Hamas Transformation : Opportunities and Challenges [1 ed.] 9781443885744, 9781443878340

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Hamas Transformation

Hamas Transformation: Opportunities and Challenges By

Ibrahim Natil

Hamas Transformation: Opportunities and Challenges By Ibrahim Natil This book first published 2015 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2015 by Ibrahim Natil All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-7834-0 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-7834-0

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ..................................................................................... vii Abbreviations ............................................................................................. ix Chapter One ................................................................................................. 1 Introduction Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 13 The Way to Hamas: Revival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza Strip (1967-1980) Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 27 Hamas Emergence in the Gaza Strip Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 43 Hamas’ Social Welfare: from Opposition to Government Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 63 Differences between Hamas’ Internal and External Leadership Chapter Six ................................................................................................ 89 Hamas’ Political Development Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 115 Hamas between Governance and Palestinian Division Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 139 Hamas between the Arab Spring and Palestinian Reconciliation Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 153 Epilogue Notes........................................................................................................ 167

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are so many friends and colleagues to acknowledge who always encouraged me to tackle the obstacles I faced while completing this thesis. This book could not have been completed without the full support of the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University. I am especially grateful to Professor Andrew Rigby and Dr Marwan Darweish who from the beginning provided me with the full support and cooperation needed to complete this project. I also offer special thanks and appreciation to the School of Politics and International Relations- University College Dublin -UCD, where I am based now, a Visiting Research Fellow. I offer special thanks for my wife and children who provided me with great support and encouragement. I hope this work will help them to pursue a sense of peace, development and reconciliation in Palestine and the region, for coming generations. Finally, this project would not have been completed without the immense emotional support and patience of my great and proud parents, whose understanding and encouragement boosted my efforts.

ABBREVIATIONS

PLO

Palestine Liberation Organisation

PA

Palestinian Authority

PLC

Palestinian Legislative Council

PCC

Palestinian Central Council

PNC

Palestinian National Council

MB

Muslim Brotherhood Society

Hamas

Islamic Resistance Movement

Fatah

Palestine National Resistance Movement

PIJ

Palestinian Islamic Jihad

UNRWA

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

WYIA

Women’s Young Islamic Association

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this book is to examine the political development and transformation made by Hamas from a resistance movement into a political authority in the Gaza Strip, as a result of Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian national elections of 2006. From a political science and conflict transformation perspective, the study will focus on the political opportunities and the process of environmental and structural change that led the resistance movement to evolve from an underground militant group to a force in conventional politics (Dudouet, 2009). Within the field of international relations, the purpose of this study is to inform policies on control or engage in dialogue with resistance/liberation movements. This study is an analysis of Hamas’ formation, development, political and strategic transformation, and of the organisational structure shifts required by the transition. The book also examines the factors, circumstances, and changes that influenced the political development that Hamas undertook from its inception until it became a political authority in 2007. This includes examining Hamas’ influence and its impact on social and political life in the Gaza Strip from 2000 to 2015. I chose this focus for my book due to the number of significant challenges and changes that had taken place in Gaza, and in Palestinian society, during the specific period under study. This period is a very important one for the purposes of academic research and political affairs, because it included a number of extremely critical and dramatic political developments and changes in the Palestinian arena. The period was characterised by the failure of the peace process between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel, and the outbreak of the second Palestinian uprising or Intifada. It was also marked by the emergence of Hamas as a major military force and political power, capable of influencing Palestinian national affairs; this power decisively challenges the dominance of the Palestinian Liberation Organisations (PLO) over Palestinian social and politics affairs at all levels. It became clear that Hamas would lead and control Gaza in the very near future. Hamas would

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Chapter One

transform the structure of Gaza to become yet more conservative and traditional. This period of study witnessed the military defeat of PA forces by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and the division of the Palestinian house into two political entities in 2007 – the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. More importantly, it witnessed the rise and fall of the Arab Spring, when Hamas believed that it would achieve its political goals after regime changes in Egyt, Tunisia, and Libya. Consequently, it is important to study Hamas both as a phenomenon and as a major political player. I believe that this study might add to a greater understanding of Islamic groups and of Hamas in particular, groups that may yet again transform the political structure of Palestinian society and challenge any future Middle East peace process. I intend to prove that Hamas is still a pragmatic movement looking to sustain its presence in the political arena, and to achieve its political programme. This book will prove that Hamas seeks to lead and represent the Palestinian society and its institutions by political and military means as well, and it will demonstrate that Hamas may one day become a full player in the Middle East in regard to the future of the Gaza Strip after the failure of the Arab Spring. The book also provides an account of the gradual changes in Hamas’ policies, despite the fact of internal, national, international, and financial challenges. To study Hamas’ development from a resistance organisation into a political governing authority in the Gaza Strip, I will divide its political development into three distinct phases. The first phase refers to Hamas’ connection to the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Palestine after 1948. The political developments were as follows: 1. Social and religious morality phase (1948-1982): During this phase the MB took the critical steps required before Hamas’ emergence in the Gaza Strip. The MB maintained its presence to mobilise the grass-roots level of Palestinian society, by returning to the religious thoughts and social morality of Islam. The MB revived its ideology by mobilising the grass roots in accordance with its social agenda (a process known as ‘Daw’a’). These actions were initially designed to bring about social and religious change based on the movement’s peaceful social ideology during the Egyptian rule of the Gaza Strip until 1966. The MB also used its peaceful social agenda to expand the movement’s social and educational network in the Gaza Strip under rule by Israeli occupying authorities after 1967 (Tamimi, 2007:39-45).

Introduction

3

In order to build their ranks, the MB invested initially in a peaceful agenda, before becoming involved explicitly in politics or resistance activity. The MB was not involved in any military action against Israeli troops until late 1983. Nonetheless, the MB presented a threat to the hegemony of the PLO, because of the PLO’s policy of compromise towards Israel. Despite the expansion of the MB, the national forces of the PLO grew stronger in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, after its military operations in Lebanon and elsewhere (Cobban, 1984: 135-136). Before it was fully recognised by the international community as a political player, however, the PLO faced the challenges of an international boycott, the siege of the Israeli alliance and strikes by Israeli forces, and its destruction and expulsion from Lebanon in 1982. The majority of the Palestinian and Arab populations praised the PLO for the two months of fighting after Israeli forces destroyed its military, social, and political infrastructure in Lebanon (Cobban, 1984: 135-136). This contributed to internal division amongst the ranks of the MB in the Occupied Territories and Gaza, which increased when the Islamic Jihad movement was celebrated by the younger generation of the MB for its violent resistance and for several attacks on Israeli targets. Islamic Jihad emerged from within the MB, but disputed the MB’s ideology; its leaders were members of the MB who rejected the movement’s non-violent approach (Tamimi, 2007:39-41). 2. Military Resistance Phase (1983-2004). The MB had to consider the use of military action against Israeli forces in response to hardline voices within the movement. Using the military ideology of liberating Palestine, Islamic Jihad recruited a number of its members from the MB. During this phase, the MB had to restructure itself to become the local wing of Hamas on the eve of the first uprising on 8 December 1987 (Abu Amr, 1994: 63). Hamas built on the MB’s record of social and educational services at the grass roots level in the Gaza Strip. The MB initially sought social change before any political or resistance agenda. As a result, Hamas operated as a social movement for more than two decades before its official announcement as a resistance movement. Consequently, first and foremost, Hamas was seen as a movement of social development, assisting the poor, and delivering religious and educational services to citizens in the occupied Palestinian territories.

4

Chapter One

In spite of Hamas’ popular expansion and influence in the Palestinian political arena during the first uprising (1987-1993), the peace process between Israel and PLO in 1993 - that led to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 - presented a challenge to Hamas. Hamas had to declare its explicit support for a Palestinian state within the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, without recognising Israel. It proposed a long-term truce without giving up its violent resistance strategy and tactics. This phase represented a political change for Hamas as a resistance movement, despite its intensive and deadly suicide bombing from 1995, which harmed the peace process and challenged the relationship between Israel and the PLO (Mishael & Sele, 2000: 66-67). Nonetheless, since this time, there has been no tangible progress in the peace process between the PLO and Israel. During the second uprising, Hamas evolved into a strong and important movement that represented a real threat to the hegemony of the PLO. 3. Governing Authority phase (2005-2015): During this stage, Hamas demonstrated its political flexibility and revealed how the movement was evolving by participating in municipal and legislative elections for the first time, during the Oslo peace process of 2005-6. Hamas’ strategic decision to become an official and acceptable future political player came about as a result of the death of the historical Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in 2004, the resulting weakness of the PA, the deep division within the Fatah movement, and Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005. Its political victory in the elections led the movement from resistance to governance in 2006, without having to fully compromise its ideologies and thoughts. This includes Hamas’ opportunities and challenges during and after the Arab Spring. This represents the third phase of Hamas’ political development towards its ‘mixed strategy’ of governance between international boycott, siege, Palestinian division, and the Arab Spring. During this phase, Hamas supported PLO’s negotiations with Israel, aimed at reaching a political settlement based on a two-state solution, in accordance with the national reconciliation document between the various PLO factions and Hamas in the summer of 2006. This represented Hamas’ implicit recognition of Israel, but Hamas would not exclude the terminology of resistance, and insisted on the inclusion of this in the document. The military takeover of Gaza by Hamas and its defeat of PLO forces in June

Introduction

5

2007 strengthened Hamas’ governing authority in spite of the international boycott and Israel’s coercive policies. However Hamas’ takeover complicated the process of moderating the movement politically and hindered its full transition to a governing authority (Schanzer, 2008: 151). However, The Arab spring also posed another challenge to Hamas after the failure of political Islam in those countries where the Arab Spring occurred. Hamas’ chief concern was not to exit as a loser from the Palestinian political scene, and it sought always to project itself as a strong force, by any means required. Hamas is worried about its future in the Palestinian division after the rapid changes in the Middle East and North Africa, as the Arab Spring failed to improve Hamas as a key political player in the region. These changes in the region united different social and youth forces to end the division in Palestine between Hamas and Fatah. The setbacks of the Arab Spring and the deposition of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has deepened Hamas’ governance crisis in the Gaza Strip. Hamas today is between the hammer of a severe financial crisis and the regional crisis that may affect its political future in Palestine. It is essential therefore that Hamas find a better space to manoeuvre within the political system, rather than being excluded from it. There have been many liberation/resistance movements that, like the PLO, chose political and military options during conflict and powersharing processes until they were able to convert their military structures into conventional politics. Conventional politics incorporates nonviolence, electoral political participation, social movement, and civil society organisations. Although Hamas’ political ideology differed from the PLO’s, the recent trajectory of Hamas’ transition has faced similar challenges and experiences to those of the PLO. The PLO’s military strategy and political thought evolved in three distinct phases as follows: 1. Total Liberation phase (1964–1968): The PLO was established in order to liberate all of historical Palestine that was occupied by Israel in 1948. PLO strategy relied on an ‘all-or-nothing’ policy, using military means to achieve the ‘total liberation of Palestine’ (Darweish and Rigby, 1995). The PLO did not attempt to use any diplomacy in its political speeches addressing its policies towards Israel, as it did not believe in politics or diplomacy given Israel’s status as the aggressor state. The different factions of the PLO were solely focused on military means and on erasing Israel from the global map.

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Chapter One

2. Secular Democratic State phase: (1969–1973): During this phase, the PLO resolved to be accepted as a political player in the international arena, without compromising its ultimate goal of liberating historical Palestine. The PLO wanted to maintain its popular support in order to not lose members from its ranks, nor the support of Palestinians in the diaspora and the occupied territories. The PLO adopted diplomatic and military tactics as part of a ‘mixed strategy’, and indicated its acceptance of the existence of Israel. However, Israel and the USA rejected the PLO’s offer and maintained their view of the PLO as a ‘terrorist organisation’ (Mohamad, 1997: Vol 4 No. 2). The political development of the PLO at this stage pleased neither the USA nor Israel, because it had not given up the military resistance option, nor had it accepted Israel’s existence as a legitimate state recognised by the United Nations. 3. “Mini-state” Governing Authority phase (1974-1994). The PLO adapted yet again by renouncing violence and explicitly accepting the two-state solution, believing diplomacy to be a strategy and tactic of state building. By accepting the conditions of the USA, a key superpower and international player, the PLO indeed became an official political player as the recognised governing authority in the occupied Palestinian territories. The PLO agreed to the twostate solution as a policy, which meant sharing historical Palestine with Israel. It shifted officially from a resistance movement into a governing authority whose legitimate coercive force was used to fight other resistance groups that might spoil the peace process, based on the Oslo agreement of 13 September 1993. This stage characterised the PLO’s efforts of state building (Dayton and Louis Kriesberg, 2009). This political development of the PLO was fiercely opposed by other national secular factions; by those represented within the PLO, and those not represented. It was also challenged by Hamas and by the Islamic Jihad movement. This also led to discrepancies within the national movement, and to fragmentation abroad. However, by the summer of 2000, the PLO’s peaceful transition policies had been undermined by the failure of the peace process between Israel and the PLO. This led to the outbreak of the second uprising, which witnessed the powerful re-emergence of Islamic forces, and of Hamas in particular. The PA became only one of a number of military factions; it began losing its political legitimacy and its coercive

Introduction

7

force due to the state of anarchy and the absence of peace process. This became an ideal opportunity for Hamas to expand its social, military, and political network at the expense of the PA and the PLO (Natil, 2012: 169170). Hamas began to pose a significant threat to the PLO and the PA as it expanded its social and welfare activities to respond to the needs of thousands of people, whilst due to the state of anarchy in its territories and its weakened institutions, the PA was unable to deliver satisfactory services to its citizens. Hamas demonstrated that it had the capacity to deliver services, and moreover, that it had the capacity to deliver a better model of social and educational provision through sympathetic leadership and professional staff who were aware of the needs of their society. Hamas demonstrated its capacity to become an alternative authority to the PLO and the PA. The challenge posed by Hamas to the hegemony of the PLO was consolidated by Hamas’ sweeping victory in the municipal and legislative elections of 2005–2006, elections that were both fair and transparent. Hamas offered its electoral programme of reform and change, which proved more popular than the various programmes of the PLO factions. Hamas’ political victory over the PLO was greatly facilitated by its social network, which served as its political platform. Its social candidates for the legislative elections were famous faces and leaders from amongst Hamas’ social activists. The elections strengthened Hamas’ political development to become an acceptable player on the political stage. Hamas’ victory in the elections had already enabled the movement to enter a new phase of political development based on its resistance and governance strategy. In fact, Hamas’ victory simultaneously turned the tables on Israel, the USA, the PA, and some Arab countries of Egypt and Jordan in particular. It also put pressure on Hamas to demonstrate its capacity to run PA institutions, which were entirely dependent on foreign aid. Had Hamas been able to do this, its rival, the secular Fatah movement, the international community, and the majority of the Palestinian people would have thought it a miracle. However, Hamas resolved to govern as a resistance movement, in a strategy that appeared adventurous to many. The movement’s ‘mixed strategy’ was immediately challenged by the international community, led by the USA and Israel, who exploited humanitarian aid as a ‘carrot and stick’ strategy, and it was also challenged by inter-factional rejections. In line with its manifesto, Hamas refused to compromise any part of its political ideology and its mission of liberating all historical Palestine, for the sake of corrupt and politicised western funding, or ‘aid’, as the movement described it in its literature.

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Chapter One

Scope of Study This study considers the existing literature emphasising a narrow, classical definition of Hamas as a resistance/liberation group according to its ideological goals and structure, the geopolitical environment, and the organisational transformation of the movement from armed struggle to democratic politics (Dudouet, 2009). As a liberation/resistance movement, Hamas has an organisational hierarchy and a leadership structure; it exploits violence for political ends, has a degree of geographical area control, and is independent from the official authority control. Hamas also challenged the Palestinian authority’s monopoly over legitimate coercive force. However, resistance/liberation movements as non-state actors became active on the international arena. For instance, after the outbreak of the second uprising in 2000, Hamas, as an unofficial authority, threatened the Palestinian official authority and its monopoly of legitimate coercive power (Schanzer, 2008: 49-63). Non-state groups and resistance movements have became significant actors in world politics, as following the end of the cold war and indeed the ‘war on terror’; states are no longer exclusive players on the international scene. During this period, many scholars have published work on contemporary liberation/resistance movements, and Hamas has been studied from two different but traditional disciplinary perspectives: ‘Islamist’ and ‘terrorist’, and from the perspective of a social organisation advocating an Islamic state based on Sharia law (Gunning, 2007: Introudction). As a result, a large amount of literature on Hamas has been published in the last few years. These publications appeared as a result of Hamas’ political victory, and more recently its military takeover of the Gaza Strip, when Hamas defeated the PA’s forces and overturned their long years of political hegemony. However, there is little literature that covers Hamas’ political transition from militarism to governance. In a recent book by Paul McGeough: Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid Mishal and the Rise of Hamas (2009), McGeough provides a biography of Khalid Mishal, as well as a history of Hamas. The book ends prior to the Israeli attack on the Gaza Strip in 2009. A book was written by Jonathon Schanzer called Hamas vs. Fatah: the struggle for Palestine (2008). Schanzer did not tackle the concept of governance of Hamas and the movement’s political development from resistance to governance after its electoral victory. Schanzer only addressed the contemporary story of fragmentation in Palestine between Hamas and

Introduction

9

Fatah. He also provided a fresh account of the Palestinian internal battle to control the Palestinian identity over the past two decades. The most important work written on Hamas is by Azzam Tamimi: Hamas Unwritten Chapters (2007). However, he did not address the challenges of Hamas’ governing concepts and the political development of the movement from resistance to governance after its electoral victory. There is further literature published in this context on Hamas, such as Gunning (2007), who describes new aspects of Hamas’ democratic approach to selecting its leaders, and examines Hamas’ victory in the elections of 2006. Hroub’s book, Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide (2006), provides detailed information on Hamas’ goals and tactics. The book by Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement (2010), was also written from different perspectives and depended mainly on hundreds of interviews over a number of years. It presented analysis of a number of developments due to Hamas’ victory and subsequent events until 2009. It highlighted analytically the activities of Hamas’ social, political, and military activities. However, I will further present details about Hamas’ differences, the challenges facing the Palestinian reconciliation, and the impact of the Palestinian Youth movement on Hamas and Fatah. There have been no studies of the different phases of Hamas’ political development process that emphasise the move from military resistance into governance, neither have existing publications discussed in detail Hamas’ ‘mixed strategy’ of resistance and governance. More importantly, Sara Roy’s book, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector (2011), seeks to study mainly on the social sector of the Islamic or the Islamist movement in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This study seeks to challenge the conventional frame of references that defines Hamas only as a terrorist organisation. It is also presented from the political economic perspective. The crux and the scope of the study is the social sector. The book tackled a number of social and political developments in the Gaza Strip due to Hamas’ victory in 2006, its violent takeover in 2007, and the Israeli war in 2008. In other words, Sara focuses on the book mainly on the social services as an important source of influence that Hamas had with the public. The core of this book attempts to fill in this gap by examining four lines as follows: o The social and economic sector o Interrelationships between the social and political sectors o Critical internal process of change within Hamas over the last 15 years

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Chapter One

o The characteristics of a future Islamic society and body politics in Palestine It seems this work by Sara is complementary to her books, Failing peace: Gaza and the Palestinian conflict and The political Economy of De-development. These two books were written from a political economic perspective. I will bring different views about the different phases of Hamas’ political development process that emphasise the move from military resistance into governance, as existing publications have not discussed in detail Hamas’ ‘mixed strategy’ of resistance and governance before and after the Arab Spring. This book presents the political changes made by Hamas from a peace studies’ perspective, which includes the structural changes that took place within Palestinian society in the Gaza Strip as a result of Hamas’ transition into political authority. This transition occurred despite the military takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas in 2007, and the Israeli military operations in 2009, 2012, and 2014. This book also examines the new dimensions and phases of Hamas’ political development after its challenges of victory in the elections, Palestinian división, and the setbacks of the Arab Spring. The author will present different views about the experiences of Hamas in governance, and its challenges, practices, and theories after the military takeover, Palestinian division and the setbacks of the Arab Spring. Finally, this text provides an in-depth illustration of Hamas’ mixed strategy and tactics between governance and resistance. I have also relied on a variety of primary and secondary sources for my research. I reviewed the most up-to-date literature and publications on Hamas that emerged in response to the dramatic events in Palestinian politics after Hamas’ political victory in the elections. During my field work (2005–2008) I reviewed Hamas’ literature, including its statements, watched the development of Hamas’ media network (Al Aqsa TV, Alqsa Radio, Palestine newspaper, Risala newspaper, and logged on to a number of its websites. I also conducted a number of interviews. To enrich the study, I will draw on my own experience of living through the events of the last two decades, as well as my personal observations and interaction as a civil society activist who was born in the Gaza Strip and has lived most of his life there. During this time I observed the most significant events in Gaza: the elections, Hamas’ government, and the takeover of Gaza. Rather than relying solely on secondary literature or texts, my account will reflect my socio-cultural background as a Palestinian citizen born in the Gaza Strip and brought up amidst its complex culture, closely

Introduction

11

watching the events of the first uprising that marked the birth of Hamas in 1987, and its rapid and wide growth. I observed first-hand the impact of Hamas on Palestinian society, and witnessed the effect of its image as a provider of social welfare services, and as a religious movement advocating a better society based on Islamic morality. As noted earlier, its emergence presented a serious challenge and threat to the dominance of Palestinian politics by the secular PLO. During the seven years of the first uprising, Hamas infuriated the secular factions of the PLO with its fiery religious rhetoric, political slogans and statements, its marches of masked-men, its rapid recruitment, and the mass communication campaigns carried out at mosques. I also witnessed the advent of the Palestinian Authority and its measures to crackdown on Hamas after the movement rejected the Oslo agreement, and the efforts made by the PA to hinder Hamas’ progress in implementing its programmes. More importantly, I witnessed and experienced bitterly the failure of the peace process that was supposed to lead to an independent Palestinian state and the impact of the failure on the outbreak and events of the second uprising. This uprising strengthened those Palestinian militant factions that rejected any resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, and subsequent actions by these militant groups resulted in the collapse of PA institutions. The PA could not respond rapidly to the social and economic demands and needs of the desperate residents of the Palestinian territories; it was dramatically weakened by Israeli activity, as well as by the deteriorating economic situation. Before taking over the Strip, Hamas, on the other hand, proved that it could deliver a model of social service managed by the professional. Hamas, however, was also never subjected to the same level of public scrutiny as the PA, because the movement had no official standing before governing the Strip. Hamas was never accountable in terms of running a government institution, nor was it required to demonstrate its responsibility and transparency to the public. Its quality of performance and delivery was never scrutinised. It was characterised by a collective approach to leadership that was able to deliver a good number of successive leaders. It was clear too that the targeting of its leaders by Israel for assassination or arrest actually encouraged rather than deterred gifted candidates from proposing themselves for leadership. The Palestinian national and secular movement, on the other hand, could not deliver that quality of leadership, because for more than thirty years it had been controlled by the man who personified it, Yasser Arafat. Consequently, the PLO was severely shaken by the death of Yasser Arafat.

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Chapter One

I also witnessed Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian elections, and the subsequent military confrontation between Fatah and Hamas in the streets of Gaza. Hamas used its military weapons against the PA to govern the Gaza Strip by force in the summer of 2007, which led to the isolation of Hamas in Gaza by the international community, despite the later conflicts in 2009-2014, such as Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip.

Book structure The book is organised into nine chapters. Following this chapter, the next chapter explores the development of the Gaza Strip’s social structure, which contributed to the expansion of the ideology of the MBs and sowed the seeds for Hamas’ future emergence. Chapter three assesses the birth or restructure of Hamas from the ‘womb’ of the MB. Chapter four examines the growth of Hamas’ social welfare services into a threat to the official state welfare system of the Palestinian Authority. Chapter five explores the external leadership role played by Hamas abroad in terms of survival and expansion in spite of discrepancies and a rift within the internal leadership of Hamas. Chapter six debates the political development of Hamas as a result of the movement’s running of the Palestinian Authority following its electoral victory. Chapter seven covers Hamas’ military takeover of the Gaza Strip by defeating the official Palestinian Authority forces, which thus divided Palestinian society. Chapter eight covers how Hamas’ governance was affected by the setbacks of the Arab Spring and the failure of the Palestinian reconciliation (2011-2015). Chapter nine concludes the essential remarks of the book, summarising Hamas’ gradual political transition from resistance to governance, its challenges, and its impact on the social and political life of the Gaza Strip (2000-15).

CHAPTER TWO THE WAY TO HAMAS: REVIVAL OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN GAZA STRIP (1967-1980)

Introduction This chapter also examines the growth and expansion of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood society (MB) in Palestine, and its resistance against the Zionist project. This chapter will present a historical overview of the socio-economic and political history of Gaza, so that the reader can understand the historical context from which Hamas emerged as a religious and political movement in the 1980s. It also highlights the socio-economic and political changes that occurred after the establishment of Israel, along with its policy of expelling thousands of Palestinians from their homes and properties to become refugees. Subsequently, it also covers Egyptian administration over the Gaza Strip, which filled in the political and legal vacuum after the establishment of Israel in parts of historical Palestine. The chapter then moves on to review the military policies and regulations imposed by the Israeli occupation on the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which adversely affected the lives of the Gaza population, and divided the society into rich and poor, weak and powerful. This chapter also traces the growth of the secular nationalist movement, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), its resistance against the MB inside and outside the occupied Palestinian territories, and the challenges it faced when it increasingly adopted a moderate position in relation to its future and goals, culminating in the acceptance of a two-state solution, which created ‘space’ for resistance movements, including the MB. However, this chapter provides a brief historical overview of MB that participated in resisting the Zionist movement before the

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Chapter Two

establishment of Israel. The Zionist movement used the suffering of Jews in Europe to intensify their immigration to Palestine during the Second World War. In 1939, the Jewish population numbered over 445,000 out of a total population of about 1.5 million; almost 30% of the total population in comparison to less than 10% twenty years earlier. Similarly, by 1939, Jewish land holdings had risen fourfold to represent almost 1.5 million dunums out of a total area of 26 million dunums (Sherbok and El Alami, 2002: 28). Zionists also intensified diplomatic efforts to convince superpowers such as the USA and the Soviet Union of their project in Palestine. The Arab Palestinians received little support from Egypt, and from its political and religious groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood Society – the MB. The MB was the only Egyptian religious and political group that had expanded its work beyond Egyptian borders into Palestine by the early 1940s. The MB aimed to recruit Palestinian youths against the Zionist project and the British mandate in Palestine (Tamimi, 2007: 3). The MB’s expansion into Palestine came during a very crucial and difficult period when the Zionist project already presented a dangerous threat to Arab Palestinian identity.

Muslim Brotherhood Society (MB) The MB was established in March 1928 by the Islamic cleric Hassan al-Banna in the city of Ismailia in Egypt. The MB grew and expanded through Ismailia, which was a route for Gazans on their way to the Egyptian capital Cairo, and to other major cities. The MB called for a return to the traditional teachings and morals of Islam before it entered politics. Its project was an endeavour to change the Ummha "nation", beginning with the individual, moving to the family, and culminating finally with society as a whole. The MB described itself as a political and social revolutionary movement that rejected Western influence (Tamimi, 2007: 3-6). The MB called for a return to original Islam, and dedicated itself to creating a global Islamic movement whose members would cooperate with each other throughout the world on the basis of a shared religious world view: the spread of Islam. The MB’s political and social theories were developed to actively pursue the establishment of a Muslim regime that would serve as the basis for re-establishing the Caliphate. The Caliphate is the rule of all

The Way to Hamas: Revival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza Strip

15

Muslims. It called for a constitution based on the Quran and the Sunnah, as well as the precedents set forth by the first four ‘rightlyguided’ Caliphs. (Militant Islam Monitoring: 2006,). The Quran and Sunnah are the religious teaching for Muslims. The MB viewed secular Egyptian culture as immoral, decadent, and atheistic, maintaining that “Islam hooah al-hal” (Islam is the solution to all Egypt and mankind’s ills). By 1938, the MB’s leader, Al-Banna, called on King Farouk of Egypt to dissolve Egypt’s political parties, as they were corrupt and were dividing the country. The MB’s tactics then began to change. From working within the system, they began advocating armed revolutionary struggle to achieve change. The MB established guerilla training camps in the Mukatam Hills overlooking Cairo, as well as in parts of southern Egypt, with members of the Egyptian officer corps (some affiliated with Nasser’s Free Officers’ Movement) providing training as early as 1940 (Military Review, July -August 2003). Influenced by the spread of the group in Egypt in the 1940s, 17 Palestinian scholars from Gaza’s most notable families who used to dominate trade with Egypt established a branch of the MB in the 1940s. In the Gaza Strip, the MB was founded with the same rigid structure as its Egyptian ‘mother’, with centralised decisionmaking by spiritual leaders reflecting its ideological background as a force for political Islam. The MB’s Gaza group succeeded in attracting a number of Muslim scholars and Imams, encouraging the Gazan community to hold Islam as a major focus for their daily lives. The MB also called for the adoption of Islam in accordance with its charter that states that: “Jihad is the only way to achieve these goals" (Militant Islam Monitoring: 2006, June 16). The MB established its main office in the Al Remal quarter of central Gaza City, which was visited by the founder and spiritual leader of the movement, Hassan Al Banna, in 1947 (Milton, 1996: 40). The MB rejected the UN partition resolution 181 on 29 November 1947 (the division of historical Palestine into two states: the Jewish state of Israel, and the Arab state of Palestine). The MB rejected the partition plan on religious grounds rather than political ones. The MB’s members and branches increased and expanded, as recorded by Kalid Mshael, Hamas’ political office: The Muslim Brotherhood movement started in the 1940s. Its first sections (central or organisational unit) were founded in 1945, in Haifa, Yafa, Gaza, Jerusalem, and Hebron. When the 1948 war erupted, the number of Muslim Brotherhood sections exceeded twenty. Later, geography imposed

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Chapter Two a new reality for the Muslim Brotherhood. Members who were in Gaza became closer to Egypt and those who were in the West Bank became closer to Jordan. This movement participated in the 1948 war. (Al Hayat, 2003).

Several thousand members of the MB participated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. This increased the organisation’s stature and recruiting ability, cementing further its relationship with the Egyptian Army (Militant Islam Monitoring: 2006). However, the MB and fighters from different parts of the Arab world could not prevent the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel. Moreover, they could not prevent the expulsion of indigenous people from their homes and lands, making them refugees in surrounding countries, or seeing them displaced within what was left of Palestine. Neither Palestinians nor the Arab states could accept that ‘Palestine’, along with its people, had vanished as a geopolitical entity from the map of the Middle East after the establishment of Israel in 1948. They also could not accept the continuing refugee problem as a result of the war and the establishment of Israel.

The Palestinian Catastrophe (Nakba): 1948 The creation of Israel restructured the map of the Middle East following the forced expulsion by Israel of more than 750,000 Palestinians from their homes and land. They then became refugees in different places: the West Bank, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip. Israel declared its own Jewish state, which included 78% of historical Palestine, leaving the remaining 22% divided between two separated geographical entities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The Israeli government rejected United Nations Resolution 149, which allowed Palestinians the right to return to their former homes, as noted by David McDowell: The Israeli leadership had already decided against allowing any back, and on 16 June 1948, the Israeli Cabinet adopted this position formally. In the words of Moshe Sharett, Israeli Foreign Minister: "They will not return. That is our policy. They are not returning "(McDowall, 1995:27).

In addition to the Israeli expulsion of Palestinian refugees, Israel prevented political and geographical connections between the two parts: the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The West Bank was

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annexed on 13 December 1948 to become part of Transjordan, and the inhabitants of the West Bank were granted Jordanian citizenship (Brand, 1988: 22-25). The population of the Gaza Strip was governed by an Egyptian military administration. The Gazan population, however, now included some 220,000-250,000 refugees who had been driven from their homes and had fled to the Gaza Strip, thus tripling the population (Roy, 1995). The indigenous population of the Gaza Strip was estimated at only some 60–80,000 people before the war (Hilal, 1992: 33-74). The indigenous population of notable families (Ayan) became a minority, although they still controlled trade, agricultural lands, and local resources. Some Ayan families also competed amongst themselves for social prestige and power. For example, families such as Al Shawwa, who had their original roots in Gaza with considerable economic and political power, and Abu Shaban, who had a strong religious background, competed over the management of the Al Sharia system, hiring teachers and preachers for Islamic schools and mosques. In addition, the Aqa and Al Faraa families had for a long time competed over the running of the municipal council of Khanounis city and its suburbs (Edwards, 1996: 36). These economic and socio-political rivalries were further intensified with the impact of the influx of refugees and the Egyptian Administration in the Gaza Strip, which started in 1949 (Astal, 2004: 30).

Egyptian Administration: 1949-1966 The legal and political vacuum in the Gaza Strip was filled by Egyptians who established three authorities: executive, judicial, and legislative, each headed by a military council, which administered the daily affairs of the enlarged Gazan population. Egypt treated the Gaza Strip as a military zone administrated by a military governor who had the power to appoint and dismiss mayors of any municipalities such as Gaza, Dire Balah, Khanounis, and Rafah (Astal, 2004: 30). The system was similar to that of the Ottomans and the British. The creation of the state of Israel separated the MB in the West Bank, now annexed to Jordan, from the organisation in the Gaza Strip, which was aligned with the group in Egypt (Tamimi, 2007: 5). The MB in the Gaza Strip found fertile ground in which to disseminate its political and social revolutionary theories among

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the refugees who were living through an extreme humanitarian crisis. The MB tried to recruit refugees to its social moral principles and to the political revolutionary ideology of ‘Islamising’ society, despite Egyptian military control over the Gaza Strip. The MB advocated Islamic religious thought and principles as a basis for social change, by reaching hearts and minds via Qur’anic and Hadith verses, and involving people in social events, religious ceremonies, and sports activities at local venues in the various refugee camps (Gunning, 2007: 27). Thus, as a result of the changes created by the political and economic environment, the MB easily maintained its close relationship with the community. This greatly assisted the MB in gaining a foothold within Gaza’s social and political scene, and particularly in gaining a hold over the young male refugees who had lost their land in Palestine. Young refugees promised loyalty to Islam, rather than to the regimes that had failed to prevent the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Young refugees were further encouraged by what was preached in mosques and taught in schools, and they were loyal to the MB. With the growing influence of the MB on the refugees, the Egyptian administration imposed new measures and restrictions on the movement’s eleven branches in the Gaza Strip, and its subbranches in local refugee camps. These measures were taken after the Egyptian regime was accused of assassinating the MB’s spiritual leader, Hassan Al Banna, in Cairo in 1949. Al Bana’ had represented a genuine challenge to the secular regime, when the popularity of the MB surged after the Israeli-Arab war. In late 1949, to avoid restrictions in Gaza, the MB reorganised its group within a centre for religious education called the ‘Unification Association’ (Mishael & Sele, 2000: 17). This enabled the MB to continue operating in Gaza. However, the failed assassination attempt of President Jamal Abed Nasser in Alexandria on 26 October 1954 by members of the MB resulted in the movement being banned, with 18,000 of its members being arrested (Milton, 1996:47). The new Egyptian policy placed the MB’s estimated 1,000 members under direct threat of arrest or, at the very least, under the threat of questioning. The expansion of the MB, its recruitment of new young male recruits, and its preaching to existing members were all at risk (Idwan, 1991:21). The MB had no other option but to operate secretly and to go underground. This new political

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environment made communication and the exchange of information between the MB in Cairo and its members in Gaza very problematic. Under these new conditions, the MB decided to "renounce resistance". This led some Palestinian activists like Khalel Al Wazir and Riad Zanoun, who had received military training at MB bases in Gaza, to join Yasser Arafat in setting up the Palestine National Liberation Movement, Fatah, in the late 1950s (Gunning, 2007: 28). The political significance of the MB both in Egypt and Gaza was further weakened when Gamal Abdul Nasser came to power in Egypt, and with the emerging popularity of his secular Arab nationalism. The new Egyptian regime also supported and encouraged the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964 (Mohamad, 1997). The MB’s political significance in the Gaza Strip declined to the extent that the group virtually disappeared, only to re-emerge after the Israeli Occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967 (Al Astal, 2004:30).

