9), 1875–97. Schroeder, Ursula C., Fairlie Chappuis, and Deniz Kocak (2014), ‘Security Sector Reform and the Emergence of Hybrid Security Governance’, International Peacekeeping, 21 (2), 214–30.

372  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Shaw, Rosalind (2007), ‘Memory Frictions: Localizing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone’, The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1 (2), 183–207. Smith, Alastair and Allan Stam (2003), ‘Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of Civil and Interstate War’, International Studies Review, 5 (4), 115–35. UN Peacekeeping (2018), ‘A4P – Action for Peacekeeping’, accessed 8 March 2022 at https://​ peacekeeping​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​a4p​-declaration​-en​.pdf. Walter, Barbara (2002), Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Williams, Paul and Alex Bellamy (2021), Understanding Peacekeeping, 3rd edition, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Wright, Thorin and J. Michael Greig (2012), ‘Staying the Course: Assessing the Durability of Peacekeeping Operations’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 29 (2), 127–47.

Index

accessibility of information 154–6 accountability 4, 135, 136, 152, 153, 257, 259, 262, 263, 264–5 Action for Peacekeeping (A4P/A4P+) 4, 88, 150 Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression 14, 76–7 active diplomacy 90 activities, and support for missions 319 adaptability 71 Aduda, Levke 93 Afghanistan 68, 288 see also UNAMA: ISAF AFISMA 351, 352 African solutions to African problems 38 African Union (AU) missions 22, 148 bridging operations 352 costs and financing 27, 32–3, 37–9 hybrid 21, 38, 206 interoperability and cooperation 70–71 non-UN 102 rapid response force 352 strategic communications 150 agency (women’s) 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 250 Agenda for Peace (1992) 47 agricultural products, impacts of peacekeeping 329 Alusala, Nelson 122 AMIB 27, 352 AMISOM 27, 29, 32, 327, 329, 330–39, 352 Amnesty International 291 Andreas, Peter 142, 296 Angola 51, 54, 156, 201, 229, 232, 345 Annan, Kofi 291 Ansorg, Nadine 53, 68, 216 Ari, Bariş 183 Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) 5, 197, 245, 366 armed groups, violence against peacekeepers 307 arms for cash 125 Article 16 (UN Charter) 281 Article 24 (UN Charter) 12 Article 25 (UN Charter) 12, 13 Article 32 (UN Charter) 279, 281 Article 33 (UN Charter) 14 Article 40 (UN Charter) 76 Article 41 (UN Charter) 76 Article 42 (UN Charter) 76

Asia 107, 113 assessment scales, expenses 33–4, 37 asymmetrical war 124 Australia 49, 98, 102 Auteserre, Séverine 4, 5, 98, 142, 174, 236, 316, 321 authoritarianism 233, 236 authorization 12, 13, 48, 74, 96, 212, 363–5 autonomy 39 Bah, Alhaji Sarjoh 351 Bakaki, Zorzeta 315, 317, 322 Balkans 36, 120, 155, 303 Bara, Corinne 98, 102, 105, 107, 108, 109, 111, 185, 218, 295, 296 Bardall, Gabrielle 245, 250 bargaining 37, 48, 52, 95, 143, 188, 189, 233 bargaining model of war 2, 367 Barnett, Michael 143 Bartels, Susan 260 battlefield casualties/fatalities 95, 113, 184, 185, 201, 249 Beardsley, Kyle 19, 35, 90, 92, 95, 184, 186, 197, 202, 245 Beber, Bernd 144, 259, 319, 329 Becker, Jordan 37 behavior 68–9, 319 see also conduct; sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA); sexual misconduct behavior change 152–3 behavioral research 365–6 Belgioioso, Margherita 62 Bell, Christine 265 Bellamy, Alex J. 4, 14, 104, 113 belligerent consent 55 benchmarking, and decisions to end PKOs 345, 347, 350 benefits of peacekeeping 106 Benson, Michelle 75, 83, 94–5, 258 best practice(s) 54, 120, 258, 276, 279, 345 Bevan, Robert 278 bias 81, 82–3, 85 bilateral assistance (financial) 28, 30, 32, 37, 40 BINUH 350 black markets 289 Blair, Robert A. 90, 99, 139, 141–2, 143, 172, 175, 191, 317, 319 Blattman, Christopher 322 Blood, Christopher G. 306

373

374  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations blue helmets see military personnel Bobrow, Davis B. 34 Bodanac, Nicholas 329 Bokova, Irina 278 Boot, Max 210 Bosnia and Herzegovina 4, 104, 201, 210, 242 see also IFOR; SFOR; UNMIBH bottom-up peacekeeping 321–3 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 149 Bove, Vincenzo 20, 37, 53, 65–6, 68, 69, 70, 188, 216, 329 Boyer, Mark A. 34 Brahimi Report (2000) 4, 15, 47, 88, 135, 137, 149, 344 Branbury, Andrew 210 Brancati, Dawn 171 bridging operations 351–2 Brosig, Malte 170 budgets 30, 31, 32, 37 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce 171 buffer zones 68, 198, 215 bunkerization 174 burden sharing 27, 33–9, 40, 105–6, 107, 237, 364 bureaucracy 107, 143, 277, 280 Burnham, Gilbert M. 306 Burundi 28, 120 Cambodia 50, 229, 249, 345 see also UNTAC Cameroonian peacekeepers 69 Cao, Xun 243, 249 capacity peacekeepers/peacekeeping 1, 107–8, 188, 243, 248, 289 see also military capacity; Standing Police Capacity (SPC); state capacity capacity-building 154, 169, 287, 289, 294, 295 Capstone Doctrine 4, 14–15, 98, 225 Carnahan, Michael 328 Carothers, Thomas 143 Carswell, Andrew J. 13 Caruso, Raul 329 casualties/fatalities 4, 249, 300, 301, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308 see also battlefield casualties/fatalities; civilian casualties/fatalities; maternal mortality Cavatorta, Elisa 37 ceasefires 215 Central African Republic (CAR) 29, 38, 65, 81, 88, 98, 122, 210, 211, 264 see also MINURCA; MINURCAT; MINUSCA; MISCA; Operation Sangaris

