Handbook of Research on Political Activism in the Information Age 9781466660663, 9781466660670, 9781466660694, 146666066X

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Handbook of Research on Political Activism in the Information Age Ashu M. G. Solo Maverick Technologies America Inc., USA

A volume in the Advances in Human and Social Aspects of Technology (AHSAT) Book Series

Managing Director: Production Editor: Development Editor: Acquisitions Editor: Typesetter: Cover Design:

Lindsay Johnston Jennifer Yoder Erin O’Dea Kayla Wolfe Thomas Creedon Jason Mull

Published in the United States of America by Information Science Reference (an imprint of IGI Global) 701 E. Chocolate Avenue Hershey PA 17033 Tel: 717-533-8845 Fax: 717-533-8661 E-mail: [email protected] Web site: http://www.igi-global.com Copyright © 2014 by IGI Global. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or distributed in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without written permission from the publisher. Product or company names used in this set are for identification purposes only. Inclusion of the names of the products or companies does not indicate a claim of ownership by IGI Global of the trademark or registered trademark. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Handbook of Research on Political activism in the information age / Ashu M.G. Solo, editor. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4666-6066-3 (hardcover) -- ISBN 978-1-4666-6067-0 (ebook) -- ISBN 978-1-4666-6069-4 (print & perpetual access) 1. Political participation. 2. Social media. 3. Internet and activism. I. Solo, Ashu M. G., 1971JF799.P6367 2014 322.4--dc23 2014007986 This book is published in the IGI Global book series Advances in Human and Social Aspects of Technology (AHSAT) (ISSN: 2328-1316; eISSN: 2328-1324)

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. All work contributed to this book is new, previously-unpublished material. The views expressed in this book are those of the authors, but not necessarily of the publisher. For electronic access to this publication, please contact: [email protected].

Advances in Human and Social Aspects of Technology (AHSAT) Book Series Ashish Dwivedi The University of Hull, UK

ISSN: 2328-1316 EISSN: 2328-1324 Mission In recent years, the societal impact of technology has been noted as we become increasingly more connected and are presented with more digital tools and devices. With the popularity of digital devices such as cell phones and tablets, it is crucial to consider the implications of our digital dependence and the presence of technology in our everyday lives. The Advances in Human and Social Aspects of Technology (AHSAT) Book Series seeks to explore the ways in which society and human beings have been affected by technology and how the technological revolution has changed the way we conduct our lives as well as our behavior. The AHSAT book series aims to publish the most cutting-edge research on human behavior and interaction with technology and the ways in which the digital age is changing society.

Coverage

• Activism & ICTs • Computer-Mediated Communication • Cultural Influence of ICTs • Cyber Behavior • End-User Computing • Gender & Technology • Human-Computer Interaction • Information Ethics • Public Access to ICTs • Technoself

IGI Global is currently accepting manuscripts for publication within this series. To submit a proposal for a volume in this series, please contact our Acquisition Editors at [email protected] or visit: http://www.igi-global.com/publish/.

The Advances in Human and Social Aspects of Technology (AHSAT) Book Series (ISSN 2328-1316) is published by IGI Global, 701 E. Chocolate Avenue, Hershey, PA 17033-1240, USA, www.igi-global.com. This series is composed of titles available for purchase individually; each title is edited to be contextually exclusive from any other title within the series. For pricing and ordering information please visit http:// www.igi-global.com/book-series/advances-human-social-aspects-technology/37145. Postmaster: Send all address changes to above address. Copyright © 2014 IGI Global. All rights, including translation in other languages reserved by the publisher. No part of this series may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means – graphics, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping, or information and retrieval systems – without written permission from the publisher, except for non commercial, educational use, including classroom teaching purposes. The views expressed in this series are those of the authors, but not necessarily of IGI Global.

Titles in this Series

For a list of additional titles in this series, please visit: www.igi-global.com

Evolving Issues Surrounding Technoethics and Society in the Digital Age Rocci Luppicini (University of Ottawa, Canada) Information Science Reference • copyright 2014 • 349pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781466661226) • US $215.00 (our price) Technological Advancements and the Impact of Actor-Network Theory Arthur Tatnall (Victoria University, Australia) Information Science Reference • copyright 2014 • 320pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781466661264) • US $195.00 (our price) Gender Considerations and Influence in the Digital Media and Gaming Industry Julie Prescott (University of Bolton, UK) and Julie Elizabeth McGurren (Codemasters, UK) Information Science Reference • copyright 2014 • 313pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781466661424) • US $195.00 (our price) Human-Computer Interfaces and Interactivity Emergent Research and Applications Pedro Isaías (Universidade Aberta (Portuguese Open University), Portugal) and Katherine Blashki (Noroff University College, Norway) Information Science Reference • copyright 2014 • 325pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781466662285) • US $200.00 (our price) Political Campaigning in the Information Age Ashu M. G. Solo (Maverick Technologies America Inc., USA) Information Science Reference • copyright 2014 • 359pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781466660625) • US $210.00 (our price) Interdisciplinary Applications of Agent-Based Social Simulation and Modeling Diana Francisca Adamatti (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande, Brasil) Graçaliz Pereira Dimuro (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande, Brasil) and Helder Coelho (Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal) Information Science Reference • copyright 2014 • 376pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781466659544) • US $225.00 (our price) Examining Paratextual Theory and its Applications in Digital Culture Nadine Desrochers (Université de Montréal, Canada) and Daniel Apollon (University of Bergen, Norway) Information Science Reference • copyright 2014 • 419pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781466660021) • US $215.00 (our price) Global Issues and Ethical Considerations in Human Enhancement Technologies Steven John Thompson (Johns Hopkins University, USA) Medical Information Science Reference • copyright 2014 • 322pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781466660106) • US $215.00 (our price)

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Editorial Advisory Board A. Aggarwal, Independent R&D Engineer, USA Anas Alahmed, Indiana University, USA Mohamad Alkhouja, University of Maryland, USA Gado Alzouma, American University of Nigeria, Nigeria Spyros Angelopoulos, University of Warwick, UK Hamid R. Arabnia, University of Georgia, USA Nelli Babayan, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany Romain Badouard, Mines ParisTech, France Mohamad Zaini Abu Bakar, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Malaysia Marco Bani, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna Pisa, Italy Ilona Biernacka-Ligieza, University of Opole, Poland Stansilas Bigirimana, Africa University, Zimbabwe G. R. Boynton, University of Iowa, USA Stefano Braghiroli, University of Tartu, Estonia Yana Breindl, Göttingen Centre for Digital Humanities, Germany Ivo Bukovsky, Czech Technical University in Prague, Czech Republic Tom Carlson, Åbo Akademi University, Finland Raphael Cohen-Almagor, University of Hull, UK Massimo Cuono, University of Torino, Italy Primavera De Filippi, CERSA/CNRS, France Kamil Demirhan, Hacettepe University, Turkey Kevin Fernandez, Universiti Malaysia Kelantan, Malaysia Mary Francoli, Carleton University, Canada Johannes Fritz, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany Christian Fuchs, Uppsala University, Sweden Nuhu Diraso Gapsiso, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria D. Elisabeth Glassco, Rutgers University, USA Ramakrishna Gokaraju, University of Saskatchewan, Canada Cédric Gossart, Telecom Business School, France M. V. Rajeev Gowda, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, India Amit Gupta, Solido Design Automation Inc., Canada Madan M. Gupta, University of Saskatchewan, Canada

Raza Hasan, Pop Currency, USA Rugayah Gy Hashim, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia Noriyasu Homma, Tohoku University, Japan Satheesh Ka, Accenture Services Ltd., India Νikos Kaplantzis, University of Athens, Greece Argyro P. Karanasiou, University of Leeds, UK & Bournemouth University, UK Elitza Katzarova, University of Trento, Italy Bert-Jaap Koops, Tilburg University, The Netherlands Joanna Kulesza, University of Lodz, Poland Georgios Lappas, Technological Institute (TEI) of Western Macedonia, Greece Jun Liu, University of Copenhagen, Denmark Cecilia G. Manrique, University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, USA Shannon E. Martin, Indiana University, USA Larry Martinez, California State University, USA Eldred Masunungure, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Samuel Mungai Mbuguah, Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, Kenya Norbert Merkovity, University of Szeged, Hungary Patricia Mindus, Uppsala University, Sweden Gary Moats, Lee University, USA Adam Monteith, Independent Researcher, USA Shepherd Mpofu, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa Geoffrey Muchiri Muketha, Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, Kenya Francesca Musiani, MINES ParisTech, France Rui Alexandre Novais, University of Porto, Portugal & University of Minho, Portugal & University of Liverpool, UK Alison N. Novak, Drexel University, USA Sivamurugan Pandian, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Malaysia Bogdan Pătruţ, Vasile Alecsandri University of Bacau, Romania Antoinette Pole, Montclair State University, USA Purnima Prakash, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, India Mohammad Reza Rajati, University of Southern California, USA Valentina Reda, University of Naples Federico II, Italy Rosália Rodrigues, Universidade da Beira Interior, Portugal António Rosas, Universidade Aberta, Portugal & Universidade Técnica de Lisboa, Portugal Steven Sams, Brunel University, UK Robert J. Sarfi, Boreas Group LLC, USA Valérie Schafer, French National Research Council (CNRS), France Sónia Pedro Sebastião, Technical University of Lisbon, Portugal Keren Sereno, Independent Researcher, Israel Bill Sherman, Seattle University, USA Bhupesh Kumar Singh, G. B. Pant University of Agriculture and Technology, India Jakob Svensson, Uppsala University, Sweden Sam Takavarasha, Jr., Computer Science University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Cristian Vaccari, University of Bologna, Italy

Andreas Veglis, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece Nicole Velasco, Lee University, USA Gyanendra Kumar Verma, Indian Institute of Information Technology Allahabad, India Lucia Vesnic-Alujevic, Ghent University, Belgium Shefali Virkar, University of Oxford, UK Timothy D. Webster, Genist Systems Inc., Canada Joseph Wilson, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria Prodromos Yannas, Technological Institute (TEI) of Western Macedonia, Greece

List of Contributors

Abu Bakar, Mohamad Zaini / Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Malaysia.................................... 166 Alahmed, Anas / Indiana University – Bloomington, USA............................................................... 1,37 Alkhouja, Mohamad / University of Maryland – College Park, USA................................................. 26 Arney, Jo / University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, USA....................................................................... 190 Babayan, Nelli / Freie Universität Berlin, Germany........................................................................... 335 Bigirimana, Stanislas / Africa University, Zimbabwe........................................................................ 364 Bishop, Jonathan / Centre for Research into Online Communities and E-Learning Systems, UK................................................................................................................................................. 231 Borah, Porismita / Washington State University, USA....................................................................... 407 Boynton, G. R. / University of Iowa, USA.......................................................................................... 212 Braghiroli, Stefano / University of Tartu, Estonia............................................................................. 335 Breindl, Yana / Georg-August University Göttingen, Germany......................................................... 273 Cox, Jonathan / Citizens UK, UK....................................................................................................... 364 Fernandez, Kevin / Universiti Malaysia Kelantan (UMK), Malaysia................................................ 166 Fritz, Johannes / Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany........................... 319 Gapsiso, Nuhu / University of Maiduguri, Nigeria.............................................................................. 94 Gowda, M. V. Rajeev / Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, India........................................ 240 Jorstad, James / University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, USA............................................................. 190 Kane, John / Griffith University, Australia......................................................................................... 351 Katzarova, Elitza / University of Trento, Italy.................................................................................... 258 Khan, Amadu Wurie / University of Edinburgh, UK........................................................................ 382 Koku, Emmanuel / Drexel University, USA....................................................................................... 425 Kuenzi, Kerry / University of Colorado – Denver, USA.................................................................... 190 Lev-On, Azi / Ariel University, Israel................................................................................................... 81 Manrique, Cecilia G. / University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, USA................................................... 190 Masunungure, Eldred / University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe............................................................ 147 Mhlanga, Brilliant / University of Hertfordshire, UK & National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Zimbabwe..................................................................................................... 129 Mpofu, Mandlenkosi / University of Oslo, Norway & National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Zimbabwe..................................................................................................... 129 Mpofu, Shepherd / University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa................................................... 114 Novak, Alison N. / Drexel University, USA........................................................................................ 425 Pandian, Sivamurugan / Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Malaysia............................................. 166 Patapan, Haig / Griffith University, Australia.................................................................................... 351 Prakash, Purnima / Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, India............................................. 240

Richardson, Jr., Glenn W. / Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, USA.......................................... 212 Rosas, António / University of Lisbon, Portugal................................................................................ 296 Sereno, Keren / Independent Researcher, Israel............................................................................. 60,81 Shah, Chirag / Rutgers University, USA............................................................................................. 179 Solo, Ashu M. G. / Maverick Technologies America Inc., USA......................................................... 231 Takavarasha, Jr., Sam / University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe............................................................ 364 Takavarasha, Jr., Sam / University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe............................................................ 147 Wilson, Joseph / University of Maiduguri, Nigeria.............................................................................. 94

Table of Contents

Preface................................................................................................................................................ xxiv Chapter 1 Political Information, Political Power, and People Power: New Media and New Social Movements in the Arab Spring.................................................................................................................................... 1 Anas Alahmed, Indiana University – Bloomington, USA Chapter 2 Social Media for Political Change: The Activists, Governments, and Firms Triangle of Powers during the Arab Movement.................................................................................................................... 26 Mohamad Alkhouja, University of Maryland – College Park, USA Chapter 3 The Potential of Political Changes in the Information Age: The Political Challenges Sphere of Saudi Arabia through Citizen Activism................................................................................................. 37 Anas Alahmed, Indiana University – Bloomington, USA Chapter 4 Identifying Hyperlink Strategies as a Tool to Discover the Connections between Offline and Online Politics........................................................................................................................................ 60 Keren Sereno, Independent Researcher, Israel Chapter 5 Cleavages and Links: Mapping Linking Patterns between Israeli Political Websites........................... 81 Keren Sereno, Independent Researcher, Israel Azi Lev-On, Ariel University, Israel Chapter 6 Information and Communication Technologies, Democracy, and Human Rights in Nigeria............... 94 Joseph Wilson, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria Nuhu Gapsiso, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria Chapter 7 Memory, National Identity, and Freedom of Expression in the Information Age: Discussing the Taboo in the Zimbabwean Public Sphere............................................................................................ 114 Shepherd Mpofu, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Chapter 8 The Virtual Parallax: Imaginations of Mthwakazi Nationalism – Online Discussions and Calls for Self-Determination............................................................................................................................... 129 Brilliant Mhlanga, University of Hertfordshire, UK & National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Zimbabwe Mandlenkosi Mpofu, University of Oslo, Norway & National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Zimbabwe Chapter 9 The Opportunities and Challenges of using Email for Political Communication in Authoritarian States: A Case of Zimbabwe’s Media Monitoring Project.................................................................. 147 Sam Takavarasha, Jr., University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Eldred Masunungure, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Chapter 10 Alternative Media Bridging the Digital Divide in Malaysia: Case Study of Sarawakreport.org........ 166 Kevin Fernandez, Universiti Malaysia Kelantan (UMK), Malaysia Sivamurugan Pandian, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Malaysia Mohamad Mohamad Zaini Abu Bakar, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Malaysia Chapter 11 Politics 2.0 with Facebook................................................................................................................... 179 Chirag Shah, Rutgers University, USA Chapter 12 The Wisconsin Spring.......................................................................................................................... 190 James Jorstad, University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, USA Jo Arney, University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, USA Kerry Kuenzi, University of Colorado – Denver, USA Cecilia G. Manrique, University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, USA Chapter 13 The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse............................................................................. 212 G. R. Boynton, University of Iowa, USA Glenn W. Richardson, Jr., Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, USA Chapter 14 Conceptualizing Network Politics following the Arab Spring............................................................. 231 Ashu M. G. Solo, Maverick Technologies America Inc., USA Jonathan Bishop, Centre for Research into Online Communities and E-Learning Systems, UK Chapter 15 The India against Corruption Movement............................................................................................. 240 M. V. Rajeev Gowda, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, India Purnima Prakash, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, India

Chapter 16 Corruption in the Public Eye: From Transparency to Publicity.......................................................... 258 Elitza Katzarova, University of Trento, Italy Chapter 17 Civic Cultures and Skills in European Digital Rights Campaigning................................................... 273 Yana Breindl, Georg-August University Göttingen, Germany Chapter 18 Protesting in a Cultural Frame: How Social Media was used by Portuguese “Geração à Rasca” Activists and the M12M Movement.................................................................................................... 296 António Rosas, University of Lisbon, Portugal Chapter 19 Two Models of Online Petitioning in the United Kingdom................................................................. 319 Johannes Fritz, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany Chapter 20 Googling Democracy: A Comparison of Democracy Promoters on the Internet................................ 335 Nelli Babayan, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany Stefano Braghiroli, University of Tartu, Estonia Chapter 21 A New Republic of Letters? The Promise and Potential of the Internet.............................................. 351 John Kane, Griffith University, Australia Haig Patapan, Griffith University, Australia Chapter 22 From Politics to E-Politics: Updating Saul Alinsky’s Community Organising Model to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of Politics in the Information Age....................................................... 364 Sam Takavarasha, Jr., University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Jonathan Cox, Citizens UK, UK Stanislas Bigirimana, Africa University, Zimbabwe Chapter 23 The Internet, National Citizenship, and the “Sovereignty Paradox”: Asylum-Seeking Migrants’ Political Agency and “Technologized” Citizenship............................................................................. 382 Amadu Wurie Khan, University of Edinburgh, UK Chapter 24 Interaction of Incivility and News Frames in the Political Blogosphere: Consequences and Psychological Mechanisms.................................................................................................................. 407 Porismita Borah, Washington State University, USA

Chapter 25 How [Not] to Caffeinate a Political Group: Parent Post Influence on Conversational Network Structure............................................................................................................................................... 425 Alison N. Novak, Drexel University, USA Emmanuel Koku, Drexel University, USA Compilation of References................................................................................................................ 443 About the Contributors..................................................................................................................... 487 Index.................................................................................................................................................... 495

Detailed Table of Contents

Preface................................................................................................................................................ xxiv Chapter 1 Political Information, Political Power, and People Power: New Media and New Social Movements in the Arab Spring.................................................................................................................................... 1 Anas Alahmed, Indiana University – Bloomington, USA This chapter explores the concept of new media in the Arab world and how politics in the information age has changed Arab politics and moved citizens to the streets. However, the evolution of new media social networks and the cause of political information in particular during the revolution is not studied alone. In fact, the evolution of the Arab Spring and the effects of new media social networks are taken into account by exploring how politics in the information age has influenced Arab citizens and allowed them to use information for the greater good and established such a new social movement. This chapter takes the Arab Spring as a case study and an empirical example to understand the transnational protests and global movements, the concept of global media and global politics in the case of the Arab Spring, new media and new politics regarding the Arab Spring, and city and street and public sphere as people power in the information age. Finally, the chapter distinguishes between the new social movements through social networks and the roles of ICTs to aim revolution and whether such a revolution will erupt without new media social networks. Chapter 2 Social Media for Political Change: The Activists, Governments, and Firms Triangle of Powers during the Arab Movement.................................................................................................................... 26 Mohamad Alkhouja, University of Maryland – College Park, USA This chapter discusses the role of social media in the uprisings of the Arab world. It argues that the seemingly democratizing impact of online activism is not due to the inherent nature of social media as a tool for democracy but rather an outcome of the equilibrium of forces that shaped the use of social media platforms by all three main players. Activists, governments, and social media firms formed a triangle of powers that influenced the use of social media during the Arab movements. In a different context, the outcome of such power balance can arguably inhibit citizens’ rights and empower governments. To this end, the chapter first explores the use of social media platforms from the perspective of activists, governments, and social media firms, then presents a framework to understand the impact of all three in shaping the use of social media during the uprisings. The chapter then concludes that the projections of the role of social media on other movements in the world must not be made without understanding the underlying complexities and dynamics of these movements.

Chapter 3 The Potential of Political Changes in the Information Age: The Political Challenges Sphere of Saudi Arabia through Citizen Activism................................................................................................. 37 Anas Alahmed, Indiana University – Bloomington, USA In non-democratic societies new media social networks have played a significant role in changing political and social positions, not necessarily through real life but, instead, through cyber life. This chapter examines how Saudi activists challenge the political authority and how Saudi citizens took advantage of publicity by demanding political change. All of this happened due to social networks and new media, which allowed citizens to mobilize information for the sake of transparency. This was a new phenomenon in Saudi Arabia. The current young generation of Saudis, who use the Internet and social networking sites, played a significant role in the public sphere by making use of the space available to them within cyberspace. This chapter discusses the potential of political information to flourish in Saudi Arabia. It examines how and why citizen activism in Saudi Arabia can be effective. The chapter also shows that social networking activities have the power to change political decisions and society. Chapter 4 Identifying Hyperlink Strategies as a Tool to Discover the Connections between Offline and Online Politics........................................................................................................................................ 60 Keren Sereno, Independent Researcher, Israel This chapter sheds light onto theoretical and empirical debates regarding the nature hyperlink as a political tool: whether the hyperlink is part of the “offline world” or should be considered as a new and separate form of practice, mainly due to its low cost and easy construction. The chapter contributes to the present literature in two innovative ways: First, based on link analysis between 90 Websites of protest Israeli NGO, a classification of link strategies was made, and 4 different linking strategies were found: Isolation, Introversion, Neighborliness, and Generalization. Furthermore, this chapter analyzes 15 protest issues and is not focused only on a single issue network. Second, 29 in-depth interviews were conduct and enable a sketch of the “offline link analysis map” and a comparison of the online policies with the offline policies. In order to understand the choice of the organization linking strategy over the others, and the decision to which exactly other organizations/Websites link to, one must remember that the Web is only one arena where the political actors operate. Therefore, the in-depth interviews not only reveal the causes affecting the hyperlinks selection and strategy in each organization but also reveal similarities between the organizations with overlap linking strategy. Chapter 5 Cleavages and Links: Mapping Linking Patterns between Israeli Political Websites........................... 81 Keren Sereno, Independent Researcher, Israel Azi Lev-On, Ariel University, Israel In the past decade, the Internet has extensively penetrated the political landscape in Israel. A variety of actors, including parties, Knesset members, NGOs, and more, have realized the significance of using the Internet to promote their goals and have established an online presence via a variety of platforms. Consequently, the Internet is becoming a fertile ground to study Israeli society with its multiple cleavages. This chapter analyses how the ideological cleavage in the Israeli society is manifest online, through the linking patterns between political Websites. Link analysis is used to study political visibility and centrality online, to map the channels of information flow between the various political actors, and to

identify recognition and discourse networks between the various political actors. From the link analysis of the sites of some 200 political parties, MPs, and NGOs, we found no links between right-wing and left-wing political sites; each side in the political spectrum conducts a different linking strategy. Most of the sites of political parties and MPs received no in-bound links from the other political sites. On the other hand, NGOs have a central role in the online political networks in Israel and maintain a relatively dense linking network. Chapter 6 Information and Communication Technologies, Democracy, and Human Rights in Nigeria............... 94 Joseph Wilson, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria Nuhu Gapsiso, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria The unprecedented impact of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) on nearly every facet of human endeavour has continued to attract individual and organizational interest to explore these technologies for specific cause. ICTs are increasingly being used in promoting democracy and human rights issues: to mobilize and strengthen solidarity, increase communication among interest groups, and share information more quickly. There is no doubt that ICTs deployment in Nigeria and other developing countries has sparked growth in citizens’ abilities to communicate and share ideas, but there are impediments. This chapter looks at the evolution of ICTs in Nigeria, the place of ICTs in promoting democracy/human rights, and discusses the challenges of harnessing the enormous benefits of ICTs in promoting democracy and human rights in Nigeria. Chapter 7 Memory, National Identity, and Freedom of Expression in the Information Age: Discussing the Taboo in the Zimbabwean Public Sphere............................................................................................ 114 Shepherd Mpofu, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa New Media and Information Technologies (NICTs) are increasingly becoming central in facilitating freedom of expression especially in repressive countries. In addition, the burgeoning diaspora community coupled with these NICTs have offered populations in these communities alternative public spheres where they can debate issues without government control. The chapter argues that through the Website, www. newzimbabwe.com, Zimbabweans have found for themselves a platform where they debate otherwise taboo issues that are not easily discussed in Zimbabwe: ethnicity and the heroes’ acre debates. The conclusion of this the chapter is that the Internet has revolutionised the way Zimbabweans know freedom of expression. Chapter 8 The Virtual Parallax: Imaginations of Mthwakazi Nationalism – Online Discussions and Calls for Self-Determination............................................................................................................................... 129 Brilliant Mhlanga, University of Hertfordshire, UK & National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Zimbabwe Mandlenkosi Mpofu, University of Oslo, Norway & National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Zimbabwe Social networking sites and the individuated privacy of the virtual space have emerged as new forms of conflating social identities and free speech for most subaltern communities. While it is clearly accepted that the notion of social networking within most African communities has always existed as part of

oramedia (orality) and has gained traction by exploiting the grapevine as a notch of communication, current communication trends, coupled with the rise of new media have brought normative and pragmatic values in the latter-day communication culture. A case study of the “Forum,” a social network from Matebeleland, Zimbabwe, is used to show how the virtual sphere has revolutionised the Habermasian public sphere. A new wave of social networking sites has emerged in which participants gather through “Internet portals” and get connected through different forms of online fora. The extent of engagement and the free speech practiced therein as part of the apparent change of people’s worldviews form the basis of this chapter. Subalternised groups like the people of Matebeleland from Zimbabwe, whose sensitive discourses have been denied spaces in the local public sphere, have found a voice in social networks. Different online fora exist, and they include Facebook groups such as Inhlamba Zesintu, Luveve Ikasi Lami, Abammeli Mthwakazi, Thina AbaMpofu, etc., and Websites like iNkundla.net, Youtube, and mailing lists and listservs, such as the Forum. Chapter 9 The Opportunities and Challenges of using Email for Political Communication in Authoritarian States: A Case of Zimbabwe’s Media Monitoring Project.................................................................. 147 Sam Takavarasha, Jr., University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Eldred Masunungure, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe This chapter uses Illich’s (1973) concept of conviviality for analysing the challenges and opportunities of using email for political communication in authoritarian states. Based on evidence from a case study of Zimbabwe’s Media Monitoring Project (MMPZ), it contends that while conviviality allows the use of ICTs for political mobilisation, it also enables a counterproductive “big brother” effect. In addition to constant censorship and overt operations, covert strategies are often used for disrupting communication platforms. This calls for a framework for harnessing ICTs for political mobilisation. This chapter is a case study on how perceived state surveillance disrupted a vibrant communicative space in Zimbabwe. Based on evidence from the volumes of email traffic transacted over two weeks of panic, anger, and heroism, the chapter discusses the challenges and opportunities of using email for political mobilisation and warns against uncritical celebration of the role of ICTs in political mobilisation. It concludes by suggesting how the adaption of e-strategies from email marketing to political communication is among the skills that could break the tie between political opponents armed with the same convivial tools for political communication in the information age. Chapter 10 Alternative Media Bridging the Digital Divide in Malaysia: Case Study of Sarawakreport.org........ 166 Kevin Fernandez, Universiti Malaysia Kelantan (UMK), Malaysia Sivamurugan Pandian, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Malaysia Mohamad Mohamad Zaini Abu Bakar, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Malaysia This chapter analyzes the burgeoning role of new media in the Malaysian political sphere. The chapter descriptively analyzes the role of Sarawakreport.org, a blog formed by the former Prime Minister of the UK’s (Gordon Brown’s) sister in-law, Clare Rewcastle Brown, in an endeavor to challenge the Chief Minister of Sarawak in his incumbency. The government used its economical, coercive, and political power to repress the symbolic power of the new media, which transgresses boundaries, space, and time. This chapter concludes that the BN (Barisan Nasional) won its two-thirds majority legitimizing its control over Sarawak, but its loss of popular votes suggests the symbolic power is of concern for the ruling regime and legitimizing its rule seems to be a serious problem.

Chapter 11 Politics 2.0 with Facebook................................................................................................................... 179 Chirag Shah, Rutgers University, USA Analyzing publicly available content on various social media sites such as YouTube and Twitter, as well as social network sites such as Facebook, has become an increasingly popular method for studying socio-political issues. Such public-contributed content, primarily available as comments, let people express their opinions and sentiments on a given topic, news story, or post, while allowing social and political scientists to extend their analysis of a political discourse to the social sphere. This new age political process, which involves political agents reaching out to their audiences through social media and common folks using social media to express their opinions and sentiments, are here referred to as “Politics 2.0.” Recognizing the importance of Facebook in studying Politics 2.0, the chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the research work in social and political science domains that use Facebook as a tool for analyzing various socio-political issues. Several popular approaches for collecting and analyzing data from Facebook are provided, and their applications to understanding public opinion and sentiment around various issues of interest are discussed. The chapter also introduces a couple of handy tools that could help the researchers and practitioners gather and analyze a large amount of Facebook data easily and effectively. The chapter concludes with a discussion on opportunities and challenges for understanding Politics 2.0 with Facebook. Chapter 12 The Wisconsin Spring.......................................................................................................................... 190 James Jorstad, University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, USA Jo Arney, University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, USA Kerry Kuenzi, University of Colorado – Denver, USA Cecilia G. Manrique, University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, USA As a relatively new form of communication and information dissemination, the effect of social media on public awareness and public participation in political events is relatively unknown. Using the events that unfolded surrounding the election of Governor Scott Walker in Wisconsin and the removal of collective bargaining rights of public employees as its main example, this chapter explores the relationship between social media, information dissemination, and collective action. Chapter 13 The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse............................................................................. 212 G. R. Boynton, University of Iowa, USA Glenn W. Richardson, Jr., Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, USA This chapter is a report about negotiating the boundaries of appropriate political discourse via Twitter. The instance looked at in depth is the communication about the shooting of Representative Giffords in 2011. The first month over 400,000 messages referred to Giffords and substantially more referred to the controversy about the campaign rhetoric of targets and reloading. The authors tracked the communication in 6 ongoing collections of streams of messages and 2 that resulted from the shooting and controversy. One stream was about how “terrorist” was used in characterizing the shooter. The major controversy was about the use of targeting or gun references in campaign rhetoric. Palin released a video using the phrase “blood libel” leading to opposing interpretations of the appropriate use of the term. The authors look in less depth at the controversy in early 2012 about Rush Limbaugh’s characterization of a student

who testified to a committee of the House of Representatives. That controversy reinforced points found in the communication about the Giffords shooting. It also reminds us that the boundaries of appropriate political rhetoric are continuously negotiated in a free speech society and that there is now a new domain for the negotiation in the new media. Chapter 14 Conceptualizing Network Politics following the Arab Spring............................................................. 231 Ashu M. G. Solo, Maverick Technologies America Inc., USA Jonathan Bishop, Centre for Research into Online Communities and E-Learning Systems, UK This chapter defines a new field called network politics. Network politics refers to politics and networks. These networks include the Internet, private networks, cellular networks, telephone networks, radio networks, television networks, etc. Network politics includes the applications of networks to enable one or more individuals or organizations to engage in political communication. Furthermore, network politics includes government regulation of networks. Finally, network politics includes the accompanying issues that arise when networks are used for political communication or when there is government regulation of networks. The domain of network politics includes, but is not limited to, e-politics (social networking for driving revolutions and organizing protests, online petitions, political blogs and vlogs, whistleblower Websites, online campaigning, e-participation, virtual town halls, e-voting, Internet freedom, access to information, net neutrality, etc.) and applications of other networks in politics (robocalling, text messaging, TV broadcasting, etc.). The definition of this field should significantly increase the pace of research and development in this important field. Chapter 15 The India against Corruption Movement............................................................................................. 240 M. V. Rajeev Gowda, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, India Purnima Prakash, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, India Activists demanding the establishment of an anti-corruption watchdog or “Lok Pal,” launched the India Against Corruption (IAC) movement. This chapter documents how IAC’s leaders made astute use of mass media and social media to draw India’s urban middle classes out onto the streets to protest against corruption in government. IAC succeeded in pressurising the Indian government to involve its activists in an effort to formulate an anti-corruption bill. A section of IAC has since launched the Aam Aadmi (Common Man) party, which has met with initial electoral success. Chapter 16 Corruption in the Public Eye: From Transparency to Publicity.......................................................... 258 Elitza Katzarova, University of Trento, Italy What role is there for publicity in the global anti-corruption debate? This chapter introduces the concepts of “transparency” and “publicity” as analytical tools that account for differentiated channels through which the availability of information can induce social change. Two case studies provide insights into the role of traditional media in comparison to new social media. The first case analyzes the role of Western news coverage during the negotiations of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the mid-1990s and

the threat of publicity as a negotiation strategy. The second case investigates the role of social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube in the success of the anti-corruption strike carried out by Indian social activist Anna Hazare in 2011. By introducing and further applying the conceptual toolkit of “transparency” and “publicity” to both cases, this chapter argues that transparency requires publicity or in the case of the OECD negotiations—the threat of publicity—in order for the anti-corruption campaign to be successful. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the ramifications for transparency and publicity as tools for social change. Chapter 17 Civic Cultures and Skills in European Digital Rights Campaigning................................................... 273 Yana Breindl, Georg-August University Göttingen, Germany Technical skills are increasingly necessary to successfully intervene in policy-making, especially when dealing with technical matters such as Internet or telecommunications regulation. Skills are rooted in experience and cultural practices. Dahlgren’s concept of civic cultures is used in this chapter to investigate the cultural underpinnings of the emergent European digital rights movement that has repeatedly targeted EU legislation on copyright enforcement, software patents, and the Internet. The values and identity of the movement are investigated along with the way knowledge and information are processed and trust established through repeated practices in a variety of online and offline spaces. The analysis illustrates how digitally skilled actors can substantially affect policy-making by disrupting the course of parliamentary law-making at the European level. However, technical skills need to be complemented by social and political competencies to gain access and provide convincing input to political institutions that increasingly rely on extra-institutional expertise. Chapter 18 Protesting in a Cultural Frame: How Social Media was used by Portuguese “Geração à Rasca” Activists and the M12M Movement.................................................................................................... 296 António Rosas, University of Lisbon, Portugal ICTs and particularly the Internet are changing national and international politics. International organizations, activists, and even national governments are now extending their organizational resources and apparatuses to the digital virtual worlds, thus expanding the horizons of politics to new levels and challenges. In this chapter, the author concentrates on a surprising and unprecedented initiative that took place in Portugal in March 12th, 2011, the “Geração à Rasca” protests, as well as on the March 12th Movement (M12M), the social movement that followed it. More precisely, the chapter examines how Internet-enabled technologies, like social media, were used as tactics for political organization and mobilization, and how several political cultures were activated. In a country where non-conventional politics was limited to unions and to well-demarcated interests, those two initiatives inaugurated a new era of political participation and democratic opposition. For the first time, 4 young graduates, who never participated in politics before, were able to mobilize more than 500,000 people in several cities of the country, while adapting their messages to the particular political cultures of their “natural” constituencies, the young unemployed or underpaid seasonable workers, to the overall population, dissatisfied with the economic performance of successive governments, and to the more radical groups still committed to the political cultures of the 1974 Carnations Revolution. Besides those tactical and discursive uses, political and economic contexts, contingent events, and the support of symbolic elites were also important factors in both initiatives.

Chapter 19 Two Models of Online Petitioning in the United Kingdom................................................................. 319 Johannes Fritz, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany The chapter identifies two models of petitioning in the United Kingdom. One is found at the devolved legislatures in Scotland and Wales, the other on the Prime Minister’s Website. Differences between these petition systems are analyzed with respect to their political and institutional context, functionality, use, and impact on politics. The model in Scotland and Wales evolved from the context of devolution and the desire of the new institutions to distance themselves from the Westminster Parliament. Their petition systems offer petitioners a detailed treatment of their petitions by specialised petition committees. Petitions are generally assessed in qualitative terms and received in small numbers. The second model on the Prime Minister’s (2006-2010) and the coalition government’s Website (since 2011) is used to collect popular demands as part of an e-engagement strategy reflecting the dominant position of the Prime Minister within the UK political system. The system focuses on quantitative criteria to identify successful petitions. Chapter 20 Googling Democracy: A Comparison of Democracy Promoters on the Internet................................ 335 Nelli Babayan, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany Stefano Braghiroli, University of Tartu, Estonia The spillover of the Arab Spring is often attributed to the increased use of the Internet and various social networks. In addition, many established democracies and international organizations have adopted democracy promotion as their foreign policy objectives. Heads of states regularly praise democracy and reiterate their commitment to its promotion. However, the on-ground activities of democracy promoters remain largely unknown to the broader population. Nevertheless, given the growing influence of nondemocratic but economically successful and resource-rich countries, democracy promoters more than ever need to “win the hearts and minds” of these populations. This chapter compares techniques and the extent of publicising democracy promotion, by focusing on the online presence of democracy promoters as the most cost-effective opportunity of communicating goals, strategies, and accomplishments. The chapter categorizes individual Websites of democracy promoters according to their structural, graphic, informative, and programmatic features. This chapter focuses on the EU and USAID in Eastern Europe, Middle East, North Africa, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Quantitative and qualitative crosscountry and cross-promoter variances are explored by analyzing a wide array of explanatory dimensions. The results suggest that the two promoters vary in their levels of e-activeness and their involvement in Internet-based activities of democracy promotion, with the EU showing a systematically higher commitment in the studied regions. In addition, Internet penetration, the level of democratic development, and geo-political factors are likely to affect a promoter’s e-activeness. Chapter 21 A New Republic of Letters? The Promise and Potential of the Internet.............................................. 351 John Kane, Griffith University, Australia Haig Patapan, Griffith University, Australia Advances in information and communication technology seem to promise a revolution in politics. Social media appear to overcome the perceived limitations of representative democracy, allowing more direct and democratic politics less influenced by “elites.” In this chapter, the authors note the nature

of this promised revolution, arguing that e-democratic politics and its hopes of democratizing political authority have in large measure not succeeded. Social media have, however, inaugurated a different form of e-politics, one that attempts to democratize knowledge or perhaps wisdom. Blogging, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter all provide new forms of communication and seem to promise a new Republic of Letters with revolutionary potential. Will the new Republic of Letters prove to be more successful than e-democracy? The chapter examines the nature of the old Republic of Letters and its fate, and in the light of that, assesses the promise of technological innovations in communication to alter the nature of modern politics. Chapter 22 From Politics to E-Politics: Updating Saul Alinsky’s Community Organising Model to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of Politics in the Information Age....................................................... 364 Sam Takavarasha, Jr., University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Jonathan Cox, Citizens UK, UK Stanislas Bigirimana, Africa University, Zimbabwe ICTs are slowly being acknowledged as effective tools for political mobilisation in the information age. Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign and the Arab Spring are typical examples of how ICTs can foster political change in the face of challenges that were considered insurmountable before the information age. The secrets behind such success stories are not readily available to local change leaders at a time when authoritarian states are devising ways of entrenching the status quo in the information age. This emphasises the need to inform activists about the relevance of updating pre-information age models in order to address the challenges of politics in the information age. It also calls for more academic analysis on how to conceptualise the role of earlier political models in the information age. This chapter presents a systematic approach for renewing traditional political models to the e-world by proposing how to update Alinsky’s (1971) community organising model used by Obama 2008 campaign. The relevance of this chapter to a book on politics in the information age is that it prepares strategists and scholars to update their tried and tested strategies to a new era as Obama did. Chapter 23 The Internet, National Citizenship, and the “Sovereignty Paradox”: Asylum-Seeking Migrants’ Political Agency and “Technologized” Citizenship............................................................................. 382 Amadu Wurie Khan, University of Edinburgh, UK This chapter explores the potential of the Internet for asylum seekers’/refugees’ political agency and for challenging the boundaries of national citizenship and state sovereignty. It considers that Western governments’ formulation of “restrictionist” and “assimilationist” citizenship policies and the conjoining “managerialist” approach to asylum are aimed at asserting state sovereignty and national citizenship. However, it is argued that attempts at the territorial construction of membership amounts to a “sovereignty paradox”: policies promote an international humanitarian norm of citizenship, which depends on state sovereignty for its realisation. Asylum-seeking migrants’ views and practices are therefore deployed to explore the counterproductivity of the UK government’s attempt to coerce would-be British citizens to have loyalty and allegiance to the nation-state. This UK case study provides empirical substantiation of asylum-seeking migrants’ political agency in the West, and the resilience of state sovereignty in affirming an international humanitarian norm of citizenship. It also contributes to an understanding of asylum-seeking migrants’ political agency through the Internet in holding political elites in the West accountable for their migration-citizenship policies. This perspective has been strikingly missing in the

citizenship and international relations theories, particularly given the context that non-citizen asylumseeking migrants residing in liberal democracies are a major trigger for these policies. The chapter also attempts to deconstruct the relationship between transnationalism and globalisation: a project that continues to be problematic in the academy. Chapter 24 Interaction of Incivility and News Frames in the Political Blogosphere: Consequences and Psychological Mechanisms.................................................................................................................. 407 Porismita Borah, Washington State University, USA The political blogosphere is replete with uncivil discussions and is apt to examine the influence of incivility on news frames. This chapter brings in literature from incivility and framing effects to examine the influence of incivility on news frames for several outcomes such as willingness to participate, online participation, attitude certainty, news credibility, and political trust. The chapter is an extension of the first two studies, which indicate the detrimental effects of incivility causing more attitude certainty and less political trust and open mindedness. At the same time, incivility caused more willingness to participate, online participation, and higher news credibility. However, the initial studies were unable to explain why the detrimental effects of incivility were observed. A third experiment examined the psychological mechanisms involved in these incivility effects. Chapter 25 How [Not] to Caffeinate a Political Group: Parent Post Influence on Conversational Network Structure............................................................................................................................................... 425 Alison N. Novak, Drexel University, USA Emmanuel Koku, Drexel University, USA The attempted assassination of Representative Gabrielle Giffords in Arizona on January 8, 2011 spurred a surge of media reflection and criticism of the Tea Party Patriots and their violent rhetoric. The Coffee Party, created in 2010 as an oppositional force to the Tea Party, spent the days following the shooting discussing the various social, political, and moral aspects of the violence on their Facebook page. This chapter is part of an ongoing investigation of language in politically oriented online forums. Here, the 24 parent posts and following Facebook conversations are studied to investigate a connection between post sentiment and network structure. Using communication accommodation theory, Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC), and network analysis, a relationship is located between social, affective, cognitive, perceptual, and biological constructs and network measures of betweeness and core/periphery size. This chapter has implications regarding online network structures, new methods in Internet research, and online political activity research. Compilation of References................................................................................................................ 443 About the Contributors..................................................................................................................... 487 Index.................................................................................................................................................... 495

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Preface

Technology and particularly the Internet have caused many changes in the realm of politics. Aspects of engineering, computer science, mathematics, or natural science can be applied to politics. Recent revolutions in many countries in the Middle East and North Africa have started in large part due to social networking Websites like Facebook and Twitter. Social networking has also played a role in protests and riots in numerous countries. The whistleblower Website Wikileaks has had a tremendous impact in exposing government corruption. The mainstream media no longer has a monopoly on political commentary, as anybody can set up a blog or post a video online. Political activists can network together online. Handbook of Research on Political Activism in the Information Age includes research chapters from numerous researchers around the world who have done research studies on different aspects of political activism with information technology, engineering, computer science, and math. This book strongly increases our understanding of methods for political activism in the information age, the effectiveness of these methods, and tools for analyzing these methods. The prospective audience includes, but is not limited to, researchers, political campaign managers and staff, politicians and their staff, political operatives, political and public policy analysts, political scientists, engineers, computer scientists, journalists, professors, students, and individuals working in the fields of politics, e-politics, e-government, new media and communication studies, and Internet marketing. Researchers and political operatives will be particularly interested in this book to gain a better understanding of methods for political activism in the information age, the effectiveness of these methods, and tools for analyzing these methods. Researchers will be interested in this book for research ideas and to build upon the research presented in their own research. In “Political Information, Political Power, and People Power: New Media and New Social Movements in the Arab Spring,” Anas Alahmed explores how social media has allowed Arabs to establish the Arab Spring. In “Social Media for Political Change: The Activists, Governments, and Firms Triangle of Powers during the Arab Movement,” Mohamad Alkhouja discusses the role of social media in the uprisings in the Arab world. The author explores the use of social media from the perspectives of activists, governments, and social media firms, and presents a framework to understand the impact of all three in influencing the usage of social media during the uprisings. In “The Potential of Political Changes in the Information Age: The Political Challenges Sphere of Saudi Arabia through Citizen Activism,” Anas Alahmed examines how Saudi activists use social media to challenge political authority and the potential of political information and citizen activism to flourish in Saudi Arabia with social media and new media.

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In “Identifying Hyperlink Strategies as a Tool to Discover the Connections between Offline and Online Politics,” Keren Sereno examines the hyperlink as a political tool. She does a link analysis of the Websites of 90 Israeli protest nongovernmental organizations and 29 in-depth interviews with these organizations. In “Cleavages and Links: Mapping Linking Patterns between Israeli Political Websites,” Keren Sereno and Azi Lev-On analyze how ideological cleavage in Israeli society is manifest online. They do a link analysis of the Websites of about 200 political parties, members of parliament, and nongovernmental organizations. In “Information and Communication Technologies, Democracy, and Human Rights in Nigeria,” Joseph Wilson and Nuhu Gapsiso examine the evolution of information and communication technologies in Nigeria, the role of information and communication technologies in promoting democracy and human rights in Nigeria, and the challenges to overcome in taking advantage of information and communication technologies in promoting democracy and human rights in Nigeria. In “Memory, National Identity, and Freedom of Expression in the Information Age: Discussing the Taboo in the Zimbabwean Public Sphere,” Shepherd Mpofu examines how new media and information technology have enabled Zimbabweans to have freedom of expression and discuss issues not easily discussed in Zimbabwe. In “The Virtual Parallax: Imaginations of Mthwakazi Nationalism – Online Discussions and Calls for Self-Determination,” Brilliant Mhlanga and Mandlenkosi Mpofu do a case study of a social network in Zimbabwe to show how the virtual sphere has revolutionized the Habermasian public sphere. In “The Opportunities and Challenges of Using Email for Political Communication in Authoritarian States: A Case of Zimbabwe’s Media Monitoring Project,” Sam Takavarasha Jr. and Eldred Masunungure use Illich’s concept of conviviality in a case study on how perceived state surveillance disrupted a vibrant communications platform for political mobilization in Zimbabwe. They discuss the challenges and opportunities of using email for political mobilization and warn against uncritical praise of information and communication technologies in political mobilization. In “Alternative Media Bridging the Digital Divide in Malaysia: Case Study of Sarawakreport.org,” Kevin Fernandez, Sivamurugan Pandian, and Mohd. Zain Abu Bakar analyze the role of new media in Malaysian politics. In “Politics 2.0 with Facebook,” Chirag Shah presents a comprehensive overview of research work in social science and political science that uses Facebook as a tool for analyzing various socio-political issues. He discusses several popular approaches for collecting and analyzing data from Facebook and the application of these approaches in understanding public opinion. He introduces handy tools that can help researchers and practitioners easily and effectively gather and analyze a large amount of Facebook data. In “The Wisconsin Spring,” Jim Jorstad, Jo Arney, Kerry Kuenzi, and Cecilia G. Manrique explore the relationship between social media, information dissemination, and collective action. Their primary example is Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker’s removal of collective bargaining rights of public employees and the protests over that. In “The Language of Threat in Our Political Discourse,” G. R. Boynton and Glenn W. Richardson Jr. examine negotiating the boundaries of appropriate political discourse on Twitter. They do an in-depth analysis of Twitter communication on the shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords, the controversy over Governor Sarah Palin’s violent campaign rhetoric that was blamed for this, and Palin’s defense for this. They also examine talk radio host Rush Limbaugh’s characterization of a student, Sandra Fluke, who testified to a committee of the U.S. House of Representatives.

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In “Conceptualizing Network Politics following the Arab Spring,” Ashu M. G. Solo and Jonathan Bishop define a new field called network politics. Network politics refers to politics and networks. These networks include the Internet, private networks, cellular networks, telephone networks, radio networks, television networks, etc. Network politics includes the applications of networks to enable one or more individuals or organizations to engage in political communication, political regulation of networks, and accompanying issues that arise when networks are used for political communication or when there is political regulation of networks. The definition of this field should significantly increase the pace of research and development in this important field. In “The India against Corruption Movement,” M. V. Rajeev Gowda and Purnima Prakash discuss the India Against Corruption movement and how its leaders used mass media and social media to draw India’s urban middle class onto the streets to protest against government corruption. In “Corruption in the Public Eye: From Transparency to Publicity,” Elitza Katzarova introduces the concepts of transparency and publicity as analytical tools that can induce social change. The chapter has two case studies that provide insight into the role of traditional media versus new social media. She analyzes the role of Western news coverage in negotiations of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the threat of publicity as a negotiation strategy. In addition, she analyzes the role of social media in the success of the anti-corruption movement in India lead by activist Anna Hazare. In “Civic Cultures and Skills in European Digital Rights Campaigning,” Yana Breindl uses Dahlgren’s concept of civic cultures to investigate cultural foundations of the European digital rights movement, which has targeted European Union legislation on copyright enforcement, software patents, and the Internet. She investigates how technically skilled actors can significantly affect policymaking. In “Protesting in a Cultural Frame: How Social Media Was Used by Portuguese ‘Geração à Rasca’ Activists and the M12M Movement,” António Rosas focuses on how Internet technologies were used for political organization and mobilization in the Portuguese Geração à Rasca protests and March 12th Movement. In “Two Models of Online Petitioning in the United Kingdom,” Johannes Fritz analyzes the model of petition in the legislatures of Scotland and Wales and the model of petition on the prime minister’s Website with respect to political and institutional context, functionality, use, and impact. In “Googling Democracy: A Comparison of Democracy Promoters on the Internet,” Nelli Babayan and Stefano Braghirolia compare techniques of democracy promotion and compare techniques of publicizing their promotion of democracy by focusing on the online presence of democracy promoters. Their research focuses on the European Union and U.S. Agency for International Development. In “A New Republic of Letters? The Promise and Potential of the Internet,” John Kane and Haig Patapan argue that e-democratic politics and its hopes of democratizing political authority have mostly not emerged, but social media and its hopes of democratizing knowledge appear to promise a new republic of letters with revolutionary potential. Their chapter examines the nature of the old republic of letters and its fate and assesses the potential of the Internet to change the nature of modern politics. In “From Politics to E-Politics: Updating Saul Alinsky’s Community Organising Model to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of Politics in the Information Age,” Sam Takavarasha, Jr., Jonathan Cox, and Stansilas Bigirimana present a systematic approach for renewing traditional political models for the information age by proposing how to update Alinsky’s community organizing model from aspects of President Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign. This chapter prepares strategists and scholars to update their old tested strategies to a new age like Obama’s campaign did.

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In “The Internet, National Citizenship, and the ‘Sovereignty Paradox’: Asylum-Seeking Migrants’ Political Agency and ‘Technologized’ Citizenship,” Amadu Wurie Khan explores the potential of the Internet for political agency of asylum seekers and refugees and for challenging the boundaries of national citizenship and state sovereignty. In “Interaction of Incivility and News Frames in the Political Blogosphere: Consequences and Psychological Mechanisms,” Porismita Borah examines the influence of incivility on news frames for outcomes including willingness to participate, online participation, attitude certainty, news credibility, and political trust. In “How (Not) to Caffeinate a Political Group: Parent Post Influence on Conversational Network Structure,” Alison N. Novak and Emmanuel Koku investigate language in political forums on the Internet and investigate a connection between post sentiment and network structure. They examine Coffee Party posts on Facebook following the shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords in Arizona. There were 25 chapters accepted from 39 researchers at universities and research institutions in the USA, Australia, Canada, Estonia, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, Nigeria, Portugal, Scotland, South Africa, Wales, and Zimbabwe. There were many more chapter proposal submissions and chapter submissions than could be accepted. The editorial advisory board is listed in this book. Each of the people on the editorial advisory board helped in editing by reviewing chapters, publicity of the call for chapters, or other work. Anas Malik Alahmed reviewed two extra chapters. Alison Novak reviewed an extra chapter. Joanna Kulesza reviewed an extra chapter. The analyses presented make strong research contributions in understanding political activism in the information age, its methods, the effectiveness of these methods, and tools for analyzing these methods. The research in every chapter can be expanded upon, built upon, or used in future research by others, and hence motivates future research by others. This book is dedicated to family, relatives, and friends. This book is also dedicated to freedom fighters and specifically to the greatest activist, Mahatma Gandhi, who liberated India from the British without war. The reader may also be interested in reading Political Campaigning in the Information Age, another book edited by me and published by IGI Global. Political Campaigning in the Information Age involves numerous researchers from around the world doing research studies analyzing different aspects of political campaigning and political messaging with information technology and writing chapters on their results. Political Campaigning in the Information Age strongly increases our understanding of methods for political campaigning and political communications in the information age, the effectiveness of these methods, and tools for analyzing these methods. Ashu M. G. Solo Maverick Technologies America Inc., USA

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Chapter 1

Political Information, Political Power, and People Power: New Media and New Social Movements in the Arab Spring Anas Alahmed Indiana University – Bloomington, USA

ABSTRACT This chapter explores the concept of new media in the Arab world and how politics in the information age has changed Arab politics and moved citizens to the streets. However, the evolution of new media social networks and the cause of political information in particular during the revolution is not studied alone. In fact, the evolution of the Arab Spring and the effects of new media social networks are taken into account by exploring how politics in the information age has influenced Arab citizens and allowed them to use information for the greater good and established such a new social movement. This chapter takes the Arab Spring as a case study and an empirical example to understand the transnational protests and global movements, the concept of global media and global politics in the case of the Arab Spring, new media and new politics regarding the Arab Spring, and city and street and public sphere as people power in the information age. Finally, the chapter distinguishes between the new social movements through social networks and the roles of ICTs to aim revolution and whether such a revolution will erupt without new media social networks.

ARAB SPRING AND TRANSNATIONAL PROTESTS The so-called “Arab Spring” has ultimately introduced a new perception regarding Arab Middle Eastern politics, society and culture. It is shaping a new environment of new Arab politics and new Arab cultures in such a way as to decentralize the

hegemony of the state and shift the power to the people, empowering citizens to take matters into their own hands and make their own decisions. While the Arab Spring has primarily affected Arab politics, it has also affected society and economics. The politics in the information age reflect the politics of the street. The protests and movements of the Arab Spring uprisings have permitted citizens

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch001

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 Political Information, Political Power, and People Power

to spread political information, which is something new to the Arab world. The amount of political information among citizens allows the latter to be more aware of and knowledgeable about politics. Additionally, citizens became more active via grassroots movements, sharing information and ideas and providing alternative and sometimes more credible information and sources as a form of democracy. In the context of the Arab Spring, the world has been witness to unprecedented uprisings throughout the Arab World. Who would have imagined that a poor, young Tunisian fruit and vegetable vendor would immolate himself in order to lead the Arab world in a moment of awakening, a revolution that began in December 2010? The so-called “Arab Spring” brought about a new perception regarding media, mass communications and new media social networks, as well as the widespread of political information and how they affect societies and new forms of politics. The new media social networks play a significant role in the Arab Revolution; social networks lead societies and citizens into activism. While the debate regarding the influential aspects of new media social networks existed before the “Arab Spring,” it is crucial to learn how the new media has led the recent Arab revolution. The big debate has been with regard to whether it was a Twitter and Facebook revolution or a Human revolution, and it has become necessary to evaluate these factors of the Arab Spring uprisings. This chapter seeks to understand the concept of new media in the Arab world and how politics in the information age has changed Arab politics and moved citizens to the streets. However, the evolution of new media social networks and the cause of political information in particular during the revolution will not be studied alone. In fact, the evolution of the Arab Spring and the effects of new media social networks will be taken into account, by exploring how politics in the information age has influenced Arab citizens and allowed them to use information for the greater good.

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Moreover, these new media landscapes channeled into collective activism during the uprisings and brought people out onto the streets. The spread of political information has been permitted to increase in the age of technology. Mobile phones, for example, were used as a means of communication and played a significant role in enabling citizens to prepare for the rebellions; this made the rebellions possible and increased their strength and inclusiveness (Dalacoura, 2012). Furthermore, the Arab Spring is not only about people in the Arab world; the events of the Arab Spring represent the impact that the new global media platforms have on people’s abilities to connect and communicate. It is evidence of global solidarity, global citizen activism, and civic engagement; journalists, for instance, using social media, became closer to their readers; because the journalists updated the events of the revolutions as they were happening, they enabled people to know what was happening at all times without the usual delay. We can see how journalists made some errors in their writing because they wrote on the fly without any reviewers or editors, but they played a key role in the shaping of public space for information (Schattle, 2012). The role of social media is to allow people to go out into the street; it is a grassroots organization aimed at political mobilization. Therefore, politics in the information age are not only affected through regimes’ authority but also through both people and information power. In the current uprisings, the global information infrastructure has impacted the structure of information in the Arab world and decentralized the power of information monopoly and information hegemony. Thus, in order to change Arab politics, the structure of Internet connectedness is examined by analyzing issues related to global connectedness, civil society, transnational activism, diplomatic recognition, and international communication networks (Seo & Thorson, 2012). The empowerment of knowledge, the connectedness associated with global communications, the

 Political Information, Political Power, and People Power

information revolution, and openness to the outside provided a new vehicle for both empowerment and mobilization; the information revolution appeared to be critical in starting the ball rolling before other segments of society joined in, as it provided information and a link to the outside world (Telhami, 2011). The politics in the age of information are not only applicable to the Arab Spring; they are a global phenomenon that encouraged people to share information and participate in the revolution. Citizens from Tahrir Square in Cairo Tweeted the revolution, while, at the same time, people in New York and London were also able to engage in what was happening. During the Iranian Green movement in 2009, most activists who provided information and followed the revolution were from the Iranian communities in Los Angeles and not from Tehran. Politics in the information age have been affected by outsiders putting pressure on regimes to make certain political moves. People are not able to witness events that were hidden to them in the past. With the new media social networking environment, politics in the information age have shifted social movement activities from local communities of people who share the same interests based on their social lives and geography to individuals from all over who share interests and create a collective identity. In other words, social movements, such as Labor Movements, Farmers Movements and Anti-war Movements, prior to the new media and information technologies revolution, used to be comprised of people who shared the same ideals and who tried to be effective from wherever they happened to be physically located. Because of new media social networks, however, social movements through cyberspace are led by a collective identity, and people share and collaborate with these movements not because they are affected based solely on their locations but because they share in the same ideology and are able to establish widespread and large-scale social movements. This enables a person from China who is interested in the environment to

connect with a person from Brazil who shares in the same interests and ideologies; these people do not know one another, but they have a common interest, and that gives them a special collective identity that leads them to establish a movement. Hence, politics in the information age are not solely embodied by political power, political regimes, and political authority but through new media landscapes that are changing the sociopolitical environment of the Arab world. New technologies and new forms of media information play an indispensable role in the conception of modern societies and reshaping global politics (Bell, 1973; Baudrillard, 1983; Castells, 1996; Webster, F 2006). Communication researchers, also, are uniquely positioned to analyze the relationships between social media and political changes in careful and nuanced ways, in terms of causes and consequences (Howard & Parks, 2012). Social media consists of the information infrastructure and tools used to produce and distribute content that has individual value but reflects shared values that became cultural products consumed by citizens. Further, current affairs have made communicative processes key to understanding international relations and developing sound foreign policy. Social media, traditional media and political culture interact with one another (Howard & Parks, 2012). ICTs helped the revolutions by facilitating the organization of protests and the global broadcast of these in real time. Additionally, ICTs fostered an open public sphere during the transition and linked new and traditional pro-democracy activism. This constitutes the focal point of the political struggles. The ICTs had the role of bringing down old regimes and in consolidating transitions to democracy once the revolutionary dust settled. The roles of ICTs helped by mobilizing of the population and creating alternative discourses to authoritarian regimes, spread information and weakened the regime’s control over the political narrative (Manrique & Mikail, 2011).

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Even though the role of social media was the main force behind the uprisings (Cohen, 2011; Webster, S 2011) the tools of social media were more or less a context of media perception of media use for political mobilization and social changes (Lim, 2012), and anti-utopians held the position that neither technology nor the media had any role in politics or democracy. However, the most important thing about the role of new media social networks is that the medium became an alternative resource of information that enabled people to exchange ideas; it also enhanced political participation through cyberspace, as more people engaged in civil society, democracy and civic engagement, collective action, mobilization, activism and social movements. New social media networks provide a space for alternative voices and opposition. Additionally, Lim (2012) argues that although the role of social media during the revolution played minor elements, it is important to look at the history of social movement and social networks before the uprisings and see what directs those kinds of movements made during the last years. Additionally, movements such as the Egyptian Kefaya (enough) and the April 6th movements played integral roles in collective activism and aggregate youth activists. These activists pioneered forms of political critique and interaction that can mediate and encompass the heterogeneity of religious and social commitments that constitute Egypt’s contemporary political terrain (Hirschkind, 2011). New media social networks also changes the form of politics, challenges authority’s power, decentralizes the monopoly of information, and weakens the control. The widespread dissemination of information not only challenges the political authority but also has a motivation; information flow is not enough, so there must be emotion and drama mixed in with the facts, reflecting deeply subjective accounts and interpretations of events in order to point out

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how hybridity in news stories published during the revolution may change the news values and solidarity among citizens (Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2012). Citizens move to use new language forms in order to articulate political life they refer to as “the street.” These political practices as a form of information politics through new media manifestation reflect the transformation of authority of knowledge (Hirschkind, 2010). The spread of protests throughout the Arab world can be viewed as “the product of social learning by Arab citizens [and] rapid diffusion of ideas, discourses, and practices from one country to another and their adoption to local contexts” (Heydemann & Leenders, 2011; p. 647). The Arab Spring caused Arab citizens to aggregate and collaborate with one another in order to stand against the authoritative regimes. From Tunisia to Egypt and the rest of the Arab world there was significant evidence to suggest how collective energy, collective anger and collective identity were shaped by the new media landscape. There have been changes to Arab politics, because people went into the streets and demanded change. Arab countries made reforms in their constitutions and offered jobs and financial support to social services while others have been fighting to celebrate victory through their uprisings. The politics of the information age in the Arab world have been established through cyberspace. Similarly, political changes in the Arab world have been achieved through the streets. In other words, both cyberspace space and physical space play significant roles in shaping Arab politics; that is, politics in the information age. The Arab citizens initially organized their grassroots movement though cyberspace, and the effectiveness of physical politics was enhanced because of this cyberspace activities. However, not all political activities through cyberspace will be achieved physically, but is has different level of impacts.

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GLOBAL MEDIA, GLOBAL POLITICS, AND GLOBAL PROTESTS The global context of the Arab Spring comes from the information flow that appeared in the new media social networks landscape. The globalization has revealed the connectivity among people and between those people and the Arab Spring. In the context of the Arab Spring, the moment of globalization arrived for Arabs upon Muhammad Bouazizi immolating himself in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia on December 17th, 2010. The Arab Spring has been institutionalized in the world history of collective action, from the Arab world to Europe and the United States and perhaps, sooner or later, to the rest of the world (Mamadouh, 2011). The Arab Spring has its own meaning of globalization: the “collective energy is the political force behind global transformation and affects how we theorize and chant revolutions” (Agathangelou & Soguk, 2011, p.552). Also, the pressing desire of the people for transformation, democracy, and the right to an equitable, meaningful and just life is a universal demand and not only for some regions, or for particular nations. The speed at which it has transpired has shattered the familiar presumption that only Western Europe or a North America is the authentic agent of direct democracy and political change. Agathangelou & Soguk argue that western mainstream media are trying to persuade us that Arabs are trying finally to be like our (neo) liberal selves. Additionally, Agathangelou & Soguk seek in understanding the agency of society in these mass movements, the religious, political and philosophical imaginaries in informing, inspiring, and energizing the rebellions, and how the youth led the uprisings. The collective energy is the political force behind global transformation, and it affects how to theorize and chant revolutions (Agathangelou & Soguk, 2012). The global effectiveness of the Arab Spring has reached Europe and the United States via Occupy Wall Street. The globalization

of protests and the transnational trends in global protest movements and modern technology have enabled global social movements, as is seen in the case of the Arab Spring “to transcend borders as rapidly as ideas can. And, social protests have found fertile ground everywhere: a sense that the ‘system’ has failed, and the conviction that even in a democracy, the electoral process will not set things right – at least not without strong pressure from the street” (Stiglitz, 2011). Moreover, the Arab Spring has had a dramatic impact on global perceptions of the fortunes of democracy. These waves are global democratic effects, because the protest movements invoked universal principles of human dignity, freedom, democracy, and a nationalist notion of citizenship (Plattner, 2011). On one hand, Valadbigi & Ghobadi (2011) argue that globalization is a source for developing ethnicity, while civil society is a forum and source of social capital. On the other hand, politics in the age of information could shape the nationalists’ imaginations during the protests, and the new environment of social media allows people to unify their nationality through cyberspace, since the nation is a central matter in gaining democracy that appeared in the Arab Spring and strengthened political mobilization. The challenge for democratic opposition is to construct an identity that unifies the population against the regime and provides alternative discourse for the nation (Baumann, 2011). Since there has been solidarity among Arab citizens with regard to the revolutions and the subsequent rebellions from one country to another, it makes the Arab Spring phenomena even more a part of the global context. People from different ethnicities, religions and sectors have participated in the revolution. Also, gender has played a significant role during the revolution. Women were not kept out of sight; they were, in fact, on the front line of revolutionary stage. Tawakul Karman, a Yemeni female activist who won a Nobel Peace Prize in 2011, is only one example of this.

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The Arab Spring, as an object of study, is a new field in understanding politics in the information age, and it entails exploring a new phenomenon in the Arab world and its media, since the Arab mass rebellions are still relatively new and have just come upon their first anniversary. Even though the collision of the revolution has shifted the peaceful movement into chaos and political conflict, the Arab Spring is an ongoing process, and there could be a way to analyze the new media social networks effects during the revolutions. Even though the social media are not solely responsible for the direction of the revolution, it can be argued that without social media and other new media platforms, we would not know much about the revolution or, more importantly, the responses of the political authority (Fayad, 2011). Thus, the evolution of the new media social networks during the Arab revolutions is still valid. Politics in the age of information is applicable to the events of the Arab Spring; since the uprisings have changed Arab politics and the West was surprised regarding those changes, it has been asked why Middle East studies missed the Arab Spring (Gause III, 2011). On the other hand, Warf (2011) emphasized the fact that American politics and media commentaries perpetuate major fallacies regarding the Arab Spring, which serve to support oppressive regimes in the Middle East. For example, media commentaries describe the Arab Spring as Arab Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic fundamentalism. He said these types of statements are not only false but that they give us a bit of American arrogance and hypocrisy. Similarly, Cox III (2011) claims that western scholars were not only surprised by the uprisings but that also they were missing the point of the civil unrest that spread through the Arab world. Elmusa (2011) argues that political change cannot come from within the region except as instigated by Western nations. In part, the Arab Spring challenged the U.S. hegemony and the capitalist world system, and the global economy fueled the grievances that

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motivate protests and aid the spread of global protest movements that seek global justice to topple corrupt and authoritarian rulers that have been vital to protecting Western economic interests and ensuring its political stability that is part of global change and a part of global uprisings against the basic structures of the world economic and political system (Smith, J 2011). These movements also challenge the dominance of the neoliberal order, because they have the potential to fundamentally transform a world system that is now forced to confront its inherent contradictions. Neoliberal globalization has helped the spread of transnational activism by undermining the legitimacy of democratic institutions. It is obvious that, according to Smith, the undemocratic regimes in the Arab world only survived because they did not threaten Western economic interests. The wave of democratization in the Arab alluded to the rest of the world’s appeals for civil liberty. Civil society in the Arab world has been achieved through cyberspace, as these technologies build extensive networks, create social capital, organize political action with speed, reach the masses, and build a community and activated collective action movements for political changes (Hussain & Howard 2012; Bellin, 2012). The advantage of globalization grants such a revolution, to some degree, an international audience and encourages people among that audience to consider that what happened there could affect them where they are. Some scholars have connected civil societies, liberty, political mobilization, and social change to new media. Khondker (2011), for instance, argues that the significance of the globalization of the new media is highlighted, as it presents an interesting case of horizontal connectivity in social and political mobilization as well signals a new trend in the intersection of new media and traditional media. Axford (2011), however, asserts that the role and the impact of social media during the uprisings should reach global proportions in terms of new media social networks. He argues that the process and the dy-

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namic of social networks through cyberspace are politics at a distance, an elite revolution, which has globalized connectivity.

ARAB SPRING, MEDIA AND NEW POLITICS The Arab Spring surprised more westerners than Arabs and challenged a number of myths and false assumptions that are perpetuated with regard to the Arab world and Arab societies and political changes as they have been characterized by American, European, and certain elitist Arab analysts since the early post-colonial era that gave birth to the authoritarian regimes (Abu-Nimer, 2011) These myths include believing that the fabric of Arab tribal society acts as a constraint, only military intervention can introduce democracy into the Arab world, the autocratic regimes will be replaced by fundamentalist Islamists, and non-violent resistance is contrary to the beliefs of Islam. The events of the Arab Spring and the information age have dismissed all of these myths and introduced a new perception of Arab society and Arab politics. They have also introduced a cultural renaissance into the Arab world (Jahshan, 2011), as Tahrir (Liberation) Square in Egypt is becoming a symbol of freedom and people power not merely in the Arab regions but to the entire world (Keating, 2011). Tahrir Square basically is a site of some of the most moving and powerful street politics and language to come out of the uprisings (Matar, 2012); Tahrir should remain a symbol for the new Arab politics; it was the arena where the camel met Facebook, and Facebook won (Fandy, 2011). Also, the Tahrir Square has moved the space into place that has a powerful meaning from social and political movement to active presence and the right to public assembly (Tawil-Souri, 2012). Moreover, the Tahrir Square was the space of the constitution of new collective subjectivities, as people organized themselves, distributing food, cleaning the spaces and the

places of the revolutionaries, prayer, as all of kind of “becoming” here (Abourahme & Jayyusi 2011). Thus, the square was not merely a symbol for manifestation of democratic possibility, it is an existence power held by public assembly and the place serves as possible democratic interaction and other civic activities and common ground and main stage of events; that the place is a practice of political dissent and became the politics of settlement and then a form of political expression (Tawil-Souri, 2012). According to Abaza (2011a) the Tahrir Square is miraculous sight, a fascinating remade space and becoming the forum for the most inventive and artistic slogans and poetry for all citizens; it was, after all, the euphoria of the newly discovered freedom and a collective longing for dignity while the way the masses gracefully moved and protected themselves in a pacifist manner set a new paradigm on reinventing space. Although it is too early to judge the changes and the effectiveness of the Arab Spring, the uprisings have surprised the world, not because of the changes in political authority but because of the immediate responses among the masses that spread throughout the Arab world and the change of politics in the age of information. Also, the effects of the Arab Spring are not merely located or felt all within a geographically local area; people throughout the world are experiencing these effects. Tahrir Square in Egypt has become a symbol of freedom and people power not only for Egyptians or people in the Arab regions but perhaps for the entire world. More importantly, however, it is not only the new media social networks that have evolved with regard to the Arab Spring; the mainstream media have also been playing significant roles in the revolutions. For instance, media commentaries in the United States sometimes make things worse than they were before. It is like state-controlled media, which stated that what happened had nothing to do with change and that the people involved were merely being chaotic (Warf, 2011). Also, Alwatan, a pro-Syrian government newspaper

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claimed that what happened in Syria was based on conspiracy activists who wanted to destroy the land of resistance (Heydemann & Leenders, 2011). Baroud (2011) indicates that Western media and think tanks have long presented a mistaken and divisive understanding of Arab – and other – societies. There is a discrepancy between the actual situation and indicators-driven understanding. Entire Arab societies are deconstructed and reduced into simple data, which is filtered, classified and juggled to fit into precise criteria and clear-cut conclusions, while public opinions and entire policies are then formed or formulated based on these conclusions. He argues that the problem does not lie in academic practices, per se, but rather the objective-specific understanding that many in the west have towards the Middle East. Regardless of their political leanings, most Washington-based think tanks, according to Baroud, tend to study distant societies only for the sake of producing definite answers and recommendations regarding their political interests. According to an International Crisis Group report from June 2011, “much Western media coverage has from the outset presented a very one-sided view of the logic of events, portraying the protest movement as entirely peaceful and repeatedly suggesting that the regime’s security forces were unaccountably massacring unarmed demonstrators who presented no security challenge” (Cockburn, 2011). These are only examples on how mainstream media and social networks worked during the crisis and, in specifically, during the Arab revolt. However, the mainstream media, especially television networks like Aljazeera, had played significant roles in the collaboration between the revolution and the effects of new media social networks (Lynch, 2011). It is interesting to see how some scholars have agreed that the emergence of satellite networks and Internet has eased the information flow to document an event, minute-by-minute. In fact, the emergences of global networks have not only eased the media coverage but have also allowed

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audiences to choose news sources and challenge the monopoly (Feuilherade, 2011; Pintak, 2011). Moreover, Aljazeera, as a prominent power, shaped the politics in the age of information in the Arab Spring. Baroud (2012) argues that the Aljazeera coverage of the Egyptian revolution was, for the most part, impeccable; it was the type of coverage that reflected the revolutionary fervor felt throughout the country and it somehow found a way to transmit the country’s mood with impressive clarity. In other words, the pervasiveness of television images during the Arab revolutions have colonized Arabs’ memories, reifying, consequently, the reality that created a “culture industry” in the penalizing, “mass deception” effect of television; exposed the power of the velocity of image transmission; and, exposed the flagrant discrepancies between propaganda and reality and the ridiculous lies of the state television propaganda. It exposed the power and velocity of image transmission through the medium of television. During the Arab Spring, technology was used for insurgence against the iron curtains of the clinically mad Arab despots (Abaza, 2011b). Furthermore, the former director of Aljazeera, Waddah Kanfar (2011), emphasized that the camera was a crucial tool to protect the protester in Tahrir Square. Aljazeera has become a refuge of people who look for uncensored information and became an Arab public sphere and a virtual space for Arabs (Lynch, 2006; Miladi, 2011).

CITY, STREET, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN THE INFORMATION AGE The politics in the age of information have moved beyond cyberspace into the cities. Complex interaction between the powerful and the powerless has shaped the urban spaces, and media have become the center of this urban and civilized space (Sassen, 2011). Street struggles and demonstrations that are vehicles for making social and political claims are part of our global modernity. Global

 Political Information, Political Power, and People Power

Street is a concept regarding global demonstrations wherein people go out to the streets, demanding social justice. The street became a political symbol that was conceived as a space where new forms of social and political involvement can be had; that is the capacity of the city, to function as a sort of weak regime. The city in this case, as a complex system that leads to the transformation of a disease into an epidemic, has become evident in the Arab Spring. The city is a site in which to make political and civic changes. And, the city is a public space that plays a central role in giving power to the people on street (Sassen, 2011). The city, according to Sassen, allows for communication technologies, such as social media, to mobilizing protests through the streets, and these technologies bring power to the city that affects change. Moreover, the city is not only a place but also a cultural and political landscape that aggregates people into collective action. That action started as grassroots organization via the media, which then became collective action taken to the streets within the city and beyond. As such, ICTs constructed a city by providing for the exchange of information among its citizens. In the other words, the interconnection between media and the city and between the inward or outward systems of media and communication limits the boundaries of identities and social groups (Georgiou, 2010). Additionally, Matar (2012) argues that the Arab revolutions took places in the age of information flows and digital media; it took places in the context of repressive micro-system of power and oppressive media apparatuses that visibly deny citizens. Thus, the spaces and the practice for mediation, representation and for exercising power and resistance are varied. The revolutionaries’ youth constitute the “street” as a new form of new global space of contestation that lead these mass protests as the anti-colonization struggles movements (Agathangelou, 2012). The street in the Arab Spring scene is not only a metaphor for alternative power rather these powers however, have affected the conclusion and the outcome of

the Arab Spring as a mass protest throughout the Arab World. Thus, the constructional power has evolved the political intervention. The Arab Spring has been “characterized by a new vitality, a new or renewed meaning, of public spaces, from the streets of Tunis to the Tahrir Square in Cairo”p.620 and the role of cities and urban space in shaping the prospects for citizenship and social change has been recognized (Souza & Lipietz, 2011). The politics in the information age provide a public sphere that has the transformative capacities of public spheres where critical discussions take place about the fate and aspirations of the political community and do not vainly crash into a wall that is often identical with established authorities and their security apparatuses (Salvatore, 2011). The politics in the information age are transforming the connectedness that is built among people through communication forums and media into a sustained political mobilization. The final proof of the vanity of the latest justification of the idea of the public sphere as a universal arena of democratization, however, is the idea that through a cumulative pressure of discussion and critique of authoritarianism and corruption, key sociopolitical changes can be effected (Salvatore, 2011). Therefore, politics in the age of information is the answer of these quarries since people shape new politics through the spread of information. Whether or not the Arab countries change after the revolutions, the most important things here are that politics in the age of information enable citizens to participate with the authority, and the traditional politics have been replaced by a new model of information politics. That transformation of the diverse protests movements throughout Arab world became a political actor that is capable in reforming national institutions and other organizations of civil society into new political system in the Arab world. The effects of information made revolutionary dynamics translated into inclusive political processes and institutions that offer opportunity for citizens to make their voices heard and create a new political culture of civic engagement

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(Bauer & Schiller, 2012). Therefore, the empowerment of the Internet as an alternative source of information as well as a powerful public sphere allows it to become a space for social imagery and political mobilization and decentralizes the information monopoly, and citizens are no longer fragmented or marginalized.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD Before moving on to discuss the new social movements happening via cyberspace, it is important to address the environment of social movements in the Arab word. Civil society in the Arab world is generally seen as impotent and disabled; there is no place for associations or even voluntarism that is isolated from the government, and there is no role or any factor for any organization in the Middle East; the absence of civil society in the Middle East is due to the constraints of political conditions, which are too oppressive for any civic life and for activists, as there is no room for any civic practice (Carapico, 2010). Even though the Arab world does not have a real civil society and powerful social movement, according to Joel Beinin (2011), there was some evidence where such a movement has affected politics. In the Arab world, social movements in places like Egypt or Tunisia can be strong, yet social movements were politically weak in Syria, Libya and Yemen, depending on the unions and workers in the given country. In other words, when civil society exists in places like Egypt and Tunisia, the revolution succeeds, while the revolution has fallen in Syria, Libya and Yemen because the civil society in these countries are weak and lack organization. Moreover, Khair El-Din Haseeb (2012) the Editor-in-Chief of Contemporary Arab Affairs has argued that only Tunisia and Egypt has succeeded in toppling regimes but not in others, notably Syria. Haseeb posits a hypothesis in explanation why Tunisia

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and Egypt gained a successful revolution while in Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain was not a successful revolution based on four component factors; barrier of fear, a revolt should be nonviolent in nature, there should exist a sufficient threshold of social cohesion and shared sentiment for national unity among the people opposing a given regime and finally, the position of the army. However, with the regards to these factors, the Arab revolutions in the Arab world, people have experienced social movements under the umbrella of civil society where social and political institutions serve as means of mobilization. According to Stork (2011), social movements and social organizations in the Middle East have succeeded in reframing political discourses as well as emerging human rights activists. In Egypt, for instance, there are numerous human rights organizations, but their activities do not appear to constitute a social movement because they are unable to build a movement without access to resources (Stork, 2011). However, with the emergence of new media social networks, the movement becomes easier to mobilize and organize. Where there is usually a lack of resources and of social aggregation in a movement, the new media landscape allows for the gaps among members in the movements to be narrowed, and this permits people to become more involved with and in support of a movement. Moreover, according to Albrecht (2008), the politics of participation in nondemocratic regimes is a form of civil society and political liberalization that leads to the potential for democracy. The purpose of political participation is to influence public policy, government determinism, and social change. These venues must have at least awakening targets to spread consciousness among society, and that is what Arab people want to accomplish. In practice, however, as Albrecht says, the political system in the Middle East is not institutionalized, and if there is any institution of civil society that exists, it does not have any influence on political participation, as the majority of citizens do not express themselves politically through these

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institutions. Since the virtual social movement and civil society is weakening in the Middle East, people try to engage in political participation as a norm of social and political movements via the cyberspace environment. Nevertheless, the cyber movements are not categorized as physical resistance movements that force government; rather, they are seen as basic movements that require more freedom and that demand democracy. These movements also do not want to enforce government, but they do want to take action and make citizens and the public more aware. The concept of resistance here is nonviolent cyber activity as a means to affect change. On the other hand, Karajah (2007) argues that the civil society in the Arab world exists but is not similar in practice or concept to that of the West. He points out that even under repressive regimes and dictatorship rulers, the civil society has an important and active role to play in the Arab world. He argues that, by definition, “civil society” in Arabic language has nothing to do with any political or social mobilization or collective action to organize or influence society. It means transformation of society from traditional life to a developed stage. Civil society in the Arab world is assembled through charitable organizations as well as voluntarism, which is different from the concept of civil society in the West because of cultural boundaries, Arab states’ commitments to tribal and family ties make the existence of civil societies very rare. Thus, in the Arab world, civil society is no substitute for the state, as the practice of social movements is a feature of civil society. Social movements aiming to bring about civil societies in the Arab world will not emerge until they are supported by a continuous struggle for democracy that, today, can be observed through the new media social networks landscape, which citizens use as a means of mobilization. A civil society is the first vehicle to a political reform. Thus, when people generate virtual social movements and civil societies, the change has arrived. Civil society contributes to democracy by giving a

voice to citizens, by maintaining transparency and good governance, by promoting democracy, and by increasing public accountability and legitimacy (ibid). Though, with new media social networks platforms, the practice of civil life comes through cyberspace, not through physical space. Beinin (2011) argues that not only social networks but also the working class assisted the recent revolution in Egypt. In Egypt, for instance, there were some strikes and other collective actions that helped Egyptian people to revolt. In his analysis, Benini makes a connection between the workers’ movement and the social network movement, as neither had national leadership. In this case, the connection between all movements in all different ideological backgrounds was a key that empowered the revolution to collapse Mubark’s regime. Thus, the success of the Arab Awakening movements “correlate well with the strength of their labor contingents: the more workers involved, the more likely a democratic outcome” (Beinin, 2011, p. 28). In the recent Arab uprisings, the outcome of each protest movement was determined by local specificities; “the accumulated experience of recent mobilizations, the social forces and leaderships that come to the forefront, the density of the social networks that have been mobilized and the extent to which they can generate sufficient mutual trust to overcome decades of fear instilled by authoritarian regimes, and the skill of insurgent movements in outmaneuvering incumbent regime by deploying a repertoire of contention including well-established and innovate tactics” (Beinin & Vairel, 2011, p. 237). They argue that the uprisings in the Arab world that spread protests all over were because of the protests of the Union workers in Tunisia and Egypt that helped to overthrow their regimes. The Unions, along with new media social networks, helped to organize and mobilize the protests. They mention that even though there were no official social movements or institutions of civil society, when a demonstration erupted and the opportunity was presented, these people

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became mobilized. The demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt had no identified leadership and were comprised of all types of ideological parties and movements; everyone joined the demonstrations in order to be a part of the protests and the revolution. People from the left and from the right joined the movement so that they could demand democracy, equality and social justice. Egypt’s social movements have Facebook pages, and the members range from 100,000 people associated with the Egyptian April 6th Youth Movement to 500,000 members associated with a page called “We Are All Khaled Said,” a movement that seeks justice.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND POLITICAL INFORMATION While the importance of this topic can be observed, the connection between social movements and social networks has not been fully studied or discussed, academically. In fact, social movements have very rarely been addressed in academic literature, in terms of dealing with communication and information policies as objects of activism and political mobilization through cyberspace (Napoli, 2007). Moreover, in addition to the lack of coverage regarding the connection between social movements and social networks in the academic literature, most studies of social movements have failed to study the cases of the Middle East (Beinin & Vairel, 2011). Looking at the literature, it is evident that there are plenty of academic works that emphasize the empowerment of information communication technologies in social and political life and citizen activism and the grassroots of social and political movements (Bennett, 2003; Castells, 2007; Howard 2011). However, it is still rare to encounter literature involving the empowerment of new media, per se, in the Arab world and particularly with regard to the Arab Spring revolt and how social networks are being used in that region.

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That could be because the uprising is still new and in its first years, and, generally, there is limited interest in studying the impact of information and communication technologies in the Arab region (Nour, 2010; Badran, 2010). This could also be because of the absence of Arab scholars who are interested in this field of study or because the publications regarding this subject matter may be offered in Arabic language but not in English. Therefore, it is important to study the connection between social media and social movement in the Middle East and try to understand how the relationship between the two has encouraged the eruption of the Arab Revolution that is happening today. Also, it is key to understand how these movements are changing society and political positioning in the Arab world by shaping a civic life and empowering institutions based on the cyberspace environment. Furthermore, new social movements take advantages of information and communication technologies as well as new media social networks platforms that have played significant roles during the Arab Spring and before. However, the big challenges and changes were during the Arab Spring, and this particular project will look at the dimensions and the potential of social and political change. The level of change could result in a revolution that requires the head of the regime to step down, or it could merely change political discourse and political decisions that come after people exercise their power and make their demands. Generally speaking, the Arab world’s lack of political structure, the absence of a constitution and the obsolete centered political power with nonexistent democracy lead Arab people to create social movements and other institutions of civil society through cyberspace and social networking platforms. These manifestations have established an alternative way for a non-democratic society to develop a new landscape for social and political democracy and even create new Arab politics that benefit from the age of information and technologies. While it may be impossible to count these

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cyberspace-based social movements, their effects are certainly observable. These movements have established an alternative way for a non-democratic society to develop a new landscape for social and political democracy. Arabs in these movements’ protests demand democracy as well as political and economic reforms. These protests movements are directed at citizens, as it is the people whose voices need to be heard in order to affect change. Arabs in these movements demand democracy as well as political and economic reforms. These movements are directed at citizens, as it is the people whose voices need to be heard in order to affect change. The protests movements in the new landscape of information allow for widespread participation, which means that people from all over who possess the same ideology can form a collective identity. It makes politics a form of citizens’ needs and choices. The identity in new social movements in the Arab world has been comprised of the youth and the young generation that uses new media and new technology to exchange ideas for political reforms and social changes. Youth has played an outsized role in driving Arab politics’ embodiment of new competencies aggregation into political change (Lynch, 2011) after years of marginalization. One significant role of new social movements in the new media social network landscape is identified by the fact that platforms ease the political mobilization into action. These new social movements feature collectivity and connectivity, and they seek to create political hegemonies and encourage citizen empowerment. The empowerment of citizens is another form of politics in the age of information, because information enables citizens to locate and make use of alternative resources. New media social networks’ output potentials come from their motivations, participation, activism, association with the movements, and mutual agreements among activists that created new perception and conception of politics in the information age for Arabs.

New politics in the information age have created new forms of social movements and transnational protests that require modernity, community, and identity to illustrate the ideology that members in social movements possess. These members collaborate with one another and contribute to their activities through new media. Since there are no social institutions or a civic society in the Arab world that promotes the concepts of good governance, how will these new cyberspace-based movements establish themselves and become effective? With new media social networks, it can be argued that the critical masses who have reached the Middle East and is using citizens’ voices to address new challenges to the political authority that dominates the flow of information. Protest movements and other form of political activities through new media social networks transform individual consciousness into mass consciousness and facilitate societal change, and the process begins with the individual and successfully reaches mass awareness. In these social movements, citizens become more engaged in society, and the new social movements in the media network landscape do not have only political purposes. There is often a balance between political life and social life, as well economic life, regarding the structure or intent of some social movements. New social movements in network activities are part of the civic landscape and help citizens to participate and engage in public life. This chapter examines the political level of social media efficiency since social media help democracy to become more powerful and more practical through social movement activities in Arab politics in the age of information. New social movements through new media social networks allow societies to be more powerful and influential in establishing a desired civic life. Thus, social media networks provide paths to a strong democracy. Also, the cyberspace-based landscape of new media social networks helps society to practice democracy, within a democratic or non-democratic society.

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Thus, the contextualization of the Arab Spring has begun contributing to the events of the revolution that have been directed by the new social media networks. That engagement has helped citizens to move into more consciousness and facilitate societal change, which is what was happening in the Arab Revolution. Social media with the efforts of information technologies could collectively help the Revolutions in many ways and change the politics in the information age. Therefore, the effectiveness of the Arab Spring has been observed since the Arab Spring is not only a means of political mobilization and social movement consequences or economic and cultural changes; it is, in fact, a new ecology of new media effects and a new face of politics in the age of information. The relationship between the Arab Spring and the new media has been widely debatable with regard to whether what happened was because of the new media or because of other socio-economic and political factors. Additionally, the political role of new media social networks and ICTs has been widely debated with regard to whether social networks mobilize society and transform people into taking part in political activism. Nevertheless, the politics at this stage, in the age of information, have been replaced by new movements of awareness and people power.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE ROLES OF ICTs Before moving to discuss social movements and the agendas of new media social networks during the crisis, it is crucial to look at some literature on the empowerment and the roles of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and social movement during the recent Arab uprisings. While Stepanova (2011) claims that the tide of mass protests in the Arab Spring highlighted the distinct role of modern information communication technologies and digital social media tools and networks, the impact of these technologies

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was felt globally, affecting both developed and developing counties at the same time and once the uprisings had gained momentum, the need for social media involvement was reduced because they were no longer in need, as people were already in the position to seek change. However, the use of technologies and social networks became more collaborative as people continued updating events and occurrences. It can be argued that the new media social networks encouraged the uprisings and the mobilization and organization of the grassroots protests, then when the demonstrations began, physically and virtually, the need of ICTs decreased and these tools were used only to perpetuate the flow information and to allow new agencies to flourish. On the other hand, Niekerk et al. (2011) claim that the role of ICTs in the uprisings was primarily that of a transmission medium through which to spread anti-government perceptions and to provide some organization and cohesion to the protests. Social media, in particular, facilitated communications and provided a degree of command and control for the protestors, therefore forming the basis for network-centric warfare (ibid). Another literature looked at the relationship between social movement and cyberspace as a result of people power (Diana, 2007) and national identity (Cooks, 2001) or diaspora (Sokefeld, 2006). Others emphasized the importance of studying the diffusion of information to understand the social movement, since diffusion of information allows a clear identification of the key elements that contribute to the transfer of ideas among groups that engage in social movement and political mobilization, especially when new media social networks are more prevalent (Rane & Salem, 2012). Though, it is important to look out at the massive protests during the revolution and the use of information technologies to utilize their movements. Hence, it is crucial to ask how information and communication technologies have empowered the movement and mobilized the protests.

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Meanwhile, there is a lot of consideration regarding the Arab Spring, but there is not much literature about the role of ICTs during the revolution per se and how the revolution does not only involve media tools and ICTs roles but also legitimacy, democratization, civil society, and other forms of political participation as a whole. ICTs help citizens to engage in public life as Arab citizens did in political life, since social media help democracy to become more powerful and more practical. ICTs and new media social networks give societies a chance to become more powerful and influential, providing a path to a strong democracy and, thus, to the strengthening of social movements’ mobilization. Since there is no region, state, or form of government that can remain immune to the impact of new information and communication technologies on social and political movements, as Stepanova (2011) claims, the recent uprisings that have flourished throughout the Arab world provide great occasion to look at the role that ICTs played in the revolution. Moreover, Newsom et al. (2011) indicate that while the role of communication technologies in generating resistance and political and social change in the Middle East is clear, the impact of these changes being caused by local knowledge articulated through communication technologies is a story currently unfolding. Thus, the importance of studying the roles of ICTs during the Arab revolution is significant, not only the role and the organization of social movements through cyberspace but also the technological tools that have helped the revolution, because ICTs aggregate and integrate protests and the grassroots for the movements through the cyberspace environment. It can be argued that the empowerment of ICTs in the Arab world could be more significant than in other societies since Arabs live in nondemocratic regimes and the media is state-controlled. Thus, ICTs became alternative platform form information and resources. Additionally, the institutions of civil society are not constituted in the Arab world, so citizens went to cyberspace to shape their civilization and practice their civic life. With

ICTs’ utilities, social norms in Arab society have shifted from local communities of people who share the same interests based on their social lives and geography to individuals from all over who share interests and create a collective identity. Citizens can now come together and engage in social norms that allow them to establish civil society, through cyberspace. In this circulation, ICTs became an alternative means of protest, a grassroots method of mobilizing the movements, easing the political mobilization into action and transforming society into a mechanism of activism and challenging the political regimes. In the context of the Arab Spring, it is apparent that many of the young and digitally savvy Arabs are adopting online social networks as a means of communication for economic and social progress and political reform, and the role of ICTs is to enlighten and lessen the burdens faced by millions of Arabs with the aid of global telecommunication leaders (Smith, P 2011). The new media social networks, along with the roles of ICTs, play a significant position in the Arab Revolution. With the various forms of ICTs, citizens can follow the news and update the details of the events minuteby-minute, through the social media networks platform; journalists and Internet activists, on the other hand, involved in the revolution, use cyberspace and provide news and information and, in this way, became sources of information for the news organizations. A cursory glance at political information with the new media social networks’ influence on the Arab Spring allows us to observe how citizens post pictures of the events via Flicker, upload videos through YouTube, and are following the revolution’s progress on Twitter. Bloggers became embedded journalists by providing news, and citizen journalists became correspondents to news organization and news agencies. Facebook become a broad discussion forum for solidarity and supporters of the revolution and campaigns, and it was the paradigm for the revolution strategy, while Wikipedia became an official record of the uprisings movements and protests. Thus, 15

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new media social networks were a means of planning when, where and how the revolution would begin and progress, and because it was made both individuals and the masses aware, it was successful. Therefore, ICTs and other social media have collectivity helped the Revolution in many ways. ICTs have not only played a role in politics and journalistic function, but they have also eased the use of technology and the access to information. Similarly, ICTs role in the process from individual to mass awareness was successful since citizens involve in the revolution not only physically but also through solidarity over great distances. ICTs and other social media networks transform individual consciousness into mass consciousness and facilitate societal change, which is what was happening in the Arab Revolution. According to Livingston, ICTs play a role in the way that the media influences mechanisms in democracies that creates a new environment for news and allows citizens to be more aware of what is happening around them and demand power to be more transparent, open and efficient and, hence, the way that ICTs contribute to the fall of anti-democratic regimes since the new digital IT systems move the position of governance and the ability to attract attention to certain issues as well as providing solutions, within a complex scenario involving new players, such as, for example, NGOs, sections of civil society and international organizations. Governments are thus faced with new forms of pressure from subjects who were previously excluded from this sphere of intervention on reality because the regimes belonging to the old system were able to exercise strict control over the media and perpetuate the illusion of good government (Buonocore, 2011). He added that technologies make information available and shareable in a manner that cannot be controlled by those in power, or at least not to the same extent as in the past. These technologies allow people to discover a common ground where they can identify common interests and requirements. Livingston argues that today, with ICTs, citizens can discover the problems afflicting them and 16

freely share their uneasiness, almost immediately and feel that they are all playing a part in searching for solutions. Citizens in this circulation are playing a part of the political process, of choices and of the implementation of decisions. Allagui and Kuebler (2011) argue that the Arab revolution demonstrated the power of networks that came from the role of ICTs during the revolution as well as the flow of networks and information dynamics to which people belong: networks of friends, family, work, school, and others of interest (such as the media); these networks create a space. Thus, “the Arab movements proved the motivating power of social relations for social activism.” In the context of network, Allagui and Kuebler argue that the solidarity among members of networks challenged political regimes, created revolutionary content on their mobile and digital media, and they distributed this same content to their friends, families, and members of other networks. They points out that the power of the communication technologies comes from the use of the information and the simple process through which the information can be widely disseminated throughout the globe in a way that prevents the state from following it or blocking it. Therefore, according to Allagui and Kuebler, communication technologies empowered citizens, some of whom used these technologies spontaneously and not strategically; ICTs roles during the revolution were to help distribute information and content. They note that that the emerging force of Arab youth benefits from the development of communication technologies in these countries and from the creation of content; those Arab youth have triggered online activism and online participation for many years now, challenging all practices of censorship. The power of Arab youth with regard to online activism has made social movement through cyberspace and political mobilization (an example of which is the April 6th Youth Movement) in order to not only challenge the political regime but also to act as an alternative source of information that further empowers them.

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On the other hand, Howard (2011) notes that with ICTs, “the power to control information no longer resides exclusively with the institutions of the state; it resides in media networks; and media networks are constituted by social relations and communication technologies. So, Castells argues that in contemporary network society the power residing in media networks is stronger than that residing in states” (p. 20). That is true in terms of power that is held not only by the people but also by communication tools that enable society to challenge the state power, especially in the case of a non-democratic society. The oppressive rulers understand the power of communication, and they not only control the information content but they also ideologize it against people’s will and orient the media in such a way that it serves the state and the government. With new media social networks and the emergence of information and communication technologies, the old frame of this picture has been reversed to people’s hegemony and not that of the state. Again, Livingston indicates that the IT environment in which the digital media obliges a change in the relationship between power and counterpower refers specifically to the manner in which the new flow of digital information can or cannot be controlled by those in power. However, the network of information makes all forms of control exercised in the past impossible and “the infinite multiplicity of news and relationships that exist in a network society take power away from the old hierarchical structure, depriving it of a capacity to supervise and manipulate everything and are an ongoing challenge for ways of managing power that now belong to the past. The pluralistic and network-like nature of the digital word makes communities adaptable to the reality they are faced with and this facilitates a number of kinds of initiatives and actions that were previously not possible” (Buonocore, 2011). In other words, the control over information is no longer a choice that dictatorship regimes have because the technologies force the flow of information and make bowdlerization irrational if not impossible. In this

sense, the protest movements take advantage of information and communication technologies to further empower their demonstrations. For the most part, according to Stepanova (2011), the input of the social media networks was critical in performing two overlapping functions: (a) organizing the protests and (b) disseminating information about them, with the help of a satellite network like Aljazeera, that whole process can serve as powerful accelerators of social transformation. In his analysis of the ICT roles during the Arab revolution, he signifies that even with the limited and absent role of major ICTs and social media networks as direct facilitators in organizing protests, the role of mainstream electronic media devices were not diminished and were capable of quickly capturing and broadly transmitting eyewitness accounts of domestic developments to the rest of the world and yet not all types of ICTs and related information and social networks have had the same impact nor have they outmatched other means of information and communication, from satellite television to cell phones, in playing a mobilization or public information role. Thus, the mobilizing role of new information and communications technologies and related networks are primarily pro-democracy, while the implications of the role of ICTs and social media networks in the Middle Eastern context go beyond direct parallels with other developing regions (ibid). Thus, the process of using the information technologies could differ from one society to another, depending on the experience that the society has, the purpose it has for using the technologies, and its political and economic conditions. Another study analyzed the role of ICTs during the revolution and did so from an information warfare perspective. Niekerk et al. (2011) stated that, in this model, it is apparent that ICTs were employed as a communication tool to disseminate information to alter the perceptions and will of both local and international target audiences in the uprisings. They argue that the role of ICTs in the uprisings from an IW perspective then could be construed as psychological operations 17

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and could command and control warfare, while the role of ICTs in the uprisings was primarily that of a transmission medium through which to spread anti-government perception and provide some organization and cohesion to the protests. However, the use of ICTs alone did not achieve these successes; they certainly made a strong contribution, though. Moreover, another study discusses how information flows were helped by ICTs, how local knowledge was transported from a very specific local context onto a global stage, and how social media and communication technologies were used to affect social change (Newsom et al, 2011). These studies explain not only the roles of ICTs during the revolution but also the model of using ICTs to combat specific barriers. According to Castells, while communication power was a balance between the old media regimes and ICTs, what is happening now in the Arab world seems suddenly to sanction the end of this balance; something revolutionary has happened, a critical threshold has, at some point, been passed; yet, in all cases, the Internet is helping grassroots movements, and freer expression of society (Bosetti, 2011). Independent of the political establishment, the Internet provides free communication, but the content of this freedom depends on social actors and the dynamics of social mobilization in a given context. While it is clear that social media play significant roles in organizing social movements and grassroots protests all over, it is unclear as to whether people have used the new media social networks to mobilize or if they were tools used coincidently by protesters. Another perspective comes from Chadwick (2007), who states that the Internet enables organizational change among traditional interest groups and political parties and is starting to resemble the looser network forms characteristic of social movements, while interest groups and parties are experiencing processes of hybridization based on the selective transplantation and adaptation of digital network repertoires previously considered typical of social movement mobilizations first observed during the 1990s and early 2000s. He 18

adds, “digital network repertoires, first developed during the social movement mobilizations involving an online element in the 1990s and early 2000s,” are now being adopted by more staid interest groups as well as those involved in party election campaigns. He argues that traditional interest groups and parties are experiencing Internet fueled increases in grassroots influence in ways that social movements now take for granted as part of their nonhierarchical, “medium is the message” approach. The outcome of social movements is best conceptualized as organizational hybridity because the cyberspace environment enables individuals to join the movement and, thus, to identify and then hybridize, as “loose alliances of groups are often able to use the Internet to link up and simultaneously mobilize and focus their efforts on different levels of politics, seamlessly shifting from the national to the transnational. The Internet is creating new opportunities for political organizations to diversify their repertoires.” This is because of groups connecting to technologies that are used by equivalent organizations, which causes them to work together in collective action. In his paper, Chadwick looks at historical perspective on how such an organization used the Internet in order to achieve political action that arose from the adoption and adaptation of digital network repertoires. Finally, this section looks at the works that have been done regarding the Arab Revolution and the impact of ICTs, as well as the roles that ICTs played during the revolution. More studies on this subject matter, both qualitative and quantitative, should be done to fill the gap on this particular area of study. Also, the revolution is in progress; what has been done could change what is going to happen in the future, and that applies to the roles of ICTs, as well. One last consideration looks at whether Arab citizens consider the empowerment of ICTs as a means to change politics and society or if they just found these tools, coincidently, and chose to work with them. The answer is not yet certain; however, the case study in this paper considers the roles that new social media played

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after the crisis. The case of “We Are All Khaled Said” determined that the movement played a significant role in organizing the grassroots movement before the Egyptian Revolution. So, every nation has a different influence regarding society and politics, and every country sets a different priority and goal regarding how their movements mobilize and change.

CONCLUSION: WILL THE REVOLUTION ERUPT WITHOUT SOCIAL MEDIA? With all respect to the work of ICTs and the impact of new media social networks, the success of new social movements through cyberspace is not sufficient. It is important to understand the sequences in such a movement because every movement has its own uniqueness in terms of its success or failure, depending on the circumstances (Morris, 1999). Thus, it is not only the ICTs that allow the protest movements to be successful, as other elements were also employed to push the movements forward to meet their goals (Filiu, 2011). In the example of the civil rights movement in America, blacks were excluded from political and social life, so politics did not play any active roles in their lives. This marginalization is very similar to that of the Arab people when they leave political life to the politicians and the ruling party. Morris stresses that social conditions play an important role in creating the circumstances conducive to protests, and social movements occur where there are political structures that allow for these movements to take place. This gives the movements more political power. Since people were unrecognized in political life, they wanted to be more active and more validated in society. Historically speaking, according to Morris, civil rights movements in America were more capable and successful when new technologies, such as television, arrived. The growth of television, satellites and cable made the movements more powerful and more globally accessible.

Thus, the rise of modern communication technologies and existing social, economic and political conditions are conducive to the rise of a massive and successful movement as it was with civil rights movement. Collective action, agency, creativity, and structural prerequisites, all together, build a strong and powerful social movement. One can claim that collective action, such as boycotting a product, and community collaboration, such as students organizing and mobilizing into masses of social protests, are more successful with new technologies. While the civil rights movement had an influential leader like Martin Luther King Jr., the leader of the Arab Street was a new media social network. Moreover, when people are suffering and want immediate action and direct participation to affect change, they are willing to become involved in the movements. This examination is similar to the case of the political Arab environment. The recent Arab revolution, like the civil rights movement, demonstrated an unprecedented level of dignity that played an important role in encouraging Arab Street to confront authorities in their quest for change and fertilized the ground so that it could take root and flower into widespread, collective action (Morris, 1999 p. 528). Finally, Morris emphasizes that nonviolent direct action by social movement as superior power enables oppressed groups as diverse as Arabs of the Middle East to engage in collective action that generates disruption. Therefore, the roles of ICTs, as was previously claimed, were to organize the movements and to mobilize the protests, then to update the demonstration and uprising activities. As a result, the actual social movements existed in both Tunisia and in Egypt but under authoritarian regimes, and it was difficult for the movements to flourish and empower society. But, since the revolution erupted, these movements became stages for practicing democracy and demanding reform. It was surprising to see how people utilized and facilitated their mobilization into actual practice. While it is clear that social media play significant roles in organizing social 19

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movements and grassroots protests all over, it is unclear yet as to whether people have used the new media social networks to mobilize or if they were tools used coincidently by protesters. It can be argued that modern civil society relies on communication to create grassroots movements and to mobilize. And, when the movement erupted, social media became tools to update the event, not to organize it. Therefore, new media and the spread of political information is not everything; when Nada Agha Sultan was killed by Iranian militias during the Green Movement in 2009, the world witnessed the killing of an innocent person during a peaceful demonstration. The media covered the incident to show the world how the oppressive the Iranian regime is. However, there are tens of Agha Sultan killed by the Syrian Army every day, but since Syria is not Iran and the Syrian situation is more complex, new media social networks have no role in political change. In fact, the world has been witness to the hypocrisy of the West with regard to the revolt in Syria. The politics of power work more efficiently sometimes than do the politics of information; the latter empowers people, while the politics of power are based on the International Coalition that is greater than the people’s will.

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Castells, M. (1996). The Rise of the Network Society, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture (Vol. 1). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Castells, M. (2007). Communication, power and counter-power in the network society. International Journal of Communication, 1, 238–266. Chadwick, A. (2007). Digital Network Repertoires and Organizational Hybridity. Political Communication, 24(3), 283–301. doi:10.1080/10584600701471666 Cockburn, P. (2011, June 24). Amnesty questions claim that Gaddafi ordered rape as weapon of war. The Independent. Retrieved from http://www. independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/amnestyquestions-claim-that-gaddafi-ordered-rape-asweapon-of-war-2302037.html Cohen, R. (2011, January 24). Facebook and Arab dignity. New York Times. Retrieved from http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/opinion/25ihtedcohen25.html Cooks, L. M. (2001). Negotiating national identity and social movement in cyberspace: Natives and invaders on the Panama-L listserv. In B. Ebo (Ed.), Cyberimperialism? Global relations in the new electronic frontier (pp. 233–252). Westport, CT: Praeger. Cox, R. III. (2011). To Thine Own Self Be True: Conflicting Interpretations of the Cultural and Social Implications of the Arab Spring. The Arab World Geographer, 14(2), 174–178.

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Dalacoura, K. (2012). The Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications. International Affairs, 88(1), 63–79. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01057.x

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Fayad, M. (2011). The Arab Youth Revolution Paradigm: Rights, Freedom, Responsibility, and Transparency. The Arab World Geographer, 14(2), 116–121. Feuilherade, P. (2011, July). Mediawatch: Arab Spring Transforms North African’s Media Landscape. The Middle East Magazine, 28-29. Filiu, J. (2011). The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising. London: Hurst & Company. Gause, G. (2011, July/August). Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability. Foreign Affairs. Georgiou, M. (2010). Media and the City: Making Sense of Place. International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics, 6(3), 343–350. doi:10.1386/ mcp.6.3.343_3 Haseeb, K. (2012). The Arab Spring Revisited. Contemporary Arab Affairs, 5(2), 185–197. doi: 10.1080/17550912.2012.673384 Heydemann, S., & Leenders, R. (2011). Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the ‘Arab Awakening’. Globalizations, 8(5), 647–653. doi:10.1080/147 47731.2011.621274

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Hussain, M., & Howard, P. (2012). Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Information Technologies and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring. Paper prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association. San Diego, CA. Jahshan, P. (2011). The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Persistence of Orientalism. The Arab World Geographer, 14(2), 122–127. Karajah, S. (2007). Civil Society in the Arab World: The Missing Concept. The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, 9(2). Keating, J. (2011). From Tahrir Square to Wall Street: What can Occupy Wall Street learn from the activists who took down Hosni Mubarak? Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://www. foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/05/from_tahrir_square_to_wall_street?page=full Khanfar, W. (2011, October 7). Journalism and a world in transition: As the Arab spring demonstrates, news organizations must embrace new forms of people-centered media. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/07/james-cameron-memorial-lecture-al-jazeera

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Khondker, H. (2011). Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring. Globalizations, 8(5), 675–679. doi:10.1080/14747731.2011.621287 Lim, M. (2012). Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004–2011. The Journal of Communication, 62(2), 231–248. doi:10.1111/j.14602466.2012.01628.x Lynch, M. (2006). Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Aljazeera, and Middle East Politics Today. New York: Columbia University Press. Lynch, M. (2011). After Egypt: the Limits of the Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab States. Perspectives on Politics, 9, 301–310. doi:10.1017/S1537592711000910 Mamadouh, V. (2011). Forum on the 2011 Arab Spring- Introduction. The Arab World Geographer, 14(2), 111–115. Manrique, M., & Mikail, B. (2011). The Role Of New Media And Communication Technologies In Arab Transitions – Analysis. FRIDE, Policy Brief, Number 106, 1-5. Matar, D. (2012). Contextualization the Media and the Uprisings: A Return to History. Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication, 5(1), 75–79. doi:10.1163/187398612X624391 Miladi, N. (2011). New Media and the Arab Revolution: Citizen Reports and Social Activism. Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research, 4(2&3), 113–119. Morris, A. (1999). A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political and Intellectual Landmarks. Annual Review of Sociology, 25, 517–553. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.517 Napoli, P. (2007). Public Interest Media Activism and Advocacy as a Social Movement: A Review of the Literature. Report prepared for the Media, Arts and Culture Unit of the Ford Foundation. New York: Fordham University.

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Schattle, H. (2012). Globalization and Citizenship. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Seo, H., & Thorson, S. J. (2012). Networks of Networks: Changing Patterns in Country Bandwidth and Centrality in Global Information Infrastructure, 2002–2010. The Journal of Communication, 62(2), 345–358. doi:10.1111/j.14602466.2012.01631.x

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Stepanova, E. (2011). The Role of Information Communication Technologies in the Arab Spring: Implications beyond the Region. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, 159. Retrieved from http:// www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/ pepm_159.pdf Stiglitz, J. (2011). The Globalization Protest. Project Syndicate. Retrieved from http://www. project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-globalization-of-protest Stork, J. (2011). Three Decades of Human Rights Activism in the Middle East and North Africa: An Ambiguous Balance Sheet. In Social Movements, Mobilization, and Constitution in the Middle East and North Africa (pp. 83–106). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Tawil-Souri, H. (2012). It’s Still the Power of Place. Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication, 5(1), 86–95. doi:10.1163/187398612X624418 24

Arab Spring: The Arab Spring is a social and political phenomenon that occurs when Arab citizens rise up against the government and demand the collapse of the political authority. It is a concept used to decentralize the hegemony of the state and shift power to the people. It empowers the citizens to take matters into their own hands and make their own decisions and brought about a new perception to the Arab citizens as well as to the globe regarding the media, mass communication and new media social networks as well as the widespread dissemination of political information and showed how such dissemination can affect societies and politics. City Politics: City politics consist of a complex system that led to the transformation of a disease into an epidemic, which became evident in the Arab Spring. The city is a public space that plays a central role in giving power to the people and, as such, city politics is where political and civic changes must be made. Civil Society: Civil society gives voice to citizens, allows them to exercise power and contribute to the democratic process. It maintains

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the transparency of those in power politically and maintains good governance by promoting liberties, freedom and social justice as well as by increasing public accountability and legitimacy. Civil society in the Arab world has been achieved through cyberspace as such technology has been used to build extensive networks, create social capital, organize political action, reach the masses, build a community and activate collective movements for political change. It also provides a space for alternative voices, sources and opposition. Collective Energy: Collective energy is the political force behind revolutions that cause global transformations. This energy is shaped by citizens on the street and spread by activists in cyberspace. Arab citizens often, initially, organize their grassroots movements in cyberspace, which enhances the effectiveness of their movements when they are finally taken to the streets in the form of marches. Cyber Movements: Cyber movements require freedom and demand democracy in regard to when people engage in political participation in social and political movements via cyberspace. These movements focus on taking action on certain topics as well as informing the public about these topics. Global Solidarity: Global solidarity is a concept in which people, regardless of where they are from, who possess the same ideology form a collective identity through which they share ideas and collaborate in such a way that reflects their identity, ideology and interests in a certain place at a certain time. ICTs: Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are transmission platforms and mechanisms that influence and transform individual consciousnesses into a mass conscious-

ness. ICTs aim to facilitate societal and political changes by using information and communication technologies, which are difficult to control in non-democratic societies. These technologies allow citizens to become more aware of what is happening around them and demand that power be more transparent, open and efficient. New Politics: New politics is a movement that requires modernity, community and identity in order to illustrate the ideology that the members of social movements possess. These members collaborate with one another and contribute to activities via cyberspace. New Social Movements: Within new social movements collective actions occur in cyberspace, which becomes the main tool for the movement in regard to creating political hegemonies and encouraging the empowerment of citizens. This movement is a part of the civic landscape that empowers institutions and helps citizens participate and engage in public life through cyberspace. Street Politics: Street politics is a form of a space that leads to protests and marches in the streets. Street politics consist of demonstrations and marches during which citizens take to the street to demand social justice. The street has become a political symbol conceived as a space where new forms of social and political involvement and political development are created. Tahrir Square: The Tahrir, which means liberation in Arabic, Square in downtown Cairo became a symbol for the manifestation of democratic possibilities, freedom and granting power to the people, not merely in Arab regions, but throughout the world. It was within this square that the people of Egypt gathered for 18 days until the Mubarak regime fell in February 2011.

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Chapter 2

Social Media for Political Change:

The Activists, Governments, and Firms Triangle of Powers during the Arab Movement Mohamad Alkhouja University of Maryland – College Park, USA

ABSTRACT This chapter discusses the role of social media in the uprisings of the Arab world. It argues that the seemingly democratizing impact of online activism is not due to the inherent nature of social media as a tool for democracy but rather an outcome of the equilibrium of forces that shaped the use of social media platforms by all three main players. Activists, governments, and social media firms formed a triangle of powers that influenced the use of social media during the Arab movements. In a different context, the outcome of such power balance can arguably inhibit citizens’ rights and empower governments. To this end, the chapter first explores the use of social media platforms from the perspective of activists, governments, and social media firms, then presents a framework to understand the impact of all three in shaping the use of social media during the uprisings. The chapter then concludes that the projections of the role of social media on other movements in the world must not be made without understanding the underlying complexities and dynamics of these movements.

INTRODUCTION Social Media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were extensively employed during the Arab Movements by activists as an instrument in the battle against the authoritarian regimes and to bring democracy to the region. Online activism’s conspicuous role during the revolutions in

the Arab world and its impact on democratization has been a topic of debate. By some, Social Media was a supportive underpinning to activism during what was dubbed as the “Facebook Revolution”. This rhetoric is supported by researchers who argue that Social Media contributes to collective action, and consequently, to the fall of regimes (Iskander, 2011). It curbs the regimes’ leverage

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch002

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to silence and criminalize opposition (Masoud, 2011). Lynch (2011) highlights the Social Media contribution to activism and collective action. He articulates that Social Media bolsters activists coordinating actions by honing protesters’ hopes of success, hindering the states repression by increasing its costs, and publicizing the movements through diffusion of information. Another rhetoric, on the other hand, argues about the possible adverse outcomes of embracing online activism by stressing how it encourages shallow support of causes and minimal activism (Gladwell, 2010). This line of thought finds that Social Media can be exploited by regimes through surveillance and infiltration (Morozov, 2011) and that policies of Social Media firms can hamper activists’ efforts (Youmans & York, 2012). To better understand the role of Social Media platform is it worthwhile to explore its uses by activists, governments and Social Media firms and to look into the driving forces and needs that motivated their strategies, tactics, actions and reactions.

ACTIVISTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA: A PROACTIVE INNOVATIVE APPROACH Undermined as the children of the Internet (Serageldin, 2011, p.28), the youth in the Arab world embraced online activism as their doctrine for change during the Arab Movements. In Egypt, the explosion in Internet use was evident. Facebook’s one million users increase in one month is a clear indicator of users attraction to the Internet (Peterson, 2011). Citizens’ congruence with online activism during the Arab Movements roots to their needs and motivations in the first place. In their quest to topple the regimes and bring reforms to their region, activists generally relied on three main strategic objectives; Maintaining a certain level of security, influencing public opinion, and mobilizing protesters and the public. Activists’ tactics

and maneuvers originated from the evolvement of those motives. The Arab Movements provide an interesting set of cases in which the innovative and proactive use of Social Media by activists and dissidents is in accordance with these strategies. First, personal security and the need for survival from retaliation or repression of authoritarian regimes pushed activists to embrace online anonymity in Social Media as a vital practice in most of their activism. An example is the famous ‘‘We Are All Khaled Said’’ Facebook page that was created in June 2010. The creator of the page, Wael Ghonim, used a pseudonymous user instead of his real name. In answering Newsweek why he chose to do so, Wael explained that he is seeking anonymity because he is scared of the government (Giglio, 2011). Activists relied as well on Facebook’s feature of creating closed and secret groups that are unsearchable. This provided them with a safe and reliable environment to organize actions on ground. However, online anonymity has its adverse impact on activism. Youmans and York (2012) explain how it “has been used by some as a cover for harassment, fraud, and illegal activity. For example, a blogger known as ‘the Gay Girl in Damascus’ became a media source on protests in Syria and was later found to be a middle-aged American man living in Scotland” (Addley, 2011). Such incidents arguably harm the public image of the opposition by raising questions on its credibility. Second, dissidents need to mobilize protestors and push more people to streets in order to challenge the state’s authority and alter the status quo. To this goal, Social Media served as a strategic effectual tool for activists. According to Vila, Facebook’s largest impact was in the mobilization of protesters (2011). It helped connecting otherwise geographically separated groups (Peterson, 2011). Amidst coerced despotic autocracy, activists utilized the Networking capabilities of Social Media platforms to undermine the states’ leverage on ground and lest be imprisoned. Many authors described the movements during the Arab upris-

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ings as diffuse and horizontal and therefor, hard to break (Becket, 2011). As Khamis and Vaughn argue about the movements in Egypt: “One of the most striking aspects of the Egyptian uprising was its loose structure and lack of identifiable leaders. It was largely a grassroots, across the board” (2011). One can argue that the formlessness and lack of hierarchy of Social Media, seen as an arbitrary randomness, was in fact a reflection in the virtual space of the movements on the streets during the insurgencies. Hence, Social Media resemblance to the nature of movements echoing its diffusion was an asset to the cyber world. Third, influencing public and gaining support was of the utmost importance for activists. Not only does it serve to win the sympathy of the public en face of regimes’ accusations, but it also helps communicating hope of success and creating a sense of solidarity among dissidents. In Egypt for instance, as Giglio (2011, p. 16) explains about the Egyptian activist, Wael Ghonim: “Ghonim implored his Facebook fans to spread word of the protest to people on the ground, and he and other activists constantly coordinated efforts, combining online savvy with the street activism long practiced by the country’s democracy movements. Ghonim seemed to view the page both as a kind of central command and a rallying point—getting people past ‘the psychological barrier’.” Activists during the Arab uprisings used Social Media platform for Information access and dissemination. In Egypt for instance, the National Coalition for Change used an intertwined communication network that included Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to get the word out and sent text messages, such as “Tell your friends,” and “Look what is happening in Tunisia. This is how people change their country” (Baker, 2011). Another tactic involved building a sense of dissatisfaction and resentment among people by highlighting stories from victims of authorities’ atrocities and brutal crackdown. Casualties of battles, this line of reasoning goes, usually affect public opinion and can create public dissatisfaction (Gartner and Segura, 1998).

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Activists effectually utilized Social Media as an alternative source to mainstream media for news and other type of information. However, it is crucial not to over exaggerate Social Media’s capacity to influence public opinion. There are cases demonstrating that, although tangible, the ability of Social Media platforms to impact public opinion has its limits. In the case of Egypt for example, “The social media youth movements could not swing a “No” vote on the constitutional changes endorsed by the military, nor could they inspire much anti-military sentiment after the army arrested and tortured protesters on March 9.” (Peterson, 2011, P. 10). A possible explanation is the limited number of citizens in the Arab world who are exposed to the Internet and its various utilities. According to the Internet world stats, Internet users in the Middle East represent 33.5% of total population. This entails that the majority are still out of reach and thus, less susceptible to the influence of social media.3 Moreover, one should not conclude that online activism inherently leads to collective action and be the sole underpinning of social and political movements. Gladwell (2010), in a contrasting narrative, challenges this analysis by arguing that activism in the cyber space encourages what he calls ‘‘slacktivism,’’ or superficial, minimal effort in support of causes which restrains physical onground activism. Examples from Tunisia, Egypt and Syria shows that rather than solely depending on Social Media and online activism, activists combined their cyber activities with conventional outreach tactics on grounds in a fierce battle on both fronts (Lynch, 2011). Overall, activists and citizens of the Arab world demonstrated success in the effectual use of Social Media towards the imploding of regimes. Their proactive, agile and evolving methods and tactics on the Internet as well on the streets contributed to rebellions through circumventing state’s criminalization of opposition (Masoud, 2011) and supporting collective action against the repression atrocity of regime’s forces.

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GOVERNMENTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA: FROM NEUTRALIZATION TO EXPLOITATION The eruption of uprisings in the Arab world predictably formed the ultimate danger to the despotic autocratic regimes. The governments of iron fist are confronting existential threats from the ruled and oppressed. Thus, their main driving force can arguably be rooted in the “Survival” need. The main common objective was to eliminate the threat by all means and by fiercely exerting leverage on all fronts. The reactions of the Arab states towards threats from Social Media have been mixed (Youmans and York, 2012). Cases from Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Syria show that diverse tactics were used by different states in different times. However, by examining all of the strategies adopted against online activism, there is a clear sense of adaptation and evolution in responses of governments. This evolution is essentially reflected in three key phases: a) Neutralization, b) Disruption, and 3) Exploitation. Not all states have undergone all three phases identically and completely. Some uprising were significantly shorter than others (Egypt vs. Syria). Nonetheless, they all seem in line with the presented model. In general, tactics of the governments in the Arab world to combat online activism and its capacity to lead to insurgency fall into four main strategies: Censorship, surveillance and propaganda (Morozov, 2011). Governments in the Arab world obtained strong control over mainstream media in several countries mainly to keep lay people uninformed, and thus incapable of effectively participating in political controversies and rational debates (Abdel Rahman, 1985, 2002; Boyd, 1999; Mellor, 2007; Rugh, 2004). That gave space to activists to present Social media as an alternative source for information exchange, a viable venue for shared expression of dissent and a tool for democracy advocacy (Armbrust, 2007). The looser grip of governments on the virtual space and the diffused nature of Social Media contributed to the embracement of Internet by the public. A recent

poll conducted by Univeristy of Maryland in October, 2011 revealed that “there is a marked increase in the percentage of Arabs who identify the internet as their main source of international news with 20% saying that the internet is their primary source of international news, in contrast to 8% in 2009”. Lacking the dogma of savvy cyber intelligence and with no previous experience in dealing with major threats coming from the web, governments in the Arab world, initially, approached the tangible threat of social Media by neutralizing it. Governments of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya practiced Internet control but proved ineffectual as protesters were highly successful in circumventing Internet controls, using tools like the aforementioned Hotspot Shield and Tor, which maintains the anonymity of the user while online (York, 2011a; Daily Mail, 2011). In addition to Internet control, governments exercised censorship in an attempt to hinder information access and dissemination. Forced to adhere to governments, Service Providers blocked Internet and communications services (Peterson, 2011). Egyptian government shut off the Internet and mobile phone services for the entire country, resulting in a blackout that lasted almost one week (Ishani, 2011). Some argued that this strategy impacted online activism in Egypt: “More than half of the survey respondents stated that governmental restrictions had impeded their ability to use their mobiles and/or the Internet…. On the other hand, only around 20 percent reported having used the technologies in question to follow or share the news since the start of the uprising – a period which included at least four or five days when Internet and mobile access were not yet blocked. One possible explanation for this apparent contradiction is that interest in acquiring and sharing news via peer-to-peer media grew as the protests mounted, but once the crackdown on these media began, new entrants into the world of social media ran up against the government blockade and were unable to make effective use of these communications methods. If this hypothesis is correct, it is reasonable to assume that the 29

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overall usage of mobiles and social networks to gather and share information would have [been] substantially greater in the absence of governmental censorship.” (IBB Office of Research, 2011). On the other hand, an opposing rhetoric argues that censorship in the case of Egypt was ineffectual in hindering the rebellion. Amira Maaty of the National Endowment for Democracy argued that in the absence of the Internet, people were afraid there would be a massacre, and so they took to the streets in large numbers to protect each other (Maaty, 2011). Therefore, it could be reasoned that, in this particular case, the lack of information in the virtual world fueled activism in the real world, instead of halting it” (Khamis et Vaughn, 2011). In Libya, government’s censorship was similarly considered ineffectual due to the country’s low Internet access. Syria’s example demonstrates learning curve in approaching Social Media. According to Youmans and York (2012), “Syria’s leader Bashar al-Assad, perhaps recognizing the failed approaches of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, chose to unblock Facebook, Blogspot, and YouTube, which were blocked since 2007, in order to increase surveillance. This move was shrewd, showing how a government can use social media to repress”. In doing so, the Syrian authorities is a great example of government’s attempt to disrupt the use of Social Media by engaging state’s intelligence apparatus in the cyber battle instead of voiding it. Similar to Bahrain and Egypt, Syrian authorities arrested Facebook users and forced them to turn over sign-in information. By using networking technologies and advanced software to track activists and monitor Internet traffic, governments are more responsive and aware of the information flow on social networks. Another example of governments’ disruption is the attempt to discredit Social Media as a source of truth. Fake Facebook pages set up by the Syrian intelligence intended to create confusion about the veracity of reported information by media outlets thus putting into doubt their credibility. (Harkin et al, 2012, p.26)

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Evolving from the responsive centric approach of hindering online activism, governments take the proactive approach by exploiting Social Media against opposition. Tactics involves surveillance, infiltration and propaganda. However, governments leverage the power of Social Media to influence public opinion and utilize resources more effectively. Yomans and York provides an example on how governments can exploit community policing provisions of the Social Media platforms in hackism, surveillance and communicate propaganda. Serving as a state apparatus, the “Syrian Electronic Army” is a pro-regime group of hackers who’s attacks included celebrities, critics of the regime and education institutions: “Harvard University has had its website hacked in what appears to be a “sophisticated” Syrian-related attack” (BBC, 2011). Other examples illustrating how crowd-sourced actions were exploited by repressive regimes illustrate how regimes progressed and evolved in their use of Social Media as a tool to dampen opposition. In Iran, the government crowd-sourced the task of identifying the faces of protesters in images posted online (Athanasiadis, 2010). Similarly, regime supporters in Bahrain gathered information on online dissenters. Governments of the Middle East were able to exploit Social Media in their favor by following various tactics and strategies and learning new ways to insure their survival. Although not always successful, they succeeded, in some cases, in curbing opposition’s leverage in the cyber world.

SOCIAL MEDIA FIRMS: BUSINESSDRIVEN ALLIANCES Social Media firms, alike private corporations, are profit driven institutions. They are revenueseeker and follow the conventional definition of business success. This commercial logic drives their policies and shapes their architecture. In understanding the dynamics of Social Media use during the Arab Movements, it is crucial to include Social Media firms as a key actor in the

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battle influential to the use and impact of Social Media by activists and governments. The discourse of the role of social media firms during the Arab Movements seems to be overshadowed by the rhetoric on the role of Social Media itself. Indeed, the actions of Facebook, YouTube, Google and Twitter towards the uprisings in the Arab world reflect general leaning towards activists. In case of Egypt and in response for the Internet blackout by the government, Google and Twitter provided alternative methods of communication. The service was called “Speak-2-Tweet” and aimed to broadcast information using voice calls (BBC, 2011). There are other examples of the collaboration of Social Media firms with activists in Syria. However, Youmans & York highlight four case studies demonstrating “how prohibitions on anonymity and certain content types, and the use of community policing of offensive material and greater infiltration by government agents can lessen social media’s utility”. Another way to explore the possible impact of firms’ business-driven strategies comes from studying the evolving new features of Social Media platforms. The “filter bubble” (Pariser, 2011) illustrates how technology personalization pursued by many Social Media firms is narrowing what users can see. In an attempt to provide an enhanced better user experience, Social Media firms are pushing platforms to filter data and provide “more relevant” content that reflect users’ opinions and tastes. Pariser explains that content personalization creates a bubble world that traps users inside and hinder the exploration of broader perspectives from the “less relevant” world. The same phenomenon can happen to the use of social media as a platform for political dialogue during the Arab Movements. More and more users have surrounded themselves with networks of activists, friends, and communities who share their same opinions. People having polarizing opinions and ideologies have become increasingly distant and, later on, disconnected from each other. This resulted in a setting, within cyberspace, where users

cluster around the same opinions and ideologies and engage in conversations that would only entrench existing convictions. Such outcome would adversely impact a key role social media can play to nurture democracy in the Arab world, that is to foster dialogue and provide a venue which allows people to freely express their ideas and opinions and engage in the discourse on politics, economics and social issues. In light of these examples, one can conclude that the policies and actions of the Social Media firms regarding online activism during the Arab uprisings are driven by the single golden rule of “corporate self-interest”. This role takes shape in light of the governing laws, limitations and regulations of the incubating environment. In addition, these policies and regulations, although they seem mostly in congruence with online activism, reveal cases of mismatch in which the actions of firms adversely impacted activists’ efforts to employ Social Media as a democratizing tool.

DYNAMICS OF THE “ARAB SPRING”: THE TRIANGLE OF POWERS In previous sections, we examined how activists, governments and Social Media firms each were driven by their needs, goals and interests in their utilization of Social Media platforms during the Arab uprisings. While this reveals insights on what shaped the role of Social Media in the political battle, looking at all three at once reveals a broader picture of the dynamics that interplayed, and continue to do so, in defining the use of Social Media in these political movements. To this end, studying the interrelation among all three players is vital. Exploring the lines of power and interest that defines the relations during Arab Movements answers an important question: Why did Social Media perform, more or less, as a democratization tool in the hands of those who pursued change?

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The answer to this question lies within the specificities of the Arab context. Governments’ exertions to quell the opposition and their mechanisms in minimizing the influence of social media affected the activists and their choices to embrace specific Social Media features. For instance, the strong grip of the Arab regimes on mainstream media undermining, and sometimes preventing, institutional independence is arguably a contributing factor to the embracement of Social Media platforms as Information platforms. In the case of the Syrian uprising, due to state control on domestic media and the restriction of access of foreign media, most media outlets have grown increasingly dependent on Social Media and the User-Generated Content (UGC) (Harkin et al, 2012). Social media is no longer restricted to the virtual sphere, it is echoed on a wider scale in classical media platforms. This serves to show how policies and actions of the Arab states affects the importance of social media in influencing and shaping the rhetoric of traditional media outlets. One could argue that given a more transparent and independent mainstream media, the level of Social Media embracement by citizens of the Arab world, and consequently its role on influencing public opinion, would be notably narrower. Another influential factor is the governmentsfirms relation. The fact that all Social Media platforms that contributed to the emancipatory movements were owned by firms located outside the Middle East, and more specifically the US, explains the minimal leverage of these governments on the Social Media platforms and could justify the “pro democracy” position Social Media firms took during the uprisings. Being subject to US law, firms felt no threat in taking the side of the people. In addition, the government of the US seemed in favor for the change in the Middle East thus, arguably did not exercise pressure on Social Media firms against the support of activists. Had Social Media firms been located within the circle of leverage of the authoritarian regimes (within Arab world, an ally state, or a state in

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less congruence with freedom of speech), then it would be plausible to see the negative impact of the new triangle of powers on online activism and the democratizing capacity of Social Media. Social Media contributed to exporting movement to other parts of the world. Several movements in Europe erupted in 2011 demanding financial reforms. The “Occupy Wall Street” movement in the US is another example of activists’ use of Social Media to trigger movements in the 50 states nationwide (Caren, Gaby, 2011). A book prepared by staff at Yes! Magazine clearly links movements in the US with those in the Arab world (Van Gelder, 2011). Examining the similar movements in other parts of the world highlights the impact of government on social media firms. “A month on from the moment President Ben Ali fled Tunisia to Saudi Arabia, Chinese officials have cracked down on the spread of online dissent by apparently escalating internet censors. Searches for terms such as “Egypt” and “Jasmine revolution” - coined from the Tunisian revolt - have been blocked on Chinese micro-blogging sites such as Weibo (Channel4, 2011). Deciphering the uses of Social Media during the Arab uprisings leads to a conclusion; The arguably democratizing impact of online activism in the context of the Arab Movements is not due to the inherent nature of Social Media as a tool for democracy but rather an outcome of the equilibrium of forces that shaped the use of Social Media Platforms by all three main players during the uprisings. Activists, Governments and Social Media firms formed a triangle of powers that influenced the use of Social Media during the “Arab Spring” (Figure 1). While all three are driven by entrenched needs and motivations, their tactics and use of social media reflects interplaying and adaptation. As a result, the role of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube was continuously evolving during the uprisings. This mostly conspicuous, yet in cases covert, evolution helps explain the causalities for the generally positive role Social Media has played and continue to play in favor

 Social Media for Political Change

Figure 1. The “triangle of powers” framework within a specific context

of dissidents of the Arab World. It also argues that given different political, social or economical contexts, the outcome of the balance from all forces of the three players could be against the interest of the people where Social Media was less of a citizen’s ally and more of an instrument for tyranny in the hands of the despotic ruling regimes. This framework serves to emphasize the strong correlation between the political, social and economical contexts and the dynamics of the triangle of powers. By defining the borders of leverage, lines power and boundaries of each key player, the surrounding political climate and surrounding circumstances shape the role Social Media plays as a citizen’s weapon for democracy and civic engagement, a government tool or a fusion of both.

CONCLUSION The analysis of this chapter shows that the relatively positive and empowering role of Social Media towards citizens of the Arab states was not neces-

sarily due to a static, deep-rooted and permanent nature of Social Media. It was a consequence of gravitations and repulsions among several powers within a specific context. These powers are driven by their needs, incentives and motivations amidst the surrounding political and social climate. Therefore, in building on our knowledge about the Arab Movements, the projections of the role Social Media in other parts of the world must not be made without understanding the underlying complexities and dynamics of these movements; “We have to respect the complexity and multifaceted nature of revolutions, rather than resorting to categorizing them and labeling them in a manner that oversimplifies or undermines their true nature and special dynamics.” (Iskander, 2011). It is evident that Social Media, technology more broadly, played an influential role during the uprisings in the Arab world. It sped up the rhythm of the uprisings and the falling of regimes (Peterson, 2011). In other words, it brought speed to social and political change. Moreover, we argue that the key significant feature of the Arab uprisings is the unprecedented level of documentation

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of the movements on the citizen’s level. There is a huge amount of raw data produced by the activists of social movements as well as ordinary people undergoing them. Never before had the fields of social and political studies been gifted with such detailed information on such large scale. Social media in the case of the Arab Movements reveals new horizons and gives insights on the motivations, reasoning, complexities and driving forces behind social movements and political mobilizations on an entirely new and deeper level. That is not to say that social media is necessarily representative of the truth but that it provides an unexplored and rich source of knowledge that could inform on the competing rhetorical discourses on the Arab Movements.

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Athanasiadis, I. (2010, January 4). Iran uses Internet as tool against protesters. Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved from http://www.csmonitor. com/World/2010/0104/Iran- uses-Internet-astool-against-protesters Baker, A. (2011). How Egypt’s opposition got a more youthful mojo. Time. Retrieved March 10, 2011, from http://www.time.com/time/world/ article/0,8599,2045446,00.html BBC. (2011). Egypt protesters use voice tweets: Google and Twitter have launched a servicewhich circumvents the ban on net services in Egypt. Retrieved March 24, 2011, from http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/technology-12332850 Beckett, C. (2011). After Tunisia and Egypt: Towards a new typology of media and networked political change. POLIS, journalism and society think tank. Retrieved from http://www.charliebeckett.org/?p=4033 Bowman, W. (2011). Dictators and the Internet. Cairo Review of Global Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/ Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=34 Boyd, D. (1999). Broadcasting in the Arab World: A Survey of the Electronic Media in the Middle East (3rd ed.). Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press. Caren, N., & Gaby, S. (2011). Occupy Online: Facebook and the Spread of Occupy Wall Street. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network Channel 4. (2011, February 25). Arab revolt: social media and the people’s revolution. Retrieved from http://www.channel4.com/news/arab-revoltsocial-media-and-the-peoples-revolution Daily Mail. (2011). How the Internet refused to abandon Egypt: authorities take entire country offline. but hackers rally to get the message out. Retrieved March 24, 2011, from http://www. dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1351904/Egyptprotests-Internet-shut-hackers-messageout.html

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El Amrani, I. (2002). Finally Free: After a Long Wait, Free Internet Appears in Egypt. Cairo Times, 21. Gartner, S. S. (1998). War, casualties, and public opinion. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(3), 278. doi:10.1177/0022002798042003004 Giglio, M. (2011, January 30). The mysterious ‘anonymous’ behind Egypt’s revolt. Newsweek. Retrieved from http://www.newsweek. com/2011/01/30/el-shaheed-the-mysteriousanonymous-behind-egypt-s-revolt.html Giglio, M. (2011, February 21). The Facebook freedom fighter. Newsweek. Gladwell, M. (2010, October 4). Small change. The New Yorker. Retrieved from http://www. newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_ fact_gladwell Harb, Z. (2011). Arab Revolutions and the Social Media Effect. M/C, 14(2). Harkin, J., Anderson, K., Morgan, L., & Smith, B. (2012). Deciphering User-Generated Content in Transitional Societies: A Syria Coverage Case Study. Philadelphia, PA: Center for Global Communication Studies, University of Pennsylvania. IBB Office of Research. (2011). Research memorandum: Media consumption during the uprising in Egypt. Broadcasting Board of Governors. Retrieved March 10, 2011, from http://media. voanews.com/documents/Egypt_Flash_Final_ sans_attitudes_TOC.doc Internet World Stats. (2011). Internet Usage in the Middle East. Retrieved October 20, 2011 from http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm Ishani, M. (2011). The hopeful network. Foreign Policy. Retrieved March 24, 2011 http://www. foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/07/the_hopeful_network

Iskander, E. (2011). Connecting the national and the virtual: Can Facebook activism remain relevant after Egypt’s January 25 uprising? International Journal of Communication, 5, 1225–1237. Iyengar, S., Jackman, S., & Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement. (2004). Technology and politics: Incentives for youth participation. College Park, MD: CIRCLE. Khamis, S., & Vaughn, K. (2011). Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution: How Civic Engagement and Citizen Journalism Tilted the Balance. Arab Media and Society, (13). Lynch, M. (2011). After Egypt: The limits and promise of online challenges to the authoritarian Arab state. Perspectives on Politics, 9(2), 301–310. doi:10.1017/S1537592711000910 Maher, K. (2011). Interview with Frog Design. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=zulsoFZ-Kqs&feature=player_embedded Masoud, T. (2011). The Road to (and from) Liberation Square. Journal of Democracy, 22(3), 20–34. doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0038 Mellor, N. (2007). Modern Arab Journalism: Problems and Prospects. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press. doi:10.3366/edinburgh/9780748634101.001.0001 Morozov, E. (2011). The net delusion: The dark side of internet freedom. New York, NY: Public Affairs. Oghia, M.J., & Indelicato, H. (2011). Ruling the Arab Internet: An Analysis of Internet Ownership Trends of Six Arab Countries. Arab Media and Society, (13). Pariser, E. (2011). The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You. New York: The Penguin Press.

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Park, J., Ahny, B., Myungy, R., Limy, L., Lee, W., & Cha, M. (2011). Revolution 2.0 in Tunisia and Egypt: Reactions and sentiments in the online world. Barcelona, Spain: ICWSM-11. Pintak, L. (2008). The role of the media as watchdogs, agenda-setters and gate-keepers in Arab states. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School. Riley, D. (2005, April 29). Bahrain to force bloggers to register with Government. The Blog Herald. Retrieved from http://www.blogherald. com/2005/04/29/bahrain-to-forcebloggers-toregister-with-government/ Rugh, W. A. (2004). Arab mass media: Newspapers, radio, and television in Arab politics. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group. Telhami, S. (2011). Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey. College Park, MD: University of Maryland. Ungerleider, N. (2011). Egypt Now Blocking Al Jazeera Broadcasts to Much of Middle East. Fast Company. Retrieved from http://www.fastcompany.com/1722354/egypt-nilesat-aljazeera Van Gelder, S. (2011). This changes everything: Occupy Wall Street and the 99% movement. San Francisco, CA: Berett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. Vila, S. (2011). South By Southwest Arab Spring Panels put final nail in the Twitter Revolution coffin. Movements.org. Retrieved 18, 2011, from http://www.movements.org/blog/entry/southby-southwest-arab-spring-panels-put-final-nailinthe-twitter-revolut/ World Bank. (2010). World Bank Development Indicators. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank. org/sites/default/files/wdi-final.pdf York, J. (2011a). How are protestors in Egypt using social media? Retrieved March 10, 2011, from http://jilliancyork.com/2011/01/27/how-areprotestors-in-egypt-using-social-media/

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Youmans, W. (2011). After Egypt: Can Al Jazeera English Leverage its’ Moment’ into an American Audience?. Arab Media & Society, (13). Youmans, W., & York, J. (2012). Social Media and the Activist Toolkit: User Agreements, Corporate Interests, and the Information Infrastructure of Modern Social Movements. The Journal of Communication, (62): 315–329. doi:10.1111/j.14602466.2012.01636.x

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Arab Uprisings: The wave of revolutions and protests that emerged in the Arab world in late 2010. Citizen Journalism: Is journalism by citizens or people. This includes the collection and dissemination of news. Cyber Anonymity: The concept of hiding the personal identity in social media sites and the cyber world. Cyber Security: A field in information studies that focuses on concepts, standards and tools surrounding the protection and security of people, organizations and governments in the cyber world. Filter Bubble: An outcome of filtering user’s digital content feed to improve relevance to user’s interests resulting in isolating them from contrasting opinions and cultures. Online Activism: Is a type of activism that occurs in the virtual world and utilizes Internet technologies including social media. Social Media: The concept and tools of people interactions and exchange of information in the cyber world.

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Chapter 3

The Potential of Political Changes in the Information Age:

The Political Challenges Sphere of Saudi Arabia through Citizen Activism Anas Alahmed Indiana University – Bloomington, USA

ABSTRACT In non-democratic societies new media social networks have played a significant role in changing political and social positions, not necessarily through real life but, instead, through cyber life. This chapter examines how Saudi activists challenge the political authority and how Saudi citizens took advantage of publicity by demanding political change. All of this happened due to social networks and new media, which allowed citizens to mobilize information for the sake of transparency. This was a new phenomenon in Saudi Arabia. The current young generation of Saudis, who use the Internet and social networking sites, played a significant role in the public sphere by making use of the space available to them within cyberspace. This chapter discusses the potential of political information to flourish in Saudi Arabia. It examines how and why citizen activism in Saudi Arabia can be effective. The chapter also shows that social networking activities have the power to change political decisions and society.