Israeli Occupation: 1967-1986 On 7 June 1967, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including Jerusalem, became territory under Israeli Occupation. The Israeli military administration exercised control over the population by its military power, but allowed Palestinians to exercise their religious rights (Beinen and Hajjar: 2001). In effect, power was in the hands of the military governor who controlled Palestinian local institutions. The military governor was responsible for appointing and dismissing the mayors and heads of councils. In the Gaza Strip, the governor appointed four mayors in the main cities, eight heads for rural councils and three heads for local committees in three refugee camps in the Gaza Strip (Mukhimer, 2005). The mayors and heads appointed by the military governor were all from notable families; this policy of Israeli Occupation maintained a divided Palestinian society between the landowning notable families, peasants, and refugees. However, from 1969, the Israeli Occupation authority allowed Palestinian workers to work in Israel. The Palestinian national resistance movement opposed this decision and attempted to prevent Palestinian workers from joining the Israeli labour force (Beinen and Hajjar: 2001). It was during this period that the influence of the secular Palestinian

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national resistance organisations began to grow amongst young Palestinians.

Growth of the National Movement In 1969, the PLO was restructured to become an umbrella for some ten Palestinian nationalist groups, headed by the Fatah National Movement under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, who remained in this position for about 36 years (Mohamad, 1997). The PLO did not include any Islamist factions, largely because of the determining role played in its creation by the Egyptian regime that had a long history of opposition to the MB. This was despite the fact that, as noted above, a number of the founders of the Fatah movement, such as Arafat’s deputies, Kalil Wazeer and Riad Zanoun, had received training at MB camps in the Gaza Strip (Hart, 1984: 33). Unlike the MB, the secular nationalists of the PLO had been able to recruit and strengthen the organisation amongst the Palestinian diaspora in an approach that was denied to the MB. As a consequence, during the first decade of the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip, political Islam, as represented by the MB, ceased to play a significant role. During this period, the MB’s actions were limited to re-establishing their bases of support in an attempt to regain some of the ground they had lost to the national movement (Tamimi 2007: 5). They were very cautious and did not take part in any activities that might anger the Israeli authorities. They would meet and pray in the mosques rather than engage openly in public. They had neither power nor finance, and were dependent on private donations. They were not in a position to challenge the dominance of the secular PLO, which had succeeded in attracting the support and commitment of the younger generation of refugees in the Gaza Strip (Milton 1996:94). In the late 1960s, secular groups began to launch raids against the Israeli occupation; their aim was to liberate Palestine without any kind of Islamist agenda, despite the fact that Palestinian society was Muslim by nature, social structure, cultural roots, and practices. The MB was not able to offer the people of Gaza an alternative to the Fedayeen ‘national fighters’ philosophy, the only concern of which was to crush Israelis in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Their dream was to return to the homes that had

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belonged to them prior to the establishment of Israel on the land of historical Palestine (Jamal, 2005:17). In the 1970s, a number of events took place in the Middle East that challenged and influenced PLO policies. These events paved the way for PLO to grasp the helm of diplomacy and politics. After the PLO lost its bases in Jordan in 1971, the movement started to find channels to find a peaceful solution for the Israel-Palestine conflict, rather than relying on violence as its sole strategy.

1. Defeat of the PLO in Jordan Jordan had absorbed thousands of Palestinian refugees expelled from their homes by Israeli forces in 1948, and Palestinians represented the overwhelming majority of the population. However, the Jordanian government felt that Palestinian military existence on its soil had begun to threaten the stability of the Jordanian Kingdom. In 1971, the PLO was defeated and expelled by the forces of King Hussein from Jordan. King Hussein of Jordan was concerned about his throne coming under threat from Palestinian factions, which had launched several attacks against Israeli forces across the borders. Jordanian forces killed more than 3,000 Palestinians in a fierce war between Jordanian and PLO forces (Cobban, 1984: 48-51).

2. Post-1973 War Politics After the 1973 war between Egypt and Syria against Israel, the PLO’s policies were influenced by and changed as a result of the Arab experience of victory. In particular, the PLO grew much closer to and accepted the moderating influence of Egypt. In Cairo on 9 June 1974, for the first time, the PLO called for the creation of a Palestinian National Authority (PA) in any part of Palestine to be liberated. The PLO wanted a PA in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank according to the Palestine National Council Political Program adopted at the 12th session of the Palestine National Council, Cairo, 8 June 1974.

3. Representing the Palestinian people After the defeat of the PLO in Jordan, and the PLO’s call for the creation of a PA in any part of Palestine in the Gaza Strip and

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the West Bank, the seventh Arab Summit in Rabat on 28 October 1974 recognised the PLO as ‘the sole and only representative’ of the Palestinian people (Cobban, 1984: 60). The moderate stance of the PLO and its rapprochement with Arab states were consolidated following Yasser Arafat’s famous speech at the United Nations General Assembly on 13 November 1974 (Neff, 1994, 70-72). This change in the political environment paved the way for the PLO to became a moderate player in Middle Eastern politics, when its struggle shifted attention from the diaspora to the occupied territories, and its ‘liberation’ strategy was modified into a ‘territorial’ strategy for statehood (Mohamad, 1997). The PLO proposed a moderate policy that would accept Israel’s legitimacy as a state. In addition, the PLO began considering diplomatic routes to reach a compromise in the Israel-Palestine conflict, rather than using violence as the sole strategy. These political changes coincided with the revival of the MB’s ambitions after a decade of absence from the Palestinian political scene. For religious reasons, the MB rejected the stance of the PLO and the Arab states for a peaceful settlement based on a two state solution, and in 1976 the MB began to revive its social agenda and nonviolent welfare related activities, rather than its political activity (Tamimi, 2007:35-41).

Revival of the Muslim Brotherhood Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the leader of the MB in the Gaza Strip, started building a socio-religious infrastructure so that the youth of Gaza could return to the practice of Islam. His aim was also to revive the MB and to provide it with a new socio-political framework. In 1976, he set up a charity-based organisation with multiple purposes and activities, including sport, health, education, and religion. The charity operated under its official name, Al Mujama Al Islami (Congress of Islam), and began mobilising women through the creation of a Young Women’s Islamic Association, so that the MB could reach all of society (Abed Kotob, 1995: 321 -339). This step was the initial re-emergence of the MB’s social work and its peaceful religious preaching in the Gaza Strip after a decade of absence. In 1978, as part of the expansion of MB infrastructure, a number of highly qualified members returned from abroad to establish the first higher education institution in Gaza, an Islamic

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university similar to those in the West Bank. The MB feared that the prospect of the new university might provoke PLO forces to impose some obstacles. The MB asked Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, to endorse the project and to issue a decree from the founding committee. Half of the founding committee members were Fatah men who sympathised with the MB, and the other half were MB members. The founding members of the Islamic University were the same members who had been involved in the establishment of the charity of Al Mujama Al Islami, headed by Sheikh Yasin (Tamimi, 2007:39-41). However, in the initial years there were disputes between Fatah and the MB over control of the university. The MB used violence to protect its project, which was a landmark in the history of the MB in Palestine. The MB in Gaza, led by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, gathered pace after the PLO expressed its implicit willingness to recognise the existence of Israel in accepting a two-state solution. The PLO was now willing to use diplomacy to achieve its strategic goals of creating an independent Palestinian state ‘in any part of Palestine’. The PLO refocused its planning and diplomacy to mark its footprint on the occupied territories, rather than on the whole of Palestine (Mohamad, 1997). However, it was too early to confirm whether the forces of political Islam had the power to reflect the real changes taking place in Palestinian society. Al Mujama was still focusing on its role as a social reformer with a religious agenda, whilst the Israeli occupation gripped the attention of forces of the PLO and its activities very tightly. The MB project introduced by Al Mujama intended to influence Palestinian social structure with a return to the practices of Islam; until the early 1980s, the MB aimed to make the ‘re-Islamisation’ of society a higher priority even than fighting the Israelis and liberating Palestine.

Concluding Observations The formation of Palestinian identity began under the Ottoman Empire, which ruled Palestine for four centuries. Ottoman Empirical policies helped to divide Palestinian society into unequal social classes – for example, Ayan, peasants, and Bedouin. The Ayan families formed the upper class, which controlled the main organs of society. There was no civic participation in or access to political institutions during this period. Peasants worked as slaves;

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they were required to pay taxes and to be conscripted for the Empire without gaining any citizenship rights. However, the British forces overthrew the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, after the Ottomans were defeated alongside the Germans. Under the mandate, Palestinian identity strengthened and developed, as Palestinians resisted the Zionist project, which aimed to create a Jewish state in Palestine by increasing the number of Jewish immigrants. After a war between Arabs and Jews began in 1947 and ended in 1948, the Jewish state was established, ending thirty-one years of the British mandate over Palestine. This reshaped the structure of Palestinian demography drastically, and caused the vast majority of Palestinians to become refugees in neighbouring countries and in the remaining parts of Palestine (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank), which included only 22% of the territory of historical Palestine. This fragmented and divided the Palestinian population into different communities that grew up under different powers and authorities in the region. These dramatic conditions contributed to the growth of Palestinian national identity that experienced a very complex evolution because of external interventions and influence. As part of wider socio-economic and political changes, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt easily found a foothold in the Gaza Strip because of shared geographical and political frontiers with Egypt. The MB mobilised impoverished Palestinian refugees at the grass-roots level behind new social ideologies and revolutionary political thinking. Its initiatives to recruit new members were enhanced by the failure of Arab nationalist regimes to defend Palestine from Israeli forces. However, the actions of MB members were restricted by the Egyptian central government in Cairo that governed the Gaza Strip (which comprised about 1% of historical Palestine) after the creation of the state of Israel. However, oppressive measures taken by the Egyptian secular government against the MB, as well as the defeat of Arab nationalist regimes in the different wars with Israel, only contributed to the growth of Palestinian national secular identity. Egypt’s government also endorsed the creation of the Palestinian National Liberation Organisation to represent the Palestinian people in their struggle to liberate all Palestine, the ‘total liberation’ phase (1964–1968). The most powerful force behind the PLO’s policies were the ‘Feddayeen’ commandos, who aimed to apply this militancy to liberate all of Palestine from the Israeli

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occupier. The PLO’s call to everyone to liberate all of Palestine helped to undermine the expansion of the MB across Palestinian society. However, in 1969, the PLO witnessed another process of restructuring when it was chaired by Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Fatah National movement supported by Egypt. In the aftermath of the 1973 war between Israel and Egypt, once again, the Palestinian cause represented by the PLO was affected by external factors and regional developments. To improve its strategy and tactics, the PLO had to consider diplomacy as a means to meet the new changes in the international and regional arena. The PLO had to formulate policies that would make it an acceptable player in regional politics. It manoeuvred towards implicit acceptance of the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine by proposing a ‘secular democratic state’ formula, but without excluding military options, in a phase which lasted from 1969 to 1973. These changes in PLO policies encouraged the MB, led by Sheik Ahmed Yasin, to revive the movement through social work and religious activities. The MB functioned peacefully, with the permission of the Israeli occupying administration, disseminating their ideologies in the Gaza Strip as a grass-roots organisation. The institutions of the MB called for moral, religious, and social change through a peaceful return to Islamic practices. Some Palestinian national figures believed that Israel’s decision to allow the MB to function aimed to divide the Palestinian people. What it did do was pave the way for the MB to adopt a different strategy and tactics, which would challenge the PLO and weaken the structure of Palestinian society at all levels. This trend towards Islam was strengthened by other causes, for example the suffering of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories caused by Israel’s tough policies, and the lack of any peaceful political improvements achieved by the PLO. This challenged the popularity and the hegemony of the PLO in the Palestinian territories, with the Islamic movement representing morality, the fairness of Islamic practices, and social work. In the meantime, the suffering of Palestinians in the occupied territories increased due to the ‘Iron Fist’ policy imposed by Israeli military forces. The political environment pushed the Palestinian population closer to politicisation; national demonstrations by students protesting against Israel’s ‘Iron Fist’ policy erupted in different places in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israel’s ‘Iron

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Fist’ was marked by aggressive and repressive measures, and a high level of human rights violations, causing injuries and deaths in both Gaza and the West Bank, even before the outbreak of the uprising in 1987, and the creation of Hamas based on the structure of the MB.

CHAPTER THREE HAMAS’ EMERGENCE IN THE GAZA STRIP

Introduction This chapter analyses the MB’s strategic transition from its initial focus on social work to its status as a militant, armed resistance movement in 1983, prior to its formal emergence as Hamas at the beginning of the first Palestinian uprising/intifada in 1987. This chapter also provides an overview of the period from 1987 to 2004, during which Hamas became a major political actor on the Palestinian socio-political scene, challenging the hegemony of the PLO and its pursuit of a ‘peace policy’ with Israel. The MB considered its main task was to change the individual and the community inside Palestine through peaceful means, and to wait for an outside power to rescue Palestine from the Israeli occupation (Tamimi, 2007: 45). The MB believed in tarbyiah (education) and Dawa (outreach) to create change within Palestinian society through a social and religious network that it built up during the 1970s (Schanzer 2008: 24). Hamas’ subsequent transition from a peaceful social movement into a violent resistance movement can be attributed to a number of challenges and changes in Palestinian society that forced the MB to transform itself.

1. PLO challenge The PLO posed a real threat to the MB’s social mission and ‘reislamisation’ project in Palestine. The PLO saw the expansion of the MB as a threat to its secular and national hegemony. The PLO aligned itself with the Egyptian authorities in their efforts to weaken and control the MB through the links to its ‘mother’ organisation in Egypt. Some PLO members from Fatah challenged the MB project to establish the Islamic University of Gaza in 1978,

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and the MB sought the endorsement of PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, to avoid Fatah’s challenge. The MB demanded that Yasser Arafat issue a decree to authorise his group’s participation at the founding committee, which subsequently included half its members from the MB and half from Fatah (Tamimi, 2007: 39-41). The MB demanded Arafat’s endorsement of the University, because it was concerned that the PLO would challenge the project. This concern became a reality when clashes erupted between Fatah and the MB over control of the University in the first year. The struggle over the Islamic university deepened the conflict between Fatah and the MB. During this period, the popularity of the PLO increased when Israeli forces launched a massive military operation called ‘Peace for Galilee’ to drive the PLO from Lebanon on 6 June 1982, in response to the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to London by a PLO operative. Israeli forces targeted and destroyed the infrastructure of the PLO in Lebanon. In spite of this challenge from the PLO, the MB’s project to achieve a ‘re-islamisation’ of society with a peaceful social and religious agenda continued into the 1980s. However, there was also another challenge, which came from within the MB itself.

2. Internal Threat In 1979, the senior leadership of the MB started to face extreme pressure and challenges from a group of its young leaders who threatened the unity of the MB, and its social and re-Islamisation project. Sheikh Fathi Shqaki, who had been an active member of the MB in Egypt, led the group of young MB leaders, who had graduated from the Egyptian universities in the 1970s. He was also influenced by Iranian Islamic revolution ideology and principles (Abu Amr, 1994: 35). His group criticised the focus of MB’s nonviolent and peaceful social agenda in the Gaza Strip. They pointed out that the MB had been one of the first to confront the creation of Israel in 1948, by sending young Egyptians to fight side by side with Arabic forces (Hroub, 2006: 11). They argued that the MB should not focus solely on social and grass-roots activities, but should use military resistance against the Israelis forces and settlers as well. Sheikh Shqaki, with his close friend Abed Aziz Owda, who had been expelled from the MB, started to mobilise other fellows and friends to join his new group -

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the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in 1979. The PIJ expanded rapidly by recruiting members from the MB and from the nationalist movement, Fatah, who were keen to attack Israeli targets. As a consequence, the PIJ began to attract recruits from the MB, and became increasingly popular amongst young Palestinians, thereby threatening the position and strength of the MB in the Gaza Strip (Tamimi, 2007: 43-44). In the face of these two threats from the PLO and from the expansion of the PIJ in particular, the MB leadership felt it had to adopt a position that would address the issues raised by its rivals (International Crisis Group, 2004).

MB’s Military Preparation In 1983, at a secret conference of the MB held in the Jordan capital of Amman, the Palestinian MB delegation found a golden opportunity to discuss possible military actions in Palestine. The purpose of the meeting was to lay the foundation for the MB’s project in Palestine. Its project was to strengthen the MB’s political and social influence on the Palestinian streets. The MB endorsed the Palestinian delegation’s proposal to establish a ‘special committee’ for Palestine as part of the Amman-based MB office. The task of this special committee was to provide money and logistical support to train fighters from Gaza in Jordan (Tamimi, 2007: 43-44). Khalid Michael, Hamas’ second political bureau chief, confirmed that the MB maintained weapons and funding from abroad during this time (Al-Hayat, 2003). In 1983, shortly after the conference, the local leader of the MB in the Gaza Strip, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, was arrested by Israeli occupation authorities for possessing weapons at his home in Gaza city. Sheikh Ahmed Yasin was freed as a part of a prisoner exchange between Israel and the General Leadership of the Popular Front for Palestinian Liberation in 1985 (Schanzer, 2008: 21). Once Sheikh Ahmed Yasin was released from Israeli prison, he tried to demonstrate to the Israeli authorities that he had no links with the MB. Nonetheless, he conducted his activities in secret until the outbreak of the first uprising that took place on the eve of 8 December 1987 (Rigby 2010: 51). The outbreak of the first Palestinian Intifada (uprising) surprised not only the Palestinians, but also the leadership of the MB, the PLO, and Israeli occupation forces (Rigby 1991:19). The outbreak of the uprising was in reality a spontaneous collective action with no prior planning. It was the

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result of the accumulation of continuing acts of aggression committed by the Israeli occupying forces against the Palestinian occupied territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from 1967 onwards (Abu Amr, 1994: 53). This popular uprising was an expression of national and political awareness by Palestinians, which aimed to establish a future ‘entity’ without any politically driven agenda or any single national or Islamic movement leading it. Yet, during its early days, the Intifada created a real and unprecedented shift from individual to collective actions, with a sense of common and productive purpose (Roy, 2007: 34). Most Palestinian people were prompted to respond to the actions of the uprising, including the MB in the Gaza Strip, who met urgently and secretly to take part in this public anger and resistance against the Israeli occupation.

MB’s Transition to Hamas A prominent group of six figures of Al Mujama Al Islami (‘Congress of Islam’), in addition to Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, met to draw up an emergency plan in response to the outbreak of the uprising in December 1987 (Tamimi, 2007: 52). These figures were the core group of the MB in the Gaza Strip. This group established the Islamic resistance movement Hamas as the resistance wing of the MB in Palestine; ‘Hamas’ means ‘strength and bravery’. There is confusion over when ‘Hamas’ was first used or appeared on the first pamphlet, but some historians believed that the first pamphlet bearing the name Hamas appeared on 11 February 1988, not in December 1987 (Schanzer, 2008: 24). With this approach, MB was able to maintain its focus on social work and on the re-Islamisation of society, whilst also acting as an integral element in the uprising of 1987 through its ‘offspring’ Hamas.

Hamas structure Hamas was divided into sub-committees. These included the following: Shura Council: Shura means ‘consultative’, and it is the central decision-making body responsible for drawing up policies and strategies. In the early days of its establishment it consisted of twenty-four members. Over time its membership increased to fifty,

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with new members drawn from the West Bank and representatives of Palestinian prisoners behind Israeli bars (Barsky, 2004: 24 May). The members of this council are scattered around Gaza, the West Bank, and Israeli prisons inside and outside Palestine. The members of the council could not meet in one place, firstly due to Israeli restrictions and a ban on travel for Hamas members between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and abroad, and secondly, members were concerned about being targeted and detained by Israeli forces (Mishael & Sele, 2000: 75-81). Executive Committee/Political Office: The executive committee was the highest executive authority of the movement. It was headed by the founder and spiritual leader of the movement, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, but after his internment by Israeli forces in 1989, he was replaced by Mousa Abu Marzouk, who was based in the USA during this period (Gambill, September 2002). In 1990, Abu Marzouk restructured the executive committee to become the political office in Amman. Abu Marzouk was arrested by the FBI in New York in 1995, and was replaced by his deputy Khaled Mishal, who took over Abu Marzouk’s organisational portfolio, including responsibility for the activities of the military wing (Tamimi, 2007: 84). Military and Security Wing: In 1991, the military wing, or ‘Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades’ was established, named after Al Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, a member of the MB who was killed by British mandate troops in Palestine in 1935 (Abu Amr, 1994: 65). Prior to 1991, the military wing was known by different names, for example Majd or Mujahedeen, and had engaged in a number of attacks against Israeli targets in Israel and the Palestinian territories, including the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers. The brigade adheres to the principle of the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of an Islamic state ‘from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River’ in accordance with the organisation’s charter (Gunning, 2007: 40). Youth Wing: Hamas also established a youth wing to operate at the universities in the Palestinian territories. Its purpose is to mobilise students on behalf of Hamas, and its ideologies and activities. It also recruits new members for Hamas in the universities. Members of this wing are also active in other parts of Hamas, for example in the military, outreach, and communication wings.

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Da’wa (Outreach) and Social Network: Hamas grew out of the MB, which had developed its strength through social, religious, cultural, and educational activities. Hamas continues with this work, offering welfare in the Palestinian territories, and in the Gaza Strip in particular. This is funded through an international funding network involving Iran, Palestinian expatriates, and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia. Thus, whilst many in the Western world view Hamas as a violent Islamic fundamentalist force, many Palestinians see Hamas as a charitable organisation that has built schools, mosques, and hospitals, and which provides welfare and social assistance (Mishael & Sele, 2000: 66-67). Communications and Media: On 14 December 1987, Hamas issued its first statement announcing its establishment and calling for a stand against Israeli occupation. It declared itself as a resistance movement with the aim of liberating historical Palestine from the sea to the Jordanian river. The pamphlet also accused Israeli intelligence services of undermining the moral fibre of Palestinian youth as part of Mossad’s recruitment of people Hamas termed ‘collaborators’ (Abu Amr, 1994: 63). Hamas activists would write slogans on walls to announce strikes or demonstrations against the Israelis. Hamas produced official newspapers such as Al Watan. Today, the newspaper Al Risala is the official mouthpiece for Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Mosques were also used to disseminate Hamas’ agenda, and more recently, Hamas launched a number of websites linked to the movement, and established its own radio and satellite TV station under the name Aqsa. Hamas’ structure was devised in response to the outbreak of the first uprising in 1987, before Hamas announced its charter in 1988.

The Hamas Charter On 18 August 1988, Hamas published its charter of 36 articles, calling for a synthesis of nationalism and Islamism. Its charter envisions the entirety of the land of Palestine as it was in 1947, as a religious trust (waqf), which cannot be divided or abandoned, and which belongs strictly to the Islamic faith. It calls for an Islamic state in historic Palestine in which other faiths will have rights according to Islamic law and will be treated with respect, as long as they do not challenge Islamic rule. It states that Palestinians should not cede one inch of the land, and that Jihad is a holy task

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for all Muslims in order to liberate Palestine. The charter also calls on neighbouring countries to open their borders to allow Muslims to participate in the liberation of Palestine. For Hamas, the ‘ultimate goal is Islam’, and Zionism is a roadblock to the establishment of universal Islam, hence, jihad against Zionism is a religious imperative (Abu Amr, 1994: 63).

Hamas and the first Intifada (Uprising): (1987-1991) During the first Intifada, Hamas expanded its activity to the rest of the Palestinian occupied territories to become the first dominant Islamic and religious organisation that rivalled the position of the PLO. As a consequence, there were extreme political, religious, national, and ideological rifts between Hamas and the PLO, which were manifested throughout the period of the first Intifada. The rift between the two began when each organisation claimed responsibility for the start of the first Intifada, despite it being a surprise for all. The Intifada had an organisational infrastructure based on local popular committees. These were coordinated through ‘Unified National Leadership of the Uprising’ (UNLU), which in turn coordinated initiatives with the PLO elite based in Tunis. The popular committees were dedicated not only to organising action against Israeli forces, but also to the provision of social welfare and health care, empowering women in particular to participate in economic development, social reconciliation among citizens, and encouraging self-sufficiency at grass-roots levels. Under PLO direction, the UNLU organised a general strike action every ninth day of every month. However, non-PLO members like Hamas tried to undermine the strikes and the authority of the UNLU, by calling strikes on different days. Hamas instructed its members to go on strike on the eighth day of each month (Rigby, 1991: 23-24). Thus, the rift deepened, further increasing the economic suffering of the people, and then Islamic Jihad enforced a different general strike day, arguing that the Intifada started on 6 October 1987, when its four leaders were killed in a gun battle on the outskirts of Gaza City at Shajaia. Palestinians regularly received different and confusing messages from the various rival factions. UNLU and the Islamic Movements (Hamas and Jihad) engaged in mass communication, even though they lacked official media agencies and radio stations, and lacked the sophisticated tools needed to recruit or raise

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national awareness. Their tools were pamphlets, slogans on walls, and public address systems at the mosques. Palestinians lived in a state of division caused by the differing ideologies and agendas of the political factions involved, which only increased the suffering of the population. On 15 November 1988, at its nineteenth meeting in Algeria, the PLO’s Palestinian National Council officially decided to accept a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. The PLO called for an international peace conference based on UN 242 and 338, which called for Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967. Hamas rejected this proposal. It described the recognition of Israel’s existence as high treason with regards to the Palestinian cause, and for the Islamic nation as well (Khalidi, 1990: 29-42). It attacked the PLO for separating the religious beliefs of the Palestinian people from their national ones. Hamas rejected any compromise regarding the status of Palestine. It also rejected the PLO’s strategic goal of establishing a secular state in Palestine. It believed that the Palestinian cause was an Islamic issue, not the issue of one people or nation. Hamas criticised the PLO because ‘it does not serve God’ (Abu Amr, 1994: 26-27). During this period, Hamas increased its popular actions against PLO concessions, which it viewed as a gesture towards peace with Israel. In an effort to suppress the Intifada, the Israelis imposed a comprehensive curfew on the entire Palestinian population in the occupied territories. It also imposed new military policies and measures to restrict the number of Palestinian labourers who could work inside Israel. The resulting increase in the suffering of Palestinians intensified their feelings of anger and their sense of nationhood. In 1989, Hamas escalated its violent resistance against Israeli forces. Hamas claimed credit for the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers and the killing of 16 Israelis, when a Palestinian forced a bus en route to Jerusalem to crash down a ravine (Schanzer, 2008: 32). This alarmed the Israeli government into launching a full-scale crackdown in May 1989, arresting hundreds of Hamas activists, including Sheikh Ahmed Yasin (Chehab, 2007: 15). Sheikh Yasin’s capture by the Israelis pushed Musa Abu Marzouk, who was studying in the USA, to fill the vacuum left by Sheikh Yasin and his associates. Abu Marzouk had been a close aide to Sheikh Yasin, and one of the team responsible for establishing the Islamic University in Gaza. In February 1990, his efforts were significant for the movement’s survival, with Israeli sources estimating that

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Hamas enjoyed the solid backing of 30 per cent of the residents of the Gaza strip (Lynfield, 1990). On the other hand, the chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, was very concerned at Hamas’ increasing popularity. He decided to have direct dialogue with Hamas’ leadership abroad. Arafat invited Hamas to a meeting in Jordan. However, despite a number of meetings there was no agreement between the two sides, and the tension continued (Kurz and Tal, July 1997: N 48). Hamas rejected the PLO’s offer that they should become a member of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), stipulating that Hamas would only consider the offer if they were granted 40 per cent of the PNC’s seats (Rubinstein, 2005). The division between the two was to grow ever sharper after Arafat agreed to participate in an international peace conference convened by the USA, to be held in Madrid in 1991.

Hamas and the Peace Process (1991-1993): The US administration invited Israel and the Arab countries of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, and the Palestinians, to attend an international peace conference in Madrid on 31 October 1991. The Palestinians were not represented as an independent delegation; they were part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation. These were the first international public bilateral talks ever between Israel and its neighbours. The purpose of the conference was to serve as an open forum for participants to discuss the formula for peace. It had no power to impose solutions or veto agreements (Ferry, 2005: 153). The conference was held on the basis of UN resolutions 242 and 338, which called for Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories. As a response to the conference, Hamas enforced a three-day general strike throughout the occupied territories. Later on, the tension between Hamas and Fatah escalated into violent clashes. Hamas increased its violent attacks against Israeli targets. In response, Israel deported 415 Islamic activists to south Lebanon in December 1992. Meanwhile, secret negotiations were taking place between Israeli and Palestinian representatives, convened by the Norwegians. These secret talks were concluded with the Declaration of Principles (Oslo) Agreement between Israel and the PLO, signed in Washington on 13 September 1993 (Rigby 2010: 59). This agreement escalated internal Palestinian tension between

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Hamas and the PLO. Hamas declared explicitly that it would launch a series of attacks against Israeli targets in a ‘race’ to halt the peace process. Hamas considered the agreement a strategic threat and a capitulation (Mishael & Sele, 2000: 66-67).

Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (1994-2000) As a result of the Oslo agreement, the PLO’s security apparatus and most of its political structures were moved from exile into the Gaza Strip, to lay the foundation for the Palestinian Authority in 1994. The new Palestinian political structure represented by PLO’s forces and the Palestinian Authority constituted a serious threat to Hamas. Hamas tried to hinder the progress of the Oslo agreement by challenging and weakening the newly established PA at political and military levels. At the political level, Hamas formed an alliance with other Islamist and secular groups based in Damascus to oppose the establishment of the PA and the Oslo peace process. Hamas and its allies launched political and media campaigns in mosques, universities, and syndicates to mobilise Palestinian society against the PA and the Oslo agreement. It attempted to de-legitimise the PA and accused it of cracking down on Hamas as Israel’s precondition for any further negotiations on the peace process (Kumaraswamy, 2001). According to the Oslo agreement, a central function of the PA was to maintain the rule of law and to prosecute those accused of armed attacks against Israeli targets. However, Hamas and its allies declared that they would engage in ‘open holy Jihad against the occupier until the liberation of all Palestine’ (Mishael & Sele, 2000: 67). At the military level, Hamas sought to weaken and threaten the existence of the PA by using military action against Israeli civilians. On 6 April 1994, Hamas carried out the first suicide bombing against Israeli civilians in the northern city of Afula. The attack killed eight and wounded thirty-four, and Hamas claimed that it was as revenge for twenty-nine Palestinians killed at AlIbrahimi mosque in Hebron by an Israeli settler. A week later, Hamas carried out another attack in Hadera that killed five people. (Schanzer, 2008: 42). In response, Israel demanded that the PA must stop the Hamas attacks as a precondition for any further negotiations and progress on the peace process. The PA considered that Hamas’ use of

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violence and suicide bombings inside Israel was against Palestinian interests, and linked Hamas to foreign agendas. The PA started to employ a coercive policy against Hamas members and could no longer tolerate its actions. It imposed a number of measures to undermine the different militant groups, and in late 1995 the PA used arms for the first time against Hamas and caused the death of seventeen worshippers after Friday prayers who were supporters of Hamas. Politically, the Palestinian Authority sought to find legitimacy and gain support for the peace process with Israel by organising the first legislative and presidential elections on 20 January 1996. Hamas and other political groups refused to participate in the elections to avoid giving legitimacy to the PA (Satloff, 2006). Hamas considered that the Oslo agreement mainly served an Israeli agenda, and exacerbated the fierce divisions between the Palestinians (Schanzer, 2003). To weaken Hamas, the PA helped some dissident Hamas leaders to establish new moderate Islamist parties. These parties were close to the PA and the PLO approach that renounced violence to achieve political gains. For its part, Hamas accused the PA of helping a number of its leaders with financing and security protection in order to divide the ‘mother movement’ into subgroups (Roy, 2007: 297). Moreover, the PA attracted a number of senior figures from Hamas and its military wing to join PA institutions. In addition, the PA also tightened its grip over religious institutions by establishing the ‘Ministry of Religious Affairs and Al Awqaf’. The Ministry controlled mosques, religious schools and sites in order to impose restrictions on Islamists who used them as strategic locations and as fertile ground for recruitment, for the dissemination of their messages, and to pass information to their followers. The PA also extended its grip on civil society organisations and demanded further scrutiny to prevent any activities that were in conflict with the PA’s political agenda. By 1996, with the now close cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security forces, Hamas was forced to function underground to avoid any possible crackdown from the PA (Human Rights Watch, 1997). As a result of this cooperation there was a significant decline in suicide bombings against Israeli targets. The efforts taken by the Palestinian Authority and Israel were crucial; their harsh policy towards Hamas managed to

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demolish the foundations of the Palestinian resistance, as Dr. Ramadan Shalah, secretary-general of the Islamic Jihad Movement, confirmed. He argued that the Islamic movement (Hamas and Jihad) witnessed a period of crisis that led to the collapse of its military infrastructure and to the loss of its human and financial resources (Shalah, 2002). This strategy towards Hamas by the Palestinian Authority and Israel enforced a successful cooperation until the collapse of the Camp David negotiations in July 2000 (Schweitzer, 2000). Palestinian and Israeli sides had failed to reach a compromise under the auspices of President Clinton’s mediation after two weeks of intensive and secret negotiations that had taken place at Camp David in the USA in July 2000. Palestinians and Israelis failed to reach a political compromise over the crucial issues of the status of Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees in order to establish a viable Palestinian state living side by side with Israel. The visit of the Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the Harm Al Shareef mosque, the holy site for Muslims in Jerusalem, on 28 September 2000, caused an eruption of violence which very quickly spread to the Palestinian streets (Rigby 2010: 63). This mosque is considered the second most holy place for Muslims after Mecca. The outbreak of the second Intifada came only two months after the failure of the Camp David negotiations between the PLO/PA and Israel.

Hamas and the Second Intifada (2000-4) The outbreak of the second Intifada changed the relationship between the PA and Israel, and signalled the use of excessive violence against unarmed civilian protesters in the holy site. The number of Palestinian casualties during the first weeks of the uprising was significantly high. This unified the different forces in Palestinian society behind Arafat after the failure of Camp David. The uprising also weakened PA security coordination with Israel, especially when the PA released large numbers of Hamas detainees on 4 October 2000 (Dudkevitch and Lahoud, 2000). Both the PA and Palestinian civilians were targeted by Israel, and for a few months this impacted positively on the relationship between the PA and other Palestinian factions, in particular Hamas. Israel held Arafat personally responsible for the violence. They accused Fatah of killing two Israeli settlers and seriously wounding

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nine in an attack on a school bus near the Kfar Darom settlement in the Gaza Strip on 20 November 2000 (Rees, 2002: 22 September). The conflict escalated when Israeli air forces bombarded the PA compound and Fatah headquarters in Gaza City. This action was the turning point for a full-scale violent confrontation, and Israel targeted PA institutions and its security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2002). The destruction of the security structure encouraged the formation of local militia groups, which attracted some of the security forces. The severe economic situation also forced some members of the security forces to leave and join these groups, which provided them with additional financial and social benefits. Local militants started to undermine the status of the PA security services as the central force for maintaining law and order, and many of the militant groups affiliated themselves with Hamas and other Islamist groups. (Luft, 2004). By then, Fatah did not have control or power, and was unable to continue its monopoly of the uprising through the use of religious symbols, security personnel and the media (Hammami and Tamari, 2001). Such changes on the Palestinian streets during the first months of the uprising encouraged Hamas to rebuild itself after six years of severe restrictions imposed on its operations, institutions and members. The PA began to lose its control over different segments of society during the second Intifada, which contributed to the weakening of its central authority and power.