Central America 118, 126, 229, 286 Chad 52, 54 see also MINURCAT Chapter VI (UN Charter) 14, 16, 18, 21, 47, 85, 185 Chapter VII (UN Charter) 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 48, 50, 76, 185, 186, 211, 280 Chapter VIII (UN Charter) 351 Chenoweth, Erica 243, 244 Chesterman, Simon 141 children 22, 212, 259 China 35, 63, 77, 348 Chowdhury, Ishita 95, 186 Cil, Deniz 184, 201 citizens see non-state actors civic education 137, 144, 171, 231, 232, 322 Civil Affairs Handbook (2012) 141 Civil Budget 31 civil wars/conflict 17 data 5 internationalization 202 missions and halting of 95 peacekeepers and duration of 183–4 preventive actions 134 civilian casualties/fatalities 75, 83–4, 108, 201, 215 civilian personnel 63, 163–76, 185 costs 30 discipline 264 effectiveness 168–72 information mechanism and accountability 259 numbers deployed 165–7 research landscape 175–6 roles and tasks 163–5, 227 SEA allegations against 261 success/failure of operations 172–4 women’s participation in 262 and women’s rights 265 civilian protection 210–21 from CRVS 246–8 information and communication 153 mission composition and 61, 68, 69 peacekeeper efficacy 201 research challenges for future 218–20 findings 215–18 resolutions 15 success of peacekeeping 97, 215, 247 UNMISS 60 see also Protection of Civilians (POC) mandates; Responsibility to Protect (R2P) civilian-led missions 89, 94 Clapham, Christopher 315

Index  375 Clayton, Govinda 90, 95, 96, 186, 203 climate neutrality 271, 272 co-deployments 70, 136 Cockayne, James 126 coercion 2, 14, 65, 225, 228, 229–30, 233, 291 Cohen, Dara Kay 257 coherence between personnel 172–3, 174, 175 of information and communication 157–8 of mission, mandates and 90 cohesive missions 306 Cold War 2, 36, 92, 365 Coleman, Katharina P. 35, 164 collective action theory 34 collective violence 185, 189 collectivity 126 Collier, Paul 328 Colombia 98, 122, 126, 286, 296 combat economies 288 combatants returnees 126–7 savagery towards civilians 210 see also ex-combatants; foreign combatants; veteran assistance commitment 1–2, 19, 67, 81, 83, 93, 187, 188 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 256 common costs 28, 30, 31, 32, 40 communications, interruption of 76 community engagement 276–7 Community Levy (ECOWAS) 39 Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) 164 community-based DDR 121, 125 complacency 210 complementarity, mediation and peacekeeping 95, 96 complete disarmament 122, 123 complete disengagement 126 Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS) 347 conditional protection 217 conduct 53, 152 conflict environment, and violence against peacekeepers 307 conflict intensity 183–5, 201 conflict recurrence 97, 186–7, 231, 295 conflict resolution 182–92 civic education and 322 civilian personnel and 170 mission composition and 71 peacekeeping mechanisms 187–8 and peace 188–91 three dimensions of 183–7 as trajectories 95–6

conflict severity and intervention 35 and level of engagement 93 and resolutions 78 and troop size 19 conflict substitution 189, 191 conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) 242 civilian protection 246–8 role of peace operations 258–9 consent 14, 17–18, 46–56 breakdown/deterioration of 52–3, 54 forms 51 from host governments areas for future research 219–20 and bias in civilian protection 218 and deployment 214 lack of 46, 50–51, 53, 185 nature and dynamics of 47–8, 51–2, 55 and post-conflict peace 185 research 364–5 new directions in 54–5 relevant findings and debates 48–54 volatility of 53 withdrawal of 50–51, 52, 82, 220 constructive ambiguity 23 containment 19, 202 continuous consent 55 control 39, 52, 247 cooperation 70, 71, 76, 157, 164, 315, 318, 319, 321, 329, 351 coordination 364 between personnel 172–3 electoral assistance 227 information and communication 157–8 integrated peacekeeping and 98 multinational 71 problems 60, 64, 68, 121, 138 in rebuilding state capacities 249 with regional IGOs 76 coping economies 288 cosmopolitan peacekeepers 61 cost share formula 31, 35–6 Costalli, Stefano 183, 201, 317 costs (mission) 3, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34, 37, 40, 93, 96 Côte d’Ivoire 21, 22, 38, 52, 54, 120, 142, 144, 156, 170, 201, 230, 231 see also Operation Licorne; UNOCI Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) 124, 126, 127 counterinsurgency 52–3, 124, 126, 237 counterterrorism 22 credibility 53, 82, 154–6, 233 credible commitment models 367–8 crime, in post-war settings 288–9 criminal capital 286

376  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS) 135 criminal violence 217, 286–7, 288, 289, 295, 296 cultural clash 274–5 cultural cleansing 278 cultural distance/closeness 53, 69, 107, 216, 330 culture 68, 155 see also environmental and cultural heritage Cyprus 30 see also UNFICYP data 4–5, 175 data collection 199–200, 204, 205, 248 Data Strategy of the Secretary General for Action by Everyone 175 Davies, David 170 Dayal, Anjali Kaushlesh 55, 213 de Coning, Cedric 172 de-escalation 94, 118–19, 230 de-radicalization 126, 127 deadlines, and ending of a PKO 347 defense expenditures, NATO members 36 delayed communications 152 delimiting DDR 125 demand, for non-UN missions 105 demobilization see disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) Democratic Republic of the Congo 4, 38, 122, 142, 150, 210, 211, 300, 303, 321 see also MONUC; MONUSCO; ONUC; Operation Artemis democratization 171, 185, 232, 234, 235, 236, 237, 319, 322 Department of Operational Support (DOS) 270, 272, 276, 277, 280 Department of Peace(keeping) Operations (DPO) 21, 90, 136, 168, 204, 227, 270, 280 Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) 90, 168, 204, 227, 276 deployment civilian protection and 213, 214, 216 consent and 54–5, 56 cost-benefit calculus 307 data 5, 71, 198, 200–203, 204, 214 decisions 2 factors influencing 106 impact of, before agreements 94 mission composition 70 in non-favorable circumstances 123 prior to hostilities 96 profit from 35 subsidies/funding 28, 32 Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSGs) 164 DeRouen, Karl 95, 186

desire for peacekeeping 48–9 deterrence 65, 66, 67, 68, 187, 188, 216, 247, 259 Di Salvatore, Jessica 20, 22, 142, 189, 190, 217, 296, 353 Diehl, Paul F. 4, 20, 90, 92, 94, 314, 362 digital communications 150 diplomacy/initiatives 76, 90, 93, 94, 95, 96, 169 disaggregation in research 144 see also spatially disaggregated data disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 118–28 Colombia 98 communication campaigns 153 evaluation/assessment 121, 122, 124 evolution of research 120–22 impacts 122 indicators of 121, 125–7 new wars, peacekeeping and 124–5 role in contemporary peacekeeping 123–4 violence and crime reduction 228, 296 and women’s security 246 disbanding 118 discipline 152, 247, 248, 262, 264 disengagement 126 displacement 190–91, 198, 202, 217 diversity advisors 71 diversity of mission composition 60–61, 65–70, 71–2, 107, 111, 172 Dixon, William J. 90 Doctor, Austin C. 248 Dorussen, Han 2, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 143, 186, 203, 302, 315, 316, 317, 319, 320, 322, 329, 353 Doss, Alan 151, 155 Downs, George 171 downsizing 344 Doyle, Michael W. 1, 4, 17, 18, 49–50, 51, 171, 172, 182, 183, 184 drawdown 94, 343, 345, 347, 350 Druckman, Daniel 20, 90, 314, 362 duration of mission and decrease in cooperation 339 and perceived relevance 318 Duursma, Allard 52, 53, 54, 199, 200, 202, 302, 322 early elections 234 early warning 151 East Timor 49, 55, 120 see also INTERFET; Timor-Leste; UNAMET; UNMISET; UNTAET ECOMOG 348 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 28, 29, 39, 102, 154 economic impact, of peacekeepers 328–30