INTRODUCTION The notion that citizens hold power in a society such as this one and sometimes become counterpowers to the government is critical, and it must be taken into consideration in order to understand how such activity has challenged the government, changed society, and shaped the public sphere. The example of Saudi Arabia with regard to

these new social movements becomes more vital and vigorous for political and social change in the country. The case studies provide significant evidence regarding how citizens initially challenged the government and demanded political and governmental reform. These advantages have changed many political decisions based on what society has stipulated. In fact, the case studies in this chapter illustrate the first citizen mobilization

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch003

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in the cyberspace environment and how citizens pressured the government and became a counterpower to authority. This chapter uses the example of Saudi Arabia as a case study, examining how Saudi Arabia has been affected by the work of new social movements through new media social networks and how the information age has affected politics there. While the success of these movements as they relate to society and political boundaries may be exaggerated, the example of Saudi Arabia here is to consider the challenges of these movements toward society and the potential of political and social changes. Thus, the two case studies regarding Saudi Arabia will be considered here as empirical examples of how social movements emerge through cyberspace, especially in a region that has no experience in civil society. Even though these movements have not taken advantage of transnational frames of movements, it is interesting to see how amateur societies practice democracy and establish a form of political participation. The first case study was done in 2009 when the first citizens took action via Citizens Against Corruption and held the government responsible by demanding accountability of the offenders. The second case study is the Saudi Women Spring, the movement that demanded that women have more rights and the ability to drive; this also addressed reforming the notion of guardianship. This movement demanded that the King of Saudi Arabia announce more political rights for women, allow them the right to vote in municipal elections, and select them to be a part of the Shura council. Two additional case studies are provided here, as well. These case studies have to do with the new youth movement that took place via cyberspace, and how the younger generations became more daring in their open critique of the government. The chapter ends by examining the Day of Rage, a result of the Arab Spring, and the government’s response to it. Hence, the new political activity that was formed through social movements activities transformed society and affected politics in the information age, which led the King to confess to 38

corruption and immediately call for reform based on what he had observed through new media social networking. This, in turn, caused the government to be embarrassed in the public sphere because citizens saw them as scandalous. Because Saudi Arabia has never before had institutions of civil society or social or political movements, I have chosen it as an example and case study to discuss online social and political movements. The nation still does not have any political parties other than the monarchy’s regime. Therefore, allowing citizens to share political and social decisions in Saudi Arabia represents a radical shift. Citizens decentralized both government power and the monopoly on information that the government held.

NEW MEDIA AND NEW POLITICS Today’s Saudi Arabian society, with the emergence of the cyberspace environment, has experienced a new form of social practice and political activities. It has applied a new phase of movement and civil society that did not previously exist. The new space through new media social networks allows citizens to aggregate, to elaborate, and discuss social, economic and even political situations in what amounts to a public space. Citizens have more confidence to talk about their demands and their problems. Citizens do not need the mainstream media in order to gain information, and they do not need to follow the news to express themselves; they have established their own forum of dialogue. They share news and even create it. Citizens find new spaces where they may share information, and these spaces are not under government control. But before discussing the actual reform events by examining the two case studies, it is important to look at the situation in Saudi Arabia and how civil society and social movements work through cyberspace. The culture of political mobilization in the Saudi Arabian society is new, and it appeared mostly after the emergence of new media social networks. The notion that the Internet activism

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“continues to play an integral part in new Arab citizen activism, and the diversity and complexity of online tactics and strategies cannot be seen as detached from a broader spectrum of intertwining and competing cultural, political, and social forces that are changing global life in unpredictable ways” (Rahimi, 2011, p. 163). In Saudi Arabia the interaction through the Internet shapes online petitions, develops public awareness into political and social activities, forms supporting protests, and offers citizens information; it has become a new form of politics in the age of information. It raises questions for the potential of political and social movements for changing action through spreading resources and information in order to garner support. It reflects the fact that activists can use new media tools to change society and can peacefully play significant roles against their government. It engages the political and cultural spectrums of society. This democratic aspect of the public sphere as a space where information is exchanged and opinions are debated between actors preparing to take responsibility for their stances is notable because it is devoted to virtual communities within the society. In this circulation, new media social networks became a place for politics more than entertainment since the feature of the Internet and social networks allow one citizen to communicate and interact with another to empower society and to mobilize political movements (McCaughey & Ayers, 2003). Now, the young Saudi generation has become involved in terms of political and social reformation through new media social networks. They have used the Internet to articulate their collective voice in public by using list serves, e-mail groups, websites, Facebook pages, Twitter, YouTube, smart phone applications such as What’s up and other social networks. Online activists use the Internet not only for interaction and communication but also for advertisements, Yahoo, and Google groups, which usually involve a group discussion or forums that include actual names and political positions. Forum discussions, for instance, have

been transformed from mainly being used in the “ivory tower” to an actual and practical world usage and, more positively, for political discourse. Twitter has become a public space for citizens to express themselves, reflect social and political problems, and move into dialogue between elites and ordinaries and sometimes between citizens and government officials or member from the royal family. Saudi Arabian youth and bloggers play a significant role in terms of using cyberspace for online activism and moving political and social acts into the realm of fact and authority that have challenged Saudi politics in the information age. The processes of exchange, deliberate discussion, critical discourse, and public dialogue mean that the Internet is easily accessible and available to all. Governments, organizations, and social movements use it to influence their audiences. Furthermore, this competition will increase democracy and expand pluralism. One of the most effective aspects of social and political activism in cyberspace is that this tool has not yet caused any fiscal harm or incited violence. Activists not only play political roles and exercise political power; they have also achieved the concept of citizenship. This conceptual change in the notion of online citizenship can create a new atmosphere of change in society and build new invisible spatial activities. This activity has unique challenges because it is difficult to find a leader for the organization and create a new phase of politics in the information age. Moreover, social and political activity through cyberspace transforms audiences from passive to active; active citizenship through the cyberspace environment creates an action rather than a counteraction through the practice of “netizens” as a venue for exercising active citizenship through cyberspace (Yu, 2006). In Saudi Arabia, just as it is in any nondemocratic society, the cyberactivism landscape diminished obscurantism, spread pluralism and encouraged the political engagement. Cyberactivists are basically an organized group of activists

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within a group that opposes some ideas and is therefore called a faction because substitutional tools and such political activity and citizens’ mobilization are not demagogic. In fact, it raises the awareness as well as consciousness among society. Contrarily, Kahn and Kellner (2006) argue that the Internet embodies and reconstructs the concept of citizenship and new forms of political activism that change politics in the information age. This whole process of exchanging information is a way to represent political and ideological power, which is for the purpose of democratic media activism that is potentially counter-hegemonic cultural and political practice (Carroll & Hackett, 2006). In the case of Saudi Arabia, this statement is true when the citizens started to critique the government, where they had a widespread consensus about corruption, for instance, and made the society have a better understanding and a desire to further seek the truth. This will help citizen activists through cyberspace in Saudi Arabia to achieve their goals. However, it is important to notice the fact that using social networks alone does not mean there will be an immediate impact and direct influence on society. The new media landscape, as we will see, is only a tool to integrate power, have alternative information among citizens, and to alter government and politics. Nonetheless, the power of new media social networks in Saudi Arabia is crucial due the expansion of information circulation and evaluation is new in the society and it is also, a new practice for cyber culture and cyber activity through the cyberspace environment. Interestingly enough, Saudi Arabians are, basically, practicing democracy without knowing the name for that process of interaction between people and government. Using technologies and the Internet for social and political activities is neither a unique task nor a new notion. In fact, transforming the usage of cyberspace into reality and interactivity has been effective in terms of social change. Nonetheless, not until 2006 or 2007 did social media networking become an active device for challenging political and social norms. In fact,

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social media became a sustainable dissention inside Saudi Arabia, not only because of information flow but also because citizens became more active and aggressive in demanding political changes. Regarding social media, Saudi citizens said that they could not protest, but they could retweet; they could not gather with groups of people and talk politics, but they could reach thousands of followers. Campaigns like those addressing women’s driving show what online organization can accomplish (MacFarquhar, 2011), as we will see in the case study. Saudi Arabia became one of the most active producers of Internet content in the Middle East. Since the beginning of 2010, the number of Saudi users has grown by 240%. Although there is no actual number regarding how many Twitter users there are in a state or how many tweets come from any specific country, in Saudi Arabia the number of tweets had grown 440% in 2010, compared to 95% worldwide according to Internet World Data. In Saudi Arabia, the Internet users totaled around 13 million or (49%) as of December 2011 and today (April, 2014) 41% of Internet users in Saudi Arabia are on Twitter, the highest rate in the world1. Additionally, there were more than 2,575,740 Facebook users as of August 31, 2010; while in December 2012, that number had increased to more than 5,852,520 or 22% (Internet World Data, 2012). As of August 2012, the number of Twitter users had reached 3 million, which made Saudis the fastest growing group on the social networking website Twitter with an increase that amounts to 3,000 percent (Alarabiya, 2012).

CIVIL SOCIETY IN SAUDI ARABIA It is important to know the civil society institutions and how the social movements work in a country that does not allow any civic life without the government’s permission or affiliation in order to understand the work of social movements and

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social networks altogether and how they challenge the government. Saudi Arabia is one of the six countries that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchies; the other countries include the United Arabs Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain, These countries have no civil society or civic movements, but there are some organizations that exist side-by-side with the governments, and that is a unique factor regarding the relationship between governments and citizens in the Gulf countries (Al-Qassemi, 2010). Saudi Arabia in particular has no experience with civil society, and there are no institutions for civil society at all; this is due to the political culture of the country. Menoret (2011) indicates that the political parties, trade unions, and demonstrations in Saudi Arabia are banned, and civil associations exist but find it difficult and precarious to act. However, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the emergence of social movement comes from the Islamist social movement that challenges the regime by using material resources, money, communications, facilities, and volunteers as the keys to social mobilization and the development of movements using specific frame, language, and cultural approaches. The success of a movement can be judged by the “transformations wrought in culture and consciousness, in collective selfdefinition and in the meanings that shape everyday life” (Okruhlik, 2004, p. 246). In Saudi Arabia, the dynamic of society, economics and governance is complex and nuanced. The governance in Saudi Arabia is not representative, not accountable and does not protect citizens’ rights, and the basic civil and political rights are absent. Practicing any civil society, public criticism, strikes, or joining political organizations and spreading antigovernment rhetoric are all considered crimes. According to Okruhlik (2010), the royal family not only rules the country politically, but it penetrates society through business deals in every economic sector, marriages into other families and tribes, controls all key political positions, and utilizes the symbols

and the vocabulary of religion to consolidate its power (p. 389). However, when activists emerge in Saudi Arabia, they ask for more accountability of every person in the country, including the ruling family. This new frame is a courageous one since citizens are challenging the political regime. There are some civic organizations, but they do not yet possess the power to effect society or government. The king of Saudi Arabia, after the War on Terror, has launched several projects, such as the National Dialogue Center (NDC), in attempt to engage citizens in social life. Still, these organizations are under government rule and are not considered part of an independent civil society. NDC meant to encourage dialogue amongst citizens, not between the government and its citizens. Some civic life, such as majalis, involves citizens gathering and having conversations and sometimes inviting intellectuals to informally talk to the citizen. In 2007, however, the government announced that any home gathering would require permission from the government so that the government could not only limit civic activism but also public participation (Okruhlik, 2010). As such, activists and citizens find cyberspace the only medium where they can have space. However, those involved in these movements encounter difficulties when they find themselves in “detention or sentenced to prison terms and forced to sign a statement agreeing to cease all forms of activism before being released. Because a large number of the civil society movements heads are appointed by the governments in the Gulf they cannot be classified as grassroots movements. There is still a long way to go before the Gulf monarchies have fully developed civil societies” (Al-Qassemi, 2010). Also, the political structures in the Arab world challenge the social movements where the absence of a “truly free press will there be a true civil society movement. On the other hand, independent civil activism also needs to be accepted socially in the Gulf before being recognized officially by the government. Perhaps the Gulf monarchies can learn from each other’s experience rather than

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implement a Western model of civic participation. One thing is for certain; the Gulf leaders can either embrace a slow and managed reform process or risk being surprised by the sudden popularity of a civil society activist” (ibid). Labor strikes were also a new phenomenon of social action in Saudi Arabia that introduced new social and political culture to the kingdom; employees from different departments of such larger-than-life companies as Saudi Airlines and the Saudi Telecom Company (STC) have gone on strike for days and, at times, weeks, due to widespread corruption, deteriorating employment conditions, and on-the-job discriminatory practices (Al-Quwaifili, 2012; Bsheer, 2012). These kinds of strikes were not only nonexistent before, but they were also prohibited, as was the case of protests and demonstrations. While the big picture that the practice of social movement and civil society is intricate, the coastal city Jeddah, for instance, has more institutions of civil society than the capital Riyadh (Al-Qassemi, 2010). On the other hand, Bundagji (2008) argues that Saudi civil societies are here to stay because human nature at its core is socially oriented and thrives to belong, to serve, to be appreciated and to be validated. It is true, according to Bundagji that the social movements in Saudi Arabian society do not follow the Western model, but it does not mean that these movements do not exist. The civil society involves commercial interests, humanitarian and charitable organizations, and some sports groups. The actual civil society organizations are Saudi Debate Society, RAISE Jeddah, Women Driving in Saudi Arabia, Save Corniche Jeddah, Every Saudi Stand Up, Million Votes for Reduced Prices, and Recycle Jeddah; and, all of these movements are “responsible groups working together, hand in hand to bridge socioeconomic and cultural divides that they have identified in their local communities.” The difference, however, between the two cases is that the list in the first question is legitimate and incorporated, while the list in the second question is made up of informal citizen-

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led initiatives that are operating from none other than Facebook. These movements, according to Bundagji, require support and recognition so that their work can continue. The weakness of civil society and the absence of a political party became a political culture for Saudi Arabia, which makes it more stable. The political stability came from a different strategy; the royal family marries the daughters of the most powerful tribes, which ensures that the tribes will remain loyal to the royal family. Also, tribes were used as military forces to stand with the regime and ruler family. The usage of religious discourse in politics makes the latter a strong tie to the Ibn Saud family. Religion has been manipulated in political discourses. In this case, Ibn Saud takes power from tribes’ support as well as religious Wahhabi clerics. However, not all Saudi citizens are devoted to the Royal family or have a connection or relationship with Ibn Saud. In fact, citizens in the Western and Eastern provinces are still not fully favored by AlSaud. The Hijazi in the West found that the Wahabbism is so much conservative and sometimes does not accept another sect and method of religious practice, since some of Hijazis are Sufis and not followers of the Wahhbi method of practicing religion. Shia on the Eastern provinces have been marginalized from society. Yet, the Shia in the East is a more critical issue than the Hijazi in the West because the latter have positioned themselves amidst the government, and some of them run the minister. The rest of the majority are Sunnis who do not have any historical tradition of mass political activity in Saudi Arabia.

POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN THE CYBERSPACE The absence of social institutions or a civic society in the Arab world and in Saudi Arabia, in particular, promotes the concepts of good governance. How will these new cyberspace-based movements establish themselves and become effective in Saudi

 The Potential of Political Changes in the Information Age

Arabia and affect politics in the information age? With new media social networks, it can be argued that the critical mass has reached the Middle East and is using citizens’ voices to address new challenges. The power of new social movements in Saudi Arabia has established a new political culture within its conservative society. Social movements through new media social networks transform individual consciousness into mass consciousness and facilitate societal change, and the process begins with the individual and successfully reaches mass awareness. It can be argued that in these social movements that are based on the cyberspace environment have challenged government and politics in the information age because citizens have become more engaged in society and allow political participation that would usually not appear in non-democratic society. These new social movements in network activities are part of the civic landscape and help citizens to participate and engage in public life. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the political level of social media efficiency through new media social networks helps democracy to become more powerful and more practical through social movement activities and allow societies to be more powerful and influential in establishing a desired civic life as will see in the example of Saudi Arabia as a case study. Since there are restrictions regarding the practice of social and political life in Saudi Arabia, citizens create their own civil society through new media social networks landscape. There are several social movements and political activities that exist, targeting the government directly, such as the National Campaign to Prevent Corruption and other social movements like the Campaign to Boycott the Municipal Election, because activists think the election is merely a spectacular theme and does not benefit society. Other progressive political movements demand that the government release opinion prisoners, while another young movement demands for a Constitutional Monarchy instead of an absolute monarchy regime. There is also the Human Rights movement based on

Facebook2 and this page has been removed and censored more than once. Other organizations and movements of this type also exist; among these are the Facebook and Twitter accounts dedicated to the women’s rights to drive in Saudi Arabia. Some other un-organized movements, such as the National Campaign to Boycott Almaraie (a dairy product) for increasing the price of milk, established their movements in cyberspace, as well, putting pressure on the company and spreading awareness to fellow-citizens. When the campaign launched, the dairy company reduced the price again since they had experienced pressure from the people, and there was a successful boycott of the product. All these movements show significant challenges to the government, and they are hugely successful in terms of making people aware of the political and social life in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, there are several political and social campaigns and dozens of pages demanding more proper life and social justice. Others blame some big corporations and, as a result, boycott their products, such as the case regarding the higher price of milk. When that campaign launched, the dairy company reduced their prices again because they felt the pressure from the people. Also, there are tens of videos that show how poorly corrupt government officials treat citizens. Two significant and yet power political movements that emerged through Facebook should be considered here. First, Toward a State of Right and Institutions3 an organization that demands for a modern state and equal rights as well as justice and constitutional reforms. More than 7,500 people have joined the group, mostly young students who have signed the statement of demands out of fear. The second group movement is also based on Facebook and is called No for Tuwaijri4, the supervisor of King Abdulla. In “No for Tuwaijri” page citizens in Saudi Arabia are demanding not only the political reform but also to have the King supervisor to be removed from power and political sphere because people think that he has caused several problems for the country. In fact, 43

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there were two pages regarding Tuwaijri, one calling for him to leave his political power position and the second page, demanding that he be held accountable for corruption and go to a jury trial. Even though these demands did not affect Tuwaijri, it is an important step that demonstrated citizens’ awareness with regard to social justice. They demanded reform, and they became brave enough to speak without any hesitation to sign a petition under their actual names. Also, with new media social networks, society functions as a watchdog, looking for officials and other government figures, asking them for their accountability and responsibility, and sending messages that citizens are watching them. The political prisoners in Saudi Arabia are estimated at around 10,000, according to human rights organizations (there is no official number on the actual mount of the prisoners – the government claims that there are only hundreds of prisoners and that they are mostly connected with Al-Qaida. Human rights activists believe that number is actually greater than 20,000, and they believe that these prisoners remain in prison for years without trials or charges. And, not all of those who are imprisoned have anything to do with Al-Qaida. Now the campaigns to release the prisoners are significant, since people are being collective and collaborative, which is of great disservice to the government. Thousands have joined the group called “Jailed until When” to discuss the issue and demand government release of prisoners5. On Twitter, the hash-tag to release these prisoners had gained increasing solidarity; when the government blocked the hash-tag, activists created a new one the next day. Also, there is more than one account on Twitter calling for the release of those who have been politically detained. One of these accounts in Twitter6 was created to document the political prisoners detained and to organize demonstrations to release the prisoners in different cities. In this account, there are more than 105 thousands followers with estimated active followers of this account range from 10,000 to 50,0007. 44

One civic organization that works toward releasing those who have been politically detained has directed great attention locally and internationally; this organization has brought a new concept into the Saudi society, which is the non-violent resistance movement. The Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA)8 became a new phenomenon on how mass solidarity will be integrated through Twitter. This movement in particular has impacted society on the issue of Saudi political detainees who have been in the jail for years without charges or trial. Activists talking about Saudi political detainees are relatively small in number but have formed a constant demonstration asking the government to release these detainees or to give them a fair and proper trial. The weekly ACPRA trial became a source of debate over time and ordinary people became more aware of the issue. In fact, the government has tried to portray all those who have been politically detained in a questionable light so that people will believe that they are not activists but rather terrorists or in support of terrorism. In the case of the ACPRA trial, the government allowed channel networks like Aljazeera and Sky news to cover the trial and its progress. The government media, especially newspapers, have also covered the trial. However, the coverage of the court suggests that trial is routine and is not a big deal. Also, this coverage makes the government look good regarding how it treats activists and allows media to cover the trial in a very transparent way. Moreover, the activists of ACPRA became internationally known, and that could embarrass the government. For instance, Mohammad Fahad al-Qahtani, the co-founder of ACPRA, was on the 2012 Foreign Policy top 100 global thinkers list. ACPRA has a Twitter account, and there are more than ten other accounts affiliated with this organization. There are 100,000 followers for each of these accounts. Yet, one of the most influential Twitter accounts in Saudi Arabia is Mujtahidd9 Saudi citizens called him Julian Assang and Saudi Wikileaks. Mujtahidd ridicules the royal family and has attracted more

 The Potential of Political Changes in the Information Age

than one million followers (as of December 2013). He provides his followers with massive amounts of information via a series of detailed posts about the alleged misdeeds of members of the extensive royal family. The writer accused one senior royal of bullying a judge into helping him perpetrate property fraud by forging documents, and he denounced another for stock market manipulation. His resources are highly confidential, and he tweets occasionally. In the beginning Mujtahidd devoted his account to talking about members from the royal family and how corrupt they are. Recently, Mujtahidd began as a political analyst and has done more than just investigative journalism and leaking information. Mujtahidd became a phenomenon and not just a mere individual Twitter user. High officials blame Twitter for spreading rumors. Religious clerics warn that such a discourse will bring about a disturbance, and they blame some Twitter activists for this, referring indirectly to Mujtahidd. A survey was issued to people who follow Mujtahidd; this survey asked whether they believe what he has said about the political situation in Saudi Arabia and whether they think it is true or not, and it asked whether they believe Mujtahidd or not, and if the news regarding the Royal family is true or not. More than 10,000 people responded to the survey. Of the respondents, 60% believe that what Mujtahidd said is true, and 67% said that what Mujtahidd is doing serves as a watchdog function for corruption that is related to the royal family.10 There are several promising Twitter accounts; one account in particular investigates the private property of the royal family members, which occupies the entire land of the kingdom while citizens can hardly find land enough to build homes. This account is devoted to the issue regarding the family’s occupancy of the most of the available land. This Twitter account provides pictures on the massive land occupation and maps that show where these lands are located and how it bothers the entire population11. Another account12 focuses

on poverty in Saudi Arabia and corruption of the Royal family and their wealth. However, it is not clear whether these kinds of Twitter accounts used by one individual or several people or some organization. Nevertheless, these Twitter accounts are merely examples on how citizens have begun to use this system to inform society and to make citizens aware of the political issues that affect them on a large scale. The following case studies are going to analyzed in depth with regard to the political transformation of the authority that was based on social movement activities through cyberspace. New media social networks allow more space and place for ordinary and elite citizens to express themselves and to find alternative ways to inform citizens and sometimes empower them. YouTube also became another space for citizens to express themselves, to show some corruptions through minutes-long video clips or make some videos related to the issues and publically post them to the site. Some videos are made specifically for YouTube, and people share these videos through Twitter, Facebook and smartphones. These new movements became a new phenomenon in Saudi Arabian society. These videos introduced a new political culture that is driven by young activists who release videos that address everything from issues regarding poverty and corruption to those regarding politicians and businessmen. However, due to the limited information available regarding this subject, this chapter focuses only on two prominent case studies that have affected the government on a large scale and have changed some government decisions. Likewise, there are several political and social campaigns and dozens of pages demanding more proper life and social justice for Saudi citizens. Also, there are dozens of videos showing corrupt people and how they treat the citizens. One group of young people made a film about the poverty in the country and another film about the high price of living accommodations and apartments.

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CASE STUDY Citizens against Corruption For the first time in modern Saudi Arabian history, since its establishment in 1932, citizens took action in order to hold the government responsible and accountable after people were killed in a flood. This event represented the first time that Saudi citizens took advantage of publicity to change political decisions and social attitudes towards the government. All of this mainly happened due to social networks and new media, which allowed citizens to mobilize information for the sake of transparency. In non-democratic societies, new media social networks have played a significant role in changing political and social positions, not necessarily through virtual life but instead through cyber life. This was a new phenomenon in Saudi Arabia. The current young generation of Saudis, who use the Internet and social networking sites, played a significant role in the public sphere by making use of place and space within cyberspace. Social movement, on the other hand, saw a great opportunity to begin a grassroots organization through cyberspace, collecting citizens’ interest to join the movement and engage in discussions via online platforms. In late November 2009, when a flood drowned the whole beach city of Jeddah (the second largest city in the kingdom), killing more than 1,500 people in Saudi Arabia and destroying hundreds of cars and homes, citizens and residents became activists; they critiqued and petitioned the government publically. That concept of government liability is a new phenomenon, new movement and courageous process in Saudi Arabia and has never existed before in this society. This event represented the first time that Saudi citizens took advantage of publicity to change political decisions and social attitudes towards the government. By using new media social networks, people in the cyberspace actively exchanged their thoughts to practically work toward reformation. These

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people talked, debated, and asked questions of social networks. In this case, the citizens did not wait until the next day to know exactly what had happened and why, nor did they wait to hear the government’s statement or read all details from newspapers; they were able to gather their own information from social networking sites. In fact, they did not need to wait for the mainstream media to tell them the story. They had already told the story. Immediately after the disaster, people videotaped the flood and put those videos onto YouTube. Thousands of citizens were able to see hundreds of videos through YouTube in mere hours. Others took pictures of flood victims or of inundated houses and uploaded them to Flickr. More interactivity, the public and a movement created a webpage on Facebook called “Citizens Against Corruption” called for an immediate investigation of who was responsible for that disaster, saying that he or she should be judged for his or her actions. Another Facebook group encouraged people to help the People’s Campaign to Save the City of Jeddah, which recognized the need to coordinate national efforts aimed at the rehabilitation of the damage that affected the population and the environment in this region. Subsequently, they launched a help mission for both the government and people who were killed by the flood. This campaign focuses on social issues like poverty by helping those affected both physically and emotionally. This includes volunteer work for people and the creation of a website through which the community can communicate. Tens of thousands of people registered and joined this group, and many more viewed it. The Monitor of Human Rights in Saudi Arabia established a group on Facebook, as well, blaming the government and publically calling for the government to accept its culpability. Thousands members joined the group just hours after the page was created. Most of their comments on the Facebook page use critical language, were directed at the head of the city, and asked for a substantial amount of money, as well as an official budget

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detailing where and how the money was spent. They asked for transparency and actively called for the government to take action. All of these social activities and movements were established in cyberspace through the use of social networking and new media. After cyberactivists spread their messages and showed people what had really happened, the King of Saudi Arabia changed his political discourse. The social media movement surrounding this flood illustrates how the new generation of Internet savvy young people in Saudi Arabia can utilize new media to deal with disaster, interact with one another, and the possible consequences of those actions. It was the first time in Saudi Arabian history that people took advantage of publicity in order to hold the government accountable for the disaster. All these processes came from social networking activities. This kind of activity constitutes a new electronic and technological movement in Saudi Arabia and changes its politics in the information age. This process of Internet activist campaigns demonstrates the social and political power of the human voice in a developing country, often considered a part of the Third World, and without democracy. This action institutes the value of shaping culture, changing society, and calling for government accountability. Moreover, this kind of change emphasizes the potential of cyberactivism. Even though this event was a virtual and convenient example, no other cyberactivist event has yet to really substantially impact the country. All of this happened due to social networks and new media, which allowed citizens to mobilize information for the sake of transparency. That was a big movement for Saudi politics in the information age, as it responded to citizens’ demands. The work of new social movements with intentions of using social media to affect the flow of information transformed society, which led the King to confess to corruption and immediately call for reform based on what he had observed through the new media social networking along with the

movements of activists through cyberspace who demanded not only reform but accountability for any corruption. The King of Saudi Arabia acknowledged corruption, saying it was a terrible shame to see what the flood had done to the city “as a non-development country, and as a poor one.” He gave one million Saudi Riyal ($267,000) for every person who was lost or who had died in the flood; the families of those lost were given the money13. This, in turn, caused the government embarrassment in the public sphere. A movement that was created through cyberspace successfully captured the government’s attention and prevented it from ignoring what was happening. Therefore, the movement that created the events that accrued through cyberspace actually affected society and politics on different levels. Since Saudi Arabia has never before had institutions of civil society or social or political movements and the nation still does not have any political parties besides the monarchy’s regime. Thus, allowing citizens to share political and social decisions in Saudi Arabia represents a major shift. In this case, citizens decentralized both government power and the monopoly on information the government holds. In response to the “Saudi Citizens Against Corruption,” a Facebook group and activist organization, I asked the initiative and the creator of the group, Abdullah Al Maliki, about the main reason for creating such a group and working as a cyberactivist. He responded by e-mail in an informal interview: As a person who believes in change, the Internet and social media networking is a fundamental resource for achieving change and aspiring political and social reformation. The consequence for your self-determination is helping you to understand the importance of change. After the flood, the Internet was a great occasion to spread our voices electorally. After using the social media networking, I realized the fact that the Internet has changed many people’s perceptions and conventions because the alternative of information has been valid and changed specifically conservative,

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close-minded societies, such as Saudi Arabia. This transference of information flow has cognitive examples. Moreover, I have seen how mainstream media has used the Internet primarily as a resource, and how the government leaks sensitive information onto the Internet to measure people’s responses. Social media networking has become a new weapon for change and for carrying bullets and these bullets are basically information and for moving the society into action and causing political and social upheaval. After the flood last year, the notion was raised about the importance of the popular campaign against ‘well-organized corruption’ that has spread everywhere. This campaign proposed to be a ‘media-watch’ investigation of corruption and its boundaries. The second goal was to measure the way people interact, from the campaign to their excitement and enthusiasm. After launching the campaign, more than 3,200 activists and supporters joined the group. Our study shows that 70% of these members are ready for action (Alahmed, 2011). However, according to Al Maliki, there are “pro-activists members and supporters for the movement. The main activists are well-known individuals and the rest are outside supporters who are attached to the group. Nevertheless, these individuals are extremely important for our encouragement.” Interestingly, the official name of the group is “The Resistance Campaign of Corruption” (RCC), which indicates that corruption exists and has affected society already, and that one should resist and fight corruption; the name has a strong impact. The statement of the campaign is based on the following government manifesto concerning the disaster, which indicates that the political and cultural schemes in Saudi Arabia, as well as the statement of this campaign and others are alike. They do not hold the government responsible; instead, they attribute the government’s action to the specific circumstances. However, despite criticizing the government and the tension between the government and the royal family, they

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say the problem is not the government itself but rather the corruption of individual government officials during that particular moment in history. The critics still have an optimistic and positive view of the government, partly because they are afraid or have insufficiently explored these issues. This aspect shows in both groups’ constitutions. The cyberspace groups are advocating based on the government’s manifesto, rather than on their own oppositional discourse. RCC, for instance, endorses the royal discourse and asserts that, as a group, they should work outside the purview of the royal family. Additionally, they argue the importance of patriotism in the amelioration of government corruption. RCC’s main goal is to make citizens aware of how significantly corruption affects Saudi society, whether the corruption comes from the government or not. Its aim is for the government to take a stance against corruption and activate oversight functions. They also work to follow the news and circulate breaking stories in the public as a way of creating transparency and to track the royal order of finding and paying compensations to those affected by the disaster. The webpage14 became a means of proving that corruption existed, through video or picture evidence. It became a public sphere for citizens discussing any event regarding corruption. The usage of the language is very critical and it is out of fear. Later, the King announced an office for anti-corruption commission that reported any corruption in government work to the King. The establishment of this office came after the hearing of citizens’ voices through cyberspace and the new social movement. Two years later, in March 2011, the King launched the National Anti-corruption Commission (Nazaha)15 to become an official institution to function as a watchdog with regard to and to provide reports on the matter. It is important to note that the commission was an outcome of citizens’ pressure in demanding reforms and accountability pertaining to the corruption.

 The Potential of Political Changes in the Information Age

SAUDI WOMEN SPRING Several feminist movements in Saudi Arabia have appeared recently throughout the cyberspace landscape. In Saudi Arabia, in particular, feminist movements have expected the range of political inclusion and have done so through online advocacy movements and awareness campaigns (Hussain & Howard 2012). Feminist movements in Saudi Arabia not only argued about Islamic clerics who ban women from driving, but they also spoke to the political authority, directly arguing that the King should order this decision not the clerics (Chraibi, 2011). One feminist movement campaign, “No to the Oppression of Women,” was launched in 2008 and has gotten a great deal of attention (Muravchik, 2009). Another feminist movement announced a campaign via Facebook tilted “My Guardian Knows What’s Better For Me” to denounce the guardianship among Saudi females, as they think this is no longer acceptable. If it is ultimately deemed necessary still, the group believes that it should be replaced by another interpretation of guardianship that does not prevent women from any movement and work. These kinds of activities are designed to promote awareness, more or less, especially for women; they are designed to allow women to know what their rights are and not to use the guardianship against women. It was responding to not only to the political authority but also to the social mentality where men are prominent in the conservative society. These movements essentially constructed a new frame of social movements that only appeared in cyberspace. Saudi Women Spring responded to the Arab Spring by demanding that women drive; this was done via a Facebook page called “Saudi Women Spring.” Thousands joined the campaign and signed the petition for women to drive and to have more political right.16 Another page argued for women to know their rights17. Also, more than 20,000 users follow women2drive on Twitter18. This movement called for a day for women to

drive, and they held a certain day for women to drive on the streets. However, few women actually went to the road to drive. Some of them were arrested and then released after the King called the jury to release all of them. Most importantly, this movement has taken more attention from Western media and from feminists who joined the movement to encourage them and spread the words. The page was created in May 2011. They called for women to drive the following June, and, in September, the King announced that women had the right to vote in the upcoming municipal election, and, moreover, the Saudi women will join the parliament or Shura council, which has been exclusive to men, as women were considered merely consulates. Therefore, it could be argued that if women had not been called to drive or if more of them had gone to do it, the King may not have announced the right of women to vote and to have them under Shura council. The effect of the feminist movement was actually a success, and the effectiveness of new media social networks was observed. However, some ask, “Is this a significant advancement for Saudi women’s rights, or just another instance of the kingdom’s ‘two steps forward, one step back’ reform policy?” (Teitelbaum, 2011). When scholars and journalists talked about the social reform, especially that regarding women, they failed to mention how that reform might change the social or political situation. Although women will introduce Majlis AlShura or Consultative Council in 2014, they forgot to mention how men did in the past or how Shura is really a dysfunctional political association that possesses no real power. Shura is just a decorative means of allowing the autocrats and the elite to believe they hold power. Members of the Shura are manipulated from their positions. For instance, the President of the University abandoned his position when he was offered a place on Shura; this manipulation satisfies the elite who are looking for a symbol of power and the government that is looking for loyalty among the elite.

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Also, the Shura Council is a kind of political bribe, because when the government sees someone from elites who may stand against it who is an activist and is demanding reform, they put him into Shura so he will become a pro-government. Academics have been promoted, so that they may raise their monthly wages and attend conferences and workshops all year round government-funded. Some workshops take months, and most of them (if not all) are in the United States, Canada or Europe. These kinds of promotions keep the elite silent. The government treats them differently on occasion, however, and sometimes arrest one of them as a message to the other elites that says, “If you step out of line, you will be next.” With a luxurious life and prosperous living, a lack of political struggle and the absence of cultural demands, elites will remain silent.

The Youth Movements Saudi youth have created their new identity through cyberspace; they express themselves through the social networks, using these technological platforms for political activity as a new form of politics in the information age. Youth has played an outsized role in driving new politics’ embodiment of new competencies of youth aggregation in order to make political change (Lynch, 2011) after years of marginalization. Saudi Arabia is alienating and estranging its youth while civil society is struggling to be born, and the state is doing its best to keep it under control, yet the youth rely on technologies of globalization to create a sense of transnational identity and to search for freedom beyond the kingdom borders. Thus, “the nature of the new media and the vulnerability of the official narrative underlying the regime make such an attempt impossible. Yet, socio-cultural heterogeneity is central to the self-understanding of Saudi Arabia’s new generation” (Yamani, 2011, p. 113-114). And, more importantly, they are seeking their identities through cyberspace so they do have more spaces to create their own

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identity among themselves. Small marches and demonstrations around the kingdom from time to time not only come from the unemployed demanding jobs, but they also come from students who demand reforms regarding their universities. Although these demonstrations are small, they are enough to capture the attention of others and to send messages to the government. These demonstrations convey that the people have a voice and that their collective voice may become louder with time. These kinds of movements make the government nervous, and occasionally things get out of control and demonstrators are arrested. Between things like the demonstrations they plan and the petitions they pass around, the youth have shown themselves to engage more in politics. One Youth Petition from March 2012, asked the government to treat citizens well, and the youth said that they would no longer accept any manipulation from the government or religious clerics. In their petition, they identified themselves as educated youth, who represent most of the youth in the Arabian Peninsula. The Youth Petition’s demands are primarily of an economic nature; they want unemployment problems to be alleviated and the government to mandate standard working wages so that they will be no less than $1860 per month for anyone with a bachelor’s degree. Additionally, they want immediate solutions to living accommodation problems, either by the government providing homes to citizens or supporting them financially since they do not have sufficient budgets. They want support for youth projects and young businessmen, and the government must reconsider the costs of telecommunications and electricity services. Politically, the youth demand release of all political prisoners, and they require that the government cease arresting citizens without subsequently providing them proper trials and spying on citizens and declaring them traitors. They require reformation of the police system, so that it will serve to protect citizens and not to terrorize them. They want the judicial system to be reformed and all citizens to

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be independent from political authority. And, they want to prevent royal family members from being treated like royalty; instead, they should be treated like any other citizen. They want government budget transparency and accountability. The Youth Petition also demands more freedom of expression, established institutions of civil society, education reformation, and serious solutions for crime. Since the Youth Petition was released, thousands have signed and agreed that this petition, in particular, has no leaders or elites, as it was released through new media19. Almost ten thousand signature the petition received although the petition’s website is blocked in Saudi Arabia. Similar to the Youth Petition demands, another Youth Statement20 demands for establishing a new dialogue between government and citizens in direct way, where others are respected, preventing the use of political power for exclusion of the others21. These petitions introduce a new political culture of Saudi youth, asking the government in a very informal way by writing down key points and making some key demands. This petition empowers citizens, and their voices are heard, although there may be no answer from the government. The issue here is that citizens delivered the message to the government peacefully and in a very civilized way. The petition was on behalf of both genders and asked for equality and social justice. Therefore, under repressive governments, where freedom is dismissed, a social movement in cyberspace allows society to take a deep breath after choking. In the absence of political, cultural, and social institutions, combined with government devotion intended to isolate this comprehensiveness and the prevalence of conservative ideology, are factors working against cyberactivism and its success, because the culture is frightened and pragmatic. In the example of Saudi Arabia where the culture of dialogue is lacking among both conservatives and liberals, these cyberactivist movements in new media social networks have led to a dialogue, not merely with the government but also with all ideological parties.

The Day of Rage and Counter-Revolution The political reflections on the recent Arab revolution occurred in Saudi Arabia on different levels, politically and socially. The first reflection was when Internet activists declared March 11th, 2011 to be “a Day of Rage,” demanding the government to be more attentive to political and social development, allow more freedom, and create more employment opportunities. Riyadh views the Arab Spring as the greatest threat; and, as such, they are frightened by the prospect of political transformation and are trying hard to crush democratic insurgencies (Jones, 2011). Moreover, “an embryonic Saudi protest movement was snuffed out by a combination of threats and massive financial aid.” The kingdom, thus, tries to manage slow change that does not undermine the regime (Teitelbaum, 2011). Even though the day did not happen, it is significant to know how this movement called for demonstration in Saudi Arabia through cyberspace, how the government responded, and why the “the Day of Rage” failed. The government took notice and prepared a great deal of security forces the night before. Statements were delivered from the government through the mainstream media calling for people not to go out on that day. Thus, even though there was not any actual and physical demonstration, by sending messages to the people through new media social networks and encouraging people to register for the demonstration, they created an actual event in cyber-life. Both the government and the people recognize the importance and effectiveness of new media social networks. The government, also, used both mainstream media as well as new media to warn citizens to not participate in the protest call. The so-called “Day of Rage” did not require any particular participation from citizens, although the government took the day very seriously and called its citizens to stay home or face punishment. So, there was no observable demonstration that

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took place on that day, as the government was successful in keeping demonstrators at bay. The Interior Ministry sent a strong and threatening message to citizens, telling them that if they went out to demonstrate they were going to be arrested. Further, potential demonstrators were told that there would be no forgiveness for anyone who participated in the demonstration. This statement followed a religious fatwa from the senior clerics who not only condemned the demonstration and its goals but also rooted that the demonstration was not a part of Islam. Most mosques, during the Friday prayer, denounced the call to demonstrate, providing the authorities and the religious clerics a statement, which declared that the demonstration was Fitna or discord. And, thus, the authority exercised its right to not tolerate protests. Moreover, people saw troops and police everywhere in the capital and major cities on Thursday March 10th, 2011, the day before the Day of Rage. One week later, the King of Saudi Arabia thanked his citizens for not answering the call for demonstration. Yet, the government made some changes and financial investments to improve social and economic services. Also, the King announced double wages and awarded some citizens money for not being involved in protests that day; the award was for every government employee as well as students. This change was a response for the Day of Rage that never happened. In addition, the policy of state under these circumstances is that the King provides money and other financial aids to support social and other economic services and welfare package. That includes two months of salary to all government employees, students and civil servants, and equals about $120 billion. In the Gulf Countries and in Saudi Arabia, the response of the government with regard to policy reform is to distribute cash to its citizens, and offering jobs to the mostly-young unemployed. However, this reform is not considered a big step but rather a means of tranquility that will not stand for long. Moreover, the government wants to take advantage of reforms or changes that are based on people’s demands. In fact, when people make 52

demands, the government ignores them because it feels that responding to their demands would give the people power that would ultimately take power away from the government itself. So, the government establishes and remains stubborn in its position. The question is why did the Day of Rage fail? Even though activists made some Facebook pages to call for demonstration, the contracture of Saudi Arabian society and politics that is a lack of civil society, social movement, lack of dissent, absence of political party, lack of people mobilization, and weak nationalism with sectarian tension; all of these factors meant failure with regard to the Day of Rage. Moreover, the wealth and luxurious life and prosperous living among Saudi citizens as is stated before creates a lack of motivation among citizens where reform is concerned. Even though poverty exists, poor people cannot rely on other citizens, and, still, citizens trust the royal family and sometimes the government. And, even if they do not trust them, they do not rely on any other external or even internal means of alternative government, as they hold out hope for their government and see it as the best of the worst. The mentality among Saudi citizens is that the people who demand reform are Shia (another Islamic sect beside Sunni), as was the case of the Day of Rage, and these Shia are loyalists to Iran. They are sometimes also seen as Muslim Brotherhood ideologists who also stand with Iran. If they are not associated with any of these groups, then they will be Sufism who destroyed pure Islam, or secularists who want to destroy the morality of Islam. The last group has allegiance to America, as they spy on their own society as a means of destroying it. Moreover, all the mainstream media condemned the political reform in the country, blaming “outsiders” and “foreigners” and “others” for effectively undoing the stability of Saudi Arabia. These political activities, as the media claim, are not only prohibited by the constitution, but they are also religious taboos, and they are “unusual” to Saudi Arabian tradition and culture.

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Therefore, “the March 11th Day of Rage did not materialize,” and the authorities did everything they could to ensure that it would not happen. The technique was the government’s use of a combination of “tribal connections, an appeal to religious legitimacy, and overwhelming deployment of force on the streets” (Teitelbaum, 2011, p. 81-82). Also, the media have been used to warn the citizens away from any participation or involvement. Thus, the combination of religious discourse, political statement, tribes’ connections, and mainstream media control all work to support political authority. Mainstream media, religious clerics, and tribes’ influence and stand with the government. All of these tools of influence became moderators and coordinators between citizens and government. In other words, the government does not speak to the activist or other citizens directly; instead, they use these tools as connections between the citizens and the government. Furthermore, the lack of political party, absence of civil society institutions and lack of political culture make the mobilization difficult if not impossible. With all regards to the impact of political information flow, it is not sufficient to have mobilization without actual social movement or solid civil society and other social institutions. Thus, “the euphoria surrounding the new communication technology, social networking, and virtual connectivity proved its limitations in the Saudi context” (Al-Rasheed, 2011; p. 519). Therefore, the Arab Spring will not easily affect Saudi Arabia, for several reasons; the government pays money to its citizens, security forces are strong deterrents, the oppositions are divided and weak, and threatening statements to any demonstration or political activities strongly influence Saudi society and citizens (Gause III, 2011). Moreover, in times of crisis, like that which has been associated with the event of Saudi Arabia, the regime basically uses a strategic way to reinvigorate sectarian discourse against the Shia in order to renew the loyalty of the Sunni majority (Al-Rasheed, 2011). Also, the grand Mufti made fatwa to claim that Iran and Shias altogether are

traitors (Abna News, 2012). Thus, it was a use of politics to manipulate society through religious rhetoric, schools and institutions, political statements, and the usage of new and mainstream media. In this case, the issue of Shia became more significant in the Arab Spring, and it has been used in Saudi politics since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Most Gulf Organizations such as Gulf Cooperation Council and Peninsula Shield Force PSF were created in the 1980s as a response to Iranian revolution. Shia minorities are rejected, based on Wahhabi ideology. As such, any demands of reform should not be answered, as the government states, because these demands came from Shia and Iran intervention (Teitelbaum, 2011). Even though the media propaganda states that Shia is loyal to Iran, there is no evidence that Iran has any intervention in Gulf uprisings (Cockburn, 2011). Hence, as is the case with other acts of protest, given Saudi repression, these constitute milestones but nonetheless serve little by way of compelling the Saudi regime to attend to any of the Saudi citizens’ demands. If anything, the regime banks on such regional divisions, in addition to religious, sectarian, ideological, social, class, and political differences to prevent any form of national solidarity from any emerging (Bsheer, 2012). Moreover, the government uses the new media and social networks platforms to manipulate society by creating pages and other hash tags to spread rumors about the external agents and promote the government propaganda against the reform activities (Al-Rasheed, 2011). For instance, counter-opposition in cyberspace created web pages such as Kulna Al Saud: We are All Al Saud (the last name of royal family). Other groups launched pages to support the idea of not going to the Day of Rage. More than one hundred thousand people joined the page supporting the government. Interestingly enough, in Saudi Arabia, the social conflict became well known through the Internet. When activists created the page for the “Day of Rage,” thousands joined the group and supported it, but no one actually participated or went to the demonstrations due to their fear and 53

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government warning. These conflicting activities moved the dialogue from real-life to cyber-life and created a new concept of democracy because people had information and discussed it through the Internet. This conflict also reflects the political environment in Saudi Arabian society where those who are for and against government set together in cyberspace but not in actual, tangible space. Therefore, the government uses sectarianism as a means of counter-revolution; it responds to the Arab Spring as a sectarian issue as it is politics in Saudi Arabia in the information age.

CONCLUSION No matter how much these movements change society in actual terms or challenge the political power, the fact that such movements exist and that there are demands for reform and that citizens are speaking out for more political changes is the first step in changing society. When citizens start to criticize the government and start to speak out in the public sphere, it is a good sign for these movements because it often means that actual changes will follow. Also, in spite of the movements’ weaknesses, there have been some changes at the political level, and the government has seen the influence of these movements among societies. Even though these political movements exist there is not much activity on these pages because the pages were blocked and some of activists have been arrested, which put any social and political movement under scrutiny. Most of the activists and users of these pages are young and well educated. Some of them posted videos and short movies about poverty and the high rate of unemployment; these were shared on YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and through smart phones. Yet, the new media social networks environment has been used to create networks of dissidents and social movements where they have no freedom, civic institutions or organization. While social movements in Saudi Arabia exist, the political movements are hard to find and are 54

sometimes impossible to practice due to the danger of playing politics in Saudi Arabia. While there are some social or cultural movements, the political movements are scarcely visible, due to the political boundaries as well as the lack of political structures in Saudi Arabian society. This chapter investigates the effectiveness of new social movements through cyberspace and political information flow in Saudi Arabia and how this activity has challenged the government, changed society, and shaped the public sphere. It illustrates that a new generation is using new media social networks not for entertainment purposes but for political and social activities. It focuses case studies that were recognized as the first success of new media and social networks. This study provided significant evidence regarding how citizens initially took advantage of the new media and social networks, demanding governmental reforms. In fact, this study illustrated the first citizens’ movement activities and shows who mobilizes the information among citizens in the democratic process. Because using the Internet in Saudi Arabia is new, occurring mostly in the last five years, that the notion of cyberactivism in Saudi Arabia and the work of social movement through cyberspace are novel and full of potential. The voice of cyberactivism, however, has been effective in both major and minor ways. This voice has led the King of Saudi Arabia to change his discourse and acknowledge corruption, which he had never done before. However, despite the many positives to cyberactivism, the movement is very slow, and society has not experienced significant change. Albeit there was some success via social movement through cyberspace, there are several aspects of that kind of movement that failed for rational reasons. First, there is not a group or organization that develops and coordinates social networking activities. Most cyberactivists work individually from their homes. There is no strategy or longterm timetable, and movements and organization are difficult. Second, even though those online activities are useful, it does not seem that they

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have enough momentum to change society but only to make society aware. Third, there are no unanimous goals for online activism and some activists are not even aware that they are engaging in reform activity. For these reasons, new social movements could drive society into chaos, and their activities will not be powerful enough for social and political change because each movement works alone. Since there is a lack of civic institutions in Saudi Arabia, each movement has a different attitude and set of priorities, and each movement lacks necessary experience. Every person and every group works individually. Each person might have major objectives but will practice them differently, making their work detectable but fractured. Nevertheless, political and social reform groups have never had a chance to voice their views, since classical and traditional media tools have never allowed them to do so. Even though new media and social networking activities in Saudi Arabia are lacking regulation and systemization, new social movement is mushrooming and growing ever stronger and more popular. Cyberactivism is not primarily an elite activity carried out by the educated middle or upper class. In fact, young people, the beneficiaries of any change, are the ones to carry out and insist upon and demand change. They use the Internet more often, according to Facebook’s activity participation website. Some of them have higher education and have often studied abroad. One criteria of these movements is that the young generation of Saudi communicate with their language; their voices are local and in the Arabic language. In fact, they do not target the Western media per se and try to remain an independent movement. The new social activists through the cyberspace environment in Saudi Arabia are not members of an actual social movement but rather are engaged in independent activities. Here, the activists are described as members of an independent, social movement network who are trying to change their society through a mass endeavor. Imagining this movement as a social one rather than as an individual movement is imprecise, due to the fact a

social movement could not happen because of the traditional political culture, the composition of the society, and the fact that the government does not legitimize it. Therefore, the conceptualization of a social movement in Saudi Arabia does not apply in this specific study. The work of cyberactivists aims to create a tolerant society by establishing a new cyberculture and contributing to political participation, which is not otherwise available in such a society. This participation and contribution is a dimension of the democratic practice of free expression in shaping culture. Consequently, one takes a look at the results, which are not the most important aspects since scrutinizing the vital, virtual expression is the first step to pluralism. In effect, all of these campaigns try to move away from government enforcement and try as much as possible to not be involved politically due to the sensitive nature of political matters, which gives the political culture in Saudi Arabian society a special, uncritical position. Therefore, whatever happens regarding the political information flow and alternative source in the information age is not sufficient if it does not follow any organization and movement that is actually organized and can become a real counter-power to the state.

REFERENCES Abna News Agency. (2012). Saudi Grand Mufti Blames Iran for Unrest Among Shia. Retrieved from http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&Id=368041 Al-Qassemi, S. (2010, September-October). The Civil Society Movement in the Arab Gulf States. Aafaq Al-Mustaqbal Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sultan-sooudalqassemi/units-of-the-civil-societ_b_720583. html Al-Quwaifili, I. (2012, January 16). Saudi Labor Strikes: Rebirth of a Suppressed Tradition. English Al Akhbar. Retrieved from http://english.alakhbar.com/content/saudi-labor-strikes-rebirthsuppressed-tradition 55

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Al-Rasheed, M. (2011). Sectarianism as CounterRevolution: Saudi Responses to the Arab Spring. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 11(3), 513–526. doi:10.1111/j.1754-9469.2011.01129.x doi:10.1111/j.1754-9469.2011.01129.x

Gause, F. G., III. (2011, March 16). Rageless in Riyadh: Why the Al Saud Dynasty Will Remain. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67660/f-gregory-gauseiii/rageless-in-riyadh

Alahmed, A. (2011). Cyberactivism and the challenges of social and political change: The case of Saudi Arabia. Paper presented at Social Media and Communication Symposium. Rochester, NY.

Hussain & Howard. (2012). Democracy’s Forth Wave? Information Technologies and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring. Paper prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association Conference. San Diego, CA.

Alarabiya English. (2012). Riyadh the most active Twitter city in the Middle East. Retrieved from http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/08/02/230037.html Bsheer, R. (2012, April 2). Political Imaginaries in Saudi Arabia: Revolutionaries without a revolution. Jadaliyya Magazine. Retrieved from http:// www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4896/politicalimaginaries-in-saudi-arabia_revolutionar Bundagji, F. (2008). Future of Saudi Civil Society Associations. Arab News. Retrieved December 6, 2011from http://archive.arabnews.com/?pag e=7§ion=0&article=108552&d=4&m=4 &y=2008 Carroll, W., & Hackett, R. (2006). Democratic media activism through the lens of social movement theory. Media Culture & Society, 28, 83–104. doi:10.1177/0163443706059289 doi:10.1177/0163443706059289 Chraibi, K. (2011). The King, the Mufti & the Facebook Girl: A Power Play. Who Decides What is Licit in Islam?. CyberOrient, 5(2). Cockburn, P. (2011, November 28). Hidden Hand Syndrome: The Demonization of Iran. Counter Punch.

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Internet World Data Statistics. (2012). Middle East Internet Usage & Population Statistics. Retrieved from http://internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm Jones, T. (2011). Saudi Arabia versus the Arab Spring. Raritan. The Quarterly Review, 31(2). Kahn, R., & Kellner, D. (2006). Oppositional Politics and the Internet: A Critical/Reconstructive Approach. In Media and Cultural Studies Key (pp. 703–725). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Lynch, M. (2011). After Egypt: the Limits of the Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab States. Perspectives on Politics, 9, 301–310. doi:10.1017/S1537592711000910 doi:10.1017/ S1537592711000910 MacFarquhar, N. (2011, June 15). Social Media Help Keep the Door Open to Sustained Dissent Inside Saudi Arabia. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/world/ middleeast/16saudi.html McCaughey, M., & Ayers, M. (2003). Introduction. In Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice (pp. 1–21). New York: M. Routledge. McLaughlin, W. S. (2003). The use of the Internet for political action by non-state dissident actors in the Middle East. First Monday, 8(11). doi:10.5210/ fm.v8i11.1096 doi:10.5210/fm.v8i11.1096

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Menoret, P. (2011). Living Islamic Activism Behind: Ambiguous Disengagement in Saudi Arabia. In Social Movements, Mobilization, and Constitution in the Middle East and North Africa (pp. 43–60). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Muravchik, J. (2009). The Next Founders: Voices of Democracy in the Middle East. New York: Encounter Books. Okruhlik, G. (2004). Making Conversation Permissible: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia. In Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (pp. 250–269). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Okruhlik, G. (2010). Saudi Arabia. In Politics and Society in the Contemporary Middle East (pp. 397–410). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Rahimi, B. (2011). The Agonistic Social Media: Cyberspace in the Formation of Dissent and Consolidation of State Power in Postelection Iran. Communication Review, 14(3), 158–178. doi:10 .1080/10714421.2011.597240 doi:10.1080/1071 4421.2011.597240 Teitelbaum, J. (2011). Saudi Arabia Faces a Changing Middle East. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 15(3), 76–95. Yamani, M. (2011). Saudi Youth: Initiative and Inertia. In Arab Youth: Social Mobilization in Times of Risk (pp. 112–126). London: Saqi Books. Yu, H. (2006). From Active Audience to Media Citizenship: The Case of PostMao China. Social Semiotics, 16(2), 303– 326. doi:10.1080/10350330600664888 doi:10.1080/10350330600664888

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Citizen Journalist: A citizen can become a journalist when he/she provides news to the public and he/she becomes a source for news stories. Citizen journalists are able to gather their own information and report. Cyberactivism: When broken down into its parts, cyberactivism refers both to the technological tools used in computer networks and the process of campaigning in the public sphere or working for an organization in order to bring about political or social change. Therefore, cyberactivism refers to how people use the Internet and social networks to shape opinions and public culture into something that reflects their lives politically, economically, culturally and/or socially. Cyberactivists: Cyberactivists are an organized group of individuals who oppose certain ideas using new media in order to shape the attitudes of others in a peaceful manner. Information Flow: Information flow focuses on how information and source are available within a society. Cyberactivists use cyberactivism to spread information in order to challenge governments and political authority. This information flow allows for a clear identification of the key elements that contribute to the transfer of ideas among groups engaging in social movements and political mobilizations, especially in regard to new media social networks. Internet Activism: Internet activism is the process by which citizens use the Internet and social media networks to interact with other citizens in certain societies in order to demand changes in political or economic systems. Internet activism includes resistance, antagonism, vocations and demands. Islamist Social Movement: The Islamist Social Movement uses religion discourse and other material resources (i.e., charities, communications, facilities and volunteers) as the keys to

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social mobilization. It differs from other social movements in that the leaders are religious activists and its discourse and goals are focused on Islam. Majalis: At Majalis, citizens gather to discuss ideas. Sometimes, they invite intellectuals and politicians to informally speak to the group political, economic and social topics. Online Citizenship: Online citizenship occurs where citizens take an active role in their online space and create a new atmosphere of change in regard to their society. Their citizenship allows them to build new, invisible spatial activities by spreading information to other citizens. Political Culture: Political culture exists whenever citizens create attitudes, ideas and opinions about the government. This culture is a cultural value. Public Sphere: The public sphere is a democratic space in which citizens can exchange information and opinions.

ENDNOTES 1

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See the economist April, 12, 2014 http:// www.economist.com/news/middle-eastand-africa/21600732-worlds-fifth-mostspoken-language-lags-online-surfing-shabaka and see internet world data http://www. internetworldstats.com/middle.htm#sa The page and the organization called itself “Monitor of Human Right in Saudi Arabia” (MHRSA) and its founder is the lawyer Walid Abu Al-Khair. The monitor established in 2008 while it registered officially as a nonprofit organization in Canada in 2012. https:// www.facebook.com/groups/40258229626. There are more than 8800 members on this group. http://www.facebook.com/dawlaty there are 8000 people signed the petintion http://www.facebook.com/No.Tuwaijri in fact, there is more than one page about same purpose. Both pages have about 9500 like.

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http://www.facebook.com/pages/%D8%B3 %D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D 9%8B-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89-%D9 %85%D8%AA%D9%89/121177831292327 in this page, there are more than 13500 people join and like the page. https://twitter.com/e3teqal it is unclear whether this account is related to someone individual or organization. Roughly, active Twitter followers range from 10% to 30% per account. http://www.acprahr.org/news. php?action=list&cat_id=12 the founders of the organization were arrested by the authority later on 9 March 2013. For more information see BBC http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-21726466 https://twitter.com/#!/mujtahidd http://www.esurveyspro.com/SurveyReport.aspx?ID=1a5e1133-9cfb-4ee7-920bb27950747b79 this survey is only indication and reflection among ten thousand users on Mujtahidd. https://twitter.com/s_2O17_ has more than 105 thousand followers (December 2013) https://twitter.com/i3tesaaam has more than 61 thousand followers (December 2013) again, there is no accurate number on how many people really died because of the flood. While the government officals said only 150 people died, activists said at least 1500 people were died. see http://www.thenational.ae/ news/world/middle-east/saudi-king-callsfor-corruption-charges-over-jeddah-floodsthat-killed-123 and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/8396446.stm the webpage https://www.facebook.com/ groups/192193191767 stopped and moved to Twitter where more activists use the latter instead of Facebook. Interestingly enough, Saudi users left Facebook and joined Twitter and it became the main tool for activism. http://www.nazaha.gov.sa/en/Pages/Default. aspx

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Saudi women Spring has more than 8200 like http://www.facebook.com/SaudiWomenSpring while http://www.facebook.com/ woman2drive has more than 19500 like. https://www.facebook.com/right2dignity and has more than 6800 like. www.Twitter.com/w2drive http://shababsaudi.wordpress.com, their Twitter account has more than 15 thousand followers https://twitter.com/shabab_saudi http://youthpetition.wordpress.com/ see also http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/818/ demands-of-saudi-youth.

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In April 2014, a new movement called “ID Revolution” where young people present their National Identification Card and asking the government for political and economic reform. For more information about this movement see https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/10748-saudi-arabia-id-cards-revolution-inflames-youtubeagainst-regime and http://www.al-monitor. com/pulse/originals/2014/04/saudi-protestyoutube-social-media-economy.html

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Chapter 4

Identifying Hyperlink Strategies as a Tool to Discover the Connections between Offline and Online Politics Keren Sereno Independent Researcher, Israel

ABSTRACT This chapter sheds light onto theoretical and empirical debates regarding the nature hyperlink as a political tool: whether the hyperlink is part of the “offline world” or should be considered as a new and separate form of practice, mainly due to its low cost and easy construction. The chapter contributes to the present literature in two innovative ways: First, based on link analysis between 90 Websites of protest Israeli NGO, a classification of link strategies was made, and 4 different linking strategies were found: Isolation, Introversion, Neighborliness, and Generalization. Furthermore, this chapter analyzes 15 protest issues and is not focused only on a single issue network. Second, 29 in-depth interviews were conduct and enable a sketch of the “offline link analysis map” and a comparison of the online policies with the offline policies. In order to understand the choice of the organization linking strategy over the others, and the decision to which exactly other organizations/Websites link to, one must remember that the Web is only one arena where the political actors operate. Therefore, the in-depth interviews not only reveal the causes affecting the hyperlinks selection and strategy in each organization but also reveal similarities between the organizations with overlap linking strategy.

INTRODUCTION The hyperlink is a technical means of linking words and ideas to each other causing the surfer to jump from one web page to another. In essence, the hyperlink is the navigation tool that can create any kind of link (positive or negative) with another

entity- it encourages relationships (Dimitrova et al, 2003; Kovarick, 2002). In an article published in 2006 in the New York Times magazine, Kevin Kelly proposed we regard the ubiquitous web hyperlink as one of the significant inventions of the last 50 years. With the massive penetration of the internet into our lives and with its enhancements

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch004

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 Identifying Hyperlink Strategies as a Tool

such as Web 2.0 and the development of the social web many political and economic players have grasped the tremendous power of the hyperlinks and now strive to consciously use them to advance their views, so that today it is hard to imagine surfing without them (Turow, 2008; Halavais, 2008). The internet embodies an inconceivable amount of information on every topic imaginable. The popular search engines, which were originally meant to solve the problem of filtering information according to relevance, gradually became immensely powerful ranking tools which determined one’s online visibility1. It is not only the information search process that is affected by the number of hyperlinks, but also the public online visibility, since the links can also affect the players’ degree of prominence and thereby influence the entire public and political discourse on any given issue. The hyperlinks play an important role in political, collective and communications activities since the linking network increases the interest in and importance of any issue on the web (Halavais, 2008; Park & Thelwall, 2003; Dimitrova et al, 2003; Rogers & Marrers, 2000). In light of this, there is clearly an urgent need to use hyperlinks as a political tool to attain web visibility among challengers, who constitute the object of this research. One way to perceive the internet as a political arena is using hyperlink analysis to map out cyberspace. The stronger the presence of the hyperlink in online platforms the more layers of social and political meaning it encompasses, In other words, there is definitely competition for political power that is considerably influenced by the offline reality (Turow, 2008; Halavais, 2008). Understanding the psychology behind the decision to create a link to a particular website or webpage may help us understand aggregate social behavior. One must seek to integrate the macro (social network) with the micro (a single link or the particular linking pattern of a single player), because the analysis of linking networks rather than of each website on its own significantly

improves our understanding, and can even help us understand the micro level better, (Halavais, 2008; Bennet 2004) as to showed in this paper. Turow (2008) calls on researchers to monitor the considerations that guide a person/organization to link to one website rather than another, and to map out the channels of information flow and the power reflected by the digital links in order to gain an in-depth understanding of their social significance. In this article, I will move forward with the above suggestions and through an indepth examination of the Israeli case, propose a typology that is the first of its kind for classification of linking strategies. The focus of this study is the issue network(s) that exist between 90 Israeli social change organizations. The findings presented here constitute part of a broader research that also includes 29 in-depth interviews I conducted with webmaster in order to understand the factors that affect the choice of one linking strategy over another.

LITERATURE REVIEW The Hyperlink as a Political Tool The choice of hyperlink is a social action par excellence, and the practices involved in this decisionmaking process have social consequences. The hyperlink by definition empowers the users who can choose whether or not to expose themselves to the linked information. Still it is important to remember that the hyperlink constitutes a selection made by the webmaster, since it is not random, but rather the outcome of a decision. This selection from among all the existing options turns the hyperlink into a gate-keeping mechanism that expresses power and authority in order to promote a particular website or webpage over the rest. Furthermore the hyperlink signals the entry point into a specific discourse sphere (Halavais, 2008; Park & Thelwall, 2003; Dimitrova et al, 2003; Rogers & Marrers, 2000).

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In the early years of the millennium, hyperlink networks began to be perceived as having meaning and power, unlike earlier perceptions which failed to grasp their full social and political significance (Halavais, 2008). The most crucial insight gained from link analysis studies of the late 1990s was that websites are linked selectively and not haphazardly. The early assumption was that hyperlinks were chance expressions, such as the button “Move to next blog” (Rogers, 2008). Today it is accepted that the hyperlink should be seen as an application that expresses the communications decisions of the website operators. It is perceived as representative of knowledge structures and social relations, and as part of larger and deeper network structures (Halavais, 2008; Park & Thelwall, 2003; Dimitrova et al, 2003 Shaw, 2001; Rogers & Marrers, 2000). The conclusions that not all links are equal and not all links are reciprocal, (one-way links are much more common) have turned the research spotlight onto questions of inclusion vs. exclusion, questions that are essentially political (Rogers, 2008). This analysis raises questions about the character of the relationships, or lack thereof, between entities, as well as why the power’s distribution in the online arena is such as it is (Halavais, 2008). The importance of this analysis lies in the fact that it helps researchers map out the web sphere and the issue networks (Gillan, 2009).

What Hyperlink Networks Can Tell Us? Once the research spotlight shifted from random links to goal-oriented links, the examination of the links between two given websites became more significant. The decision to link often indicates the granting of authority, support and trust in the linked website and what it stands for (Ackland et al., 2006; Park & Thelwall, 2003; Rogers & Marrers, 2000). Acts of making or not making a link, or omitting a link may be examined sociologically as a gesture of recognition, non-recognition or

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detachment respectively (Rogers, 2008; Park & Thelwall, 2003).The decision which website to link to reflects the choice of a certain communications strategy, and embodies three stages: whether or not to create a hyperlink, how many links to create and the main dilemma who exactly to link to (Shumate & Dewitt, 2008). Links indicate the public group affiliation of the actors, hence the existence of a network between certain websites can testify to the connective character of a particular community (Shumate & Dewitt, 2008; Barnett & Sung, 2005; Park & Thelwall, 2003; Rogers & Marres, 2000). It thus emerges that link networks, as representative networks, help establish and define the structure and boundaries of a community and/or a discourse on the web (Ackland et al., 2006). The selective construction of link networks has led to the creation of spaces on the web – those areas shaped and framed by certain limited acts of recognition. The aims of mapping web networks are to discover those discourse spaces / issue networks, identify their boundaries, map out their members and their channels of information flow. All of these make it possible to uncover underlying social structures and kinds of relationships. Adamic (2008), who analyzed linking among political bloggers in the USA sums up her research as follows: “The hyperlink frequently reveals very real underlying communities” (Adamic, 2008. quoted in: Turow, 2008, pp: 15). She thus reminds us of the importance of the offline world when we discuss hyperlinks and their socio-political significance.

Hyperlink Analysis as a Means to Examine Political Protest Through link analysis between the protest organizations’ websites we can identify cooperation, ideological affinity and recognition. Moreover the hyperlink can help construct a collective identity, social capital and the establishment of coalitions. Hence it emerges that an examination of the hyperlink structure of network protest can

 Identifying Hyperlink Strategies as a Tool

unearth important characteristics of the network that may lead to collective action offilne, and enables advanced identification of the internet’s role within political protest processes (Biddix & Park, 2008). There were attempts to understand how different domains tend to link up. It was found that government authorities (.gov) tend to link only to other government sites, while corporations (.com) tend to use internal (in the same website) links and not to other entities. In contrast, social organizations (.org) tend towards to be more generous with their hyperlinks, and tend to link mainly to other social organizations, but also to government institutions, research institutes and so forth. Yet, it was also found that these organizations are quite selective about which organizations they link to (Roger & Marres, 2000). Organizational selectivity regarding hyperlinks is expressed in not linking to actors to whom this would afford direct or indirect recognition. Organizations may mention other actors, slogans, documents and other contributions, but still not generate a hyperlink (Rogers, 2004; 2002; Rogers & Marres, 2000). According to the Politics of Association’s theory, the decision not to link to “enemies” is considered as a given and legitimate- it is very common not to find hyperlinks between opponents, but it would not be typical not to find links between organizations fighting for the same cause. Intentionally not making hyperlinks to colleague express a low opinion of that organization’s importance, value and relevance to the cause. Such an act might be interpreted as an attempt to exclude that organization from the issue network space, or even to reduce its visibility and prominence on the web in general (following the search engines’ logic). Furthermore Hyperlink Diplomacy approach argues that not making a hyperlink may be considered an intention to humiliate or a sign of disrespect (Rogers & Ben-David, 2008). In a study that examined 70 websites of nonprofit organizations in the USA in the mid-2000s, it emerged that only 38% of them had links to supporting organizations, and there were no links

at all to the opposition. (Kenix, 2007). A similar picture emerges from three studies examining the websites of initiatives and organizations protesting against corporate globalization. The studies showed that the vast majority of the websites were linked to each other and one could identify an issue network with clear boundaries where actors had varying degrees of centrality (Rosenkrands, 2004; Bennett, 2004; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2004). Another study which examined random sample of US-based social movement organization internet uses found that most of them link to other organizations working within the same protest cluster (61.6%), and only about one third had links to organizations belonging to another protest cluster (34.9%). Similarly, it was found that there was no connection between an organization‘s budget and the size of its membership and the degree of technological sophistication of its website (to what extent it exploited the medium) (Stein, 2009).

Issue Networks of Social Organizations’ Websites Creating issue network links may also be explained by the Theory of Collective Action as a rational contribution for the public good. The hyperlink has been defined as a connective computer-mediated public good, since when the organization chooses to link to another organization, it contributes to its virtual space and also chooses to share its contacts with others. The hyperlink networks of NGOs are defined as sets of inter-organizational links meant to connect members and non-members to other organizations holding similar positions in order to increase the visibility of the goals of the issue network through informal organizational strategies (Shumate & Dewitt, 2008; Shumate & Lipp, 2008). The creation of a link network of itself is perceived as a collective act since it has implications for the degree of visibility of a particular social discourse on the web (Ackland et al., 2006).

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In studies that examined the hyperlinks between websites of protest organizations it was found that connecting the website to a larger protest network made it much more effective for the purposes of the protest and improved the implementation of the protest, from recruitment to organization. The referrals to other websites according to current events and campaigns were meant to help enlist activists and support, by connected each website to wider communities of activists. These ties enabled the distribution of information about events across time and space within the various relevant audiences and thereby helped established an online issue network (Biddix & Park, 2008; Bennett, 2004). A study that examined the hyperlinks between Islamic resistance organizations distinguished between general organizations with broad-scope objectives and specific ones with more limited goals. It found that these two kinds of organizations differ in how they link. The linking patterns of the various actors were influenced by the degree of heterogeneity of the goals of the actor, the heterogeneity of the goals of the other organizations and the role each actor fulfilled within the network. The follow differences were found: 1) general organizations had almost three times as many hyperlinks as the specialized ones. 2) The general organizations promoted a long list of goals within the network rather than focusing on a limited, narrow list of goals. 3) The links between general and specific organizations were limited. The general organizations preferred not to link to the specialized ones, which were mostly perceived as more radical. The analysis revealed that the general organizations linked to the most central and legitimate organizations thereby make them more visible in the issue network. 4) Each kind of organization played different role within the issue network. The general organizations carried great weight within the issue network as brokers and initiators. They filled in structural blanks – linking between organizations previously not linked, thereby contributing to the recognition and linkage between the general organizations and also 64

between all actors within the network while the specific organizations played a relatively isolated role with the network (Shumate & Lipp, 2008). A study that examined hyperlinks between NGOs around the world working to defeat AIDS drew an important conclusion - technology has not eliminated the global digital divide. Many organizations received only a few hyperlinks while a few received many hyperlinks, and this division matched the global digital divide. Organizations from the northern hemisphere made many more links than that from the southern hemisphere their contribution to the issue network was more significant and they had greater legitimacy and centrality. This means that the power distribution known from the offline reality is retained in linking patterns. The northern organizations act more globally and this was also reflected in their hyperlinks, while the organizations from the southern hemisphere act more locally and this too, was reflected in their hyperlinks – work practices from the ‘real’ world are transferred into the hyperlink network (Shumate & Dewitt, 2008) . In contrast to this conclusion, the findings of a study on the hyperlink network among British protest movements against the war in Iraq led to contradictory conclusion. The analysis of their expression and mainly of their hyperlink network revealed gaps between the nature of these movements and how they act offline and their decisions in relation to the online issue network. The study proved that the online experience of the movement may differ from its offline experience. Moreover, the research demonstrated the unique power of the internet in overcoming the physical limitations of time and place and all the other strategic decisions regarding the establishment of coalitions and collaborations. In other words, one does not have to maintain contact in the physical world or generate joint activities in order to link. The study also indicated an added value of constructing a virtual issue network – expansion of the options for interaction beyond those in daily life (Gillan, 2009).

 Identifying Hyperlink Strategies as a Tool

The studies above show that existing research literature dealing with links between social organizations, present contradictory findings regarding questions such as: to what extent is offline politics (hierarchy of power and daily routines) replicated in linking patterns? To what extent does the internet actually enable the establishment of a ‘new’ kind of politics? Deriving from these two questions is a very important third one: what has a greater influence on the decision whom to link to – the actual work relations between organizations or purely the perceived ideological proximity? Purely ideological proximity means there is no actual ongoing working relationship and the link, as a simple and accessible technology application, actually bypasses the various physical obstacles (inter-organizational politics, budget etc.). Thus the link enables organizations to also legitimize and recognize others with which they do not collaborate in practice but which share the same ideals and vision. On the other hand, one might claim that the link is the continuation of the politics by other means, and that an organization’s working practices offline are permeate its online strategies. This fascinating issue underlies this current study. The only research published to date that has studied the hyperlinks between Israeli protests organizations discovered that there is a hyperlink network between a very wide range of them. The issue network of organizations opposing the separation fence included many kinds of organizations that are not directly or exclusively connected to the issue of the fence – feminist organizations, peace organizations, conscientious objectors organizations, human rights organizations, Israeli Arab advocacy organizations, Palestinian organizations and even one Israeli environmental organization (Rogers & Ben-David, 2008). This finding begs the question of why this is so – a question beyond the scope of Rogers and Ben David’s study, but one certainly worthy of investigation in the current research. This finding proved and justified my desire to research protest issues in Israel, examine

their points of contact and to discover whether the degree of ideological proximity between the various protest topics as expressed in the organizations’ daily functioning is also expressed in their linking patterns. This study proposed to examine the following: 1. What are the linking strategies among social change organizations in Israel? 2. What are the factors that influence the choice of linking strategy?

Importance of the Research and Its Contribution to Existing Literature Firstly, the main contribution of this research is its construction of a typology of linking strategies that enhances our knowledge of linking patterns by domain (Rogers & Marres, 2000), specially of NGOs. This typology deepens our understanding about when an organization chooses not to make a hyperlink at all, when to link to websites dealing only with the same protest topic, and when to link to websites that deal with a variety of protest issues. Moreover, the typology proposes measurable variables that can explain a preference between the various strategies with reference to the factors both at the micro-level (within the organization) and the macro-level (the political environment). Secondly, so far the theories that have tried to explain the findings of link analysis discussed the fact that social organizations were selective in choosing their hyperlinks, and that the act of linking was meant to grant recognition to the organization linked to. These theories are a solid foundation for continued research on the unanswered questions: why are there organizations that do not link at all while others are very generous with their hyperlinks? Is it possible to distinguish between different linking strategies? Will all the organizations in the same protest cluster have the same linking pattern and why or why not? Is there any preference between ideological proximity and practical partnership when deciding on a link? The

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above theories only provided partial answers to these questions. In this study I wished to get into the “black box” of the decision-making process for linking by adding explanatory variables and constructing a typology of linking strategies. Thirdly, this study did not stop at only describing the existing state by presenting the issue network though hyperlink analysis. In order to reinforce the linking strategy typology proposed in this article, 29 in-depth interviews were conducted with organization webmasters. From these interviews one may learn not only why certain hyperlinks are chosen and not others, but also about the offline politics and how it reflected in the hyperlink network. With this we can fully understand the political and social significance of the link and try to answer some of the as yet unresolved questions in the current research literature. Fourthly, as far as I know, so far there have only been studies published analyzing hyperlink networks that focused on one protest issue (antiglobalization, Islamic resistance, etc.). This study is the first to offer an analysis of 15 protest issues and thus enables an examination of macro variables (belonging to one protest cluster rather than another, cluster size) as factors that can influence the decisions regarding linking strategies. Fifthly, until now, there has been only one published study that examined hyperlink networks among Israeli protest organizations. The study by Rogers and Ben David (2008) only dealt with one protest cause. We need to enrich our knowledge about the Israeli hyperlink networks and expand the scope of research so that we may better understand the Israeli online protest.

Methodology The findings of this study were extracted in three stages: firstly, a manual analysis of all the hyperlinks on the Links Page of the organization’s website; secondly, automatic hyperlink analysis using the ‘Issue Crawler’ software to all the pages on the organization’s website; thirdly - based on

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hyperlinks maps and according to the Network Ethnography Approach (Howard, 2002) - 29 partially structured in-depth interviews were conducted with the organization’s webmasters. Qualitative and manual hyperlinks analysis conducted at the beginning of the study permit a unique and perceptive understanding of the various linking strategies as well as a deeper understanding of the linking politics of the organizations studied. However, it appears that an analytical tool is needed to quickly and efficiently analyze a larger research corpus. For this purpose the Issue Crawler software was chosen. Over the years, as the academic interest in linking and links grew, a new research method of ‘link analysis’ has developed. This method grew out of social network analysis and perceives links between web pages as expressions of relations between entities. The purpose of the analysis is to recognize patterns of connectivity and information flow between a large number of agents. This non-intrusive method is applied on data that can be presented as nodes and the links between them. A node represents a player (a site, page, documents, etc.), and the results of the analysis are presented as a graph or a map of the players’ relations (Park and Thelwall, 2003). To analyze the linking strategies the author applied the Issue Crawler software, which allows for several levels of in-depth analysis. The software enables selection of how many levels of internal links to follow and how much iteration of outbound links (i.e., snowball effect) to conduct. The software was selected because it is user-friendly and free and has been used in many parallel studies of linking patterns between political websites.2 In each site included in the sample, the software referred not only to links from the homepage sites or from the “Links” pages, but rather to all the links on pages removed by three or less pages from the homepage, for two reasons. First, the author sought to include all possible links found on the site. Second, to understand the connectivity decisions between different sites, it is important

 Identifying Hyperlink Strategies as a Tool

to study the site as a single entity and to look at the linking decisions that were made at different times and in different contexts. Ultimately, the software produced a connectivity map, which includes sites of organizations as nodes and lines that represent links between the nodes (see Figure 1). The size of a node on the map is proportional to the number of inbound links from sites in the sample. The more inbound links a certain site receives, the bigger the node. Also, the closeness between the different nodes in the network represents the number of links between these sites, and the more links that exist between two different sites, the closer their respective nodes appear on the map. Finally, the relative position of the points in the map represents a player’s centrality in the network. The more inbound links received by a node, the more central its position on the map. Non-dominant players (nodes that received

a small number of links) are peripherally located in the map. It is also important to note that the software does not display in the map organizations that received zero or one inbound links from the sites in the sample.

Constructing the Sample The sample construction procedure was also conducted in several stages. Firstly, after extensively reviewing dozens of protest movement and social change organization websites in Israel, it was determined that the 15 largest and protest clusters would be included in the sample, and these are: feminism, human rights in Israel - in general, human rights in Israel - Israeli Arabs, human rights in the Palestinian territories, human rights - refugees and migrant workers, conscientious objectors, peace, the movement

Figure 1. Hyperlink analysis map of 90 Israeli NGO’s (Inter-Actor)

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for greater Israel, social justice, workers’ rights, environment, education, Oriental Jewry3 struggle, animal rights and the rights of LGBT. The attribution into protest clusters followed the main area of activities, according to the organization’s stated self-definition. With the aim of achieving a finer distinction in my research, and in light of the profusion of Israeli organizations operating under the general definition of human rights, I broke this down into sub-clusters, according to the primary target audience of the organization. Later, two prerequisites were set for selecting the organizations in the sample: the organization must be recognized and not merely a transient initiative, and must have an official website. The starting point in sampling the sites was a long-term personal knowledge of Israeli social change organizations. During the year prior to the research, and during the study itself, I volunteered as the internet coordinator for the Israeli Infoshop that serves as an information distribution centre for social change. Pursuant to this, and due to my prior involvement in other social organizations active in several protest clusters, I composed an initial list comprising dozens of organizations. Later, as is customary in such studies, I followed the hyperlinks on these websites and the hyperlinks on the linked sites, and so on and so forth, until - at a fairly early stage - these organizations were simply repeating themselves over and over. I added the ‘new’ organizations to the list, and eventually also consulted with activists in various fields who added organizations. Ultimately 90 organizations were selected.

Definition of the Research Variables In order to better understand the various factors which can explain the selection of a certain hyperlink strategy, a number of independent variables were tested. Since the greater part of the information about the organizations in this sample is based on self-reporting by the organizations themselves, as published on their websites, or emanating from the in-depth interviews, there 68

are disparities in the quantity of available information about each organization. Whenever possible I closed these information gaps with information available outside their websites .To overcome this obstacle, the different variables were measured ordinally, where each variable was determined by an appropriately graded category: Size of Protest Cluster: How many organizations are active in this field in Israel: small cluster - up to five organizations; moderate cluster - 10-30 organizations; large cluster - over 40 organizations. Number of Protest Clusters the Organization is Involved in: The organizations main fields of activity,according to the organization’s self-definition, description of objectives and activities. Size of Organization: How many employees / volunteers the organization has in its close and distant circles: small organization - dozens; moderate - hundreds; large - thousands. Extent of Publicity: How well the organization is known by the public. A questionnaire was distributed amongst 100 individuals across a wide range of ages, political leanings and education, asking them to indicate one of three possibilities: have not heard of the organization at all; the name of the organization ‘sounds familiar’; they know the organization. Each response was given a point (0 - 2) and after totaling the points an index of organization recognition was constructed, with 5 levels of recognition. Resources: The organization’s annual budget: small - tens of thousands Shekels; medium - hundreds of thousands Shekels; large - millions Shekels. Website as a Database: To what degree the organization’s website is recognized as an information reserve for the organization’s field, i.e. whether the site contains a lot of information (documents, reports, testimonies, videos etc), or represents a type of electronic brochure only about the organization itself.

 Identifying Hyperlink Strategies as a Tool

Degree of Perceived Ideological Proximity between Protest Clusters: The extent to which the organization’s ideology stresses the points of contact between the different areas of protest: low degree – an ideology that emphasizes the distinction of the areas of protest, or no explicit statement is made regarding any ideological connection with others; moderate degree - an ideology that perceives points of contact with related issues; high degree - a holistic ideology that perceives many points of contact between a wide range of protest fields. Degree of Cooperation with other Organizations: The frequency with which the organization cooperates with others, which ones and which protest clusters they belong to. Cooperation has many facets such as seminars, demonstrations, petitions, appeals to the Courts etc: low degree - cooperation with other organizations is infrequent; moderate degree – cooperation is according to objective, with routine partners active in the same protest cluster; high degree – ongoing collaboration with many other organizations, and partnership in a broad range of coalitions, even with organizations that may not directly engage in the same protest cluster. Degree of Radicalism: The extent to which the organization is distanced from the Israeli consensus. Any organization that defines itself as being post-Zionist, calling for a boycott on Israel, or refusing a command from any side of the political spectrum; or, alternatively, calling for the establishment of a religious State in Israel - revoking the secular rule of law, is defined as radical. The next stage was to identify the regularity in the hyperlink patterns of the sampled websites, and to differentiate between the various strategies. That was essentially an inductive process due to the pioneering nature of the research, thus the category classification developed as the data

was gathered. All the hyperlink strategies found were refined into the four primary ones. Later, the independent variables were tested and, based on that, the typology was constructed. Since this study is interested in a deeper understanding of the various motivations behind hyperlinks, it was also necessary to conduct indepth interviews to provide sociological-political explanations for the hyperlink mapping generated. In order to avoid any bias deriving from the sample, the Network Ethnography (Howard, 2002) was selected, where ethnographic methods are applied to selected cases using social networks’ analysis. Thanks to a sharper understanding of the roles of the actors in the social network studied, it is possible to improve representativeness during selecting interviews, thus increasing the validity of the study, while gaining an in-depth understanding of the social relationships. Also, this method balances the social network’s level and the individual’s level. Due to space restrictions these interviews will not be analyzed in this paper.

Results The typology of hyperlink strategies distinguishes between four hyperlink strategies used by organizations: Isolation, Introversion, Neighborliness and Generalization. I shall now discuss each one of these more broadly.

Isolation A little more than one quarter of the organizations in the sample (24) chose to link to no other organization whatsoever. The findings show that more than half of the organizations choosing this strategy (14 , 58.33%) belong to the medium sized protest cluster and three-quarters of them (18) operate only in a single protest cluster. In other words, they are single issue organizations. Furthermore, almost 80% thereof only consist of a few dozen activists whose annual budgets amount

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to some hundreds of thousands of shekels. 62.5% of the organizations (15) achieved low and the lowest levels of publicity, only 12.5% achieved a high level of publicity, and not a single one of the organizations in this group (!) achieved the highest level of publicity, which could point to the fact that most residents of Israel are unfamiliar with most of the organizations that choose this hyperlink strategy. Only 12.5% (3) of the organizations in this group turned their web sites into a database intended to supply surfers with a great deal of information regarding the organization’s field of activities. Moreover, most of the organizations in this group 62.5%, (15) demonstrated a low ideological proximity to other clusters, despite the fact that slightly more than half of them cooperate to an intermediate degree with other organizations, so that a significant proportion of the organizations in the group cooperate with other organizations only seldom or not at all (41.66%, 10). This proportion is significantly higher when comparing this to what happens in the other groups: Introversion - 15%; Neighborliness - 25%; and Generalization - 14.28%. Furthermore, only 16.66% of the organizations in the group presented any ideological manifesto on their websites that could be defined as radical. In this group of isolationist organizations, one can find ones from many protest clusters, but one recurrent characteristic was that the target populations of those organizations belonged to disadvantaged groups in society, e.g.: Kayan - Israeli Arab women; The Association of Forty - Bedouin struggling for recognition for their villages; Women’s Spirit - Women injured by violence; Community Advocacy - The residents of neighborhoods in distress; Taayush - Palestinians; Tebeka - Ethiopians; Humans Without Borders - Palestinians requiring medical treatment in Israel, etc. This is contrary to other organizations that primarily choose other hyperlink strategies and whose target audience is the Israeli general public. An especially interesting exception was the environmental organization- Adam, Teva V’Din, which holds a very good public and political sta70

tus. This organization represents Israel at various international conventions, advises many Israeli decision-makers, and has a budget of millions of shekels and dozens of paid employees. From the in-depth interview it appears that the organization suffers from “a rich man’s problems” - every day, various environmental organizations request to exchange hyperlinks. As this organization’s workers strictly guard the high reputation of the organization they made a principled and firm decision not to link to anyone else. A claim was raised that they really do not need hyperlinks, as even without them the organization is very well known, a claim that was found to be true in this research. However, it is important to recall that alongside this unique exception, a very large proportion of this group includes small, poor and almost unheard of organizations. Another outstanding finding is that nine organizations out of the entire group, i.e. more than one-third, belong to one cluster, which is: the struggle over the complete historical Land of Israel. This is especially surprising in light of the fact that in the entire sample there is a total of 11 organizations in this cluster. In other words, more than 80% of the organizations in this cluster chose an identical hyperlink strategy - Isolation. Regretfully, all nine right-wing organizations refused to be interviewed- Honenu; Women in Green, and others, so that faced with no other choice, I had to apply to other sources to attempt to explain this finding. From comprehensive research on Israeli right-wing protest movements, it appears that this involves a group distinguished by its sociological characteristics whose members establish dense social networks that include not only uniquely sectoral media organizations, but also who live geographically very close together, share formal and informal educational institutions, as well as common religious and political attitudes (Sprinzak, 1981). Furthermore, recently concluded research among Gush Katif evacuees (the forefront of the struggle against the Gaza Strip Disengagement) shows that the most popular media for keeping in

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touch with other community members were phones and Sabbath Leaflets (newspapers distributed in thousands of copies, obtainable in synagogues before the Sabbath) namely, small-scope media that maintain the intimate character of the community (Lev-On, 2012). This research can shed light on the online behavior of right-wing organizations and may perhaps hint that organizations belonging to protest clusters containing substantive social networks that are relatively very dense and closely knit will feel that there is no need for hyperlinks between the various websites as this function is fulfilled in other more substantial ways. This is only an initial direction and further research is required to assess its veracity. Finally, I would like to discuss another interesting protest cluster – the conscientious objectors cluster (refusal to serve in the Israel Defense Forces at all or only in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). In the present sample, and in Israel generally to the best of my knowledge, there are three such organizations, two of which - Courage to Refuse and New Profile - chose not to have any hyperlinks at all. In the Israeli context, a refusal to serve in the army is a criminal offense punishable by actual imprisonment, but more than this, it is a radical position that is condemned and denounced in the mainstream media, by the establishment and public opinion. Hence we can see that this cluster also chooses the linking strategy of isolation, mostly for organizational reasons that are identical for most of the isolation organizations: a lack of human resources, money and technical understanding (deriving from, inter alia, the high average age of the organization’s members) as was shown from the interview conducted with the volunteer responsible for New Profile’s website. Among the isolation group is left-wing ideological extremism - Anarchists Against the Wall, but also on the right, The Temple Mount and Eretz Israel Faithful Movement, which call for the founding of the Third Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount and the enforcement of Jewish religious law in the State of Israel.

Introversion This hyperlink strategy relates to an organization’s decision to link only to those organizations that directly deal with the area of protest of that organization and in the current sample 20 organizations chose this strategy. One-third of the organizations that chose introversion within their protest cluster/s (35%, 7) belong to a large protest cluster, primarily environment and feminism, while about a third (30%, 6) simultaneously deal with several protest clusters of various sizes. A unique finding for this cluster is that a high percentage of organizations specialize in only one area of activity (60%, 12) - only 20% of the introvert organizations operate in three or more protest clusters. Two of the most outstanding protest clusters in this group are: the animal rights cluster and the environment cluster. Two-thirds of the introversion organizations are small (only dozens of activists). The annual budget of half of these organizations is medium (hundreds of thousands of shekels), while one third has a large budget. It is easy to understand this finding if you understand that for the overwhelming majority of cases in the sample, when there is a small organization with a large or medium budget, this will involve a social advocacy organization that employs workers, rather than a broad-base grass roots movement. The degree of publicity of these organizations is affected by the quantity of the media coverage and the quality of the work of the organization’s spokesperson (PR). 70% of the organizations in this group had a low or the lowest degree of publicity among those asked, which hints at the complete anonymity of most of the organizations in this group. However, it is important to state that a quarter of the organizations were ranked as having a high or the highest degree of publicity. As opposed to the small percentage among the isolation organizations that have turned their organization’s websites into a database with a great deal of information regarding the organization’s field, among the introversion group, this rate jumps to 35%. There are websites with much detailed 71

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content owing to the focusing on a specific protest issue, which is not part of the Israeli public agenda, such as animal rights. It appears that all the organizations working in this field that belong to the introversion group - The Israeli Association against Animal Experimentation; Anonymous; and Shevi, have turned their websites into a respectable database which includes many articles, referrals to movies, books, and researches related with vegetarianism, veganism, and a wide range of struggles (battery cages, cosmetics industry, etc.). An additional reason for turning the website into a database is the fact that it has a very specific target audience - e.g. Arab lesbians in Aswat; or religious feminist women in Kolech - and the desire to fill it with information relevant to their lives, as arises from the interviews. From interviews it appears that the uniqueness of the organizations constitutes a reason to invest hundreds of work hours on the website to provide information which is mostly not available in Hebrew or Arabic. Furthermore, in this way organizations generally keep in touch with those who might potentially join the organization, and try to reach anyone interested in the subject but who does not want to be actively involved. Another type of organization that has turned their website into a database is the rich and large environmental organizations such as Green Peace Mediterranean, or activists in the grass roots movements such as Green Action that also displays a marked desire to distribute knowledge and to make it readily available to the general public. The hyperlinks are without doubt an inseparable part of building a database, and in most cases there are dozens of hyperlinks referring to other sites. It is interesting to note that 70% of the organizations in this group demonstrate a low degree of ideological proximity to other clusters. This percentage is the highest in the sample (among the Isolation group only 62.5% was found) and this can explain the choice in this hyperlink strategy. Furthermore 75% of the introversion organizations mostly or always cooperate only with organizations

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from the same cluster, which is true primarily for environmental and animal rights organizations dropping the high rate of cooperation with others to 10% only. Only one out of the 20 organizations in this group, presented an ideological manifesto on its website that could be defined as radical - Socialist World - that calls for eliminating the capitalist system. But it is important to remember that both Kolech and Aswat are considered radical and unusual within the communities they derive from - lesbian women in Arab society, or feminist women in religious society, but because other colleague social organizations do not perceive them as radical, in this research also they are not classified as such. In attempting to identify linking strategies at the macro level- the protest cluster as a whole,, the findings unequivocally show that the environmental cluster and the animal rights cluster replicate their offline modus operandi in their linking strategy. Six out of the nine environmental organizations in the sample chose the Introversion hyperlink strategy. In the in-depth interviews, several reasons were mentioned for this decision, primarily the desire to keep the environmental cluster “free” of politics. The aim is to position environmental issues as belonging to everyone, and not only to left- or right-wingers. The fear of losing an audience that has been given an incorrect impression about the organization because of the hyperlinks it provides becomes more acute when it comes to the potential loss of support funds. Furthermore, issues such as human rights in Israel, social justice, or feminism, are simply not perceived as relevant for hyperlinks as far as the above webmasters are concerned. A similar picture also arises from animal rights organizations, where 3 out of 4 have chosen the Introversion strategy. Even if, at the personal level, most of their activists are involved in other social change organizations (most of which, belong to the radical left) they made an principle decision that at the organization level they are putting

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forward single issue message - animal rights - in order not to “push away” potential activists with radical messages that do not deal directly with the main issue of the organization. Another important point worth noting is that a large proportion of the introversion organizations belong to a protest cluster that is more clearly differentiated. Others, such as social justice or human rights clusters can relate to a large number of other sub-clusters. Environment and animal rights are areas whose boundaries are much more clearly defined.

Neighborliness This group is the largest in the sample with 32 organizations, slightly more than a third of the total sample. This strategy relates to organizations that chose to link also to organizations and websites that do not directly deal with the same area of protest, but where there is still some relatively significant similarity between them. For example, the general field of human rights might connect with several sub-clusters depending on the subject of the activity: Palestinians, refugees and migrant workers; LGBT community, Arabs and Bedouin. Furthermore, women’s rights, could connect also with human rights, and thus also with social justice, workers’ rights, and even education or oriental Jewry struggles. One quarter of the Neighborliness group organizations belong to one large sized protest cluster while half of these belong, simultaneously to several protest clusters of various sizes. So one might summarize the protest clusters most of the organizations in this group belong to as: human rights in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (12); feminism (11); and human rights for Israeli Arabs (11); It is interesting to observe that only 37.5% (12) of this group are single-issue organizations (as compared with 60% in the Introversion group). A further 37.5% of these organizations belong to two protest clusters while the remaining quarter are organizations belonging to 3-7 protest clusters, e.g.: Worker’s Hotline; Adva Center; and Tarabut that operates in 5, 6 and 7 protest clusters

respectively. This finding is important as it can explain the practices of the organization offline and shed light on the connection between online and offline politics. The findings show that organizations which work with more organizations and cooperate with a larger number of coalitions tend to link more, when those hyperlinks follow the organizations they work with. Based on this finding, it is not surprising to see that among the isolation organizations there were only two organizations (8.33%) that worked in three or more protest clusters. Furthermore, a very central characteristic of this group is that most of the organizations belonging to this group operate in cluster/s that is/are close to other protest clusters to the point where it is hard to define a clear and obvious boundary between them, e.g. social justice and workers’ rights, or peace and human rights in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The hyperlinks between the most widespread protest clusters created ever-widening circles. The hard core of most of the organizations that link to their neighbors include hyperlinks between the cluster for human rights in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, human rights in Israel in general and human rights for Israeli Arabs. Frequently, to this circle is added the Worker’s Hotline organization whose main but not exclusive focus is workers’ rights. Sometimes it was also possible to find hyperlinks to feminist organizations that promoting the rights of the Palestinians. Another circle of organizations included social justice and workers’ rights and sometimes even feminism, Oriental Jewry struggles, human rights in Israel in general and human rights for Israeli Arabs. Another common circle of hyperlinks included organizations for peace and for human rights in the West Bank and Gaza that sometimes even linked to social justice and feminism, and 4 times even to the cluster of conscientious objectors. Another characteristic of this group is that its organizations are usually partners in many coalitions, and work on a daily basis with other organizations from the same or close clusters, such 73

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as: Coalition of Women for Peace, Gush Shalom, Israeli Committee against House Demolitions, etc. These organization differ from multi issue organizations referred to above, because they have a narrower orientation. They focus only on human rights in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or peace or human rights for Israeli Arabs. It is important to mention that these kinds of organizations also link to organizations involved in similar areas of protest too. 65.62% (21) of the organizations in this group are small, 53.12% (17) have a large budget (millions of shekels) with a quarter of them having achieved a high or the highest level of publicity, which indicates the large number of social organizations rather than grass roots movements. 34.37% (11) of the Neighborliness group organizations have turned their websites into a database. Furthermore, most of them (59.37%, 19) demonstrate an ideological proximity to other clusters to a medium degree, and 71.87% (23) of them cooperate to a medium degree with other organizations. Surprisingly, 21.87% (7) of the group’s organizations present an radical ideological manifesto on their website- Civil Forum, Zochrot, Gush Shalom and Israeli Committee against House Demolitions which object, in varying degrees, to the Zionist character of the State of Israel. These organizations received significantly lower linking rates compared with the non-radical organizations, and where they did receive a hyperlink, it was mostly from other radical organizations, or from organizations that to some degree doubt the Zionist narrative.

Generalization This hyperlink strategy is surprising and especially interesting as at first sight it is difficult to understand the logic behind it - organizations choosing to link to others and to websites that not only do not deal directly with their areas of protest, but on the face of it are not even close to it. This is the

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essential difference between the Neighborliness and the Generalization groups. For example, an LGBT organization that links to one dealing with the Oriental Jewry struggle, or an Oriental feminist organization that links to an environmental organization. This is the smallest group in the sample, numbering only 14 organizations. Even though 28.57% (4) of the organizations choosing this strategy belong to a medium sized protest cluster and 28.57% belong simultaneously to several clusters of different sizes, it is very interesting to see the high percentage that this group has of organizations that belong to a small cluster - 21.42%. This is relatively high compared with the Neighborliness (6.25%) and the Isolation (8.33%) groups. This finding is especially interesting as it sheds light on one of the characteristics of this strategy - the frequency of small protest clusters located on the fringe of the protest issue spectrum - Oriental Jewry struggle (3), conscientious objectors (1), animal rights (1), education (1), the rights of migrant workers and refugees (2), as well as medium sized clusters also: LGBT (1) and workers’ rights (2). Moreover, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the organizations operate only are single issue organizations - 64.28% (9), 28.57% of them still operate in three or more protest clusters, which is the highest proportion in the sample (compared with 8.33% in the isolation group). Furthermore, most of the organizations (71.42%, 10) are small; half with budgets of hundreds of thousands of shekels, while a third have budgets of millions of shekels (35.71%, 5). A significant and fascinating finding reveals that 42.84% of the generalization organizations are publicized to a high or the highest degree, a percentage with no competition in the sample (Neighborliness and Introversion - 25%; isolation - 12.5%). Future research will need to look into this question in depth. In the meantime, one may guess that this is related partially to the dominance some of the organizations have in the

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relevant protest arena and therefore their greater prominence in public discourse, such as: The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Peace Now and The National Association of LGBT in Israel. Another interesting and unique finding that arises is that 64.28% (9) of the organizations in this group have turned their website into a database (Neighborliness - 34.77%; Introversion - 35%; Isolation - 12.5%). In other words, there is an increase in desire to distribute unique information and to make it accessible to a wider audience. Examples may be found in the websites of the following organizations: Ir Amim that specializes in Jerusalem-related problems; Public Committee Against Torture in Israel – which speaks for itself; The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, a veteran civil rights organization in Israel that has been reviewing this field from every possible angle, etc. Only 21.42% of the generalization organizations have demonstrated a low degree of ideological proximity, this is a relatively low percentage compared to the other groups (34.37% of Neighborliness, 62.5% of Isolation, and 70% of the Introversion group). Moreover, 28.57% of the organizations expressed a high degree of ideological proximity on their websites with other protest issues, which is definitely a higher percentage compared to the other groups (10% from the Introversion group; 8.33% from the Isolation group; and 6.25% from the Neighborliness group). This finding has far-reaching implications as we can learn from it about the main motivation in choosing this linking strategy. A significant proportion of the organizations in the generalization group are organizations with a generalized protest philosophy that stresses the connections between the various struggles. In the in-depth interviews the ideological concept that stresses points of contact between many different protest clusters arose repeatedly. Excellent examples of this are the movements:

One Struggle and My Sister. One Struggle is an anarchistic radical movement that fights for animal rights and whose main message is ‘oppression is oppression is oppression’. From their point of view, there are close connections between animal rights, human rights, (whatever they are) peace, conscientious objectors, social justice, workers’ rights, LGBT rights, feminism, Oriental Jewry struggle, and environmental justice. The name of the movement emphasizes this holistic ideology completely. This concept is also expressed in the everyday activities of the movement, and is also in full sync with the hyperlinks appearing on its website. My Sister is a movement for Oriental feminism (the Israeli version of black feminism) that also links the to human rights in the West Bank and Gaza, peace, social justice, workers’ rights, LGBT, education, the rights of refugees and migrant workers, and the rights of Israeli Arabs. They even went so far as to place a hyperlink on their website to an environmental organization. Indeed, most of the generalization organizations (71.42%, 10) cooperate to a medium degree with other organizations, but it is interesting to still see that this is the group with the highest proportion of organizations that cooperate to a high degree with others: 14.28% (compared with 3.12% for Neighborliness; 4.16% for Isolation; and 10% for Introversion). Furthermore, this is the group with the lowest proportion of organizations that cooperates to a low degree with other organizations: 14.28% (compared with 41.66% for Isolation; 25% for Neighborliness; and 15% for Introversion). To sum up, I will add that only 14.28% of the organizations in this group presented a radical ideological manifesto on their website which is consistent with the general picture that shows that the generalization organizations will be, in the main, well-known, rich, with a high status, that frequently work with many organizations and are partners to a large number of coalitions.

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Table 1. A summary table of the typology of linking strategies    Strategy Name

Isolation

   Introversion

   Neighborliness

   Generalization

   Name of Variable    No. of Linked Protest Clusters

   No links at all

A link to one cluster only

   Most organizations link to another 2-5 clusters

   Most organizations link to another 5-7 clusters

   Degree of Ideological Proximity between the Linked Clusters and the Organization

   No links at all

   A link only to the protest cluster within which the organization operates

   Links to clusters relatively close to protest cluster of the organization

Links to a wide range of clusters that have varying degrees of proximity to protest cluster of the organization

   Degree of Practical Collaboration between the Organizations

   No links at all

   Relatively very high degree of cooperation between linked organizations

Relatively very high degree of cooperation between linked organizations

   Varying degree of proximity –the more distant the cluster, the less cooperation in most cases

   Size of Cluster

   Mostly medium

   Large or small

   Mostly relatively large a

   From smallest cluster to largest, but with a high proportion of small ones

   Main Characteristics that Could Explain the Link Strategy

Single issue organizations with low ideological and practical proximity to other clusters. Relatively small and unknown organizations representing disadvantaged groups    Organizations with substantive social networks that are relatively dense and closed

Single-issue organizations that belong to a clearly distinct protest cluster Organizations with a low ideological and practical proximity to other clusters. Organizations with a relatively specific and distinct target audience    Organizations that are relatively small and mostly unknown.

Multi-issue organizations belonging to a large, and central protest cluster Organizations that belong to a cluster that is very close to other protest clusters where it is difficult to define boundaries between them Organizations that are members in relatively many coalitions, and that frequently work with other organizations.    Organizations that are relatively rich and well known.

Most are single issue organizations, but there is quite a high percentage that are multiissue. Organizations that have a general and holistic protest philosophy - emphasizing the connections between the various struggles. Mostly organizations that are relatively rich, large and well known. Organizations whose protest cluster is at the margin of the protest continuum Organizations that are members in many coalitions, and that frequently work with other organizations.    Their website functions as a database.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The conclusion of this study is that hyperlinks are the continuation of politics by other means. Hyperlinks are, to a very great extent, a reflection of practices and ideologies that are exist offline, and that despite the ease with which they are created, for the most part they do not establish any ‘new politics’. An organization which stresses its individuality and rarely collaborates with other organizations offline is likely to choose an Isolation linking strategy. An organization that chooses to work offline only with organizations

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from its own protest field is likely to choose an Introversion linking strategy. An organization that is active is several protest clusters and often collaborates with others in the same or proximal clusters is likely to choose the linking strategy of Neighborliness. An organization that has a holistic ideology and relates to the connections between different protest clusters, and which tends to collaborate frequently with others is likely to choose the linking strategy of Generalization. Other variables examined reinforce findings from earlier studies (Shumate & Dewitt, 2008; Shumate & Lipp, 2008; Stein, 2009). The power

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distribution existing offline is retained in the linking patterns: organizations that seek to promote disadvantaged populations and were “disadvantaged” themselves, did not receive many hyperlinks on the whole, neither did they provide hyperlinks for the most part. Radical organizations were also relatively isolated within the issue network, and most received hyperlinks either from other radical organizations or from less consensual ones. Moreover, the more aims an organization has, the greater and more varied its contribution to the issue network. In this study, too, hyperlinks were not found between opposing organizations, and there were hyperlinks to different kinds of websites such as mainstream and independent news websites, research institutes and overseas websites. This study supports the claims about the political and social significance of the hyperlink as a political tool that expresses trust, credit and support of another actor (Rogers & Ben-David, 2008; Park & Thelwall, 2003; Rogers & Marres, 2000; Rogers, 2004; Rogers, 2002; Halavais, 2008; Ackland at el, 2006; Turow, 2008). Despite the similarity to Stein’s (2009) research, it is important to note two significant differences. 1) The higher percentage of organizations linking to other organizations. While Stein shows links in only 38% of the websites sampled, in the current study this figure stands at 73.4%. 2) While Stein found that only 34.9% of the organizations linked to another protest cluster, here this figure rises to 51.11%. Other researches are needed in order to determine the reason for these differences. Perhaps it is merely a function of time, or maybe the explanation lies in the differences between the USA and Israel in political culture and socio-political contexts. Future studies should deal with the limitations of this study. Firstly, the pioneering linking typology presented here should be validated across many contexts (other countries, other types of actors) as possible and on as broad a sample as possible in order to conduct comparative studies. There is also a need to measure more precise variables which will strengthen the validity of this

study. Another important variable that deserves serious attention is the degree of technological sophistication and how the digital divide between classes and mainly between different age groups affects the choice of one linking strategy over another. Preliminary evidence of the digital divide and its impact on hyperlink strategy was found in the in-depth interviews. It is important to remember that the internet medium is a highly dynamic arena and that things can change from one moment to the next. In the time that has passed since the end of this study, a small number of the websites included in the sample have completely disappeared from the web, some have been completely upgraded, including the Links page, and on some websites the Links Page was changed, partly as a direct outcome of the in-depth interview were conducted with the webmaster. This is natural and even inevitable in this communications environment and one must be aware of the fact that link analysis studies are snapshots of a particular point in time that is open to change. However, it is worth remembering that not only have the vast majority of hyperlinks from the sample websites remained unchanged, but the pioneering typology proposed in this study extends far beyond the local Israeli context and contributes to the accumulation of knowledge about the political and social role of hyperlinks and about the internet in general. This study shows that while technologies may come and go, politics remains forever.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT A draft of this paper was presented at the conference: Internet, Politics, Policy 2010: An Impact Assessment, University of Oxford 16-17 September 2010. I would like to thank Prof. Gadi Wolfsfeld, Dr. Azi Lev-On, and Ms. Anat Ben David for their great help. I would also like to thank all my interviewees for their time and for the insights they gave me.

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REFERENCES Ackland, R., O’Neil, M., Bimber, B., Gibson, R., & Ward, S. (2006). New methods for studying online environmental-activist networks. Paper presented at the 26th International Sunbelt Social Network Conference. Vancouver, Canada. Retrieved 28 December 2012 from http://voson.anu.edu.au/ papers/environmental_activists_methods_presentation.pdf Adamic, L. (2008). The social hyperlink. In The hyperlinked society (pp. 227–250). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Barnett, G. A., & Sung, E. (2005). Culture and the structure of the international hyperlink network. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 11, 217–238. doi:10.1111/j.1083-6101.2006. tb00311.x Bennett, L. W. (2004). Communicating global activism: Strengths and vulnerabilities of networked politics. In Cyberprotest: New media, citizens and social movements (pp. 109–129). London: Routledge. Biddix, J. P., & Park, H. W. (2008). Online networks of student protest: The case of the living wage campaign. New Media & Society, 10, 871–891. doi:10.1177/1461444808096249 Dimitrova, D. V., Connolly-Ahern, C., Williams, A. P., Kaid, L. L., & Reid, A. (2003). Hyperlinking as gatekeeping: Online newspaper coverage of the execution of an American terrorist. Journalism Studies, 4, 401–414. doi:10.1080/14616700306488 Gillan, K. (2009). The UK anti-war movement online: Uses and limitations of internet technologies for contemporary activism. Information Communication and Society, 12, 25–43. doi:10.1080/13691180802158532

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Halavais, A. (2008). The hyperlink as organizing principle. In The hyperlinked society (pp. 39–56). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Howard, P. (2002). Network ethnography and the hypermedia organization: New media, new organizations, new methods. New Media & Society, 4, 550–574. doi:10.1177/146144402321466813 Kelly, K. (2006, May 14). Scan this book! New York Times Magazine. Retrieved 28 December 2010 from http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/14/ magazine/14publishing.html Kenix, L. J. (2007). In search of utopia: An analysis of non-profit web pages. Information Communication and Society, 10, 69–94. doi:10.1080/13691180701193085 Kovarick, B. (2002). Web Design for the Mass Media. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Lev-On, A. (2012). Communication, community, crisis: Mapping uses and gratifications in the contemporary media environment. New Media & Society, 14, 98–116. doi:10.1177/1461444811410401 Park, H. W., & Thelwall, M. (2003). Hyperlink analysis of the world wide web: A review. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 8(4). Rogers, R. (2002). Operating issue networks on the web. Science as Culture, 11, 191–214. doi:10.1080/09505430220137243 Rogers, R. (2004). Information politics on the web. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Rogers, R. (2008). The Politics of Web Space. Retrieved 18 July 2010 from http://www.govcom. org/publications/full_list/rogers_politics_web_ space_2008_pre.pdf

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Rogers, R., & Ben-David, A. (2008). The Palestinian–Israeli peace process and transnational issue networks: The complicated place of the Israeli NGO. New Media & Society, 10, 497–528. doi:10.1177/1461444807085321 Rogers, R., & Marres, N. N. (2000). Landscaping climate change: A mapping technique for understanding science and technology debates on the world wide web. Public Understanding of Science (Bristol, England), 9, 141–163. doi:10.1088/09636625/9/2/304 Rosenkrands, J. (2004). Homo economics: Analysis of anti-corporate websites. In Cyberprotest: New media, citizens and social movements (pp. 49–68). London: Routledge. Shaw, D. (2001). Playing the links: interactivity and stickiness in.Com and Not.Com Websites. First Monday, 6(3). doi:10.5210/fm.v6i3.837 Shumate, M., & Dewitt, L. (2008). The north/ south divide in NGO hyperlink networks. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13, 405–428. doi:10.1111/j.1083-6101.2008.00402.x Shumate, M., & Lipp, J. (2008). Connective collective action online: An examination of the hyperlink network structure of an NGO issue network. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 14, 178–201. doi:10.1111/j.1083-6101.2008.01436.x Sprinzak, E. (1981). Gush Emunim—The iceberg model of political extremism. Medina. Mimshal Veyahasim Binleumiyyim, 14, 25–52. Stein, L. (2009). Social movement web use in theory and practice: A content analysis of US movement websites. New Media & Society, 11, 749–771. doi:10.1177/1461444809105350 Turow, J. (2008). Introduction: On not taking the hyperlink for granted. In The hyperlinked society (pp. 1–20). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Van Aelst, P., & Walgrave, S. (2004). New media, new movements? The role of the internet in shaping the ‘anti- globalization’ movement. In Cyberprotest: New media, citizens and social movements (pp. 87–108). London: Routledge.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Hyperlink: Is a technical means of linking words and ideas to each other causing the surfer to jump from one web page to another. Link Analysis: A non-intrusive research method that grew out of social network analysis and perceives links between web pages as expressions of relations between entities. The purpose of the analysis is to recognize patterns of connectivity and information flow between a large numbers of agents. Link Analysis Map: This is the graphic outcome of the link analysis method. It presented the data as nodes and the links between them. A node represents an agent (a site, page, documents, etc.). Link Strategy: The decision which website to link to reflects the choice of a certain communications strategy, and embodies three stages: whether or not to create a hyperlink, how many links to create and the main dilemma who exactly to link to. Network Ethnography: Research method which applies ethnoraphic methods to select interviews using social networks’ analysis. NGO’S Links Network: Sets of interorganizational links meant to connect members and non-members to other organizations holding similar positions in order to increase the visibility of the goals of the issue network through informal organizational strategies. Typology of Linking Strategies: Identifying similarities vs. differences among the various linking strategies and to reveling the regularities and the correlations with other variables.

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ENDNOTES 1

2

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Presenting the results as a long list ensures almost exclusive visibility to those results appearing on the first pages at most. Furthermore, one must not underestimate the importance of hyperlinks since they constitute the basis of the search engine rankings. Such as: Gillan & Pickerill, 2008; Sullivan & Xie, 2009; Rogers & Ben David, 2008; Rogers & Marres, 2000, etc. For more about the capabilities of the software, see: http:// www.govcom.org.

3

4

5

Sephardic Jews originating from Arab countries. Such as: Gillan & Pickerill, 2008; Sullivan & Xie, 2009; Rogers & Ben David, 2008; Rogers & Marres, 2000, etc. For more about the capabilities of the software, see: http:// www.govcom.org. Sephardic Jews originating from Arab countries.

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Chapter 5

Cleavages and Links:

Mapping Linking Patterns between Israeli Political Websites Keren Sereno Independent Researcher, Israel Azi Lev-On Ariel University, Israel

ABSTRACT In the past decade, the Internet has extensively penetrated the political landscape in Israel. A variety of actors, including parties, Knesset members, NGOs, and more, have realized the significance of using the Internet to promote their goals and have established an online presence via a variety of platforms. Consequently, the Internet is becoming a fertile ground to study Israeli society with its multiple cleavages. This chapter analyses how the ideological cleavage in the Israeli society is manifest online, through the linking patterns between political Websites. Link analysis is used to study political visibility and centrality online, to map the channels of information flow between the various political actors, and to identify recognition and discourse networks between the various political actors. From the link analysis of the sites of some 200 political parties, MPs, and NGOs, we found no links between right-wing and left-wing political sites; each side in the political spectrum conducts a different linking strategy. Most of the sites of political parties and MPs received no in-bound links from the other political sites. On the other hand, NGOs have a central role in the online political networks in Israel and maintain a relatively dense linking network.

INTRODUCTION In the past decade, the Internet has extensively penetrated the Israeli political landscape. A variety of political actors, including parties, Knesset (parliament) members, NGOs, social activists and others have realized the significance of using the Internet to promote their causes and established

an online presence via a variety of platforms. Hence, the Internet is becoming a fertile ground for the study of Israeli politics and society, with their multiple cleavages. This article analyses how the ideological cleavage in Israeli politics between right and left is manifest online, through studying the linking patterns between political websites. The disputes between political right and left in Israel regarding

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch005

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 Cleavages and Links

peace negotiations, security, and the possibility and character of a future accord with the Palestinians, all stand continuously at the height of the political, public and media agenda in Israel. Therefore, we chose to focus on these cleavages in examining patterns of connectivity between Israeli political players. Any decision that is made online concerning what to read, whom to respond to and how, whom to link to and how, happens at the micro level of the individual user. However, the accumulation of decisions made by many individuals produces interesting conclusions at the macro level. In particular, studying the online linking behaviors of the various political actors enables us to better understand if and how the online arena reflects existing social cleavages, and whether links assist in bridging these cleavages, or rather further exacerbate them. Link analysis enables examination of online political centrality and visibility, mapping channels of information flow between actors, and identification and mapping of patterns of recognition and discourse between various political actors. Studying links allows to better understand if the Internet exposes users to opposing views and stimulates interactions between ideological rivals, or rather the very opposite – if it encourages users to become more entrenched in their prior opinions and get exposed only to like-minded perspectives. The percentage of broadband Internet connectivity in Israel is significant. In the beginning of 2012, 70.4% of Israeli citizens in Israel were online (more than 5.2 million people), including more than 3.3 million Israelis with a Facebook account.1 Among the Jewish population, more than 80% of households were connected to the Internet. The average number of online hours is more than 3 per day, while the most common uses include information search, email, file downloads and social applications, ranging from community sites through social networks such as Facebook and YouTube.2 Alongside this high percentage of internet connectivity in Israel, earlier studies of the online 82

presence of Members of Knesset (MKs) and political parties suggest that they do not continuously maintain their online representation. Rather, they divert significant budgets and attention to their online platforms mainly before general elections or party primaries (Haleva-Amir, 2011; Lev-On, 2011). The extensive penetration and multiplicity of uses of the Internet enables a new angle of analysis of the social cleavages within Israel. The present study examines the links between the websites of various political players, MKs, parties, and social organizations, in order to analyze if and how the ideological divide between the Israeli right and the left is reflected online.

The Political Use of Links The “melting pot” ideology, according to which newly-arrived Jewish immigrants coming to Israel from different backgrounds should form a new type of Zionist person, was prevalent in Israel’s early years (Kimmerling, 2001, Lissak, 1999; Almog, 2004; Horowitz and Lissak, 1990). Still, over the course of Israeli history, the Israelis started to recognize that Israeli society is and will be composed of a large number of cleavages. These cleavages include gaps between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians and between various ethnic, religious, and political ideological groups (see Peres and Ben-Raphael, 2006; Kimmerling, 2001, Lissak, 1999; Almog, 2004; Horowitz and Lissak, 1990). On one hand, the existence of multiple cleavages can be translated into a multiplicity of opinions expressed in public spheres, reduce the possibilities of hegemonic domination over the public discourse and force agents to become exposed to each other and mutually adjust their positions accordingly. On the other hand, however, when cleavages become extreme and the society becomes polarized, this situation may impair the integrity of the social fabric, thus challenging governmental legitimacy and stability. This article focuses on the political cleavage in Israel and its online expression. The Internet

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makes it possible for individuals, groups and sectors of the population to open online sites and fora “of their own”, in which they can even challenge the dominant voices inside their own sector and represent a variety of voices it that were not heard before (for example, on ultra-Orthodox women, see Lev-On and Neriya-Ben Shahar, 2011). The link is a significant tool through which one can examine social and ideological cleavages. A link is a referral to an additional source of online information, which is provided on various sites in order to increase the accessibility of information to users and grant them with an easy route to navigate the ocean of information that exists online. Given the unimaginable amounts of online information on every possible topic, online visibility is an acute issue for actors who are interested in achieving salience and encouraging users to access their site. In this regard, one cannot underestimate the importance of links upon which search engines partly rely for ranking the results presented to the users. Like references, links are symbolic entry barriers to discourse arenas and can be interpreted as markers of legitimacy and validity (Halavais, 2008; Park & Thelwall, 2003; Dimitrova et al., 2003; Rogers & Marrers, 2000). Hence, actions such as providing links to another site, refusal to provide links to another site or removing an existing link can be understood as acts of recognition, lack of recognition or disengagement, respectively (Park & Thelwall, 2003). Thus, the link is not only a tool for online navigation designed to establish a connection with another entity; it also facilitates relationships. Links form an expression of a selection carried out by the content manager of the website. This selection of particular sites to link to from all existing possibilities transforms the act of setting links into a gate-keeping mechanism, through which content managers can promote a certain site, idea, or person (Dimitrova et al., 2003; Tsui, 2008). The previous discussion highlights two main functions of the link: providing legitimacy and creating visibility (Turow, 2008; Hargittai, 2008; Halavais, 2008). Online visibility refers not only to

competition between various players over media prominence, but also to competition over political power. Specifically, this attribute includes the struggle to introduce agendas, define problems, present possible solutions, mobilize support/ resources and influence public decision and decision makers. Hence, we can learn about the social structure and the channels of communication between the players on the network through analyzing networks of links (Halavais, 2008; Park & Thelwall, 2003; Dimitrova et al., 2003; Shaw, 2001; Rogers & Marrers, 2000). Viewed this way, links not only represent the structure of the network, but also comprise means to form a collective identity and social capital, and to create coalitions among players (Ackland at el, 2006; Park & Thelwall, 2003; Rogers & Marrers, 2000). Deliberatively not providing links (to colleagues or partners in a struggle) can undermine the other organization and its value and relevance to the particular social action. Furthermore, the act of linkage exclusion can be perceived as an attempt to exclude this organization from the space of the issue network and even as an attempt to reduce the prominence and visibility of the organization in the network (Rogers & Ben-David, 2008). A number of studies have examined patterns of connectivity between political actors. Adamic and Glance (2005), in a study of linking patterns of bloggers during the 2004 US presidential campaign, found that progressively-oriented bloggers linked almost exclusively to other progressivelyoriented bloggers, whereas conservativelyoriented bloggers linked almost exclusively to other conservatively-oriented bloggers. Only 9% of bloggers linked to bloggers with opposing ideological convictions. A study of 70 websites of non-profit organizations in the US in the mid2000s found that only 38% link to organizations with a similar ideological affinity and none at all link to organizations that support the opposite ideology (Kenix, 2007; for other findings of clustering of links between political allies, see Rosenkrands, 2004; Bennett, 2004; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2002). 83

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The importance of network connectivity for activist recruitment, mobilization and organization is evident from several studies. For example, a study of links between sites of students protest groups fighting for fair wages found that links to other sites increased and improved the way in which the protest was carried out (from recruitment through to campaign organization). Indeed, connecting the organizational site to a wider protest network turned the site into more effective mechanism for organizing the protest (Biddix & Park, 2008). Bennett (2004) found that links between sites protesting against corporate globalization kept the sites active and connected them to wider communities of activists beyond those that were present in the various demonstrations. Furthermore, these links assisted in the establishment of online issue networks against corporate globalization (Bennett, 2004). The research of Rogers and Ben-David (2008), which analyzed the issues networks of Israeli non-governmental organizations (NGOs) resisting the ‘security fence’, found that a network of links exists between a wide range of Israeli protest organizations, for example, feminist organizations, peace organizations, refusal organizations (against service in the military), human rights organizations, and advocacy organizations (Rogers & Ben-David 2008). Sereno (2010), unlike Rogers and Ben-David (2008), did not look at one issue network but rather included many Israeli protest domains dealing with the environment, ethnic discrimination, education, social justice, animal rights, LGBT rights, right of refugees and foreign workers, and more – 15 clusters of protests in all. The findings demonstrate a very high connectivity level between organizations for social change in Israel. Left-wing organizations created a very dense network, whereas right-wing organizations hardly linked to each other. Finally, a small number of studies look at differential connectivity patterns between governmental and NGO websites. Such studies found that government websites (.gov) tend to link only to other government sites, while social organiza84

tions (.org) tend to be more generous with their hyperlinks and tend to link mainly to other social organizations, but also link to government institutions, research institutes and more. Yet research also uncovered that these organizations are quite selective about which organizations they link to. This selectivity is expressed in not linking to actors to whom linkage would afford direct or indirect recognition (Rogers, 2004; 2002; Rogers & Marres, 2000).

Research Questions 1. What characterizes the linking patterns between Israeli political right- and left-wing websites? 2. What characterizes the clusters of links within Israeli political right- and left-wing websites? 3. Who are the major players in each cluster?

Research Hypotheses 1. Very few (if any) links exist between Israeli right-wing and left-wing websites. 2. Israeli right-wing political players link less than left-wing political players, hence creating a sparser network of links among right-wing websites as compared to left-wing websites. 3. a. The central players in terms of connectivity in both left-wing and right-wing sites are NGOs and not sites of traditional political players such as political parties and MKs. b. The sites of political parties and MKs gain significantly less inbound links than other sites in general.

Methodology Over the years, as the academic interest in linking and links grew, a new research method of ‘link analysis’ has developed. This method grew out of social network analysis and perceives links

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between web pages as expressions of relations between entities. The purpose of the analysis is to recognize patterns of connectivity and information flow between a large number of agents. This non-intrusive method is applied on data that can be presented as nodes and the links between them. A node represents an agent (a site, page, documents, etc.), and the results of the analysis are presented as a graph or a map of agents’ relations (Park and Thelwall, 2003). When examining patters of links in right-wing and left-wing political websites, one must first define the criteria by which such sites are classified. The Israeli right is associated with more rigid positions regarding territorial concessions during negotiations with the Palestinians and with a more aggressive position in the war against Palestinian terrorism. The left-wing identifies more with positions that advocate territorial compromise and providing relief to the Palestinian population in times of need (Peres and Ben-Raphael, 2006; Almog, 2004; Horowitz and Lissak, 1990). To avoid bias in classifying the sites, all the sites that were sampled were sent to external referees and were classified as right-wing, left-wing or center, according to their expressed statements regarding the relations between Israelis and Palestinians. The sample also includes organizations that deal with relations between Jews and Arabs inside Israel as part of the wider discourse of the Israeli/ Palestinian conflict. The vast number of Israeli online political sites – including sites of ad-hoc initiatives, political blogs, online magazines, independent news sites, memorial sites, educational institutions and forums for various ideological musings – made it difficult in this early stages to decide which sites should be included in the sample. Ultimately, we decided to settle in the current study for the linking patterns between the institutional players, i.e. the following types of websites: official site of Israeli parties, unofficial sites of the parties (i.e. sites of party activists that are not endorsed by the party itself), personal sites of Knesset members, sites of

those who tried to get onto a party list and were not elected, or registered social organizations. We also decided not to include Facebook pages of parties, Knesset members and organizations, since they are fully available only to registered members of the network and not to the general public. We sampled only Hebrew-language sites of Israeli organizations, for the following reasons: first, our goal is to map the issue networks and interactions between Israeli actors and not foreign players. Second, we want to study sites in which the content is accessible to Israeli Internet users who are in general much more fluent in Hebrew than in English. Third, it is possible that sites in different languages that belong to the same political agent would include different content and different links. Including only Hebrew sites enabled us to overcome this limitation. The sample was constructed in five phases, reflecting the political reality at the time of research (November 2010). First, we conducted an extensive manual Google search for all the presiding members of the 18th Knesset. We also looked for sites of parties who are either represented in the Knesset or are formally registered with the registrar of the parties (even if not represented in the Knesset). We also included unofficial party sites, which are not managed by parties but still function as a central hub of conversations between supporters. In the second stage, we added to the sample a long list of NGOs dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on an updated list received from the Israeli Corporations Authority. In the third stage, the sample was compared to lists that exist on several key websites dealing with civic associations active in Israel. The sites listed there that met our criteria were added to our list. In the fourth phase, the complied list was sent to ten expert referees who are familiar with the research field (Internet scholars, consultants and activists, among others). The experts added dozens of organizations to the list and also referred us to additional central websites from which additional relevant sites could be found. In the fifth and last

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phase, we applied the ‘snowballing’ method and included in our list all sites that were linked to the sites in our sample until no new sites were accessible from the sites in the sample. Ultimately, the sample included 202 websites, which comprised as follows: 64 sites of Knesset members, 29 official sites of parties that were registered with the Registrar of Parties (including parties who were not represented in the Knesset), ten unofficial party sites and 99 NGO websites. To analyze the linking patterns, we applied the Issue Crawler software, which allows for several levels of in-depth analysis. The software enables selection of how many levels of internal links to follow and how much iteration of outbound links (i.e., snowball effect) to conduct. The software was selected because it is user-friendly and free and has been used in many parallel studies of linking patterns between political websites (Gillan & Pickerill, 2008; Sullivan & Xie, 2009; Rogers & Ben-David, 2008; Rogers & Marres, 2000, etc.).3 In each site included in the sample, we referred not only to links from the homepage sites or from the “Links” pages, but rather to all the links on pages removed by three or less pages from the homepage, for two reasons. First, we sought to include all possible links found on the site. Second, to understand the connectivity decisions between different sites, it is important to study the site as a single entity and to look at the linking decisions that were made at different times and in different contexts. For example, there may be a situation in which a left-wing organization does not link to a right-wing organization on its official links page, but still such links can be found in internal content pages. Ultimately, the software produced a connectivity map, which includes sites of organizations as nodes and lines that represent links between the nodes (see screenshot below). The size of a node on the map is proportional to the number of inbound links from sites in the sample. The more inbound links a certain site receives, the bigger the node. Also, the closeness between the different nodes in the network represents the number 86

of links between these sites, and the more links that exist between two different sites, the closer their respective nodes appear on the map. Finally, the relative position of the points in the map represents a player’s centrality in the network. The more inbound links received by a node, the more central its position on the map. Non-dominant players (nodes that received a small number of links) are peripherally located in the map. It is also important to note that the software does not display in the map organizations that received zero or one inbound links from the sites in the sample. Thus, although our sample included 202 sites, isolated or solitary organizations do not appear on the map.

Findings Figures1 and 2 present the link analysis between the 202 sites included in the sample. The hypotheses of the study have been supported. As expected, some links were found between politicians and their parties, and no links were found between politicians from any party and politicians from other parties. For example: the site of MK Zeev Bielsky links to the site of his party – Kadima – which in turn links to the sites of its Chairman at the time, Zippi Livni. This finding supports Hypothesis 1. Another interesting finding is that a very small number of right-wing political websites are linked to, or are linked from, other sites in the sample. This finding supports Hypothesis 2. This pattern is consistent with a finding of Sereno (2010), who called this linking strategy ‘isolationist’. Not only do right-wing sites fail to link to left-wing sites and vice versa, but also, right-wing sites hardly link to other right-wing sites either (they don’t include any links at all). In fact, because of their absence of hyperlinks, most of the right-wing sites were simply erased from the map, although they were included in the sample. Due to the near absence of right-wing sites on the map, the network between right-wing organizations is significantly sparser as compared to left-wing organizations. The maps

 Cleavages and Links

Figure 1. Hyperlink analysis map of 202 Israeli political websites, depth 2

include a very small number of right-wing sites (e.g., the site of Prime Minister Netanyahu and of Deputy Prime Minister Silvan Shalom and also the site of the “Party of Hope”, which is not represented in the Knesset). The key central sites are the sites of opposition leader Tzipi Livni and the website of the key opposition party at the time, Kadima. The most salient finding is the dominance of social organization sites, over and above the sites of political parties and candidates, making the latter appear peripheral and isolated (supporting Hypothesis 3). The players who gained salience in the map of links are social organizations from the left side of the ideological cleavage. The most prominent among these are the sites of the human rights organization Betselem (linked to from 25 sites), the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (linked to from 24 sites), Adalah - the Legal Center

for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (linked to from 23 sites), Physicians for Human Rights – Israel (linked to from 20 sites), the Adva Center – an independent research institute that focuses on equality and social justice (linked to from 17 sites), and Shatil – which provides support and consulting for social change organizations (also linked to from 17 sites). Another interesting finding is the near absence of most of the sites of parties and politicians from the hyperlinks maps. Only a small number of politicians are linked either from sites of NGOs or from sites of parties. Unsurprisingly, the politicians who are famous for their online connections and networks of activists offline are those politicians who remained on the maps, including left-wing politicians Shelly Yehimovich (Labor) and Dov Chanin (Chadash). Chanin’s site is unique due to its bi-directional connections with the sites of

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Figure 2. Hyperlink analysis map of 202 Israeli political websites, depth 3

“Chadash” (the party on whose ticket he ran for the Knesset), the site of the party “A City for All” (on whose behalf he ran for Mayor of the city of Tel Aviv), as well as activist organizations’ sites. Netanyahu and Livni, the leaders of the two main Knesset parties, indeed appear on the map but are far less connected than these lesser-known politicians. Among the parties, one can discern in the hyperlinks maps two typical groups of players. On one hand are sites of big parties (i.e., “Labor”, “Likkud” and “Kadima”), which are linked to and from the personal sites of their leaders and the unofficial sites of the parties. On the other hand, the map also includes smaller parties, such as “Meretz”, “Chadash”, “Maki” and the “Green Movement Meimad”, which the last two are not even represented in the Knesset.

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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The study examines the linking patterns in the Israeli Internet between various political players – MKs, parties and organizations for social change. The methodology of link analysis was selected in order to identify channels of recognition and information flow, and discern online discourse patterns. The study hypotheses have been supported. Right-wing and left-wing websites hardly linked to one another; the cluster of left-wing websites was tighter and denser than the cluster of rightwing sites; the major players in these clusters are not traditional political players such as parties and MKs, but rather NGOs; and the websites of parties and MKs not only linked less to other political websites, but also received less linkage from such sites.

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The absence of links between left-wing and right-wing sites is consistent with the findings of Adamic (2005), which demonstrated that liberal blogs linked almost exclusively to liberal blogs and not to conservative blogs, and vice versa. The reason for this exclusionary phenomenon may be the social background of the link as an online tool to grant recognition, declare ideological and similarity and establish a discourse community with clear boundaries. Seen this way, the findings of this study support the findings about the expressive and social meaning of the link, and the selective manner that is it used by the various political players (Halavais, 2008; Park & Thelwall, 2003; Dimitrova et al., 2003; Rogers & Marrers, 2000; Tsui, 2008; Turow, 2008; Hargittai, 2008; Shaw, 2001; Ackland at el, 2006; Rogers & BenDavid, 2008; Rosenkrands, 2004; Bennett, 2004; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2002; Sereno, 2010). Thus, it is not surprising that these ‘rules of the game’ have been maintained in the Israeli Internet, and each side preserves its loyalty to players who are close to its own values and ideology. The current study continues the study by Sereno (2010), who found that the clustering within leftwing NGOs in Israel was substantially denser than the clustering within right-wing NGOs. One can speculate that the reason for this occurrence involves sociological and strategic considerations. A comprehensive study that examined the protest movements in the Israeli right found that its members maintain a dense social network supported by local media, live in close geographic proximity, attend formal and informal educational institutions, and adhere to similar political and even religious worldviews (Sprinzak,1981). Moreover, a recent study (Lev-On, 2012) among evacuees from Gush Katif (who stood in the right-wing forefront of resistance to the disengagement from the Gaza strip in 2005) found that the most popular media used in maintaining contact between the evacuees have been small media (niche websites, pamphlets and even group SMS). These studies may shed some light on the online behavior of right-wing organizations and suggest that political players

who enjoy very dense social networks may not feel the need to connect to many websites, since the function of ‘tightening the political glue’ between them is carried out in other ways. This speculation, however, requires further empirical support. Another interesting finding is the lack of inbound, as well as outbound, links to the sites of MKs and parties. Earlier studies of the online presence of MKs and parties suggest that these actors do not continuously maintain their online presence, but rather divert significant budgets and attention to their online platforms mainly before general elections or party primaries (HalevaAmir, 2011; Lev-On, 2011). It seems that a large number of the leading political players in Israel, in spite of the high penetration rates and extensive usage of the Internet, still do not perceive it as a dominant medium. The linkage maps produced for this study further demonstrate this point, and show that the leading political players do not see the importance of being connected to and from other political sites, do not realize the importance of linking as increasing visibility in search engines and attracting additional traffic to their websites, and do not perceive websites as central arenas for conversation with other players and with the public. This situation may change with the rise of Facebook, but exploration of this issue is left for future studies. Unlike the more institutionalized players in Israeli politics, it seems that NGOs perceive the Internet as more important, and invest more in their linking strategy. An earlier study by Sereno (2010), who examined the linking patterns of social change organizations, helps explain the reason for this phenomenon. In addition to link analysis, Sereno (2010) conducted some 29 indepth interviews with the content managers of the websites of Israeli NGOs in order to understand their decision making while linking or not linking to other sites. The study also looked at the level of Internet usage by the organization, as well as its positions regarding Internet usage. The study found that low budgets are the primary reason for these organizations’ consistent and intensive 89

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usage of the Internet, which provides efficient and inexpensive ways to reach the target audience and recruit and mobilize it. A second reason is the difficulty to place stories in the mainstream media, and the constant struggle to receive positive coverage. As the mainstream media prioritizes the central and more institutionalized players in politics (and also serves as the communicative focus of politicians and parties), the need for alternative channels of communication with the public and the activists is acute, and here also the Internet is especially useful. The two reasons for NGOs’ reliance on the Internet – scarcity of resources and blocked access to the mainstream media – are well documented in the literature and seem to apply worldwide (Wolfsfeld, 1991; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Wolfsfeld, 1997; Paletz & Entman, 1981; Van Zoonen, 1996; Van Dijk, 1996; Hertog & McLeod, 1995). According to many researchers, the Internet is invaluable in overcoming these challenges (Van de Donk, Loader, Nixon & Rucht, 2004; Pickerill, 2003; Cammaerts, 2006; Vedel, 2003; Harcup, 2003; Owens & Palmer, 2003). Another reason that is unique to the Israeli landscape may explain the dense clustering of the left-wing NGOs in Israel. Sereno (2010) found that many left-wing activists work simultaneously in a number of organizations, which further strengthens the links between these organizations. This cross-activism can help explain the decision regarding whether to link to sites. Clearly, this phenomenon is very different from the inter-party/ intra-party arena, which is characterized by a significantly higher level of competition, which may reduce the tendency to link to others who may be perceived first and foremost as competitors, rather than potential collaborators. The last point may also explain why leftwing NGOs link much more to NGOs than to politicians and parties. This pattern is consistent with findings from past studies, i.e. that social organizations tend to link to each other and not to political institutions (Rogers & Marres, 2000), as

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that identification with formal political institutions is not always perceived to serve the goals of the organization. Furthermore, social organizations generally seek to change reality and are critical towards the establishment, even towards players who are on ‘the same side’ of the respective ideological cleavage. Our sample includes two MKs who are an exception to this rule – Shelly Yehimovich (Labor) and Dov Hanin (Chadash). In conclusion, the study shows that online Israeli politics in 2010 seems to be quite distinct from its offline corollary. Institutional players (mainly MKs and parties) do not form central nodes on the map; indeed, they are virtually non-existent. Not only do right-wing and left-wing organizations polarized and fail to link to each other, but in fact, it seems that right-wing players demonstrate an ‘isolationist’ strategy of linking and do not link even to their close right-wing allies. Of course, link analysis is not the only tool to explain online politics. The choice of a single methodology narrows our understanding of online politics and yields limited explanatory value. Future studies of the issue should apply other tools such as interviews and content analysis. Such studies may also include additional online political venues, such as blogs and especially Facebook which seems – in the period following the completion of this analysis – to have become a primary arena for online politics (Haleva-Amir, 2011). Ultimately, this study should form one piece in a larger longitudinal study showing how linking patterns change over time. The Internet is a very dynamic arena, and links may change rapidly. Linkage maps created repeatedly every few months may present the dynamics of discourse in the Israeli political web. Such a longitudinal study may shed light not only on the changing online behavior of political players, but also on collaborations that emerge and disintegrate in politics, on the rise and decline of information channels, as well as on processes of identification, recognition and legitimacy.