New Era for Hamas Hamas exploited the deteriorating security and political situation to rebuild its military power, and social and media networks. From June to September 2001, it organised violent suicide attacks inside Israel (Economist, June 9-15, 2001: 46). The PA tried but failed to arrest Hamas activists and the Hamas leader Sheikh Yasin. In response to the PA’s attempts to make these arrests, demonstrations were organised and Hamas supporters set fire to the PA intelligence agency compound in the southern town of Rafah in the Gaza Strip (Hider, 2001). The Arab countries called for a summit in Beirut on 28 March 2002 to deliver the Arab Peace Initiative, which offered the recognition of Israel, alongside lasting and normal relations, in exchange for full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. Hamas challenged this by launching a massive attack on the eve of the Jewish Passover in Netanya, on

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27 March 2002, killing twenty-nine civilians and wounding more than one hundred (Chosak and Sawyer, 2005). There was outrage against this devastating bombing, both globally and within Israel, and for the first time Israel prevented Arafat from leaving the West Bank to participate in the summit, accusing him of promoting violence against Israel. Hamas’ action led to deep anger and frustration amongst the Israeli public, and military action against Hamas and the PA became imminent. After a short time Israel launched a military operation called ‘Defensive Shield’ and occupied all areas of the West Bank (Miller, 2004). Israeli forces surrounded and confined Arafat’s compound in Ramallah in late March 2002. The military operation destroyed the infrastructure of the Palestinian security services, its training bases and detention centres. Palestinian Minister of Interior `Abd alRazaq Yahya argued that the PA security services were unable to regain control of the security situation or impose order and law (Heinrich, 2002). Undermining PA legitimacy and its failure to restore law and order provided an opportunity for Hamas to extend the influence of its social network. They especially used the fact that the economic situation had deteriorated. According to the UN figures, 50 per cent of the 2.2 million Palestinians in the West Bank lived below the poverty line in 2004, compared with 22 percent in 2001. The UN also recorded 68 per cent in Gaza under the poverty line in 2004 (Miller, 2004). Hamas continued with its violent attacks to target Israeli civilians, and Israel on the other hand initiated a campaign of violence against the senior Hamas political and military leadership. It assassinated the spiritual leader of the movement, Sheikh Ahmmed Yasin on March 22 2004, and Islamil Abu Shanab, a member of the political office on August 21 2003. The movement had thus lost its spiritual leader (Tamimi, 2007: 206).

Concluding Thoughts The MB group in the Gaza Strip, before it had restructured itself under Hamas’ resistance movement, had taken a strategic decision to make a shift from social work into resistance in 1983. This represented the second phase of Hamas’ political development process (1983-2004). Its decision came in order to accommodate itself with the increasing demands of the younger generation, who

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admired the military resistance undertaken by the PIJ style. The PIJ was initially composed of a dissidents group that disputed the ideology of the MB, which was based on social and religious work. This group left the MB believing in the military resistance against Israel as a means to change society. The MB restructured itself as a national Palestinian group under the name of the Islamic resistance movement – Hamas - on December 14 1987. Its members were very disciplined and well organised, with a religious background. It demonstrated that it had a very sophisticated structure and collective leadership. In the meantime, it succeeded in challenging drastically and quickly the hegemony of PLO during the first popular uprising in 1987. The first Palestinian uprising in 1987 represented a unique opportunity for Hamas to emphasise religious beliefs as an essential component of Palestinian legitimacy and of its national identity. It used its existence through mosques, universities, welfare activities, and social institutions to challenge the policy of compromise of the PLO. On 15 November 1988 in Algeria, the PLO accepted Israel’s existence at the National Council, which paved the way for the Oslo agreement between the PLO and Israel on 13 September 1993, which stopped the actions of the Intifada and established the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and Jericho only. Hamas saw the PA as an outcome of the process of betrayal that began with the Oslo agreement and ignored the Palestinian cause and Islamic rights. Hamas vowed it would exert all its power to halt the peace process. Hamas rejected any acceptance of Israel’s existence or compromises with the Israelis on core issues of the Palestinian cause. Hamas also challenged Israeli-Palestinian agreements by targeting Israeli civilians in the heart of Israeli cities to weaken any progress in the peace process. This contributed to a tense relationship between Hamas and the PA, and the PA security forces used extreme force to crackdown on Hamas’ institutions and individuals until the collapse of the Camp David negotiations in July 2000. However, there were many attempts and initiatives from different international and regional actors to reform the PA and to stop the violence between Palestinians and Israelis. All these initiatives, including the Road Map, faced considerable challenges from Israeli aggression and its policies of settlements expansion, as well as from Hamas’ military policies. This challenged the PA and PLO hegemony, and the peace process as well. Hamas emerged as a

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force in the Palestinian territories and hit the headlines due to a string of suicide bombings in the heart of Israeli cities. Ultimately, the PA could not undertake any initiative to reform itself or initiate a peace process without reaching a political understanding with all the different factions and with Hamas in particular. Hamas was rooted within the Palestinian occupied territories as an Islamic social welfare movement, which gave it strong popular support. Hamas had transformed gradually from an Islamic social manifestation to a politically significant actor in society challenging the political hegemony of the PA or PLO. It showed that it was a powerful force within society running alternative institutions at all levels, including social welfare. The next chapter will discuss the impact of Hamas’ welfare on the social and political life of the Gaza Strip.

CHAPTER FOUR HAMAS’ SOCIAL WELFARE: FROM OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT

Introduction This chapter examines Hamas’ social welfare networks and NGOs and its social change theory. It explains the purpose and methodology of this theory, which defined Hamas’ approach to delivering different services in education, health and sport, and to providing financial and ‘in-kind’ support for poor families. It also examines the impact of Hamas’ social welfare on the Palestinians as distinct from that provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and by the PA’s own services. Hamas’ social network and NGO actions responded to citizens’ needs at all levels, while the Israeli military system failed to do so. These actions not only amplified the importance of NGOs’ work, but also expanded their opportunities to educate diverse populations about their social and political beliefs, values and norms. This was as much about their peaceful resistance to and their social and political ideology towards defeating the occupier and oppressor as it was about their cultural survival. There was a direct and organic link between NGOs’ social actions aimed at achieving Palestinian ideological goals and the ‘all-strings-attached’ philosophy and practice of social and charitable giving (Natil, 2014). It also examines the interrelationships between the social and political sectors of Hamas and how Hamas’ social welfare networks challenged the social welfare of the PA during the second uprising, which led to the defeat of Fatah and other secular groups in the Palestinian elections of 2006 (Roy, 2011). Hamas kept social services as the main component of its scope of work after it won the elections and governed the Gaza Strip (2007-2015). It delivers social services, despite the financial crisis after the closure of the tunnels and fall of the Arab Spring. Hamas continues to deliver social activities to its target groups through its social network of charities and local organisations. It still functions as part of a charitable network that is

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separate from the governmental system. In other words, its social network still works independently of its public institutions. During the Arab Spring, Hamas also improved its international network in order to raise funds for government purposes and for its operations focussed on breaking the siege (Natil, 2012: 166-182). However, it is important to look briefly at the history of social welfare operations involving the PLO and UNRWA, before examining Hamas’ social theory and the political impact of its welfare networks on Palestinian society.

History of Social Welfare under UNRWA and the PLO In 1949, UNRWA was established by the United Nations to provide social welfare (for example, educational, health, financial, and shelter) to all Palestinian refugees who had been forced or expelled from their homes after the establishment of Israel in 1948. UNRWA was the backbone for the survival of the Palestinian population in the midst of political and civil conflict and economic hardship, and with the lack of natural resources in the Gaza Strip. However, UNRWA did not provide services for one third of the population who were recorded as non-refugees. These non-refugees are the indigenous people who lived in the Gaza Strip before the flood of refugees arrived there as the result of the creation of Israel. Moreover, of the three subsequent and different authorities (the Egyptian Administration, the Israeli Military Administration and the Palestinian National Authority) that governed the Gaza Strip, all faced difficulties in satisfying the needs of refugees and non-refugees alike, due to the ongoing conflict and to high levels of poverty and unemployment (Mukhimer, 13 July 2005). These political and economic hardships encouraged the different political factions to become involved in social, education, and health activities to gain the support of their constituencies. Some national figures established and led local organisations to provide social and health services to the population. One example was the Palestinian Red Crescent for the Gaza Strip, led by a prominent national leftist figure, Dr Haider Abed Shafai, which provided social contributions and health work before the first uprising in 1987. The Red Crescent was established in 1969, and was active in different social and health fields for many years. But the health and social conditions of the population had deteriorated by the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987, due to the high level of conflict-related injuries, as well as the very low capacity of the public hospital run by the Israeli military administration. This encouraged the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees to take the initiative to

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supplement eight mobile teams (three in the Gaza Strip and five in the West Bank) with a number of permanent emergency first aid centres in the densely populated areas, where clashes with the Israeli military were almost daily occurrences (Rigby 1990: 89). In respect of other needs, some political groups set up various community committees to support women, youth, and children during the first uprising. However, Hamas was much more able to provide responsive social welfare, since it had an established social infrastructure which it had inherited from the MB (Tamimi, 2007: 52-55). The MB legacy meant that Hamas’ social welfare work, based on its Islamic ideology and social change theory, was years ahead of the social work of the various PLO factions.

Hamas’ Social Change Theory Hamas’ social theory aimed at changing individuals by returning to the teachings of Islam before engaging in politics. It sought to build community bases before bringing about political change. It also sought to mobilise communities by spreading Islamic values through its own good example of providing social and community services. This theory was inherited from its mother organisation, the MB, as part of Islamic culture, beliefs, ideology, and practices. Hamas’ Islamic doctrine and the prevalence of its theory were to change society’s values and norms in all areas of life, including in education, economy, law, and even social behaviour (Roy, 2007: 298). Through its social theory, Hamas sought to educate a generation of young leaders about Islamic beliefs, values, and norms. This was as much about its resistance to and political ideology of defeating the occupier and the oppressor as it was about the mere matter of cultural survival. The organic interconnection between political and social actions aimed to achieve Hamas’ ideological goals that offered this insight into the ‘all-strings-attached’ philosophy of Hamas regarding social and charitable giving. Hamas’ use of social services to achieve its political goals is outlined in its charter, too. (Abu Amr, 1994: 25). Hamas’ charter emphasised its social theory and responsibilities as an Islamic resistance movement there to provide social welfare and financial support to all segments of society, as explained in article 21:

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Chapter Four Mutual social responsibility means extending assistance, financial or moral, to all those who are in need, and joining in the execution of some of the work. Members of the Islamic Resistance Movement should consider the interests of the masses as their own personal interests. They must spare no effort in achieving and preserving them. They must prevent any foul play with the future of the upcoming generations and anything that could cause loss to society. The masses are part of them and they are part of the masses. Their strength is theirs, and their future is theirs. Members of the Islamic Resistance Movement should share the people’s joy and grief, adopt the demands of the public and whatever means by which they could be realised. The day that such a spirit prevails, brotherliness would deepen, cooperation, sympathy, and unity will be enhanced, and the ranks will be solidified to confront the enemies (Hamas’ Charter, Chapter 21).

As a part of its social change theory based on Islamic teachings and doctrine, Hamas also brought attention to the role of women in society and to their need for empowerment. Hamas considered that women play a most important role in looking after the family, rearing children and imbuing them with moral values and thoughts derived from Islam. It also emphasised the teaching of children to perform religious duties in preparation for the fighting role that awaited them. It also paid great attention to schools and to an educational curriculum for Muslim girls, so that they would grow up to be good mothers and aware of their role in the battle for liberation. Hamas’ social change theory also emphasised the provision of sufficient knowledge and understanding where housekeeping matters were concerned, because economy and avoidance of waste in the family budget was required in order to continue moving forward amidst the difficult conditions that surrounded them (Hamas’ Charter, Chapter 18). Hamas’ social change theory also emphasised resolving community disputes and social reconciliation, and mediating between Gazan clans involved in feuds and disputes. From the early days of its establishment, Hamas realised the importance of conciliation committees in public discourse. It set up a number of committees through a charitable organisation called Al Mjama Al Islami - ‘Islamic Congress’ - to mediate community disputes (Lafi, 2007). Hamas’ theory of social welfare did not face serious implementation challenges because it relied on the existing social welfare infrastructure of the MB. Hamas started to expand this infrastructure and its networks throughout the Palestinian occupied

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territories - and the Gaza Strip in particular - during the decade preceding its emergence (Tamimi, 2007: 52-60).

Social Welfare Networks Hamas inherited social welfare networks consisting of schools, sport clubs, kindergartens, women’s centres, mosques, medical centres, and charitable associations, serving hundreds if not thousands of grass-roots Palestinians. The social welfare networks were directed and managed by Hamas’ Dawa (Outreach) Committee. These networks aimed to attract activists and supporters and to mobilise the community with the intent of making a real shift towards the Islamism of the Gaza Strip (Lafi, 2007).

1. Educational Network Hamas’ educational network ran a number of schools, kindergartens, and training centres and, most importantly, the Islamic University. The Islamic University had been run by Islamists for many years and was considered the ‘engine’ for Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Many students graduating from the Islamic University were active in student groups responsible for mobilising society. The Islamic University, rather than the political factions and mosques, had empowered a generation of preachers, educators and leading Hamas teachers, when the University enjoyed autonomy under the occupation before the advent of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 (Jamal, 2005: 109). One of the key schools run by Hamas’ educational network was Al Salah Islamic School, which educated 1,000 orphans and other youngsters every year in the town of Deir al Balah. The school was registered and certified by the Palestinian Ministry of Education. The school provided meals, food, clothes, books, and other services to orphans and other families with cash payments of $40-100 monthly. The school disseminated Islamic beliefs and values. Two different banners hung outside the school proclaiming ‘Muslims are the best nation created in the world’ and ‘Those who learn more earn a higher degree in paradise’ (Murphy, 2006). During this period, some Israeli observers blamed Hamas’ educational network for drawing young children towards violence and making them aspire to be martyrs. Israeli newspapers reported on the graduation ceremony at a kindergarten run by al-Jam’iya al-Islamiya (The Islamic Foundation) - a Hamas charitable association run by Sheikh Ahmad Bahar, the current deputy speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council.

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Hamas’ educational sector services were larger than those run by the PA. According to the PA Ministry of Education, Islamic institutions comprised 65 per cent of all registered educational institutions in the Gaza Strip, excluding public schools (Roy 2000: 25). This underlined the explicit intent of the Hamas leadership to ensure its educational network would be an alternative to PA institutions, by serving thousands of suffering people, orphans, widows, children, and students (Roy, 2007: 175-176).

2. Religious Network The religious network consisted of mosques and their religious libraries. Mosques represented the symbolic identity of Hamas in the eyes of many Palestinians. Hamas sought to use the mosques as a platform from which to express political views and ideology. Hamas also used mosques to expose corruption, calling for morality, integrity, and the abandonment of secular concepts and practices during the first uprising in 1987. By 1987, Hamas succeeded in controlling about 40 per cent of the mosques in the Gaza Strip, as a result of the movement’s good relations with the community. These relations were forged by the collection of donations to build the mosques and their libraries, as confirmed by Sheikh Abed Fatah Dokhan, a senior founding member of Hamas in the Gaza Strip (Lafi, 2007). For members of Hamas, mosques also represented fertile social ground and an essential base for the dissemination of Hamas ideology and for the recruitment of new members. The mosque also represented a channel for internal communication among Hamas members. Moreover, the mosque played an important social and sporting role among members of Hamas. For example, every mosque in the Gaza Strip had its own soccer team, which were not particularly distinguished for the quality of their soccer; the teams did however, produce several Hamas members who were responsible for participating actively in the events of the uprising. Hamas extended and developed the existing mosques under its control. It also set up and developed Islamic libraries within mosques to teach the Quran to men, women, and children (International Crisis Group, 2003). The religious sites and mosques were also a source of division and dispute as they became the battlegrounds of Gaza in the power struggle between Hamas and Fatah during the first uprising, as the two competed over control of the mosques. For instance, I personally witnessed clashes

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that erupted between Hamas and Fatah over control of the great mosque in the Maghazi Camp in the middle section of the Gaza Strip in 1992. However, after a long dispute, this mosque remained in the hands of the Imam who was supported by Fatah groups at the time. The mosque also included a Zakat office which supported less well-off people with social deliveries. The mosques were used for religious education classes for both men and women.

3. Social Services Delivery Network Hamas’ delivery of social services was the most important and huge component in Hamas’ public actions. It delivered in-kind and cash services to hundreds of poor people in different areas of the Gaza Strip. These services were delivered by a number of charitable organisations run by Hamas’ social leaders. One of such organisations, Al Salah Islamic Association, in particular attempted to respond to the needs of people whose houses were destroyed by Israeli military forces during the first Intifada, as Al Salah’s director, Ahmad Kurd, (later elected mayor of Deir al Balah City and Hamas minister for social affairs) confirmed: In 1994, there was an Israeli operation that destroyed several Palestinian houses of families of suspected militants in one of the poorest neighbourhoods. I had to meet with the Israeli commander, and he asked me, ‘Why are you supporting and helping those victims who lost their homes?’ I told him, ‘The Red Crescent is helping; the United Churches organisation also gives some help to them, the Catholic Relief organisation, the United Nations. And Al Salah Society is there as well. Is it forbidden?’ And he was not able to respond to that (Murphy, 2006).

Hamas’ welfare organisations comprised approximately 10-40 per cent of all social institutions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, according to official and private sources (Roy, 2000: 25). Furthermore, there were 22,615 families representing 278,348 individuals, who received assistance from Islamic charitable foundations in 1997. The credibility of Hamas’ social delivery charities increased in 2003, when average individual income declined by roughly 50 per cent, and those living below the poverty line reached 60 per cent (International Crisis Group, 2003). Hamas’ welfare delivery services were also linked to hospital construction, surgeries, and care of the elderly.

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4. Health Network Through Islamic organisations, Hamas also ran a number of local clinics, medical centres and small hospitals, which expanded during the second Intifada due to the high level of casualties. During the Intifada, Hamas worked to establish a medical centre in every population centre. The medical centres provided health care services on a sliding scale of fees across a range of needs within society, including surgery and the care of elderly throughout the Gaza Strip. Hamas also ran Al Wafa Hospital for the elderly in Gaza; this was the only hospital of its kind in the Gaza Strip, as prior to 2007, the PA had not built any public hospitals for the elderly. The Islamic health network was consistently popular among Palestinians in the Gaza Strip; many women preferred to go to health centres provided by the Islamic movement rather than the nationalist movement. 24-year old Najwa Abu Mustafa from Khanounis confirmed: “It’s safer to come to an Islamic place where you can find a doctor who’s not only a good dentist, but a good Muslim. You’re putting yourself in God’s hands” (Murphy, 2006). Hamas’ Islamic health services contributed to the strengthening of the movement’s relations at a grass-roots level, which were more powerful than those of the other national groups.

5. Women’s Network Hamas paid special attention to the empowerment of women, based on its own Islamic ideology, and on political trends. Hamas ran a special committee within the movement to organise and coordinate with female groups as well. One of the main local Islamic organisations in this field was the Women’s Young Islamic Association (WYIA). By 2004, the WYIA had eleven branches and 102 employees to run five kindergartens across the Gaza Strip (Darwish, 2002: 46.68). Hamas’ women’s network participated actively in the local elections after years of appointed committees in 2004 and December 2005. Two women were elected for every local council in the occupied territories. Women’s representation came about as part of the Cotta system imposed by the late Palestinian election law, but women still have no real power or voice within these councils. Some of the councils are rural and traditionally controlled by families and dominant males (Natil, 2013). With such an infrastructure, Hamas was able to provide opportunities for women within their homes, as well as opportunities for them to participate in political and social life by engaging in a range of community

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activities designed by Hamas’ social leaders. These community-based organisations enabled women to engage within a safe environment controlled by Hamas’ political and religious values. Hamas was unlike the Taliban movement in Afghanistan; it did not prohibit women from working or from gaining an education. Many of Hamas’ female members and supporters were professional doctors, lawyers, teachers, and social workers. Nonetheless, women were oppressed and believed they had cause to struggle against discrimination and sexism, as Jamila Shanti, a Philosophy professor at the Islamic University and a current PLC member stated: Hamas women needed to tackle discrimination. Our first job is to correct this because this is not Islam. We are going to show that women are not secondary, they are equal to men. Discrimination is not from Islam, it is from tradition. It may not be easy. Men may not agree (Bullimore, 2006).

Women’s organisations were also provided with counselling and training on techniques of better household management, such as cost-effective food preparation and basic home maintenance. Women’s activities were always run by well-trained females in accordance with Islamic beliefs and cultural discipline. Women sent their children to nurseries and kindergartens run by the Al Salah Islamic Association, the Islamic Compound, Islamic Foundation, or the Women’s Young Islamic Association to be educated about the guidance of Islamic teachings based on the Q’uran and Sauna (Darwish, 2002: 46.68). Like its counterparts in other areas of the Gaza Strip, in the Magahzi camp where I lived, Hamas ran a number of women’s groups associated with the movement that were involved in social, religious, and even political activities. These groups usually played a role in the activities run by Hamas in the camp. Groups of women conducted house-to-house visits to urge other women to attend religious activities held in the mosques or in other venues hired by Hamas. Women associated with the groups took part in demonstrations and events organised by the movement to support its political positions. In addition, they visited the houses of the movement’s ‘martyrs’ or those who had been injured in confrontations with Israeli forces, to console or support their families in social solidarity. The social welfare network relied on various sources of funding to continue operating these networks. The network began by collecting donations in the occupied Palestinian territories from

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Muslims who, according to the five pillars of Islam, make charity donations each year called zakat. The network also relied on the power of Islamic movements abroad, in Europe, the Arab and Islamic world, and in North America. It also received donations from foreign governments such as Iran, and had investments in various commercial projects, for instance, buildings, shops, money exchange and others, in order to expand the various welfare networks (Levitt, 2006: 2-4). The capacity of these networks to deliver basic services both quickly and reliably increased Hamas’ reputation and gave it credibility among Palestinians. Its services were well-regarded for their efficiency and were perceived to be of a higher quality than those operated by the PA. The efficiency of these social networks promoted Hamas’ image and credibility against the legitimacy of the PA led by the Fatah movement (Roy, 2007: 181).

Challenging the PA’s legitimacy The growth and expansion of social networks imposed a real challenge and threat to the hegemony of PLO during the first Intifada, as during this period there was no central administrative authority for the Palestinian people. The tensions and conflict between Hamas and Fatah were over the symbolic domination, political programmes, local organisations and the actions of the uprising. The tension and conflict increased between the two movements after the establishment of the PA in the Gaza Strip in 1994 (Hroub, 2006). The PA feared Hamas’ social networks due to several different political considerations: -

Islamic NGOs were suspected of diverting social funds to Hamas’ military and political infrastructure. Hamas always denied any links to the charities, as Hamas’ leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi said: “The charities have nothing to do with Hamas, and the restrictions will not affect Hamas, but will affect the poor families.” Hamas exploited the beneficiaries of Islamic NGOs to incite violent resistance and recruit militants. Hamas could not attain its political objectives in Palestinian society without the social welfare network. Any systematic crackdown on its social sector would help to compel its military wing to stop actions against civilians (International Crisis Group, 2 April 2003: 23-24).

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The PA saw the existence of the welfare network as an affiliated body linked to Hamas. Sami Abu Zuhri, a Hamas spokesperson in the Gaza Strip, did not fully deny Hamas’ link to Islamic charitable organisations when he said: “Hamas doesn’t have much in the way of resources, but they have a big network of charities working in order to reduce the suffering of the Palestinian people. People feel the credibility of Hamas, and its ability to make change through the charitable organisations that it runs” (International Crisis Group, 2003).

In addition to these fears and considerations, the PA was always under pressure from Israel and the international community to impose restrictions on Hamas’s social institutions, whilst Hamas maintained its resistance to Israel’s existence with the use of violence. Pressure and challenges increased after the events of 11 September 2001, when the social networks were accused by the USA, Israel, and the PA of supporting Hamas’ military actions against Israeli targets. However, the International Crisis Group said there was ‘little substantial evidence’ that those Islamic welfare institutions systematically diverted funds to support any military activity (Murphy, 2006). Due to these political fears, considerations, and international pressures, the PA attempted to remove any threats and challenges posed by Hamas’ social infrastructure by taking different steps: 1- Security Measures: The PA imposed a number of restrictions on Hamas’ social and political institutions, as well as making arrests and imprisoning Hamas members. These restrictions came after Hamas militants carried out a number of suicide bombings in the heart of Israeli cities to undermine the relationship between Israel and the PA (Schanzer, 2008: 40-45). 2- Administrative Measures: During the second Intifada, the PA was threatened with Hamas’ social expansion, but could not engage in military confrontation, because as a central authority the PA was weak. The PA froze thirty-nine accounts of nine of the Islamic charities in response to US pressure after a Hamas suicide bombing carried out in Jerusalem killed nineteen Israelis on 19 August 2003 (Haaretz, 2003). The PA froze the charitable accounts in order to investigate whether the organisations channelled funds to Hamas, or whether

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the money was solely used by the organisations for social service purposes. The freezing of these charities’ accounts cut aid and services to about 2,000 welfare recipients who took to the streets protesting in front of the headquarters of the Palestinian Monetary Authority carrying banners which read: “We are not terrorists. Freezing the bank accounts is a crime.” From one Hamas social welfare charity, Al Mujamma Al Islami (Islamic Congress), some recipients used to receive the equivalent of $190 each per month. Mrs. Hanan Jaress, 45, a mother of 12, was one of these recipients who depended on Hamas’ social services. To avoid the PA’s restrictions on Islamic charities and the freezing of their accounts, Al Salah Islamic Association launched a campaign to collect cash and in-kind donations. It recruited dozens of fund-raisers with megaphones to walk the streets, from mosque to mosque, from door to door. Women even dropped their gold necklaces into the collection boxes, and with this approach, Al Salah collected $1 million worth of food, valuables, and cash in Gaza, which enabled them to continue to provide social and relief services throughout 2004. This meant they could provide relief assistance to the Rafah Camp in 2004, when the Israeli forces launched a major incursion, leaving nearly 1,500 residents homeless (Murphy, 2006). -

Social Welfare Capacity Re-building: Local and international bodies encouraged the PA to challenge Hamas’ influence and to weaken the dependency of the population on Hamas’ social welfare network by rebuilding its own welfare system that was administered by the Ministry of Social Affairs. The PA attempted a number of times to set up a competing social safety network. International organisations, including the World Bank, assisted and supported the PA to strengthen its social safety network. The PA’s social safety network aimed at financing and supporting thousands of poor people in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in order to counter Hamas’ welfare network. The PA’s social safety network attempted to replace the management of the charities that operated with Hamas’ support, seeking to block the influence of Hamas. However, Hamas’ social networks had been successful in assisting impoverished Palestinians for about two decades; the PA would take years to dismantle and to replace that

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social welfare system, which had become so much a part of the fabric of Palestinian life (Issacharoff, 2008). However, during the second Intifada, there were various changes in the environment that made Hamas’ social welfare networks indispensable and provided Hamas with golden opportunities for expansion at the expense of the central government of the PA: -

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Economic and Social Deterioration: Hamas’ contributions to the less well-off had increased as a result of the drastic deterioration of economic and political conditions after the deliberate destruction by Israel of the civic organisations of the PA, which had weakened its capacity to meet even the basic needs of the population. Economic development dropped in 2004, when 68 per cent of the population of the Gaza Strip lived below the poverty line, according to the UN figures (Miller, 2004). Institutional Vacuum: The Israeli military targeting of the PA produced an institutional vacuum and created conditions that made Hamas’ services indispensable as an alternative network of social welfare to the PA’s own institutions. Israeli military forces targeted the PA’s infrastructure to force it to take action against militant groups that were launching attacks against Israeli targets in the occupied territories and in the heart of Israeli cities. Israeli forces attempted to force the PA to begin coordinating again with the Israeli security agency to stop the second Intifada. A high-ranking official from the Palestinian Ministry of Interior acknowledged the power of Islamic institutions that filled this institutional vacuum in a statement to the International Crisis Group: “We look the other way with many Islamic institutions because they provide excellent services and this helps us [the PNA] a great deal. The "Islamic NGOs" provide services to marginalized locations and vulnerable target groups (e.g., widows, orphans, children born out of wedlock, the elderly)” (International Crisis Group, 2003). Less Legitimacy: The PA had already lost its central authority due to the spread of violence and the expanding power of local militant groups. The PA’s legitimacy had been reduced so that it had become merely one faction

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amongst others. The PA had no capacity to meet even the most basic economic and welfare needs of the population (Luft, 2000). Hamas took advantage of these changes and used them in an opportunity to promote its own agenda, promoting itself as an alternative to the PA during the second Intifada from 2000 to 2005. Islamic charities took the initiative in setting up a number of local sub-committees to expand their social relief facilities and financial support (Gordon, 2006). These sub-committees brought prestige and political support to Hamas whenever an organisation affiliated to Hamas provided good health care services or assisted prisoners. Hamas expanded its network of kindergartens and schools, and offered free meals for children and education centres for women, youth, and sports clubs. Its medical clinics provided subsidised treatment to the sick, and the organisation extended financial and technical assistance to those whose homes had been demolished, as well as to refugees living in sub-standard conditions (Gordon, 2006). The social networks increased Hamas’ political credibility during the second uprising Intifada. Social networks provided Hamas with the political weight to govern in some of the PA’s municipalities. The networks enabled Hamas to move from the chair of opposition and challenge to a seat of governance, when it succeeded in the PA’s municipal elections.

From Challenger to Governor The social networks carried Hamas from the role of challenger to the PA and its Fatah forces, into governance and administration, when its social leaders won the municipal elections across the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which were held on 27 January 2005 (Tamimi, 2007: 210). Hamas had proved itself, now that it had achieved its first major political goal, by winning the hearts of the people with its social welfare network, and for its appearance of fiscal rectitude. Hamas now governed more than 1,000,000 Palestinians in the municipalities governed by its mayors in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, compared to about 700,000 Palestinians in the municipalities governed by leaders from the dominant Fatah movement (Litvak, December 26, 2005: no 156) Hamas succeeded in the elections for a number of reasons:

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Hamas employed its social agenda to expose corruption within the PA through advocacy campaigns. Hamas used socio-economic issues and the suffering of the population in its municipal campaigns to fight against corruption, using its faith-based social welfare network, and based on its appearance of fiscal integrity. Hamas’ social welfare groups had made a consolidated effort by providing assistance at all levels, far more than at any period since its establishment. Hamas also claimed the Israeli disengagement plan or ‘Israeli withdrawal’ from the Gaza Strip as one of its own political achievements, which helped it to gain a sweeping victory in the municipal elections of 2005. Hamas suggested that it had forced Israel to withdraw its forces from Gaza using violence. Hamas’ local social welfare and educational institutions leaders headed its electoral lists called the “Reform and Change” in the municipal elections. Hamas exploited the failure of the Fatah movement to nominate candidates with a professional background in social services; Fatah lacked social leaders with a clear agenda and it failed to reach the hearts and minds of voters under its different lists. Hamas’ success in the municipal elections was also due to the fact that Palestinians had had enough of the gross ineffectiveness and ineptitude of Fatah. Hamas had never been tested for its transparency or accountability because it had never operated a government budget before. Providing Islamic-based social welfare programmes on a charitable basis without any external audit controls or accountability was not the same thing as governing (Yerushalmi, 2006).

Post-Government Challenges Thus, Hamas started its evolution into a dominant player in Palestinian domestic politics after its sweeping victory in 2005 and control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. The year was a very important one for Hamas’ transition from violence to politics. It was also the foundation for a new era of Hamas’ political development as a governing authority in the coming year. Hamas runs the ministries of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip. Hamas continues delivering social activities to its target groups through its social network of charities and local organisations. Hamas still functions as a charitable network out of the governmental system. In other words, its social network still works independently from

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the public institutions of Hamas’ government. During the Arab Spring, Hamas also had improved its international network abroad to raise funds for operations and for its government to break the siege (Natil, 2012: 166182). However, the political, economic, health, personal, food, community, and environmental insecurity of the people of the Gaza Strip had worsened acutely, and life had become impossible for Palestinians there as a result of Israel’s Operation Cast Lead, waged from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009. Israeli military operations left more than 1,300 people dead and over 5,000 wounded, and 2,400 buildings were destroyed. The operation increased the suffering of the Gazan population for years to come. Many wounded and sick were trapped in their homes, unable to get medical care. Corpses were left among rubble and in destroyed homes because Israeli forces denied access to medical crews during the campaign. The war increased the numbers who were displaced or trapped in their homes. Gaza’s civilians faced dire shortages of food, water, cooking gas, fuel, and medical care due to insecurities, the enforced closure of all of Gaza’s borders, and alleged serious violations of international humanitarian law. Electricity was sharply down, and in some places sewage was spilling into the streets. Children, who make up 56 per cent of Gaza’s residents, were especially vulnerable (Levy 2010: introduction). Due to these human insecurities, Hamas’ social network organisations also worked closely with many Islamic organisations. For example, official Turkish humanitarian aid was clearly visible when a delegation from the Turkish Red Crescent, headed by its chairman Tekin Küçükali, visited the Gaza Strip to distribute aid, including flour, rice, and pasta. The delegation also showed solidarity when they visited several families who were trying to survive in their damaged houses. In addition, Turkish civil society groups led an international support and solidarity campaign that strengthened as a result of the devastating consequences of the 2009 war in Gaza, particularly for civilians. Hamas’ social network worked closely with the activities of Turkish civil society organisations, and the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) in particular also tried to contribute to improving economic conditions by financing community and infrastructure projects in cooperation with the Hamas government after the war. Moreover, IHH community projects created employment for a number of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. There were a number of initiatives to send humanitarian aid and food by ships from different parts of the world; many of these came from Europe via the Mediterranean. They aimed to expose Israeli

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responsibility for its crimes in the Gaza Strip during the war, and were primarily sponsored and supported by Turkish groups such as IHH, which took a leading role in organising the ‘freedom flotilla’ of nine ships loaded with humanitarian aid (Natil, 2013: 198-210). However, the challenges for all social organisations including Hamas increased when Israel launched 51 days of military operation starting on July 8 2014. This operation has created a new environment of destruction, overloaded with psychological problems. It has left 100,000 Gazans homeless and over 2,100 Gazans dead, the majority of them Palestinian civilians, compared with 76 Israeli fatalities, all soldiers (United Nations, 2014). This complicated and hostile environment imposes huge challenges on PA and Hamas. It has already increased pressures and demands on work of local and international organisations, including UNRWA to achieve their agenda of peace and development. This has created massive new challenges for PA, Hamas, international organisations, and Gaza NGOs as they struggle to meet citizens’ needs and demands transparently and efficiently, not least because resources are sorely lacking after 10 years of blockades. The United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Mr. Nickolay Mladenov, following his first visit to Gaza, on 29 April 2015 said: “No human being who visits can remain untouched by the terrible devastation that one sees here in Gaza, and as shocking as the devastation of the buildings might be, the devastation of peoples’ livelihoods is 10 times more shocking” (UNRWA, 2015). Thus, the work of all peace, relief, and development organisations including Hamas’ social network face today a various ranges of serious challenges due to high level of hostility in the political environment, and absence of human security at all levels. Gazans have been living in very vulnerable and risky circumstances since the last Palestinian elections took place in 2006. The Gaza Strip is isolated from the entire world by serve closure and restrictions on movement. The society also faces a very high level of unemployment, drug addiction, and a lack of jobs and resources. The coastal Strip will face a very serious problem, as Gazans may effectively be unable to access usable water in 2020. The entire population is dependent on international assistance. They also suffer from high levels of psychological problems, because the coastal strip faced three different large scales of Israeli military offensives that caused major loss of life among youth, women, and children, and the destruction of already impoverished infrastructures (UNRWA, 2013).