Index  377 economic reintegration 120–21 economic relations, interruption of 76 economic status 339 Edloe, L. Lenisse 121 effectiveness of peacekeeping civilian components 168–72 conditional effect, mediation 95 consent and 53, 56 of DDR provisions and programs 119, 125 economic dynamics and individual security 329 in elections 228 mediation 96 models 89 non-UN missions 107–8 generalized findings 109–111 political process and 95 provision of impartial information 2 theoretical arguments 367 UN missions civilian protection 211, 246 DDR and 120 diversity of mission 61, 65–70 generalized findings 109–111 useful indicators of 97 efficacy 54, 200–203 efficiency 107, 233–4 Egypt 28, 47, 63 El Salvador 48–9, 50, 122, 135, 170, 229 elections (postwar) 225 manipulation 230 peacekeeping assistance activities 226–7 Electoral Assistance Divisions 171, 227 electoral integrity 233 electoral violence 190, 225–38, 287, 290 inducing side-effects of peacekeeping 232–5 peacekeeping and reduction 227–32 Elfversson, Emma 202, 287 Ellerby, Kara 265 Elster, Jon 187 emotions 71–2 employment, and trust 329–30 ending peacekeeping operations 343–55 aftermath 353–4 concepts and processes 343–4 concerns about safety 329 decisions 344, 345, 346–8 factors informing decisions 346–8 process 344 the thinking and practice of 344–6 as transitioning between UN and regional peacekeeping 351–3 transitions and outcomes of withdrawal 348–51

enforcement missions 14–15, 17, 22, 50, 184, 185, 186, 221, 306 Environment and Culture unit (MINUSMA) 281 Environment Strategy for Field Missions 272, 277 environmental and cultural footprint 270, 271, 272, 274, 275–6, 277, 278, 279, 281, 282 environmental and cultural heritage impact of operations see material impact protection 270, 271, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280 environmental degradation 270, 275 Environmental Pocket Guide for UNIFIL Contingents 276 Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions 270, 274, 275–6, 276, 278 Environmental Risk and Performance Management 271–2 environmentalization 278, 279 Eritrea 52, 54, 156, 349 escalation 93–4, 96 Ethiopia 28, 63, 202, 349 EULEX 150, 167, 351 EUMM 167 European Union (EU) missions 88 bridging operations 352 civilian deployment 166–7 comparability to NATO-led missions 111 financing 28, 29, 32 information and communications 150 non-UN 102, 104 rapid response force 352 rich nation troop deployment 107 evaluation of peacekeeping, and local support 319 evaluation systems 205 Everyday Peace Initiative 366 ex-combatants, support for peacekeeping 321 exit strategies 122, 123, 125, 128, 344–5, 352 expectations, and consent 56 experience diversity of 68 and support for peacekeeping 319 expertise 1, 68, 90, 156–7, 163, 164, 205, 236, 288 exploitation hypothesis 34–5, 36, 40 exposure, and perceptions 142, 316–17 external actors, and consent 55 fact-finding missions 74, 76, 90 failure(s) organizational 54 in peacekeeping 2, 3–4, 21, 53, 93, 104, 210, 308, 362 to fulfil a mandate 347 fairness 82 Fang, Songying 143 Favretto, Katja 83

378  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations Fazal, Tanisha M. 302 Fearon, James D. 2, 52 female fighters 244, 246 female peacekeepers 53, 168, 258, 262, 306 field diversity 70 field service staff 165 financing 27–41 burden-sharing debates 33–9 contemporary models 29–33 research 364 sources 28–9 Financing a Sustainable Peace 353 first responders 105, 352 Fjelde, Hanne 199, 201, 202, 214, 218, 220, 227, 229, 307, 317 Folke Bernadotte Academy 141 follow-on arrangements 350–51 follow-up missions 93 Fondation Hirondelle 154 Force Generation Service 71 Force Intervention Brigade (BIG) 16 foreign combatants 126, 127 Formed Police Units (FPUs) 289, 291, 293, 295, 296 Fortna, V. Page 2, 4, 5, 17, 18, 48, 49, 50, 171, 185, 188, 196, 230, 315, 367 fragmented mandates 90, 211 France 13, 32, 63, 88, 98, 102–3, 264, 279 Frazier, Derrick V. 90 free riding 34, 36, 40 freezing violent conflict 191 Friends of the Secretary General 50 Friis, Karsten 172 functions (assigned) 20 Gaibulloev, Khusrav 34–5 Gbagbo, Laurent 52 gender see men; women gender data revolution 251 gender empowerment 183 gender equality 246, 248, 259, 263–4, 265 gender inequality 247, 251, 262, 263, 265 gender power imbalances 262, 263, 265 gender-based violence see sexual and gender-based violence gender-responsive peacebuilding 265 General Assembly (GA) 12, 34, 118, 122 Geneva Centre for Security Governance (DCAF) 141 Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) 5, 199, 201, 305 geographic proximity 53 geographic space see spatially disaggregated data geographical origin, of peacekeepers 63 Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) 197

Germany 28, 32, 35 Gilligan, Michael 2 Giustozzi, Antonio 122 Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene 2, 143, 183, 243, 249, 258, 302, 315, 316, 319, 320 Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede 19, 197, 202 goal conflict 232–3 Goldring, Edward 68, 69 González, Andrea 119 good governance 1, 134, 225 good offices 76, 89, 90, 95, 227, 350 Goodhand, Jonathan 288 Gordon, Grant M. 144, 173, 315, 316, 317, 319 Gorman, Ryan 62 Great Lakes 122 greenhouse gas emissions 271, 272, 282 Greening the Blue 271, 272, 276 Greig, J. Michael 94, 106 Grimm, Sonja 139 Group of Friends Leading on Environmental Management 277 Guterres, António 88 Haass, Felix 53, 68, 216 Haggard, Stephan 139 Haiti 98, 102, 120, 122, 142, 144, 152, 210, 229, 317, 320 see also BINUH; MINUJUSTH; MINUSTAH; UNMIH Haley, Nikki 210 Hammarskjöld, Dag 14, 219 Handbook for United Nations Field Missions on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence 258 handover operations 351 hard cases 93, 105, 196, 202, 214 Hegre, Håvard 184 Heldt, Birger 4, 74, 92, 99, 139 Hendricks, Michael 68, 69 Henke, Marina E. 303 Herbst, Jeffrey 2 heritage-ization 278 heterogeneity 60, 64, 66–8, 69, 111, 201, 203, 316, 321, 363 high politics 280 High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO) 4, 71, 150, 167, 276, 303, 346 Hills, Alice 296 Hoeffler, Anke 249 Hoelscher, Kristian 98 Högbladh, Stina 119 Höglund, Kristine 226, 227, 229 Holt, Victoria 21 honesty 83