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Lev-On, A. (2012). Communication, community, crisis: Mapping uses and gratifications in the contemporary media environment. New Media & Society, 14, 98–116. doi:10.1177/1461444811410401 Lev-On, A., & Neriya-Ben Shahar, R. (2011). A forum of their own: Views about the Internet among ultra-Orthodox Jewish women who browse designated closed forums. First Monday, 16(4). doi:10.5210/fm.v16i4.3228 Lissak, M. (1999). The Mass Immigration in the Fifties: The Failure of the Melting Pot Policy. Jerusalem: Bialik Institute Press (Hebrew). Owens, L., & Palmer, L. K. (2003). Making the news: Anarchist counter-public relations on the World Wide Web. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 20(4), 335–361. doi:10.1080/0739318032000142007 Paletz, D. L., & Entman, R. M. (1981). Media Power Politics. New York: Free Press. Park, H. W., & Thelwall, M. (2003). Hyperlink analyses of the World Wide Web: A review. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 8(4). Peres, Y., & Ben-Rafael, E. (2006). Cleavages in Israeli Society. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hebrew). Pickerill, J. (2003). Cyberprotest: Environmental Activism Online. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Rogers, R. (2002). Operating issue networks on the Web. Science as Culture, 11(2), 191–214. doi:10.1080/09505430220137243 Rogers, R. (2004). Information Politics on the Web. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Rogers, R., & Ben-David, A. (2008). The Palestinian-Israeli peace process and transnational issue networks: the complicated place of the Israeli NGO. New Media & Society, 10(3), 497–528. doi:10.1177/1461444807085321

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Rogers, R., & Marres, N. (2000). Landscaping climate change: A mapping technique for understanding science and technology debates on the World Wide Web. Public Understanding of Science (Bristol, England), 9(2), 141–163. doi:10.1088/0963-6625/9/2/304 Rosenkrands, J. (2004). Politicizing Homo economics: Analysis of anti-corporate websites. In W. Van de Donk, B. D. Loader, P. G. Nixon, & D. Rucht (Eds.), Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements. London: Routledge. Sereno, K. (2010). Understanding the hyperlinks politics better: The Israeli protest networks as a case study. Retrieved September 30, 2013, from http://microsites.oii.ox.ac.uk/ipp2010/system/ files/IPP2010_Sereno_Paper.pdf Shaw, D. (2001). Playing the links: Interactivity and stickiness in. com and not. com Web sites. First Monday, 6(3). doi:10.5210/fm.v6i3.837 Sprinzak, E. (1981). Gush Emunim: The iceberg model of political extremism. State [Hebrew]. Administration and International Relations, 14, 25–52. Tsui, L. (2008). The hyperlink in newspapers and blogs. In J. Turow, & L. Tsui (Eds.), The Hyperlinked Society (pp. 70–83). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Turow, J. (2008). Introduction: On not taking the hyperlink for granted. In J. Turow, & L. Tsui (Eds.), The Hyperlinked Society (pp. 1–18). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Van Aelst, P., & Walgrave, S. (2002). New media, new movements? The role of the internet in shaping the ‘anti‐globalization’movement. Information Communication and Society, 5(4), 465–493. doi:10.1080/13691180208538801

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Van de Donk, W., Loader, B. D., Nixon, P. G., & Rucht, D. (2004). Introduction: Social movements and ICTs. In W. Van de Donk, B. D. Loader, P. G. Nixon, & D. Rucht (Eds.), Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements (pp. 1–21). London: Routledge. Van Dijk, T. A. (1996). Power and news media. In D. L. Paletz (Ed.), Political Communication in Action: States, Institutions, Movements, Audiences. Hampton Press. Van Zoonen, L. (1996). A dance of death: New social movements and mass media. In D. L. Paletz (Ed.), Political Communication in Action: States, Institutions Movements, Audiences. Hampton Press. Vedel, T. (2003). Political communication in the age of the Internet. In J. M. Philippe, & G. Wolfsfeld (Eds.), Political Communication in the New Era: A Cross National Perspective (pp. 41–59). London: Routledge. Wolfsfeld, G. (1991). Media, protest and political violence. Journalism Monographs (Austin, Tex.), 127, 1–61.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Link Analysis: A method used to evaluate the relations between various nodes in networks. Links: Electronic references that enables users to open another document. NGOs: Organizations that are neither a part of the government nor for-profit businesses. Political Communication: A research field that focuses on the intersection between politics and communication. Political Parties: An organization of people with similar views on the distribution of resources in a country or society. Social Media: Interactions in which people collaboratively exchange and share information.

ENDNOTES 1



2



3

http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5. htm http://www.140.co.il/blog/2010/01/13/3902 For more about the capabilities of the software, see: http://www.govcom.org.

Wolfsfeld, G. (1997). Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

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Chapter 6

Information and Communication Technologies, Democracy, and Human Rights in Nigeria Joseph Wilson University of Maiduguri, Nigeria Nuhu Gapsiso University of Maiduguri, Nigeria

ABSTRACT The unprecedented impact of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) on nearly every facet of human endeavour has continued to attract individual and organizational interest to explore these technologies for specific cause. ICTs are increasingly being used in promoting democracy and human rights issues: to mobilize and strengthen solidarity, increase communication among interest groups, and share information more quickly. There is no doubt that ICTs deployment in Nigeria and other developing countries has sparked growth in citizens’ abilities to communicate and share ideas, but there are impediments. This chapter looks at the evolution of ICTs in Nigeria, the place of ICTs in promoting democracy/human rights, and discusses the challenges of harnessing the enormous benefits of ICTs in promoting democracy and human rights in Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have emerged to be significant tools for human development. The 21st century and the beginning of the new millennium have marked many changes in the way the world thinks and functions. Perhaps the most significant of these are the glaring developments in the sphere of

information and communication technologies (ICTs). We now live in the information age with tools of information being more sophisticated and effective than ever before (UNESCO, 2007). ICTs have opened up new horizons for unimaginable exchange of information, knowledge and ideas. These technologies have in no little way influenced nearly every area of human endeavours such as education, livelihood, communication, healthcare,

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social behaviour, etc. ICTs have opened-up areas that used to be an exclusive preserve for very few in the society. For example, international trade and businesses were in recent past a preserve for the affluent in the society, but today ICTs have made it possible for a rural-based cocoa farmer in Africa to contact buyers any-where in the world to sell his products in good price. A fish farmer in a village in Yobe State, Nigeria can contact a five star hotel in London to buy his fish. Man’s yearning for freedom and a system of governance by the people and for the people are to some extent met by use of these new technologies. For example, governance in most countries used to be strictly top-down approach; a system that gives citizens little or no opportunity to make inputs in affairs or issues that concerns their wellbeing. The majority globally had little opportunity to express themselves because they lack the means or channels to do so. The scenario is different now with the emergence of ICTs. Horrocks and Prachett (1995) note that ICTs offer the promise of an information rich-society: one in which citizens have access to a wide range of information from a variety of sources; one in which every issue is extensively debated amongst citizens and policy makers through interactive media; and also a society in which participation in the political process is greatly increased. It is interesting to note that citizens in diaspora now have the opportunity to participate in electoral processes such as campaigning for a candidate of their choice and even voting in the diaspora. In recent times, promoting democracy and the protection of human rights through the use of new communication technologies have become areas of growing interest, which involves working towards the betterment of governance mechanisms and the growth of a global civil society that is characterized by equity (International Telecommunication Union, 2005). These strides as a result of ICTs have compelled governments to formulate policies to harness the utilization of ICTs for the larger benefit of mankind.

Like other countries of the world, Nigeria is not left out in the pursuit for providing an enabling environment for ICTs access and usage to thrive. For example, it has an Information Technology (IT) policy designed to bring ICTs to bear in every facet of its national endeavours. Based on its IT policy, it would not be out of place to say that Nigeria has joined the League of Nations where ICTs are being explored for various purposes. For example, the Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (INEC) has adopted the use of ICTs for electoral processes such as electronic voter registration, submission of election results via email to the headquarters, publishing of election results, voters education etc. These are some indicators of the use of ICTs in democratic process in Nigeria. The National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria has a website that informs and educates people on its activities (see http:// www.inecnigeria.org/). The site also has provision for users to send their complaint (see http:// www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/). Other areas these technologies are being employed in Nigeria include: agriculture, trade, broadcasting, tourism, consumer protection, medicine etc. However, there are challenges militating against the effective utilization of these technologies in the various fields of human endeavours to achieve desired results. This chapter examines the state of ICTs in promoting democracy and human rights in Nigeria. It also looks at the problems associated with the use of these technologies.

ICT STATUS IN NIGERIA According to Ibikunle (2008) ICTs initiative in Nigeria started in the 1950s with focus on print and electronic media. He notes that no major policy or result was achieved because of government’s strict control of all productive sectors. The print media were the major means of information dissemination that attained early and reasonable vibrancy in Nigeria. The electronic digital computer made its

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first appearance in Nigeria in 1963, in connection with the analysis of the 1962/63 national population census data. Between 1963 and 1973, the total computer population in the country stood at 20-25, with 6 or so of these being associated with the multinational companies (Ibikunle, 2008) . By 1977 the total number of installations had grown to around 70. Subsequently, many universities, government departments, and parastatal organizations, such as the West African Examinations Council (WAEC), the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB), the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) now Power Holdingg Company of Nigeria (PHCN), the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), and the Federal Office of Statistics, as well as many banks and commercial firms, began to show interest in computers (Nwachuku, 1994). In telecommunications, Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) the then national carrier dominated the telecommunication sector for several years with services available to very few Nigerians. The major ICTs initiative in Nigeria was flagged off with the establishment of the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), and the Nigeria Communication Commission (NCC) in 1992. The NBC at that time was able to achieve some success by licensing private operators commencing in 1993 with the likes of African Independent Television (AIT), Ray Power FM, Channels TV, Cool FM among others. The NCC, however could not achieve similar strides as the NBC until 1997 when few wireless operators were licensed to provide telephoning services in some major Nigerian cities especially Abuja and Lagos (Ndukwe, 2011). In 1998 the country took a leap towards space science or satellite technology. The National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA) was established by the Federal Government of Nigeria. The administration also set up a National Council on Space Science Technology to oversee the programme, underscoring the importance with which government viewed the programme. The National Space Research and Development

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Agency (NASRDA) was mandated to coordinate and consolidate all space and technology activities that would lead to development of a Nigerian satellite (GlobalSecurity.org, 2009). By June 2001, government approved the policy and programmes of its Space Technology agenda, thus creating the enabling environment for the actualization of the NigeriaSat-1 project. In 2003, Nigeria launched (from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Russia) its first satellite with Russian assistance (a reconnaissance satellite). Four years later (in 2007) the country launched its second satellite (The Nigerian Communication Satellite NIGCOMSAT-1) which is expected to offer broadcasting, phone and broadband internet services for Africa (BBC World Service, 2007). Efforts in respect of ICTs deployment was further boosted by setting up the National Policy on information technology. The Federal Executive Council approved a National Information Technology policy in March 2001 and the implementation started in April with the establishment (through the Ministry of Science and Technology) of the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA), charged with the implementation responsibility. NITDA is to enter into strategic alliance, collaboration and joint venture with the private sector for the actualization of the IT vision, which is to make Nigeria an ICTs-capable country as well as using ICTs as an engine for sustainable development and global competitiveness. It is also to be used for education, job creation, wealth creation, poverty eradication and global competitiveness. Emphasis is to be laid on development of National Information Infrastructure Backbone (NIIB) as well as the Human Resources Development. In addition, Information Technology Parts are to be developed in Abuja and in each of the six geo-political zones (National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA), 2007). Nigeria ICT status has enjoyed some remarkable improvement. Besides the massive importation of ICT facilities such as computers, compact disc players, digital video disc players, mp3 and 4

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players, ipods etc, the country has in recent years experienced improvement in telecommunication services. Ndukwe (2011) notes that Nigeria has had a Telecom revolution that has seen the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology develop side by side with the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) technology. Just as Nigeria currently has the largest number of GSM connections on the continent it also true that Nigeria has the largest number of CDMA connections in Africa. Significant consolidation has also occurred in Nigeria’s Internet and broadband sector, from over 400 ISPs in 2009 to around 120 in early 2012. New powerful players from the fixed wireless and mobile network operator camp have entered the market with 3G mobile and advanced wireless broadband services. At least two operators are rolling out fourth generation (4G) LTE networks (budde.comm, 2012). The arrival of two new international submarine fibre optic cables in 2009 has to a large extent broken the monopoly in this sub-sector and revolutionised the market by reducing the cost of bandwidth by up to 90%. Several national fibre backbone networks are being rolled out to transport this bandwidth to the end-users. However, due to the vast expanse of the country and decades of neglect of infrastructure prior to market liberalization, satellite-based services will continue to play an important role in Nigeria’s telecoms sector (see www.companiesandmarket.com) . There are obvious development being recorded in respect of broadband technology.. For example: The Internet Protocol (IP)-based next generation networks currently being rolled out are enabling converged voice, data/Internet and video services. VoIP is already carrying the bulk of Nigeria’s international voice traffic. The arrival of a second international submarine fibre-optic cable (Glo-1) in 2009 and a third in 2010 (Main One) has broken the monopoly of Nitel’s SAT-3/ WASC cable and is revolutionising the market by

reducing the cost of international bandwidth by up to 90%. Two additional cables are expected to go online in 2012. Supported by the expansion of several competing national fibre backbone networks, applications such as e-commerce, online banking and e-payments, e-health, e-learning and e-government are rapidly evolving (budde. comm, 2012). Currently, Nigeria stands as one of the biggest and fastest growing telecom markets in Africa, attracting large number of foreign investment. It has even overtaken South Africa to become the continent’s largest mobile market with now more than 110 million subscribers (Longe, 2013). The country has grown from one telecommunication giant (NITEL) to several telecommunication companies such as Globacom, Airtel, Etisalat, MTN, Starcomms, Multilink among others, and yet market penetration stands at only around 70% in early 2013 (Longe, 2013).. Far reaching regulatory reform has led to hundreds of companies providing virtually all kinds of telecom and value-added services in an independently regulated market. Billions of US dollars are being invested into network infrastructure each year. Competition has increased under a new unified licensing regime, and declining average revenue per user levels are forcing the operators to streamline their businesses, introduce new services and transform themselves into converged broadband service providers in order to maintain market share (see www.companiesandmarket.com). Ndukwe (2011) notes that the introduction of the State Accelerated Broadband Initiative (SABI) project was NCC’s immediate response to the urgent need to initiate policies that are aimed at promoting faster deployment of broadband in Nigeria. The project was designed to encourage the operating companies to build and run broadband infrastructure with Government support and incentives in all state capitals, major commercial cities and subsequently all over the country.

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These developments in the various ICTs sectors in Nigeria have, to a large extent empowered Nigerians whom in the recent past had very limited ICTs opportunities. These technologies are being explored by Nigerians for various purposes including democratic and human rights purposes.

THE PUSH-ICT THEORY AND NIGERIA ICTS STATUS The Nigeria ICT status finds expression within the framework of ICT-Push theory. The Push-ICT Theory is a derivative of the word “push”. Which means to press until it’s accepted. The theory is a product of longitudinal observation of the situation surrounding the use of some information and communication technologies (such mobile phone, computer and computer literacy training) (Wilson, 2009). Although the history of computer deployment in Nigeria dates back to 1960 but it did not gain popularity until the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium (2000) when several organization and government agencies, educational institutions began a massive deployment of computers for various purposes. Although there was enthusiasm among Nigerians but there was also resistance to change some old practices like manual record keeping, manual payroll for staff, manual processing of students’ results and lecture notes, manual banking services etc were still largely the practices. However, the earliest push came from the Nigeria government through introduction the Information Technology policy (Policy Push) which it tied to every aspect of national development (agriculture, education, economy, governance) indirectly coercing Nigerians to adopt. Most organizations made computer literacy one of the requirements for employment, promotion etc. The second push was government and organizations deployment of ICT facilities (Deployment Push).

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It deployed computers to government agencies and educational institution through organizations like the Petroleum Technology Development Fund-Nigeria, Educational Trust Fund -Nigeria. It also introduced the One –US- Dollar-Computer initiative. Computers were also made affordable to Nigerians through soft loans (payable in several months) these and other efforts pushed computers to the doorsteps of Nigeria and served as a kind of indirect coercion for Nigerians into the use of computers. There was also social coercion or push (Social Push). Organizations (educational institutions and their proprietors, businesses and individuals made computer services and ownership, mobile phone ownership a social status symbol. This forced individuals and organization into buying computers, offering computer services and mobile phone to belong to the supposedly social class of these technologies users. The Social push could come from close associates (friends, colleagues. spouses, and people not known (competing organizations, similar businesses etc) to the user. Another angle of the theory is the push from ICT users (Users Push). When ICT facilities are not affordable which in most cases is as a result of poor implementation of policy, the users of these ICTs are forced to complain to relevant authorities. In Nigeria the high tariff hitherto on mobile telecommunication services has compelled subscribers to push for reduction on tariff through the legislative arm of government and the Nigeria Communication Commission. The Push-ICT Theory stipulates that: •

In a situation where Information and Communication technologies are considered important or relevant to development of individuals or community, such technologies should be deployed by the relevant organization (government, non-governmental organizations or individual.

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• •

•

•

The relevant technology or services (e.g. training) should be made affordable. It can be deployed free or highly subsidized. The deploying organization or individual would clearly identifying workable benefits of the technology and subsequently coerce the individuals or communities to use the deployed technologies or services. The push is usually through policy framework, cheap and affordable deployment of ICT facilities, social status push and ICTuser push. Where ICT remains unaffordable (may be as a result of poor implementation of policy) users also push ICT providers to offer affordable facilities and services (Wilson, 2009).

When there is easy access or availability of ICT facilities, resistance to adopt the use of ICT is highly reduced, while acceptance to use is greatly enhanced and the possibility to use the technology is high.

ICTS AND DEMOCRACY One of the global characteristics of a well-functioning nation is democracy. Strong elements of democracy, as Ibikunle (2008) notes, are people’s participation in governance through regular elections and a vibrant civil society. The spirit of open and public dialogue, open government and easy access to government office holders by citizens are some important features of democracy. These features in most democracies are a far cry, as most of the citizens lack the opportunity to do so, since the ruling power in most cases controls the channels of information dissemination and only give the people what they want the people to hear and what they want the people to know. Access to people’s representatives is often difficult and sometimes impossible. Thus policies are often top-down without the consent of citizens.

Hence, it is imperative to explore ways to address such democracy deficits. Information and communication technologies, to some extent offer such a solution. ICTs present benefits and challenges to democratic development. For example, the Internet provides a voice for many individuals and groups, whether democratic or undemocratic. Undemocratic forces are employing powerful technologies with equal, if not greater, efficiency and scope, which further highlights the importance of empowering democrats and institutions in emerging democracies to use ICTs as a tool to enhance the information sharing, efficiency and transparency that are crucial to building and sustaining democracy (National Democratic Institute, 2007) ICTs such as cell phones, internet and satellite television are unimaginably affecting socio- political institutions worldwide, particularly in new and emerging democracies like Nigeria that were cut off as a result of prolonged military rule. In the hands of reformers and activists, these technologies can overcome resource disparities and entrenched monopolies of power and voice. There are several examples worldwide of how ICTs are used from a democratic perspective. Some of these uses include the use of ICTs such as the internet to promote citizen advocacy, voter’s awareness and education, improve government transparency and accountability, citizen mobilization etc. Individuals, civil and non-governmental organizations, companies, civil servants, politicians, and large state and private-sector organizations are employing technologies such as Internet to enhance communication, improve access to important information, and increase their efficiency which expectedly results in a strengthened democratic processes and more effective governance (National Democratic Institute, 2007). Adopting the use of ICTs in democratic development has thus become necessary covering areas such as voter registration, campaigns, mobilization of members of political parties and fund raising for campaigns.

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THE NIGERIAN SCENARIO Nigeria emerged from British colonial rule in 1960, and 30 years of its 49 years of existence as an independent state was spent under military rule. The military leadership is usually the antithesis? of a democratic system and for this reason democratic principles had no expression for several years. Although there were some brief touch of democracy in the course of the nation’s existence which are commonly referred to as the First (1963-1966), Second (1979-1983) and Third (June 1993- August 1993) Republics, the present stable democratic scene which gained ground in 1999 when General Abdulsalam Abubakar handed over power to a democratically elected government of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. In May 2009 the country marked its 10th year of a stable uninterrupted democratic government. It is still a widely held view that the democratic system is comparatively young and thus not devoid of challenges. Citizens are often not carried along; representatives of the people in either the State House of Assembly or the National Assembly are out of the reach of the members of their constituencies. The situation is such that the President and his Cabinet have very little contact with the citizens they supposedly serve. State governors and chairpersons of local government areas who ordinarily should be close to the people are far from them. Policies are based on what they believe is good for the people and in most cases neglecting the immediate needs of the people. BBC Hausa Service programme “BBC a Karkara”, that ran on air for weeks in 2009 (a live presentation of the status of the rural dweller in some selected locations in the Northern Nigeria) revealed to a large extent how most Nigerians are cut-off from their leaders. According to Drake (2001) Political parties are another essential foundation of vibrant democracies. But unfortunately, the state of parties around the world is rather mixed. In many developing countries, political parties are weakly institutionalized, highly fragmented, and inadequately

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prepared to govern. The social foundations of electoral politics, such as political parties and a shared civic culture are minimal in democracies in such countries. The scenario in Nigeria is the winner-takes-all and uses state apparatus such as the media, law enforcement agencies etc to silence the opposition voice. The question now is what is the role of ICTs in addressing these issues or promoting democracy? ICTs, especially the Internet is a viable tool to develop a democratic culture in Nigeria through revitalizing open and public debate, establishing open government, enhancing interactions between the government and citizens, promoting equity, and strengthening the capacity of public officials. A typical example is the posting of State monthly financial allocation by Nigeria Federal Ministry of Finance on its websites for global consumption. Currently nearly all agencies in Nigeria are developing web sites and portals offering access to government services. ICTs are also viable tools to open the government to the public and to also provide the citizens a better ability to enhance their interaction with each other and with the government. Parliaments and government agencies can provide information on programmes and pending legislation online and broadcast stations. Citizens can be invited to send in comments and their views to government officials or parliamentarians. By so doing, their views are taken into account before laws are passed and policies made. This will have the effect of making governance more transparent, accessible, and accountable to its constituents and will likely reduce public cynicism about the political process. Examples of these in Nigeria are Radio Link on Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN), Nightline live on Nigeria Television Authority (NTA), and “House Ticket“and “from the Senate” by New Age Communication on NTA. However,It is noticeable that the Nigeria National Assembly websites does not have provision for citizens comments or contributions from citzens. It is rather more of an informative side with

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no provision for reaction (see http://www.nassnig. org/). There are initiatives by State governors who make their phone lines available to the public to allow them call and make comments and complains on issues of public interest.For example the current Executive of Governors of Lagos State, Raji Fasola and Jigawa State, Sule Lamido have such initiative in place. State governments in Nigeria all have official websites showcasing the various activities of the government. ICTs can make existing models of representative democracy more responsive. This is a view espoused strongly by American pluralists who expect ICTs to create a more level playing field on which a diverse range of interest groups can compete. From this perspective, ICTs are expected to make more information more widely available to a more diverse range of groups, and for a more diverse range of purposes, than has previously been possible (Horrocks and Prachett,1995) Drake (2001) notes that ICTs present political parties with some significant new opportunities. Properly managed, ICTs can be used to reach out to politically disaffected or unmotivated citizens, including youth and historically marginalized groups. They can serve tools to publicize party positions, and to solicit feedback, new ideas, and new members; to energize party members, both nationally and at the grass-roots level; and to strengthen intra-party communications and create more flexible, less bureaucratic organizations. The mobile phone is very relevant in this case. Politicians are taking advantage of the availability of mobile phones to mobilize members along party lines. ICTs in democracy address a major foundation of democracy, which is, promoting vital public sphere of ideas and information. These technologies, if properly managed can contribute to the conduct of fair and transparent electoral process. Computerized and networked systems can significantly increase the speed and accuracy with which registrations are checked and votes counted. Broadcast networks, as it is the case now and the Internet greatly facilitate quick dissemination of results, thereby increas-

ing much needed transparency in the process. For example the Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria adopted the electronic voter’s registration at the last election exercise in 2011 but could not extend it to the voting process due to absence of a legislative framework to support the method. For instance, Section 52 (1) (b) of the Electoral Act 2010 makes it an offence for INEC to use e-voting.“The use of electronic voting for the time being is prohibited,” the section puts it. However, (2012) note that strong indications emerged recently that the Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria might be pushing for the adoption of electronic voting for the 2015 general elections (Odebode, Soriwei, Odesola & Olokor, 2012). If this is properly harnessed it could minimize, electoral fraud,, post-election complaints, save time and money and motivate citizens to participate in elections and possibly convince them to accept election results. On-line or e-voting could be effective and encourage greater participation especially in conflict prone areas. Martin and Norman (1970) note that voting from home is a technical possibility, and perhaps will be implemented in some countries. The e–voting is now a reality in countries like India, Ghana etc. An electoral system that would give the people the expected role in the election of their leaders is desirable. Milakovich (2010) notes that the internet can foster increased interest in political life and broader citizen participation in the political process, by opening up the possibility of direct two-way interaction between citizens and parties. And it is one way in which the prevailing disinterest in traditional party politics among social groups such as young people can be countered. Can ICTs not also be used in public opinion and, especially, in exit polling? These usages have greatly enhanced democratic processes and minimized the possibility of post-election violence, that is, if there is inter-party consensus to use exit polling. However, if improperly used, exit polling can produce perverse effects.

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There are other areas in which ICTs could go a long way in promoting democracy if properly managed. These areas include: the use of ICTs by government to make documents and legislative deliberations progressively more accessible to the public. e-democracy through electronic interaction among the various arms of government would improve government’s efficiency, transparency, and accountability while limiting the scope for arbitrary decisions, abuses of power and delay as a result of bureaucratic procedures. ICTs provide the information processing power and communication facilities which would enable unlimited numbers of people to participate simultaneously in debate on issues of national interest.

ICTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is a non-binding declaration adopted partly in response to the atrocities of World War II. Although a non-binding resolution at that point, it is now considered to be a central component of international customary law which may be invoked under appropriate circumstances by nations. The declaration encourages member nations to promote a number of human, civil, economic and social rights. Asserting these rights are part of the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world (see www.un.org). Human rights refer to the basic rights and freedoms to which all humans are entitled. Some of these rights and freedoms which have come to be commonly thought of as human rights include civil and political rights, such as the right to life and liberty, freedom of expression, and equality before the law; economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to participate in culture, the right to food, the right to work, and the right to education (see http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/ Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx). The United Nations General Assembly package these rights

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in 30 articles and presented as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society. It is expected that keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall make effort to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. The platform upon which information and communication technologies (ICTs) and human rights can be analyzed was forged at the United Nations Millennium Summit, which resulted in a declaration that affirmed common global commitments to the protection of the vulnerable, the alleviation of poverty, and the rectification of corrupt structures and processes – particularly in those countries in which there is a dearth of rule of law. The world’s leaders resolved to spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development (International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2005) The protection of human rights through the use of new communication technologies is an area of growing interest, not only from the point of view of the technology and communications sectors, but from the vantage position of those (individuals organizations, government agencies) working towards the continued development of an equitable global civil society. The growing interest in the use of ICTs for promoting human rights is such that ITU (2005) points out that various players are increasingly leveraging and applying ICTs amidst various contending national and corporate interests, and their work represents a significant challenge for traditional distributions of power in the international system. The proper use of ICTs can improve access to justice and make public services more responsive, transparent and accountable. The rule of law is essential for the information

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society to become a space of confidence, trust and security where human rights are fully respected (World Information Society 2003). Jorgensen et al (2004) note there has been increase in creation and the use of websites and portals specifically for providing systematic and reliable information on human rights globally. This as an important starting point, has made widely available the key human rights well-structured and comprehensive UN documents collections, UN Treaty database at: http://www.un.org, and the website of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at:, http://www.ohchr.org, which individuals and staff of most human rights organizations globally access and for various human rights related purposes.

THE NIGERIAN SCENARIO As a member of the United Nations, Nigeria is bound by the Declaration of Human Rights. The nation spent greater part of its existence since independence under military rule which spanned 30 years. Between 1960 and 1966 there were several events that infringed upon the rights of Nigerians. St Jorre’s book of 1972 on the Nigeria Civil war highlights some of the human rights abuses especially during the First Republic. Some of the human rights infringements include political inspired rioting which claimed lives and properties, looting, arson and murder across the country which resulted in the intervention of the military and marked the beginning of military rule. General Agwin Ironsi regime of 1966 was truncated by General Yakubu Gowan in July 1966 and held on to power for nine years were characterized at some points by political intolerance, interethnic antagonism, corruption, political repression and injustice. The climax of the human righst violation was the civil war which lasted 30 months. It displaced and claimed several lives and properties. Then came the General Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo regime from 1975-1979 which

had its own human rights abuses especially the massive purges in the civil service, judiciary and the universities which was done in the name of improving productivity but some were malicious and displaced several professionals and left them jobless (see www.onlinenigeria.com) The short-lived second republic led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari from 1979 to 1983 was bedeviled by the socio –political turbulence such as inter and intra party rivalry, conflict, violence that featured prominently in the 1983 election. There was deterioration of Nigerian economy which led to the importation of food items and imposition of stringent austerity measures. Other demeaning situations were high unemployment, rising incidence of armed robbery, violent ethnic and religious conflict (e.g.Maitetsine sect in Kano and Borno State). Gneral Buhari/Idiagbon regime, from 1984 to 85, General Ibrahim Babangida 1985-1993, General Sani Abacha 1993-1998 and General Abdusalam Abubakar 1998- May, 1999 all had some form of human rights violation, such as abuse of democratic principles, for example, annulling election, unlawful arrest and detention of oppositions, inability to pay workers salary for months, introduction of stringent economic measures that took food away from the tables of Nigerians (the Structural Adjustment Programme), large scale retrenchment of public servants, unrest in tertiary institutions as a result of introduction of fees and withdrawal of food subsidies (see www.onlinenigeria.com). The various military regimes were tough on Nigerians. They operated with draconian laws without consideration for the rule of law and legalities. This affected Nigerians negatively and brought sufferings to the people without correcting the anomalies such regimes claimed brought them to power (Esogbue, 2009). From the brief Ernest Shonekan Interim Government in 1993 and return of the present democratic governance in 1999, Nigeria’s human rights record according to United States Department

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of states (2008), remains poor and government officials at all levels continue to commit serious abuses. It highlighted the most significant human rights problems which include: extrajudicial killings and use of excessive force by security forces; impunity for abuses by security forces; arbitrary arrests; prolonged pretrial detention; judicial corruption and executive influence on the judiciary; torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees and suspects; harsh and life threatening prison and detention center conditions; human trafficking for the purpose of prostitution and forced labor; societal violence and vigilante killings; child labor, child abuse and child sexual exploitation; female genital mutilation (FGM); domestic violence; discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, ethnicity, region and religion; restrictions on freedom of assembly, movement, speech and religion; infringement of privacy rights; and the abridgement of the right of citizens to change the government (United States Department of States,2011). For example in the decade ending in 2009, over 1,000 children were murdered as “witches” in Nigeria (Houreld, 2009) A glance at the articles that highlight the various human rights (see www.un.org/en/document/udhr) does not require an extraordinary brainstorming to identify the role of ICTs in promoting human rights. ICTs are providing enabling environment for unlimited sharing of knowledge and ideas globally. The technologies provide tremendous opportunities to enhance the human rights to education through remote learning and the provision of innovative, interactive tools. ICT also enables wider access to education about human rights, particularly via the internet. Technology like the mobile phones is used to report cases of human right infringements to appropriate authorities. The mobile phone have been used to record scenes of human right abuses and in some cases posted uploaded on popular websites especially the

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social networking sites like Facebook for global consumption. For example the video of a Lagos woman beaten by Nigerian Navy personnel (see http://maxsiollun.wordpress.com/2008/11/10/ video-of-lagos-woman-beaten-by-navy-officersguards/ European Union Monitoring and Advocacy Program (2004) notes that the last decade has seen an increase in creation and the use of websites and portals specifically for providing systematic and reliable information on human rights globally, as well making widely available the key human rights documents. The staff of most human rights organizations all over the world know and regularly use such key sites as the UN Treaty database at: http://www.un.org, and especially the website of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at: http://www.ohchr.org, both holding comprehensive and well-structured UN documents collections. The National Human Rights Institution Forum is a portal that makes available, in a systematic form, all types of documents related to national human rights institutions at the global, regional and national levels, including conference documents, research and literature overviews, case law databases, as well as other key documents that otherwise would be unavailable or very difficult to access. The security of lives and properties has been greatly enhanced through the use of technology like reconnaissance satellite, CCTV, tracking devices on cars, enhanced communication among security agencies. Rights to free expression have enjoyed a great boost from cell phones and the internet. Man’s ability to associate freely has recorded some improvement as a result of ICTs. People now have the opportunity to associate irrespective of distance race, sex etc. The facebook for example is a melting port for all sorts of association with a global membership. People’s economic status have been enhanced through the use of ICTs to make business contact, set up ICTs/

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business centres, call centres, which are greatly alleviating poverty. Telemedicine has tremendously improved the right to health. The revolution in information and communications technologies (ICTs) has transformed the way people can organize, relate, discuss or debate with each other, and the way they exchange, find, retrieve, and disseminate information. These technologies are a manifestation of social relations, reflecting the rights of those who use them.

CHALLENGES OF ICTS IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ICTs have become important features of a modern society. The role of these technologies in various fields of human endeavours including democracy and human rights is unprecedented. It has provided Nigerians with unquantifiable opportunities to enhance nation’s democratic system and boost the human right record. There are over 80 million mobile phone users in Nigeria which affords them the opportunity to associate, express themselves, discuss with political leaders and sometimes mobilize themselves to protest over unpopular policies. For example, the “Talakawanta” Programme of the Jigawa State government has given indigenes the opportunity to call the Governor’s direct line for discussion. Cell phones have been used by citizens to draw the attention of security agencies on issues of security. The benefits of ICTs in democracy and human rights are enormous but there are challenges militating against the effective use of these technologies for desired results. Nigeria has suffered problems in the past and there are still problems even after adopting the utilization of these technologies. Ibikinle (2008) puts it that, lack of ICTs success in the past was largely due to lack of honesty and faith in various policies and programmes initiated by the military. Another serious factor, was the over dependence on the

public sector and Government’s strict control of all productive variables. Only recently has the public sector come to be involved in ICTs development. Some of the existing challenges that directly or indirectly affect the harnessing of ICTs in promoting democracy and human rights include:

Infrastructural Problem Infrastructural development is a major problem in most developing countries. Problems in this regard as it affect Nigeria include: Epileptic electric power ; inadequate supporting ICTs infrastructure and rapid technological change. For example, the 3G telecommunication technology is yet to be available in some parts of the country. The informatics infrastructure in Nigeria and most developing countries is a problem that requires attention. In many cases there may be problem of compatibility between technologies. Nations have often invested heavily in particular technology only to discover in a short while or few years of procurement that the facilities are obsolete. The problem of rapid technological change has often left developing nations lagging behind due to the huge foreign exchange required to procure latest facilities (Internet World Stat, 2006). UNESCO report (1999), points out in this context that it is essential to understand the process of rapid technological change and to formulate knowledgeable, but flexible strategies to make progress and exchange of experience at global level. The situation in Nigeria has improved lately with the involvement of private sector in telecommunication which has ushered in a competitive scenario. “Only the best retains the costumers”. This has forced players in ICTs to improve and acquire latest technologies for effective service delivery. The epileptic electric power supply of the country has made ICTs investors rely on other sources of power for various technologies. The availability of reliable electricity is still very poor in developing countries. For example in Nigeria, the use of generator has been an alternative source of power

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which adds to the cost of services (Wilson, 2007). Arunachalam (1998), notes that most developing counties, especially those with large population do not have adequate infrastructure (computer terminals, networks, communication channels, large bandwidth, inadequate redundant links and back-up equipment in many cases which tend to limit the reliability of applications etc) and will take a long time to have it in place to be able to take part as equal partners in the worldwide enterprise of knowledge production and dissemination. Nigeria’s major hindrance is the underdeveloped and unreliable infrastructure (Internet World Stat, 2006). In some cases the country suffers from flooding of the market with inferior ICTs products which translate to inefficient output.

Financial Challenge The high cost of ICTs facilities/equipment constitutes another obstacle to Nigeria. The costs relates to: infrastructure, hardware, tariffs and as it affects the service providers and the end users. Infrastructure cost loom very high for developing countries. Cost of infrastructure has restricted infrastructure or latest facilities to the urban areas or capital cities. For example most ICTs service providers like the telecommunication companies, internet service providers and satellite television service providers, concentrate on Abuja and Lagos before extending it to other capital cities in the country. The cost of internet and other ICT hardware poses a significant challenge to nearly all African nations. The cost of latest computers with basic network connectivity are expensive, and obviously making it inaccessible to many sector of the society. The cost sustaining reliable electricity especially in very highly populated nation is outrageous (Fung, 2006). Tariff for telecommunication services and facilities needed in the ICT sector that are of public interest, notably data communication, electronic mail and other internet services are often high. The

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high subscription charges by telephone companies and internet service providers have resulted in the collapse of several cyber cafes or internet centres in Nigeria. Wilson (2007) notes that, the inability of internet centres operators to rapidly update their facilities for efficient internet and a telecommunication service is basically because of financial constraint. This poses a serious problem for internet access and usage as well as getting the best or near best telephone service. For example, in Nigeria, you find some internet centres with outdated software and applications, which make access to some internet sites and materials produced on higher versions difficult or sometimes impossible. The cost of some third generation (3G) mobile phones are prohibitive and out of the reach of most Nigerians. Satellite television decoders and cost of subscription limits the use of the technology to very few Nigerians.

Political and Institutional Challenge There is often the challenge of political reluctance to review and modify national policies regarding ICTs for implementing new technologies and regulatory measures. A giant like Nigeria only opened up its ICTs market in 1999 due to neglect by successive military regimes. Coordination in terms of policy implementation is a major problem to government which often result to policy failure. For example in Nigeria one of its major challenges is policy continuity. Successive government abandons policy of previous government and floats new ones that are sometimes abandoned halfway or scraped by a new government. Currently the Nigeria Information technology policy is under review which leaves Nigerians asking the question “ to what extent has the existing IT policy been implemented? There is often insufficient effort to cooperate with other leaders within a country and between countries. For example, in Nigeria, very few state governments are committed to the internet universal access effort. Jigawa State in

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Nigeria has comparatively fair internet connectivity in most part of the states. This is not the case in most of the states in Nigeria. Although highly desirable, it is often quite difficult for organizations such as government ministries, the private sector and NGO’s to really work together because of different organizational cultures and attitude (Wilson, 2007). For example in 2009, there was a clash of interest between the Nigeria Federal Ministry of Information and Communication and Nigeria Communication Commission (NCC) over the sale of 2.3GHz Spectrum. The 2.3 GHz licensing, by Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), was trailed by controversy when some petitions on their method of sale apparently prompted the minister to order the cancellation of the exercise for what she termed “lack of transparency and due process.” . It took the intervention of the National Assembly and the then President Yar’adua to resolve. Coordination of ICT developmental effort has been difficult. Little wonder there is duplication of ICTs efforts. The scenario is such that the deployment of ICTs by organizations is done irrespective of beneficiaries’ interest or immediate needs. For example company “A” donates 100 computers to a school, company “B” and “C” also donate another 100 computers without consideration for suitable building and furniture to go with the computers or internet connectivity. Lack of political will on the side of the government has often thwarted some ICTs development efforts. For example, Nigeria’s rural telephoning project has lingered for years without the desired impact. The reform that swept through Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) during Ben Murray Bruce Tenure as the Director General, ended on his departure. His effort to bring NTA broadcast to the rural population of Nigeria never gained the desired impetus from the subsequent leadership. Some state governors supported the effort while some did not.

The kind of democratic culture that exists in a country makes a significant difference to policy formulation. A country with a strong and vibrant civil society would produce a far more representative, reflective and democratic policy. The ultimate goal for any ICT policy should rest on the process of participatory and consultative planning for developing infrastructure to ensure easy access for all segment of the society. Nigeria’s National Policy for Information Technology which was issued under the auspices of the Ministry of Science and Technology, which has 31 objectives, emphasizes, among others, the need for harnessing ICT for education, wealth creation, poverty eradication, job creation and global competitiveness. The key strategies outlined in the policy document are: establishing a national fund for ICT, setting up an ICT development agency, harnessing ICT to improve Government operations, empowering the public and private sectors and small and medium enterprises by creating an enabling environment, harnessing ICT in the education and health sectors and setting up information technology parks. To what extent have these been implemented? Citizens, through the NCC consumer parliament, have pleaded for slash in telecommunication tariff but to no avail.

Human Resource Challenge The ability to effectively access internet and other ICTs particularly in developing countries is severely hampered by inadequate human resources. There is tremendous shortage of technically trained personnel to support national and local information infrastructures in developing countries. For example, an information specialist need to learn how to design and implement information systems in different applications and national sectoral database; to capture data, build and administer database and decision support systems, and to build information servers on internet. In addition,

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information services providers need to know how to analyze user needs and identify what information services their users require; to access information available from national, regional and international sources, and to establish systems or updating data on a regular basis (African Development Forum, 1999). Telecommunication and network specialist need to learn how to plan, design install, operate and maintain communication and information networks. Unfortunately, Nigeria and most developing countries have limited number of such specialists and the programmes and also facilities for training them. For example, in Nigeria internet subscribers in Northern region of the country rely substantially on internet service providers (ISPs) located in Lagos with branch offices in Abuja. They rely on such ISPs for minor and major repairs, installation and maintenance of internet equipment. Sometimes reaching such ISPs gets so difficult because of high demand of their services. Internet centres sometimes fold up due to frequency of systems and equipment failures and their inability to pay for the services of internet specialists ((Wilson, 2007). Some telecommunication companies in Nigeria may have just a specialist supervising and maintaining facilities in a whole state that spans hundreds of kilometers. This has often led to epileptic services by most service providers. Sometimes it takes several hours to get through with a call or even recharge a phone line (NDI, 2007).

Social Challenge There are real and debilitating social problems which in some ways prevent Nigerians from fully utilizing ICTs for specific purposes. These problems are in form of digital divide in terms of access to ICTs facilities (exclusion of rural dwellers, under-educated or illiterates), technophobia, resistance to change, poor level of awareness/ understanding of ICTs and religion.

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Providing access to all citizens, particularly those in less developed socio-economic areas in Nigeria, presents a challenge. Lack of access to technologies such as telephones, television, radio and others have frustrated ICTs propelled development efforts for decades in Nigeria. Access is currently concentrated to a large extent in the urban centres. Internet and telephone services enjoyed by users in the country sometimes differ from one region to the other. For example in Lagos and Abuja there are area with internet clouds, and 3G telephone services while in the far North like Borno state you hardly find a viable internet café. A reasonable number of villages’ especially nonlinear settlement still lack telephone services. The technological divide between those with access and those without is significant and growing (NDI (2007). At first glance, this poses a serious challenge to exploiting the potential of the Internet for democratic development and citizen participation in democratic governance. The issue of technophobia is also posing a challenge, especially in the use of these technologies. This problem has cut off people from using ICTs facilities and has left them as techno-illiterates. Some of these fears of technology are tied to issues like cell phone causes cancer, continuous exposure to computer causes blindness, fear of being mocked for inability to use computers and internet, and lack of interest. These and many more phobia `issues have excluded many people from using ICTs. Many organizations are disconnected not because they lack telecommunications infrastructure or providers of equipment and training, nor because they lack recognition of the importance of getting connected and communicating or sharing information. They remain disconnected because they lack the technical and managerial expertise to adequately plan for and procure the needed equipment, systems and services. (NDI, 2007) Another social challenge is resistance to change by some people. There are categories of people who still believe in the “old way of doing it is

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the best and must be sustained”. For example the introduction of electronic voter registration by Nigeria Independent Electoral Commission met with strong condemnation by opposition parties and many Nigerians who saw it as a ploy by the ruling party to manipulate the electoral process. The posting on the net of monthly financial allocation to the states and local government did not go down well with some Nigerians especially those at the helm of affairs who felt it would expose their financial mismanagement. Poor level of awareness/understanding of ICTs is also a major challenge. People still underestimate the power of ICTs and thus pay little attention to these technologies. Some still see telephones as mere tool for voice calls and text messages but is much more than that especially when one brings to the fore the concept of technological convergence and divergence. Some religious group condemns the use of television and some ICTs facilities. They see these facilities as diversionary tools from concentrating on serving God. Some see it as imperialist tools employed by the developed nations. There are concerns over very little diversity and relevance of content, particularly at local levels as well as low production quality in developing countries especially on the internet. Most contents in the internet are produced either in developed countries or in urbanized capitals of developing countries. It often fails to reflect the physical conditions, the culture, the experiences and the development priorities of many current and potential users. Moreover, there is a growing condition in which access to the internet is constrained by too much information and too little bandwidth, particularly in developing countries. It is estimated that there is a staggering over 150 million pages on the web, containing 50 – 60 billion words. The major challenge in this context revolves around the ability to locate and retrieve content (d’Orville, 1996)

Language can also be a serious barrier to access. It is obvious that majority of the information available on the internet is still in English and the principal “browser” software widely used to access the information cannot identify and effectively present non-Roman scripts. Such a situation serves to exclude the wide range of users who do not read language originated in Western Europe. Nigeria with over 200 ethnic groups sand 400 languages is bedeviled by this challenge because the illiteracy status of the nation is still high. Another barrier is Illiteracy. Illiteracy and ICT illiteracy can restrict opportunities to harness ICTs for democratic and human rights purposes. It is obvious that merely placing computers and Internet connections in the hand of citizens is not by itself enough to guarantee usage. People need to learn how to effectively use this new tool for more than just playing games and passively searching the web. In a world overflowing with easily available digital information, there is the need to equip the populace with efficient skills to assess and judge the relevance of any particular piece of information (Okwor, 2009) . Illiterates and illiterate users (those who lack basic education and those lack the necessary skills for ICT usage) are excluded from the information revolution regardless of what language they speak or their social status (Brayton,1999) These challenges are some of the major barriers that have continued to hinder Nigerians from effectively harnessing the benefits of ICTs. The following recommendation could be helpful.

RECOMMENDATIONS Addressing these challenges requires the contribution of not just government as has been the mentality of most Nigerians. Some of these recommendations are possible solutions to these challenges.

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•

Ensuring and providing a suitable and up-to-date ICTs infrastructure. This is the responsibility of the government regulatory agencies like the standard organization of Nigeria, Nigeria Communication Commission, National Broadcasting Commission and Consumer Protection Agency to ensure that sub-standard facilities are not imported for use in the country. This would bring about quality in infrastructure and will rid Nigeria of the popular “dumping ground” status. Encouraging investors to manufacture equipment in the country would give a boost to infrastructure in Nigeria

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Source of power supply should be greatly enhanced. There should be enabling environment for private sector participation in areas of electric power supply. •

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Government policy makers should encourage ICT resource inflow by creating an enabling environment, and provide for specialized subsidies to ICTs service providers and ICTs centre operators. The National Information Technology Development Agency as a policy making body would be of importance in this regard. It should understand that policies should be supported by actions. Issues like subsidies on ICTs facilities and services would go a long way in addressing the financial challenge to both users and service providers. Subsidy should cover hardware: telephones, computers, LAN network hub, printer, scanner, television set, fax laminating machine, digital camera, projector, radio, video, CD and audiotape players, microphone as well as software. Management structure of beneficiaries ICTs projects, whether government or community should be committed to main-

•

•

tenance, improvements and sustenance of procured or donated ICTs infrastructure. It is a common scenario in Nigeria to see facilities procured by government agencies or donated by organizations neglected and allowed to rot. Partnership and collaboration between public, private and the communities is an important element in ensuring the sustainability of ICTs efforts. Involving communities in especially the provision of Internet centres would go a long way in enhancing access level. It is common to see community viewing centre in Nigeria but not community internet. This can be extended to cover internet. . When Community ICTs centres established, either through donation of equipment or funds, for specific programmes or volunteer services, their sustainability should depend on the generation of funds for maintenance and support. The management of such a centre should be prepared to assume responsibility for the maintenance and support of donated equipment, in order for it to be sustainable. Adequate plans should be made for paid staff, and the centre should not rely on volunteers who come and go, as they will. While most of the contents especially on the internet is developed outside the community or country, there is a need to include services and contents that will encourage community development, participation in democratic and human rights issues. Non-Governmental organizations in Nigeria should embark on massive enlightenment effort on the unlimited potential of ICTs in democracy and human rights. It should also lobby its counterparts overseas to assist in ensuring free or affordable access to ICTs that would promote democracy and human rights in Nigeria as well as provide basic training for proper use.

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•

This chapter recommends the adoption of the Push-ICT theory which undoubtedly explains the Nigerian ICT status, could be used to further implement laudable ICT programmes for the benefit of the nation.

CONCLUSION In this era where knowledge and information sharing is no longer the preserve of the few, where democracy and protection of human rights are at the forefront of modern society, success in promoting these fundamental issues requires access to information and an ability to use it effectively. Information and communication technologies present great opportunities and challenges for both industrialized and developing countries alike. Unless Nigeria stands firm to address the challenges, successfully harnessed the benefits of ICTs in all fields of human endeavours would remain a mirage. As the New Partnership for Africa Development (2002) puts it, the intensive use of ICTs could be of unprecedented comparative advantage to not just Nigeria but Africa.

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United States Department of States. (2011). 2011 country reports on human rights practices: Nigeria. Washington, DC: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State. Wilson, J. (2007). Internet access and usage among female students in University of Maiduguri. (Unpublished Masters Dissertation). University of Maiduguri, Maiduguri, Nigeria. Wilson, J. (2009). Push-ICT Theory. Paper presented at the Centre for Research and Documentation at Centre for Democratic Research and Training workshop on Journalists struggle for Democracy and Human Rights. Kano, Nigeria. World Information Society. (2003). Statement on Human Rights, Human Dignity and the Information Society. International Symposium on the Information Society. Retrieved September 27, 2012 from http://www.pdhre.org/wsis/statement.doc

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Democracy: People oriented system of government by the choice of the majority. Human Rights: Basic rights and freedoms that belong to every existing human. Information and Communication Technologies: Facilities for information gathering, processing and dissemination. Interactive Media: Information and communication channels that allows for two-way exchange of information (sender to receiver and receiver to sender). Nigeria: A Country in the West of Africa. Participation: Opportunity to be a part of an issue or event. Push-ICT Theory: Theory that explains the deployment or diffusing of ICT by direct or indirect coercion.

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Chapter 7

Memory, National Identity, and Freedom of Expression in the Information Age: Discussing the Taboo in the Zimbabwean Public Sphere Shepherd Mpofu University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

ABSTRACT New media and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are increasingly becoming central in facilitating freedom of expression especially in repressive countries. In addition, the burgeoning diaspora community coupled with these ICTs have offered populations in these communities alternative public spheres where they can debate issues without government control. The chapter argues that through the Website, www.newzimbabwe.com, Zimbabweans have found for themselves a platform where they debate otherwise taboo issues that are not easily discussed in Zimbabwe: ethnicity and the debates surrounding the selection and burial of national heroes at the National Heroes’ Acre. The conclusion of this the chapter is that Internet has revolutionised the way Zimbabweans know freedom of expression.

INTRODUCTION This chapter attempts to explore how the internet has become a safe platform for Zimbabweans to exercise their right to freedom of expression. The internet simultaneously enables the user to exercise this right, receive and disseminate information, ideas and opinions visually or phonetically to large audiences at the lowest possible cost. Also, this evolution of technology has caused global dramatic changes in the field of journalism. Thus the

internet has closed the gap between the traditional electronic media, and cyberspace; where these are now linked and local papers, radio or television stations are now available online world-wide. The invasion of the Zimbabwean communicative space by the internet has posed many challenges to the government and citizens alike. It seems the internet is both liberating and enslaving at the same time. This of course depends on where the user accesses and generates content. It is important to note that the internet, much as it has been hyped as a lib-

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch007

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erating tool, may be used for committing crimes hence the increasing need for its legal regulation by national governments. For example the most curios issue in Zimbabwe’s freedom of expression debates is government control of the internet. In August 2007 the Zimbabwean president signed into law the Interception of Communications Act (ICA), an instrument that allows state officials to snoop and eavesdrop on personal telephonic or internet interactions. The law is said to be necessary to protect the interests of national security or the maintenance of law and order. The chapter looks at the freedom of expression in the information age in the Zimbabwean context. Most precisely, the chapter explores how the internet has transformed the elitist dominated domestic public sphere into a sphere where ordinary citizens interact among themselves and those in power. The chapter argues that since the rise to prominence of the Zimbabwe crisis in 2000, the internet and online media have played an integral role in the politics of the country. The chapter uses the concept of voice and power (Mitra 2001) to negotiate the central role the internet has played in Zimbabwean politics. Specifically the chapter looks at a diasporic news website, www.newzimbabwe.com, a site that covers Zimbabwean issues, and how it is used as a counter-hegemonic forum to challenge the dominant discourses advanced by the former ruling party-Zimbabwe African Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-Pf). The site is probably the first professionally run and trusted source of Zimbabwean news accessed by those at home and in the diaspora. Also, the website covers stories that relate specifically to Zimbabwean communities across the globe. Specific attention is paid to the use of historical archive and memory in the discussion of the 1980s genocide and the contested National Heroes’ Acre, a burial site for those individuals deemed heroes to the nation. The possibility of the internet to offer Zimbabweans a platform for freedom of expression in the information age is looked at in this context. Memory is used as a lens to look at how Zimbabweans discuss these ‘taboo’ issues like the 1983-1987 genocide,

also known as Gukurahundi, and the issue of the national shrine, the National Heroes Acre. The former looks at the role the former ruling party, (Zanu-Pf) and its leader Robert Mugabe played during this era. The public media in Zimbabwe has not critically covered issues relating to the event besides systematically using the Zanu-Pf narratives to address whatever issues arise. What is clear is that the event continues to affect the fragile cohesive Zimbabwean identity that the nationalists have always struggled to construct. The latter aspect specifically looks at the contests of the government of national unity (GNU) for the control of the heroes acre. The GNU consists of Zanu-Pf and two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change led by Welshman Ncube and Morgan Tsvangirai. The heroes acre is a space where national heroes are supposedly buried. However, it seems Zanu-Pf has a monopoly on conferring the hero’s status. Also the criteria for selecting heroes seems to be determined, among other things by serving the nation, having fought the war and remaining loyal to Zanu-Pf. This is explored later. These two topics form part of ‘the taboo’ in that no one can freely discuss them within Zimbabwe as there are legal or extralegal ramifications as shall be shown later. This chapter makes an intervention in that it argues that the dearth of freedom of expression on the ‘taboo’ has been circumvented by the internet. Newzimbabwe.com, a website based in Wales, is used to analyse news stories that cover these taboo issues mainly because it offers a platform for readers to debate issues and it is “the most famous among” Zimbabweans in the homeland and diaspora (Moyo 2009). Also, the website offers a hitherto unknown and new technological characteristic in media that is only a preserve of new media, that of user generated content, in the form of reader comments, to gauge the role of the internet in advancing freedom of expression in Zimbabwe. As a background, the chapter argues that the role of public media after independence in Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular was to advance the government of the day’s pro115

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grammes and aspirations, uniting the new nation and trying to create a cohesive national identity (Nyamnjoh 2005). In so doing the media have been used to serve the narrow political ends of Zanu-Pf and this has led to many scholars labelling this as an abuse of nationalist historiography (NdlovuGatsheni 2009, Masunungure 2005, Ranger 2004 and Raftopolous 1999). The internet and specifically new media have contributed to the broader Zimbabwean public sphere as alternative public spheres (Atton 2000) by challenging government domination (Bailey et. al. 2007). This then makes it clear what role the internet plays in the Zimbabwean communicative space and, largely, in contributing to freedom of expression. The diasporic nature of the case study, newzimbabwe.com, complicates the understanding of consumption and operations of diasporic media in this particular chapter. However, what needs to be clarified is that this medium is accessible both by the homeland and diaspora communities, and this is how it enhances freedom of expression. Because these topics are ‘feared’ they are treated as taboo issues in this chapter. Further to gauge the effectiveness of the internet as an enabler and instrument pivotal for freedom of expression, the chapter assess how Zimbabweans discuss these issues, issues they would otherwise not freely discuss in public media or gatherings in the homeland. This shows that indeed every nation has skeletons in its cupboard “stained with fratricidal blood,” (Odhiambo and Lonsdale 2003, 1) that cannot be discussed openly. Also the tensions of having the state controlling the informational needs of citizens have led to the latter resisting such controls using various tactics. Some tactics have included the setting up of pirate radio stations outside the country and setting up of websites in the diaspora. These have had various effects on the Zimbabwean deliberative platforms. Some of the effects have been that the new media and the internet have awakened the nation to the relevance of deliberation on matters that

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help build the nation, enhance national development and cohesion. This includes appreciating memory and the past and recognising that these influence the future (Mangcu 2011). Identity in the post colonial Zimbabwe has emerged as a central theme for academic and cultural studies inquiry since the 1990s. Not only that, it has become an important political resource and this chapter argues that it is possible to use identity debates partly to show and argue that the internet has played an important role in enabling people some freedoms to express their identities, affiliations and aspirations. Woodward (1997) argues that identities are important as they “give us a location in the world and presents the link between us and the society in which we live… [identity is] the conceptual tool the object of increased academic interest; it is the conceptual tool with which individuals actors understand and make sense of social, cultural, economic and political changes,” (cited in Zhang 2002, 176). This chapter therefore argues that the advent of the internet has changed the trajectories of how debates are conducted; and identity dynamics in Zimbabwe. Embedded in this change is the concept of freedom of expression. While the diaspora, that is, to use the Zimbabweans’ understanding of the term as anyone living outside of Zimbabwe, has always been peripheral in the country’s salient debates, cyber-communication and activism has made this group come together, find new cohesion and challenge the dominant political elite voices in the homeland. This reality of dislocation and living in the diaspora while acting in the homeland points to the existence of a transnational Zimbabwean community, a community that exists “beyond and outside the borders” of the homeland and its territories (Kastoryano 2007, 160) while acting on issues in the homeland. The previously taboo issues can now be discussed and demystified online without fear as the internet grants ordinary people such an opportunity. I also argue that the website offers its users an opportunity to imagine

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a new Zimbabwe, probably a post-Mugabe and post-Zanu-Pf one characterized by law, order, democracy, freedom of expression and a cohesive national identity.

METHOD AND THEORY This chapter is predicated upon the digital public sphere (Habermas 1962, 1989), voice and memory theories to formulate and advance an argument for the usefulness of the internet in promoting freedom of expression in the information age in Zimbabwe. The digital public sphere theory stems from the Habermasian conception of the public sphere as a forum where people meet and discuss issues of the day (Habermas 1962, 1989). This was conceptualized in relation to the 18th century bourgeoisie public sphere as it obtained in Europe. Habermas’s contention is that the media as the public sphere were infiltrated by commerce and politics leading to their decline and failure to serve the people in a democratic way, one that enabled them to make positive political choices. Ideally, the public sphere is meant to be a space of communication of ideas and projects that emerge from society and these are addressed to the decision makers or the political elite in the various organs of society, (Castells 2008). The public sphere is not just a space for social interaction, it is a space for cultural and informational release, debate and it is through the public sphere that decisions of the state are influenced and identities negotiated. Through the internet, the technology of public sphere has changed from the bourgeoisie public sphere in the 18th century to a different one where all and sundry may have access. The internet, wireless and network society have shaped the public sphere in a new way that has never been seen before. Through the same, freedom of expression is realised especially for those people coming from authoritarian countries like Zimbabwe where public media are used to advance status quo ideologies. Therefore, there is no question on the role of the internet in

promoting, nourishing and enabling freedoms of expression in such issues as identity and democratic debates that are raised in this chapter. When offered a space to speak, the concept of voice is important in the public sphere. The idea of voice, as conceptualised by Mitra and Watts (2002), helps us in the thinking about the concept of voice in cyberspace and internet. Mitra and Watts argue that there is need to recognise the concept of voice on cyber-communication and activity as the use of technology helps people “express their opinions and discuss their shared views” (2002, 480). They further argue that the many web pages on the internet represent “what an individual or an institution might want to say,” and in order to theorise this we may argue that “a robust construct such as voice might offer an unique theoretical lens through which to examine the internet and cyberspace phenomenon,” (ibid:, 2002, 480). I use the concept of voice in this chapter to refer to the human “capacity [to act rather than] as a function of the linguistic” (Mitra and Watts 2002, 481). This helps locate human agency in participating in certain discourses through the manipulation of technology like the internet. This issue of voice and agency is important as Bakhtin (1986) argues that there is a danger of one’s or society’s voice to face extinction should they rely on official discourse. At the same time the official discourse in authoritarian regimes like Zimbabwe is the one that maintains hegemony and suppresses alternative discourses. This renders other channels of such discourses like the internet relevant as they bring about freedom of expression. According to Herbert Hirsch, memory is the “capacity to remember, the ability to use our brains to create and re-create our past... (1995, xi)” Hirsch continues to posit that the politics of memory and history involve the creation of mythsconstructed and these are exploited for different ends. Memory is employed in identity construction and maintenance and “acts as a powerful cohesive force, binding the disparate members of a nation together, “it demarcates the boundary 117

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between Them and Us...Such binding memory can be passed from generation to generation…” (Bell 2000, 70). Writing about the Cambodian memory and national identity experiences, Milton Takei argues that “collective memory is the key to understanding why people retain a certain group identity. Both the distant past and more recent events can be important, since all these experiences can be part of a group’s collective memory” (1998, 59).

UNDERSTANDING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, THE CONTEXT OF ZIMBABWE Freedom of expression is a cornerstone for any democratic state and it anchors other rights and freedoms. This is universal and indivisible. The United Nations proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU now African Union –AU) promulgated the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights in 1981 while the Zimbabwean constitution’s Declaration of Rights provides for freedom of expression. It is important to articulate some prominent characteristics of these so as to locate the tensions between freedom of expression and censorship in Zimbabwe. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) makes it clear that “[E] veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1946) This has located and guided many countries and regional bodies in promulgating and stating clearly that their people have many freedoms important of which is the freedom of expression (Patel 1997). Article 9 of the African Charter accords the peoples of Africa and indeed anyone from anywhere, among other freedoms, the freedom of expression. The Charter states, 118

1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information. 2. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law,” (African Charter, 1981). Thus stated and important in the study of the internet and freedom of expression is the dual way of seeing this freedom of expression especially as evident in the Charter quoted above. Freedom of expression carries within it two distinct and important rights, “the right to receive and the right to impart information, opinions and ideas,” (Patel 1997, 53). Thus, one important question one has to ask is, Does the internet accord the exercise of the freedom of expression while at the same time restricting this freedom through the limitations of the law? Implicated in this question is the justification of curtailing freedom of expression especially in authoritarian states like Zimbabwe through the use of ‘public’ interest, order and peace. This chapter cannot labour on this suffice to say that the public interest, order and peace laws are selectively applied to protect the hegemony of these authoritarian regimes. This will be shown shortly, but it is instructive to observe how elaborate and liberating the section that offers and guarantees freedom of expression in the Zimbabwean constitution is. The Zimbabwean constitution guarantees freedom of expression under Section 20. Section 20(1) and 2(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides as follows, 20(1) Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference, and freedom from interference with his correspondence.’ The dualities characteristic of the conventions mentioned earlier also exist in the Zimbabwean case, that is, the enjoyment of this freedom of

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expression has to be within the confines of the law (Patel 1997). However, the safeguards of this freedom of expression are not enough as at times what is ‘reasonably justifiable,’ under the law is used to curtail one’s freedom of expression by the politicians especially. This phrase is wide, all catching and is open to various interpretations some of which may arbitrarily lead to a broader infringement on fundamental rights. Interestingly the law puts emphasis to the privacy people have to enjoy regarding their correspondence. This is curios because in August 2007 the Zimbabwean president signed into law the Interception of Communications Act (ICA), an instrument that allows state officials to snoop and eavesdrop on personal telephonic or internet interactions. The law is said to be necessary to protect the interests of national security or the maintenance of law and order. This law came to buttress a host of other draconian laws that include the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA, 2002), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA, 2002) and the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA, 2001). AIPPA, POSA and BSA have been used in the arrest of many people and journalists that addressing this here will not help as it would be akin to reinventing the wheel. In addition, my interest at this juncture and indeed the whole chapter are on the internet and its contribution to enhancing the freedom of expression in Zimbabweans. However, it is imperative to highlight how the internet may also be a legal landmine. ICA seeks to curb the spread of anti-Mugabe sentiments on the internet among Zimbabweans in the homeland. For instance, 40 people were arrested in November 2004 for circulating an email calling for protests to oust President Mugabe. Further, in February 2011, a Zimbabwean man, Vikas Muvhudzi was arrested for writing the following on Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirayi’s Facebook wall, I am overwhelmed, I don’t want to say Mr. or PM what happened in Egypt is sending shockwaves to dictators around the world. No weapon but unity of purpose worth emulating, hey. (Sibanda, 2011: online)

The post was in reference to the mass protests in Egypt which saw the toppling of Hosni Mubarak’s government. The government argued that the post was “advocating or attempting to take-over government by unconstitutional means” (Sibanda, 2011). This partly brings to perspective Mugabe’s anti-internet beliefs as shown in an address at the World Summit on the Information Society in 2003, where he described the internet as being used by “the aloof immigrant settler landed gentry, all-royal, all-untouchable, all-western supported” former colonists and some Western powers especially the United States of America and Britain as a platform, [T]hrough which virulent propaganda and misinformation are peddled to delegitimize our just struggles against vestigial colonialism…to weaken national cohesion and efforts at forging a broad Third World front against what patently is a dangerous imperial world order led by warrior states and kingdoms. (Mugabe, 2003) With this in mind, the censorship of political communication in private online and offline spheres cogently highlights the repressive role officials play and practice in regulation freedom of expression in Zimbabwe. Virtual worlds, it must be noted, are not free from the stereotypes and cultural prejudices that characterise the offline world. Thus, it is possible that the internet may be abused by certain users and indeed this calls for responsibility, monitoring and legislating its use to effectively affect a people’s freedom of expression.

MEMORY AND HEROES ACRE DEBATES, GRAVE TUSSLES BETWEEN THE ELITE AND THE ORDINARY PEOPLE One of the main arguments of this chapter is that both private and public media in Zimbabwe 119

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have, for a long time limited ordinary people’s freedom of expression and participation in the public sphere. The public media, as has been made clear, have advanced Zanu-Pf ideologies while the private media have been concerned about propagating counter-hegemonic ideologies using the oppositional elite voice while ignoring ordinary people’s views and voices. Having said that, this chapter is an intervention that attempts to show how new media and specifically internet based media like newzimbabwe.com have deposed elite dominated public spheres to offer ordinary people an opportunity to express themselves without the confines of power and economy. Thus the online discussions of and on memory and the heroes acre by the ordinary people brings to the fore liberation and a freedom of expression for the previously unheard voices. This chapter is alive to the digital divide debates that characterise the Zimbabwean virtual world but this is outside the scope of this work to discuss. This borders on issues of access and affordability of software, hardware and technological knowhow of manipulating computers and the internet. It seems those at universities, middle class and diaspora have ready access than most ordinary Zimbabweans. Without dwelling much on these, it is important to reiterate that Zimbabwean memory and identity are hotly contested notions and this has caused a lot of tensions and the new media have enabled a rigorous exploration of these debates. Many cultural, social and political aspects foster identities and relationships. In a paper on memory, mythology and national identity, Duncan Bell (2003) argues that one cannot talk of identity without addressing some of the fundamental aspects like memory that cement a people together. For instance, the genocide period has heightened the Ndebele particularism among the Ndebele people of Zimbabwe to an extent of creating a mythic Mthwakazi nation (Moyo 2009b). Zimbabweans have gone through different experiences as a nation or ethnic groups and this influences the various multi-dimensional contested identities.

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Another aspect that speaks to the larger debate of freedoms of expression and employs identity that this article address is the conservation and commemorative monuments, shrines and statues (Marschall 2006) like the imposing North Korean funded and constructed National Heroes Acre in Harare. The Heroes Acre is meant to be a memorial and burial site of the heroes who fought for the liberation of the country. What currently obtains is that the shrine has been a theatre for political power contestation and nationalist historiography for memory, control and ownership of the state. Participation or non-participation specifically in the liberation struggle has been used by Zanu-PF to legitimate and de-ligitimate who can wield political power, be considered a hero, and, in the process, determine the main tenets of a Zimbabwean identity. The Heroes Acre is an integral monument for a post-colonial country like Zimbabwe as it is central in honouring those who sacrificed their lives for the liberation of the country. Their burial therefore ceases to be a private but becomes a public national project. Many people who lie buried at the Heroes Acre are certified for burial in the shrine by Zanu-Pf even in an era when the former liberation movement shares power with two parties that it has managed to emasculate on many important state decisions. By the look of things, there is no intention by Zanu-Pf to let any other body outside itself declare anyone a national hero. What follows is an analysis of what Zimbabweans think of the salient debates that have hitherto been silenced in public media. The overarching objective here is to explore how new media have become facilitators and enablers of freedom of expression. This is illustrated below.

GUKURAHUNDI GENOCIDE, A BAD BIRTHMARK Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980 after a protracted struggle against the colonial regime led by Ian Smith. At independence, the country did not come together to define what and who

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constituted the new nation. Two years later, Zanu-Pf delivered the country into one of the most violent episodes in the post colonial Zimbabwe that left over 20 000 people dead. The war, which was later declared genocide by an United States based Non Governmental Organisation, Genocide Watch, because it was seen as an ethnic war, with Mugabe using a mostly Shona (his ethnic group) North Korean trained military outfit against Nkomo’s perceived Ndebele supporters from three regions (Matabeleland North, South and Midlands) of Zimbabwe. The severity of the genocide is captured in the following paragraphs from Genocide Watch, Genocide is a special crime against humanity, because it must be intentionally carried out against a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group... The Gukurahundi meets the definition of genocide because it was carried out by the North-Korean trained, exclusively Shona Fifth Brigade under President Mugabe and it targeted ethnic Matabele people. (NewZimbabwe.com, 2010: online) The genocide, code-named Gukurahundi (the rain that washes away chaff after harvesting) lasted until 1987 when Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union-Patriotic Front (Pf-Zapu) decided to merge with Mugabe’s ruling party to save more lives. The political elite erroneously saw the merger as a construction of a united cohesive nation just like they viewed the triumph over colonial oppression. From thereon, Zanu-Pf and its ideologues have always tried to define the Zimbabwean national identity through the use of skewed nationalist historiography (Ranger, 2004) violence and blood as invitations to the people to buy into this imagined national identity (NdlovuGatsheni 2009). What follows in this section is an online engagement on the debates to do with this genocide. The main point is not the veracity of the people’s assertions but the need to highlight the fact that the internet enables freedom of expression in a way that old media cannot given the Zimbabwean politi-

cal climate. The genocide did not gain worldwide recognition when it happened precisely because the former colonialists’ interests were not under threat. It became an issue when it was ‘perceived’ that Mugabe was a human rights abuser who needed to be stopped when he sanctioned land grabs from the white commercial farmers. The above establishes the context within which Zimbabweans speak when addressing this issue. The government has not come up with mechanisms to address this historical injustice; criminalizing any debates about it, a symbolic act of suppressing, erasure and denial of right to memory. For instance, a story Police shut down a Gukurahundi exhibition (NewZimbabwe.com, 2010: online) shows how sensitive the issue is to the Zanu-Pf dominated government. The exhibition was meant to commemorate and remember the victims of genocide through art. Artist Owen Maseko “collected family photos of missing people, images of mine shafts where bodies were believed dumped,” for his work. While the country’s Prime Minister argued that such exhibitions are “part of a campaign for national healing,” the fact of the matter is that trying to address, understand and remember the victims of this dark period in the history of the country is criminal as Maseko was arrested. Criminalisation of the genocide memory within Zimbabwe does not only apply to ordinary citizens but even former opposition politicians serving in the coalition government are equally affected. A case in point is the Minister of the misnamed National Healing and Reconciliation, Andrew Mzila-Ndlovu’s arrest for attending a memorial service for the victims of the genocide, (NewZimbabwe.com, 2010: online). Besides criminalisation and making it hard for people in the homeland to discuss the issue and other forms of repressive erasure of the issue from memory, diasporic media like newzimbabwe.com have made it possible for people to openly discuss the issue without the risk of arrest or sanction. In 2010 the year when Zimbabwe’s neighbour, South Africa was hosting the soccer world cup, the North Korean team was meant to have a pretour121

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nament training camp in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe a part of the region where the massacres took place (NewZimbabwe.com, 2010: online). Online media were used by activists as sites of resistance and collective memory during this period. Nkululeko Sibanda, an activist and Ndebele sent out an email protesting the training camp in Zimbabwe saying, The relationship between Zimbabwe and North Korean was cemented by the blood of our kin. Symbolically, this is the best chance in more than 20 years we have had to defend our dead and our blood (NewZimbabwe.com, 2010: online) Zapu spokesman, Methuseli Moyo quipped, In as much as Zimbabwe desperately needs to be part of the FIFA 2010 South Africa showcase, ZAPU feels hosting the national team of a country associated more with the emotive and evil Gukurahundi exercise, than for its footballing reputation, has nothing to do with tourism. It is simply a glorification of Gukurahundi, and an act of provocation to the victims of the military operation against unarmed, defenceless and innocent Ndebeles. ZAPU calls on those behind bringing the North Korean team to Zimbabwe to think seriously about the implications of this, and politely ask the North Koreans to go elsewhere. They are not welcome at all in Zimbabwe The precise reason is captured by a comment from Brilliant Mhlanga who asserted in the same story cited above thus: “We cannot allow them to train and merry-make in our environment when the scar caused by the genocide continues to bleed to this day.” This comment insinuates that there has not been healing since the scar “continues to bleed to this day,” some 30 years after independence and therefore no closure to the victims.

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The debates on genocide also encompass issues that have to do with justice and a need to address and find finality to the issue. A story from the website gleaned from the WikiLeaks, an expose on the US diplomatic cables about Zimbabwe on one former commanders of the army, Perence Shiri, during the atrocities reveals this (NewZimbabwe. com, 2011). Perence Shiri, the cable claims, had repented of the role he played during the genocide. The readers feel there is a way in which his remorse could be shown besides information from a leaked cable. A comment from Umfundisi reveals this, Mr Shiri repentence demands confession. Prove yourself, stand up and ownup. If you were brave enough to to do the crime be brave enough to stand up and face the people you wronged and ask for forgiveness. dont do it from the office, but come down to us, face us, pleade with us. Come let us resean together. Woza ndoda sikhulume (Translated fron IsiNdebele, Come man let’s talk). Woza (Come). (sic) In addition readers try to offer two solutions and these are to allow for repentance/dialogue or to punish the genocide architects and participants. Joe Rug, a reader suggests a solution and comments thus, He deserves to die & nothing more..This guys has blood on his hands just like his master.A bullet in his head will justify the role he played in Gukurahundi massacres.The hour is at hand.Wait & see.Lybia is a good lesson for all to see but these myopic minded politicians pretend they are in a world of their own.Such arrogance will do you no good.You are digging your own graves & the happiest hour. (sic) And Kulwant adds another solution that he wishes may be considered, The only way our country can move forward is having people like these who reform and regret their past deeds and move on with times.l wish

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the rest will follow suit and Zimbabwe will once again be a nation for all Zimbabweans. Mokoena believes that repentance has to be shown to the people who were affected, Yes every man is capable of repentance Shiri included. What we wait to see is Shiri’s deeds to the people of the Middlands and Matabeleland not only to Dabengwa and we need to hear from his own mouth ukuthi (that) he has repented. that includes him telling us who gave the orders, who killed who yonke lenyakanyaka (everything that happened) (sic). I include opposing voices for us to see a meeting of minds in a public sphere where any one is free to air their views as well as hear others. Habermas wanted an ideal public sphere where participants can assent to the force of the better argument instead of ruling elite. The internet also provides space for the Zanu PF and Shona to say what they wont dare say in front of a Gukurahundi victim. Dont dwell on that but use it to paint an ideal speech situation. This matters to the reader than Zim politics I think Clearly, from above that this taboo topic is easily engaged with using not only pseudonyms but also in sheer honesty as people know that they are safe from legal or extralegal repercussions that would have followed were the issue discussed in the open within Zimbabwe. The contributions clearly speak to the need for dialogue about the genocide so that there will be closure on the issue and have the country “move forward” (Kulwant 2011). Another suggested solution is coming out in the open, through a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and addressing the past as happened in Rwanda and South Africa to quote examples closer to Zimbabwe. The fact that Gukurahundi and the post-colonial subjugation of the people of Matabeleland seems

to be continuing even after the 1987 unity accord has implications on how history is variously engaged with and forms pivotal parts of the Ndebeles’ collective memory when addressing issues of development and democracy in Zimbabwe. Memory cannot be easily escaped. In this vein, the struggles that the people from the Midlands and Matabeleland regions engage with daily in the post colonial Zimbabwe are informed by such memories of experiences during the genocide period. Memory, affects identities and these identities carry conceptions of the past and the future. The past events bind people together as they collectively perceive themselves as collective victims. In addition, any counterhegemonic challenges to the status quo have led to criminalisation of ethnicity Zanu-Pf especially. Ethnic identities in Zimbabwe cannot be easily celebrated without re-invoking memories of the past and wrath of the former ruling and ‘strongest’ party in the GNU, Zanu-Pf. However, in the same vein it must be noted that when states gain independence there are certain memories that are kept and some that are wished away. Instead of granting everyone the right to memory and remembrance, Zimbabwean authorities, as shown above, have sought to violently erase the genocide memory through arrest and detention of those who seek to recall the event through art of rituals. What is important here is that while memories may not be necessarily key for the whole nation, they can, however be necessary for the identity of certain groups (Reading 2011). The internet has made it possible for people to voice their concerns about issues they have previously been unable to; commemorate events that are integral to their history and identity and debate issues of interest and importance regardless of the ruling elite’s feelings.

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HEROES AND VILLAINS, CONTESTING THE GRAVEYARD

establish separate shrines for their own heroes.. (NewZimbabwe.com 2011)

The Heroes Acre is the country’s symbol of identity, memory and nationhood. It is where people who fought for the country’s liberation are commemorated, honoured and buried. Unlike other memory archives, it is a physical monument for remembrance. The selection or declaration of heroes has always been at the behest of Zanu-Pf. The definition of a hero is not clear and is not public knowledge. In a diverse society like Zimbabwe with three political parties in government, the declaration of national hero status is contentious. The tensions, as will be shown soon, range from people refusing to be buried at the Heroes Acre to contesting the definition of a hero and space in the graveyard for the dead ‘heroes.’ Welshman Mabhena, one of the heroes declared by Zanu-Pf demanded that he be not buried at the heroes acre because, “he would not want to be buried with ‘thieves and crooks’ at the National Heroes’ Acre in Harare” (NewZimbabwe.com 2011). Mabhena had fallen out with Mugabe after he called the president to quit politics and relinquish power. Thus the personalised politics of Zanu-Pf revolve around Mugabe as the eternal leader of the party and country, and it is a taboo to challenge him. After the call for Mugabe to retire, Mabhena was marginalised to an extent that he died “a bitter and frustrated man... for speaking out on issues undermining the development of the Matabeleland regions and government’s failure to address the Gukurahundi issue.” As happened to Mabhena after death, the Heroes Acre is also a shrine has been used to humiliate and punish Mugabe’s critics, local or international, real or perceived, dead or alive. In addition, the exclusive nature of the shrine is revealed by the president’s assertion when he said that,

The above statement shows a typical Zanu-Pf nationalist understanding of the meaning of the Heroes Acre. It is not as a memorial shrine for those who died for independence regardless of political belonging but as a shrine exclusively for Zanu-Pf. As alluded to before, the Heroes Acre and the declaration of hero status have been contested terrains. Through the internet ordinary Zimbabweans believe they can declare anyone a hero as long as that person deserves; in a move that seeks to disregard the Zanu-Pf formalities and this shows that some debates may be discursively formulated from below thanks to new media. A few instances may illustrate this. Innocent Sithole commented on his blog on newzimbabwe.com that,

…only members of his Zanu PF party will be buried at the national Heroes Acre in Harare and those unhappy with the development were free to

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Most profoundly, many Zimbabweans have now come to recognise heroism apart from Zanu PF pronouncements, and whatever Mugabe and his Politburo say of those with whom they do not agree politically, if people see them as heroes, then heroes they will forever be (Sithole, 2011: Online). Tsitsi Maguvaz further remarks, showing impatience to the Zanu-Pf system of hero selection, What qualifies a heroe in Zimbabwe, is there some kind of criteria or a panel that decides this? If not there is a need for one or let the people decide. A hero is definately to the country and not to the politicians. Let us not all get tangled up in politics and give the respect to our heroes. I do not think it is fair for someone to deem a hero based merely on their personal, emotional opion or affiliation. (sic) Clearly citizens have exercised their capabilities and shown their powers and rights to wrestle the power from Zanu-Pf to declare anyone a hero in Zimbabwe. When a Zapu member, Thenjiwe Lesabe died she was not conferred with a national

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heroine status precisely because at some point she left Zanu-Pf to revive Zapu and therefore was deemed not consistent with Zanu-Pf policies. Thus heroism in Zanu-Pf’s books means not only having a history of fighting in the country’s liberation but also being loyal to the party. This led to the Methuseli Moyo (2011) commenting that, Lesabe’s passing-on also brought into perspective Zanu PF’s slide back to Gukurahundi mode, which says there can be no heroes in Zapu, worse if they are Ndebele like Thenjiwe Lesabe… Zanu PF demonstrated this through denying Lesabe heroine status. However, Moyo contends that Lesabe fought the war and made herself a hero unlike Mugabe’s late wife, Sally Mugabe, who became a heroine by association. Thus clearly there is a problem with the way Zanu-Pf confers the heroe/ine status. JJ asserts that, hero selection system in Zimbabwe is partisan and tribal. ZAPU is the first political party to be brave enough to openly talk about this… [there is need for] condemning the privatizing of the national heroes system in Zimbabwe. Further, JJ shows how Zanu-Pf has adulterated the definition of a heroe, Mai (Mrs.) Lesabe is not the first national hero who fits the criteria NOT to be a Zimbabwean national hero. The criteria NOT to be a national hero in no specific order is that 1-You have to be part of ZAPU; 2-You have to be Ndebele. Being one of these is bad, being both GUARNTEES that you are not a national hero. There are countless examples of this; Gibson Sibanda(zapu & ndebele), Lookout Masuku(ZAPU & Ndebele), Thenjiwe Lesabe(ZAPU & Ndebele).. The list is too long. However, if you want to guarantee being a Zimbabwe national hero, you have to be in

no order;1-Shona, 2-ZANU, 3-A thug. The most important of these is being a Shona Ofcourse.(sic) From the foregoing, it is clear that JJ expresses some sensitive issues that, where they discussed in a public forum in Zimbabwe they would have been deemed divisive and not acceptable to Zanu-PF which is happy to suggest that they build their own shrine. What is apparent is that new media have played an important role in mediating Zimbabwean politics and identities while simultaneously promoting freedom of expression at the same time.

CONCLUSION From the two examples of debating the taboo used in the discussion and, there are certain fundamental issues that stand out about the internet’s role in enabling freedom of expression. The people can now use the internet both as producers and consumers (prosumers) of information. Their status as ‘prosumers’ has given them freedom, power and a voice to speak up to authority (Mitra and Watts, 2002) and generate content. The internet offers an alternative digital public sphere where ordinary citizens meet and discuss issues they would not ordinarily discuss in public spaces because of government control, draconian laws and the elitist nature of old media that have made discussions of these taboo topics impossible. In addition, there are tensions in the public sphere and these express themselves in cyber-fights and this proves that “anarchy, individuality, and disagreement, rather than rational accord, lead to true democratic emancipation” (Papacharissi, 2000, 9). In addition, the fact that public media stifle vibrant debate that speaks against state programmes, means people will forever be in the dark. To circumvent this, the internet, as a forum for power, voice and self-expression, has made it possible for debate and tensions between the elite and ordinary people to be experienced in a typical Habermasian public sphere fashion online.

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The tussle between the nationalist political elite and ordinary citizens has exposed critical issues. One of them is that the elite discussions on country’s history and national hero status are narrowly cast, politically motivated and not representative of the general feelings of Zimbabweans. Through discussing these separately, a counter discourse is created whereby the Zanu-Pf nationalist elites sing from a different hymn book from the one ordinary people use. This chapter has explored these ‘taboo’ debates through the lenses of new media, voice and memory. It has used news articles and reader comments as a way of understanding and showing that the internet has given people an opportunity and avenue to offer counter-hegemonic narratives from below and not only be consumers of discourses from above. The chapter has also argued that even though it is taboo to discuss certain issues in the Zimbabwean politics, the internet has helped create a forum for intellectualization and conceptualization various debates (Chapman, 2008, 56). New media have managed to displace the nationalist constructed histories and identities that dominate the Zimbabwean public sphere.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This chapter is informed partly by my PhD thesis (Mpofu, 2014).

REFERENCES Atton, C. (2002). Alternative Media. London: Sage. Bailey, C. O., & Carpentier, N. (2008). Understanding Alternative Media. London: Open University Press.

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Bell, D. (2003). Mythscapes, Memory, Mythology, and National Identity. The British Journal of Sociology, 1(5), 63–81. doi:10.1080/0007131032000045905 PMID:12745819 Castelle, M. (2008). The New Public Sphere, Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance. Annals AAPSS, (616), 78-93. Chapman, D. (2008). Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity. New York: Routledge. Habermas, J. (1962). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hirsch, H. (1995). Genocide and the Politics of Memory. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Kastoryano, R. (2007). Transnational Nationalism, Redifining Nation and Territory. In Identities, Affiliations and Allegiances. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/ CBO9780511808487.008 Mangcu, X. (2011). Becoming Worthy Ancestors: Archive, Public Deliberation and Identity in South Africa. Johannesburg, South Africa: Wits University Press. Marschall, S. (2006). Commemorating ‘Struggle Heroes’, Constructing a Genealogy for the New South Africa. International Journal of Heritage Studies, 12(2), 176–193. doi:10.1080/13527250500496136 Masunungure, E V. (2006). Nation Building, State Building and Power Configuration in Zimbabwe. Conflict Trends Magazine, (1), 1-10. Mikhail, M. B. (1986). Speech Genres and other Late Essays. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

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Mitra, A. (2001). Marginal Voices in Cyberspace. New Media & Society, 3(1), 29–48. doi:10.1177/1461444801003001003 Moyo, L. (2009a). Constructing a Home away from Home: Internet, Nostalgia and Identity Politics among Zimbabwean Communities in the Diaspora. Journal of Global Mass Communication, 2(1/2), 66–86. Moyo, L. (2009b). Repression, Propaganda, and Digital Resistance: New Media and Democracy in Zimbabwe. In African Media and the Digital Public Sphere. Palgrave MacMillan. Moyo, M. (2011). The good from Lesabe’s death. Retrieved November 11, 2011 from http//www.newzimbabwe.com/opinion/opinion. aspx?newsid=4627 Mpofu, S. (2014). Public and Diasporic online media in the Discursive Construction of Identity: A case of Zimbabwe. (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. Mugabe, R. (2003). Speech on the Occasion of the World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva, Switzerland, 10th December, 2003. Retrieved June 14, 2013 from www.Itu.Int/Wsis/Geneva/Coverage/Statements/Zimbabwe/Zw.Html Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2009). Do ‘Zimbabweans’ exist?: Trajectories of nationalism, national identity formation and crisis in the post-colonial state. Peter Lang. NewZimbabwe.com. (2010a). Gukurahundi was ‘genocide’, US Group. Retrieved November 11, 2011 from http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news3336-Gukurahundi%20was%20genocide%20 US%20group/news.aspx

NewZimbabwe.com. (2010b). Police Shut down Gukurahundi exhibition. Retrieved November 11, 2011 from http://www.newzimbabwe.com/ news-2132-Police%20shut%20down%20Gukurahundi%20exhibit/news.aspx NewZimbabwe.com. (2010c). Minister arrested over Gukurahundi memorial. Retrieved November 11, 2011 from http://www.newzimbabwe. com/news-4919-Gukurahundi%20minister%20 arrested/news.aspx NewZimbabwe.com. (2010d). North Korea team not welcome, activists. Retrieved November 11, 2011 from http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news2198-Bulawayo%20NO%20to%20North%20 Korea%20team/news.aspx NewZimbabwe.com. (2011a). Shiri has repented of Gukurahundi, Dabengwa. Retrieved November 11, 2011 from http://www.newzimbabwe. com/news-6019-Shiri%20has%20repented%20 Dabengwa/news.aspx NewZimbabwe.com. (2011b). Mabhena rejected burial with ‘crooks’, family. Retrieved November 11, 2011 from http://www.newzimbabwe.com/ news-3525-Mabhena%20rejected%20burial%20 with%20’crooks/news.aspx NewZimbabwe.com. (2011c). Heroes Acre only for Zanu PF, Mugabe. Retrieved November 11, 2011 from http//www.newzimbabwe.com/news4766-Build+your+own+Heroes+Acres+Muga be/news.aspx Nyamnjoh, F. (2005). Africa’s Media, Democracy and the Politics of Belonging. Pretoria, South Africa: Unisa Press. Odhiambo, E. S. O., & Lonsdale, J. (2003). Introduction (1-7). In Mau Mau and Nationhood: Arms, Authority and Narration. Nairobi, Kenya: East African Educational Publishers.

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Papacharissi, Z. (2000). The Virtual Sphere: Internet as a Public Sphere. New Media & Society, 4(1), 9–27. doi:10.1177/14614440222226244

Woodward, K. (1997). Identity and Difference. London: Sage Publications Inc.

Patel, B. T. (1997). Freedom of Literary Expression and Censorship in Zimbabwe. Zambezia, 24(1), 51–67.

Zhang, W. (2002). Displaying Culture, Voicing Identity: A Study of the Manchurian Website Eight Banners Descendant. Networks and Communication Studies, 16(3-4), 175–190.

Raftopoulos, B. (1999). Problematising Nationalism in Zimbabwe: A Historiographical Review. Zambezia, 26(11), 115–134.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Ranger, T. (2004). Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle Over the Past in Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies, 30(2), 215–234. doi:10.1080/0305707042000215338 Sibanda, L. (2011). Zimbabwe makes first Facebook arrest. Retrieved March 17, 2012 from http//www.newzimbabwe.com/news-4599Zim+makes+first+Facebook+arrest/news.aspx Sithole, C. (2011). Heroes, history has longer memory than Zanu PF thinks. Retrieved November 11, 2011 from http//www.newzimbabwe.com/ blog/index.php/2011/02/isithole/heroes-historyhas-longer-memory-than-zanu-pf-thinks Takei, M. (1998). Collective Memory as the Key to National and Ethnic Identity: The Case of Cambodia. Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 4(3), 59–78. doi:10.1080/13537119808428538 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (1946). Retrieved November 11, 2011 from http://www. un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml

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Diaspora: A group of people based outside their homeland. Genocide: A mass killing of people based on their ethnicity or religious beliefs etc. Memory: The human or a group of people’s ability to store, retain and recall certain episodes that influenced their present ‘political’ ends. National Identity: A sense of belonging to a nation or group of people. New Media: Interactive forms of communication that grant on demand access and participation to content from anywhere, anytime and from any internet enabled device. Public Sphere: A place, be it physical or digital, where citizens converge and debate issues that affect them. Taboo: Issues that are prohibited from public debate.

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Chapter 8

The Virtual Parallax:

Imaginations of Mthwakazi Nationalism – Online Discussions and Calls for Self-Determination Brilliant Mhlanga University of Hertfordshire, UK & National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Zimbabwe Mandlenkosi Mpofu University of Oslo, Norway & National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT Social networking sites and the individuated privacy of the virtual space have emerged as new forms of conflating social identities and free speech for most subaltern communities. While it is clearly accepted that the notion of social networking within most African communities has always existed as part of oramedia (orality) and has gained traction by exploiting the grapevine as a notch of communication, current communication trends, coupled with the rise of new media have brought normative and pragmatic values in the latter-day communication culture. A case study of the “Forum,” a social network from Matebeleland, Zimbabwe, is used to show how the virtual sphere has revolutionised the Habermasian public sphere. A new wave of social networking sites has emerged in which participants gather through “Internet portals” and get connected through different forms of online fora. The extent of engagement and the free speech practiced therein as part of the apparent change of people’s worldviews form the basis of this chapter. Subalternised groups like the people of Matebeleland from Zimbabwe, whose sensitive discourses have been denied spaces in the local public sphere, have found a voice in social networks. Different online fora exist, and they include Facebook groups such as Inhlamba Zesintu, Luveve Ikasi Lami, Abammeli Mthwakazi, Thina AbaMpofu, etc., and Websites like iNkundla.net, Youtube, and mailing lists and listservs, such as the Forum.

INTRODUCTION The rapid spread of the information and communication technologies (ICTs) particularly the Internet in the past 10-15 years has raised new

debates about the possibilities of overcoming structural political boundaries that were seen as impeding the citizens’ autonomy in the traditional communicative spaces. New and previously unimagined platforms of communication, based on

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch008

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the Internet and mobile phone technology continue to emerge at a rapid pace. In today’s networked world, groups faced with challenges to accessing information and participation in political processes and those living in societies where laws, policies and the political environment hinder free communication have found platforms presented by the new media as opportunities to create their own autonomous spaces. Dispersed, migrant or diasporic groups, particularly those in developed Western societies, find themselves in environments with lower barriers of accessing technologies and platforms of communication. For these groups, the diffuse nature of ICTs and particularly the Internet offer a potential to “support new communicative relationships” and “new ways” of producing and circulating information (Mansell et al, 2007: 13). Diasporic groups from Matebeleland1 use different social networking sites owing to unfettered access to new media and the expansion of communicative spaces and the emergent opportunities thereof. The Forum as one of the social networking groups that have emerged as a result of the rise of communicative spaces and due to access to Internet has its own uniqueness. First, it is organised as a mailing list whose membership and constitution is on the basis of origination and nativity to any part of Matebeleland. The use of personal emails has this sense of intrusion into one’s private space and has a way of breaking the individuated barriers often seen in the case of other social networks. Second, it takes advantage of the fact that most people continue to use emails when communicating and the fact that different forms of media platforms, such as, mobile phone gadgets now offer access to the Internet. Unlike in the case of twitter, Facebook, Myspace and other social networking sites, the use of grouping personal emails ensures that communication reaches the intended individuals. As will be discussed later, membership to the Forum is on voluntary basis and tends to follow a viral approach in which any member of the group can add a friend’s email address by way of responding to a particular communication thread. In this 130

way, the Forum represents a dialogical site where participants discuss and evaluate their experiences and circumstances over the last three decades. In their study of discourses among Zimbabweans in 1990, in an older medium, the letters to the editor, Morrison and Love (1996: 40) say readers/ citizens’ dialogue offer the participants a chance to engage in legitimate challenges to “central political power and its individual representatives”. Through these forms of evaluation shared values and objectives emerge giving impetus to calls for self-determination. This chapter is an attempt to critically analyse the different discourses taking place within the Forum. And will, therefore, use critical discourse analysis as a method to engage with the issues raised in different communication threads. As will be discussed later, discourses are seen as instruments of social construction of reality. Moreover, it is strikingly acknowledged that thirty-two years after independence citizens continue to dialogue on issues of power relations, exclusion and inclusion in Zimbabwe. Further, issues of resistance to and legitimation of power will be closely analysed. As a result the following questions will be asked; are they engaged in such discourses in ways that liberate them from their circumstances? What do the participants do by engaging in this dialogue? What does it bring to them and out of them to do so, especially given they are disparate and also most are so far away from home? The Forum has had its own fair share of contribution to the discourses and imagination of a seceded state of Mthwakazi coined around irredentist lines. Members of this social networking site tend to share a common vision, which is the cause of Matebeleland but are spread all over the world, as a result most of them do not know each other. Therefore a common feature on these platforms is the use of pseudonyms, which speaks to participants’ condition of being subaltern and living in fear. The Forum tends to act as a point of confluence for diasporic groups and those still at home in Matebeleland, thus encouraging a robust engagement of issues about the idea of

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Mthwakazi as a separate state. This paper will therefore engage the salient issues discussed within this virtual space. Using critical discourse analysis as a research method and a method of textual analysis, it will also engage the different discourses on the cause of Matebeleland with a view to understand its genesis and to possibly conjecture into the outcome of such discourses.

MARKING THE TABLET OF TIME AND SPACE: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE NEW MEDIA ICTs offer new opportunities for the formation and consolidation of identities, as will be seen in the case of ‘the Forum’. Within Zimbabwe, the question of ethnicity has dominated politics since independence, not least because of the deliberate policy by government to keep sections of the Ndebele speaking people of the Matebeleland and Midlands regions on the margins of society. This policy had the Gukurahundi genocide (1982-1988) as the denominator, and is characterised by the sidelining of sections of the populations in terms of opportunities in educational institutions, and in private and public sector appointments (Mhlanga 2009, 2010, 2012). Migration, especially to the regional economic powerhouse South Africa, was strong among Ndebele communities as from the early 1980s, largely due to these reasons (cf. Webner 1992). Another explanation for the traditional migration of Ndebele speaking people to South Africa has traces in the pre-colonial and colonial era especially with the development of mining industries particularly from the time of the post World War II economic boom. This is the closely linked to the shared history of Nguni groups in the two countries, on ethnic and linguistic grounds; this identification is evident in the cultural life of the people of Matebeleland, where popular South African music continues to be dominant since colonial times. Contemporary Ndebele music and art is also loaded with these imaginations, as works by artists such as Lovemore Majaivana and Cont

Mhlanga show.2 Many people in Matebeleland therefore see the trek down South as a journey back to their real roots, which adds onto the imaginations of themselves as not full Zimbabwean. However, migration intensified from the late 1990s as the Zimbabwean crisis set and previously limited prospects for a future began to fade. With the advent of time the massive migration of people from Zimbabwe as a result of economic and social circumstances took a turn for the worst at the turn of the millennium, which presented both challenges and opportunities for the marginalised people of Matebeleland, both for those who migrated and those who stayed behind. First, the dispersal of many people, particularly the young, educated and more economically productive groups, meant that efforts by the people of Matebeleland to keep their marginalisation and their aspirations on the political agenda were disrupted; i.e., in social and political discourses within the Zimbabwean body politics and thus threatening to keep the issue of Matebeleland frozen in time. Further, the lack of regional news organisations (that focus on and managed by the people of Matebeleland) has historically meant that spaces in the national public sphere in Zimbabwe have not prioritised issues affecting the people of Matebeleland even prior to this period. But like all marginalised groups, the people of Matebeleland have created their own alternative spheres of articulation, built around political and cultural experiences, and a shared ethnic identity based on historical imaginations, shared experiences and memory. Therefore many people who have migrated abroad in search of greener pastures because of the political and economic crisis carry with themselves problems and conflicts that define their existence back at home. They also find themselves dispersed and estranged from their localities and from each other, often with few opportunities of face-to-face meeting even among those that have relocated to the same country, and with no immediate access to the alternative spheres back home. Their existence therefore becomes redefined through virtuality. This has altered the ‘quantity 131

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and quality of their social relationships’ (van Dijk 2012: 4). These shared exigencies of history have resulted in new forms of inscription on the tablet of time and revolutionised communicative spaces; in terms of the re-articulation of the cause of Matebeleland. Therefore, in looking at the new media generated social networks, it is important not to extricate them from their social processes and contexts (Rønning, 2010: 134; Agre, 2005: 311; Winner, 1988: 35). New media has therefore presented fresh opportunities for these groups to reinvent their communities, network with each other and build links with their fellow citizens back home; thus expanding the cultural spaces of communication (van Dijk 2012: 111). A new wave of social networking sites has emerged in which participants gather through ‘internet portals’ and get connected through different forms of online fora, and these have also been popular among Zimbabwean groups. From around the early 2000s, for instance, a new form of news organisation, the online based newspapers, began to emerge, and were launched mainly by Zimbabweans living in the diaspora. These news organisations were a consequence of the resultant thirst for news among these communities, whose migrations also coincided with shrinking news spaces back home due to the crackdown on newspapers and journalists from around 2002 (Mano & Willems, 2008: 51ff). But they also reflected a desire to create new platforms to articulate the new experiences associated with living in foreign environments. Commenting on another form of news organisation that emerges around this time in Zimbabwe, the “pirate” radio stations beaming into the country from abroad and also managed by migrant Zimbabweans, Ndlela (2010: 93) says their intention is also “to expand … shrinking communicative spaces”. Therefore, in approaching the potential that new media technologies hold for dispersed groups, this paper does not take a deterministic approach but sees the adoption of these technologies as fitting within already existing social processes, particular

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forms of social yearning, ideation and realities. For example Facebook was originally designed to cultivate off-line social relations but experiences in the Arab-spring presented a situation where such technologies were adapted and appropriated to suite the demands for public mobilisation, raising international awareness and influencing public policy. This helps us to look into the “larger social processes” within which “political activities on the Internet are embedded” (Papacharissi, 2002: 14; cf. van Dijk, 2006).

DIVESTED STRUCTURES OF COMMUNICATION AND THEIR INTERFACE WITH METHODOLOGY Examining the divested structures of communication using new media and the advantages emergent thereof requires a robust form of critical discourse analysis. As Stephen Coleman (2005: 178) would argue, while the advent of new digital media is often fraught with dichotomies of; “…technology as a utopian liberator versus technocratic dystopianism; direct democracy versus politics as normal; determinism versus choice”, a research methodology that attempts to engage with the social networking sites in the era of new media must embark on a more dialectical path, which embraces connections between the relationships of representation and mediation. From this perspective new media technologies present hope for direct societal representation by giving voice to the subaltern groups. “To represent is to mediate between the absent and the present”, says Coleman (2005: 178) and this captures the luxuriating space of representation for the marginalised. In order to fully appreciate the different scenarios emerging from this paper and in line with the social currencies provided for by the rise of social media critical discourse analysis was used as a method of research and a form of interpretive textual analysis. The major component of critical discourse analysis as a qualitative engagement of

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social reality is for researchers to reject a ‘valuefree’ science. This allows for exploration of connotation, together with the firm acknowledgement that texts often exist between two ends; production and reception. Researchers are influenced by social structure and existing forms of social interaction. The relationship between scholarship and society in critical discourse analysis is marked by bold lines of convergence; thus acknowledging the socio-politically situated nature of discourses and social reflections. As a phenomenological engagement of social action critical discourse analysis of a social network such as the Forum requires a teleological explanation related to its goals and purposes; what Max Weber refers to as the process of Verstenhen – understanding facts by interpreting their meanings in the light of relevant social goals and values (Fischer 2003: 50). This is an interpretivist engagement of a group such as the Forum by being situated within as a member and an activist. Critical discourse entails analysing the texts that project beliefs, values and categories embodying fundamental ideological positions. And as forms of locus of enunciation, discourses embody within them a form of re-enactment of memory and social structure as forms of social interaction. As will be seen in the case of different thematic discourses on Matebeleland and imaginations of a separate state critical discourse entails that the past is relived, re-invigorated, re-enunciated and made ‘real’ through the creation of social networks that as nodes mirror the structure of social ideation. This type of research enacts, confirms, legitimates and challenges relations of power and domination in society. It is embedded in the discursive nature of social networks. As Fowler (1991) would suggest discourse analysis allows us to explore a variety of forms social interaction. It helps in the study of language usage and in uncovering the ideological assumptions embedded in communicative texts (Gunter 2000: 87).

In order to present a concrete appreciation of the discourses taking place within the Forum as our case study of a social network site for this paper – an analysis of the language used is presented. Language in this instance examines the context of communication; i.e., who is communicating with who and why? It also analyses the actual constitution of the social networks being studied. Also an evolution of different types of communication and their relationship within the different discourses on Matebeleland and ultimately the cause of Mthwakazi is analysed. Meaning in this instance is not static or inherent in representation but is socially constructed through symbolic systems and discourses. Critical discourse analysis, therefore, helps us to understand the presence of the crucial interface between shared social representations governing collective action. In that regard, discourses of power and feelings of being dominated were taken into account. Using critical discourse analysis we analysed different aspects; such as, material significance, which entails how language is used in the creation of significance; identities – what identities is the language used constructing; connections – this links with memorialisation of issues being discussed; thus creating a link between current trends and certain historical episodes. These engagements enabled us to understand the origins of Mthwakazi nationalism as an ideology, also hinged on socially shared interpretive frameworks that allow group members to understand and make sense of social reality, everyday practices and relations to other groups (Button 1991). From this we understand that this study is about engagement of an Internet based social network of oppressed people who are engaged in cognitive discourse in their exchange of ideas, beliefs, values, judgements and values (van Dijk 1995: 244). Various themes were created as part of the discourses that usually shape different topics within the Forum. As will be presented in the section on discourses on Mthwakazi nationalism the follow-

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ing are the thematic areas covered, although given the space constraints not all of them will be covered in detail: History and narratives of peoplehood – discourses on Mthwakazi history. Here identity issues were presented in view of the discursive accordance of the Mthwakazi identity. Second, discourses on development issues and marginalisation of Matebeleland. Third, discourses on Zimbabwean politics and the exclusion of Matebeleland. Four, discourses on economic issues - investment and the emergence of China in the scene. The fifth theme presents discourses on verbal interactions in which disagreements and other such related issues emerged in the Forum. A social networking group such as the Forum, which is composed of people from different backgrounds tends to face the challenge of in-fighting and divergences of cognitive dimension; i.e., worldviews, beliefs and judgements. Through such disagreements we are able to glean that ideologies are cognitive and axiomatic; through socially shared belief systems of groups (van Dijk 1995: 244).

THE INTERNET AND ICTS IN ZIMBABWE Internet usage has grown phenomenally in Zimbabwe over the past decade, and currently stands at 34% (ZAMPS, 2012) of an estimated population of around 15 million. While this reveals glaring social gaps, especially between the rural and urban owing to uneven infrastructure distribution and economic disparities, what is remarkable is how phenomenally the rate keeps rising (it was at 12% between 2012 and 2013). There are many indicators that show that there has been an exponential rise in Internet usage in recent years. In the past 12 – 18 months, competition between service providers who previously worked like cartels, keeping prices high has also seen a steady reduction in prices for broadband users, which has implications for other Internet services.3 Techzim notes the reduction of prices

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by the ISPs had a cascading effect, which resulted in a reduction by the three GSM operators in the country, Telecel, and Econent, even though prices remain beyond the reach of the majority. Between 2007 and 2009, it grew by 165%,4 pushing Zimbabwe to number 10 on the continent in terms of numbers of users.5 As of June 2010, Zimbabwe had 29,094 Internet hosts and 1,422,000 million Internet users representing just over 12% of the population. However, it is interesting to note that Econet Wireless alone (one of the three mobile phone operators) now has a combined 2.1 million broadband subscribers and indications are that the figures keep going up.6 Therefore, the increase in access to and use of mobile phones has also contributed to the rise in the number of Internet users in Zimbabwe. McCombs (2011) says mobile Internet penetration in Zimbabwe increased by a phenomenal 4000% in the 18 months up to September 2011. She predicts it will grow faster in the near future and is likely to change the way Zimbabweans consume news7. Zimbabwe’s three mobile phone operators – the state owned Net One, Telecel and Econet, have expanded their networks and made mobile phone lines more easily accessible and at very low rates after almost a decade of exorbitantly high prices, particularly since the local currency was abandoned and Zimbabwe became a dollarized economy. Mobile phone penetration has therefore grown phenomenally in Zimbabwe since around 2008. The rapid growth in Internet penetration can partly be attributed to this development. About 33% of users who access Facebook, said to be the most popular social network among Zimbabweans, are doing so through their mobile phones (McCombs, 2011) and this number keeps rising. The proliferation of cheap Chinese made imitation handsets also lowered the barrier to obtaining a mobile phone. As a result, from a total figure of 1,2 million users country wide in 2007, Econet alone now has 6,4 million active subscribers (a 2 million increase from 4,6 in August 20108). Econet’s competitors, Net One and Telecel, have

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also reported remarkable growth in subscribers in the same period and together have 3,1 million active subscribers (although in the case of Telecel there has been a reversal of fortunes with around 300,000 subscribers leaving the network by March 2012.9 While previously penetration was restricted to urban and semi-urban centres, both Econet and Net One have expanded their networks across the country, to the extent that only the most remote parts of Zimbabwe are now outside mobile phone coverage. Network coverage therefore continues to push beyond Growth Points and District Centres into more remote areas. Ndlela (2009: 233) describes the opportunities presented by these developments: The increasing number of mobile phone users has opened the way for innovative distribution of news headlines and mobilisation. Text messages have become an integral part of campaigning. In fact, Zimbabwean political parties have resorted to sending text messages to potential voters containing messages about their information platforms and distributing slogans and jingles demeaning their opponents. Zimbabweans have also circulated satirical messages about presidential contenders. A significant outcome of these developments is that not only are diasporic Ndebele groups able to socialise among themselves in their foreign environs, but they are also able to more easily link with groups back home, and increasingly in Zimbabwe even more socially and economically disadvantaged groups are able to have a presence online. And so the richness and diversity of the discourses taking place in the Forum tend to explore all these developments. This is significant in overcoming problems emanating from the digital divide, which is described as inequalities in physically accessing ICTs, the Internet and other computer based technologies, but also more importantly the social and cultural factors whose net effect is the exclusion of many people from

using the Internet. Therefore, as this paper will show, these platforms while being initiated and dominated by groups based in the diaspora also have a significant presence of people based in Zimbabwe.

THE “VULNERABLE” POTENTIAL OF ICTS The Internet offers many possibilities for the extension of the public sphere, or for the creation of counter or alternative public spheres where the main public sphere is rendered inaccessible, as is the case in many repressive societies. Also, unlike older technologies like TV that have been repeatedly accused of keeping people separated (Gordon & Silva, 2011: 105) and alienated, it encourages the cultivation of both weak and strong ties (cf. Granovetter, 1973), thereby bringing dispersed groups and individuals together. Coleman (2005: 180) says digital technologies, unlike older “megaphone” mediums like television which offered an essentially one way of communication, are “radar” technologies, and they “make for effective radar devices precisely because they are interactive, diminishing the significance of the old dichotomy between sender and receiver, producer and audience”. The Internet in particular “ideally provides, simultaneously, a participatory interface and a two-way flow of information between many different users” (Rønning, 2010: 133). Flew (2005: 4) says: Internet usage involves person-to-person communication, group communication, and global publishing and information provision, through electronic mail (email), news groups, chat rooms, mailing lists, and the World Wide Web. No doubt some of these functions existed through older media: for instance phone-in programmes on radio and television, and readers’ forums in print media. As Flew (2005: 3-4) ob-

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serves, “new media” in actual fact “captures both the development of unique forms of digital media, and the remaking of more traditional media forms to adopt and adapt to the new media technologies”, to the extent that the boundaries between “old” and “new” are blurred. Through its popular features such as blogs, discussion forums and boards, it provides virtual spaces that transcend space and time (Wright & Street, 2007: 850; Rønning, 2010: 133). New media makes possible the combination of horizontal and vertical communication creating the possibility for “deliberation (citizen-to-citizen communication) and ‘hearing’ (citizen-to-authorities communication)” (Tsagarousianou, 1999: 196); the Forum vividly captures both these aspects. This represents a reversal of the processes Habermas saw as disintegrating the public sphere and ending the possibilities for a more participatory politics, whose net result was that “horizontal communication between citizens … [was] increasingly replaced by vertical communication between mass media” (Downey & Fenton, 2003: 186). The dispersed nature of ICT/Internet based communication, however, cultivates the creation and strengthening of horizontal communication between groups at the bottom brought together by shared “imaginations” while also permitting the same to approach centres of power with renewed confidence and defiance, which is evident where the Forum has lobbied policy makers and the government of Zimbabwe on certain issues. The Forum represents an example of disempowered citizens, acting as an interest group and taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the Internet to not only form a discursive, alternative public sphere but to connect it to the larger, national public sphere. Such a phenomenon aptly captures Craig Calhoun’s (1992: 37) intervention that turns the Habermasian-Ardonian immanent pessimism on its head, by showing how the Forum as part of civil society exerts influence on the mass-media (through online discourses as forms of news) as an established alternative discursively connected public sphere. In this way, the Forum 136

offers its members the opportunity to mobilise and advocate on issues that affect the people of Matebeleland. The Forum is, therefore, a result of the domineering public sphere exacerbated by the oppressive state of affairs in Zimbabwe. New media technologies have therefore helped in the creation of social networks whose ethos continues to negate established nationalist discourses in Zimbabwe; especially the view of a ‘united Zimbabwe.’ Peter Dalgren (1994) in his distinction between the common domain of the public sphere and advocacy domain presents a telling exposition of the continued transformation of the public sphere with the rise of new media technologies and how established discourses tend to be challenged by voices from the advocacy domain. As a result functional differentiation emerges which John Downey and Natalie Fenton (2003: 188) suggest …is done through a variety of media, formats and representational modes, taking into account the sociocultural segmentation of society. The advocacy domain consists partly of time and space made available by the dominant media and partly of a plurality of smaller civic media from political parties, interest groups, movements, organizations and networks. This distinction allows us to consider not only the official public sphere of the dominators, but also the public sphere of the dominated (2003). The latter presents an interface between shared social representation and collective action taken by those whose voices are constantly suppressed. The advocacy domain presents a conduit for the expression of feelings of being dominated. An example is the case of Zimbabwe Football Association (ZIFA) in 2009 following the position stated by the ZIFA CEO suggesting that Barbourfields football stadium in Bulawayo (Matebeleland’s major city whose alleged neglect by the central government has dominated discourses invoking feelings of exclusion by people of the region since independence) may not benefit from FIFA’s development projects meant for the World-Cup football

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tournament in South Africa. A story appeared in one of the online newspapers on April 4 2009 with the following headline: “Activists fear Bulawayo side-lined for 2010 world-cup projects.” Citing the Forum, the story read as follows: …The internet discussion10 involved prominent campaigners from the region, including Amakhosi Theatre Productions director Cont Mhlanga, … among others. Some of the activists were particularly scathing of the political leadership in the region over its silence on the matter. Barbourfields Stadium is in Deputy Prime Minister Thokozani Khupe’s parliamentary constituency.11 The above statement presents salient discourses of protest. Accusations against the local leadership, in particular, mention of Thokozani Kupe, who would be seen as a progressive politician in the more “national” opposition movement (big virtue of being a senior leader in the MDC-T; presently the biggest opposition to Mugabe rule) present an interesting case of conscious attempts by of the people of Matebeleland to extricate themselves from broader national political struggles as part of their attempts to not only assert their autonomy but to insist that national politics cannot resolve their problems.

DISCOURSES ON MTHWAKAZI NATIONALISM This section will present different discourses taking place within the Forum. Using the classical case of China in which discourses of development, economic, political marginalisation, and investment are discussed the section will attempt to capture the dilemma faced by the people of Matebeleland. As indicated topics pursued by participants of the Forum have been wide and diverse and have received different levels of attention, in terms of times and number of threads. This Chinese case encompasses both regional and national undertones. Regional in the sense

of Matebeleland as a region, inclusive of the aspirations of a people, and national in the sense of a centralised governmental system of decisionmaking; where decisions that have implications on the people from the region are taken without solicitation of their participation whatsoever. As one member of the group observed; …What is troubling for me is that a deal has already been made and sealed without Bulawayo’s participation. It goes without saying that the one who made and sealed the deal calls the tune here and I don’t see how the City of Bulawayo12 can begin to negotiate a separate deal with the Chinese. […] I think we have to concern ourselves mostly with policy to make deep changes […]. This observation brings out power relations between the people of Matebeleland viz-a-viz the national agenda, in which case the people of Matebeland have over the years been forced to think of themselves as peripheral. Another participant commented on March 17 2011 that; Bulawayo is the only town in Zimbabwe where there are permanent roadblocks both inside the city and as you leave the city. This is not by accident, this is by design. It disrupts business and development as well. It feeds corruption. Given the enormity of summarising all the discussions that have taken place since the formation of this group in January 2006 and the challenge of space limitations for this paper we have chosen to present as sound-bites only a few selected issues. The Forum’s richness stems from the diverse composition it enjoys. It is made up of people from diverse backgrounds including their areas of expertise. This as its major source of strength tends to result in different issues discussed ranging from policy related issues to major political issues. An example is the major policy debate pitting different views regarding China’s investment exploits in Zimbabwe and their plans to extend into Matebeleland. 137

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The forum has been in existence since January 2006. The language of discussion is not always confined to English; since most members are Ndebele speakers; participants interchange between Ndebele and English in most discussions. The Forum has tackled a myriad of issues ranging from the unresolved Gukurahundi genocide, leading to the mooting of the Members Bill by Parliamentarians from Matebeleland, devolution of power as raised by Sam Siphepha Nkomo in 2006, in which he presented it as ‘provincialisation’, to the issue of recent debates about the Chinese involvement in development and investment projects in Matebeleland in particular and Zimbabwe in general. As stated above in these threads dominant discourses emerge concerning exclusion in the sense of broader cases of national development and feelings of powerlessness and questioning of legitimacy of the central governments and frustrations about opportunities. An example is the case of unfair employment of a Director of an Orphanage in Nketa, Bulawayo who had been hired from the Sally Mugabe Children’s Fund in Harare in 2007/8 to manage a local NGO. Discourse on Investment and China. The theme of investment and emergence of China has been marred with pitched debates. Given the dialogical nature of discourses characterizing the Forum two clearly distinct groups have emerged as a result of some points of strategic divergences. One group favors the idea of engaging the Chinese but with firm conditions on quality related issues and involvement of people from Matebeleland. This prompted one prominent economic policy advisor to respond as a way of allaying these fears by saying; I am advised that the contract with the Chinese on the Matebeleland Zambezi Water Project prescribes that: all labour employees must be residents of Matebeleland, save for the engineering specialists; all inputs e.g. building materials, must be of Zimbabwean origin.

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To this another participant quickly retorted by observing that; I’m laughing at point number one that says: “All labour employees must be residents of Matebeleland.” Ongakwaziyo ukuthi yiwaphi lawo ma residents eMatebeleland azaqhatshwa hatshi usemnyameni sibili. (who ever does not know which residents of Matebeleland will be employed suffers from blissful ignorance). 13 The observation stated above expresses issues of political exclusion, marginalization and the tribalised state of Zimbabwe’s developmental processes; with the people of Matebeleland regions, in particular, the Ndebele speakers excluded. Further, it expresses shared frustrations with government dealings and offers a critique of central political power (cf. Morrison and Love 1996: 40); thereby legitimating calls for solidarity among the people of Matebeleland as the oppressed. The group that favours engaging the Chinese argues that unlike their colleagues who are firmly opposed to any form of dealing with the Chinese the project of self-determination remains their major goal. They also argue that their position is informed by the current state of affairs and economic realism; the fact that China is already having some investment projects in Zimbabwe. Then the group opposed to this position warns that while the argument of economic realism remains plausible the fact that issues are determined in Harare does not help the situation. Moreover, they express lack of trust for Chinese products arguing that they prefer dealing with China only if Mthwakazi can afford to determine her affairs. One member trenchantly puts it; I still wouldn’t touch the Chinese with a budge pole! […] a free Mthwakazi State […] will decide democratically and choose who to engage with to the best interests of Mthwakazians and their future generations.

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Another member responded; …In present day Zimbabwe, it’s not the Chinese that are a problem. It’s the government. The Chinese were invited there. What we should have instead are laws that say if there is a project like a national stadium, or dam to be built. Let the community under where the structure is to be located put out a tender and let it be fair. Open the economy up that way. […] let foreign companies compete to come and do business in Zimbabwe. While your role as the Zimbabwean government is ensuring that laws are followed, and there is no stealing of resources by international companies. The discussion on Chinese investment in Matebeleland tended to have a marked political twist, with some members of the Forum arguing that it is almost impossible for the people of Matebeleland to clearly declare their conditions to the Chinese. From this political twist discourses on the imagination of a separate Mthwakazi state could be gleaned. As the discussion on China’s investments plans in Bulawayo and the greater Matebeleland continues one member of the group observed that; States are the basic foundations of the international political and legal order. Within a State, everything you do (at least of a public nature) is controlled by the State. You can source ‘squillion’ dollars for Bulawayo or Matebeleland. You still have to go through the laws and regulations of the existing State called Zimbabwe. Now if that State is against what you do, how can you even dream of doing anything big. Under existing conditions, or reformed conditions of decentralisation or devolution, nothing will change unless Mthwakazi wields real power as that basic constituent part of the international system: the State. The above position clearly speaks to the growing gravitas as people from Matebeleland imagine a separate state of Mthwakazi as the solution

to their subaltern situation. In addition another member of the Forum opined that; […] we all want to see Bulawayo develop and return to being the industrial capital of the present day Zimbabwe. The reason why Harare may be so keen to invite the Chinese to develop Bulawayo could be simple that Harare knows that it is now almost in total control of Bulawayo. Unconfirmed statistics show that Harare now controls more than 68% of the Bulawayo economy both in the formal and informal sectors. The only sector were Mthwakazi was dominating kuse mkambo (at the flea-market) but she is also being displaced. So we should never fool ourselves that the development will benefit us. Yes we will benefit in that we are going to be their employees if we are lucky. Otherwise we are to be consumers first. However, one member of the Forum strongly observed that; As much as we are all entitled to I think everyone is correct in some way i.e. those that say that we face major policy and political obstacles while at the same time there are some who still see an opportunity to get involved in spite of the obstacles. […] Perhaps some things are meant to happen in parallel. I fully subscribe to the notion of encouraging devolution as well as a review of the policy framework but also believe I’m not going to wait while all that is happening. These policy conjectures, including calls for self-determination expresses suspicions people have of anything that is decided or undertaken by the state. People from Matebeleland always lack of belief in the government, except only if there is an ulterior motive. This is also because of deepseated suspicions people have coupled with the common tribal cleavages often faced whereby the government tends to be seen as favouring people from Mashonaland.

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NEW MEDIA AND THE INTERPERSONAL: A REJECTION OF DETERMINISMS This paper endorses neither technological nor sociological determinism, and as argued above, advocates an approach that emphasises the interaction between technologies, which do possess certain, unique qualities and already existing social processes. In this way, it draws attention to and tries to downplay some of the problems identified by scholars who dismiss interactions based on online groups. New media technologies like all structures developed by human beings tend to enable and, in some instances, limit human action. As Nicol (2003: 12) argues ICTs are central to contemporary society in that they affect us continually in many ways. To Croteau and Hoynes (2003: 302) our understanding of the deterministic ways of the new media has to revert to the roots of the communication processes; it requires a macro-sociological and economic perspective. New media technologies, therefore, have a social significance because they affect human communication. A sociological look at new media technologies would in this case seek to identify how these technologies shape the ways we interact and communicate with one another. ICTs lubricate interaction; through them mediated communication resembles interpersonal interaction. From this perspective it can be gleaned that the relationship between society and technological developments is characterised by interdependence; as new media technologies have a determining role in processes of social change. Marshal McLuhan sums it up by suggesting that; “…all media, from the phonetic alphabet to the computer, are extensions of man that cause deep and lasting changes in him and transform his environment” (McLuhan 1964: 54). ICTs provide a form of social cement, as people unite into ‘virtual families’; thereby shrinking time and space. These technological advances have gained acceptance as the central causal elements in the processes of social change. Impliedly, new 140

media technologies are invented, and created by human beings who raise the control factor which determines to a certain degree their use and potential effect. Similarly, Claude Fischer (1992:08) describes the most prominent forms of technological determinism as ‘billiard ball’ approaches; thus new media technologies are external forces introduced into a social situation, which produces a series of ricochet effects. The view holds that technology causes things to happen, albeit often through a series of intermediary steps. The Forum as an example shows how new media technologies have been exploited as conduits for mediating an already existing social situation of inequalities given the marginalisation of Matebeleland (cf. Mhlanga 2010, 2012). It follows therefore that usage of ICTs as forms of new media tends to impact far more than the given content (Levinson 1999: 35). An example in this case would be the process of watching television, which tends to have influence on the viewer than the specific program or content. The viewer in this case begins to see himself as part of the broader society; i.e., through the creation of a community of those who own and have access to the ICTs as they share experiences. Following Marshal McLuhan’s position “… many people would be disposed to say it was not the machine, but what one did with the machine, that was its meaning or message” (McLuhan 1964:07). This implies that new media technologies have the power to alter our relations and lives in general. To the people of Matebeleland, especially members of the Forum, new technologies act as ‘liberating devices’ from some social constraints. ICTs therefore are not just applied technologies for transmitting certain symbolic content or linking participants to some exchange (McQuail 2000:118); rather they embody a set of social relations that interact with features of the new technologies. Social transformation as a form of emancipatory project becomes a product of symbiotic relationship between human agenda and technological advances. The content plays a major role once the technology has established

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itself in society (cf. Illich 1973). But it is difficult to separate content from the medium. The opportunity for direct communication between citizens on virtual forums have raised hopes for the revival of the public sphere (Papacharissi, 2004) and the opportunity to address the failure of modern mass media to sustain feasible forums for critical debate and participation (Ferdinand, 2000: 6; Dahlgren, 2001: 64; cf. Wright & Street, 2007; Coleman & Blumler, 2009). The Habermasian theory of the public sphere is finding new and in some cases more radical interpretation based on the “vulnerable potential” of the Internet to create an online commons (Blumler & Gurevitch, 2001; Sassi, 2001: 90). Experiments have been conducted on the possibility of using the Internet for political deliberation (cf. Coleman & Blumler, 2009; Wright & Street, 2007; Dahlberg, 2001).

ICTS AND THE NEGATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE Many doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of using the Internet for mobilising groups and for advocacy, with pessimists suggesting that some of the successes cited by scholars and activists are exaggerated if not at all part of the problematic about the seemingly magic abilities of technology. Morozov, (2011) suggests that the Internet (and any technology) be seen as doublesided, which helps focus more productively on its potential and limitations, as a technology. Therefore, hopes raised on the basis of its possibilities through forums, email groups, social networks and other platforms must be tempered with grim reminders of its darker side, and those qualities that could hinder civic participation and the cultivation of discursive groups such as the Forum thereby impinging on the extension of the public sphere (Dahlgren, 2001: 75). The point here is that the Internet is not an inherently liberating or positive technology. Controversial founder of the website Wikileaks, Julian Assange captured this paradox:

It [the Net] is not a technology that favours freedom of speech. It is not a technology that favours human rights. It is not a technology that favours civil life. Rather it is a technology that can be used to set up a totalitarian spying regime, the likes of which we have never seen. Or, on the other hand, taken by us, taken by activists, and taken by all those who want a different trajectory for the technological world, it can be something we all hope for.14 Thus, it appears the democratising potential of the Internet is developing parallel to its darker, constricting side (cf. Morozov, 2011). Platforms such as the Forum present as many challenges and questions as they offer possibilities. Outside the restrictions brought by nervous policy makers and politicians, some of the features of the Internet, that are hailed for the possibilities they possess equally have the potential to negate participatory discussion and civic engagement. On many blogsites and discussion forums, the promotion of pseudonymity and anonymity, which is important as it allows people with concerns about their security to participate, as is the case with many members of the Forum, has opened doors to various levels of irresponsibility and abuse including serious violations of privacy and threats to the security of individuals (Rønning, 2010: 138). Therefore, the Internet presents both opportunities for the extension of disenfranchised groups and threats to their existence. Citron (2010: 49) underlines this double-sidedness: The Internet has two faces. One propels us forward with exciting opportunities for women and minorities to work, network, and spread their ideas online. The other brings us back to a time when anonymous mobs prevented vulnerable people from participating in society as equals. Papacharissi (2002: 10) notes that this technology “frequently induce[s] fragmented, nonsensical, and enraged discussion” which is referred to as “flaming”. Flaming can be both deliberate or the 141

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result of emotions rising from heated discussions, which is usually the case in discussions involving politics, race or ethnicity. It can be described as hostile postings or threads that are intended, deliberately or not, to cause hurt or insult to one or other participants on an online platform, and there are plenty of examples in the Forum. Flaming has many negative consequences for discussion platforms and may cause some participants to withdraw or at the very least to avoid expressing their honest opinions or disagreeing with more aggressive members of the group. To corroborate the above observation, following a heated debate, which stretched for weeks, in 2010, one member of the Forum observed that; I suggest that we suspend this forum until we put in place rules of participation? We can select some people, […] to write the rules of the game. This forum has become intimidating. Some people are not comfortable participating under such conditions. Besides, there is nothing to participate in since this has turned into a mudslinging arena. However, for us to understand the vitality of these forms of agreements and heated debates within the Forum we are reminded here of Lewis Coser’s (1957: 198) conflict functionalist’s perspective that; Conflict within and between groups in a society can prevent accommodations and habitual relations from progressively impoverishing creativity. The clash of values and interests, the tension between what is and what some groups feel ought to be, the conflict between vested interests and new strata and groups demanding their share of power, wealth and status, have been productive of vitality. Perhaps the most vivid way of emphasizing the functionality of in-group conflict, marking the progressiveness emanating from such forms of divergence was best captured by John Dewey (1930: 300) in Human Nature and Conduct; in particular on his position that consciousness and 142

thought arises from the realisation of obstacles to the interaction of groups. Furthermore, he opined that; Conflict is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates […] invention. It shocks us out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at noting and contriving [....] Conflict is a sine qua non of reflection and ingenuity In acknowledgement of the ingenuity and level of consciousness emanating from the sharp exchanges on the Forum another member observed that; I am more than pleased to note that people have not been side-tracked but emerged even more solid and have gotten to know each other! With this our people will win; the struggle for a change of heart has won a minor victory, which until yesterday appeared poised to take our unity of purpose to the doldrums. To all of you I pay my profound respects. Another recurrent concern with platforms like the Forum is that while bringing together individuals or groups who share the same identity is important for the consolidation of identities and the solidarity needed to pursue shared interests, the idea that this is a public sphere is flawed because the composition of the group robs it of critical debate, an essential requirement for the public sphere. Instead, such forums bring “‘like-minded’ individuals” together to form “deliberative enclaves” or “mini public spheres” in which they reinforce each other’s opinions without critical reflection (Dahlberg, 2007: 828). In many instances, such groups are also not connected to any larger forums (Dahlgren, 2001: 76; cf. Papacharissi, 2002 & 2004). Where groups are heterogeneous and more representative of larger society, some individuals and groups take advantage of anonymity and pseudonyms to intimidate participants who hold different views (Papacharissi, 2002: 16), an issue that can also be raised concerning the Forum.

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CONCLUSION

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Using critical discourse analysis the theoretical conclusions and positions presented in this chapter have attempted to provide a picture of the discursive nature of the Forum as an online social network. An exegesis of the nuanced discourses taking place within the Forum showing how the rise of ICTs has further transformed the Habermasian public sphere has been undertaken. Also by engaging the vulnerable potential of new media technologies as a critique of the deterministic approach often used by other scholars we have attempted to show how the Internet remains a ‘doubled edged sword’. However, the chapter acknowledges the role played by the Internet in providing impetus and space for regrouping and reshaping of suppressed memory and voices such as those of the people of Matebeleland. The Forum as a social network; i.e., one organised along the grouping of people’s personal emails enjoys a kind of prima facie uniqueness in which participants enter into it as soon as they log-on to their emails, unlike in other social networks such as Facebook groups or other web-based networks. This has encouraged the viral nature and instantaneity of engagement of issues. More-over, it shows how an oppressive system has enabled the creation of a virtual sphere in which members engage in different discourses using a simple mailing list. The Forum’s individuated nature speaks to the archaeology of social interaction, the nature of different discourses on Matebeleland and their imaginations of a separate state. It acts as a miniature of the much longed for space that should be traditionally located between the state and the household or citizens; which has been criminalised in Zimbabwe. The obstruction of such an important space, including the criminalisation of certain discourses has led to the re-enactment of citizenship, this time as ‘netizens’.

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Ferdinand, P. (2000). The Internet, democracy and democratization. Democratization, 7(1), 1–17. doi:10.1080/13510340008403642 Fischer, C. (1992). America’s calling. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Fischer, F. (2003). Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics & Deliberative Practices. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199 24264X.001.0001 Flew, T. (2005). New Media: An Introduction (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Fowler, R. (1991). Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press. London: Routledge. Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The Strenght of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 1360–1380. doi:10.1086/225469

Mhlanga, B. (2010). Zimbabwe’s Postcolonial Antinomies as the ‘Northern Problem’: Policy Projections. African Security Review Journal, 19(4), 104–113. doi:10.1080/10246029.2010.5 39816 Mhlanga, B. (2012). Devolution – The ‘Ticklish’ Subject: The ‘Northern Problem’ and the National Question in Zimbabwe. Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict Transformation, 1(1-2). Morozov, E. (2011). The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom. New York: Public Affairs. Morrison, A., & Love, A. (1996). A Discourse of Disillusionment: Letters to the Editor in Two Zimbabwean Magazines 10 Years after Independence. Discourse & Society, 7(1), 39–75. doi:10.1177/0957926596007001003

Levinson, P. (1999). Digital McLuhan: A guide to the information Millennium. London: Routledge.

Ndlela, N. M. (2009). New ICTs and Social Change in Southern Africa. In The Power of Communication: Changes and Challenges in African Media. Unpublished.

Mano, W., & Willems, W. (2008). Emerging communities, emerging media: the case of a Zimbabwean nurse in the British Big Brother show. Critical Arts, 20(1), 49–68.

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Nicol, C. (2003). Information and Communication Technology Policy: A Beginner’s Handbook. Johannesburg, South Africa: APC. Papacharissi, Z. (2002). The virtual sphere: The Internet as a public sphere. New Media & Society, 4(1), 9–27. doi:10.1177/14614440222226244 Papacharissi, Z. (2004). Democracy online: civility, politeness, and the democratic potential of online political discussion groups. New Media & Society, 6(2), 259–283. doi:10.1177/1461444804041444 Rønning, H. (2010). Tools for Democracy or Surveillance? Reflections on the Rule of Law on the Internet. In The Digital Public Sphere: Challenges for Media Policy. Göteborg: NORDICOM. Sassi, S. (2001). Transforming the Public Sphere? In New Media and Politics. London: SAGE Publications. doi:10.4135/9781446218846.n4 Tsagarousianou, R. (1999). Electronic Democracy: Rhetoric and Reality. Communications, 24(2), 189–208. doi:10.1515/comm.1999.24.2.189 van Dijk, J. (2012). The Network Society (3rd ed.). London: Sage. van Dijk, T. A. (1995). Discourse semantics and Ideology. Discourse & Society, 6(2), 243–289. doi:10.1177/0957926595006002006 Webner, R. (1992). Tears of the Dead: The social biography of an African family. Harare: Baobab.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Diasporic Groups: This refers to displaced groups of people or those who have migrated from their original homeland. Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs): Refers to a phenomenon of the convergence between telecommunications and computer technologies, creating a ‘cyberspace’, ‘information society’, ‘network society’, ‘the

knowledge society’, or the ‘information superhighway.’ Mthwakazi: Refers to a group or amalgamation of different ethnic groups within the region of Matebeleland whose identification is hinged on collective self-understanding of nationhood constructed on the back of recognition of some shared historical context, with characteristics that include; forms of solidarity conjured by their sense of shared suffering during the Gukurahundi genocide. Self-Determination: The process by which a group(s) of people who regard themselves to be a nation can determine their statehood within the confines of international law in a given context. This also captures the most important aspect of existential responsibility as people determine their destiny. Social Networks: Refers to infrastructure of social links in which communication is technologically enhanced and organised at every level; individual, group or societal. It can extend to include contours of oramedia. Subaltern: Refers to the oppressed or downtrodden groups – these can be minority ethnic groups or those that have suffered a kind of pogrom in any given context. Technological Convergence: Refers to the structural new media characteristic in which technologies of communication, telecommunications and (mass) communication are integrated.

ENDNOTES 1



The official government representation of the region’s name as ‘Matabeleland’ is colonially inherited. However, given our interpretive critical discourse analysis of issues of exclusion, politics of marginality and subaltern issues and as insiders; with the advantage of ‘subjective’ insider knowledge, we have chosen to consistently spell it as; Matebeleland. Further, we present the

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post-colonial leadership’s inability to correct these as signifiers of cultural ‘phanerons’ of exclusion. This is seen as the post-colonial government’s official policy of misrepresenting Ndebele as a language. Also seen in the official Zimbabwean Passport, (please see the Ndebele translation in the second paragraph of page. 48). These serve to explain suspicions by people of Matebeleland that the central government has a policy of excluding them. These collective feelings of neglect by the people of Matebeleland are glaring as shown in in the discourses taking place within the Forum. In the case of Cont Mhlanga reference is made of his famous play – Dabulap. This is a play that seeks to reflect the challenges faced by the people of Matebeleland, as push factors that characterise migratory trends from Matebeleland to South Africa. This information was obtained from the following link - http://www.techzim.co.zw “Zimbabwe Internet Report” from Internet World Stats (www.internetworldstats.com) obtain on http://newzimbabwe.com/pages/ email21.18645.html Accessed 28.04.11 I have used this period to show the trend in terms of growth in Zimbabwe.

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For more information on this issue refer to the following link: http://www.techzim. co.zw Cited in The Financial Gazette, 13 October 2011 http://www.econet.co.zw/eco/index. php?option=com_content&task=view& id=47&Itemid=82, Accessed 28.4.2011. Unverified Press reports say Econet reached 5.5 million subscribers in January 2011 refer to the following link: http://www. techzim.co.zw Our emphasis. As stated above, this in http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/ zifa23.19649.html The City of Bulawayo stands as the representative capital of Matebeleland regions This statement captures the common feelings of discriminatory employment tendencies by public and private sector where Shona speaking residents are seen to be given preference ahead of the indigenous people of Matebeleland. Assange was addressing students at Cambridge University, reported by The Guardian March 15, 2011(http://www.guardian. co.uk(media/2011/mar/15/web-spyingmachine-julian-assange/print Accessed 16 March 2011)

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Chapter 9

The Opportunities and Challenges of using Email for Political Communication in Authoritarian States: A Case of Zimbabwe’s Media Monitoring Project Sam Takavarasha, Jr. University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Eldred Masunungure University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT This chapter uses Illich’s (1973) concept of conviviality for analysing the challenges and opportunities of using email for political communication in authoritarian states. Based on evidence from a case study of Zimbabwe’s Media Monitoring Project (MMPZ), it contends that while conviviality allows the use of ICTs for political mobilisation, it also enables a counterproductive “big brother” effect. In addition to constant censorship and overt operations, covert strategies are often used for disrupting communication platforms. This calls for a framework for harnessing ICTs for political mobilisation. This chapter is a case study on how perceived state surveillance disrupted a vibrant communicative space in Zimbabwe. Based on evidence from the volumes of email traffic transacted over two weeks of panic, anger, and heroism, the chapter discusses the challenges and opportunities of using email for political mobilisation and warns against uncritical celebration of the role of ICTs in political mobilisation. It concludes by suggesting how the adaption of e-strategies from email marketing to political communication is among the skills that could break the tie between political opponents armed with the same convivial tools for political communication in the information age.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch009

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

 The Opportunities and Challenges of using Email for Political Communication

INTRODUCTION The role of ICTs in promoting political change in autocratic states has attracted the attention of a growing number of scholars in the information age (Delany 2009; Eltantawy and Wiest 2011; Joseph 2011; Lynch 2011; Shirky 2011). This interest was also fuelled by a phenomenal use of ICTs for political change in authoritarian states like Tunisia, Egypt and Libya during the Arab Spring which commenced in the year 2011. The same period also saw the birth of ongoing Information and Communication Technology (ICT) enabled revolutions in Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. In all of these cases, the use of ICTs marked a departure from earlier springs (e.g. in Central Europe and popular movements that overthrew Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines or Suharto in Indonesia) to the emerging practice of ICT enabled political activism in the information age. Optimism about the power of internet as articulated by Utopians (Joseph 2011, Shirky 2011) has been challenged by techno-pessimistic voices in burgeoning literature that view the internet as a tool of surveillance used by totalising states to thwart democracy in developing countries. This is supported by a growing body of literature articulating how governments can counter the use of the internet by terrorists (Jacobson 2010). Other sceptics dismiss online activism as mere ‘slacktivism’ which requires no sacrifice on the part of participants (Gladwell 2010) and yield no tangible results. This ambiguity begs a question whether ICTs are the boon or the bane of politics in the information age? It also creates a fertile ground for philosophical exegesis on the transformative effect of ICTs by invoking a contest between the utopian and dystopian views. Without supporting the utopian thesis or its dystopian antithesis, this paper adopts Illich’s (1973) tools of conviviality theory for demonstrating the opportunities that ICTs grant social movements as well as the challenges associated with ICT-enhanced state

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surveillance and repression (lynch 2011). The concept of conviviality of electronic communication tools posits that ICTs can empower whoever is using them. In comparison with Illich’s (1973) telephone, Ameripour et al (2010) present the internet as an ideal example of convivial tools for political mobilisation in the information age. A debate on the role of ICTs in political mobilisation would seem shallow to the uncritical reader due to a perceived given-ness of the pros and cons that lie on the surface of the discourse. However, mining deeper into the discourse reveals the translucent issues that may redefine our expectations of the nature of politics in the information age. For instance, while ICTs have altered the contours of political opportunities, it is not clear whether they will abate the authoritarian state by undermining its pillars or whether they will entrench it by taking traditional imbalances to a new frontier. Against this background, a case study of how Zimbabwe’s Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ) was allegedly infiltrated by Zimbabwe’s dreaded state agency is used as field evidence for articulating the synthesis of the utopian thesis and its dystopian antithesis. In this study as in other ICT enabled applications, we deny technological determinism (McLuhan 1964) by hypothesising that ICTs can only achieve results when championed by appropriate skills under a conducive socio-political environment but not on their own. Our unit of analysis MMPZ is based in Zimbabwe, a Sub-Saharan country with 88.9% tele-density and 12% internet penetration which is overseen by repressive laws that allow government to monitor and intercept electronic communication. We refer to it as an authoritarian state because of its repression of opposition parties and civil society which has led to international isolation and intervention by regional block. As information assumed a more central and convivial role in information age politics, Zimbabwe passed the Interception of Communications Act of 2007 (ICA [2007]) to buttress a raft of other restrictive

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laws (Mpofu 2012). ICA [2007] restricts online political freedoms by requiring all electronic communication to be routed through government’s interception centre or fitted with a recording device. After its independence from British rule in 1980 following a bloody liberation struggle, Zimbabwe’s post colonial state has paradoxically contained opposition from political parties and NGOs mainly through force administered by heavy handed uniformed forces. While this has created a culture of fear and self censorship, it has also bred a vibrant civil society that checks government’s excesses in a country with Africa’s highest literacy level. Zimbabwe’s surveillance of online political activity against a phenomenal ICT penetration makes Zimbabwe an ideal case for accessing the challenges of using ICTs as tools of political mobilisation in authoritarian states. Its relentless civil society bent on overcoming the lack of media freedoms resort to cyberspace for political communication. While other communication modes have been used, this study focuses on email political communication with a view to assessing how it could be done better. On the 5th of December 2011 MMPZ staffers were arrested in Matebeleland for allegedly holding an unsanctioned meeting and undermining the office of the President. This was followed by the arrest of their Chairperson and confiscation of their outreach material and these developments prompted e-mail debate among MMPZ subscribers. The next day the state owned The Herald newspaper carried a verbatim quote of an e-mail message that had been flighted on the list by a prominent activist. This prompted a mixed reaction of anger, panic and fear among activists who suddenly realised that they were being monitored by the dreaded Central Intelligence Organisation. This ‘covert act of destabilisation’ resulted in mass requests to be removed from the MMPZ mailing list as well as counter requests to be kept on it. The dynamics of the resultant drama begs the empirical question whether this was caused by fear of state surveillance or frustration with

volumes of e-mail if not both. Without attempting to answer that question, this paper uses the ensuing evidence for developing a framework for using conviviality of ICT in political mobilisation so as to minimise the effect of surveillance and maximise e-opportunities through good practice. This is done by critically analysing the evidence from emails and drawing lessons from the art of email marketing. After this introduction, the rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.0. ICTs as Convivial Tools, Section 3.0 Use of ICTs in political communication, 3.1 ICTs and Surveillance the big brother effect, Section 4 The MMPZ case, Section 5 Methods and Approach, Section 6 Lessons from online marketing, Section 7 Framework for using email for political mobilisation and Section 8 Concluding remarks Section 9 References

ICTS AS CONVIVIAL TOOLS In the previous sections, we have discussed the power of ICTs to enable activism in cyberspace. We have also discussed how governments have used ICTs for surveillance on activists as well as terrorists who take advantage of the internet. Without supporting the utopian thesis or the dystopian antitheses, this paper articulates Illich’s (1973) tools of conviviality theory as a necessary synthesis of both views which also provides key lessons for political practitioners in the information age. Several Information systems studies have drawn on Illich’s (1973) concept of conviviality (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001; Wastell et al. 2004; Ameripour et al. 2010; Johri and Pal 2012). We contend that the applicability to the use of ICTs in the contest between authoritarian regimes and their citizens is a window through which information age movements like the Arab Spring can be analysed. According to Illich (1973), convivial tools enable whoever holds them to saturate their environment with their influence. The concept of conviviality refers to people’s power and control

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over the physical and metaphorical tools at their disposal for self-expression. This implies that actors at both sides of the political divide have the capacity to use ICTs for influencing their environment. Illich’s (1973) insights on conviviality give neither the authoritarian state nor its opponents the opportunity to monopolize the political space. This defines the opportunities and challenges presented by ICTs to politics in the information age. Four characteristics are associated with convivial tools. These are 1) that users and not designers must shape them to meet their needs 2) they must maximise communication in the community 3) convivial tools must maximise the creativity of their users and 4) the users must be contributors and not mere customers (Illich 1973). These features bear profound insights into the analysis of political activism in the information age because they define how ICTs can turn politically and socially marginalised societies into active change agents. Above all they invoke the un-monopolisable question of creativity and dedication to the deployment of ICT for political activism. Illich (1973) presents the telephone of his day as an example of a convivial tool. We argue that today’s mobile phone (as articulated by Rheingold (2002)) is a more convivial tool given the convergence of video, computer and telephony on a cheap and portable devises. Before 1990s, the idea of conviviality was not as pronounced as it is in the context of increased ICT penetration. Morden ICTs can create convivial societies that are capable of challenging pre-information age vertical power structures into a flatter world where anyone can create, access or disseminate political information (Friedman 2007). Of particular significance is conviviality’s onslaught on the pre-information age monopoly of political information by authoritarian state. News channels like CNN, Al-Jazeera, BBC and etc are now providing platforms for ordinary people to tweet, email and blog thereby creating alternative political voices for information age audiences. According to Lynch (2011), the

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advent of Al-Jazeera marked the birth of a new political space at its inception ten years ago. This represents the mainstreaming of conviviality in the information age since the news consumer has also become a news producer. That is an example of what Ritzer (2008) refers to as Prosumption or the McDonaldization of media since news consumers have become news producers as they are in McDonald’s fast food chain where the customer is also a waiter. With convivial tools capable of empowering whoever employs them, it seems that the difference in ability to exploit convivial tools may break the tie between opponents armed with them. Equipped with qualified personnel and superior ICTs, the state should have the advantage to exploit conviviality for perpetuating the status quo than its change seeking opponents who are usually volunteers driven by a desire to meet a cause. Several examples of voluntary causes that defeated seemingly indomitable states should compel us to question the inevitability of state dominance of public sphere in the information age. For instance, Ameripour et al. (2010), present the cases of two Iranian online campaigns during which bloggers successfully used the internet for defending women’s rights in an authoritarian state. Other examples include the Arab spring (Lynch 2011) and Obama’s use of ICTs to beat the seemingly unbeatable Clinton campaign machinery (Plouffe 2009). There should therefore be other factors determining political practice in the information age. Uncovering such issues calls for a deeper understanding of convivial societies and a multi disciplinary grasp of the role of convivial tools in the information age. A convivial society emanates from social structures that guarantee free access to the tools of the community for each member to exploit (Ameripour et al. 2010). Illich’s (1973) also shows the role of technology in fostering autonomous and creative interaction between people and other people as well as people and their environment. The risks of allowing a con-

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vivial society to thrive are known to authoritarian regimes. This explains why politically volatile states like Zimbabwe monitor the use of ICTs by their citizens.