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Concluding Thoughts The social and educational networks represented the cornerstone of Hamas’ political development as a resistance movement during the first Intifada, based on the social infrastructure inherited from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in 1987. Hamas’ social welfare was the initial seed of the movement’s roots in Palestinian society. The expansion and impact of social work as part of Hamas’ political strategy and ideological goals was an element of its resistance actions pre- and post- the Oslo process. The social strategy ‘linkage’ with Hamas’ political, military, and religious hierarchy within the socio-political framework of Palestinian society played a powerful role in improving its image and increasing its popularity vis-à-vis other Palestinian political forces, and particularly in relation to Fatah, the leader of the PLO. The strategy also represented a real challenge to the popularity of the PLO. Hamas’ social work as “soft power” imposed a threat to the hegemony of the official institutions of the PA, which was created after the first Intifada. Hamas’ social work was always under pressure as long as its political and military activities faced challenges from the different factors influencing Palestinian politics such as the PA, Israel, and the United States. Hamas had to adopt a tactic of accommodation post-Oslo as a result of the PA’s counter-measure campaign against Hamas’ social, civil, and political institutions. However, Hamas succeeded in rebuilding itself rapidly and grew by expanding its social structure to the point where it presented a real threat to the PA in the second Intifada, when the PA lost its central authority because of the spiral of violence across Palestinian society, in particular in the Gaza Strip. In this political environment, Hamas demonstrated how well-prepared it was to replace the PA’s institutional leadership politically, socially, and financially. Hamas created a public base of support and built a strong and trusted relationship with the community by touching the hearts and minds of poor people in Gaza. It met people’s basic humanitarian needs when other political groups and the PA failed to do so. Thus, Hamas believed social work to be the pillar of their Islamic values, beliefs and teaching, giving Zakat to deprived women, orphans, and children, the ill, and unemployed men. It paved the way for maintaining this existing socio-religious organisational structure in

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the form of charitable and educational systems. Hamas expanded its organisational infrastructure by building mosques, health and educational centres, women’s committees, Islamic libraries, sport and youth clubs. This new emergence within Palestinian society assisted in empowering a generation of young religious leaders. The public perceived the Islamic welfare NGOs and their wellknown leaders with their links and loyalties to Hamas, as trusted people who believed in God: “Good Muslims practising Islamic teachings properly.” Thus, the political message of Hamas was influential with citizens, while the PA was weak and unable to operate efficiently or to assist poor people properly. The connection between Hamas’ political ideology and the Islamic social sector served Hamas’ strategic goals. Hamas’ social work structure was a soft power for capturing the hearts and minds of less well-off people through the provision of social relief and financial assistance. This role was essential in order to demonstrate Hamas’ ability and credibility in delivering services to people who were under the economic closure imposed on the Palestinian territories by the Israeli occupation forces, as well as to highlight the inefficient performance of the PA in meeting people’s needs. However, Hamas’s social welfare network was under huge pressure and tough restrictions from Israel and the PA, due to their links with the Hamas military wing. The Islamists were known for honesty and a good reputation, in comparison to PLO members. They effectively provided recruits, logistics, and cover for the movement as well. Indeed, many officials of the charities were arrested, their assets seized, and their offices closed down by Palestinian and Israeli authorities. However, these measures could not hinder the social welfare of the Islamic NGOs from expansion or strengthening their power. Either directly or indirectly they were linked to Hamas, and represented a ‘state within a state’. Hamas derived its legitimacy from its organisational ability to respond to individual and community needs when the official PA institutions had failed to do so. Its operations empowered Islamic institutions to play a critical role and gain the trust of grass-roots constituencies. These circumstances contributed to the failure of the Fatah, the leader of the PLO and the PA, in the municipal elections in 2005, which were held for the first time in PA areas. It was expected that the Islamists would achieve an overwhelming majority in the local and municipal elections, due to their well-organised social actions, good reputation in running the

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community centres, and lack of political scandal. Hamas planned a well-designed local media and outreach campaign to mobilise the community to vote for Hamas candidates who had clear records working for Islamic NGOs during the last two decades. Its social leaders were supported by Hamas political leaders inside and outside the territories. But the Hamas leadership in exile in various different locations in the Arab world played a crucial role in facilitating communications and the fundraising campaigns run by the leaders of the Islamic Network in the Gulf States. Most of the local associations and private businesses in the Gulf States transferred funds to the Islamic welfare network of NGOs, believing that they were headed by ‘good Muslims, honest and clean handed leaders’, who provided social support for food delivery, finance for the basic needs of orphans, free health services for widows and poor women, the building of mosques and schools, and provision of tuition fees for poor students. Thus, Hamas invested in its social theory and welfare networks to achieve its political ideology of resisting Israeli occupation forces and challenging the hegemony of PLO in the Gaza Strip. It invested in its welfare network with the assistance of the external leadership based abroad. Hamas’ welfare system was expanded by funds raised abroad to promote the image of the movement, at the expense of the PLO. However, there were some differences between internal and external leadership, as will be discussed indepth in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HAMAS’ INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LEADERSHIP

Introduction Hamas’ image has been that of a disciplined, well-structured, united movement with one voice. It has consistently undertaken a consensual decision-making process through consulting grass roots and other constituencies across a wide geographic area. Hamas also conducts internal elections to select its representatives and leaders. It is seen to be a reputable social welfare movement managed entirely by its internal leaders in the Palestinian Territories. However, this chapter provides some evidence of the discord between Hamas’ internal and external leadership, illustrating the different roles played by both sides due to the discontinuous nature of the Palestinian territory and the complicated process of decisionmaking required to pursue the movement’s goals. This chapter also examines the decision-making process within Hamas and the key division and tension that exists between the different sets of leaders – those based in Gaza, those based in the West Bank, and those based ‘outside’. This tension is explained as a reflection of Hamas’ geographical division; evidenced in its often slow response to political developments, complicated organisational structure, unclear decision-making process, and the influence of the various ‘host’ countries. The chapter also presents examples of the varying positions of Hamas’ external and internal leadership with regard to cease-fires, participation in national elections, whether or not to use violence against Israel, and the movement’s relationship with the Palestinian Authority (PA). This chapter will assess the differences that emerged between Hamas’ external and internal leadership during the Arab Spring in respect of the Palestinian reconciliation with Fatah (Milton Edwards, 2013:60-71).

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To understand these differences and tensions between the internal and external leadership of Hamas, it is essential to provide a very brief explanation of the early tensions, discord and division of the MB in the Gaza Strip that led to the establishment of the Islamic Jihad movement in 1979, the establishment of which had taken place a few years before the local leadership of MB restructured itself to become Hamas.

The MB’s Early Division As noted in chapter three, by the late 1970s, the senior leadership of the Palestinian MB in the Gaza Strip was facing considerable pressure from a group of young leaders who had just finished their studies at Egyptian universities. These young leaders had close connections with members of the Egyptian MB; one such member was Sheikh Fathi Shqaki, who was an active member of the Islamic society in Egypt. On his return to Gaza, he disputed the tactics of the MB in the Gaza Strip. Sheikh Shqaki believed that the movement should not focus on social and grass-roots activities only; it must also use military resistance against Israeli forces and settlers (Hroub, 2006: 11). He was also influenced by Iranian Islamic revolution ideologies and principles (Abu Amr, 1994: 35). He argued strongly with his MB leadership that the MB had been one of the first to confront the establishment of Israel in 1948, by sending young Egyptians to fight side by side with Arabic forces (Tamimi, 2007: 43-4). Sheikh Shqaki, together with his close friend Abed Aziz Owda, who had been expelled from the MB, started to mobilise other fellows and friends to join his new group, the ‘Palestinian Islamic Jihad’ (PIJ). His group expanded rapidly by recruiting members from the MB and the nationalist movement, Fatah. This newlyestablished movement began to threaten the unity of the MB in the Gaza Strip by attracting a number of the young cadres of the MB. The PIJ also started preparing to target Israeli military and settlers in the Gaza Strip, and became popular and well-known among young Palestinians. MB leaders recognised that the PIJ’s expansion was threatening and challenging the popularity and reputation of the MB’s own movement (International Crisis Group, 2004). Ranks of young MB leaders were attracted to the military activity and ideologies of the PIJ. They started to challenge the senior leadership in the Gaza Strip to begin preparing for military action.

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The MB had to save the unity of their movement by finding a solution that would appease these young leaders. As mentioned earlier in chapter three, the Palestinian delegation for the MB Global Conference, held in the Jordan capital of Amman in 1983, found a golden opportunity to discuss possible military action and the unity of the movement in Palestine. The delegation fought for a special hearing where the issue of Palestine would be given special consideration. The global MB endorsed the Palestinian delegation’s proposal to establish a ‘special committee’ for Palestine. The special committee assisted in raising funds for the Gaza Strip MB, who purchased and supplied weapons and undertook logistics for Jihad (‘holy war’). Khalid Mashael, Hamas’ second political bureau chief, confirmed that, during this period, the MB maintained weapons and received funds from abroad (Al-Hayat, 2003). Shortly after the conference, the local leader of the MB in the Gaza Strip, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, was captured by Israeli occupation authorities. The Israelis accused him of maintaining weapons to use against their forces and settlers. However, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin was freed as a part of a prisoner exchange between Israel and the Popular Front for Palestine Liberation General Leadership in 1985 (Schanzer, 2008: 21). Once he was released from the Israeli prison, Sheikh Yasin attempted to demonstrate to the Israeli authorities that he had no links to the MB. However, he conducted activities in secret until the sudden outbreak of the popular actions of the first Intifada that took place on the eve of 8 December 1987 (Rigby 2010: 51). This popular uprising encouraged Hamas to declare its official establishment as a resistance movement. This declaration had come late - six days after the outbreak of the uprising - due to extensive, heated, internal discussions among the movement’s founders over the name ‘Hamas’ rather than ‘Muslim Brotherhood’. The declaration of Hamas as a resistance movement from within the Gaza Strip surprised the global MB ‘mother’ movement, and the MB was worried about its future in Palestine. However, Sheikh Yasin pushed the MB to accept Hamas due to the political changes occurring in Palestinian society. The MB’s social grass-roots infrastructure and facilities assisted Yasin’s leadership to recruit military operatives and young members to participate in the actions of the Intifada (Levitt, 2006: 35). Sheikh Yasin and his close associates wrote and published the controversial Hamas covenant from the Gaza Strip in 1988 (Neff,

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2002: 20-21). They also expanded and empowered the military wing, which began firing at Israeli positions and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers. Israel immediately classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and arrested its founding leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, with his main associates on 18 May 1989 (International Crisis Group, 2004). This meant that Hamas was paralysed to a great extent.

External Intervention The capture of Hamas’ founding leader and his senior associates in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank encouraged Mousa Abu Marzouk to intervene, in a move to secure the continuance of the movement. Abu Marzouk returned to Gaza from the USA where he had been pursuing his doctorate in industrial engineering at Colombia State University in Louisiana. His intervention was much easier because he had been born in the Rafah Camp in the Gaza Strip. Abu Marzouk had also been involved in establishing the Islamic University there, and had been a close associate of Sheikh Yasin before he joined an Egyptian University to pursue an undergraduate degree there. Abu Marzouk’s social background and knowledge of Gazan social structure enabled him to lay a new foundation for Hamas in a very short period of time following the detention of most of its active cells in the Palestinian Territories. Yasin had tended to control all aspects and activities of Hamas under a centralised and hierarchical organisational structure. As a consequence, Abu Marzouk was able to restructure Hamas to his own design (Levitt, 2006: 41-43). Abu Marzouk headed the executive committee of Hamas, which became responsible for completely rebuilding Hamas after it had been severely undermined by Israeli forces. After a brief stay in Gaza, Abu Marzouk continued to administer Hamas’ fundraising, social services, and military infrastructure from the USA. His efforts were strengthened by the deportation of another strong figure, Imad al-Alami, from the Gaza Strip in 1990. AlAlami was responsible for the group’s interior committee (the Palestinian Territories Committee Affairs). Al-Alami relocated to Amman before moving to Tehran, and then Damascus (Gambill, 2002). Al-Alami was a chief aid to Abu Marzouk and supported him in all his operations. However, Abu Marzouk eventually moved from the USA to join the rest of his Hamas colleagues who

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had been living in Kuwait. Later, as a result of the Iraqi invasion in 1990, they were forced to leave Kuwait for Jordan. All of this group originally came from the West Bank and were closely associated with the Jordanian MB, both ideologically and tactically. Abu Marzouk and Al-Alami, on the other hand, were ideologically closer to the Egyptian MB, due to the geographical and cultural relationship between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. These two groups with different cultural and social backgrounds worked together closely as an executive committee managing Hamas’ affairs and regional political developments after the first Gulf War in 1990. Hamas’ external leaders opposed and criticised the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as well as US attacks against the Iraqi people (Mishael & Sele, 2000: 88-89). Hamas benefited from its political stand against the Iraqi invasion, unlike the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), who had sided with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Kuwait then expelled the majority of the 400,000 or so Palestinians who were living in Kuwait - the wealthiest Palestinian community outside the Palestinian territories. It was a shock to many Palestinians that PLO’s chairman, Yasser Arafat, had backed the Iraqi invasion, and this decision later deprived the PLO of billions of dollars of aid from the Gulf States. (In the last decade before the invasion, the PLO had received about $10 billion in financial backing from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.) It was said that Arafat supported Iraq in the invasion because Iraq demanded that Israel withdraw its military forces from the Palestinian occupied territories. Dr. George Habash, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - the largest member group in the PLO after Fatah - called on the ‘Arab masses and all its nationalist, democratic, and progressive forces to resist the American invasion of the Arab region and to defeat the aggressive forces’ of the West and the Arab world, reinforcing the impression that, by and large, the PLO supported Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Hamas opposed the invasion for religious and ideological reasons, in other words because Muslims should not fight each other. Hamas believed that Muslims should settle their differences through dialogue and understanding, not through war. Thus, Hamas gained the popular and financial support of the Gulf States at the expense of the PLO. This enabled Hamas’ external leadership to improve its financial network through access to external resources. At the same time, Hamas developed a

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sophisticated fundraising network based on the MB throughout the Middle East, Europe, and the United States (Gunning, 2007: 40). It also built alliances with governments to secure additional logistical support and training. Hamas officials such as Khalid Michael, prior to his taking up leadership of Hamas, administered these financial networks and held the purse strings (Yehudit Barsky, June 1996: Vol. 3, No. 2). These changes within Hamas’ leadership, as well as the regional political developments with the increased financial and popular support they brought, enabled Hamas to expand its military, social, and political operations in the Palestinian territories, with a particularly strong impact on Palestinian politics, and presenting a challenge to the legitimacy of the PLO. In light of these developments, Arafat decided to have a direct dialogue with Hamas’ external leadership. In 1990, he invited Hamas to become a member of the Palestinian National Council (PNC). Hamas’ external leadership rejected the invitation to join the PLO unless they were granted 40 per cent of the PNC’s seats (Danny, 2005). However, it was unclear whether the external leadership had consulted its internal leadership, many of whom in any case were behind Israeli prison bars. This was an attempt by Arafat to undermine the emerging power of Hamas by integrating it, through the PNC, into his own political system. The PNC was fully controlled by Arafat’s Fatah group and his alliance with the other national and small factions. He also wanted to undermine Hamas’ regional growth and to reclaim the PLO’s position as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. He also realised that Hamas’ external leadership had enough power to define the movement’s overall policy, as well as to control its financial resources and military activities from abroad.

Military and Funding Tensions The power of the external leadership over the movement after it moved to Amman was strengthened by the establishment of its military wing, reorganised as Izz al-Din al-Qassam Battalions in 1991. The external leadership controlled the military wing operationally and financially, and this caused tension within the Gaza-based leadership (Gunning, 2007: 40). Hamas has never had an explicit separation between its military and its political wings, as all its branches answered to the same organisational hierarchy.

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All key decisions about military operations and political, social, and other policies were in the hands of the external leadership, moreover the external leadership also controlled the financial resources of the movement. However, the external leadership was less adjusted to pragmatic inspirations and grass roots realities due to changes on the ground in the Palestinian territories. It was much closer in its position to regional players and to the external political interests of Syria and Iran (Herzog, 2006). Actions by the military wing intensified against Israeli posts, including the kidnapping of a soldier in 1992. As a result of these actions and the concomitant Israeli countermeasures, the military wing evolved a new compartmentalised organisational structure, with individual cells operating secretly and independently from one another under the directives of the internal commanders (Gambill, 2002). These structural changes within Hamas were in part the result of several problems, which included the dispersed aspects of leadership between the internal and external conduits (and their mix of Gaza and West Bank backgrounds). This also occasionally contributed to a state of difference and tension, particularly when the supreme body, the consultative council or ‘Shura’, was unable to convene collectively in one place, due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the geographical distance between Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, and Syria, made meeting in one place difficult, plus Israeli restrictions on movement and travel meant that the Hamas leadership could not move freely. Secondly, if Hamas leaders met in the Palestinian territories, they faced the possibility of being targeted by Israeli forces, and thirdly, a number of Hamas leaders were behind Israeli prison bars. This undermined the formal authority of the Shura, because if the Shura was unable to meet, then Hamas’ executive or political office took over decision-making within the movement. Hamas constituents in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Israeli prisons, and the external enclaves each had their own consultative councils. However, the overall Shura for all locations could not fully exercise its authority over the movement because the funds for both welfare and military operations were in the hands of external sources, i.e. the political office (Mishael & Sele, 2000: 75-81). When the Israeli government decided to expel 415 Hamas senior leaders to South Lebanon and an uncertain future, this also created a unique opportunity for the deportees to meet their external leadership for the first time in 1992 (International Crisis Group:

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2004). The deportees from the occupied territories brought with them the concerns and sufferings they had faced in confronting the Israeli authorities to share with the external leaders of the movement. Both leaderships now had an opportunity to discuss their organisational issues. Nonetheless, the deportees did not abandon their right to return to their homes in the Palestinian territories. They rejected all proposals to remain outside the Palestinian territories. However, some local leaders such as Sheikh Izz al-Din Khalil, a senior military wing figure from Gaza, preferred to be stationed outside Gaza in Syria, establishing an operational headquarters for the Hamas military wing there. Khalil’s authorisation for military attacks was relayed from the executive committee in Amman, which had restructured to become the Political Bureau of Hamas, headed by Mousa Abu Marzouk in 1992 (Gambill, 2002).

Failure of Dialogue with PLO Mousa Abu Marzouk headed Hamas’ delegation when they travelled to Tunisia to meet the PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat, in September 1992. Abu Marzouk’s delegation and Arafat discussed the diplomatic efforts required to resolve the crisis of the deportees in Southern Lebanon, so that they might return to their homes in the occupied territories. This meeting was one of several that had taken place since the deportation to discuss Hamas joining the PLO. However, in response to Hamas’ demand for 40 per cent of the Palestinian National Council, Arafat offered only 4 per cent, which was far below Hamas’ demands. In its publications, Hamas explicitly and implicitly challenged the PLO as the ‘sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’, a phrase that is included in its covenant. Hamas insisted that the PLO had not been elected in order to monopolise Palestinian representation. In January 1993, neither faction could reach a compromise about Hamas joining the PLO. However, after the September 1993 Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO, the external leadership position towards the PLO became more radical. Hamas believed that the PLO was conceding the fundamental and principal rights of the Palestinian people (Tamimi, 2007: 187-190). In spite of the failed dialogue, the internal leadership of Hamas attempted to pursue an alliance with the PLO and its newly

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established Palestinian Authority (PA) in the Gaza Strip, in order to maintain the movement’s civil and social infrastructure. Hamas’ internal leadership sought to make the shift into social work in an effort to achieve accommodation and consensus, and to reflect the needs of the movement’s members in the occupied territories (Roy, 2007: 298). Most importantly, the external leadership did not face the Israeli aggression like the internal one. It also did not face any direct problems to its members, because of the Israeli aggression and hard economic situations in the Palestinian territories (Gunning, 2007: 40). While the military wing of Hamas in Gaza tended to operate under orders from internal leaders, cells in the West Bank reported directly to the external leadership. The external leadership exerted more control over the timing and frequency of Hamas suicide bombings in the heart of Israeli cities, which began in April 1994 (Gambill, 2002). In response to the suicide bombings, Israeli intelligence officers visited Sheikh Yasin in his isolation cell in prison and tried to persuade him to make a statement that could be broadcast on Israeli television. The Israelis thought that Sheikh Yasin had the power to persuade the militants to stop carrying out further suicide bombings. However, at that time the final decision on strategic issues were in the hands of the political bureau in Amman, headed by Mousa Abu Marzouk. However, in October 1994, after the Jordanian kingdom signed a peace treaty with Israel and began to forge closer ties with the PA, Abu Marzouk and Al-Alami were expelled from Jordan in June 1995, to avoid any pressure from Israel and the PA (Tamimi, 2007: 159-191).

Tension Increases, Externally and Internally Abu Marzouk and Al Alami’s expulsion from Jordan prompted the latter to relocate Hamas’ interior committee, which was responsible for directing Hamas activities in the Gaza Strip, to Damascus. However, the political committee kept its headquarters in Amman under Khaled Mashael and his compatriots, who were already Jordanian citizens. Abu Marzouk found it difficult to accommodate himself in Syria in 1995, because his children had remained in the USA. He decided to return to the USA despite the objections of his colleagues (Tamimi, 2007: 84).

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They advised him to stay in Syria to avoid any detention by US federal authorities. He ignored his colleagues’ recommendation and continued his journey to the USA, where he was immediately detained for about two years. Consequently, the fifty-member Hamas Consultative Council, or Shura, elected Abu Marzouk’s deputy, Khaled Mashael, to be the chairman of the political bureau. However, Mashael had also held responsibility for international fundraising efforts in the Amman offices before he was elected chairman, and so took over all of Abu Marzouk’s organisational portfolio. Mashael also assumed responsibility for the resistance activities of Hamas’ military wing (Levitt, 2006: 44). Subsequently, Mashael also represented Hamas at different public events and during official visits to Syria and Iran. He was supported in the political office by his friends from the West Bank who knew him when he was in Kuwait. However, there was some tension between his group and the Gaza members of the political office based in the occupied territories. However, Hamas leaders realised that they must work together drawing on the movement’s political culture of harmony, ideal unity, and collective consensus, to avoid any internal split. Most importantly, they realised that they were still being systematically targeted by Israel and Hamas’ rival, the PLO (Gunning, 2007: 130). As a result of the shift in leadership after Abu Marzouk’s detention, the PA had problems communicating with Hamas’ decision-making body in the Gaza Strip. All decision-making and the final authority of Hamas were in the hands of the political office. Arafat dispatched a senior military adviser to Amman to meet Hamas’ political leadership there, but was unable to persuade them to allow the internal leadership in Palestine to participate in the first national elections in 1996. However, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank leadership expressed a different position and considered participating in the elections; to do this they had to consult with the external leadership in order to take a decision. For its part, the PA coordinated with the Israeli authorities to allow internal leadership delegations from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to travel abroad for consultation in December 1995 (Tamimi, 2007: 192). This was the second opportunity for internal leaders to meet face to face with the external leadership after their expulsion to south Lebanon. After five days of consultation, the external leaders were strong enough to persuade the internal leaders to continue

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attacking Israeli targets and boycott participation in the elections. The external leadership defended its position by stating that ‘the elections were organised under the Oslo peace process agreement and Hamas did not want to legitimatise the peace process itself’ (Tamimi, 2007: 192-193). In spite of the consensus eventually reached within the movement, the elections were still an occasion for internal division, as some young internal leaders still favoured participating in the PA elections, although the majority advocated a boycott. A senior leader of Hamas, Ismail Hania (the current Hamas Prime Minister) and others obtained authorisation from a section of Hamas’ leadership to stand for election in a personal capacity. Some of Hamas’ internal leadership and consultative body in the Gaza Strip supported Hania’s participation in the election. However, others within the internal leadership, supported by the external leadership, issued a leaflet calling Hania and his colleagues ‘traitors’ (Gunning, 2007: 110-111). In the end, Hania stood down and withdrew his candidacy after Rantisi, a senior leader, sent a letter from his prison cell persuading him to do so, in order to maintain the unity and harmony of the movement. However, Imad Al-Faluji, formerly chief editor of Hamas’ Al-Watan publication and an official spokesman for the movement, did not stand down, won a seat at the elections and was subsequently appointed Telecommunications Minister by Chairman Arafat. Al-Faluji was then expelled from Hamas for becoming too close to the PA (International Crisis Group, 2004). In addition, there were also signs of serious friction among the affiliated groups of Hamas. A new cell emerged from within Hamas called the New Pupils of the Martyr Engineer Yahya Ayyash, which took responsibility for a suicide attack on 3 March 1996 in Jerusalem. The attack broke a temporary halt to the violence, which had been declared by the official armed wing of Hamas, the Qassam Brigades, after a similar bombing a few days earlier. This attack undermined an understanding reached in December 1996 after months of negotiations, when Hamas had promised not to ‘embarrass’ the PA, implying that it would suspend attacks from territories under Palestinian self-rule. Ayyash’s cells declared that the bombing was ‘the culmination of our violent revenge for the death of the engineer, Yahya Ayyash’. The ‘engineer’ was the nickname of Yahya Ayyash who was behind most suicide bombings in Israeli cities, before he was

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assassinated by Israel on 5 January 1996. It is widely believed that he was assassinated by an exploding cellular phone planted by Israeli agents in the Gaza Strip. However, it was also said that Israeli agents were only able to assassinate Ayyash because of poor coordination among the different wings of Hamas that tried to provide him with a safe haven (Mishael & Sele, 2000: 75-76). The cells criticised the Qassam Brigades for its offer of a truce, and warned that attacks would resume if Israel pursued Hamas militants, but declared that they would halt attacks for three months to enable Hamas and Israel to reach a truce mediated by the PA. This reflected the discord between the radical and pragmatic elements within the movement, as Ziyad Abu Amr, a political science professor at Bir Zeit University said: The group behind the latest bombings may be being guided by external radical Hamas leaders abroad. Either this is a splinter group out of control, or a split is taking place, with external elements of Hamas trying to spoil the rapprochement between internal Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (Greenberg, 1996).

As a part of this discord, a number of senior figures from Hamas called for dialogue with the PA. As Sheik Jamil Hamami, a Hamas leader from Jerusalem said: ‘Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Hamas must arrive at a common ground to stop the cycle of violence’ (Greenberg March 4, 1996). Hamas’ response to urgent political developments on the ground sometimes took longer due to activities’ circumstances, such as dialogue with the PA or stopping bombing. The nature of decision-making within Hamas was made more complicated by its dispersed leadership; for example, the external leadership’s decision and support for suicide bombing operations in Israel in 1996 put an end to the tentative rapprochement between the internal leadership and the PA (Mishael & Sele, 2000: 75-76). It was clear that the internal leadership sought accommodation with the PA, because it had experienced the challenges for real and had witnessed the changes on the ground. A number of internal Hamas leaders therefore rejected the decision of the external leadership to support the renewal of suicide bombing, and instead in 1997, established new, small parties supported by the PA. Dr. Khaled Hrub maintained nonetheless, that, ‘there have been no splits or even small splinter groups in Hamas’ (Hroub, 2006: 119). But in fact, Hamas had split. In 1997, the PA authorised a number

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of new legal moderate Islamist parties such as the Islamic National Union Movement (Massar), the Salvation party, Islamic JihadAlqsa, and the Islamic Struggle Movement, under Palestinian law. These parties were predominantly headed by senior figures from Hamas. These newly-created parties were associated with and close to the programmes of the PLO, and they had all renounced violence as a tool to achieve political gains or objectives. Moreover, ex-Hamas members were required to renounce the ideology of Hamas as a precondition to joining the civil and security institutions of the PA, despite the fact that these parties had emerged from the very heart of Hamas. Their leaders accused Hamas of being unable to accommodate de facto socio-political environmental changes and structural developments in Palestinian society, which had come about as a result of PA initiatives. However, these parties carried no weight or impact on Palestinian politics, as they had not taken part in any elections or demonstrations since their appearance. Nonetheless, the creation of these small parties increased tension between Hamas and the PA: Hamas accused the PA of offering a number of its leaders financial resources and security protection in order to divide the ‘mother’ movement into sub-groups (Roy, 2007: 297). In spite of these domestic structural changes, the image of Hamas received a boost once more after the failed Israeli assassination plot against the leader of Hamas’ political office, Khaled Mishael, in the Jordanian capital Amman in 1997. Israel attempted to liquidate Mishael to undermine Hamas’ military capacities and its decision-making process, which was directed by the external leadership and headed by Mishael himself. Mishael’s power within the movement had increased; he was seen as someone ‘sacrificing himself’ to serve the group and the embodiment of the collective movement. He had also engendered high levels of trust that were vital for his representation of Hamas to function effectively (Gunning, 2007: 130). The event contributed to the release of Hamas’ spiritual leader, Ahmed Yasin, from prison in Israel as a conciliatory gesture by the government of Israel towards Jordan, in order to avoid any diplomatic problems between the two countries. King Hussain of Jordan believed that the release of Yasin would empower and encourage the moderate line of the movement towards stability and the peace process. The Jordanian Authorities also allowed Abu Marzouk to return to Jordan when he was deported by the FBI

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from the USA after two years in detention (Tamimi, 2007: 192193). Once Yasin was released in October 1997, he called upon his movement to rebuild its organisational and social welfare network, which had been targeted by Israel and the PA. He also advocated within the movement for cooperation with Arafat and a suspension of military actions against Israel, but this was objected to by the external leadership, who were capable of ordering attacks without Yasin’s approval. An example of this occurred when a power struggle erupted between the rival leadership wings over control of Qassam Brigade cells in the spring of 1998 (Gambill, 2002). It was also said that Yasin had reportedly condemned ‘corruption’ in Hamas missions abroad, hinting at his preference to bypass Mishael in favour of Mousa Abu Marzouk. Yasin had also intimated that he was uncomfortable with Hamas’ links to some foreign countries, such as Iran (Schenker, 1999). He wanted Hamas to be a purely independent movement making its decisions without any intervention from any host countries. In 1999, Arafat invited Sheikh Yasin to attend the PLO’s Central Council (PCC) as an observer, thus creating a further opportunity for the differences between the two wings of Hamas (the internal and the external leadership) to become exacerbated, confirming once again that geographical distance and problems of communication caused problems in decision-making. This event also revealed that the decision-making process within Hamas was very slow in responding to political changes and emergencies, both in the Palestinian territories and in the region. In late April 1999, for the first time in the Gaza Strip, the PCC was to debate the proposal to declare the PA to be a Palestinian state, with the date set for 4 May 1999. This date had been defined as the end of the temporary Oslo agreement with Israel (Haaretz, 1999). Sheikh Yasin attended the meeting at Arafat’s invitation, despite the objections of Hamas’ political office that the invitation was part of Arafat’s plan to split the movement. The political office in Amman believed that Yasin’s presence appeared to tacitly legitimise the PLO’s approach to the peace process. Yasin’s decision to attend the PCC meeting, if only as an observer, seemed to be the culminating event in a growing number of accommodations in Yasin’s approach towards the PLO. (Schenker, Peace, 1999). Immediately, Hamas’ political office issued a statement declaring that Yasin’s participation would be in his personal capacity only. This prompted Yasin to withdraw his

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attendance on the second day of the meeting and issue a statement in line with the political office. In his statement, Yasin confirmed that the internal leadership had attempted to contact its political office prior to his participation, but the time-frame had been very short, as he had received the invitation only two days before the PCC began its sessions (Tamimi, 2007:196). However, Yasin’s withdrawal from the PCC meeting following the external leadership’s statement did reveal that final authority was in the hands of the external political leadership. It also indicated that the spiritual leader was very wise in repositioning himself in order to avoid any split within Hamas, and to maintain the unity of the movement. Perhaps Yasin was acknowledging the crucial role that had been played by the external leadership in maintaining Hamas’s existence and its power over Palestinian politics while he was in the Israeli prison? Or Yasin might have gleaned that the Hamas movement abroad was about to face serious problems, such as growing tension in its relationship with the Jordanian authorities, and with the MB in Jordan as well.

End of Hamas’ Relationship with the Jordanian MB While there were difficulties facing Hamas’ internal leadership in the Palestinian territories, its external leadership was challenging efforts to separate Hamas from its sister MB in Jordan. The Jordanian MB accused Hamas of misusing MB resources and infiltrating its constituencies at the expense of the Jordanian MB and of Jordan itself. The MB believed that Hamas’ expansion in Jordan had come at the cost of the MB’s own programme in Jordan. Hamas recruited some members of the younger generation of the MB who became more committed to the Hamas position than the Jordanian MB position. Some leaders of the Jordanian MB held the view that Hamas leaders must decide whether they wanted to be Jordanian or Palestinian, despite the fact that the Jordanian MB primarily assisted Hamas leaders stationed in Jordan in coordination with the Jordanian authorities. Senior leaders of the MB such as Imad Abu Dayya, deputy leader in Jordan, demanded the return of Hamas’ leaders to the Palestinian territories (Tamimi, 2007: 123-127). However, Hamas had always described itself as a ‘wing of the MB in Palestine’. These moves coincided with steps by the Jordanian MB to distance itself from Hamas operatives inside

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Jordan. At the same time, King Abdullah II and his intelligence advisers had decided to use a ‘divide-and-rule’ approach to Islamism in Jordan, as a result of the MB’s victory in the parliamentary elections. Subsequently, government agents took a number of measures against Hamas operations inside Jordan. Several Hamas officials were arrested, including two personal bodyguards of the Hamas political bureau chief Khalid Mishael, and Hamas was ordered to cease issuing communiqués from Jordan (Tamimi, 2007: 123-131). The Jordanian authorities exerted pressure on the Hamas external leadership in order to promote the more traditional Islamist leadership of the MB in Amman, and the older traditional line of Hamas leadership headed by Yasin in the Gaza Strip. The old leadership of Hamas appeared always to lean towards a more pragmatic, less confrontational approach. The barring of Hamas activities in Jordan affected the movement’s operations to a great extent in 1999. However, Hamas members continued delivering statements to the media, ignoring the instructions and restrictions imposed by the Jordanian authorities (Schenker, 1999). This forced the authorities to outlaw Hamas’ operations from Jordan and expel its leaders, particularly in response to huge pressures being exerted by the USA, Israel, and the PA. The government of Jordan expelled Hamas’ leaders to Qatar on 21 November 1999, despite the Qatari government’s refusal to receive them permanently. They were received on a temporary basis although the government of Jordan refused to allow them back into Jordan, which later contributed to a political and diplomatic crisis between the two states (Los Anglos Times: November 22 1999). Consequently, Hamas moved its external offices from Jordan into Syria. The Syrian authorities allowed Hamas leaders to conduct their activities in Syria after the introduction of Jordanian countermeasures. Although Mashael officially resided in Qatar, he was not allowed to undertake any form of political activity there, however, he was given an important platform through the well-known and worldwide satellite television channel, Al Jazeera. In reality, Mashael spent the majority of his time in Syria. The United States had exerted pressure on the Syrian government to stop the Palestinian movement from directing violence against Israeli positions from its soil, which later evolved into a precondition for the first direct Israeli-Syrian cycle of negotiation in Shepherdstown, West Virginia in 1999. Following the failure of these talks in early 2000, Hamas resumed its public operations

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from Syria, and in April 2000, Israeli occupation forces discovered a Hamas cell in Nablus, which was said to be taking orders from Hamas leaders in the Syrian capital (Gambill, 2002). Simply put, Hamas’ dispute with the Jordanian MB, its sister organisation, sped up its expulsion from Jordan. However, its expulsion encouraged Syria to provide a safe haven for Hamas, and was a catalyst for a comfortable relationship with the state of Qatar. Despite the challenges to and changes in where the external leadership of Hamas was located, the movement did not halt its attempts to rebuild the capacity of its military wing until the outbreak of the uprising from the holy shrine of Jerusalem on September 28 2000 (Tamimi, 2007: 199).