Index  379 Hoover Greene, Amelia 248 Horgan, John 126, 127 Horwitz, Irwin B. 66 Horwitz, Sujin K. 66 host community experiences 5 host governments barriers to dissemination of information 156 consent 52–3, 214, 218, 219–20, 364 decisions to end PKOs 348 electoral obstruction 233, 236 funding from 28, 40 participation in planning transitions 346 willingness to pay for non-UN missions 106 Howard, Lise Morjé 1, 5, 54, 65, 140–41, 153, 188, 196, 213, 221 Huang, Reyko 171 Huber, Laura 259 Hultman, Lisa 2, 19–20, 75, 92, 102, 105, 107, 108, 109, 111, 186, 213, 215, 218, 219, 242, 246, 247, 259, 317 human rights 2, 134, 170–71, 231, 242, 319 humanitarian agencies 88, 98 humanitarianism 94, 98, 170, 173, 306, 319 Humphreys, Macartan 121 Hungary 28, 32 Hunnicutt, Patrick 201, 203 hybrid peacekeeping 21, 88, 98, 351, 367 IFOR 351 illiberal rule 142–3 immaterial impact 271 impartiality 2, 14, 49, 74, 75, 82, 103, 151–2, 188, 220, 306, 309 imperial peacekeeping 34 implementation costs 228 impure public goods 106 in-kind support 28, 29, 30, 32, 39, 40 incomplete/partial disarmament 120, 122 Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) 103–4 Individual Police Units (IPUs) 289, 293, 295 Indonesia 49, 102 inducement 65, 187 influence 1, 35 informal economies 288, 289 information asymmetric 66, 67, 187–8 balancing 187 flows 188 protection and accountability 259 see also public information and strategic communications informative communicability 66 informative fungibility 66, 67 informative trust 66 infrastructure 226, 249

initial consent 51 insecurity 249, 289, 328, 339 Insight, Impact and Integrity 175 institution-building 140, 169, 217, 236, 294, 322 institutional norms 258, 262 institutionalization, peacekeeping activities 279–81 Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) 121, 122 integrated peacekeeping 4, 88, 98, 119, 164, 173 intentional destruction 272–4, 275, 277 Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force 135 Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) on DDR 121 inter-IO financial support 30 inter-state wars 2, 17, 47, 94 inter-TCC support 32, 40 interactions based on diversity of missions 74 peacekeepers and local populations 68–9, 72, 188, 316, 319 interest-driven financing 35, 36, 40 interest-driven peacekeeping 49, 106 INTERFET 49, 112 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 166 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) 55, 76 internal diversity (mission) 61, 66, 68 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 13 International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset 18–19 international missions 112 International Peace Institute (IPI) 4 international relations (IR) theory 1–2 internationalization, civil wars 202 interoperability 70–71 interposition 118 intimidation 225, 231, 234, 302 intrusive interventions 143 ISAF 27, 28, 31, 32, 36, 37, 88, 98, 111, 150, 166, 172–3 Israel 28, 47 Japan 35, 49, 155 Jetschke, Anje 103 Jo, Jung In 185, 186 Job, Brian L. 21, 22 Johansson, Karin 247, 259 Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC) 199, 200, 204 Joint Operations Centers (JOCs) 204 Jones, Bruce D. 351 Joshi, Madhav 95, 119, 185 judicial reform 136–7

380  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations justice chain 136 Kabila, Joseph 52, 291, 348 Kalyvas, Stathis N. 189 Karim, Sabrina 62, 245, 259 Karlsrud, John 15, 22 Karreth, Johannes 55 Kathman, Jacob D. 4, 75, 94–5, 183 keep(ing) the peace 92, 185 Kelling, Claire 202 Kelmendi, Pellumb 315, 320 Khanna, Jyoti 34 Ki-Moon, Ban 271 Kim, Wukki 185, 186, 249 Kingma, Kees 121 Kirschner, Shanna 170, 247, 249 Kisangani, Emizet F. 18 Kishi, Roudabeh 243 Kissinger, Henry 23 Knight, Mark 120, 125 knowledge accumulation 198–9 knowledge sharing 70 Kosovo 249, 293, 322 see also EULEX; UNMIK Kosovo Force (KFOR) 32, 272, 274 Kreft, Anne-Kathrin 257–8, 265 Kydd, Andrew 82–3, 85 Labuda, Patryk 17 Lake, David A. 143 language effectiveness of peacekeeping 107 of information operations 153 in mandates 19, 21, 22, 212–13, 219, 246 in resolutions 75, 78, 81 leadership positions 164 Ledgerwood, Judy L. 53 Lee, Sabine 260 legitimacy 1, 49, 75, 82, 103, 151–2, 265, 274–5, 278, 315, 339 Leib, Julia 315 Leiby, Michele L. 247 Leloup, Mathilde 275 lenient peacekeeping 23 levy (African), on eligible imports 32, 38, 39 liberal IR theories 1–2 Liberia 28, 29, 38, 98, 120, 141–2, 143–4, 153–4, 155, 229, 322 see also UNMIL Libya 36, 88 Lijn, Jaïr van der 169, 173, 174 Lin, YiJyun 202 Lindberg Bromley, Sara 175 Lindley, Dan 151 linguistic distance/closeness 68, 69, 330

Linzer, Drew A. 139 liquidation, of a PKO 344 local populations interactions between peacekeepers and 68–9, 173–4, 216, 275 learning effect 70 perception of peacekeepers 314–23 protests against UN presence/activities 287 local support 314, 315–16 conflict dynamics 319–21 determinants 316–19 economic conditions and (Somalia) 328, 330–39 relevance of bottom-up peacekeeping 321–3 local turn 365–6 logistical support 28, 29, 31–2, 164, 227, 230, 231, 234, 271, 330 Logistics Forum (AU) 32 Loken, Meredith 265 low politics 280–81 Lührmann, Anna 233 Macedonia 348 see also UNPROFOR McMullin, Jaremey R. 126 Maertens, Lucile 278 majority rule 233 Malesky, Edmund 37 Mali 29, 38, 60, 79, 88, 98, 211, 300, 308, 322 see also AFISMA; MINUSMA; MISAHEL malicious acts 300, 301 management positions 164 mandates 12–23 common characteristics 13 distinguishing missions by 112 implementation, and decision to end a PKO 346–7 inclusion of election support tasks 225 and international commitment 1 measuring 17–22 mission coherence 90 need for flexibility 127 need for spatially disaggregated data 198 overlap with humanitarian activities 88 postwar settings 295 reforming/rebuilding security sector 289 regional peacekeeping 134 types and authority to use force 14–17 vagueness 23 and violence against peacekeepers 306 women’s security 242, 243 see also fragmented mandates; Protection of Civilians (POC) mandates; robust mandates maps 5, 199, 203