USE OF ICTS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION ICTs are attractive to political activists because of their ability to enhance political participation (Alaore 2011), create sense of community, develop sense of collective identity, create less confined political spaces and connection with other movements (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011). Lynch (2011) suggests that ICTs challenge authoritarian regimes by 1) limiting state repression mechanisms by empowering collective action 2) denting the international community’s support of repressive states by publishing their human rights abuses 3) reducing their control of the public sphere by creating alternative forums 4) promoting collective action by citizens. Underground political groups which include repressed civil society groups, political movements like Hamas and ‘terrorist’ groups resort to the internet because of its broad reach, anonymity and ability to raise and transfer funds (Jacobson 2010). There is great scope for non-profit organisations to use ICTs for fundraising (Olsen et al 2001). Other social movements have organised dissention activities like consumer boycotts, public protests and demonstrations (Langman 2005) using new media. This growing use of the internet also makes it a viable space for political communication in the information age. According International Telecommunications Union (ITU) internet use across the globe has increased from 8.0 in 2001 to 34.7 per 100 inhabitants in 2011 i.e. from 495 to 2421 million (ITU 2012). This makes it imperative for political players including incumbent political parties to have an online presence for propaganda purposes. During the Arab Spring activists managed to keep the international community engaged about their

struggles by sending them messages through the internet (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011). Several cyber-activist movements have emerged in recent years to oppose geopolitical powers like World Trade Organisation (WTO) and United States invasion of Iraq. Notable ones include Antiwar Coalition, Anti-Globilisation and Global Justice Movement which attracted large followings across the world (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011). The unprecedented diversity and magnitude of these movements define the dawn of a new era in political mobilisation. 1. Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign is acknowledged as the profoundest game changer of political campaigning in the information age. Delany (2009) posits that without his innovative use of the internet, Barack Obama could have remained a junior Illinois senator. He however managed to beat the politically Clintons who were better able to “raise money from big donors and lock up endorsements from elected officials and party activists” (p.3) by harnessing ICTs. Apart from Obama and McCain campaigns there is evidence of increased use of ICTs by elected politicians (Lusoli et al. 2006; Williamson 2009) and activists (Comninos 2011; Eltantawy and Wiest 2011). Other organisations which used the internet for raising funds for political activity include Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), radical Islamic groups and mainstream political parties (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011). While the internet can facilitate other political activities like fund raising, it is this ability to spread propaganda and mobilise political activism that worries authoritarian states like Zimbabwe. They have therefore resorted to the use of laws like Interception of Communications Act to legalise eaves dropping on e-mail and mobile communication. Having demonstrated the role of ICTs in supporting political campaigns, let us focus on the

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counter revolutionary reading articulated by the dystopian camp as the bane of political activism in the information age.

ICTs and Surveillance: The Big Brother Effect In this section we critique techno-optimism with the usefulness of ICTs to political activists and social movements (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011) in the information age, by considering ICT enabled surveillance by the authoritarian state. Given its threat to their hegemony, governments have not ignored ICT enabled activism, they have harnessed ICTs for repressing political movements (Howard 2010, Zuckerman 2011) and have often taken extreme measures for containing the use of ICTs by their political rivals (Howard et al 2011). We acknowledge that while surveillance is chiefly done by states, big money and organised crime is also on record for thwarting online social movements (Avaaz 2012). Authoritarian states have responded to the threat of online activism by both technical censorship of internet access and brute repression (Lust-Okar 2007). They have used surveillance (Lust-Okar 2007), infiltration, disruption of online activity (Morozov 2011) and repressive laws to control information flows and track dissenters. These activities are often done in partnerships with Western companies (Morozov 2011) and telecommunication giants like Vodafone which assisted the Egyptian dictatorship with subscriber details during the Arab Spring (Lynch 2011). Other scholars deny that governments are concerned with cyber-activism. Huxley (nd) cited in Joseph (2011) dismisses the internet as a front for hedonism and triviality that “Big Brother” needs not worry about. In spite of this reading of online interaction between activists, authorities are arguably concerned about cyber activism as evidenced by laws that are meant to control and monitor it.

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An assessment of these threats presents a reality check against an uncritical celebration of ICTs by political activists. Of particular interest to this study is the infiltration of ICT platforms, use of restrictive legislature and the shutting down of web sites by repressive governments. There is evidence of drastic measures taken by governments to contain online activism. Howard et al (2011) found 606 unique incidents in which states went beyond surveillance to disconnection and blocking of websites in 99 countries since 1995. They report that 52 percent of these incidents took place in authoritarian regimes while 39 percent occurred in democracies. The remaining, 6 percent happened in emerging democracies while 3 percent were in fragile states. Western countries have been chiefly motivated by the need to counter the use of internet by terrorist groups (Jacobson 2010) and criminal elements. This arguably accounts for what Howard et al (2011) refer to as 39% of web site disconnections that were done by ‘democracies’. Literature has expressed concern that such surveillance for addressing security could infringe on citizens’ privacy (Katos et al 2010). Authoritarian states have however sought to limit the capacity of citizens to engage in political communication (Lynch 2011), through ICT enabled surveillance. This is more so in developing countries where the state apparatus are pitted against less resourced though technologically savvy populace. Given the similarity between the DNA of politicians across the North South divide, it would be naive to absolve Western countries from subtle versions of surveillance on their citizens. The Arab spring saw an extensive use of ICTs for political mobilisation which warned governments about the power of communication tools (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011). According to (Lifvergren 2011) there was a profound use of social media like Face Book and Twitter by Tunisian and Egyptian protest movements. On realising the effectiveness of ICTs during the Arab Spring, the Egyptian government resorted

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to shutting down the internet for five days. This prompted some activists to resort to other means like dialing-up to remote destination and the innovative use of twitter by voice (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011). While this shows that surveillance can not contain social movements, such a sudden stop to an ICT enabled public sphere that activists depended on betrays its vulnerability as a political tool. While such restrictions may disrupt and reduce the scale of activism, it is important to note that after being shut down cyber-activists and terrorist organisations have often re-emerged under different names (Jacobson 2010) or using different ICT enabled platforms (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011). This shows that in spite of the vulnerabilities stated above, containing cyberspace activism is challenging. After all, invoking drastic measures like shutting down the internet attracts social and economic costs that governments may not want to face. Legal instruments are also a potential tool for restricting use of the ICTs for political activism in authoritarian states. This invokes the inconclusive debate about how to conduct surveillance for security reasons while guaranteeing freedom of expression to law abiding citizen. The ensuing arguments for and against surveillance are open to abuse for partisan political reasons. While maximum restriction is advocated by conservatives bent on maintaining status quo and liberty is defended by both pro-freedom lobby groups, there are several shades of grey in between. This study discusses the use ICT for political communication in an environment where surveillance is used for infringing on people’s political rights to participate in activities championed by a legal NGO. The government of Zimbabwe’s Interception of Communications Act (ICA) of 2007 [chap 11:20] requires that all electronic communications should be routed through an interception centre. This enables the governments to constantly monitor communications from its perceived opponents a thing which tilts the political play field in their favour. Under such circumstances it is impracti-

cal to adequately use ICTs for political activism. There are however, different ways of addressing such challenges i.e. including use of data encryption tools. In such an environment data encryption could be a sell off since monitors who may be overwhelmed with volumes of traffic tend to be curious why any data is being encrypted. There is also an added possibility of using traditional intelligence gathering methods like infiltration of targeted organisations by secret police. This approach has been used by Western countries to counter terrorist activities as well as by authoritarian regimes for suppressing political opposition. As we discuss below, infiltrators often opt-into email list of targeted organisations for intelligence gathering. While a deeper discussion on the approaches used for counter revolutionary activity is beyond the scope of this study, we acknowledge that ICTs also make it easy for counterrevolutionary forces to monitor and repress political activism. The use of ICTs for thwarting social movements begs the question whether ICTs are the boon or the bane of political activism in the information age. As stated earlier, Illich’s (1973) tools of conviviality theory is a window through which we can answer such a question.

THE MMPZ CASE MMPZ is a Zimbabwean pro-democracy NGO which monitors the media space and publishes the irregularities in various print and electronic forms. Its mission statement is to defend free expression and the right to know. Like most NGOs in Zimbabwe, MMPZ is targeted by the government for their constant criticism of partisan use of state controlled media. While it also criticises private media, the organisation’s criticism of government controlled media gets it associated with the former Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition whose members are also vulnerable to politically motivated arrests and torture. This is in spite of a unity government between the MDCs and

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the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) because ZANU-PF still uses its repressive mechanism against the MDC in order to protect its thirty two-year old political hegemony. In pursuit of their endeavour to communicate with other NGOs and the Zimbabwean public, MMPZ uses an email distribution list for disseminating messages. Such use of ICTs by NGOs reduces the state’s control of the public sphere and it dents the international community’s support of repressive states by exposing lack of press freedoms (Lynch 2011). On the 5th of December 2011 MMPZ released an email statement notifying subscribers that their advocacy officers Fadzai December and Molly Chimhanda had been detained by ‘Zimbabwe Republic Police in Gwanda in connection with a civic education meeting they facilitated in the town two weeks ago on the 24th November 2011. Also arrested with them was the chairperson of MMPZ’S Public Information Rights Forum Committee for Gwanda Mr Gilbert Mabusa’ (letter 5/12/11). Gwanda is in Matabeleland North which the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) – a human rights defender - referred to as the most hostile province in the country because Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) has arrested or harassed more than 40 politicians and human rights activists in the province since January 2011. According to the email statement, the MMPZ officials were arrested “for allegedly contravening section 25(1) (b) of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) which relates to “participating in a gathering without seeking authority from the regulating authority”. They were also accused of contravening section 37(1) (b) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, by “participating in a gathering with intent to promote public violence, breaches of the peace or bigotry”. Zimbabwe is considered an authoritarian state because of such repression of NGOs and political opposition. A few activists on the mailing list replied to the list expressing their concern about the politically-motivated arrest of the officers. The

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following morning i.e. the 6th December 2011, police officers visited MMPZ offices in Harare and arrested the director Andy Moyse, searched the premises and confiscated 127 DVDs meant for advocacy. MMPZ sent another e-mail advising their subscribers about the sustained persecution of their organisation by the Zimbabwe Republic Police. As before, the news generated some debate on the distribution list. This was followed by an email from Dewa Mavhinga an activist and political commentator advising that his email to the MMPZ had been leaked to the state owned press. The email also included the verbatim quote of the Herald. A series of emails expressing concern about the possible presence of Central Intelligence Organisation operatives on the distribution list and the need for improved security were flighted by several subscribers on the list - see figure 1 conversations entitled ‘MMPZ email security alert’. In no time, the volumes of e-mail on the subject increased until other subscribers began to complain. On the 7th December 2011 MMPZ sent an email apologising for excessive e-mail and suggesting that people wishing to engage in the dialogue needed to avoid replying to the entire list. In spite of the instruction to e-mail whoever they were replying without going through the entire list, a huge flood of e-mails continued to come through the distribution list to all recipients. This was followed by 45 e-mails requesting removal from the list. The e-mails opt-out requests were usually one-line messages written in reply to the first one which had requested removal. On the 9th December 2011, someone wrote to MMPZ asking to be kept on the list. This triggered a chain of e-mails also asking to stay on the list in a way that seemed to associate heroism with being kept on the list. There was a discernable ‘herding’ effect where each request to opt-out or stay on the list would trigger several followers that seemed to view it as a long awaited initiator of a route they support. This pattern continued unabated; for instance on Monday the 12th December 2011 an

 The Opportunities and Challenges of using Email for Political Communication

Figure 1. A screen shot of e-mails received on the 8th and 9th December 2011

email requesting to be removed triggered several others. On the same day an email requesting to be kept on the list also triggered a chain of supporters asking to be kept. The subscribers who requested to stay on the list showed concern for the breaking down of the list and they also made it clear that they were not scared of the security threat posed by perceived Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) infiltration. Those who opted out openly complained about the volumes of email yet none of them mentioned the danger of being monitored. This was followed on the same day by an e-mail from a colleague who explained how people could unsubscribe themselves if they so wished. Ironically, this email was not coming from MMPZ but rather from a sister organisation. At this point, it is important to note that most emails were coming from people who were claiming not to know how they had ever been put on this list. We will return to this later on but for now we point out the danger of being accused for employing stealth marketing

methods or unsolicited email. It was also surprising that MMPZ’s email list was configured in a way that allowed one to reply to all subscribers on the distribution list although one could not view the email addresses of other recipients. On the 14th of December 2011 more requests to be removed from the list kept pouring in. Along with these were complaints from people who claimed that their request to be removed from the list had been ignored. We eventually noted that the request to be removed from the list was difficult to meet with immediate effect since several subscribers were replying to the emails in their in-boxes. This is because the removal of an email from the central list would not automatically translate into a removal from the list that subscribers were replying to. The continual flow of emails to mail boxes of people who had opted out continued to generate angry emails from subscribers. On the 15th of December more e-mails requesting removal kept coming in. The pattern of requests seemed 155

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to follow the one observed earlier. Like-minded people always added their voice to e-mails they supported. On the 16th December 2011 a request to be kept on the list once again triggered a flood of requests to stay on.

METHODS AND APPROACH Before we can discuss the conceptual implications of our findings, it is important to discuss key aspects of case study research in the interpretivist philosophy that we adopted. We followed Klein and Myers’s (1999) principles of hermeneutic circle, contextualisation and interaction between the researcher and subjects. A key issue towards understanding of the MMPZ case study is to understand the Zimbabwean political context. Denzin (2001) presents contextualisation among the six steps to interpretive research namely: framing the research question, deconstructing, capturing, bracketing, constructing, and contextualizing. According to Klein and Myers (1999) contextualisation of the problem is critical to the evaluation of interpretive case studies because it allows a ‘critical reflection of the social and historical background of the research setting’ (p. 6). It is important to declare at this stage that while our familiarity with the players involved and the Zimbabwean political environment could be viewed as ‘bias’ (especially in non interpretivist circles), we contend that it enabled a deeper understanding as articulated by Walsham (1995). Since space limitations do not allow us to invoke the bias and neutrality debate we refer the interested reader to Bednar and Welch (2008). While the researcher conducting interpretive case studies is expected to directly take part in data collection and analysis (Klein and Myers 1999), some of the data we present in this study unfolded under our gaze without us soliciting for it. After re-evaluating the e-mail, we however went on to interview key participants with a view to figuring why they opted in or out of the list. These two phases (each of which consisting of 156

iterative conversations) that build on previous one resemble circles of hermeneutics whereby ‘human understanding is achieved by iterating between considering the interdependent meaning of parts and the whole that they form’ (p.6). This gave us deep insights into the problem which enabled an interpretation of the issues involved as well as an ability to explain them (Neuman 1997).

LESSONS FROM ONLINE MARKETING Some of the challenges that MMPZ faced could have been addressed by using conventional online marketing approaches. The use of e-marketing strategies for political mobilisation has been done by Hamas (Mozes and Weimann 2010). Just as ICTs are a game changing factor to marketing, so are they to political activism in the information age. Political activists’ endeavour to capture the attention of an increasing elusive audience makes it necessary for them to draw lessons from e-marketers. Obama’s innovative campaign employed conventional e-marketing strategies in a way that justifies the need for politicians and NGOs to adopt online marketing strategies to politics (Plouffe 2009). Of particular interest was his use of text messaging (Olaore 2011), interactive marketing, centralised decision making and market segmentation (Anderson 2008) to adopt his community organising skills (Bretherton 2009) to political campaigning. Interactive marketing is meant to keep the communication between marketer and the customer complete. This has necessitated the ‘addressability’ of online content, a term which refers to personalisation of web pages to subscriber’s preferences. Addressability in e-politics is pioneered and typified by On MyBarackObama.com, or MyBO, Obama’s own Socnet, through which 2 million profiles were created (Delany 2009). This kind of targeted marketing endeavours to produce targeted and individualised communication with supporters. In business, customer awareness is key

 The Opportunities and Challenges of using Email for Political Communication

in allowing the marketer to listen to the customer’s implicit and explicit needs, to predict outcomes and seize various opportunities (Anderson 2008). MMPZ did not view its subscribers as different individuals. This may have been due to the fact that the nature of their project requires dissemination of information instead of personalised relationships with subscribers. There was therefore no effort to segment the emails either at the time they were acquired or by monitoring their communication. We contend that there is a need for political communicators to constantly monitor and segment their list in line with their communication strategy. For instance, Obama’s team was constantly testing their strategy and fine tuning it mainly by segmenting supporters by age, location and donation history. The information that they captured was skilfully tailored to feed their central decision making process (Delany 2009). In other words, Team Obama’s technical team regarded Information Technology (IT) unit as part of their campaign strategy instead of employing it as a mere technical support. These skills are learnt from emarketing and information systems’ insistence on harmonising marketing strategy and IT strategy. At the centre of their game was an innovative email communication strategy (Plouffe 2009).

meets key criteria used by email markers. These include but are not limited to personalisation of messages, visual appeal of the page and regularity of the dispatch to subscribers as discussed below. Before doing so it is important to posit that its ability to create a convivial society in a country will depend on its internet penetration and the demographics issue that affect its digital divides. In Western countries younger people are more inclined to use email while in the global south it is the upper class. Although there are several shades of grey in between these extremes, the common feature in the information age is an increased internet penetration which arguably calls for e-readiness on the part political players. This is particularly important for developing countries since mobile penetration is increasing in spite of the digital exclusion of some segments of the population. Since email marketing takes time to yield returns, it is necessary for political campaigners to develop email marketing skills sooner than latter. Towards this end we present the following framework for political mobilisation in the context of the challenges that MMPZ encountered in email communication for political communication.

Lessons for E-Mail Marketing

FRAMEWORK FOR USING EMAIL FOR POLITICAL MOBILISATION

According to HubSport (2012) the size of an organisation’s email list demonstrates its reach and thought leadership. E-marketers employ different strategies for email communication which political operators need to adopt and adapt for politics in the information age. Key among them is the need to maintain a two way communication with their audience. This access to supporters’ opinion makes it necessary to synchronise email with other communication platforms discussed earlier in this chapter. According to Olsen et al (2001) email will enable fundraising for non profit organisations in a way that saves printing and mailing costs if it

Another route to using email for political activism is to draw lessons from email marketing (Olsen et al. 2001). Among many aspects of email marketing there are some that are applicable to political mobilisation. In our endeavour to develop a framework for email for political communication we discuss how to build and manage permissionbased email list. Based on the MMPZ case we discuss list building and segmentation for effective communication and for avoiding being a source of nonsensical spam to the people we wish to lobby. Finally we also address how to harmonize information strategy with political strategy.

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While the first two address the problems that affected MMPZ, we present harmonisation of political and information strategy as a new aspect of politics necessitated by the central role of ICTs in the information age.

Email List Management Email list management refers to an inexhaustible process of taking care of an organisation’s email list. Here we discuss the process of creating and segmenting an email list in a way that would be relevant for political mobilisation. We restrict our discussion to issues that would have addressed some of the issues that were encountered by MMPZ in our case study. Of particular interest are the processes of compiling a permission-based email lists, segmenting it and securing it.

Building Permission Based Email List A permission-based email list is one that is composed of recipients who subscribed to receive regular email content from your organisation (Godin 1999). These are also referred to as opt-in emails and are in direct contrast to spam which is defined as sending emails to people without their permission (Cranor and LaMacchia 1998). In spite of several studies that document the negative impact of unsolicited email (Godin 1999, Olsen et al. 2001) many campaign groups are still using it. Others suggest that spam hurts your brand (Allis 2009) and others posit that since its benefits are unpredictable it is wiser to use permission based email which always produces positive results. According to one subscriber who requested to be removed from MMPZ list, they had been put on it simply because they were registered as an NGO (Interview 20/1/12). While this does not amount to an unknown source of email, it could be treated as spam by NGOs that do not find the content relevant to them.

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Organisations that send a regular newsletter like MMPZ need to build their email lists through opt-ins or better still double opt-ins for them to reap the results of conviviality. Opt-in refers to subscriptions to e-Zine (electronic magazine or newsletter) and double opt-ins require new subscribers to click a further link to confirm their subscription. This approach has the downside of costing you up to 40% of your subscribers who have been found to fail to confirm subscription. It however has the advantage of having lower spam complain rates, higher response and lower unsubscribe and bounce rates (Allis 2012). A closer look at the MMPZ case shows that their email traffic ended up annoying other subscribers while others were highly engaged with the discussion. This suggests that list building process did not collect enough information about subscribers may be because it was not permission based. The disadvantage of doing so is that it makes list segmentation difficult.

Email List Segmentation We contend that email list segmentation could have made it possible to treat segments of subscribers differently. List segmentation ensures that subscribers get the content that is relevant to them. While segmentation is often done by interest, demographic and geographical parameters like age, gender and location (Allis 2009), we suggest that MMPZ segmentation should have been done by degree of political interest. Our analysis suggests that there were at least three groups on their email list. That is those political activists who were infuriated by state harassment and others who were scarred of victimisation as well as the less concerned whose commitment to the cause would not let them have their mail boxes flooded albeit for a cause they supported. The difference of these segments of subscribers obviously calls for them to be treated differently.

 The Opportunities and Challenges of using Email for Political Communication

We believe that political campaigners will need to handle two main groups of subscriber also identifiable on the MMPZ email list i.e. activists and supporters. The subscribers who seem to have been annoyed by excessive debate on human rights are mere supporters while the enthusiasts who generated most of the discussion emails were activists. It would have been better to keep these groups apart in order to ensure that supporters do not get annoyed by activist content. At what point and how can email segmentation be done? List segmentation is a continuous process that must start on the day you build the list. To explain the process we must go back to the question of permission based email marketing. We have already mentioned the need for acquiring subscribers’ consent prior to including them on your email list. E-marketers employ a lot of tactics for getting people to subscribe to their newsletters. There are many ways of networking including encouraging them to sign on to guest books, contests, memberships, free online content, discount cards and etc. We suggest that at the time when subscribers are signing up to any of the above, they should be prompted to provide information necessary for immediate segmentation and future content distribution. This must be done in a way that does not weary the subscriber. To start with, list segmentation should not be viewed as a one off event. As time goes on, people’s activity must provide information that enables more improved segmentation. For instance the crisis discussed in this study should have been used for refining the subscriber segments. E-marketing also employs colourful email of rich ‘rich-media’ format with tracked click-through data that enables them to track the subscribers’ interests from the clicks on links to subjects they like. This information is then used for designing targeted information content which in turn reveals more information for list segmentation. Political movements must skilfully employ this method for refining their email list management.

Securing the List Given the risk associated with participating in opposition politics in authoritarian states and the need to control email frequency, it is important to secure email lists. Equally as important is the need to assure subscribers on political lists that their identities are protected. Such email platform must be secure from abuse by snooping hackers, mischievous subscribers and cyber-attacks bent on bringing the email server down. As a result the subscriber list must be undisclosed and subscribers should not be allowed to disseminate information to other subscribers through the official email list. Where an interactive public sphere is required, a chat room platform needs to be provided in order to facilitate debate without loosing control of the email platform. Since information is increasingly proving to be a convivial tool, security and control can be achieved by ensuring that only authorised officials can communicate with subscribers. In the case of MMPZ, the subscribers’ names were undisclosed but any subscriber could reply to the entire list. Whether this was planned or accidental, it proved to be unsafe since it gave room for excessive volumes of negative messages which eventually drowned MMPZ’s call for courage and calm when it was desperately necessary. Since being identified as an advocate of political fair play by the authoritarian state is as dangerous as political opposition, NGOs like MMPZ must prioritise the security of their communication platforms. This is because when NGOs challenge government on a public issue, (albeit non-violently) such ‘social net war’ (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001) is often branded as violent and disruptive ‘criminal net-war’ by the authoritarian state seeking to criminalise political criticism. Information security is also important because political opponents are always keen to pre-empty each other’s strategy or disrupt opponents’ projects as they temporarily managed to do with MMPZ’s

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communication platforms. As the political battle field continuous to shift to the realm of information, the rise of hacktivism, electronic terrorism (Denning 1999) and the big brother central government (Howard et al 2011; Joseph 2011) will make it more important to secure communication platforms. Hosting the web site outside the country may turn out to be a viable way of addressing repressive legislation. This strategy is often used by Western companies that wish to bypass data protection laws in home countries.

Harmonising Political and Information Strategy Having presented the importance of adapting e-marketing skills to political activism we now need to emphasize the need to subordinate them to political skills. Scholars have found it difficult to rigorously demonstrate that social media directly caused the outcomes of the Arab Spring (Lynch 2011). Many IS scholars have emphasised the folly of technological determinism (McLuhan 1964, Dusek 2007). By this they endeavour to articulate the importance of discipline specific skills over the technologies employed. We argue that ICT enabled political activism is no exception to that rule. Political skill is the core discipline and ICT skills are to be viewed as mere enablers of politics in the information age. Their role however, should be best understood in the context of the political game we wish to play. It is therefore important for activists to use the skills discussed above for augmenting their political skills. By arguing this way we are not relegating ICTs to the hand maiden role associated with the IT help desk. In what was seen as an opening of a new frontier of information age politics, ‘Team Obama’ set a good example by incorporating IS into the campaign strategy. The skills we adapted from e-marketing are branded as information skills rather than IT skills. Just as e-business has been viewed as a deployment of ICTs for maximising customer value (Kalkota and

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Robinson 1999), e-politics is meant for harnessing ICTs for engaging and augmenting political support. The practice of politics in the information age should therefore be viewed as using the information skills for enhancing the traditional game of politics. In the case of MMPZ, an understanding of the fear that pervades the political climate of Zimbabwe could have warned them to make the subscriber feel safe. This then calls for the use of IT tools and IS skills for creating a secure and anonymous email list. This is similar to the use of security reassuring icons to inform electronic payment system users that their details are secured from credit card hacker that prowl the internet for victims. The fact that subscribers were unsure about their security worried some of the subscribers who ended up opting out. In addition to that, every response to the distribution list ended up being read by the entire list. This did not just increase the flow of email traffic it probably caused the interception centre to closely monitor the discussions, recipients and their comments. Given their nasty experience with the authoritarian state, MMPZ were not strangers to the challenges posed by such threats, they probably lacked the skill to combine their political skills with IS skills. They may have also lacked the mindfulness that they could one day face the commotion they experienced in December 2011. Given the danger of loosing your communication platform to usurpers, it is politically important to maintain full control of online communication. An email list must be viewed as a convivial tool capable of being used to spread the influence of whoever is in control of it. It must therefore be restricted to the control of its builder and must be used for disseminating the information that its subscriber chose to receive. This is not just strategically important; it also ensures that subscribers are not irritated with unsolicited information. In spite of the fact that relinquishing the control of personal information to unsanctioned users in criminalised by data protection laws of most

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countries, it is politically un-strategic to annoy supporters with uncontrolled volumes of email from whosoever can send it. The internet is replete with cyber terrorists bent on usurping other people’s communication lists for both social and criminal net-warfare reasons (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001). The MMPZ case showed this loss of such control of a strategic political front. The fact that activists kept interacting over the distribution list even after being told to stop doing so meant that their information platform was unconnected to their political and information strategy. There is every reason to suspect that some of the communications that caused the virtual stampede of opt-outs could have been exacerbated by enemies of MMPZ who wanted to cause its demise. We therefore posit that political street-fighting in the information age may soon see the use of ‘dirty’ net-war techniques by both hacktivists and authoritarian states. Literature suggests that the tools are the same although the motivation may differ. This therefore compels political actors to re-conceptualise and re-configure their information systems as techno-political systems meant for achieving their political goals. Given the challenge of striking a balance between the danger of restricting a healthy political debate and losing control of it until it annoys the uninterested, it is important to decide whether you wish to lets people interact or whether you simply want to send messages to them. In the event that you want to allow them to interact it is also important to determine how this should be done. Two key options are online chat forums and social media. Social networking platforms like Twitter and Face Book also present other ways to allow subscribers to interact since they can be integrated with email. Finally we emphasise the need to be ready to counter negative developments (like bad publicity) using the speed and power of ICTs. When Barak Obama’s campaign was threatened by Rev Jeremiah Wright’s inflammatory sermons (just before the Pennsylvania primary), he was quick

to neutralize them through his historic race speech watched mainly on YouTube (Plouffe 2009). MMPZ needed to regulate the flow of email traffic as well as contain the negative effect of the message that alerted subscribers about the danger of infiltration. The complaints of subscribers that were clamouring to opt-out were not addressed as expeditiously as necessary for a political environment like Zimbabwe. This was left to cause negative sentiments that could have been avoided if there was readiness to deal with the negative impact. It must be noted that by email marketing best practice standards, MMPZ was not legally wrong. The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 (though not enforceable in Zimbabwe) suggests that requests for removal from email list should be honoured within 10 business days. It may be necessary for high activity platforms to have a team dedicated to containing negative publicity.

CONCLUSION ICTs have evidently revolutionarised the practise of politics in the information age. Political information can now be quickly moved between countless numbers of collaborators in a way that was not possible before the information age. Since ICTs have proved to be useful tools for both prodemocracy movements and authoritarian regimes, neither of the opponents can afford to ignore ICT adoption. Activists armed with low cost tools can now challenge their governments just as much as governments are now better placed to conduct surveillance on its opponents (Lynch 2011). By allowing the speedy processing and dissemination of information, convivial tools have reshaped the practice of politics in ways that were never expected in previous generations. This provides new challenges and opportunities to both authoritarian governments and their change seeking citizens. The political space created by the conviviality of ICTs has empowered political opponents with capabilities that cannot be celebrated without due

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concern with the concomitant vulnerabilities they bring. The proverbial kaleidoscope was shaken at the frontier of the information age and it has altered the practice of politics by creating a viable space for political mobilisation while exposing its participants to perilous state surveillance. This puts us at the junction of celebrating the creation of an ideal speech situation (Habermas 1989) and bemoaning a resurgence of a chronic fear for victimisation as articulated by Hobbes (1968). The ideal speech situation should allow all participants to freely initiate or participate in any political discussion but this remains unachievable due to conviviality’s empowerment of both sides. Information age political spaces therefore falls short of Habermas’ (1989) ideal speech situation because of the freedom limiting fear factor induced by state surveillance particularly in developing countries. While conviviality had attempted to level the play field, governments have introduced laws that restrict people from communicating without being monitored. The very thought that emails and mobile calls are being intercepted cuts back on communication freedoms by reminding them that they are liable for protection. The MMPZ case shows that any similitude of infiltration can adversely disrupt the public sphere in authoritarian state. We contend that this also leads to self censorship (Takavarasha and Makumbe, 2012) and it impedes the development of democracy which should have been greatly enhanced by an ideal speech situation in cyberspace. We have discussed how Zimbabwe’s MMPZ had successfully engaged thousands of subscribers about media irregularities for years yet one day it unexpectedly suffered the challenge of state surveillance. We have also discussed how the realisation that the dreaded state security agencies had infiltrated their mailing list negatively affected its support base. It is however interesting to note that even at the height of that disruption, conviviality of ICTs allowed opposing voices to be heard. This silver lining overrides the gloomy

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picture painted by the MMPZ case by showing that the revolution continues in spite of surveillance. In addition to that it must be noted that MMPZ continued its mission after that bitter experience. Surveillance proved to be a challenge but not a set back. It’s therefore no reason for techno-skeptics to celebrate. Over empirical evidence shows that security concern makes it hard for either side to celebrate the power of convivial tools in the context of politics in the information age. For instance applications like Face Book and Twitter which were designed for democratic society are not just vulnerable to infiltration by spies posing as friends; they easily betray one’s political affiliation. Overt strategies like forcing victims to open their emails in front of state operatives or using Google to screen arrivals at airports empower the authoritarian state (Lust-Okar 2007) yet the same tools have been used for toppling states like Egypt (Lynch 2011). The question whether ICTs could be the boon or the bane of politics in the information age cannot be answered in the affirmative or negative. We contend that net-wars will be won through superiority of skills, tools employed and adherence to good practice. The resultant effect of covert state activity against MMPZ emphasises the need to adopt good practice for using email for political communication. This is important in email based political communication in spite of the absence of any threats or perceived usefulness to a political entity’s current strategies. We have also assessed how MMPZ could have contained the fall out that resulted from both fear of state surveillance and the nuisance of excessive email traffic. This was done by discussing potential approaches that could have been used to allow users to opt-out without causing others to do the same. We have also discussed how email traffic from individual subscribers could have been restricted from being a nuisance by restricting email replies to MMPZ from reaching other subscribers. E-marketing approaches like mail list segmentation have been presented as potential methods

 The Opportunities and Challenges of using Email for Political Communication

that could have been used for keeping activists engaging with each other without disturbing the peace of less interested subscribers. Segmentation could have also created an opportunity for MMPZ to send more targeted messages in the event of a need to do so in future. In all this we have concluded that ICTs have revolutionarised politics in the information age by enabling quicker, cheaper communication and making it easier for underdogs to win unexpected victories. This has ironically brought unwelcome challenges by enabling greater surveillance by hackers and state agencies who may wish to counter their opponents’ political strategy. To that end ICTs are both the boon and the bane of politics although the balance will arguably shift on a case by case scenario dependent on political and information skills adopted for exploiting conviviality of ICTs. Politics in the information age is a much more cerebral game which calls for new skills, tactics and strategies.

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Williamson, A. (2009). The Effect of Digital Media on MPs’ Communication with Constituents. Parliamentary Affairs, 62(3), 514–527. doi:10.1093/ pa/gsp009 Zuckerman, E. (2011). The First Twitter Revolution? Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http:// www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/14/ the_first_twitter_revolution

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS E-Politics: The conduct of traditional politics using electronic tools. Email Marketing: Use of email as a medium for marketing. Convivial Tools: Devices and tools that have the ability of enabling however posses them to influence their environment. E-Mobilization: The use of electronic tools for mobilisation of supporters. Surveillance: Monitoring of the activities of citizens as security measure. Hacktivism: The use of hacking methods for activism.

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Chapter 10

Alternative Media Bridging the Digital Divide in Malaysia: Case Study of Sarawakreport.org Kevin Fernandez Universiti Kelantan Malaysia (UMK), Malaysia Sivamurugan Pandian Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Malaysia Zaini Abu Bakar Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Malaysia

ABSTRACT This chapter analyzes the burgeoning role of new media in the Malaysian political sphere. The chapter descriptively analyzes the role of Sarawakreport.org, a blog formed by the former Prime Minister of the UK’s (Gordon Brown’s) sister in-law, Clare Rewcastle Brown, in an endeavor to challenge the Chief Minister of Sarawak in his incumbency. The government used its economical, coercive, and political power to repress the symbolic power of the new media, which transgresses boundaries, space, and time. This chapter concludes that the BN (Barisan Nasional) won its two-thirds majority legitimizing its control over Sarawak, but its loss of popular votes suggests the symbolic power is of concern for the ruling regime and legitimizing its rule seems to be a serious problem.

INTRODUCTION The internet has been accredited as a political space across the globe. Nation states such as South Korea (Joyce, 2007), US (Lawrence et. al., 2010) and Britain (Aeron, 2009) has felt the presence of the Internet as a political force. Even in highly restrictive regimes such as Burma (Chowdhury, 2008), Russia (Lysenko, 2010) and Ukraine (Goldstein, 2007) the venom of the internet was felt. In most

instances, the blogsphere was the most prominent feature of the internet and the mass mobilization people were inevitable. While some contend that it is generally a misplaced judgment that the Web 2.0 is increasingly attracting the younger generation (Kisane, 2009), others have argued that while those interested in politics is increasingly engaging themselves, but those disfranchised previously are pulling away further (Aeron, 2009). There are several factors

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch010

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contributory to the polarization process, causative by the characteristics of the internet and the blogsphere. These factors are due to the plethora of information available on the internet and consumers tend to gravitate to sites and issues that are of similar interest and beliefs as them, similarly blogs tend to provide links to other blogs that are of parallel to their inclinations (Himelboim, 2010). Lawrence et. al. (2010) compliments these findings by suggesting that political blogs tend to polarize readers and increase tendencies of mobilization efforts, especially left-wing bloggers. As Zenko (2011) clearly states in his article for the Foreign Policy on the Future of War concluding interviews and surveys done on experts, he states that ‘the most dangerous [threat] continues to be the Internet which is as anarchic as it is democratic. Our vulnerabilities with respect to the Internet are almost as great as the advantages we derive from our internetconnectedness.’ Internet connectedness has been argued to play imperative role on increased polarization and influence on the ‘imagined community’ (Mate et. al. 2006). The author wishes to clarify that the ‘imagined community’ of nations via the internet is not a puerile area of study. In an attempt to redefine anthropological studies of blogs as e-ethnography, Varisco (2009) claims that there is no singular Muslim identity existent on the Internet. Muslim orientated blogs are precariously dependent on national resemblances and ethnic cleavages. Fernandez (2010) in his study of the byelections in Malaysia and the internet’s role ascertains that new media plays an important role in Malaysian contemporary political arena. Sarawakreport.org that was formed by Clare Rewcastle Brown would be used as analogy for the purpose of this study. This study would also attempt to analyze the outcomes of the Sarawak State elections held in April 16 2011, to provide explanation whether the Internet was successful in becoming a ‘political space’ for the displaced. While most of these studies tend to on the de-

mocratization possibilities of the blogosphere in particular, investigative journalism (Steele, 2008) others tend to focus on its collective identity and political mobilization capabilities. This study attempts to particularly analyze the democratization process of blogosphere where the rural and urban divide is wide and the democratization outcomes it produces with special reference to the ballots.

THE PRESENCE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL BLOGS IN MALAYSIA Malaysia is a country that is widely accepted as a competitive democracy among. The internet decisively played an important role during the recent General Elections (GE) held in 2008. While some accused the internet, others have accredited it for the outcomes of the GE 2008 (Steele, 2008; Fernandez, 2010; Chin, 2009; Abdul, 2009). It is unjust to inscribe in this volume that the GE 2008 was the first incidence of the Internet or blogs making inroads in the Malaysian political domain. According to a survey conducted on journalist and preferred avenue of choice information, a majority of respondents or figuratively, 68% read 3 or more blogs regularly and 37.8% used Facebook as a source of inspiration for news (Intelectasia, 2010). Russian bloggers have likened blogs to ‘kitchen debates’ of Soviet times, where major forum discussions were held in kitchens (Yekaterina, 2008). As Yekaterina (2008) adequately contends that the blogsphere is flourished with a glut of blogs that tends to cover a wide range of ideals and motivations. The reader endeavors to surmount the best blog like the mindboggling advertisements we are constantly exposed to, or metaphorically described as choosing the best rose in a pocket full of posies. Indulgence on the burdening question of why blogs have burgeoned in Malaysia serves fruit for thought. Fernandez (2010) contends that there were two waves of cyberpolitics in Malaysia. Others have detailed accounts on the burgeoning of blogs

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during the reformasi periods in Malaysia (Brown, 2005; Abbott, 2004). Nevertheless, during the first burst of cyberpolitics that was propelled by the incarceration of the Deputy Prime Minister in Malaysia would not have been complete without the missing link or civil society movements (Khoo, 2010). Similarly, we see parallel patterns during the 2008 elections, if incidences of the Hindraf and BERSIH movements are taken into consideration. Civil society movements were vibrant during the Reformasi period. Websites such as Laman reformasi (reformasi website), Anwar Online, freeMalaysia and Jiwa Merdeka (Merdeka Spirit) were borne out of the spirit of reformasi (Khoo, 2010). Dissident websites that burgeoned such as the Mahafiraun (Great Pharoah) and MahaZalim (Great tyrant) were existent to castigate the then Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammed. The first independent news portal, Malaysiakini.com, was founded months before the 1999 GE. It is imperative to note that the restrictive laws in Malaysia were impetus for the founding of such avenues to disseminate information. Officials Secrecy Act (OSA), Internal Security Act (ISA), Sedition Act, Printing and Publications Act and the Universities and University Colleges Act are examples of curtailment laws instilled to restrict sub-culture movements. The 1987 Operasi Lalang is an example of these draconian laws in play. The Star and Watan are examples of publications alongside over one hundred dissidents that were incarcerated, falling victim to the government’s attempt to redress malpractices that were purportedly observed. The Barisan Alternatif (BA) consisting Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM), Parti Keadilan, Parti SeIslam Malaysia (PAS), Democratic Action Party (DAP) and several NGO’s formed a coalition to challenge the ruling regime during the GE 1999. A culmination of events led to the plummeting role of blogs in Malaysia prior to the GE 2004. The fallout between PAS and DAP played an important role during the GE 2004 elections. This signaled a sense of hostility amongst the alternative coalition parties and a rather conspicuous inability to stand 168

as a substantial substitute. The September 2001 terrorist attacks poised another cloud of suspicion on Islamic parties. Mahathir’s sudden decision to step down as the regime’s premier was yet another timely maneuver by the regime to garner the support of the Malaysian suffrage. Abdullah Badawi, dubbed as ‘Mr. Clean’, was definitely a wise choice. The popular vote was indefinitely in support of the Malaysian ruling regime. It was one of their most successful moments at the ballots for all of the component parties (Abdul, 2009). Two important events that transpired in the Malaysian political prism during the Badawi administration was the Bersih and Hindraf movement. A total number of 26 NGO’s (Non-Governmental Organizations) and five opposition parties held a rally on the 10th of November called Bersih calling for a clean and fair elections in the upcoming polls followed by another rally held on the 25th of November 2007 by the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf) to send a petition to the Embassy of Britain in Kuala Lumpur (Fernandez, 2010). It was these events that led to a clear air of dissent, antagonizing the ruling regime. As Khoo (2010) clearly stated that without this missing link, the GE 2008 would not have been possible to impair the ruling government of its two-thirds majority. Badawi did make attempts for transformations and a corrupt free state. The setting up of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) in 2009 is an example of such initiatives. The setting up of an independent police complaints and misconduct board was received with great resistance from the police. His son-in-law was accused of running the country with the assistance of the Fourth Floor Boys (Chin, 2009). A minister that built a mansion without the required mandatory documents was also not properly dealt with. Moreover, a list of ministers was caught in a scandalous deal called the Port Klang Free Trade Zone (PKFZ). This led to a string of blogs that were making comments and remarks regarding these events in the Malaysian political realm. Thus, blogs played an important role on the dissemination of news and an imperative function

 Alternative Media Bridging the Digital Divide in Malaysia

in the mobilization of people. It is important to highlight that the political spectrum in Sabah and Sarawak is distinguishably different compared to the political milieu of West Malaysia.

ORANG UTAN PRESSURES THE BN The Malaysian premier was cited saying right after the Sarawak state elections that ‘with open democracy and the existence of online media, it is getting more difficult to win elections with big majorities as seen in some countries of late... winning with a simple majority is already a big relief,’ (Malaysiakini, 2011). On the internet and its concerted attacks the Information Communication and Culture Minister Dr. Rais Yatim1 reported days before the Sarawak state election that the “we cannot simply terminate any signal from an Internet source or through the shortwave band as this is embedded in the Human Rights Convention of Geneva. Criticizing per se, we cannot do anything. We should not be too alarmed whether they are saying the truth or otherwise” (Bernama, 2011). Similarly, towards the summit of the Sarawak state elections, the Home Minister was quoted saying, ‘this is not about politics. This is about spreading malicious lies, the issue of unity and harmony among the races,’ and ISA could be used to incarcerate the individuals behind Radio Free Sarawak and Sarawakreport.org (The Star, March 8 2001). The sarawakreport.org and Radio Free Sarawak was actually intriguing the political landscape of Malaysia, until it decided to uncover its surreptitious mask. SarawakReport.com was founded by Clare Rewcastle Brown, who happened to be the sisterin-law of the former Prime Minister of Britain, Gordon Brown (Cohen, 2011). Mrs. Brown justifies her ‘civic’ movement to oust the current Chief Minister of Sarawak, (as of date of this inscription), by mentioning that she was born in Sarawak before it was handed over to Malaysia and her concerns over the deprivation of the 2.5 million people living

in Sarawak (Cohen, 2011). Prior to exposing their identities Mrs. Brown was taking the stance of a clandestine blogger leaving much speculation to Taib’s aides. The George Soros Foundation was speculated to be the funders of this movement. She and her counterpart, Peter John Jaban, widely known under the pseudonym, Papa Orang Utan, managed SarawakReport and Radion Free Sarawak (Cohen, 2011). Their timely identity exposure was due to two main factors: (i) as described by Mrs. Brown herself, “before Christmas, Taib’s disaffected US aide Ross Boyert was found dead in a Los Angeles hotel room with a plastic bag around his head. The inquest is still pending but there was a sense that Peter and I could be in danger. Rather than hide, we’ve decided to come out fighting”; and (ii) in lieu with the upcoming state elections to be held in Sarawak (Cohen, 2011). How does Sarawakreport.org challenge the ruling coalition headed by a man that has held office for 30 years? Crewe in contention of the party identification advocates, that ‘British voters tend to change their party identification to match their party choice in a given election, which questions the “predispositional” nature of party identification and suggests that more attention should be given to current politics rather than childhood “learn- ing” as its cause’ (Janda, 1979). In congruence, issues that were reported by Sarawakreport.org were seen as fundamentally impairing minds of the Sarawakian suffrage during the elections. For one, Karim Raslan rightfully suggested ‘urban Malaysians in Sarawak and elsewhere are no longer dependent on BN for basic amenities like water or electricity’ (Karim, 2011). Sarawakreport.org’s aim was at chastising the long standing Chief Minister of Sarawak for his clientelist and patronage malpractices, especially for the distribution of logging rights. Rightfully, Yekaterina (2008) contends reporting an event is ultimately being at the right place and time, the author also wishes to include that writing dexterity is vital to attaining a wider following or consumership. Concomitantly, having proper whistleblowers to disclose insider information

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is vital for attainment of firsthand information. A deeper understanding of Sarawakian political milieu is essential for this study.

HEGEMONY, PATRONAGE DEMOCRACY AND VANGUARD PARTY The ‘Orientalist’ augmentation of an argument that the West was far superior then the East was the crux of an age old argument mystifying the Eastern ‘others’. The ‘Orient’ was constructed as ‘(1) monolithic, (2) static and stagnant, or changeless, (3) inferior, simple and irrational, and (4) primitive, exotic and mysterious’ (Mohamed, 2003 p. 1). The Malay has been described by the British as helpless and lazy among other demeaning characteristics in a oversimplification and depicturing statements such as, ‘I should say that the Malays of the Peninsula is the most steadfast loafer on the face of the earth… For nine-tenths of his waking hours, year in and year out, he sits on a wooden bench in the shade and watched the Chinaman and the Tamil builds roads and railways, work the mines, cultivate the soil, raise cattle, and pay the taxes’ 2(Syed, 1977). Arguably UMNO has justified its existence as the vanguard of the Malay race by promulgating the protecting or guardianship role. Neo-orientalist Malay writers such as Mahathir (Malay Dilemma), Za’ba (Perangai bergantung pada diri sendiri) and Senu Abdul Rahman (Revolusi Mental), condescendingly wrote effortlessly how the Malays were inadequate to act independently and the need for a superior fiat to act as an arbitrator for the Malay society as whole. This ideology of a superior fiat and arbitrator was adapted in Sarawak, but the fear element was different. In the Western Peninsula of Malaysia, the Chinese and Western (European) societies were chastised as being the ‘other’ and ‘fear’ was orchestrated around this theme (Mahathir, 1970; Mahathir 1986). Contradictorily, the Sarawakian fear was none other than Malaysia itself, simply 170

put, the Federal Government of Malaysia. Elucidation of the Federation of Malaysia and the political milieu of Malaysia would provide the reader with a better understanding of the East Malaysia political relationship with the Federal Government of Malaysia. During the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election in 1952 a marriage between the UMNO (United Malay National Organization) and MCA (Malayan Chinese Association) was solemnized. The two found great success and later included the missing link, MIC (Malayan Indian Congress) in 1955. The bliss and unintentional nuptials proved to be a true success, politically, adopting a consociationalist democratic model. It was during this epoch that Malaya gained her independence in 1957 with UMNO being the hegemony, holding key portfolios in the political arena. Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore joined Malaya and a new form of Malaysian Federation was introduced in September 16, 19633. Skepticism towards the configuration of the Federation of Malaysia was at climax from several parties including the proposed Sabah, Sarawak and Singaporean parties. The people in Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak were more interested in consolidating themselves under a single independent state called the North Kalimantan state before joining the Malaysian Federation (Ongkili, 1967). The main concerns of these coalition states was that they were to be woven into an entity called Federation of Malaysia instead of becoming de facto states (Ongkili, 1967). A scrutiny of Brunei’s hesitation and reluctance to be part of the ‘wider’ Malaysia serves as a compass reflective of the North Kalimantan states contemplations. The Brunei Sultan4 was discontented that it had vast oil reserves and the arrangements that was proposed by the Federal Constitution5, added with the power sharing proposition between the Sultans of the Malaysian Federation, called the Conference of Rulers6 (Ongkili, 1967). Sarawak and Sabah agreed on nuptials with the Federation of Malaysia, when it was agreed that it was guaranteed political autonomy to what is commonly

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referred to as ‘The Twenty Points’. ‘These gave the East Malaysian states a high degree of political autonomy in key areas like immigration control, language, the recruitment of local people for key posts, and religion (Islam)’ (Chin, 2010 p. 222). Hence, though Sabah and Sarawak were part of Malaysia, it was always viewed as the ‘other’ contributory to its geopolitical distance from the Peninsula7. Taib Mahmud’s presence in the political prism of Malaysia was rather timely as it was during the very edgy epoch of the Team A and Team B fraction that the coalition hegemony was facing. The fourth prime minister was in dire need of a fix deposit especially in the form of an under developed state that could be easily maneuvered towards the UMNO Team A fraction. It is important to highlight that the Malay votes of Malaya was highly divided at this epoch. The infamous Ming Court Affair 1987 was the year that Abdul Rahman Ya’kub, uncle of Taib Mahmud (current Chief Minister of Sarawak) and governor of the State since 1981 vividly challenged his nephew attempting to attain a no confidence vote against Taib. That failed and Taib Mahmud was able to maintain control of Sarawak since then till the 2011 State Elections. Nevertheless, the author contends that Taib was able to control of Sarawak mainly due to the assurance of keeping the Peninsula Malaysians away. The people of Sarawak as Chin (2011) contends for the case of Sabah are not aligned to the political milieu of the Peninsula. Hence, opposition coalitions especially from the peninsula have difficulties penetrating the Borneo islands.

PKR-SNAP-DAP-PAS (A MATRIMONY OF MISCALCULATED CONVENIENCE) The issue with a viable opposition party in Malaysia could be summed up in one word, leader. The opposition parties in Malaysia commonly refer to themselves as Parti Rakyat (Parti Rakyat). Anwar Ibrahim was the glue that was keeping

the coalition of opposition parties in concert. The Anwar saga was used to a lesser extent and the opposition understood that the oil issue that was used the last time would not be as effective. Siva (2006) clearly stated that when Anwar was the Finance Minister he deferred in giving more concessions and additional royalties to Sarawak. An attempt to garner sympathy on the Anwar affair would not yield support of the masses in Sarawak. Milne and Mauzy (1999) have aptly described his personality as stated below: One difficulty that affects a prediction is that Anwar is said to have a reputation for sometimes telling people what he thinks they want to hear. Of course, may be an indication of his politeness, or use of the “Malay way.”….. Another academic said that although Anwar believes that some of the main provisions of the Internal Security Act would have to go, that he still favors preventive detention, and would not be more liberal (p. 149). Table 1 suggests that the BN nevertheless gained momentum and the support of the peninsula Malaysians. Since the Bagan Pinang by elections, the Barisan Nasional was able to attain a clean sheet in winning all the contested by elections it participated in. Provoking thought if the Malaysian populace may not be as buoyant about the opposition coalition, or the protest vote fever has simmered. For morality purposes, a win in Sarawak would bolster the spirit and comradeship of the opposition in Peninsula, especially if speculations of snap polls were affirmative. Baru Bian was the PKR chief in Sarawak. It was reported that the PR decided that the Baru Bian would be leader of the coalition if even if the DAP had a majority in the elections (Chooi, 2011). The opposition parties could not be referred to as comrades of a battalion, instead their squabbles were rather overt. Overt public name-calling by DAP’s Tony Pua accusing PKR seat-negotiator Tian Chua a “little Napolean” and Chua retaliating that DAP was “a duplication of MCA and SUPP” (Tan, 2011). The BN although seemed 171

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Table 1. BN and Pakatan Rakyat by-elections outcomes BN

Pakatan

Batang Ai – April 7 2009

Permatang Pauh – August 6 2008

Bagan Pinang – October 11 2009

Kuala Terengganu – January 7 2009

Hulu Selangor – April 7 2010

Bukit Selambau – April 7 2009

Galas – November 4 2010

Bukit Gantang – April 7 2009

Batu Sapi – November 4 2010

Penanti – May 31 2009

Tenang – January 30 2011

Manek Urai – July 14 2009

Kerdau – March 6 2011

Permatang Pasir – August 25 2009

Merlimau – March 6 2011

Sibu – May 16 2009

very poised for the elections but were bewildered with yet another stumbling bloc, the bible and Taib Mahmud himself.

ONE MALAYSIA, THE BIBLE AND TAIB MAHMUD Najib Tun Razak, being the son of the second prime minister of Malaysia, is notably the most prominent exemplary of dynastic politics in Malaysia. One of the youngest statesman of his time, he was the appointed Member of Parliament 1976 and became the youngest Menteri Besar of Pahang in 1983 (Milne and Mauzy, 1999). He was deputy vice president of UMNO youth in 1986 and president in 1988, Minister of Education in 1995 and was part of Anwar’s Vision team UMNO vice-president in 1993. His was also one of the more prominent members that switched from UMNO ‘Team B’ to ‘Team A’ during the spilt in the party. Najib was arguably one of the first Prime Ministers of Malaysia to embark on his premiership in the most pluralistic notion. His One Malaysia concept was contradictory to any other former prime minister that usually started off on a chauvinistic Malay sentiment and towards the end of their administrations was more inclusive in nature. One element that daunted the Najib administration to the summit of the Sarawak state elections was the Bible issue. Taib towards the date of the elections commented that stamping the bibles 172

before releasing it was a “very stupid thing to do” (The Star, 2011). It must be noted that Sarawak consists of significant amount of Christians as depicted in Table 2. Many bibles are imported from Indonesia, and these ‘Malay’ version bibles refer to God as Allah. This issue has become very controversial and still pending court order. According to the demographics of the Sarawakian population, the issue of the confiscated bibles was of importance. The bible could be seen as a mechanism of shunning or depriving the Christian suffrage of their rights to freely profess Christianity, or any other religion other than Islam. After it later got stamped, it created greater apprehension amongst the majority Christian followers. Sarawakreport.org and the opposition parties were all mounting a popular slogan to oust Taib Mahmud. Mrs. Brown and Peter John Jaban (popularly known as Papa Orang Utan) continuously attempted to uncover the can of worms that Taib Mahmud was embroiled. Even his son, was not spared in their cyber reporting antics (Brown & Jaban, 2011). Was the BN worried about Sarawakreport.org and Radio Free Sarawak?

THE INTERNATIONAL MILIEU AND THE CYBER COUNTERATTACKS In recent times, Twitter, Facebook and other avenues of alternative media made its presence felt in Moldovo and Iran causing protests and

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Table 2. Population by ethnicity in Sarawak Iban

33%

Chinese

26%

Malay

21%

Orang Ulu

8%

Melanau

7%

Bidayuh

5%

*Orang Ulu includes tribes like Lun Bawang, Kayan, Kanyah, Kelabit and Penan Welsh, B. (2011). Final Countdown in BN ‘Fixed Deposit’ State, Malaysiakini.com, Retrieved on 4th may from http://www. malaysiakini.com/news/161616

Table 3. Sarawak Population Breakdown by Religion Religion

(%)

Christianity

42.6

Islam

31.3

Buddhism

12.0

Tribal/Folk Religion

5.2

No Religion

3.9

Confucianism/Taoism, etc.

2.6

Others

1.3

Unknown

0.9

Hinduism

0.1

Source: Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristics Report (Press Statement), Department of Statistics Malaysia (2000)

demonstrations van der Zee (2009). The Muslim socio-political upheavals were indefinitely assisted by social networking sites and micro-blogging sites. The January 25 2011 Egyptian protest in which Ghonim, a marketing manager for Google, was a catalyst to the upheaval, reached out to the Egyptian youths through Facebook (Huffingtonpost, 2011). It is argued that the Twitter Revolution that toppled the Ben Ali regime (Lynch, 2011). ‘There’s no question that social networking was a critical factor in Mubarak’s overthrow. Groups like the April 6 Youth Movement and the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, which first called for the Jan. 25 protests that sparked the uprising, played a daring, important role in breaking the

barrier of fear that had kept Egyptians in their homes’ (Hounshell, 2011). Mubarak was likened to Taib Mahmud as both were similarly in power for 30 years and were immensely autocratic in their leadership styles, not to mention their siphoned money into their personal wealth. The prime minister of Malaysia definitely felt the pressures of the internet as he was quoted saying, “if there are people who think that Malaysia will go the way of Egypt, I say that it will not experience any political upheaval because we have met the expectations of the people. We have given the people hope,” (Themalaysianinsider.com, 2011). For obvious reasons sarawakreport.org was very much feared by the ruling coalition. A site called sarawakreports.org was founded and launched as a counterattack towards the actual polling date. Since the government had better funding, sarawakreports.org appears before sarawakreport.org. This goes on to show that the BN was antagonized by the presence of a dissent website such as sarawakreport.org. The lack of funding and hindrances such as the ‘Distributed Denial of Service Attack’ made it inaccessible to the general public towards the summit of the snap polls. The main focus of the negative attacks remained focused on the Opposition Leader Anwar Ibrahim, from the sex video to the blogger Raja Petra Kamarudin (RPK). RPK who was incarcerated in 2007 for defamation against the King and ruler was a known blogger. His sudden ‘U-turn’ claiming that his statutory declaration in 2008 was not all true was timely as the elections dates were only days ahead (Petra Kamaruddin, 2011). RPK’s turn around had a dualistic role, one it was in essence to clear the name of the Malaysian premier of his links to the murder of a certain Mongolian model and the other further concretizing the image of Anwar as an unscrupulous and malicious politician. Another development towards the pinnacle of the Sarawak State elections was the release of a sex video by three individuals including a former Chief Minister under the pseudonym ‘Dato Trio’. The internet here again played an important role

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Table 4. Electoral Outcomes 2011 BN –PBB 35

BN -SUPP 6

BN -PRS 8

BN -SPDP 6

PR – DAP 12

PR - PKR 3

Independent 1

SNAP, PCM,PAS 0

Total: BN (55), Opposition (16)

Table 5. Opposition gains Area

Opposition gains in % share of Majority

Rural

14.8

Semi-Rural

19.7

Urban

13.4

Welsh, B. (2011). Sweet and sour aftermath of S’wak polls. Malaysiakini.com, Retrieved on 1 May 2011 from http://www. malaysiakini.com/news/162087

in the dissemination of the videos and the Pro-BN bloggers were quick to spread allegations against the opposition leader.

MY ‘UBAH’ TOY BIRD: EXPLAINING THE SARAWAK STATE ELECTORAL OUTCOMES Case (2010) contested though believed that electoral manipulations should demoralize voters, instead the electorates ‘gave more thought to protesting against the government than they did to bringing the opposition to power’ (p. 95). Case further contends that ‘favored communities thus find the government legitimate. Excluded communities, of course, find this same government to lack legitimacy – but may still view it as worthy of support if it is more accommodative than alternatives’ (p. 97). As depicted above, the semi-rural areas have heinously rejected the monopolistic Taib Mahmud administration. It would be deemed unethical and undeserving to provide further analyses along ethnic lines as the political climate in Sarawak was merely rejection of Taib Mahmud. Though,

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the opposition parties overtly adopted locals as frontiers for their political campaigning, the BN took a different path. Najib himself was at the ground campaigning for the BN. Najib was in all accounts attempting to promote the multiethnic and inclusive slogan of One Malaysia. It may be convenient for political analysts and political observers to countervail his efforts as a callithump orchestration for his political survival but the electoral outcomes suggests otherwise. The ‘ubah’ toy bird may have sold into the heartlands of the urban and suburban areas, but it could also mean a sheer rejection of Taib. Malaysia, otherwise still lacks the credentials of a charismatic leader for all, accepted by the masses. Protest votes does not opine acceptance of the opposition, but rejection of the money, machinery and mechanism (3Ms) that the ruling regime currently enjoys at its disposal. The strong showing by BN in East Malaysia means that Sabah and Sarawak will play a key role in BN’s strategy for retaining power in the next general election, due in 2013. It is likely that Najib Tun Razak, the new prime minister, will call for a general election much earlier.

CONCLUSION This study aptly suggests that Sarawakreport.org played an important role in revolutionizing the political landscape in the paradisiacal land of the hornbill. Though the ruling regime managed to win its two thirds majority in the state of Sarawak, closer scrutiny of the ballots suggests that protest votes were apparent. It may be deemed that the opposition has made inroads in Sarawak, but

 Alternative Media Bridging the Digital Divide in Malaysia

sympathy votes should not over shadow protest votes as the Sarawakian suffrage were more reluctant to reinstate Taib Mahmud than to instill the opposition party. The ruling regime did feel the heat of the murky remarks and antagonizing statements made through Sarawakreport.org. Though the presence of the new media and its venomous sting was not felt as ghastly as the autocratic domino affects on the middle region, it will make a definite impact on the Malaysian political sphere especially during the next general elections. On April 25th 2011 the 1st ASEAN Regional Bloggers Conference was hosted in Malaysia. It was here that the prime minister assured non-censorship of the internet and that ‘the people may be pro-government on some issues and against the government on other issues. I believe the flow of opinions on cyberspace today are more balanced compared with how it was previously,’ (Aruna, 2011). This was move towards embracement of the bloggers in anticipation of the upcoming elections and the hindrances that it will spur. This study also suggests that the ruling regime had faced difficulties in urban and semi urban areas in Sarawak. This trend could be replicated in the Peninsula. While Najib has an advantage over the opposition currently, and his One Malaysia slogan is slowly sinking into the minds and souls of his own party members, there seem to be watershed events that tends to imply that more work needs to be done. Examples are the Utusan publication of a One Melayu One Islam slogan and suggestions that Christians of the country are trying to overthrow Islam as the religion of the federation. These quarters have attained news from bloggers without verifying the credentials of these claims. The blogosphere is playing an important role in democratizing the knowledge of ideas in Malaysia, even at places where the rural and urban divide is wide.

REFERENCES Abbott, J. (2001). Vanquishing Banquo’s ghost: the Anwar Ibrahim affair and its impact on Malaysian politics. Asian Studies Review, 25(3), 285–308. doi:10.1080/10357820108713311 Abbott, J. (2004). The Internet, reformasi and democratization in Malaysia. In The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform. London: Routledge Curzon. Abdul, R. M. (2009). 2004 and 2008 General Elections in Malaysia: Towards a Multicultural, Bi-party Political System? Asian Journal of Political Science, 17(2), 173–194. doi:10.1080/02185370903077469 Aeron, D. (2009). New media and fat democracy: the paradox of online participation. New Media & Society, 12(5), 745–761. Aruna, P. (2011). Bloggers urged to unite despite opposing views. The Star. Retrieved on 30th April 2011 from http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/4/25/ nation/8546992&sec=nation Bernama. (2011, April). Rais Yatim: MCMC to study if Free Sarawak Radio Broadcasters Instigating people. Malaysian National News Agency. Retrieved on 11th April 2011 from http://www. bernama.com.my/bernama/v5/newsgeneral. php?id=578170 Brown, C. R. (2011). Scandal About AIDS. Retrieved on 4 May 2011 from http://www.sarawakreport.org/2011/04/scandal-about-aids-in-sarawak/ Brown, G. (2005). Democratization and Communication in Asia. Pacific Affairs, 78(1), 39–56. doi:10.5509/200578139 Chin, J. (2009). Malaysia’s Electoral Upheaval. Journal of Democracy, 20(3), 71–85. doi:10.1353/ jod.0.0108

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Chin, J., & Puyok, A. (2010). Going Against the Tide: Sabah and the 2008 Malaysian General Election. Asian Politics & Policy, 2, 219–235. doi:10.1111/j.1943-0787.2010.01185.x Chooi, C. (2011). DAP picks Baru Bian for CM if Sarawak captured. The Malaysian Insider. Retrieved on 4th April 2011 from http://www. themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/dappicks-baru-bian-for-cm-if-sarawak-captured/ Chowdhury, M. (2008). The Role of the Internet in Burma’s Saffron Revolution. Berkman Center Research Publication. Retrieved on 3rd November 2010 from http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2008/Role_of_the_Internet_in_Burmas_ Saffron_Revolution Cohen, D. (2011, February 22). Gordon Brown’s sister-in-law tackles corruption in Borneo. London Evening Standard. Retrieved on 23th November 2011 from http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/lifestyle/article-23925368-gordon-brown-sister-inlaw-tackles-corruption-in-borneo.do Fernandez, K. (2010). The two waves of cyberpolitics in Malaysia: What does the by-elections barometer tell us? CEU Political Science Journal, 5(4), 597–626. Goldstein, J. (2007). The Role of Digital Networked Technologies in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. Berkman Center Research Publication. Retrieved on 3rd November 2010 from http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2007/ The_Role_of_Digital_Networked_Technologies_in_the_Ukranian_Orange_Revolution Himelboim, I. (2010). Civil Society and Online Political Discourse: The Network Structure of Unrestricted Discussions. Communication Research. doi: doi:10.1177/0093650210384853 Hounshell, B. (2011). Think Again: Egypt, Foreign Policy. Retrieved on February 15 2011 from http:// www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/14/ think_again_egypt

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Huffingtonpost.com. (2011). Egypt’s Facebook Revolution: Wael Ghonim Thanks The Social Network. Huffingtonpost. Retrieved on 27 March 2011 from http://www.huffingtonpost. com/2011/02/11/egypt-facebook-revolutionwael-ghonim_n_822078.html Intelectasia. (2010). 2010 media relations practices survey in Malaysia. Institute of Journalism Studies, Universiti Teknologi MARA. Retrieved on 23th April 2011 from http://intelectasia.com/ document/news/mediasurvey_2010.pdf Janda, K. (1979). Article. Computers and the Humanities, 13(2), 131–132. doi:10.1007/ BF02404510 Joyce, M. (2007). The Citizen Journalism Web Site ‘OhmyNews’ and the 2002 South Korean Presidential Election. Internet & Democracy Case Study Series. Berkman Center Research Publication. Retrieved on 3rd November 2010 from http://cyber. law.harvard.edu/publications/2007/The_Citizen_Journalism_Web_Site_OhMy_News_and_ the_South_Korean_Presidential_Election Karim, R. (2011). Holding on to the ‘fixed deposit’. The Star.com.my. Retrieved on 18th April 2011 from http://thestar.com.my/columnists/story.asp ?col=ceritalah&file=/2011/4/12/columnists/cer italah/8461678&sec=Ceritalah Khoo, B. T. (2010). Cyber-networks, physical coalitions and missing links: Imagining and realizing dissent in Malaysia 1998-2008 (244). Institute of Developing Economies. Kissane, D. (2009). Kevin07, web 2.0 and young voters at the 2007 Australian federal election. CEU Political Science Journal, 4(2), 144–168. Lawrence, E., Sides, J., & Farrell, H. (2010). Self-Segregation or Deliberation? Blog Readership, Participation, and Polarization in American Politics. Perspectives on Politics, 8(1), 141–157. doi:10.1017/S1537592709992714

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Lynch, M. (2011). Tunisia and the New Arab Media Space. Foreign Policy. Retrieved on February 15, 2011 from http://lynch.foreignpolicy. com/posts/2011/01/15/tunisia_and_the_new_ arab_media_space Lysenko, V. V., & Desouza, K. C. (2010). Cyberprotest in contemporary Russia: The cases of Ingushetiya.ru and Bakhmina.ru. Technological Forecasting and Social Change. doi:10.1016/j. techfore.2010.04.021 Mahathir, M. (1970). The Malay Dilemma. Singapore: Times International. Mahathir, M. (1986). The Challenge, Petaling Jaya. Selangor, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications. Malaysikini.com. (2011). Open democracy, online media made win difficult. Malaysiakini.com. Retrieved from http://www.malaysiakini.com/ news/161728 Mate, S., & Ball-Rokeach, S. (2006). The Internet in the Communication Infrastructure of Urban Residential Communities: Macro- or Mesolinkage? The Journal of Communication, 53(4), 642–657. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2003.tb02915.x Milne, R. S., & Mauzy, D. K. (1999). Malaysian politics under Mahathir. Routledge. Mohamed, I. M. T. (n.d.). On Orientalism, Culture and the Muslims: Edward Said and His Contribution to Us. The Reading Group Sharing Session. Retrieved on 19 February 2011 from http://www. thereadinggroup.sg/Articles/On%20Orientalism,%20Culture%20and%20the%20Muslims.pdf Ongkili, J. (1967). The Borneo Response to Malaysia 1961-1963. Donald Moore Press. Petra Kamaruddin, R. (2011). Interview with TV3 Press. Retrieved on 1 May 2011 from http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=QBslOyX8J4Q

Rubis, J. (2011). Beyond the poster wars of Pilihanraya Sarawak 2011. The Malaysian Insider. Retrieved on 2 May from http://www. themalaysianinsider.com/breakingviews/article/ beyond-the-poster-wars-of-pilihanraya-sarawak2011-june-rubis-www.loyarburok.com/ Shazwan, M. K. (2011, March 8). Anwar: Dr M a ‘blatant liar’ with ‘selective amnesia’. The Malaysian Insider. Retrieved on the 18 March 2011 from http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/ malaysia/article/anwar-dr-m-a-blatant-liar-withselective-amnesia/ Sivamurugan, P. (2006). Sarawak State Elections: Issues and Electoral Results. Canadian Social Science, 6(5), 43–48. Star. (2011a). Taib: Stamping of Bibles a very stupid thing to do. Sarawak Decides 2011. Retrieved on 29th April 2011 from http://elections.thestar. com.my/sarawak/news/story.asp?file=/2011/4/9/ sarawakpolls/20110409181012&sec=sarawak polls Star. (2011b). Home Ministry probing Radio Free Sarawak. Thestaronline.com.my. Retrieved March 8 2011 from http://thestar.com.my/news/ story.asp?file=/2011/3/8/nation/201103082130 17&sec=nation Steele, J. (2009). Professionalism Online: How Malaysiakini Challenges Authoritarianism. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 14, 91. doi:10.1177/1940161208326927 Syed Hussein Alatas. (1977). The Myth of the Lazy Native. London: Frank Cass. Tan, J. (2011, April 3). In sync with the times. The Star. Retrieved on 2 May from http://thestar. com.my/columnists/story.asp?file=/2011/4/3/ columnists/joceline/8406086&sec=joceline

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Themalaysianinsider.com. (2011). Najib tells UiTM community to be grateful to BN. Retrieved on 25 March 2011 from http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/najib-tells-uitmcommunity-to-be-grateful-to-bn/ van der Zee, B. (2009). Twitter Triumphs. Index on Censorship, 38(4), 97–102. doi:10.1080/03064220903392570 Varisco, D. M. (2009). Muslims and the media in the blogosphere. Contemporary Islam, 4, 157–177. doi:10.1007/s11562-009-0106-y Yekater ina, P. (2008). Blog Talk. Index on Censorship, 37(1), 174– 1 7 8 . doi:10.1080/03064220701882822 Zenko, M. (2011). The future of War. Foreign Policy. Retrieved on 27th March 2011 from http:// www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/ the_future_of_war

4



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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Alternative Media: Non-mainstream based dissemination channels of information. Social-Political Blogging: Internet based weblogs used for political commentary and news dissemination.

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Rais Yatim was also a victim of the internet when he was accused of sexually molesting his maid. Syed Hussein Alatas. (1977). The Myth of the Lazy Native. London: Frank Cass pg.214. Syed Hussein Alatas quotes this excerpt from a foreign scholar on his description of the Malays at the turn of the century. Singapore’s short lived amalgamation with Malaysia ended in 1965. Singapore’s

transitional federation was about to end in 1963. The British was apprehensive over the domino effect and the possibility of the Chinese populated Singapore turning towards Communist ideologies. Malaya had mixed feelings over the merger especially the idea of embracing more Chinese ‘brothers’ that would water down the already inadequate Malay numbers. The Malay elites were more worried that the Chinese would ‘take over’ the country, even ideologically towards Communism. Hence, the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak was treated with more optimism. Lazy categorization would sum Sabahans and Sarawakian as Malays or Chinese. Racially they can be suffice be categorized as jus soli or under the new Malaysian Federation 1963, instead of Malay, they were bumiputeras. It is to be noted that unlike Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak did not have Sultans. It was proposed that Brunei will own the oil reserves before transferring complete ownership to the federal government after 10 years. Malaysia is a constitutional democracy, parliamentary democracy at two levels, Federal and state levels. The King is head of the state and the prime minister is the head of government at the Federal Level. Chief Ministers are head of the state government while the Sultans or Chief Ministers are the head of the state. Each Sultan in Malaysia will serve as King for duration of 5 years, rotational amongst the 9 Sultans. The Sultan of Brunei believed that he deserved a more senior role than serving as equals amongst the other Sultans of Malaya. One of the fourth prime minister’s first policy maneuvers was to synchronize the time difference between the Peninsula and East Borneo states of Malaysia.

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Chapter 11

Politics 2.0 with Facebook Chirag Shah Rutgers University, USA

ABSTRACT Analyzing publicly available content on various social media sites such as YouTube and Twitter, as well as social network sites such as Facebook, has become an increasingly popular method for studying socio-political issues. Such public-contributed content, primarily available as comments, let people express their opinions and sentiments on a given topic, news story, or post, while allowing social and political scientists to extend their analysis of a political discourse to the social sphere. This new age political process, which involves political agents reaching out to their audiences through social media and common folks using social media to express their opinions and sentiments, are here referred to as “Politics 2.0.” Recognizing the importance of Facebook in studying Politics 2.0, the chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the research work in social and political science domains that use Facebook as a tool for analyzing various socio-political issues. Several popular approaches for collecting and analyzing data from Facebook are provided, and their applications to understanding public opinion and sentiment around various issues of interest are discussed. The chapter also introduces a couple of handy tools that could help the researchers and practitioners gather and analyze a large amount of Facebook data easily and effectively. The chapter concludes with a discussion on opportunities and challenges for understanding Politics 2.0 with Facebook.

INTRODUCTION The public messages exchanged by social network site members, sometimes called comments or wall postings are a new type of text-based communication. These messages are unusual in that they are public – either world-visible or visible to all of a members’ friends – and can be permanently associated with the identity of the poster, more directly and publicly so than listserv postings (Thelwall,

2009). Due to the nature of these postings, that is, being public and available for harvesting,1 they make an excellent choice for a social or political scientist to capture and study them as a proxy for people’s voices for a given political discourse. Thelwall (2009) argued that the widespread use of social network sites (SNS) in many countries (boyd and Ellison, 2007) makes them an important object of study, and also gives an opportunity to investigate informal interpersonal communication

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch011

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on a larger scale than previously possible. In another study, Thelwall (2010) looked at the role of emotion in SNSs and whether emotion is typically reciprocated, and whether Friends express and/ or receive similar levels of emotional expression to each other. His findings indicate statistically significant evidence for a weak correlation between the strength of positive emotion exchanged between Friends and received by Friends. This has larger implications on understanding how information propagates from person to person and source to source using SNS, and what they mean to the receiver of information (Shah, 2010). In addition to providing a background for the research relating to the use of SNS and more specifically Facebook for studying various sociopolitical topics, this chapter introduces the problem of collecting and analyzing public comments from Facebook, and demonstrate the pros and cons of various approaches. Specifically, the reader is taken through a series of steps that one may have to take for manually studying a political topic on Facebook, demonstrate a fully-automated process, and then a hybrid approach for collecting and analyzing public comments from Facebook. The chapter starts with a brief overview of the relevant literature, describes a couple of methods for collecting and analyzing data from Facebook, and their implications for studying political discourses.

APPROACHES TO USING FACEBOOK FOR STUDYING SOCIO-POLITICAL ISSUES There have been several studies reported in the recent years relating to the use of Facebook for investigating various socio-political issues. These fields including information and library science, political science, human-computer interaction, and computer and social sciences. This section provides a few examples of these works to inform and inspire the reader about the use of Facebook and other SNSs for understading political discourses taking place online. 180

Methods Whether the data collection and analysis are done for investigating online political discourse around a current issue, or for understanding pscyho-socio behavior of a certain population, methods for them overlap and inform researchers from all kinds of disciplines. Here, some of the recent works are reviewed to provide a flavor of various methods that are employed for collecting and studying Facebook data. One of the most common approaches is survey since it allows an easy and effective way to collect data about Facebook users without invading their privacy. For instance, using an online survey, Joinson (2008) investigated the uses of social networking site Facebook, and the gratifications users derive from those uses. Factor analysis identified seven unique uses and gratifications: social connection, shared identities, content, social investigation, social network surfing and status updating. Results indicate Users derive a variety of uses and gratifications from social networking sites, including traditional content gratification alongside building social capital, communication, surveillance and social networking surfing. The different uses and gratifications relate differentially to patterns of usage, with social connection gratifications tending to lead to increased frequency of use, and content gratifications to increased time spent on the site. Morris et al. (2010) explored the phenomenon of using social network status messages to ask questions. They conducted a survey of 624 people, asking them to share the questions they have asked and answered of their online social networks. They presented detailed data on the frequency of this type of question asking, the types of questions asked, and respondents’ motivations for asking their social networks rather than using more traditional search tools like Web search engines. They reported on the perceived speed and quality of the answers received, as well as what motivates people to respond to questions seen in their friends’ status messages.

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Lampe et al. (2006) surveyed several college students to explore whether they were using Facebook to find new people in their offline communities or to learn more about people they initially meet offline. The results suggest that the users are largely employing Facebook to learn more about people they meet offline, and are less likely to use the site to initiate new connections. Similarly, studying college students using surveys, Ellison et al. (2006) found a positive relationship between certain kinds of Facebook use and the maintenance and creation of social capital, and that intensive Facebook use is a significant predictor of bonding, bridging, and high school social capital. The consistent theme throughout their findings is that certain kinds of Facebook use appear to facilitate the maintenance and formation of social capital of all kinds. Another important approach for using Facebook in research is by manually or automatically collecting data – primarily profiles and posts, and analyze it quantitatively or qualitatively. For instance, Elison et al. (2007), Using a dataset consisting of 30,773 Facebook profiles, the authors determined which profile elements are most likely to predict friendship links.

Applications to Political Science Let us now look at a sample of works that use various kinds of analyses to study political topics of interest. A common approach is to study posts and comments on Facebook pages of an organization, cause, or a public figure. For example, Kushin et al. (2009) explored the use of Facebook for online political discussion. Analysis revealed the participation of disagreeing parties within a discussion, with the large majority of posters expressing support for the stated position of the Facebook group, and a minority of posters expressing opposition to the position of the group. Despite the presence of uncivil discussion posting within the Facebook group, the large majority of discussion participation was found devoid of

flaming. The results demonstrated the capability of social networks to afford persons of different perspectives the ability to coalesce and engage in political debate. Robertson et al. (2010) examined two years of posts on the Facebook walls of the three major contenders for the U.S. Presidency in 2008: Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and John McCain. The authors analyzed participation patterns of usage along dimensions of breadth and frequency, and interpreted them in terms of the concept of the “public sphere”. Fernandes et al. (2010) looked at student Facebook groups supporting the 2008 presidential candidates in seven battleground states. The findings of a content analysis of wall posts showed that students were using Facebook to facilitate dialog and civic political involvement. Political discussions related to the political civic process, policy issues, campaign information, candidate issues, and acquisition of campaign products dominated across groups and election seasons. The overall findings of this study suggest that youth online communities actively follow campaigns and post comments that foster the political dialog and civic engagement. Robertson et al. (2009) examined the linkage patterns of people who posted links on the Facebook “walls” of Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and John McCain over two years prior to the 2008 U.S. Presidential election. Linkage patterns indicated the destinations to which participants in these social networking dialogues wished to send other participants. Data showed a strong integration of the Web 2.0 and new media technologies of social networking, online video, and blogs. Outside of video content, users tended to direct others to groups and applications within the Facebook community, but this homophilous behavior was more common for infrequent posters. The authors offered a discussion of the Facebook candidate walls as a public sphere for political discourse and introduce some design concepts for visualizing and navigating the walls.

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Woolley et al. (2010), using quantitative content analysis, assessed how both John McCain and Barack Obama were portrayed across these Facebook groups. Results indicated that group membership and activity levels were higher for Barack Obama than for John McCain. Overall, Barack Obama was portrayed more positively across Facebook groups than John McCain. In addition, profanity, racial, religious, and agerelated language were also coded for and varied with regard to how each candidate was portrayed. The authors also discuss theoretical and practical implications of these findings and their approach.

COLLECTING AND ANALYZING DATA FROM FACEBOOK Let us now shift the focus to conducting research with Facebook ourselves and consider one of the central questions while using Facebook for studying a socio-political topic – “how would one collect and analyze Facebook comments without any specialized support?” The answer to this is given in the following subsection as a step-wise procedure. A tool is then described that that automatically collect a large number of Facebook comments and status updates. Finally, a few tips are given on how to combine this automated process for data collection to manual analysis and form a hybrid approach.

Manual Data Collection and Analysis In order to understand the process of analyzing public comments on Facebook, numerous Facebook pages were visited, and a large amount of data (comments) collected and analyzed manually. Following are some of the observations that resulted from this process. •

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The layout of most of Facebook pages is set up in a way that the administrator of the page posts a news piece or a bold statement,

•

and that creates a discussions thread that can go on for a while, sometimes days after the original posting. For example, Reform Immigration FOR America (http://www. facebook.com/reformimmigrationforamerica) is a page that is dedicated to the issue of immigration. Their mission statement as it appears on their info page is: “the U.S. immigration system no longer works. Fixing it presents a daunting challenge, but action must be taken sooner rather than later. The time is NOW to do the right thing and fight for practical solutions that benefit all of us and are rooted in the restoration of the rule of law, earned citizenship, united families, and fair treatment of workers.” A wall post with a statement that was a quote from a senator who had spoken on the senate floor was chosen for further analysis. A total of 97 comments were found on this post that were copied and pasted to a word file in a matter of seconds. Once all the comments were captured, interpretation of each of them was made based on relevancy, sentiments, objectivity, and the quality. The objective of this analysis was to find “useful” comments that help us understand people’s reactions to the wall post. Assessing each of the collected comments for these criteria took approximately 30-40 minutes. It was noticed that in contrast to sports or entertainment pages on Facebook, political pages generate comments that are to the point and for the most part relevant to the given topic at hand. Comments on other pages are sometimes unrelated and completely irrelevant to the page topic. Pages that tackle social/political topics such as healthcare reform or child obesity also generate meaningful discussions that we are able to analyze thoroughly. For example, the popular music group Coldplay has a Facebook page2 that is used for reaching out to their fans and informing them of

 Politics 2.0 with Facebook

•

•

their activities such as tour dates, etc. The layout is very much similar to the other Facebook pages. There are announcements about the band, and each announcement generates hundreds of comments. These comments are overwhelmingly centered around the fans’ passion and devotion to the group. For instance, a link about a Christmas show in Liverpool3 generated 1,310 comments and 18,960 people Liked it. The comments were transferred to a word file and analyzed using the same criteria mentioned before, which took nearly two hours. The majority of the comments were in English and although there were no real discussions included, the great many of messages contained strong positive sentiments about the mentioned show. A good example for the social/political page is Join the Coffee Party Movement page on Facebook4, which carries the same layout as the other pages. One of the links on this page that was examined was a statement made by the administrator, which has generated a great discussion thread, and 67 people had commented and 764 had Liked. By analyzing the messages (about 40 minutes), it was found that a great majority of comments were relevant to the subject of statement and also the majority could be assessed based on sentiment. The sentiments were a mixture of negative/positive and the discussions were for the most part meaningful. There were agreements and strong disagreements with the statement and each created replies by the other commentators. When it comes to Facebook pages for corporations such as Starbucks, it was found that there were fewer discussions and more open-ended opinionated comments that center on Starbucks as a brand. By looking at about 200 comments from this page (about 1 hour), it can be see that the ma-

jority of commentators were expressing their love or loyalty for the brand and sharing stories that centered on Starbucks. No meaningful discussion threads was found, but only sentiments that were overwhelmingly positive towards the brand.5 Given that the above analysis was driven toward exploring objectivity, sentiment, relevance and other criteria, it would be simply hard to do this only via the automatic process. For example, if we are to determine whether a comment holds sentiments, we must read it to be able to decide whether it is negative/positive. Sometimes a comment is issued in a sarcastic tone and holds the opposite sentiment of what it appears to show. This can only be detected through manual data analysis. The same argument can be made for objectivity and relevance. The most significant disadvantage of this approach, however, is the great amount of time it takes to evaluate large collections of data. Several of analyses reported above took about one hour for less than 100 comments. Given that many interesting and important political topics generate thousands of comments, and that these comments keep coming constantly, it becomes prohibitively expensive to study many of these political discourses using public comments. There are several tools these days available to researchers for collecting and/or analyzing a large amount of data from Facebook. The following subsection demonstrates one of such tools.

Automatic Data Collection and Analysis Researchers at Rutgers University have developed a Facebook Harvester to quickly and effectively collect a large amount of data from a Facebook page. This data includes the status updates as well as the wall postings. The harvester uses newly introduced Facebook Open Graph APIs6. Figures 1 to 3 show the working of this web-based harvester using screenshots.

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Figure 1. Main menu for the Facebook Harvester

Figure 2. Starting a new harvesting process requires a Facebook page ID

The result of running this harvesting process was thousands of messages (status updates and wall comments) within a few minutes. The data collected with these processes is stored in structured format using MySQL. One could easily export this data in other structured formats, such as comma-separated values (CSV), or XML for further analysis. One could also run SQL queries on the MySQL database directly to filter, sort, and analyze the data. A similar harvesting process was run for a climate change group’s Facebook page available at http://www.facebook.com/pages/ClimateChange/. The results of the data collection are shown in Figure 4 as a partial snapshot obtained using Sequel Pro.7 A front-end web-based interface has also been provided to display the collected data from harvesting processes (Figure 5).

Hybrid Approach

Figure 3. The harvesting process is now running in the background

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At times and depending on the objective (whether it is sentiment analysis or relevance), it is both easier and more accurate to analyze the comments by simply reading them and going through them one by one. However, the manual approach may not be the most practical when it comes to larger size data. When we are faced with thousands of comments, it can be difficult and we are looking to analyze them without the intention of investigating the details of each message, the automatic approach is our best solution. Here a a hybrid approach is suggested, in which the data collection is done automatically and the analysis is facilitated with the help of sorting and filtering features of the system. Following on the same example of the previous subsection, a large number of comments are collected from a climate change Facebook page using automated processes. This itself saves one enormous amount of time, but now one is left with thousands of these comments and it could take days to go through them. To aid us in this process, we can use querying, sorting, and filtering using the Sequel Pro or a similar tool for database access and manipula-

 Politics 2.0 with Facebook

Figure 4. A snapshot (back-end) of the data collected from the Climate Change Facebook page

tion. This processing may differ depending on the objective of the. For instance, we may only want to look at messages that contain a certain word to see how many people are using a negative/positive term to address an issue and at the same time want to know the number of likes to those comments. Figure 6 shows a snapshot of the data with messages containing ‘climate’ word in them, and sorted by the number of comments to that message. This simple restructuring of the data was obtained by an SQL query taking only a fraction of a second to run. The obtained data is now a small subset (a few dozen messages), and more suitable and manageable for analyzing only the messages that explicitly talk about the climate, with the processing prioritized using the number of comments posted on a given message. This allows for a more thorough examination of discussions that take place on a given topic.

Another way of prioritizing message processing could be by using the length of a given message. It was observed that more meaningful messages tend to be lengthier than those without useful or interesting critique. Figure 7 shows a snapshot of the results ordered by the message length.

CONCLUSION The way people obtain and interpret political messages have changed significantly in the past few years. It took radio 17 years to spread among 50 million people, while TV took 14 years, Internet 5 years, MySpace 3 years, and YouTube merely a year. This significant shift in the media landscape has triggered a snowball effect in many political discourses. It is now far easier to reach to a large number of people with a political message, 185

 Politics 2.0 with Facebook

Figure 5. A snapshot (front-end) showing various harvesting jobs run and comments collected for ‘Climate Change’

Figure 6. Filtered data filtered for messages with ‘climate’ in them, and sorted using the comments counts in the ascending order

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Figure 7. Data ordered by the message length

and have them involved in a discourse. It is also surprisingly inexpensive for an average person to add his or her voice to such discourse. This newage politics, referred to here as “Politics 2.0”, is operationalized in many ways and through many channels; Facebook is one of the most prominent ones. The current chapter introduced the reader to some of the concepts, notions, and research works related to this topic. In addition, this chapter demonstrated how one could go about collecting public comments data from Facebook and analyzing them manually. It was clear that such data can be a valuable asset for studying a political discourse, but very expensive without additional technology support. Fortunately, there are many tools and support these days available for aiding researchers to Facebook Harvester, a web-based tool we have developed to collect public comments and their attributes from a Facebook page. These comments include status updates and wall posts. Furthermore, we showed how such automated data collection could be combined with simple filtering to provide us significantly less expensive analysis methods. This can be extremely helpful in studying various socio-political issues. A couple of scenarios are presented below.

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General scenario: The White House posts constant updates, announcements, and contents on their Facebook page,8 which includes pictures and videos. On a given post, there are typically few hundreds to few thousands comments posted by the visitors. One could not only collect these data once, but also keep collecting them at regular interval (e.g., daily) using our harvester. Such automated data collection and a few simple filtering could allow one to monitor White House’s official stand on certain issues and people’s opinions on them. Specific Scenario: Starbucks recently rolled out a new brand logo, which created quite a bit of stir in the loyal fans and customers. Not surprisingly, they stared posting comments on Starbucks’ Facebook page expressing their opinions and sentiments. Using an automated system, one could easily collect Starbucks status updates and wall comments from Facebook to study these opinions and sentiments, as well as Starbucks’ own reactions to these comments. 187

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This field that is at the intersection of social media, social and political sciences, and web technology, is still taking shape, and we have just seen the tip of that iceberg here. While we have already seen the immense success and potential of Politics 2.0, it is important to know that we are just getting started.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT The author is thankful to Tayebeh Yazdani nia for doing much of the literature scanning and reviewing reported here. The work reported here is in part funded by the National Science Foundation award #1244704.

REFERENCES Boyd, D., & Ellison, N. (2007). Social network sites: Definition, history, and scholarship. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication. Retrieved from http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol2013/issue2001/ Boyd.ellison.html Ellison, N. B., Steinfield, C., & Lampe, C. (2007). The benefits of Facebook friends: social capital and college students’ use of online social network sites. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 12, 1143–1168. doi:10.1111/j.10836101.2007.00367.x Ellison, N. B., Steinfield, C., & Lampe, C. (2007). A familiar face(book), profile elements as signals in an online social network. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM Publications. Fernandes, J., Giurcanu, M., Bowers, K., & Neely, J. (2010). The Writing on the Wall: A Content Analysis of College Students’ Facebook Groups for the 2008 Presidential Election. Mass Communication & Society, 13(5), 653–675. doi:10.1 080/15205436.2010.516865

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Joinson, A. N. (2008). Looking at, looking up or keeping up with people? Motives and use of facebook. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM Publications. Kushin, M., & Kitchener, K. (2009). Getting political on social network sites: Exploring online political discourse on Facebook. First Monday, 14(11). doi:10.5210/fm.v14i11.2645 Morris, M. R., Teevan, J., & Panovich, K. (2010). What do people ask their social networks, and why? A survey study of status message Q&A behavior. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM Publications. Robertson, S. P., Vatrapu, R. K., & Medina, R. (2009). The social life of social networks: Facebook linkage patterns in the 2008 U.S. presidential election. In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research: Social Networks: Making Connections between Citizens, Data and Government. Academic Press. Shah, C. (2010). Information derivatives – A new way to examine information propagation. In Proceedings of Workshop on Human Computer Interaction and Retrieval (HCIR) 2010. Retrieved from http://research.microsoft.com/ en-us/um/people/ryenw/hcir2010/docs/papers/ Shah_pp14.pdf Thelwall, M. (2009). MySpace Comments. Online Information Review, 33(1), 58–76. doi:10.1108/14684520910944391 Thelwall, M. (2010). Emotion homophily in social network site messages. First Monday, 15(4). doi:10.5210/fm.v15i4.2897 Woolley, J., Limperos, A., & Oliver, M. B. (2010). The 2008 Presidential election 2.0: A Content Analysis of User-Generated Political Facebook groups. Mass Communication & Society, 13(5). doi:10.1080/15205436.2010.516864

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

ENDNOTES

Social Media: Information created by people and shared through various online exchanges such as Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, and YouTube. The same exchanges also allow for participation around this information, facilitating social connections. Social Network Sites (SNS): Websites that allow making connections, and through sharing of information, among people. Examples include Facebook, LinkedIn, and Last.fm. Public Comments: Comments made by anyone on information objects such as blogs, news stories, and videos, that are publicly available for others to view and possibly respond to. Harvester: A tool for gathering a large amounts of data from online environments. Examples include ContextMiner and TubeKit. Crawler or Web Crawler: A tool that follows links or some other connections to collect related information objects. Examples include ‘wget’ utility on UNIX platforms and Heritrix crawler by Internet Archives. Structured Data: Data organized and labeled with meaningful information about them. Such data are typically stored in databases or represented using markup languages such as XML. Sentiment Analysis: A technique to extract and sentiments (typically positive and negative) expressed in public comments, blogs, and microblogs.

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According to Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibility: 2.4, “When you publish content or information using the ‘everyone’ setting, it means that you are allowing everyone, including people off of Facebook, to access and use that information, and to associate it with you (i.e., your name and profile picture).” http://www.facebook.com/coldplay/ http://www.facebook.com/coldplay/ posts/182958395063566 http://www.facebook.com/coffeeparty/ posts/144485285605017 Note that the sentiment analysis was done by a single individual, which may have biased such subjective judgment. For a more complete analysis, one may want to involve multiple coders in the process. http://developers.facebook.com/docs/opengraph http://www.sequelpro.com/ http://www.facebook.com/WhiteHouse http://www.facebook.com/coldplay/ http://www.facebook.com/coldplay/ posts/182958395063566 http://www.facebook.com/coffeeparty/ posts/144485285605017 http://developers.facebook.com/docs/opengraph http://www.sequelpro.com/

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Chapter 12

The Wisconsin Spring James Jorstad University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, USA

Kerry Kuenzi University of Colorado – Denver, USA

Jo Arney University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, USA

Cecilia G. Manrique University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, USA

ABSTRACT As a relatively new form of communication and information dissemination, the effect of social media on public awareness and public participation in political events is relatively unknown. Using the events that unfolded surrounding the election of Governor Scott Walker in Wisconsin and the removal of collective bargaining rights of public employees as its main example, this chapter explores the relationship between social media, information dissemination, and collective action.

THE WISCONSIN SPRING In the spring of 2011 Wisconsin entered into unchartered political waters, involving political action that had not occurred since the state earned its statehood in 1848, over 163 years earlier. Hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered at the state capitol, and at many other venues in Wisconsin, to protest the governmental action of removing most of the collective bargaining rights of public workers and the lack of transparency in the state government. While the world was captivated by the resignation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, newly-elected Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker quietly began his initial steps in eliminating the rights of public sector unions in the state. Under the pretense of a “Budget Repair Bill,” forces were

unleashed that dramatically polarized the state. Soon, the news spotlight was directly focused on Wisconsin, and more precisely on Madison. The clash of big business and organized labor appeared on the front pages of newspapers, blogs, and websites throughout the country and the world. Protests, like the ones in Wisconsin and Egypt, are now recognized as collective action examples. In these cases, collective action among dis-satisfied constituents is enlarged because individuals are able to benefit from the protesting of others without having to protest themselves. Further complicating the matter, electronic media creates new forums for individuals to air the grievances and debate preferred outcomes. Just as the case of Egypt began with the action of an individual, Wael Ghomin, who created a Facebook (FB) page dedicated to the Egyptian businessman Khaled

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch012

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Saeed beaten to death by police, so did this create an online space for protestors and those discontented with the Egyptian government to “gather,” vent their frustrations and organize the protest which led to the downfall of the government. As shown by this case, social media became a major player in disseminating information. In Wisconsin specifically, the highly-charged political environment provided an opportunity for the media to explain the issues, but more dramatically, provided a platform to potentially polarize, misinform, or reinforce people’s perceptions and opinions. While the media continued to shape and reinforce opinions, people turned to social media to express their support or opposition of the measures taken by Governor Walker, further shaping the state’s political climate.

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA In the fall of 2011, the Associated Press reported that eight of every 10 members of Congress are on Facebook and Twitter. In fact, the story noted that Republicans, by a slight majority, tweeted contentious times and how did it affect the political environment? A variety of social media tools including Twitter, blogs, YouTube, and Facebook were used to disseminate information and political opinion surrounding these events. In addition, one of the writers of this chapter authored a series of CNN iReports focusing on Wisconsin politics. After the iReports were written they were vetted, posted, and tracked to analyze how people would react in Wisconsin, the U.S. and the world. Over 300,000 people viewed these reports with over 1,000 readers placing comments on-line. Once the stories were uploaded, CNN iReport producers in Atlanta would contact the writer to “vet” the story to ensure its accuracy. After a few months, rather than an iReport producer intern calling to vet the story, the CNN news desk followed up

to “check in with Wisconsin,” and to ensure the accuracy of the report. Once the story was vetted, it was not unusual to see the iReport placed on-line within hours in Forbes, NPR, and other news outlets worldwide. During this time it became increasingly clear that not only was Wisconsin becoming polarized, but so was the entire nation. When posting stories about worker’s rights or the removal of collective bargaining for public employees, comments quickly appeared saying: Unions are a pox on the land. Public unions are blood suckers. Wisconsin unionists are just like the Democratic party. They believe in tax and spend as long as it’s spent on them. On the other end of the spectrum, people commented: The working class needs to stand up all over this country to show these Elitists who does the work and who makes the money for these corporations. I hope the people of Wisconsin are successful in taking their state back from the pirates who are now controlling the government. (I) am in awe of these people; this is what the American People should be doing right now, after the devastation they have just been handed by the Republicans in Congress. Comments from political groups could be found from the conservative far right, independents, and left wing progressives. The environment in the state became supercharged. On March 12, 2011 an historic protest was held at the Madison state capitol with crowds swelling to nearly 200,000 protesters. Even the Vietnam War protests

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drew only about 30,000-40,000 protestors. That same evening, a 3-minute clip from the protest was uploaded to YouTube. Five hundred viewers watched it that day. Throughout the next two days, more than 3,000 people worldwide viewed the clip. It was also highlighted by the Center for Media and Democracy. This YouTube clip later appeared on the Rachel Maddow and The Ed Show on MSNBC. Since the clip was posted, over 11,000 people have viewed it, including individuals from every state and many countries worldwide. A hundred and three people have “liked” the video, versus only 2 “dislikes”. For example, one person commented, “So proud to live in Madison!!!! This was the most amazing thing I’ve ever been a part of.” Furthermore, the clip was viewed extensively during the Wisconsin summer recall elections. The highest percentage of views came from Russia. This demonstrated the global impact of the Wisconsin Spring. Social media enabled messages to reach a large audience in a very short time. For example, one CNN iReport highlighted Jesse Jackson’s visit to La Crosse, WI to speak on the April Supreme Court race between David Prosser and Joanne Kloppenburg. He spoke about the importance of voting, encouraging Wisconsinites to “be alive, April 5.” Once the report was placed, viewership increased 200-300 new viewers per minute demonstrating that social media could disseminate information at blazingly fast speeds. The negative comments about Jackson illustrated just how polarized people were. For example, “For a minute there I thought I was watching SNL,” and “Get this dinosaur out of here…”, vs. “Great speech. Glad someone is rallying the young voters.” All totaled, over 20,000 people viewed this CNN iReport with over 70 people providing comments, mostly negative, some racist. What can we learn from the power or influence of social media? This project informs of six trends in social media including its ability to:

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Make learning more relevant. Accelerate the speed of dissemination. Provide insights into public opinion. Reinforce, influence, or change opinion. Motivate and engage “the base.” Add or eliminate attribution of the author. Disseminate fact or fiction. These will be discussed in detail below.

WISCONSIN PROGRESSIVE HISTORY AND POLITICAL CULTURE In order to understand the context in which the events in the spring of 2011 took place it is important to first review the history and political culture of the state. Wisconsin has long been a laboratory for democracy. Only five decades after Wisconsin became a state, then Governor “Fighting Bob” La Follette issued in an era of progressive reforms. “Among the new policies the reformers ushered in were a workman’s compensation act, a state income tax, a law establishing maximum hours of labor for women and children, a pension act, a retirement fund for teachers, and a corruptpractices act that limited and publicized campaign expenses” (Conant 2006). In addition, Wisconsin also became the first state to recognize public unions in 1959. Although federal employees had the right to bargain collectively as early as 1935 this was not transferred to state workers until decades later. The movement for public unions coincided with the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. Over thirty states followed Wisconsin’s lead. Prior to the efforts to remove collective bargaining in Wisconsin in the spring of 2011, thirty four states required the state to bargain with state employee unions, 5 additional states allowed this, and 11 states outright prohibited public unions. Wisconsin is said to have a moralistic political culture. Political Scientist Daniel Elazar identifies three types of political cultures in the United

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States. Different cultures have varying views about the appropriate role of government. While some see the role of government as upholding the traditional political elite (traditionalistic culture) others see the purpose of government as creating a space for marketplace and individual aspirations (individualistic culture). A moralistic culture refers to a government that exists to promote the common good over individualistic aspirations (Elazar, 1972). As James Conant notes, “Throughout much of Wisconsin’s history, its politics and public policy have been shaped by those who believe that government’s proper role is to protect citizens and to advance the interests of the community as a whole rather than the interests of a few” (Conant, 2006). This does not mean all citizens in the state of Wisconsin have historically been of one mind, however. Conant also notes that there has been a long standing struggle between moralistic and marketplace (individualistic) motivations in the state. One of the battle grounds between individualistic and moralistic aspirations has been in the state capitol and specifically with the state budget. “Wisconsin’s legislature has traditionally been very active in the budgetary process. The key budget committee is the Joint Committee on Finance. The committee introduces and then examines the biennial budget proposed by the governor” (Conant, 2006). Members of this committee have considerable influence on the policies of the state by using the budget to enforce or implement policy decisions. While this gives the legislature power to negotiate with the governor Conant notes that “…the committee votes are often along partisan lines, with the party controlling the governorship voting for the governor’s budget proposals” (Conant, 2006).

A CATALOGUE OF EVENTS Republican Scott Walker was elected to the Governorship on November 2, 2010 beating his opponent, Democrat Tom Barrett, by a 52 to 48

percent margin. He took the oath of office on January 3, 2011 becoming the 45th governor of the State of Wisconsin. As noted above, Governor Walker unveiled a budget repair bill on February 11, 2011. Wisconsin operates under a biennial budget, with Walker taking office with six months remaining in the budget cycle. Rather than waiting for a new cycle to begin, he sought to repair a budget deficit in the current budget included changing working arrangements for public employees within the state. He also sought to increase the amount of pension and health care contributions for public employees and to limit the power of public employees to bargain collectively. Government workers were asked to contribute 5.8 percent of their salary toward their pensions (previously contributed by the state) and 12.5 percent of their health care coverage (previously half this amount). The budget repair bill also removed the power of public unions to negotiate over anything other than salary, required yearly votes for public unions to continue their existence, and disallowed union dues to be deducted from union member’s paychecks. Like the Egyptian protestors who gathered at Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011 based on the call by twenty-six-year old Asmaa Mahfouz who posted a video blog urging the Egyptian people to join the day of protest, the first wave of Wisconsin protestors began to gather in Madison on February 14, 2011. They numbered in the thousands and hoped to gain the attention of the Legislature’s Joint Finance Committee. On February 15 the Legislature’s Joint Finance Committee held a public hearing on the bill with thousands lined up to testify; so many, in fact, that a sleep-in began as individuals waited to testify. Over the next several days and weeks, the number of protestors in Madison continued to grow. On February 16 schools around the state began to close as hundreds of teachers called in sick in order to attend the protests and rallies against the budget repair bill at the capitol and other locations.

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The matter escalated on February 17, when Democratic state senators left the state to block a vote on the budget repair bill in the Senate. At issue was an obscure Senate rule that required a quorum of 20 senators to vote on fiscal matters but just 17 to vote on other matters. Wisconsin has a total of 33 state senators. The 2011-2012 Senate consisted of 19 Republican and 14 Democrats senators meaning the Republicans could not vote on the measure without at least 1 Democratic senator in the chamber. While these events were unfolding, dozens of rallies labeled as “solidarity events” broke out across the state. For example, on February 18th an estimated 40,000 people attended Capitol Square rallies. Reverend Jesse Jackson made an appearance and spoke on behalf of the workers. Saturday, February 19, saw an estimated 65,000 people attend Capitol Square rallies. Pro-Walker protesters also showed up and numbered between 3,000 and 5,000, with the rest being pro-union. The following Tuesday, February 22 the mayor of Madison, Dave Cieslewicz, signed an open letter to Governor Walker, along with 160 other local officials from around the state, telling him that collective bargaining worked. While the protests continued to escalate and the Democrats remained outside of the state, the governor vowed to take other measures to balance the budget. This included laying off state workings. Specifically, the governor estimated that up to 2,700 workers would lose their jobs if a resolution could not be reached and the dispute continued. Finally, when this response did not result in Democrats returning to the state, Republicans removed the financial components of the bill resulting in a target on the collective bargaining rights of state employees. On March 10, the state assembly passed the revised bill, and on March 11, Governor Walker signed the bill into law. The battle was not over, however. Recall elections were called for six Republicans and three Democrats in the summer of 2011. Two Republicans lost their recall elections, changing 194

the margin in the State Senate to 17 Democrats and 16 Republicans. Finally, on January 17, 2012 nearly 1 million signatures in support of a recall election for Governor Walker were turned in to the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board. The recall elections and the protests in Wisconsin have been portrayed in many different lights. While some news sources portrayed them as public employees scrambling to save their lucrative benefits packages, other sources captured the sentiment among protestors that the Governor was simply union busting. As Greenhouse explains “Labor leaders view these efforts as political retaliation by Republicans upset that unions recently spent more than $200 million to defeat Republican candidates” (Greenhouse, 2011). Further, other sources discussed the apparent partisan attacks on unions by the governor. Conservative leaning groups, specifically police and fire unions were excluded from the collective bargaining bill passed by the state assembly (Krugman, 2011). Governor Walker emerged victorious from a recall election held in June 2012.

LITERATURE REVIEW As discussed above, these events revolve around the concept of collective action. Specifically, electronic media create new forums for collective action to take place. Furthermore, the governor’s action inhibits the likelihood that collective action would take place. The theoretical origins of collective action evolve from several disciplines including philosophy, sociology, political science, and economics. The definition is based on the notion that individuals with common interests act together on behalf of those interests. Organizations, such as labor unions, help to facilitate this group action, which rests on the assumption that organizations perform the important function of advancing common interests of groups of individuals. In this vein, Sandler defines collective action as “efforts of two or more agents (e.g. individuals,

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firms, institutions, or nations) required to obtain an outcome” (Sandler, 2004). From these origins, the development of the term in modern economics and political science stems from Olsen’s 1965 publication of The Logic of Collective Action. Collective action theory, as devised by Olsen, rests on the principles of market failure and public (collective) goods. More specifically, the failure of the unrestricted market to produce the optimal quantity of a public good is a commonly recognized market failure. Public goods are “goods for which the investment of any one individual benefits everyone in a large group” (Gruber, 2007). They are distinguishable from other types of good because they are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. A nonrivalrous good is one in which multiple users can derive consumption benefits from such at any time, while nonexcludability refers to the principle that no single individual maintains control over the good (Weimer & Vining, 2011). Because of these characteristics, public goods bring about several problems including overconsumption and free riders. A free rider problem exists when an investment has personal costs but common benefits, leading to underinvestment by individuals. Olsen explains: The successful boycott or lobbying action will bring the better price or wage for everyone in the relevant category, so the individual in any large group with a common interest will reap only a minute share of the gains from whatever sacrifices the individuals makes to achieve this common interest. Since any gain goes to everyone in the group, those who contribute nothing to the effort will get just as much as those who made a contribution. (Olsen, 1982) Group size is the integral variable predicting whether individuals will work together towards a common goal and small groups are more efficient and viable than larger groups. Problems that arise in this context are known as collective action problems.

Collective action problems are covered extensively in the political science literature, especially as they relate to population growth and climate change. Forest resources, grazing pastures, and fishing areas are all examples of commonly held resources that suffer from these issues. Hardin demonstrates this with a pasture in The Tragedy of the Commons: “self-interested individuals are locked into a system that leads them to overgraze their animals in the commonly held pasture until its depletion” (Hardin, 1968). Recently, Ostrom’s body of work demonstrates how to overcome some of the collective action problems of common pool resources. More specifically, she demonstrates how frequent and personal interaction among stakeholders in a resource space can use either formal or informal institutions to guarantee to manage these resources. Collective action problems can be clarified through the lens of game theory. Game theory examines how individuals make choices when the outcomes of their choice are not only affected by their decision, but by the decisions of others in the situation. Scholars have identified several theoretical explanations of ways to overcome collective action problems including conditional cooperation (i.e. tit-for-tat), convention, selective incentives, the state, community, political entrepreneurs, and others (Zheng & Wu, 2005). A more concrete option includes developing shared understandings and identities that foster trust and cooperation (Tarrow, 1998). Similarly, Chong argues that social interaction increases identity politics that helps to develop mutual obligation and commitments (Chong,1991). Game theory has also been tested empirically both in the laboratory and in the field with mixed results leading to “considerable theoretic turmoil” (Ostrom, 2010). In most instances, individuals cooperate at much greater levels than predicted. For example, in a series of field experiments conducted in rural Colombia, it was found that in base-line experiments, villagers substantially overinvested in resources (Cardenas, 2000). Similarly, Miller shows how individuals work beyond 195

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their individual self-interest in hierarchical work environments (Miller, 1992). It is important to note that Olsen did not suggest that all groups would fail to overcome collective action problems. What he and other researchers have demonstrated is that communication and personal relationships substantially increase cooperation in collective settings (Olsen, 1965). Communication, specifically, impacts the future study of collective action. New technology has changed the way collective action takes place, especially with the advent of new and faster ways to communicate. Specifically the Internet, through email and online social networking sites like Twitter, LinkedIn and Facebook has changed the ways that individuals and organizations communicate. Recent statistics indicate that 75 percent of Americans have access to the internet in their homes (Nielsen, 2006). Many libraries offer free internet access to individuals, and they also access the internet through wireless hot spots located throughout cities. Furthermore, email and Facebook are available to individuals on their mobile phones and other devises. “Flows of people, information, images, easily cross borders with a greater degree of flexibility than ever before” (Fahmi, 2009). One way to understand these flows of communication is through the building of an online community. Not only are new communities being built in cyber-space, but the definition of community itself is being transformed. “Current views of community are now tempered by activity and association at the personal, group, and network levels, spanning multiple geographical locations but surprisingly rooted in local action” (Haythornthwaite & Kendall, 2010). This trend of information flow can be understood as a globalization of issues. Not only are people more aware of social movements because of these new avenues for communication, they are able to participate like never before. On the one hand, activists are able to create new spaces of resistance like electronic sit-ins, while on the

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other, people are able to obtain information about activity in physical spaces and act accordingly (Fahmi, 2009). Recent studies have attempted to evaluate the Internet as a conduit for community building and social capital through increasing social ties. Lin argues that the emergence of social, economic, and political networks online signals a new era in the construction and development of social capital (Lin, 2001). Cummings, Heeks, and Huysman investigate how social capital can facilitate understanding of online networks and use this to form a framework for assessing social capital in online development networks (Cummings, Heeks, and Huysman, 2006) . However, there exist several competing views of the impact of the Internet on individual’s social networks and social capital. For example, Uslaner recognizes the Internet’s ability to increase strong ties and thus the size of one’s social network. However, he concludes that because of the types of ties that exist within these networks social capital is not created or strengthened (Uslaner, 2004). Putnam suggests that the Internet encourages individuals to withdraw from civil society (Putnam, 2000). Gladwell argues that “social media can’t provide what social change has always required” (Gladwell, 2010). Conversely, Hopkins and Thomas hypothesize that in addition to the obvious weak ties created through social networking on the Internet, strong ties may be created and strengthened in instances when families or friends are divided by distance and when certain media like chat messaging are utilized to induce a great repertoire of communication links for an individual (Hopkins and Thomas, 2002). While the impacts of the Internet on politics are still ambiguous, there is general agreement that the Internet and other new forms of communication have been utilized by citizens groups around the world to highlight their message and encourage others to engage. The emergence of electronicbased social networks induces individuals to form

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and re-form activist groups. So called “smart mobs” have been capable of meaningful collective action outcomes through these different avenues (Coyne, 2009). Social media has moved to the frontline of communication not only for protestors, but for police and mass media as well. Researchers have worked to understand social networking’s role in many contentious debates often attempting to understand the real consequences for politics. Studies have also investigated the extent to which political activity operates online. Segerberg and Bennett (2011) researched Twitter and its effects on contentious politics. They argue that understanding the role of social media in collective action requires recognition of how these networks infuse specific protest ecologies. Furthermore, this requires understanding both the information and organizing role that these technologies play. Finally, through an investigation of Twitter Feeds surrounding the 2009 United Nations Summit, they find that “… (a) Twitter streams represent crosscutting networking mechanisms in a protest ecology, (b) they embed and are embedded in various kinds of gatekeeping processes, and (c) they reflect changing dynamics in ecology over time” (Segerberg and Bennett, 2011). Zheng and Wi argue that “the internet promotes collective action by promoting social interaction and developing identity politics over the cyber-public sphere” (Zheng and Wi, 2005). Smith et al. find that respondents utilized blogs and social networks as new opportunities for political engagement. Furthermore, while previous research signaled a strong relationship between income and education to civic engagement, online outlets are beginning to weaken this relationship (Smith et al., 2009). Finally, Paske, More, and Romer find that while social networking users were more engaged (vs. nonusers) civically, they were also less trusting of others (Paske, More, and Romer, 2010). Several examples of current events demonstrate the Internet’s ability to affect the way individuals interact and create change. Rahimi demonstrates

how the Internet has developed an important role in the struggle for democracy in Iran, arguing that it is an innovative method for resistance (Rahimi, 2003). Fahmi discusses the blogger’s street movement in Egypt and their ability to reclaim both real and virtual spaces of freedom (Fahmi, 2009). Finally, China has emerged as an interesting case study for scholars interested in this issue. Zhen and Wu compare the current development of websites independently of the government in China to the guerilla warfare of the government and liberal intellectuals in the 1930s, demonstrating how cyber discussions have had an important impact on the people’s perception of politics. “Where dissident intellectuals in the 1930s relied on printed materials to voice their grievances and thoughts, now they have progressed to using IT”(Zhen and WU, 2005). Similarly, opinion polls conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and UCLA’s Center for Communication Policy have found that a large portion of respondents believed the Internet has increased their contact with people who shared hobbies, recreational activities, and professions. Finally, the same study demonstrated how the Internet had a more substantial political impact than traditional media in democratic countries. When asked: “Do you think by using the internet people like you can better understand politics?” 79.2 percent of individuals agreed or strongly agreed vs. 42.5 percent in the United States, 60.6 percent in Sweden, 60.4 percent in Spain, and 31.5 percent in Japan. While past theoretical research has been skeptical of the role of the Internet and other developments in Internet communications and its ability to foster social capital, increase collective identities and encourage civic and political engagement most current research is more optimistic. There is some evidence of the positive role that these new forms of communication has, but that research is still sparse and limited. What is clear is that more developed and nuanced theories are required to better understand the role of these

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technologies on collective action. Finally, more empirical work can also improve knowledge on the impact of these technologies.

SOCIAL MEDIA IN WISCONSIN February 11 became known as the day Walker “dropped the bomb.” This infamous phrase arose from a prank phone call in which Walker admitted his political strategy to a reporter posing as billionaire, political contributor David Koch. Through a wide array of protests, news reports, editorials, photographs and video, Wisconsin became the global epicenter of political news that extended well beyond the central issue of collective bargaining rights. Other themes quickly emerged including government transparency, outside corporate influence, open meeting laws, and the top 1percent of the population versus the remaining 99. The one key element that provided the mechanism for the dissemination of information, and disinformation was the personal, strategic, and sometimes unintended use of social media. On this political stage social media was creating “history in real time.” To document these historically significant events, and to analyze the influence of social media, a yearlong investigation was undertaken, entitled “The Wisconsin Experience - History in Real Time.”

Making Learning Relevant Initially, this investigation sought to find strategies or methods to make learning more relevant for students, and also for faculty. By illustrating real world events, in real time, the intent was to more fully engage students and faculty in the learning and teaching process. A series of tools were identified to utilize in the project including, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Tweetdeck.

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An important portion of this project centered on the creation of CNN iReports which focused on political environment and events in Wisconsin. These iReports included images, videos, and personal narratives about political issues and how they affected people in Wisconsin and beyond. Comments generated by these reports provided a useful assessment tool to further analyze the medium and the message. Analytical data from YouTube helped track and identify viewers based on gender, age, and location. Tweetdeck provided the mechanism to track trends through Twitter postings, and to strategically target messages to specific groups, at specific times as shown in Figure 1. These Tweets also provided web links, photos, and videos to find additional resources, news reports, and conversations. All of these social media tools helped to provide a deeper level of understanding of the power and danger of social media. From an academic perspective, could social media be used as a tool to enhance our ability to engage students in relevant and authentic learning opportunities? A EDUCAUSE Center for Applied Research (ECAR) National Study of Undergraduate Students and Information Technology 2011 Report, found that over 90 percent of students use Facebook. On the other hand, more than half of students (53%) think its academic value was limited or nonexistent. A study by Manrique and Manrique found that students wanted a divide between their academic world and their social world thus protesting when their faculty members tried to incorporate Facebook and Twitter discussions in their courses (Manrique and Manrique, 2011). Perhaps directly integrating social media into the teaching and learning process through relevant real world events, and carefully integrating them into the curriculum could create a more dynamic and relevant teaching and learning environment. The University of Wisconsin-La Crosse study was created to see if this new “virtual learning environment” could be effectively created.

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Figure 1. Tweetdeck allows viewers to monitor multiple streams of Tweets worldwide

Speed of Dissemination There is no doubt the speed of disseminating information through social media is impressive. Tools such as Facebook™, YouTube™, and Twitter™ allow anyone across the globe to communicate a personal autobiography or a news event with narrative, multimedia, and in some cases in less than 140 characters. In the world of politics, these social media tools provide a free communications channel with worldwide reach and create a new environment for individuals to act collectively. As the political upheaval in Wisconsin began to take hold in the spring of 2011, social media played an integral role in mobilizing people and groups. Social media provided the mechanism for people with similar perspectives to connect, and also allowed people to spread their ideas and thoughts worldwide through other media channels and news agencies. The speed of dissemination can be demonstrated with several examples. First, on March 20, 2011 a story was placed on CNN iReports about

a visit to La Crosse, Wisconsin by Wisconsin Senator Erpenbach, one of the 14 Wisconsin Democratic senators who left the state to prevent a quorum for a vote on the collective bargaining bill. This group of senators later became known as the “Fab 14.” The iReport was “vetted” by CNN producers early the next morning as shown in Figure 2. Vetting is a process whereby the CNN producers contact the iReporter to verify the story’s accuracy, who took the images, when, where in order to get a sense of the scene. As part of the iReport, the reporter or viewer can share the story via e-mail, Facebook, and Twitter directly from the CNN iReport web page. After the story was officially vetted, an iReport icon is placed on the upper left of the first image from the story. At this point other electronic news agencies pick up the story, and it will subsequently appear on blogs and web pages. Initially, only a handful of viewers read the story, however, within a day, the total increased to nearly two thousand. With a simple Google search of the article’s title, the story was no 199

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Figure 2. A CNN iReport highlighting Sen. Jon Erpenbach(Screencapture used with permission from CNN)

longer referenced as a CNN iReport, but rather, a CNN story. The news item was quickly posted on Forbes.com, the Houston Chronicle, and NPR News, all within hours. Another tool that was helpful was Interceder ™ “a topic search engine that aggregates news, video, and Twitter posts about topics and people within a single window of information.” The original story about Senator Erpenbach’s visit was filtered by his name and how recent the information was posted. This website (http://interceder.net/) is a useful tool when researching news filtered by topic. In another example, the Rev. Jesse Jackson was a guest lecturer at the University of WisconsinLa Crosse on March 28, 2011. He came to the campus to talk about the importance of voting and referenced a looming Wisconsin Supreme Court race. A few clips were posted on CNN iReports (Figure 3) and sent to the Jackson logistical group and other potential social media outlets. As soon

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as this story was vetted by CNN in Atlanta and shared, the number of views rapidly increased. At one point the number of iReport views increased by 200-300 new viewers every 30 seconds. This could be easily tracked by simply refreshing the iReport in the browser screen. Over 20,000 viewers read the article and viewed the video. Through a Google search, the story could be tracked as a wide assortment of news agencies published the story. At one point it was picked up by Latino News. Not only was the speed of dissemination important to note, but this article also provided an insightful snapshot of global comments about Jesse Jackson. This is another critical component of analyzing the power and the dangers of social media. Public comments can provide an important tool to understand what people are willing to say on-line, with some sense of anonymity.

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Figure 3. An iReport filed about Jesse Jackson drew over 20,000 views, with viewership, at times, increasing by up to 300 new views every 30 seconds (Screencapture used with permission from CNN)

Insights into Public Opinion

•

One of the most insightful and valuable outcomes of using social media is the opportunity of collecting comments from the viewing public. In this investigation, comments were carefully collected from YouTube videos and CNN iReports. What people may resist commenting on in public can become graphically negative and harsh when anonymously posting through social media. A number of comments in the iReport were particularly significant about what people felt about Jesse Jackson. In a posting about Jesse Jackson, some of the comments said,

• • • •

“For a minute there I thought I was watching SNL...” “If you believe this bozo you’re smoking something…” “Great speech. Glad someone is rallying the young voters.” “Get this dinosaur out of here….” “Hey Jesse- The 1980’s are calling. They are saying you left your relevance there…”

Another iReport about the Wisconsin recall process brought out personally negative comments about unions. In the story, some viewers commented on a union worker in the photo, and about unions generally (see Figure 4). Some comments said,

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Figure 4. Sometimes seemingly innocent people or storylines can yield negative on-line comments from on-line viewers

• • •

“Typical fat union slob in the pic you see here in WI…” “Public unions are blood suckers who destroy everything they touch….” “Unions are a pox upon the land. Combined with Socialism, they have ruined the country.”

Nearly 25,000 viewers read the story, with nearly 200 people both either recommending the story, or sharing it. On-line comments can provide clues as to how people feel about an issue or event. However, some comments can be written by paid on-line posters to promote specific points of view. These types of on-line commenters are sometimes infamously referred to as “trolls.”

Social Media Can Influence, Reinforce, or Change Attitudes As viewers continue to migrate from newspaper outlets to on-line resources and social media, “the presentation, selection, and availability of news are no longer chiefly controlled by journalists” 202

(Purcell, Rainie, Mitchell, Rosenstiel, & Olmstead, 2010). The audience of today is shifting towards a myriad of new social media contributors and authors around the globe. There has been an ever increasing amount of issue-specific or ideologically-driven information outlets viewers can choose from. These information outlets create a more segmented and diverse information resource environment. Research shows these specialized outlets of news and information can either cause a sense of apathy or a more partisan polarization in the electorate (Prior, 2007). This acute sense of political polarization was demonstrated in Wisconsin in the spring of 2011. It could be said that social media today can form greater polarization between two differing viewpoints. Before social media came to the political scene, information and ideas were primarily distributed through newspapers, radio, and later television. As social media became more of a mainstream dissemination channel, people could quickly connect to individuals and form groups, or a collective of similar thinking. As the group grows with people of similar beliefs, it can become centralized around common beliefs and opinions. Common thoughts and thinking could then reinforce itself and strengthen their perspectives, creating an endless cycle of common belief. Groups with specific ideologies could become hyperpolarized simply because of the close knit nature of their “group-think”. In analyzing and researching social media, it is important to consider how social media affects our personal opinions and perspectives. Generally, people tend to gravitate towards information they agree with. In other words, if you have a certain opinion on an issue, you tend to search out media channels that reinforce your opinion. Social media can serve to emphasize that phenomenon. In an Ohio State research study conducted by Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng it was found that participants were most likely to read only

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articles that were consistent with their views (Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng, 2009). The next most common group was those reading both views on an issue, followed by very few people reading articles that opposed their views. The same observation occurs with social media. To get a true picture of the accuracy or veracity of social media messaging, one would need to compare disparate views to gain a wider perspective. In a social media world, this can be easy to do, but many people do not have the motivation, time, or interest to view contrasting perspectives or opinions. Understanding our choices for news outlets is important. In a survey of one English and two Political Science classes at the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse in 2011, students were asked about their political leanings and what news agencies they typically follow. While 45% of the students said they tend to lean Republican, 63% felt that FOX news was the most biased in their reporting. Forty-six percent of all students felt that CNN was least biased in their reporting. When students were asked in class where they get their news, one student commented, “I watch FOX News because my parents watch it.” How we search out information can be based on our beliefs, or determined by the environment we live in. Not only do we choose our own channels of information, but our personal surroundings or friend networks may also have an effect on our choices. It is not unusual to “unfriend” Facebook friends, when their political or social views are different from ours. However, keeping them as “friends” may provide insight into their thinking, and their own social network. Social media can influence and reinforce our thinking, but it can also change attitudes.

Social Media Has Significant Advantages and Dangers While much has been written about the positive aspects of social media’s immediacy, broad reach, and influence, it can also be used to disseminate

non-factual information. Social media can also be used as a tool to actually impede its distribution and dissemination. The political environment in Wisconsin provided a fertile testing ground for social media. By using a software product called Tweetdeck™, it was easy to monitor multiple streams of tweets based upon content or the tweet author. For example, viewing a stream entitled #wiunion and @ maddow would give you a progressive perspective. Conservative Twitter feeds might come from @ Redstate or @conservatives. At times both progressive and conservative tweet authors may post items on opposing Twitter feeds. Others may use provocative icons or photos to entice viewers to click on web links or photos embedded in their tweet. To understand the point of view of any Twitter feed, it is important to view and understand both perspectives when forming your opinions or strategies. A “flagging phenomenon” occurred in several of the iReports. In one report about a potential Wisconsin governor recall candidate, Mahlon Mitchell, viewers could “flag” a report as “inappropriate content” (Figure 5). When this occurs an automatically generated message appears that says the “article is under review for inappropriate content”. You are prompted by the message, “Are you sure you want to proceed?” It still allows you to eventually click to the story, but it takes more effort. In the comment section of the iReports, readers began asking why this article was flagged as inappropriate. In conversations with CNN producers, it was determined that a group of viewers were purposefully “flagging the article” to make it more difficult for people to view it. In the end, the “flagging” technique had the opposite effect for this iReport story. The more you prevent people from seeing something, the more people want to see what is being hidden. What started at approximately 15,000 viewers reading the iReport quickly became 30,000 viewers.

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Figure 5. A CNN iReport illustrated how viewers can “flag” content as inappropriate (Screencapture used with permission from CNN)

The iReporter eventually commented on the story saying, “For those purposely flagging this article as inappropriate, it is having the opposite effect.” Soon afterwards the “flagging” stopped.

Social Media Can Mobilize the Base As soon as the Madison protests began to gain momentum, the use of social media accelerated at an increasing pace. In rural areas of the state, social media was an effective tool in bringing groups together and for planning anti-Governor Walker events. As the events grew in number, and the protests increased in size, the national press began to cover the “Wisconsin experience” much more closely and frequently. On March 12, 2011 nearly 200,000 people gathered in Madison at the state capitol (see Figure 6). As part of this project, a 2 minute clip was 204

posted on YouTube (Figure 7) within hours of the protest. On the first day, 500 people viewed the clip, with a viewership of 3,000 the next day. Today over 12,000 people have viewed the clip. During the course of the year, the video was distributed through targeted Twitter messages that coincided with important political events. Twitter messages were sent through Tweetdeck to specific content areas of interest. These messages were timed to coincide with news items in Wisconsin, and also political events in Indiana and Ohio, where similar collective bargaining issues were in play. Through YouTube Analytics one could track the gender, age, and location of viewers in the U.S. and the world. By using multiple social media tools such as Twitter and YouTube, in a targeted, timely, and strategic manner, a cohesive organized political strategy can be mapped out. Carefully understand-

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Figure 6. Madison Protest March 12, 2011 ©2011 Jim Jorstad

Figure 7. YouTube and the Madison Protest

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ing this strategy can also provide an opportunity to plan for alternative methods of distributing information, if other factors and events dynamically change the environment.

Author Attribution Can Change When reading social media postings the attribution of the author may change. In addition, determining whether a blog, tweet, or personal narrative is fact or fiction can be exceedingly difficult. We discovered that when CNN iReports were vetted, some news agencies would change the attribution to an actual CNN Report and in other cases would totally remove whatever attribution originally existed. Information disseminated via social media during the “Wisconsin Experience” served a wide variety of purposes. Bloggers would write opinion pieces about legislators, legislation, or issues. These blog narratives would then be tweeted or reported through traditional news channels. What was reported in the mainstream news would then be re-blogged or RT (re-tweeted), creating an almost endless cycle of reporting. In addition, some social media and network news was biased even before it was disseminated. This leads us to the question, was the message fact or fiction to begin with, and who wrote it?

Determining Fact or Fiction In social media communications, and in some major news channels, the initial dissemination of the message was already biased. One well reported example of this was the infamous “palm tree incident” in Madison during the height of the protests. On March 1, 2011 on the Fox News “Bill O’Reilly Show”, FOX reporter Mike Tobin provided a live broadcast from the state capitol. O’Reilly asks “Can you break the crowd down, how many are professional left-wingers, and how many are just regular folks?” Tobin responds, “It’s hard to tell…in the weekend you get a lot of

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out of towners …a lot are bussed in not just from Wisconsin but a lot of surrounding states.” At that moment, the report cuts to footage of protesters pushing and shoving, and finger pointing. If you look closely at the footage, you see palm trees in the background. [http://youtu.be/jOqBpsh94xQ] Of course Wisconsin does not have palm trees, particularly in March (Figure 7). Bloggers and Twitter authors were quick to point this out, along with analysis of videos posted on YouTube. Many individuals expressed surprise that this would occur on a global news network like Fox. Later at a University of Wisconsin media panel discussion, David Tabacoff, FOX Senior Executive Producer spoke about the incident. In a quote by the Wisconsin Badger Herald Tabacoff stated, “That was in fact an error piece of video that was run over a series of discussions regarding trouble in a number of areas. I just think that [the accusations] are a cheap shot,” Tabacoff said. “Every shot in Wisconsin was labeled as Wisconsin.” In the end if a viewer proactively checks sources and attribution, they may well be able to see through fact or fiction. In this situation, the “palm tree incident” provided a great deal of humorous material for the progressive liberal movement against the Governor. As a side note, the palm tree provided additional fodder for Wisconsin. At protests and recall Walker petition stations, you could typically see some inflatable palm trees, not far behind. Palm tree photos invariably appeared throughout the year on blogs and tweets.

Analytics Provides Insights into the Audience We discovered that analytical measures of the reach and popularity of the social media was extremely important. Analytics within YouTube provides a wealth of information. In tracking the Madison March 12th video, the gender breakdown over the last year was evenly split between male and female, with the dominant age group being 45-54 years old. The top countries viewing the

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video were the United States, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia. According to the analytics found in Figure 8, over the past 365 days, 66% watched the video on the YouTube watch page, with the other 21% views being watched with embedded players on other sites. Knowing your audience and their viewing habits helps to precisely target your message to the appropriate groups, and analytics helps to show you if you have been successful. What we learned is that the Wisconsin Experience was truly a global experience, 24 hours a day.

WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED, WHERE DO WE GO? Social media is a complex set of tools and strategies that can disseminate and re-disseminate a wide array of messages, media, and comments. The use of social media is not limited to the 18-24 aged adults, but rather extends to a fairly broad range of people. There is great certainty that social media can mobilize “the base” and this mobilization of thought can extend to other media channels and other issues. The political events that occurred in Wisconsin spilled over to the Occupy Wall Street movement, and resurfaced

Figure 8. Example of YouTube Analytics

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again when union-based issues cropped up in the states of Ohio and Indiana. Much of the social media created for this project was reported in the national media, blogs, and Twitter feeds. Footage from the Madison protests was frequently played on the Rachel Maddow Show (Figure 9) and the Ed Show on MSNBC. Once the CNN iReport is vetted, it could be found on social media outlets worldwide. Viewership on the iReport extended to well over 300,000 viewers. While the speed of disseminating information via social media can be a great advantage, this advantage can become its greatest handicap. With speed comes the danger of disseminating falsehoods or narratives with little or no attribution to the author. In a world of fast-paced communications, the public may be less inclined to spend the necessary time to check accuracy or details of the information. And, if we already have pre-existing biases on a specific topic, we may exacerbate the problem by only reading social media that reinforces what we already believe.

Our challenge may be to effectively educate the public about the incredible potential of social media, and to harness its power by explaining the caveats of its inappropriate use. Through additional research, we may gain a better understanding of the proper use of social media, and to be ever aware of its abuses. Using social media to create relevant curriculum for more engaged teaching and learning can be an important and critical first step.

CONCLUSION The jury is not yet in on whether the use of various social media over the Internet has increased public awareness of political events and issues, whether political participation has indeed increased as a result of the ubiquity of social media resources. One conclusion that can be drawn is that indeed there is a prevalence of reliance on a different source of information from the traditional print and broadcast media sources. What the presence of the Internet has done is broaden or widen the

Figure 9. Footage from March 12, 2012 Madison protest appears on the Rachel Maddow Show on MSNBC (Screencapture used with permission from NBC Universal)

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public’s choices in terms of what they can rely on for information. Social media may not yet have increased political participation but it has certainly changed the nature of the way we access material, the way we communicate politically with those who have the power to bring about societal change and the way “politics as usual” is evolving. Likewise, social media has changed the nature of political movements and the way interest groups have mobilized people and resources to bring about the achievement of goals. Such has been shown by the movements from the Arab awakening leading to the Arab spring in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain. What was happening in the Arab world was being reflected in Wisconsin and vice-versa albeit with entirely different motivations, consequences, and outcomes. All of such movements show the power of collective action as spurred by some kind of social media reliance. What form political participation through social movements will evolve into in the future is still neither definite nor clear. Thus, there is a need to be mindful of the existence of some kind of relationship between social media and political movement participation and know that it has spurred much attention and research. It is indeed a budding field of study that many have gone into in search of answers and which many of the chapters in this anthology have been a part of.

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Chong, D. (1991). Collective action and the civil rights movement. University of Chicago Press. Conant, J. K. (2006). Wisconsin Politics and Government: America’s Laboratory of Democracy. University of Nebraska Press. Coyne, R. (2009). Interpretative communities as decisive agents: on pervasive digital technologies. Architectural Research Quarterly, 13(2), 127–132. doi:10.1017/S1359135509990212 Cummings, S., Heeks, R., & Huysman, M. (2006). Knowledge and learning in online networks in development: a social-capital perspective. Development in Practice, 16(6), 570–586. doi:10.1080/09614520600958215 Davey, M. (2011, July 12). It’s a Season of Recalls for Voters in Wisconsin. The New York Times. ECAR National Study of Undergraduate Students and Information Technology. (2011). 2011 Report. ECAR. Elazar, D. J. (1972). American Federalism: A view from the states. Thomas Y. Crowell. Fahmi, W. S. (2009). Bloggers’ street movement and the right to the city: (Re)claiming Cairo’s real and virtual spaces of freedom. Environment and Urbanization, 21(1), 89–107. doi:10.1177/0956247809103006 Gladwell, M. (2010). Small change: Why the revolution will not be tweeted. The New Yorker. Retrieved from http://www.newyorker.com/ reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell Greenhouse, S. (2011, January 4). Strained states turning to laws to curb unions. The New York Times. Gruber, J. (2007). Public finance and public policy (2nd ed.). Worth Publishers. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243–1248. doi:10.1126/ science.162.3859.1243 PMID:5699198

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Haythornthwaite, C., & Kendell, L. (2011). Internet and community. The American Behavioral Scientist, 53(8), 1083–1094. doi:10.1177/0002764209356242 Hopkins, L., & Thomas, J. (2002). E-Social capital: Building community through online networks. In Proceedings: Electronic Networking 2002 – Building Community. Refereed Stream. Retrieved from http://researchbank.swinburne.edu.au/vital/ access/services/Download/swin:4126/SOURCE1 Jorstad, A. (n.d.). The Learning Space. Retrieved from www.jjorstad.blogspot.com Knobloch-Westerwick, M. (2009, June). Looking the Other Way: Selective Exposure to Attitude-Consistent and Counter attitudinal Political Information. Communication Research. doi:10.1177/0093650209333030 Krugman, P. (2011, February 21). Wisconsin Power Play. The New York Times. Levenducky, M. S. (2011). Do Partisan Media Polarize Voters? Paper presented at the 4th Annual CEES-NYU Experimental Political Science Conference. New York, NY. Lin, M. (2001). Social capital. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511815447 Manrique, C., & Manrique, G. (2012, January). Leveraging Learning Resources: Social Networking, Online Teaching Utilities, Digital Media and the Modern Classroom Experience. International Journal of Arts and Sciences. Miller, G. (1992). Managerial dilemmas: The political economy of hierarchy. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139173742 Olsen, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press. Olsen, M. (1982). The logic. In Readings in Public Sector Economics (pp. 193–206). D.C. Heath and Company.