The Second Intifada: Guide the Second Uprising from Abroad The outbreak of the second Intifada encouraged Hamas to operate strongly from within the Palestinian territories once again, but under the direction of the external leadership, which still controlled the movement’s finances and promoted the movement’s relationships with Syria and Iran. The fact of being based in Syria after its expulsion from Jordan clearly improved Hamas’ operational capabilities. Hamas increased its capacity to participate in the actions of the Intifada, including the launching of suicide bomb attacks in the heart of Israeli cities (Al-Majd, 24 September 2001). Within a short space of time, Israel captured a Hamas cell whose members had received training in Syria and Lebanon, some of whom had been involved in planning two different suicide bombings in April and May 2001, which killed eight Israelis. Israeli security announced that Hamas had recruited the captured militants while they were attending universities in Syria, Sudan, and Yemen (The Jerusalem Post, 2001). In 2001, the PA came under tremendous pressures from the USA and Israel to crack down on the local leadership and civic institutions of Hamas in an effort to stop its actions against Israeli targets. However, the former Clinton administration Middle East envoy, Dennis Ross, had a different opinion, and wrote: Recent efforts by PA officials in Gaza to convince Hamas to stop terror attacks against Israel appeared to be making headway until the Hamas leadership in Gaza got explicit instructions from the Hamas leadership outside (The Wall Street Journal, 2002).

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Despite efforts made by the PA to persuade the internal leadership to stop the attacks, the violence reached its peak when a bomber self-detonated in a restaurant, killing fifteen Israelis in Haifa in March 2002. The Israeli security services agency announced that Qayyis Adwan, the Hamas bomb-maker behind the attack, had allegedly received orders from Hamas headquarters in Syria. Subsequently, Israeli revenge was directed rapidly against the internal Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip, particularly since Israel was uneasy about targeting the external leadership based in Damascus. In so doing, Israel assassinated Salah Shihadah, a senior founding figure of Hamas’ leadership in the Gaza Strip, on 22 June 2002 (Palestinian Centre for Information). This was the first assassination conducted by Israel, which had assassinated a senior founding figure from the internal Hamas leadership of the Gaza Strip. Not surprisingly, however, Hamas intensified its efforts to improve the capacity of its military wing and to expand its operations in preparation for any confrontation with Israel or the PA. During this period, there were tensions between the external and internal leadership over truces and military actions during negotiations for an agreement in June 2003, aimed at improving the security situation and building trust between the PA and Israel. The PA, headed by its first Prime Minister, Mahmud Abbas, succeeded in persuading the various factions including Hamas and Islamic Jihad to give the government a chance to negotiate with Israel. Abed Aziz Rantisi, a senior leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip announced it would respect the ceasefire reached between the PA and Israel on 29 June 2003 according to the Ceasefire Statement issued by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad as well. Subsequently, Hamas militants were also instructed to respect and enforce the movement’s commitment to the ceasefire. However, a member of Hamas’ military wing from Hebron did not adhere to the internal leadership’s instructions, and carried out a suicide bombing in Western Jerusalem, killing twenty-one Israelis on 19 August 2003 (International Crisis Group, 2004). The crisis group also reported at the time that neither the internal nor the external leadership of Hamas had ordered the attack, it was believed that the suicide bomber intended to exact revenge for the assassination of his friend. However, Israel retaliated by assassinating a senior Hamas political office figure, Islamil Abu Shanab on 21 August 2003, which put an end to the fragile .

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ceasefire. This also forced the Palestinian Prime Minister, Mahmud Abbas, to submit his resignation to Chairman Yasser Arafat. Once again, the cycle of violence in the Palestinian territories escalated when the Israelis attempted to assassinate the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, along with five of Hamas’ senior figures including Ismail Hania, on 6 September 2003 (Bennet, , 2003). Later, the eventual success of the Israelis in assassinating Hamas’ ‘moderate leader’, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin on 22 March 2004, gave the external leadership the chance to increase its dominance over the movement, in the wake of its spiritual leader’s assassination. Moreover, the assassination of Sheikh Yasin by Israeli occupation forces had left Hamas in something of a leadership vacuum. Mohammed Nazal, a senior figure in the political office abroad, denied the existence of any vacuum however: The movement has lost its spiritual leader who provided guidance for everyone in the movement, whose strategic initiatives could be addressed. But there are no conflicting groups within the movement. The movement makes its crucial decisions through a consensual process. It is an organisation with democratic principles. There is no single one who controls the movement. The absence of the Sheikh will not leave a negative impact on the continuity of the movement (The Palestinian Information Centre).

Sheikh Yasin had been the symbol of the Islamic movement in the Palestinian territories. He had been the leader able to bridge the radical and moderate ideologies of the movement. However, although Yasin had been the movement’s spiritual leader, much of the control of its financial resources and strategies had resided in the leadership abroad. Hamas was able to pass the test of losing its founder and spiritual leader, Sheik Ahmed Yasin, and his successor Dr. Abed Aziz Al Rantisi, who were both assassinated by Israeli forces within a month (Hroub, 2004: 21-38). In order to protect the internal leadership from any Israeli aggression, Hamas named Khalid Mishael as its effective leader from abroad. But these structural and leadership changes contributed to the increasing differences and tensions that had emerged between the external leadership headed by Khaled Mashael and his deputy Musa Abu Marzouk on the one hand, and the movement’s internal leadership whose most prominent figures were Ismail Hanyia and Mahmoud Al-Zahar, on the other. These changes in the leadership structure happened before the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and

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participation in the municipal elections in 2005 (Tamimi, 2007: 206). Despite the changes to leadership, the movement’s internal leadership almost immediately needed the support of the external leadership for Hamas’ participation in the Palestinian municipal and legislative elections. The external leadership provided adequate funds and strategic direction to run a massive electoral campaign. It included the design for an ambiguous electoral programme consisting of thirty-four different points. This collective effort of both the internal and external leadership of Hamas enabled the movement to win the overwhelming majority at the municipal and legislative elections. Hamas was able to defeat the PLO that had dominated the Palestinian political landscape for more than forty years (Mishal, 2006). Despite Hamas’ impressive electoral performance on 25 January 2006, the elections intensified the political and ideological differences within the movement. Its victory also sharpened the political dilemmas, and emphasised the internal organisational tension and discord among the various wings with regard to Hamas’ governmental structure and modes of governance. Tensions and differences surrounding the shaping of the Palestinian agenda and control of the central power of the PA also surfaced within Hamas, when the internal leadership preferred a government led by Hamas’ senior figure, Ismail Hania, the first Hamas prime minister. Mousa Abu Marzouk attempted to display a much more moderate and conciliatory tone in the wake of the Hamas victory in the elections, and subsequently in its government composition. He was also much closer to the moderate line of Hamas in the Gaza Strip led by Ismail Hania. Abu Marzouk suggested that ‘Hamas might be able to co-exist with Israel, on the condition that Israel surrender its aspirations of domination and that the United States agree to play the role of a fair and impartial mediator between the two parties’ (Washington Post, 2006).

Differences over Hamas’ Government The internal leadership also preferred a government able to reach out to Fatah and to all the other national, leftist and liberal parties that had won limited seats with marginalised power. The external leadership preferred the establishment of a government of technocrats, with more professional and independent personalities,

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instead of a Hamas government led by the movement’s senior internal figures, and so attempted to minimise the presence of internal Hamas leaders within the new Palestinian government. Moreover, tensions had also been rising within Hamas as some radical figures expressed their opposition to certain elements of the Hamas-led government platform. Mishael wanted to prevent Hamas from being pressurised into making concessions to Israel and the West, while demonstrating his own claims to be the movement’s dominant power broker and the top leader within the movement’s hierarchical structure. This aimed to serve the interests of the external leaders by ensuring their own central role concerning issues of ideological and strategic importance, and continuing their influence over shaping the movement’s future policy (Mishal, 2006). On the other hand, the internal political leadership represented by Ismail Hania had been unable to overrule the abduction of an Israeli soldier on 26 June 2006, which was thought to have been authorised primarily by the external leadership in Syria (The Christine Science, 2006). Professor Fawaz Gerges, the chair of Middle Eastern and International Studies at Sarah Lawrence College in New York, summarised these differences between the internal leadership and external leadership of Hamas in The World Today, shortly after the abduction of the Israeli soldier: I believe there are major differences within Hamas. Hamas is not a monolith. There is what I call the internal leadership that exists within the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and there is the external leadership that basically exists in Damascus, Syria, and Amman and other places. And I think that in fact, Ismail Hania, the Palestinian Prime Minister, was reportedly surprised that a major operation against the Israeli military was carried out without his knowledge (The World Today, 2006).

However, a close source to the movement confirmed that the military wing had its own central authority to conduct operations in accordance with its perceptions of the situation on the ground (Abu Amer, 2008). It seemed that Hamas thought the abduction of the Israeli soldier could contribute to easing the pressures that were imposed on the Hamas government by the West and Israel, and that capturing the soldier might assist its government to have direct contact with western actors and regional players to legitimise its position in the international arena. Hamas also thought it might be

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able to release Palestinian prisoners behind Israeli prison bars in what would be an historical achievement, after it had failed to implement its electoral programmes. Differences between the external and internal leadership continued for the many reasons mentioned above, with an emphasis on the distance between geographical locations, pressure on the ground, and with the difficulties of communication that meant the two leadership groups had distinct positions over the military takeover of PA forces in Gaza on 14 June 2007. Hamas’ decision to seize the Gaza Strip was taken primarily by the internal Gaza leadership without the approval of its external leadership (Abu Amer, 2008). This is also an indication of the imbalance of power, which contributed to the friction between hardcore radicals and pragmatists in Hamas. Hamas’ senior leader, Ismail Hania, who headed two successive Hamas-led governments later made a surprisingly conciliatory statement when he said that Hamas’ rule in Gaza would be temporary. Hania also said that serious efforts were being made to create a dialogue with the Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas’ Fatah party. But in reality, certain voices within Hamas did not intend to surrender control over the Gaza Strip to PLO forces, because these voices believed that the ‘Gaza Strip will remain a crucial ground for Hamas’ political and military future’ (Abu Amer: November 18 2008). Nizar Rayan, a hard-liner and senior Hamas militant from the Gaza Strip, although also someone who was closer to the views of the external leadership denounced any hope of imminent reconciliation with Fatah after the Gaza takeover in June 2007. He even vowed at a rally in the Gaza Strip that Hamas would control all of the West Bank too, and predicted a rapid overthrow of the elected Palestinian president. His comments embarrassed the Hamas leadership, which openly favoured dialogue with the PA, as the dominant faction in the PLO (Zaanoun, November 1 2007). The Hamas expert Magnus Ranstorp, an analyst at the Swedish National Defence College, had a different view regarding any Hamas split, tensions, or differences. He commented to the Christian Science Monitor: It is a mirage to think that the internal and external leadership of Hamas fundamentally represents some cataclysmic rift. Yes, there are differences, but the movement is much larger than individual representatives. They play the inside-outside card very carefully, and they have divorced the military wing from the rest,

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so they could say [militant activities] ‘are outside our control’. But the inside-outside leadership is much closer than what appears (The Christine science monitor, 2006).

I believe there is no friction in Hamas’ core political positions. These differences are part of the political game and of the sharing of responsibility between the external and internal leadership. However, there are differences in the views of individuals, due to differences stemming from the geographical locations and cultural backgrounds of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Syria-based office. As a Palestinian analyst, Adel Zannoun said, ‘there are certainly differing points of view, but these do not degenerate into quarrels or dissension’ (Zaanoun, 2007).

Differences during the Arab Spring There were differences between Hamas’ external and internal leadership emerged during the Arab Spring in regard to the Palestinian reconciliation with Fatah. Hamas’ internal leadership allegedly boycotted the signing of the Doha agreement in January 2012. They believed that Meshal had made a deal with the Palestinian President Abbas without their consent. Hamas also consistently tried to hide the differences between the external and internal leadership, but the re-election of Meshal was seen as confirmation of the power of the external wing over the organisation (Milton Edwards, 2013:70). I think they complement each other at all levels, despite the differing views of the external and internal leadership. It appears that the external and internal ‘card’ is used to serve the interests of the movement. Hamas is a united group and there are no major divisions or splinters in it. Decisions between the external and internal leadership are taken in consensus. There is a consensus over the strategic policies of the movement. But the two different leaderships manage their own daily administration differently, due to their daily needs and to frequent changes on the grounds.

Concluding Remarks There were tensions and differences in attitude, positions, and behaviour between the external and internal leadership. But there were no core differences and rifts on strategic issues between the

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internal and external leadership. The external leadership is mainly based in the Syrian capital of Damascus, and its internal leadership has traditionally been based in the Palestinian territories and in the Gaza Strip in particular. It is well known that amidst the ongoing Israeli occupation, the internal leadership of Hamas launched the group in the Gaza Strip, which has always been historically poorer, more conservative, and more isolated than the much larger West Bank. However, Hamas’ external leadership has always functioned and operated from different locations such as Jordan, the USA, Syria, Iran, and Qatar. This chapter illustrated a number of challenges faced by Hamas as a result of the establishment of the PA. These include sociopolitical environment developments, Hamas’ decision over whether to participate in the first Palestinian elections or not, and the assassination of its spiritual and founder leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin and his predecessor, Dr. Rantisi, by Israel. Any attempt to understand Hamas’ internal dynamics cannot be made outside this context where domestic and regional pressures have shaken the movement’s unity. As a result of these political changes, which lead to political differences between different groups within the movement and between the external and internal leadership, a number of Hamas local leaders left the organisation. The chapter also considered the manner in which Hamas’ decision-making process, in spite of its Shura Council practices, was undermined by the geographical spread of its leaders. It also considered the relative political and financial autonomy that affected the behaviour, attitude, and positions of the external leadership in its various host countries. Hamas’ internal leadership practices were also affected by continuing pressures and demands from its constituencies to avoid any loss of position and achievement in the Palestinian territories. Hamas, as a major player in the Palestinian political arena, had always struggled over whether to respond to or ignore comments by its rival faction, Fatah, and by the PLO as well. Hamas was affected by a number of political changes both within the Palestinian territories and in the wider region. It needed to respond rapidly to domestic, regional, and global political changes, but was often unable to do so due to its physically widespread leadership, security risks, the influence of host countries and the complicated process of achieving consensus among the leadership spread across

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the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, several Israeli prisons, and the diaspora at large, in spite of technological developments. Naturally, the constraints and barriers facing internal organisational communications within any movement will reflect adversely on the positions and attitudes held by figures of the movement who live in different cultural, social, political, and economic environments. Simply speaking, there has always been tension, discord, and difference among Hamas’ leaders, ever since the movement was established. However, Hamas has continued to employ a system of consensus-making and opinion-sharing, based on committees representing a spectrum of figures and groups coming together to discuss the major issues such as Hamas’ relationship with the PA, participation in the Palestinian elections, the composition of a Hamas-led government, and ceasefires and periods of calm with Israel. This process has served to create a broad basis of consensus and to strengthen internal unity based on religious values, Islamic ideals and teachings, and cultural solidarity. It also helped minimise the potential for insoluble disagreement during any moment of crisis facing the movement. The internal leadership always claimed that there was no conflict of interest that could ever result in the dissent of some groups or in their rejection of decisions. However, the existence of a decentralised, splintered, and slow-moving organisational framework also exacted a high price from Hamas’ capacity to respond to crisis. Furthermore, Hamas spokesmen (never ‘spokeswomen’) denied any talk about ‘radicalism and moderation’ within the movement and continued to project unity as they always had done. However, the external leadership based in Damascus dominated strategy-making, financial resources and military orders, because the internal leadership realised that it could not develop, grow, or even progress without the external leadership’s support. The external leadership enjoyed the privilege of free movement and travel within Islamic and Arab countries, and was able to present the movement’s views in public and through the media. It was able to raise sufficient funds necessary for Hamas’ social welfare improvement schemes, political mobilisation both locally and abroad, and for any military infrastructure expansion. Even so, the internal leadership and ‘domestic front’ had to face two opponents of the movement’s ideology and politics. On a daily basis it faced the Israeli military machine, which had

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liquidated dozens of its founders, leaders, militants, and ordinary supporters. And in addition, it had fought the PLO, a stubborn rival of many years and recognised internationally to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people. It was very difficult for other actors in Palestinian politics, whether those from Arab countries, the West, foreign states or friendly countries, to influence the internal leadership in the Gaza Strip without a final say or authorisation from the external leadership. It was impossible for Hamas to continue influencing Palestinian politics and the peace process in particular without directions or orders from its external leadership based in Damascus. In this sense, without the efforts of the external leadership, it would have been very difficult for Hamas to exist and manipulate Palestinian politics up to now. Its external leadership provided the internal leadership with all manner of political expertise. It also provided it with sufficient funds to enable the running of a wellorganised electoral campaign, resulting in an overwhelming victory. It also delivered efficient advice during the creation of the Hamas-led government. However, the internal leadership also grew stronger in many ways in terms of challenging the external leadership after its victory in the elections and the internal seizure of the Gaza Strip. ‘Internal’ Hamas showed that it could continue just with local resources collected from Palestinian people through taxes. But the external leadership secured sufficient funds to continue operating despite the domestic barriers, regional pressures, and the international embargo facing the Hamas-led government. The external leadership played an important role in Hamas’ decision to participate in the political process through the municipal and national elections. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX HAMAS’ POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Introduction This chapter analyses Hamas’ political development from a resistance movement into a political authority; a government which governs without having given up its rhetoric of resistance. It reviews the main episodes involved in Hamas’ gradual transition from a resistance movement into a semi-political one, and analyses the challenges Hamas faced in the process of adopting its ‘mixed strategy’ of resistance and governance. This chapter examines how Hamas challenged the unseen but profound rifts within its own ranks by transforming itself rapidly from a resistance movement into a governing political authority under Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories. The rapid change took place in Hamas’ political theories and literature in order to present itself as an alternative movement for ‘reform and change’ that could govern the PA institutions in the occupied Palestinian territories. This challenge was in addition to the complex, conservative, cultural, and social environment of the Gaza Strip, which had evolved amidst extreme poverty, conservatism, and traditionalism under different colonial powers for many years. The traditional and classical ideology of most Hamas’ members was closely linked to the extreme poverty of Gazan society, which was slow to change. The impoverished Gaza Strip, lacking nearly all basic natural resources, was fertile ground for Hamas’ particular contribution to Palestinian political, social, and economic life for many years. For Hamas’ military wing, recognising the PLO’s agreement with Israel was still ‘religious taboo’. However, Hamas had also given a number of clever political speeches consisting of religious and nationalist rhetoric, without changing its core ideologies, as part of the wider changing socio-economic environment and the opportunities inherent in existing political structures (Natil 2012: 166-182).

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Hamas’ Electoral Participation When Hamas refused to participate in the first legislative and presidential elections, which took place in 1996, it argued that its participation would legitimise the Oslo process and thus implicitly recognise Israel (Gruber, 2007). Hamas’ decision to participate in the political process ten years later was partly attributable to Arafat’s death and his absence from the political scene on 11 November 2004 (Ben-Ami, 2006: 324). Hamas viewed Arafat as the major obstacle to its successful participation and to its ability to influence Palestinian politics, and was concerned about those of Arafat’s policies that aimed at preventing Hamas’ emergence as a major political actor. Hamas could not have succeeded in confronting the symbolism of Arafat’s leadership. However, Hamas understood that without Arafat’s capacity to unify all the elements of the Fatah movement as well as the PLO under his authority, the Palestinian national movement had become weaker and internally divided. Hamas knew that its chances of victory in the later election were much greater with Fatah fragmented and weaker after Arafat’s death, and saw the opportunity to achieve strong results in the election, whilst Fatah struggled with internal division and the inability to change itself for the better (Natil, 2012; 166-182). In addition to the fundamental change in the Palestinian political arena as a consequence of Arafat’s death, there were a number of other reasons for Hamas’ decision to participate in the electoral and political process:

1. Failure of Peace Process The failure of the peace process between Israel and the PLO, and the failure of the PLO to achieve its national goal of a viable Palestinian state, enabled Hamas to become a significant military force able to threaten the power of the Palestinian Authority. The collapse of the peace process was the main factor behind a spiral of violence that increased the power and spread of militant groups confronting the Palestinian Authority. Hamas participated in the violent uprising by strengthening its military power and increasing its political influence on Palestinian streets in order to resist Israeli occupation. This elevated Hamas’ image in the popular consciousness.

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2. The Image of Hamas The failure of the peace process and Hamas’ growing power contributed greatly to the weakening of the Palestinian Authority and its increasingly poor image in the eyes of Palestinians, who did not trust the Palestinian Authority’s policies due to mismanagement and the corruption of its leaders. Meanwhile, Hamas’ image strengthened in the eyes of Palestinians, who saw it as a viable alternative to the corruption of the Palestinian Authority. This more powerful image was a key factor in encouraging Hamas to run in the Palestinian Authority municipal elections.

3. Municipal Elections Hamas’ decision to participate in the Palestinian national elections received further encouragement after Hamas was successful in the first round of the municipal elections in 2004. Its victory strengthened its image in the Palestinian mindset as well, and the political weight of the movement was revealed when victory was achieved so easily. This victory gave Hamas a chance to test its political weight and power against the Palestinian Authority, and against the national movement’s forces on the Palestinian streets.

4. Israeli withdrawal Much more importantly, Hamas’ decision to participate in the national elections received a further boost after the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip on 12 September 2005, under the ‘disengagement plan’ (Natil 2012: 166-182). Hamas repeatedly claimed that the withdrawal was a victory for its resistance, and as such reinforced the belief that Hamas was the major resistance movement responsible for expelling the Israelis from the coastal strip, compared to the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, which had not resisted and instead had merely coordinated with the Israelis. Thus, Hamas claimed the Israeli disengagement as its own victory and frequently referred to this in its political speeches and programmes. However, the Gaza Strip remained under occupation by Israel. Gaza’s borders, airspace,

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territorial waters, and the movement of goods and people from and into the Gaza Strip remained under Israeli control.

5. The Palestinian national dialogue Hamas’ decision to participate in the national elections also came about as a result of a comprehensive dialogue amongst all Palestinian political factions organised and supported by Egypt in 2005 (Tamimi, 2007: 211-212). The dialogue had concluded with an emphasis on conducting municipal and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories, and on reforming the PLO. During the dialogue, Hamas had demonstrated both political realism and pragmatism when it proposed that a reformed PLO should be an umbrella for all factions so that Hamas might join the Palestinian political system. Hamas’ pragmatism came after the Arab states and other interlocutors rejected the movement’s claim to be recognised as the alternative to the PLO. This led to an incremental change in Hamas’ political strategy. However, Hamas’ decision to participate in the 2006 elections was taken after an intensive consultation had taken place between its leadership and the different institutions on the ground and overseas (Tamimi, 2007: 210). The decision to participate in the political process was built on a mixed strategy of ‘resistance and political participation’, as described by a senior moderate Hamas figure, Ghazi Hamad, on the eve of the elections: ‘I think Israel does the same thing. They (Israelis) fight against us, use assassination against us, they build settlements against us, demolish homes at the same time, and at the same time they talk about the peace process— it’s the same thing. Hamas also believes that we have to mix political actions and military actions. We cannot drop the resistance against occupation, because our territories are under the occupation. It is very difficult for us to go to negotiations without teeth, without weapons. We are a moderate organisation, really. We are not a radical organisation and we are not an extremist or fundamentalist one. No, we are an open-minded organisation. We believe in democracy and freedom and political pluralisation. We respect all people, so I think we can create a new society’ (Warner, 2006).

This led Hamas to launch its ambitious electoral programme under the slogan, ‘Change and Reform’, with a moderate tone that would bring the group significant gains. Hamas’ electoral programme of thirty-four points, with its mix of moderate and

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hard-line messages, was intended to challenge not only the hegemony of the Fatah movement and the PLO, but also the position of Israel and the countries of the West, which considered Hamas a terrorist organisation. However, Hamas candidates and leaders persisted in sending contradictory messages during the electoral campaign, such as when Hamas leader Mahmud Zahar in Gaza said that ‘negotiation is not a taboo’, whilst at the same time stating, ‘we do not consider the Israeli enemy as a partner or a neighbour’ (The Christian Science Monitor, 2006). Hamas’ decision to participate in the elections pleased most Palestinian actors, including the Palestinian President, Mahmud Abbas, who wanted to ensure political participation by all factions. Abbas believed that this would enable him to implement his reform programmes based on a new mandate created by a new legislative council. This would give the peace process a new chance, as confirmed by a senior Fatah figure close to the Palestinian President, Khadoura Fares: Hamas has given more than one signal that it is a pragmatic ideological movement and is willing to enter political life. Our responsibility in Fatah is to help Hamas change its political program, to lead the whole Palestinian people in their struggle under just one program. Then Israel will understand that the peace agreements signed with the Palestinian people are signed with all the people, and not just with one party or another. (Warner, 2006)

Nonetheless, Hamas was also in defensive mode due to the harsh criticism it faced from some observers and from its traditional rival the Fatah National Movement and the leader of the PLO, in relation to the upcoming elections. Some Fatah leaders criticised Hamas’ decision to participate after the movement had rejected opportunities to participate over the past ten years. Hamas’ political pragmatism however, had become more and more evident as the movement’s strength in relation to the PLO had grown (Abu Amr, 1994: 83). It was clear to PLO members that Hamas’ growing popularity would cause problems for the PLO if Hamas should win significant support in the elections. As a senior Fatah member, Dr. Nabil Shaat, stated: Hamas does not have a program. It doesn’t even have a clue of what it takes to get foreign aid, what it takes to get Palestinian private investment. If Hamas were really to make a government today, that would be the

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Dr. Nabil Shaat’s fears became reality when Hamas did win the January 2006 legislative elections for the Palestinian Authority, with 74 seats (56%) compared to Fatah’s 45 seats (34%). These results were endorsed by all international and national monitors. Democracy Reporting International, a non-profit organisation, also defended the transparency of the elections: “Looking at the state of democracy in the region, the Palestinian elections were remarkably transparent and well-run in a context of occupation. The establishment of an independent, impartial and professional election commission was a key to this success” (Democracy Reporting International, 2006). These surprising and transparent results represented a major shift in the Palestinian political landscape, which had been dominated by the secular nationalist Fatah faction of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation for forty years. There were four key reasons behind Hamas’ victory. Firstly, Hamas directed its religious figures to influence various constituencies in order to enjoy an advantage over the secular Fatah movement. It also employed its religious platform, rhetoric, and slogans to disseminate its political programme. Moreover, Fatah was unable to convince the electorate of its capacity to achieve its political programme in the context of an ongoing ‘peace process’ with Israel. Secondly, Hamas put its achievements in providing social services to good use, as well as promoting an anti-corruption image at the national level of the elections. Before the elections, Hamas used its social network to promote its image as a competent movement able to serve the poor in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Democracy Reporting International, 2006). Thirdly, Hamas also selected some locally and nationally respected personalities with good reputations to be represented in its ‘Change and Reform’ list. By contrast, Fatah had provided a list that included some candidates of poor reputation who had been accused of corruption. Fourthly, Hamas members and supporters were more focused and disciplined than Fatah’s. They were committed to obtaining the vote for their movement’s candidates. Fatah, on the other hand, was internally divided. Fatah’s younger generation was marginalised by the older generation that dominated the movement’s central

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committee, and this adversely affected Fatah’s preparations for the election preparation. Moreover, more than seventy well-known figures from Fatah ran in the elections as independents; they had rejected the movement’s list as nominated by the leadership of Fatah and the PLO. This divided the movement and as a consequence, Fatah lost thousands of votes across the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Despite Hamas’ political victory in the elections, the movement faced an early challenge before it had even begun to create a government.

Early challenges to Hamas’ Success Hamas’ early challenge came in the form of different responses to its success by national, regional and international actors. These were split mainly into two different camps; moderate and radical. The moderate camp represented most of the world’s nations that were still supportive of the peace process between Israel and Palestine. This included the USA, Europe, Russia, the UN, and some Arab and Islamic countries; Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, and Morocco had peace accords with Israel. The moderate camp considered the political process through negotiation as the only viable option to achieve a Palestinian state. This camp called upon Hamas to change its political position and to engage in the peace process. Even more significantly, Israel’s early response to Hamas’ victory represented a real challenge to the movement. The former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated: “We have made it clear that without giving up its ways of terror, recognising Israel’s right to exist in peace and security, and honouring all the Palestinian Authority accords towards Israel - including, of course, annulling the Hamas charter calling for the destruction of the State of Israel Israel will not hold any contact with the Palestinians” (Ha’aretz, 2006). The Israeli government had the final word in allowing Hamas to govern the Palestinian Authority, as it maintained sovereignty over the areas of the Palestinian Authority. Any Palestinian administration had to comply with the Oslo agreement and with Israeli security arrangements. The Palestinian administration could not function without Israeli approval. Hamas had to choose

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between securing the approval of Israel and maintaining the approval of the constituency that had voted for the movement. In addition, the US administration made things difficult for Hamas even before a government had been formed. The USA contended that there should be no place in the political process for groups and individuals who refused to denounce terror and violence, refused to recognise Israel’s right to exist, or who refused to disarm. The USA looked for ways to maintain its ties with Palestinian officials from Fatah and the PLO, whilst the executive authority, as well as security responsibility, international relations, and negotiations with Israel remained in the hands of President Mahmud Abbas. US officials considered that Palestinian support for Hamas was conditional and could be eroded if Hamas failed to improve the lives of Palestinians. According to Aaron D. Pina, a Middle East analyst in the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Division of the Congress of the USA: The shift from a secular Fatah government toward a militant, Islamist government, however, does not necessarily mean all Palestinians accept the ideology of Hamas. The public’s support for Hamas is conditional and may erode if Hamas does not improve the lives of Palestinians in demonstrable ways. Its victory would challenge not only the Palestinian Authority, but also the other regional and international actors who had been interested in the Israel-Palestine conflict (Pina, 2006).

This position, taken by the USA, was similar to the one it had adopted towards the PLO some three decades earlier, when it demanded a rejection of violence as a prerequisite for the PLO engaging in a political dialogue with the USA (Bennis, 2006). The other, ‘radical’ camp consisted of Syria, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, Indonesia, and Malaysia, amongst others. This camp supported Hamas’ policies against Israel and supported the movement’s right to be given a chance to govern the Palestinian people based on the election result. This view was also shared by some EU intellectuals and conflict resolution activists, one of which was Alastair Crooke, the Director of Conflicts Forum and a former EU negotiator with the Palestinian factions, who stated: “Hamas now has more legitimacy than any ruling government in the Middle East. If you radiate hostility and negativity towards the outcome of the elections it will seem very perverse and it will colour and damage engagement in the Middle East” (Financial Times, 2006).

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In spite of the USA’s rejection of Hamas’ political positions, the Turkish government (a NATO member) offered to mediate between Hamas and Israel. The Hamas delegation headed by Khaled Mishael, chairman of the political office was invited to Ankara on 16 February 2006 to discuss the offer of mediation with Turkish diplomats. Hamas’ direct dialogue and discussion with Turkish officials represented a very important development. Hamas trusted the Turkish government, as its officials represented the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (Palestine Centre for Information, 2006). The Russian government also invited Khalid Mishael to visit Moscow for a meeting on 3 March 2006. This invitation was an unexpected step, as Hamas was still listed as a terrorist organisation by the USA and by the EU, and Russia was a member of the Middle East Quartet. The Russian government explained publicly that its intention was to persuade Hamas to change its political position with regard to Israel and the peace process. Some saw this initiative as evidence of Russia’s attempt to use the Palestinian issue to regain a foothold in the Middle East, which Russia had lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The possibility was that if a Hamas-led government could moderate its position and recognise Israel’s existence based on long-term coexistence, it might ensure a positive relationship not only with the Palestinian people but with the larger Muslim world; a relationship that Fatah had been unable to deliver (New York Times Review, 2006). The public diplomatic channels opened to Hamas by Russia and Turkey did not encourage the key regional powers such as Jordan and Egypt. For instance, the Egyptian Intelligence Chief, Omar Suleiman, who had brokered past Israeli-Palestinian deals, demanded that before Hamas be invited to form a Palestinian government, it should fall in line with other international actors by meeting the three pre-conditions of accepting Israel, renouncing violence, and accepting all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements.

The Hamas-led Government The Palestinian President, Mahmud Abbas, directed the Hamas leader in Gaza, Ismail Hania, to form the first Hamas-led government based on the result of the elections. Hamas explicitly stated that it wanted to lead a coalition government drawn from all factions, including from its rival, Fatah. Hamas’ move to form such

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a coalition comprising all political factions and parties could be seen as a move to reduce international pressure. However, Fatah and other national factions refused to participate in any political union because Hamas was reluctant to compromise on its political positions with any potential coalition partners. PLO forces considered that Hamas’ refusal to accept the three basic conditions set up by the international community for restoring aid to its government was unrealistic (Myre, 2006). Hamas believed these international conditions were unfair, given that Hamas was the democratically elected movement from a transparent and fair election process by the Palestinian people. Hamas viewed the rejection by the other factions as an attempt to isolate Hamas - a ‘let-them-go-it-alone’ strategy engineered by Fatah so that President Mahmud Abbas could exploit his mandate as PLO chairman to undermine the power of any Hamas-led government. The PLO realised that the world would definitely not change its position towards Hamas, as was explicitly stated by Dennis Ross, the former US Peace Process Envoy to the Middle East: The tougher question is not whether to meet with Hamas officials in the new Palestinian government. That is or should be a given: no meetings if they do not alter their positions on rejection of Israel and support for violence. They must know that the world is not going to adjust to them, but they must adjust to the world (Ross, 2006).

Despite the refusal by the PLO to participate in a Hamas-led government, Hamas decided to form its own government without the participation of other independent figures or Fatah members. The new government was approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) on 27 March 2006. Prime Minister Ismail Hania indicated in his inaugural speech before the PLC that his government would recognise the Palestinian Basic Law, which was developed as a result of the Oslo Peace Agreement. Prime Minister Hania addressed the PLC in a new and careful diplomatic language designed to improve Hamas’ image in the western world and garner sympathy with other moderate states (Hroub, 2006: 145). Hamas’ programme of ‘change and reform’ did not address any of the demands of the international community to renounce violence and recognise Israel’s right of existence, and to accept all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. The outgoing Fatah government, which had signed agreements with the state of Israel, handed over

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responsibilities to a Hamas-led government peacefully and without any confrontation. However, Israel rejected the Hamas government’s careful language of moderation. Israel also sought global support for their tough position against Hamas, as the Israeli Prime Minster Ehud Olmert stated: We clarified that without a clear abandonment of the path of terror, recognition of Israel’s right to exist in security, and peace, Israel won’t have any contact with the Palestinians. These principles are accepted by the international community. On this issue, I don’t intend to make any compromises (Federman, 2006).

The Hamas government had not taken Israeli rejection seriously, believing it was simply a ploy to force Hamas to abandon its ideology and tactics. However, Hamas remained unclear as to how it would find an alternative way forward in the face of Israeli rejection. Hamas’ government had to deal with Israel in order to secure the basic needs of the Palestinian people in the form of the daily flow of electricity, food, water, and health supplies, which meant direct co-ordination with the Israeli Borders Authority under Israeli military command. For example, tax revenues estimated at $54 million collected monthly by Israel constituted a huge segment of the Palestinian budget needed to pay employees’ salaries and deliver public services. When Israel stopped transferring tax revenues from imports and exports to the Hamas government, pressure on Hamas increased dramatically, with the salaries of more than 165,000 civil servant employees suspended as a result of the freezing of tax revenues. The Palestinian economy relied to a great extent on these employee salaries. Another challenge was that 80,000 personnel from the security forces, led by national figures belonging to the Fatah movement, rejected Hamas-led government policies (Silverman, 2006). Fatah personnel refused to cooperate with the Hamas government. The Hamas government immediately exploited this by establishing its own executive security force in April 2006. This force of about 2,500-3,000 personnel was mainly drawn from the militant wing of Hamas and its supporters were paid primarily from Hamas’ own budget. Hamas justified this executive security force due to its fear that a coup might be carried out by Fatah security forces. The establishment of this new Hamas force resulted in a deteriorating law and order situation, and there were a

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number of attacks organised against public institutions and officials that reflected the security chaos in the Palestinian territories (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 2006). As a part of an international policy to de-legitimise the Hamas government, the international community led by the Middle East Quartet (comprising the US, UN, EU, and Russia) approved a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) to deliver aid and humanitarian assistance whilst bypassing the Hamas government’s Ministry of Finance (Silverman, 2006). This was the new application of a ‘carrot and stick’ policy to exploit humanitarian aid in order to force Hamas to change its ideology and policies towards Israel and the peace process. However, it did little to address the economic deterioration in the Gaza Strip, where unemployment stood at almost fifty per cent. It further complicated the social and economic problems on the ground, as 160,000 civil servants (except those in the education and health sectors) had not yet received their regular salaries, as confirmed by an EU spokeswoman: The EU will offer $126 million for the programme, although the statement did not mention the payment of PA employee salaries, opposed by the US and Israel. The mechanism will immediately cover essential supplies to the health sector and payments to healthcare service providers through an emergency World Bank programme. The European Commission will provide utilities such as fuel. By July a fund will be established to meet the basic needs of the most impoverished Palestinians. Direct payments will be made to individual bank accounts (Silverman, 2006).