Index  381 Marks, Zoe 243, 244 Martin-Shields, Charles P. 329 Matanock, Alia M. 228, 231 material assistance 152, 154, 155, 227, 230, 231, 234 material benefits, and consent 55 material impact, peace operations defining and assessing 271–7 future research 282 learning from the analysis of 277–81 maternal mortality 249 mediators/mediation 82–3, 88, 90, 93, 94–5, 171, 191, 322 Mehra, Tanya 125 Melin, Molly M. 93 Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) 23, 265 men 243, 245, 247, 249, 250, 261 Metternich, Nils W. 233 Military Budget 31 military capacity 37, 49, 107, 216 military cultures 68, 71, 216 military interventions 18–19, 83, 102, 103, 104, 134, 215–16, 248 Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 27 military personnel 60 activities 18, 19 attacks against 292 Blue Helmet caste-system 305 civilian protection 215–17, 219, 258–9 conflict recurrence 187 costs 30 diversity of mission and effectiveness 66, 68, 69 electoral assistance 171, 226 electoral violence 227–8, 229 environmental and cultural protection 276, 280 intentional acts of vandalism by 272 postwar violence 287 presence and battle casualties 201 decreased risk of unreported atrocities 216 and levels of violence 142 and reduction in civilian fatalities 201 proximity of bases and security perception 329 and SEA 261, 262 spatial position of 198 troop quality 68, 216 troop size 19 (1991-2018) 62 (2008-19) 166 decrease in civilian casualties/deaths 83–4, 215

lower level of violence 108, 184 peace duration 186 postwar settings 293–4 troop strength and knowledge sharing 70 military reform 136, 138 military stalemates 48–9, 94 Miller, Adam 170, 247, 249 minimum use of force 104, 291 MINUJUSTH 281, 350 MINURCA 293 MINURCAT 46, 49, 109, 156, 348, 349 MINURSO 272, 277 MINUSCA 16–17, 30, 69, 170, 173, 281, 291, 345 MINUSMA 16, 27, 54, 69, 90, 111, 155, 164, 173, 201, 270, 274, 275, 278, 279, 280, 281, 301, 345, 351 MINUSTAH 119, 157, 274, 276, 291, 316, 319, 350 Mironova, Vera 322 MISAHEL 352 MISCA 352 mission composition 60–72 data 4 and effectiveness 65–70 future research 70–72, 363–4 peace duration 186 peacekeepers 62–5 mission creep 277, 279, 280 mission size 4, 20, 184, 186, 317–18 mission structure 70 misunderstanding/miscommunication 68 mitigation 74, 76, 190, 191 monitoring 294 conflict resolution 184, 185, 186, 188 DDR programs 122 diversity of mission and effectiveness 66, 68 elections 228, 230 monitoring systems 205 MONUC 21, 52, 149, 153, 201, 216, 293, 305, 348, 352 MONUSCO 3, 16, 27, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 164, 276, 281, 291, 293, 345, 350 Morgan, Michael A. 306 Morocco 30, 32 Mozambique 28, 49, 229, 230, 348 see also ONUMOZ Muggah, Robert 120, 121 Müller, Tanja R. 152 multidimensional peacekeeping 2, 17, 22, 60, 163, 171, 184, 185, 186, 225, 265, 270 multilateral cooperation 76 Multilateral Peace Operations Database 167, 204 multiple actors 121, 264, 322, 369 multiple missions

382  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations identifying 89–92 interdependencies between 94–5, 98 research 95–9, 361–3 sequencing of initiatives 92–4 Murdie, Amanda 170 Muvumba Sellström, Angela 242, 246, 247 Mvukiyehe, Eric 142, 143–4, 153, 171, 201, 229, 231, 315, 317, 321, 322, 329 Nagel, Robert Ulrich 248, 257 Namibia 65, 126, 229 see also UNTAG naming of names 78–81, 82 naming and shaming 171, 248, 259, 264, 265 national armies 62, 68, 70, 237 national ownership, electoral process 236 national police 289, 291 nationalities 68–9 NATO missions costs and financing 27, 28, 31–2, 35–7 interoperability and cooperation 70–71 missions, and rich nation troop deployment 107 non-UN 102, 104 strategic communications 150 see also ISAF; SFOR NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) 31 negative sentiment 74, 81 negotiated settlements 83, 84, 94, 97, 109, 113, 185, 187 Nelson, Susan 228 neo-imperialist practices 2 Nepal 63, 122 Neumayer, Eric 249 neutrality 74, 75, 126, 152 new warfare, implications of 124–5 New Zealand 49 Nilsson, Desirée 244 Nomikos, William G. 201, 203, 322 non-permanent members of the UNSC 75–6 non-state actors 218, 289, 296 and rule of law 134, 137, 141–2, 142–3 violence against peacekeepers 307 non-UN peacekeeping 88, 102–112, 201 data collection 204 defining 102–4 effectiveness see effectiveness of peacekeeping explaining 104–7 research 92, 111–12, 366–7 non-UN police 113 non-use of force 14, 74 non-violence 290 nonmaterial power 66

Nordås, Ragnhild 257 normalization of violence 290 norms 1, 2, 66, 170, 258, 262, 263, 278 Nyblade, Benjamin 35 Obasanjo, Olusegun 348 objectives (operational) 13, 18, 20, 46, 352 observer missions 3, 17, 19, 184, 185, 186, 187 obstructions to peacekeeping 54 Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) 136 Olson, Mancur 34 Ondieki, Johnson 60 one-sided violence 68, 84, 97, 108, 201, 213 O’Neil, Siobhan 126 ONUC 2, 13, 34 ONUCA 118 ONUMOZ 54, 348 ONUSAL 135, 170 Operation Artemis 352 Operation Boleas 103 Operation Licorne 103 Operation Sangaris 32, 103 Operations and Management expenditure 37 Organization of African Union (OAU) 37 Organization of American States (OAS) 88, 166 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 167 organizational assistance, electoral 227, 230–31, 237 organizational learning 54 organized crime 122, 124, 125, 142, 189, 217, 250 Otto, Sabine 170, 175 outcomes 17 consent and longer-term 50 of DDR 121, 126 diversity of mission and 66–8 influence of peacekeeping on 1, 83 of withdrawal 348–51 output legitimacy 151, 152 outsourcing 237 Owsiak, Andrew P. 93, 94, 96 Özerdem, Alpaslan 120, 125 Paddon Rhoads, Emily 220 parallel peacekeeping 30, 32, 38, 103, 112, 221, 351 Paris, Roland 2, 236 partial consent 51 participatory peace 139 partnership peacekeeping 38, 112, 351–2 party(ies) to the conflict 82, 83, 156 passive diplomacy 90 patrols 203, 204, 228, 229, 289