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Oppel, R. A. (2011, February 26). Wisconsin Assembly Passes Anti-Union Bill as Democrats Stay Away. The New York Times. Ostrom, E. (2010). Analyzing collective action. Agricultural Economics, 41(1), 155–166. doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2010.00497.x Pasek, J., More, E., & Romer, D. (2009). Realizing the Social Internet? Online Social Networking Meets Offline Civic Engagement. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 6, 197–215. doi:10.1080/19331680902996403 Prior, M. (2007). Post-Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality in Political 2007 Involvement and Polarizes Elections. Cambridge University Press. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. Simon & Schuster. doi:10.1145/358916.361990 Rahimi, B. (2003). Cyberdissent: the Internet in revolutionary Iran. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 7(3), 101–116. Sandler, T. (2004). Global collective action. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/ CBO9780511617119 Sautter, J., Littvay, L., & Bearnes, B. (2007). A dual-edged sword: Empathy and collective action in the prisoner’s dilemma. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 614(1), 154–171. doi:10.1177/0002716207306360 Scheufele, D.A., & Nisbet, M.C. (in press). Online News and the Demise of Political Disagreement. Communication Yearbook, 36. Segerberg, A., & Bennet, W. L. (2011). Digital media and the personalization of collective action. Information Communication and Society, 14(6), 770–799. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2011.579141

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Smith, A., Schlozman, K.L., Verba, S., & Brady, H. (2009). The Internet and Civic Engagement. Pew Internet and American Life Project. Retrieved from pewinternet.org Sulsberger, A. G. (2011, February 22). In Wisconsin, Back to Work in the Senate, Minus a Party. The New York Times. Talking Points Memo. (n.d.). Retrieved from http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOqBpsh94xQ Tarrow, S. (1998). Fishnets, internets, and catnets. In Challenging Authority: The History of Contentious Politics. Regents of the University of Minnesota. Uslaner, E. M. (2004). Trust, Civic Engagement, and the Internet. Political Communication, 223– 242. doi:10.1080/10584600490443895 Weimer, D. L., & Vining, A. R. (2011). Policy analysis (5th ed.). Longman. Economist. (2011, February 24). Wisconsin and Wider: A Dispute in One Cold State is having Repercussions in Others. The Economist. Zheng, Y., & Wu, G. (2005). Information technology, publics, and collective action in China. Comparative Political Studies, 38(5), 507–536. doi:10.1177/0010414004273505

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Collective Bargaining: The process of negotiating rights or agreements between employees and management. These negotiations can focus on such issues as worker rights, pay, benefits, or working conditions. The negotiations can eventually take the form of a labor contract. Employees are typically represented by a union which can negotiate on behalf of a single employee or the entire union group. Labor Unions: A group of employees who organize legally to recognize and support worker rights which may include disputes over collective

bargaining, wages, worker benefits and work place conditions. Labor unions also have historically been involved in lobbying activities at the state and national level. Progressive Reform: A form of social activism and political reform historically known for exposing corruption, reforming local government, public education and services. Progressive philosophy typically is tied to the rights of the middle class, and the empowerment of citizens to participate and become more actively and directly involved in the political process. Recall: The process of removing elected officials from office through a special election. Recalls are typically begun through a citizen signed petition, which if enough signatures are obtained, an election can be held as provided by a constitution or statue. Smart Mobs: Refer to a group of individuals who behave in an intelligent fashion and grow into a large collective through social network tools and engagement. Social Media: The process of sharing electronic communications on-line by individuals and groups through common tools such as Facebook ™, Twitter ™, YouTube ™, Pinterest ™, blogging, and others which are typically referred to as Web 2.0 technologies. Tweetdeck ™: A social media tool owned by Twitter which allows the end users to monitor multiple Twitter streams for reference or analysis in tracking worldwide trends, information, and events. Vetting (iReporting): A process employed by CNN iReport producers whereby the veracity of a digital story or user-generated content uploaded by a citizen journalist is reviewed. Producers check to ensure a story’s factual information is correct, and to confirm who took the video or photographs. The vetting process helps to ensure the digital story is the actual work of the iReporter and that the reporter can vouch for the accuracy of the information provided.

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Chapter 13

The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse G. R. Boynton University of Iowa, USA Glenn W. Richardson, Jr. Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, USA

ABSTRACT This chapter is a report about negotiating the boundaries of appropriate political discourse via Twitter. The instance looked at in depth is the communication about the shooting of Representative Giffords in 2011. The first month over 400,000 messages referred to Giffords and substantially more referred to the controversy about the campaign rhetoric of targets and reloading. The authors tracked the communication in 6 ongoing collections of streams of messages and 2 that resulted from the shooting and controversy. One stream was about how “terrorist” was used in characterizing the shooter. The major controversy was about the use of targeting or gun references in campaign rhetoric. Palin released a video using the phrase “blood libel” leading to opposing interpretations of the appropriate use of the term. The authors look in less depth at the controversy in early 2012 about Rush Limbaugh’s characterization of a student who testified to a committee of the House of Representatives. That controversy reinforced points found in the communication about the Giffords shooting. It also reminds us that the boundaries of appropriate political rhetoric are continuously negotiated in a free speech society and that there is now a new domain for the negotiation in the new media. The threat was manifest: • • •

A target planted immediately overhead. A slogan: don’t retreat, reload. Support for an opponent who had campaign events at a rifle range for M16 practice.

And on January 8, 2011 Representative Giffords was meeting constituents in a public space when a gunman opened fire killing 6 and wounding

13. Representative Giffords was shot in the head, and while she did not die her recovery was long. This is not the first attempted political assassination in our history. The best known are Lincoln, the Kennedy brothers, Martin Luther King, and Ronald Reagan. But there were two ways this event was different from its predecessors. This is the first attempted political assassination in the U.S. in the new social media communication era. Twitter and Facebook allow persons to

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch013

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

 The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse

express their thoughts and concerns publicly in a way that has not been possible before. And they were very busy doing that. Collecting Twitter messages that included Giffords name did not start until several hours after the shooting. The 50,000 messages collected on January 8 gives a substantial underestimate of the volume of messages about Giffords that day. There were 98,000 messages the second day, 57,000 the third day, 33,000 the fourth and fifth days, and it declined from there. Between January 8 and the end of the month there were more than 430,000 messages containing Giffords’ name (Figure 1). We have never had a record of personal concern like this to examine. The event is also unusual in having a leading political figure who could be associated with the threat -- Sarah Palin. She had affixed the target to the map of Representative Giffords’ district, it was her slogan, and she supported Representative Giffords’ opponent. Understanding that association was another facet of the communication about this event. The messages are rife with claims about what should and should not be considered threat and what consequence one should attribute to the

threat. Here we have a massive public discussion about threat in the rhetoric of political practice. We will describe the flow of messages prompted by the shooting in considerable detail. But the importance of this episode in American history is best understood when contrasted with political communication in other countries. Governments around the world feel free to regulate speech including ‘speech’ that uses internet resources. China claims their regulation of the internet is a matter of sovereignty (Tan 5/20/2011). And they use that sovereign authority to close down websites by the millions (Fox 7/13/2011). And famously they have a whole dictionary of words and phrases that may not appear on their internet. (Russell 3/12/2012) China is not unique, of course. Iran prepares its own internet to be able to exercise complete control over what is uttered there (Messieh 7/25/2011). India wants web companies to “self-censor” if they want to provide internet services in India (Eldon 12/5/2011). A Syrian blogger is arrested and charged with “weakening national sentiment.” (Messieh 12/12/2011) And the listing could go on and on.

Figure 1. Number of Twitter messages containing Giffords name: January 8 to January 30

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Regulating speech is more difficult in a nation founded on the principle of free speech, however. The U.S. government does regulate speech. Companies can claim that their product will cure what ails you only after proving it will; commercial speech may be regulated. There are struggles with hate speech (Marlin-Bennett 2012). But political speech is very difficult given the first amendment to the constitution. The boundaries are largely constituted culturally. They are what people say and what people do not say. But there are occasions when the boundaries become a matter of contention. An event prompts reflection on the culturally constituted boundaries. This was one of those times. And for the first time the articulation of what a person thinks is appropriate and inappropriate was available to almost everyone. With Twitter one speaks to the world. There is no guarantee that the world is listening. But in this case the flow of messages was clearly full of responding to others. People were listening and responding. The analysis examines what they had to say and how they said it when given the opportunity. When we have completed the analysis of this event we compare it to two other incidents that reinforce some of what is found by examining the communication about the Giffords shooting.

already found. For these searches the program was run twenty-four hours a day. The streams of messages is the complete collection of messages with the exception of an occasional computer glitch which had a trivial impact on the total in the stream. This is the population. Hence, tests of significance that are designed to indicate how similar a sample would be to the population are not relevant. Twitter will supply at most 1,500 messages per search request. One consequence of that restriction is the difficulty of getting the first messages of a stream that starts suddenly. If you were not ‘there’ you cannot retrieve messages before the most recent 1,500. In this case the collection of messages containing Giffords does not start until several hours after the shooting. However, the gap in that stream is partially offset by drawing on the five ongoing collections. Those collections were already in operation at the time of the shooting and can be drawn on for an analysis of the first hours. The analysis is twofold. We look at the streams to see how they increase and decrease in time and how the content changes over time. We also look more specifically at the way the language of threat is used in the messages.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

It was a few messages the first thirty minutes, and then it burst into an explosion of concern for the member of Congress and for what this act meant for our political system. Our collection of Twitter messages did not begin immediately, but these five streams of messages were being collected and they contain 76,000 messages between 11:00 and 3:45 MST on January 8. Shown in Table 1 are the messages that were collected by searching Twitter for messages containing #p2 or #teaparty or Palin or terrorism or 9/11 at five minute intervals. Almost immediately there were messages about Giffords being shot. These five were the first messages mentioning the shooting in each

Seven streams of Twitter messages are used in the paper. The searches for #p2, #teaparty, Palin, terrorism, and 9/11 are ongoing searches. The two streams that were collected specifically for this research were searches for “Giffords” and “blood libel.” The Twitter messages were collected by searching the Twitter data base using Archivist, which is a program running on Windows computers. You give it a search term, such as Giffords, and every five minutes it searches the Twitter data base and adds new messages to the file of messages it has

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THE FIRST HOURS

 The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse

Table 1. Collection of Twitter messages containing #p2 or #teaparty or Palin or terrorism or 9/11 at five minute intervals #p2

11:07

MT @JonJustice: CD8 Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords has been shot at the Safeway Area closed, no word on condition. #tcot #p2

#teaparty

11:17

Democratic CongressWoman Giffords shot in AZ

Palin

11:25

Gabrielle Giffords was on Palin’s infamous “target” map: http://usat.ly/e4NSjp

terrorism

11:35

Horrified that Gabrielle Giffords was shot. But not surprised something like this has happened

9/11

12:29

RIP Rep. Giffords. I haven’t been this frightened by a news story since 9/11. We need to learn from this.

stream. Congresswoman Giffords has been shot; no word on condition. CongressWoman Giffords shot in AZ. Horrified Giffords was shot but not suprised. RIP Giffords. The first sentences set the themes for the first hours. In those first hours onethird of the Twitter messages included Giffords’ name, but virtually all were about the shooting and its repercussions. Because of the way we collected messages in the first hours there is less information about Giffords and the others who were shot than might be expected. The messages above were the first messages reporting the shooting. At about 12:00 MST NPR reported that Giffords was dead, and that news was repeated over and over in the communication. Loughner was not identified until 2:00 MST. But the focus was not on who in these streams. Instead it was on how to understand the event. In the #p2, the progressive hashtag, stream the first messages were • • •

919 Giffords shot. 479 Giffords assassinated. 127 Giffords shot; what is US turning into?

Almost immediately the word went out; Giffords was shot was included in 919 Twitter messages. The language became harsher when it became Giffords assassinated. And then the joining of the threat, the shooting and the consequences for American politics.

RT @tcmassie: Rep. Giffords was on #Palin’s infamous “target” map: http://usat.ly/e4NSjp Today she was shot in Tuscon. What is the US turning into? #p2 The move immediately is from threat to personal tragedy and then to what politics in the US is becoming. The stream identified by searching for Palin is full of references to the threat. Crosshairs was mentioned 6927 times. Target was included in 10,566 messages. And don’t retreat, reload was in 1886 messages. The conclusion drawn was: RT @mrdaveyd: @mendocoaster Remember Palin’s bullseye map? Congreswmn Giffords was on it. thr R real consequences 2 their words & actions? There are real consequences to their words and actions -- when you expand the Twitter-ese. The conclusion that the people using this language should understand that there are real consequences was mentioned 450 times in this stream and it was mentioned 221 times in the #teaparty stream. The accusatory way to make this point was: RT @markos: If Palin’s crosshair effort was excusable, why has her PAC scrubbed her site of that page? #tcot #teaparty #sgp

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If, after this shooting, they did not think there was something wrong with what they had done why were they taking down the web pages that carried the target and list of targeted members of Congress? The standard phrase was some version of “scrub” that appeared 683 times in the Palin stream and 206 times in the #teaparty stream. Terrorism has been the most important societal threat since the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and became more fully central in the collective psyche with 9/11. The first messages in the stream found by searching for terrorism identify the shooting with terrorism; “this is terrorism” is included in 2897 statements and this is what “terrorism looks like” is included in another 389 messages. Or: RT @DanteAtkins: Gabrielle Giffords was not “shot”. She was assassinated in an act of domestic terrorism. This is domestic terrorism was included in 1128 messages. Then CNN announced that it was not the act of a terrorist, and that unleashed a flood of messages criticizing their understanding of what it takes to be terrorism: CNN: “There is nothing to indicate this is terrorism.” NEWS FLASH! Political murderers are terrorists even if they’re white #p2 CNN says rep giffords shooting “was not terrorism”. translation: shooter was not a muslim. #doublestandards Several thousand times the point was made that CNN, and the society, were identifying terrorism only with Muslims. If he is white it cannot be terrorism. If he is not a Muslim it cannot be terrorism. The stream identified by searching for 9/11 continues this point with “blame all.”

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RT @davidsirota: Question for conservatives who blame all Muslims for 9/11: Should we blame all conservatives for Giffords attack if attacker is Tea Partier? Blaming all Muslims for 9/11 is as appropriate as blaming all conservatives for the shooting of Giffords if the attacker is a Tea Partier. In the first hours 76,000 messages were captured. One-third mentioned Giffords. After the first thirty minutes they were virtually all about the shooting. They set the themes that would dominate for the next several days: the language of threat and the consequences that follow when this language becomes the language of politics, and the identification of this language and action with terrorism.

THE STREAMS Three streams of Twitter messages are important for the analysis. They are the stream of messages that contains Giffords, the stream that contains Palin and the stream that was found by searching for blood libel. Figure 2 plots the number of Twitter messages containing Giffords and Palin by date. The Giffords timeline starts at about 50,000 the eighth of January, climbs to almost 100,000 the ninth, and then declines to five to six hundred by the end of the month. It is 50,000 the first day because the search did not start for three hours after the shooting. The Palin stream starts at close to 100,000 on the 8th, declines until the 12th when it spikes back up to almost 100,000, and then declines to around 10,000 messages a day by the end of the month. The spike on the 12th results from comment about the video she released that day in which she used blood libel to characterize the action of her critics.

 The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse

Figure 2. Number of Twitter messages containing Giffords and Palin by date

Some Twitter messages contained both Giffords and Palin. The central column in Table 2 gives the number of overlaps for each day. That shows how the streams converge and diverge. There is a roughly ten percent overlap the first five days. The two streams are increasing and decreasing in somewhat different ways, but the overlap is much more substantial than it becomes at the end of the month. At the end of the month the streams of messages have diverged with little reference to each other. The blood libel stream does not start until Palin’s video on the 12th of January (Table 3). The first day there were almost 17,000 Twitter messages containing blood libel, and 11,000 contained both Palin and blood libel. The blood libel stream is small relative to the Palin stream, and it decreases much more over time. However, the proportion of messages containing blood libel that also contain Palin does not change even as the number of messages decreases.

Beginning on January 8 the Giffords and Palin streams of Twitter messages overlapped substantially. Over time they diverged, and by the end of the month there was almost no Palin in the Giffords stream and no Giffords in the Palin stream. The blood libel stream was largely a substream of the Palin stream. But blood libel went away over time and the Palin stream continued without reference to either Giffords or blood libel.

The Giffords Stream Between January 8 and the end of the month 430,000 Twitter messages were found containing the name of Representative Giffords. The first days saw a flood of messages, the flow decreased rather quickly from 100,000 on the 9th to 500 at the end of the month. While our focus is on the language of threat used in these messages we also want to examine the total communication stream in which the language of threat is immersed. How the language of threat fits into and is embodied

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Table 2. Overlap between Giffords and Palin streams Date

Giffords

Giffords-Palin

Palin

1/8/2011

49806

7790

92831

1/9/2011

98069

13465

66790

1/10/2011

56884

5308

49809

1/11/2011

32976

2198

34489

1/12/2011

33043

4527

98872

1/13/2011

21098

1055

45090

1/14/2011

9862

392

21625

1/15/2011

9550

206

11138

1/16/2011

10949

297

8826

1/17/2011

11306

414

18401

1/18/2011

8163

245

23992

1/19/2011

15707

188

17844

1/20/2011

13329

111

14506

1/21/2011

18461

86

16132

1/22/2011

7266

65

10646

1/23/2011

5125

48

6423

1/24/2011

4575

136

10756

1/25/2011

8319

68

12840

1/26/2011

9296

24

10151

1/27/2011

2235

41

19409

1/28/2011

612

38

18792

1/29/2011

517

20

8949

1/30/2011

1118

7

8180

1/31/2011

558

32

11785

in communication can be more easily examined using these messages than is often the case. What were people writing in their Twitter messages? We ask, who are the people identified in messages? What was the ‘news’ about the event and what happened in the next weeks? And what was the argument about blame for the shooting and what this meant for the rhetoric of American politics? We developed a coding scheme to help answer the three questions, and we used QDA Miner to code the Twitter messages for analysis. Twitter messages often included more than one of these

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categories of information. Representative Giffords was shot both identifies the person as a member of the House of Representatives and reports the news that she was shot. So the numbers used here are the number of instances of each of the codes. They are not the number of Twitter messages in which they appear. At the most general we are interested in who is identified, the news reporting in the messages, and assigning blame for the shooting. At this level of abstraction the occurrence of identification and news reporting are almost equal with 438,574 instances of identification and 431,358 instances of news reporting. Assigning blame was just over half of those numbers at 238,620 instances. Because the total number of messages per day drops quite sharply over time the same is true for the codings. There are many more instances of each of the codes the first few days than is the case toward the end of the month. However, one can look at the relative incidence of the coded materials over time. In Figure 3 the top set is news reporting, the middle set is identity, and the bottom is assign blame. Initially the three are almost equal. Assigning blame is 30% on the second day, identity is 40%, which adds up to 70%, and news reporting is 30%. Over time assigning blame decreases relative to the other two. Identity is somewhat greater than news reporting, and that is more pronounced toward the end of the month than earlier. Over time assigning blame decreases and identity increases as a proportion of the total coding assignments. Who? The twitter messaging was national and international. Representative Giffords was not a well known figure nationally nor internationally. The other people involved were even less well known. A first act in this kind of situation is to find out who. So tens of thousands of messages identify the people involved in this shooting. Giffords, of course, but in addition her staff person Daniel Hernandez, Mark Kelly, a local judge, the sheriff, Christina and Loughner. On the 9th, for example, Giffords was identified 64,504 times;

 The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse

Table 3. Messages containing Palin, blood libel, and overlap Date

Palin

Blood Libel

Overlap

1/12/2011

98872

16972

11232

1/13/2011

45090

8789

6018

1/14/2011

21625

2579

1712

1/15/2011

11138

1044

646

1/16/2011

8826

670

376

1/17/2011

18401

2055

1624

1/18/2011

23992

2970

2649

1/19/2011

17844

795

414

1/20/2011

14506

329

163

1/21/2011

16132

252

176

1/22/2011

10646

125

98

1/23/2011

6423

114

80

1/24/2011

10756

82

60

1/25/2011

12840

119

50

1/26/2011

10151

55

34

1/27/2011

19409

103

37

1/28/2011

18792

45

22

1/29/2011

8949

46

64

1/30/2011

8180

31

13

1/31/2011

11785

23

13

her first name Gabrielle, Gabby and Gaby were used 34,500 times. That she was a Representative was mentioned 18 thousand times. She is married, and her husband is the astronaut Mark Kelly, which was mentioned 2300 times. On the same day Daniel Hernandez was identified as a member of her congressional staff who had been at the meeting and was killed attempting to save the lives of others; he was mentioned 10,000 times. The judge who was killed was identified 600 times. Christiana was a young girl who was born on 9/11 and had been featured as one of the persons who came into the world on the same day that so many were departing. She was identified 6,700 times on that day. And Loughner/shooter was identified 9,800 times.

The news was twofold. There was news about the shooting, and there was news about Giffords health. The first three days the two were about equally present in the Twitter messages at 20,000 the 8th, 33,000 the 9th and 17,000 the 10th. After that the shooting was ‘old news’ and it dropped quickly to a very modest number of communications. The news about Giffords health continued to be communicated more frequently. For the entire period the ratio was just over to two to one with total mentions of 239,455 and 110,960. The reporting about Giffords health condition was much more detailed than the news about the shooting. First, she was taken to the hospital. She was reported dead by NPR. She was also reported to be talking to her husband, which was also false. Doctors were mentioned. Her condition was clarified. As she improved her movements were reported. It was a daily report on her condition with new details almost every day. It is in this context of identifying the persons and news about the shooting and the health condition of Giffords that discussion of how this happened and who was to blame took place. If you were following the Giffords story, as many tens of thousands were, you encountered all of the strands of the story. As a general category we called it assigning blame, but it was really quite detailed with a highly differentiated set of claims about what and how and who. Who’s to blame? First, Palin -- 10,000 on the 8th, 20,000 on the 9th, 7,000 on the 10th, 2,800 on the 11th, and 5,700 on the 12th. After the 12th the number of times blame is assigned to Palin drops to the hundreds and toward the end of the month to the teens. Who’s to blame? Second, Loughner, though he never reaches the ‘credit’ that Palin does. If you compare the totals for the entire period Palin is assigned blame 50,691 times and Loughner only 32,399 times. Loughner pulled the trigger. What is the language that allocates blame to Palin? It is the threat in her campaign against Democratic candidates in

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 The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse

Figure 3.

the 2010 election. It is the crosshairs. It is the target. It is the district that is targeted. It is the rhetoric of hate, and violence that is inciting violence. It is the consequence of that rhetoric in political contests that promotes strange individuals to act, to kill. It is the theme that was present in the very first hours that is carried forward in Twitter message after Twitter message. Messages that number in the tens of thousands in only a few days indicting Palin for her political rhetoric. And then she responds.

Blood Libel After being pummeled for four days she responded by posting a video on her Facebook page on January 12. There were nearly 17,000 Twitter messages mentioning blood libel that day (Figure 4).

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The message stream drops precipitously after two or three days, with a spike in message volume on January 17 and 18, after Palin defended herself on FOX News the evening of January 16.

The Blood Libel Stream: Who Sarah Palin’s use of the term “blood libel” in a Facebook posting on January 12, 2011 (defending herself against the charge that her overheated and violent rhetoric had contributed to the shooting rampage in Tucson, Arizona) created a flash flood of messages on Twitter. By February 4, 2011, some 21,593 usernames had sent a total of 35,940 tweets including the phrase “blood libel.” The most prolific tweeter went by the username “bloodlibel,” and posted 544 messages, fully 1.5 percent of all tweets including the words

 The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse

Figure 4. Blood libel messages on Twitter January 12-February 3, 2011

“blood libel.” The next most prolific contributor was “SarahStormRpt,” posting 127 messages (.3 percent of the total) including “blood libel.” Only 10 users posted more than 50 messages; 291 users posted 10 or more messages. Of the total of more than 21,000 tweets, 5516 posted two or more messages; 16, 077 users (nearly 75 percent of the total) posted but a single message including the words “blood libel.” While there were a huge number of users tweeting, 40.5 percent of the postings (16,615 messages) were “re-tweets,” where one user essentially “forwarded” the tweet of another user. Better than 50 percent of all tweets in the stream (21,016 messages) included an http link. Let us now turn to a closer examination of the substantive content of the blood libel message stream.

The Blood Libel Stream: What The vast majority of messages were focused on blame (including words like “Palin,” “Loughner,” “provocation,” “perpetrator,” and “rhetoric”) (see Figure 5). Typically over the course of this message stream, the next largest category of messages involve news reporting. Messages including words of identity (including “Giffords,” “Judge,” and “Taylor Green”) are, on most days, next most common. Words of argument or division, while typically least common among the four categories, do rise on occasion as a percentage of all mes-

sages, including a spike on Sunday, January 23, a point by which mainstream media coverage had solidified and Palin’s responses had come under widespread criticism including from some in her own party (see for example Washington 2011; Mann 2011). Note, however, the sharp rise in proPalin language on January 23 and 24 (Figure 6). While there are some serious limitations to substantive analysis of tens of thousands of data points, we can drill deeper into the essence of the stream of twitter messages including the phrase blood libel by using content analysis software to identify the most commonly appearing phrases. On the first day of the stream (January 12) there were in excess of 15,000 messages. Because often repeated phrases may differ slightly, several separate entries may in fact represent the same phrase being repeated. A cursory examination of the most commonly appearing phrases indicate that most of the messages frequently re-tweeted were critical of Sarah Palin. The most repeated tweet appears to be the following: “When asked to use ‘blood libel’ in a sentence, Palin said, ‘when you hunt a moose, blood libel to pour out of it.” That message, originally posted by BorowitzReport, appeared in at least 5.3 percent of cases on January 12. The next most commonly appearing phrases occurred in fewer than 1.5 percent of cases. They include “Palin need better advice before she issues statements” (1.4 percent of cases), “Sorry in advance for whatever Sarah Palin has to say about

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 The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse

Figure 5. Focus of blood libel messages January 12-February 4, 2011

Figure 6. Pro-Palin messages as a percent of all blood libel messages on Twitter January 12-February 4, 2011

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 The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse

MLK Day” (1.3 percent of cases), “Pat Buchanan calls Palin’s blood libel remark ‘excellent.’ That’s like getting a dog show blue ribbon from Michael Vick” (1 percent of cases), and “Calling bad press a blood libel is like calling a rough day at work the holocaust” (.8 percent of cases). At least one fairly common re-tweet was supportive of Sarah Palin. The user “RabbiShmuley” posted “sarah palin or any person falsely accused of being accessory 2 murder has right to call it ‘blood libel.’ Not reserved only 4 accusing jews.” On January 13, the second day of the blood libel stream, the number of pro-Palin messages as a share of the total stream appears to increase. While the most commonly re-tweeted message continued to be BorowitzReport’s moose tweet (1.9 percent of cases), the next most commonly appearing phrase was “Palin is right about blood libel” appearing in 1.3 percent of cases. In order, the next most common re-tweets include “why Sarah Palin used the term blood libel” (1.0 percent of cases), “Term ‘blood libel’ used on MSNBC in 2000 in Reference to Bush, In 2006 to Kerry Without Objection by Network Hosts” (.8 percent of cases), “Top 10 Reasons to Stop the Blood Libel Schmear Campaign against Honorary Jew Sarah Palin … ” (.8 percent of cases). The most commonly appearing phrases on January 14 also suggest a trend toward messages more supportive of Palin, though the most commonly re-tweeted message included an html link to a blog from The Economist magazine website (appearing in just over 2 percent of cases). On January 15, the top tweet read, “the same people who have a problem with the term ‘blood libel’ also have a problem with ‘In God We Trust.’ Take it for what its worth” (1.6 percent of cases). Other top tweets also were pro-Palin, including “@SpeakerBoehner I would ask you not to go soft on the Left after their attempted blood libel this week. Go on offense and let them have it” (.6 percent of cases). On January 16, the top tweet was “Sharpton is a real practitioner of violent speech and blood libel” (2.8 percent of cases). The tweet “apologizing in advance for whatever Sarah Palin has to say

about MLK Day” re-appeared among the most commonly re-tweeted messages (.9 percent). On January 17, the day after Palin’s FOX News interview, the most commonly re-tweeted message was “Gave a toast at my friend’s wedding last night. ‘Blood libel’ line did not get the laugh I was hoping for” (5.0 percent of cases). The next most commonly re-tweeted messages were supportive of Palin, including “Palin says her use of ‘blood libel’ after Tucson was appropriate and that she knows the history of the term with Jews” (3.4 percent of cases). Over the next several days, the pattern persists. The volume of the message stream declines, and over time, the share of proPalin messages rises.

The Blood Libel Stream: Where Of all messages in the blood libel stream, 24.4 percent included a hashtag (the # symbol followed by a name or topic of interest). The hashtag that appeared most frequently was “TCOT” (Top Conservatives on Twitter), which constituted 12.2 percent of hashtags. Next most common was “P2,” a progressive counterpart to TCOT comprising 8.9 percent of hashtags. Table 4 documents the 30 most frequently appearing hashtags over the life of the stream. Roughly 50 percent of all hashtags referred to the top twelve hashtags. Figure 7 charts the top seven hashtags overall by date over the life of the blood libel stream. Figure 7 indicates that in general, hashtag references tend to track a similar arc. Notably, however, the hashtag “quotethatmovie” bursts like a supernova only to disappear completely; these tweets do not appear to be related to Sarah Palin’s Facebook posting but were included in the stream because they also included the hashtags “#blood” and/or “#libel.” It is perhaps significant to note the divergent trends in #TCOT and #P2 use during the second day of the stream. This appears to underscore the rally effect for Palin following her remarks.

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 The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse

Table 4. 30 most frequently appearing hashtags over the life of the blood libel stream

The Blood Libel Stream: Why? It is hard to review the blood libel twitter stream and not suspect that it represented a conscious effort on the part of the former Alaska Governor and 2008 GOP vice-presidential nominee. One portrait readily sketched is consistent with the victimization narrative of Sarah Palin, and it reveals the dramatic impact the FOX News pundit’s words had. Division, in short, appeared to suit Palin, as it fired her supporters and reinforced her status as victim at the hands of what she frequently refers to as the “lamestream media.” Another Palin pattern is hard to ignore: spotlight stealing. Palin managed to draw prominent

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media attention on the days putative rivals Mitt Romney and Michelle Bachmann announced their presidential campaigns.

ONE YEAR LATER One year later, March of 2012, American politics was again embroiled in controversy over language appropriate for political discourse. Sandra Fluke, a law school student, testified to a House of Representatives committee about the necessity of including contraceptives in health insurance for women. Rush Limbaugh used this as an opportunity to express his opposition to the

 The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse

Figure 7. Top hashtags by date

position she supported. And he used the grossest possible language; his most civil characterization was calling her a slut. And that produced a firestorm. Figure 8 traces the number of Twitter messages containing Limbaugh over time. Figure 8 was produced by Trendistic which tracks Twitter messaging. Even though Mr. Limbaugh is a well-known political commentator the number of messages referring to him before this incident was negligible. It is a twenty-four hour figure so there is ordinarily a high and a low for the day, which are present in this figure. On the first of March there was something like a messaging frenzy as people used Twitter to express their displeasure with what he had said. There are three points that make this a good comparison for the Giffords shooting. First, this is, as we will show, about the language. Second, as in the Giffords shooting the event that instigated the stream of messages became generalized. And third, there was his apology. The three points come together on March 4 so the Twitter messages of that day will be used in the analysis.

Like the reaction to the Giffords shooting this was a controversy about appropriate language for political discourse. Ms. Fluke testified, and Limbaugh used exceedingly crude language to give his characterization of the reasons for her stated position. Twitter messages about Limbaugh’s comments characterized them as: • • • • • • • • • •

It was an unforgivable attack (6,413 times). It was a cruel tirade (4,511 times). It was an attack on, not an argument but an attack. (3,791 times). It was misogyny (882 times). It was hateful comments (716 times). It was sexist attacks (502 times). It was beyond the bounds of decency (320 times) It was vitriol (161 times). It was despicable comments (87 times). It was “slut-shaming” that was meant to silence (51 times).

These messages did not exhaust the total messages of the day. There were also expressions of concern for the young woman, support for the 225

 The Language of Threat in our Political Discourse

Figure 8. The number of Twitter messages containing Limbaugh over time

policy that had been her testimony, and calls for Limbaugh’s advertisers to withdraw support. But it is clear from the list of phrases used repeatedly in the messages that it was the language Limbaugh used that was upsetting and the belief that it was beyond the bounds of decency and intended to silence those with a point of view different than his. One year apart there were controversies in American politics revolving around the use of language. Limbaugh and his detractors are a reminder that the problem of developing bounds for political speech is a continuing problem. It is not limited to the Giffords shooting or to Limbaugh’s foul language. Second, the entire incident became generalized. In the Giffords shooting there was an incident, a shooting. But the critique was of the language of targets that had the potential to inspire such activity anywhere in the U.S. By March 4, in this case, the attack became an attack on women. The “unforgivable attacks” were attacks on women. The “cruel tirade” was a cruel tirade against women. The “attack on” was generally an attack on Ms. Fluke or the law school student. It was not generalized. Misogyny and “hateful comments” were directed at women. Ms. Fluke was not lost in this messaging, but she now had become a symbol of attack on all women. Women are mentioned 15,931 times and Ms. Fluke only 10,276 times. And

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roughly half the messages mentioning Ms. Fluke are specifically about Limbaugh’s apology rather than being about how his language was an attack. In the communication about the Giffords shooting and in this case the incident quickly moved beyond the specific incident to become generalized to American politics. Third, Limbaugh apologized and Palin did not. Palin never acknowledged that her campaign language was inappropriate. She would not acknowledge that her language had crossed an edge that should be preserved in campaign discourse. Instead she fired back with the blood libel claim. Limbaugh, on the other hand, did apologize. And he apologized specifically for his language. “My choice of words was not the best, and in the attempt to be humorous, I created a national stir,” Limbaugh said on his website. “I sincerely apologize to Ms. Fluke for the insulting word choices.” (Elliot, 3/5/2012) The difference is less about Palin and Limbaugh than it is about the nature of their support. Limbaugh’s support was public. It was advertising, and the advertisers were necessarily public in their support of Mr. Limbaugh. A firestorm of protest against Mr. Limbaugh was enough to get his advertisers to reconsider their involvement with him and his radio programs. They were publicly exposed, and that was something they did not

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want. So, he lost at least 142 sponsors. (Legum, 3/12/2012) Palin’s supporters were not publicly exposed. So they could cheer her on without fear that there would be retribution for their support. While the incident did not enhance her reputation she was not in a position of needing to apologize to maintain support for her political work. Setting boundaries for appropriate language in political discourse is not a one time thing. It is recurring negotiation which is now more public than it has been in the past because of the new media that open public comment to everyone. But it is a political process; nothing is guaranteed.

COLLEGE SHOOTINGS The second comparison is to a study of Twitter responses to shootings on college campuses. (Heverin and Zach 2012) They studied responses to shootings at Johns Hopkins University Hospital on September 16, 2010, Middle Tennessee State University February 14, 2011, and University of Texas shooting on September 28, 2010. In many ways these are similar to the Giffords shooting. They were unexpected events. They were crisis events entailing closing down the institutions until the apparent danger was resolved. What had happened was not initially known. The offenders were apprehended within two or three hours or in Texas he had killed himself, and the researchers continued their examination of Twitter messages about the events for six hours to determine the way the communication changed over time. The question here is how the communication in those events was similar to or was not similar to the communication in the Giffords shooting. What Heverin and Zach found was that the initial communications were largely sharing information about what had happened. They found both information sharing and information negotiating communication dominated the first hours. As that information became widespread the

communication changed to expressing individual’s opinions and emotions about what happened. They suggest this pattern can be understood in terms of Dervin’s theory of sense making applied to crises and communication during crises. (Dervin 1983) What is different about the two political events is that what happened is contested through to the point at which there is no longer any communication about the event in the Giffords case. In the Giffords shooting event there was an initial search for information about the event, but the details of the shooting were not sufficient for sense making. The sense making became an argument about how Palin’s campaign rhetoric had been responsible for the shooting. One argument was that this specific event was directly tied to Palin’s rhetoric and thus was part of that larger political phenomenon. However, even during the first four days of the Giffords shooting episode there were supporters of Palin arguing that the event should not be traced to her campaign rhetoric. And her claim four days later about the blood libel ‘campaign’ was a straightforward rejection of one interpretation of what had happened. Was it an event that was part of the larger framing of campaigns? Was it an event of a mentally unstable person taking actions that had nothing to do with the Palin rhetoric? To the end it was an argument in sense making. How should this shooting be understood? The same difficulty in sense making can be seen in the response to Limbaugh’s characterizations of Ms. Fluke. One way to make sense of it was that it was an attack on women and an effort to silence them. However, Mr. Limbaugh had supporters who made sense in a very different way. It was a partisan/liberal media attack on Limbaugh. Sandra Fluke was not the victim; the Constitution was the victim of her arguments. The US taxpayer was the victim of irresponsible Sandra Fluke types everywhere. And liberal politicians Bill Maher, Alec Baldwin, Barack Obama and David Letterman have been equally

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offensive in their language in political discourse but they have never apologized while Limbaugh has. In this sense making it was a partisan fight, and Andrew Brietbart was quoted. “You can’t compromise with these people.”

THE LANGUAGE OF THREAT IN OUR POLITICAL DISCOURSE A member of Congress was shot and hundreds of thousands of Twitter messages sought the answer to what had happened, how did it happen, and what were the implications for the political system. A first move was to associate the action with terrorism. Terrorism has been the fundamental threat for the society for a decade. Bringing this act into the domain of terrorism sets up a whole series of understandings. Stereotypes abound in the common cultural understanding of terrorism, and one came to the fore in this case. It was argued in thousands of Twitter messages that terrorism cannot mean Muslim even though that is one of the stereotypes. So, they fought it out with CNN’s interpretation that Loughner was not a terrorist. The second move was to assert that the how was Palin’s campaign rhetoric for the 2010 congressional election. Crosshairs, targets, the slogan don’t retreat, reload all produce a rhetorical context for the election that threatens to end up with crazies taking the language literally. So, the claim -- language matters. Language has consequences. Scrubbing your website of the offending language does not absolve you. The third move was blood libel. An ancient story was invoked as a rhetorical device to claim that she, Palin, was being falsely accused and persecuted as Jews were accused and persecuted in the middle ages. Her accusation was met with a maelstrom of objections to the use of a sacred story to cover what she had done.

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And after three weeks it was but a memory. The streams of communication that had converged now diverged. Representative Giffords had become a person of note. Between February and her return to the House of Representatives in August there were many thousands of Twitter messages about her health. Her health, her travels were subjects of interest, and Twitter was a way to keep track and satisfy that interest. And the pursuit of will she or won’t she for Palin motivated an average of six to ten thousand messages a day along with occasional spikes into the tens of thousands. That is the story. A similar story is found in the Twitter messages about Limbaugh and his characterization of Ms. Fluke. But the import is in negotiating the boundaries of appropriate and inappropriate political discourse. The Giffords shooting calls to our attention the need to negotiate those boundaries. And the Limbaugh incident reminds us that this is an ongoing process. It does not end. What is different in these two instances is that the negotiation is going on ‘in public.’ Twitter is used to argue for one boundary or another in a public forum that did not exist in the past. In the past it was talking with one’s neighbors that was the conversation. Now it is addressing the world. And in both cases it is clear that the world was listening and responding. Twitter and other social media open the public forum for comment to tens or hundreds of thousands of persons. It is no longer limited to the mainline media. And that adds a new dimension to the political world.

REFERENCES Dervin, B. (1983, May). An overview of sensemaking research: Concepts, methods and results to date. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association. Dallas, TX.

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Eldon, E. (2011, December 5). Indian Minister wants web companies to self-censor user content. TechCrunch. Retrieved April 14, 2014 from http://techcrunch.com/2011/12/05/indianminister-wants-web-companies-to-self-censoruser-content/ Elliot, P. (2012, March 3). Limbaugh apologizes to law student for insult on sex, says he intended no personal attack. Minneapolis Star-Tribune. Retrieved April 15, 2014 from http://www.startribune.com/politics/141311433.html Fox, Z. (2011, July 13). China shut down 1.3M websites in 2010. Mashable. Retrieved April 14, 2014 from http://mashable.com/2011/07/13/ china-web-shutdown/ Heverin, T., & Zach, L. (2012). Use of Microblogging for Collective Sense-Making During Violent Crises: A Study of Three Campus Shootings. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 63(1), 34–47. doi:10.1002/asi.21685 Legum, J. (2012, March 12). Exclusive: 140 Companies Drop Advertising From Rush Limbaugh [Update: 142]. ThinkProgress. Retrieved April 15, 2014 from http://thinkprogress.org/ media/2012/03/12/442673/141-companiesadvertisng-rush-limbaugh/ Marlin-Bennett, R., & Thornton, E. N. (2012). Governance within social media websites: Ruling new frontiers. Telecommunications Policy, 36, 493–501. doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2012.01.002 Messieh, N. (2011, December 12). Syrian blogger charged with weakening national sentiment. TheNewWeb. Retrieved April 15, 2014 from http:// thenextweb.com/me/2011/12/12/syrian-bloggercharged-with-weakening-national-sentiment/ Messieh, N. (2011, July 25). Iran set to launch its own Internet. TheNewWeb. Retrieved April 15, 2014 from http://thenextweb.com/me/2011/07/05/ iran-set-to-launch-its-own-internet/

Russell, J. (2012, March 12). Blocked On Weibo is a blog documenting words that are censored from China’s microblogs. TheNextWeb. Retrieved April 15, 2014 from http://thenextweb.com/ asia/2012/03/12/blocked-on-weibo-is-a-blogdocumenting-words-that-are-censored-fromchinas-microblogs/ Tan, F. (2011, May 20). China: Internet regulation is a sovereign issue, U.S. has no jurisdiction. TheNewWeb. Retrieved April 15, 2014 from http://thenextweb.com/asia/2011/05/20/chinainternet-regulation-is-a-sovereign-issue-u-s-hasno-jurisdiction/ Trendistic. (2012, March 15). Search for Limbaugh. Retrieved March 15, 2012 from http:// www.trendistic.com

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Giffords, Gabrielle: Former U.S. Representative (D-AZ 8th District). Rep. Giffords was seriously wounded in an assassination attempt in the parking lot of a Casas Abode, Arizona supermarket on January 8, 2011. Six people died during the attack, which sparked and extended debate over gun violence and the language of threat in American politics. Language: The focus of controversy in the public discourse in the aftermath of the Arizona shooting was the language of threat. Discourse surrounding Rush Limbaugh’s comments on law school student Sandra Fluke also turned on the boundaries of appropriate language in the public sphere. Limbaugh, Rush: Syndicated radio talkshow host. His language referring to law school student Sandra Fluke, (who had testified before a Democratic members of the House Oversight and Reform Committee on the necessity of contraceptive coverage under the Affordable Care Act) sparked an extended public discourse on the

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boundaries of appropriate language for political discourse in February, 2012. Messages: Individual text postings to Twitter (also known as “tweets”). Palin, Sarah: Former Governor of Alaska and 2008 Republican Party nominee for Vice President of the United States. Palin became intertwined with the public discourse on gun violence and the language of threat after the shootings near Tuscon, first because of the telescopic cross-hair imagery used on the website of SarahPAC, her political action committee, and second because of the attention generated by her comments labeling criticisms of her a “blood libel.”

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Shooting: On January 8, 2011, Jared Loughner, a 22 year-old Tuscon man shot U.S. Rep. Gabrielle Giffords in the head at point blank range before turning fire on others. Eighteen other people were shot and six died. Twitter: Social media microblogging service introduced publicly on July 15, 2006 that allows users to send and view text messages of 140 characters or less. As of September, 2013, some 200 million Twitters were sending some 400 million messages or tweets each day.

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Chapter 14

Conceptualizing Network Politics following the Arab Spring Ashu M. G. Solo Maverick Technologies America Inc., USA Jonathan Bishop Centre for Research into Online Communities and E-Learning Systems, UK

ABSTRACT This chapter defines a new field called “network politics.” Network politics refers to politics and networks. These networks include the Internet, private networks, cellular networks, telephone networks, radio networks, television networks, etc. Network politics includes the applications of networks to enable one or more individuals or organizations to engage in political communication. Furthermore, network politics includes government regulation of networks. Finally, network politics includes the accompanying issues that arise when networks are used for political communication or when there is government regulation of networks. The domain of network politics includes, but is not limited to, e-politics (social networking for driving revolutions and organizing protests, online petitions, political blogs and vlogs, whistleblower Web sites, online campaigning, e-participation, virtual town halls, e-voting, Internet freedom, access to information, net neutrality, etc.) and applications of other networks in politics (robocalling, text messaging, TV broadcasting, etc.). The definition of this field should significantly increase the pace of research and development in this important field.

INTRODUCTION Technology has brought about many changes in the realm of politics. The Internet is having an extreme impact on social and political systems that is unparalleled in the history of humanity.

This is no truer than in the Middle East and North Africa where citizen lead and technology enabled revolts have led to the overthrow of brutally repressive dictators. The revolts in the Middle East and North Africa that started after the beginning of 2011 were largely driven by social networks

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch014

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

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and are often referred to as the “Arab Spring” (Shavitt & Zilberman, 2012). The Arab Spring involved widespread anti-government protests in many Middle Eastern and North African countries including Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia (Bruns, Highfield, & Burgess, 2013). The debate about the Arab Spring is embedded within a complex of wider theoretical debates about how new media might affect political outcomes (Aday et al., 2013). Recent revolutions in many countries in the Middle East and North Africa have started in large part due to social networking Web sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. YouTube is an important tool of the Arab Spring, particularly in Syria where the absence of professional journalists has created a need for citizen video (Youmans & York, 2012). Much of the world was able to see the Arab Spring through photographs and videos made by anonymous local citizens with mobile devices such as cellular phones (Cox, 2011) . The whistleblower Web site Wikileaks has had a tremendous impact in exposing government corruption (Corneil, 2010). Politicians and candidates use their own Web sites and social networking profiles to get their message out. The mainstream media no longer has a monopoly on political commentary as anybody can set up a blog or vlog and post opinions online. Political activists can network together online. Voting is often done using electronic voting machines, which has created many problems. In the future, voting will likely be done over the Internet, but there are many issues that need to be worked out. Internet freedom and equal access are important issues that have many facets. The Arab Spring wasn’t the first technology transformed political struggle. The printing press challenged government ideologies too. In the past, the only political engagement for many people involved voting and following news. Now because of the Internet, there is much more direct participation in politics (McBeth & Robison,

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2012). Therefore, it is necessary to develop new paradigms to understand the changing world. Therefore, in this research paper, the authors define a new field that they are initiating called network politics. This field was first originated and defined by the authors of this research paper in (Solo & Bishop, 2011).

NETWORK POLITICS The authors have coined the term network politics, which refers to politics and networks. These networks include the Internet, private networks, cellular networks, telephone networks, radio networks, television networks, etc. Network politics includes applications of networks to enable one or more individuals or organizations to engage in political communication including expression, organization, or voting. Furthermore, network politics includes government regulation of networks. Finally, network politics includes the accompanying issues that arise when networks are used for political communication or when there is government regulation of networks. The term e-politics (Romm-Livermore, 2011) just refers to politics and the Internet. Therefore, e-politics is a subset of network politics. The term e-government refers to the use of information and communication technologies in government operations, access to government data, interactions between government agencies, interactions between government and citizens, and interactions between government and external organizations (Reddick, 2010). Only those e-government applications in the realm of politics, such as e-voting, are in the domain of network politics. The domain of network politics includes, but is not limited to, e-politics (social networking for driving revolutions, social networking for organizing protests, online petitions, online political videos, political blogs, political vlogs, whistleblower

 Conceptualizing Network Politics following the Arab Spring

Web sites, online campaigning, e-participation, virtual town halls, e-voting, Internet freedom, access to information, net neutrality, etc.) and the applications of other networks in politics (robocalling, text messaging, TV broadcasting, etc.). A network politics layman activity could be posting a political blog entry, starting an online petition, or holding a virtual town hall, all of which can use existing software tools. A network politics research and development activity could be studying the characteristics of political bloggers, developing new software tools for organizing political activists, or developing a tool for candidates to alert voters by text message when a candidate will be giving a speech in their particular geographical area. One of the most exciting recent developments in network politics occurred in the recent Libyan Revolution against the dictatorship of Col. Moammar Gaddafi. To prevent rebel fighters from communicating, Gaddafi cut off their telephone and Internet service. Mr. Ousama Abushagur and his team of engineers hived off part of the Libyan cellular phone network and rewired it to run independently of the regime’s control, so rebel fighters are able to communicate with cellular phones again. The efforts of Abushagur and his team are described more fully in (Piaggesi, Sund, & Castelnovo, 2010).

SCOPE OF NETWORK POLITICS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT The scope of research and development in the field of network politics includes applications of networks to enable one or more individuals or organizations to engage in political communication, government regulation of networks, as well as the accompanying issues that occur as a result of the preceding. More specifically, the scope of research and development in the field of network politics includes, but is not limited to, the following:

Political Revolutions, Political Protests, and Citizen Activism in the Information Age The following topics lie within the scope of network politics research and development: • • • • • • •

Role of social networking in political revolutions. Role of social networking in political protests. Online petitions. Political blogs. Online political videos. Political vlogs. Case studies.

A more direct form of participative democracy using the Internet can result in more people joining in both real world and online political activism (Bohler-Muller & Van der Merwe, 2011). The Internet and mobile devices have had a major role in the way modern political revolutions are executed and planned and democratization (Sabadello, 2011). However, the use of social networking tools, social media tools, text messaging, email, photo sharing, and the like does not have a single preordained outcome in many political revolutions (Shirky, 2011). Facebook in particular was used throughout the protests to organize protesters, plan protest routes, and update protesters in real time on the latest location of other protesters and allied protests (Newnham & Bell, 2012). Most collective actions in the Arab Spring had comparable forms of online action, such as online petitions and online fundraising (Rao, 2012). International mobilization through online petitions has denounced human rights violations (Della Porta & Mosca, 2005). Political blogs are a key reason for the growing popularity of blog reading, and many people use them to get political news (Sweetser & Kaid, 2008). Political blogs are often strongly partisan and opinionated and more

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ruthless in their writing. They usually allow people to interact with the bloggers and other readers in online discussions (McIntosh, 2005).

Whistleblowing in the Information Age The following topics also lie within the scope of network politics research and development: • • • • • • • • • •

Wikileaks. Whistleblower Web sites. Transparency. Advantages and disadvantages transparency. Whistleblowing. Whistleblower protection. whistleblower prosecution. Whistleblower persecution. Lawsuits against whistleblowers. Case studies.

of

Until now, information on Wikleaks was secret to all but selected people in governments and their organizations (Flew & Liu, 2011). WikiLeaks is a change agent. This may be what most disturbs the growing number of governments and organizations that want to shut it down (Dreyfus, Lederman, & Bosua, 2011). Using the Internet, WikiLeaks has made it much more difficult for governments to censor information (Dreyfus et al., 2011).

Political Campaigns in the Information Age The following topics also lie within the scope of network politics research and development: • • • • • 234

Online campaigning. Online campaigning using social networking. Online campaigning using multimedia tools. Political activism on the Internet. Political debates on the Internet.

• • • • •

E-Participation. Virtual town hall. Robocalling. Text messaging. Case studies.

Industry professionals widely believe that robocalling is a powerful and inexpensive medium for candidates to use in targeting specific voters (Shaw, Green, Gimpel, & Gerber, 2012). Legitimate political robocalling is one of the most common political campaign tools, but Congress and the public are concerned about the increasing use of political robocalls to trick voters or prevent them from voting (Hatifled, 2010). Text messaging systems updated people in real time within and outside countries affected by the Arab Spring with the latest information on where the action was, where the abuses were, and what the next step would be (Howard & Hussain, 2011). Slim Amamou, a popular Tunisian blogger, told reporters that the brisk toppling of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was due to text messaging and the Internet. “Information was immediately available,” he said (Owais, 2011).

Network Political Media in the Information Age The following topics also lie within the scope of network politics research and development: • • • •

Political coverage on television. Political coverage on radio. Political coverage on the Internet. Case studies.

During the revolution in Egypt in spring 2011, the state television headquarters in Egypt was the first site secured by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) (Saleh, Brevini, Hintz, & McCurdy, 2013). Using social media tools, a political debate television series was created by BBC Arabic and citizen producers in spring 2010.

 Conceptualizing Network Politics following the Arab Spring

Voting in the Information Age

•

The following topics also lie within the scope of network politics research and development:

• • •

• • • • • • • •

E-Voting. Remote e-voting over Internet. Remote e-voting over telephones. E-Voting advantages and risks. Electronic voting theft. Stolen elections. Electronic instant results voting (IRV). Case studies.

E-voting is an election system that allows a voter to record her ballot securely and electronically (Panda, Sahu, Mohapatra, & Mohapatra, 2013). While e-voting can increase voter turnout and convenience, concerns about identity verification make its usage unlikely in the near future (Williamson, 2013). Stolen elections can cause a social uprising if there enough outrage about a stolen election for activists to coordinate in mobilizing protests (Petrov, Lipman, & Hale, 2013).

Network Freedom The following topics also lie within the scope of network politics research and development: • • • • • • • • • • •

Global access to information. Equal access to information. Government restriction on access to Web sites. Internet censorship. Freedom to connect on the Internet. Freedom to organize on the Internet. Net neutrality. Privacy issues in the information age. Right to privacy on the Internet. Citizen surveillance on the Internet. Warrantless wiretapping.

• • • •

Freedom of expression in the information age. Free speech in the information age. Freedom of religion on the Internet. Domain name seizures without due process. Disability accommodation in technology usage. Telephone access in prisons. Internet access in prisons. Case studies.

With the increased popularity of the Internet, censorship has become a part of both the public and government agendas in many countries (Dahan, 1995). Global Internet companies have received censorship requests from governments around the world including from democratic countries such as Turkey and Thailand (MacKinnon, 2009). The Chinese government has maintained power so far through censorship and regulation in blocking activists from using the Internet as an effective political tool (Sweetser & Kaid, 2008). Despite widespread government censorship, the Internet offers the potential for cyber-resistance to authoritarianism (Warf & Vincent, 2007). The Internet allows activists to circumvent government censorship, express their message without traditional media, express political opposition in anonymity, and organize across borders (Everett, 1998). Net neutrality means that Internet content should not be differentially processed. The speed of access to a Web site shouldn’t be increased or decreased based on how much it has paid (Crampton, 2008). If net neutrality is abandoned, then Internet service providers can gain by charging fees for preferential treatment from content providers (Pil Choi & Kim, 2010). Then content providers with less financial resources will never be able to compete with content providers with more financial resources.

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CONCLUSION The definition of the new field of network politics will increase the pace of research and development in this extremely important field. Recent events have demonstrated how important this field is. These recent events include recent revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa that were in large part organized using social networking tools such as Facebook and Twitter, the recent role of whistleblower Web site Wikileaks in exposing government corruption throughout the world, the ever-increasing role of the Internet in political campaigns and political activism, the extreme importance of preventing stolen elections using electronic voting methods, and the ever-increasing importance of Internet freedom issues such as net neutrality and government restrictions on access to Web sites.

Cox, L. P. (2011). Truth in crowdsourcing. IEEE Security & Privacy, 9(5), 74–76. doi:10.1109/ MSP.2011.145 Crampton, J. W. (2008). Cartography: Maps 2.0. Progress in Human Geography. Dahan, M. (1995). The internet and government censorship: The case of the Israeli secret service. Paper presented at the International Online Information Meeting. New York, NY. Della Porta, D., & Mosca, L. (2005). Globalnet for global movements? A network of networks for a movement of movements. Journal of Public Policy, 25(1), 165–190. doi:10.1017/ S0143814X05000255 Dreyfus, S., Lederman, R., & Bosua, R. (2011). Is there a role for secrecy in government? Global Media Journal-Australian Ed., 5(1).

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Owais, R. (2011). Arab media during the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunisia: Time for change. Middle East Media Educator, 1(1), 9–13. Panda, S., Sahu, S. K., Mohapatra, J., & Mohapatra, R. K. (2013). An application of time stamped proxy blind signature in e-voting. International Journal on Computer Science & Engineering, 5(6). Petrov, N., Lipman, M., & Hale, H. E. (2013). Three dilemmas of hybrid regime governance: Russia from Putin to Putin. Post-Soviet Affairs, 1-26. Piaggesi, D., Sund, K., & Castelnovo, W. (Eds.). (2010). Global strategy and practice of E-governance: Examples from around the world. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. Pil Choi, J., & Kim, B. C. (2010). Net neutrality and investment incentives. The Rand Journal of Economics, 41(3), 446–471. doi:10.1111/j.17562171.2010.00107.x Rao, A. (2012). Sister-groups and online-offline linkages in networked collective action: A case study of the right to information movement in India. The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries, 52. Reddick, C. G. (2010). Politics, democracy, and E-government: Participation and service delivery. Information Science Reference. doi:10.4018/9781-61520-933-0

Saleh, I., Brevini, B., Hintz, A., & McCurdy, P. (2013). Wikileaks and the Arab Spring: The twists and turns of media, culture and power. Beyond WikiLeaks: Implications for the Future of Communications, Journalism and Society, 245-253. Shavitt, Y., & Zilberman, N. (2012). Arabian nights: Measuring the Arab Internet during the 2011 events. IEEE Network, 26(6), 75–80. doi:10.1109/MNET.2012.6375897 Shaw, D. R., Green, D. P., Gimpel, J. G., & Gerber, A. S. (2012). Do robotic calls from credible sources influence voter turnout or vote choice? Evidence from a randomized field experiment. Journal of Political Marketing, 11(4), 231–245. doi:10.1080/15377857.2012.724305 Shirky, C. (2011). Political power of social mediatechnology, the public sphere sphere, and political change. Foreign Affairs, 90, 28. Solo, A. M. G., & Bishop, J. (2011). The New Field of Network Politics. In Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on e-Learning, e-Business, Enterprise Information Systems, and e-Government (EEE’11) (pp. 442-444). CSREA. Sweetser, K. D., & Kaid, L. L. (2008). Stealth soapboxes: Political information efficacy, cynicism and uses of celebrity weblogs among readers. New Media & Society, 10(1), 67–91. doi:10.1177/1461444807085322

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Warf, B., & Vincent, P. (2007). Multiple geographies of the Arab Internet. Area, 39(1), 83–96. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4762.2007.00717.x Williamson, A. (2013). eVoting is a good idea, but it won’t happen any time soon. Democratic Audit. Youmans, W. L., & York, J. C. (2012). Social media and the activist toolkit: User agreements, corporate interests, and the information infrastructure of modern social movements. The Journal of Communication, 62(2), 315–329. doi:10.1111/j.14602466.2012.01636.x

Solo, A. M. G. (2014). The New Interdisciplinary Fields of Political Engineering and Computational Politics. In A. M. G. Solo (Ed.), Political Campaigning in the Information Age. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. Solo, A. M. G. (2014). The New Interdisciplinary Fields of Public Policy Engineering and Computational Public Policy. In A. M. G. Solo (Ed.), Political Campaigning in the Information Age. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. Solo, A. M. G. (Ed.). (2014). Political Campaigning in the Information Age. Hershey, PA: IGI Global.

ADDITIONAL READING Bishop, J. (2014). My Click is My Bond: The Role of Contracts, Social Proof, and Gamification for Sysops to Reduce Pseudo-Activism and Internet Trolling. In J. Bishop (Ed.), Gamification for Human Factors Integration: Social, Educational and Psychological Issues. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. doi:10.4018/978-1-4666-5071-8.ch001 Bishop, J. (2014). Microeconomics of Education and the effect of Government intervention: The role of Classroom 2.0 in facilitating the UK Government’s schools policies. In J. Bishop (Ed.), Transforming Politics and Policy in the Digital Age. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. doi:10.4018/9781-4666-6038-0.ch004 Bishop, J. (Ed.). (2014). Transforming Politics and Policy in the Digital Age. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. doi:10.4018/978-1-4666-6038-0 Solo, A. M. G. (2011). The New Fields of Public Policy Engineering, Political Engineering, Computational Public Policy, and Computational Politics. In Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on e-Learning, e-Business, Enterprise Information Systems, and e-Government (EEE’11) (pp. 431-434). CSREA.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Arab Spring: The revolts in the Middle East and North Africa that started after the beginning of 2011 were referred to as the Arab Spring. These were largely driven by social networks and involved widespread anti-government protests in countries including Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. E-Government: E-government refers to the use of information and communication technologies in government operations, access to government data, interactions between government agencies, interactions between government and citizens, and interactions between government and external organizations. E-Politics: E-politics refers to politics and the Internet. Therefore, e-politics is a subset of network politics. E-Voting: E-voting is an election system that allows a voter to record her ballot securely and electronically. Net Neutrality: Net neutrality means that Internet content should not be differentially processed. The speed of access to a Web site shouldn’t be increased or decreased based on how much it has paid.

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Network Politics: Network politics refers to politics and networks. These networks include the Internet, private networks, cellular networks, telephone networks, radio networks, television networks, etc. Network politics includes applications of networks to enable one or more individuals or organizations to engage in political communication including expression, organization, or voting. Furthermore, network politics includes government regulation of networks. Finally, network politics includes the accompanying issues

that arise when networks are used for political communication or when there is government regulation of networks. Social Media: Social media is the term giving to the construction of user-generated content via social networking services, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and MySpace. Text Messaging: Text messaging is the activity of sending messages using the small messaging service (SMS) from one cellular phone to another.

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Chapter 15

The India against Corruption Movement M. V. Rajeev Gowda Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, India Purnima Prakash Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, India

ABSTRACT Activists demanding the establishment of an anti-corruption watchdog or “Lok Pal,” launched the India Against Corruption (IAC) movement. This chapter documents how IAC’s leaders made astute use of mass media and social media to draw India’s urban middle classes out onto the streets to protest against corruption in government. IAC succeeded in pressurising the Indian government to involve its activists in an effort to formulate an anti-corruption bill. A section of IAC has since launched the Aam Aadmi (Common Man) party, which has met with initial electoral success.

INTRODUCTION On April 9, 2011, India witnessed a unique development. Its government announced the formation of a ten member committee, comprised equally of cabinet ministers and civil society activists, to draft a bill to establish a powerful anti-corruption ombudsman or Lok Pal. The government did not take this unprecedented step of granting unelected activists the same legitimacy as elected representatives voluntarily. It was forced to take this step in order to check a fast-spreading nationwide agitation—the India Against Corruption movement (IAC) led by Anna Hazare. The immediate trigger for the government’s concession was its desire to persuade Hazare to call off a hunger strike he

had launched five days earlier demanding that the government take action to pass the Lok Pal bill. The remarkable rise and success of the Hazareled IAC movement to the point where it was able to dictate terms to the government was fuelled by five key factors: (1) A cascade of corruption scams affecting various institutions that came to light in a short period of time; (2) The decision of experienced civil society activists to come together under the IAC banner to fight for the establishment of a Lok Pal; (3) IAC’s innovative use of symbols and rhetoric, and its masterly use of broadcast, print and new media; (4) the Indian media’s willingness to actively cover, and even advocate, IAC’s demands; and (5) IAC’s ability to politicize India’s traditionally apathetic urban

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch015

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middle and upper classes and to get them out onto the streets. In this chapter, we describe how the IAC movement evolved and how it was able to shake up the Indian political establishment through deft use of traditional and new media.

THE BACKDROP: A CASCADE OF CORRUPTION CASES India liberalized its economy in 1991, cutting taxes and reducing restrictions on market forces that had been in place for four decades. While well-intended, the earlier governmental control regime (“license-quota-permit-raj”) had spawned a corrupt nexus between corporate actors and contractors on the one hand and bureaucrats and politicians on the other. Excessive bureaucratic controls also led to a decline in government efficiency and public service delivery. Liberalization was expected to end government corruption and inefficiency. Paradoxically, however the magnitude and extent of corruption seems to have increased after liberalization (Mohanty, 2011). Corruption flourishes because the government still controls key aspects of the economy, e.g., the allocation of natural resources such as mines or electromagnetic spectrum. Preferential allocation of such resources can enable politicians and bureaucrats to generate substantial kickbacks. Political parties use such allocations to raise party and election funds because India’s flawed system for party financing and electoral expenditure makes it difficult to raise and spend resources legally (“Its Anna vs Aruna as rift in civil society shows”, 2011). The ensuing corruption has now become so widespread that the political class has seen a precipitous drop in its moral legitimacy. The year 2011 saw many instances of corruption coming to public notice. They revealed that a range of governmental institutions were compromised, thus creating an appropriate environment for the launch of an anti-corruption agitation.

The diversified portfolio of corruption cases included: (1) The revelation by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) that the Minister for Telecommunications had allocated 2G spectrum to companies in a manner that caused the government to forego $5 billion in revenue. The Minister was forced to resign and spent a year in jail while the case went to trial. (2) The resignation of a state high court chief justice accused of corruption to forestall impeachment proceedings in parliament. (3) The Supreme Court’s rejection of the government’s choice of Chief Vigilance Commissioner (the official charged with policing the bureaucracy) as he was facing corruption charges himself. (4) The resignation of the chief minister of Maharashtra state after he was accused of colluding with army and government officials to reallocate prime real estate meant for war widows to his family members and ineligible officials. (5) The arrest of the chief organizer of the Commonwealth Games, a Member of Parliament, on charges of misusing funds meant for the Games.

RISE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVISM As the corruption scandals mounted, the space was opened up for civil society activists to take a leadership position in demanding systemic reform. Many of them had been at the forefront of reform movements for more than a decade, and had the track record and network that helped to launch the IAC movement (Bawiskar, 2011). They enjoyed public trust, partly because many, e.g., Aruna Roy, Arvind Kejiriwal, and Nikhil Dey, were middle class professionals who had forsaken respectable careers to take up public causes. Their life styles and behaviour enabled people to attribute selflessness, simplicity and other altruistic virtues to them. Their success in bringing about reform through agitations and strategic use of the legal system burnished their haloes. Activists such as IAC leaders Hazare and Kiran Bedi (a retired

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woman police officer) also had “a reputation for personal probity and courage, [and] they endorse a form of individualist authoritarian action that’s applauded by a public hungry for vigilante heroes” (Bawiskar, 2011). One civil society initiative that had succeeded in initiating political reform was the effort of the Association for Democratic Reforms to ensure that voters have access to information about candidates’ assets and liabilities, education, and possible criminal record (Sastry, 2004).This effort succeeded in getting the support of the courts and parliament passed legislation to this effect, under pressure. In Maharashtra state, civil society activists, including Anna Hazare, came together to fight corruption in the public distribution system that provides access to food for the poor (Jenkins, 2007). Many of these civil society initiatives came together under the umbrella of the National Alliance of People’s Movements (Levien, 2007), thus establishing a powerful, if somewhat ideologically diverse, network of activists across the country. Another major success of civil society reform efforts was the passage of the Right-to-Information (RTI) Act. This was a decades-long movement that was begun by Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey of the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sanghathan (MKSS) when they fought against corruption at the village level. They used public hearings as a way to challenge authority and trained and empowered local activists to challenge government officials. They eventually teamed up with the National Alliance of People’s Movements and with, among others, the Delhi-based non-governmental organization (NGO) Parivartan (led by Arvind Kejriwal) which was fighting against corruption in the public distribution system. Together these groups generated substantial political credibility in their fight for the passage of the RTI bill (Bawiskar, 2011). The RTI bill became law after the election of the Congress party-led United Progressive Alliance government in 2004. One after effect of the change in the political regime was that the Congress party’s president, Sonia Gandhi, refused to

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take over as Prime Minister, and instead chose to head a new body, the National Advisory Council (NAC), that included academics and NGO activists such as Roy. The NAC essentially set the government’s policy agenda, especially because it was led by the most powerful Congress party leader. The RTI legislation was one of its early successes, followed thereafter by the passage of a number of “rights”-based legislation, including an ambitious, large-scale employment guarantee scheme for the rural poor (Sankaran, 2010). The presence of NGO activists in the NAC and its championing of pro-poor legislation served to strengthen the legitimacy of civil society in contrast to other branches of government widely regarded as corrupt. In terms of overall impact, to quote Jenkins (2007), “NGO movement partnerships represent a powerful combination. Even one of the NGO sector’s most outspoken critics concedes that “when they have tied up with oppositional social movements,” India’s “NGOs have been able to transform political agendas.” However, these movements saw participation only by activists. In contrast, the IAC movement was able to spur the re-engagement with politics by India’s urban, educated middle and upper classes. One key factor that enabled that change was IAC’s imaginative use of media and information and communication technologies (ICTs) for political mobilization, building on the successes of a few initiatives across the country (Gowda, 2008; Gowda & Sridharan, 2012).

THE INDIA AGAINST CORRUPTION MOVEMENT The IAC movement’s origin can be traced to a rally organized by anti-corruption activists in Bangalore1. Coming together under the banner “Saaku,” (meaning “Enough!” in the region’s language, Kannada) activists participated in a protest march which was also attended by Delhi-

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based RTI activist, Kejriwal. The Saaku group’s evident anger and frustration caused Kejriwal to think about launching a nationwide movement to combat corruption. He then proceeded to connect with other anti-corruption activists nationwide and formed a core committee (later termed Team Anna)2 which decided to focus on establishing a Lok Pal with the power to prosecute and punish those indulging in corruption in the public sector. Parliament had been considering different versions of bills to establish the Lok Pal for the last forty years without any of them being passed3. The core group of IAC activists came up with its own version of the ombudsman legislation and called it the Jan Lok Pal or People’s Ombudsman bill (Jeelani, 2011). This core group decided to invite Hazare to lead its planned agitation. They went to Hazare’s village, explained the issue to him and when Hazare agreed, the IAC team launched a public protest at Jantar Mantar (a historic observatory, now designated as a site for protests) in Delhi. This rally drew substantial media coverage and different groups of people including students, professionals and even some politicians attended. Simultaneously, rallies were held in cities across India under the IAC banner. Across the country, print and broadcast media seamlessly transitioned from highlighting scams to covering IAC’s rallies. IAC members then filed lawsuits against corruption in the organization of the Commonwealth Games and in the allocation of 2G spectrum. Their next event was a protest rally on December 22, 2010 at Delhi’s Ram Lila grounds. The 20.000 strong protest was directed against the perpetrators of the scams and the Government of India (for not responding adequately to corruption) (“Indian opposition holds mass protest”, 2010). The public response and media coverage gave the impression that there was now a mass movement against corruption. The next event, on March 26th 2011, was a second Dandi March (in commemoration of the historic march against British rule undertaken by Mahatma Gandhi). Demanding action against

corruption, these marches took place in over forty cities in India and New York City, Washington DC, and Los Angeles in the United States of America (where Indian expatriates rallied). An open letter was sent by IAC (and a reformist political party, Lok Satta) to the Prime Minister of India (“Dandi March II in US against corruption in India”, 2011) demanding action against corruption. On March 13th, Hazare had declared to the media and the Government that he was going to go on an indefinite fast demanding the passage of the Lok Pal legislation from April 5th. IAC organized a car rally in support (“Drive around Delhi”, 2011) which generated substantial media coverage even with only 50 cars participating. On April 5th, Hazare commenced his fast at Jantar Mantar. The fast saw thousands of people coming to the ground to participate and show their support. Celebrities, students and citizens drawn from across economic classes came to support the fast but politicians were explicitly kept out. People sang patriotic songs and waved placards in support of the movement and Hazare (Joshi, 2011). IAC organized simultaneous protests in other parts of the country using the media (Facebook, Twitter, newspapers and television) (“Where to Join India’s crusade against corruption”, 2011), e.g., at Bangalore’s Freedom Park (Paul, Gopinathan &Mathew, 2011). The government responded to Hazare’s fast by commencing negotiations with Team Anna. At this stage, some fissures emerged and a renowned activist, Swami Agnivesh, was dropped from Team Anna. Pressurized by concerns for Hazare’s health and the IAC movement’s growing momentum, the Government announced on April 9th its decision to set up the joint committee to draft the Lok Pal bill with equal participation by activists and parliamentarians (“Govt Blinks on Lok Pal bill, Anna to end fast”, 2011) thereupon Hazare ended his fast. The joint committee was not a success. Team Anna wanted its proceedings to be televised while the government only consented to audio releases

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and public discussions (“Anna Hazare seeks interpreter from next meeting”, 2011). On June 9th, Hazare announced that if the Lok Pal bill was not formulated by August 15th (India’s Independence Day); he would launch another fast from the next day. He declared that the IAC movement was India’s Second Freedom struggle (“Anna to fast in support of Baba Ramdev”, 2011). On June 16th, there was a wide split amongst the committee members and no agreement on the bill could be reached. The Government questioned the moral authority of Team Anna. They leveled charges of corruption against specific team members. Throughout, the charges, counter charges and debates were conducted through the media. Simultaneously, on June 4th another protest against corruption was organized at Delhi’s Ram Lila grounds by Swami Baba Ramdev, a popular yoga and spirituality teacher with his own television show. He demanded that black money funneled to offshore banks by politicians and bureaucrats be brought and utilized for the Indian public’s well being (“Ramdev to launch people’s movement”, 2011). The government was hostile to his protest on the grounds that Ramdev was a front for right-wing political activists opposed to the government. The police used tear gas and batons to evict the protestors; one protester later died from injuries suffered during the police attack. Ramdev was arrested, whisked out of the state and prohibited from entering Delhi for 15 days (“Police bans Ramdev”, 2011). This act drew wide condemnation and served as a catalyst for Team Anna to declare an ultimatum to the Government. On August 15th, Hazare commenced the day by meditating alone at the Mahatma Gandhi memorial (Raj Ghat); this was widely covered by the media. Then Team Anna announced that Hazare would launch another fast from the next day. This message was announced through broadcast, print and Youtube, Facebook and Twitter. The Government reacted by imposing Section 144 (prohibiting groups of people from assembling together) on the proposed protest venues. On August 16th, Hazare and his core team were arrested. However, just 244

before his arrest, Hazare had videotaped a public message, which was then aired on Youtube and widely covered in print and broadcast media. Hazare’s arrest triggered candle light vigils at Delhi’s India Gate and across the country. Facebook and Twitter witnessed an outpouring of protest. People expressed their opposition through polls and opinion forums conducted by television channels’ websites. College and school students showed their protests by waving black flags. Pressurized by the public and various political parties, the Government announced Hazare’s release from prison. However, Hazare refused to leave Tihar Jail until his demands were met. Finally, Hazare agreed to leave the jail only if he was granted permission by the Delhi Police to fast for fifteen days at the Ram Lila grounds. Upon release from Tihar jail, Hazare was greeted by a large crowd. Prior to the commencement of the fast, Hazare paid his respects to Mahatma Gandhi at the Raj Ghat memorial and proclaimed to the estimated 100,000 people assembled there that he would not quit till he had achieved the Jan Lok Pal. As the fast progressed, it seemed that neither the Government nor Hazare were willing to compromise. Supporters of Team Anna like the religious leader Sri Sri Ravishankar met leaders from opposition parties to discuss the Lok Pal bill. The Prime Minister and other government leaders tried to persuade Hazare to give up the fast. However, Hazare and Team Anna refused to give in. On the seventh day of his fast, on 22nd August, Hazare identified some of the political leaders with whom he was willing to negotiate. Hazare demanded that a resolution announcing the establishment of a Citizen’s Charter and Lok Ayuktas (state level ombudsmen) in all states be passed in the parliament the following day, on August 26th. The following day, August 26th, Parliament began its discussion on the Lok Pal. The majority of Members of Parliament voted in favor of Hazare’s conditions. The news was received with jubilation by the crowds who had gathered at the Ram Lila grounds. Thereupon Hazare ended his 12 day fast.

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However, by the beginning of December, Team Anna and Hazare did not see much progress in terms of the Lok Pal bill and decided to stage another protest. On December 11th, Hazare sat on a day long fast at Jantar Mantar to protest against the parliamentary committee working on the anti-graft legislation. This protest was significant because, for the first time, some political leaders were allowed to join Hazare’s movement (Earlier, Kejriwal had plunged into a parliament election campaign in Hissar and publicly called for people to vote against the Congress party, which leads India’s coalition government. These moves were regarded as having dramatically changed the apolitical nature of the IAC movement). However, Parliament still could not get over its differences over the constitution of the Lok Pal. On 22nd December, the Indian Government finally withdrew its previous bill and presented a new bill called “the Lok Pal and Lok Ayuktas Bill” in 2011. However, IAC and Hazare asserted that the bill was a diluted version which did not achieve its objective of empowering the common citizen. It drove Hazare to announce a hunger strike on the 27th, 28th and the 29th of December. He also announced a jail bharoandolan (fill the jails) campaign which asked citizens to sign up to voluntarily court arrest. This campaign (while drawing inspiration from Mahatma Gandhi’s methods) used a website (http://www.jailchalo. com/) to sign up participants. People responded on Twitter, Facebook and this website to demonstrate their willingness to go to jail in response to Hazare’s call. While parliament was still drafting the bill, on December 27th, Hazare began a one-day fast in Mumbai demanding a stronger version of the Lok Pal bill. He and Kejriwal used this platform to declare that they would campaign against the Congress party in future elections. The rally had a low public turnout that was highlighted by the media, amid questions over whether the movement was now in terminal decline. On December 28th, because of the deteriorating health of Hazare, Team

Anna announced the closure of the fast and the Jail Bharo Campaign (“Anna Hazare calls of fast”, 2011). Post his recuperation, which was itself covered widely by the media, Hazare announced that he would continue his mission, starting with a fast seeking protection for whistle blowers. However, as election results from four states in March 2012 showed, neither corruption nor Team Anna had any impact on political discourse and outcomes. Hazare and IAC leaders conducted another ten-day fast at Delhi’s Jantar Mantar that ended on August 3, 2012, without achieving any of its Lok Pal bill-related goals. Thereupon, IAC leader Kejriwal announced that IAC would launch a political party and fight for reforms through the electoral process. This announcement led to a split in the IAC movement. After a series of talks with supporters, Hazare announced that he would not enter politics and even asked Kejriwal not to use his photo or name or IAC’s name while campaigning for the new party (Dhawan, 2012) Kejriwal thereafter launched a series of regular exposes of corruption targeting a cabinet minister and the President of the Bharatiya Janata Party (among others) which were widely covered in the media. On Mahatma Gandhi’s birthday, October 2, Kejriwal formally launched his yet unnamed party to much media fanfare. However, a few weeks later, he announced the new party’s name (Aam Aadmi or Common Man’s Party) to a lukewarm from a once adulatory media. At the time of writing, Hazare and the IAC and Kejriwal and his Aam Aadmi Party are at a crossroads. But the curtains are certainly down on Act I of a civil society movement that shook India over a two-year period.

ROLE OF PRINT AND TELEVISION MEDIA IN THE IAC CAMPAIGN Team Anna demonstrated a mastery over broadcast and print media. It played an agenda-setting role that was aided and abetted by a willing media hun-

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gry for breaking news, viewership and advertising revenues (Ninan, 2011)Team Anna’s aggressive media strategy was not matched by the government, which was thus pushed into a corner on the Lok Pal issue. Its media management was executed by television industry veterans in its core group of strategists and helped by its leaders’ readiness to participate in television discussions (Gandhi & Pandita, 2011). Key members included Manish Sisodia, a former producer with Zee News and Shazia Ilmi, a former Star News anchor, who had an insider’s knowledge of the operations of India’s TV channels. They laid out rules on what times of day and on which days to make announcements, how to dramatize events, and over how to avoid competition for media attention. For example, Team Anna avoided scheduling events when the nation was distracted by the popular Twenty20 World Cup cricket tournament. Team Anna also used an external media tracking agency to provide it feedback on news coverage and immediately worked out ways to refocus media coverage on their message whenever necessary (Kanwal, 2011). Team Anna also demonstrated a mastery over the use of symbols in political persuasion when they invited Hazare to lead the movement, thus creating “Brand Anna” (Verma & Swamy 2011; Sharma, 2011). A former soldier, Hazare had returned to his village and ushered in development through persuasive and coercive means. Living a life of simplicity, he had led anti-corruption movements in Maharashtra state which had led to the resignation of ministers accused of corruption. His dress, practices and lifestyle harked back to Mahatma Gandhi and he had the moral authority to successfully utilize Gandhian weapons of non-violent resistance, such as fasts (Sharma, 2006). Hazare was also not associated with any political party. He thus fulfilled many of the characteristics of a Weberian charismatic leader in the Indian context and his being nonpartisan added to his moral authority when the entire political class had declined in legitimacy. Mohanty (2011) argues that “[o]nly when Anna Hazare turned it into a mass campaign by going 246

on a fast and when the government’s unwise and most deplorable decision to arrest Anna created a massive groundswell of support, the dynamics of a mass upsurge began to unfold.” Team Anna took full advantage of the Indian media’s desire for controversial stories that sell. Public demonstrations were designed with visual appeal (e.g., candlelight processions). It created opportunities for different groups to join the protests by coordinating with a wide network of organizations and educational institutions.4 Team Anna’s careful choice of corruption as the key issue and its positioning of its Jan Lok Pal as the definitive solution5 enabled it to attract widespread support without indulging in partisan politics.6 The rhetoric of a second freedom movement was also a powerful draw and crowds constantly chanted slogans and sang patriotic songs from India’s independence struggle (Ananth, 2011). Children and adults alike started to wear Hazare’s characteristic white cap as a gesture of solidarity and stickers with “I am Anna” were displayed on vehicles across the country. All these provided visuals and new stories for the media every day. Print and television media in India, both English and vernacular, have been witnessing double digit growth over the last decade, spurred by rising literacy and incomes (PwC, 2007). Subscribers to English media are predominantly the urban, educated English-speaking middle and upper classes (Rajagopal, 2011). English media is criticized as reflecting middle class values (Teltumbde, 2011), aligning with corporate interests, and not paying attention to issues affecting rural India and the poor. Vernacular media is more inclusive, has wider viewership and has been supportive of movements by grassroots organizations (Ananth, 2011). English media has been able to trigger political activism, as demonstrated by a media-led campaign which brought urban middle and upper classes onto the streets of Delhi to pressurize the court to correct a potentially dubious legal verdict in the “Jessica Lall case.” (Samanta, 2008). Team Anna managed to draw the English and vernacular media together. The media painted an

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“us versus them” discourse where civil society (Hazare and Team Anna) was painted as good and political society as bad (Ananth, 2011). The English media made half-hearted, ineffective attempts to provide a space for criticizing the IAC movement. It also highlighted the urban middle class’s involvement and reported on the usage of new ICTs like blogs and Facebook [Kattakayam, 2011; Kurup, 2011). Overall, media coverage bordered on advocacy with the English media reverberating Hazare’s description of the movement as a second freedom struggle. Veteran activists such as Aruna Roy criticized the media for its narrow emphasis on the IAC movement, for downplaying critiques by activists who were against IAC’s methods and solution, and for not according similar coverage to tribal struggles and the longstanding hunger strike by Irom Sharmila against the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. (“Hazare’s movement lacked ideological tethering”, 2011). For example the Times group, one of the largest media houses in India, actively propagated Hazare’s image as the next “Gandhi” (Ananth, 2011). Its Times Now television channel projected and developed the image of Hazare as a crusader who stood on a higher moral ground. The group’s media outlets actively encouraged people to participate by introducing online polls, blogs and by airing videos of Hazare’s speech. Indeed, on the day of Hazare’s fast in April, all leading English news channels devoted their entire air time to report on the fast (Rajagopal, 2011).Despite a ceaseless barrage of news on Hazare and the IAC campaign, the media did not construct a dialogue on corruption and an assessment of the Lok Pal bill (Muralidharan, 2011). The discourse was built on the premise that the Lok Pal bill would eliminate all corruption. A report by the Television Audience Monitoring agency (TAM)7 reveals that the IAC movement had a significant impact on viewership and media content aired during the period of August 14-20, 2011. Compared to the week before, viewership nearly doubled during the period that Hazare fasted (Mukherjee, 2011). While Hindi news channels

reported an increase in viewership by 87 percent, English channels reported a 74 percent increase. The average time spent in a day watching Hindi and English news also increased by 98 percent during this week. The analysis also revealed that the IAC movement and Hazare accounted for 71.27 percent of the news content across ten prominent news channels during that period. Among the English news channels, Times Now gained the most in terms of viewership, with its share growing by eight per cent — to 37.8 per cent from the 35 per cent registered in the previous week. With increasing viewership comes increasing advertising revenue, thus making it a sound business decision for the media to provide the IAC movement the coverage it did.8 The TAM report also showed that coverage of Hazare took precedence over a simultaneous cricket tournament which reported a significantly lesser viewership and content sharing compared to the IAC movement (Mukherjee, 2011). Interestingly, television and print media outlets made extensive use of Internet and social media during their coverage of the IAC movement. Channels showed clips of Twitter feeds and opinions voiced on Facebook. They conducted opinion polls where viewers were asked to participate by sending SMSs to the channels. Television and print outlets’ websites carried blogs and additional material on the IAC movement, and were extensively used by viewers/readers to post their comments. Comments on articles relating to Hazare and the movement ranged from positive to critical, and comments were even expressed in vernacular languages like Hindi and Tamil, sometimes typed using the English script. The IAC movement’s success in managing the media ended when Hazare launched his fast in Mumbai on December 27th. Hazare was greeted by sparse crowds, numbering in the thousands, compared to the tens of thousands who attended his Delhi rallies. By this time, IAC and the government had reached an impasse over the Lok Pal bill and Team Anna was driven by public quarrels over whether to enter electoral politics. The clear distinction between the IAC movement and the 247

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political class started to get blurred Brand Anna (“Why Anna Hazare failed to attract crowds this time”, 2011). Thereafter the media turned critical of and less interested in the IAC movement. When Hazare and key members of Team Anna launched another fast in July 2012, media coverage dropped to a fifth of its level a year earlier (“Anna Hazare’s Protest Coverage Dips”, 2012). At that point, Kejriwal announced that he would launch a political party. He went on to maintain his record of obtaining extraordinary media coverage by unleashing a series of exposes targeting leading political figures. But soon thereafter Hazare and Kejriwal parted ways, thus ending the first phase of the IAC movement (Dhawan, 2012).

ONLINE AND SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGY In contrast to the IAC team’s ready mastery over print and broadcast media, its social media strategy was significantly “learning by doing” and built on previous anti-corruption campaigns. IAC’s online and social media strategy was led by Shivendra Chauhan, a journalist with experience with both television and online media,9 and thus proficient with newer technological platforms as well as pithy, newsworthy sound bites. Chauhan’s online activism had commenced during the corruption scandals surrounding the Commonwealth Games. By August 2010, Chauhan felt the need to do more than write critical stories on his official blog at the Navbharat Times10. He set up a Facebook page, www.facebook.com\cwjhel (jhel = suffering in Hindi) to raise awareness about the Games organizers’ misdeeds. Thanks to his promoting this Facebook page on his newspaper’s blog, it soon became the hub for critical posts, articles, videos, satirical pieces, poetry, and even a catchy “jhel rap” jazz composition. The online community spawned by this Facebook page turned out to very interactive. Key participants decided to take their anti-corruption campaign offline, spurred by a Greenpeace activ248

ist, Kapil Mishra. After a meeting, they created stickers for automobiles with catchy slogans against corruption. These were distributed at the campuses of Delhi University and Jawaharlal Nehru University and were also dispatched to other cities from where requests arrived. Thereafter, in October 2010, at a meeting of a few activists, Mishra introduced Chauhan to Kejriwal, who informed them that parliament was likely to pass a Lok Pal legislation in the forthcoming winter session. He wanted to ensure that the bill created a strong Lok Pal and that the perspective of civil society activists was taken into account. This small group decided to launch an awareness campaign and christened it “India Against Corruption” (IAC). Chauhan offered to take charge of an online campaign to promote awareness about this legislation. Taking the help of a design professional, he created a Facebook page: www.facebook.com/IndiaACor which preceded the creation of the IAC’s formal web site. He also took charge of handling IAC’s and Kejriwal’s email accounts, and created a Twitter handle, thus handling overall online communications for IAC. The website India Against Corruption (http:// www.indiaagainstcorruption.org/index1.html) was used to enable political mobilization online and offline. It contained information on the movement, on the Lok Pal bill, and had pictures and videos of the movement, Team Anna’s speeches and a discussion forum for people to air their views. City specific websites, e.g., in Bangalore and Chennai, were formed to provide locally-relevant information on the movement, while remaining hyper linked to the main website. The website also provided comprehensive information of other ways to connect with the movement. In another effective use of the internet, an online campaign website (Avaaz) recorded two signatories every second in support of the Jan Lok Pal bill during the 13 days of Hazare fast (Ullek, 2011). Chauhan started collating content on other corruption scandals on IAC’s Facebook page and it became the hub for updates from anti-corruption

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activists across India. When Hazare announced his plan to march from Ram Lila Ground to Jantar Mantar in Delhi on January 30 (the anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination), activists from 60 different cities announced on this page that they too would hold parallel marches. Chauhan also promoted the page and the event through mass emails to employees of various corporations, using a database that he had procured, and even secured responses from respected industry figures11.The Delhi march witnessed more than 10,000 participants, many of whom had learned about the event through the Facebook page or through the extensive media interviews with Kejriwal. Chauhan and his team set up a “control room” where they uploaded updates and pictures of the parallel marches across India in real time. These marches witnessed the participation of mainly the educated middle classes, with numbers also swelled by adherents of the Art of Living spiritual group founded by Sri Sri Ravi Shankar.12 Voluntary contributions enabled the marchers to carry banners with anti-corruption and pro-Jan Lok Pal slogans. Interestingly, by this time, there were virtual and real branches of IAC across the world, and Indian expatriates held parallel protests in the United States of America (Kumar, 2011).

When Hazare announced that he would launch a protest fast on April 5, the Facebook page became the hub for mobilization of supporters worldwide. Activists from about 350 Indian cities and towns, and more than 100 international cities used the platform to plan their activities. Thus the social media strategy had enabled a widespread network to be in place before the Hazare fast. When IAC activists learned of the government’s move to pre-emptively arrest Hazare, they had him record a video message to his supporters stating that he had been arrested and that they should come out onto the streets to protest. This was posted on Youtube as soon as Hazare was arrested. Further, when Kiran Bedi, a key IAC activist visited Hazare in Tihar jail, she recorded a video of her meeting which was also posted on Youtube. Posting videos on Youtube ensured wide viewership. A study by Bong, et al. (2012) using the IAC movement as a case study of social media momentum analyzed the relationship between posts, comments and “likes” on the Anna Hazare and India Against Corruption Facebook pages. As Figure 1 shows, IAC’s social media strategy witnessed tremendous and widespread participation.13 While India has many digital divides (relatively low penetration of Internet and dominance of English, accessible to a minority of Indians, on

Figure 1. Facebook activity per day: April 2011 to February 2012 (Source: Bong et al., 2012)

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the Internet), mobile telephony has truly democratized communication. India now has nearly 900 million mobile connections (not necessarily unique customers) (Appsolute wonder. 2012). The IAC team came up with the idea of asking people to register their support by making a “missed call” to designated numbers. (A missed call involves making a call and disconnecting, thus avoiding a charge). Through this method, IAC were able to generate more than 5 million missed calls from unique numbers. This exercise also enabled IAC to obtain a database of supporters’ numbers to which they thereupon sent bulk SMS (short message service) messages to promote the cause and announce events. (Sending out bulk SMSs cost the IAC nearly Rs. 5 million, which they raised through donations from volunteers). Interestingly, the government passed a regulation banning bulk SMSs after this development but that was bypassed by many users by utilizing servers outside the country. IAC also used cellphone service providers’ value added services to make the campaign more viral. Nearly 30% of cellphone users download ringtones (a song of their choice is used as the ringtone when others call them). IAC created a song (pass karojanlokpal) for the campaign which came in handy. Ringtone service actually costs money, but IAC’s team reasoned that since people were already paying for this money, all they needed to do was to encourage cellphone users to switch their selection to the IAC’s song. As a result, millions of people around the country heard this song when they made phone calls to friends who were supportive of the IAC campaign. As the movement evolved, the management of the Facebook page, website, Twitter handle, etc., was now handled by multiple administrators across the country (many of who had never met one another but had come together and developed mutual trust online). However, after Hazare’s December 2011 rally in Mumbai did not generate much support, the IAC movement moved toward a split between those advocating participation in

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electoral politics and those against. Thereupon Chauhan, an opponent of turning the movement into a political party, went ahead and removed the other administrators. This led to an acrimonious parting of ways with Kejriwal and supporters of the electoral politics initiative who went on to create new online properties under the title “Final War Against Corruption” and promoted it extensively at the Jantar Mantar fast of Hazare in April 5th. The impact of IAC’s social media efforts was magnified by the public. Individuals created Facebook pages, blogs and Youtube videos about the movement. They created online forums where people could voice their views. Facebook alone shows more than hundred pages devoted to Hazare. A Google search for Anti-Corruption Movement in India shows approximately 6,400,000 results. For Anna Hazare and Jan Lok Pal bill, Google shows 31,800,000 results and 5,040,000 results respectively14. It is noteworthy that Hazare dominates the number of search results compared to information on the bill or even the IAC movement itself. People also used mobile phones to further broadcast messages to their contacts, adding to the “viral” reach of IAC’s messages. Twitter was also used by IAC in its mobilization efforts. Twitter is a social medium created in 2006 as a microblogging service that allows users to post messages up to 140 characters. Twitter enables people to access instant and brief updates or information from news events to the lives of celebrities. IAC activists Kejriwal and Bedi and the Janlokpal movement have twitter accounts with more than 100,000 followers.15 When Hazare was arrested on August 16th, a Twitter onslaught ensued against the Government (“Aamir Khan, Bollywood support Anna Hazare”, 2011). Overall, Team Anna activists used ICTs in a multifaceted manner to reach out to 75,000 followers on Twitter, 15 million people on mobile phones, and half a million fans on Facebook (Kattakayam, 2011). These numbers indicate the reach of the IAC movement and its success at harnessing social media for political mobilization.

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CONCLUSION Looking back at the IAC movement, it clearly satisfies Tilly’s classic definition of social movements as involving a “series of interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support” (Tilly, 1984). The IAC movement’s extensive use of mainstream and new media also fits well with the resource mobilization literature’s emphasis on the need to go beyond the role of charismatic leaders to examine the centrality of “rationality, resources, networks of solidarity, continuities between unruly challengers and institutionalized politics, and the central role of movements in generating social change” (Jenkins, 1986). IAC could not have launched a nationwide public mobilization against corruption without tremendous organizational capacity and reach. Here, Team Anna took advantage of the existing networks of the Right-to-Information movement which had activists across India16. It was also able to tap into the well-oiled nationwide networks of followers of spiritual leaders Baba Ramdev and of Sri Sri Ravi Shankar, who seem to want to extend their influence to secular issues such as better governance. It also benefited from the active participation of members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a politico-religious organization affiliated to the opposition BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP), through much of 2011 (Verma & Swamy 2011)17. The IAC movement also succeeded in getting India’s urban middle and upper classes to re-engage with the political process after three decades during which these sections entrenched themselves in the bureaucracy, media and private sector but distanced themselves from active politics [Yadav 1999; Mawdsley, 2004). Team Anna, whose members are drawn from these sections, was

able to frame issues and manage an agitation in a manner that went beyond these sections to attract mass support. In so doing, Team Anna improved over recent mobilizations, e.g., against quotas for other backward classes, which were seen as serving the self interest of entrenched middle and upper classes (Gowda, 2008). Sitapaty (2011, p. 43-44) sums up the reasons for the potency of the IAC movement: “It was able to employ Gandhian motifs to popularise an urban middle class worry that has had, until now, less currency in the rest of India. The strong legal tinge to the movement – and the legal credentials of the activists in the movement – ensures that it is able to suggest tangible legislative changes in terms of clauses and sections. The energy and acumen of India Shining [India’s elites] gave the movement its media-savviness and heft. … Yet, the middle class strands supporting the movement give us pause. None of them have any problem with the unrepresentative nature of the movement or the draconian powers given to the Lok Pal. No matter how earnest, India’s middle class has yet to view the political class as legitimate, the party system as the main way to achieve programmatic changes. Until that happens, middle class activism will be consciously set up in opposition to electoral politics, rather than as a potent force within it.” Epilogue: While Hazare stayed away from electoral politics, the section of the IAC movement led by Kejriwal had formed a new political party called the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in October 2012. In December 2013, the AAP made a spectacular electoral debut in the elections to the legislative assembly of the city-state of Delhi. Continuing with its creative campaigning and buoyed by the participation of erstwhile IAC volunteers from around India and the world, the AAP secured 28 seats in the 70 member legislative assembly (Kumar & Kumar, 2013). If its success influences parliament to establish a strong Lok Pal to combat corruption, Kejriwal’s AAP will have accomplished the goals of the original IAC movement (Yadav, 2012).

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Hindu. (2011a, January 21). Hazare’s movement lacked ideological tethering: Aruna Roy. The Hindu. Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/ news/national/article2820353.ece Hindu. (2011b, June 5). Police bans Ramdev from entering Delhi for 15 days. The Hindu. Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ article2079134.ece Hindu. (2011c, April 14). Ramdev to launch people’s movement to root out corruption. The Hindu Online Ed. Retrieved from http://www.hindu. com/2011/04/14/stories/2011041453631100.htm HT Media Limited. (2011, June 5). Anna to fast in support of Baba Ramdev. Hindustan Times. Retrieved from http://www.hindustantimes.com/ India-news/NewDelhi/Anna-to-fast-in-supportof-Baba-Ramdev/Article1-706052.aspx

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India Today. (2011, April 29). VHP supplied ration to Anna Hazare’s supporters at Ramlila Maidan: Singhal. India Today. Retrieved fromhttp:// indiatoday.intoday.in/story/anna-hazare-ramlilamaidan-vishwa-hindu-parishad/1/149404.html Jeelani, M. (2011, September 1). The Insurgent. Caravan Magazine. Retrieved from http://www. caravanmagazine.in/Story.aspx?Storyid=1050& StoryStyle=FullStory Jenkins, J. C. (1986). Stirring the Masses: Indigenous Roots of the Civil Rights Movement. Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews, 15(3), 354-357. Jenkins, R. (2007). Civil society versus corruption. Journal of Democracy, 18(2), 55–69. doi:10.1353/ jod.2007.0026 Joshi, S. (2011, April 7). Support Pours in For Hazare’s Movement. The Hindu. Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ article1606249.ece Kanwal, R. (2011, August 18). A think-tank brings Anna the eyeballs. India Today. Retrieved from http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/anna-hazaresmedia-strategy-decoded/1/148483.html Kattakayam, J. (2011, August 24). Social Networking Sites Helping Team Anna. The Hindu. Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/news/ cities/Delhi/article2391856.ece Kumar, A. (2011, August 22). Indian Americans Rally in Anna Hazare’s Support. DNA: Daily News & Analysis. Retrieved from http://www. dnaindia.com/india/report_indian-americansrally-in-anna-hazare-s-support_1578597 Kumar, N., & Kumar, V. (2013, December 9). AAP humbles Congress, stops BJP in its tracks. The Hindu. Retrieved from http://www.thehindu. com/news/national/aap-humbles-congress-stopsbjp-in-its-tracks/article5433393.ece

Kurup, D. (2011, April 11). How Web 2.0 responded to Hazare. The Hindu. Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/news/states/karnataka/ article1685157.ece Levien, M. (2007). India’s Double-Movement: Polanyi and the National Alliance of People’s Movements. Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 51, 119–149. Mawdsley, E. (2004). India’s Middle Classes and the Environment. Development and Change, 35(1), 79–103. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2004.00343.x Mohanty, M. (2011). People’s Movement and The Anna Upsurge. Economic and Political Weekly, 46(38), 16–19. Mukherjee, S. (2011, August 26). News channels strike it rich amid anti-corruption stir. Business Standard. Retrieved from http://www.businessstandard.com/india/news/news-channels-strikeit-rich-amid-anti-corruption-stir/447092/ Muralidharan, S. (2011). Media as an echo chamber. Economic and Political Weekly, 46(37), 19–22. New Delhi Television. (2011, March 28). Dandi March II in US against corruption in India. NDTV. Retrieved from http://www.ndtv.com/article/ india/dandi-march-ii-in-us-against-corruptionin-india-94692 Ninan, S. (2011, August 27). Media Matters: The people multiplier. The Hindu. Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/ Sevanti_Ninan/article2395833.ece Paul, A., Gopinathan, V., & Mathew, V. (2011, April 7). Anti-corruption drive gathers storm in Bangalore. DNA: Daily News Analysis. Retrieved from http://www.dnaindia.com/bangalore/ report_anti-corruption-drive-gathers-storm-inbangalore_1529200

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PwC. (2007). Indian Entertainment and Media Industry A Growth Story Unfolds. Retrieved from http://www.pwc.com/en_IN/in/assets/pdfs/ indian-entertainment-media-industry-growthstory-unfolds.pdf Rajagopal. (2011). A Visibility as a Trap in the Anna Hazare Campaign. Economic and Political Weekly, 46(47), 20-21. Samanta, N. (2008). Trial by Media – Jessica Lal Case. National University of Juridical Sciences (NUJS) Working Papers (March). http://dx.doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.1003644 Sankaran, S. R. (2010). The Rebirth of the National Advisory Council. Economic and Political Weekly, 45(34), 10–12. Sastry, T. (2004). Electoral Reforms and Citizens’ Initiatives. Economic and Political Weekly, 1, 1391–1397. Sharma, M. (2006). The Making of Moral Authority: Anna Hazare and Watershed Management Programme in Ralegan Siddhi. Economic and Political Weekly, 41(20), 1981–1988. Sharma, S. (2011, August 29). Anna Among top 10 brands online. Times of India. Retrieved from http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Anna-among-top-10-brands-online/ articleshow/9774818.cms Siasat Daily. (2011, March 13). Drive around Delhi to demand strong Lok Pal Bill. The Siasat Daily. Retrieved from http://www.siasat.com/ english/news/drive-around-delhi-demand-strongLok Pal-bill Sitapaty, V. (2011). What Anna Hazare’s Movement and India’s Middle Classes Say about Each Other. Economic and Political Weekly, 46(30), 39–44.

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Sunayana Communication. (2012, August 5). Anna Hazare’s Protest Coverage Dips by 5 Times During Prime Time News: CMS. Media Khabar. Retrieved from http://english.mediakhabar.com/ index.php/media-articles/38-media-articles/158anna-hazares-protest-coverage-dips-by-5-timesduring-prime-time-news-cms-media-lab-studyTeltumbde, A. (2011). Fasts, Hunger and Hunger Strikes. Economic and Political Weekly, 46(26), 10–11. Tilly, C. (1984). Social Movements and National Politics. In C. Bright, & S. Harding (Eds.), State making and Social Movements (pp. 297–317). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Times Group. (2011a, April 6). Aamir Khan, Bollywood support Anna Hazare. The Times of India. Retrieved from http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-04-06/india/29388014_1_effectsystemic-change-absolute-supporter-country-ofcorrupt-schmoozers Times Group. (2011b, December 28). Anna Hazare calls of fast, cancels jail bharo campaign. The Times of India. Retrieved from http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-1228/ india/30564941_1_jail-bharo-anna-hazaregeneral-elections Times Group. (2011c, August 1). Brand Anna: Why Anna Hazare failed to attract crowds this time. The Economic Times. Retrieved from http:// articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-0801/news/32981510_1_social-media-brand-annaanna-hazare Times Group. (2012, July 2). Appsolute wonder. The Times of India. Retrieved from http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-07-02/ news/32507740_1_mobile-app-mobile-connections-mobile-phones

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Ullek, N. P. (2011, September 4). Avaaz founder Ricken Patel: The man who gives you your voice. The Economic Times. Retrieved fromhttp:// articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/201109-04/news/30110248_1_citizen-journalistscampaigns-ads Verma, S., & Swamy, V. K. (2011, August 21). A brand is born. The Telegraph Calcutta India. Retrieved from http://www.telegraphindia. com/1110821/jsp/7days/story_14403973.jsp Yadav, Y. (1999). Electoral Politics in the Time of Change – India’s Third Electoral System 19891999. Economic and Political Weekly, 34(34/35), 2393–2399. Yadav, Y. (2012, August 22). Imagining a new national politics. The Hindu. Retrieved from http:// www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/imagining-anew-national-politics/article3804296.ece

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Apolitical: Describes an uninterestedness and lack of alignment to political ideologies. Civil Society: Is a generic term to describe a composite of social actors who are not part of the Government. These social actors may include private corporations, non-governmental organisations, social groups, and community groups. Civil societies at large work with vision of bettering the society. Mass Media: It refers to a diverse range of communication mediums to reach out to large populations. These include televisions, radios and newspapers. NGOs: Non-Governmental organisations are those organisations that are neither Government institutions nor profit making corporations. NonGovernmental organisations primarily focus on community and society welfare related activities.

Political Mobilization: It refers to the process by which an actor(s) motivates and organises a mass in support of a political agenda and towards political action of the same. Rally: A form of protest that involves assembling of masses in support of a change in society. Social Media: It refers primarily to interaction platforms that depend on virtual mediums like Twitter, Facebook, and other online forums. Social Movements: The assembly of organised and unorganised groups of people who have an agenda towards reformation or changing of society and institutions through political, religious and other social ideologies.

ENDNOTES

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Interview with Ashwin Mahesh, member of national committee, India Against Corruption, 2011 In addition to Kejriwal, Team Anna included the Supreme Court lawyers Shanti Bhushan, a former Union Law Minister and his son Prashant Bhushan, both of whom had a track record of pursuing public interest litigation, the ombudsman of the state of Karnataka, former Supreme Court judge, Santosh Hegde, an activist fighting for people’s causes who wore the saffron robes of a religious order, Swami Agnivesh, India’s first woman police chief, Kiran Bedi, among others. This group was also supported by Shazia Ilmi and Shivendra Chauhan who had expertise in television and social media production. The larger India Against Corruption national committee created a network of anti-corruption activists in different cities across India. The bill was initially proposed in 1969. However, it was not passed in the upper house of parliament, the Rajya Sabha. The

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bill was subsequently introduced in 1971, 1977, 1985, 1889, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2008 but has never been passed Some schools and colleges allowed their students to miss classes to participate in the protests. Muralidharan (2011) points out Team Anna did not countenance any alternative to its conception of ombudsman embodied in the Jan Lok Pal bill and those who raised such questions were criticized for disrupting civil society’s unity. This led to a rift with the other civil society leaders such as Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey who had been piloting an alternative draft of the ombudsman legislation in the NAC (“Its Anna vs Aruna as rift in civil society shows”, Business Standard). Muralidharan (2011) also points out that the audience of a television show unanimously raised hands in support of the Jan Lok Pal bill but not a single hand went up when the follow up question was asked: had any of these supporters of the bill actually read it! The data involved viewership of the following news channels, a mix of Hindi and English: AajTak, Headlines Today, CNN IBN, IBN 7, India TV, NDTV 24/7, NDTV India, STAR News, Times Now and Zee News. According to Esha News Service, which monitors and analyzes broadcast media, Hazare’s April 2011 fast generated 655 hours of television coverage, enabling news channels to raise $38 million through advertising. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/ world-south-asia-14660513 Interview with Shivendra Chauhan.Chauhan had been part of the online initiatives of the Times of India group of media companies and thereafter had managed the website, e-magazine and e-newsletter of the Osho World Foundation. He had also worked as a copy editor for the television channels, AajTak and IBN7.



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Navbharat Times is part of the Times Group and one of India’s largest circulation Hindi newspapers. These included Azim Premji of WIPRO, the office of Ratan Tata, and E. Sreedharan of the Delhi Metro, who all emailed expressing support for the IAC campaign. Some of them had been part of a group that had raised the issue of corruption in an open letter to the Prime Minister. Many respected Indians participated—Sant Vaswani and Vinita Deshmukh in Pune, N Gopalaswamy in Chennai, JM Lyngdoh and Jayaprakash Narayan in Hyderabad. Amar (undated), in his case study of the Anna Hazare movement’s activity on Facebook, presents the following statistics: Between August 4-31, 2011, its official India Against Corruption Facebook site witnessed 4.3 million (non-unique) active users who generated 304 million page impressions for its news feed, 1.9 million “likes” and 0.33 million comments. This made the site the most popular Facebook page in the world. The majority of the “likes” (86%) were from India and the rest from the United States of America. The participation from India was drawn mainly from the 18-24 age group and from India’s biggest cities. Amar (undated) also points out that there was also substantial traffic and discussion on other Facebook pages dedicated to the Anna Hazare movement. As of February 11th 2012, 9:30 p.m. (Indian Standard Time) The followers and the following: Twitter enables one to obtain information from people or “feeds” of interest by “following” them; when someone else follows one’s feeds, they become “followers.” IAC itself follows1 a broad profile of news feeds, journalists, celebrities and athletic stars, including the actor Aamir Khan, writer-diplomat-turned-

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politician Shashi Tharoor and media veteran, Pritish Nandy. In this connection, it is worth noting Jenkins and Goetz’s (1999) perspective on the role of networks in the success of the RTI movement led by Aruna Roy, Nikhil Dey and the MKSS: “MKSS’s local success and wider influence has been at least partly the result of its skill in developing a network of support within the elite IAS, among Delhi-based intellectuals and activists, and within the regional and national media. Press coverage, influenced by the extremely thoughtful and articulate people associated with the MKSS, has contributed enormously to linking the idea of a right to information with debates



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on governance and transparency. The MKSS’ s success in forging this support network, in turn, stems largely from the personal and professional connections of its most well known leader, the elite-level contacts of several people associated with the MKSS afford its activities a degree of protection which would doubtless be lacking for other groups operating in less fortuitous circumstances.” Senior government ministers were carried away by their suspicion that VHP and BJP activists were hijacking the movement and this led them to underplay the support to the movement and make key mistakes in responding to it.

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Chapter 16

Corruption in the Public Eye: From Transparency to Publicity Elitza Katzarova University of Trento, Italy

ABSTRACT What role is there for publicity in the global anti-corruption debate? This chapter introduces the concepts of “transparency” and “publicity” as analytical tools that account for differentiated channels through which the availability of information can induce social change. Two case studies provide insights into the role of traditional media in comparison to new social media. The first case analyzes the role of Western news coverage during the negotiations of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the mid-1990s and the threat of publicity as a negotiation strategy. The second case investigates the role of social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube in the success of the anti-corruption strike carried out by Indian social activist Anna Hazare in 2011. By introducing and further applying the conceptual toolkit of “transparency” and “publicity” to both cases, this chapter argues that transparency requires publicity or in the case of the OECD negotiations — the threat of publicity — in order for the anticorruption campaign to be successful. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the ramifications for transparency and publicity as tools for social change.

INTRODUCTION Transparency is a concept that is heard ever more frequently in public and academic debates. While ‘more transparent-than-thou’ has become synonymous with ‘holier-than-thou’ (Hood, 2006, 9), the fervor of some proponents of transparency often obscures the ideological instrumentalization of the term as a tool for promoting less regulation (Etzioni, 2010). Transparency is heralded by some of its avid supporters as a social empowerment tool

that will almost completely extinguish the need for government regulation. It is noteworthy that the concept of transparency is heralded by both corporations and anti-globalization activists, by proponents of stringent government regulation and their laissez-faire critics. Its promotion as a substitute for regulation by the latter group is based on the assumption that due to policies of disclosure, well-informed citizens will take on the role of public regulators in a world where less and less government restrictions will be needed

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch016

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for democratic and efficient governance (Etzioni, 2010). This hypothesis, while sometimes bracketing the transaction costs of processing disclosed information, recreates a ‘harmony of interests’ in which information equalizes power asymmetries and empowers citizens as guardians of the public interest. This chapter argues that transparency and publicity form a constant couple. Publicity is required both for ‘furthering’ and ‘activating’ transparency. Publicity as a social tool is indispensable in pushing for further transparency because it addresses the problem of power asymmetry in state-society relations. Once further transparency through a successful anti-corruption campaign or reform has been achieved, publicity is also necessary to ‘activate’ the benefits from the reform. In order to differentiate transparency and publicity, the article repackages the concepts, by taking away characteristics that are assumed to be an inherent part of transparency and investing them in a refurbished concept of publicity based on a Habermasian reading of the public sphere. Two case studies are discussed that reveal the use of publicity in furthering transparency. The first case analyzes the role of Western media coverage during the negotiations of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in the mid-nineties and the threat of publicity as a negotiation strategy. The second case study investigates the role of social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube in the anti-corruption strike carried out by Indian social activist Anna Hazare in 2011. By introducing and further applying the conceptual toolkit of ´transparency´ and ´publicity´ to both cases, this chapter argues that transparency requires publicity and that successful anti-corruption campaigning in order to further transparency depends on publicity. The two cases take place at different levels of analysis and are selected for providing insights about the role of traditional media in comparison to social media.

FROM TRANSPARENCY TO PUBLICITY, AND BACK? Transparency is a multi-faceted concept, which comes in weaker and stronger varieties. More broadly transparency can be defined as ‘increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social, and political information’ available to the plurality of stakeholders (Kaufman & Vishwanath, 2001, p.42). Public transparency refers to the provision of public access to the dealings and structure of a given institution. This could be a governmental body, a transnational corporation, a public school, or a private hospital (Heald, 2006). Another side of the definition of transparency has to do with evaluating performance and concerns ‘the release of information by institutions that is relevant to evaluating those institutions’ (Florini, 1999, p.5). This chapter stresses the passivity of the availability of information in both weaker and stronger definitions of transparency and delimitates policies of transparency as potentially positive, yet passive in nature, with publicity being the ‘activating’ agent for transparency reforms. Transparency is a multi-faceted concept that also appears to be multi-directional. Heald (2006) proposes a typology of transparency along vertical (upwards and downwards) and horizontal (inwards and outwards) axes. In a societal, rather than organizational context, downwards transparency allows citizens to observe authorities and demand accountability and upwards transparency allows the authorities to observe the public.1 Thus for citizens a constant negotiation between surveillance as a form of transparency and privacy is at hand (Brin, 1998). The ‘visibility’ in a hypothetical ‘transparent society’ goes both ways - from the citizens towards the authorities and from the authorities towards the citizens. Therefore, an ongoing struggle exists for civil society to keep the right balance. What is sometimes neglected in the transparency debate is not only its upward manifestation in the form of surveillance but also

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the power asymmetries inherent to transparency. It might be the case that in a society where both downwards and upwards forms of transparency have to coexist, governments simply have more resources at their disposal than citizens. The assumption that the citizens’ ‘right to know’ can be satisfied by transparency alone is therefore misplaced. Self-reporting is an effective yet troublesome method for making information available since incentives for manipulative disclosure abound (Mitchell, 1998). In order for available information to be reliably processed, ‘other-reporting’ has to complement self-reporting and for that at least three more conditions are necessary - expertise, time and financial resources. Research in the field of economics has concentrated on the problem of accessibility of information in terms of transaction costs (Etzioni, 2010). Organized civil society is the most likely candidate to pay the transaction costs for processing available information. Traditional media usually have the necessary resources at their disposal and employ them in presenting news to the public while simultaneously serving as interpreters of information. Social media platforms are more inclusive and decentralized, but the socially significant information saturating them still has to be obtained and interpreted which sometimes requires a significant investment in terms of time and/or financial resources. The investment goes both ways – it is essential for furthering transparency and setting standards for public disclosure and for translating the information once the reform has been achieved. For example, the Global Transparency Initiative (GTI) advocates further transparency in international financial institutions (‘Global Transparency Initiative’, 2012). In order to do this, the GTI has to create and maintain an online resource that makes the available data understandable. The success of the initiative also requires grants for advocacy and research as well as expertise in the work of international financial institutions. Without the network of partner organi-

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zations serving as ‘translators’ of this information to the public, the data would remain obscure and unusable for broader civil society. Stiglitz (2002) argues that governments have the tendency to manipulate information in a game of facilitation and restriction. The central piece of the puzzle lies in the privileged position of the government as the repository and dispenser of information, the flow of which it regulates. Paradoxically, governments have a strong incentive to manipulate the disclosure of information because transparency can reduce public confidence in the competence of government simply by exposing the chaotic process of policy making to public scrutiny. Therefore, ‘effective communication’ often becomes the central piece of a government strategy to increase legitimacy and public trust (O’Neill, 2006). If publicity is limited, however, to the production of clear, yet potentially biased messages from government officials or corporations, the standards of transparency will be decreased through manipulative disclosure. Thus, the notion of publicity as a top-down process, in which the public is the recipient of wellprocessed messages, appears problematic.2 Publicity in the sense of making discussions truly public with the help of intermediaries remains relevant as a check on governments and corporations by the broader public. Organized civil society becomes an essential channel for such control and debates. The responsibility of the interpreters to expose blatant or sophisticated attempts at ‘window-dressing’ becomes essential.3 The complexity and detail of disclosure documents, which sometimes have been drafted by professional lawyers, could not readily be translated into clear, accessible information without the services of social ‘interpreters’. Yet, the public has to remain skeptical towards these intermediaries’ objectives. Etzioni (2010) suggests that the solution to the problem may lay in regulating the intermediaries. This alternative appears problematic, however, because it places one more layer of regulation (between the ‘raw’

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data and citizens) without guaranteeing pluralism of opinions. Essentially, if we come up with one additional guard to guard each guard, regulation would raise ad infinitum. Implicit in the concept of transparency is that visibility equals knowledge but the interpretation of information entails transaction costs. Social interpreters of information who are in position to meet the transaction costs could gain asymmetrical power similar to that which needs checking in governments. If these intermediaries are to be held accountable in some way and if regulation is not to increase ad infinitum, active and informed citizenship becomes essential. In a ‘transparent’ society, however this ideal citizen has a lot of tasks to handle. On the one hand, citizens have to find time, gain knowledge and expertise in a variety of complex governance issues in order to knowledgeably scrutinize the behavior of institutions and avoid being misled by ‘interpreters’, who might be concealing a hidden agenda. On the other hand, citizens have to keep in check the demands for furthering upwards transparency that are imposed on them by public authorities. Upwards transparency often takes the form of surveillance and ever more frequently works through the very tools of civil society empowerment - that are the social media platforms themselves. In order to stress the passivity of ‘transparency’ this chapter proposes the concept of publicity as a necessary tool for ‘furthering’ and ‘activating’ transparency. The chapter argues that what is usually assumed as an inherent part of transparency can be better conceptualized as publicity. This distinction is not made for the sake of proliferation of concepts, but in order to stress the potential passivity of transparency alone which is due to two primary factors 1) knowledge has a cost and 2) knowledge requires ‘interpreters’ who acquire asymmetrical power. While knowledge has often been seen as a ‘power equalizer’, this knowledge, even with the paradigmatic shift attained by social media that offer low-cost storage for information and place for debate, does

not come free. Interpretation of information and deliberation require investment at least in terms of time and expertise. This can be seen as the Utopian side of the transparency debate, the part where the concept of transparency inadvertently leads us to the ideal of deliberative democracy and active citizenship. Publicity is not only necessary for ‘activating’ transparency as a tool for social change, but also for promoting government accountability and furthering transparency in the first place. Demands for furthering transparency in government not only benefit from, but also actually require publicity as the two case studies demonstrate. Transparency and publicity as tools for social change can therefore be seen as two concepts involved in a constant cycle where publicity is needed to further reforms that increase transparency and for the benefits of these reforms to be reaped further publicity is required anew. The question however remains as to what kind of publicity?

RECONSTRUCTING CONCEPTUALLY TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLICITY This section demarcates the borders and maps the theoretical interaction between the concepts of ‘transparency’ and ‘publicity’ before applying them to two cases that present the role of publicity in achieving further transparency of national public authorities and of global economic governance. This section answers the question ‘what kind of publicity?’ by adopting a normative approach based on Habermas and briefly tackles the contraarguments of his critics. Transparency is inherently connected to anticorruption since one of the main expected benefits of public transparency is a less corrupt and more efficient government. To put it in the words of Bentham (1843) ‘the eye of the public makes the statesman virtuous’ (10: 227)4. While Bentham’s formulation, informs the title of this article, the

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notion of publicity in the late 18th and early 19th century was quite different than the current one. Habermas in his analysis of the transformations of the public sphere depicts the drastic change that occurred in the late 19th and the 20th century, which led to the end of the liberal public sphere in which informed and critical public discourse was the main tool for monitoring public authorities. The public sphere was transformed from a space of critical public debate into a ‘field of competition among conflicting interests’ where organized civil society bargains on behalf of its constituencies but excludes the general public from the discussion (McCarthy, 1991, xii). This is how, according to Habermas (1991), the concept of ‘publicity’ was redefined as ‘whatever attracts public opinion’ and the liberal public sphere ideal of scrutinizing authority through ‘informed discussion’ was lost (p. 2). The discussion of Bentham and Habermas is relevant to the concepts of transparency and publicity, because some contemporary interpretations of transparency resonate with the benevolent effect that ‘panopticon’ transparency was assumed to possess. ‘Panopticon’ transparency and publicity are Bentham’s solutions to the problem of ‘who guards the guards’ (Harrison, 1983).5 However, while Habermas discovers in Bentham the possibility for rational discourse, Foucault finds in the panopticon only the disciplinary eyes of power (Gaonkar & McCarthy, 1994). Foucault is critical of the ability of transparency to exude control over authorities since it is precisely through ‘visibility’ that modern power exerts its influence. The contemporary repackaging of publicity does not constrain power either, since it simply provides an opportunity to witness the functioning of institutions that through their very transparency manage to exert more control over the public (Foucault, 1977). The primary function of the panopticon is, therefore, to induce a sense of ‘visibilty that assures the automatic functioning of power’ (p.201). Habermas disagrees with Foucault’s treatment of the role of power, but the

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critical stance of Foucault provides a valuable check on the idealistic tendencies of the theory of communicative action. A Foucauldian based critique of publicity would point to the nonrational side of public discourse, to the hidden interests and the argument of ‘validity’, proven not through the substance, but through the ‘mode of communication e.g., eloquence, hidden control, rationalisation, charisma, using dependency relations between participants--rather than through rational arguments concerning the matter at hand’ (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002, 47). The normative expectations from the Habermasian public is that consensus would be reached through ‘argumentative rationality’ and amidst an ‘ideally expanded audience’ (1996, p.322). Central to the notion of Habermasian publicity is requiring further transparency and publicity from governmental and other institutions. Maxwell (2010) criticizes the demand for transparency and publicity as detrimental to the task of replenishing the public sphere. The skepticism of Habermas (1991) himself for the reinvigoration of the public sphere, however, comes from the role of traditional media as agents of manipulative publicity since the commercial ‘media became the gate through which privileged private interests invaded the public sphere’ (p.185). ‘Manipulative publicity’ compromises the public sphere by taking away the substance of rational public discourse and using publicity simply as a tool for sanctioning authorities. Furthermore, rational arguments are translated into a simplistic ‘yes or no’ debate where identification rather than argumentation is the principle modus operandi of the public: ‘even arguments are translated into symbols to which again one can not respond by arguing but only by identifying with them’ (p.206). In order to clarify the implicit distinctions that Habermas makes between different types of publicity, it would be useful to distinguish between ‘manipulative’ and ‘deliberative’ publicity. Deliberative publicity may appear paradoxical since ‘if deliberation is about transforming preferences, and

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publicity forces you to know what you want and stand by your position, then “public deliberation” is something of a contradiction in terms’ (Naurin, 2003,p.32). Yet, the concept of deliberative or also critical publicity, which Habermas implicitly endorses, provides a useful contrast to the concept of manipulative or staged publicity that has triumphed over the contemporary public sphere. This distinction provides two lenses through which to see the case studies – one of normative and another of empirical nature and to a certain extent incorporates the Foucauldian critique as part of the analysis. Manipulative publicity becomes the most obvious channel through which authorities restrict and manipulate information and exert control over the public. At the same time, manipulative publicity is not all encompassing as Foucault could have suggested. Deliberative publicity could still exist in an autonomous ideal public sphere where informed rational discussions recognize and dismiss manipulative publicity for what it is. Transparency becomes useful as a tool for strengthening democratic institutions and promoting social change if it is accompanied by deliberative publicity, in the form of informed debates engaging the broader public. Most importantly, both manipulative and deliberative publicity can become tools for furthering transparency and providing an almost revolutionary impetus for reform. Thus, transparency and publicity become intertwined as tools for social change. The strength of new social media platforms is that they empower the broader public without necessitating traditional media or any other established interpreter who can employ manipulative publicity and distort public debates. In the case of Anna Hazare, the role of the traditional media does not contradict the type of discourse and activity prompted by new social media, but rather complements it. The time difference between the two cases shows that the role of traditional media in the mid-nineties was to ‘inform’ the public or even make possible the use of public opinion as part of a bargaining

strategy. The fact that this bargaining strategy was generally in the interest of the public does not undermine the problem that this use of ‘publicity’ instrumentalizes the public rather than include it in the debate. The value added of social media is that the public acquires a relative independence from the media and from the government and involves individuals directly. The scope of involvement becomes broader, as not only organized civil society has the means of planning and carrying out organized action efficiently. Buzzwords like ‘transparency’ often attract critics who refute the claim of such concepts as the panacea for all social ills. Publicity is another similar conceptual construct, which has been part of the academic vocabulary for more than a century. Dean (2002) argues that publicity has become part of the narrative of a technocratic economic elite that aims for concealment rather than disclosure. Thus, she calls for the abandonment of publicity as a solution to every social problem.6 This chapter does not promote the argument that transparency should be abandoned for the sake of publicity, but rather analyzes the way in which the two work together in providing impetus for social change. For the purpose of refurbishing both transparency and publicity, the chapter adopts a definition of transparency that stresses the passivity of the conceptual construct and therefore refuses the claims of automaticity that are sometimes attributed to policies of transparency. Publicity is therefore the ‘activating agent’, which makes transparency reforms functional. This publicity is divided between manipulative and deliberative and while both varieties are potentially beneficial it is only the latter that is normatively desirable according to the Habermasian reading of the public sphere. Publicity is not only necessary for ‘activating’ transparency as a tool for social change, but also for promoting government accountability and furthering transparency in the first place. With the risk of oversimplifying the main elements of this modified conceptualization, deliberative publicity means involving the broader public and promot-

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ing informed discussions not only as a check on government authority and private business, but also as a source for policy recommendations. In order to make the principle of transparency functional, the inclusion of the broader public and the pluralism of information interpreters are essential in order to diminish manipulative publicity. Social media give the possibility to further democratize and revive the public sphere by involving a higher percentage of individuals in public forums and debates. The crucial question remains whether in the transparency and anti-corruption debate, the rational deliberative publicity that Habermas envisions is feasible? The two case studies begin to shed light on this question and discuss how traditional media and social media differ in ‘binding together’ publicity and transparency.

PIONEERING A MORE TRANSPARENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF PUBLICITY IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions is a centerpiece of the global anti-corruption and transparency movement. The Convention, signed in 1997, was the first manifestation of a rising global consensus against corruption, which until the mid-nineties was not a subject of discussion in international organizations7. The adoption of the Convention was also decisive for building international consensus against corruption and the subsequent emergence of a global anti-corruption norm (McCoy, 2001). The very notion of ‘transparency’ was established during the negotiation as a concept that allowed getting all stakeholders on board. In the 1990s as the price of bribes was steadily rising, business actors started recognizing bribery as a significant barrier to trade (Pieth & Low, 2007). Bribery made markets less transparent and thus made it

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difficult for a potential investor to calculate the costs of entering a new market. The connection to the concept of ‘market transparency’ made it possible for the issue of anti-bribery to be seen as beneficial to all – public and private actors alike. The OECD Convention was the first international legal instrument banning transnational bribery, which was occurring in a legal vacuum until the adoption of the Convention. The market of global bribery was paradoxically intransparent because it was hidden under the cover of its own legality. The negotiations about unveiling and illegalizing ‘illicit payments’ (the name with which bribery figured for decades in the archival documents of the OECD and the UN) was meeting notoriously tough opposition and was dropped off the agenda several times in a time frame of twenty years. The attempt to address the issue of corruption and help eradicate bribery might have failed again in the mid-nineties if it wasn’t for one essential ingredient. Banning transnational bribery was a cornerstone on the road to a more transparent and just global economy and one of the main factors that allowed the signing of the OECD Convention in 1997 was publicity. Culminating in 1994, an alarming number of corruption accusations in OECD member states saturated traditional media. From the ‘cash for questions’ affair in the United Kingdom, the ‘Carrignon affair’ and the subsequent Seguin Law against corruption in France to the three ministerial resignations in Spain, the European public was shaken by what one observer called a ‘corruption eruption’ (Naim, 1995). All of these domestic cases of alleged corruption occurred in the mid-1990s and lead the Financial Times to categorize 1995 as the ‘Year of Corruption‘, but the following years could have easily qualified for the same category (Tanzi, 1998). A joint survey of FT, The Economist and New York Times expressed quantitatively the saturation of traditional media with the problem of corruption showing that there has been a fourfold increase in reporting on corruption between 1984 and 1995 (Moore, 1997).

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These developments provided a favorable climate for the discussions at the OECD in the mid-1990s. Initially the US did not mean to use this public revulsion across Europe surrounding corruption scandals as a tool in the OECD negotiation, but it appeared that the threat of publicity was a very successful tactic to overcome resistance in the European partners. Daniel Tarullo, the US State Department representative and chief US negotiator during the OECD discussions, reportedly carried a list with the ten top bribing companies in the world, threatening with a simple pad on his pocket that he would disclose the names to the media if the negotiations stalled (Abbott & Snidal, 2002). This negotiation game was using publicity as a pressure tactic and relying on traditional media to inform the public by carefully selecting the content and timing of ‘leaking’ the information to the press. The OECD press reports from April 1995 to December 1997 show a world press that while altogether interested in the negotiations, provides information that appears close to official press releases, is descriptive rather than analytical, and does not attempt to dwell on the issue of transnational bribery substantially. This type of publicity, or threat of publicity can easily be classified as manipulative rather than deliberative since it instrumentalizes the public and uses public opinion. The most important element is the threat of releasing selected information to the public, hence employing the tactic of ‘publicity’ in an instrumental manner. Publicity becomes just another tool in the negotiation game for furthering transparency. While one might argue that everything is allowed in love and international negotiations, manipulative publicity is dangerous for, as Habermas argues, it undermines the public sphere. The paradoxical nature of manipulative publicity, however, is that it is nonetheless (if not more) effective in carrying out reforms that lead to further transparency. The presentation of the problem of corruption and bribery as well as the negotiation process of

the Convention itself were presented in traditional media in simplistic and moralistic terms: there is one virtuous position – the one voiced by the American negotiator and the reluctance of the European partners is based on their derision of ‘American puritanism’ (Lewis, 1997). The complexity of the negotiation is reduced to a predominantly moral matter that requires a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer rather than debate as to the substance of the problem. For example, the fact that the negotiations take place in a general framework of opposition towards laws with extra-territorial reach, of which the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is just an example, is not mentioned in any of the publications.8 ‘Public disgust over bribery scandals’ and ‘popular outrage over corruption’ are the driving forces of public opinion according to The Washington Post and the New York Times (Blustein, 1997). Neither the German nor French press is more detailed and precise over the issues at stake. While generally supportive of the cause of anti-corruption, they reduce the negotiation to a war between the European partners and the ‘Washington policeman’ as Le Monde puts it (N.A., 1997). It is only in late November 1997, when the negotiations have moved towards completion, that journalistic pieces appear which present a more varied and substantive view of the problem. For example, the issue of the legality of payments to political parties appears in the New York Times (Andrews, 1997) as well as a more varied picture of the negotiation position of each country rather than their standardizations as ‘blocks’ (Jack, 1997). It is likely that both the above pieces appear because of the tactical release of information prior to the final battle for ratification that is strategically released and is targeted towards exerting pressure through the public rather than opening a meaningful debate. What is not said is equally important as what is, since information about particular bribery practices is either not released at all, or presented in an extremely balanced manner that will not lead to unnecessary escalation.

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Bribery cases that would immediately fuel public outrage are bundled together and ‘such practices’ are kept neutral and anonymous. Publicity is carefully tailored so as not to become a source of unnecessary complications and is employed as a negotiation technique and a potential threat in case the negotiations stall again. This analysis of international negotiations cannot be completed without acknowledging that international negotiations themselves are as a rule not transparent. Secrecy is not the opposite of transparency however. Florini (2002), proclaiming the ‘end of secrecy’, observed that transparency and secrecy are not mutually exclusive, but rather two ends of a continuum and that the big societal change of the late nineties comes from citizen’s expectations as to where government and big business should be placed on that continuum. This demand on behalf of the public for clearer and more transparent governance is not innocent. It comes with even greater opportunities for manipulative publicity on behalf of public and private authorities. Well-crafted information released selectively to the public may conceal a significant part of the issue at stake and instrumentalize rather than include the public in the debate. This is what Elster (1998) calls the ‘civilizing force of hypocrisy’ since the mere presence of the public does not change the motives of decisions taken by authorities but forces them to hide the language of self-interest in a narrative of virtue and public benefit. The way publicity was tackled during the OECD negotiations of the Anti-Bribery Convention in the mid-1990s was different than the type of publicity Anna Hazare received in 2011 with the help of traditional media and new social media. In the first case manipulative publicity, or the threat of publicity, was instrumentally employed as a negotiation strategy. In the case of Anna Hazare the broader pluralism of information sources led to a fast escalation and public unrest that may have become an obstacle to the successful completion of the anti-corruption reform. Publicity remains

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the essential ingredient of the highly visible campaign, but the question remains as to what kind of publicity it is. While social media holds the promise for providing free space for the substantive deliberative publicity, promoted by Habermas, it is unclear as to whether actual communication in social media delivers on that promise.

PIONEERING A MORE TRANSPARENT SYSTEM AT THE LEVEL OF THE NATION STATE: THE DYNAMICS OF IDENTIFICATION AND THE LIMITS OF RATIONAL DEBATE Anna Hazare is an Indian activist and public figure seen by the Western press as the symbol of new India. Hazare defined his campaigns as a ‘second freedom struggle’ in a YouTube video released in August 2011, but the activist’s tribute to Gandhi is not only rhetorical (Burke, 2011b). In order to promote social change, Hazare has undertaken a succession of peaceful protests in the form of hunger strikes. His fast in April 2011, prompted the expansion of an Indian anti-corruption movement that is pushing for a more stringent Ombudsman anti-corruption bill, known as ‘lokpal’ (literal translation from Sanskrit as the ‘guardian of the people’) (Burke, 2011d). The recent case of Anna Hazare is of interest because it reveals how within an albeit imperfect democratic order, social media platforms do not necessarily change the nature of publicity. When information in social media is not counteracting lack of information or misinformation in traditional media, social media sources do not necessarily change the nature of publicity but multiply the audience and strengthen the representational effect. When there is strong support for a public figure, his or her representational qualities fuel the expansion of the support for the reform movement. The chant ‘I am Anna Hazare’ is indicative of this phenomenon (Burke, 2011b). Wearing a cap with the same slogan as a sign of support for

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the anti-corruption movement is another material manifestation of the strong representational and symbolical power that public figures like Hazare possess. The tendency for identification is enhanced by social media platforms. It is exactly the representational power of a charismatic public figure, however, that raises questions of a debate based on identification instead of a rational discussion. Hazare’s fast in April 2011 was one in a series of fasts, as forms of social protest, with the first one dating as far back as the 1990s (Burke, 2011a). His fast from the 5th of April 2011, prompted avid public support and led to a succession of protests that peaked in August, 2011. The developments from this time frame are at the center of discussion because they provide the most robust evidence for the effect that social media platforms have on anti-corruption campaigning. News coverage in Hazare’s case remained anchored in traditional media, but social media platforms exhibited a threefold effect on publicity: they multiplied, decentralized, and made public engagement more participatory. A noteworthy peculiarity of the case is that social media platforms did not oppose but rather complemented the traditional media coverage, which was sympathetic to Hazare’s demands. The spontaneous organization of protests with the help of new social media produced a visible threat to a government reluctant to undergo reform by posing the danger of social unrest. Social media platforms provided an autonomous space for deliberation and an opportunity for public mobilization at a speed inconceivable with traditional media. Public support spread first in the social media platforms and was fully mobilized within just three days after the beginning of Anna Hazare’s strike. Protest burst out in Bangalore, Mumbai and other cities and the government conceded to form a committee with civil society representatives in order to discuss the draft of a more stringent anti-corruption law (Burke, 2011a). Furthermore, in August Anna Hazare set a deadline for the adoption of the bill but was arrested hours before the planned strike. Protests broke

out after his arrest with over a thousand people being detained in major cities and demonstrations around the country followed (Associated Press, 2011). While traditional media remained closely involved in the coverage, it was with the help of social media platforms that news stories were created. Paradoxically, the speed of citizen’s reaction and the turbulence of the situation complicated the successful outcome of the campaign. When public mobilization takes time, very often governments can foresee future developments and act prior to escalation. Once this escalation is in place, it may become more difficult for popular demands to be met. Paradoxically, the ‘ideally extended public’ imposes a threat to the government and problematizes the acceptance of demands because if the authorities give in to popular pressure this would create distorted incentives for the public. If the position of the government changes after escalation, incentives for unrest and social tension could be created. After his arrest, Anna Hazare joined Facebook and Twitter as recognition for the important role that these social media platforms played. Until that moment only his followers were creating pages and events dedicated to him with the main ‘India Against Corruption Movement’ on Facebook having more than 700 000 followers (‘India Against Corruption’, 2012). Within 30 minutes after Hazare’s release from custody, 3000 people had shown their support on that page. Twitter had also been flooded with information about Hazare and more than 200 000 people were following the ‘Janlokpal’ page (‘Janlokpal’, 2012). While these examples suffice for presenting the dynamic and broad public support for the cause of Anna Hazare, they do not necessarily speak about the nature of the ongoing debate. The major effect of social media platforms is to mobilize supporters for a cause within a few hours with practically no cost. The immediate participation in this virtual environment potentially enables citizens to engage online in the process of deliberative publicity endorsed by Habermas. Traditional media impose a more top-down in267

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formation flow that allows for less participatory interventions than the social platforms where users are not simply consumers of news, but they are makers of news and very often they become news. This dynamic is important in cases such as the one of Anna Hazare where the representational power of a leader comes from his inspirational position as ‘one of the people’. Publicity and participation in this case have a more humane face, which involves the participant more intimately because it appeals to his or her emotions. This phenomenon, however, according to the Habermasian definition of rational debate, poses a threat for deliberative publicity as it increases the danger of a public sphere moved by the power of irrational identification rather than rational debate. Strong tendencies of identification are evident in Hazare’s campaign and may be detrimental to creating conditions for deliberative publicity. Once again the slogan ‘I am Anna Hazare’ which was chanted in the streets best depicts not only the support for the anti-corruption campaign, started by the activist, but also the strong emotional identification and representation that protesters were showing for their leader (Burke, 2011c). These elements push Hazare’s support movement into the dangerous field of identification where support is not based on rational argumentation but on irrational identification which provokes a ‘yes or no’ public response rather than the building blocks of critical deliberative publicity. Therefore, even from the camp of Hazare’s supporters, concerns have been voiced out that with his methods he is endangering the democratic process in India (Bery, 2011).

CONCLUSION So far, academic debates have shown that transparency is not enough and this chapter has argued that publicity is necessary for enacting transparency and reaping real social reforms. Publicity is not only necessary for ‘activating’ transparency

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as a tool for social change, but also for promoting government accountability and furthering transparency in the first place. Seen from this perspective transparency and publicity constitute a constant couple and a platform for social reform which requires a more engaged, informed, and knowledgeable civil society as well as a more open government. In the future, the equilibrium between upwards and downwards transparency is likely to be placed at the center of public debates with civil society and government actors negotiating the right measure for each. This chapter has proposed an analytical toolbox for transparency and publicity based on a normative framework, developed by Habermas. It has further applied the concepts proposed by this framework to two case studies. Distinguishing between manipulative and deliberative publicity can provide a useful lens for assessing the condition of the public sphere and establishing an analytical tool with which to address the question of power within a normative debate. The case study of the OECD anti-bribery negotiation has shown that despite its normative undesirability manipulative publicity can have a positive effect on pushing for transparency reforms. The second case study has suggested that social media, while providing a possible forum for the deliberative publicity promoted by Habermas, also give strong impulses for identification rather than rational debate and interaction. While manipulative publicity can be efficient in pushing for transparency reforms, it is unlikely to contribute to reaping the benefits of these reforms. If the benefits of transparency are to be explored, deliberative publicity is to be enacted after the reforms. Publicity is essential not only as an ‘input’, but also as an ‘output’ factor which provides further transparency and accountability. While the Habermasian ideal of deliberative publicity is probably never to be achieved, it provides an essential normative indicator against transparency being caught in a game of windowdressing and manipulative top-down publicity that contribute little to substantial social reforms.

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Foucault, M. (1977). Disciplne and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York, NY: Vintage Books. Fox, J. (2007). The Uncertain Relationship between Transparency and Accountability. Development in Practice, 17(4-5), 663–671. doi:10.1080/09614520701469955 Galtung, F., & Pope, J. (1999). The Global Coalition Against Corruption: Evaluating Transparency International. In A. Schedler, & M. Plattner (Eds.), The Self- Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (pp. 257–252). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Gaonkar, D., & McCarthy, R. (1994). Panopticism and Publicity: Bentham’s Quest for Transparency. Public Culture, 6(3), 547–575. doi:10.1215/08992363-6-3-547 Global Transparency Initiative. (2012, June 12). Retrieved from http://www.ifitransparency.org/ Habermas, J. (1991). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Harrison, R. (1983). Bentham: The Arguments of the Philosophers. London: Routledge. Heald, D. (2006). Varieties of transparency. In C. Hood, & D. Heald (Eds.), Transparency: The Key to Better Governance? (pp. 25–40). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. doi:10.5871/ bacad/9780197263839.003.0002 Hood, C. (2006). Transparency in historical perspective. In C. Hood, & D. Heald (Eds.), Transparency: The Key to Better Governance? (pp. 3–23). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. doi:10.5871/bacad/9780197263839.003.0001

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Moore, S. (1997). Power and Corruption. London: Vision Paperbacks. N.A. (1997, October 21). Les gendarmes de Washington contre la corruption. Le Monde. Naim, M. (1995). The Corruption Eruption. Brown Journal of World Affairs, 2(2), 245–261. Naurin, D. (2003). Does publicity purify politics? Journal of Information Ethics, 12(1), 21–33. O’Neill, O. (2006). Transparency and the Ethics of Communication. In C. Hood, & D. Heald (Eds.), Transparency: The Key to Better Governance? (pp. 75–90). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. doi:10.5871/bacad/9780197263839.003.0005 Pieth, M., & Low, L. (2007). The OECD Convention on Bribery: A Commentary. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Senturia, J. (1931). Corruption, Political. In Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Vol. 4, pp. 448–452). New York, NY: Macmillan. Stiglitz, J. (2002). Transparency in Government. In R. Islam (Ed.), The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development (pp. 27–45). Washington, DC: The World Bank. Tanzi, V. (1998). Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures. IMF Staff Papers, 45(1), 559–594. doi:10.2307/3867585

Deliberative Publicity: Instead of instrumentalizing public opinion, this ‘bottom-up’ publicity is based on rational discourse that has constitutive and deliberative effects on social problems and public policies and aims to dissipate manipulative publicity. Manipulative Publicity (Habermas): Has triumphed over the contemporary public sphere as a kind of staged ‘top down’ publicity which aims to channel or manipulate public opinion instead of promoting rational debate. Public Sphere (Habermas): Social and discursive space which acts as middle ground between the private sphere and the sphere of official authority. Social Media Platform: Refers to digital communication platforms for broadcasting, networking, blogging and micro-blogging, etc. that allow for users to build online communities for information exchange and political activism. Transparency: The increasing disclosure of information (by both public and private actors) that does not include the costs of processing information, but refers to increased public availability.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Anti-Corruption: Refers in the broad sense to increased efforts (especially since the 1990s) of public and private actors and institutions to counter corruption at the global and national level. Corruption: The widely accepted definition of corruption in the social sciences is the abuse of public power for private gain. While often unreferenced in the literature, this definition can be traced back to Senturia (1931).

Heald (2006) bases his typology on a principal-agent model in which the vertical relationship between the government and the citizens is reversible in accordance with the identity of the presumed principal (voters or elected authorities). In a democratic order the presumed principal will be the public and thus upwards transparency will manifest most often as survaillance of the general public by the authorities. The problem with ‘top-down’ publicity is that it provides authorities with an incentive to frame information in a way that will be acceptable for the public and thus cover true intentions or omit and distort facts in order to compose a publicly appealing narrative.