The deteriorating economic situation led to an escalation of the conflict between Hamas and Fatah. This prompted a number of political leaders from different factions (national, secular, Islamist and liberal) who were imprisoned behind Israeli bars, to initiate the creation of a document for national reconciliation, despite the severe restrictions imposed on them by Israel’s occupation forces.

The Prisoners’ National Reconciliation Document These Palestinian prisoners represented a critical element in Palestinian politics, in much the same way that Republican prisoners from Northern Ireland held in the British prisons became an engine of the political process that led to the Good Friday Agreement. The Palestinian prisoners’ initiative was known as the

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prisoners’ national reconciliation document. The document was signed by prominent leaders including Marwan Barghouti (Fatah), Abedul Khaliq A Natshah (Hamas), Basam Al Sadi (Islamic Jihad), Abedul Rahim Mallouh (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), and Mustafa Badarnah (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine). The prisoners’ document of eighteen points called for the acceptance of Arab mediation initiatives, the pursuit of international legitimacy, and the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. More importantly, the document was also the first comprehensive initiative to consider forming a national unity government that would secure the participation of all parliamentary blocs, especially Fatah and Hamas (prisoners’ national reconciliation document, 2006) The document did not only focus on forming a unity government, but also urged the formation of a Palestinian plan, aimed at comprehensive political action based on a Palestinian national consensus programme endorsed by the Arab states, the PLO, and the PNA, represented by the president and government, the national and Islamic factions, the civil society organisations, and by public figures. Shortly after publication of the prisoners’ document, Hamas dismissed it as simply the individual and personal view of its signatories. At the same time, Hamas considered the document, alongside other ideas and initiatives, to be a basis for dialogue between the different political factions (Tamimi, 2007: 237). On 25 May 2006, the representative factions outside prison began to negotiate using the document’s content as the basis for a national programme or government. During this meeting, President Abbas acknowledged the National Conciliation Document of Prisoners as a route map towards a national programme. He called upon the Hamas-led government to accept the prisoners’ document, which included a proposal for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank alongside Israel. However, dialogue over the prisoners’ document was interrupted by the consequences of the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier in June 2006, by Hamas’ military wing, Az Al Deen Al Qssam, which, in association with two other militant groups, had launched a huge operation against Israeli military posts along the borders of the Gaza Strip and Israel. They kidnapped an Israeli soldier and killed at least two soldiers and injured more in an attack that eliminated

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any hope of a national unity government based on the prisoners’ document (The Christine Science Monitor, 2006). President Abbas had been surprised by the attack, saying it was against the ‘national consensus’: We have always warned against the danger of certain groups or factions leaving the national consensus and carrying out operations for which the Palestinian people will always have to pay the price (Erlange, 2006).

In this context, I believe that the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier by Hamas forces was an ‘exit strategy’; an attempt to emerge from the dark tunnel into which Hamas’ government had been pushed. The kidnapping would either cause the Israeli forces to topple the Hamas government, or it would push Israel and the international community to accept Hamas as a player, in order to negotiate the freedom of the soldier. If Israel did topple the government, Hamas would still remain a resistance movement in the eyes of its constituencies. On the other hand, if Israel negotiated with Hamas or with its government, even through a third party, it would mean that Hamas had achieved political recognition as a legitimate and practical player. Israel immediately conducted a large scale operation in the Gaza Strip, closing the entry and exit points. Israel also detained most of Hamas’ ministers and parliamentarians in the West Bank in response to the abduction, and as a consequence, the Palestinian legislature was paralysed. Having closed all channels between the Gaza Strip and the rest of the world, Israeli forces then bombarded the Gaza Strip’s infrastructure of bridges, main roads and the sole power plant of the Gaza Strip, which left the Palestinian people in darkness for long hours. This all prevented the factions from reaching a consensus over the National Conciliation Document of Prisoners. It also radically complicated the Palestinian political landscape as the economy and security situation deteriorated drastically.

Intra-Palestinian Strife Neither the international community’s economic sanctions, the Israeli-military threat nor the frequent threats of the Palestinian President to call for early elections and a referendum resulted in any change in Hamas’ position. Such conditions were not ideal or encouraging for any ‘pragmatic government’ seeking reform and

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change. Hamas believed that it could govern without compromising its ideology, including its status as a resistance movement prepared to resort to violence. Hamas could not shape any realistic strategy able to reconcile its status as a governing party and as a resistance movement. Indeed, the fact that it managed to remain in office was considered by many to be a significant achievement in itself (International Crisis Group, 2007). The economic sanctions and political boycott of the Hamas-led government contributed to a collapse of law and order in the Gaza Strip. Whilst Hamas members remained loyal to their movement and not a single case was explicitly recorded of anyone abandoning Hamas for the sake of family loyalty, nonetheless different families, clans, and political factions had their own armed units, out of concern for their own security. As the Palestinian Authority’s institutions of law and order virtually collapsed, and the rival factions of Fatah and Hamas focused increasingly on their own struggle over the ‘balance of power’, people equipped themselves with weapons. (International Crisis Group, 2007). All members of both factions were on high alert when the Palestinian President issued a decree on 6 January 2007, de-legitimising the Hamas government’s executive security forces (The Palestinian Strategic Report, 2007). The decree considered Hamas’ forces illegal, and its members as outlaws. The resulting level of chaos on the streets of Palestine was unprecedented. The number of casualties from inter-factional fighting and clan disputes increased in 2006, according to my personal experiences in civil society. People also suffered during street confrontations; some civilians who were not involved in any activities were killed because they were outside. Simply put, there was a state of fear and a lack of security at all levels. The clashes in the street and campaign of provocation between Fatah and Hamas reached its peak when Fatah organised a central festival in Gaza City on 7 January 2007 to celebrate its fortysecond anniversary. The parliament member for Fatah, Mohammed Dahlan, led thousands of Fatah members and addressed his supporters; ‘Hamas is a gang and we’ll hit Hamas back if it hurts any member of Fatah’ (Ma’an News Agency, 2007). His statements contributed to a heightening of the tension between Hamas and Fatah. Dahlan had been an opponent of Hamas for many years, and Hamas considered him a real threat to its governance. Dahlan had launched a fierce security campaign

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against Hamas’ existence in the Gaza Strip before the second Intifada. Hamas’ spokesperson said that Dahlan was ‘working for the American and Israeli agendas and interests and [was] leading the Palestinian security forces and presidential apparatuses against its political victory under the American General Keith Dayton’ (Dokhan, 2008). General Dayton was responsible for reforming the Palestinian security apparatuses under the Palestinian President, Mahmud Abbas, and Hamas alleged that the apparatuses had received a total of $86.4 million from the USA to topple the Hamas government and its executive forces (The Palestinian Strategic Report, 2007). As a result of clashes between the two rival movements and media incitement, there were a number of third party interventions and efforts made by the Qataris, Egyptians, and some Palestinian political factions to broker a deal for a national unity government. The intervention of Syrian president Basher Al Asad was the most important, as Syria hosted Hamas leaders at their offices in Damascus. Syria also considered Hamas an ally and it supported its actions in the Palestinian territories. Syria attempted to play a role in bridging the gap between Fatah and Hamas, despite the fact that the Palestinian Authority had a tense relationship with Syria due to its support for Hamas and rejection of the peace process with Israel. The tense relationship with Syria did not help Fatah to reach agreement with Hamas. Hamas showed flexibility only by ‘respecting’ previous agreements with Israel, but not by ‘committing’ to these. Hamas laid claim not only to political participation in a national unity government, but also to participation in the general Palestinian political system, including with delegates and representatives to the PLO. Hamas was prepared to share the Palestinian Authority with Fatah, but without recognition of Israel. This was unacceptable to the PLO president, who demanded that Hamas explicitly accept all previous agreements with Israel (The Palestinian Strategic Report, 2007). The failure to reach any agreement on strategic issues after the political polarisation of Hamas and Fatah led to an escalation of intra-Palestinian strife. On 25 January 2007, there were armed confrontations between the two movements in the north of the Gaza Strip. Hamas intensified its media campaign against the Fatah movement and the Palestinian Authority. Said Syiam, Minister of the Interior in the Hamas government, launched a

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verbal attack against President Abbas in a press conference on 27 January 2007, which consisted of the following:

 Syiam accused Abbas of delaying his decisions with regard









to reform of the Palestinian security agencies when the President’s security agencies rejected Syiam’s decisions as Minister of the Interior. Syiam criticised the decision of President Abbas to designate Mohammed Dahlan as being responsible for the security apparatus. He noted that the Prime Minister had dispatched a number of letters to the President expressing concern that had not yet been replied to. He said that Dahlan would not be allowed to engage in any executive position while he was a legislative member. Syiam expressed surprise about the weapons that had been channelled into the Gaza Strip and received by the security apparatuses in co-ordination with the Israeli forces. Where had these weapons gone? Why had these weapons gone to the presidential guard? Why had police not received weapons? Syiam expressed astonishment that there was an American plan to establish new Palestinian security brigades in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to confront Hamas executive security forces. He referred to American General Keith Dayton who was responsible for reforming the Palestinian security apparatuses and for empowering the capacities of the Palestinian security personnel. Syiam demanded that the Palestinian President head the reform of the national Security Council. He wanted to reform the Palestinian security agency to include all political factions, not only Fatah members.

This press conference opened the door to a fierce campaign between officials of the Hamas government and the president’s advisers. This put the Gaza Strip on the edge of civil war when Hamas militants attacked the presidential armoured convoy in the centre of the Strip in early February 2007. Hamas justified its act as an attempt to capture weapons on their way to Fatah forces. Hamas feared that Fatah would use the weapons against its government and use its militants to destroy Hamas’ political

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existence. However, it should be noted that Hamas failed to provide any evidence to support such allegations and claims. The Egyptian official, General Borhan Hamad, who lived in Gaza, failed to broker a truce between Hamas and Fatah. Meanwhile, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority security agency struck back at the Islamic University and burnt a number of its buildings at night, claiming there were Iranian-supplied weapons caches on the premises (Los Anglos Times, 2007). The Islamic University was seen as a symbol. Fatah subsequently failed to provide any evidence to support its claims, nor was it able to justify its attack on one of the key symbols of Hamas’ power in the Gaza Strip. The majority of Hamas government and parliament members in the Gaza Strip were exIslamic University professors, employees, or students (New York Times, 2000). These clashes between Hamas and Fatah threatened the existence of the Palestinian Authority and split the national Palestinian house. Both movements were on the alert, preparing for the second round of confrontations. To avoid this, strong thirdparty intervention was required.

Saudi Intervention The internal division and threat of civil war caused concern around the Arab and Muslim world, and there was a feeling that something had to be done. The Saudi King Abdullah called on Hamas and Fatah to participate in dialogue sessions in Mecca, which began on 6 February 2007 (The Palestinian Strategic Report, 2007). The Saudi King used his influence over both factions to reach an agreement. King Abed Allah had selected Mecca, given its status as a holy shrine and its impact on Muslims around the world, to force both movements to reach a consensus. The Palestinian President and Fatah Chairman, Abbas, and Khaled Mishael, the Hamas Chief in Exile, signed a Reconciliation Document called the ‘Mecca Agreement’ on 8 February 2007. The agreement was positively received with great popular support from Palestinians, who went out onto the streets to celebrate the reconciliation. The agreement was premised on the commitment of the two movements to settle their differences peacefully through dialogue and in the spirit of political partnership. The features of the agreement included:

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Emphasis on Palestinian national unity, a cessation of fighting between the two sides, and the use of dialogue for solving Palestinian differences; Agreement on a national unity government between the two movements with other Palestinian factions and independents. (Nine ministries for Hamas, six ministries for Fatah, four ministries for the other four parliamentarian blocs and the four main ministries of finance, foreign affairs, interior and information – all being the source of much conflict - to go to four independents); Requirement to make progress on reforming the Palestinian Liberation Organisation; Emphasis on political participation based on political pluralism.

It had proven impossible to reach an agreement between Hamas and Fatah in Cairo or Damascus, in part because it was presumed at the time that Egypt supported Fatah and Syria supported Hamas. The Mecca Agreement was concluded because the Saudis enjoyed influence over not only the Palestinians, but also over large swathes of the Arab and Muslim world. The agreement was considered the best possible outcome of the dialogue when they managed to achieve a compromise that Hamas would ‘respect’ previous agreements with Israel rather than ‘commit’ to them. The internal Palestinian conflict had focused on those two words. Both parties also agreed that the national unity government would be headed by the senior Hamas leader, Ismail Hania, who would respect the decisions of the Palestinian National Council and the basic law protecting Palestinian interests. Accordingly, on 16 February 2007, the Palestinian President invited Ismail Hania to form a national unity government in accordance with the Mecca agreement. This national government would ‘respect’ the international legitimacy of Israel and previous PLO agreements with Israel according to the Mecca Agreement document between Fatah and Hamas on February 8 2007. Hamas sought a compromise with Fatah in order to reduce domestic and international pressure on the government. Hamas believed the agreement would help it to become part of the Palestinian political system at large, which had been controlled by the PLO for about four decades. The Palestinian President agreed to persuade Western countries to accept the agreement between the

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two movements. The Saudi officials also committed to do their best to persuade the USA and other parties to accept the compromise agreement. However, Hamas’ ‘respect’ for previous agreements between Israel and PLO did not satisfy Israel. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, repeated the conditions of the Quartet, insisting on ‘commitment’ (Jerusalem Post, 2008). The US administration adopted the same position as the Israeli government when the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, informed the Palestinian President of the US decision to boycott the national unity government and to deal only with the President’s office from 18 February 2007. Despite American and Israeli dissatisfaction with the composition of the national unity government, Hania continued his consultation with all Palestinian factions and independents. Throughout this consultation process, narrow party interests prevailed over any sense of national duty on the part of the various political factions. The Palestinian leftist group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, refused to participate in the national government, as its senior figures argued that the government’s composition was based on dividing up the ministries between Fatah and Hamas, and was not based on any consideration of national interests. However, a close source admitted that the Popular Front had demanded that they should run more than one ministry, as agreed at Mecca. Islamic Jihad also refused to participate in the National Unity government for ideological reasons, as it believed the government would be controlled by the PLO and by its commitment to previous agreements with Israel. In spite of these initial challenges from both international actors and smaller domestic players, the Prime Minister succeeded in forming his government, and submitted this to the President on 15 March 2007. Before Prime Minister Hania could receive the parliamentary vote of confidence for his government, he was required to deliver a speech outlining his government’s programme. The programme indicated very essential political developments, because the national government led by Hamas had agreed to a Palestinian state within its pre-1967 borders. Hamas also promised a mandate for the PLO to negotiate with Israel. Indeed, the speech was notable for identifying a range of issues around which there appeared to be consensus. These included:

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Reference to the Palestinian state with its pre-1967 borders and its capital in Jerusalem, without mentioning the state of Israel; Rejection of a Palestinian state with temporary borders as mentioned in the "Road Map” plan; Emphasis on the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes in accordance to UN Resolution 194; Indication that negotiation with Israel was one of the duties/responsibilities of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO); Emphasis on working to free the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, kidnapped by Hamas in the summer of 2006 through a prisoners’ exchange agreement; Emphasis on continued resistance against the Israeli occupation by all means including by ‘popular resistance’; Call to the West to take practical steps to lift the boycott on the government and the siege of the Palestinian territories. Hania specifically called upon the US administration to reconsider its position with regard to the Palestinian issue; Commitment to deal with the security situation in the Palestinian territories by imposing order and working to construct the National Security Council as the reference for all security apparatus; Commitment to reduce government expenses and fight corruption in public institutions as the Prime Minister delivered in his national unity government political speech to the Palestinian Legislative Council on March 17 2008.

The reality was more challenging than simply the making of promises. The various political factions in the government had different interests and agendas, and they were not prepared for the huge external difficulties caused by the international boycott. It had become impossible for this government, or any Palestinian government, to survive without some degree of international support. More dangerously, the government had failed to solve the complex issue of security conflict between Hamas and Fatah. There were still two rival security apparatuses with different leaders, allies, interests, agendas and budgets.

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Threats Facing the National Unity Government Thus, the national unity government faced huge challenges, including the impact of the international boycott on the social and economic life of the Palestinians, while the security chaos was threatening the stability of society at large. The security chaos reflected not only the tense relationship between Fatah and Hamas, but also the balance of power between different families and clans who used freely available weapons to fight amongst themselves in the Gaza Strip. Despite this, neither militants of Hamas nor Fatah were able to overcome their differences in order to give the national unity government an opportunity to carry out its duties. As a result of this conflict, Hani Al Qwasmi, the Minister of the Interior in the government, who was supported by Hamas, complained publicly that he had no authority or power over the security apparatus under the control of the Palestinian Authority. The security personnel were not happy with his appointment as Minister of the Interior because, according to a number of informants, he had neither a security background, nor did he have any charisma or authority in the eyes of long-term established officers. This intensified the conflict between the Interior Minister and high-ranking security forces aligned with Fatah. As the conflict between the Hamas and Fatah security forces escalated, the Palestinian President appointed Mohammed Dahlan to take responsibility for the security apparatuses of the Palestinian Authority. Hamas was always worried about Dahlan’s appointment, and particularly about his responsibility for security, even though Dahlan had participated in the dialogue with Hamas at Mecca. These worries increased after the USA appointed General Keith Dayton as adviser to empower the Presidential guard under the responsibility of Mohammed Dahlan (Al Majd, 2007). Hamas launched a media campaign against both the Palestinian President and Mohammed Dahlan for their engagement in what Hamas claimed was the USA’s security plans against Hamas. Hamas insisted that this was part of an ongoing conspiracy to undermine its forces, the national unity government, and the Mecca Agreement (Dokhan, 2008). On 14 May 2007, the Minister of the Interior resigned, faced with a lack of confidence and cooperation in the implementation of his security service reforms. In the following weeks there was a

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growing number of kidnappings, torture, and killings between Hamas and Fatah, despite the attempts by Egyptian security officials in the Gaza Strip to settle the conflict. In the context of this deteriorating situation Hamas decided to seize control of the Gaza Strip, and on 14 June 2007, its forces raided the compounds of the security apparatus of the Palestinian President. This military action by Hamas led to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority’s civil and military institutions. The short-term consequence was that Hamas controlled all government institutions in the Gaza Strip. The military takeover had divided Palestinian society into two different identities, authorities and governments: one governed by Fatah in the West Bank and one governed by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Through its control of the Gaza Strip, Hamas hoped to force the PLO and the world to accept its ideological, political and military realities once and for all. It believed that it might achieve by military victory what it had failed to achieve with its political one.

Concluding Observations This chapter outlined the range of challenges that Hamas faced after its electoral victory in 2006. It examined Hamas’ political development from resistance to governance. Despite its efforts, Hamas failed to convince significant actors in the international community that it was committed to a peace process with Israel and was willing to renounce the use of violence. The ‘mixed strategy’ of resistance and governance simply did not allow enough room to manoeuvre, and it was immediately challenged by international players who exploited humanitarian aid as a ‘carrot and stick’ policy to put pressure on Hamas. Hamas had experienced a gradual and slow process of change based on this strategy that began with the mobilisation of grass roots constituencies through the delivery of social welfare. Later, Hamas evolved into a movement with a mixed strategy of resistance and governance, as a result of the political opportunities and structural changes that had emerged from its victory in the democratic elections. Hamas gladly accepted the prestige and the political gain of creating a Palestinian government, but it did not anticipate the high price demanded by the responsibility of governance. Hamas wanted to prove that it would be able to deliver a real mixture of

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resistance and governance, without compromising its political program. Hamas looked to the Lebanese (Hezbollah) militant group which had recently become part of the government in Lebanon, as a model of how to pursue a ‘mixed strategy’ of both participation in government and continuing resistance. However, the Lebanese political environment was totally different from the Palestinian one, and the Lebanese experiment would turn out to be completely different from the Palestinian political scene, due to the multiple political, geographical, and demographic factors that shape Lebanese politics and its international relations.. Hamas wanted all players influencing the Palestinian cause to accept it de facto, without compromising its own ideology. Hamas thought that domestic and international community actors would be prepared to deal with it at any price. But the secular political factions rejected Hamas’ proposal that they participate in its government, based on its programmes. Moreover, Hamas did not expect a severe international economic embargo and political boycott to result when it rejected international demands to renounce violence, accept the existence of Israel, and accept previous IsraeliPalestinian agreements. The Hamas-led government had the opportunity to evolve from a resistance movement into a government for all Palestinians, dealing with both their daily needs and the requirements of international co-operation. But Hamas had no experience of governance and did not feel that it was in a position to meet the demands of the international community, insofar as there was concern about the movement’s unity and its relations with regional powers that rejected peace. It believed that the Palestinian cause needed a political government not a technocratic one. And a political government should be a resistance government, as Hamas had defined itself. Hamas wanted the international community to accept it simply as it was. The movement was not prepared to change itself in order to become an acceptable player in the eyes of the international community. From this perspective it is clear that Hamas was unrealistic in its expectations. Hamas had neither experience in governance, nor was it familiar with the world of compromise and pragmatism that characterises global politics and international relations. The goals and the methods of the movement

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were unworkable, unachievable, and unacceptable in the global politics of today. Many have said however, that Hamas was not even given a chance. But there often is only one chance in politics. As a political movement, Hamas had to grasp the chance when there were few other worthwhile opportunities in the Middle East. Under the strain of crippling problems caused by the almost total international boycott of its government, Hamas used its military power to defeat the weak and unpopular Palestinian Security Agency in June 2007. However, the decision to use weapons to settle political differences with a rival that also happened to be an organisation under the direct responsibility of an elected president (who himself had directed a democratically-elected Hamas to form a government) went too far. That an elected government should use the weapons of a militant group to achieve its political goals was completely unacceptable to moderate Palestinian factions, and to international actors as well. It demonstrated Hamas’ ideological rigidity and its willingness to use violence to achieve its goals, in spite of the political victory it had achieved through a fair political process. In the next chapter I shall examine the military takeover of the Gaza Strip, which left Hamas in full political control of the territory, with significant consequences for a Palestinian society already divided politically, socially, and geographically between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

CHAPTER SEVEN HAMAS BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND PALESTINIAN DIVISION

Introduction This chapter examines the impact of Hamas’ military actions against the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the political repercussions of dividing Palestinian society geographically and politically into two entities, within the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. It also examines the challenges that faced Hamas’ political transition and authority after its military takeover of the Gaza Strip. This military action resulted in the Palestinian people dividing into two entities (Gaza under Hamas, and the West Bank under Fatah). The Gaza Strip under the Hamas government was entirely isolated by the international community and boycotted by the PLO-chaired PA. Hamas turned its back on political participation when it decided to take military action. Hamas’ military collective action and political behaviour was an attempt to find a way out of its crisis of governance and the problem of its differences with Fatah. Hamas used violence, despite the fact that the movement was elected democratically in fair and transparent national elections. This was contradictory to the values and the principle of its electoral programme for change, and to its aims of reforming Palestinian public institutions and society. However, Hamas’ use of violence against the official security agencies of the PA took place in a state where, in some senses, there existed a ‘free market’ of violence and security, similar to the situation in modern Somalia or Europe during the Dark Ages. The chapter assesses the efforts and initiatives of different mediators to broker a peace and reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah in order to end the division within Palestinians. It explores the impact of Israel’s political positioning and the Cast Lead military operation against the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip during 2008-2009. This

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chapter also analyses international post-war efforts to broker a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel while the political deadlock and the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza continued.

The Collapse of the Palestinian Authority On 7 June 2007, Hamas used violence and military action against the security forces of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in order to control the administration of security throughout the Gaza Strip. The PA security forces were managed and controlled entirely by Fatah (Schanzer, 2008: 107). On 14 June 2007, Hamas military forces defeated the PA forces, leaving Hamas in full control of the Gaza Strip, along with 161 casualties (forty-five civilian, ninetyone Fatah, and twenty-seven Hamas) according to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights on June 17 2007. Hamas justified its military takeover as a preemptive measure against a conspiracy by the Fatah leader Mohammed Dahlan and the USA. Dahlan, however, had been part of the dialogue with Hamas at Mecca in February 2007, which aimed to establish a national unity government. Hamas claimed there was a secret plan masterminded by the US-appointed General Keith Dayton, to undermine Hamas forces, the national unity government and the Mecca Agreement (Dokhan, 2008). General Dayton was the adviser appointed to empower the presidential guard under the responsibility of Mohammed Dahlan. Politically, Hamas’ military takeover led to the collapse of the civil and security institutions of the PA in the Gaza Strip, and consequently to the collapse of the unity government headed by Ismail Hania after the Mecca agreement (Saleh, 2010). It also effectively divided Palestinian society into two geographical and political entities: Hamas Islamists controlling the Gaza Strip, and Fatah secularists controlling the West Bank. The takeover also contributed to divisions within the social structure of some small and extended families whose members belonged to both Hamas and Fatah. The military actions further exacerbated society’s wounds and badly affected Palestinian national interests that were already suffering under the Israeli occupation. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank were now without a sovereign authority able to resolve issues relating to borders, movement, fuel, energy, electricity, and raw materials.

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The military takeover of Gaza by Hamas was primarily a shock for the PLO and Fatah national factions. The shock experienced by Fatah was an extremely significant one, given that Fatah was responsible for the establishment of the PA in July 1994, and consequently for all its executive tasks and security apparatus. Since the PA’s inception, Fatah and its members had developed and maintained control over all the financial, economic and security resources of Palestinian public institutions (Tamimi, 2007: 81). When Hamas won the elections in 2006 nearly all PA members were from the Fatah movement and therefore it had not been easy for the PA to handover security and civic responsibility to Hamas (Gunning, 2007: 1). As a result, and due to the fact that the President of the PA was also the chairman of Fatah, these responsibilities and some essential executive tasks remained in the hands of Fatah officials even after the Mecca agreement. In accordance with PLO hierarchy, the Palestinian president was also the highest authority with regard to security matters. Besides, Israel and the international community refused to allow Hamas to have any responsibility in the security arena. Hamas was soon to gain stronger political grounds for the legitimacy of its military plan to defeat the forces of the PA when the movement faced challenges from President Abbas, the PLO, Israel, and the international community. Hamas had sought to impose its political and military will on the PA (Cherbl, 2008). However, the PA did not accept this and so deposed the Hamas government – this led to the military takeover - despite the fact that the PA had no power now in the Gaza Strip. Hamas dealt with it as an ‘unconstitutional’ and illegitimate body with no support from the Palestinian legislative council. Hamas also believed that the composition of the government was part of a secret plot against Hamas’ political victory in the 2006 elections (International Herald Tribune, 2007) The main goal of the PA’s emergency government was to face and challenge Hamas’ military takeover and its government. The PLO and the PA believed Hamas’ takeover to be a ‘coup’ against Palestinian national legitimacy, and against its peaceful struggle for a future Palestinian state. The PLO and the PA also believed that Hamas was planning to manipulate the coup in order to build its radical Islamic kingdom in the Gaza Strip. Both the PLO and the PA believed that the takeover was a plot to strengthen the opposition to the peace process and to moderation in the region;

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this was confirmed when the Secretary of the PLO, Yasser Abed Rabo, accused Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah of helping Hamas to carry out the coup (Cherbl, 2008). It was clear that these dramatic changes in the Palestinian political arena were part of a battle of wills in the Middle East between two different political camps. The PA/PLO secularist movement, which was linked to moderate regimes in the Middle East, believed in the peace process as a strategic choice to settle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hamas, on the other hand, was linked to countries and groups that rejected the peace process with Israel, such as Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah. After the shock of the takeover, the PA would not enter into direct dialogue with Hamas, nor respond positively to Hamas’ calls for reconciliation. As Dr. Yousef Rizka, the Hamas Minister for Information said: There will be no national reconciliation in the time of the Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas. The President saw Hamas’ Gaza takeover as a personal stab against him. Hamas’ government in Gaza will continue despite the international and regional boycott and challenges. (Rizka 2008)

The President of the PA, Mahmud Abbas, confirmed the refusal to conduct any dialogue with Hamas unless it gave up its military control of the Gaza Strip. He stated: There is no dialogue with those murderous terrorists. We tried to prevent conflict through continuous dialogue. Instead, we are seeing the assassination of leaders of Palestinian security and Fatah in Gaza. It’s a fight between the national project and this small kingdom they want to establish in Gaza, the kingdom of Gaza, between those who are using assassination and killing to achieve their goals, and those who are using the rule of law (Haaretz, 2007).

These changes in the Palestinian political system imposed real challenges for Hamas’ government in the Gaza Strip after the takeover.

Challenges Faced by Hamas after the Takeover Hamas continued governing Palestinian President deposed President had legitimacy and Palestinian government, despite the PLC. Even though Hamas

the Gaza Strip despite the fact the its government. The Palestinian power to appoint or depose the the fact Hamas was the majority in was still not recognised by the PA,

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the Arab league, and by the international community, it still saw itself as a legitimate government; democratically elected and responsible for public institutions. Hamas sought to empower its governance by implementing a number of political and security procedures and actions against the PLO, PA, and Fatah leaders in the Gaza Strip. However, the Hamas government still faced a number of political, technical, economic, and international challenges.

First: Political Challenge On 15 June 2007, Hamas faced a significant political challenge when President Abbas directed Dr Salam Fayyad to compose an emergency government. Dr Fayyad had been the Minister of Finance in the national unity government led by Hamas before the military takeover, and had been elected as an independent candidate to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in 2006. He was also the international community’s preferred candidate, due to his professionalism and the credibility gained from working for the World Bank. Dr. Fayyad composed his emergency government of twelve independent ministers, which received very quick international recognition, whereas the previous national government led by Hamas had failed to obtain international support and legitimacy (Palestinian Information Centre, June 15 2007). However, the new government faced a key challenge in that it had no access to the Gaza Strip and was therefore unable to function there. The Palestinian President also sought national support for his emergency government by calling the PLO’s Central Council (PCC) on 21 June 2007. He sought national endorsement by the PCC in order that his government could undertake a series of measures to stabilise and bring order to society, and to dismantle military groups, including Hamas. The PCC had previously set up the PA in Gaza and the West Bank, in a decision taken at Tunis in 1993. The PCC also recommended dissolving all Palestinian militant groups; this included Hamas’ executive force and its military wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigade, as well as Fatah’s Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (Saleh, 2010: 50-53). The PLO used the power of the PCC to bypass the Palestinian Legislative Council, which was controlled by a Hamas majority, to support and legitimatise the new emergency government. Hamas

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believed this emergency government was part of a secret plan to undermine the Hamas government, supported by the USA, supervised by the US General Keith Dayton, and to be implemented by the Fatah leader, Mohammed Dahalan. As Abed Fatah Dokhan, a founding figure of Hamas and a current Parliament member, declared: The Palestinian Authority plotted a plan to attack Hamas and topple its government by late June 2007. Hamas had to use its power to prevent the Palestinian Authority forces, directed by the USA General Keith Dayton and managed by Mohammed Dahalan, to do so. Hamas decided to use its power to protect the Palestinian democracy based on the election results. The Palestinian President issued a number of decrees to control all aspects of Palestinian governance. The Palestinian President’s decrees made the Hamas government powerless and valueless (Dokhan, 2008).

Politically, the PA increased its grip on Palestinian institutions and imposed new measures in the West Bank against Hamas institutions and members. The PA also imposed a series of security, financial, and administrative measures aimed at undermining any of Hamas’ future plans to control the West Bank. The PA government arrested hundreds of Hamas members and closed many of its institutions. It prevented Hamas media such as the Al Risala and Palestine newspapers from distribution throughout the West Bank, and also banned Hamas television correspondents from broadcasting. In short, the emergency government did everything it could to eradicate the existence and infrastructure of Hamas in the West Bank (Saleh, 2010: 51-59). The PA continued to apply its policy of de-legitimising Hamas within the Palestinian political scene, and continued challenging its governance by calling for early elections, which Hamas rejected. On July 16 2007, the PA also sought to use its disengagement with Hamas as an opportunity when it accepted the call of the President of the USA, George W. Bush, to participate in an international peace conference at Annapolis in the fall of 2007 (Schanzer, 2008: 155-160). Through this, the PA was attempting to demonstrate to the Palestinian people that Hamas was an obstacle to peace and economic development. The PA sought to advance the peace process, which in turn would strengthen the PA’s governance. Restarting the peace process with Israel would increase support and assistance from the international community, at Hamas’ expense. The PA wanted to prove that Hamas could not improve the lives of the Palestinian people whilst it continued to promote an

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unrealistic political programme. Simply put, the PA’s policies aimed to challenge Hamas’ governance and its existence in the Gaza Strip.

Second: International Recognition The international community rejected Hamas’ use of violence against PA forces, and this subsequently increased Hamas’ isolation internationally. International recognition, financial support, and co-operation had always been essential for any Palestinian government to function and to be capable of delivering services across Palestinian society, and it was difficult for any Palestinian government to operate without this recognition and support. Nonetheless, Hamas sought engagement and international legitimacy with Western countries that had rejected the military takeover of Gaza, such as the gesture of good will offered by Hamas when it freed the kidnapped BBC journalist, Alan Johnston. Johnston had been kidnapped and held for 114 days by the ‘Army of Islam’ under the command of Mumtaz Dogmush since 12 March 2007 (Haarretz, 2007). Hamas used its military power against the Army of Islam, an Al-Qaeda-inspired group linked to the Dogmush clan, which was also the group that had acted with Hamas in the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, on 26 June 2006 (International Crisis Group, 2011). The release of the British citizen did not bring overnight success for Hamas at the official diplomatic level. But it did promote Hamas’ image when the British Foreign Secretary David Miliband ‘fully acknowledged the crucial role’ played by Hamas’ government. A group of British MPs from all parties, including the Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond, signed a House of Commons motion to indicate a softening of its stance towards Hamas. Despite these moves however, Western countries remained reluctant to engage in any direct dialogue with Hamas’ government (Reynolds, 2007). Hamas wanted to show that its forces would be used to achieve humanitarian objectives, and tried to avoid creating a negative image similar to the one held by the PA’s former forces in the Gaza Strip. Hamas intended to send a clear message that it was a responsible organisation, an elected body, and that it had nothing to do with the Al-Qaeda-inspired kidnappers. It also intended to show that it could impose law and

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order, as a step towards being accepted internationally as the recognised representative of the Palestinian people.

Third: Security Challenge Hamas succeeded in defeating the PA forces and in controlling the Gaza Strip. However, a security threat to its governance still existed in the guise of a number of strong clans and Fatah military groups. Hamas decided to implement a series of measures against different Fatah military groups such as the Ahmad Abu-Reish Brigades, the Al-Aqsa Brigades, and clans aligned with Fatah. It killed some, arresting others and confiscating their weapons (Saleh, 2010: 43-47). Hamas believed that these groups and clans contributed to weakening the PA before Hamas’ takeover. These groups and clans had weapons and military power capable of defeating Hamas’ government in the future. On 25 July 2008, the stability in Gaza maintained by Hamas’ security was interrupted when a car full of Hamas activists exploded in an incident that became known locally as ‘the beach accident’ (Amayreh, 2008: No. 909). This led to a new state of tension, when Hamas accused Fatah of engineering the incident in order to disturb Hamas’ governance in the Gaza Strip. In response, Hamas then launched a security and military campaign against the leaders and members of Fatah. It also targeted the Helis clan, which is believed to be one of the largest clans in the Gaza Strip and historically linked to Fatah and the PA. Hamas’ operation against Helis left eleven people dead and 107 injured. Later, 188 members of the Helis clan fled to Israel after Hamas forces destroyed parts of their homes with rocket shells (Saleh, 2010: 65). Hamas arrested more than 400 members of Fatah and closed down more than 120 civil society organisations (CSOs) in response to the ‘beach accident’. Hamas also shut down the only radio station that still maintained its opposition to them following its military takeover of the Gaza Strip; this station was the only voice still critical of Hamas’ policies, and was managed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Hamas prevented the major Palestinian newspapers, Al-Ayyam, Hayyat, and Al-Quds, from being distributed in the Gaza Strip; just as the PA prevented Hamas newspapers from distribution within the West Bank (Saleh, 2010: 65-65).