Index  383 peace agreements 2, 47, 51, 93, 119, 172, 265, 320 peace duration 185–6 Peace Fund (AU) 32 Peace and Justice Commission 322 peace negotiations 119 peace operation doctrine 13 Peace and Security Council (AU) 38 peacebuilding 2, 88, 120, 124, 235, 265, 276–7, 366 Peacebuilding Triangle 1–2 peaceful activism 290 peacekeepers behavior see behavior deployment see deployment and local populations see local populations performance 69, 308 POC mandates 211, 213, 217 preconceptions of 69 SEA allegations 259, 260–61 support for mediation 95 tasks 3, 5, 163–5, 226–7, 294 transactional sex 259–60 and violence 189 violence against see violence, against peacekeepers see also civilian personnel; military personnel; police personnel Peacekeepers at Risk (PAR) 4, 304, 305, 310 Peacekeeping Activity Data 175 peacekeeping dividends 243, 244, 249 peacekeeping economies 289 Peacekeeping Location Event Data (PKOLED) 5, 199, 201 Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset 5, 20–21 peacekeeping operations (PKOs) benefits 106 DDR provisions 119 difficulty in distinguishing political missions from 88–9 early 14 impacts 61, 74, 125, 328–30 lack of consent as threat to 46 as part of a political process 88 political missions contrasted with 90 see also ending peacekeeping operations; multiple missions Peacekeeping Operations Corpus (PKOC) 5 Peacekeeping Operations Deployment (PKODEP) 5, 199, 201, 203 peacekept 196, 314, 315 Peitz, Laura 201, 202, 216 Peksen, Dursun 265 perceptions

of peacekeepers/peacekeeping 53, 173, 314–23 of security 329 Permanent Five (P5) members of the UNSC 1, 34, 35, 75–7, 78, 81, 106 personnel see peacekeepers persuasion 65, 66, 153, 188 Peru 247, 263 phased withdrawal 350 Phayal, Anup 201, 321 physical violence 211, 215 Pickering, Jeffrey 18 Pietz, Tobias 121 PKO Governance (PKOGOV) 5 planning, PKO endings 344, 345 Plümper, Thomas 249 police personnel civilian protection 62–3, 217, 247, 250, 258, 259 costs 30 crime reduction 142 economic conditions and support for 328 election assistance 226 and level of violence 108, 185 numbers deployed 62 and SEA 261, 262 training of local police 265 see also national police; non-UN police; Somali Police Force; troop and/ or police contributing countries (T/ PCCs); UNPOL police reform 135, 137 policies, and support for peacekeeping 319 Policy on Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in the Field 152 Policy and Guidance for Public Information in UN Peacekeeping Operations 149–50 policy reviews 4 Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions 137–8 political considerations, ending of PKOs 348 political economy of peacekeeping (study) 327–40 case study (Somalia) 330–39 discussion and conclusion 339 economic impact of peacekeepers 328–30 political experiences, effectiveness of non-UN missions 107 political interests, and troop size 19 political missions 88, 90 contrasted with peacekeeping missions 90 difficulty in distinguishing peacekeeping and 88–9 reconfiguration of international presence 350

384  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations see also multiple missions political participation 153, 171, 229, 230, 231, 234, 290 political rights 170, 227, 244 political trust 315, 322 political violence 189, 192, 245, 248–9 political-development missions 90, 93, 94, 97 politics 88, 189, 280–81 population safety 249 positive sentiment 74, 81 post-Cold War era 47, 78, 90, 140 postponing violent conflict 191 postwar settings crime in 288–9 demands for early elections 234 peacekeeping in 292–5 relevance of liberal interventions 2 transitions see transitions postwar violence 190, 286–96 forms 217, 286–7 Pouligny, Beatrice 142, 174, 234, 275 poverty 260, 328, 335–6 power 1, 35, 52, 66, 81, 278–9, 308 power balance/imbalances 232, 259, 262, 263, 265 power relations 189, 190, 278, 279 power sharing 233, 236 non-democratic 233 Powers, Mathew 317 practice of peacekeeping 2–4 practitioner support 199 preventive actions 134 primacy 39 principle of distinction 98 Principles of Guidelines 82 private goods 106 pro-all sentiment 79 pro-government sentiment 78, 79, 80, 84 pro-rebel sentiment 78 proactive peacekeeping 17 procedural legitimacy 151 profit 35, 37, 288 Protection of Civilians (POC) mandates 15, 211–14, 327 aspects of protection 21–2 caveats 211 challenges for future research 219 generic, passive and active 20–21 language 21 personnel count 19–20 trends in 211 protective culture 245 protests and demonstrations 152, 226, 230, 231, 235, 274, 287, 290, 291–2, 319 proximity, and effectiveness of peacekeepers 69

Pruitt, Lesley 265 public goods paradigm 34, 36, 40, 106, 364 public information and strategic communications 148–58 a brief history 148–50 effectiveness of 154–8 electoral assistance 227 outgoing PKOs 344 peacekeeping success 151–4 research challenges and directions 158 public order, in postwar cities 290–92 Pugel, James 120 pure public goods 106 quality of life 249 Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) 152, 154, 275, 322 Quinn, J. Michael 95 Rabin, Andrew 315, 320 radicalization 127 radio 148, 149, 151, 154, 155, 156, 158, 227 rapid exit 348–9 rapid response forces 352 Ratner, Steven R. 319 re-hatting 112, 352 re-recruitment of combatants 127 Read, Roísín 200, 202 rebel groups 49, 74, 173, 185, 233, 235, 244, 248, 288, 307, 318, 321 recidivism 121, 122, 127 reconfiguration of international presence 350–51 recruitment of combatants 126, 127, 244 of peacekeepers 63, 66, 167–8, 176, 264 Reeder, Bryce W. 201 Regan, Patrick M. 83, 92 regional peacekeeping 37–8, 88, 102, 107, 111–12, 134, 221, 351–3 regional stability 106 rehabilitation 120, 127 Reilly, Benjamin 233–4 reimbursements 28–9, 30, 32, 35, 37, 40 reinsertion 118 reintegration see disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) Reisch, Gregor 201, 202, 216 relationships complete/partial interruption of 76 information and communication 156 peacekeeper presence and 308 role of civilian component 173–4 relevance (mission), and local support 316–17 religious distance 69 Reparation decision (ICJ) 12