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Fox (2007) claims that transparency is very often offered as a substitute for the demand for accountability. In this sense, policies of transparency can become a ‘window dressing’ technique since the mere availability of information is a necessary, but insufficient condition for accountable governance. In the original context of the famous line, Bentham stresses the importance of the ‘multitude of the audience’: ‘If it be true, according to the homely proverb, ‘that the eye of the master makes the ox fat,’ it is no less so that the eye of the public makes the statesman virtuous. The multitude of the audience multiplies for disintegrity the chances of detection.’ (10:p. 227) In a panopticon both the prisoners and the guards are subject to public control. Bentham (1843) argued that the only way for a guard or principal to be in touch with the public responsibility of his job was publicity: ‘publicity the most effectual means of applying the force of moral motives, in a direction tending to strengthen the union between his interest and the humane branch of his duty’(8: p.583). Dean’s definition of publicity comes closer to the ‘manipulative’ variety that Habermas also refutes. The secret of publicity is that it

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has become the centerpiece of a ‘technocultural ideology’ that manipulates the public and is destructive to the public sphere (p.36). James Wolfensohn recalled that when he became President of the World Bank in 1995, the subject of corruption was banned from international organizations: ‘there was one word I could not use, which was the “C” word, the “C” word being “corruption”. Corruption, you see, was identified with politics, and if I got into that, I would have a terrible time with my Board.’ (February 24, 1999) Remarks at a Global Forum on Fighting Corruption, World Bank Washington D.C., available at http://go.worldbank.org/ FQMIZVENC0 The FCPA was the first national law against transnational bribery, adopted by the United States in 1977. The FCPA provided the blueprint for the discussions at the OECD and for the Convention adopted in 1997. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq.(FCPA), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ fcpa/

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Chapter 17

Civic Cultures and Skills in European Digital Rights Campaigning Yana Breindl Georg-August University Göttingen, Germany

ABSTRACT Technical skills are increasingly necessary to successfully intervene in policy-making, especially when dealing with technical matters such as Internet or telecommunications regulation. Skills are rooted in experience and cultural practices. Dahlgren’s concept of civic cultures is used in this chapter to investigate the cultural underpinnings of the emergent European digital rights movement that has repeatedly targeted EU legislation on copyright enforcement, software patents, and the Internet. The values and identity of the movement are investigated along with the way knowledge and information are processed and trust established through repeated practices in a variety of online and offline spaces. The analysis illustrates how digitally skilled actors can substantially affect policy-making by disrupting the course of parliamentary law-making at the European level. However, technical skills need to be complemented by social and political competencies to gain access and provide convincing input to political institutions that increasingly rely on extra-institutional expertise.

INTRODUCTION Technical skills are increasingly necessary to successfully intervene in policy-making, especially when dealing with technical matters such as Internet or telecommunications regulation. The Internet does not automatically empower all of its users. Jensen (2006) points out that online involvement remains shaped by traditional factors (resources, education, social capital and prior political engagement) that are complemented

by new “digital factors” such as access, competences and motivation to use information and communication technologies (ICTs). Skills are rooted in experience and cultural practices. The case of the emergent digital rights movement illustrates how technological know-how can play an empowering role in terms of political agency. To understand current digital rights campaigning one needs to investigate its origins, values, and the wider culture it is part of. Political agency is always culturally embedded. Dahlgren’s (2006;

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch017

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2007; 2009) concept of civic cultures is used to explore the values, practices, spaces and identities that underpin digital rights activism. Digital rights activism has emerged as a new political movement that increasingly interferes with various levels of policy-making. The recent protests against two US copyright bills, SOPA and PIPA, which included the highly mediatised Wikipedia blackout, and led to the stalling of both legislations, or the recurring attacks by hacker groups such as Anonymous or Lulzec on corporate or governmental websites around the world are manifestations of a much larger political movement of loosely-associated individuals and groups whose objective is to defend the open architecture of the Internet and to protect civil liberties in the digital realm. We consider the historical roots of digital rights activism in hacking and free and open source software. These origins help understand the three tenets characterising digital rights activism. First, it is specialised in that it requires a certain set of skills and techniques, a combination of technological know-how, legal expertise and resources to provide decision-makers with what they most crucially need: specialised information. Second, digital rights campaigning is networked, as it mobilises a cluster of individuals, associations and more or less formal structures who communicate intensively through computers for developing shared interpretations and analysis of legal texts. This distributed nature allows the cluster to reconfigure itself to rapidly adapt to new situations and provides spaces of autonomous action. Third, it is recursive: the values defended as well as the tools used are deeply rooted in what is to be defended: the Internet. It is because activists inhabit the Internet and use it in a certain way that they stand up to defend their conception of an open and free Internet. An analysis of the civic culture underlying two digital rights campaigns carried out at the European Union level is carried out, investigating the particular set of values and principles that

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shaped the actions, the mobilisation of knowledge and trust through particular practices in a series of online and offline spaces that altogether underpin the movement’s identity. For each dimension of Dahlgren’s civic cultures, we focus on the technical, social and political skills that were essential for engaging as political agents in EU policy-making.

POLITICAL AGENCY IN THE DIGITAL AGE Political agency refers to the possibilities for political action a person holds. It constitutes the point of departure for political participation. For Dahlgren (2007; 2009), political agency contrasts with formal and state-centred notions of citizenship that insist on rights and obligations that should be universally and equally received by all citizens. The concept of political agency considers that differences are the point of departure for civic participation. It resonates with tenants of radical democracy who believe that conflict is an inherent part of democracy in that different groups are continually negotiating positions while remaining committed to democratic values and procedures. Political agency embodies thus the notion of “achieved” citizenship (Dahlgren, 2009). Civic agency refers to the perception of oneself as a “participant” as being able of “meaningful” engagement and capable to act “in accordance with a coherent sense of self, or identity” (Dahlgren 2009, p. 138). Such agency is always culturally embedded. Cultures are affordances. They offer possibilities for action and underpin social, civic and political agency. Civic cultures are cultural patterns acting as the foundation for identities of citizenship and civic agencies. They are resources that have been collectively generated over years and can be leveraged for political purposes. They are comparable to what Habermas has termed the life-world or Bourdieu’s civic habitus. “To understand the origins of civic agency and competence, we need to look beyond the public sphere itself,

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into the terrain of the private – or, expressed alternatively, into the experiential domain of everyday life”, argues Dahlgren (2006, p. 276). To do so, Dahlgren distinguishes six dimensions of civic cultures that are closely interrelated but can be distinguished for heuristic reasons: knowledge, values, trust, spaces, practices and identities. The next sections review these concepts by situating them in the discussion on the Internet and political activism.

Knowledge European Union decision-making is characterised by a systemic reliance upon interest groups’ input in the policy process (Greenwood, 2007). The EU’s legitimacy is built on the involvement of stakeholders who represent the various interests in the EU and are often territorially defined. Its multi-level structure provides multiple access points from which to obtain information and to gather expertise. Information constitutes a primary resource in the political game, which is fundamentally asymmetric: interest groups gain access to decision-makers, whose legitimacy builds upon the input of member preferences and expertise (Klüver, 2009). To engage in EU policyprocesses, citizens need to be knowledgeable and provide expertise. Knowledge refers to the active appropriation of information. Access to information is traditionally considered a prerequisite for all forms of political participation. Citizens need to be informed to express their opinions or contest political decisions. Political information is increasingly available online to the point where various authors speak about an “information” or “knowledge” society (Lyon, 1991; Mattelart, 2003; Webster, 2006). The exponential amount of information available poses new challenges of how to deal with and retrieve relevant information from the abundance of information available. The Internet permits facilitated access, production, dissemination and storage of information. Institutional information

for instance is increasingly placed online for all citizens to access. However, access alone is not sufficient. For Dahlgren, information becomes knowledge once it is appropriated, related to one’s frames and reference points, once information becomes personally meaningful. Knowledge refers to an active appropriation that builds on pre-existing understandings as well as the ability to generate and disseminate that knowledge. Being knowledgeable requires thus a certain set of skills, particularly in our contemporary fluid and porous information environment. The Internet does not automatically lead to a broadly informed citizenry. New digital skills or literacies have to be learnt to deal with the constant flux of information (Lankshear & Knobel, 2008). For Chadwick (2009), the digital age allows for the aggregation of ever expanding amounts of information. Individuals with the right skills and competences will be able to extract and use it, which will provide them with an advantage over users suffering from “information overload”. Additionally, expert knowledge is ever more important as exemplified by public debates on specialised issues such as climate change or copyright law. This development is not without posing questions of power and equality in society. The role played by expert knowledge in policy-processes produces exclusionary discourses that form barriers to citizen participation (Dahlgren, 2009). However, it can also produce possibilities for mobilising counter-knowledge. The Internet facilitates the emergence of “communities of interests” that engage in intensive production of knowledge and produce counter-claims to dominant discourses.

Values Values hold communities together. In a democracy, two basic sets of values exist: substantive ones such as the belief in equality, liberty or justice; and procedural ones such as openness, reciprocity and discussion (Dahlgren, 2009). For scholars subscribing to agonistic pluralism, the political is

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inherently conflicting, resulting in struggles that cannot be resolved rationally. Different visions can be confronted and clash with one another. But disagreement with other positions should not result in violent antagonism. Instead, the right to defend opposing ideas should not be put into question (Mouffe, 2000; 2005). The Internet is a contested terrain for a growing range of actors, whose actions are sustained by particular beliefs and values. Internet regulation in particular is shaped by values and principles defended by various actors at various stages of its development. They are the academic innovators of the Internet’s early development, hacker and free and open source software developers, virtual communitarians, Internet entrepreneurs and democrats wishing to assert the Internet to principles of democratic governance (Breindl & Houghton, 2010; Rasmussen, 2007; Castells, 2001; Flichy, 2001). Equality and cooperation were at the heart of early Internet cultures. Academic innovators considered the network as a tool for sharing, cooperating and exchanging information. They applied standard academic values (e.g.: peer reputation, academic excellence or the open communication of technological developments) in order to achieve their goals of building a global electronic communication network for the well-being and progress of all humans. Passionate about exploring the technical capacities of computers and the emerging network, hackers promoted open access to computers, informational freedom, the mistrust of authority and the promotion of decentralization, judgements based upon hacking skills alone, the possibility to create art and beauty on computers, and the belief that computers can change life for the better (Levy, 1984; pp. 27-33). These values are still present in current free and open source software (FLOSS) development as well as digital rights activism as will be examined below. Additionally, “virtual communities” (Rheingold, 1993) emerged on Usenet or Bulletin Boards long before social media platforms existed. These

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online communities, based on sharing and cooperation between participants evaluated upon their personal merits, provide spaces for free public debate between individuals with shared interests (Flichy, 2001). The variety of communities using the Internet has augmented exponentially since the early 1990s, bringing society’s complexity and diversity online. Many value free, horizontal communication and the possibility to network autonomously with any other connected person (Castells, 2001). The adoption of the Internet by a mass public in the 1990s attracted commercial and regulatory interests. Fascinated by the prospects of a new virtual market, entrepreneurs invested in electronic business opportunities, effecting an increasing commercialization of cyberspace (Rasmussen, 2007). Inspired by what has been called the “Californian ideology” (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996), entrepreneurs defended this new market space from state intervention. Situating itself in the ideology of economic globalization, this discourse articulates political-economic liberalism based on the citizen-consumer model and valorises creative and hedonistic individualism (Vedel, 2003). Some business ideas clash with the original open architecture of the Internet and seek to structurally adjust to their previous business models. States have equally attempted to reassert their sovereignty on the decentralised and global medium. Nation states and supranational institutions have incessantly regulated online content and the Internet’s infrastructure, often influenced by commercial entities. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, interest and new legislation turned to national security issues (Rasmussen, 2007), often at the expense of civil liberties. Civil society actors increasingly call upon regulatory institutions to subject the Internet to democratic governance principles, calling for the defence of civil liberties in digital environments and greater public participation in regulatory processes. For actors to coherently work together, trust relations need to be established.

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Trust Trust is one of the components of social capital (Agre, 2004), which postulates that daily social contacts increase and support the development of horizontal civic trust and reciprocity (Putnam, 1995). Various scholars conclude that a functioning social network can be a prerequisite for political participation (Putnam, 1995; Vromen, 2008; Gillan, 2008). While some authors deplore a weakening of social ties in current societies (Putnam, 2000), cyberenthusiasts argue that computer-mediated communication supports social networks and new forms of community life (e.g. Rheingold, 2000). Putnam (2000) distinguishes between thick and thin trust. Thick trust refers to established personal relationships while thin trust refers to a more general expectation of honesty and reciprocity with people we may not know personally but feel comfortable with. For Dahlgren (2009), thin trust is the most important mode as loose bonds and networks form the basis of civic and political participation. In its classic sociological definition (Tönnies, 1887/1935), community (Gemeinschaft) refers to a collective of persons tight together by geographical and emotional proximity who interact directly with each other (Proulx & Latzko-Toth, 2000). Members share a common habitat, a shared identity and/or organic or affective will. The concept of community refers to deep feelings, shared values and trust relations and is traditionally opposed to society (Gesellschaft) that incarnates a more distant and rational relation between its constituting members. In its minimal sense, community refers at least to some common characteristics and trust relations shared by its members. Discussions about Internet communities problematize this distinction, by notably arguing against a binary distinction between “real” and “virtual” or “offline” and “online” relations (Proulx & Latzko-Toth, 2000; Hine, 2000). Rejecting accounts of “virtual communities” that would be equivalent to “offline” communities, Wellman (1999; 2001) and Castells

(2000; 2001) push forward the concept of social networks that are articulated to computer and technical networks in societies that are themselves conceptualised as thoroughly networked. “We find community in networks, not groups” argues Wellman (2001, p. 227). Communities cease to be defined by territoriality. On the contrary, they are spread out over geographical distances through loose ties (Wellman, 2001). Individuals are the members of multiple and shifting networks of social relations that are constitutive of networked societies (Wellman et al. 2003). Thin trust is at the basis of these networks. Offline encounters constitute primary arenas for the building of trust and social relations. Online platforms complement these by providing new spaces of interaction and debate for all types of social interactions.

Spaces Communicative spaces have extended with online platforms. They allow for “despatialized simultaneity” (Thompson, 1995), the possibility to move freely between different communicative spaces, online as well as offline. For Dahlgren (2009, p. 202), “the ease of interacting, reformatting, remixing, adding on to existing texts, and so forth, promotes the participatory uses of these technologies – and alters forever the traditional premises whereby mass audiences receive ostensibly authoritative, centralized information in a one-way manner.” The user is no longer only a passive receiver of information but a producer of that information too (Bruns, 2008). Early enthusiastic accounts considered the Internet as an incarnation of the habermasian public sphere based on rational discourse. Studies of forums and chat room discussions, however, soon countered these assumptions by highlighting phenomena of impolite discourse such as flame wars and the non-existence of a unique public sphere in which individuals could share rational exchanges of points of view. In fact, a plurality of public spheres exists, “dynamic and spatially

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complex in nature” (Bentivegna, 2006, p. 336). Keane (2000) describes a mosaic of micro-spheres (interpersonal communication), meso-spheres (local/national media) and macro-spheres (international media), interconnected by the Internet. Far from being one homogeneous “public sphere”, a multiplicity of “publics” exists and interacts, one person belonging to various “publics” that are continually evolving. Furthermore, public spheres are not necessarily characterised by a general norm of rationality. Elite discourse may aim for rationality but many other forms of public communication would be excluded by uniquely taking rational discourse into account. Fraser (1990) argues that protest sites constitute counter-public spheres, i.e. alternative discursive networks in which subordinate groups can interact, deliberate and foster oppositional projects towards dominant discourses. Within the larger public sphere, dominated by elite discourses, a multiplicity of counter-public spheres takes shape against or in opposition to each other. Chat rooms and mailing lists constitute spaces of dialogue and debate that can facilitate the emergence of discursive oppositional networks (Kahn & Kellner, 2004; Dryzek, 2006; Stein, 2009). Those spaces are the result of repeated social practices.

Practices Practices are learned and repeated, requiring a certain set of skills, notably communicative ones. Engaging in social practices contributes to experience that empowers citizens. It is particularly important that citizens know how to define, use and create suitable spaces that foster civic and political identities (Dahlgren, 2009). For Agre (2004), it is the capacity to use networks to connect to specific issues. Internet spaces offer new possibilities for carrying out conventional tasks (e.g. shopping, banking), inventing new practices and extending our sense of what is possible. Individuals can do more things by themselves and can find

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new spaces to collaborate with others (Dahlgren, 2009). Over the years, the Internet has become a place where large-scale voluntary collaboration or “commons-based peer production” (Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006) flourishes. The result is the provision of public information or cultural goods such as free and open source software or the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia. For Fuster Morell (2009) online collaboration platforms are characterised by open forms of participation that facilitate the integration of multiple and flexible contributions through weak ties of cooperation. Participation is decentralised, asynchronous, public, voluntary and autonomous. Accordingly, each participant can modulate his engagement depending on the time available and his personal motivation. The platform’s openness does not guarantee that the project will be successful. It also depends on the project’s modularity, rules of participation, quality controls and further modes of peer production (Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006). Some projects generate community-type networks, e.g. Wikimedia in which a true commitment to the cause and strong rules of participation are expected from Wikipedians (Reagle Jr., 2010). Others, such as Flickr, the photo sharing and archiving site, do not allow users to interfere in the management of the site itself. The provider, a commercial entity, offers a service around which users gather, while the community is incidental to the profit-seeking nature of the site (Fuster Morell, 2009). In some cases, however, repeated online practices result in a shared identity.

Identities Identities refer to people’s subjective perception of themselves. They are generally plural as one person can feel a sense of belonging to more than one group or entity. Identities are changing as they evolve over time and are rooted in a person’s life experience. Citizenship is one component of a wider array of identities in a person’s life.

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The experience of being an empowered political agent provides meaning to one’s sense of being a citizen. Often, not all members of a network or community, defined by a kind of affinity or a minimal sense of commonality (Dahlgren, 2009), can meet or interact synchronously. As a result, they must imagine their relationship with each other, and construct a community through social practices rather than structures (Jordan, 2008). Online communities emerge in spaces where individuals share a common worldview and values and some sense of a collective identity. Online communities have used the Internet in order to keep traces of their past activities and to shape a common identity. The hacker jargon file (Raymond, 2004) for instance is one of the early glossaries of hacker slang created in 1975. Since, it has been continually updated, and eventually edited as a book in 1983 (the Hacker’s Dictionary), becoming an iconic account of early hackerdom. After years of non-activity, the hacker jargon file attracted further comments and a new edition into the New Hacker’s Dictionary in the 1990s. The full process is meticulously recorded on Wikipedia (Jargon File, n.d.). The hacker principles and values form a mythology, a story of innovative computer fans who shaped the early developments of information technologies. It is a collective story of early computerisation that has been and continues to be collectively archived through the Internet and with which many digital rights activists identify.

DIGITAL RIGHTS ACTIVISM Digital rights activism is rooted in hacking and free and open source software principles. The hacker discourse has spread from programmers to non-programmers who sympathise with their core ethics (Breindl, 2011; Rasmussen, 2007). Activists found inspiration in hacking techniques and values and applied these to political domains. A larger transnational movement has emerged that advo-

cates and practices free access to information and culture in the fields of software (FLOSS), culture (e.g. creative commons, free culture), information and knowledge (e.g. Wikimedia Foundation) and science (e.g. open access journals). Digital rights activism is an umbrella term that is applied here to a large variety of struggles for an open information infrastructure such as: • • • • •

The defence of freedom of expression online; Freedom to access information and knowledge; The respect of privacy and encryption methods; The right to create and share knowledge; The promotion of open models such as free software, copyleft licenses and peer-topeer networking.

It is opposed to restrictions on freedoms such as limitations to access online content (e.g. through filtering techniques), state surveillance, data retention measures or workplace monitoring. It promotes encryption systems, anonymity, free access to information and knowledge through open standards and interoperability, and the use of free and open source software. Initial initiatives in the domains of copyright, e-commerce and censorship were driven by nationstates and supranational institutions, and continue to develop. However, governments are not the only source of concern for digital rights activists. Industry interests, particularly in the domain of copyright law trigger widespread concern as they are viewed as using “a combination of law and technology to suppress the rights of people using technology” (EFF, n.d.). Copyright legislation plays a major role in politicizing a loosely-knit community of Internet users, hackers, FLOSS supporters and civil liberties activists. Digital rights actions are informed by a desire to empower citizens through technology. Some groups operate outside of conventional policy processes while

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others act as “insiders” and actively engage in institutional processes (Hintz & Milan, 2009). Groups also diverge in terms of resources, strategies and organisational forms. What distinguishes digital rights activism from other types of Internet-based activism is that it is recursive (Kelty, 2008). It uses the Internet as a tool and space of political contention aiming at safeguarding and protecting a particular conception of the Internet. The Internet allows dispersed users to interact, share their interests and act when they feel that their “natural habitat” is threatened by interferences from newcomers or elites who do not understand their space. The purpose of digital rights activism is to use the Internet’s affordances to promote information self-determination as well as to counter restrictions that result from regulation or commercial encroachments. Digital rights activists are particular in that their political claims focus on the tools they use for mobilising and organising. They resort to particular types of actions including political coding (Breindl, 2011) or the voluntary provision of alternative communication channels (Hintz & Milan, 2009). The aim is not only to protect and safeguard rights in the digital realm but also to extend and realise these when possible. Digital rights activism defends existing rights discursively but also by proposing alternatives such as software development or the publication of information. In the next section, we focus on two types of European campaigns against the adoption of software patents and the extension of copyright enforcement mechanisms that would harm the open Internet infrastructure.

METHODS The article focuses on the cultural similarities that were observed between actors engaged in two digital rights campaigns. The first case study focuses on the “No Software Patents” campaign that took place from February 2002 to September 2005 surrounding the proposed directive on the patentability of computer-implemented 280

inventions, considered as a hidden attempt to introduce software patents into EU law. Sensitised by the US context where software patents had been introduced in the 1990s, FLOSS users and supporters started to discuss the issue from 1998 onwards, which ultimately led to the rejection of the controversial directive by the European Parliament on July 6, 2005. This struggle marks the politicisation of the digital rights community in Europe. In Yin’s (2003) terminology, the campaign constitutes a “revelatory” case in that it holds a constitutive character for the digital rights movement, even though it was studied retrospectively. At the time of the data collection, activists were also engaged in the Telecoms package reform, a set of five directives regulating the European telecommunications market. This campaign was followed as it was unfolding. Additional information on the particular campaigning practices and the issues at stake during the “No Software Patents” debate can be found in Haunss & Kohlmorgen (2009), Karanovic (2009), Breindl and Briatte (2010) and on the Telecoms package reform in Breindl (2011) and Horten (2011). The analysis is based on forty-four interviews carried out from February 2008 to April 2010. Two types of in-depth interviews were carried out: thirty interviews with activists and, in the case of the Telecoms package, with fourteen targets of the campaign, i.e. members and staff of the European Parliament. Interviewees were selected following a purposive sampling strategy. Activists were identified following three criteria: They pursued a clear political goal, attempting to influence the EU policy-process on software patents in the first campaign and on graduated response, a controversial copyright enforcement mechanism (Yu, 2010), and net neutrality, the indiscriminate routing of data over the Internet (Marsden, 2010), in the second campaign. They spoke from a civil society background, and would not benefit materially from policy changes (Mueller et al., 2004). They were centrally involved in the organisation of the campaign, acting as leaders or movement entrepreneurs (Earl & Schussman,

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2003). Interviews were also carried out with the parliamentary staff most frequently mentioned by activists as targets of the campaign. Additionally, the unfolding of the “Telecoms package” campaign was carefully observed in “real-life” settings and online spaces. The Internet constitutes a field site in its own right, a place of interaction, identity formation and sense-making for activists. “The Internet is both a “cultural artefact” and “a place where culture is formed and reformed” (Hine, 2009, p. 9). Websites and wikis constituted privileged spaces of observation. The main campaigning sites were regularly viewed, read and downloaded. Mailing lists, IRC channels and social media sites provided further entry points into the campaign. Most of these are public and could be easily accessed. Additionally, observations took place in “real-life” settings such as hearings in the European Parliament, a German social media conference and a digital rights workshop organised at the European Parliament in February 2010. Finally, official documents, academic studies and media articles were used to triangulate the activists’ perspective with other parties and verify facts and positions.

THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN DIGITAL RIGHTS CAMPAIGNING Informing and reframing Internet issues Both campaigns aimed at generating awareness around an issue that was not previously mediatised or recognised as controversial by decisionmakers. In the first case, the directive dealt with “computer-implemented inventions” while the second did not explicitly refer to copyright or net neutrality. Activists’ first attempts to reframe the debate were ignored. However, in both campaigns, activists succeeded in generating public awareness by providing detailed analysis and expertise.

Activists benefited from their previous knowledge of computers and the Internet. Many of them had experience as free or open source software developers and users. However, at the outset of the software patents debate, most of them did not know how EU decision-making works and how to impact it most effectively. Nonetheless, they knew how to find information over the Internet and were eager to spend hours reading the European Parliament’s rules of procedure or navigate the Europa online directory to find the latest amendments to the directives. The large availability of official information online was considered disruptive for citizen groups aiming to influence the EU: We netcitizens dispose nowadays of research possibilities that used to be reserved to state news services. The Internet opens new channels of participation, creates more transparency and changes the communicative relations between actors and institutions. Even very specialised interest groups reach now a critical mass thanks to the Internet (Rebentisch, 2005, p. 1). However, official websites did not publish all politically relevant information online. Repeatedly, activists complained about the lack of transparency and delays in making EU content available online. To obtain the latest news from inside the institutions, activists therefore relied on contacts working on the issues on a daily basis. They could count on a number of institutional allies who would send them the latest updates on the policy-process along with their assessment of the situation. On the Telecoms package campaign, allies were instrumental in raising awareness about copyright issues in the first place. In April 2008, a parliamentary assistant sent activists hundreds of amendments to the package that were then analysed internally to detect striking similarities with a French graduate response law proposal debated at the time and fully or partially published online for others to read and analyse. More than once activists received confidential documents

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from within the European Parliament. Clues and advice from insiders working daily on the contentious sections of the Telecoms package were invaluable in determining the current stand of the policy-process and the power balance. Insiders also provided information about private meetings in which activists could not take part. This helped activists determine who to target and how to frame their arguments: “[A political adviser] explains to us the positions of this or this elected official”, explains a QdN campaigner (itv. 21*1). “Then, we know to whom to direct our communication. We know who behaved badly, which European parliamentarians need a little encouragement via press releases, and those who need to be condemned. She explains all the negotiation documents to us and gives them to us.” The collection of insider information was crucial for activists to offer insights and analysis for a wider audience. Digital skills, knowledge about how the Internet worked and functioned, were not sufficient. They were complemented by the political skills of allies gained by activists’ engagement in the campaign and the continuous learning process of activists themselves. Campaigners were eager to learn about EU policy-making continually: “It’s one of the most interesting things that I’ve done. It’s just by following the process”, comments an activist (itv. 20*). “It’s by having the curiosity to go and see on institutional sites the internal rules, how things work, what kind of majority you need at which moment, who has the right to table amendments, and so forth that I manage to understand. That has been an excellent asset.” Political experience came with sustained involvement in the EU policy-process. Many activists involved on the software patents debate also engaged in the Telecoms package campaign. Their digital skills facilitated the analysis of legal texts. Activists designed their own tools, such as LawTracks that allows comparing different versions of a same legislative text:

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We knew which words, which expressions were dangerous. So we searched for them in all the law, the amendments, where these expressions are used, and we see more or less what they touch upon. That’s even more important, because the Telecoms package, at the outset, touched upon things that nearly did not interest us at all, the repartition of frequencies and things like that. So really, to target what is underneath and what concerns us that has been the essential part of the job. That’s what LawTracks does actually, extract only the parts of the text that concern us (itv. 20*). Internet tools enhanced the collection, production and dissemination of politically relevant information. The network benefited from many watchful eyes that would follow the decisionmaking process: “There is so much coming through the pipes! It’s impossible to follow everything yourself. But various activist groups would notice things that are happening in different areas”, argues a Pirate Party MEP (itv. 16). Activists gathered the results of their monitoring online, especially through wikis that allow many users to edit a common webspace. They used the collected material to analyse and deconstruct their opponents’ frames and produce counter-frames and analyses. Arguments, tutorials, caricatures, banners and slogans were developed to convince decisions makers, especially inside the European Parliament which was considered the most accessible institution. Frequent press releases and news feeds informed with increasing intensity about the process. All information was (and for most of it, still is) publicly available, as an online archive, so as to favour its dissemination and re-use by others: We search, on our site, the information we relayed at a certain moment, the arguments we produced at another, and it’s used as a memory. Mainly for our members and for all the others who are interested in what we are doing. It provides them

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with material from which to forge their ideas, to eventually construct their own arguments, and then go to sensitise politicians, to speak about it in their company, to speak about it in their association, to try to make things move (QdN activist, itv. 27*). The open character of information collection, analysis and dissemination of both campaigns is based on a series of values that will be analysed in the next section.

Self-Determination, Empowerment and European Integration Digital rights campaigners are inspired by three sets of values: hacker and free and open source software principles, the belief in democracy and in European integration. Values, principles and practices stemming from the hacker and free and open source software imaginaire underpin digital rights activism. Open source principles play an important role in how Internet affordances are being used. Activists use technology as a means of opening up the political process, by tinkering and through innovative uses of Internet applications. The belief in values of freedom, decentralisation, openness, creativity and progress inspires a particular type of collective action that promotes autonomy, participation and efficiency. Activists frequently referred to hacker and FLOSS values such as openness, freedom, being judged upon one’s merits alone and promoting decentralisation and empowerment through technology. A broad range of values are shared among the diversity of groups operating at the European level: There is a very strong consensus about freedom of speech and network neutrality; about the freedom of culture and file-sharing and these issues. We share values with the Pirate Party, but we share values with many other groups as well, like freedom of speech groups and human rights organisations. This is the foundation of the values that we share,

and usually we actually don’t discuss them very much. We try to focus very much on action, on the strategic manoeuvre that we are trying to do, how do you get the politicians to understand that these values are important? (Telecomix/WeRebuild activist, itv. 39) The drive to comprehend patent or copyright law and the complex EU decision-making process can be explained by the desire to understand and to learn continually, as preconized by hacker values. What characterises digital rights activists is “technical interest, i.e. the getting into technical procedures, like ‘hacking parliament’, to engage in it. It’s a special application of law in a way” (FFIIGermany activist, itv. 41**). The active engagement in the policy process reveals an underlying philosophy or a “culture of doing” (itv. 20*). The hacker attitude and the belief in a free and open Internet provide the cohesion to the disparity of groups engaged in the campaigns. This influence is illustrated by a Telecomix/WeRebuild activist: Hacktivism that emerged in the eighties and nineties was a new attitude towards technology, technological systems and technological artefacts. This attitude consisted in the simple principle of ‘well, let’s see how this thing works, and let’s see if we can modify it and make it work in a better way’. This attitude, in an abstract sense, has been very influential in pirate politics, but also, I would say, in activism because it reverses the order of a political process. […] Where in this whole system can we ‘plug-in’ and make a difference, make this protest become something other than what we think it will be? So hacktivism is crucial, in that sense, to our way of doing politics (itv. 39). The starting point of digital rights activism is not a clearly defined ideology or set of beliefs. Rather a desire to understand and actively engage in complex systems, not by radical opposition to the policy-process but by understanding how the

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process works to change it from within, similarly to what hackers would do with computers: identify the flaws of a system to modify and improve it. Next to hacker values, the movement more broadly referred to democratic values, empowerment, and citizen engagement. Activist groups conceived of themselves as open and participatory. Any person could join the campaign where decisions were taken by consensus. Beyond providing access to information, activists aimed at empowering citizens. This was notably the case of the French advocacy group la Quadrature: “There is something that completely transcends partisan cleavages”, said a QdN supporter (itv. 27*). “For me, I tend to call it general interest and to embrace progress, not in the sense of progressive theory and technological progress, but that you have to take the best out of it, and most of all not isolate yourself from it.” They were also active on the Telecoms package reform, which considered itself a toolbox to help make the issues and processes at stake understandable to “ordinary” citizens, and to provide them with the tools to act. The supporter said: “Those people of good will are, finally, so attached to these values that they quite easily find allies among each other, against their own party sometimes.” Finally, activists also shared a concern for intervening at the European level, which increasingly sets the political agenda for member states. Coordination and communication with other European activists is necessary in order to influence decisions at the earliest stage possible: It’s very important because all the framework decisions for the digital age are taken in Brussels. Therefore, it is important for civil society to think transnationally and to ally with others, to overcome these linguistic barriers, because in fact we all have the same values, in fact we all work on the same topics. But we have to try to be with as many resources, and as much pressure as possible in Brussels to make our voice be heard (Netzpolitik contributor, itv. 40**).

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Activists felt a sense of belonging to the same European space. A campaigner highlights that “with all the people we’ve met, we have a very European spirit. We like to work together with people of our culture, with whom we share common points” (itv. 20*). Another activist agrees: “We all share a diagnostic of the importance of the European level and also a certain form of European citizenship, even if we are not necessarily satisfied with the current state of the democratic process (itv. 13*). The EU policy-process is repeatedly criticised for being not sufficiently transparent and open. However, activists did not only support the process of European integration but frequently asked for an increased politicization of the European Union, notably through a transfer of power to the European parliament. To influence the policy process, activists had to gain the trust of other campaigners and political decision-makers.

Trust and Alliances Trust played an important role in the campaigns at two levels: within the activist movement and between activists and their targets, European decision-makers. At the base of the campaigning networks was the trust established through repeated communication among individuals. What reinforced the movement was also the perceived threat, a clear and visible enemy. Trust relationships emerged among persons sharing a common set of values, focusing on the defence of a common objective: to preserve the free and open Internet. As a long-time European activist explains, at the EU level, civil society input is scarce, offering little choice in finding allies: “The rule in Brussels is that you cooperate with whoever is there to cooperate with, regardless of who they are, to a point”, states an EDRi campaigner (itv. 38). “I would have, by default, campaigned with anybody who would have campaigned on civil rights issues, there just weren’t very many”. The trust relationships established during the previous campaigns, at EU and national levels, were revived in early 2008 when activists alarmed

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others to the potential dangers for the Internet in the Telecoms package. The second campaign thus built on the persons who had previously been involved and succeeded to extend and broaden the issue to include new actors. The memory of the “No Software Patents” mobilisation generated a precedent of successful campaigning that contributed to generating a sense of togetherness and shared interest of various digital rights campaigners across the EU. Internet use, as a place for negotiation and action was fundamental for building relationships with like-minded persons. Involving “movement intellectuals” (Earl & Schussman, 2003; Garrett, 2006) helped sensitise a larger public, among the FLOSS movement and beyond. The founder of the GNU license, activist and free software guru, Richard M. Stallman, spoke at several gatherings against software patents. Stallman was one of the few widely recognised figures of the movement: “because he was world-famous, [Stallman] opened the door for all of us” (Müller, 2006, p. 173). No other campaigners were equally known beyond their country of origin or issue area. News media remained an essential channel to sensitise and raise awareness among a broader public. Mailing lists and conferences were valuable for reaching the “converted”, notably FLOSS supporters and developers. Yet, to convince the non-initiated, to turn the issue into a public debate, campaigners elaborated a media strategy. Getting into the media was not an easy task, thus ambitions remained modest: “we send [the press release] to all the newspapers”, recalls a Spanish activist. “And sometimes, they don’t publish you but from this point they knew you” (FFII-Spain activist, itv. 4). From 1998 onwards, a growing network of activists emerged around software patents. For Haunss & Kohlmorgen (2010, p. 23) “at some point during the mobilisation individuals and organisations started to join the protests and lobbying campaign without being explicitly asked to do so”. Activists repeatedly organised media-visible actions - demonstration in prison uniforms, website shut down - at key moments

of the political agenda. These created a sense of togetherness and solidarity across the movement and helped to pass the selection mechanisms of mass media outlets. Especially symbolic actions, such as demonstrations, slogans or caricatures were essential for communicating about an issue considered as obscure by many. Inside the EU institutions, activists found allies across all political groups. In the European Parliament, political groups are usually less united than national party lines, offering the possibility for multiple and shifting alliances. “You make and unmake alliances” explains a Greens/EFA adviser (itv. 33*). Cohesion inside the groups is not secured as national sensitivities are omnipresent. Activists gained the sympathy of allies through direct lobbying, or because allies were activists before entering the institutions, such as in the case of a Pirate party representative. Activists were keen to connect with a wide range of persons: “We tried to make friends with everyone who makes decisions, be it corporations, or politicians or journalists”, confirms a Telecomix/WeRebuild activist (itv. 39). “We tried to assimilate into those environments, and have those people become us. We worked as a very hybrid cluster of people who want to assimilate people to start talking about Internet politics”. MEPs considered activists as legitimate civil society actors and concerned citizens that needed to be listened to politely. Reception of their claims differed following the political positions defended by MEPs, with left-wing parliamentarians generally being more open towards citizens compared to conservative MEPs. However, even politicians who were opposed to their arguments did acknowledge their presence and involved them in the process, notably because they were citizens, not lobbyists: “[Lobbyists] have money for their campaigns but they don’t have the legitimisation of persons who simply call or write”, argues a committee administrator (itv. 30). “That’s something else. And MEPs take that seriously.”

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Activists earned trust and credibility through their continuous presence inside the institutions and the persuasive presentation of their claims. Leading campaigners were perceived as knowledgeable, able to voice a coherent alternative discourse. For conservative MEPs and their assistants, activists enriched the substance of the legislative process: “they did spot a series of interesting judicial issues, so we don’t say that they got it wrong”, declares a socialist S&D assistant (itv. 19*). Representing the “citizens of the future”, they understood the Internet because they had been using it intensively for years. They did thus provide a valuable input by explaining to MEPs how the infrastructure worked and why it was important for them to preserve it. Furthermore, what made them relatively successful was that they applied this “technical interest” to EU policy-making, digging deep into the parliamentary process and the technical side of the legislation, not necessarily well understood by MEPs and their advisers (liberal ADLE adviser, itv. 42*). Accordingly, they succeeded in convincing a series of parliamentarians and their staff to trust their arguments. However, activists also had to face a number of critics such as that they lacked knowledge about the EU institutions and were oversimplifying a complex piece of legislation to Internet issues. Generating trust remained an important challenge throughout the campaign. Unskilled activists were considered detrimental to the campaign: “As they were lacking people, they sometimes brought over young interns to collect signatures or to explain something to MEPs and they were very badly trained”, criticises a socialist S&D assistant (itv. 32*). “As they needed help, they took people who were not very skilled so that didn’t help for the image of [a campaigning group].” Nonetheless, activists succeeded in creating trust relationships with parliamentarians from across the political spectrum. They succeeded in reaching out of the Internet and carry their message inside the halls of the European Parliament, in the daily working spaces of MEPs.

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Internet-Based Campaigning In both campaigns, the Internet and other electronic devices played a major role. The technological infrastructure of the Internet enabled the connection, organisation and collaboration of a vast array of individuals and groups. Mailing lists, websites, wikis and instant messaging channels formed the communication arteries and points of stability for the multiplicity of groups that took part in the campaigns. The tools constituted spaces of open coordination, interaction but also dispute. Using the Internet to communicate and collaborate was a necessity for activists. No other channel allowed fast and affordable communication, across national borders, among a geographically dispersed group of interested individuals: “Without the Internet, we couldn’t have informed nor gathered such a community and coordinated the actions at the national and at the European level”, states an FFII-France activist (itv. 18*). “Without the Internet, there would probably not even have been a campaign.” All interviewees concurred: the campaign would not have existed without frequent Internet communication, simply because activists would not have been able to meet frequently enough and collaborate together. The Internet’s affordance for working together across geographical distances (Earl & Kimport, 2011) was highly leveraged in both campaigns. Internet spaces were completed by “offline” interventions, demonstrating that online and offline actions are not only supportive of each other, but that Internet-based campaigning is only successful once it penetrates inside the corridors of political institutions and/or reaches media resonance. The advantage of gaining access to the European Parliament goes beyond simply meeting MEPs. Once a badge has been acquired, activists can freely move through the halls of the parliament and engage in conversations with assistants and MEPs. Another advantage of being in Brussels was to have debriefing meetings, often inside the parliament or near to it:

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It’s a political adviser who made us enter. We need to know somebody inside to be able to enter. So we were in his office, following the debates live, we met people when possible, we wrote argumentation and amendments, and gave them to representatives. We wrote press releases, we had some every day, so we did it over there. Let’s say that what we did there we could have done it without being there. But being there, you can see people, you have the corridor conversations, you know what’s going on and you can meet the parliamentary assistants who are in charge of these questions. We can submit our ideas to them, and most of all receive some feedback on what is happening, what the strategies are (QdN activist, itv. 21*). Internet-based campaigns are not only technology-mediated, but are shaped by intensive “real-life” activities inside political institutions. If the Internet has become a central place, tool, and object of political struggle, being present inside decision-making centres remains essential for convincing decision-makers and obtaining information that can be redistributed online. The online and offline spaces are inherently complementary.

Open Collaboration and Political Coding Analysis, production, and dissemination of information were effective because both campaigns relied on a pan-European network of supporters across the EU. Distributed monitoring and open collaboration processes leveraged ICTs to aggregate small contributions and coordinate internationally. A wide range of applications were used to facilitate the involvement of as many persons as possible. Campaign wikis used in both cases resemble Benkler & Nissenbaum’s (2006) commons-based peer productions or Fuster Morell’s (2009) online creation communities. Participation is public and open, allowing new projects to emerge and activists to choose their level of engagement in an autonomous manner.

The Internet’s affordances facilitated coordination, collaboration and the aggregation of multiple contributions into a united campaigning effort. Activists applied what Himanen (2001) calls the “open model” of free and open source software development to political activism: any individual can launch an idea and ask others to join. It is also a consecration of the hackers’ hands-on imperative (Levy, 1984): instead of complaining about or discussing at length a particular problem, one is better served by starting to do something about it, engaging with it, taking it apart and reconfiguring it to improve it: “It’s like free software”, comments an FFII-Germany activist (itv. 11**). “Each group starts with a project and [group members] start programming. Some are successful, others not. Some join a project, some leave it. It’s just very alive and decentralised, which allows to provide feedback very rapidly and many things are simply tried out.” Internet-based associations supported this type of initiatives by providing resources for members to tinker and attempt to find a solution to the problem at stake. Participation is voluntary and autonomous, leading to a very open form of engagement: Everyone contributes in his manner, which certainly has inconveniences - everybody is not always agreeing - but allows an incomparable reactivity compared to [formal] organisations where every action has to be well thought through and approved. [An analyst at FFII] made a beautiful comparison about this with the court of King Arthur: everybody goes his way to confront all sorts of dragons and other monsters, then everybody comes to the court to tell his adventures, to bring up new dangers and draw the big lines of a new strategy (FFII-France activist, itv. 18*). Raymond’s (2001) distinction between the “cathedral” and the “bazaar” model, considered as superior, in software development comes to mind. Contrary to highly centralised top-down

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approaches, the “bazaar” model promotes distributed participation and the extensive sharing of information. Digital rights campaigning resembles free and open source software’s open collaboration and development model. Interest in the issues is shared through mailing lists that constituted spaces of coordination and interaction. Mailing lists allow to aggregate small contributions: There are many [people] who, simply participate in our projects. Some invest lots of time, others only three sentences. But all of it helps. For example, there are 20 patents on the poster [illustrating the number of patents on a typical e-commerce website] and somebody noticed that those patents are not so good. He just pointed it out and that’s all what the person did on that project but it was very helpful. And there are just hundreds of people participating in our lists (FFII-Germany activist, itv. 11**). Furthermore, new forms of Internet-based actions emerged during the campaigns and facilitated the analysis and interpretation of complex policy-issues. Political coding consists of software development for a political purpose (Samuel, 2004). As mentioned previously, a voluntary campaigner developed LawTracks, an open source tool that allows any Internet user to compare different versions of Telecoms package extracts considered as problematic. Another program recorded the voting behaviour of MEPs over time and was used to target those who needed convincing. Skilled participants are valuable resources, and once they are integrated in the network, they are not as readily replaced as campaigners might wish for. Through the active engagement in the campaigns, activists learned precious skills of organising and coordinating: “It’s essentially what I learned at FFII”, says an FFII-France activist (itv. 18*). “That’s to use the same tools, mailing lists, wikis, organise demonstrations, manage a stand. It’s stupid but you

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have to think about some things, all the internal management, declarations you have to do, I’ve seen a bit of everything really.” Rather than paying a membership fee, activists supported the campaign through their active and more or less fluctuating engagement depending on their time and motivation. What held the campaigns together were common objectives and a certain sense of a common identity.

Netcitizens and Hackers During the software patents campaign, near to all supporters identified in one way or another with the free and open source software movement, being active as users or developers. In order to involve them, campaigners used references and frames belonging to the hacker and FLOSS movement. As the “natural constituency” for mobilising people around these issues is the hacker and IT community, the use of programming language comparing the legislative process to the development of a computer program was widespread. When an amendment needs to be introduced, this is known as “patching” the directive. Similarly, proponents of the directive were portrayed as “patent trolls”. This common language, which finds its origin in the hacker, FLOSS and broader Internet culture, helped make the complex EU policy-process understandable to audiences across the EU. Especially for a transnational campaign that targeted citizens in all EU member states, the use of predominately English computer or Internet-related terms facilitated a common understanding of the issue. The use of a common language, although with different shades, helped build consensus among different actors. The success of the “No Software Patents” campaign that led to the rejection of the directive by the European Parliament formed a myth of how citizens, when united and fighting for a noble cause, can overcome more powerful actors:

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That success and the other successes of interaction and real-time intervention formed a picture or an expectation or a self-image of the community that we can do things. Fantastic things! That is of course true. Many of these people are still active like me. […] This small group of activists, with an experience, a self-image can change the universe, which is actually something that goes together with the hacker culture, where you sit and you control your universe. That’s yours! That is your computer! (Greens/EFA-Pirate Party adviser, itv. 23). Free and open source software users and developers were not directly engaged politically prior to the software patents debate. They became politicised through GNU/Linux discussion groups or mailing lists. The software patents campaign politicised new actors to engage into politics and remain attentive to similar issues: “You see a real involvement in the political process by this community who is not particularly aware”, analyses an FFII-Belgium activist (itv. 6). “Now what happens is that any new political initiative is immediately jumped on, analysed, broken apart... How can we hack this political initiative? So, it has been very interesting. It has politicised the whole technological community.” During the Telecoms package campaign, activists identified more broadly with the Internet beyond the free and open source community, referring to it as their natural space, a central component of their daily lives: That’s basically where [on the Internet] most of my life has been. I mean most of the people I know, I know [them] through the Internet even those next door. Many of my friends I’ve met through the Internet and ‘oh you live nearby that’s cool!’ [...] It has basically been a way of life not so much of choice. Not a conscious choice, it has come quite naturally as a way of working and I really just love it, ‘cause being able to talk to a person even without knowing where they live and not having

to know where they live, I mean, it can be just as fruitful as talking to someone you meet (Telecomix/ WeRebuild activist, itv. 37). The Internet is considered as more than a network of computers. It’s perceived as a living space, a habitat and a place to meet like-minded persons. Digital rights activists engage on Internet matters because they want to protect a space and practices they identify with: “We are citizens of the Net!”, claims an interviewee (itv. 12*). “Before I did [activism] full-time, I was a free-lance engineer-consultant using exclusively the Internet and free software to earn my living. I believe that [the Internet is] THE invention after the printing press of Gutenberg that revolutionises most knowledge and humanity as a whole! It’s what we want to protect and we use it to protect it.” If the software patents campaign was carried by FLOSS supporters, a broader range of individuals were involved in the Telecoms package campaign. The common denominator of all engaged campaigners was the defence of a free and open Internet against what was perceive as an external threat. What gathered people in IRC channels was the belief in the Internet as a positive transformative force for society that needed to be defended against “abusive” encroachments. The protection of their “natural habitat” recursively constituted the basis of their political agency: Internet politics is self-defence, in the sense that what we are promoting is simultaneously our method of becoming political subjects. When we talk about the free and open Internet, we are talking about what we are as political subjects. If we take away the open Internet, we have no political agency at all, because everything we do, and the fact that we can do volunteer work without any money, depends totally on the fact that we have constant access to the Internet. So yes, it’s selfdefence, in the sense that a free and open Internet is not only an ideal or value, it’s also a practice

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that we practice every day. Once it’s threatened by, for example, data retention or when net neutrality is threatened, it is a self-defence to engage in these questions (Telecomix/WeRebuild activist, itv. 39). The confrontation with politicians or lobbyists opposing activists’ positions lead to a reinforcement of this collective identity of Internet citizens working in the defence of the public interest beyond traditional political ideologies. Digital skills or the feeling of knowing how to use the Internet was particularly important in providing a feeling of empowerment for activists: Very often, when we act inside the parliament, we are against or in front of what professional lobbyists do; with on our side, the fact that we are citizens, that we are passionate, that we are hackers, that we can use wikis, IRC channels, mailing lists, Twitter… and so get interesting results sometimes. Build an expertise in order to be in contact with parliamentary assistants, ideally in all parliamentary groups, […] From there on, the internal work starts, the parliamentary work, where you can suggest amendments, and that’s where we’re, all together, going to patch the legislative code (QdN activist, Pas Sage en Seine cohackingspace, May 15, 2010). The collective identity was based on the dimensions of civic cultures discussed previously. Identity emerges when individuals share information and values, build trust relationships with one another by engaging in a series of repeated practices in various spaces.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS Rooted in the hacker culture, free and open source software practices and Internet culture more generally, digital rights activists are present in most European countries and committed to issues of

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intellectual property rights, Internet regulation, free and open source software, interoperability and civil liberties. Far from wishing to fundamentally disrupt the political system, digital rights activists accept and play by the rules of policy-making. Hacking, in the sense that it has been used in the present paper, is not radical and disruptive. Instead, it is parasitical in the sense that it does not exist without the structure it attacks or subverts (Taylor, 2005; Berry, 2008). Its radicality is not the introduction of new elements into the system but rather “its transcendence of the categories that the establishment would seek to apply” (Taylor, 2005, p. 633) as hacking re-interprets and reengineers the system that it confronts. Applied to the political realm, hacking and FLOSS values and practices do not seek to fundamentally alter the current policy-process. Instead, activists introduce ideas, actors and practices into the current system to transform and reinterpret it from within. The campaigns reveal the skill-sets mobilised by activists intervening in one or both campaigns. Those skills can be categorised as social, technological and political. Social skills refer to the respect of a particular set of codes and practices that are generally considered as acceptable among a certain community. In this respect, activists had to mobilise different skills depending on the environment in which they engaged. Relations with other activists were more informal than discussions with political representatives for instance. Communicative skills such as politeness were very appreciated by members of the European parliament and activists’ credibility and access to decision-makers depended upon their respect of this particular codes of behaviour. Furthermore, activists used their technological skills, meaning knowledge about how the Internet and computers worked but also how to use them for their purposes. Technological skills were mobilised across various dimensions of civic cultures. They were most useful for finding, analysing and disseminating relevant information, generating spaces for discussion and collaboration and ne-

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gotiating a common interpretation of a particular issue. Finally, political skills, knowledge of the institutions and the policy-process, were gained over time by many activists. The hacker values of digging deep into complex systems motivated many activists to learn more and engage directly with the EU policy-process, attempting to change it from within. All three sets of skills were combined across the various dimensions of civic cultures to sustain political agency or the feeling to be an able and competent participant in the policy process. If social and political skills are widely recognised as related to political agency and political attitudes, the present cases suggest that digital skills and technological competences need to be increasingly taken into account when dealing with Internet-based phenomena such as digital rights activism. The cases show that values and discourses build upon concrete practices, for example free and open source software development. Campaigners wished to preserve both as an alternative business model and because of their profound attachment to liberal and egalitarian values. The Telecoms package campaign in particular illustrated how a core group of highly engaged campaigners could count on the mobilisation of individuals engaged in the widespread practice of file-sharing (of copyrighted and non-copyrighted material), software development and other open collaboration practices through which a public good is produced. Digital rights activists from a great variety of countries followed specialised information platforms, used free and open source software and engaged in open collaboration processes. These common interests and practices formed the backdrop for mailing list or IRC channel discussions as well as encounters at specialised conferences (e.g. the Chaos Computer Congress organised every year in Berlin). The claims put forward by activists have the potential to be linked to many more oppositional discourses, hence, the creation of a much larger, more diverse and flexible network of counter-publics is possible. Further research

is necessary to investigate the discursive and practice-related links between various groups and subcultures populating the Internet and sustaining digital rights campaigning.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Civic Cultures: Cultural patterns acting as the foundation for identities of citizenship and civic agencies. They are resources that have been collectively generated over years and can be leveraged for political purposes. Digital Rights: Human rights (e.g. protection of privacy, freedom of expression) in the digital realm. Digital Rights Activism: Political activism using the Internet aiming to change the power structures of digital information spaces. Based on principles of freedom and openness, digital rights activism aims to protect a digital commons against encroachments from private and state

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actors seeking to control digital spaces. Digital rights activism is an umbrella term that is applied here to a large variety of struggles for an open information infrastructure such as: The defence of freedom of expression online; Freedom to access information and knowledge; The respect of privacy and encryption methods; The right to create and share knowledge; The promotion of open models such as free software, copyleft licenses and peerto-peer networking. Digital Skills: Technical competences necessary to interact, communicate with and mobilise others in the digital realm. These skills complement social and political skills necessary for engaging in political activism. Skills are rooted in experience and cultural practices. Hackers: Computer aficionado who tinkers with computers for his/her own pleasure or peer recognition and without criminal or malicious

intentions, combining creativity, style and technical virtuosity to explore, find and/or improve the flaws of computer programs or networks. Netcitizens: Internet users considering the Internet an extension of their natural habitat and engaging for its protection. Political Agency: Possibilities for political action a person holds. It constitutes the point of departure for political participation. Political Coding: Computer programming in the pursuit of an explicit political goal.

ENDNOTES 1



Interviews with one asterisk are translations by the author from French, two asterisks from German.

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Chapter 18

Protesting in a Cultural Frame: How Social Media was used by Portuguese “Geração à Rasca” Activists and the M12M Movement António Rosas University of Lisbon, Portugal

ABSTRACT ICTs and particularly the Internet are changing national and international politics. International organizations, activists, and even national governments are now extending their organizational resources and apparatuses to the digital virtual worlds, thus expanding the horizons of politics to new levels and challenges. In this chapter, the author concentrates on a surprising and unprecedented initiative that took place in Portugal in March 12th, 2011, the “Geração à Rasca” protests, as well as on the March 12th Movement (M12M), the social movement that followed it. More precisely, the chapter examines how Internet-enabled technologies, like social media, were used as tactics for political organization and mobilization, and how several political cultures were activated. In a country where non-conventional politics was limited to unions and to well-demarcated interests, those two initiatives inaugurated a new era of political participation and democratic opposition. For the first time, 4 young graduates, who never participated in politics before, were able to mobilize more than 500,000 people in several cities of the country, while adapting their messages to the particular political cultures of their “natural” constituencies, the young unemployed or underpaid seasonable workers, to the overall population, dissatisfied with the economic performance of successive governments, and to the more radical groups still committed to the political cultures of the 1974 Carnations Revolution. Besides those tactical and discursive uses, political and economic contexts, contingent events, and the support of symbolic elites were also important factors in both initiatives.

INTRODUCTION The way social media and the Internet are used by protesters and activists is largely dependent on national and local cultural contexts (for a

defense of this argument, although not dealing, explicitly, with political cultures, see Kallinikos, 2004 and Anduiza, Jensen & Jorba, 2012). These can influence significantly how actors perceive and use ICTs and how these tools are related to

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch018

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 Protesting in a Cultural Frame

their political objectives and outcomes. In this essay, the author intend to examine how Web 2.0 technologies, like Facebook and YouTube, were used by Portuguese activists of the “Geração à Rasca” protests and their following initiative, the March 12th Movement (M12M), concentrating, specifically, on how these uses and messages were related to Portuguese online practices and political cultures, respectively. To achieve these goals, we use relevant literature on the emergence and dynamics of social movements and recent insights on digital activism and related issues concerning the relationships between people and technology. On March 12th, 2011, Portugal saw two things that were completely unknown and even surprising in the light of its recent political history. The first was that the massive protests that erupted in the country’s major cities, and that enrolled more than 500,000 people from all ages, backgrounds and status, were not mobilized by unions, political parties, or traditional social movements, but by four young university graduates (Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho, António Frazão, João Labrincha e Paula Gil) that were friends, never did politics before, and were just demanding more jobs and better working conditions for their generation and for precarious workers like them (“Precários”) (see Neilson & Rossiter, 2005, and Mattoni, 2012 for definitions of precarious work and job precariousness).1 The second important lesson was that these protests were not organized and coordinated through traditional offline organizations or grassroots movements, but through the Internet and some of its Web 2.0 technologies, in particular social media tools like Facebook and YouTube. How this could happen in a country where nonconventional politics were almost reserved to unions and to corporative interests was, indeed, puzzling, as it was puzzling why it happened in 2011 and not before. Although there will be always room for all types of explanations, it can hardly be denied that the Internet and social media played a crucial role in the protests, a so crucial role that we can even doubt they could happen without them. On the other hand, part of the success of

the “Geração à Rasca”2 protests can be attributed to the fact that the activists used social media not to impose their political or technological cultures, but molded their tactics, actions and messages to the political cultures and media practices that were at hand. If this was particularly evident in the case of the March 12th protests, it cannot be denied also in respect to the movement that was created after the protests, on April 18th, 2011, by the same group of young graduates. Yet, for social media and ICTs to be useful, and for political cultures to be activated for participation and protest, some more favoring conditions are needed. The truth is that after almost forty years of democracy, more and more citizens had become dissatisfied, not to say profoundly affected, by Portuguese strictly representative and elitist democracy. Between 1976 and 2011, electoral abstencionism was predominantly on the rise,3 while partidocracy had a strong hand on public policy, jobs, and almost every aspect of Portuguese society. The outcomes of these self-centered and exclusivist politics, together with the international financial crisis that begun in 2008, were not only unrealistic and insufficient public policies, news of corruption and mismanagement, together with the estrangement of the population, but generalized social and economic problems, like rampant unemployment and flagrant democratic deficits. So, by 2011, the lack of jobs and working precariousness had become a problem that affected not just the youth and the “Precários”, but a national issue that appealed to many bystander audiences, like different classes, professions and ages, from liberal and civil employees, to white and blue collar workers, or from post-Revolutionary generations to those that were born before 1974 but were unemployed or losing ground to adverse economic conditions.4 One way to “purge” the regime and claim for a more transparent, participatory and accountable democracy was, obviously, going back to its revolutionary origins - the emotional context and the political cultures of the 1974 Carnations Revolution.5 As so, trying to know why and how 297

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a generation of activists that were born after the Revolution, and living in a very different political, social and cultural milieu, used some of the most recent Internet enabled technologies, like Facebook, YouTube or Wordpress, to strategically activate and update these revolutionary cultures of the past, while calling for national reconciliation, like in the March 12th protests, can be, undoubtedly, interesting. As it can be interesting to know how Internet enabled technologies were further used to launch a post-protests online movement intended to be a new and genuine landmark in participative democracy. In fact, the March 12th protests can be view mainly as a test, and a cautious one, directed at the political establishment, as the four activists preferred to send a message of responsibility and consensus, a blank and neutral stand that aimed to solve an “unbearable” situation for which they were themselves, as their constituencies, the “precários”, co-responsible. Internet enabled technologies were then used to embark on some very favourable contextual conditions and events and to build up a loose network of allies posited between their natural constituencies and the general public. As for the M12M movement, things were somewhat different. Messages became less neutral and consensual, more ideologically motivated and demarcated, while the role played by Internet enabled technologies promised to be more diversified. Instead of being inter-generational, consensual and emotionally driven, the movement positioned itself as a new online network of the Portuguese civil society (with links to the military, as we will see) intended to be a watchdog of Portuguese politics. While advancing a prodemocratic ideology that has reminiscences of the Revolution, M12M more fully uses Internet and Internet enabled technologies as tactics to participate and resist. Yet, political and discursive opportunities structure and tactical repertoires were not the only factors facilitating the protests and the emergence of M12M. Another class of contextual facilita-

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tors, like contingent events, the arrival of allies in the form of symbolic elites and mainstream media coverage of both initiatives also played an important part in the success, mainly, of the protests, although symbolic elites would give a hand to the emergence of the movement too. Those facts, together with the uses of Internet enabled technologies for political participation, can help us understand how and why traditional social movement scholarship needs to be updated in the era of online politics. This essay will be structured as follows. In the first section we will briefly discuss the importance of cultural and ideological factors on social movement emergence and dynamics. Along with it, we will consider the contribution of Internet enabled technologies both to protests and to social movements, paying a special attention to the analytic relationship between people and technology. The “leverage of affordances of the Web” model (Earl, 2011) will then be presented, in order to help us understand how the Web can be used to expand the reach, or eventually change, traditional nonconventional politics. In the following section we will deal both with the political and the social contexts in which the “Geração à Rasca” protests and the M12M movement emerged. As we already noticed, in 2011 Portugal was living in a very different social and political climate than the one in which emerged the Revolution of 1974. While in 1974, the country was not independent of the global context of the Cold War and of its ideological tensions, since 1986 it had become a member of the EEC (now the European Union), while democratic institutions were minimally set in place and the more radical ideologies of the past were now bypassed by centrist and moderate policies and programs both from successive Governments and political parties. For the sake of clarity, the consideration of contingent events, although contextual in nature, will be postponed to the next section, where we will examine also in more detail the roles of other contextual factors like the support of symbolic elites and mainstream

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media coverage during the phases of mobilization of resources in both initiatives. There, and in the subsequent section, we will move from the macro context of political opportunities to the meso and micro levels of the organization and of the signifying work related both to the protests and the movement, showing how, in these two initiatives, the activists perceived and used Internet and Internet enabled technologies to organize political action, connect online with other actors and frame their messages. This last task will be carried on using social movement literature related to strategic framing. Our intent will be to show, both in the protests and in the M12M movement, how collective action frames communicated through social media were related to local or national political cultures. Finally, we will offer a synthetic view of the two initiatives and present some concluding remarks on how political cultures and political contexts, together with technology practices and uses, influenced the movement’s objectives and outcomes.

POLITICAL CULTURES, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND WEB 2.0 During the 90´s, social movement scholars began paying increased attention to the cultural frameworks and processes that were tied to social movement emergence and dynamics (see Zald, 1996 and the seminal works of David Snow and his associates on strategic framing). Their main contention was that political opportunities and structural resources were not enough to explain why and how activists and citizens rebelled or opposed their Governments or other influential actors. This prompted new studies focusing on the cultural and the ideological dimensions of social movements, particularly on the framing and dialogical processes associated with political action. According to David Snow and associates, ideologies are dialogical products closely associated with social interaction. As such, they are not systems of though situated above the individuals

and ready to motivate action in a mechanical way (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Byrd, 2007, p.121). This view of ideologies and cultural phenomena goes hand in hand, in our view, with Michael Mann´ notion of “organizational networks” (Mann, 1986; see also Rosas & Máiz, 2008 for a materialist account of political cultures). For Mann, ideologies, or any of the other three sources of social power, cannot be isolated and apprehended without taking into consideration the concrete modes of social production in which they are entangled. Consequently, a materialist and performative view on ideologies conceives them as organizationally and socially produced and in a constant process of fragmentation, recreation and adaptation. Seeing individuals or groups as cultural receivers or producers, without taking into account the material conditions at the base of their creativity, the concrete organizational networks through where cultural and symbolic resources are constantly recreated through social interaction is, thus, an oxymoron. As we will see when discussing framing, social movements and all other forms of politically oriented collective action must thus necessarily actualize socially available ideologies and political cultures through complex dialogical processes of frame articulation and frame elaboration in order to exist and succeed. Accordingly, we must always pay special attention to what culturalists call “discursive fields” (Steinberg, 1999) and structural symbolic-interaccionists call “discursive opportunity structures” (Koopmans and Statham, 1999) when trying to assess how collective action frames are processed and ideologically constrained or facilitated by contextual political cultures. In this essay, we contend that the political cultures that were at hand, both during the March 12th protests and the emergence of the movement, were basically three: a majoritarian liberal/social democratic culture, very instrumentalist and deeply associated with party politics; a proto-revolutionary culture descendant from the Carnations Revolution, collectivistic and still anchored on the premises of the class struggle; 299

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and a sui generis local version of the New Left political culture, formed by discontents of the proto-revolutionaries while open to new ideas, constituents and interests. How Portuguese activists used those ideological stocks to succeed in a spectacular mobilization on March 12th and to put in place a permanent social movement is what we will see, when dealing with framing processes. Simultaneously, it cannot be denied that the Internet and the Web 2.0 are having an enormous impact on non-institutional activism, social movements and, in particular, on their ideological and cultural components. This is so because not only of the impact those technologies have on social networking and organizations, but also because of their extended scope and improved capacity to rapidly propagate interpretations, innovations and practices. In fact, national and local activists can now dramatically extend and transform their organizational networks (Mann, 1986) to the point of getting a global reach, less structural constraints, and eventually enhanced ideological power with extremely reduced operational costs. Even so, they are, of course, not floating in a heaven. As Evgeny Morozov has shown (2011), using the Internet for political activism can be as challenging and dangerous as in the offline world, if not more. We must not forget that the same technologies that cyberoptimists frame as liberating and democratic can be used by states and powerful actors to censure, persecute or silence their opponents, or simply to impose their preferred ideologies. Furthermore, the simple confrontation of local cultures and practices with the ideologies and the economic and political powers that comes with the Internet can be demanding. Technologies are not ideologically neutral and even if digital activists are in principle more free to reach national and global audiences, more free from mainstream media constraints and their Governments interference and censorship, they are not immune to the material constraints coming from these new technologies or from the political cultures and ideologies that are carried through them.

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One of the first episodes of those cultural clashes happened just before the Tunisian revolution, the inaugural revolution that marked the so-called Arab Spring. Just a few months before, while Tunisian bloggers were preparing to play a crucial role in the pre-revolutionary events, Ben Gharbia, an important Tunisian blogger and “bridgeblogger” (Zuckerman, 2008) denounced Hilary Clinton US Internet Freedom policy on the grounds that propagating democracy through the Internet was far for being politically and culturally neutral. Exporting technologies is also exporting cultures and practices, which could be viewed by Arab activists and their audiences as an illegitimate and even damaging interference in local and national non institutional politics (see Rosas, 2012 for a discussion of Ben Gharbia´ blog). In this sense, creating or transforming existing organizational networks through the use of the Internet is double demanding, as simple processes of technological and ideological adoption can be hazardous and even self-defeating. In fact, the impact of the Internet and social media technologies on local political action, organizational networks and their outcomes can be diverse and complex. After a period of exacerbated optimism, that was still very present during the first Arab revolutions, especially during the Egyptian upraisings against Hosni Mubarak´ regime, scholars became more prudent, certainly aware of the growing capacity of some States and their allies to use communication technologies like the Internet for control and repression. The fact is that even when they are judiciously adopted, ICTs are not the magic bullet that alone can bring down dictatorships or modernize cultures. In his study on the impact of ICTs on democratic change in the Arab World, Philip Howard advances a strong argument in this respect (Howard, 2011). Using comparative qualitative analysis and his direct knowledge of the national contexts on which is based his study, Howard contends that although the impact of ICT´s on democratization and regime change cannot be ignored, their main efficacy can

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be measured on how they can foster the development of national and local democratic political cultures, on how digital media is used as politicized media. “Democracy - and democratization – can no longer be effectively studied without some attention paid to the role of digital information technologies. Not only does the character of this infrastructure have an impact on the opportunity structures for political change and the range of possible outcomes, but technologies themselves support new forums for political discussion and are themselves politicized media” (Howard, 2011, p.132). To better understand how technologies are used by activists and how they perceive their importance for political action to we must now present the reader with a brief account on the most recent theoretical advances regarding the relations between social movements and ICTs and between people and technology in general. Naturally, the uses of ICTs in nonconventional politics begun posing many questions regarding how Internet enabled technologies, for instance, were challenging our knowledge about social movement emergence and dynamics. Beginning in the nineties (see, for instance Ayres, 1999), communication and social scientists directed their attention to the eventual transformations propelled by the use of ICTs on political action. While some of them clearly downgraded these impacts (Diani, 2000; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 2004), others saw the emergence of Internet activism as a mere “accentuation” of offline activism effects (Bennett, 2004; Fisher, 1998; Myers, 1994) and others the dawn of a new paradigm, leading to model-changing explanations (Bimber et al., 2005; Earl & Schussman, 2003). In the remainder of this section, we will deal briefly with two related problems arising from digital activism: tactical innovations and protest-related diffusion processes on the Web (Earl, 2010) and how people relate to technology, as they are of particular relevance to our subject and to the aim of this study. Let us begin by the latter.

Regarding the relationship between technology, agency and social processes, we propose a case by case and problem driven approach, together with a flexible and balanced perspective, in order to evade the basic dichotomy exposed by the realist and the constructivist camps. As we have said, we believe that technologies are not used in the same way across countries, and we hypothesize that their uses depend, at least during initial phases, on local and national political cultures and practices. This implies that we use Jennifer Earl and Katrina Kimport leverage of affordances model (2011; see, also, Hutchby, 2001) with caution, as it presupposes a purely strategic model of decision making together with an understanding of mediated politics in the context of American political culture. Over the next lines we will deal briefly with the leverage of affordances model for understanding both the people/technologies relationship and Internet enabled political action. According to Jennifer Earl and Katrina Kimport (2011, p.189), “Technologies don’t change societies or social processes through mere existence but rather impact social processes through their mundane or innovative uses, and in which the affordances of the technology are leveraged by those mundane or innovative uses.” Consequently, Earl classifies online mediated protests according to the degree activists leverage two important affordances provided by the Web: star-up and scaling costs, and copresence affordances. The more those two are leveraged, the more “transformative” and “augmentative” are the impacts of Internet enabled technologies to political action and social processes. Low leverage of cost and copresence affordances of the Web leads to “e-mobilizations”, while greater leverages lead to “e-tactics” and, ultimately, to “e-movements”. As the authors say, “the more these two affordances are leveraged, the more transformative the changes are to organizing and participation processes leading to the need for what we dub “theory 2.0”; the less these affordances are leveraged, the more likely it is that researchers will find what we refer to as a

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“supersize” model where the Web leads to faster, wider, cheaper activism, but without fundamental changes to the dynamics of contention” (Earl & Kimport, 2011, p.185). In the remaining of this essay, we will apply this overall framework for analyzing both the March protests and the M12M movement, although taking into account local political cultures and media practices as they can produce significant deviances from a pure strategic decision model. At this point, it can be argued that although Internet enabled innovations, the same way as information, are continuously on the risk of spreading, their local availabilities, uses and interpretations are not automatically updated and immediate. In this essay, we assume that digital activism is always culturally situated, which means that we cannot fully understand digital action if local uses and decisions are automatically set against a pure strategic model. In fact, as we will see, when dealing with mobilization resources, both the March 12th protests and the M12M movement cannot be fully appreciated too if technological choices are disengaged from social practices and local contexts, or if social actors and their decisions are set against a pure strategic model. Although forms of protest and innovations were relatively well known and diffused in Portugal by 2011, Portuguese activists largely ignored innovations on their March protests as they used Web technologies to mobilize traditional protests “by other ways”. On the other hand, although the M12M promises to update its arsenal of tactics with new innovations, like petitions or distinct forms of direct action in its intention to act as a democratic watchdog of the government, these are not yet fully adopted, as they can generate resistances to the movement objectives. Jennifer Earl´s contention (2010) that diffusion of online protest-related innovations and of protests can have significant second-order effects on political action must thus be taken with caution, also. As of diffusion of protests, as a “problemsolving tool” and “as a strategy for gaining redress is spreading to newly politically active individuals” 302

(Earl 2010, p.210), our case is somehow different, as we must not forget that the March protests followed and accompanied the wave of anti-regime protests that swept through North Africa and the optimistic mood regarding digital tools special ability for pro-democratic regime change and pro-democratic reforms. As such, protest diffusion processes cannot be ignored, as it cannot be ignored that the March 12th events anticipated both May 14th Spanish “Indignados” of the same year and, indirectly, the global movement that culminated in the Occupy Wall Street phenomenon (for more on this, see below when we present the political opportunities structure). Also, some significant nuances must be safeguarded between the Portuguese “Precários” and similar movements elsewhere, mainly in Italy (Mattoni, 2012). Contrary to what Alice Mattoni as shown for the Italian case, there were no successful or big initiatives that can be credited to the Portuguese precarious workers before the March protests. Italian maydays were only adopted by Portuguese “Precários” in 2007 (six years after Milan´s first initiative) and never gained the popularity and the visibility of their Italian counterparts. Also, contrary to the Italian case, Portuguese “precários” soon organized around a unique civil society association (Precários Inflexíveis), which concentrated their claims. As we will see, Precários Inflexíveis will be an important ally of “Geração à Rasca” protests during its initial phase of organization. This is not to say, in the context of our discussion, that Italian “Precarious workers” were not an important influence on the Portuguese movement.

THE PROTESTS AND THE M12M MOVEMENT IN CONTEXT The mobilization of massive protesters in several cities in Portugal in March 12th, 2011 cannot be understood without the specification of the national and the international contexts in which the protests emerged and got their first dynamics. The

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same is true for the M12M movement, created, as we saw, roughly one month after the protests. Consequently, we supplement our earlier discussion of the discursive opportunities structure by focusing now on what social movement scholars calls the political opportunities structure (POS). We will try to assess the existing POS at the time of the March protests and of the emergence of the M12M movement. As both initiatives were very close to each other, we assume that the same macro contexts encompassed both initiatives. Political opportunity structure refers to the conditions in the political environment that favor social movement activity (see the pioneering works of Eisinger, 1973; Kenniston, 1968; Parkin, 1968; Tilly, 1978). According to Doug McAdam (1996, p. 27), POS most important dimensions are the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the stability or instability “of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity”, the presences or absence of elite allies, and the State’s capacity and propensity for repression. In our case, the circumstances anticipating and surrounding the March protests were a critical and fragile conjuncture, in political, economic and social terms. This section will deal with those dimensions using as dependent variables both the timings and the outcomes of the two initiatives. By the time the movement begun to organize, Portuguese political elites were not living under blue skies. In fact, not only the socialist and minority Government was under high pressure from the opposition parties at the Parliament, as the political climate between the Prime-Minster, José Sócrates (Partido Socialista, PS) and the President, Cavaco Silva, was worn and coming to a saturation point. After six years of a quite sensitive political management, both men personalities and political agendas were increasingly not matching together. Thus, the situation vis-à-vis the elites’ alignments were not unfavorable for protest, especially regarding the signs coming from the top of the democratic establishment and from political parties.

Additionally, the international context was also playing its cards against the regime stability, making still more difficult and vulnerable the Government position and its policies. Western economies were suffering a deep and worldwide crisis since July 2008, further dividing Portuguese elites and severely narrowing their margins to establish consensus or negotiate. Also, the financial crisis coming from the American Lehman Brothers collapse made a strong impact on the Portuguese economy and on citizen´s perceptions of their national and European rulers, alienating national and European politics further from the people and making them more exasperating and incomprehensible. While public debt and unemployment were steady growing, especially for the youth, and Government policies were becoming more and more dysfunctional and alienating to some important sectors of the population, like teachers and other classes of civil employees, the Government of José Sócrates was still debating the construction of a new airport in Lisbon and the strategic opportunity of a fast train (TGV) connection between the country and the rest of Europe. We must not forget that in March 12th, 2011, the Socialist Government was making its way out from the political scene, after the President´s refusal to accept a fourth stability program for 2011-2014 (PEC, “Programa de Estabilidade e Crescimento”). In June of that year, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the main opposition party, won the general election, finally being able to get rid of the very uncomfortable position of playing the role as a broker between the Socialist minority Government and the Parliament. Despite more than forty years of democracy, Portuguese elites were never able or interested in opening the regime to real and substantive participation. In 2011, party politics was still dominating national politics and the limits of strict representative democracy was never questioned or altered since the April 25th, 1974 Carnations Revolution put an end to Salazar´s and Marcelo Caetano´s dictatorships, introduced democracy in the country and “implausibly and unwittingly“ 303

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initiated the Third Wave of democratic transitions (Huntington, 1991, p.3). So we can say that the relative institutional accessibility of the Portuguese political system, although real, was never accompanied with a democratic political culture coming from above, or from below, that would free political participation from the bounds of conventional politics and that would be prepared to control for the growing political, economic and social discontent and unease coming from the governed. Nonconventional politics in Portugal were dominated by professional and working associations, mainly fighting for corporate or class interests. This can explain why “Geração à Rasca” organizers were so keen of not being supported by any of the political parties or unions. In fact, March 12th protests were also explicitly directed against political parties, considering that civil society should look inwards, rather to the establishment, and look for political emancipation and participation, rather than electoral channels and platforms. Instead of entering the usual political game, “Geração à Rasca” organizers just wanted to know ‘how did we get so badly?” (how did we get ‘à rasca´?). An initial state of mind that would mean to be especially directed to the youth became, thus, an appeal to massive and intergenerational discontent. This was completely new in Portuguese politics and marked the beginning of a new kind of democratic political action that was less selfcentered, ideologically minded, and corporative. This direct appeal to some segments of the populations and its independent strategy were not obviously the best choices to attract allies, especially at the highest levels. In fact, we can confidently assume that March 12th activists relied ostensibly on themselves and on minor political players, some independent, others from all quadrants of the political Portuguese spectrum, to call directly to the masses and to bypass the system. This, of course, had direct costs for some. The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and its allies, for instance, immediately distanced themselves from the protests, sensing danger in what they saw as an unexpected and strong adversary to 304

their traditional class mobilizations. They were even ready for paying the price, while trying to minimize and bypass the movement in later stages. The result was that the movement was supported by its own dynamics while being able to get the attention from some national popular artists, celebrities and grassroots associations, before gaining some informal help by some parties, like Bloco de Esquerda (BE, Left Bloc), a Portuguese version of a New Left bloc of radical formations and activists. But we will discuss this more deeply below, when we will show how both the protests and the movement emerged and were organized. For now what we can say is that although the divisions between political elites did not produce allies both for the protests and the movement, the same is not true regarding what has been called symbolic elites (Rocher 2004). In fact, both initiatives attracted many artists and popular personalities that would be important to their visibilities and emergence. As we said in the introduction, the role of symbolic elites will be treated in the next section. As for both the State’s capacity and propensity for repression and relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, we must bear in mind that Portugal is a democratic regime, a member of the European Union and a member of some of the most relevant international organizations related to human rights and other democratic values. Additionally, nonconventional politics, at least in the form of demonstrations, strikes and other types of contention, were always present in Portuguese politics since the Carnations Revolution. As we said earlier, these episodes of contention were nonetheless very different from the “Geração à Rasca” protests, as they were corporative, related to political parties (socialists, social democrats and communists were always present in Portuguese unions) and defending specific class interests. Therefore, it must be said that since the Revolution, the democratic regime has shown notable levels of tolerance to those forms of nonconventional opposition and political participation. Apart from being a member of the

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European Union and of many democratic international organizations, those rights to freely protest and assemble are constitutionally guaranteed. The Portuguese Constitution clearly states that all citizens have the right to demonstrate and to associate (Articles 45 and 46), while the suspension of those rights is only legitimate in extreme cases, like the imminent downfall of the democratic regime and of its institutions (Article 19, nº2).6 Furthermore, Portugal is keen of its international image of a fair and democratic country that can take a stand against the use of force for political control or the persecution or silencing of minorities and opposition groups. We must bear in mind that in its recent history, Portugal was instrumental in freeing the East-Timorese people from Indonesian domination (Cardoso & Neto, 2004). The fact that mainstream media and ICT´s were freely and amply available to the population can be seen, also, as signs of the regime openness, and we will concentrate on the later. Although the maintains a liberal regional policy towards Internet Service Providers (ISPs), under the Electronic Commerce Directive, it is well known that some EU Member States and ISPs have taken upon themselves the task of monitoring, filtering and censoring unwanted content (Deibert et al., 2010, p.281). This is not the case with Portugal, however, as both the Government and private operators were never accused of censoring or filtering the Web. Although as of December 2011, Portugal was still not included among Europe´s Top Internet Countries,7 it has shown an impressive record on Internet and particularly of Facebook users, especially if we compare those numbers to the size of its population. Between 2000 and 2010, the number of Portuguese Internet users more than doubled (from 2,500,000 to 5,168,000, almost half the country´s population), while 4,174,000 of those were Facebook users (38.8% penetration rate, a rate that was bigger than leading Internet countries, like France, Spain, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy).8 Additionally, the vast majority of Internet and Facebook Portuguese users were the young (no

more than 24 years old). This is very significant, in our opinion, as Facebook was one of the main technologies used in the protests. This brief summary of political opportunities would be incomplete if we didn´t take into account some international events that anticipated and accompanied the protests. We refer, obviously, to the waves of unrest and social revolutions that began in the last month of 2010, in Tunisia, and that precipitated what we now call the Arab Spring. This is of special interest, in this context, both because the Tunisian uprisings, and all that followed them in the Arab world, especially in Egypt, Yemen and in Libya, used intensively ICTs (especially mobile phones and the Internet) to organize and mobilize protests, and to frame demands for liberation and democracy. Although the first events of the Arab Spring had been anticipated by other important episodes of contention elsewhere, where ICTs had also played an important role (in Iran, for instance), it would be a mistake to ignore the strong impression left by those events in the West, particularly among the young. We must not forget that the image that international media transmitted of those revolutions, especially on the role of social media, was close to idolatry. For many observers, democracy had now a powerful allied, and social media and the Internet where framed as almost miraculous recipes bot for regime change and democratization. Thus, when the “Geração à Rasca” emerged, using especially Facebook and YouTube, social media had already been instrumental to the downfall of three regimes in North Africa and that the uprising they helped initiate seemed unstoppable. We can thus say that the Portuguese protesters were living in a techno-political limbo, in a phase of social media utopic euphoria, as would be their Spanish “compagnons de route” of the 15-M Movement that camped at “Puerta del Sol” in May of the same year, or the Greek protesters of Direct Democracy Now!. Both Spanish and Greek protesters framed themselves as “outraged” citizens, which was a Portuguese innovation (“os indignados”) but,

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unlike North Africa and Arab protesters fighting against dictatorship, Portuguese, Spanish and Greek “indignados” were fighting against the economic crisis and the lack of job opportunities, democratic deficits and rampant social and economic inequalities. As so, they can be labeled civic movements. In view of the above, we now begin to understand why the protests and the movement emerged in 2011 and not before, as we saw that several macro conditions were in place. This, however, is not enough, as these conditions existed for some time. In order to proceed, we must turn now to a more comprehensive evaluation of contextual dynamics, taking into account contingent events and their role as catalyzers of political action, together with the meso and micro conditions that help explain both the success of the protests and the emergence of M12M. In the next section, we will try to show how Internet enabled technologies, like social media, were instrumental resources to the coordination and the organization of the two initiatives, and how its uses, together with the discursive components of political action (framings) were related to political cultures.

CONTINGENT EVENTS, ALLIES, AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL “RÉSEAU” Political contexts are important factors for explaining social movement emergence and dynamics, but they are not enough. According to the now tenets of social movement theory, in order to succeed, activists must also be able to organize and to mobilize a panoply of resources, and communicate successfully their messages. If this was so in an era when communication technologies were not changing nonconventional politics, we must now take it into account, asking how the Internet and social media were perceived and used by March 12th “Geração à Rasca” protesters and the M12M movement and how they impacted on organizational and mobilization resources.

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As we said before, we will also see now see how contextual factors like contingent events, the arrival of symbolic elites as allies and mainstream media coverage were related to the protests and with the emergence of the movement. Right from the beginning, it is hardly convincing that some apparently banal and innocuous events, like some pop concerts, would play important roles in collective political action, as it was the case of the March protests. But they did. On January, a Portuguese pop group called Deolinda gave two concerts in the two most important cities of the country (Porto, January 22nd and 23rd; Lisbon, 28th and 29th), where, at the end, they played an unpublished song entitled “Que Parva que eu Sou” (“What a fool I am”). What followed was surprising. This song, dealing with job inequalities and working precariousness, resonated so strongly with the audiences that many kept stood after listening to it while others recorded the event and its emotionally charged atmosphere. Although this event would almost certainly pass unnoticed some years ago, it could hardly lost its momentum in the Web 2.0 era. Deolinda´s concert in Porto was immediately uploaded to many web sites, began attracting mainstream media attention and initiated a process of amplification. In just three weeks, the two YouTube pages that publicized the event registered more than 500.000 visualizations.9 The importance of these concerts to the protests can now be viewed as crucial, as they set up the emotional atmosphere and the right audiences to the initiative. It was, in fact, under their direct influence that the four young university graduates were led to political action.10 In fact, immediately after, on February 4th, 2011, they initiated the “Geração à Rasca” campaign on Facebook, where they also published a manifest,11 and one week later, on February 11th, they created a Wordpress blog12 where they called for national protests on March 12th against youth unemployment and the lack of working conditions.

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Another big moment, though, would come when, on 10 February, an important ally joined the initiative. Precários Inflexíveis, a civic political organization defending working rights and better working conditions for the “precários” (precarious workers) used its weblog to further publicize the call for the protests13 while, importantly, associating it with Deolinda´s song (publicizing the lyrics) and stating that more than 15.000 people had already confirmed their presence through the “Geração à Rasca” Facebook page. At that time, the song was already strongly resonating with Precários Inflexíveis audiences. As we can see, the four friend´s decision to organize the protests didn´t came out of thin air. On January 23rd, YouTube14 was already broadcasting Deolinda’s performance in Oporto Coliseum and playing the song “Que Parva que eu Sou”,15 attracting generalized attention from online audiences and further attention from mainstream media. Yet, also importantly, in our view, was the fact that the Deolinda´s song created almost instantly an atmosphere of proto-revolutionary and emotionally driven awakening that resonated profoundly with the Portuguese audiences and served as a bridge between the three important ideological cultures that we presented earlier. This was mainly because the song was immediately associated with another important event of Portuguese political history, the Carnations Revolution of 1974. In fact, it was with a song, “Grândola Vila Morena”, by Zeca Afonso, a mythical revolutionary reference, that the Captains of the April 25th, 1974 revolution coordinated their coup against the dictatorial regime of Marcelo Caetano (the political heir of Salazar), and introduced democracy in the country. In this context, it is not surprising that the four friends didn´t need to highly leverage the affordances of the Web, as they viewed their movement as consonant with a classical mobilization and in line with the popular demonstrations that followed the military revolutionary coup. Although they intended to stage pacific demonstrations, it would be defeating for their strategy if they didn’t use the culturally and emotionally rich context created

by the song in order to maximize its prospects of success through offline mobilizations. In other words, making their demands using other tactics (“e-tactics”, in Earl´s terminology), like an online petition or an online boycott, would be defeating for the movement because it would be incomprehensible by the majority of the publics that were being “trapped” by a proto-revolutionary atmosphere. Internet enabled technologies were used only to scale or to multiply offline effects, even if other tools and possibilities were at hand and technology literate publics were available. While YouTube and an important ally like Precários Inflexíveis were creating the conditions for successful political action, it is worth mentioning that many references to the protests soon multiplied on the Internet: on blogs, on pages created by other movements, and on online outlets of trade unions and political parties that appeared to be sympathetic to the initiative, like left-wing “Bloquistas” (BE, Bloco de Esquerda or Left Bloc, an oppositional party in the Parliament). The creation of that “reseau” of loosed and informal networks, combined with some institutional and more traditional actors, marked the second big moment in the organization of the initiative. An important aspect of this dynamic was the fact that, at that time, some social movements, trade unions and political parties, were also organizing around the issue of youth unemployment and job precariousness. Nevertheless, as their websites, social networks or news portals reported the announcement of the protests, they redirected Internet users to “Geração à Rasca” Facebook page, further acting as magnets to the protests. Additionally, fresh actions coming from the activists became instrumental to attract even more audiences from YouTube pages. In fact, the Wordpress blog served as the main liaison between them and the activist´ Facebook page, connecting it, in turn, to the media outlets that were following Deolinda´s song on YouTube and relating about the unusual popularity of their concerts because of it.16

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At this point, some collective actors, mainly from civil society, joined the call for the protests. This was the case, for instance, of the entertainment and audiovisual group Plataforma dos Intermitentes, but also with many organizations known to be more ideologically radical or protorevolutionary.17 The involvement of these organizations, their convergence to a central online platform and the promotion of national, local and sectorial dynamics, produced a cascading effect directed at the disclosure of the event which, of course, increased the chances of mobilizing new allies and interests. Using a term from social network analysis, the activist´s platforms, especially the Wordpress blog, soon were able to function as an authority node that connected with many hubs. This would not be possible without the emotional and cultural contextualization offered by the Deolinda concerts, as we saw, but also without the ways those concerts were integrated in the organizational network centered on the activists Wordpress and Facebook pages. Together, these efforts were capable of attracting not only proto-revolutionaries and New Left groups, but also the more moderate audiences dissatisfied with democracy and, especially, its economic and distributive shortcomings. Apart from the use of the Internet and social media to inform and to aggregate information about the protests, the organizers used them in conjunction with two other tactics to promote the event. This is especially relevant, as these further tactics enhanced substantially the role of mainstream media outlets as involuntary allies to the protests because, mainly, of their novelty. The first one was a “flash mob” initiative at the Lisbon subway and it took place on March 3rd. Activists used portable devices, like mobile phones, to play the music of Deolinda inside metro carriages, thus calling the attention of subway passengers and the media. The second offline action, fully organized and coordinated online, was the interruption of a speech by the prime minister during an official session of the Portuguese Socialist Party

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(PS).18 This spectacular move, besides publicizing even further the call for the protests through its mainstream media coverage, served to promote directly the event, as the activists announced the confirmation of some popular artists in the protests and disclosed the total number of confirmations so far in the Facebook page.19 This move publicized via mainstream media the adherence of Portuguese symbolic elites to the protests and officially marked the presence of those as allies (Rocher, 2004, p. 436).20 As this was not enough, on March 5th, another event played its part, also related to the role that symbolic elites would play in the events. Seven days before the date chosen for the protests, a musical group called Homens da Luta, won the Portuguese Public Television´ (RTP) Song Festival, an extremely popular song contest, and announced that they would be with the protesters, attracting further public and mainstream media attention. Instead of relying on favoring events and allies, M12M explored the popularity gained by the March protests and by the expanding publicizing role of the Wordpress blog (see http:// geracaoenrascada.wordpress.com) to step into political action. On April 18th, 2011, the four activists created a Facebook page (http://www. facebook.com/movimento12m) for the movement, and on June 14th a web site hosting a blog (http:// www.movimento12m.org/). In order to get a sense of the nature of the new network, we performed relational hyperlink analysis (Lusher & Ackland, 2011) of M12M online connections, using as crawling seeds both the website and the Facebook page.21 The graphical result is presented below (see Figure 1), where deeper colors represent sites with more in-coming connections (inbounds), or more authority. As we see, the Wordpress blog (http://geracaoenrascada. wordpress.com) is pivotal for the networking of the movement, while many technologies, like Twitter and YouTube are now used, further enhancing the panoply of e-tactics at the disposal of the movement. Additionally, several hubs, or

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Figure 1. M12M most immediate connections (inbound links and outbound links). Darker greys correspond to more inbound links, or links pointing to the site; the greyish-blue site (“http://geracaoenrascada. wordpress.com”, below) has the maximum number of inbound links.

sites endorsing authorities in a network, along with new individual and collective actors, now emerge.22 The most important of these collective actors is A25A (Associação 25 de Abril), the political association funded by some of the military that ousted the dictatorship in 1974. Another two are the Provedor da Justiça site (an important Justice institution, set up to hear citizens claims) and a civil online group, called Aprofundamento da Democracia (“Deepening of Democracy”). This curious networking between civil society pro-democratic organizations and the military, is nonetheless insightful and will be better understood when we will see how the M12M framed their initial messages. Also, positing as a political

platform in an overall participatory and critical political civil society network, M12M seems to rely less on mainstream media and on contingent events to act. While the military can be viewed as political elites turned potential allies, the use of an important endorsement to the movement as the communist writer and Nobel laureate José Saramago is undoubtedly a strong reference that now plays the role that was played by symbolic elites during the protests. On the other hand, those two references cannot be dissociated from the more revolutionary and radical cultures of the Revolution. In this context, it is not impossible to infer that the March 12th organizers are now fully confident that they have the legitimacy to

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propose a more radical and circumscribed political platform that can be successful as a watchdog of the government and of democracy. In fact, M12M seems to capitalize on the general success of the March protests in order to offer a more elaborated platform between a vanguard of loosed networks of activists and the population. Additionally, it is beyond doubt that to fulfill its more participative and oppositional aims, M12M will highly use the affordances of the Web like the uses of direct actions and petitions, judicial actions, or popular legislative initiatives, to name just these. How successful these will be, will depend on the overall acceptation of new practices and how proto-revolutionary and radical cultures will combine with these and the cultures associated with them. If the protest were successful in achieving great visibility in the public discourse to the “Precários” along with their capacity to capitalize and represent general discontent, M12M remains a shoot in the dark, as the risks involved in the new mission of being a watchdog of democracy can be defeating both to the movement as a prodemocracy platform and as a springboard for the defense of “Precários” interests.23

FRAMINGS AND IDEOLOGIES: FROM THE MARCH PROTESTS CONSENSUAL STAND TO M12M AS A PROTOREVOLUTIONARY WATCHDOG Standing between macro and meso processes, and mobilization, are framing processes. These are strategic attempts to craft, disseminate and contest the language and the narratives used to describe a movement, and aiming to justify the activist’s claims and motivate collective action using culturally shared beliefs and understandings (Zald, 1996; see McAdam et al., 1996). In this section, we will use frame analysis in order to scrutinize the “Geração à Rasca” Manifest exhibited on its Facebook page and the “About” page of M12M platform. Our intent will be ex310

amine the movement´s ideological and cultural appropriations resulting from frame articulation and frame elaboration processes (Snow & Byrd, 2007) that were at work during three core framing tasks: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and motivational framing (Zald, 1996; McAdam et al., 1996). To be effective, collective action frames enacted by social movements, must fulfill three essential tasks: 1) they must identify a problem (or problems), along with its, or their, causes (diagnostic framing); 2) propose a logical solution to that problem (or problems), as much as they must identify who will be the protagonists of the solution, a task that eventually involves exposing the organizational or the group tactics and strategies related to it (prognostic framing); and, finally, 3) be able to emotionally engage their audiences, generally through the enactment of slogans or calls for action (motivational framing). In order to understand how collective action frames are related to ideologies (and, in our view, to political cultures), or the “metaphorical blending, weaving, and grafting” processes that are at work during ideological reception, transformation and reproduction, we must, nonetheless, turn our attention to two “highly agentic, interactive, discursive” processes: frame articulation and frame elaboration (Snow & Byrd, 2007, p.130). Frame articulation generally “involves the connection and alignment of events, experience, and strands of moral codes so that they hang together in a relatively unified and compelling way”, while frame elaboration is associated with the task of “accenting and highlighting some events, issues, or beliefs as being more important than others” (Snow & Byrd, 2007, p. 130). Over the next lines, we will begin to examine closely the “Geração à Rasca” March 12th Manifest on the Facebook page (http://www. facebook.com/events/180447445325625/) in order to scrutinize those interpretative processes. We will try to understand how the four activists used available cultural and ideological resources while framing this message and, more precisely, it´s nature and content. After that, we will concen-

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trate on the framing processes that were present in the M12M movement´s messages. From an ideological point of view, the manifest seems, thus, apparently uninteresting. It is a vague text destined to resonate with the masses and optimize the effects of social media content on ideologically fragmented audiences. In terms of diagnostic framing (see Table 1), the problem is framed as an unbearable state of affairs, a general context, or situation, of social and economic precariousness and uncertainty. Curiously enough, job precariousness is not only a problem which causes cannot be attributed to others, like employers or politicians. The younger generations are also part of the problem and, thus, co-responsible. The logical solution (prognostic framing) is a collective endeavor to solve the situation and regenerate the country, to make it worth

of the efforts of anterior generations, turn the youth useful and give a future to Portugal. While the unbearable labor condition of the younger generations and their responsible are diagnosed in apolitical and non-adversarial terms, prognostic framing is constructed as a partnership between those that suffer under unbearable conditions and the nation. Those are: “Nós, desempregados, “quinhentoseuristas” e outros mal remunerados, escravos disfarçados, subcontratados, contratados a prazo, falsos trabalhadores independentes, trabalhadores intermitentes, estagiários, bolseiros, trabalhadores-estudantes, estudantes, mães, pais e filhos de Portugal”.24 As we can see, the experience of frustration and job insecurity by some is articulated as a national experience uniting generations, and elaborated, or reinterpreted, as a general imperative: “Protesta-

Table 1. Stategic framing: 12 March “Geração à Rasca” protests    Core Framing Tasks Diagnostic Framing Problem(s) “situação precária para a qual fomos arrastados” (the precarious situation to which we were all dragged) “actual situação de incerteza” (actual uncertaintities) “realidade, que se tornou insustentável” (an unbearable situation) Responsible(s) “todos os responsáveis pela nossa actual situação de incerteza - políticos, empregadores e nós mesmos” (all the responsible for our present situation of uncertainty – politicians, employers and us) Prognostic Framing Logical Solution “alteração rápida desta realidade, que se tornou insustentável.” (a swift change of this reality, which became unbearable) Protagonists “desempregados, “quinhentoseuristas” e outros mal-remunerados, escravos disfarçados, subcontratados, contratados a prazo, falsos trabalhadores independentes, trabalhadores intermitentes, estagiários, bolseiros, trabalhadores-estudantes, estudantes, mães, pais e filhos de Portugal” (We, the unemployed, the “five hundred euros workers” and other under-paid people, disguised slaves, subcontracted workers, term contracted workers, false independent workers, intermittent workers, trainees, fellows, students, student-workers, students, mothers, fathers and sons of Portugal) “Nós, que até agora compactuámos com esta condição todos os responsáveis pela nossa actual situação de incerteza - políticos, empregadores e nós mesmos” (all we that pactuated with this uncertain situation – politicians, employers and us) Tactics/Strategies “estamos aqui, hoje, para dar o nosso contributo no sentido de desencadear uma mudança qualitativa do país” (we are here, today, to give our contribute for a qualitative change in the country) Motivational Framing “não estamos, nem queremos estar à espera que os problemas se resolvam” (we are not, nor want to be waiting for the problems to be solved) “Protestamos por uma solução e queremos ser parte dela” (we protest for a solution and we want to be part of it) “temos os recursos e as ferramentas para dar um futuro melhor a nós mesmos e a Portugal” (we have the resources and the tools to give a better future to us and to Portugal) “futuro digno, com estabilidade e segurança em todas as áreas da nossa vida” (for a worthy future, with stability and security in all areas of our lives)

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mos para que todos os responsáveis pela nossa actual situação de incerteza - políticos, empregadores e nós mesmos – actuem em conjunto para uma alteração rápida desta realidade, que se tornou insustentável.”25 Frame elaboration proceeds thus in defining an ample and consensual discourse that prefers to be apolitical and not antagonistic, while being directed to generational claims that can be satisfied pacifically and democratically. As part of the consensual and apolitical tone of the manifest, motivational framing is construed in terms of an appeal to self-vindication, vindication of others (not only the older generations, including those that were present during the Carnations Revolution, but also those that will come) and as patriotic zeal, directed at a more just future and national economic success. As we see it, thus, an appeal directed to change through dialogue and consensus between all parts of the great functional problem posed by an unbearable state of things, is construe alongside an indirect appeal to the Revolution and the hopes it raised. All the three discursive fields that were present in 2011 are thus tapped. In order to see how in the M12M case, frame articulation and elaboration processes were related to Portuguese political cultures and available ideological stocks, we will examine the “About” page located at the site of the movement (http:// www.movimento12m.org/?q=node/14). Right from the beginning, the M12M page exhibits a brief citation from the communist writer José Saramago, which value comes more from being apparently emblematic to the movement than analytically interesting. Clearly, Saramago is not a political scientist. Nonetheless, he tries to grasp a normative democratic characteristic that has some traction for our purposes. In his words, and putatively, in the words of the four founders of the movement, true democracy and the spirit of democracy only begins when all citizens are politicians. Apart the fact that such democracy would be unbearable, because it would arm many of the freedoms that lie, precisely, at the heart of 312

democracy, this is undoubtedly a very significant citation, as it eloquently expresses a particular political culture and an ideological standing underpinning the movement or, at least, large part of its messages. In fact, citing a communist writer as Saramago, not only immediately appeals to the Revolution of 1974, the most emblematic event of Portuguese communism, as it shows how part of the leftist intelligentsia has culturally apprehended democracy. Additionally, borrowing from this particular author, a Nobel laureate in 1998, had not only good chances of being well received by the non-intelligentsia, or even by the non-left intelligentsia (obviously not from the same reasons), as it revealed how far a movement that was putatively interested in defending restricted interests wanted to extend the scope of its claims. By extending, through the Saramago´s citation, the scope of their aims to the realization of a particular democratic ideal, M12M activists tried to place its claims in the overall political context of democratic amelioration and, implicitly, as critical stances towards the political establishment. Insofar as this was to be accomplished through this peculiar interpretation of democracy, can tell us a lot on how the leftist and the Portuguese protorevolutionary intelligentsia interpreted it, almost forty years after the revolution: as an emotionally charged and naïve, tough potentially totalitarian, tool for the permanent control of the masses. As of diagnostic framing (see Table 2), the main problem now is not only the unbearable situation of the present, but a more ideologically focused one: the lack of democratic accountability and transparence. While the responsible are the same, not a class or a group, but all, now the protagonists are not directly the “Precários”, or the people, or some groups, but a network of post-protest movements, civic groups and organizations in which M12M takes an equal part. As we can see from both initiatives, frame articulation and frame elaboration processes were very dissimilar. While the protests associated incidental injustices suffered by the “Precários” with an opportunity for reconciliation between

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Table 2. Framing: M12M movement    Core Framing Tasks Diagnostic Framing Problem(s) “Actual situação de incerteza” (the uncertain present situation) Lack of democratic transparency and accountability. Responsible(s)    “políticos, empregadores e nós mesmos” (politicians, employers and us) Prognostic Framing Logical solution “Questionaremos frequentemente os responsáveis políticos, avaliando as consequências das suas decisões e a coerência das suas acções” (we will question regularly political leaders, assessing the consequences of their decisions and the rationale underlying their actions) Protagonists M12M e “grupos e associações no pós-manifestação” (M12M and groups, associations created after the protests) Tactics/Strategies “ajudar a dinamizar e a promover o diálogo, a reflexão crítica focada no encontro de soluções, promovendo pontos de encontro, sinergias e solidariedade entre movimentos e cidadãos” (to help dinamize and to promote the dialogue, critical reflection geared to reach solutions, consensus, synergies, and solidarity between movements and citizens) Participative democracy    Popular legislative initiatives, judicial actions, petitions and direct actions. Motivational Framing    “ mais e melhor democracia” (more and better democracy)

equals, governed and governors, with a view on a collective catharsis, the M12M movement main frame associates real and a better democracy with the permanent political action of an oppositional vanguard in all domains of national life, from the economic to the cultural. Far from tapping the centrist and consensual cultural stock, it revives revolutionary and radical political cultures to engage in democratic improvement through a vanguard and mediated popular control.

CONCLUSION Both economic crisis and the sense of grievances were not enough to produce March 12th, 2011 protests. Since 2008, at least, economic and financial problems were very much visible, both internationally and inside borders. On the other hand, the Socialists incapacity to stop recession and generate employment since 2005, when José Sócrates took office, is a matter of fact. Both youth and global unemployment never ceased to grow steadily, at least since 2008, although signs of it were already present before, during the social-democrat (PSD) and the PP govern-

ment, especially conducting to the creation of the “Precários” (precarious workers) movement. For many years, ramping unemployment, along with favorable political opportunities, were ever present in Portuguese society, dominated as it was by strict representative democracy, bad performance of the economy and the elites un-ability to generate a more just and efficient society in a democratic framework. Embarking on special circumstances, like the popularity of a song that evoked the cultural and the emotional atmospheres of the 1974 Revolution, “Geração à Rasca” activists didn´t need to leverage high the affordances of the web to strategically organize the protests and mobilize discontentment. They used social media as low cost tools to capitalize on those favorable conditions and reduce the information and organizational costs associated with mobilization. The outcomes of these actions were “e-mobilizations”, where other online tactics served mainly to further gain visibility to the “precários”, as representatives of the overall population. This goes hand in hand with their messages, destined to appeal to all political cultures that were at hand and to mobilize the maximum of protesters. Despite the meagre 313

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resources, the campaign organizers were also able to capitalize on the popularity and the media coverage of Deolinda’s song and attract a significant number of other movements, trade unions, political parties, and finally, an important group of symbolic elites, like popular singers and artists. This dynamic reached a daily average of more than 1,900 acknowledgements on the Facebook page, showing the adherence of global audiences. On the other hand, the organizational and discursive problems confronting the M12M movement were somewhat different. As we saw, its objectives were not to defend specific interests appealing to all or to voice general discontentment through the claims of the “precários”. In fact, M12M emerged from the conditions created by the protests themselves and from the public spaces that they opened. Although the national problems denounced earlier persisted, the objectives of the movement were intended to capitalize on the success of the protests in order to be a part of a new and regenerated network of civic organizations using the Internet and Internet enabled technologies to act as a watchdog of the government and to confront directly the political system and its representative democracy. Relying also on allies like the military and the prestige of the Nobel laureate José Saramago, M12M must be viewed as very different initiative, both in terms of organization and discourse. Instead of consensual messages and inclusive organizational aims, M12M taps intentionally on New Left and proto-revolutionary appeals and programs, together with more global and highly leveraged affordances of the Web in order to fulfill a mission that can be very risky to its initial aims and successes. The close identification between M12M and the military of A25A may signal that the movement is not yet capable of engendering by itself new democratic practices and an emancipated political culture. This, in our perspective, is a very important point, as the reception and the uses of new “e-tactics”, jointly with the arrival of potential international allies, will much depend on it.

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Neilson, B., & Rossiter, N. (2005). From Precarity to Precariousness and Back Again: Labour, Life and Unstable Networks. The Fibreculture Journal, 5. Parkin, F. (1968). Middle-Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Rocher, G. (2004). A General Introduction to Sociology. Calcutta: B.K. Dhur. Rosas, A. (2012). Framing Freedom in the Middle East – Blogger Sami Ben Gharbia and Arab Digital Activism. In K. Prasad (Ed.), Transforming International Communication: Media, Culture and Society in the Middle East. New Delhi: BRPC Publishing. Rosas, A., & Máiz, R. (2008). Democracia e Cultura: Da Cultura Política às Práticas Culturais Democráticas. História. Revista da Faculdade de Letras, 9, 337–356. Snow, D., & Byrd, S. C. (2007). Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements. Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review, 12(1), 119–136. Steinberg, M. W. (1999). The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action: A Dialogic Analysis of Repertoires of Discourse among Nineteenth-Century English Cotton-Spinners. American Journal of Sociology, 105, 736–780. doi:10.1086/210359 Tarrow, S. (1998). Fishnets, Internets, and Catnets: Globalization and Transnational Collective Action. In Challenging Authority: The Historical Study of Contentious Politics (pp. 228–244). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Tilly, C. (1978). From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Tilly, C. (2004). Social Movements 1768-2004. London: Paradigm Publishers.

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Zuckerman, E. (2008). Meet the Bridgebloggers. Public Choice, 134, 47–65. doi:10.1007/s11127007-9200-y

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Activism Networks: Online and offline resources intended for organizing, coordinating and mobilizing political action. New Media: Generally digital on-demand access to content anytime, anywhere, as well as interactive user feedback and participation. Examples include Facebook, Twitter or YouTube. Political Cultures: The overall set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to the political process and which provide its underlying assumptions and rules. Political Ideologies: Systems of thought intended directly at political action and the transformation of society. Precarious Workers: Workers with a short term contract, either full-time or part-time but no stable working conditions, being generally excluded from the Welfare State. Social Movements: Forms of non-conventional political action directed at democratic opposition and participation. Web 2.0: A new Web technology in which web sites are not limited to static pages but allow users to interact as creators of user-generated content in a virtual community.

ENDNOTES 1

“Precários” is the term used by the protesters to define themselves, meaning all those that have precarious jobs. “Precários” (precarious workers) are workers with a short term contract, either full-time or part-time and no stable working conditions, being generally

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excluded from the welfare state. Another term very used by the protesters was “quinhentoseuristas”, which refers to those who are paid 500 euros by month for their work. “Geração à Rasca” was the term used by the Portuguese protesters to describe their generation of unemployed and precarious workers. We can loosely translate it by “the generation on the brink” or “the afflicted generation”. Of the 13 legislative elections of the period, only 3 registered a drop in abstencionism (in 1989, dropping from 17,13% to 16,06%, in 2002, from 38,95% to 38,52%, and in 2005, from 38,52% to 35,74%). In the last legislative elections (June 5th, 2011), abstencionism rose to its historical high since the Revolution, 41,97%. According to Eurostat (“Unemployment statistics” - Statistics Explained (2012/4/1) ), Portuguese youth unemployment rate (between 15 and 24 years, inclusive) in the third quarter of 2011 reached almost 30%, its highest value since 2008, a value similar to Ireland, although much lower than Greece and Spain. In 2010, the total unemployment rate was also strong and growing - 10% for the male population and 12% for the female population. One of the most important of these political cultures, deeply infiltrated in the army that brought the coup de grace to the Portuguese dictatorship, was Marxism and its ideological derivations: Stalinism, Trotskyism and Maoism. Stalinism was mainly introduced by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), which aim was the satellitization of the country under the URSS influence. The other discourses were two national appropriations of North European social democracy and French Socialism (by the Portuguese Socialists (PS) and the Social Democrats



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(PPD)), the liberal and the conservative, both strongly tied to the Catholic Church, and fringe radical parties and movements adamantly critical not only of the right but also of the left, especially of PCP´ Stalinism. As Article 19, nº 2 states: “O estado de sítio ou o estado de emergência só podem ser declarados, no todo ou em parte do território nacional, nos casos de agressão efectiva ou iminente por forças estrangeiras, de grave ameaça ou perturbação da ordem constitucional democrática ou de calamidade pública.” (The state of siege or the state of emergency may be declared in all or part of the national territory, in cases of actual or imminent aggression by foreign forces, serious threat or disruption of the democratic constitutional order or public calamity.) Internet World Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com/europa.htm#pt . Internet World Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com/europa.htm#pt . Available at http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=f8lo82tXbWU and http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ rgOFS7UZ2I&feature=related It was not possible, despite our attempts, to interview the four founders of the “Geração à Rasca” movement before submitting this essay. We hope to close that gap in a near future. S e e w w w. f a c e b o o k . c o m / e v e n t . php?eid=180447445325625. Accessed on September 30, 2011. See http://geracaoenrascada.wordpress.com, accessed on September 30, 2011. Still live at http://www.precariosinflexiveis. org/2011/02/protesto-da-geracao-rasca-nofacebook.html#more . Accessed on September 30, 2011. See www.youtube.com/ watch?v=LDFAI0vDgWM, published on February 13, 2011, accessed on September 30, 2011.

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S e e h t t p : / / w w w. y o u t u b e . c o m / watch?v=f81o82tXBWU, published on January 23rd; accessed on September 30, 2011. Public and private television broadcasters, like TV 2, TV1, TVI 24, SIC; print and digital generalist mainstream media, like Jornal de Notícias, Público, Sol, and free, popular, and specialized outlets like Destak and Blitz. Just to cite a few: AIP - Associação de Imagem Portuguesa; ANC - Associação Novo Circo; ARA - Associação de Assistentes de Realização e Anotação; ATSP - Associação dos Técnicos de Som Profissional; CPAV Centro Profissional do Sector Audiovisual; GRANULAR – Associação de Música Contemporânea; PLATEIA - Associação de Profissionais das Artes Cénicas; REDE – Associação de Estruturas para a Dança Contemporânea; RAMPA, Sindicato dos Músicos; SINTTAV - Sindicato Nacional dos Trabalhadores das Telecomunicações e Audiovisual; and, STE - Sindicato dos Trabalhadores do Espectáculo. On March 7th, 2011, a small group of activists from the “Geração à Rasca” campaign interrupted a speech of the Socialist Party’s Secretary-General, José Sócrates, during a Congress of the party. After walking on stage, the youths, using a megaphone, said: “The time for the “Geração à Rasca” to speak out is now; this is a peaceful demonstration, we only want to speak out.” The confirmation of the presence of popular artists and groups like Homens da Luta; Lúcia Moniz; Paulo de Carvalho; Chullage; Blasted Mechanism; Rui Veloso; Luís Represas; Kumpania Algazarra; Vitorino;



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Valete; Nação Vira Lata; Social Smokers; Fernando Tordo; Tiago Bettencourt; and Zé Pedro. Rocher defines symbolic elites as those “individuals or groups who present themselves or are presented as the prototypes of certain ways of living, acting or thinking, or who represent certain qualities and values”. The author further presents popular artists and singers as top examples of symbolic elites. The crawling was performed on May 20th, 2012 and involved two steps. The first used as seeds the two sites mentioned, while the second added to these some of the most relevant sites that were discovered on the first crawl. The result is a network of incoming and outgoing connec-tions between all sites that is not, off course, exhaustive, but it offers a reasonable account of M12M most immediate connections. The http://movimento12m.wprdpress.com is actually inactive, serving as a relay both to the M12M site and the M12M Facebook page. Another Facebook page, https://facebook. com/forum.dasgeracoes, was not scraped. This can eventually explain why Paula Gil left M12M a few months after its creation. “We, the unemployed, the ‘five hundred Euros people’ and other under-paid people, disguised slaves, subcontracted workers, term contracted workers, false independent workers, intermittent workers, trainees, fellows, students, student-workers, students, mothers, fathers and sons of Portugal.” “We protest in order that all responsible for our current situation of uncertainty - politicians, employers and ourselves - act together for a quick change of this reality, as it became untenable.”

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Chapter 19

Two Models of Online Petitioning in the United Kingdom Johannes Fritz Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany

ABSTRACT The chapter identifies two models of petitioning in the United Kingdom. One is found at the devolved legislatures in Scotland and Wales, the other on the Prime Minister’s Website. Differences between these petition systems are analyzed with respect to their political and institutional context, functionality, use, and impact on politics. The model in Scotland and Wales evolved from the context of devolution and the desire of the new institutions to distance themselves from the Westminster Parliament. Their petition systems offer petitioners a detailed treatment of their petitions by specialised petition committees. Petitions are generally assessed in qualitative terms and received in small numbers. The second model on the Prime Minister’s (2006-2010) and the coalition government’s Website (since 2011) is used to collect popular demands as part of an e-engagement strategy reflecting the dominant position of the Prime Minister within the UK political system. The system focuses on quantitative criteria to identify successful petitions.

POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT Petitions, defined as submissions of demands and concerns from the public to political institutions, mostly in written form, have a long tradition in the United Kingdom. The “ancient right to petition” dates back to the middle ages (Dodd, 2007; Ormrod, 2009; Zaret, 2000) and it is well-known among the population to this day (Interview Carman). However, during the 20th century petitions

lost most of their importance for British politics. As the electorate and the membership of the House of Commons came to closely approximate the UK population for the first time, most popular concerns were directly represented by Members of Parliament. In 1974, Westminster’s petition committee disbanded due to a decline in the number of incoming petitions and the loss of importance of the petition system as a whole (Judge, 1978: 394-396).

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch019

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

 Two Models of Online Petitioning in the United Kingdom

With the expansion of the Internet and its broad use by the population came an unlikely renaissance for petitions around the year 2000. Applications based on the global information network offer numerous possibilities to share knowledge, publish commentary and discuss politics within and across national borders. Petitions fit well into this context. The Internet allows for the discussion and preparation of petitions to organisations and political institutions, thus linking the “online world”, political decision-makers and political processes. Individual citizens and interest groups use online petitions to call public attention to their concerns, generate support for their demands and influence decisions by governments and parliaments. Especially when online petition systems are integrated into platforms such as Facebook, it is easy to recruit supporters and connect them to each other, although the reach and depth of such “clicktivist” support has reasonably been questioned (Morozov, 2009). Online petition systems are provided both by independent initiatives (for example on the website ipetitions.com) and by political institutions, mostly national parliaments and governments (Riehm, 2009; Riehm et al., 2011). The focus of this chapter is on three examples of the latter type within the United Kingdom. Here, two models of dealing with online petitions have evolved. One of these models can be found at the devolved legislatures for Scotland and Wales and the other on the website of the UK Prime Minister. As this chapter shows, the two models differ especially with respect to (1) the political and institutional context of their establishment, (2) their functionality and (3) their use by the population. These characteristics have been analysed on the basis of 16 interviews carried out in 2009 and 2010 with members and staff of the devolved legislatures and the Prime Minister’s Office as well as with political scientists and petitioners.1 Where necessary, the information gathered in these interviews is amended using more up-todate sources.

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POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT As this section will show, whether and how online petition systems are established depends heavily on the political and institutional context in which the respective political institutions operate at the time. Impulses for modernising the handling of petitions may well come from outside the institutions, but the decision to follow or ignore that proposal is mostly with their members and staff.

Devolution to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly When the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales were created in 1999, they found themselves in very different situations. In Scotland, a large majority of the population had voted for the transferral of legislative powers to a new parliament in 1997, while in Wales support for the devolution of administrative and executive powers to a new hybrid Assembly was much weaker. This reflects the stronger demand for increased independence from London in Scotland, where the campaign for more extensive devolution had been built up over the years through initiatives such as the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC) and the Consultative Steering Group (CSG). The CSG formulated four basic principles for the new Parliament to follow: power-sharing, accountability, access and participation as well as equal opportunities (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008, p. 12-13). The goal to ease access and participation, especially for previously excluded groups, proved relevant for the introduction of a modernised petitioning system. The Welsh Assembly was not as well founded in civil society. In the first months of the Assembly’s existence, its members had to work against rather than within the hybrid structure which proved difficult in practice. Only after a Welsh government comprising the devolved executive competences was formally

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split from the Assembly in 2000, the Assembly started working as previously intended (Sturm, 2009, p. 82). The split was formalized through a new Governance of Wales Act in 2006 (Trench, 2009, p. 147-150; Sturm, 2009, p. 83-84; House of Commons Welsh Affairs Committee, 2005, p. 3-6). The differences to the Scottish Parliament were further diminished in 2011. In a referendum, the population voted for granting the Weslsh Assembly legislative powers within the devolved policy areas (BBC.co.uk, 2011). Despite these differences, the founders and early members of the Scottish and Welsh legislatures were united in their dismissal of what they saw as the archaic functioning of the Westminster Parliament. This is where a common impulse for introducing online petitions came from. The Scottish Parliament was designed as a complete antithesis to Westminster. This was accompanied by hopes for a “new politics” in which parliament would supervise the work of government, set the political agenda and initiate part of new legislation. Strong committees would monitor the ministries and contribute to government legislation at the same time (Megaughin and Jeffery, 2009, p. 9-10; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008, p. 88, 90-91, 219; Sturm, 2009, p. 67; Interview Cochrane). While in many respects, the Scottish Parliament did in fact not manage to distance itself completely from its “institutional inheritance” in the UK Parliament (Mitchell, 2010, p. 98; Interview Mitchell) it did take a different approach to citizen involvement. Because some of the other initiatives did not resound with the population as expected, the petition system including online petitions came to be a central element of this strategy (Interview Jeffery). The Welsh Assembly is likewise committed to involving the public in its work. It seeks to achieve this goal by holding committee meetings outside of Cardiff and by using the Internet to connect to the population. Online petitions are part of this strategy. Since 2000, recordings of all

Assembly business have been published on the Internet and the Assembly uses Facebook (Sturm, 2009, p. 85-86; Interview Chaney). The Scottish Parliament was the first parliament in the world to introduce online petitions in the year 2000 using the “e-petitioner” software developed by the International Tele Democracy Centre at Napier University in Edinburgh (Beddie et al., 2001; Macintosh et al., 2002a; Macintosh et al., 2002b). After a trial period, the system was set up on the servers of British Telecom (BT) and supervised by the ITC. In February 2004, the system became fully operational. The ITC stopped maintenance of the system in 2008, handing it over to the clerks of the petition committee (Interview Cochrane) until the temporary disconnection of the system in the summer of 2011 (Cherbi, 2011). The Welsh Assembly accepts online petitions since April 2008. The system was set up with the goal to allow for maximum interaction among its users. The Petitions Committee of the Welsh Assembly sees online petitions as an important component of an accessible and transparent legislature. The IT team of the Welsh Assembly designed the system on its own, following the Scottish example. For advanced functions such as automatic notification by e-mail when a petition is being processed, the IT team worked in partnership with BT (Interview Jones and Spragg).

Engaging with the UK Prime Minister The online petition system on the website of the Prime Minister (http://petitions.number10.gov. uk) was established under completely different circumstances in November 2006. After a meeting with Google CEO Eric Schmidt in October 2006, Prime Minister Blair decided to introduce online petitions to the executive. Schmidt had encouraged Blair to improve communication between his government and the public. Blair was immediately enthusiastic about the idea (Winnett

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and Swinford, 2007). This is not surprising as the Prime Minister owed his electoral successes in part to an efficient communication strategy (Sturm, 2006, p. 286). Blair’s special advisor and head of the Prime Minister’s Strategic Communications Unit, Benjamin Wegg-Prosser, was charged with the immediate implementation of the online petition concept (Winnett and Swinford, 2007; BBC News, 2005). Since the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) wanted to use online petitions as a mere communication tool and as a supplement to its e-engagement strategy, no legal basis was required for their introduction. The only predefined specifications were that the rules for the treatment of online petitions had to be similar to that for the traditional petitions on paper. Neither Parliament nor ministers were consulted. For the technical realisation of the online petition system, the independent non-profit organisation MySociety was won. It realised the system at a cost of only around £17,500. The PMO did not claim the sole rights to the finished product, but the system was built under an Open Source license and can be downloaded and modified (Interview Green). The quick introduction of online petitions on the Prime Minister’s website was possible because during Blair’s premiership, political power had been concentrated within the executive and especially in the person of the Prime Minister. Blair had a pragmatic relationship to power, taking every possibility to optimise his political assertiveness. Contrary to the absolute sovereignty of Parliament, which remains as a traditional concept in the United Kingdom, Westminster is in fact largely controlled by government, which is in turn led by the Prime Minister. As the party or coalition in government has a majority in the House of Commons, legislative and executive powers are in practice deeply entangled. In 1976, Lord Hailsham summarised this system as “elective dictatorship“ (Grant, 2009, p. 32). Thus, while the Prime Minister’s online petitioning system was installed without consulting Parliament, the government could block the establishment of an

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online petition system in the Commons, referring to its likely costs (House of Commons Procedure Committee, 2009, p. 1). The quick introduction of the petition system also reflects Blair’s style of government. It was often campaign-like, defying the powers of ministers and civil servants. From the perspective of critical observers, Blair took over various political subjects in order to devote himself to them and to set own priorities. Once he thought of a subject to be completed, he let it fall again and it was difficult to get him interested in it again (Foley, 2004, p. 296-298). Positive representations argue that Blair had a desire to personally work on these initiatives to ensure that his ideas would be implemented (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006, p. 9). Regardless of how this style of government is evaluated, the online petition system appears to be particularly useful for it. Incoming petitions allow the Prime Minister to respond to newly arising issues quickly and without regard to existing responsibilities. At the same time, the online petition system does not oblige the Prime Minister to respond. Petitions can be completely ignored or passed on to ministers, whose answer will create less public attention. Lastly, the online petition system must be seen against the declined confidence in the political leadership of the United Kingdom (Seldon, 2009). Blair had stated at the beginning of his term that he wanted to involve the population more in political processes (Judge, 2004, p. 698; The Independent, 2007), including new ways to improve communication between the government (with himself in the centre) and the population. Blair sought to realise this goal through a number of initiatives such as a People’s Panel, the “Big Conversation” and “Let’s Talk” (Sturm, 2009, p. 111-112; Hollingshead, 2006, Labour.org.uk, 2006). Ultimately, these initiatives remained unsuccessful and were criticised as “gimmicks” (BBC News, 2003). The government was repeatedly accused of only simulating an interest in public opinion for electoral reasons (Wheen, 2007, Stringer, 2007).

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Although Blair’s successor Gordon Brown distanced himself from Blair’s sprawling selfportrayal early in his term, he did not change much in the public image of the Prime Minister. Just as Brown took advantage of popular television shows and the good relations of his wife to the press in order to improve his perception among the public (Wring, 2008, p. 222-224), he also continued the operation of the online petition system without any changes. After the coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats came to power in May 2010, the online petition system went offline until August 2011. It was then restarted on the website of the Government (http://epetitions.direct.gov.uk) instead of on the Prime Minister’s. As Cameron had promised during his election campaign, petitions receiving at least 100,000 signatures can now be debated in the House of Commons. But this does not happen automatically. A debate only takes place only if a member of the Backbench Business Committee supports the petition and the Committee voted in favour of it (UK Parliament, 2011). Another campaign pledge, that petitions with more than one million signatures would be put as legislation before the Commons, was dropped (McSmith, 2010).

FUNCTIONALITY The different functionality of the online petition systems largely follows from the context in which they were created and the goals pursued with them. Already before the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, the CSG had put forward specific proposals for its treatment of petitions. These proposals were transferred largely unchanged into the Standing Orders of the Parliament. With the exception of Scottish MPs, any person can submit petitions, also from outside of Scotland. The Parliament gives petitioners advice and information on the possibilities and limits of a petition and provide clear instructions as to their form and content. Since the establishment

of the Parliament in 1999, the Public Petitions Committee fulfils this task as one of the permanent committees. The Welsh Assembly accepts petitions since 2006. The petition system has been developed by the Rules Committee during the Assembly’s second term (2003-2007) after the Scottish model and has become part of the Standing Orders after the GOWA 2006 (Petitions Committee Clerk, 2008, p. 1; Interview Lloyd). The Westminster Parliament again served as a negative example. The processing of petitions at Westminster was seen by the Welsh AMs as too superficial to inspire people to submit a petition. In Wales, all persons, groups and companies can submit petitions. Petitions must ask the Assembly to something within its remit, collect at least ten signatures or be submitted by a corporation body, and must not contain offensive language (National Assembly for Wales, 2012b, p. 93).

Qualitative Assessment through Petition Committees in Scotland and Wales In both parliaments, the petitions committee treats incoming petitions in a very pragmatic way. The Scottish Public Petitions Committee was made up of nine members in accordance to the strength of the fractions (Scottish Parliament, 2010). It now consists of seven members (Scottish Parliament, 2012). In Wales, the four parties represented in the Assembly (Labour, Plaid Cymru, Liberal Democrats, Conservatives), are each represented by one member (National Assembly for Wales, 2012a). Political differences are rare in both committees as most to all decisions are decided unanimously. Compared to other committees, the members of the petition committees are both disproportionately young and inexperienced and turnover is high. This would suggest that the committees are considered by the parliament as comparably insignificant. In 2009, Mitchell described the Scottish Public Petitions Committee as the weakest and least important of all committees. According to

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Mitchell, none of the chairs, all from the Labour party, were leading figures (Interview Mitchell). The previous chairman Frank McAveety and the committee clerk Fergus Cochrane, however, argue that members choose to join the committee due to its focus on consensus (Interviews McAveety; Cochrane). New petitions are dealt with in Scotland and Wales in a similar way. The committee clerks consider petitions according to the published criteria. The Committee members are not involved in this process. Most petitions reach the clerks by e-mail or via the online system. Both committees accept filmed petitions. The Welsh Committee has already sent video responses to petitioners. Submissions through the phone are possible only in Scotland. For blind or otherwise handicapped persons, the Scottish Committee accepts petitions in sign language or Braille. The Scottish Committee is also planning to accept petitions via text message or audio recording. Regardless of the input medium, the committees sum up the number of signatures they receive on paper and via the online system. All petitions can gather signatures on the Internet. If submitted petitions do not meet the criteria, the clerks try to help the petitioners by rephrasing their wording or generalising the petition content. If petitioners express a personal concern, the clerks help them to make it a topic of general interest and policy relevance (Interviews Cochrane, Stocks et al.). A complaint about a neighbour’s overhanging tree would be expanded to an issue of building law. The committees react differently to petitions dealing with competence of Westminster. Only the Scottish committee debates these petitions under the condition that they do not require legislative change, which is reserved to Westminster. The Scottish committee also deals with petitions dealing with local government. To be accepted, these petitions must refer to a political problem and the appropriate local government unit must not have a petition system of its own (Interview Cochrane). After a period in which petitions can be cosigned by internet users, online petitions are

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returned into the normal editing process of the legislatures, which is identical for all petitions. The clerks set the agendas for the committee meetings in which the petitions are discussed. Petitions with largely the same issues are grouped. For the prospects of a petition, the first meeting is often crucial. If the committees are unable or unwilling to do anything for the fulfilment of a petition, its processing ends in this first meeting. The completion of the procedure is reported on the Internet. The committee members stress that petitions are not assessed and processed according to the number of signatures or the public support they gain, but according to their content. The former Scottish Committee Chairman Frank McAveety sees the Petitions Committee as a means to enable petitions which are thematically important to have a greater effect (Interview McAveety). A single signature in Scotland or ten signatures in Wales are sufficient for all forms of processing and engagement by the committees. Petitioners with very interesting and promising issues may appear in person before the committees. Such an invitation is a privilege and not common (Interview Cochrane). During the meetings, MPs often accompany petitioners and thus show support for their demands. The most common response of the petition committees to a petition is to send letters asking for comments and background information to various stakeholders. These are often the ministries of the regional governments. Other treatments such as the publication of a report, site visits and plenary debates on the basis of petitions are comparably rare. The committees can also forward petitions to other parliamentary committees. This is used mainly by the small Welsh committee whose own resources for research are strongly limited. The Scottish committee members decided to follow a different strategy as they wanted to avoid the committee from functioning like a letter box. While the committee of the first term forwarded a large portion of petitions to other committees, in latter terms the committee increased the number

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of petitions it worked with on its own. This was also because the other committees often lacked the time to work on petitions forwarded to them in an appropriate detail. The members of the petition committees in Scotland and Wales do not restrict their role to the processing of incoming petitions. They see themselves as ambassadors of their legislatures and seek to motivate politically under-represented groups to submit petitions. They aim for a balanced political participation of the entire population. Both committees provide interested persons with comprehensive information material as to how petitions can be submitted and will be treated. They also organise information days. Video recordings of the meetings of both committees are webcast live and can be retrieved at a later date. In addition, both committees hold regular meetings outside their legislatures. These often take place in schools in order to attract young people to the legislature and the filing of petitions. Also, new input devices such as text messaging, membership in social networking sites and blogs are used to attract young people. In addition, the public work of the committees is aimed at ethnic minorities and people with disabilities. To reach them, the committees cooperate with organisations representing these groups. In Wales, the Welsh Department of Education supports the committee in this goal (Interviews Cochrane, Carman, Stocks et al.).

Quantitative Assessment at the Prime Minister’s Office The online petition system of the Prime Minister exists since 14th November 2006 (Riehm et al., 2009). Petitioners who managed to reach 500 signatures were promised an e-mail response from the relevant government department. Since the restart of the system by the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition in August 2011, petitions receiving more than 100,000 signatures can be debated in the House of Commons if accepted by the Backbench Business Committee. For the PMO,

the system is just one of many Internet services of the government. In 2010, three employees of the Internet team invested around five percent of their labour time to manage the online petition system. The team checked most incoming petitions within five days (Number10.gov.uk, 2007) against the published criteria. Policy makers were not involved in this process. There were no other submission hurdles, such as prior examination of the phrasing by an expert or a specialized committee. In particular, the question of phrasing is left to the Internet in a pragmatic way. Due to the lack of a legal basis, the PMO does not require an ex ante review of the statements made in petitions, but petitions which are factually wrong are usually removed after complaints. Only if statements seem problematic, the Internet team asks the relevant ministry before it publishes an online petition. Petitions that contain falsehoods are then removed because otherwise, they could develop into messages, whose authenticity would no longer be doubted as they appeared on the list of accepted petitions. Whenever a petition is not accepted due to the criteria, the petitioner receives an e-mail from MySociety detailing the reasons for refusal and providing guidance on how the petition must be adjusted so that it can be submitted in accordance with the rules. If the revised version fails to meet the criteria again, it appears in the list of rejected online petitions. This is how a high transparency of the system is ensured. However, the long list of rejected petitions creates the impression of a very selective system, which the PMO would actually like to avoid. The reasons for rejection are in fact mostly banal, but they become clear only after clicking on the respective petition (Interview Green). When the co-signing phase is over, the PMO’s Internet team split accepted petitions into two groups. Petitions which have exceeded the quorum for a government response were forwarded to the appropriate ministry. The threshold for a response from the government was already increased twice since mid-2009 and was located at 500 signatures

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until the restart by the coalition government. In exceptional cases, no response is sent out, even if the threshold is crossed. An example is a petition of October 2009, which called for the resignation of Prime Minister Brown and received 72,000 signatures (Woodcock, 2009). Contrary to the online petition systems in Scotland and Wales, there is no substantive review of petitions by the PMO. Most petitions are not answered if the number of signatures does not exceed the threshold. An exception applies to petitions which concern only a small number of people, for example within a local government unit. They are exempt from the threshold (Number10.gov.uk, 2007). The Prime Minister is informed about the development of the system. The process generally ends with the delivery of e-mail responses to petitioners and signatories. Further reactions of the government are not provided within the system. This shows in particular that for the PMO, the online petition system is a component of the e-engagement activities of the Prime Minister. However, the lacking feedback of the system into the work of the government led to frequent criticism (Interviews Facey, Williamson, Henderson).

USE Petitions systems are aimed primarily at citizens. After their establishment, they leave the sphere of their respective political institutions. The citizens take an assessment of the system. They decide whether they want to achieve their aim through a petition, or whether they prefer other forms of political participation. This decision finds expression in the intensity of use of a petition system. But there are other indicators of “success”, such as the awareness of the system in the population and the media and the satisfaction of the petitioners and supporters of the system. Which of these criteria reflects the “success” of a petition system at best remains in the eye of the beholder (Carman, 2006,

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p. 71). If success is meant in quantitative terms, a successful petition system is relatively easy to detect. If more petitions are submitted, the better known and thus the more successful is the system. Qualitative criteria such as user satisfaction with the petition system are difficult to measure. Within the United Kingdom, surveys on the satisfaction of petitioners have been carried out only for the petition system of the Scottish Parliament. They showed that for petitioners, a feeling of fairness and impartiality on the part of those working on the petitions is a lot more important than the actual “success” in terms of having changed a policy (Carman, 2006, p. 61).

Few Petitions in Scotland and Wales The absolute numbers for the online petition systems at the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly are low. The Scottish system levelled off after a peak period of 275 petitions in 2000 at 100 to 150 petitions per year. This corresponds to one petition on 29,000 Scots. Between 1999 and 2006, some 47 percent of all petitions to the Scottish Parliament received only one signature, while another 30 percent had over 100 signatures. The number of petitions in Wales is lower, similarly to the numerically smaller population. From 2007 to 2009, an average of 66 petitions per year, or of one petition on around 45,500 Welsh was achieved. It is impossible to determine whether the less far-reaching powers of the Welsh Assembly have led to this lower volume. It may well be that the exclusion of petitions voicing personal concerns or involving powers on the local or national level could reduce the use of the Welsh system. The petition committees in Scotland and Wales accept a large majority of petitions. Between 2006 and 2009 the Scottish committee rejected around 20 percent of new petitions, while in Wales the proportion was at 10 per cent between 2007 and 2009. Although this is not required for the processing of petitions in Scotland, most petitioners wanted to collect more signatures. As in Wales,

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online petitions were used as part of Internet-based campaigns, for example with links on weblogs. Other petitioners preferred paper petitions, arguing that these were more effective for topics of limited geographical importance. Data on the social background of petitioner is available only for the Scottish system and the period between 1999 and 2006. During this period, individuals made up 54 percent of petitioners, followed by community groups (18 percent) and other interest groups (15 percent). Only two percent of the petitions were submitted by politicians and parties. A total of 94 petitioners submitted more than one petition with one person handing in 53 petitions. Most petitioners lived in the largest Scottish cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow. Fewer petitions were received from rural areas and 18 petitions were submitted by persons outside of Scotland. The typical petitioner was older than the population average (57.3 years), two thirds were male and 56.2 percent self-identified as members of the middle class, 58 percent had a university degree. Their confidence in political institutions corresponded to the Scottish average, but they were more sceptical of the workings of the national political institutions than the total population (Carman, 2006, p. 1-3, 29-34). The best indicator of whether a person will submit a petition is Internet access (Interview Carman). The clerks of the Welsh petitions committee described their typical petitioners in a similar manner: They were mostly male, middle-aged, politically interested and politically active. The interviewed members and staff of both committees freely admitted that so far, they had hardly reached the whole population. This is also because the existence of online petitions and their treatment by the committees remained largely unknown in the population. In Scotland, especially people from lower social strata knew little about the task and position of the Scottish Parliament. Asked about the possibility of a petition, only a few respondents mentioned the Scottish Parliament as an addressee, while

the Prime Minister and Westminster Parliament were familiar to them as institutions with petition systems. Those respondents who were familiar with the Scottish petitioning system also rated it positively (Ipsos Mori and Carman, 2009). This further supports the initiatives to increase knowledge of the petition system, especially in groups that are so far hardly reached. Another hurdle for the Welsh petitions committee is that for many people, the division of responsibilities between local, regional and central government and between the legislative and executive branches on the regional level remains unclear. Thus, the Welsh Assembly can hardly succeed as an addressee for petitions (Petitions Committee Clerk, 2008, p. 1). The petition committee staff in Scotland and Wales were often faced with very high expectations on the part of potential or actual petitioners. This is confirmed by the survey in Scotland. A majority of respondents saw petitions as an effective means to make their voice in politics heard and to influence the government. On the other hand, most respondents expected that petitions would largely be ignored and doubted that the Scottish petitions committee actually processed all incoming petitions. This is why the respondents named the number of signatures as an important indicator of a “successful” petition, although, as explained, this number hardly plays a role for the committees in Scotland and Wales (Petitions Committee Clerk, 2008, p. 1).

High Volume of Petitions to the Prime Minister The system of the Prime Minister has limited statistical capabilities. The number of submitted online petitions is very high compared to the other systems. Each day approximately 25,000 Internet users visit the system (Coleman and Blumler, 2009, p. 189). Given the political and institutional context of the system as well as its design, this is not surprising. Especially for petitioners who have not dealt with the differences of individual

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petition systems, the system is highly attractive. It allows the filing of petitions directly to the Prime Minister, the best known and in fact the most powerful policymaker in the United Kingdom. In addition, the barriers to submitting a petition are very low compared to the other systems. The Prime Minister received a total of 67,799 petitions between 1 December 2006 and 1 February 2010. Under the (purely theoretical) assumption that each petitioner filed only one petition during this period, this represents a substantial rate of a petition to 915 Britons. The online petitions collected a total of nearly 11,8 million signatures. At the end of the period, 27,023 or about 40 percent of online petitions had been completed. The government sent an answer to the submitters and supporters of 3,091 petitions. In sum, this represents the delivery of over eight million e-mails. Of the closed petitions, 11.4 percent thus received a response. The number of responses exceeded 1,913 due to the previously lower hurdle for an answer and the special arrangement for petitions directed at a small group of people. Extraordinarily successful petitions frequently received a response before the end of the co-signing phase. About 4,000 to 5,000 online petitions are usually to be found in the co-signing phase. Rejected petitions make up between 50 and 55 percent of the total volume. In the year 2008, the Prime Minister’s system recorded a significant increase in the number of incoming petitions. The number of petitions which completed the co-signing phase increased by 50 percent compared to the years 2007 and 2009. This strong increase can be explained by a copycat effect as a result of the most successful online petition. This petition was submitted by Peter Roberts from Telford in Shropshire asking the Prime Minister to drop plans for satellite tracking of vehicle movements and the introduction of a road pricing policy. Roberts implied that both would put high burdens on all drivers. Especially people having to travel far to their family and poorer people would be at a disadvantage. Roberts asked Blair to concentrate on improving roads and reducing congestion instead (Number10.gov.uk, 328

2006; Walker and Massey, 2007). In an interview with the newspaper “The Daily Telegraph” shortly before the end of the co-signing phase, Roberts argued against state control and the high cost of such a project (The Daily Telegraph, 2007a). Roberts had started his collection of signatures with an e-mail to his friends. Within two weeks, his online petition grew to become the biggest online petition to the Prime Minister to date. Every day, another 20,000 signatures were added. Under the pressure of 200 queries per second, the online petition system went offline for a short time (Stringer, 2007; Woodward et al., 2007). The statement of the Minister for Transport Douglas Alexander, that the petition was built on common myths, brought another surge (Bright, 2007). At the end of the co-signing phase on 20th February 2007, the petition had collected more than 1.8 million signatures (Number10.gov.uk, 2006). Among the other petitions receiving a high number of signatures, the frequency of petitions in the area of “government, politics and administration” is striking. Behind this is the regular use of the petition system for (party) political protest. Online petitions calling for the resignation of the Prime Minister or the holding of new elections have always been part of the system. If they follow the rules in language and form, they are allowed by the PMO’s Internet team. Only online petitions relating to internal party decisions beyond the reach of government are rejected. Their approval would lead to the questioning of the political neutrality of the system. In the context of the MP expenses scandal, for example, numerous petitions were filed. They all had to be rejected because they were related to decisions beyond the control of the government. These are often difficult decisions. A petition calling for a change in the education policy of the Government would be permitted while a call for a change in education policy of the Labour Party would be rejected (Interview Green). When petitions are rejected by the PMO, this is mostly due to other reasons than party politics. Duplicates of existing petitions and petitions formulated in an unintelligible way amount to around 60 percent

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of rejected petitions. Petitioners frequently enter their name in the field in which they are expected to formulate their demands (Interview Green). The Internet team initially approved humorous online petitions. The best known petition of this kind called on the Prime Minister to stand on his head while juggling ice cream (Moss, 2006). Since this form of unintended use went out of control, humorous online petitions are no longer accepted (Number10.gov.uk, 2007). The PMO has so far not evaluated the online petition system. There is therefore no reliable data on its reputation in the population. When the success of Roberts’ petition was foreseeable, it brought the system increased attention in the media for the first time. Shortly thereafter, the interest of the press dwindled again and it has remained at a low level ever since. During Blair’s term, reports on the online petition system were strongly associated with his person. The popularity of online petitions critical of the government was described as a personal defeat for Blair by many journalists. While Blair expected to increase his personal popularity and that of his policies through the online petition system, it led mostly to political protest and satire (Kirby, 2007, Moss, 2006). There is also no data on the expectations of users and their satisfaction with the online petition system of the Prime Minister. Petitioners often set high expectations for the possibilities of their petition. Many expect that if a sufficient number of people support an online petition, this directly leads to a new law. The Internet team of the PMO was often asked for the number of online petitions that have already become law (Interview Green). The road pricing petitioner Peter Roberts seems to have shared this opinion. In an interview, Roberts said that if government would not make his online petition law, this would show just how undemocratic it was (The Daily Telegraph, 2007a). The fact that the online petition system conveys these perceptions is one of the criticisms expressed by observers. They argue that the system gives the impression that it could suspend the rules of

representative democracy. Online petitions to the Prime Minister are then seen as a mechanism to avoid Westminster when making laws (Interviews Williamson, Cruickshank, Seaton and Winetrobe). Some of the interviewed experts saw the disappointment of petitioners as the biggest problem of the system. If petitioners’ expectations were not met, this would inevitably destroy the value of petitions (Interview Henderson). Facey argued that online petitions to the Prime Minister are so popular because for many Britons, they are the only outlet to turn their frustration into political expression. This argument explains the large proportion of petitions to the Prime Minister voicing political protest. Moreover, it was argued that the system worked like a placebo. It promised participation in the democratic process without being able to keeping this problem (Interview Williamson). Another characteristic seen as problematic is the missing connection between the online petition system and the inner workings of government, so that the majority of online petitions cannot truly enter the political system (Interviews Facey, Williamson). This is also the case with other e-engagement efforts by the government, especially in social networks. These initiatives have in common that they promise better “listening” by the government, but usually do not amount to a participation in politics. The critics further argue that for petitioners, the experience that their participation leads to no more than an e-mail is even more frustrating. This is why Facey sees the system as cynical (Interview Facey). Williamson argued that the exceptional cases in which the contents of an online petition are taken up by government allowed the government to change course without any damage to itself. In this sense, the online petition system worked for the government as an early warning system. Unpopular political considerations such as the one criticised by the road pricing petitions are easily detected by government which can then drop them before they cause more damage.