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Hamas felt that the news coverage of these papers was too biased towards Fatah and the PA. Furthermore, Hamas sought to undermine any party, organisation, or individual that had not supported its own measures in the Gaza Strip. Hamas believed that those who did not support Hamas’ policies organisations were affiliated to Fatah and the PA. Hamas believed too that those organisations were providing security information to the PA about Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Fourth: Disobedience by Civil Servants Once Hamas had expelled the PA’s security forces, it faced a problem with civil servants who refused to return to their jobs at public institutions now under Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip. President Abbas called on civil servants aligned with Fatah, to remain at home and to abandon their public institutions as a challenge to the Hamas government. Hamas responded to the problem this created by employing thousands of its own members to run the public institutions paralysed by the departure of the public servants aligned to Fatah. However in fact, some civil servants employed by previous Fatah governments remained in post and showed new loyalty to Hamas. They supported newly employed Hamas civil servants through their training, helping them to run various ministries and institutions. Hamas was able to pay the salaries of its new employees through locally collected taxes and from funds raised through its own sources overseas.

Fifth: Economic Sanctions As a result of the complete borders closure by Israel, the Hamas government was also faced with the extreme suffering of the people of Gaza. Israel declared the Gaza Strip to be an enemy entity, and Hamas found itself isolated in a closed Gaza that was completely dependent on international assistance. Hamas saw that the Israeli siege had contributed to the closure of about eighty-five per cent of the workshops and factories in Gaza, leaving 70,000 employees jobless (Al Hayyat, 2007). The Palestinian people began to sense there was a complete difference between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. There always had been huge differences between the two societies, but after Hamas’ military takeover in the Gaza Strip, all aspects of life deteriorated and became more

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difficult. The economic situation of the Gaza Strip remained extremely low whilst Israel maintained the closure of all border passages, and Egypt closed its only border passage with Gaza. In order to find a solution to this isolation and the impact it was having on economic conditions in Gaza, Hamas assisted in the digging of dozens of illegal tunnels between the Gazan and Egyptian borders, which were managed and licensed by the Hamas government. The tunnels increased in number from twenty-four to more than 500; these were used for many purposes including channelling fuel, goods, and weapons (Saleh, 2010: 29).

Sixth: The Rafah Terminal Closures The closure of the Egyptian border with Gaza represented another challenge for Hamas’ governance after its military takeover. The Rafah terminal was the only passage between the Gaza Strip and the rest of the world after Israel closed its five terminals with the Gaza Strip. The closure of the Egyptian terminal increased the tension between the Hamas government and Egypt. Nonetheless, Hamas continued trying to seek an end to its isolation in order to reopen the border for passengers and trade between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. In an effort to break the siege, on 23 January 2008, Hamas members in the Rafah area destroyed the fences of the borders. From this, Hamas hoped to achieve political gains; as Mahmud Zahar, its senior leader in the Gaza Strip stated: “We are taking action. We have to try to change the situation, and now we await the results” (Erlanger, 2008). As a result of this action at the Egyptian border, thousands of Palestinian citizens from the Gaza Strip streamed into the Egyptian territories to go shopping, where prices were much lower than in the Gazan markets. It was also an opportunity for a few Palestinian and Egyptian relatives living across the border to see each other again after several months of virtual internment. The Egyptian authorities managed the crisis of the borders, demonstrating that it was not participating in the siege imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip. Egypt also wanted to show those who sympathised with the people of Gaza that Egypt was helping the Gazans by providing them with their basic needs. The Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak declared: “Let them come in to eat and buy food, then they go back, as long as they are not carrying weapons” (Erlanger, 2008)

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The consequences of this event however, were to increase the challenges facing Hamas. The Egyptian government’s official newspapers launched a public relations campaign against Hamas, accusing Hamas of attacking and killing Egyptian border police and harming Egyptian sovereignty by replacing the Egyptian flag at the border with a Hamas flag. Hamas failed to face up to Egyptian public outrage over this act, demonstrating its reluctance to cooperate with Egyptian authorities in resealing the borders, when Hamas’ spokesperson Sami Abu Zohri argued: “The people of Palestine will not go back to their cage. We broke the handcuffs and we will break the siege” (Knickmeyer, 2008). Hamas did not always trust the government of Egypt, as it had a close relationship both with the PA and with Israel. Moreover, Hamas is a member group of the Egyptian MB that was in a protracted conflict with the government of Egypt. However, Hamas always sought to deal with Egypt due to its regional power, and because of its historical, political, and geographical relationship with the Gaza Strip. Hamas always sought formal recognition for its government from Egypt and to create a dialogue with the country. The challenge for Egypt to reopen the borders with Gaza was a political one, because the PA, Israel, and the European Union had jointly controlled the border. Egypt was unable to open the borders unilaterally without coordinating with all the other parties, and Egypt did not want to give Hamas a degree of legitimacy by reopening the terminal. The terminal would give Hamas some access to the outside world, which would help to strengthen its governance and dominance over the Gaza Strip. Hamas sought to legitimise its governance by managing the opening of the Egyptian border passage in co-ordination with the Egyptians. This would also help Hamas to improve its relations with other actors across the world. All these challenges presented a genuine threat to Hamas’ governance, but it continued to govern the Gaza Strip by enforcing its own security and reform policies. Abed Fatah Dokhan, a Hamas founding member, described the actions of his government as a ‘clean national model for reform’ in terms of security and in protecting resistance figures in the Gaza Strip (Dokhan, 2008).

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Hamas’s Reform Model Hamas’ reform and change model, as published in its electoral programme, stemmed from its ideology and political theories aimed at fighting corruption, security coordination with Israel, and the mismanagement of public institutions. This model of reform and change indicated that Hamas would continue its resistance policy in addition to its political participation, in order to achieve the full range of rights for Palestinians. Theirs was a mixed programme between resistance and governance. But Hamas did not explain clearly the tools and mechanisms of resistance. Hamas’ reform programme reflected its own political ideology of presenting an Islamic model of governance and of state building. Hamas’ reform and governance theory was still part and parcel of MB’s ideologies, and it would not change its policies due to an economic siege, or because of military threats. The Hamas Prime Minister, Ismail Hania, stated: Hamas represents the Global Islamic Project of MB. It provides a model of governance and resistance. It also represents clean governance as no one can manipulate it by political aid (international humanitarian aid). No one will force Hamas to change its policies at all (Hania, December 14, 2008).

As part of its own reform process, Hamas continued conducting meetings of its parliamentarian bloc, (Reform and Change) at the building of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in Gaza, despite the fact that the parliament itself was paralysed after Hamas’ military takeover. Hamas intended to show its rivals and constituencies that it had the capacity to implement its reform and change programme after Israeli forces arrested forty PLC members in the West Bank in June 2006. Hamas’ Reform and Change bloc attempted to face up to the social and political impact of the 406 decrees issued by the Palestinian President and his government in the West Bank during June 2007 and June 2008 (Saleh, 2010:27). For example, Hamas’ bloc issued a number of laws, but the Palestinian President refused to ratify any law issued by the bloc. The Reform and Change bloc issued a number of controversial laws such as the ‘Panel Law’, presented on 22 December 2008, a law that included a number of disputed articles that were unacceptable to human rights groups and civil society organisations in Palestine. The bloc sought to impose punishments

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based on the Islamic law of Sharia such as execution, lashes, and the severing of hands. The bloc declared that this law would be implemented in any part of Palestine that the PA might extend to (Sabah, Daralhayat: December 24, 2008). Hamas’ Reform and Change programme entailed several other changes, such as security reforms. Hamas built a new internal security apparatus comprised of its own members, accusing the former PA security apparatus of being linked to Fatah and of coordinating and collaborating with Israel. Its own security reform aimed to protect the government of Hamas from any threats from Fatah and its affiliated families and clans (Brom: August 11 2008). Through its media network, Hamas showed that its security forces were truly national, and were not collaborating with Israel. Hamas was also proud that it had succeeded in creating greater personal safety and security, which had been eroded before the military takeover. Hamas was always proudly stating that it had succeeded in bringing security to the citizens of Gaza where the PA’s former security apparatus had failed. Hamas’ reform policy in the Gaza Strip, and the PA’s policies in the West Bank, deepened the Palestinian divide. This encouraged a number of Arab and Muslim countries, including Yemen, Qatar, Sudan, Syria, Senegal, Egypt, and the Arab league, to broker a peace agreement between Hamas and the PA (Saleh, 2010:37-40). All efforts to broker an agreement between Hamas and the PA had failed, although Egypt had kept ongoing contact with Hamas and the PA since the military takeover. Egypt was able to manoeuvre in this environment, as it had a very long experience of dealing with the different Palestinian factions and with Palestinian politics.

Egyptian Intervention In 2008, Egypt attempted to secure a peace agreement between the PA and Hamas, aimed at ending the division between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The impact of the Palestinian division on Egypt was greater than on any other Arab country because of its joint borders and its history with the Gaza Strip. Egypt was also worried that Israel might push the Egyptians into taking responsibility for the Gaza Strip. Egypt was concerned about Hamas’s threats to its borders. Therefore, Egypt identified the need to conduct indirect negotiation rounds between Hamas and Israel in order to secure an exchange of prisoners. Egypt wanted to

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bring stability to the Gaza Strip and to engage Hamas in a political process based on non-violence and recognising Israel. Hamas was always suspicious of Egypt’s role of coordinating with the Israeli government over security issues, and the prevailing impression amongst members of some leading Hamas institutions was that Egypt would not exert any real pressure on Israel to push for a deal on the exchange of prisoners. Such an achievement would enable Hamas to compete with the PA, a close ally of Egypt, and would strengthen Hamas’ position in the Gaza Strip (Jum’ah: Asharq Al-Awsat, 2008). This prevailing and negative impression by Hamas increased when Israeli occupation forces released dozens of Palestinian prisoners as a goodwill gesture towards President Abbas and his government in the West Bank. This gesture of goodwill challenged Hamas, particularly when Egypt’s mediation (indirect negotiation) between Hamas and Israel failed to secure an exchange of prisoners in order to release the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who had been held by Hamas since 26 June 2006, in exchange for hundreds of Palestinian prisoners held in Israel. The negative impact on Hamas increased when Egypt succeeded only in brokering a written agreement for a six-month period of calm (Tahdyyia) between Hamas and Israel that began on 19 June 2008. This agreement also included the lifting of the siege to allow for the flow of raw materials, fuels to power plants, and cooking gas, which Israel had forbidden after Hamas’ takeover (Al-Naami, AlAhram Weekly: 2008: 903). The PA and Fatah used the agreement over the period of calm between Hamas and Israel as a reason to accuse Hamas of achieving an unimpressive ceasefire, solely in order to protect its governance. Fatah also accused Hamas of using the agreement to fuel the Palestinian divide, as I heard personally from many Fatah and non-Fatah figures in the Gaza Strip. However, this agreement encouraged Egypt to promote efforts to bridge the gap between Hamas and the PA. On 8 October 2008, Egypt invited PA and Hamas delegations to Cairo to broker a peace agreement. Egypt offered a number of proposals to end the military takeover by Hamas in Gaza. Egypt also suggested reopening the Rafah terminal and the return of PA forces to the borders. Hamas refused to take part in the dialogue and instead demanded the following:

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1. The PA must release Hamas detainees in Palestinian prisons in the West Bank; 2. The PA must secure travel for the Hamas delegation from the West Bank to the dialogue location; 3. The Palestinian President, Mahmud Abbas, must participate in all dialogue sessions (The Palestinian Information Centre, November 5, 2008). Hamas realised that the PA had no power to secure the travel of Hamas delegates as long as Israel controlled the movement of Palestinians to and from the West Bank. The conditions listed above were explicit indicators that Hamas was concerned about any future agreement with the PA, realising that it would lose its control over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank altogether, and worried that the PA would not tolerate its military takeover actions at all. The Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip therefore rejected the initiative for peace with the PA, based on a return to the situation prior to Hamas’ military takeover. As Abed Fattah Dokhan, a Hamas founding figure, stated cynically: To whom will Hamas return the Gaza Strip? Will it return it to traitors escaped from the Strip? Or to the leaders of the security apparatus who pursue the resistance factions in co-ordination with the Israeli security agencies? Will Hamas return the Gaza Strip to the traitors of the Palestinian people who wanted to sell the Palestinian issue at a cheap price? To return it to those who burnt the Islamic University or who prevented the pilgrims from visiting Mecca. To those who detained the resisters in the West Bank, to return the Gaza Strip to all of them or some of them? Will Hamas return it to the corrupted leaders? (Dokhan, 2008).

This position also reflected the differences and rift between Hamas’ internal and external leadership; the external leadership of Hamas held a different vision of the complete control of the Gaza Strip through military power, but had lost its freedom and capacity to act in the West Bank. Hamas’ external leadership (the majority of whose leaders were originally from the West Bank) attempted to persuade the leadership in Gaza to agree to dialogue and reconciliation with the PA. Hamas’ external leadership was fully aware of the risks that this might destroy their movement in the West Bank. On 19 December 2008, Hamas refused to renew the ceasefire because Israel would not commit to any single item of the agreement. Some in Hamas believed that the Tahdyiah was a trap

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intended to weaken Hamas’ authority, decrease its popularity and undermine its image amongst Palestinians. The Tahdyiah did not achieve its aim of improving the economic and social conditions in the Gaza Strip; moreover the siege had remained firm. Hamas itself had not achieved a single objective from the agreement, except that of protecting the heads of its leaders from being targeted by Israeli attacks, which the majority of Fatah members believed had been its main purpose. Hamas had achieved nothing more than keeping its authority in the Gaza Strip alive, and Palestinian society divided geographically and politically (The Palestinian Information Centre, December 19 2008). After the end of the Tahdyiah, the state of fear and concern amongst the Gazan population suggested there would shortly be a major Israeli military operation or a war in the Gaza Strip.

The Military Cast Lead Operation On 24 December 2008, the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert addressed the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip via the Arab news broadcasting network, calling on them to topple Hamas’ government, as this was the main cause of their suffering. This speech prepared the ground for a new cycle of violence against the Gaza Strip, and it was expected that Israel would launch a largescale operation against Hamas there. Olmert wanted the people of Gaza to know that Hamas was responsible for their suffering, and that it worked against the spirit of Islam. Olmert also described Hamas as an enemy to both Israeli and Gazan society, declaring that: Hamas is firing on us and on the power station meant to give Gaza electricity. Stop them. Stop your enemy and I will not hesitate to use Israel’s might to strike Hamas and [Islamic] Jihad. How? I will not go into detail. Israel left Gaza about three years ago with no intention of returning... Is the spirit of Islam to kill innocent children, to fire rockets at kindergartens and civilians? I don’t think that is the spirit of Islam. That Hamas does this in opposition to the spirit of Islam is the main reason for your suffering, and ours. I say to you in a last minute call, stop it. You, the residents of Gaza, can stop it (Haaretz, December 25 2008).

The Israeli Prime Minister considered the innocent people of the Gaza strip responsible and accountable for the actions of Hamas. However, Olmert realised that the suffering and powerless people of Gaza were not able to confront or stop Hamas militants.

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Nonetheless, he wanted to inform the people of Gaza and their sympathizers that Hamas would be responsible for any future war against Gaza, and for the suffering of innocent people. On 27 December 2008, Israeli threats against Hamas became a reality when Israel bombed Hamas military compounds in the Gaza Strip (Roggio, 2009). Israel called this military campaign ‘Operation Cast Lead’. It caused a high number of casualties amongst Hamas members (Levy, 2010: 78). Despite the end of Tahdyiah and the serious threat of Israeli military action, Hamas was unprepared for any emergency. It had not taken Israeli threats seriously, interpreting them as part of a psychological war against Hamas’ government and the movement in the Gaza Strip. However, a number of observers and sources close to Hamas warned that Israeli forces were well prepared for a long and tough military operation against Hamas’ military and organisational infrastructure. In late 2007, Saleh Al-Naami, a journalist for AlAhram weekly, had warned that Israel would choose the right moment to undertake a wide-scale military campaign in the Gaza Strip. Israel would destroy Hamas’ military and organisational infrastructure, and would push for the collapse of the Hamas government, occupying the Gaza Strip before handing it over to the PA (Al-Naami/Al-Ahram Weekly, December 27 2007 – January 2 2008: 887). It was clear that Hamas believed that the Israeli threat was an attempt at psychological warfare in order to prevent ‘resistance actions’ by Hamas, for example the launching of rockets, as well as to force Hamas to release the captured Israeli soldier, and to relinquish its control over the Gaza Strip. Hamas also believed that Israel was no longer interested in returning to the Gaza Strip to face Hamas militancy. Hamas misread Israel and miscalculated its willingness to tolerate or accept any Palestinian entity that did not recognise the existence of Israel. Israel would not tolerate Hamas’ entity and saw it as a movement that fostered hatred. Moreover, Israel would not tolerate Hamas’ link to Iran and Syria, and the support to Hamas by these two countries. As a part of the shock and crisis experienced by Hamas during the war, it launched a media campaign and organised various popular demonstrations against the Egyptian stance towards Hamas. Egypt was accused of participating in the war; during the war Egypt closed its border with the Gaza Strip. Egypt rejected a regular reopening of the borders between it and the Gaza Strip, and

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opened them only for humanitarian reasons from time to time, in response to the war. Hamas’ leadership was in a state of embarrassment because it had no emergency plan to face the crisis of war. The Prime Minister, Ismail Hania, projected a tough stance; his political statements emphasised that Hamas would not give up, and would not compromise over its political agenda (Hania, December 27 2008). The PA used the war against Hamas in Gaza to call for national unity. The PA’s Palestinian President, Mahmud Abbas, called for a dialogue to form a common strategy to deal with Israel’s aggression. However, the PA could not engage in any reconciliation process with Hamas, without the latter’s acceptance of the international demands. Any compromises by the PA to Hamas would jeopardise financial and political support from the EU and the USA (Salama, 2008: 927). Hamas understood the PA and Fatah’s call for unity and reconciliation as political rhetoric, rejecting the President’s call for dialogue because he placed responsibility with Hamas for rejecting the renewal of the Tahdyia with Israel, which had led to the Israeli war on Gaza. It was difficult however, for Hamas to accept the calls of its rivals for national unity and dialogue so immediately, as the movement was still in shock, given that it had not anticipated Israel’s military campaign (Al Nono, December 27 2008). It was clear that Hamas had no vision or exit strategy to avoid more civilian casualties and further loss of its members and institutions. Hamas was concerned that the Israeli military actions would undermine its capacity to govern, with the result that Hamas would be replaced by the PA. Hamas believed that the PA had instructed its members and loyalists in Gaza to begin undermining Hamas. Hamas placed dozens of Fatah members under house arrest, worried that they would exploit the Israeli attack to regain power in the Gaza Strip. As a senior Hamas figure put it: We will kill them all if they try to help Israel bring down our government. We will hang Mahmud Abbas and former Fatah security chief Muhammad Dahlan in the public square if they try to enter the Gaza Strip aboard Israeli tanks. Security forces had launched a massive "pre-emptive" campaign aimed at thwarting Fatah’s attempts to "spread anarchy and chaos, and Fatah operatives had been shot in the legs over the past few days by Hamas “to make sure that they don’t help Israel” (Abu Toameh,

2009).

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In fact, the Fatah-led PA was unwilling and too badly prepared to return to Gaza Strip, as a result of Israel’s actions to topple Hamas. It would be impossible for Fatah leaders to fight back against Hamas during the war, because Fatah had sought greater popular and political support from its constituencies. Fatah was still divided by different leaders and clans, and there was no charismatic leader able to unite the group. The leaders of Fatah would never be willing to ride into Gaza on the back of an Israeli tank (Bronner, 2009). Despite the heavy destruction of Hamas’ infrastructure, it was still able to threaten the normal lives of Israelis living adjacent to the Israeli–Gaza border. Hamas launched locally made rockets with a range of forty kilometres. Israel’s military operation was interrupted by Hamas’ military action, despite the limited impact of the rockets. The impact of Hamas rockets was not as significant as the attacks on Israel by Lebanese militants in 2006. Hezbollah was supported by Syria during the war, but Hamas had no accessible borders allowing the opportunity to receive support from either the Syrians or the Iranians. Equally, Hamas had no military arsenal or capacity, and the resulting impact of its rockets against Israel was very limited (Bronner, 2009). The military capabilities of the Hamas government were undermined by the Israeli bombardment. Israel also rejected all demands to stop firing on Gaza until the Israelis had achieved their operational goals of undermining Hamas’ military capacity and its governance (Bar’el, 2009). However, Israel did not in fact achieve one single goal of the operation, which included preventing Hamas from launching rockets, the release of the Israeli soldier, or the toppling of the government of Hamas, in the context of fighting a terrorist organisation, as classified by the international community. Israel had no intention of working out a diplomatic outcome with Hamas. Israel also sought a diplomatic agreement with moderate actors such as Egypt for its military actions in the Gaza Strip, after it failed to achieve its goals.

Diplomatic Strategy Post-War The Israeli Foreign Affairs and security agencies began drawing up a plan for an exit strategy to achieve political gain from the military operation, leaving open the possibility of future intervention in the Gaza Strip. Israel worked to develop a deal in

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cooperation with allies such as Egypt, the USA and France, in order to broker a ceasefire and to save the lives of Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip. In Damascus, the Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyb Ordagan, tried to persuade Israel and Hamas to accept a ceasefire. However, just as Hamas failed to engineer an exit strategy, the Arab League was unable to reach a consensus on how to help the Palestinian people. This also exposed internal fragmentation and division within the Arab countries, and their inability to produce a plan to deal with the crisis. As the Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal said at the opening of the League meeting in Cairo: “This terrible massacre would not have happened if the Palestinian people were united behind one leadership and one voice” (Gazzar, Jerusalem Post: December 31 2008). Although the Palestinians remained responsible and accountable for their internal division, Egyptian efforts failed time and time again to broker a peace agreement. At the beginning of the war, more than one scenario faced Hamas. Firstly, the war could lead to a ceasefire that might help Hamas to remain a political player in control of the Gaza Strip, separated from the West Bank. Secondly, there could be a ceasefire leading to the end of Hamas’ governance, causing it to vanish from the Palestinian political landscape. Thirdly, Hamas could enter into a new unity government with the PLO’s factions, and other independent Palestinian technocrats and professionals, in order to end the Palestinian deadlock based on international demands. I, like other observers at the start of the war, expected that Israel’s battle against Hamas would lead to the weakening of the latter’s governance to a great extent. As Israel’s Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, said: “There is no doubt that as long as Hamas controls Gaza, it is a problem for Israel, a problem for the Palestinians, and a problem for the entire region” (Gazzar, 2008). The reality was that Israel’s main objective in the military operation was to keep Hamas politically active and governing the Gaza Strip, when Israel ended the Cast Lead Operation without any diplomatic agreement with any party, on 18 January 2009. Its military operations in Gaza left more than 1,300 dead, over 5,000 wounded and with 2,400 buildings destroyed. The number of Palestinian casualties was more than one hundred times the number of Israeli casualties (Levy, 2010: 78). The future of the Gaza Strip remained ambiguous, as long as the division in Palestine remained. Israel was keen to maintain the Palestinian political division as a

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part of a wider Arab division between two camps: one moderate and one radical, as Israel is still the key player that decides the future of the Gaza Strip - as long as it is considered an occupying authority within the Palestinian territories, according to international law. All efforts to end the Palestinian division after the war failed. However, international civil society support and sympathy with the Gaza Strip had increased as a result of the devastating consequences of the war in Gaza, particularly among civilians. There were a number of initiatives to send humanitarian aid and food by ship from different parts of the world; many of these came from Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. The aim of these initiatives was to expose Israeli responsibility for its crimes in the Gaza Strip during the war. These initiatives also increased the international isolation of Israel, especially following the assault on the ‘freedom flotilla’ and the killing of nine Turkish activists on 31 May 2010 (Rigby 2010: 74). However, international sympathy and support for Palestinians has not encouraged them to end their division and to challenge the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, which has made it into a mass open air prison. The suffering of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip continues; they continue to live in extremely impoverished conditions. No one knows what will happen tomorrow.

Concluding Remarks: The military takeover by Hamas divided Palestinian society into two different entities politically, geographically, and economically. Hamas planned to create a de facto display of its power, to force political gains from the Palestinian Authority that Hamas had failed to achieve after its electoral win. In doing so, Hamas believed that the Palestinian Authority would be forced to accept its demands, but it did not anticipate the measures taken by the Palestinian President, which included firing the National Unity government in response to Hamas’ military takeover. Hamas did not expect that the Palestinian President would use his powers without asking for parliamentary approval in order to impose an emergency government, without Hamas’ participation. In spite of the mistrust and a profound conflict of interests, as a result of Hamas’ violence, Hamas nonetheless indicated its willingness to conduct a dialogue with the rival Fatah movement

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and with the Palestinian Authority, which then rejected any dialogue with Hamas unless it returned control of the Gaza strip to the legitimate PA. On the other hand, Hamas was willing to have a dialogue with the Palestinian Authority without any pre-conditions. Campaigns by Hamas and calls for dialogue with the Palestinian Authority failed as a result of the PLO’s refusal to engage. In June 2008, the Palestinian Authority agreed to enter into dialogue with Hamas, which led Hamas to consider various conditions for a resumption of the dialogue. Hamas was not willing to give up the Gaza Strip, as it believed there was a conspiracy against Hamas after the Palestinian Authority, in co-ordination with Israeli security forces, took steps in the West Bank against its institutions. It appeared that Hamas’ military takeover of the Palestinian Authority was a very long-term plan. A colleague of mine, working for a civil society organisation in the field of democracy and conflict resolution, told me in 2001 that ‘Hamas is seeking to run the Palestinian Authority. It desires to overturn the existing authority’. I could not believe that one day these words would be fulfilled. It seemed unrealistic not only to me, but also to Palestinian Authority officials, who believed that Hamas only wanted to destroy it, not to govern it. However, Hamas tried to show its constituencies that it could provide a model of governance and resistance together. It believed that the price of governance would be cheaper than the price of resistance, once this was mandated through elections. Various international and local parties acted as a third party in an attempt to intervene between the two parties and to referee a dialogue. However, all these parties failed to develop a way to dislodge the deadlock between Hamas and Fatah. Senegal, Yemen, and Egypt all used their power and relations with both parties, but they were unable to reach common ground. Both Hamas and Fatah kept accusing each other of accepting the external influence of parties such as Iran, Syria, and the USA. However, Hamas managed to negotiate indirectly with Israel through the Egyptians, in order to develop a prisoner exchange deal with Israel to free the Israeli soldier held by Hamas in exchange for one hundred Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Through the Egyptian mediator, Hamas also negotiated with Israel to enter a truce or a ‘period of calm’ for six months, to strengthen its governance and

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control over the Gaza Strip, which was under threat from coercive Israeli policy. Once again, Hamas’ strategy failed to play an important role in the Palestinian political system after the PLO, along with countries both regionally and internationally, rejected Hamas’ military takeover of the Gaza Strip. This contributed to the deterioration of the economic and political situation. Hamas believed that Fatah had the same objectives as those of the international, economic, and political boycott. These aimed to undermine Hamas’ capacity to govern, to allow Fatah to regain power after its losses in the last elections, and to supply Western funds to topple Hamas’ government in the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ failure to manage an exit strategy from its crisis of governance was compounded when the movement took the radical step of settling its political differences with the Fatah movement by using weapons and violence. However, Hamas had built its political platform on the strategy of ‘reform and change’ within Palestinian society. In fact, Hamas needed to use its political rather than military power to bring about change now, so it was leading a national unity government. Hamas’ explicit strategic decision to use its military power to subdue the security apparatus of the Palestinian Authority led by the Fatah movement was unjustified and unacceptable to the moderate Palestinian national movement, to moderate Arab states, and to Western countries. All rejected Hamas’ actions. The PA accused Hamas of receiving funds from Iran, which it would then use to undermine the Palestinian national project for both Hamas and Iran’s global Islamic project. Hamas’ military takeover of the Gaza Strip then undermined Palestinian struggle for statehood due to its links to regional powers such as Iran and Syria. As a result of this division, the Palestinian people witnessed two dark and tough years in 2007 and 2008. A bloody confrontation on Palestinian soil between the Islamic movement and the national movement interrupted the Palestinian national project of establishing an independent Palestinian state. They could achieve their differences peacefully. They could not neutralise the direct influence of international actors, including Israel, on Palestinian national decisions. The Palestinian people would remain unable to solve their differences without an international mediator or third party intervention, as the Lebanese had been able to do.

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Hamas believed that it would continue governing the Gaza strip until the West Bank failed due to the collapse of the PalestinianIsraeli negotiation. Hamas would wait for another huge crisis that might transform the Palestinian landscape, such as the death of Yasser Arafat. Hamas did not realise however, that Israel was preparing its army to topple Hamas’ government of the Gaza Strip. It did not foresee that Israel would not allow an entity to threaten its southern borders with the Gaza Strip. An entity controlled by Islamists who refused to recognise Israel’s existence, and an Islamic entity built on a military infrastructure, taking Hezbollah as its model of ‘resistance’. Hamas did not understand that its neighbour, Egypt, had already suffered from Hamas’ takeover, as Egypt feared this would extend to the Muslim brotherhood. Egypt was concerned that Hamas’ governance in the Gaza Strip might strengthen its connection with the rival Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Society (MB). The MB had represented a threat to the governing national party in Egypt for many years now. In brief, the Israeli war against the Gaza Strip, which started at the end of 2008, would leave the Palestinian people with the highest number of losses ever. Israel’s war against the Gaza strip did not lead to a weakening of Hamas’ government, and was not able to contribute to any political changes in the Gaza Strip in the short-term. It would however, lead to new arrangements for the borders between Gaza and Egypt. Israel’s coercive campaign against Hamas was to keep Hamas’ governance in place, not to remove it, as long as it continues to serve Israel’s interest. But I doubt that, after many years of sacrifice, any new situation will lead to an independent Palestinian State on Palestinian soil because of the Palestinian division between Hamas and Fatah (Gaza Strip and the West Bank). This was also a serious challenge for Hamas’ governance and its transformation from violence into a full political player post-war. In the next chapter, I will examine the repercussions of the Arab Spring and failure of Palestinian reconciliation on Hamas’ governance in the Gaza Strip.

CHAPTER EIGHT HAMAS BETWEEN THE ARAB SPRING AND PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION

Introduction This chapter examines how Hamas’ governance was affected by the setbacks of the Arab Spring and the failure of the Palestinian reconciliation (2011-2015). It also discusses, however, the early political opportunities that Hamas gained from the temporary changes created by the Arab Spring and victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia. Regime change allowed Hamas to become engaged in the political process of the Arab spring. Hamas had the chance of becoming a key political player before the “Arab Spring” regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. They also hoped to take over the leading role from the PLO. Their political engagement in the Arab Spring, however, was both tested and damaged by the Israeli military operation, “Pillar Defence”, during November 2012 (Milton Edwards, 2013:60-71). This chapter also examines the serious repercussions of the deposition of President Morsi on Hamas in July 2013. Hamas faced a very serious, unprecedented financial and political crisis as Egypt closed the tunnels and boycotted Hamas politically. This situation presented Hamas with serious challenges and risks after the setbacks of the Arab spring in the region and political changes in Egypt. More importantly, it provided debate on the impact of the broken relationship between Hamas, Syria, and Iran on Hamas’ governance in Gaza. It also provided an insight into the continued challenges facing the Palestinian reconciliation process between Hamas and Fatah. These challenges were caused by the failure of the Arab Spring in empowering the Islamist movement, and 51 days of war in the Gaza Strip during the summer of 2014.

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Arab Spring In early 2011, peaceful youth revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East that ousted the dictators of Egypt and Tunisia had already brought new hope and optimism for Palestinian society. In these countries, youth played major roles in non-violent protests against dictatorship, which were nicknamed the Arab Spring (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012: 125-138). The Palestinian youth had watched the events of the Arab Spring and hoped that the revolutions in the Arab world would reflect positively on the Palestinian cause. The themes and achievements of youth in Arab Spring countries were always present at the various activities, actions, and discussions of different youth groups at all levels (Khosrokhavar, 2012: 223). Some Palestinian young leaders attended several activities and regional meetings in Tunisia and Egypt to learn and listen to the experiences of other colleagues about the Arab spring. The Palestinian participants found the activities of those regional forums good opportunities to inspire the waves of change and transfer the experiences to Palestine to challenge the Israeli occupation and internal division between Hamas and Fatah. The Palestinian youth attempted to organise themselves under different initiatives to challenge de facto. On 17 February 2011, a group of young activists met in one of the cafés in Ramallah city in the West Bank to plan for a revolution. They arranged a Skype conversation with four activists from the Gaza Strip to use social media effectively and efficiently to reignite the Palestinian street (Alsaafin, 2012).

Palestine’s 15 March movement On 15 March 2011, social movements and youth groups have organised massive peaceful marches and non-violent protests to make a stand against the division and conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Those groups were known as the March 15 Movement, which employed different tools of modern social media networks to organise the protests. These protests were the first wellorganised marches in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank since 2007. The youth March 15 movement posed a real challenge for Hamas and Fatah, and could become a similar phenomenon to Egyptian youth revolution, as the organisers intended (Natil, 2012: 180). The Movement forced the Prime Minister of Hamas, Ismail Hania, to invite the Palestinian President,

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Mahmud Abbas, to visit Gaza, and he responded positively to the call. This rapid and positive response was an attempt from Hamas and Fatah to take into account the peaceful youth protests and their efforts to unify Palestinian society. Hamas and Fatah also wanted to avoid more protests and campaigns in the near future. It was clear that the March 15 movement was inspired by the regional changes. However, the youth movement was also part of a series of peaceful efforts against the Israeli occupation that emerged in different areas of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank during the previous few years. Many members of the March 15 movement had already learned the lessons of Gandhi and Martin Luther King in using non-violent resistance, and they continued their efforts against the Israeli wall in the West Bank, as well as against the security fence in the Gaza Strip. The 15 March movement was a brave initiative and a step forward, but the movement found it difficult to continue its efforts to force Fatah and Hamas towards unity and reconciliation, without external intervention or regional changes in Egypt and Syria. The youth March 15 movement in Palestine did not succeed to bring about genuine change similar to Tunisia or Egypt; there are many differences between Palestine and other Arab countries, from society to politics to culture. More importantly, those countries have experienced peace and stability for more than thirty years at least, unlike Palestine. The reasons, circumstances and factors for this are many, and I summarise them as follows: 1. Palestinians have been living under Israeli occupation and violence for more than forty-four years; there has been no peace and development in Palestine. 2. Palestinians have been divided between Hamas and Fatah since 1987. The Palestinian people have never had a representative leadership for all Palestinians in order to consider a strategic plan for peace or war, even though the PLO has been the legal body and Palestinian representative for more than four decades. Hamas has disputed and refused the representation of PLO, as the latter was unelected. 3. Palestinian political factions were fragmented and loyal to two different Arab camps. Hamas was loyal and linked to Syria, and Fatah was loyal and linked to the former Egyptian regime. 4. The Palestinian people have been fragmented and distributed between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Jerusalem, without any geographical unity.