Index  385 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations see Brahimi Report reputation 83, 152 reputation costs 228, 229, 231 research 4, 89 data see data disaggregation see disaggregation in research evolutionary changes in 360–67 methodological diversity 175–6 new directions 367–9 see also individual topics resilience (mission) 54 Resolution 1270 (1990) 15 Resolution 1325 (2000) 212, 214 Resolution 1590 (2005) 15 Resolution 1888 (2009) 258, 259 Resolution 2098 (2013) 16 Resolution 2100 (2013) 270, 279, 280, 281 Resolution 2518 (2020) 300 resolutions 74–85 civilian protection 15, 258, 259 Cold War peacekeeping 365 distribution 74–5, 77 environmental and cultural heritage 270, 279, 280, 281 frequency 77–8 impacts 75, 79, 84 importance 74 levels of action 76–7 mentioning the rule of law 135 motivating factors 78 process of making 75–7 sentiment 74, 78–84, 85 sexual violence and issue of 214 sunset clauses 347 women, peace and security (WPS) 242, 246, 251 resourcing, consent and 54–5 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 2, 13, 85, 170, 212 responsible presence 276 restricted consent 50, 51 rich countries, deployment of troops 107 Rietjens, Sebastiaan 90, 173, 175 risk(s) 120, 300, 303, 304, 305, 307–8 risk sharing 37 risk tolerance 107 Robust Africa Deployments of Peacekeeping Operations (RADPKO) 5, 199, 201, 203 robust consent 46, 50, 51, 54 robust mandates 17, 19, 20, 124, 125, 213, 302, 306 The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 120

Rost, Nicolas 106 Rubinstein, Robert A. 274–5 Ruffa, Chiara 90, 173, 175, 247 Ruggeri, Andrea 2, 20, 53, 66, 68, 69, 143, 183, 184, 188, 199, 201, 203, 315, 317, 318, 321, 329, 353 rule of law 134 establishing 134–5, 217 peacekeeping, SSR and empirical evidence 138–43 future avenues for research 143–4 promotion of 135–8 third generation DDR 127 rule-based intervention 1–5 rules of engagement (ROE) 13, 23 rules and procedures, electoral 233–4 Ruppel, Samantha 315 Russia 35, 77, 279 Rwanda 4, 54, 63, 104, 156, 210, 242, 308 see also UNAMIR Sabrow, Sophia 315 Sahel 22, 38 Salverda, Nynke 307 Sambanis, Nicholas 1, 4, 17, 18, 49–50, 51, 108, 111, 124, 171, 172, 182, 183, 184, 328 Samii, Cyrus 144, 201, 231, 315, 317, 321, 322, 329 sanctions 74 Sandler, Todd 34 São Tomé and Príncipe 32 Sarfati, Agathe 94 satisfaction with missions 315, 320, 333 Sawyer, Katharine 257 Schelling, Thomas Crombie 189 Schlipphak, Bernd 103 Schmidt, Holger 35, 90, 92 Schulhofer-Wohl, Jonah 108, 111, 124 scope, distinguishing missions by 112 second generation DDR 119, 122, 123 securitization of the environment 278 security criminal groups and provision of 288 deployment and 201 economics and trust in peacekeepers 329–30 electoral 226, 227, 228–30, 231, 235, 237 environmentalization of 278 military capacity and 216 of peacekeepers 306–7 promotion of 3 see also women’s security Security Council (UNSC) 38 and DDR 120 deployment decisions 2 membership 75–6

386  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations peacekeeping studies 1 see also mandates; resolutions security sector reform (SSR) 121–2 and law see rule of law Seet, Benjamin 306 self-defense 16, 18 self-interest 103, 106 self-sustaining peace 50, 346 Sempijja, Norman 170 sentiment anti-all 79 anti-government 78, 79, 84 anti-rebel 78, 79, 80, 84 in resolutions 74, 78–84, 85 sequential operations 92–4, 112, 351–2, 362, 367 settlements 14, 18, 84, 94, 97, 109, 113, 185, 187 sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) 152, 214, 249, 256 role of peace operations in 259–62 UN response to 250, 319 sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) 256–66 addressing the challenges 263–5 in armed conflict 256–63 sexual misconduct 4, 152, 248 sexual violence 22, 170, 210, 214, 244 see also conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) 247, 257 SFOR 109, 351 shadow economies 288 Sharif, Sally 121, 122 Shesterinina, Anastasia 21, 22 Sierra Leone 29, 38, 120, 121, 155, 201, 210, 219, 230, 303, 348 see also UNAMSIL; UNIOSIL Sisk, Timothy D. 228 Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE) 204, 205 Smidt, Hannah 143, 144, 170, 185, 227, 228, 229, 322 Snyder, Jack 171 social conflict 189 social contract, disarmament as a 120 social media 148, 150, 151, 158 social reintegration 120 socialization 188, 248, 259, 261, 263, 264 Somali Police Force 335 Somalia 22, 37, 38, 54, 81, 104, 126, 148, 150, 155, 202, 210, 300, 308 see also AMISOM; UNOSOM; UNSOM; UNSOS South Sudan 157, 170, 211, 220, 321, 329 see also Sudan

sparse deployments 198 spatial contingencies 198 spatially disaggregated data collection projects 199–200, 204, 205 deployment patterns and peacekeeper efficacy 200–203, 204, 214 need for 198–9 persistent data limitations 203–4 Spear, Joanna 121 special political missions (SPMs) 88–9, 98, 99, 168 Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) 164 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC) 258 Specker, Leontine 122 stabilization missions 15–17, 22 stakeholders 55, 365 standard procedures, for accountability 264–5 Standing Police Capacity (SPC) 136, 295 state capacity 143, 249, 287, 288, 353, 354 Staton, Jeffrey K. 139 Stedman, Stephen J. 2 Steenken, Cornelis 125 Steinert, Janina Isabel 139 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 4, 108, 113, 165, 167, 175, 204 strategic communications see public information and strategic communications Strategic Communications and Public Information Policy 150 strategic position, and consent 49 strategic theories, of violence against civilians 215 Strazzari, Francesco 124 strength, calculation of, and desire for peacekeeping 49 strict peacekeeping 23 sub-Saharan Africa 156, 229, 292, 304, 316, 317 substantive issues, environment and cultural heritage 280, 281 substantive sections, civilian personnel work 164 substitution of conflict/violence 189, 191 subversion of peacekeeping 55 success of peacekeeping civil components 172–4 civilian protection 97, 215, 247 consent and 50, 53 information, communications and 151–4 peaceful elections as a benchmark for 225 peacekeeper presence 321 research 362 Sudan 21, 38, 202