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Some of the interviewees also mentioned positive aspects of the Prime Minister’s online petition system. Henderson remarked that it had brought online petitions to the attention of the population (Interview Henderson). The ease of use (Interview Cruickshank) and the cost-effective implementation of the system were also highlighted as exemplary (Interview Williamson). Seaton and Winetrobe highlighted the intense coverage of the online petition system of the Prime Minister. This would allow the petitioners to extend their campaigns around the online petition (Interview Seaton and Winetrobe). This allows to really put the government under pressure. The campaign around the road pricing petition included several MPs and the online edition of the “Daily Telegraph” (The Daily Telegraph, 2007b). The petitioner Peter Roberts sought to take advantage of the popularity of his petition. In October 2007, Roberts

announced his candidacy for the parliamentary seat in his home constituency for the conservative UK Independence Party (UKIP). The UKIP’s press release described the petitioner as a “road tax-hero” and “leading Internet activist”. In his speech announcing his candidacy, Roberts continued to stress the prevention of a road tax as his most important political goal (UK Independence Party, 2007). In June 2008, he founded the Drivers’ Alliance, which campaigns for the interests of motorists (Birmingham Post, 2008).

CONCLUSION This chapter identified two models of online petitioning in the United Kingdom. The model of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly evolved from the context of devolution and the

Table 1. Interviews Name

Date

Place

Description

Carman, Chris

30.11.2009

Glasgow

Political scientist (Scotland), evaluated Scottish petition system

Chaney, Paul

08.12.2009

Cardiff

Political scientist (Wales), analysed Welsh petition system

Cochrane, Fergus

02.12.2009

Edinburgh

Clerk of the Scottish Public Petitions Committee

Cruickshank, Peter

01.12.2009

Edinburgh

Employee of the ITC at Napier University, worked on Scottish online petition system

Facey, Peter

01.02.2010

London

Chair of Unlock Democracy, working for constitutional reform

Green, Ian

02.12.2010

London

Employee of PMO, responsible for online petition system

Henderson, Fraser

04.02.2010

Bristol

Expert for E-Participation, advises government

Jeffery, Charlie

01.12.2009

Edinburgh

Political scientist (Scotland), expert for devolution

Jones, Bedwyr and Spragg, Michael

08.12.2009

Cardiff

Members of the IT teams of the Welsh Assembly

Knight, Greg MP

03.12.2010

London

Member of Parliament, Chair of the Procedure Committee

Lloyd, Val AM

07.12.2009

Cardiff

Member of the Welsh Assembly, then-chairwoman of Petitions Committee

McAveety, Frank MSP

02.12.2009

Edinburgh

Member of the Scottish Parliament, then-chairman of Public Petitions Committee

Mitchell, James

30.11.2009

Glasgow

Political scientist (Scotland), expert for devolution

Seaton, Janet and Winetrobe, Barry

03.02.2010

By e-mail

Political scientists, experts for devolution

Stocks, Naomi, Minnis, Andrew and Thomas, Gareth

08.12.2009

Cardiff

Employees of the Welsh Assembly working for the Petitions Committee

Williamson, Andy

02.12.2010

London

Employee of the Hansard Society, leads „Digital Dialogues“

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desire of the new institutions to distance themselves from the Westminster Parliament. Their petition systems reflect this desire as they offer petitioners a detailed treatment of their petitions by specialised petition committees. As petitions are generally assessed in qualitative terms, the number of signatures a petition receives is almost completely unimportant. If the committees consider the content of a petition to be relevant, they are willing to react with a wide range of measures ranging from letters to relevant institutions to plenary debates and investigations leading to detailed reports. Despite these offers, the petition systems receive a comparably small number of petitions. This is mainly due to the low profile of the systems among the population. However, those who have petitioned the legislatures are generally rather satisfied with the results. They value the thorough and adjusted treatment given to their concern. The second model can be found at the website of the Prime Minister between 2006 and 2010. Since its restart by the coalition government in 2011, it has moved to the government’s website. Prime Minister Blair started the online petition system to gather popular demands as part of an e-engagement strategy. As the system was installed without a legal basis and without consulting Parliament or government ministers, it also reflects the dominant position of the Prime Minister within the UK political system. The system focuses on quantitative criteria to identify successful petitions. The Prime Minister or relevant ministries issue responses to petitions receiving at least 500 signatures. Since the restart in 2011, petitions receiving at least 100,000 signatures can also be debated in the Commons, if the Backbench Business Committee decides to do so. These are all options available and there are no other reactions possible. Concerning the numbers, this model is far more successful as it receives a lot more petitions. But from the outset, this system has attracted a high proportion of satire, cynicism and criticism towards the Prime Minister and government. Only

if petitioners manage to collect a large number of signatures and build a campaign around their demand, the system can help them achieve their goals as the institutions receiving the petition does not involve itself in it. Other petitioners are almost necessarily disappointed by a system offering them nothing more than an e-mail response.

REFERENCES BBC.co.uk. (2011). Wales says Yes in referendum vote. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ uk-wales-politics-12648649 Beddie, L., Macintosh, A., & Malina, A. (2001). E-democracy and the Scottish Parliament. In B. Schmid, K. Stanoevska-Slabeva, & V. Tschammer (Eds.), Towards the e-society: E-commerce, e-business, and e-government (pp. 695–705). Boston: Kluwer. Bevir, M., & Rhodes, R. A. W. (2006). Prime Ministers, Presidentialism and Westminster Smokescreens. Retrieved from http://escholarship. org/uc/item/9k1922xm Birmingham Post. (2008, June 13). Drive ahead. Birmingham Post. Bright, M. (2007, February 19). Petition power cannot be brushed aside. New Statesman. Retrieved from http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/martin-bright/2007/02/road-pricing-brown-petition Carman, C. (2006). The assessment of the Scottish Parliament’s Public Petitions System 1999-2006. Edinburgh, UK: The Scottish Parliament. Cherbi, P. (2011). Democracy Live @ Holyrood? Scottish Parliament to re-launch e-Petitions website after major redesign hopes to improve Scots interaction with politics. Retrieved from https:// petercherbi.wordpress.com/2011/12/02/democracy-live-holyrood-scottish-parliament-to-relaunch-e-petitions-website-after-major-redesignhopes-to-improve-scots-interaction-with-politics

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Coleman, S., & Blumler, J. G. (2009). The Internet and democratic citizenship: Theory, practice and policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511818271 Daily Telegraph. (2007a). Peter Roberts Road Pricing Petition. Retrieved from http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=RMLtp4uDRQM Daily Telegraph. (2007b). Road to ruin. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/roadpricing Dodd, G. (2007). Justice and grace: Private petitioning and the English parliament in the late Middle Ages. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:o so/9780199202805.001.0001 Foley, M. (2004). Presidential Attribution as an Agency of Prime Ministerial Critique in a Parliamentary Democracy: The Case of Tony Blair. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6, 292–311. doi:10.1111/j.1467856X.2004.00141.x Grant, M. (2009). The UK Parliament. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh Univ. Press. House of Commons Procedure Committee. (2009). e-Petitions: Call for Government Action: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2008–09. London: The Stationery Office Limited. House of Commons Welsh Affairs Committee. (2005). Government White Paper: Better Governance for Wales. Retrieved from http://www. publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmwelaf/551/551.pdf Judge, D. (1978). Public Petitions and the House of Commons. Parliamentary Affairs, 31, 391–405. Judge, D. (2004). Whatever Happened to Parliamentary Democracy in the United Kingdom. Parliamentary Affairs, 57, 682–701. doi:10.1093/ pa/gsh052

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Kirby, T. (2007, February 12). Critics seize No 10’s petitions website to slate Government. Independent. Macintosh, A., Malina, A., & Farrell, S. (2002a). Digital Democracy through Electronic Petitioning. In W. J. McIver (Ed.), Advances in digital government (pp. 137–148). Boston: Kluwer. doi:10.1007/0-306-47374-7_8 Macintosh, A., Malina, A., & Whyte, A. (2002b). Designing E-Democracy in Scotland. Communications, 27, 261–278. doi:10.1515/comm.27.2.261 McGarvey, N., & Cairney, P. (2008). Scottish politics: An introduction. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. McSmith, A. (2010). Cameron: I’ll give power to the petition. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cameron-ill-givepower-to-the-petition-1893322.html Megaughin, E., & Jeffery, C. (2009). Introduction: The First Decade in Perspective. In C. Jeffery, & J. Mitchell (Eds.), The Scottish Parliament 19992009 (pp. 9–15). Edinburgh, UK: Luath Press. Mitchell, J. (2010). The Narcissism of Small Differences: Scotland and Westminster. Parliamentary Affairs, 63, 98–116. doi:10.1093/pa/gsp047 Mori, I., & Carman, C. (2009). Engaging the Public in the Scottish Parliament’s Petitions Process. Retrieved from http://www.scottish. parliament.uk/S3/committees/petitions/inquiries/ petitionsProcess/Engagingthepublicinthepetitionsprocess.pdf.pdf Morozov, E. (2009). From slacktivism to activism. Retrieved from http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/ posts/2009/09/05/from_slacktivism_to_activism Moss, V. (2006, November 19). Clowning Street. Exclusive Jokers Mock PM’s Call for Ideas on Web. Sunday Mirror.

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National Assembly for Wales. (2012a). Committee Details – Petitions Committee. Retrieved from http://www.senedd.assemblywales.org/mgCommitteeDetails.aspx?ID=218 National Assembly for Wales. (2012b). Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales. Retrieved from http://www.assemblywales. org/120508_may_2012_-_tracked_sos.pdf News, B. B. C. (2003). Blair launches ‘Big Conversation’. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/uk_news/politics/3245620.stm News, B. B. C. (2005). Ex-Mandelson aide in no 10 post. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/uk_news/politics/4723971.stm Number10.gov.uk. (2006). Petition to Scrap the planned vehicle tracking and road pricing policy. Retrieved from http://petitions.number10.gov.uk/ traveltax Number10.gov.uk. (2007). EPetitions: facts, figures and progress. Retrieved from http://www. number10.gov.uk/Page11051 Ormrod, W. M. (2009). Medieval petitions: Grace and grievance. Woodbridge, UK: York Medieval Press. Parliament, U. K. (2011). Online petitions and the Backbench Business Committee. Retrieved from http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/ committees-a-z/commons-select/backbenchbusiness-committee/online petitions Petitions Committee Clerk. (2008). The National Assembly for Wales’s Petitions Process. Retrieved from http://www.scotparliament.com/s3/committees/petitions/inquiries/ petitionsProcess/5NAWPC.pdf

Riehm, U., Böhle, K., & Lindner, R. (2011). Elektronische Petitionen und Modernisierung des Petitionswesens in Europa. Berlin: Büro für Technikfolgen-Abschätzung beim Deutschen Bundestag. Retrieved from http://www.tab-beimbundestag.de/de/pdf/publikationen/berichte/ TAB-Arbeitsbericht-ab146.pdf Riehm, U., Coenen, C., Lindner, R., & Blümel, C. (2009). Bürgerbeteiligung durch E-Petitionen: Analysen von Kontinuität und Wandel im Petitionswesen. Berlin: Ed. Sigma. Scottish Parliament. (2010). Membership. Retrieved from http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/ s3/committees/petitions/membership.htm Scottish Parliament. (2012). Public Petitions Committee: About The Committee. Retrieved from http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/CurrentCommittees/29869.aspx Seldon, A. (2009). Trust: How We Lost it and How to Get it Back. London: Biteback. Stringer, D. (2007, February 21). Blair Seeks E-Opinions, Gets 3 Million. Associated Press. Sturm, R. (2006). Modernes Regieren in der Ära Tony Blair. In S. Berg, & A. Kaiser (Eds.), New Labour und die Modernisierung Großbritanniens (pp. 279–300). Augsburg, Germany: Wißner. Sturm, R. (2009). Politik in Großbritannien. Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. doi:10.1007/978-3-531-91652-1 Trench, A. (2009). Opening Doors: Devolution in Wales and the Scottish Parliament, 1999-2009. In C. Jeffery, & J. Mitchell (Eds.), The Scottish Parliament 1999-2009 (pp. 147–152). Edinburgh, UK: Luath Press. UK Independence Party. (2007). Road pricing hero to stand for UKIP. Retrieved from http://www. ukip.org/content/latest-news/228-road-pricinghero-to-stand-for-ukip

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Walker, K., & Massey, R. (2007, February 17). Now MPs join road toll revolt. Mail Online. Retrieved from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-435384/Now-MPs-join-road-toll-revolt.html Wheen, F. (2007, February 20). Pretending to listen? It’s the modern way to rule. The Evening Standard. Winnett, R., & Swinford, S. (2007, February 18). Revealed: the e-petition ‘prat’. The Sunday Times. Woodcock, A. (2009, October 22). 72,000 Sign No 10 E-Petition Urging Brown to Quit. Press Association Mediapoint. Woodward, W., Wintour, P., & Milmo, D. (2007, February 14). Downing Street to send Blair emails to 2 million road pricing protesters. The Guardian. Wring, D. (2008). Reverse Spin? Brown and the Media. In M. Rush, & P. J. Giddings (Eds.), When Gordon took the helm: The Palgrave review of British politics 2007-08. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Zaret, D. (2000). Origins of democratic culture: Printing, petitions, and the public sphere in early-modern England. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Devolution: The (reversible) granting of power from the central government to a subnational government in a unitary state.

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Online Petitioning: Depending on the petition system: to use the Internet for submitting, receiving and discussing petitions, getting informed on the progress of petition treatment. Petition: A submission of demands and concerns from the public to political institutions, mostly in written form. Petition Committee: Parliamentary committee dealing with petitions. Petition System: The mechanism with which an institution receiving petitions deals with these. Qualitative Assessment: Treatment of petitions irrespective of the number of signatures as exercised in Scotland and Wales. Quantitative Assessment: Treatment of petitions according to the number of signatures as exercised by the petition system on the website of the UK prime minister.

ENDNOTES

1

These interviews were conducted by Professor Roland Sturm of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg and the author of this chapter for a report on the petition system of the United Kingdom as part of the research project “Electronic Petitions and the Modernisation of Petition Systems in Europe” which was carried out by the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag on behalf of the German Bundestag. See Riehm et al. 2011 for full results and the annex of this chapter for an overview of those interviewed.

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Chapter 20

Googling Democracy: A Comparison of Democracy Promoters on the Internet Nelli Babayan Freie Universität Berlin, Germany Stefano Braghiroli University of Tartu, Estonia

ABSTRACT The spillover of the Arab Spring is often attributed to the increased use of the Internet and various social networks. In addition, many established democracies and international organizations have adopted democracy promotion as their foreign policy objectives. Heads of states regularly praise democracy and reiterate their commitment to its promotion. However, the on-ground activities of democracy promoters remain largely unknown to the broader population. Nevertheless, given the growing influence of nondemocratic but economically successful and resource-rich countries, democracy promoters more than ever need to “win the hearts and minds” of these populations. This chapter compares techniques and the extent of publicising democracy promotion, by focusing on the online presence of democracy promoters as the most cost-effective opportunity of communicating goals, strategies, and accomplishments. The chapter categorizes individual Websites of democracy promoters according to their structural, graphic, informative, and programmatic features. This chapter focuses on the EU and USAID in Eastern Europe, Middle East, North Africa, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Quantitative and qualitative crosscountry and cross-promoter variances are explored by analyzing a wide array of explanatory dimensions. The results suggest that the two promoters vary in their levels of e-activeness and their involvement in Internet-based activities of democracy promotion, with the EU showing a systematically higher commitment in the studied regions. In addition, Internet penetration, the level of democratic development, and geo-political factors are likely to affect a promoter’s e-activeness.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch020

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

 Googling Democracy

INTRODUCTION Whether positive or negative, the role of the Internet-based media in snowball revolutions in Northern Africa is currently undisputed. Social networks such as Facebook and micro-blogging website such as Twitter were used in the mobilization of thousands of people, proving to be more effective and efficient than other traditional methods of protest. Regardless of the consequent effectiveness of these democratic protests, early 2011 events demonstrated the widespread penetration of the Internet and its success in mobilizing civil society to a degree, previously not achieved by any democracy promoter (Kalathil and Boas, 2003; Ott and Rosser, 2007). This spillover of protests requiring democracy occurred after nearly 20 years of continuous democracy promotion by the most influential international actors. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, democracy promotion has become one of the pillars of international actors, prompting them to engage in the internal affairs of other countries. However, not all international actors publicize their democracy promotion activities to the same extent and while often maintaining close relations with governmental offices, their activities remain largely unknown to the general population. Internet seems to increasingly provide opportunities for democratization and political transformation, especially in societies where freedom of speech and expression is constrained by the government (Abbott, 2010). However, it seems that not all international actors equally avail themselves of the opportunities offered by the growing array of information technologies. Thus, to show whether international actors similarly to local ones adapt to the developments in information technologies, this chapter compares techniques of publicizing their promotion of democracy and their own image among local populations by the extent of their e-activeness. Growing involvement of politicians in information sharing through the Internet has proven to become a worldwide phenomenon, however, 336

with greater popularity in North America than in Europe (Dizard, 2001; Westcott, 2008). With the steadily increasing perception of the Internet as the main information source, the importance of e-activeness of democracy promoters leaves no place for doubts. In addition, democracy promotion projects remain limited to their target groups with the general public remaining largely unaware of international actors’ involvement and often demanding more active actions (Jönsson and Hall, 2008). As interviews with opinion leaders and general public in European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) partners show, while opinion leaders have relatively good knowledge on the European Union (EU), general public often confuses basic facts and even mentions UNICEF as an EU institution.1While the level of awareness on different democracy promoters may vary, unawareness of their activities may damage their objectives of democratic reforms and developing vibrant civil societies. In addition, the low level of awareness of local population should not only be attributed to their disinterest but also to possible low level of openness of an international actor. By focusing on e-activeness of the main democracy promoters—the EU and United States Development Agency (USAID)—this chapter examines the range of online tools used in publicizing democracy promotion activities in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. The choice of comparison is based on the relative similarity of these two international actors in political and economic leverages they can exert or incentives they can offer for democratic transformations. Thus, the choice has been made not with the goal of selecting two most diverse or two most similar cases but with the goal of selecting cases that are comparable for their organizational resources and international coverage. To control for possible blockage of promoters’ online activities, only countries that have welcomed democracy promotion or promoters’ other related activities are studied. Consequently, cases of democracy promotion through military interventions, covert

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intelligence actions, or local regimes displaying hostility to the international actors have not been considered. Identifying and categorizing a variety of structural features of promoters’ e-activeness, this study creates a dataset of multidimensional factors, demonstrating cross-country and crosspromoter variances. The chapter also explores whether the same democracy promoter displays different e- activism in different target countries. After showing different levels of e-activeness of promoters in different countries (limited, medium, and high), the chapter outlines possible variables influencing the level of e-activeness, ranging from promoter’s own structural organization and geostrategic interests to local levels of democracy and perceptions of an international actor.

IDENTIFYING E-ACTIVENESS The methods of introducing social and political changes through such traditional means of social activism as demonstrations, sit-in protests, and strikes have been gradually broadened to include a plethora of Internet activism2through social networks, email lists, online petitions, or blogging. Internet activism has been defined as “politically motivated movement relying on the Internet” (Vegh, 2003,p. 71). Strategies of Internet activism range from Internet-based—for activities possible only online—and Internet-enhanced—for real-world activities boosted and emphasized by online actions (Vegh, 2003). While agreeing that Internet activism entails “proactive actions to achieve a certain goal or of reactive actions against controls and the authorities imposing them” (Vegh, 2003, p. 72), this chapter proposes a modified understanding of the Internet activities of international actors promoting democracy. Based on the nature of democracy promotion that often requires consent from local authorities to be carried out, Internet activities of international actors cannot be defined in the same manner as of social activists. However, parallels can still

be drawn given that democracy promoters also aim to modify political situation by promotion of their agenda. Thus, this chapter emphasizes the differences between Internet activism of interest groups and rationally feasible Internet activities of international actors promoting democracy. Consequently, this chapter investigates the e-activeness of international actors as opposed to e-activism that can be displayed by social actors. E-activeness is defined here as the extent of international actors’ existence on the Internet, their capacity of information sharing, and frequency of updates (Table 1). Thus, e-activeness of international actors is measured not by their vigor of introducing changes but by their visibility on the Internet, which is especially important in case local authorities, which are not necessarily prone to change, are actually e-active. While the online presence measures the extent to which an international actor publicizes its activities, the capacity of information sharing measures the extent to which the publicized information may be accessible to local population. The online presence of international actors may range from absent to high depending whether the actor has a website and what type of information it chooses to share (Table 1). Similarly, the capacity of information sharing and update frequency can range from absent to high depending on the availability of a website, languages chosen to convey the information and how often that information is updated—i.e., that an international actor does not simply create the website without regularly publicizing its activities. The degree of e-activeness of a promoter may stem from a number of reasons, which may range from its being non-tech savvy to being plain secretive. However, these considerations are discussed further in this chapter after the analysis of the actual e-activeness of the international actors. The first factor considered is the existence of a context-specific web-page. The variable is dichotomous and coded as follows: absence (0), presence (1). The assessment of the content of the websites followed standardized and systematized

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Table 1. Indicators of e-activeness E-Activeness    Online Presence

Capacity of Information Sharing

   Update Frequency

   Absent/eDummy

   No website

   No website

   No website

   Low/eNewbie

About Staff    Contacts

   Only the official language(s) of the international actor or a spoken but not an official language

   More than four weeks before the analysis

   Medium/eAmateur

News Current Projects    FAQ

   The official language(s) of the international actor and national language(s), however not covering all original information

   From four to two weeks before the analysis

   High / ePro

Past and upcoming projects Upcoming events Monthly/annual reports    Social networks

   Identical information in the language(s) of the international actor and national language(s)

   Less than two weeks before the analysis

Source: Authors’ own compilation

criteria. In this respect, a clear distinction is required. First, the informative level of the actors’ online presence is examined. Second, the analysis moved to the way the information is shared. The informative level of the online presence was coded as follows: low (1), medium (2), and high (3). Websites providing only basic information (i.e. about, staff, contacts, etc.) fell in the first category of low online presence. Those providing also details on promoters’ specific activities (News, Current Projects, press releases, FAQ, etc.) and sporadic posts were classified as medium online presence. Finally, those providing an in-depth coverage of promoters’ activities (past and upcoming projects, upcoming events, monthly/annual reports, links to social networks), without any empty menus, were classified as high online presence. The capacity of information sharing may be a crucial factor for the effectiveness of an actor’s e-activenesss, since having the website only in the language of an actor (often English) may substantially diminish its accessibility to wide sectors of the local society. Given the growing penetration of the Internet and spread of online social activism and activeness, also international actors would be expected to adapt to developing technologies and increase their e-activeness. The assessment of the aspects related to multi-lingualism of the

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websites is based on a comparison between the volume of information conveyed in the language(s) of a democracy promoter and in local language(s). Local language was understood as the official language(s) of a target country, while any minority languages not given an official status or spoken but not officially recognized languages were not considered. The capacity of multi-lingual information sharing was coded as follows: low in case the websites convey information only in the language(s) of an international actor (0); medium in case the information is presented in the language(s) of both international actor and target country, however, pages in local language(s) do not fully cover the original information (1); and high in case the information is identical in the languages of both international actor and target country (2).In case an international actor and a target country share a language, this categorisation becomes redundant. Finally, an aspect related to the informative nature of the web-pages concerns the updating frequency. It is an indicator of promoters’ degree of present e-activeness in the promotion of their activities. It might as well be that a website has highly informative features, but, it lags behind in terms of updating. Web-pages’ updating level was coded as follows: low, in case the latest update

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of information happened more than four weeks prior to the analysis (1); medium, in case the latest update of information happened from four to two weeks prior to the analysis (2); and high, in case the latest update of information happened less than two weeks prior to the analysis (3). Since one of the objectives was to understand whether international actors have been adapting to the growing proliferation of the information technologies in line with general populations, only ongoing democracy promotion projects were considered. A final measure of e-activeness has been calculated for every promoter with respect to each of the 14 cases chosen on the basis of the scores given to the three indicators described above, according to the following function:  a + b + c   e - activeness =    3 where a represents each case’s score in terms of online presence, b the score in terms of capacity of information sharing, and c the score in terms of update frequency. The final measure ranges from 0 to 3.

CASE SELECTION AND DATA To study the level of e-activeness of international actors, 14 national contexts have been selected marked by an active involvement of the most visible and influential democracy promoters having roughly similar political and economic leverage: the EU and USAID. Thus, to grant a satisfactory level of comparability, the main criterion adopted in the case selection has been the presence of both international actors in the same region. Even though, slight differences in the presence within single countries were revealed, both the EU and USAID launch and carry out their activities in all selected regions. The cases analyzed equal 28 (two for every country studied). When more than

one web-page was found in a national context for the same promoter their features where analyzed and coded jointly. Only the EU and USAID websites with a direct and physical representation in the countries selected were coded, while collective or regional websites were not included. Similarly, in the case of the EU delegations, the representations accredited to countries where they do not have a physical presence are not coded since such an arrangement does not allow direct involvement in terms of democracy promotion activities. This further distinction grants a higher degree of the promoters’ involvement in the context of the Eastern European, the Middle Eastern, North African, South Caucasian, and Central Asian countries included in the analysis. In total 24 web-pages have been analysed, the list of which is given in the Appendix 1. The countries selected reflect the variety of cultural and territorial contexts, in which the activities of democracy promoters take place. In particular, four regions are included in the analysis: the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), Eastern Europe (Moldova and Ukraine), and North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia). The degree of Internet penetration at citizenry level varies highly in these fourteen countries, with Turkmenistan presenting the lowest level of permeability and Morocco emerging as the most wired one (Figure 1). This factor seems to grant a high level of internal variance and contribute to the generalization of the results of this study. Whether different levels of Internet penetration correlate with the different levels of e-activeness of the international actors is discussed further. The analysis is based on data collected by the authors between January and March 2012 with the aim to categorize democracy promoters’ websites according to straightforward and objective criteria. The definition of fixed and clear criteria of classification posed the key challenge. Given structural

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Figure 1. Internet penetration in the fourteen countries

Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Word Bank data. For more information see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ IT.NET.USER.P2?order=wbapi_data_value_2010+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc&cid=GPD_44

and functional differences of the involved actors and different cultural and geographical contexts they operate in, the primary goal was to identify classification criteria not subject to contextual changes. Thus, this study focused more on the “observational side of the analysis”, rather than on a content-based assessment of the websites. The data collection process was based on a systematic and standardized codification of a number of clearly identifiable characteristics of the websites.

MEASURING E-ACTIVENESS The EU Some substantial changes have been made to the EU’s foreign policy and its representation, which also included the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Assembling its delegations and special representatives under one roof, the EU aimed to make its foreign policy more coherent and enhance its external action.

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Although, the notion of enhanced external action has been often exploited by EU analysts, not much has been said on its conceptualization. To enhance the external representation of the EU, the Lisbon Treaty has established the EEAS, which basically serves as the EU foreign ministry, implementing the Common and Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the authority of the High Representative. The policy is further implemented by the newly renamed EU delegations that have been upgraded into embassy-type missions that aim to speak not only for the Commission but for the EU as a single institution (Rettman 2009). Apparently, little effort has been spared by the EU to develop a new institutional design of its foreign policy. Having the same interface and design, the websites of EU delegations, nevertheless are not identical in terms of the provided information, with some country websites more complete than the others. The projects often are not separated based on their completion status, which makes finding information on current activities somewhat complicated even if the projects are separated ac-

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cording to umbrella themes. In addition, the menu projects is the least translated one, which always appears in full in English or another official EU language but almost never in the local language. In some instances the uncomplicated way for the promoter is chosen as in the case of Algeria and Tunisia, where the EU delegation website is only in French, even though website of the delegation in Morocco has both French and Arabic versions. While French is spoken and understood in all three countries, it is not an official language and though choosing French may decrease the workload for the promoter, it may also decrease the percentage of population’s access to information. Similarly, in the case of Egypt the website has both English and Arabic versions, although the latter presents a lower degree of complexity. In

Central Asian countries, where Russian is widely spoken and understood, it is chosen instead of other country-specific official languages. Russia is an official language in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, and an officially recognized language for inter-ethnic communication in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Among such local-friendly websites as the one of the delegation in the Kyrgyz Republic, there are also others where often only titles of menus are translated, with information presented in both English and local languages under the same menu—e.g. in Moldova, while in the case of Tajikistan the website of the delegation is only in English. When it comes to the cases of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, no website was recorded given the absence of EU delegation in those countries3.

Table 2. The EU’s e-activeness Country

   Online    Presence

   Capacity of Information    Sharing

   Update    Frequency

South Caucasus    Armenia

   3

   2

   3

   Azerbaijan

   3

   2

   3

   Georgia

   3

   3

   3

   Kazakhstan

   3

   2

   3

   Kyrgyzstan

   3

   2

   3

   Tajikistan

   3

   1

   3

   Turkmenistan

   N/A

   N/A

   N/A

   Uzbekistan

   N/A

   N/A

   N/A

   Moldova

   3

   2

   Ukraine

   3

   2

Central Asia

Eastern Europe    3    3 North Africa    Algeria

   3

   1

   3

   Egypt

   3

   2

   3

   Morocco

   3

   2

   3

   Tunisia

   3

   1

   3

Source: Authors’ own compilation

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USAID USAID conducts its actions in the host countries through a wide network of its missions, which are based in over 50 developing countries. The missions consult with country’s government and with local NGOs, managing and distributing USAID funds. In addition, they conduct socioeconomic analysis, design projects, award contracts and grants, administer projects (including evaluation and reporting), and manage the flow of funding. USAID missions are led by Mission Directors and are staffed both by USAID Foreign Service Officers and by development professionals from the host country, with local professionals forming a majority of the staff. Although enjoying a fairly high level of autonomy from the US Embassy of the country in which they act, USAID missions function within the framework of the US Diplomatic

Service and its Mission Director is a member of the US Embassy’s “Country Team” under the direction of the U.S. Ambassador. As USAID missions are marked by frequent public interaction, in many instances they have been located in independent offices in the business districts of capital cities. In other cases, e.g. Armenia, USAID missions are located within large compounds together with the US Embassy offices. As in the case of EU delegations’ portals, the websites of USAID missions have a similar design and structure, however their degree of complexity and sophistication vary from one context to the other (Table 3). In general, the missions’ portals appear fairly intuitive and user-friendly with sections concerning programmes and opportunities clearly identifiable. All the websites present a high informative potential and appear to convey all the necessary information about the activities

Table 3. USAID’s e-activeness Country

   Online Presence

   Capacity of Information Sharing

   Update Frequency

South Caucasus    Armenia

3

   1

   3

   Azerbaijan

3

   1

   3

   Georgia

3

   3

   3

Central Asia    Kazakhstan

N/A

   N/A

   N/A

   Kyrgyzstan

3

   3

   3

   Tajikistan

N/A

   N/A

   N/A

   Turkmenistan

N/A

   N/A

   N/A

   Uzbekistan

N/A

   N/A

   N/A

Eastern Europe    Moldova

3

   2

   3

   Ukraine

3

   2

   2

North Africa    Algeria

N/A

   N/A

   N/A

   Egypt

3

   2

   3

   Morocco

3

   3

   1

   Tunisia

N/A

   N/A

   N/A

Source: Authors’ own compilation

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of the mission, while allowing an easy interaction between “users” and “providers”. In terms of online presence, the case of USAID’s action in the Central Asian republics is worth noting. With the notable exception of the website of USAID mission to the Kyrgyz Republic where the representative office is based, USAID’s online presence in all the other Central Asian countries is limited to a centralized website both in English and Russian. The disparity between the capacities of information sharing is present also in the case of the online presence of USAID missions to the South Caucasus countries. While the website for Georgia is translated into Georgian, the ones for Armenia and Azerbaijan have only English versions. In the case of the mission to Ukraine only few sections appear to be translated into the local language. In terms of update frequency, despite a generally good performance in updating USAID websites, the case of the website of the mission to Morocco is worth noting, since its last recorded update dates back to November 2009. On the other hand, while Morocco’s, even if outdated website is dully translated into Arabic and French, Egypt’s website can show only a few sections translated in Arabic, without giving an actual choice of language change but simply integrating Arabic sections in English drop-down menus. Having no mission in Algeria and no activities in Tunisia, USAID Middle East Mission located in Cairo collaborates with the US Embassy in Algeria, without having a separate website. However, some information about USAID activities can be gathered from USAID regional website.

CONTROL FRACTORS: INFLUENCING E-ACTIVENESS The analysis of EU delegations and USAID missions reveals a commitment from these international actors to remain up to date with modern information sharing techniques. However, the extent of their e- activeness varies depending on

the location of their delegations and missions. While nearly all representations have their own well-developed and frequently updated websites, only few of those provide the same information both in the language of the international actor and the target country. Having the information on the website only in the language of the promoter (usually English), potentially leaves out large segments of local population. In addition, having the websites translated in spoken but not official languages (e.g. French in MENA and Russian in Central Asia) targets only selected segments of the local population. In either case, the information is not equally delivered to the whole population. This can be considered a major disadvantage in publicizing democracy promotion activities, since those often target all levels of the society. However, even if current projects involve only the political society—i.e. political parties—the civil society and individuals should also be equally informed to avoid possible disinterest or reluctance towards democratic processes. This chapter hypothesized that the level of local Internet penetration (Figure 1) may correlate with the level of democracy promoter’s e-activeness or the level of its information sharing capacity. However, the analysis of separate websites has revealed that such correlation even if possible is very vague: often the websites of representations to countries with lower levels of Internet penetration display higher levels of e-activeness and vice versa. Other important factors, which may influence the decision of international actors on their e-activeness can be the level of Internet freedom and the state of local democracy. It could be hypothesized that higher levels of Internet freedom are likely to encourage higher e-activeness by international actors, since the probability of access to their websites would be high and without restrictions. Research on the level of Internet freedom has been recently introduced by Freedom House, however, with 2011 report covering only 31 countries. The measure ranges from 1 (highest level of freedom) to 100 (lowest level of freedom).4

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Some of the countries hosting EU delegations and USAID missions analysed in this chapter are also covered by Freedom House report (Table 4). Similarly higher level of democracy would create less obstacles to the access to the Internet, since freedom of expression would not be curtailed. The measure used in the analysis is calculated as the average between each country’s scores in terms of “political rights” and “civil liberties”.

Each indicator ranges from 1 (highest level of freedom) to 7 (lowest level of freedom). Despite a range of potentially influencing variables, it is not surprising to see the lowest levels of e-activeness for both the EU and USAID in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which receive the lowest democracy scores among the analyzed countries (Table 5). However, it remains to be determined whether such an approach is justified given that an increased

Table 4. Freedom on the net    Country

   Freedom on the Net Status

   Freedom on the Net Total

   A Subtotal: Obstacles to Access

   B Subtotal: Limits on Content

   C Subtotal: Violations of Users Rights

   Georgia

   Partly Free

   355

   12

   10

   13

   Azerbaijan

   Partly Free

   48

   15

   13

   18

   Egypt

   Partly Free

   54

   12

   14

   28

   Kazakhstan

   Partly Free

   55

   16

   22

   17

   Tunisia

   Not Free

   81

   21

   28

   36

Source: Based on Freedom House (2011), Freedom on the Net, pp. 13-14.

Table 5. Freedom/Democracy levels    Country

   Freedom Status

   Political Rights

   Civil Liberties

South Caucasus    Armenia

   Partly Free

   66

   4

   Azerbaijan

   Not Free

   6

   5

   Georgia

   Partly Free

   4

   3

Central Asia    Kazakhstan

   Not Free

   6

   5

   Kyrgyzstan

   Partly Free

   5

   5

   Tajikistan

   Not Free

   6

   5

   Turkmenistan

   Not Free

   7

   7

   Uzbekistan

   Not Free

   7

   7

Eastern Europe    Moldova

   Partly Free

   3

   3

   Ukraine

   Partly Free

   4

   3

North Africa    Algeria

   Not Free

   6

   5

   Egypt

   Not Free

   6

   5

   Morocco

   Partly Free

   5

   4

   Tunisia

   Partly Free

   3

   4

Source: Freedom in the World 2012.

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visibility of promoters’ actions may also positively influence the process of democratization and local identification with democracy. Local identification with democracy in addition is supported by generally positive perceptions of democracy promoters. Different surveys (ENPI Info Center, International Republican Institute) show that in general the EU enjoys slightly better approval rankings than the USA, especially in the Central Asian countries (Gallup World). Respondents in most of the analyzed countries positively evaluate relations with the EU, while Georgia is the most pronounced EU-enthusiast with 91% approval ranking according to the survey by the International Republican Institute. However, along with positive attitudes the respondents express the necessity for increased activeness of the EU in local development issues and resolutions of

outstanding conflicts if any. Table 6 presents the perceptions of the relations with the EU and the USA and approval of US leadership (Gallup). To this set of survey-based measures we added a set of dummy variables capturing the geo-political and territorial specificity of the four regions analysed—South Caucasus, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and North Africa.

CROSSING CAUSES AND EFFECT Following the general discussion of the nature of our set of explanatory factors, this section discusses the results of our analysis. Using correlation7, we assess the nature of the relationship between e-activeness of the two democracy promoters and our set of explanatory factors. A distinct

Table 6. Local approval of the EU and the USA    Country

   EU

   USA

   Survey

   South Caucasus    Armenia

   68%/84%

   68%/50%

   ENPI 2010/IRI 2008/Gallup 2009

   Azerbaijan

   47%

   53%

   ENPI 2010/Gallup 2009

   Georgia

   81%/91%

   94%/45%

   ENPI 2010/IRI 2011/Gallup 2009

   Central Asia    Kazakhstan

   N/A

   36%

   Gallup 2009

   Kyrgyzstan

   68%

   45%/34%

   IRI 2011/Gallup 2009

   Tajikistan

   N/A

   42%

   Gallup 2009

   Turkmenistan

   N/A

   61%

   Gallup 2009

   Uzbekistan

   N/A

   41%

   Gallup 2009    Eastern Europe

   Moldova

   66%/69%

   60%/44%

   ENPI 2010/IRI 2011/Gallup 2009

   Ukraine

   67%

   24%

   ENPI 2010/Gallup 2009    North Africa

   Algeria

   87%

   43%

   ENPI 2010/Gallup 2009

   Egypt

   56%

   37%

   ENPI 2010/Gallup 2009

   Morocco

   79%

   38%

   ENPI 2010/Gallup 2009

   Tunisia

   91%

   37%

   ENPI 2010/Gallup 2009

Source: Authors’ own compilation based on surveys by ENPI Info Centre, Gallup World and International Republican Institute in 20082011.

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analysis is performed for each promoter in order to facilitate comparative assessments between the two (see Table 7). Before moving on to the discussion of the impact of every item included in the analysis, a general datum is worth mentioning. Following the process of coding of the individual items composing our measure of e-activeness and the calculation of the promoters’ level of involvement in every local case included in the sample, a wide gap emerges between the EU and the USAID delegations both in absolute terms and in terms of quality of the e-action performed. The EU’s level of e-activeness equals 2.2, while in the case of the USAID delegations it equals 1.5, marking a gap of more than 0.7 points. This phenomenon is confirmed even if we look at the measure of e-activeness in the four regional contexts chosen. The EU delegations score on average +0.2 points in South Caucasus, +1.38 in Central Asia, +0.15 in Eastern Europe, and +1.22 in North Africa. As hypothesized in the previous section, both US and the EU’s e-activeness appear significantly and positively affected by acting in a national context marked by a fair level of Internet freedom. Looking at the coefficients produced by the analysis (respectively Spear R. = .872* and .894*) this emerges as the strongest explanatory factor behind promoters’ e-activeness and could

be depicted as a prerequisite for the involvement in Internet-based activities of democracy promotion. Despite the limited coverage in terms of the analyzed countries, the absence of EU and USAID delegations in countries marked by a low level of Internet freedom and their lower level of activism seem to confirm the effectiveness of this predictor. Again in line with our expectations, the level of involvement of both actors appears directly and significantly affected by the democratic nature of the local environment in which they operate (respectively Spear R. = -.601** and -.547*). On a scale that goes from 0 to 3, the EU’s average level of e-activeness in countries labeled as “not free” equals 1.8, while it grows to 2.6 in those labeled as “partly free”. Similarly, in the case of the USAID delegations, the shift is even more significant, from 0.7 to 2.2. It is no surprise, that democracy promoters find a more favourable environment to conduct their activities in relatively liberal societies and political systems, than in environments marked by open authoritarianism and by a very high level of social control. Interestingly, the level of Internet penetration is a very powerful predictor of e-activeness, although it produces significant results only in the case of the EU delegations (Spear R. = .588*). While in countries marked by a low level of Internet penetration (from 0 to 29%) the average level of

Table 7. Testing a set of explanatory factors E-Activeness EU

E-Activeness US

   Internet penetration

   .588*

   .353

   Internet freedom

   .894*

   .872*

   Level of democracy

   -.601**

   -.547*

   Perception EU

   -.391

   ---

   Perception US

   ---

   .153

   Dummy Central Asia

   -.474*

   -.391*

   Dummy Caucasus

   .506*

   .365

   Dummy Eastern Europe

   .226

   .267

   Dummy North Africa

   -.131

   -.124

Source: Coefficients in columns are Spear. R. * Correlation is significant at .05 level; ** Correlation is significant at .001 level.

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e-activeness of the EU delegations equals 1.8 in those presenting a relatively high penetration (from 30% to 50%) it reaches 2.6. The phenomenon is evident also in the case of the USAID delegations, although the gap between the two groups appear smaller than 0.5. Interestingly, public opinion perception of the democratizers does not seem to play any significant role in determining their involvement in internet-based democracy promotion activities (respectively Spear R. = -.391 and .153). When it comes to the dummy factors capturing the geo-political and territorial diversity of our sample, worth mentioning is the widespread neglect when it comes to the Central Asian republics, both in the case of the EU and USAID delegations (respectively Spear R. = -.474* and -.391*). The average level of e-activeness in the case of the Central Asian republics equals 1.5 (EU) and 0.6 (USAID), corresponding respectively to -0.6 and -0.3. On the other, hand the EU presents an above-the-average level of e-activeness in the case of South Caucasus (Spear. R. = .506*); something that does not emerge in the case of the USAID delegations.

CONCLUSION With the tweets of an average citizen and a state official making news headlines, the importance of the widespread phenomenon of Internet activism and activeness is currently undeniable. However, the levels of e-activeness still vary not only among populations or state officials and parliamentarians but also among international actors. Despite the growing relevance of the phenomenon, international actors’ e-activeness appears still widely neglected. This chapter aimed to fill this gap and to explore the dynamics that characterize democracy promoters’ Internet-based activities and the factors that influence their attitude to “get online”. In their efforts of spreading specific types of policies, international actors often need

to turn to the Internet to promote their activities and cover larger segments of populations and keep up with the growing usage of social media by the civil society in democratizing states. Though the main democracy promoters, the EU and USAID, have both acknowledged the importance of Internet based publication of their activities, our analysis has demonstrated that the extent of their e-activeness varies. The analysis highlighted a gap between EU and USAID delegations both in absolute terms and in terms of quality of the e-action performed. The EU’s level of e-activeness appears systematically higher than the one displayed in the case of USAID. The existing gap is confirmed while looking at the measure of e-activeness in the four regional contexts chosen, where the EU delegations appear on average more active. Even in qualitative terms, the EU displays on average a more sophisticated online presence and higher information capacity potential, and more frequently updated websites. Moreover, in purely quantitative terms it is worth mentioning that USAID delegations’ websites were absent in six out of the fourteen analysed cases (despite ongoing projects), thereby reducing the overall level of e-activeness observed. This chapter has analysed the possible impact of a wide set of structural and survey-based measures such as the local Internet penetration, Internet freedom, and the level of democracy and local perceptions of democracy promoters as factors potentially influencing the e-activeness of democracy promoters. While Internet penetration, Internet freedom, and the level of democracy have shown strong correlation with different levels of e-activeness, the local perceptions of democracy promoters seemed to have no significant effect. Interestingly, regional differences seemed to play a per se role in affecting the likelihood of active Internet-based promoters. In the case of the South Caucasus the effect registered in terms of promoters’ activism is positive, while in the case of Central Asia it is negative.

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The analyses of EU and USAID websites have shown that their general e-activeness can be classified as medium, which involves a substantial amount of information about the mission and activities of an actor, but may be inaccessible to large segments of population. Often the information is provided only in the language of the promoter, restricting access to the population without the knowledge of a foreign language. In addition, the analysis of different components of e-activeness—online presence, capacity of information sharing, and update frequency—has shown that e-activeness of the analyzed democracy promoters can be classified as high in regards to online presence and often to update frequency but often as low or sometimes as medium in regards to their capacity of information sharing. This variation, however, does not always stay the same from country to country where the EU and USAID have their representations, prompting assumptions that different levels of e-activeness are likely to be affected by a number of country-specific factors. Nevertheless, the correlations here are based on statistical analysis, which would need to be further validated through qualitative analysis of individual case studies to show a stronger causal link. In addition, while this chapter has analysed domestic factors, further research on systemic factors and structural specificities of democracy promoters will be conducive to explaining varied e-activeness of democracy promoters and other international actors.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT The part of this research conducted by Stefano Braghiroli has been supported by the Estonian Research Council under grant projects ERMOS95. The Chapter was completed and submitted to the editors in August 2012.

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REFERENCES Abbot, J. P. (2010). [email protected]? The challenges to the emancipatory potential of the net: Lessons from China and Malaysia. Third World Quarterly, 22(1), 99–114. doi:10.1080/01436590020022600 Braghiroli, S. (2010). Politicians Online! MEP Communication Strategies in the Internet Era. Politics and Institutions, EPIN Working Papers. Dizard, W. (2001). Digital diplomacy: U.S. foreign policy in the information age. Westport, CT: Praeger Publisher. Jönsson, C., & Hall, M. (2003). Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy. International Studies Perspectives, 4(2), 195–210. doi:10.1111/1528-3577.402009 Kathalil, S., & Boas, T. (2003). Open network, closed regimes: The impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ott, D., & Rosser, M. (2007). The electronic republic? The role of the Internet in promoting democracy in Africa. Democratization, 7(1), 137–156. doi:10.1080/13510340008403649 Rettman, A. (2009, October 23). EU states near agreement on diplomatic service. EuObserver. Retrieved March 2013, from http://euobserver. com/9/28878 Vegh, S. (2003). Classifying forms of online activism: The case of cyberprotests against the World Bank. In M. McCaughey, & M. D. Ayers (Eds.), Cyberactivism: Online activism in theory and practice. New York: Routledge. Westcott, N. (2008). Digital Diplomacy: The Impact of the Internet on International Relations. OII Working Paper, 16.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Capacity of Information Sharing: The extent to which the publicized information may be accessible to local population. Democracy Promoter: A governmental or non-governmental actor involved in democracy promotion. Democracy Promotion: Set of foreign policy actions and strategies aiming to increase the level of democracy in the recipient country. E-Activeness: The extent of international actors’ existence on the Internet, their capacity of information sharing, and frequency of updates. Internet Penetration: The percentage of the population using Internet. Online Presence: The extent to which an international actor publicizes its activities. Update Frequency: The rate with which new information is posted on the analyzed website.

ENDNOTES 1



2



3



Opinion leaders involve government officials and members of national parliaments. Internet activism is often referred to as online activism, e-activism, and cyberactivism. The EU’s relations with the two countries are managed by the delegation to Kazakhstan, which is accredited also to Turkmenistan and

4



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6



7



Uzbekistan. According to EU sources, the creation of fully-fledged EU delegations to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will be finalized by the end of 2012. The item used in the analysis has been recorded and the conceptual order of the scores inverted. In the final measure 100 denotes the highest level of freedom, while 1 indicates the lowest level of freedom. Freedom House gives each country receives a numerical score from 0 (the most free) to 100 (the least free), serving as the basis for an internet freedom status designation of Free (0-30 points), Partly Free (31-60 points), or Not Free (61-100). Freedom House gives numerical scores to each country, ranking those from 1 (the most free) to 7 (the least free). Although Freedom House’s ranking categorizes level of freedom, perceived as a combination of political and civil liberties, it is widely used as a democracy index. In case of high and significant correlation between two independent variables included in the model, all the coefficients presented in the study (Spearman’s R) were controlled accordingly. In all the cases discussed in the paper the orientation of the original correlation did not change, while presenting satisfactory levels of significance, unless explicitly mentioned in the text.

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APPENDIX The List of Analyzed Websites The EU (in alphabetical order of country names): http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/algeria/index_fr.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/index_en.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/azerbaijan/index_en.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/index_en.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/index_en.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/index_en.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kyrgyzstan/index_en.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/moldova/index_en.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/morocco/index_fr.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tajikistan/index_en.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tunisia/index_fr.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/index_en.htm The USAID (in Alphabetical Order of Country Names): http://armenia.usaid.gov/ http://azerbaijan.usaid.gov/ http://centralasia.usaid.gov/ http://egypt.usaid.gov/ http://georgia.usaid.gov/ http://kyrgyzstan.usaid.gov/kyrgyzstan http://moldova.usaid.gov/ http://morocco.usaid.gov/ http://ukraine.usaid.gov/

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Chapter 21

A New Republic of Letters?

The Promise and Potential of the Internet John Kane Griffith University, Australia Haig Patapan Griffith University, Australia

ABSTRACT Advances in information and communication technology seem to promise a revolution in politics. Social media appear to overcome the perceived limitations of representative democracy, allowing more direct and democratic politics less influenced by “elites.” In this chapter, the authors note the nature of this promised revolution, arguing that e-democratic politics and its hopes of democratizing political authority have in large measure not succeeded. Social media have, however, inaugurated a different form of epolitics, one that attempts to democratize knowledge or perhaps wisdom. Blogging, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter all provide new forms of communication and seem to promise a new Republic of Letters with revolutionary potential. Will the new Republic of Letters prove to be more successful than e-democracy? The chapter examines the nature of the old Republic of Letters and its fate, and in the light of that, assesses the promise of technological innovations in communication to alter the nature of modern politics.

INTRODUCTION Political commentator Roger Cohen (2008) observed, during the long battle for the US Democratic nomination in 2008, that the advantage Barack Obama’s campaign had over that of Hillary Clinton lay in its greater awareness of the importance of modern communications. Clinton had failed to note that the Mutually Assured Destruction of the Cold War days in which she had grown up had been replaced by Mutually As-

sured Connectivity. She had depended on the old Democratic Party power structures and tapped the old sources of Democratic wealth while Obama developed a grassroots social network (‘netroots’) and a user-friendly Web site to generate enthusiasm and a fortune in donations from over a million supporters. As an online phenomenon, he inevitably generated as much buzz abroad as at home. Obama understood that, in the globalized world of MySpace, LinkedIn and so on, the future would be determined by ‘sociability and connectivity,’ with sociability as strong a force as sovereignty.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch021

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

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Cohen was drawing approvingly here on a book, Network Power, by David Singh Grewal (2008), who argues that in the present world, ... everything is being globalized except politics. ...We live in a world in which our relations of sociability — our commerce, culture, ideas, manners — are increasingly shared, coordinated by newly global conversations in these domains, but in which our politics remains inescapably national, centered in the nation states that are the only loci of sovereign decision making (Grewal, 2008, p. 50). Grewal analyzes the history of globalization starting from the eighteenth century, and notes the long-term effects of previous sociabilities made possible by earlier technological innovations. He investigates the modern phenomenon of ‘network power’ using examples from the domains of technology, language, culture and economy. Twenty-first century sociability, he says, although it is a form of personal sovereignty, has as much capacity to create oppressively imprisoning social structures as does traditional state sovereignty. The liberating potential of new technologies depends for fulfillment on democratic political action and influence. Grewal concludes, however, by pointing to the possibility that ‘epistemic networks’ — professional and other forms of community that share standards, a language and overall view of the world — might be extended so as to produce a convergence at the level of ‘global social imaginaries’.1 Such convergence, he says, ‘might constitute the emergence of a new global subjectivity, a shared consciousness through which any and all forms of conventional sociability could be rethought (and hence transformed)’ (Grewal, 2008, p. 291). Grewal’s brief speculations recall the phenomenon known from the late seventeenth to early nineteenth centuries as the ‘Republic of Letters.’ The ideal of this republic was an egalitarian, cosmopolitan, non-discriminatory community

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centered on reasonable discourse that could inform policy making in the interests of all. The modern revolution in communications has occasioned a revival of hope for such a virtual republic. In this essay we wish to assess how likely it is that the Internet revolution constitutes a genuine opportunity for such a founding and thus a radical remaking of democratic politics. We will briefly examine the history of the old Republic of Letters and its eventual fate, and then critically examine the potential for new communicative technologies to radically alter political realities either directly, by introducing something called e-democracy, or indirectly by their simply irresistible democratizing force. We conclude that, while technology has undoubtedly and fundamentally changed the way the political game is played, it has not and will not change the nature of the game itself.

BACKGROUND: THE IDEAL OF A REPUBLIC OF LETTERS The idea of a respublica literaria — a cosmopolitan community of thinkers and literati transcending bounds of time and space and committed to ideals of free inquiry and communication − has been traced to humanist scholars of the fifteenth century. It persisted throughout the Renaissance and attained its greatest force during the European intellectual revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The ideal gave birth to a genuine trans-European intellectual community, though one always constituted as a yet-to-be-fullyrealized ideal ‘state.’ This was an ‘imaginary’ state with a citizen body composed of all people of open and enquiring minds, irrespective of their country, religion, language, age or sex. Crucial to the development of a state dependent on the communication of ideas and intellectual discoveries were two inventions, the printing press and the postal service (Habermas, 1989, p. 16). Communication might take a predominantly epistolary form supplemented by travel and personal visitation

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(Goldgar, 1995) or be organized around certain focal ‘centers of sociability’ like universities, publishing houses, specialized societies, literary journals or the Salons of prominent society figures (Goodman, 1996).2 Every aspect of the nature and development of a European Republic of Letters has, as one might expect, been the subject of debate and contest.3 It is possible, nevertheless, to draw from the scholarship a broad story of a partially realized ideal transformed over time by social and political forces without and by attendant tensions and divisions within. For much of the seventeenth century, the imagined Republic consisted of a cosmopolitan network of elite intellectuals concerned with the circulation of information and ideas among themselves but desirous of avoiding dangerously divisive topics of politics or religion. This stance became increasingly difficult to sustain, however, with the end of religious warfare after 1648 and the rise of modern centralized states. The central motif of the Republic of Letters was, after all, critique of received wisdoms, a practice bound to clash often with the interests of the state in administrative control and the maintenance of public order (free thinking being generally regarded as incompatible with order). Scholars, like those among the oppressed and eventually dispersed Huguenot community of France, were forced to rethink their relationships with an intrusive political authority and with society generally (Goldgar, 1995).4 By the mid-eighteenth century, thinkers of the new Enlightenment were no longer shying away from religious and political controversy, but insistently engaging in it in order to combat ancient obscurantist attitudes and to attack entrenched evils. Habermas (1989) theorized these developments by portraying the Republic of Letters as the dynamic core of a larger emerging phenomenon, the ‘critical public sphere.’ He argued that European Protestantism, in conceiving the notion of freedom of conscience, had determined a hitherto unrecognized private sphere of human activity while, at the same time, absolutist monarchies (particularly that of Louis XIV’s France) were

creating an administrative state that separated the private holdings of the king from a public budget (Habermas, 1989, pp. 11–12). The emerging public sphere did not, however, denote the domain of the administrative state as opposed to the domain of private individuals; it was rather a distinctively new civic space created by private individuals reacting to the unwelcome encroachments of state policy upon their lives. An authentic ‘public’ arose as an opponent of state power, using the tools of reasoned critique and ‘publicity’ to counter that power. This critical public sphere was, for Habermas, an essentially ‘bourgeois’ phenomenon in which the status of participants was not so much equalized as simply disregarded for the purposes of rational discourse, allegedly an important step in establishing general reason, not social status, as a basis for law (Habermas, 1989, p. 36).5 But these developments caused a crisis, and in fact a permanent split, within the old Republic of Letters. Citizens of the original trans-European republic were imaginatively defined by their devotion to learning and the search for truth. Theirs was a collective enterprise of many minds in constant communication with one another, in communion with the great thinkers of the past and, in prospect, with those who would come after. The central freedom claimed by this republic was the freedom of a cosmopolitan community of scholars to pursue its studies without hindrance from social prejudice or political authority. But the developing public sphere analyzed by Habermas was a popular not a scholarly republic, an arena not of learned debate but of social and political contest in which modern modes of reason were put to polemical use or, more generally, to public service. The democratization of this republic was further stimulated by the increase in general literacy in the eighteenth century, and the accompanying growth of popular presses informed by a vigorous species of journalism (Lambe, 1988). The philosophes who were this reformed republic’s intellectual leaders derided the inward, elitist erudition of their forebears and turned outward to try consciously to shape, through their very public writings, a new 353

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and profound force in society, ‘public opinion.’ For this purpose, deep learning was less useful than encyclopedic knowledge and a means of conveying it through exemplary personalities and wit. The presumed timelessness of the old republic had, meanwhile, been called into question by developments within the scholarly community itself, notably the rise of historicist studies. These emphasized change over time and the influence of historical, social and political forces on scholars and their outputs, calling into question their timeless ‘rationality.’ The universal ideal of a cosmopolitan republic was, at the same time, seriously challenged by emerging European nationalisms — in eighteenth century Germany an attempt was made to found a specifically national identity on the Republic of Letters idea (Eskildsen, 2004). The Jacobinism of the French Revolution gave a huge boost to state nationalisms, partly by example and partly in reaction, further fragmenting the erstwhile universal republic, while its radical democratic critique challenged the republic’s claim to egalitarianism and representativeness.6 Meanwhile, according to Habermas, that critical public sphere which had reached its finest development in late eighteenth century had begun to degrade as the newspapers that were its essential medium became increasingly commercialized and profit-driven, turning into little more than means for privileged private interests to penetrate the public sphere (Habermas, 1989, pp. 181–185) Nevertheless, the idea and ideal of a Republic of Letters survived into the nineteenth century and beyond. Sibum (2003) shows how the epistemological status of instrumental experimentation gave experimental science a place within the Republic in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the burgeoning of experimental science over the last two centuries has marked a transition from the republican metaphor to the notion of a ‘scientific community’ with its own ideals of universality, rationality and equality. At the heart of this conception is the continuing ideal of devotion to truth and learning that transcends any national, religious or linguistic boundary (or, 354

we must add today, commercial rivalry), and the essentially egalitarian and convivial relationship of the devotees (Stichweh, 2003). The language of a Republic of Letters has been revived in recent times with the rise of modern communications systems, most specifically the Internet. The multifarious uses to which the Web can be put — storage of and instant access to digitized scholarship, ancient and modern; online university courses; personal Web pages of scholars and thinkers; blogging sites of all varieties; online discussion sites on philosophical, intellectual and political themes — have encouraged hopes for a genuinely universal egalitarian (virtual) community that might fulfill the hopes of centuries past. Of particular interest has been the hope that the democratic equality and inclusiveness promoted by general access to information and communication will have political consequences in the wider world. Just as the cosmopolitan community made possible four hundred years ago by printing presses and postal services led to the creation of a public space with profound political effects, so might the Internet create a new and even wider space for social connectivity and political action that will permit radical transformation. It remains for us to assess the prospects for this.

THE INTERNET AND A NEW REPUBLIC OF LETTERS Issues, Controversies, Problems One of the earliest political hopes raised by the communicative potential of modern technology was for something called e-democracy. E-democracy was distinguishable from e-government — which was simply the improvement of government services to, and governmental communication with, citizens using the potential of the Internet — in that it appeared to have more ambitious aims. Yet it was uncertain whether etechnology was expected to legitimize, without structurally altering, existing forms and functions

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of liberal democracy by improving governmental performance, accessibility and accountability, or whether it was expected to effect a fundamental transformation of representative democracy into something superior and ‘more democratic.’ At the extreme, the new technology seemed to some to promise a renovation of the whole democratic system. It was possible to argue, after all, that representative government was a compromise on true democracy. The latter required, as even representation’s great defender, J.S. Mill (1974, p. 198), admitted, ‘the admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the state’. Compromise had been necessary because the size of populations and geographical extent of countries prohibited the gathering of all to make decisions. But the Internet overcame the tyranny of size and distance, making theoretically possible the regular participation of all in the decision-making power of government. If direct democracy could now be electronically coordinated and achieved, then representation was no longer necessary. But even if a fully direct democratic system seemed too ambitious, there was at least scope for a vast increase in citizen participation in deliberation over important policies and participation in their formulation. Thus Putnam’s diagnosis of the crisis of democratic legitimacy and accountability in America, in Bowling Alone (2000), was answered by Stephen Coleman and John Gøtze in Bowling Together (2001). Coleman and Gøtze argued that the crisis might be addressed by encouraging online public engagement in policy deliberation, to encourage ‘preference formation’ rather than ‘preference assertion.’ Encouraged by such promise, experiments in e-democracy enjoyed a brief vogue around the world. Some of these were initiated by citizens who set up programs permitting their fellows to participate in online discussions of policies of local importance, the results to be fed into the political process. Sometimes these were coordinated with cooperative local governments. Often governments themselves, concerned about the oft-noted disenchantment of citizens with democratic politics and politicians, established

their own e-democratic Web sites.7 E-democracy was taken to be a possible and plausible means of addressing the growth of what has been called the modern ‘democratic deficit.’ The results, however, were seldom impressive. For one thing, governmental e-democracy initiatives were rather limited. They consisted mostly of things like: e-petitions (an electronic version of the traditional right of citizens to petition government); Internet broadcasting of the legislature; online ‘consultation’ on a few carefully selected issues. Other moves were, however, more ambitious. In 2002 an Australian member of federal parliament, for example, ‘contracted’ with his constituents to post questions for voting by email, promising to act on the majority view. This was, he claimed, real democracy in action, the triumph of the people’s will and a ‘logical consequence of Information Age politics.’ The promise was not to institute direct democracy but to provide a version of ‘agency representation,’ in which the representative would act faithfully as an agent of the electorate’s expressed will. Limited as the experiment was, it soon ran afoul of political reality. A vote on whether the government should ban online gambling produced a majority (of only 213 respondents) for ‘Yes,’ contradicting the member’s own party’s policy line and putting him on its opponents’ side (Bishop, Kane & Patapan, 2002). The truth was that any similar attempt to alter existing structures of decision making authority was bound to meet severe and no doubt fatal resistance. Agency representation, direct participative democracy and current representative forms are not points on a smooth spectrum along which a polity can simply slide at will. Any attempt to move to a more radical democratic form constitutes not a reform, but a revolution. The mere existence of the necessary technology could certainly not accomplish that, and there was little sign that the public, despite its alienation, had any great hunger to travel such a road. The more optimistic views of the potential of the new technology to directly alter political reality, therefore, were soon eroded by practical experience. 355

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There remained, nevertheless, the possibility that, even if direct reform of democratic systems was unlikely, the sheer ‘democratizing’ potential of the Web might produce qualitative societal changes. There is no doubt, for example, that the Internet can be an effective liberationist tool in authoritarian regimes, which is why such regimes spend so much time finding ways to exert control over a decentralized communication system that seems inherently difficult (if not impossible) to control. In Kyrgyzstan, unofficial blogs seemed to have performed an important role as a unique and rich source of information for citizens during their 2005 ‘tulip revolution’ against dictatorial President Akeyev (Kulikova & Perlmutter, 2007), (though the fact that these were called ‘samizdat’ blogs reveals their continuity with pre-Internet resistance practices). The inability of the Islamic Iranian regime, after the dubious presidential elections of June 2009, to shut down protesters communications to each other and to the outside world provided a dramatic demonstration of the declining capacity of repressive systems to maintain total control,8 as did, even more dramatically, the events of the ‘Arab Spring’ in countries of the Middle East in 2011. This democratizing potential of social media in authoritarian regimes may be real but there is nothing inevitable about it. China provides a most pertinent case here. The Chinese government has been criticized for curtailing Google’s search presence and requiring Facebook to remove derogatory materials, but on the other hand has actively promoted increased use of the Internet by citizens and even used it as an early warning system of cases of corruption or other problematic issues, such as the train accident in Wenzhou in 2011. The distinctive Chinese response to the Internet has been to allow it to flourish during a period of rapid change but to control it sufficiently so that it will not destabilize the regime and possibly the nation. According to Yeo and Li (2012), the Chinese government has succeeded to a remarkable extent in performing this balancing act.

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No doubt many politicians even in long established democracies wish they could control as effectively the unpredictable consequences of instant, universal communications technology on political actors and processes. The success of the Obama campaign was argued to be effecting a shift of power away from an old Democratic ‘establishment’ already undermined by very active Internet constituency groups like MoveOn.org. Ministers in Great Britain were revealed to be deeply concerned that their media message on military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan was being undermined by negative stories by soldiers on the ground using social networking and video-sharing sites to publicize grievances (Verkaik, 2008). The ‘warp speed’ with which news of scandals is transmitted in a wired world placed swift, inordinate pressure on erring politicians, often immediately terminating careers (Farhi, 2008). The incursion of so-called User Generated Content into the media — online text, photos, audio and video material produced by amateurs — also produced dramatic results: mobile phone footage of Saddam Hussein’s execution damagingly undercut the official, more decorous Iraqi version; the YouTube Webcast of Virginia Senator George Allen calling a young man of Indian extraction ‘Macaca’ cost him his re-election (Carvin, 2007). Without denying the importance of all such developments, we must still ask whether openness and speed of access to the virtual public sphere founds conditions for a new Republic of Letters. Undoubtedly the most mature expression of the Internet’s potential for developing human connectivity has been provided by Facebook. But even a cursory examination of its reach and scope suggests that it is a predominantly social medium with little discernible Republic of Letters ambitions. Indeed, Sherry Turkle in Alone Together (2011) has questioned even the social benefits of a medium that may leave us less connected with real people even as we are more connected to simulations of them. Henry Jenkins (2006) has argued that the Internet has produced

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a ‘participatory culture’ with significant impact on mainstream media, but mostly at the level of ‘pop’ culture and gaming. But perhaps the real potential for a modern Republic of Letters lies in the explosive growth of Web logs, or ‘blogs,’ along with chat-rooms and online discussion groups which has given rise to the so-called blogosphere (Barlow, 2007). With regard to specifically political blogs — Web sites maintained by individuals that consist of regular entries of commentary on issues along with photos and links to other blogs or Web sites — some have canvassed the question of whether the new medium has the characteristics essential to an ideal political public space with democratic potential (Barton, 2005; Davis, 2005). Consider the case made by New York Times columnist Frank Rich (2007), who argued that YouTube marked the passing of an era in the US dominated by cynical political operators like George W. Bush’s chief strategist, Karl Rove: The rise of YouTube certifies the passing of Mr. Rove’s era, a cultural changing of the guard in the digital age. Mr. Rove made his name in direct-mail fund-raising and with fierce top-down message management. As the Internet erodes snail mail, so it upends direct mail. As YouTube threatens a politician’s ability to rigidly control a message, so it threatens the Rove ethos that led Mr. Bush to campaign at ‘town hall’ meetings attended only by hand-picked supporters (Rich, 2007). The general case for a new public sphere is here in microcosm. The Internet, it is claimed, is causing a shift in the balance of power between people generally and the few who have hitherto ‘controlled the message,’ whether political operatives, business corporations or the mainstream media. It does so by altering the landscape from one in which a few producers/controllers feed whatever information they wish to convey to a basically consumerist public that possesses few alternative sources, to one in which participation

in, critical discussion of and commentary upon news production becomes general and potentially unlimited. Removing the hierarchical power of a few means the removal of control as such, creating a field of freedom for critical discussion where biases and vested interests have no authoritative purchase. Under these conditions, the power of reasoned argument must be the eventual vindicator of positions, with the result that the general public interest is attended to more than that of special interests. Thus it may be that, thanks to the Web, we are approaching the point that Habermas claimed the bourgeoisie had reached in the late eighteenth century when, he says, the private sphere became ‘emancipated from the directives of public authority to such an extent that the political public sphere could attain its full development’ (Habermas, 1989. p. 79). This public sphere was characterized by rational-critical debate that changed political will into political reason, ‘that in the public competition of private arguments came into being as the consensus about what was practically necessary in the interest of all’ (Habermas, 1989, p. 83). The Habermasian ideal that many hoped realizable on the Web encompassed, as well as autonomy from political and economic power, a willingness by participants to engage civilly in critical-rational debate, implying readiness to evaluate critically one’s own values and assumptions and a sincere openness to and respect for the views of all interlocutors under a condition of inclusiveness and equality (Dahlberg, 2001). The optimism of this hope is tempered if we consider a few empirical investigations into the reality of the public space created by the Web. Richard Davis (2005) conducted extensive investigations in 2004 and concluded that the practice did not live up to the ideal promise. Participants in online forums were never representative of the population at large and in fact constituted quite a specific demographic that was incapable of credibly gauging public opinion. Another study by David Perlmutter (2008) emphasized the relative political powerlessness

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of bloggers. Perlmutter argued that blogs are a welcome development because they allow wide dissemination of information and opinion and thus enrich the democratic culture, but claimed bloggers have little leverage — financial, social, moral or cultural — to move readers toward any particular political position or behavior. More critically, Robert McDougall (2005) argued that, ‘At their worst, blogs represent the latest form of mass-mediated triviality and celebrity spectacle, with the potential to create and sustain insulated enclaves of intolerance predicated on little more than personal illusion, rumor, and politically motivated innuendo’ (McDougall, 2005, p. 575). As for relationships with mainstream media, Perlmutter noted that blogs have displaced the latter entirely for some Internet users. Tanni Haas (2005) had already argued, however, that blogs did not represent a radical departure from established media, a finding echoed by Reese et al. (2007) who investigated the possibility that bloggers would supplant the work of traditional journalists altogether. They found that, Broadly speaking, the blogosphere — while dominated by citizen communicators — relied heavily on professional news sites and stories by journalists associated with professional media organizations. ... Thus, the blogosphere incorporates professional journalistic voices as a complementary part of the network, and is not the source of relentless criticism of press bias that one may have sensed from some higher profile anti-media moments. These bloggers, for the most part, simply engage the facts and information carried in news accounts, accepting them at face value and using them to form their own arguments, reinforce views, and challenge opponents. ... We may thus regard them ironically as in some ways preserving and reinforcing professional norms of journalism as they disseminate content generated by traditional reporting practices (Reese et al., 2007, p. 257).

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In his discussion of ‘superblogs’ — Daily Kos, Huffington Post etc. — Perlmutter indicated the existence of a hierarchy of blog sites and thus of influence. Haas had already noted that a small number of blogs set the agenda for thousands of others, and that some of the biggest had begun to apply selection measures resembling the gatekeeping methods of mainstream media (Haas, 2005, pp. 391–393). Meanwhile, familiar issues were being fought out in the new domain. Harp and Tremayne (2006), for example, analyzed the gendered nature of network use and, finding that only ten per cent of top bloggers were women, offered suggestions for increasing the representation of female voices in the blogosphere. Janack (2006) analyzed Howard Dean’s 2004 campaign blog that allowed citizens to post ostensibly unedited comments, creating the potential, Janack said, for the rational-critical interaction expected of the ideal public sphere. But campaigns are structured to craft candidate images, and the study unsurprisingly found that, ‘In effect, Howard Dean’s campaign blog became a self-disciplining system in which comments that promoted the goals and echoed the strategies of the campaign were encouraged and those that did not were discouraged through subtle and not-so-subtle disciplinary strategies’ (Janack, 2006, p. 297). Overall, the impression gained from these and many other studies is not one of an emerging ‘ideal public sphere of rational-critical discourse’. The very title of Perlmutter’s book, Blogwars: The New Political Battleground, suggested this is less a sphere of reasoned debate than one where ordinary politics can be continued by other means — a presumption reinforced by that fact that blogs are rapidly becoming part of the toolkit of all political professionals. Moreover, non-professional political bloggers seemed, according to a Virginian study by Kavanaugh et al. (2006), to be a self-selecting group of politically active opinion leaders using the Web to extend their informal influence. For some, this question

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of ‘self-selection’ poses a radical challenge to the democratic credentials of the new technological innovations and therefore potentially undermines any prospect of a new republic of letters. Sunstein (2001) in Republic.com argues that our ability to filter what we want to see, hear and read in cyberspace undermines the potential for a shared culture, potentially fragmenting communities into ‘cybercascades’. The very potential to form virtual republics, according to Sunstein, poses dangers for the democratic health of the larger community. Pariser (2011) in The Filter Bubble extends this argument by noting that the increasing use by large corporations of personalized filters or algorithms that track personal web preferences, and subsequently use them as filters to supply us with what we might want to see and hear, places us in ‘bubbles’ that conceal from us unexpected encounters that spark creativity, innovation and democratic exchange of ideas. These authors therefore claim that, even if the web can be said to facilitate republics of letters, the very means employed will inevitably undermine their promise and potential.

CONCLUSION Writers in this field often express regret that the, admittedly Utopian, ideal of the rational public sphere seems undermined by politics-as usual. Janack, for example, notes that the Habermasian conception of this sphere assumes a rational subject, but that rationality if often subverted in subtle ways by power relations; the problem is not so much with the technological means, he concludes, but with citizens themselves corrupted by political interests and power (Janack, 2006, p. 297). Such a view, however, begs many philosophical questions, not least to do with the inescapably political nature of the political realm. The Habermasian ideal, with its underlying presumption that open, inclusive, rational-critical debate will lead to consensus, is fundamentally unpolitical and

probably also fundamentally unreasonable. Even within actual republics, people argue irreconcilably. We noted how the old Republic of Letters fragmented, not just under pressure of political and economic forces, but due to disagreements within the scholarly community itself, including over the meaning and even possibility of ‘rationality’ as such. It is inevitable that independent thought and open debate will create divisions, sometimes deep and irreconcilable, among thinkers concerned not (or not necessarily) with politics but with the very nature of things. How much less, then, should we ever expect ‘rational consensus’ in the ever-fractious realm of politics? That the Internet has changed in dramatic and important ways the communication and dissemination of knowledge and opinion cannot be doubted. It has altered the rules of the game to the extent that it allows more players to participate and robs formerly powerful centers of at least some of their capacity to control ‘the message.’ It has not, however, changed the nature of the game itself, nor could it do so. It has become a commonplace to note that, if the new communications technologies can be used by, for example, civil society organizations for ‘reformatting the terms and terrains of global politics’ in their favor (Anderson, Dean and Lovink 2006), it is equally a tool at the disposal of international terrorists to forward their destructive aims. Davidow (2011) has argued that the very speed of the Internet promotes ‘hyper-connection’ that often precludes mature judgment and spreads ‘contagions’ of various kinds (including financial contagion) with unprecedented force. If the Internet has genuine democratic potential, it also has potential for many other purposes, both good and ill. The problem with the supposed modern Republic of Letters and the hope for a critical-rational public sphere that it spawned does not lie with technological means, nor with the unfortunate ‘irrationality’ of human subjects who use them, but with the perennial hope that technology can solve the intractable problems of political life.

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REFERENCES Anderson, J. W., Dean, J., & Lovink, G. (2006). Reformatting politics: Information technology and global civil society. London: Routledge. Appadurai, A. (1996). Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalization. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Barlow, A. (2007). The rise of the blogosphere. Westport, CT: Praeger. Barton, M. (2005). The future of rational-critical debate in online public spheres. Computers and Composition, 22(2), 177–190. doi:10.1016/j. compcom.2005.02.002 Bishop, P., Kane, J., & Patapan, H. (2002). The theory and practice of e-democracy: Agency, trusteeship and participation on the Web. International Review of Public Administration, 7(2), 21–31. doi:10.1080/12294659.2002.10805003 Carvin, A. (2007). How the Internet is changing the playing field. eJournalUSA. Retrieved August 29, 2013, from http://prague.usembassy. gov/how_the_internet_is_changing_the_playing_field.html Cohen, R. (2008, May 26). The Obama connection. New York Times. Retrieved July 25, 2013, from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/26/ opinion/26cohen.html?_r=0 Coleman, S., & Gøtze, J. (2001). Bowling together: Online public engagement in policy deliberation. Retrieved August 29, 2013, from http://www. bowlingtogether.net/intro.html Dahlberg, L. (2001). Extending the public sphere through cyberspace: The case of Minnesota e-democracy. First Monday. Retrieved August 7, 2013, from http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_3/dahlberg/index.html Davidow, B. (2011). Overconnected: The promise and threat of the Internet. New York: Delphinium Books. 360

Davis, R. (2005). Politics online: Blogs, chatrooms, and discussion groups in American democracy. New York: Routledge. Eley, G. (1992). Nations, publics, and political cultures: Placing Habermas in the nineteenth century. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), Habermas and the public sphere (pp. 289–339). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Eskildsen, K. R. (2004). How Germany left the Republic of Letters. Journal of the History of Ideas, 65(3), 421–432. doi:10.1353/jhi.2005.0004 Farhi, P. (2008, March 14). Bad news travels fast, and furiously. Washington Post. Retrieved July 30, 2013, from http://articles.washingtonpost. com/2008-03-14/news/36887042_1_state-senator-politicians-affair Gilmartin, K. (1994). Popular radicalism and the public sphere. Studies in Romanticism, 33, 549–557. doi:10.2307/25601085 Goldgar, A. (1995). Impolite learning: Conduct and community in the Republic of Letters, 1680– 1750. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Goodman, D. (1996). The Republic of Letters: A cultural history of the French Enlightenment. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Grewal, D. (2008). Network power: The social dynamics of globalization. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Haas, T. (2005). From ‘Public Journalism’ to the ‘Public’s Journalism’? Rhetoric and reality in the discourse on weblogs. Journalism Studies, 6(3), 387–396. doi:10.1080/14616700500132073 Habermas, J. (1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society (T. Burger, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Harp, D., & Tremayne, M. (2006). The Gendered Blogosphere: Examining Inequality using Network and Feminist Theory. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 83(2), 247–264. doi:10.1177/107769900608300202 Janack, J. A. (2006). Mediated citizenship and digital discipline: A rhetoric of control in a campaign blog. Social Semiotics, 16(2), 283–301. doi:10.1080/10350330600664862 Jenkins, H. (2006). Fans, bloggers, and gamers: Exploring participatory culture. New York: New York University Press. Kavanaugh, A., Zin, T., Carroll, J., Schmitz, J., Pérez-Quiñones, M., & Isenhour, P. (2006). When opinion leaders blog: New forms of citizen interaction. In Proceedings of the international Conference on Digital Government Research. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Kulikova, S. V., & Perlmutter, D. D. (2007). Blogging down the dictator? The Kyrgyz revolution and samizdat websites. International Communication Gazette, 69(1), 29–50. doi:10.1177/1748048507072777 Lambe, P. J. (1988). Critics and skeptics in the seventeenth-century Republic of Letters. The Harvard Theological Review, 81(3), 271–296. Mayhew, R. (2004). British geography’s Republic of Letters: Mapping an imagined community, 1600–1800. Journal of the History of Ideas, 65(2), 251–276. doi:10.1353/jhi.2004.0029 McDougall, R. (2005). Identity, electronic ethos, and blogs: A technologic analysis of symbolic exchange on the new news medium. The American Behavioral Scientist, 49(4), 575–599. doi:10.1177/0002764205280922

Miles, R. (2005). Trouble in the Republic of Letters: The reception of Shakespeare’s forgeries. Studies in Romanticism, 44(3), 317–342. doi:10.2307/25602003 Mill, J. S. (1974). Representative government. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: What the internet is hiding from you. New York: Penguin Press. Perlmutter, D. D. (2008). Blogwars: The new political battleground. New York: Oxford University Press. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon & Schuster. doi:10.1145/358916.361990 Reese, S. D., Rutigliano, L., Hyun, K., & Jeong, J. (2007). Mapping the Blogosphere: Professional and Citizen-based Media in the Global News Arena. Journalism, 8(3), 235–261. doi:10.1177/1464884907076459 Rich, F. (2007, August 19). He got out while the getting was good. New York Times. Retrieved September 3, 2013, from http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/08/19/3267 Sibum, H. O. (2003). Experimentalists in the Republic of Letters. Science in Context, 16(1–2), 89–120. doi:10.1017/S0269889703000747 Stichweh, R. (2003). Genesis of world science. Soziale Systeme, 9, 3–26. Sunstein, C. (2001). Republic.com. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Taylor, C. (2004). Modern social imaginaries. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

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Turkle, S. (2011). Alone together: Why we expect more from technology and less from each other. New York: Basic Books. Verkaik, R. (2008, February 8). Facebook — the new battleground in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Independent. Retrieved September 3, 2013, from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ home-news/freedom-of-information-facebookndash-the-new-battleground-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-779766.html Yeo, G., & Li, E. X. (2012). China’s parallel universe. New Perspectives Quarterly, 29.

Epistemic Networks: Communities of professionals and other individuals who share expertise in a given area and draw on similar values and standards in the pursuit and validation of knowledge. Public Sphere: The ‘public sphere’, originally conceptualized by Habermas, refers to a realm that mediates between the private concerns of individuals and the concerns of public life, where members of civil society engage in rational discussion to achieve social consensus and to influence political authority. Republic of Letters: Concept that emerged in seventeenth century Europe based on the idea of an intellectual community characterized by egalitarian and cosmopolitan principles.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Democratic Deficit: ‘Democratic deficit’ is the situation in which political institutions, actors and processes fail to deliver outcomes that measure up to the ideals of democracy, particularly in terms of accountability, transparency and justice. Direct Democracy: Direct democracy is a form of democracy where popular sovereignty is put into practice to its full extent by the people making public decisions, as opposed to representative democracy, where people elect representatives to make decisions on their behalf; direct participatory or deliberative democracy are variations of direct democracy. E-Democracy: E-democracy refers to the use of information and communication technologies by political actors in governance processes in order to increase citizens’ participation and engagement in the political process, for instance, online petitions, discussions and consultations. E-Government: E-government refers to the use of information technology to deliver services and information to citizens.

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ENDNOTES 1



2



3



4



5



Grewal is referring here to work by Appadurai (1996) and Taylor (2004). Goldgar (1995) notes that the institution of academies and journals, a response to a felt need for a corporate identity, professionalized the Republic of Letters but also made it more impersonal. See an interesting attempt by Mayhew (2004) to analyze the complex geography of the Republic of Letters by mapping its spatial extent in diagrams and prose. Pierre Bayle, a notable thinker of Huguenot parentage, fled to Holland after Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes (that prescribed toleration of Protestants) and established a journal, Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, which made the term prominent throughout Europe. Habermas’s claim of the bourgeois nature of the public sphere has been particularly challenged by arguments that many of the

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6



significant pressures exerted in it originated in orders lower than, or sources wider than, the bourgeoisie. See, for example, Eley (1992), Gilmartin (1994) and Miles (2005). Goodman (1994) argues that the forces of democratization had already been felt in France in the 1780s with the rise of new institutions, musées, that challenged the existing Salon culture dominated by women. The musées represented what Habermas termed the transformation of the intellectual public sphere into the political public sphere, masculizing it in the process.

7



8



For a hopeful analysis of the potential of the Internet see Lincoln Dahlberg’s (2001) analysis of the functioning of one of the best known experiments, that of Minnesota E-Democracy. It was a notable feature of the Iranian events that Twitter, apparently at the request of the US State Department, shelved its plans to close down its services for maintenance so as not to interrupt the flow of messages in and from Iran.

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Chapter 22

From Politics to E-Politics:

Updating Saul Alinsky’s Community Organising Model to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of Politics in the Information Age Sam Takavarasha, Jr. University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Jonathan Cox Citizens UK, UK Stanislas Bigirimana Africa University, Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT ICTs are slowly being acknowledged as effective tools for political mobilisation in the information age. Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign and the Arab Spring are typical examples of how ICTs can foster political change in the face of challenges that were considered insurmountable before the information age. The secrets behind such success stories are not readily available to local change leaders at a time when authoritarian states are devising ways of entrenching the status quo in the information age. This emphasises the need to inform activists about the relevance of updating pre-information age models in order to address the challenges of politics in the information age. It also calls for more academic analysis on how to conceptualise the role of earlier political models in the information age. This chapter presents a systematic approach for renewing traditional political models to the e-world by proposing how to update Alinsky’s (1971) community organising model used by Obama 2008 campaign. The relevance of this chapter to a book on politics in the information age is that it prepares strategists and scholars to update their tried and tested strategies to a new era as Obama did.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch022

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

 From Politics to E-Politics

INTRODUCTION The forces of globalisation such as the diminishing of the territorial state (Herz 1957) and the concomitant virtual phenomena such as the global village or the networked Society allegedly fuelled by the over arching role of information technologies (Gabberty and Vambery 2007) define a profound departure from pre-information age approaches to political mobilisation. This new era has been dubbed as network politics (Solo and Bishop 2011). While this could be assessed from other aspects of the globalisation phenomena, we focus on the information component and particularly how it affects local level political activism. Our approach is influenced by the central role of information in networking and defining the contours of sociopolitical and socio-economic life under globalization. We argue that the practice of politics in the information age will inevitably be characterised by an increasingly innovative use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) as well as a broadening of the political space that affects local political dynamics. We however warn against the expectation of wholesale change by positing that that while out comes may be phenomenal, at the conceptual level the models simply need updating. As a result we present a framework for updating models that are already understood by political actors as highly significant. We demonstrate this updating Alinsky’s community organising level by drawing lessons from aspect of Obama’s 2008 campaign. The practice of politics in the information age should therefore be understood by unpacking the role of ICTs in facilitating power dynamics in an increasingly globalised world. This will be proposed here as a process of automating the information, knowledge and communication components (McNamara 2003) of pre-information age political models. Instead of analysing the impact thereof, this chapter is concerned with the formulation of models that address the challenges

and opportunities emanating from the advent of new information tools and the changes in political power structures under globalisation. In view of the foregoing, our challenge as scholars and practitioners is to establish how globalisation will transform traditional political models into the sphere of e-politics. Our concern with updating traditional political models to the information age should not imply that e-politics does not exist. While we acknowledge the existence of e-politics, we emphasise the need to migrate other political models and sub disciplines (e.g. political mobilisation) to meet contemporary challenges. We draw lessons from commerce whose e-commerce sub-domains like e-customer relations, e-money and e-auctions emigrated from classic versions to meet the challenges of the eworld in both theory and practice. While this may be due to the quest for economic progress and profitability, we contend that the shifting power dynamics under globalisation call for similar shifts of political models to e-politics versions. At this juncture it is essential to define a few terms used in this chapter. By e-world we refer to the electronic space characterized by the automation of their earlier versions. This should not be confused with Apple Inc.’s now defunct online platform. E-politics therefore refers to the practice of political activity over electronic media. Like wise e-money is electronic money, e-auctions refers to electronic auctions i.e. auctions conducted over the internet and e-customer relations is the electronic version of a discipline meant to manage the customer loyalty. The challenges of analysing complex social issue against a dichotomy of upgrading to the eworld or not doing so is worsened by the existence of a several exogenous issues that come into play in investigating the multi-dimensional phenomena that surround political change. These dynamics beg several analytical questions that affect our understanding of politics in the information age. For instance it compels us to question whether

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ICTs were solely responsible for the unprecedented results we saw in contemporary revolutions like the Arab Spring. It also compels us to investigate if the difficulties faced in dislodging successive dictatorships reveal a lack of systematic approach or a failure to learn from approaches used by earlier movements. Finally it compels us to investigate the necessity and possibility of using traditional mobilisation models to guide our approach to the new political environment where information plays a central role. These questions define a rich ground for philosophical analysis on the key issues affecting local politics in the information age. Without purporting to understand the former, this chapter contributes to that debate by discussing how Saul Alinsky’s (1971) place based community organising model can be adapted to the information age. In this endeavour we discuss how the game changing effects of globalisation have reduced the impact of the Alinsky model and how the harnessing of ICTs can make it relevant to the information age. We implore the reader not to be distracted by their perception of Alinsky or Obama models but rather focus on the viability of updating earlier political models to the information age which is our central argument. Lessons drawn from information systems suggest that other than the mere harnessing of information and communication tools, success in the information age (politics included) will be determined by the viability of the strategic directions that ICTs are meant to achieve (Gabberty and Vambery 2007). For instance, both Barack Obama and John McCain used ICTs in their political campaigns to a greater extent than earlier campaigns, yet automating key aspects of Alinsky’s model defined Obama’s superiority over McCain (Delany 2009, Plouffe 2009). As innovation has been known to also entail a combination of old models to form new ones (Barnett 1953, Schumpeter 1971), we contend that the formulation of information age e-strategies may be based on adapting pre-information political models to retain their viability in the new 366

environment. Toward this end, (Ross et al 2001) advocate for an exploitation of existing processes through information rich channels. According to Gabberty and Vambery (2007) Amazon’s initial e-commerce success relied on automating traditional book selling methods. They used ‘sneaker net’ technology that used hard copies of customer orders to process orders by hand just as book sellers did it before. Along the same lines we demonstrate how to update traditional political models to the e-world by adapting Alinsky’s (1971) community organising model to the e-world. Alinksy’s (1971) community organising model is a relational approach to democratic politics which mobilises marginalised citizens to reclaim their political power from the hands of totalising and centralising states and multinational capitalists (Ivereigh 2010). It is ideal for guiding non-violent political mobilisation because of its ability to organise divergent groups into broad based organisations that act around a common cause. While the classic version uses a face to face approach to community organising, we suggest how it could be modernised by harnessing ICTs like social networking to build bigger broad based organisations in a faster way than face to face organising. After this introduction we discuss the role and limitations of ICTs for communication in the information age. We then discuss the game changing effects of globalisation on politics in the information age. This is followed by an introduction of the Alinsky (1971) model and a discussion on the need to update it, after which we use the Alinsky model for presenting a frame work for updating political models to the information age. We then justify building the future political models on legacy ones. The chapter then ends with a discussion on political dynamics of the information age and the need and approach to adapting to them. It concludes with by asserting that strategists mustn’t look too far to find appropriate models for politics in the information age since legacy concepts would hold if their information and knowledge components were updated using ICTs.

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ICTs AND COMMUNICATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE In this section we discuss the limitations of (ICTs) the most definitive tool of communication in the information age. Even before presenting their superior role in the project of updating classical political models, we find it necessary to warn that ICTs are no magic bullet. By so doing we endeavour to warn its adopters to consider these limitations when updating earlier political models to the information age. We argue that the advent of information age communication tools could be decried as the paradoxical boon and bane of communication. This is because the celebrated increase in communication and information over internet and mobile platforms is ironically accompanied by qualitative weakness of textual messages that are often read through only one of the five senses of human actors. This has serious implications on the quality of communication employed in a ‘heads and hearts’ game like politics. When one reads an email, a tweet or a short message service (SMS), they read one’s words unaccompanied by one’s emotions. According to Bordia (1997), ‘There are no nonverbal cues to embellish meaning or social context cues regarding gender, age, or status. Not only can the absence of cues hamper communication efficiency, but it seems to create a semblance of anonymity and lack of awareness of the social context’ (p.100). The impact of such loss of quality cannot be underestimated by scholars and political strategists who wish to use ICTs for extending the reach of traditional face to face communication. Against this background we must also acknowledge that the information age has turned contemporary society into writers and readers of ICT mediated text. Writing and reading are now central part of life since a significant amount of information is now being communicated via text or email. This has an impact on the quality of communication since emails, blogs and text messages expose the reader to the common language not to

subjective opinion (Ricoeur 1981) and experience of the communicator (Alinsky 1971). The mainly textual computer mediated communications (Bordia 1997) brings us to the age old challenge of interpreting texts that preoccupied scholars of hermeneutics. Paul Ricoeur writes; ‘according to Schleirermacher “to consider the common language is to forget the writer; whereas to understand the individual author is to forget his language” we either perceive what is common or we perceive what is peculiar’. He posits that to perceive what is common is termed objective and negative. It is considered objective because it deals with linguistic distinction from the author and it’s also negative since it simply indicates limits of understanding; its critical values bears upon errors in meaning of words (Ricoeur 1981). This mode of interpretation of one’s message has serious implications on political communication because it will not achieve the peculiar rapport that Alinsky’s (1971) relational model of community organisation depends on. This relational and personal touch between organisers and the community is achieved through face to face interaction i.e. one-to-ones described latter. Alinsky’s one-to-ones (hereafter referred as 1-21s) achieve a socio-emotional communication akin to an interpretation of messages that Ricoeur (1981) endorses as the proper task of hermeneutics (p.47). According to Ricoeur (1981) we must reach the subjectivity of the one who speaks and when we do so the language (as textually presented) becomes forgotten. He argues that the language is at the servitude of the individual and posits that this is positive because it reaches the individual thought produced in the communication. The foregoing brings up the taken for granted issue of the accuracy of communication itself by asking if pen pushers or key strikers are accurately communicating the message in their minds. Based on the aphoria that hermeneutics has for the interpretation of text, we must present textual prevalence as the bane of information age modes of communication because few writers are accurate secretaries of their mind. 367

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This then begs a tough question for the advocates of the e-world and e-politics in particular. It compels us to question if ICTs can replace the face to face communication they are meant to substitute in the e-politics project. The foregoing suggests that the answer can not be in the affirmative. This therefore calls upon current users of ICTs for political communication to acknowledge the limitations of ICTs by employing them in tandem with traditional methods. As we argue below ICTs need to be skilfully employed to automate the knowledge and information components of political models. Users should also hone their writing skills while the creators of ICTs improve them enough to capture the subjectivity of the communicators. It may seem unfair to blame the inadequacy of textual communication on the information age because it pre dates the information age. We are compelled to associate the curse of textual communication with the information age because of its unprecedented scale. Unlike Ricoeur‘s (in the 1970s) and Schleiermacher’s (during then1830s) days when written text was mainly for the learned few, electronic textual messages are now widely used for social interaction as well as the political activism discussed here. As stated earlier, the information age has turned unprecedented volumes of political communicators into writers ranging from bloggers, e-mailers, tweeters and text message writers and readers. As we decry the dearth of face-to-face communication due to increased ICT mediated communication, we cannot ignore the limited reach of face to face communications used by Alinsky and others for community organisation. At a time when the community organiser’s project confronts the all pervading and game changing effect of globalisation. Information age communication methods must therefore address information age challenges by harnessing ICTs while acknowledging its limitations.

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THE GAME CHANGING EFFECT OF GLOBALISATION Having dealt with the ICTs and their limitations, in this section we discuss globalisation as a factor that calls for the updating of earlier political models to the information age. Globalisation and the concomitant ICT revolution has had a profound impact on the practice of contemporary politics due to the increased enmeshment of political and economic systems between nations. The contested concept of Globalisation will be defined here as the enmeshment of ‘economic, technological, cultural, social, and political forces and processes that collectively produced the characteristic conditions of contemporary life’ (Yeates 2001 p.629). We adopted this definition because it illustrates the need for a new order of political mobilisation as discussed below. While globalisation is not a new phenomenon its resurgence after the world wars and the great depression (Keohane and Nye 1998; Kozul-Wright and Rayment 2004) is a game changer to several aspects of both local politics and international relations. This has since been fuelled by the information revolution and in particular the mainstreaming of the internet after the 1980s. The hard shell impenetrability of the territorial state whose head was rex est in regno suo (emperor in his realm) and superiorem non recognoscens (who recognised no superior) is giving way to a new order (Herz 1957). This closer integration of societies and economies to achieve lower trade barriers, knowledge diffusion and improved capital flows (Dercon 2007), also alters the practice of local politics because of the dispersion of political actors whose interests and influence affect local politics. While it is evident that other countries are more globalised than others, it must be argued that political focus is changing under the pressure of globalisation. According to (Daalder and Lindsay 2003) American foreign policy will pivot on

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unrivalled power in global politics instead of the territorial space of the geopolitical era. This shows that power dynamics are no longer geographically localised, they are now globally spread. Arguing from Marxist pessimist stance Giroux (2005) posits that it has become more difficult to address not only the complex nature of social agency and the importance of democratic public spheres, but also the fact that active and critical political agents have to be formed, educated, and socialized into a new world of politics. This paradigm shift is in response to a new political system where forces affecting local socio-political climate are often situated beyond the reach of local agencies using traditional methods in the same old way. The newness of such a world has a profound impact on how local level politics will be conducted in the information age. We therefore concur with Shatkin (2004) that globalisation has brought new challenges and opportunities to activists at local level. As we argue elsewhere in this chapter, there will be a need to reconfigure and adapt the traditional models of political activism to achieve a broader reach. Under globalisation the place based political activism will have to be reconceptualised to space based political activism. The political space is a new unit of analysis and arena for political combat that demands our attention as the world gets interconnected. It therefore presents new challenges for both custodians of power and those that seek political change. We will however articulate these challenges from the stand point of marginalised communities fighting for power at local level as articulated by Alinsky (1971). This exposure of local communities to new vulnerabilities calls for a rethink of the entire preinformation age project of politics because what used to work will not necessarily continue to work as well it used to do. We therefore advocate for the use of adaptive techniques discussed below.

SAUL ALINSKY’S COMMUNITY ORGANISING MODEL In this section we introduce Alinsky’s community organising model, our case example for updating pre-information age political models to the information age. This is meant to prepare the reader to understand the process that follows below. We make no apologies for using examples from the social democratic family because these only actors in contemporary politics to adopt it. Barack Obama’s 2008 electoral victory has generated intellectual curiosity about the effectiveness of Alinsky’s community organising (Bretherton 2009; Delany 2009; Horowitz 2009; Ivereigh 2010). His ability to defeat America’s most formidable campaigners like the Republicans and the Clintons has been attributed to the community organising skills (Bretherton 2009; Horowitz 2009) which he developed during his time as a community organiser in Chicago. This inspired David Miliband to use the Alinsky model for his 2010 campaign which won the popular vote but narrowly lost the Labour party leadership to his brother Edward. The Alinsky model was originally developed for organising politically and economically marginalised groups into formidable broad based organisations that can influence local politics. Saul Alinsky’s (1971) project gives power to the people just as Nicolo Machiavelli’s project gives power to the principe (ruler). Like Machiavelli (1999), Alinsky (1971) was a political realist who viewed human actors as the ego driven ‘beasts that they are’ instead of the ‘saints they should be’. Their rejection of metaphysical teleology inspires a quest for practical reality (Femia 2009) which forced Alinsky (1971) to organise people around their self interest. Bretherton (2009) refers to Alinsky’s (1971) model as a ‘deliberately unprogrammatic, unideological and anti-theoretical’ (p. 2) method which favours the practice of politics over talk-

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ing about politics and action over theory. This pragmatic action orientation explains its success in comparison with the endless bickering associated with left wing ideologues that discuss erudite political issues that they rarely act on. A rich array of influences helped Alinsky to develop the community organising approach which now enjoys over sixty five broad based organisations or faith based organisations in Europe and the USA. After studying organised crime, criminologist Saul Alinsky appreciated the importance of group loyalty and people’s need for recognition. From organised labour, Alinsky also learnt the importance of public assemblies and of focusing people’s efforts around issues of mutual concern. Luke Bretherton also suggests that Alinsky’s Russian Jewish migrant community in Chicago gave him an appreciation of strong family and local community institutions dedicated to the welfare of their society (Ivereigh 2010). Alinsky (1971) then built this relational method of mobilising by exploiting people’s loyalty to their organisations, their interest in the welfare of their society as well as their need for recognition. Based on a realist philosophy, the model organises people in line with their self interest rather than benevolence. It uses 1-2-1s and house meetings for conducting listening campaigns. A 1-2-1 meeting is a face to face meeting for building rapport between an organiser or leader with anyone they wish to work with, and a house meeting is a consensus building meeting with people who had 1-2-1s with leaders and organisers. These methods help the organiser to identify people’s self interests and to building networks between citizens in order to organise them to act for common interest. The model also uses project evaluation for using each project success or failure for building confidence and for honing the route to future success. Through evaluation Alinsky‘s model is meant to tap into people’s ego and quest for recognition in accordance with his realist philosophy

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and lessons drawn from criminology. It also uses evaluation for the continuous refinement of his approaches in order to meet an elusive political environment just as this chapter seeks to reshape it for the information age. The Alinsky model draws its power from organising the social capital of divergent groups into broad based organisations with formidable political muscle for acting on issues of mutual interest wherever necessary. The collaboration of diverse groups for a common purpose is at the heart of Alinsky’s citizens organising model. Building broad based organisations is effective for developing strong and lasting political power that groups would not have been achieved without collaborating with others (Alinsky 1971). Through listening campaigns, it democratically ensures that action is centred on issues of mutual interest instead of top down dictates or narrow sectarian interests. Using the Alinsky model, citizens have organised themselves around matters as basic as garbage collection and crime to deeper issues of government policy (Ivereigh 2010). Citizens UK has dragged both mayoral and prime ministerial candidates from 3 main political parties to pledge support for living wage and affordable housing campaigns in front of mass rallies. Citizens have come together as broad based organisations consisting of religious groups, schools and unions to make a difference in their communities.

COMMUNITY ORGANISING IN A CHANGING WORLD According to Keohane and Nye (1998) the twentieth century saw a consistent claim by modernists that technology was going to change world politics. Herz (1957) argues that ‘advances in technology and scientific knowledge bring the possibility of economic, ideological and military penetration of states’ (Williams, Wright and Evans, 1993 p.203).

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While modernists referred to telecommunication (Illich, 1973) and jet travel as enablers of the impending information and travel revolution that would reshape world politics, they did not anticipate the all pervading impact of today’s ICTs. These changes in geopolitical outlook as well as the tools at our disposal have an impact on both practice and theory of politics. While modernists correctly predicted that the multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and global financial markets would become immensely more significant in the 1970s, the anticipated impact of globalisation and the information revolution did not move the community organisers of the day. In the 1970s Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) only saw the need to revise the Alinsky model in order to engage the social capital of faith groups more deeply (Warren 2001) and to redefine their horizon to include the middle class. This was achieved by drawing from Catholic Social Thought and Social gospel so as to encourage faith groups to fight for social justice (Warren and Wood 2001). There was no noticeable effort to comply with the information revolution and the concomitant impact of increased globalisation. Just as IAF saw a need in 1970s to revise Alinsky’s winning formula into its current internationally recognised state, there is a need to adapt it to the information age. This is because the cost reduction of communication and the increased computing capacity have augmented the interdependence of communities to an extent that drastically alters the community organiser’s focus and hence communication tools. The viability of such a project was demonstrated by Obama (Alinsky’s most famous disciple) who used it in a presidential campaign that was also applauded for use of ICTs for political campaigning and for recruiting and organising a massive army of volunteers (Horowitz 2009; Plouffe 2009). While Barak Obama’s campaign team kept their strategy highly secretive (Delany 2009), here we deconstruct the conceptual components

of adapting Alinsky’s (1971) model to information age political activism in order to demonstrate how any earlier model can be enriched by digitisation.

RELEVANCE OF USING ICTs FOR UPDATING EARLIER MODELS TO THE INFORMATION AGE The key aspects of ICTs that make them relevant for the project of updating traditional political models to the information age deserve attention here. Key to interaction beyond local area is ICTs’ ability to shrink distances between stakeholders. The dispersion of stakeholders in a globalised world calls for the use of ICTs for facilitating interaction between organisers, leaders and communities by enabling both synchronous and asynchronous communication of information. ICTs can also automate the processing of information with astonishing accuracy. They also have the capacity to store and sift volumes of data at very reasonable cost. A typical example is their use for segmentation of various customer segments whose needs are continuously evolving in a fluid business environment. We argue that while these strengths have already been applied to other disciplines they make ICTs relevant for updating traditional methods of political activism to meet information age challenges.

A FRAMEWORK FOR MIGRATING TRADITIONAL POLITICAL MODELS TO E-POLITICS Adapting a model from one discipline to another must should be justified by 1) a fit between the model and the phenomenon of interest, 2) an understanding of the model’s historical context and underlying assumptions, 3) a consideration of its impact on the choice of method (Truex et al, 2006). While the adaption of a political model to e-politics does not pass for transition from a dif-

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ferent discipline we draw from Truex et al (2006) because migrating a model from pre-information age scenario to the information age represents a significant paradigm shift. The transition from traditional political mobilisation may follow a disruptive (Lee 2001) or an evolutionary (Ross 2001) route to change. Here we present an evolutionary transition built on the strength of traditional approaches. By updating Alinsky’s model to the information age as discussed in this chapter we present a lesson for scholars and practitioners of politics on how to update other pre-information age models. In the following section we demonstrate how we conducted such a process: 1. Assessing fit between current state of the model and proposed phenomena of interest. We found that the traditional state of Alinsky model’s model is similar to what we wish to adapt it through our updating process. Since the adaption process does not entail any cross disciplinary transition, we suggest that the consistence of purpose of the model and its e-world version justifies the transition. There is however a transition from place based to space based application which remains viable because it does not constitute a misfit of proposed phenomena of interest. 2. An understanding of the model’s historical context and underlying assumptions. An appreciating of the historical context of the model helped to us identify why the legacy model is becoming irrelevant to the information age. This key step emphasised the necessity of updating Alinsky’s model to the information age. The model was meant to organise local actor to lobby local powers. The information age is characterised by evidence of growing regionalisation of bodies that make decisions affecting the local population. Consequently the size of the stakeholder base and the distance between them has increased. This rendered the face372

to-face approach too narrow and slow to cope with its evolved and now automated target because the centralisation of power renders pre-information age place based activism irrelevant to the information age and calls for action at national or regional level. 3. Assessing the impact of method chosen. Having chosen to automate the information and communication components of the model we assess the viability of doing so. Like most projects to do with interaction between stakeholders, any political model must have information, communication and knowledge components pertaining to interaction between human actors. The process of updating pre-information age approaches must also involve the automation of these components of the transactions of issues involved. We therefore attempted to finding out how information is generated, processed, communicated or stored in the traditional model and whether is could be done using ICTs. We also analysed the tools and strategies necessary for automating the information component so as to extend the model’s influence to a wider reach as discussed below.

ADAPTING THE TRADITIONAL SOLUTION TO THE INFORMATION AGE Updating a traditional solution to the information age is discussed here as harnessing the power of ICTs in order to automate traditional approaches to the e-world. This is done here by using ICTs for addressing the information and communication components of the political process as exemplified using the Alinsky model below. Such a project involves drawing lessons information systems discipline because of the key role of ICTs in automating social phenomena. For a more detailed understanding of theory in information systems, we refer the reader to Gregor (2006).

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ADAPTING ALINSKY MODEL TO INFORMATION AGE Before embarking on this modernisation exercise, we must acknowledge that the project of updating Alinsky’s (1971) model to the information is not at odds with its founder. According to Saul Alinsky, ‘an organiser is constantly creating the new out of the old’ (p.79) such an endeavour will be necessitated by both globalisation and the information revolution. We have already discussed the key components of Alinsky’s organising model as including the use of rapport building through face to face methods like 1-2-1s, issue identification through house meetings, mass rallies, organiser training and evaluation of actions. In the following paragraphs we discuss how cutting age ICTs can be used for enhancing these components in a way that updates these processes to the information age. We discuss how traditional components become e-one-to-ones, e-house meetings, e-rallies, e-evaluations and e-training sessions in the electronic version. Before doing so we must discuss Alinsky’s approach to communication given the central role of information and communication in the process of updating pre-information models to the e-world.

ALINSKY’S APPROACH TO COMMUNICATION According to Alinsky(1971) communication skill is the only attribute that an organiser cannot afford to lack if they hope to be successful. In his own words; ‘It does not mater what you know about anything, if you cannot communicate to your people’ (p. 81). He also suggests that in order to be understood, the organiser must communicate within the experience of his listener/s and he or she must use the Socratic method of guided questioning for teasing out their enthusiasm to act. This has serious implications on the tools

that an organiser can use for communication as well as the adaptability of Alinsky’s model to the information age. The organiser mainly uses 1-2-1s for in-depth communication within the person’s experience. One -to- ones are a key tool employed by community organisers for building rapport and for identifying the self interest of the people they want to organise. As the name implies, a 1-2-1 conversation is between two people i.e. the organiser and an individual, a leader or member of a group the organiser wishes to work with. This could take place in a venue neutral to both parties e.g. a public place (park or restaurant) or an office. For the sake of this chapter we will not get into the details of the discussion that should be done. We instead discuss the possibility of using ICTs for facilitating a 1-2-1 meeting in a way that employs the Socratic method and communicates within the listener’s experience as articulated by Alinsky (1971).

ELECTRONIC ONE-TOONES/ E-ONE-TO-ONES Social media has revolutionised interaction between people to ways that are just as interactive as face to face meetings in spite of the distance between them. Applications like skype and googleplus can allow people equipped with very cheap technologies to enjoy extremely high media richness (Illia & Lawson-Body 2007) for conducting 1-2-1s in cyberspace. High media richness allows people to read contextual issues like gestures and voice projection in addition to their verbatim content. There are many stories in mainstream media about how people in distant countries have developed long term relationships over ICT mediated platforms. Since such exchanges are similar to 1-2-1s we therefore argue that social media can be used for building rapport with distant activists in the process of organising people that

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share a common concern to organise and lobby a common centre of power. This can be done in political space rather than the geographical places that Alinsky originally intended. One-to-ones can also be conducted through internet chat rooms and text messages albeit with the limitations discussed earlier.

E-HOUSE MEETINGS One-to-ones usually lead to house meetings between the organiser and leaders and/or people who would have taken part in 1-2-1s and shown an interest in getting organised around problems of concern to them. This can be done in a public place of house belonging to one of the leaders or participants. During the house meeting the organiser and leaders aim to identify an issue to organise around. Just like the 1-2-1s describe above, there so many ICT enabled tools that can facilitate a house meeting in cyberspace. Technologies like skype can facilitate video conference calls with the highest level of media richness which is as good as a face to face meeting between participants who are located in different geographical locations. In addition to these there are other low media richness options like voice based conference calls and text based chat rooms that can facilitate house meetings in a similar fashion. In such cyberspace house meetings and 1-2-1s described above, the organiser can employ the Socratic method in pretty much the same way as they would do in face to face meetings.

E-RALLIES Alinsky leant the importance of rallies from labour unions. During such rallies the participants get motivated by the strength that they have in numbers that are organised to act together for a common interests. They are also used for demonstrating the power of the organised masses to

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targeted authorities like politicians that organisers wish to lobby. While these were mostly local issues in Alinsky’s days or regional issues during Industrial Areas Foundation’s regional broad based organisations, they will need to be global as the globalisation phenomena increases. The need to lobby, multi-national companies, regional political blocks and international NGOs will call for mass rallies attended by people in different regional and global spaces. The targeted officials i.e. multinational company directors or regional politicians will have to attend the rallies in their respective areas. Giant video screens in each convention would be used for showing the coordinated events via video link. This calls for the innovative use of ICTs like video conferencing to facilitate real time coordination of rallies in halls scattered across different parts of the globe. Multiparticipant video conferencing technologies are already being used by news channels for facilitating real time debates between people in different parts of the world. Such e-rallies can produce the effect that Alinsky leant from labour unions.

E-EVALUATIONS After any action i.e. a protest, lobby, training session or rally, organisers always evaluate the extent to which their objectives were met. Evaluation is a fundamental principle of professional organising (IAF manual, nd). Without it “organisation couldn’t last, leader couldn’t grow, organisers couldn’t mature unless their actions were digested and evaluated” (p.4). In other words evaluations allow organiser to use previous actions in order for them to horn their approaches to subsequent actions. While founders (like Ed Chambers) thought of evaluations as place and event based activities, a fuller use of ICTs would usher in a more in-depth form of evaluation. For instance Delany (2009) describes Obama’s incessant use of evaluation as key to his approach. In his own words:

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‘Measurability was so important to the Obamans that it actually influenced tactical choices: Rospars has mentioned that the campaign ran relatively few display ads (classic billboardstyle online advertising) compared with search/ contextual ads (Google Ads), concentrating their spending on what they could “measure and count” rather than on “amorphous” messaging goals. The point: what’s the use of doing something you can’t test? If you can’t test it, you don’t know how much good it’s doing you, and your money might be better spent elsewhere’ (Delany 2009 p15). We consider this to be a kind of evaluation whose usefulness will increase as deeper use of ICTs if adopted. For example where large volumes of data shall be captured thorough web sites and ‘rich-media’ format email with tracked click-through data used for tracking subscribers’ clicks on links. ICTs will be able to evaluate online activity that will enable the team to decide how to segment their email list and what information to target which segment of activists. Alinsky also used evaluation for gauging the impact of the action on the activists. This entails asking the participants to shout one word answers about how they feel about the day’s action. Answers to how they feel could be ‘Great!’, ‘stronger!’ or ‘enthusiastic’. Instead of having an organiser stand next to clip board asking ‘how do you feel?’ and writing every response with a marker, a message board can be used for displaying the answers as respondents shout them out. This could even be done by several groups evaluating the event from several locations by posting them to a central message board which is visible to all teams as proposed for e-rallies above.

E-TRAINING SESSIONS The central actor in community organising is the organiser. Since successful organising depends on the organiser’s skills, Alinsky’s successors (Ed Chambers, Richard Harmon and Peter Martinez)

introduced recurrent training of organisers and community leaders to the model (IAF manual, nd). Training was meant to equip organisers with core skills of community organising like 1-2-1s, negotiating, communicating and etc. We suggest that training can be facilitated by ICTs to learners in different parts of the world. There are lots of e-learning methods appropriate for use in training of activists in the information age. Many universities are using live and down loadable videos for training through their virtual learning platforms. These tools are handy for real time or asynchronous ICT enabled training of activists. Their use in the context of Obama 2008 campaign reflects the strength of adapting a traditional approach to an online platform. Obama’s innovative campaign used ICTs for training team members and volunteers that they organised. They used online video briefings for guiding volunteers and for teaching volunteers how to use the online campaign tools they created. For instance they use ICTs for guiding the use of array of buttons, badges and widgets for supporters to add to their face book and MySpace profile pages which effectively worked as communication hubs within each supporter‘s network of friends(Delany 2009). As team Obama demonstrated, community organisers could adopt e-training for reaching a wider audience than Alinsky’s legacy face to face approach.

BUILDING THE FUTURE ON FOUNDATIONS OF THE PAST A body of IS literature has articulated the danger of characterising lCTs as capable of causing social change on their own (Avgerou 2008/9). This has been referred to as technological determinism (Lawson 2004; Gabberty and Vambery 2007; Duesek 2007) i.e. a misreading of technology as the main component instead of the facilitator. Such an approach would put computer experts in charge of e-politics strategy instead of political strategists.

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The resultant pitfalls are obvious and they call for the building of information age political models on the foundation of pre-information age models. According to Delany (2009) anyone could have used the tools that team Obama used in 2008 yet no one used them as effectively. He therefore suggests that the issue is not the tool used but the model it automated. It has been argued that Obama’s innovative adaption of Alinsky’s (1971) community organising skills to the information age did the trick (Delany 2009; Horowitz 2009; Ivereigh 2010). We therefore argue that as politics endeavours to harness ICTs in the information age their project must automate solutions that used to work in the pre-information age. This chapter discussed the viability of such a project by demonstrating how a traditional political model could be adapted to the information age. Our central endeavour is to use ICTs (i.e. the primary tool that revolutionarises the information age) for extending the effectiveness of traditional political models. Alinsky’s place based and face to face model has limitations to do with the time it takes to reach a broader audience for politics in global platforms. We contend that models of politics in the information age can safely be built on the foundation of their pre-information age predecessors. In this adaptation we posit that success is built on the effectiveness of tried and test models not mere installation of new media. This may suggest that the information age is more of an evolution than a revolution since the same classic models have been automated to preserve their relevance in the information age. The revolution is arguably in the new political power structures while the pillars of the political concepts remain the same. New media allows traditional paper based petitions to have a global reach as e-petitions in order lobby globally situated multinational companies and regional bodies. Low cost air travel also allows people to move between nations in record time at a time when nations are interconnected by

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the power of ICTs. This has shifted international relations from a realist perspective to cooperation with global partners. Against such a background, we contend that social networking tools like facebook, twitter and flickr and skype are in a position to adapt classical political models to the information age by automating traditional strength to meet political challenges of the contemporary era. The choice of the ICTs will also depend on their ability to enhance earlier strengths of political models. For instance Skype can afford high media richness of nearly as effective an impact as face to face 1-2-1s. This gives the rapport building strengths of Alinsky’s 1-2-1s a fresh relevance for global collaboration. Unlike face to face I-2-1s, Skype based 1-2-1s have a greater reach which is almost boundless. By advocating the use of high richness technologies, we do not dismiss low richness media. In the absence of broad band internet connection or when organisers are interacting with people they know, low richness technologies like texts, chat rooms and emails can be useful. Where internet connections exist as we expect the information age to soon enable, distances will shrink and national boundaries will be more permeable across the global village. Alinsky’s model also makes critical use of public gatherings like house meetings and rallies. ICTs have the potential to facilitate the communication of such meetings as well as conducting some of them over the internet. Having denied technological determinism and suggested that e-politics models be built on the foundation of earlier ones, we acknowledge that in key circumstances some pre-information age models are still relevant for their original purposes. Just as traditional commerce runs parallel to e-commerce, we contend that e-politics can run parallel to traditional political models. While ICT enabled community organising is built on traditional face to face / place based approaches, it may have to be combined with its legacy models. Where

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proximity allows it, face to face methods will be ideal for community organising. If local leaders happen to be separated from their communities or if they have to organise communities in different nations, the methods suggested above apply.

DISCUSSION According to Karl Marx philosophers must not simply describe the world, it is important for them to attempt to change it. Rather than simply describe the nature of politics in the information age, this paper has endeavoured to guide political actors how to update their pre-information tools to cope with it. Politics in the information age confronts new challenges and opportunities in the wake of shifting power structure of politics and an increased flow of information. This departure from a vertical to a flatter power structure has serious implications on the game of political activism. It calls for a different approach to political activism and hence the updating of earlier models in order to harness information tools for political activism in an increasingly globalised environment. This paper has attempted to discuss how older models could be updated by describing how Alinsky’s (1971) community organisation model could be updated to the information age. Our approach to adapting this model is based on our understanding of information age political power structure, the features of the model itself and its redundancy in the wake of globalisation. Our solutions to the weaknesses of this model were mainly meant to address political changes in an increasingly globalised world. Literature has also identified ICTs as key enablers and catalysts of global networks and increased intermeshing of national polities (Friedman 2007). In comparison the success experienced in business, the task of analysing the effect of harnessing information technologies in reshaping political models in the information age is a challenge that should not be underestimated. This is due to the heterogeneity of political factors and the incom-

mensurability of political progress compared to the quantifiability of profits in e-business. Equally as difficult to predict are the implications of increased use of convivial tools like ICTs in politics. For instance, in the context of developing countries where the dawning of the information age is characterised by the advent of new divides and inequalities (Gorski 2005; Hamel 2009) as well as the aggravation of traditional ones, the practice of politics in the information age may mean the entrenchment of power in the hands of the already powerful defenders of the status quo. This view is immediately discounted by the evidence of successful use of ICTs for challenging authoritarian regimes through the so called face book (Lifvergren 2011) and twitter revolutions (Comninos 2011). Such a rebuttal could however be criticised for its perceived disregard for contextual issues that determined the success of political movements in different countries e.g. during the Arab Spring. It could also be seen as a mis-reading of revolutions like the Arab Spring as snap shots of in-country revolutions instead of longitudinal processes which are becoming increasingly difficult and are taking longer in successive countries than it was in preceding ones. It could also betray ignorance about the unpredictability of the e-world as a mine field of success and failure threats for its participants. According to Mohr (2000) the high-tech environment is characterised by market uncertainty, technology uncertainty and competitive volatility and their impact on planning process. This in our view is a sign of conviviality of ICTs because it shows how ICTs can empower any user to fill the environment with their influence (Illich, 1973). Against this we argue that the political actors’ skills and strategies mater as the political game becomes more cerebral in knowledge societies. Globalisation presents paradoxes and ironies that affect our future approach to political action. Chief among them being the alleged centralisation of the power of regional bodies and multinationals which removes decision makers from the reach of local activists ironically when the world is 377

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flattening and previously muffled voices can be heard through cyberspace. Mergers and acquisitions of multinational companies are being fuelled by quick transfer of hot money and increased interconnection across national boundaries. Hot money is the money that flows between financial markets of different countries in search for the highest short term interest. This is paradoxically happening at a time when ordinary citizens are equipped with convivial ICTs that enable them to acquire information (previously beyond their reach) and to disseminate them beyond national boundaries. Since changes in information flows have centralised as well as flattened the world (Friedman 2007), information tools must be used for updating pre-information age models to the information age. We however warn that the methods of doing so are neither easy nor obvious hence the need for a guide on how to do so. In our endeavour to update the Alinsky model we found it appropriate to enhance its information and communication components. This is because the same components have been used for networking the powers that the model was previously meant to lobby. It should therefore be used for updating pre-information age models for a new political space. Since what used to be the political place (geographical territory) is now a political space, we argue that place based political approaches like Alinsky’s (1971) need information tools to migrate them to the information age’s political space. We have already highlighted the demerits of the excessive use of text based communication like web pages, bloggs, tweets and SMS. While we argue that it presents a weaker communication pattern than face to face interaction, we argue that their reach tends to extend the impact of communication beyond original limits of preinformation age methods. We also argue that since the powers we need to lobby are equipped with the conviviality of ICTs, ICTs should be relevant for countering them.

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Since our main focus was on using ICTs to automate the information component of the traditional models, we have devised a three step process meant to deconstruct the pre-information age model in context of the problem it was meant to solve, identify its redundancy and addressing it by automating its information component. We must add a final step i.e. to conduct a stakeholder power analysis throughout the life span of the model. This final stage as Alinsky (1971) suggests is meant to continuously horn the model to suit its requirements. We acknowledge that this approach has short comings to do with its ability to communicate within the person’s experience. Communications within cyber space is criticised for annonymising the communicator. Since people are said to be more daring online than they are in real life, it becomes difficult to understand the person you are communicating with hence the challenge of communicating within their experience. Cyberspace activism is ideal for action that is done online e.g. online petitions have been highly successful in getting an international audience to lobby and pressure the powers that be. It is however becomes a bit difficult to get online activists to engage in some of the actions that Alinsky (1971) advocates. According to Plouffe (2009), a million names on the Obama online list by June 2007, only managed to generate 250 000 contributors and 10 000 of which took part in the “walk for change”. While these figures represented an unprecedented achievement at the time, they show the difference between cyber activism and practical leg work like the walk for change or door to door canvassing. It sadly suggests that a quarter will be willing to donate without leaving their homes while only 4% will be prepared to take practical action. This is in agreement with literature alleging that cyberspace activism requires no sacrifice from its participants (Gladwell, 2010). According to Alinsky (1971) it is the challenge at hand and the available options that determine the choice of the means to be employed in a revolution.

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Organisers are disadvantaged when they have less opportunity to employ practical action than they have for information based activity like online pressuring, lobbying and publishing. So while we celebrate online activism for its global reach, we decry the absence of a matching scale of practical activism like placard waving and picketing since most cyber-activists are not as active off-line. The positive thing about such a scenario is that net-wars are appropriate for action beyond national boundaries at a time when power is getting increasingly spread across national boundaries. It must however be noted that authoritarian states crumble as result of practical riots not online pressure. This suggests that since for some actions cyber-activism will need to be accompanied by practical protests we are warned against celebrating increased online activism against a reduction in the opportunity for practical activism. While ICTs have been used to coordinate practical actions against G8 and other international bodies there are few such examples where an international audience travelled beyond national boundaries to protest.

CONCLUSION We conclude that scholars of e-politics should not look too far to find appropriate models for politics in the information age. An appropriate starting point is to update pre-information age models by automating their information and knowledge components. The pros and cons of cyber-activism however call for analytical humility on the part of scholars of politics in the information age because they are as significant as the paradoxes of globalisation. In spite of these challenges the need to update traditional models to the information age cannot be underestimated. This is because of the apparent need to harness the power of ICTs in order to cope with the challenges of globalisation like the shrinking distances between networked partners. While we used Alinsky’s community organising for demonstrating this process, we

acknowledge that some models may be more difficult to adapt to this way than others due to the complexity of their information components. We have therefore identified the automation of the information, communication and knowledge components of political models as a potential route to updating traditional political models to cope with information age challenges like the loss of autonomy by local polity and the need to cope with regionalisation of power.

REFERENCES Alinsky, S. (1971). Rules for Radicals. New York: Random House. Avgerou, C. (2008). Information systems in developing countries: a critical research review. Journal of Information Technology, 23(3), 133–146. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jit.2000136 Avgerou, C. (2010). Discourses on ICT and development. Information Technologies and International, 6(3), 1–18. Barnett, H. G. (1953). Innovation: the basis of cultural change. New York: McGraw Hill. Bordia. (1997). Face-to-Face Versus ComputerMediated Communication: A Synthesis of the Experimental Literature. The Journal of Business Communication, 34(1), 99-120. Bretherton, L. (2009). The Origins of Organising: A Political and Intellectual Sketch. American Sociological Association. Comninos, A. (2011). Twitter revolutions and cyber crackdowns User-generated content and social networking in the Arab spring and beyond. Association for Progressive Communications. APC. Delany, C. (2009). Learning from Obama: Lessons for Online Communicators in 2009 and Beyond. Retrieved August 2, 2011 from www.epolitics.com

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Dercon, S. (2007). Globalization and Marginalization in Africa Poverty, Risk, and Vulnerability in Rural Ethiopia. UNU- WIDER, Research Paper No. 2007/73.

Illia, A., & Lawson-Body, A. (2007). ICT Use: The Influence of Cultural Dimensions on the Need for Media Richness and Technological Richness. Issues in Information Systems, 8(2), 171–179.

Dusek, V. (2007). Philosophy of Technology: An introduction. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Illich, I. (1973). Tools for Conviviality. New York: Harper Collins.

Femia, J. V. (2009). Machiavelli. In D. Boucher, & P. Kelly (Eds.), Political Thinkers. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Ivereigh, A. (2010). Faithful Citizens: A practical guide to Catholic social teaching and community organising. Darton, Longman and Todd.

Friedman, T. (2007). The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. Vancouver, Canada: Douglas & McIntyre.

Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. Jr. (1998). Power and Interdependence in the Information Age. Foreign Affairs, 77(5). doi:10.2307/20049052

Gabberty, J. W., & Vambery, R. G. (2007). Information and Communication Technology: A comparative view of technological determinism. The Journal of Applied Business Research, 23(3).

Kozul-Wright, R., & Rayment, P. (2004). Globalization Reloaded: An UNCTAD perspective UNCTAD Discussion Papers (January), no. 167. Retrieved from http://www.unctad.org/Templates/ Download.asp?docid

Giroux, H. A. (2005). The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of Cultural Politics. College Literature, 32(1), 1–19. doi:10.1353/ lit.2005.0006 Gladwell, M. (2010, October 4). Small Change. New Yorker (New York, N.Y.). Gorski, P. (2005). Education equity and the digital divide. AACE Journal, 13(1), 3–45. Hamel, J. Y. (2009). Information and Communication Technologies and Migration (Human Development Research Paper HDRP/2009/39). New York: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report Office. Herz, J. H. (1957). The rise and demise of the territorial state. World Politics, 9(4), 473–493. doi:10.2307/2009421 Horowitz, D. (2009). Barack Obama’s Rules for Revolution The Alinsky Model. David Horowitz Freedom Center. Retrieved May 15, 2012 from http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/articles/ rules%20for%20revolution%20(2).pdf

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Lawson, C. (2004). Technology, Technological determinism and the Transformational Model of the Technical activity. Retrieved May 15, 2012 from http://it.mesce.ac.in/downloads/CriticalPerspectives/Reading%20Material%20CPT-S7/ LawsonC.pdf Lee, C. S. (2001). An Analytical Framework for Evaluating e-Commerce Business Models and Strategies. Internet Research: Electronic Networking Applications and Policy, 11(4), 349–359. doi:10.1108/10662240110402803 Lifvergren, M. (2011). The Facebook Revolution: A Content Analysis on the British Mainstream Media Coverage of the Protests in Egypt. (MA Dissertation). University of Leicester, Leicester, UK. Machiavelli, N. (1999). The Prince. London: Penguin Books. Mayers, J. (2005). Stakeholder Power Analysis: Power tools series. International Institute for Environment and Development. Retrieved March 22, 2012 from http://www.policy-powertools.org/ Tools/Understanding/SPA.html

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McNamara, K. S. (2003). Information and Communication Technologies, Poverty and Development: Learning from Experience Information for Development Program. Paper presented at the infoDev Annual Symposium. Geneva, Switzerland. Retrieved June 10, 2010 from www.infodev.org Mohr, J. (2000). The marketing of hightechnology products and services. Journal of Marketing Education, 22(3), 246–260. doi:10.1177/0273475300223008 Plouffe, D. (2009). The Audacity to Win: How Obama won and how we can beat the party of Limbaugh, Beck and Palin. New York: Penguin Books. Ricoeur, P. (1981). Hermeneutics and the Human Science. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ross, J., Vitale, M., & Weill, P. (2001). From Place to Space: Migrating to Profitable Electronic Commerce Business Models (CISR WP No. 324). MIT Sloan School of Management. Schumpeter, J. (1971). The Fundamental Phenomenon of Economic Development. In P. Kilby (Ed.), Entrepreneurship and Economic Development. New York: The Free Press. Shatkin, G. (2004). Globalization and Local Leadership: Growth, Power and Politics in Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 28(1), 11–26. doi:10.1111/j.0309-1317.2004.00500.x Solo, A., & Bishop, J. (2011). The New Field of Network Politics. Retrieved May10, 2012 from http:// www.lidi.info.unlp.edu.ar/WorldComp2011Mirror/EEE5223.pdf Warren, M. R. (2001). Dry Bones Rattling: Community-Building to Revitalize American Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Warren, M. R., & Wood, R. L. (2001). Faith-Based Community Organizing: The State of the Field. Jericho, NY: Interfaith Funders. Williams, H., Wright, M., & Evans, T. (1993). International Relations and Political Theory. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Yeates, N. (2001). Globalisation and social policy. London: Sage.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Community Organising: A pluralist approach for bringing diverse communities to band together for fighting common problems, by mobilising them to reclaim their political power authorities that feed on their disunity. Evaluations: A fundamental method used in community organising for learning from a critique of each successful or unsuccessful action in order to horn skills and refine their approach to future actions. Globalisation: A new era characterised by an increased enmeshment of political and economic systems between nations also fuelled by information technologies. House Meetings: A small group meeting used by community organisers for identifying and prioritising the issues to organise around. ICTs: Information and communication technologies are electronic communication technologies increasingly being used for automating traditional methods into electronic methods, e.g. from mail to e-mail. Information Age: The current era where information exchange has assumed greater importance. One-to-One (1-2-1): A face to face meeting used by community organisers as a core method for understanding and building rapport with the people they want to organise.

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Chapter 23

The Internet, National Citizenship, and the “Sovereignty Paradox”:

Asylum-Seeking Migrants’ Political Agency and “Technologized” Citizenship Amadu Wurie Khan University of Edinburgh, UK

ABSTRACT This chapter explores the potential of the Internet for asylum seekers’/refugees’ political agency and for challenging the boundaries of national citizenship and state sovereignty. It considers that Western governments’ formulation of “restrictionist” and “assimilationist” citizenship policies and the conjoining “managerialist” approach to asylum are aimed at asserting state sovereignty and national citizenship. However, it is argued that attempts at the territorial construction of membership amounts to a “sovereignty paradox”: policies promote an international humanitarian norm of citizenship, which depends on state sovereignty for its realisation. Asylum-seeking migrants’ views and practices are therefore deployed to explore the counterproductivity of the UK government’s attempt to coerce would-be British citizens to have loyalty and allegiance to the nation-state. This UK case study provides empirical substantiation of asylum-seeking migrants’ political agency in the West, and the resilience of state sovereignty in affirming an international humanitarian norm of citizenship. It also contributes to an understanding of asylum-seeking migrants’ political agency through the Internet in holding political elites in the West accountable for their migration-citizenship policies. This perspective has been strikingly missing in the citizenship and international relations theories, particularly given the context that non-citizen asylumseeking migrants residing in liberal democracies are a major trigger for these policies. The chapter also attempts to deconstruct the relationship between transnationalism and globalisation: a project that continues to be problematic in the academy.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch023

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 The Internet, National Citizenship, and the “Sovereignty Paradox”

INTRODUCTION: THE RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY This chapter will explore the intersection of asylum-seeking migrants’ usage of the Internet, political agency, citizenship formations and state sovereignty. It will argue that Western governments’ formulation of policies to admit noncitizens into national citizenship and to assert state sovereignty amounts to a ‘sovereignty paradox’: policies promoted an international humanitarian norm of membership, which is beyond the territorial construction of the nation-state and that depended on state sovereignty for its realisation. Political agency means the capacities (behaviour and practices) that individuals have for political action and participation. Such actions are used by different groups in the nation-state to make claims and negotiate their viewpoints and aspirations within the democratic spaces and procedures that are available to them (Dahlgren, 2009). ‘State sovereignty’ is used here to mean “the assertion of final authority within a given territory” (Krasner, 1988, p. 8 quoted in Joppke, 1997, p. 23). ‘National citizenship’ is used here to refer to the ‘legal’ status of citizenship by which an individual is officially conferred membership of a nation-state. As a legal status, national citizenship is bestowed on individuals by virtue of birth or jus soli, descent and ethno-cultural identity or jus sanguinis and naturalisation especially due to residency or jus domicili (Sales, 2007; Castles & Davidson, 2000). The individual is expected by the state to automatically inherit a ‘social’ status and a formal nationality, by which they enjoy certain welfare rights and obligations in equal measure to all citizenry (Jenkins, 2006). Membership of the nation-state also comes with special privileges that are distinguishable from those of non-citizens even though membership is open to long-term residents (Odmalm, 2007, p. 21). There is an expectation that all members should have allegiance and loyalty to the nation-state and around “a particular set of

common practices and characteristics” (Dwyer, 2008, p. 167; Gustafson, 2002). For example, in the case of the UK, admission into national citizenship implies that the state expects individuals to automatically have allegiance to the UK. National citizenship in this sense is synonymous with British citizenship. National citizenship (henceforth referred to as citizenship) is a formal or official attribution by the state of what citizens are, what constitute membership to the national community and the rights to be accrued by such members. Membership is to the state as a political community and to the ‘nation’ as a cultural community in which all citizens should have the same rights and responsibilities or obligations (Gustafson, 2002). Citizenship as a legal status therefore assumes that the ‘nation’ and the ‘state, and the ‘political’ and the ‘cultural’ community’ are coterminous, an assumption that is precarious especially in relation to the multinational states of many western democracies such as the UK (see Keating, 2009). The Scottish devolved context is a reminder of this problematic where in the case of Scotland, as a country within the UK, the political and cultural community, the nation and the state are not coterminous. For many Scots, the national and cultural community is Scotland, while Britain is perceived as the political community and ‘legal’ (national) citizenship is British. Arguable therefore citizenship and sovereignty are interconnected in the sense that the acquisition of legal status of membership of the political and cultural community is the prerogative of state authority. As Joppke (1997) and Nickels (2007) argued, the nation-state is able to exert its authority or sovereignty by granting ‘legal’ membership of the nation-state to non-citizens. Both citizenship and sovereignty therefore construct a collective membership with the nation-state that is territorially (or nationally) defined. The sovereign state assumes that members of the nation-state should share a common national, cultural and political community. This conception of citizenship is therefore crucial to sovereignty because

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it is intended to evoke a sense of belonging to a national collectivity to which citizens should have allegiance (see Rudolph, 2005). Belonging in this sense refers to an individual’s sense of being part of, and demonstration of, loyalty or allegiance to the nation-state. Belonging is also about having a feeling of shared membership of the national collectivity and therefore a process of identification that is transience and that can be contested. For example, the British passport that Scots carry is a major symbol of citizenship, which denotes that the UK exerts sovereignty over devolved Scotland even though for some Scots the national community may be Scotland. In addition, citizenship and sovereignty are interconnected because membership or who is deemed to belong or not belong to the nation-state depends on legal rules that are restricted to and are protected by officialdom within state territorial borders (Hoxsey, 2011). By admitting individuals into ‘legal’ membership through granting them citizenship status, the state asserts its authority by extending access to rights, privileges, immunities and obligations to its citizens. At the same time, the state exerts control within its territorial borders by excluding non-citizens or ‘aliens’ from these entitlements. Recent legislation in the West including the UK that makes it possible for individuals to be stripped of citizenship (and by extension British nationality) and to be deported to their homelands highlights that exclusion from formal membership of the state is another locus for exercising sovereignty. Citizenship and sovereignty therefore have a functional status; that of the inclusion and exclusion of individuals within the nation-state. This is because being a citizen grants individuals the access to state rights, entitlements and immunities, while those not regarded as citizens are excluded through measures such as limited access to rights, welfare benefits and deportation. Territorial presence or residency and identification with the geographical borders of the nation-state are therefore crucial for the exercise of sovereignty by the state and

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the access to citizenship rights by individuals. An individual’s or group’s access to citizenship rights and the attendant participation in the democratic processes of the state is also crucial for political agency. This is because, as others have argued, an individual’s experiences of or capacity to exercise political agency provides them with a sense of being a citizen (or citizenship) and belonging to the nation-state (Dahlgren, 2009; Khan 2013). However, political agency does not necessarily depend on having rights and responsibilities or obligations of citizenship. The impetus for an individual’s or group’s particularly non-citizens’ political agency might be derived from the lack of such rights and obligations. Exclusion from citizenship might therefore act as an instigator for individuals’ participation in democratic processes of the nation-state that is the cornerstone of political agency. For instance, as I argued elsewhere, asylum seekers/refugees’ proactive social actions would suggest that exclusion from some citizenship rights in the UK would not preclude their ‘agentic’ practices in exercising responsibilities imposed on them by the host country (see Khan, a, b, c). We know that admission into citizenship and territorial presence might not necessarily lead to an individual or a group to have allegiance to a collective national community (see Khan, 2012a, b, c; 2013). An individual’s sense of belonging could be with any other community beyond the geographical borders of residence. Community can imply being part of a collectivity that could be linked with an ‘imagined’ place, locality, neighbourhood or social institution. It may also imply shared values, aspirations, networks and practices (Anthias 2009). We also know that citizenship is only a facet, among many others, of an individual’s self-perception of sense of belonging to the nation-state (Dahlgren 2009). It is therefore precarious to make having a sense of belonging and loyalty to the nation-state a prerequisite for acquiring British citizenship. Also precarious are state-centric conceptions of citizenship that grant individuals access to rights, obligations and

 The Internet, National Citizenship, and the “Sovereignty Paradox”

entitlements. For example, asylum seekers/refugees, as ‘transmigrants’, could make claims for the citizenship of their homelands as well as for the rights to state protection. Asylum seekers could also participate in transnational politics through online (Khan, 2012c). Transnational politics refers to an individual’s political engagements with their homeland so that allegiances, affiliations and a sense of belonging pertain to more than one nationstate (Bauback, 2008, p. 15; Morrell, 2008, p. 18; Khan, 2012). These multiple identifications and citizenship formations are at odds with the ‘assimilationist’ policies that are aimed at coercing migrants into internalising British cultural values and way of life in order to facilitate their sense of belonging and allegiance to the nation-state. Also probably inefficacious are attempts by the state to use the acquisition of citizenship as a symbolic act of asserting sovereignty. In this regard, the online practices of forced migrants confront the state’s attempt to influence their sense of belonging and loyalty to the UK that is the cornerstone of exerting sovereignty. The core argument in this chapter, therefore, is that asylum seekers/refugees’ practices and processes of citizenship amount to a ‘sovereignty paradox’. This is because inasmuch as policies might be facilitating a national citizenship order, meaning the internalising of British cultural values and sense of belonging and loyalty to the nationstate among would-be British citizens, they also trigger other forms of membership and identification that might not require territorial presence or constructed along geographical borders of the nation-state. Membership can be in relation to shared values, aspirations and networks. The ‘sovereignty paradox’ also constitutes asylum seekers/refugees’ reliance on state protection for realising these non-formal forms of citizenship and belonging as well as shared values and aspirations. The chapter will specifically generate insights into how forced migrants’ citizenship formations and sense of belonging are made possible through the Internet and underpinned by international humanitarian norms, which are beyond geographical

borders of residence. It will highlight that asylum seekers/refugees’ online activities suggest that migrants’ political agency and engagement might not be necessarily contingent on physical activity such as artistic productions and political protests (Jones, 2006, p. 365; Khan, 2012c, p. 121). It will also highlight that the online activities suggest that political agency is exercised by non-citizens through political participation within and beyond the territorial borders of the host state. These insights would contribute to the debate about what constitute political agency and its role in the capacity of Western states to exercise sovereignty in upholding international humanitarian law. The collective political agency by British citizens to hold the government accountable in exercising state power to control asylum-seeking migration had been accorded due prominence in the citizenship and international relations theorising. For example, Bickerton et al’s (2007) ‘Politics Without Sovereignty’ made an interesting critique of the social contract process by which governments constantly re-negotiate their authority to govern by formulating asylum-migration policies that reflect the views of citizens. This process is used by citizens to hold political elites’ accountability for their actions or failures. Anti-asylum policies, for instance, are part of state legitimisation by which political elites socially control citizens and show that they are in synch with citizens’ aspirations and beliefs on immigration (Nolan, 1998, p. 20). However, there is absence within Bickerton et al’s (2007) analysis and in the wider literature about asylum-seeking migrants’ political agency in holding political elites in the West accountable for their asylum-migration policies. The oversight is striking in two respects. In the first place, non-citizen asylum-seeking migrants residing in liberal democracies are the policies’ intended targets. Secondly, asylum seekers/refugees unlike other migrants and British citizens are the ones who are in desperate need of state protection and resettlement under international humanitarian law (Adamo, 2007). This chapter will therefore explore this missing link by considering 385

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how forced migrants’ political action is aimed at canvassing support for the recognition of their human rights to asylum and for them to be granted state protection. Such political agency normally entails mobilising support and resources through the Internet to pursue their interests in homelands (Barnett, 2003, p. 78; Vertovec, 2004; OstergaardNielson, 2002). This is significant in informing the debate about the role of state sovereignty in upholding a humanitarian norm of citizenship. Much needs to be learned about asylum seekers/ refugees’ political agency in the pursuit of human rights and claims for social, political and cultural recognition beyond the territorial borders of host countries in the West. This kind of political agency may be at variance with those of citizens of the host country. It may also contrast state-centric conceptions of citizenship as a formal status that grants access to rights, responsibilities and obligations that provide individuals with a sense of identification with the nation-state (see also Dahlgren, 2007; 2009). Yet, the ‘internationalisation’ of citizenship is made possible with the protection offered to them by the host state, which would render the politically ‘agentic’ practices as one of the loci of the ‘sovereignty paradox’. Having explained key concepts and the link between citizenship and sovereignty, the rest of the chapter is laid out as follows. The following section will explain why asylum-seeking migration is perceived as one of the most significant threats to the national citizenship order and sovereignty in the West. This would be followed by a brief description of the empirical context of the data used in this discussion. Following from this is an exploration of the role played by policies and media communication in asylum seekers/refugees’ online practices for exercising political agency. The chapter will then go on to explore why the impulse and pattern of usage of the Internet is constitutive of asylum seekers’ political agency at the transnational level and therefore a function of the ‘sovereignty paradox’. The chapter’s conclusion will discuss why claims for social, cultural and

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political recognition and human rights underpin interviewees’ self-constructions of citizenship and sovereignty.

WHY ASYLUM-SEEKING MIGRANTS AND ‘FORTRESS BRITAIN’? Asylum-seeking migration illustrates the problematic confronting liberal states in the West: the ability to uphold their moral commitment to offer protection for persecuted people whilst pursuing their national interest to assert sovereignty. The dilemma is compounded by the West’s ethical humanitarian foreign policy that “universalises the political subject” and extended a duty of care to those outside their sovereignty, rather than just to its citizens (Chandler, 2006, p. 69). Asylum-seeking migration has therefore become a politically vexed issue in the West and immune to ethical policy commitment (Chandler, 2006). This is because the ability of Western governments to assert control over access to their territorial borders has been continually challenged by increased numbers of individuals seeking asylum. A perceived asylum ‘invasion’ into the West has generated urgency across Western Europe for the conception of citizenship that restricts entry, welfare rights and prescribes ways of belonging and loyalty to the nation-state through citizenship and migration policies (Joppke, 1997; Kofman, 2005, p. 459). This is to assert sovereignty over the state’s territorial borders. It is also to placate public anxiety, mainly fuelled by media moral panics that the uncontrollable asylum ‘influx’ is a threat to the welfare system. Managing public unease is about socially controlling citizens, albeit in a subtle form, that is part of seeking political legitimacy to govern. Political legitimacy therefore subsists on political elites showing that they are in synch with citizens’ aspirations and beliefs on immigration (Nolan, 1998, p.20). In this way, political legitimacy becomes a cornerstone of exercising sovereignty.

 The Internet, National Citizenship, and the “Sovereignty Paradox”

In the UK, for instance, increased in-ward asylum-seeking migration, particularly from 1990 and up to mid-2000, was represented in media and political rhetoric as one of the main threats to the ruling elites’ political legitimacy to govern. To counter these perceptions and to assuage public anxiety, the then New Labour government formulated ‘restrictionist’ and ‘assimilationist’ asylumcitizenship policies that have earned the UK the label ‘Fortress Britain’ (Sales, 2007; Kofman, 2005; Schuster, 2003). By ‘restrictionist’, is meant the policies provide asylum seekers/refugees with limited access to welfare benefit, and ‘stratified’ civil, economic and social rights (Sales, 2007; Kofman, 2005; Schuster, 2003; Morris, 2002). Asylum seekers/refugees are required to perform the same responsibilities as British citizens while restricting their access to citizenship rights. By ‘assimilationist’, or what others referred to as ‘neoassimilationist’ is meant policies require would-be British citizens such as asylum seekers/refugees to internalise a belonging to, and identification with ‘imagined’ British cultural values as a sine qua non for becoming British citizens or to be admitted into membership of the political community (Gustafson, 2002, p. 464; Kofman, 2005; Sales, 2007, p. 183; McGhee, 2009; Tyler, 2010; Waite, 2012). These policies are constitutive of ‘othering’ in two respects: firstly, the creation of a binary of deserving British citizens and the un-deserving asylum seeker/refugee non-citizens. Secondly, the ‘othering’ has created a perception that being a British citizen encapsulates positive British values of patriotism and loyalty to the UK that all aspiring citizens should internalise. In this sense, the policies are also intended to communicate to the public that British cultural homogeneity and state sovereignty are not under threat (Dwyer, 2008). The UK, like many other Western democracies, therefore employs policymaking as a tool to pacify public concern about migrants’ loyalty to the UK and citizenship. An exploration of the intersection of asylumseeking migrants’ political agency, citizenship formations and sovereignty arises from the situ-

ation of asylum seekers/refugees; compelled to migrate, they reside in ‘Fortress Britain’, and under UK sovereignty to whose citizenship they aspire. Looking at citizenship and sovereignty empirically through the experiences of asylum-seeking migrants would therefore provide insights in two respects. Firstly, it will develop our understanding of the motivations and challenges faced by asylum seekers/refugees in exercising political agency and what makes attaining citizenship and identification with the nation-state or its ‘deterritorialisation’ possible (see Wahl-Jorgensen, 2006; Chadwick, 2006; Chadwick & May, 2003; Silverston & Georgiou, 2005). As products of forced migration, asylum seekers/refugees encompass spaces and networks across territorial borders and have multiple sense of belonging (Morrell, 2008). In addition, as already stated, they bore the brunt of policies that subjected them to marginalisation and structural inequalities (Khan, 2012a). Asylum seekers/refugees are often depicted in media and political rhetoric as a problem community that are incapable of internalising a feeling of belonging to the UK (Khan, 2012a, b; 2013; Cheong et al., 2007; Sales, 2007; Kofman, 2005). The antiasylum political rhetoric assigned passive roles to asylum seekers/refugees as being incapable of exercising ‘responsible’ social and political agency (see Leudar et al., 2008; Garcia, 2005, p. 7). Secondly, the rationale for this analysis is that there is a paucity of empirical evidence on how ethnic minorities, particularly forced migrants’ personal ‘lived’ experiences impact on the state’s authority to seek political legitimacy and to control and shape membership of the political community or the nation-state. As explained in the previous section, there has been too much focus on the role of citizens in the ability or lack of it by liberal democracies to undertake their international obligation to grant asylum. Much needs to be learned about the ways non-citizens’ online practices and behaviour equally impact on the state’s ability to honour its international commitment to grant asylum. It is therefore insightful to explore how asylum-seeking migrants’ views 387

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and usage of the Internet influence the exercise of state sovereignty. This UK case study will provide empirical substantiation of asylum-seeking migrants’ political agency in the West, and the resilience of state sovereignty in affirming an international humanitarian norm of citizenship.

THE STUDY The data used here is drawn from research conducted between 2007 and 2008, among asylum seekers/refugees residing in Glasgow and Edinburgh in Scotland, the UK. Parts have been selected on the basis that they are relevant to an exploration of the relationship between asylum seekers’ agency, Internet usage and citizenship formations. Data gathering was through in-depth, semi-structured, individual face-to-face interviews with 23 asylum-seeking migrants. The cohort consists of males and females, aged between 26 and 65 years. Eight interviewees, four males and four females, described themselves as Muslims. All were aware of the ‘citizenship classes, tests & oath’ policy, and were dispersed to Scotland. At time of fieldwork, three interviewees had been granted British citizenship; seven had legal residency status as either refugees or have Indefinite Leave to Remain status; and the rest were awaiting decision on their asylum applications. Ten were participating in either citizenship or language classes. Except for the Chilean who came in the early 1970’s, all sought asylum between 1997 and 2005. Glasgow is the only city in Scotland to agree to receive asylum seekers in 2000. By the time of fieldwork, the city hosted 3905 dispersed asylum seekers, currently host to the most dispersed asylum seekers of all cities in the UK (Home Office, 2007 in Rosenberg, 2008, p. 74; Sim & Bowes, 2007). All Glasgow-based interviewees settled in the city because of the dispersal programme. Interviewees in Edinburgh said they moved from other parts of the UK, including Glasgow, into the city either to join friends or relatives. 388

Sampling was by ‘snowballing’, ‘convenience’ and non-random. Interviewees were selected for ease of access and ability to speak English. I knew four interviewees through my participation in IKAZE, a theatre group run by asylum seeker/ refugees in Edinburgh. I knew one interviewee through membership of the Exiled Journalists Network (EJN), a UK wide organisation for exiled journalists. Given my social relationship with some interviewees, and being a refugee myself, a fact known to all interviewees, attempts were made to ensure that this did not impinge on their responses. Measures included adopting an open mind to interviewees’ responses and refraining from influencing such responses as much as I could (Kezar, 2005). I also ensured that my biases and views did not affect my ability to ‘objectively’ analyse the data. This is through ‘respondent validation’ and note taking of contextual information to crosscheck the accuracy of views and to inform my analysis (Creswell, 1998; Beresford & Evans, 1999; Arthur & Nazroo, 2003; Small & Uttal, 2005; Kezar, 2005). Interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity to facilitate participation (Powles, 2004).

ASYLUM AND ‘CITIZENSHIPSOVEREIGNTY’ CONUNDRUM This section in divided into two parts and will discuss the challenges posed by asylum-seeking migration to attempts by Western nations, including the UK, to restrict access to state protection of persecuted people. The first section will consider how the UK government and news media treatment of asylum seekers/refugees function as a ‘managerialist’ response to asylum-seeking migration. This section will further expand on the ways state sovereignty is exercised with the aim of deterring asylum seekers from entering the UK and at pacifying a hostile British public against uncontrollable asylum in the 1990s/2000s. The second section will consider how and why asylum-seeking migration continues to challenge

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the restrictions to grant them asylum and citizenship rights in the West. It will consider why asylum-seeking migration is an affirmation of, and a challenge to the territorial constructions of citizenship and how this amounts to a ‘sovereignty paradox’. This section is intended to foreground the rest of the discussion of the relationship between asylum seekers’ online politicking, the ‘de-territorial’ construction of citizenship and the ‘sovereignty paradox’.

‘Policy-Media’ Nexus in Boundary Marking Citizenship In the past decades (1990s and 2000s), the UK, like other liberal states in the West, has witnessed a recent upsurge in immigration and its attendant multiculturalism, a phenomenon that has been attributed to asylum-seeking migration. Right-wing political parties and the news media go as far as to blame the recent spate of ‘Islamic’ terrorist attacks on asylum seekers/refugees (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Kofman, 2005; Lister et al., 2007; Gustafson, 2002). This is also depicted as a threat to sovereignty. Consequently, internal pressure has been placed on the state to control access to its territory and British citizenship and to assert sovereignty (Gustafson, 2002; Lavenex, 2006). The UK is a signatory to international human rights conventions, which places it under an obligation to offer asylum to those fleeing persecution, mostly from the non-West. For example, the cohort of this study fled persecution from fourteen different states in the three continents of Africa, Asia and South America. Although forced to flee persecution, the study’s entire cohort made claims to their homeland citizenship on the basis of birth, residency, naturalisation and ancestral connections. Asylum-seeking migration, however, highlights the contradiction between the state’s international commitment to offer protection of the universal rights of persecuted people and the state’s author-

ity to pursue its national interest to foster shared membership of the nation-state, garner political legitimacy and to assert its sovereignty. This has been evident in the promulgation of immigration, citizenship and asylum policies in which the UK and other governments of the West tread a paradoxically fine line: upholding international humanitarian norms including universal human rights and the obligation to grant asylum whilst simultaneously restricting the use of these rights by asylum-seeking migrants. It is not surprising that recent policymaking is aimed at providing deterrence and preventing the so-called ‘abuse’ of the asylum system (Nickels, 2007, p. 43). It is a ‘managerialist’ approach that has led to a ‘draconian’ asylum-migration regime1, which makes it difficult for asylum seekers to enter into UK territory and has created an ‘inclusionexclusion’ nexus of rights for various categories of asylum-seeking migrants and British citizens (Sales, 2007; Dwyer, 2008). For example, asylum seekers/refugees share some rights and responsibilities with British citizens including entitlement to some social and economic benefits as well as having an obligation to pay taxes and obey the law (Safran, 1997; Cheong et al., 2007; Dwyer, 2008). These rights and responsibilities also vary among categories of asylum-seeking migrants. While both asylum seekers and refugees have a right to residency, among other entitlements, asylum seekers are only entitled to residency while their cases are being heard. They are also likely to face deportation if their application fails. In contrast to asylum seekers, refugees have the right of residence and, depending on their fulfilment of other criteria including the successful completion of ‘citizenship classes, test and oath’ and the demonstration of ‘good conduct’, they may obtain British citizenship over time (Dwyer, 2008, p. 30). It should be noted that the devolved governance in the UK has made it possible for asylum seekers/ refugees to have some rights (such as access to

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health, housing and education but not all benefits) that their counterparts in England do not have. Nonetheless, policies have been created as part of a strategy by the UK government to manage public anxiety over threat posed by migrants to British citizenship and loyalty to the UK. A striking example of such policies is the ‘citizenship classes, tests and oaths’ policy. This policy acts as a ‘rite of passage’ into membership of the nation-state or citizenship because the policy subjects would-be British citizens to a probationary period of residency. During this period, they are expected to demonstrate a sense of belonging; internalise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, and integrate or, as others would argue, assimilate, into British society (Lister et al., 2007; Kofman, 2005; Gustafson, 2002, p. 464; Castles & Davidson, 2000). Moreover, the successful completion of the classes is a prerequisite for acquiring British citizenship, which is perceived by critics as a ‘technocratic’ instrument of state sovereignty (Joppke, 1997, p. 23; Kofman, 2005; Lister et al., 2007)2. Although policies make provision for building migrants’ localised knowledge of the homeland nations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the mainstream cultural values are framed as ‘British’. For instance, Scotland-based migrants including this cohort who are aspiring to be British citizens are also expected to go through the citizenship classes, British cultural values and histories. Policymaking becomes a tool for nation-building and facilitator of allegiance and loyalty to the UK (see Kofman, 2005; Lentin & Titley, 2011). British citizenship is therefore a formalised status that juxtaposes citizens of the nation-state with non-citizens, and underscores that British citizenship should be earned by non-citizens. As already noted, deportation laws by which migrants could be stripped of their British citizenship and passport (and the attendant British nationality) before repatriated to their homelands is part of exercising sovereignty. Policies like ‘citizenship classes’ and ‘deportation’ therefore constitute the coercive assertion of state authority because these can control access 390

to British citizenship and UK territorial borders. Making citizenship classes compulsory and the forced removal or repatriation of those not deemed suitable for residing in the UK becomes an instrument for legitimising the social contract between the host state and migrants. As a social contract, migrants accept the conditions for residency and membership to the political community or risk deportation or statelessness. The grounding in the psyche of migrants the language, histories, values and traditions of the UK nation-state and the threat of expulsion from it is the process by which political elites seek legitimacy. Overall, these policies are tools for nation-building and asserting the authority of the state by demonstrating to the populace that (asylum-seeking) migration is under control and not a threat to a British collective national character, security and safety (see Kofman, 2005, p. 459; Joppke, 1997). By so doing, political elites hope to gain political legitimacy, which is crucial for sovereignty. Similarly, much of the UK media commentary on asylum functions, in many respects, as another form of citizenship boundary demarcation. In the first place, much of the news media treated asylum seekers/ refugees as the non-citizen ‘folk devils’ or aliens who threaten the safety, security and wellbeing of British citizens and are a burden on the UK’s welfare budget (Khan, 2012a, b; 2013). Asylum seekers/refugees are mainly depicted as a community that lacks allegiance or sense of belonging to the UK. Moreover, the dominant media representation has been that asylum seekers/ refugees pose a threat to successive UK governments’ political legitimacy to serve as custodian of public safety, state authority and individuals’ sense of belonging to the national citizenship order (Khan, 2012a, b). By so doing, parts of the news media become a forum for questioning the ability of the ruling class to foster a shared membership of and allegiance to the nation-state, and its political legitimacy to govern. Sections of the news media also become a space for promoting the conditionality of membership into the political community, by prescribing standards to determine who is or

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not deserving of British citizenship. It is in media spaces that anti-immigration segments articulate that the asylum ‘influx’ is motivated by economic considerations such as welfare benefits rather than by political persecution. Parts of the UK media have also called for the deportation of migrants deemed to be detrimental to the national interest or the nation-state. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of this study’s cohort felt that much of the UK media’s negative coverage of the asylum issue points to a collusion between media and political elites to regulate asylum-seeking migrants’ access to the UK and to coerce them to have a sense of belonging to the UK: So in addition to the political point of view of the government, they put certain legislation to restrict the number of people who come to this country. …And so they started with the media to talk about asylum seekers, they invented this failed asylum seeker. …They are preparing the public to have a negative view of these people and the government put on restriction to prepare the public…. you know these laws and regulation change all the time according to political wish of government [S] These perceptions would support observations elsewhere that the inequalities and marginalisation that asylum seekers/refugees suffer is perpetrated by the state and other powerful institutions such as the news media (see Gillespie, 2007, p. 282; Buchanan & Grillo, 2003; Stewart & Mulvey, 2010). It is this exclusion from citizenship rights that provides the impulse for asylum seekers’ reliance on the Internet to exercise a ‘voice’ and claims for rights to multiple forms of state membership (citizenship) and humanitarian aspirations (see Khan, 2008; 2012c; Gillespie, 2007; Siapera, 2005; 2004). The following section will explore why seeking asylum constitute a challenge to liberal democracies’ ability to assert its sovereignty to regulate access to its territorial borders and citizenship. It will contribute to our understanding of asylumseeking migrants’ political agency in holding

political elites in the West accountable for their asylum-migration policies (see Bickerton et al., 2007).

Agency as ‘Exit’ and ‘Voice’ of Stateless Citizens Asylum seekers/refugees are victims of social and political injustices of their homelands, mainly in the non-West. In the case of failed states, the persecution could be perpetrated by other oppressive institutions or members of the political community from which the state was either unable to protect the individual or refused to do so (Tickner, 1995; Chandler, 2006; Bickerton et al., 2007). Asylum seekers/refugees therefore sought safety in the UK, a process that is constitutive of political agency in claims making to human rights at the national and transnational levels. Interviewees’ choice of the UK as a site for asylum was based on moral and rational logic. The moral logic was that the West, including the UK, had been complicit in the internal politics of interviewees’ homelands. Most (10) of those interviewed blamed the West for the social and economic disenfranchisement in their homelands which led to civil wars. In addition, all interviewees accused the West of failure to protect them from repressive regimes or to mediate a peaceful resolution to the armed conflicts (Cash, 1995). Although asylum is not a legal obligation under The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and therefore not prioritised over state sovereignty, interviewees perceived the UK as morally obligated to grant them asylum (Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000; Chandler 2006, p. 55), as one interviewee from Chile explained: In fact these countries, so called developed countries promote the problem. Like the British are responsible for the arms trading and promoting wars, like the Americans do. So they see this human disaster and they don’t want to take responsibility for it. [C]

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By seeking asylum, this interviewee therefore displayed knowledge of the UK’s moral responsibility, as a member of the international humanitarian community, to provide them safety, albeit derived from international law (see Chandler, 2006). An Algerian interviewee said she chose the UK as destination because she saw herself as “a citizen of the world…as a citizen of every country….” [M]. Seeking asylum would therefore suggest a ‘sovereignty paradox’ because individuals exit the sovereignty of their homelands to submit to an international humanitarian order. However, they depended on the sovereignty of another state to exercise their human rights to seek asylum. Granting asylum implied that the UK exercised its sovereignty to uphold its international responsibilities to protect victims of political repression (Jopkke, 1997). Being a citizen in this respect was conceptualised by some forced migrants as belonging to and identifying with membership of an international system. It could be equally argued that the UK was also upholding an international humanitarian norm of citizenship. Paradoxically, like many other liberal democracies, the UK might renege in or withdraw from this international obligation to suit its political exigency as an exercise of sovereignty. This would explain why the restrictive citizenship and asylum policies have been widely characterised as an attempt by successive UK governments to manage public anxiety over perceptions that an asylum ‘influx’ posed a threat to public safety and security because migrants lack loyalty to the UK. There is another plausible interpretation of asylum seekers’ ‘exit’ from the ‘persecutory’ sovereignty of their homelands to seek asylum in the West. It suggests ‘autonomous agency’ in seeking cross-border state solidarity with British citizens. ‘Autonomous agency’ refers to social processes by which asylum seekers, as victims of political persecution, take actions to shape their lives through considered choices that were consistent with their own beliefs and values (Mackenzie et al., 2007, p. 302). The actions are crucial for political agency because the ‘exit’ or

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escape from state persecution amounts to challenging the repressive regimes of homeland and its democratic deficit. A significant factor in choosing the UK was also underpinned by rational logic. This was a widespread perception among the cohort that the West is capable of providing them safety or protection from reprisals by ‘agents’ of repressive homeland regimes. Many said it had been impossible to be guaranteed protection or safety in neighbouring countries of the region where they could be easy targets for reprisal by ‘undercover lackeys’ of their homeland governments. There was also a belief that governments of neighbouring countries were inclined to prevent them from using their territories to engage in any actions that might be perceived to be subversive to the government of their homelands. Many felt that that they could be deported to homeland or likely to be further repressed by the government of neighbouring countries hosting them. Interviewees attributed the neighbouring state’s hostility to bi-lateral agreements between both countries that sanction against the non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs. Another rational reason for choosing the UK was the perception that it provides an ideo-political and cultural connectedness for them as a Zimbabwean explained: …I have been in Zimbabwe, born and bred there, and colonised by the British, I speak fluent English. [N] Interviewees’ ideo-political affinity with the UK was understandably attributed to colonial ties. However, British ideo-political liberal values largely played a part in many interviewees including Muslims’ choice of Britain. For example, all eight Muslim interviewees cited the UK’s multiculturalism and its liberal values as reason for seeking asylum in the UK, which they said provided them with the freedom to continue to practice Islam. Fleeing was therefore symbolic

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of asylum seekers/refugees’ escape to another sovereign state that would provide them with the freedom to pursue their ideo-political, democratic and cultural beliefs. It is worth noting that whilst many interviewees said they exercised autonomy to flee and choose the country for political asylum, there were others who ended up in the UK not by choice, but by chance. In this case escape for many was ‘immediate’ rather than ‘anticipatory’ (Kunz, 1981). What conclusions can we draw from this form of political agency through ‘flight’ to seek asylum in the West that will shed insights on the intersection of asylum-seeking migration and the ‘sovereignty paradox’? Firstly, it highlights that challenge to state sovereignty might not always be exercised only by armed insurrection of disenfranchised citizens, but also by citizens’ ‘exit’ to escape state repression (Moses, 2005; Bickerton et al., 2007, p. 5 citing Held, 2003). Whilst armed insurrection has been regarded as a physical challenge to the persecutory power of sovereignty and the political legitimacy to govern, the use of ‘exit’ to seek asylum constitutes similar action. By using ‘exit’, oppressed citizens demand from their government political action: either a positive response to their claims or risk political legitimacy (Moses, 2005). Secondly, ‘exit’ as a form of political agency suggests asylum seekers/refugees make claims for human rights and international solidarity. This, in turn, implies that asylum-seeking migrants’ loyalties and political agency cannot be restricted to territorial borders (Jopkke, 1997). It highlights that although migrants may carry their homeland citizenship and fled its sovereignty, they will submit to and depend on the host state sovereignty to realise their human rights to safety and protection. ‘Exit’ and recognition of humanitarian norm of citizenship, however, should not be misconstrued by critics of state sovereignty to imply the reduction of state sovereignty. On the contrary, it implies that asylum seekers, as victims of state persecution and who international law should aim at protecting, depend

on the UK as host country for such protection and in exercising their claims to humanitarian rights of citizenship. They also depend on sovereignty to grant them membership of a nation-state that they perceived to be safe. The process of interviewees, as involuntary migrants, fleeing the persecutory regime of state sovereignty (of their homelands) and seeking a safe sanctuary in the sovereignty of another state continues to pose a challenge to the territorial borders of states. It is therefore logical and rational for the UK to respond to this situation in ways that are aimed at curbing immigration and assuaging public fears and media-induced trepidation. This is partly responsible for the formulation of ‘restrictive’ and ‘assimilationist’ asylum-citizenship policies, which are a manifestation of the coercive assertion of state authority on non-citizens. This is in two respects: imposition of a prescribed form of belonging to the UK and controlling access to citizenship rights to placate public anxiety and media moral panics on asylum. Upon arrival in the UK, all interviewees felt disappointed with their mistreatment or what they often referred to as “continued persecution” [B] by a ‘draconian’ asylum regime. Given their political orientation that led to their persecution, it is not surprising that asylum seekers/refugees would deploy the Internet to challenge the UK state’s attempt at denying them the rights under humanitarian norm of citizenship. The next section will discuss how asylum seeker/refugees use the Internet to hold the host state to account for their international obligation.

THE INTERNET AND THE ‘SOVEREIGNTY PARADOX’ This section has two parts. The first will present asylum seekers/refugees’ impulse for and pattern of usage of the Internet. This is followed by making the case that asylum seekers’ engagement with the Internet is constitutive of political agency

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(Robin et al., 2008). Such online usage is integral to political participation and claims making for a right to freedom of expression or to exercise a “voice’. The second will further highlights that political mobilisation via online continues to be the modus operandi of asylum seekers/refugees’ political agency. It will draw attention to how transnational networking and politicking is a function of the ‘sovereignty paradox’.

Reasons for Using the Internet The use of the Internet for political participation was widespread among the cohort. Many reasons may be adduced to explain this occurrence: financial expediency; language accessibility; opportunities for interactive communication and for expressing their viewpoints or ‘voice’ (see Khan, 2012c for further insights on asylum seekers mediated politics). The sites include those owned by individuals or by refugee-supporting and Diaspora networks. Diaspora network refers to websites or email networks that are managed by and for migrants from the same ethnic and national background. There was a general perception that the Internet is free or cheaper, and therefore easy for asylum seekers/refugees to access than TV and newspapers. Many said they had free access to Internet at schools, libraries and public centres where they “can access all the newspapers from the Internet without having to buy them” [M]. Others said: “it is quick, it is fast”; “it is easier”; and that “it allows anybody, anywhere, anytime to put their views” across [A2, J, L]. The Internet therefore made it possible for interviewees to access and to communicate at a cheaper rate or at no cost within the UK and beyond. Given the limited financial support and their preclusion from paid employment especially for asylum seekers, the popularity of the Internet is understandable. This would also explain why free newspapers such as the Metro were also widely read by interviewees. Free access of the Internet and the Metro was obviously preferable to purchasing newspapers

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or TV channels, especially satellite broadcasts. Financial exigency was therefore crucial to interviewees’ ability to access and communicate information via online. Another reason for interviewees’ preference for the Internet was that they used it to access news in detail in both English and other languages associated with homelands that they could more easily understand. 22 out of 23 interviewees said once they learned of a news item in English that was of interest to them, they would explore it further in the language they are proficient3 in, on Internet sites and TV as one interviewee explained: “If I saw [news] on the radio or TV then I can go to the internet in Arabic, in Amharic, in Tigrean to learn more about it because reading it in Arabic is better for me” [T]. Another said they started to use the Internet because other media types “hardly bring us any news about Somalia once the Americans have left the country” [J]. The Internet was also used to access diverse information or news on current and topical issues including asylum. One said: “I use it to read documents from the Home Office, to read new rules and regulations to do with new migrants in my situation” [L]; whilst another said: “you get a lot of information in terms of different press briefing on different subject areas”. Interviewees’ comments suggest that the Internet is more disposed than the TV, radio or newspapers to help asylum seekers/ refugees learn about policies and interventions relating to asylum or citizenship. A third reason for the Internet’s popularity was attributed to its interactive possibilities through its email service. 20 out of 23 interviewees used the email to communicate, share information and network with others in their homelands or across the world. Many communicated with other asylum seekers/refugees around the world through the Internet “to find, and reconnect with others by letting each other know where people are and pass on information about other things” [L]; whilst others used it to “share information with others and find out about what is going on

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in [his] country” [A]. Communication and information sharing with friends, families and other social networks also occurred within the UK. In addition, many used the Internet as a medium for providing an alternative view of their experiences of seeking asylum in the UK. One interviewee, who got refugee status almost 30 years ago, said using the internet in this way was important to them because “[asylum seekers and refugees] as a people think, with sentiment, with a point of view” [C]. He added: The computer has given me the opportunity to write and express myself and communicate with others in South America and the world over. [C]. There was another use of the Internet, even though it was used by a minority of interviewees that is significant to political agency: to exercise a ‘voice’ and contest the negative representation of the asylum issue in the British press. Interviewees said that sites owned by UK newspapers would not publish their opinions. In contrast, their views had been published in sites that were owned either by individuals including themselves or by refugeesupporting media sites or those owned by media outside the UK. For example, one interviewee was a refugee journalist and a contributor to the Exiled Journalists Network (EJN)4. This person said that attempts to contribute their views on the asylum issue to UK media sites including TV and newspapers had been futile. Another interviewee owned a website, known as FABULA, that was aimed at promoting the “cultures and art and viewpoints” of South American asylum-seeking migrants, particularly those from Chile. The Internet therefore provides more possibilities for democratic participation for marginalised migrants such as asylum seekers/refugees than any other news media form. In addition, through the Internet-facilitated sharing of information and communication with others around the world including their homelands, asylum seekers/refugees participated in transnational political activities.

These two websites (the EJN and FABULA) will be used as case studies to shed insights on the relationship between the Internet and the ‘sovereignty paradox’. Before then a discussion of why deploying the Internet to access news and information published as newspapers and policy documents is constitutive of political agency.

The Internet, Political Agency and Citizenship Formations Interviewees unanimously said the ability to access and participate in media sites was one of the limited political rights of citizenship that they equally shared with British citizens. In addition to the Internet, TV, radio and newspapers (aka ‘traditional’ media) were all claimed to be sites for accessing information, albeit with variations of significance. For example, all interviewees said their engagement with TV, radio and newspapers hardly contributed to their learning or understanding of policies relating to their rights, responsibilities and entitlements as residents or citizens of the UK. This is not to say that ‘traditional’ media did not contribute to interviewees’ ability to access information or learn about asylum policies or citizenship roles. Indeed, interviewees cited The Guardian, the BBC, and Channel 4 as “likely to report the facts [about] what the government is planning to do, and make them [aware] of the issues being discussed or talked about” [Y]. One interpretation may be that interviewees were not aware that they sub-consciously learned about citizenship roles and policies by reading newspapers and watching or listening to the radio and TV. This may be attributable to interviewees’ perceptions that media coverage was mainly anti-asylum that focussed less on reporting the details and much time on denigrating policies related to asylum seekers/refugees. It was only when interviewees were reminded during the discussions that they had mentioned that asylum and citizenship policies had been reported in the media, albeit it mainly negatively, that some conceded to media contributing

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to their learning about citizenship issues. However, the general perception was that the Internet was more instrumental in interviewees’ accessing of “the details of [policies] issues [relating to citizenship]” and thereby contributing to their understanding of these issues. For example, many said they learned about the ‘legacy case review’ and ‘voluntary repatriation’ policies of the UK government from the Internet5. The general view was that the press and TV was mainly focussed on criticising the government for introducing these policies on the basis that asylum seekers/ refugees would benefit from them. Interviewees said they had to depend on the Internet to learn about the details of the policies, particularly their purpose and those asylum seekers/refugees that would benefit from it. In addition, many interviewees said they read newspapers that they perceived as anti-asylum in their quest to get news from diverse sources and perspectives. They said this would help them to analyse or compare the objectivity and accuracy of the news as these excerpts explained: At time I buy the Daily Mail because I like to have a balanced view of the news …though their coverage of asylum seekers is very, very negative. [A3]. [I use the Internet] to look for news on the same headlines and do comparison. It’s funny – the way the news is portrayed. If you are talking about the Middle East, the French views are different from the British and Americans. [P] Interviewees’ comments can be unpicked to explain why the use of the Internet was popular. Interviewees found it to be user-friendly in sourcing and comparing news stories and information. The comments also imply that interviewees used their multilingual skills to source out news and information from not only the Internet, but also satellite TV. In this sense, the multilingual skills that interviewees have could be deployed to access and compare news reporting of political

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issues in the UK and homelands. This pattern of media engagement is consistent with findings elsewhere that individuals’ would select the news media that they found relevant to their everyday needs, particularly to enable them to function properly in the polity (Jones, 2006; Rosie et al., 2006). The Internet was therefore popular because interviewees used it to get information that was pertinent to asylum seekers/refugees’ needs for daily survival and wellbeing in the host country, particularly about current policies published by the Home Office. As already mentioned, the general view was that the frequency and fluidity of policymaking around asylum made the Internet even more significant in enabling asylum seekers/refugees to keep abreast of policy changes. Choice of media sites were therefore based on practicalities of accessing information and news about the communities they live in and beyond the territorial borders of the UK including their homelands. Drawing news from diverse media sources enabled interviewees to delineate accuracy from biased coverage. What conclusions can be drawn from interviewees’ online behaviour and practices to enable us gain insights into forced migrants’ political agency? Firstly, it suggests an analytical disposition to news consumption because asylum seekers/refugees used the Internet to source out and compare various media material to ascertain the accuracy of stories (Jensen & Jankowski, 1991, p. 101). Jones argued that this analytical engagement with diverse medial material is constitutive of political action (Jones, 2006, p. 378). Through this pattern of engagement with media texts, asylum seekers/refugees participated in a citizenship learning activity about the political and social conditions, which would impinge on their political activism in the host country and their homelands (Pajnik, 2005). Secondly, such knowledge was shared with others within the asylum-seeking community and therefore could help other asylum seekers/refugees to learn about policies and service provision that would impact

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on their lives and wellbeing. The Internet therefore could provide the facilitative base for migrant participation in democratic processes and in the life and activities of their community including service provision, albeit in a minimal way, in both the host country and homelands. Thirdly, this form of participation and capacity to be included in service provision and democratic processes is constitutive of political agency. As they consumed media stories from a variety of news sources, most interviewees were able to make an analytical judgement of the news coverage. It enabled them to be pragmatic analytical consumers of media materials, a practice that is germane to political agency. By so doing, the internet provides asylum seekers/refugees with a sense of being a citizen (or citizenship) or belonging to their homeland nation-states (see Dahlgren, 2009).

‘TECHNOLOGIZED’ CITIZENSHIP VS. SOVEREIGNTY This section will specifically focus on how the Internet is deployed by interviewees as a technological tool for political mobilisation and engagement with other asylum seekers/refugees and interlocutors in national and transnational polities including the UK and homeland. As already explained, asylum seekers/refugees deployed the Internet for communication with social and political networks at the local and international levels. It was also used to access information and policies, particularly UK government policy relating to asylum. Most of the interviewees’ political interaction and sharing of information was with others in their homelands or with whom they shared an ethno-cultural connection. They also used the Internet to contest negative representations of asylum seekers/refugees in parts of the UK media and for human rights activism within and beyond the geographical borders of the UK. Many interviewees’ membership, ownership and participation in Internet-based networks could

therefore be described as ‘technologized’ citizenship (see Jones, 2006; Nolan, 2006; Pajnik, 2005). This is a form of participation in political and democratic processes of the UK and other countries across the world through the Internet. For example, the interviewee member of EJN said that it was founded by asylum seeker/refugee journalists residing in the UK to respond to their exclusion from the mainstream UK media. It was also aimed at providing “a voice” to counter negative coverage of asylum seekers/refugees in parts of the UK media. In addition, the sites functioned as avenues for advocating for the recognition of the right to seek asylum. They were also for challenging and raising awareness of the repression of free speech and other human rights abuses perpetrated by states against their citizens around the world. This person and many others among the cohort felt that the state repression was mainly responsible for generating asylum-seeking migration in the first place (see Rudolph, 2005). Interviewee said their actions generated support among British citizens including getting them to participate in canvassing support among some parliamentarians to stand up against repression by state regimes in other parts of the world. The other interviewee who was a member of FABULA said the site was designed to contest misrepresentations and minimal representations of Latin-American cultures in the UK media and cultural spheres. Like the EJN site, FABULA tried to mobilise support beyond Latin American Diaspora communities by targeting British citizens in the UK and others around the world. These websites therefore become self-organising technological instruments and virtual spaces for political and cultural mobilisation, contestations and participation at cross-border levels (Lister et al., 2007; Siapera, 2004; 2005; Gillespie, 2007; Khan, 2012c). In this sense, asylum-seeking migrants perceive the nation-state as a community of solidarity for persecuted individuals and a facilitator of rights and responsibilities at the international humanitarian level (Murphy &

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Harty 2003, p. 187; Jopkke, 1997). It suggests that asylum-seeking migrants are politically savvy in understanding that political elites are more likely to respond to the agency of electorate than to those of non-citizens. Interviewees therefore felt that public support for asylum seekers would be crucial in influencing the UK government’s continued support for asylum seekers/refugees’ right to international protection and the formulation of asylum friendly policies (Bickerton et al., 2007). By so doing, asylum seekers/refugees deployed the language and instrumentality of international relations to legitimise state sovereignty as a viable political system in their demands for human rights and international solidarity (Jopkke, 1997). The above case studies of forced migrants’ ‘technologized’ citizenship and political agency is instructive in deconstructing the relationship between transnationalism and globalisation or may even compound the distinction between the two: a project that continues to be problematic. Transnationalism theory restricts the concept to the ethnic and cultural characteristics of participants across nation-state borders, whilst globalisation is conceptualised as transcending ethno-cultural and national boundaries and has an economistic bent (Morrell, 2008)6. As the EJN example would suggest, migrants’ transnational links might not necessarily be contingent upon sharing any national or ethno-cultural links. Neither were their activities restricted to their homelands, but spanned a global space of transnational networks. Equally, although FABULA mainly focused on Latin-American cultures, interlocutors and actors were from different homelands and resided in countries within and outside Latin America. All that EJN and FABULA interlocutors had in common was shared aspirations as journalists, artists, human rights and political activists who had suffered political persecution and subscribed to a universal human rights norm. In this sense transnationalism and globalisation tend to converge: political actors are usually driven by values based on a ‘shared experience’ that would engender

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an emotional connectedness and identification with others outside their ‘homelands’, and not necessarily with citizens with whom they share an ethno-cultural or national affinity, as has been argued elsewhere (Morrell 2008). What then could we conclude from migrant’s Internet activities about the relationship between political agency, citizenship and sovereignty? Firstly, the different ethnicities and nationalities of network members were irrelevant to interviewees’ ability to self-organise and mobilised towards cultural, political and social recognition that were denied to them and others around the world. What was germane to their political agency was a desire to challenge exclusion from citizenship rights that subjected them to injustice and social and political disenfranchisement that they and others within the geographical borders of the nation-state (the UK and elsewhere) suffered. The online networking was also to promote a human rights agenda. Political agency was therefore driven by a sense of shared aspirations and values that transcends national borders. Secondly, this begs the question, should ‘formal’ or national citizenship and sovereignty matter anymore in providing asylumseeking migrants with safety from state persecution? For forced migrants, state sovereignty matter. This is because it is through sovereignty that their safety and protection from deportation could be guaranteed. It is through state authority that their statelessness could be averted, and by which an international humanitarian norm of citizenship and ethical foreign policy agenda could be achieved. Thirdly, this amounts to a ‘sovereignty paradox’: whilst these activities suggest an affirmation of an international humanitarian norm of citizenships, they might be analysable as support for, or an expression of, an individual’s allegiance and sense of belonging to or membership of the nation-state. Membership is either by residency or being granted citizenship that would accord them the protection or safety that would enable them to participate in political, cultural and democratic processes of their homelands and the international realm (Bickerton

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et al., 2007). In addition, the Internet activities suggest that, paradoxically, forced migrants as social and political actors would depend on one state’s sovereignty (in this case the UK) to provide the requisite infrastructure (the Internet, security and human capital), for political participation in humanitarian activities across national borders (Camilleri, 1995). Through these activities, migrants displayed emotional connectedness and identification with multiple national territories. Sovereignty could therefore play a part in an individual’s identification with and sense of belonging to an international humanitarian system rather than restricted to the nation-state hosting them or their homelands. Politics could operate across multiple state territories and involve multiple state sovereignties (Tickner 1995; Bickerton et al., 2007). Fourthly, and paradoxically, this suggests that political agency through online offers possibilities for challenging the UK government’s attempt at influencing forced migrants’ allegiance and loyalty to a collective national and political community. A sense of belonging to a national collectivity cannot always be imposed by the nation-state in its attempt to exercise sovereignty. Individuals including forced migrants could make claims to and contest citizenship rights that accompanied membership of the political community or the nation-state. Individuals therefore could prioritise humanitarian norm of citizenship or membership of international systems to territorial membership or ‘formal’ citizenship.

CONCLUSION This chapter has explored how the un-abating asylum-seeking migration to the West, including the UK, had provided the impulse for urgent action that often resulted in anti-asylum policy-making and media coverage. It has been considered that the aims of these policies and anti-asylum media and political rhetoric were to deter asylum seekers and to pacify and ‘manage’ public anxiety. At the

same time, inward asylum-seeking migration is a permanent feature of the debate about the role of citizenship and sovereignty in responding to this dilemma in the contemporary Western state. As recounted here, asylum seekers/refugees limit the possibility of the sovereign state’s avoidance of its international humanitarian obligations as well as its ability to restrict forced migration into its territory. Asylum seekers/refugees are victims of the repression of the sovereign state in two respects; the anti-asylum policies that subjected them to structural inequalities in the host state and homeland’s tyranny that led to their ‘exit’. Nonetheless, asylum seekers/refugees continue to be political mobilisers and champions of human rights as well as challenge and “call into question” the excesses of state sovereignty (Archibugi, 2003, quoted in Bickerton et al., 2007, p. 13). As discussed above, the agency of asylum seekers was exemplified by their flight from the persecutory regime of their homeland to seek safety and security in the West. ‘Exit’ could mean temporary statelessness or loss of citizenship and sovereignty of their homelands. Yet, asylum-seeking migrants’ choice of asylum sites in the West implies they relied on and value the citizenship and sovereignty of the host countries for safeguarding their human rights and safety (Brown, 2007, p. xiii). They depended on state sovereignty to guarantee their rights to seek asylum and the attendant privileges and immunities as prescribed by international humanitarian law. Submitting to another country was an ‘agentic’ process of choosing a preference of sovereignty. It has been explored that the complexity and nuanced nature of political agency was a by-product of ‘restrictions’ and ‘assimilationist’ policies experienced by asylum-seeking migrants. It has therefore been argued that fleeing persecution was an act of political agency in challenging the persecutory sovereignty of their homelands. ‘Exit’ and seeking asylum also amounted to challenging the ‘fortress Britain’ notoriety of the UK. Such political agency subsisted on a conception

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of citizenship that was anchored on international humanitarian law. However, it has been explored that this physical challenge to national citizenship and state sovereignty was equally matched by asylum seekers’ usage of the Internet. Online practices were a response and challenge to the UK sovereign state’s attempt to restrict the boundaries of political and cultural connectedness, the territorial construction of membership and sense of belonging to the polity through policy-making. Through the Internet, asylum seekers/refugees raised awareness of those cultural, social and political issues that affected them and their homelands. The Internet was used to mobilise support among Diaspora communities and British citizenry towards their claims to human, cultural and social rights at the national and transnational level. It has been explored that this kind of solidarity building canvassed support for their plight among British citizenry, which in turn they hoped, would pressurise the UK government to intervene in other repressive countries, including their homelands. It has been suggested that this form of interaction between state and individuals is important for an ethical or humanitarian foreign policy intervention by host countries (Camilleri, 1995). It has also been suggested that political agency might not only be achieved by physical action such as artistic production, political protests and demonstrations as argued elsewhere (see Jones, 2006; Khan, 2012c). It could be realised through escape to seek asylum. This chapter has also drawn attention to the role of asylum-seeking migration in understanding political agency of non-citizens in the West; a dimension that was missing in the debate on ‘politics without sovereignty’ that Bickerton et al. (2007) steered. This is insightful to our re-evaluation of state sovereignty and international relations. This is because anti-asylum policies will continue to be a characteristic of the contemporary state in the West as politicians attempt to placate public anxiety that perceptions of an asylum ‘influx’ are

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a threat to the safety and security of the UK and its welfare system. This might explain why antiasylum rhetoric was heightened during elections in the UK as both government and opposition sought to present a ‘fortress Britain’ immigration policy to win the electorate’s mandate to exercise sovereignty. As Nolan reminded us, political campaigns in liberal democracies have been about political elites resonating with the values of citizens and that the latter were inclined to support politicians who reflected their worldview and sentiments (Nolan, 1998, p. 241). In addition, it would explain why the UK and other governments in the West were keen to maintain control over their immigration and asylum policies rather than sign up to EU efforts to harmonise asylum policy in the EU. In both cases, political elites aimed to communicate to citizens, as electorate, that the state has the capacity to control and assuage public concerns of the asylum-migration crisis (Rudolph, 2005). Moreover, politicians will continue to deploy policies including ‘citizenship classes’ and ‘deportation’ to communicate to the public that they would exert sovereignty by coercing migrants to internalise British values, patriotism and loyalty to the UK. Policymaking therefore illustrates the ‘sovereignty paradox’ that characterises the modern state: policies become a social contract in which noncitizen migrants accept certain obligations of the core values of the state, in this case internalising a sense of patriotism and loyalty to the UK, and state sovereignty in return for residency, whilst paradoxically providing the impetus for internationalisation of culture that have pushed forms of belonging beyond the nation-state (Bickerton et al., 2007, p. 5 citing Held, 2003). Critics of state sovereignty who argued that the power of the state to control unwanted migration is declining should draw lessons from this: that states still continue to assert their authority within international humanitarian regimes (Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000, p.164). As Guiraudon & Lahav (2000) noted, the same international rules that protect individuals’

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rights to asylum also provide for states to enact restrictive migration policies (Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000, p. 168; Chandler, 2006). The state is also better placed to provide and uphold the rights to seek asylum and the immunities and privileges as prescribed by international law. Finally, this UK case study also suggests that asylum-seeking migration and its cross-border political mobilisation and politicking have provided the sovereign state with opportunities for political agency in two respects (Veit-Brause, 1995, p. 69). First, seeking asylum limits the possibility for the UK to wriggle out of its international humanitarian obligations. Asylum-seeking migrants will continue to challenge and ‘call into question’ the excesses of state sovereignty (Bickerton et al., 2007, p. 13 citing Archibugi, 2003). Second, and more importantly, it suggests that collective political agency between citizens and non-citizens are possible within and beyond the territory of the state. One can therefore expect that the Internet will continue to play a dominant role in migrants’ political activism for an international human rights and ethical foreign policy agenda in the West. Host countries in the West including Britain can harness these resources through policy-making to facilitate their allegiance and sense of belonging and empowerment of culturally diverse migrants like asylum seekers/refugees by reflecting their human rights aspirations and participation in the national and international realms. It is within the ‘bounded’ political territory hosting asylum seekers that the moral and material infrastructures such as the Internet and political agency in enforcing and protecting international relations reside.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Asylum Seekers/Refugees: The term asylum seekers/refugees refers to individuals that fit into any of the three categories of asylum statuses offered by the UK government, namely; asylum seekers, refugees and persons granted Indefinite Leave to Remain - (ILR). By asylum seeker, is meant someone who has made a formal application for asylum and is awaiting a decision on his or her claim. In the UK, a refugee refers to a person whose application for asylum has been successful, and is recognised as needing protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention. The Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) category consists of individuals who have been granted right of residency in the UK on a permanent basis.

Belonging: Refers to an individual feeling of being part of, and demonstration of, loyalty or allegiance to any place including a country, community or institution. It is a process of identification by which individuals have a sense of shared membership of these places. Community: Refers to an individual sense of being part of a collectivity that could be an ‘imagined’ place, locality, neighbourhood or social institution as well as shared values, aspirations and networks. Diaspora Networks: Refer to Internet sites including websites and emails that are owned, managed and used by migrants of the same ethnicity and nationality. National Citizenship: Is used here to refer to the ‘legal’ status of citizenship by which an individual is officially conferred membership of a nation-state. The term in this sense is synonymous with nationality. Political Agency: Refers to the capacities including behaviour and practices that individuals have for political action and participation. State Sovereignty: Refers to the capacity of the nation-state to assert its authority, autonomy and control within a given territory. ‘Technologized’ Citizenship: Is used to broadly describe the learning about and participation in political and democratic processes of the nation-state. Transnational Politics: Constitutes an individual’s political engagement with other states and institutions beyond the geographical state of residency that generates a sense of belonging and identification with those nation-states and institutions.

ENDNOTES 1



Regime policies including the dispersal, deportation and detention of asylum seekers and restricting their access to welfare benefits.

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2



3



4

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Lister et al. (2007) noted that the language requirement for ‘legal’ (national) citizenship is commonplace in European countries. This is usually a mother tongue or the official language of homeland. The EJN is a UK-wide organisation owned by asylum seeker/refugee journalists. It particularly focuses on challenging the negative treatment of asylum in the UK media and journalists around the world. It



5



6

also campaigns for freedom of expression around the world. These policies were formulated during fieldwork. Morrell (2008) provides an interesting analysis of the problem of distinguishing between the two concepts.

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Chapter 24

Interaction of Incivility and News Frames in the Political Blogosphere:

Consequences and Psychological Mechanisms Porismita Borah Washington State University, USA

ABSTRACT The political blogosphere is replete with uncivil discussions and is apt to examine the influence of incivility on news frames. This chapter brings in literature from incivility and framing effects to examine the influence of incivility on news frames for several outcomes such as willingness to participate, online participation, attitude certainty, news credibility, and political trust. The chapter is an extension of the first two studies, which indicate the detrimental effects of incivility causing more attitude certainty and less political trust and open mindedness. At the same time, incivility caused more willingness to participate, online participation, and higher news credibility. However, the initial studies were unable to explain why the detrimental effects of incivility were observed. A third experiment examined the psychological mechanisms involved in these incivility effects.

INTRODUCTION On a typical day, one could read the newspaper on one’s breakfast table, watch the news on television or get information online. Perhaps, on an average, individuals indulge in all three of the above. While news content in print and television are very specific regarding their presentation style (the newspaper is all text with a few still images, while

television consists of visual stories and audio with minimal text), the world of contemporary media is unique from how traditional media offers information. For example, visitors to a website such as the New York Times encounter a mixture of hard news, opinion columns and blogs in text, still images, video and audio together on the same page. On the other hand, in the social media landscape, bloggers regularly repurpose news from the online

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch024

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 Interaction of Incivility and News Frames in the Political Blogosphere

news websites, other blogs and different online sources mixed with their own editorial content and commentary. The most common types of links bloggers use are those that link to mainstream news websites (Corfiled, Carson, Kalis & Simon, 2005; Reese, Rutigliano, Hyun & Jeong, 2007). It is common knowledge now that bloggers are “news readers—often very active readers” (Tremayne, 2007, p. 261). And the links that bloggers create often lead directly to the mainstream news sites. Thus, in general bloggers voraciously consume the mainstream news and repurpose them with added information and opinionated commentary. The blurring of the lines between traditional media and social media seems to be an established fact. Increasingly researchers are being faced with questions about new theoretical perspectives to investigate the contemporary media landscape. News content is no longer read by the audience as selected by the editors of a news organization. Individuals could get their information from online news portals such as Google news. Information can be provided via selected sources dependent on the individual’s personal customization choice (Sundar & Nass, 2001). Now, it is also possible to access a combination of video, audio and textbased news all at once, on one page. Additionally, the online environment facilitates the blurring of distinctions among news genres (Thorson, Vraga & Ekdale, 2010). An objective story from traditional news media could very well be juxtaposed with an opinionated commentary. The Internet has become one of the common tools for political discourse and scholarly attention has increasingly turned to the role of this new medium in reinvigorating democracy. The anonymity and flexibility of the online world allows the free expression of views and exposure to crosscutting information leading to increased knowledge about public issues and active participation in politics. For example, Stromer-Galley (2002) claims that the absence of non-verbal cues in online discussions leads to a “lowered sense of social presence and heightened sense of anonymity” (p. 35). She

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further observes that these same characteristics facilitate political conversations online by mitigating perceived social risks, which, in some cases, can discourage face-to-face political talk. However, this same anonymity and unconstrained expression can initiate vicious and acerbic debate thus invalidating the ideals of democracy (Barber, Mattson, & Peterson 1997; Dahlberg, 2001). The political blogosphere is replete with uncivil discussions so much so that some scholars have called for the development of rudimentary guidelines for the type of discussion that can be considered appropriate (O’Reilly, 2007). The political blogosphere then becomes an apt context to examine the influence of incivility on news content. The author conducted two experimental studies to examine the influence of incivility on news frames for several outcomes such as willingness to participate, online participation, attitude certainty, news credibility and political trust. The present study is an extension of the first two studies, which indicate the detrimental effects of incivility causing more attitude certainty and less political trust. At the same time, incivility caused more willingness to participate, online participation and higher news credibility. However, the initial studies were unable to explain why the detrimental effects of incivility were observed. The third experiment examined the psychological mechanisms involved in these incivility effects.

The Contemporary Media Landscape Nearly 15 years ago Morris and Ogan (1996) argued for the importance of taking the Internet seriously, “the Internet has become impossible to ignore” (Morris & Ogan, 1996, p. 39). They aptly pointed out that the introduction of any new medium should make us rethink the basic theoretical assumptions in our field. How does the new media environment influence traditional theories in the communication field such as agenda setting, framing, uses and gratifications and gatekeeping, to name a few? McCombs and colleagues

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first tested the proposition that by the day-to-day selection of news, the mass media influences the public agenda. Their studies found a significantly high rank-order correlation between the importance of issues on the media agenda and their corresponding importance on the public agenda. Althaus and Tewskbury (2002) tested this concept of agenda setting in the online environment by conducting an experiment where individuals read the newspaper version of the New York Times as opposed to the online version. Their overall pattern of findings show that print readers modify their agendas differently than the online readers. They contend that the online environment may allow individuals to create more personalized information environments (Althaus & Tewskbury, 2002). Continuing to examine the influence of online news consumption, Tewksbury (2003) investigates the information seeking behavior of individuals online. He finds that, in general, individuals in the online world tend to read “public affairs news less frequently” (p. 694). Although researchers have begun to posit questions of how the social media landscape influences traditional communication concepts, scholars have not yet examined the influence of news frames in the social media environment. There is much research that demonstrates how news framing influences information processing and the subsequent decision-making processes. The increasingly changing landscape of the new media environment becomes ideal for re-examining communication concepts such as news frames.

Context, Audience and Medium In order to be able to understand the influence of incivility on news frames in the social media environment, it is important to understand the broader characteristics of these various concepts. Before examining the specific content of incivility in the blogosphere, it is pertinent to understand the larger picture of how these different characteristics play out. First, it is important to understand that

incivility effects can be examined in several contexts. For example negative political advertising, television talk shows or the political blogosphere. Scholars have enthusiastically studied political advertising (e.g. Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Finkel & Geer, 1998) and the effects of “political advertisements rank among the most pressing questions in political communication” (Shah, Cho, Nah et al., 2007, p. 676). Empirical evidence from these studies have been mixed. Ansolabehere and Iyengar, (1995) finds that negative political advertisements demobilizes individuals and causes substantial decrease in voter participation. They used both experimental data and content analysis of advertisements to show that negative advertisements decreased intentions to vote in both candidates, not just the desire to support one candidate or not. They concluded that attack advertisements left voters cynical about the entire political process. Similarly, other scholars have demonstrated detrimental effects of attack ads (Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Yoon, Pinkleton, & Ko, 2005). The adverse effects of attack ads could be specifically applicable when campaigns turn hostile. In such cases exposure to advertising can cause citizens’ disgust with the electoral process or even backlash against a sponsoring candidate (Pinkleton, 1998; Pinkleton, Um, & Austin, 2002). The incivility in attack ads has been the concern of scholars for decades. A recent development in the American mainstream media has been the ideological fragmentation. Television channels such as FOX news and MSNBC no longer follow the rules of objectivity especially in the genre of talk shows. Talk shows have been known to constitute an “electronic public space” (Herbst, 1995), which provides a venue for the voice of the ordinary citizens, increasing public involvement (Hume, 2010). In general talk shows have guests from two sides of the story and the host of the show moderates the discussion of social and political issues. In most cases, these discussions become volatile as representatives of each side struggle to make their voice heard,

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often resulting in inflammatory exchanges. This incivility in television talk shows has become a relevant concern. Similarly the political blogosphere, which is highly fragmented on ideological lines, has abundant uncivil messages. The incivility in the political blogosphere can be created both by the blogger post or the comments that constitute the discussion of that specific issue. However, it is important to note that uncivil messages in the blogosphere could become all the more prolific because of the nature of the cotemporary media landscape. In the blogosphere individuals are largely anonymous. Where as in political advertisements as well as talk shows, the originator of the message is known. Secondly, audience characteristics can play an important role in this process. For example selective exposure is important when we think about audience characteristics. Selective exposure to political information is the “tendency to craft an information environment that reflects one’s political beliefs” (Garrett, 2009) and has been studies by scholars for decades (Frey, 1986; Sears & Freedman, 1967). Taking into account the three different kinds of context, selective exposure is perhaps least possible in political advertising, since all kinds of advertisements can be played out any time during different shows that individuals choose to watch. In case of talk shows, audience can select and choose what kind of shows they want to watch. However, television shows are not yet as fragmented as the political blogosphere. Hence, in case of blogs, selective exposure could be highest compared to advertising and talk shows. Related to the concept of selective exposure, audience involvement could also differ in all three contexts. An audience member is least involved in political adverting. A negative advertisement can be played on television when one is watching his favorite show and he would be exposed to the negative message by chance. In talk shows however, there is some amount of involvement. In

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most cases, audiences would seek for particular shows and perhaps pay attention to the ongoing dialogue. It is in the political blogosphere that an audience member would be most involved. In the case of blogs, readers would seek out particular blogs, comment on the posts and generally become active participants in the political discourse. Audience characteristics can also differ in terms of gender, predispositions, and party identification to name a few. Third, political predispositions could also play out differently in case of the three different contexts. Political predispositions manifest in the context of political advertising. It is highly ideological since the general purpose is to persuade the audience against the opponent. In talk shows it would depend on the news organization. A talk show on CNN might not be as ideologically charged as in FOX news or MSNBC. The political blogosphere is also somewhat similar; there are many blogs, which are ideologically inclined toward one political party or the other. However, there are some blogs that do talk about both sides of an issue in a more “objective” manner. Finally, the characteristics of the medium could be significant for understanding the three contexts. In all three contexts, text, video and audio can be used. However, political advertising is generally in video mostly employing television shows or the online environment. There can be political ads in both newspapers and radio. Talk shows use only video. While blogs are mostly in text, sometimes there could be some video messages as well. Scholars have defined incivility as disagreement expressed in a way that shows disrespect, contempt and derision of the opposing group (Brooks & Geer, 2007). Incivility can be present in face-to-face communications as well as in an online environment. In case of television talk shows incivility could be found in the content of discourse, incivility could be due to the tone and it could be non-verbal. For example non-verbal incivility could play out when an individual “rolls”

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Figure 1. Overall concepts that could be involved in the process of interactions between incivility and framing effects

his eyes or even in a simple laugh. On the online set up individuals are in general anonymous. As a result without a face-to-face context, individuals can post uncivil messages online without any restrictions. These various factors can play important roles in the understanding of incivility and it’s interaction with news frames. I attempt to synthesize the various concepts in Figure 1 below. However, it is beyond the scope of this project to examine all of these dimensions. The concepts immediately relevant to the present project are shown below in Figure 2.

Frames and Framing Effects A large and growing body of literature in framing studies has emerged in recent years from a range of disciplines and academic domains (D’Angelo, 2002; Shah, Domke, & Wackman, 1996, Borah, 2011a). Framing research draws on literature from “cognitive, constructionist, and critical” studies (D’Angelo, 2002, p. 870); “sociology, economics, psychology, cognitive linguistics and communication” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 9) and “political science, sociology and media studies” (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p. 139). There are sev-

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Figure 2. Concepts relevant to the present project in the process of interactions between incivility and framing effects

eral “intertwined answers” (Simon, 2001, p.76) to the question of how framing is defined. Framing research that grew from sociological foundations refers to the “frames in communication” (Chong & Druckman, 2007b, p. 106). In general, this research tends to focus on the “words, images, phrases, and presentation styles” (Druckman, 2001, p. 227) that are used to construct news stories and the processes that shape this construction. Besides examining media frames, researchers have studied the processes involved in the formation of the audience frame. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984) were the first to demonstrate how different presentations of essentially the same information can have an impact on people’s choices. They found that individuals were inclined to take risks when “losses” are highlighted. But when the

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same information is presented in terms of “gains,” individuals shy away from risks. This approach, called “equivalency” (Druckman, 2001, p. 228) framing, examines the influence of different but logically equivalent messages. In this approach, all factual and stylistic elements are comparable so that the pure influence of the frame can be observed. The “equivalency” perspective draws extensively on the experiments of risk-gain research (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). However, scholars in political communication found this definition of framing limiting and “not very useful” (Simon, 2001, p. 77). In politics, framing almost always involves adding or subtracting information in the different alternatives. The “emphasis” (Druckman, 2001, p. 230) approach to framing, which has become

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popular in political communication, demonstrates that accentuating certain considerations in a message can influence individuals to focus on those particular considerations. Scholars (Domke et al., 1998; Iyengar, 1991; McLeod & Detenber, 1999; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; Borah, 2011b) aligned to this interpretation of framing maintain that it is not always possible to manipulate a frame without changing some of the facts. Druckman (2004) aptly points out that in many cases, especially with political issues, there is not always a way to present a situation in different but equivalent ways. Instead, emphasis framing effects refer to situations when by “emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant considerations,” individuals are led to focus on these considerations in the decision-making process (Druckman, 2004, p. 672). Thus, for political issues the concept of framing usually refers to “characterizations” of a course of action where a central idea provides meaning to the event (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004, p. 136). It is within “emphasis” framing that scholars have again differentiated frames— episodic vs. thematic (Iyengar, 1991); strategy vs. issue (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997); in terms of values (Brewer & Gross, 2005; Shah et al., 1996).

Strategy vs. Value Frames Strategy frames use the language of wars, games, and competition; stories that use performers, critics and voters; and focuses on the performance, style and perception of the candidates. As a result, policy positions in strategy frames are interpreted as winning a voter block. Strategic framing tends to incite cynical reactions in news consumers (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997), specifically when there is a higher level of strategic news present in the coverage (de Vreese, 2005). Scholars have also linked the exposure of strategic frames to decrease in voter turnout, trust in government and civic duty (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997); and decreased intention to participate (Valentino, Beckmann & Buhr, 2001). Value frames or “value conflicts” on

the other hand, usually depict policy debates as a clash of basic values. Value frames provide an interpretive framework to understand a political issue (Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1996). Value frames resonate with individuals’ preexisting schema, perhaps reinforcing existing values. Shah, et al., (1996) demonstrate that value frames prompt the spread of activation to related issue schemas, influencing individuals’ judgments about other issues, vote choice, or candidate character.

Theoretical Explication of Incivility Incivility has been studied in many different contexts such as negative political advertising (e.g. Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Finkel & Geer, 1998), television talk shows (e.g. Mutz & Reeves; 2005, Mutz, 2007), or the online world (e.g. Papacharissi, 2002; 2004; Phillips & Smith, 2004; Hwang, et al., 2008a; Thorson et al., 2010). For the purpose of the present study, incivility is defined as offensive discussion that “attacks democratic ideals” (Papacharissi, 2004, p. 273). In this sense, incivility in the online world can range from rude critiques and name-calling to offensive stereotyping of groups, which can vary from use of milder words such as “liberal” to more offensive “faggot” (Papacharissi, 2004, p. 274). Whether incivility is understood in terms of television talk shows or in the political blogosphere, the findings from the literature demonstrate serious consequences.

Incivility and its Consequences Civility is often considered a social norm of interpersonal communication. Violation of normative expectation by others, such as civility, leads to detrimental consequences regarding attitudes and behaviors (Fraser, 1990). One of the often-cited studies in the mass communication literature, Mutz and Reeves (2005) showed that uncivil exchanges among politicians in a televised debate significantly decreased viewers’ trust in politicians, Congress, and the system of government. Several

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other studies have showed the detrimental effects of incivility (see Forgette & Morris, 2006; Fridkin & Kenney, 2008). However, an experimental study by Brooks and Geer (2007) suggests that uncivil attacks in political advertisements may not always have detrimental effects on citizens, and might even have some positive effects on political engagement. Scholars have also started examining incivility present in the online world. In a recent study Sobieraj and Berry, (2011) concluded that uncivil discourse is “extensive” and “takes many different forms” in the online world (p. 19). In an experimental study, Hwang et al. (2008a) examined the influence of uncivil messages on deliberative attitudes and emotions. Similarly, Thorson et al., (2010), demonstrate the influence of an uncivil blog post on news credibility.

Interactions of Incivility and News Frames Two experiments embedded in web-based surveys were conducted to understand the interactions between incivility and news frames (Borah, 2012; Borah, forthcoming). The experiments used two kinds of consistent frames—strategy and value frames. The first study (gay rights) was conducted in the fall of 2009 and the second study (immigration policy) was conducted in the fall of 2011. The dependent variables examined were willingness to participate, online participation, attitude certainty, open-mindedness, news credibility and political trust. Findings show that uncivil blogger commentary increases willingness to participate and online participation. It is important to note that the significant difference between the civil vs. uncivil messages is seen only in the value frame. Further, the findings show that incivility decreases open-mindedness and increases attitude certainty in participants. Results also show that incivility and strategic frames decreases political trust. On the other hand incivility and value frames increases news credibility. The findings from this project are fundamental to understanding the moderating 414

effects of incivility on news frames in the context of the social media environment. The confidence in the findings from the project is increased as the hypotheses are tested with the help of two experiments using two different issues. The data analysis yielded consistent findings revealing complicated relationships between incivility and news content. Results from the first set of hypotheses indicate that participants exposed to uncivil messages are more willing to participate. Prior research has shown that individuals could experience feelings of hostility when exposed to uncivil messages, which could lead them to engage more (Hwang, et al., 2008b). And interestingly, this pattern is true only in case of the value frames. We already know that value frames resonate with individuals’ preexisting schema and help them interpret political issues (Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1996). When individuals are exposed to an uncivil message that criticizes their point of view, and a value frame, individuals become more engaged. As a result subjects show a greater willingness to participate. Individuals exposed to strategic news frame could often become aware of the connotations related to partisanship (Lee et al., 2008) and they may be less inclined to participate when exposed to strategic frames. These results also show that incivility in the blogosphere could lead to less open-mindedness and polarized attitudes. Findings from the set of hypotheses on news credibility show significant main effects of both incivility and news frames. More specifically, uncivil blogger commentary increased the credibility of the news article. Further, the interaction between news frames and incivility shows that participants in the uncivil and the value frame considered the news story the most credible. These findings have valuable implications for research on news credibility. In the contemporary media environment where news article are placed with opinionated messages, the credibility of the news story could depend on what is juxtaposed next to the story. The results from the significant interaction pattern show that the effect of the uncivil message is prominent only in the value framed

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condition. In case of the strategy frame, incivility of the opinionated message does not make a significant difference. Prior research demonstrates that strategy frames lead to cynical reactions in news consumers (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; de Vreese, 2005; Valentino, Buhr & Beckmann, 2001). Perhaps individuals in the strategy frame condition see the story as less credible because the strategic coverage in general bring about a cynical reaction to politicians as well as to the source that delivers this news. On the other hand, the value frame resonates with individuals’ existing values (Ball-Rokeach, et al., 1990; Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1996; Shah, et al., 1996; Price & Tewksbury, 1997). Participants in the value-framed condition are able to relate to the story in terms of their existing schema. When this value framed news story is juxtaposed with an uncivil message, the credibility of the story rises. Compared to the opinionated uncivil message, the objective news story that resonates with their value predispositions seem more credible to participants. In the civil condition, however, the news frame does not make a significant difference to the credibility of the news story. The uncivil blogger commentary, a common factor in the political blogosphere, seems to accentuate the detrimental effects of the strategic frame. The findings for political trust do not come as a surprise. The detrimental effects of incivility as well as strategic frames on political trust are reiterated in this study. The interaction pattern suggests that it is only in the value frame and the civil condition respondents demonstrated political trust. The patterns demonstrated in the first study on gay rights are again tested in a second experiment using the immigration issue.

Psychological Mechanisms Although the two studies (Borah, 2012; Borah, forthcoming) demonstrate influences of incivility and meaningful interactions between incivility and news frames, the findings do not explain the psychological mechanisms. Research (e.g.

Brooks & Geer, 2007) demonstrates that incivility can encourage higher political engagement, a pattern that can be explained by research on defensive mechanism. Prior research indicates that different psychological mechanisms could influence how individuals react to disagreement and incivility (Kunda, 1987, 1990). According to the theory of motivated reasoning, the motives for political reasoning can be understood in two ways: accuracy goals (which motivate individuals to make accurate judgments) and defensive goals (which motivate individuals to defend their prior attitudes). Defensive motivations could be a potential explanation for the psychological processes involved in incivility effects. Uncivil messages in a discussion could bring forth strong perceptions of hostility, which can lead to defensive motivations (Kinny & Segrin, 1998). Ng and Detenber (2005) demonstrate that incivility produces hostile perceptions and negative evaluations of online discussants. And these hostile perceptions can cause individuals to get politically engaged (Hwang, Pan & Sun, 2008b). With the help of this literature, the hypotheses are proposed:

Research Hypotheses H1: Hostile emotions mediate the interactions between incivility and news frames in increasing willingness to participate and online participation. H2: Hostile emotions mediate the interactions between incivility and news frames in decreasing open-mindedness. H3: Hostile emotions mediate the interactions between incivility and news frames in increasing attitude certainty. H4: Hostile emotions mediate the interactions between incivility and news frames in increasing the perception of news credibility. H5: Hostile emotions mediate the interactions between incivility and news frames in decreasing the perception of political trust.

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METHODS The data for this study were collected using an experiment embedded in a web-based survey. The experiment used two kinds of consistent frames— strategy and value frames (for a discussion on consistent vs. unique frames see Borah, 2011a). The two frames as well as the issue chosen gay rights (e.g. Brewer, 2003) have been studied in prior framing effects research. Since the influence of these frames have already been established in the literature, it was considered appropriate to examine their interactions with incivility and the psychological mechanisms involved, in the context of the political blogosphere. The participants were undergraduate students enrolled at a Midwestern university. Although student samples are often regarded weak for generalizability, Druckman and Kam (2011) argue that student samples do not always hinder causal inference. Using empirical evidence the authors demonstrate that a convenience sample could create problems only when the effect of an experimental manipulation depends on a particular characteristic on which the sample has no variance. The study was conducted in the fall of 2011 and course instructors offered extra credit for participation in this study. All potential participants were contacted by e-mail and given the Web site of the online experiment. A total of 229 participants (75% female; 74.9% democrat; mean age = 20.41 years) completed the experiment. The experiment dealt with the issue of gay rights and consisted of both pre and post-manipulation survey items. After answering the pre-test questions, the respondents were presented with manipulated stimuli in a news analysis story. The study used a 2 (incivility) x 2 (framed conditions) between-subjects design. Before reading the news story, the respondents read a blogger commentary, which was manipulated as either civil or uncivil. The two versions of the manipulated story portray the gay rights issue using a strategy frame and a value frame.

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After the respondents finished answering the pre-test questions, they were told that they would be reading a blog page. Every precaution was taken to make the blog page look real. The blog page was designed after studying other real blogs. The name of the blogger and other identifying information was blocked in all of the experimental conditions. The blog started with a commentary from the blogger, which was manipulated as either civil or uncivil. After the commentary, the blogger asked readers to check out a news story from The Star Tribune and the rest of the blog page contained the news story employing a strategic frame or a value frame. All features of the blog except the blogger comments and news story remained constant in the different conditions. The blogosphere is not homogenous and there are several types of blogs. However, repurposing of news from the mainstream media is a very common format, where the blogger often adds a comment before sharing the news story. The blog page used for the present study followed this format.

Manipulations In order to manipulate incivility, the blogger commentary differed civil vs. uncivil. The blogger commentary was developed with the help of prior studies on incivility in the blogosphere (Hwang, et al. 2008; Thorson et al., 2010). The blogger commentary was also constructed with the help of actual blogger commentaries from real blog posts on the gay marriage issue. Although this was not a systematic content analysis, reading the real blog posts helped in constructing the blogger commentary. The second manipulation in the study was developed with the help of prior studies (Lee, et al., 2008). Further, to maintain consistency, both news stories were structured identically. The placement and length of the quotes remained the same in both versions; however, the content of the quotes differed according to the frame. The value framed news story presented arguments about the gay

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rights issue in terms of moral values. On the other hand the strategy frame presented the debates in the gay rights issue as a political gamesmanship.

Dependent Variables Willingness to participate. Like various other concepts, political participation has been conceptualized in many ways: as having four dimensions; voting, campaign activity, contacting officials and collective activities (Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995) or two forms; campaigning and complaining (Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999). With the growth of the new media landscape, political participation has taken new dimensions on the web (Gennaro & Dutton, 2006; Graber, Bimber, Bennett, Davis, & Norris, 2004). Willingness to participate was constructed by modifying items from prior studies. In the present study, the items are not measures of actual behavior. The variable was captured by averaging participants’ scores on 10 items to create an index (α = .93, M = 2.51, SD = 1.50). The items in the index asked participants to rate their willingness to participate and were measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). The items asked questions about both traditional and online activities. Both traditional and online participation items were included in this construct because an exploratory factor analysis with promax rotation provided evidence of the items comprising of one factor. Promax rotation derives the name from “procrustean rotation” because it fits a target matrix with a simple structure (Abdi, 2003). The indicators to measure the factor had substantial factor loadings ranging from .75 to .87. Online participation. Besides having the measure for willingness to participate, the second study included an additional measure in an attempt to capture actual behavior. Participants were asked to click on a link if they were willing to join an online petition seeking to influence public policy on the issue (M = 1.77, SD = .420). The partici-

pants had to click “yes” or “no” on the page, and in either case it would lead them to the next page. Open-mindedness and attitude certainty. Participants were asked to indicate how the news story influenced their attitudes with four items (Hwang et al., 2008a). All items were measured on a seven-point scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). An exploratory factor analysis with promax rotation provided evidence of the items comprising two factors. The indicators to measure the factors had substantial factor loadings ranging from .81 to .93. While the factor loadings on the other factor was substantially low (-.063). The factor analysis for the second study revealed similar patterns, with factor loadings ranging from .79 to .93. With the help of these results from factor analysis, two measures were constructed by taking mean scores, open-mindedness, (r = .75, M = 3.18, SD = 1.63) and attitude certainty (r = .69, M = 4.22, SD = 1.59). News credibility. Participants were asked to evaluate the credibility of the news story using a scale comprised of six semantic differentials on an eleven-point scale with the following anchors: fair/unfair, biased/unbiased, accurate/inaccurate, doesn’t tell the whole story/tells the whole story, cannot be trusted/can be trusted and balanced/imbalanced (Meyer, 1988; Fico et al., 2004). Factor analyses revealed a single factor for the credibility of the news story. Items were averaged to create a credibility index for news credibility (α = .93, M = 5.31, SD = 2.24). Political trust. Political trust was measured with a single item (M = 4.16, SD = 1.43). The item was measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) and participants were asked to indicate their agreement to the statement “government officials can be trusted”. Hostile Emotions. To capture hostile emotions participants were asked to think about how they felt after reading the stimulus materials (Hwang, Pan & Sun, 2008b). All items were measured on a seven-point scale (1=strongly disagree,

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7=strongly agree). The participants were asked how often they felt the following emotions: contemptuous, angry, disgusted, and resentful (α = .90, M = 3.31, SD = 1.24). Manipulation checks. Manipulation checks were conducted for both the level of incivility in the blogger’s comment as well as the news frames. All manipulation check measures indicated successful manipulation. After being exposed to the stimulus materials, participants were asked to evaluate the incivility of the blogger’s commentary using a semantic differentials eleven-point scale with the following item: uncivil/ civil (t = 9.60, p < .001; M = 3.61, S.D. = 2.48). The news frames manipulation was conducted by using the two items “the news story was about the moral values of the gay rights issue” (t = -8.022, p < .02, M = 4.61, S.D. = 1.84) and “the news story was about the political struggle over the gay rights issue” (t = 3.262, p < .001, M = 3.59, S.D. = 1.69). Manipulation checks in experimental research could be a tricky issue, since questions asked for manipulation checks could sensitize subjects. In the present study, careful attention was paid to avoid priming the subjects. The manipulation check questions were embedded with items unrelated to the hypotheses and did not identify the hypotheses for the present study. First, for the manipulation check of the incivility of the blogger’s commentary, the item was part of six-item question on blogger credibility. Basically, civil/uncivil question was added to the six-item credibility scale. Moreover, the items were repeated for the news story credibility as well. Secondly, the news frame manipulation checks questions were part of several questions asked about other unrelated issues, such as Iraq war or health care reform.

RESULTS To examine the psychological mechanisms involved in the interaction between incivility and news frames path analyses were used. Incivility 418

of the bloggers comments and news frames were the independent variables, while there were six different dependent variables: willingness to participate, online participation, attitude certainty, open mindedness, news credibility and political trust. SPSS (AMOS) was used to conduct the path analysis models. The five hypotheses proposed were supported by the data. Figure 3 demonstrates the values for each path. The findings from the model revealed a chi square of 12.03 (df=5, p = .04), GFI of .99, adjusted GFI of .96, RMSEA of .05 and NFI of .97 in the value-framed condition. The model indicates the conceptual model fits the data very well. Hostile emotions indeed mediate the relations between the interactions of uncivil message and news frames, and the six dependent variables.

DISCUSSION This project draws literature from two different streams, framing and incivility effects, to examine the mechanisms involved in the interplay between news frames and uncivil messages in the context of the political blogosphere. With the blurring of lines between traditional and social media, understanding communication theories in the social media environment is valuable. Before discussing the implications of the results, it is important to highlight some of the limitations of the study. The blogosphere is not a homogenous entity. There are many different kinds of blogs; several factors such as reach of the blog, credibility of the blog and ratings of the blog that could influence how individuals perceive the information received from a blog. The present project did not manipulate any of the factors in the blog except the incivility of the blogger’s comment. Many of these other factors could influence audience perception of the blog as well as the news story embedded in it. Despite some of these limitations, the findings from this project are fundamental to understanding the psychological mechanisms involved in incivility in the social media environment. Results from

 Interaction of Incivility and News Frames in the Political Blogosphere

Figure 3. Psychological mechanisms involved in incivility and frames. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

the first two hypotheses indicate that participants exposed to uncivil messages are more willing to participate. We already know that value frames resonate with individuals’ preexisting schema and help them interpret political issues (Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1996). When individuals are exposed to an uncivil message that criticizes their point of view, and a value frame, individuals become more engaged. As a result subjects show a greater

willingness to participate or participate online. The path model shows that the interaction of uncivil message and value frame leads to hostile emotions. And these emotions influences participants to engage more. These findings support prior research, which has shown that individuals could experience feelings of hostility when exposed to uncivil messages, which could lead them to engage more (Hwang, et al., 2008b). Individuals exposed

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to strategic news frame could often become aware of the connotations related to partisanship (Lee et al., 2008) and they may be less inclined to participate when exposed to strategic frames. Similarly, the findings from the next set of hypotheses show that hostile emotions mediate the relationship between incivility and attitude certainty as well as open mindedness. These results show that incivility in the blogosphere could lead to less open-mindedness and more polarized attitudes. Uncivil messages in political blogs instigate hostile emotions, which increase attitude certainty and decreases open mindedness. When participants encounter uncivil comments against their position, they become defensive about their own beliefs and their attitudes become certain, which also make them more willing to participate. The findings show that individuals become less open-minded and more certain about their attitudes indicating polarized attitudes in the uncivil condition. Hostile attitudes toward the other side brought about by incivility could erode deliberative discourse online. If individuals on different sides of an issue do not respect each other, they could become more polarized through political discourse. This is essentially the opposite of the “virtuous circle” of democratic engagement (Shah, 1998). Ironically, the same uncivil message causes individuals to participate more. Uncivil messages polarized individuals’ attitudes, which perhaps led to greater willingness to participate and online participation. Although the findings of incivility effects and the interactions with news frames (Borah, 2012; Borah, forthcoming) are highly relevant, testing the mechanisms involved in the process gives a better understanding. The path model also indicates that hostile emotions mediate incivility effects on news credibility and political trust. These findings have valuable implications for research on news credibility. In the new media environment where objective news article are placed with opinionated messages, the credibility of the news story could depend on what is juxtaposed next to the story. The findings support previous research, (e.g. Thorson et al., 2010) which 420

shows that an objective story is perceived more credible when juxtaposed to an uncivil message. Moreover, Newhagen and Nass (1989) had showed that individuals use different criteria to evaluate the credibility of different media. The patterns are applicable only in the value-framed condition. Hence, when participants are exposed to uncivil blogger message and a value-framed story that resonates with their prior values, hostile feelings toward the uncivil blogger commentary mediates their perception of the news story. In the case of political trust, uncivil blogger commentary and a strategic-framed story incites hostile emotions in participants. These emotions are responsible for decreasing political trust. Given the rise of the social media environment, the findings from this project have important implications for journalism. It is no longer guaranteed that a New York Times article will be read as a print copy or in the New York Times website. Citizens could very well read the news story in a political blog or on their Facebook page. Therein lies the importance of testing communication concepts such as news frames in the social media environment. The present project uses one of the common factors of the political blogosphere—incivility, to examine some of these relationships. This project takes prior research in this subject further by testing the psychological mechanisms involved in incivility effects. A fruitful possibility for future research would be to investigate factors such as credibility of the blog, reach of the blog and ratings of the blog. These and many other factors could influence how individuals perceive the news in the political blogosphere, and the mechanisms involved. Research questions from the present project should be tested in terms of different kinds of blogs. For instance, do these patterns change when the blogger is a known journalist? Future studies should also explore other news frames. This project extended prior work to understand the psychological mechanisms involved in incivility effects. The findings suggest that incivility can have both negative and positive influences on

 Interaction of Incivility and News Frames in the Political Blogosphere

democratic outcomes. Prior research by the author also demonstrated that these effects depend on the kind of news frames individuals are exposed to. The present study shows that these effects are mediated by hostile emotions. As evident from the findings of the present project and prior research (Borah, 2012; Borah, forthcoming) examining other communication theories and concepts in the social media environment is fundamental for understanding communication research in the contemporary media landscape.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT The author would like to thank Dhavan Shah, Zhongdang Pan, Douglas McLeod and Albert Gunther for their useful comments during various stages of this project.

Borah, P. (2011a). Conceptual issues in framing: A systematic examination of a decade’s literature. The Journal of Communication, 61(2), 246–263. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2011.01539.x Borah, P. (2011b). Seeking more information and conversations: Influence of competitive frames and motivated processing. Communication Research, 38(3), 303–325. doi:10.1177/0093650210376190 Borah, P. (2012). Does it matter where you read the news stories? Interaction of incivility and news frames in the political blogosphere. Communication Research. doi:10.1177/0093650212449353 Borah, P. (Forthcoming). Interactions of news frames and incivility in the political blogosphere: Examining perceptual outcomes. Political Communication.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Attitude Certainty: Individuals who are certain about their attitudes. Incivility: For the purpose of the present study, incivility is defined as offensive discussion that “attacks democratic ideals.” News Frames: In general, this research tends to focus on the “words, images, phrases, and presentation styles” that are used to construct news stories and the processes that shape this construction. Open-Mindedness: Individuals open to others views. Political Blogosphere: The political blogosphere consists of blogs that cover political issues. Political Trust: Trust in the political system. Willingness to Participate: The willingness of individuals to participate. The measure is used if actual behavior measures are not available.

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Chapter 25

How [Not] to Caffeinate a Political Group:

Parent Post Influence on Conversational Network Structure Alison N. Novak Drexel University, USA Emmanuel Koku Drexel University, USA

ABSTRACT The attempted assassination of Representative Gabrielle Giffords in Arizona on January 8, 2011 spurred a surge of media reflection and criticism of the Tea Party Patriots and their violent rhetoric. The Coffee Party, created in 2010 as an oppositional force to the Tea Party, spent the days following the shooting discussing the various social, political, and moral aspects of the violence on their Facebook page. This chapter is part of an ongoing investigation of language in politically oriented online forums. Here, the 24 parent posts and following Facebook conversations are studied to investigate a connection between post sentiment and network structure. Using communication accommodation theory, Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC), and network analysis, a relationship is located between social, affective, cognitive, perceptual, and biological constructs and network measures of betweeness and core/periphery size. This chapter has implications regarding online network structures, new methods in Internet research, and online political activity research.

INTRODUCTION Online social networks have become a place for political discussion and debate over the decade and there is no indication that this trend is slowing down (Smitten, 2008). The ability for people from all over the world to contribute to an online forum of ideas related to contemporary and his-

toric political events is seen as a unique possibility and opportunity for discourse. The discussion is limited by both the technology of the social network and the discussion leaders who chose a topic to initiate a conversation. As a result, it is the leaders of the online discussion group that often direct the discourse around certain topics and ideas pertinent to the interests of the group.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6066-3.ch025

Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

 How [Not] to Caffeinate a Political Group

The tone and sentiment of parent posts created by the group’s facilitators should therefore be studied to see how it relates and potentially influences the discussion network. This work presents new methodology that can be used to understand new forms of online political interaction. The following study will investigate the responsive conversational network measures correlated to the tone and sentiment of the original parent post on politically focused social network forums. Using the Facebook group “Join the Coffee Party Movement,” the largest (406,118 online members) of the national groups associated with the grassroots United States Coffee Party, it is possible to look at the conversations surrounding a specific event. The attempted assassination of Representative Gabrielle Giffords in Arizona on January 8, 2011 spurred the group leaders to create 24 parent posts from January 8th to January 17th topically related to the event. Media outlets suggested the shooting was associated with the violent rhetoric of the Tea Party Patriots. The Coffee Party was created with the intention of diffusing and countering the Tea Party’s efforts and ideology, therefore, investigating the discussions surrounding the Coffee Party’s response would be pertinent to understanding the group’s ideology, network, and structure.

BACKGROUND The Coffee Party The Coffee Party is a politically focused movement that began on Facebook in January 2010 as a means to “advocate for the interests of the American people without having our objectives, and the notions on which they are based, governed by powerful interests that already have too much influence in Washington” (CoffeePartyUSA about us, para. 1). As a self-described grassroots democracy movement, The Coffee Party states that their members come to their own conclusions through debate and discussion using facts and principles 426

rather than the traditional rhetoric and ideology of political leaders and the media. Further, the movement relies on technology stating “thanks to new technology available on the Internet, we believe that Americans can meet the challenges of self-governance in the 21st century by becoming active citizens rather than periodic consumers of partisan entertainment (CoffeePartyUSA about us, para. 6). Because of the reliance on technology, the majority of the Coffee Party’s information distribution occurs through their website and their social networking page on Facebook. Most discussion by group members occurs through these channels as well. The Coffee Party also states that their mission is to fight the “cycle of corruption” which involves reforming campaign finance, taxes, and Wall Street (Mission statement, para. 1). Also a part of the cycle includes the “violent rhetoric” of the Tea Party Patriots CoffeePartyUSA about us, 00:05:11). Coffee Party creator Annabel Park states that the coffee party is not “the opposite of the tea party, but a response or alternative” (CoffeePartyUSA about us). According to Park, the origins of the Tea Party’s rhetoric comes from political culture and social structure which both government officials and the public respond to. After observing the rhetoric surrounding the healthcare debates of 2010, Park wanted to create an organization which focused on “core issues in the country” and overcame the rhetoric of the Tea Party Patriots which is destructive to progress and fixing the “real problems” (CoffeePartyUSA about us). These efforts were tested and demonstrated in the discussions on the group’s Facebook page.

Shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords On January 8th, 2011 Representative Gabrielle Giffords was a shot in the head by attempted assassin Jared Lee Loughner during a “Congress on your corner” event in Casas Adobes, Arizona. During the incident, 19 people were shot, six of whom died from the injury. In the days that followed

 How [Not] to Caffeinate a Political Group

the shooting, an increased focus was placed on the role of the Tea Party Patriots and the mindset of Jared Lee Loughner. Slate.com writer Jacob Weisberg (2011, January 10) summarized much of the media’s and coffee party’s thoughts when stating “the Tea Party movement did make it appreciably more likely that a disturbed person like Loughner would react, would be able to react, and would not be prevented from reacting, in the crazy way he did” (“The tea party and the Tucson tragedy,” para. 2). Many blamed the incident on the far rights propaganda, rhetoric, and efforts to call into question the “legitimacy of U.S. government” (para. 3). Further, there was a connection drawn between the political rhetoric of the far right before the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and the backdrop to Loughner’s attack (para. 3). Because of the connections being drawn between the political far right, the Tea Party Patriots, and their critique of the U.S. government, the media coverage became heavily followed by political groups and the public. The Coffee Party’s responses and discussions of these connections were recorded on the groups Facebook page over the following week.

Online Political Discourse in Social Networks Smitten (2008) describes the concept of online political discussion groups as being critical to the modern democratic process. As online communities, these groups have the capacity to both discuss and act upon physical world issues in online and physical spaces (Smitten, 2008). Because of the nature of the online medium, the groups have goals that extend into the physical space (Smitten, 2008). Similarly, the Coffee Party’s goals include both online and physical space action and political participation. Mascaro, Novak, and Goggins (2012) utilized similar methodology to look how political groups censor themselves and group members who disagree with the discourse within the network. In looking at the Tea Party Patriots facebook page, it

is clear that dissenting members of online political groups are censored and addressed by both group administrators and group members. Similarly, other researchers have questioned the ability for online political groups to foster political debate and discussion that represents all perspectives on a subject. In groups where the primary purpose is political, democratic discussion is limited and deliberation is dominated by a small subset of discussion/position leaders (Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). This draws into question whether group discussions are as open and flexible as researchers like Smitten (2008) believe. Questions in the field remain: are dissenters or members influenced by more than just other group members? How does formalized leadership affect the conversational patterns of the group? This paper seeks to explore these questions and add to literature in the field. To do this, we utilize an approach that uses new methodologies which will be explained in the following sections.

Sentiment of the Parent Post Influencing Discussion Communicative Accommodation Theory. Previous research in sociolinguistics has identified Howard Giles’ accommodation theory as pivotal in understanding how the expectations of each individual in a conversational pair influences discussion. During interaction or communication, individuals adjust their behavior, language, and nonverbal communication to accommodate the perceived needs of others (Giles & Coupland, 1991). Although this theory was created in studying face-to-face pairs, Postmes, Spears, and Lea (2000) suggest that in computer mediated groups, the processes of accommodation theory are ever present. In forming group norms, members tailored their messages and online behavior to their perceptions of what other group members needed and wanted to see happen. Accommodation theory has since been used to study the behavior of communicators in both face-to-face and computer mediated interactions, such as looking at the influences of the 427

 How [Not] to Caffeinate a Political Group

sentiment of the parent post. The findings of this add to the body of work already on communication accommodation theory and its application in computer mediated communication. Effect on Following Conversation. Previous research has suggested that the tone and intention of the initial speaker can have an effect on the following conversation or debate. Pardo, Jay, and Krauss (2010) also studied the relationship between the tone of the conversation’s initiator and the responses of conversational partners. By studying accommodation theory and the phonetic convergence during conversational interaction, they found that partners often adjusted their tone based on the perceived identity of the initiator. In conversational pairs, individuals adjusted their conversational tones and phonetic pronunciations in an effort to accommodate the perceived goals and needs of themselves and their partner. Although in computer mediated communication the vocal element of conversation is removed, Pardo, Jay, and Krauss’ (2010) theory that the role of the initiator can influence the conversation can be tested when looking for the relationship between tone and sentiment of the parent post and the following structure of a conversational network. The following section will further explain these phenomena in computer mediated communication. Computer Mediated Communication. Jeong (2006) found that the role that an individual leader takes in a conversation can influence both the frequency and responses of the group. Additionally, the type of language used in initial messages can also influence a following group discussion. “Messages with more conversational language were more likely to elicit responses to produce more critical discussions than messages with less conversational language.” Jeong (2006) found that the tone of the original message influences the way that others respond to that individual or the group through the course of conversation and debate. Jeong (2006) adds that more research is needed to investigate the role of conversational style and parent posts and the responses generated by the group. This paper seeks to expand upon Jeong’s 428

work to describe the relationship between the sentiment of the parent post and the responders’ conversational network. Additionally, the culture of contributors and subject matter of the conversation influences network structure and measures of an online group. Montero-Fleta, Montesinos-López, Pérez-Sabater and Turney (2009) found that when comparing conversations of identical political or sports subject matter across international cultures, the structure of the conversational network and formalization of language differed. For example, English language computer mediated asynchronous communication on political topics “displayed markedly more oral elements than in Catalan and Spanish,” as well as more message frequency and length. These results changed when the topic of the forum was sports related, thus showing that the network structure and use of formal language in user responses depends upon the topic of discussion as well as the culture and language of contributors. This paper builds upon the ideas set forth by Montero-Fleta, Montesinos-López, Pérez-Sabater and Turney to look for a correlation between a political forum, language of the parent post, and the structure of the responding network.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS 1. Can a parent post influence the strength and features of a network, including density, centrality, and individuals in the core? We must first look to see if the parent post has any effect on the network. To do this, the measures from LIWC and network measures will be tested for correlation and significance. This research question is critical because, should and effect be found, it can verify that communication accommodation theory is present in online interaction. 2. Are the structure of some networks different than others due to the linguistic processes of the parent post?

 How [Not] to Caffeinate a Political Group

We anticipate that each of the 24 networks will be different due to the different amounts of people in the network as well as the different amounts of interaction. But, we have to take this further and ask why. Is there a statistically significant finding that suggests the diversity of network structures are a result of the diverse language processes used in the parent post? 3. Which linguistic process (social processes, affect processes, cognitive processes, perceptual processes, and biological processes) is the most related to network measures? Should the first two questions result in findings that support a relationship between the sentiment of the parent post and the network structure, we can then look to see how forum leaders can alter their use of language in parent posts to influence measures of density, centralization and core membership. In short, which processes influence which measures?

METHODOLOGY In the following section, we will discuss the combination of social networking, linguistic processes and communication accommodation theory that this paper is oriented in. In order to understand how members of the Coffee Party discussed and debated the issues surrounding the shooting of Representative Giffords, the entire set of 24 parent posts topically related to the event were utilized. In total, 24 parent posts were created and posted on the Coffee Party facebook page from January 8, 2011 at 2:56pm ET to January 17, 2011 at 7:19pm ET. This represents the complete data set, because after January 17, 2011, there were no more posts related to the shooting. To understand the sentiment used in these parent posts and to look for a connection between the parent post and the network structure and composite, Language Inquiry Word Count

(LIWC) was used. The text of the 24 parent posts (not including web links, and thumbnail text from news stories) was run through the tool producing measures of five key categories: social processes, affect processes, cognitive processes, perceptual processes, and biological processes. The output of which was used in comparison to measures of density, centrality, and core/periphery produced by UCINet analytic technologies. Because this study emphasized looking for conversations and direct addressals in a social network, we created 24 directed valued and directed matrices corresponding to the 24 individual parent posts created in the days that followed the shooting. Because we were looking at specific responses to individuals, this is a directed network. It is valued because some individuals addressed each other multiple times. These values can be seen in the thickness of the line, where a thicker line denotes more addressals between a pair. The weighting and directing data collected makes measuring for indegree and outdegree centrality possible. Each of the 24 networks are separate because although there are some members who posted under multiple parent posts, there is a unique combination of individuals in each network. Further, developing a network for each parent posts allows us to segment the conversation and look for the separate relationships based upon specific initiations set forth by administrators. Only the actors who addressed another individual by name were included. To demonstrate that they were addressing individuals, contributors used two different methods. First, they used the “@” sign placed before the addressee. This is a technological affordance used on other social networking sites such as Twitter to link a comment to another’s profile or post. Alternatively, some contributors did not use the “@” sign and instead placed the addressee’s name in text of their message. When a post was addressed to multiple people, this was noted and included in the data set. From these posts, 24 matrices and networks were developed which corresponded to the 24

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parent posts created by the leaders of the Coffee Party Facebook page. Utilizing the tools of UCINet, measures for network density, core/periphery, and centralization were collected for each of the 24 conversational networks. The text of the parent post was run through the LIWC software and the output was recorded. Although LIWC gives an output of over 80 measures, only five measures (social, affect, cognitive, perceptual, biological processes) were utilized in this study. These major five measures encompassed and incorporated many of the additional 75, meaning that they include measures for more words and with higher judged validity than the other measures (http://www.liwc.net/ descriptiontable1.php). Thus, this makes them the five strongest measures of the LIWC output. This too will be discussed in further sections. The data collected was inputted into SPSS to look for correlation. Using the Bivariate Pearson one-tailed test, correlation and significance were tested for every combination of processes and measures.

Network Analysis Network analysis is helpful in understanding groups and language because it provides visualization and statistical measures for members of a group and the group as a whole. These measures include density, centralization, and number of members in the core and periphery. Density. Density relates to “the completeness of the network: the extent to which all possible relations are actually present” (Scott, 2009, p. 32). Density is one of many factors that social network designers strive for. A dense network is a strong network because members are talking to all other members and information is easily and quickly disseminated. Density is measured as a percent or decimal, the closer to 100% or 1.000 the measure is, the higher the density and stronger the network will be.

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Centralization. Centralization is one of the oldest measures of social networks and is concerned with network activity and involvement by all members (Scott, 2009). Because this is a directed network, each member has a measure of indegree centralization and outdegree centralization. This measure is a ratio of the amount of messages sent by the member (outdegree) or received by the member (indegree) compared to all other directed messages in the network. Network centralization then is a ratio of “the actual sum of differences (between in and out degree) to the maximum possible sum of differences” (p. 90). These measures take into account degree (the level of involvement by each member), betweeness (measures where connections are located in the network), and closeness (how quickly and effectively members can interact). A strong network has both high measures of in- and out-degree centrality. Core. Finally, the number of individuals in the core network structure suggests the size of the group of people who make up the majority of the conversation. In networks, there is usually a group of individuals who are very involved with each other and communicate frequently. The other group of people sit on the outside of the network, infrequently talking with each other, or members of the core. A strong core (the larger the core is) the more effectively and efficiently the group can communicate. Although there are many other measures that can be found using UCINet and Social Network Analysis, the results of this study found measures of density, centrality, and core/periphery to be the most significant. By measuring for these three factors of the 24 responding networks and looking for positive and negative correlations between the increase of social, affective, cognitive, perceptual, and biological processes from linguistic inquiry and word count we can look for evidence of a positive or negative increase in density, centralization, number in the core, and the language of the parent post. These language processes will now be discussed in detail.

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New Linguistic Tools To understand this discourse and language we will use a new combination of network analysis, and linguistic inquiry and word count (LIWC) methodology. LIWC is a content analysis tool used to determine “the degree to which people use different categories of words across a wide array of texts” (www.liwc.net, para. 1). Using a dictionary of thousands of words, the program determines the frequency and degree of which words signify specific processes. For example, the program associates certain words with different forms of communication. This study analyzed the five major processes described by LIWC. Social, affective, cognitive, perceptual, and biological processes were measured using the corresponding words identified by the LIWC program. Each process is identified based on the presence of words which are associated with it. A list of examples of the words that denote each process can be found in Figure 4: Examples of words included in LIWC. Because all five processes can be found in the words of one text or post, the output of the program measures the co-presence of each word which denotes a specific process. Therefore, a sentence can have words and measures for all five processes. By process, LIWC means to suggest that it looks for words that identify a psychological construct. Through rigorous testing combining human coders and other content analysis software, words, phrases and punctuation are used to see how a text relates to the five psychological constructs of: Social, affective, cognitive, perceptual, and biological processes. For example, the sentence “You hear about crazy, but it’s rarer than you think,” is high in perceptual processes because of the words, “hear,” “crazy,” “think,” and “you.” The ratio of psychological processes is high because most of the words correspond to this psychological construct. LIWC also produces measures for the other four categories, thus allowing us to have a full analysis of all five processes for each post.

Previously, LIWC has been utilized to measure the changes in sentiment expressed in textual form over the course of an event or period of time. Back, Küfner and Egloff (2010) used the LIWC tool to investigate the emotions expressed through text messages sent after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001. By analyzing a database of 58,000 text messages sent over the first 18 hours after the attack, the researchers looked for patterns of anger, sadness, and anxiety and plotted their frequency. As a result, they were able to create the “emotional timeline” of the hours following the attacks and study the public’s reactions to specific events within that time frame. This chapter builds upon the ground work set forth by Back, Küfner and Egloff (2010). Although they were primarily interested in the emotional (affective processes) of a specific event, we look at how these processes might influence following conversation. These findings are thus oriented and grounded in communication accommodation theory. The following will summarize the findings for the correlation between each linguistic process and measures for density, centrality, and size of core groups

FINDINGS To look for the relationship between parent post and network structure, network statistics were collected and compared. Because the parent post suggests a theme and discussion topic, we propose that the following conversational network is influenced by the linguistic processes prevalent in the post.

Social Processes These processes include language directed to the themes of family, friends, and human beings. The highest amount of correlation found with social

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processes was the density of the corresponding conversational networks. A correlation of -.246 with a significance level of .123 was found. This suggests that as the amount of social processes found within a parent post decreases, the density of the network increases. There was minimal correlation found between degree of network centralization (in or outward ties) and social processes. Positive correlation was found between social process and number of actors in the core group. Although not strong, .155 positive correlation and a .235 significance level was measured. This suggests that as more social linguistic processes are used in the parent post, the number of individuals in the core structure also increases. Network 23 (January 17, 2011 8:34am), a post about a news story on the current state of Giffords (nearly one week after the shooting) and the communities response to her progress, demonstrates the relationship between low social processes and high density. The quoted material from post states “The camera rolling, a man stormed out of the Gadsden Hotel, a historic landmark. He screamed that Giffords was about to get “thrown out” of office, creating such a scene that police intervened.” The social processes output was 6.06 (the second lowest of all the posts) and the density was .1727 (the highest of all the posts).

Affect Processes Affect Processes measures the emotional language of the parent post, including anxiety, anger, and sadness. The highest amount of correlation detected with affect processes regarded the measure of network centralization indegree. Here, a -.182 correlation was found with a significance level of .198. This suggests as the amount of affect process rises in the parent post, the amount of indegree centrality decreases for the network. Negligible results were found in the comparisons of number of actors in the core, network centralization outdegree, and density. Network three (January 8, 2011 4:34pm), instructions from the Coffee Party Organization, 432

show the relation of high amounts of affect processes to low amounts of indegree centrality. The quoted portion of the parent post states “Friends, this is not the moment to justify anger and hatred directed at our own perceived opponents. This is the time to unite in our love for peace and the well-being of our community, country and humanity...” Here, the affect processes measure 15.79 (the highest of all the networks) and the indegree centrality .034 (the third lowest of all networks).

Cognitive Processes Cognitive processes measures look for language related to causation, certainty, and insight. The strongest correlation found with cognitive processes was network density. A -.229 correlation and .141 significance level was found between the variables of cognitive process and network density. This suggests that as the amount of cognitive processes rise in the parent post, the density of the conversational network increases. Negligible results were found for network centralization, and number of actors in core structure. Network 21 (January 15, 2011 12:31pm) demonstrates the negative correlation between cognitive process and density. This network features a quote from Mohandas Gandhi. The parent post states “’anger and intolerance are the enemies of correct understanding.’ - Mohandas Gandhi. Friends, let’s focus on seeking the truth and reaching understanding instead of fingerpointing and fighting. We all need to do some soul-searching and looking in the mirror.” The cognitive processes was 30.77 (the highest for all 24 networks) and the density measure was .031 (the seventh smallest of all 24 networks).

Perceptual Processes These processes deal with language related to sensory items. The most correlation found with perceptual process regarded the number of actors in the core structure. A .162 correlation and .224 significance level were measured with these

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Table 1. Network measures (highlighted portion not included)

variables. As perceptual processes increase, the amount of individuals in the core structure also increases. There were negligible results found with network degree and density. Network 12 (January 11, 2011 8:03pm), featuring a quote by Jon Stewart, demonstrates the positive relationship between perceptual processes and number of individual actors in the core structure. “’You hear about crazy, but it’s rarer than you think.’ - Jon Stewart” The perceptual processes

measure is 8.33 (second highest for this measure) and 10 actors in the core (second highest for this measure).

Biological Processes These measures look for language related to the body, health, or sexuality. The strongest amount of correlation in all networks was found between biological processes and network centrality indegree.

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Figure 1. Network 231

Figure 2. Network 3

A -.341 correlation and .051 significance level was found between these variables, suggesting that as the biological processes increased in the parent post, the indegree centralization would decrease. Correlation was also found between density and biological processes. A -.173 correlation and .209

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significance level was measured, suggesting that as biological processes increase, the density of the network decreases. Negligible results were found between network centrality outdegree and number of actors in the core group.

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Figure 3. Network 21

Figure 4. Network 12

Network eight (January 9, 2011 9:10pm), featuring a news story about Giffords’ relationship with her constituents and the story of another shooting victim, demonstrates the negative correlation found between indegree centrality and measures of biological processes. The parent post states “Though a Republican, Phyllis Schneck

had come to shake Rep. Gabrielle Giffords’ hand. She had moved to escape the New Jersey winters; her husband died of cancer a few years ago.” The biological processes measure was 6.45 (highest for all 24 networks) and the indegree centrality is .072 (tenth smallest for all networks).

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DISCUSSION AND APPLICATION This chapter seeks to investigate the relationship and possible correlations between LIWC outputs of social, affect, cognitive, perceptual, and biological processes and network structure. The communication field has previously identified how the conversation initiator can direct the conversation of a small group or online community (Pardo, Jay, & Krauss, 2010, p. 2254). These findings are supported by communication accommodation theory. This paper seeks to contribute to this literature and look at how group leaders can direct and influence the conversational network through the linguistic processes used in the parent post of an online forum. The results of this paper potentially suggest that by changing the processes used in the parent post, forum leaders can influence network structural elements such as centrality, density, and number of individuals in the core group. Although these results are not widely generalizable, these implications extend beyond online political groups dealing with emotional national events.

Figure 5. Network 8

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In all 24 networks, the most linguistic processes were from the cognitive category. These include measures for insight, causation, discrepancy, certainty, and inhibition (http://www.liwc.net/). This supports the idea that this group was responding to the event by blaming other political groups (i.e. the Tea Party Patriots) and looking for cause and effect relationships between those groups and the latest information on the shooting. This supports Back, Küfner, and Egloff’s (2011) concept that affect processes are less prevalent than cognitive processes when dealing with a longitudinal look at a traumatic event (p. 1417). The strongest correlation was found between biological processes and network centralization indegree. Biological processes include measures for words about the body, health, sexuality, and ingestion. Although biological processes were not the most prevalent throughout the 24 networks, the findings regarding correlation have important implications. The more biological processes included in the parent post of a network, the more directed comments (indegree network centrality) can be expected (Scott, 2009, p. 69). This suggest

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if an online political group leader wants to increase the amount of directed posts in the conversational network, they can increase the amount of references to biological processes in the parent post. This strong level of correlation answers the first research question. Linguistic processes in the parent post can influence the structure of the network. Other findings in this study support this as well. Social, cognitive, and biological processes were also found to be negatively correlated with network density. In all three cases, these measures were negatively correlated, suggesting that as these processes increase, the density of the networks decrease. Martino and Spoto (2006) state that “density indicates in an immediate way how our network is cohesive as a whole” (p. 67). To increase the amount of cohesion in the conversational network, leaders creating a parent post could try decreasing the amount of social, cognitive, and biological processes. Our results indicate that these have the potential to create divides and fewer connections between actors in the network. This supports Jeong’s (2006) notion that “messages with more conversational language were more likely to elicit responses to produce more critical discussions than messages with less conversational language” (p. 390). Following Jeong’s theory and use of accommodation theory, perceptual and affective linguistic processes have more conversational language because of the higher density and more critical discussions produced. This could be because the other three processes often imply that respondents must take a firm stance of support or opposition to the statements made in the parent post. Rather than encouraging conversation and discussion, these posts boost a different response. The strongest connections between parent post linguistic processes and the structure of the network are related to density, and indegree network centrality. Perceptual processes also support that the amount of actors in the core of the network is related to the parent post. For a stronger core, leaders should create parent posts with high

amounts of perceptual processes such as seeing, hearing, and feeling. The core and periphery of the network are important to an online group because this can demonstrate the most active members. The strength of the connections between actors in the core can also relate to the desire for future participation and involvement in the group.

Communication Accommodation Theory While this paper originally sought out to look at the presence of communication accommodation theory, strict and generalizable results were not found. However, this remains a very important area of research when it comes to online communication. Communication accommodation theory is often described as an unconscious process of adapting to the needs of a conversational pair. While we found that the tone of the administrator most certainly influences the network, it is unclear if this is the result of accommodation on an individual level. A qualitative approach could be used to study this, by examining the content of messages in addition to their tone. Further, applying LIWC to the actual content of the conversational messages could investigate an effect that goes beyond network measures and further examine message content. This could have stronger evidence to support or oppose the presence of communication accommodation theory in online political networks.

Future Studies Beyond gaining an understanding of the way that LIWC and network analysis can be used together methodologically, this study provides insight into the new forms of political interaction in online contexts. The Coffee and Tea Party are relatively new political movements and forces, which gained widespread acceptance and support in the 2010 midterm election season (Mascaro, Novak, Goggins, 2012). Because both groups were founded

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online, it is important for researchers to understand how their online communication is structured. This paper begins to examine this by looking at the influence of parent posts on the conversational network, but this far from completes the investigation. Questions remain regarding the extent of this influence, as well as the construction of the conversational pairs. What are the other influences on the conversational network? What role did this subject matter and content of these posts play in the conversational network? How could this study be improved using qualitative methods? How much of an influence does the political orientation of the group have on the structure of conversation?

CONCLUSION The findings of this study suggest that the structure of a conversational network in an online political group is related to the linguistic processes of the parent post. Network measures such as density, degree centrality and number of actors in the core are correlated with different amounts of psychological constructs. Further research needs to be done on other network measures such as betweeness, closeness, cliques, and centrality and power. Additionally, looking at the other 75 linguistic measures could also produce statistically significant results regarding the smaller linguistic processes. This methodology could also be used to look at other active and historical political online groups. We are only beginning to understand how parent posts and group administrators can influence the direction and structure of online group discussion and debate. However, as these results show, influence goes far beyond topical and can impact the way that group members address the group and each other.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Affect Processes: A measure in Linguistic Inquiry Word Count of the emotional language, including anxiety, anger, and sadness. Biological Processes: A measure in Linguistic Inquiry Word Count of language related to the body, health, or sexuality.

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Cognitive Processes: A measure in Linguistic Inquiry Word Count of language related to causation, certainty, and insight. LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry Word Count): A tool used to determine linguistic sentiment in a body of text. Network Analysis: A method used to determine the connectivity, direction, and weight of social interaction. Network Core: In network analysis, the points that are central and highly connected. Network Density: In network analysis, a ratio of connections to individual points of contact. Perceptual Processes: A measure in Linguistic Inquiry Word Count that deals with language related to sensory items.

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Social Processes: A measure in Linguistic Inquiry Word Count of the language directed to the themes of family, friends, and human beings.

ENDNOTES 1



Names in all networks have been changed to protect users identity

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APPENDIX 1

Example of parent post

APPENDIX 2 Example of directed and weighted network (10)

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APPENDIX 3 Example of posting with the “@” sign

APPENDIX 4 Examples of words included in LIWC

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487

About the Contributors

Ashu M. G. Solo is an interdisciplinary researcher and developer, electrical engineer, computer engineer, intelligent systems engineer, political and public policy engineer, mathematician, political writer, public policy analyst, political operative, engineering entrepreneur, former infantry platoon commander understudy, and progressive activist. Solo has over 500 research and political commentary publications. He is the creator of multidimensional matrix mathematics and its subsets, multidimensional matrix algebra and multidimensional matrix calculus, all of which are published. He is the originator of public policy engineering, computational public policy, political engineering, computational politics, and network politics, all of which are published. He co-developed some of the best published methods for maintaining power flow in and multiobjective optimization of radial power distribution system operations using intelligent systems. Solo is the principal of Maverick Technologies America Inc. and Trailblazer Intelligent Systems, Inc. He previously worked in 9 different research and development labs in universities and companies. He has served on 212 international program committees for research conferences. He is a fellow of the British Computer Society. He won two Outstanding Achievement Awards, two Distinguished Service Awards, and three Achievement Awards from research conferences. Solo is the CEO of the Saskatoon Provincial Green Party Association in Canada, the former acting CEO of the Saskatoon-Humboldt Federal Green Party Association, an electoral district association for one of five parties represented in the Canadian parliament, and a former representative on the City of Saskatoon Cultural Diversity and Race Relations Committee. Solo previously served honorably as an infantry officer (occupation) and platoon commander understudy (appointment) in the Cdn. Army Reserve. *** Anas Alahmed is currently a PhD candidate in the School of Journalism at Indiana University – Bloomington. He has been working as a journalist for almost a decade. His area of interests is Arab media and Arab politics and social movements, the relationship between politics and the media in the Arab world, and how the landscape of new media and the Internet transform society as well as political decisions in the Arab world. He has published several articles on that subject matter in a variety of national and international magazines and newspapers, in addition to several academic publications. Mohamad Alkhouja is a Data Science researcher and Big Data specialist with focus on scalable Machine Learning and applications of Big Data technologies in politics, social studies and development. Mohamad has experience in technology consulting and research in private and public sectors including Oracle, University of Maryland Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, International Research and Exchange Board, and the United Nations Development Program. He is a Fulbright alumni and holds a Master from the University of Maryland, College Park and a Bachelor of Engineering from Damascus University.

About the Contributors

Jo Arney is an assistant professor in the department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Wisconsin – La Crosse. Nelli Babayan is a Senior researcher within TRANSWORLD project and a lecturer at the Freie Universität Berlin. Her main research interests include democracy promotion/democratization, EU and US foreign policies, and transatlantic relations. Her book on EU and US democracy promotion is to be published by Routledge in 2014. Mohamad Zaini Abu Bakar, PhD, is Senior Lecturer and currently Deputy Dean (Academic) at the School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM). Dr. Mohamad Zaini earned his Bachelor of Social Sciences (with Hons) from Universiti Sains Malaysia in 1985. In 1995, he joined the graduate program in Peace and Conflict Management at the University of Bradford, United Kingdom for Master and PhD. His research interest include Islamic Political Economy, Islamic Conflict Management, Ethnic Relation, and Community-Based Organisation. A number of his articles on ethnic relations, conflict management, Islamic political economy in Malaysia have been published in journals, chapters in books, and conference proceedings. In addition, he has served as consultant on several research projects funded by government agencies and nongovernmental organizations. Stanislas Bigirimana holds a Doctor of Philosophy from the Ruprecht-Karls-University in Heidelberg (Germany), a Masters of Arts in Philosophy from the University of Zimbabwe, and a Master of Business Administration (MBA) from Azaliah University, Albuquerque, New Mexico (USA). He is a senior lecturer at Africa University in Mutare (Zimbabwe). His diverse academic interests converge on the fact the information society in his view calls for a series of paradigm changes that imply at the metaphysical level recognising reality as complex and at the epistemological level designing new approaches and models that accommodate not only the intrinsic complexity of reality but the dynamic and integrative nature of individual and collective human processes. His doctoral thesis on the epistemological implications of the information revolution assesses the needed paradigm changes for a model of human knowing that integrates the emotional, intellectual, ethical, and practical abilities of the human person and that influences organisational, decision-making, and problem-solving processes in a dynamic and integrative pattern. He grounds these paradigm changes in a global “information society” that defines itself as a “knowledge society.” Jonathan Bishop is an information technology executive, researcher, and writer. He has a total of 4 degrees and over 50 research publications, including a patent and 4 edited books. Jonathan has always been interested in blending his interests in politics with technology. He first became a councillor in 2003 during his MSc in E-Learning at the University of South Wales, and following gaining his LLM in European Union Law from USW, he became a town councillor between 2008 and 2012, during which time he also gained a MScEcon in Information Systems from Aberystwyth University. Jonathan is now the leader of a minor party in the UK called The Pluralist Party, which he has contested 4 elections in the name of, seeking to encourage inter-party dialogue and cooperation among those in politics with different ideologies. At the time of going to press, he had contested a total of 7 public elections to 4 different local councils. In 2005, Jonathan founded the Centre for Research into Online Communities and E-Learning Systems, which has led to a number of companies and initiatives, including Crocels CMG CYF, The Crocels Press Limited and Crocels News, Inc. In his spare time, Jonathan enjoys swimming, listening to music, and chess. 488

About the Contributors

Porismita Borah is an Assistant professor at the Edward R. Murrow College of Communication, Washington State University, Pullman, WA. She has her PhD (2010) in Mass Communications from University of Wisconsin – Madison. Her research interests are digital media and political communication. G. R. Boynton is a professor of new media and politics in the Department of Political Science at the University of Iowa. He earned his PhD from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1964 and has been a professor at the University of Iowa since. He is the program director of Political Science at the National Science Foundation 1972-1974. His research has covered citizen support for governments, comparative legislative politics, mathematics and politics, cognitive processing, congressional committee action, campaign advertising, global news production, governing Medieval England, and now new media and politics with a special emphasis on political communication via Twitter. Currently, he is the president of the American Political Science Association section on Information Technology and Politics. Stefano Braghiroli is a post-doctoral researcher at the Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu. His main research interests include politics in the European Parliament, e-politics, EU enlargement, and party politics in Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey. His most recent publications include articles in the Journal of Contemporary European Research, Rivista Il Mulino, and Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, and various book chapters in publications with highly renowned publishing houses. Yana Breindl is a post-doctoral researcher at the Institute of political science and the Göttingen Centre for Digital Humanities, Georg-August University Göttingen. She holds a BA, MA, and PhD from the Université Libre de Bruxelles and has researched at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford. Her work focuses on digital rights campaigning and the regulation of digital content in liberal democracies. Jonathan Cox holds a Masters degree in Community Organising from Queen Mary, University of London. His dissertation, “Neighbourhoods Controlling their own Destinies,” won the Principal’s Prize in 2011. In addition to seven years of experience as a community organiser with Citizens UK, he now co-teaches the Postgraduate Certificate in Community Organising at Queen Mary, University of London with Professor Jane Wills. Kevin Fernandez is a Senior Lecturer at Universiti Kelantan Malaysia (UMK). He recently completed his PhD at Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) on new media and social movements in Malaysia. He was a recipient of a scholarship from the Ministry of Higher Education in Malaysia for his Masters at the University of Malaya and a fellowship recipient at USM for his PhD. During the course of his PhD, he was also a recipient of the Erasmus Mundus Scholarship spending a total of 11 months at Humboldt Universitat, Berlin. Kevin was also a regular attendee for the seminars and conferences held at the Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (HIIG) during the study excursion. His research interest includes the politics of resistance, new media social movements. He has published several journal articles and news commentaries. Johannes Fritz studied Political Science and Economics at Duke University in the United States and at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg in Germany from which he graduated with a Master’s degree in 2009. In 2009-2010, Fritz prepared a report together with Professor Roland Sturm on the petition system of the United Kingdom as part of the research project “Electronic Petitions and the Modernisa489

About the Contributors

tion of Petition Systems in Europe,” which was carried out by the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag on behalf of the German Bundestag. In 2013, Fritz received a PhD in Political Science from the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. In his dissertation, published by Nomos Verlag, he analyzes decision-making processes in German and UK Internet politics. Since 2013, Fritz heads the office of the lord major of the city of Ansbach, Germany. Nuhu Gapsiso is a lecturer in the Department of Mass Communication, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria. His teaching and research interest is in area of Health Communication, Public Relations, and Journalism. His most recent research (yet to be published) is on Media Coverage of Human Rights Issues in Nigeria. He is a member of African Council for Communication Education. He is a member of Faculty of Social Sciences, Board of Examiners, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria. He has served as resource person and facilitator in several workshops in Nigeria. M. V. Rajeev Gowda is Professor of Economics and Social Sciences at the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore. He has a PhD in Public Policy and Management from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. His work is broadly at the intersection of Business, Government, and Society, including risk analysis and public policy. His research on Indian political parties and electoral reform draws on his active participation in Indian politics. Jim Jorstad is a leading force in the innovative use of technology and media. He currently is the Director of Academic Technologies at the University of Wisconsin – La Crosse. Jim is known for his work with technology in teaching and learning, strategic use of social media, and learning space design. He is a frequent lecturer for academics and corporations worldwide. Jim is a global journalist with his work appearing on CNN, MSNBC, Forbes, and NPR. His blog, The Learning Space, is followed by nearly 100 countries. A 2013 CNN iReport Spirit Award-winner, his work has nearly 1 million views worldwide. A former member of the EDUCAUSE Quarterly, he is a Leading Change Fellow, one of 50 leading IT professionals chosen worldwide. In 2008, he was the recipient of the Mediasite UNLEASH Return on Investment Award. Jim describes himself as an innovative technologist who is passionate, innovative, and creative. John Kane works in the School of Government and International Relations, Griffith University, teaching and researching in political theory, leadership and foreign policy. He has several times been Visiting Professor to Yale University and is the author of numerous articles on politics and political theory. His books include The Politics of Moral Capital (Cambridge UP, 2001) and Between Virtue and Power: The Persistent Moral Dilemma of US Foreign Policy (Yale UP, 2008). His most recent book (co-authored with Haig Patapan) is The Democratic Leader: How Democracy Defines, Empowers and Limits its Leaders (Oxford UP, 2012). Elitza Katzarova is currently a PhD. candidate at the School of International Studies, at the University of Trento, Italy. She was also a visiting fellow at the University of Vienna in 2011-2012 and has spent a 6-month research period at the headquarters of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, France as part of her dissertation data collection. Her research interests include international anti-corruption measures and the social construction of problems and identities in a global setting. 490

About the Contributors

Amadu Wurie Khan, PhD, was Research Associate in the University of Edinburgh. He has undertaken research on marginalised communities including asylum seekers’/refugees’ engagement with news media communication including new media technology. He is a career human rights journalist and freelance research consultant on media communication and citizenship. Emmanuel Koku is a sociologist with interests in the social networks, sexual health behaviors, new media use, and knowledge/learning networks. He completed his PhD in Sociology from the University of Toronto (Canada). His current research examines socio-demographic determinants of HIV risk in Africa, the lived-experiences of persons living with HIV in Africa and US, as well as professional and informal networks of academic researchers and policy makers. He has published in Sociological Research Online and Virtual Community Practices and Social Interactive Media: Technology Lifecycle and Workflow Analysis. Kerry Kuenzi is a doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado’s School of Public Affairs. She studies networks, collaborative governance, and public and nonprofit management. She teaches political science and public administration classes. She is currently finishing her dissertation, which tests a theory of network effectiveness utilizing data on public health networks. Azi Lev-On is the chair of the school of communication in Ariel University, Israel. His studies explore behaviors and collective action in computer-mediated environments, employing a variety of methods such as link analysis, laboratory experiments, surveys, and interviews. Cecilia G. Manrique is professor and chair of the Political Science/Public Administration Department at the University of Wisconsin – La Crosse. She received her doctorate in Political Science from the University of Notre Dame. She has published in the fields of immigration (The Multicultural or Immigrant Faculty in American Society) and incorporating technology in the Political Science classroom (The Houghton Mifflin Guide to the Internet for Political Science) and writes regular reviews for Computing Reviews. She has been a member of the American Political Science Association (APSA) since 1988, was President of the Computers and Multimedia Section (now Information Technology and Politics) of APSA, and has been Treasurer since 1995. She is also the Treasurer of the Wisconsin Political Science Association. In 2012, she completed a second three-year term as President of the International Leadership Council of the Golden Key International Honour Society. She is married to Gabriel and has two children, Patrick and Michelle. Eldred V. Masunungure is a Political Science and Public Administration graduate of the University of Zimbabwe and Dalhousie University (Canada) and teaches in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zimbabwe. His current research interests include elections, political transitions, governance, policy-making, and related topics. He edited Defying the Winds of Change: Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections (2009) and Zimbabwe: Mired in Transition (2012). He is also widely published in local and international journals. Brilliant Mhlanga holds a PhD from the University of Westminster. He is currently a member of the Mass Media and Communications Group and a Senior Lecturer in Media Cultures at the University of Hertfordshire, and remains affiliated to the National University of Science and Technology (NUST), 491

About the Contributors

Zimbabwe. He is currently working on a number of topics, among them a book titled Bondage of Boundaries & the ‘Toxic Other’ in Postcolonial Africa: The Northern Problem & Identity Politics Today, and another project provisionally titled On the Banality of Evil: Cultural Particularities & Genocide in Africa. His research interests include media and development communication, community radio, ethnic minority media, ethnicity, nationalism and postcolonial studies, media policies, and political economy of the media. Mandlenkosi Mpofu is a Researcher and PhD Candidate in the Department of Media and Communication, University of Oslo, Norway. He is also a Lecturer in the Department of Journalism and Media Studies, National University of Science and Technology, Zimbabwe. Shepherd Mpofu holds a PhD in Media studies from the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits University). His thesis looked at public and new media in the construction of Zimbabwean national identities. He is a human and media rights activist. His research interests are media, audiences and texts, African media systems, global media systems, media and identity, media and memory, media, politics and democracy, and development and cultural studies. Dr. Mpofu has tutored at Wits University and remains a lecturer at the University of Science and Technology in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. As a young and upcoming academic, Dr. Mpofu is working on publishing his thesis into journal articles and turning it into a book. Alison N. Novak is a PhD Candidate and Instructor in Drexel University’s Department of Culture and Communication. She has a B.A. in Public Relations and Organizational Communication from Marist College. Her primary area of study includes the millennial generations political and media engagement. She has also published with The Journal of Information, Technology and Politics and edited volumes such as Web 2.0 Technologies and Democratic Governance: Political, Policy, and Management Implications and Teen Pregnancy and MTV: Critical Essays on 16 and Pregnant and Teen Mom. She also writes for the Huffington Post on politics and the millennial generation. Sivamurugan Pandian is Associate Professor and the former Deputy Dean (Research and Graduate Studies) at the School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia. He has a BA in Anthropology and Sociology from University of Malaya, Malaysia and pursued his MA in International Politics at Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan. In 2004, he obtained his PhD in Political Sociology from University of Malaya, Malaysia. His research interests include leadership, political behavior, ethnic relations, international politics, and social issues. He is the author/editor of several books and has contributed articles to numerous journals, magazines, and newspapers. He was a US Government International Visitor Leadership Program participant; one of the ASEAN – Republic of Korea Academic Exchange Fellowship recipients; Sumitomo Foundation, Japan fellowship recipient; visiting fellow at University of Tokyo, Seoul National University and SungKyunKwan University, South Korea. He was also granted the “Tokoh 1 Malaysia Award” in the year 2009 and appointed as one of the members for National Integration Training and Research Institute Advisory Council in 2010, and has been a member of the National Education Advisory Council since 2010.

492

About the Contributors

Haig Patapan is Director oof the Centre for Governance and Public Policy Centre, Griffith University, Australia. His research interests include political philosophy, comparative constitutionalism, and judicial politics. In addition to numerous journal articles and book chapters, he is the author of Judging Democracy (Cambridge UP 2000) and Machiavelli in Love: The Modern Politics of Love and Fear (Lexington 2006), Globalisation and Equality (co-edited, Routledge 2004), Westminster Legacies (co-edited, UNSW Press 2005). His most recent book (co-authored with John Kane) is The Democratic Leader: How Democracy Defines, Empowers, and Limits its Leaders (Oxford UP, 2012). Purnima Prakash is a Research Assistant with the Centre for Public Policy, Indian Institute Management Bangalore. Presently, she is engaged in a longitudinal study of low-income settlements of Bangalore in the context of social and spatial mobility. She has a Masters in Sociology from Oxford University and is a graduate of Stella Maris College, Madras University. Her research interests include urban development, history, poverty, and Indian politics. Glenn W. Richardson, Jr., PhD., University of Iowa, has been published in the Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, Journal of Communication, Political Communication, Rhetoric and Public Affairs, American Communication Journal, Political Research Quarterly, and Poroi. He is the author of Visual Storytelling and the Competition for Political Meaning in Political Advertising and News in Campaign 2000, which earned the 2002 American Communication Journal Article of the Year Award. His book, Pulp Politics: How Political Advertising Tells the Stories of American Politics, was published in a second edition by Rowman and Littlefield in 2008. He is also the author of “Ad Watch 3.0: Developing Audiovisual and Narrative Techniques for Engaging the Audiovisual Content of Political Advertising,” published in Poroi (2012) Vol. 8: Iss. 1. He teaches courses in American Government, the American Presidency, American Political Thought, Constitutional Law, American Political Parties, and Public Opinion. António Rosas is a Portuguese Political Scientist and a specialist in New Media, who has a PhD in Political Science and a M.A. in Culture and Communication. As a researcher, he was Research Director of the Meta-Activism Project, an international project funded by Mary Joyce, New Media Operations Manager at Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign, aimed at studying online activism throughout the world. This project is now hosted by Mary Joyce and Philip Howard at the University of Washington. Author or co-editor of several articles and books on political ideologies, social movements, and digital activism, António Rosas is Tutor at Universidade Aberta, Lisbon, and an Associate Researcher at CLEPUL, Research Centre of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Lisbon, Portugal. You can find his personal Web page at http://antoniorosas.wordpress.com. Keren Sereno graduated cum laude with her Master in the Political Communication from the Department of Communication and Journalism at The Hebrew University, Israel. Since 2008, she has been working as independent researcher and a lecturer in various academic institutions in Israel. Her research interests are the uses of the Internet by social movements and their implications on collective action.

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About the Contributors

Chirag Shah is an assistant professor in the School of Communication and Information (SC&I) and an affiliate faculty of Dept. of Computer Science at Rutgers University. He received his PhD from School of Information and Library Science (SILS) at UNC Chapel Hill, and MS in Computer Science from UMass Amherst. His research interests include studies of interactive information seeking, especially in the context of online social networks and collaborations, contextual information mining, and applications of social media services for exploring critical socio-political issues. He is the author of a book on collaborative information seeking, published by Springer. He has also developed several systems for collecting and analyzing data from social media channels, including award-winning ContextMiner, InfoExtractor, and TubeKit. His latest project is SOCRATES (SOcial and CRowdsourced ActiviTies Extraction System), funded by the NSF, and intended to create a new platform for collecting, analyzing, and exploring social media data. Sam Takavarasha, Jr. is a PhD Candidate at the University of Zimbabwe. He is a computer and information systems graduate from University of Portsmouth, and his research interests include ICT for development and poverty reduction, e-politics, e-commerce, and other related information systems subjects. Sam is the author of several information systems journal and conference papers. Joseph Wilson is a lecturer in the Department of Mass Communication, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria. His teaching and research interest is in the field of Information and Communication Technology/New Media, African Communication System, and Journalism. His most recent research (yet to be published) is on Interactivity in Online Print Media. He is a Member of African Council for Communication Education (ACCE) and European Communication Research and Education Association (ECREA). He is a member of Faculty of Social Sciences, Board of Examiners, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria.

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495

Index A Aam Aadmi Party 245, 251 Activism Networks 316 Affect Processes 429, 432, 436, 439 Alternative Media 166, 172, 178 Anna Hazare 240, 242, 244-246, 248-250, 258-259, 263, 266-268 Anti-Corruption 48, 168, 240-243, 246, 248-250, 258-259, 261, 264-268, 271 Apolitical 245, 255, 311-312 Arab Spring 1-9, 12, 14-15, 24, 31-32, 38, 49, 51, 53-54, 148-152, 160, 209, 231-234, 238, 300, 305, 335, 356, 364, 366, 377 Arab Uprisings 11, 14, 27-28, 31-33, 36 Arvind Kejriwal 242 Asylum Seekers 382, 384-391, 393-401, 405 asylum-seeking migration 385-389, 393, 397, 399401 Attitude Certainty 407-408, 414, 417-418, 420, 424

B Belonging 16, 63, 66, 71-73, 124, 278, 284, 288, 374, 384-387, 390-393, 397-401, 405 Biological Processes 429-431, 433-437, 439 blogs 85, 89-90, 136, 167-168, 181, 189-191, 197, 199, 206, 208, 231-233, 247, 250, 307, 325, 356-358, 367, 407-408, 410, 416, 418, 420, 424

C Capacity of Information Sharing 337-339, 348-349 Citizen Journalism 36, 57, 211 citizenship 5, 9, 39-40, 58, 143, 261, 274, 278, 284, 294, 382-398, 400, 405 City Politics 24 Civic Cultures 273-275, 290-291, 294 CNN iReports 191, 198-201, 206 Coffee Party 425-427, 429-430, 432 Cognitive Processes 429, 432, 436, 440 Collective Bargaining 190-192, 194, 198-199, 204, 211 Collective Energy 4-5, 25 Community Organising 156, 364-366, 369-370, 375-377, 379, 381 connectivity 5-7, 13, 53, 66-67, 79, 82-86, 106-107, 351, 354, 356, 440

conviviality 147-150, 153, 158, 161-163, 377-378 Convivial Tools 147-150, 161-162, 165, 377 Corruption 9, 38, 40, 42-48, 54, 103-104, 137, 211, 232, 236, 240-251, 258, 264-265, 267, 271, 297, 356, 426 Crawler or Web Crawler 189 Cyberactivism 39, 47, 51, 54-55, 57 Cyber Anonymity 36 Cyber Movements 11, 25 Cyber Security 36

D Day of Rage 38, 51-53 Deliberative Publicity 262-264, 266-268, 271 Democracy Promoter 335-339, 343, 346-347, 349 Democratic Deficit 355, 362, 392 Devolution 138-139, 319-320, 330, 334 Diaspora 14, 95, 114-116, 120, 128, 132, 135, 394, 397, 400, 405 Diaspora Networks 394, 405 Diasporic Groups 130, 145 Digital Rights Activism 274, 276, 279-280, 283, 291, 294-295 Digital Skills 275, 282, 290-291, 295 Direct Democracy 5, 132, 305, 355, 362

E E-Activeness 335-340, 343-345, 347-349 E-Democracy 102, 351-352, 354-355, 362 E-Government 97, 232, 238, 354, 362 Email Marketing 147, 149, 157, 159, 161, 165 E-Mobilization 165 Epistemic Networks 352, 362 E-Politics 156, 160, 165, 231-232, 238, 351, 364365, 368, 371, 375-376, 379 EU 273-275, 280-288, 291, 305-307, 335-336, 339348, 350, 400 Evaluations 374, 381, 415 E-Voting 101, 231-233, 235, 238

F Filter Bubble 31, 36, 359 framing effects 407, 411-413, 416

Index

G

M

Genocide 115, 120-123, 128, 131, 138, 145 Giffords, Gabrielle 216, 230, 425-426, 435 globalization 5-6, 50, 63, 84, 196, 276, 352, 365 Global Solidarity 2, 25

Majalis 41, 58 Manipulative Publicity 262-266, 268, 271 Mass Media 136, 141, 197, 240, 255, 285, 409 Memory 114-124, 126, 128, 131, 133, 142-143, 228, 282, 285 Mthwakazi 120, 129, 131, 133-134, 137-139, 145

H Habermas 117, 123, 136, 162, 261-268, 271, 274, 352-354, 357, 362 Hackers 30, 159, 163, 276, 279, 284, 287-288, 290, 295 Hacktivism 160, 165, 283 Harvester 183-184, 187, 189 House Meetings 370, 373-374, 376, 381 humanitarian norm 382-383, 386, 388, 392-393, 398-399 Human Rights 10, 43-44, 46, 65, 67-68, 72-75, 84, 87, 94-95, 98, 102-105, 109, 111, 113, 118, 121, 141, 151, 154, 159, 169, 233, 283, 294, 304, 386, 389, 391-393, 397-399, 401 Hyperlink 60-72, 74-75, 77, 79, 87-88, 308

I Incivility 407-416, 418-420, 424 India 101, 213, 240-251, 266-268 India Against Corruption 240, 242, 248-249, 267 Information Age 1-4, 6-9, 13-14, 37-40, 43, 47, 50, 54-55, 94, 114-115, 117, 147-153, 156-158, 160-163, 233-235, 355, 364-373, 375-379, 381 Information Flow 4-5, 8, 30, 40, 48, 53-55, 57, 6162, 66, 79, 81-82, 85, 88, 196, 267 information sharing 99, 111, 227, 336-339, 343, 348-349, 395 Interactive Media 95, 113 Internet Activism 38, 57, 301, 337, 347 Internet Penetration 134, 148, 157, 335, 339-340, 343, 346-347, 349 Islamist Social Movement 41, 57

L Labor Unions 194, 211 Languages 85, 109, 189, 247, 337-338, 341, 343, 394 Limbaugh, Rush 229 Linguistic Inquiry Word Count 425, 439-440 Linguistic Processes 429, 431-432, 436-438 Link Analysis 60, 62, 65-66, 77, 79, 81-82, 84, 86, 88-90, 93 Link Strategy 79 LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry Word Count) 440 496

N National citizenship 382-383, 385-386, 390, 398, 400, 405 National Identity 14, 114, 116-118, 120-121, 354 Netcitizens 281, 288, 295 Net Neutrality 231, 233, 235-236, 238, 280-281, 290 Network Analysis 66, 79, 84, 308, 425, 430-431, 437, 440 Network Core 440 Network Density 430, 432, 437, 440 Network Ethnography 66, 69, 79 Network Politics 231-236, 238-239, 365 New politics 1, 7, 9, 13, 25, 38, 50, 76, 321 News Frames 407-409, 411, 414-415, 418, 420-421, 424 New Social Movement 1, 48, 55 NGOs 16, 63-65, 81, 84-85, 87-90, 93, 149, 153154, 156, 158-159, 242, 255, 342, 371, 374 Nigeria 94-101, 103-105, 107-109, 111, 113

O One-to-One (1-2-1) 381 Online Activism 16, 26-32, 36, 39, 55, 148, 152, 248, 379 Online Citizenship 39, 58 Online Petitioning 319, 322, 330, 334 Online Presence 81-82, 89, 151, 335, 337-339, 343, 347-349 Open-Mindedness 414, 417, 420, 424

P Palin, Sarah 213, 220-221, 223-224, 230 People Power 1, 7, 14, 52 Perceptual Processes 429, 431-433, 437, 440 Petition Committee 319, 321, 327, 334 Petition System 319, 321-331, 334 political activists 151-152, 156, 158, 232-233, 244, 398 Political Agency 273-274, 289, 291, 295, 382-388, 391-401, 405 Political Blogosphere 407-410, 413, 415-416, 418, 420, 424

Index

political blogs 85, 167, 231-233, 357, 420 Political Coding 280, 287-288, 295 Political Communication 93, 119, 147, 149, 151153, 157, 162, 213, 231-233, 239, 367-368, 409, 412-413 Political Culture 3, 9, 41-43, 45, 51, 53, 55, 58, 77, 192, 300-301, 304, 312, 314, 426 political detainees 44 Political discourse 12, 39, 47, 61, 179-181, 187, 212, 224-225, 227-228, 230, 245, 408, 410, 420, 427 Political Ideologies 255, 290, 316 Political Information 1-2, 12, 15, 20, 24, 37, 53-55, 150, 161, 259, 275, 410 Political Mobilization 2, 4-6, 9-10, 12-16, 38, 167, 242, 248, 250, 255 political participation 4, 10-11, 15, 25, 38, 43, 55, 151, 208-209, 274-275, 277, 295-296, 298, 304, 325-326, 385, 394, 399, 417, 427 political reforms 13 Political Trust 407-408, 414-415, 417-418, 420, 424 Precarious Workers 297, 302, 307, 313, 316 Progressive Reform 211 psychological mechanisms 407-408, 415-416, 418420 Public Comments 180, 182-183, 187, 189, 200 Push-ICT Theory 98, 113

Social Network Sites (SNS) 11, 13, 19, 61, 66, 69, 79, 84, 89, 129, 133-134, 143, 179-180, 189, 196, 203, 211, 277, 308, 351, 425-426, 429-430 Social-Political Blogging 178 Social Processes 132, 140, 301, 392, 429, 431-432, 440 sovereignty 213, 276, 322, 351-352, 362, 382-395, 397-401, 405 State sovereignty 352, 382-383, 386-388, 390-391, 393, 398-401, 405 Street Politics 7, 25 Structured Data 189 Subaltern 129-130, 132, 139, 145 Surveillance 27, 29-30, 147-149, 152-153, 161-163, 165, 180, 259, 261, 279

T

Qualitative Assessment 323, 334 Quantitative Assessment 325, 334

Taboo 114-116, 123-126 Tahrir Square 3, 7-9, 25, 193 Tea Party Patriots 425-427, 436 Technological Convergence 109, 145 Technologized Citizenship 397-398, 405 transnationalism 382, 398 Transnational Politics 385, 405 transnational protests 1, 13 Transparency 11, 25, 37, 46-48, 51, 99, 101-102, 107, 190, 198, 258-266, 268, 271, 281, 325, 362 tweets 40, 45, 198-199, 203, 206, 220-221, 223, 230, 347, 378 Typology of Linking Strategies 65-66, 79

R

U

Rally 168, 223, 242-243, 245, 250, 255, 374 Recall 70, 123, 128, 192, 194, 201, 203, 206, 211, 352 Republic of Letters 351-354, 356-357, 359, 362

Update Frequency 337, 339, 343, 348-349 USA 62-63, 77, 345, 370 USAID 335-336, 339, 342-344, 346-348, 350

Q

S Saudi Arabia 32, 37-55 Self-Determination 47, 129-130, 138-139, 145, 280, 283 Sentiment Analysis 184, 189 Shooting 212-216, 218-220, 225-230, 425, 427, 429, 432, 435-436 Smart Mobs 197, 211 Social Media Platform 26-28, 30-32, 258-261, 263, 266-267, 271, 276 Social Movements 1, 3-5, 10-15, 18-19, 25, 34, 37-43, 47, 49, 54-55, 57-58, 148, 151-153, 196, 209, 242, 251, 255, 297-301, 307, 310, 316

V Vetting (iReporting) 211

W Web 2.0 61, 166, 181, 211, 297, 299-300, 306, 316 Willingness to Participate 407-408, 414, 417-420, 424 Wisconsin Spring 190, 192

Z Zimbabwe 114-115, 117-125, 129-132, 134-139, 143, 147-149, 151, 154, 160-162, 392 497