Index  387 see also South Sudan; UNAMID; UNMIS; UNMISS Suez Crisis (1956) 13, 47 Sundberg, Ralph 217 sunset clauses 347 support follow on arrangements 350 see also local support support issues, environment and cultural heritage 280, 281 support sections, civilian personnel work 165–7 sustained consent 51, 53, 54 Svensson, Isak 84, 244 symbolic property, attacks on 274 Syria 126, 210, 212, 219 Tajima, Yuhki 121 Talentino, Andrea 173–4 task force, on diversity 71 tasks (peacekeeper) 3, 5, 163–5, 226–7, 294 team diversity 66 technical assistance 227, 231, 234, 237, 350 technocratic missions 90, 93–4, 97 technological change, in weaponry 125 television 148, 149, 150, 154, 155, 156 Tharoor, Shashi 12 theoretical diversity 175 theory 1–2, 367–8 theory testing 198 Thies, Wallace 37 third generation DDR 123, 127 third generation peacekeeping 123 third party peacekeeping 76, 92, 93, 103, 301, 322, 367 third party SSR and rule of law 138 Thomas, Jakana L. 244 Thompson, Samuel W. 353 threats to peace 14 Tiede, Lydia 139 Tilly, Charles 189 Timor-Leste 98, 212, 315, 318, 321 see also East Timor; UNMIT Tir, Jaroslav 55 token troop contributors 62, 63 Torjesen, Stina 121 Townsen, Ashly Adam 201 traditional missions 17, 184, 185, 186 trafficking (illegal) 120, 125, 249, 257, 272, 275, 289 training 53, 62, 71, 212, 227, 248, 259, 262, 274, 290–91 trajectories, conflict resolution as 95–6 transactional sex 259–60, 289, 319 transformative peacekeeping 3, 5, 50, 186, 315 transition(s)

between UN and regional peacekeeping 351–3 DDR and 118, 121, 122, 124, 125 modes of 348–51 strategies 345–6 transparency 39, 151 Trenkov-Wermuth, Calin 141 troop and/or police contributing countries (T/ PCCs) financing 28, 30–31, 32, 35, 37, 39, 105–6 troop contributing countries (TCCs) 4, 62, 63, 64, 68, 69, 216 troops see military personnel Trump, Donald 210 trust 4, 53, 66, 68, 151, 153, 231, 315, 322, 327–8, 329–30, 330–39 trust funds 29 trustworthiness of information 155–6 Tucker, Colin 75, 83 umbrella IOs see African Union (AU); European Union (EU); NATO; UN UN criticisms of 210 financing 28–9, 30–31, 33–5 investment in police reform 137 mediation of peace 2 missions see peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and rule of law 134 see also General Assembly (GA); Security Council (UNSC) UN Charter 37 see also Chapter VI; Chapter VII; Chapter VIII; individual articles UN Country Teams 89, 94, 346, 350 UN Development Programme (UNDP) 88, 231, 350–51 UN Emergency Forces (UNEF) 13, 34, 47, 274–5 UN Environment Programme (UNEP) 276, 278, 280 UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 21, 88 UN Peace Initiatives (UNPI) dataset 5, 90, 92 UN Peacebuilding Support Office 122 UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) 88, 322 UN Verification Mission (Colombia) 98 UN-sponsored Women’s Police Service (UNWPS) 265 UNAMA 98 UNAMET 155, 217 UNAMID 150, 156, 200, 272, 276, 351 UNAMIR 50, 347 UNAMSIL 15, 211, 293, 316, 345, 350 unarmed missions 14

388  Handbook on peacekeeping and international relations unarmed vehicles (UAVs) 125 unbiased mediators 82 unemployed individuals 328, 333, 334, 335, 336, 339 UNESCO 280, 281 UNFICYP 3, 28, 30, 198, 272, 274, 315 UNIFIL 60–61, 65, 69, 276, 281 Uniformed Capability Requirements for United Nations Peacekeeping 70, 71 unintended consequences 2, 271, 319, 363 UNIOSIL 350 UNISFA 281 United Kingdom (UK) 13, 28, 32, 63, 98, 279 United States (USA) 27, 28, 32, 36, 98, 102, 279 Uniting for Peace resolution (1950) 12, 13 units of analysis, in research 368–9 UNMIBH 109, 347, 351 UNMIH 228 UNMIK 109, 272, 274, 320, 351 UNMIL 70, 137, 142, 171, 201, 228, 231, 260, 276, 281, 315, 317, 319, 321, 322, 350, 354 UNMIS 15 UNMISET 291 UNMISS 27, 60, 154, 157, 164, 165, 198, 204, 216, 276, 345 UNMIT 154, 276, 315, 317, 353 UNMOGIP 3, 315 UNMOT 111 UNOCI 52, 81, 276, 316, 322 UNOSOM 347 UNPOL 287, 289, 291, 293–4, 295–6, 317 UNPROFOR 149, 155, 156, 183 unrestricted consent 50, 51 UNSMIS 212 UNSOM 164 UNSOS 281, 330 UNTAC 53, 136–7, 149, 151, 155, 171, 232, 348–9 UNTAES 347 UNTAET 49, 112, 315 UNTAG 118, 136, 137, 149 UNTEA 149 UNTSO 3 urban areas (postwar) maintaining public order in 290–92 violence in 287 urged/called upon operations 22 use of force 13, 14–17, 50, 74, 76, 104, 280, 291, 309 valuation, of financial and military burdens 39, 40 vandalism 272, 277 Veit, Alex 142–3 verbal action 76

verbal appeals 90 veteran assistance 126 violence against civilians strategic theories 215 UN response to 214 against peacekeepers 124, 201, 292, 300–309, 314 exposure and 142 mission opposition and 54 parameters relevant for study of 301–2 research directions for future 308–9 review of existing 302–8 against women 243, 245, 256 data on use of 5 deployment and 201 factors increasing 98, 120, 183, 189 factors reducing 53, 108, 185, 322 mission type and levels of 184 mitigation 107, 169–70, 190, 229 peacekeeping research 360–61 see also electoral violence; one-sided violence; physical violence; political violence; postwar violence; sexual violence violent conflict 189, 190, 191, 233, 234, 290, 348, 360 Voeten, Erik 78 voluntary contributions 28, 29, 30, 36, 40, 106 voter education 171, 227, 231–2, 237 vulnerability 22, 40, 127, 157, 210, 213, 217, 243, 257, 259, 260, 288, 305, 321, 339 Wagner group 88 Waleij, Annica 275 Wallensteen, Peter 4, 74, 92 Walter, Barbara F. 5, 19, 196, 205, 329 war economy 288 Waste Management Policy for UN Field Missions 277 waste products, from peacekeeping 271–2, 274 weapons/weaponry 125 Weber, Max 189 Webster, Kaitlyn 244 Weinstein, Jeremy 2, 121 Whalan, Jeni 339 Whitt, Sam 322 wider impact pillar 272, 277 Williams, Paul D. 4, 104, 113, 154 windows of opportunity 189, 265 women access to radio, and political participation 153 agency 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 250

Index  389 security 242–51 violence against 243, 245, 256 women, peace and security (WPS) 242, 246, 251 see also female fighters; female peacekeepers Women Protection Advisers (WPSs) 243, 258 women’s rights 242, 244, 245, 248, 265 women’s security 242–51 challenges 243 impact of war and peacekeeping dividends 248–50 impediments to progress in 242–3 participation–protection nexus 244–6 protection from violence 22, 212, 246–8 research development 243–4

future 250–51 women, peace and security (WPS) 242, 246, 251 Wood, Reed M. 244 World Bank 122, 139, 329 Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) 197 Young, Lauren E. 144, 173, 315, 316, 317, 319 Yuen, Amy 50, 51, 55 Zeckhauser, Richard 34 zero tolerance 260, 264, 319 Zhang, Shenghao 98 Zürcher, Christoph 143