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5. The Palestinian youth witnessed two long, popular, and violent uprisings from 1987 to 1993 and from 2000 to 2005. 6. Palestinians suffered international sanctions after Hamas composed the Palestinian government in 2006, which caused a number of humanitarian problems. 7. Palestinian youth witnessed the collapse of the peace process between Israel and the PLO under the Israeli expansionist settlement policy in the occupied Palestinian territories. 8. Hamas’ military takeover of Gaza and the expulsion of the PA’s forces in 2007, when about 700 young Palestinians were killed and injured, deepened the wounds and social fragmentations among families. 9. The Israeli Military Cast Lead Operation in the Gaza Strip destroyed the poor infrastructure and further deepened the wounds of Palestinians; it left more than 1,300 dead, over 5,000 wounded, and 2,400 buildings destroyed. 10. There have been about 5,935 Palestinian prisoners behind Israeli bars for many years. Those prisoners represent an important segment of society. Since the beginning of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories in 1967, over 650,000 Palestinians have been detained by Israel. This forms approximately 20% of the total Palestinian population in the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT) in accordance with the Addameer Prisoners’ Support and Human Rights Association, as of January 1 2012 (Natil, 2012: 180).

1. Palestinian Reconciliation The governments of Hamas and Fatah easily controlled the youth movement in different ways. However, peaceful youth revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East that ousted the dictators of Egypt and Tunisia brought new hope and optimism for Palestinian society that time. The youth still hoped and worked to bring change to the Palestinian society free from Israeli occupation and internal division. They participated actively and regularly to protest peacefully against the Israeli settlement and separation wall. This initiative started before the Arab Spring, but it still continues resisting the Israeli occupation’s “popular resistance”.

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Shy Response to the Arab Spring However, on 27 April 2011, Hamas and Fatah responded positively to regional changes in the Middle East and North Africa, and to calls within Palestinian society, when they signed in preliminary letters of a historic achievement for the Palestinians; an agreement of reconciliation. The agreement would put an end to the division between the rivals in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank that had weakened the Palestinian people and that had been exploited by Israel in its refusal to continue the peace process. The agreement concluded with the formation of an interim government of independents, for a year, to avoid the international boycott. This future government will also be responsible for organising general elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and for implementing the reconciliation agreement (Milton Edwards, 2013:60-71). The reconciliation agreement also gives Hamas an incentive and advantage to offer its constituencies, by enabling it to maintain a major part of its existing governance; for example, it is likely that the majority of Hamas employees and security officers will keep their positions. It gives Hamas full participation in the decisionmaking process of Palestinian politics through the interim committee, which includes the current PLO executive structure, independents, and Islamic Jihad. In fact, this agreement represents a real triumph for the new Egyptian regime and a challenge to Israel, the US, and the EU, all of which have shunned Hamas as a terrorist organisation. The agreement was a version of the Arab Spring, destabilising regimes from Libya to Syria and giving the hope of change after years of impasse, which created commonalities between Hamas and Fatah. Both parties felt threatened by and worried about their future. Hamas and Fatah lost allies and support in Syria and Egypt; Fatah lost the support of the former Egyptian regime, and Hamas felt that it had almost lost its Syrian regime. Hamas wanted to establish a new agreement swiftly and securely before it lost everything, and so tried to build a stronger relationship with the new regime of Egypt. Hamas realised that the region had changed and sought to find new allies to avoid an unexpected political tsunami in Palestine. However, the reconciliation process between Hamas and Fatah remains in its infancy. It was a long process ahead, and a number of challenges still remained:

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 Israel did not accept the Palestinian reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, as Palestinian division serves Israel’s interest. Israel has warned that it will not deal with the next government if it includes independent members supported by Hamas.  The USA will not accept Hamas’ inclusion in the Palestinian political system as long as Hamas does not recognise Israel. The USA might lead international pressure to boycott the Palestinian government.  A few members of Hamas and Fatah did not accept the agreement and they may pose a threat to it.  Some families and clans that suffered and lost members during clashes between Hamas and Fatah might pose further threats. Despite the challenges facing the reconciliation, there is still strong hope for success this time, due to the regional changes, popular support by Palestinians, the need and willingness of both parties, and the support of international civil society groups. In addition, Arab financial support will strengthen and contribute to the sustainability of the reconciliation process. The Palestinian people are still desperate to implement the reconciliation agreement after five years of disastrous social and political consequences for society at large. This agreement also represents new hope for political participation and social change in the occupied Palestinian territories, when Hamas will take part in the political system based on democracy, non-violence, good governance and respect for human rights. The agreement provides an advanced step towards Hamas’ engagement in the peace process, even if only indirectly at this stage. The reconciliation process will also allow Hamas to participate in efforts to ensure the Palestinian state is recognised internationally this year. The reconciliation process that has already united Palestinian society under one political entity will provide Hamas with an active role in the Palestinian political system through participation in this potential achievement. Within the Palestinian political system today, Hamas will be in a stronger position if the Palestinian state is born with international recognition. Thus, Hamas will be included and not excluded, as Khalid Mishal, the leader of Hamas, emphasised in Hamas’ political vision post-reconciliation:

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Our aim is to establish a free and completely sovereign Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, whose capital is Jerusalem, without any settlers, without giving up a single inch of land, and without giving up on the right of return of Palestinian refugees (Michal, 2011).

Thus, Hamas explicitly supports a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. This is an implicit recognition of Israel’s existence. Hamas is now close to Fatah’s political programme, although it does not yet accept the existence of Israel at this stage. If it accepts Israel now, there would no longer be any differences between Fatah and Hamas. Hamas offered to play a more constructive role in Palestinian politics and to be open to other regional and western powers, but not to be a direct negotiator with Israel. Through third party engagement with, for example, the PLO, Hamas will participate in the peace process. By enabling Hamas to retain a major part of its existing governance, the reconciliation agreement allows Hamas to offer an incentive to its constituencies; for example, it is likely that the majority of Hamas employees and security officers will keep their positions. The agreement grants Hamas full participation in political decision-making through the interim committee, which includes the current PLO executive structure, the independents, and Islamic Jihad. In fact, this agreement represents a genuine triumph for the new Egyptian regime, and poses a challenge to Israel, the US, and the EU, which have all shunned Hamas as a terrorist organisation. The agreement was influenced by the Arab Spring, which ousted unstable regimes from Libya to Syria, and gave the hope of change after years of impasse. This emphasised commonalities between Hamas and Fatah, as both parties felt threatened by and worried about the future. Both Hamas and Fatah lost allies and support in Syria and Egypt; Fatah lost the support of the former Egyptian regime, and Hamas felt that it had lost the support of Syrian and Iranian regimes. Hamas wanted to establish a new agreement swiftly and securely to achieve its own goals, and so tried to build a stronger relationship with the new regime of Egypt.

Israeli Pillar Israel always plays an influential role in Palestinian internal politics, including the reconciliation process between Hamas and Fatah. On November 14 2012, Israel launched a military operation,

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“Pillar of Defence”, in order to achieve a number of political and security goals. The operation began just a few hours after the significant visit by the Emir of Qatar to Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The visit was very significant for Hamas both politically and economically. The Qatari Emir pledged $500 million for improvements to the infrastructure and services in the Gaza Strip. The PLO was not happy that this visit took place and saw in it as a further step towards sustaining the Palestinian division (Milton Edwards, 2013:60-71). Hamas, however, believed that the Israeli operation tested the new regime of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The “Pillar of Defence” operation continued for 8 days and left at least 161 Palestinians, including 71 civilians, dead. It started with the assassination of Hamas’ military wing commander, Ahmed Jabari. Jabari was responsible for capturing and exchanging the Israeli soldier, Gilead Schalit, for more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in October 2011. He was also interested in establishing a long cease fire with Israel, as Gershon Baskin believed. Gershon was the initiator and person responsible for the secret channel between Israel and Hamas that successfully negotiated the release of the abducted Israeli soldier, Gilead Schalit. Gershon realised the influence of Jabari and his potential role in any long-term ceasefire, and he wrote the following in the New York Times: Passing messages between the two sides, I was able to learn firsthand that Mr Jabari wasn’t just interested in a long-term ceasefire; he was also the person responsible for enforcing previous cease-fire understandings brokered by the Egyptian intelligence agency. Mr Jabari enforced those ceasefires only after confirming that Israel was prepared to stop its attacks on Gaza. On the morning that he was killed, Mr Jabari received a draft proposal for an extended ceasefire with Israel, including mechanisms that would verify intentions and ensure compliance. Hamas’ deputy foreign minister, Mr Hamad, and I agreed upon this draft when we met last week in Egypt (New York Times, 2012).

The Israeli ‘Pillar of Defence’ operations on Hamas in Gaza came to test the new regimes in the Arab Spring countries. The new regime in Egypt, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, issued statements supporting Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. It used its influence over Hamas and Islamic Jihad to hold a cease fire on November 21, 2012. The Israeli ‘Pillar of Defence’ operations and the failure of the reconciliation process during the Arab Spring increased pressure on both the Palestinians and Hamas’

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governance in the Gaza Strip. The citizens suffered from deteriorating economic circumstances and the entire closure of the Gaza Strip. The cease fire and Egypt’s intervention did not promote Hamas’ political weight as a single dominant force in the Palestinian political landscape and/or as a regional political player. Hamas still faces internal isolation in the Gaza Strip, as well as regional isolation.

Hamas’ Multi-Faceted Crisis Power and regime change in the Arab Spring countries, therefore, temporarily allowed Hamas to have new allies in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Hamas supported the demands of the Syrians, including the Muslim Brotherhood, to depose the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, who is a close ally of Iran. Hamas believed that Al-Assad would fall and the Muslim Brotherhood would have a better position in Syria. Hamas chose to support the demands of the Muslim Brotherhood. It could not assume a neutral position regarding the crisis in Syria. Hamas completely shifted its relationship to the Sunni axis including the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar, and Turkey (Milton Edwards, 2013:60-71). Hamas thus lost its main financial and logistical support and its classical allies in Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran, the “Axis of Resistance”. Its politburo chief, Khaled Meshal, left Damascus for Qatar’s capital Doha in 2012. Hamas’ rival, the PLO, however, benefited from its shifts and took a neutral position towards the Syrian crisis. The PLO succeeded in improving its historically broken relationship with the Al-Assad regime during the Syrian crisis. Hamas has so far failed to repair its broken relationship with Iran and Syria, despite having sent a delegation to Tehran in December 2014. Syria still has a veto to restore the relationship between Hamas and Iran (El-Sayed, 2015). The removal of President Morsi from power has made the political and economic life of Hamas’ governance in the Gaza Strip much more difficult and insecure since July 2013. Egypt’s new regime has accused Hamas of involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Palestinian youth also started to lose hope in the Arab Spring as AWRAD’s public poll revealed that 57 per cent of Palestinian youth (18-30 years old) believe regional events (Arab revolutions) will negatively affect the Palestinian situation. The poll also showed the differences between views and positions of youth in

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the West Bank under the PA rule, and the Gaza Strip under Hamas’ rule. 45 per cent of youth in Gaza believed an uprising similar to those in Egypt and Tunisia could occur against the Hamas government, and 48 per cent would support such an event. 26 per cent of youth in the West Bank state that an uprising similar to those that had occurred in Egypt and Tunisia could occur against the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and 15 per cent would support it. 57 per cent believe Morsi’s ousting would have a negative effect on reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. 50 per cent believed the removal of Morsi would have a negative impact on the peace process (Arab World for Research & Development, 2013: July 3). The setbacks that influenced the Palestinian political landscape motivated a number of youths to try to change the circumstances. They played a role in studying the views and directions of the citizens in general and youth in particular towards the Arab Spring. The Palestinian youth have already lost faith in the Arab spring after the failure of the Islamic parties in governance, and the deterioration of political and economic stability in those countries. Inspired by the Egyptian group that participated in ousting the Egyptian president from the Muslim Brotherhood society, the mother group of Hamas, a group of youths called the "Palestinian Tamrod" revolt movement, started shortly after to call for ousting Hamas’ governance of the Gaza Strip. Palestinian Tamrod aimed to protest against Hamas’ rule in Gaza on November 11 2013. A number of Tamrod members appeared masked, calling the Palestinian youth to go to the streets and protest against Hamas’ rule. Tamrod issued and uploaded videos on YouTube which circulated very rapidly on social networks. The members of the movement were not known. However, Hamas’ government had already taken a number of steps to control the protests before it started. Some Hamas leaders accused the PA, Egypt, and Israel behind this movement to topple its rule in the Gaza Strip. Hamas questioned and detained a number of writers and journalists who wrote about this movement. It also phoned a number of journalists, calling them to avoid participation or contribution to Tamrod (AlGhoul, 2013). This movement could not achieve what the Egyptian one did. The youth movement of the Gaza Strip did not participate peacefully to change the situation on the ground, and this group disappeared with its goals not having been achieved. The setbacks of the Arab spring shifted the political environment

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in the region as Hamas lost its new allies, the Muslim Brotherhood, in both Egypt and Tunisia. Egyptian security demolished most of the tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. Hamas’ economy had relied heavily upon smuggling activity through those tunnels. Egypt also boycotted Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and the Egyptian media came out against Hamas, accusing it of intervening in Egyptian affairs. In addition, Hamas lost its main financial support from Iran after disengaging with the Syrian regime and supporting the opposition. Thus, political shifts made Hamas unable to pay the salaries of its 45,000 employees and offices it had hired since 2007. Gazan society was almost at the edge of explosion. Therefore, Hamas had to throw the ball to the Palestinian Authority to manage its crisis. Hamas signed an agreement with Fatah. Hamas agreed to solve its government in the Gaza Strip, and supported the consensus national government for the West Bank and Gaza Strip on April 27 2014. However, there was a long path to implement the agreement, which still faces a number of security, political, and financial challenges at all levels after eight years of Hamas’ takeover that had already changed the structure of the public institutions in the Gaza Strip. Hamas and Fatah agreed to implement the reconciliation in accordance with the agreement signed earlier in Cairo on 27 April 2011. However, Israel exerted tremendous pressure on the Palestinian reconciliation and the Gaza Strip when it launched 51 days of military operation, starting on July 8 2014. This operation created a new environment of destruction, overloaded with psychological problems. It has left 100,000 Gazans homeless and over 2,100 Gazans dead, the majority of them Palestinian civilians, compared with 76 Israeli fatalities, all soldiers (Natil, 2014: 82-87). This complicated and hostile environment imposes huge challenges on the PA and on Hamas. It has already increased pressures and demands on the work of local and international organisations, including the UNRWA, to achieve their agenda of peace and development. This has created massive new challenges for the PA, Hamas, international organisations, and Gaza NGOs as they struggle to meet citizens’ needs and demands transparently and efficiently, not least because resources are sorely lacking after 10 years of blockades. The United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Mr. Nickolay Mladenov, following his first visit to Gaza on 29 April 2015, said: “No human being who visits can remain untouched by the terrible devastation that one

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sees here in Gaza and, as shocking as the devastation of the buildings might be, the devastation of peoples’ livelihoods is 10 times more shocking” (UNRWA, 2015). Thus, the peace, relief, and development process face a variety of serious challenges due to the extremely hostile political environment and absence of human security at all levels. Youth refugees of the Gaza Strip have been living in very vulnerable and risky circumstances since the last Palestinian elections took place in 2006. However, the United Nations mechanism to reconstruct the Gaza Strip after the last war in summer 2014 has seen limited progress. “Gaza reconstruction will take a century to complete due the Israeli blockade” (Oxfam, 2015). The slow mechanism of recovery is another serious challenge on Hamas’ transformation to play a real role in peace building in the Gaza Strip. The security environment in the Gaza Strip is very fragile, as the entire population has been suffering from the impact of the latest war, closure, slow process of reconstruction, and the failure of internal Palestinian reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, in addition to the peace process between the PLO and Israel. Despite consensus between Hamas and Fatah to support one government administrating the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, headed by the academic Rami Al Hamdallah, the government has been challenged with mountains of crises emerging after the latest devastating Israeli war on the Gaza Strip in summer 2014. Hamas and Fatah are still locked over administrating the Gaza Strip, paying the salaries of people employed by the former Hamas government, including the security and civil servants who are mostly Hamas members. In practice, Hamas still controls the Gaza Strip at all levels, despite the consensus government. The Gaza Strip now lives under a new barrel of powder that can be exploded at any time due to the deadlock between Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel, and is absent of peace process, economic, financial, and human security.

Conclusion Hamas’ governance in the Gaza Strip was influenced by the setbacks of the Arab Spring. In the beginning, Hamas believed the Arab Spring would serve its causes and its goals of legitimising its role as a key political actor in the region. It took part and engaged in the Arab Spring in close relationship with other Islamic movements,

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including in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, in order to take over political representation from the PLO. Hamas’ losses, however, were unexpectedly large because of the removal of President Morsi, and it had already suffered from a very harsh and unprecedented economic crisis in the Gaza Strip. This crisis will affect the political future of Hamas in the long-term if the current balance of power remains. These serious setbacks have been caused mainly by the continued Palestinian division, occupation, and the Arab Spring. They have also been caused, in part, by the absence of both a Palestinian collective leadership and collective strategy, as well as common policies during the last three decades. This has made Palestinian society, and youth in particular, much more tired, frustrated, and desperate. However, Hamas went through a complicated process of political opportunities and phases of environmental and structural change, which led Hamas to evolve its organisational structure from that of a militant underground group, to a force in de facto authority in the Gaza Strip. This process reflected the dilemmas inherent within the structure of Hamas due to the Palestinian division and setbacks of the Arab Spring. Palestinian division and the Arab Spring deepened Hamas’ tension between its primarily socio-religious identity in Islamic terms and its nationalist agenda, which challenged its existence since its rebirth from within the Muslim Brotherhood Society in 1987. Hamas has already suffered from the setback of the Arab Spring for years coming. Despite the challenges facing the reconciliation, there is still strong hope for success, given the regional changes, popular support for the agreement by Palestinians, the need and willingness of both parties, and the support of international civil society groups. Arab financial support will strengthen and contribute to the sustainability of the reconciliation process. Palestinians are desperate to implement the reconciliation agreement after five years of disastrous social and political consequences for society at large. The agreement also represents new hope for political participation and social change in the occupied Palestinian territories, when Hamas will participate in a political system based on democracy, non-violence, good governance, and respect for human rights. Thus, Hamas explicitly supports a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, which is an implicit recognition of Israel’s existence. Hamas is now close to Fatah’s political programme, although it does not yet explicitly accept the existence of Israel, it has offered to play a more constructive role in Palestinian politics,

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to be open to other regional and western powers, but not to be a direct negotiator with Israel.

CHAPTER NINE EPILOGUE

The period covered in this study of Hamas, a resistance/liberation movement and major political actor and governing authority in the Gaza Strip, witnessed a number of crucial and dramatic political developments and changes within Palestine. These included the failure of the peace process between the PLO and Israel despite Israel’s unilateral withdrawal or ‘disengagement’ from the Gaza Strip in 2005. Hamas’ transition began when it implemented its strategy to become a political player after the death of the traditional Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, the growing weakness of the PA, and the deep division within the Fatah movement. Its strategic decision to participate in the political process was based on a mix of resistance and governance. This transition of Hamas into a political governing authority in the Gaza Strip began shortly after Israel’s decision to disengage from the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ participation in the electoral process came after ten years of refusing to engage in the electoral process under the Oslo agreement. Thus, Hamas entered a period of gradual transition as a result of electoral victory. This period was also marked by the emergence of Hamas as a major military force and political power able to influence Palestinian national affairs, a change that was reflected in the transition of Hamas’ brand of politics from military to civilian after its victory in the national elections in 2006. However, Hamas’ transformation also faced a number of internal, external, and domestic challenges from 2006 to 2015.

Internal challenge It is clear that the gradual transition of Hamas into a political governing authority was still challenged by the traditional thoughts and political ideology of its members. Its decision to govern

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Palestine was a reaction to its sweeping victory and to becoming a legitimate political player. Hamas could not decide whether it was a political party or a violent resistance movement. Hamas challenged the unseen but profound rifts within its own ranks in transforming itself rapidly from a resistance movement into a governing political authority under Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories. The rapid change took place in Hamas’ political theories and literature in order to present itself as an alternative movement for ‘reform and change’ that could govern the PA institutions in the occupied Palestinian territories. This challenge was in addition to the complex, conservative, cultural and social environment of the Gaza Strip, which had evolved amidst extreme poverty, conservatism and traditionalism under different colonial powers for many years. The traditional and classical ideology of most Hamas’ members was closely linked to the extreme poverty of Gazan society, which was slow to change. The impoverished Gaza Strip, lacking nearly all basic natural resources, was fertile ground for Hamas’ particular contribution to Palestinian political, social, and economic life for many years. For Hamas’ military wing, recognising the PLO’s agreement with Israel was still ‘religious taboo’. However, Hamas had also given a number of clever political speeches consisting of religious and nationalist rhetoric, without changing its core ideologies, as part of the wider changing socio-economic environment, and the opportunities inherent in existing political structures. Hamas sought to avoid any frictions or division within its ranks as a collective leadership in the Palestinian territories and abroad after it had composed a government. The collective Hamas (external and internal) leadership evolved the political strategies and attitudes of a resistance movement in order to become a future acceptable and official political player nationally, regionally, and internationally. Developing its political strategies in this way enabled the movement to take part during the electoral political participation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and resulted in Hamas winning the majority of national and municipal seats. This tactic also enabled Hamas to empower a cadre of connected and consistent leaders from different spectrums within the movement. The movement had a collective approach to leadership, which was able to deliver a number of successive leaders. However, there were some differences and tensions between Hamas’ leadership in Gaza and the leadership abroad on certain

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occasions because of restrictions on the internal leadership and the distant geographical distribution of its constituents over different locations. These differences and their internal problems were mostly hidden. It was not easy for the Palestinian public to learn about Hamas’ internal differences and problems, as its image among the Palestinian public was of a united movement. On the other hand, other rival secular groups had been unable to hide their secrets and differences from the public - the Fatah movement in particular. It was fairly usual to learn about the deep differences within Fatah and of the conflict of interest amongst its leaders. Fatah’s officials used to accuse each other publicly through the media outlets in relation to their differing views and positions over various political issues. However, it was impossible to find two Hamas officials or members arguing with each other publicly or through the media; they were always united and disciplined in their positions and views. The geographical distribution imposed different realities on Hamas’ internal communications and the views of its external and internal leaderships. However, the differences between the two leaderships was very likely a tactical move to enable the internal leadership to avoid pressure from Israel and the PA against its members and institutions, and because the decision-making process within Hamas was a consultative one. This was not an individual process taken by the chairman of the political office; rather it was based on consensus over strategic issues among the leaderships of Gaza, the West Bank, overseas, and of Hamas’ leadership behind Israeli prison bars. Consequently, the decisionmaking process took a long time because of the geographical distribution. But at the end of the process, the decision taken was mandatory for every member, even though it might be against the personal interest or position of that member. This tactic meant that Hamas remained united and disciplined, despite the appearance of some differences that arose from changes in the political environment after the advent of the PA, participation in the first legislative council, the breakout of the second uprising, and the failure of the peace process. Moreover, Hamas was concerned to show its constituencies and rivals that it would be able to deliver a means of governance. However, Hamas’ strategic mistake was to compose a government from its most senior political cadre and its traditional leadership in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Hamas attempted to defend itself; it had won

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the elections and had the right to compose a government. Its government had to take a chance to govern. But, Palestinian politics are complicated; the Palestinians had not had an independent state, nor did they have official borders or an independent economy. Any government had to coordinate with Israel to trade goods and provide for the basic needs of the Palestinian population. I think this internal challenge imposed a serious reality that Hamas was not well prepared to govern the Palestinian institutions that were defined by the basic concepts of the Oslo Agreement. It was difficult for Hamas to persuade its constituencies of the genuine difficulties and challenges that faced its governance because of the boycott by western countries and by Israel as well. It was extremely problematic for Hamas to compose a government based on the values of the Oslo agreement. I think it would be a better opportunity for Hamas to stay in parliament without forming a government. It would then have been easier for Hamas to control and decide the government’s programme, without its traditional leaders being ministers and key civil servants in any government. It would have been able to support a professional and technocratic government to implement its change and reform programme and avoid PLO challenges.

Fatah Challenge The historical tension between Hamas and Fatah imposed a real and major challenge to Hamas’ transition from violence into a political governing authority. It was so hard for Hamas when it decided to govern the PA headed by Fatah before it had settled its political differences with Fatah. Hamas failed to reach a compromise agreement with Fatah over strategic issues of administration and security, and was unable to solve political differences with the group over the Palestinian political programme, popular representation, the tactics required to resist the occupying Israeli forces, and the stance to be adopted towards the commitments made by the PLO/PA under its previous agreements with Israel. The PLO had led Palestinian politics and international relations for more than forty years, in exile and in the homeland. It would be impossible to govern without adhering to and explicitly recognising the PLO’s previous agreement with Israel. Moreover, the PA cannot function properly without Israeli cooperation. Israel still exercises sovereignty over the Palestinian

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occupied territories and controls access to the areas under PA rule in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Fatah ignored Hamas’ gradual political changes and engagement in forming a Palestinian government. Fatah also ignored Hamas when the latter demonstrated its interest in reforming the PLO, and sought to join the PLO in a leading role without compromising its ideologies (rejecting Israel’s existence, the renunciation of violence, and the acceptance of previous agreements between the PLO and Israel). It intended to join the PLO on its own conditions in order to lead the PLO, without having to make any political concessions. Hamas’ goal in leading an internationally recognised body was to legitimise itself, but without giving up its ideology. It assumed that the international community would not object to its joining the PLO. This was politically naive. In spite of this major challenge to Hamas’ transition, there was a glimpse of hope when the PLO factions, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, reached an agreement on a joint political programme under the ‘Prisoners’ Document for Reconciliation’. This document paved the way for the first step to agreeing a collective programme among the Palestinian factions. This development aimed to provide a framework for a national unity government that would bring all political factions under one umbrella. It also opened the door for political participation under Hamas’ lead. The document authorised the PLO to conduct negotiations with Israel, whilst also reserving the right to continue ‘resistance’. However, the document did not identify the methods, techniques and tools of resistance, and it was unclear whether the different factions had the right to use a popular non-violent or military strategy. The document was very vague and complex to implement. It did not identify accurately and clearly the methods of power sharing and resistance needed to avoid any future conflict. Hamas agreed to the document after several modifications, and the political factions were able to manage the crisis and reach a vague consensus. This would empower each party to interpret the document from a different perspective. However, the planned rapprochement of the Palestinian factions, including Hamas, could not continue due to the complicated Palestinian political environment. Despite agreement on a joint political programme among all factions, Palestinian society witnessed a military confrontation between the security personnel of the PA and Fatah and the forces of Hamas in the streets of the Gaza Strip after

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Hamas took over the government in 2006. Every single Gazan resident was threatened as a result of this confrontation as they went about their daily life. A number of civilians were killed. The confrontation verged on developing into a civil war, threatening the social, political, and economic unity of the Palestinian people, as both sides descended into a conflict over an authority under occupation. However, all Palestinians were relieved and hoped for national unity when both sides consented to govern together in February 2007, as a result of Saudi intervention. Only by sharing governmental responsibilities could they satisfy the international community. However, this was a sign to Hamas that it could not govern alone in the face of international rejection of its values and concepts. But still, Hamas rejected compromise over its political stances and its own ‘theory of governance’. Both sides had different interests and goals in this ‘sharing of governance’. Again, some believed that shared governance between Hamas and Fatah would lead to social and political peace in the Palestinian territories. But there was no real political will between Hamas and Fatah to sustain the Palestinian unity government and genuine political participation.

Hamas’ Violence There was another major challenge to Hamas’ transition: its military wing, Aziz Al Din Al Qassam. It had been the military wing that had threatened the official security agency before Hamas ran for election. Hamas had strengthened its military wing, considering it a legitimate body to resist Israeli occupation. Hamas also considered the PA’s security agency illegitimate, because it functioned under the Oslo agreement with Israel. In June 2007, Hamas used its military weapons against the forces of the PA to settle its differences by violence, arguing that it had won the elections democratically. Hamas decided to define its own ‘exit strategy’ to reform the Palestinian security agency led by the weak Fatah, which was a barrier to Hamas’ full control over Palestinian society. Subsequently, after the defeat of the Fatah movement, Hamas governed the Gaza Strip by force and, in doing so, lost the support of an important segment of the social structure when it used excessive force against clans and extended families. This military action resulted in the Palestinian people dividing into two entities (Gaza under Hamas, and the West Bank under

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Fatah). The Gaza Strip under the Hamas government was entirely isolated by the international community and boycotted by the PLOchaired PA. Hamas turned its back on political participation when it decided to take military action. Hamas’ military collective action and political behaviour was an attempt to find a way out of its crisis of governance and the problem of its differences with Fatah. Hamas used violence, despite the fact that the movement was elected democratically in fair and transparent national elections. This was contradictory to the values and the principle of its electoral programme for change and to its aims of reforming Palestinian public institutions and society as well. However, Hamas’ use of violence against the official security agencies of the PA took place in a state where in some senses there existed a ‘free market’ of violence and security, similar to the situation in modern Somalia or Europe during the Dark Ages. Hamas stated that its use of violence and military action against the PA was neither an accident nor a planned coup to take over the authority. It called immediately for open dialogue with the PA/PLO. The PLO blocked Hamas from the Palestinian political landscape until it had to step back. Hamas was also severely besieged by the Israeli closure of the entire Gaza Strip. The Gaza strip was prevented from importing materials such as building materials and fuels. The population of Gaza was prevented from contact with the outside world except for a flood of humanitarian assistance. Thus, the use of violence by Hamas against the forces of the PA increased the challenges and obstacles to Hamas’ political rule. Subsequently, Hamas’ government came under serious Israeli military threat from an intense and severe war in the Gaza Strip, because Hamas rejected an extension to a ‘calmness period’ of six months; an agreement that had been brokered by Egyptian mediation. This followed Egypt’s failure to persuade Hamas to reach a compromise with the PA/PLO. Moreover, Hamas failed to manage its crisis with Israel and to reach a compromise with the PLO over control of the Gaza Strip. Hamas failed to prevent a war against its bases and against civilians in the Gaza Strip. Hamas failed to persuade the Egyptian mediator to use its political weight in the region to prevent Israel from launching a destructive war lasting more than three weeks against its institutions and against Palestinian civilians.

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This war left the governance of Hamas in the Gaza Strip even more challenged, besieged and boycotted, with severe consequences for the suffering population. Hamas could not offer an exit plan able to remove the economic and political isolation of Gaza. Thus, Hamas’ takeover of Gaza and the Israeli military Cast Lead Operation imposed additional serious challenges for Hamas’ governance and its engagement in a political dialogue with the international community.

International challenge Another major challenge to Hamas’ transition from violence into a political governing authority was the embargo of the international community on it and its government at all levels. Hamas rejected international demands to compromise its ideology in order to become a legitimate political player, according to the values and norms of world politics. Hamas had made its decision to administer the PA’s institutions, despite the fact that for some time it had fought the existence of the PA as the result of the ‘taboo agreement’ of Oslo, which had compromised the historical parts of Palestine where Israel was established in 1948. The PA was built on the values, cultures, and literature of the Oslo peace process, and the Oslo agreement was the essential and basic reference for the PA in all its manifestation, functions, and directions, based on the renunciation of violence, the acceptance of Israel’s existence, and agreeing to coordinate with Israeli forces at both the civil and military levels. Its decision to govern Palestinian public institutions was a real challenge for the demands of the international community. Hamas intended to promote its image as a legal organisation, not as a ‘terrorist organisation’ - as it was considered by the USA, UK, and EU. It intended to represent the Palestinian people through its administration of the PA. Hamas thought it could manage international communications and relationships with the international community easily, without compromising its ideology and political standpoints. However, Hamas’ image was that of a force dedicated to wiping Israel off the world map. Most ordinary Palestinian people were not fully aware of the complexity of global politics. They were eager for a change and did not realise what would happen next. Hamas rejected calls by the international community to moderate its political ideologies. As a consequence,

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Hamas began to face harsh criticism from a Palestinian public who were suffering deteriorating economic conditions because of the political deadlock with the international community. Hamas’ political development has not yet fully matured or reached its final destination of accommodating the imperatives of international relations and world politics. Hamas’ full future transition into a political party will remain dependent on the support of the global MB network and regional political changes. The MB’s support for the complete transition of Hamas will consider any future domestic, regional, and international changes that might serve the causes and missions of the MB after the setbacks of the Arab Spring. However, Hamas achieved a major part of its transformation into a political authority during the difficult experience of maintaining its governance under the international embargo and in the face of national criticism. Palestinians in the Gaza Strip suffered extreme hardship and humanitarian challenges as a result of the embargo. More importantly, Hamas’ supporters and constituencies accepted its role as a full political player, despite its political rhetoric of resistance and the use of violence to liberate all Palestine.

Hamas’ Political Engagement The pressure imposed by the international community on the Hamas government because it would not recognise Israel weakened the reputation of Egypt, the PA, the USA, and Israel across the Muslim world and in Europe, many of whose people believed the countries were complicit in imposing an economic embargo on poor people who had no power to influence Hamas’ policies. Those countries should consider different ways to enable diplomatic communication with Islamic movements, and with Hamas in particular, given the fact that Hamas took power through elections. Hamas remains a strong political and social force in Palestinian society. The use of violence or economic embargo against Hamas is not the correct mechanism to force the movement to change its political process or become engaged in the peace process; the major world powers should consider peaceful alternatives instead. If the major powers and players had engaged Hamas in a truly political process, through the PA, at least during recent times, then I believe the peace process between Palestine and Israel would be

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in a better situation than it is today. The USA could engage a third party from the Islamic world, for example, to move Hamas from its ‘zero square’ state of rejection to the position of a political player. I think if the USA and other regional powers engaged with Hamas peacefully at high levels, Hamas would transform itself more than expected. However, Hamas’ engagement in a diplomatic process with the West might also risk destroying its unity. Some members might consider that engagement with the West would betray its ideology and its mission of liberating all of Palestine. Hamas’ engagement in a political process would influence other Islamic groups in the Middle East, because the Palestinian cause has been an inspiration for them. I believe that bringing Hamas into a peace process is still a significant requirement. The Hamas movement of today is more mature and better able to play an advanced political role in the peace process, even if only indirectly at this stage. Hamas has demonstrated its capacity to hinder any political progress at various levels since the Oslo agreement. It used its military power to undermine the political process through suicide bombing and military actions. However, during the period of Hamas’ governance of the Gaza Strip, the PA and the former Israeli government carried on negotiations. It was a worthwhile opportunity for the political and peace process that Hamas was a part of the Palestinian governance system. Hamas is better as a part of the political system than as an excluded group that is violently attacked by the PA or Israel. Hamas showed discipline and commitment in maintaining security and protecting the borders between Gaza and Israel. If Hamas were given an opportunity to become engaged in a political process, it would deliver to a greater degree than expected. In 2006, Hamas took a step forward when it mandated the PLO to negotiate with Israel as outlined in the Prisoners’ Document. This document also indicated that any future agreement between the PLO and Israel must be presented in a referendum to the Palestinian people. This was a pragmatic and genuine indication of Hamas’ real engagement in the political process, despite the fact it would not seek direct dialogue with Israel. Hamas also demonstrated that it would respect the results of any referendum, if Palestinians decide to support a future agreement with Israel. Hamas delivers politics when it becomes engaged in a guaranteed process without any threat; for example, Hamas signed the

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reconciliation agreement with Fatah when it received a warm welcome and guarantees from Egypt’s new regime. However, changes in the Middle East and North Africa encouraged Hamas to sign the reconciliation agreement with Fatah. Hamas felt that the former regime of Egypt sought to trap it in a political process designed to lose its constituencies and supporters. Hamas sought always to maintain itself as a part of the Palestinian political system. Hamas has been seeking a representative place in the PLO. The PLO is an internationally recognised representative body for all Palestinians. The movement feared that if it were defeated, it would lose its supporters forever, not just in Palestine, but everywhere. Hamas is part of political Islam, and it believes that a defeat for Hamas is a defeat for Islam. Hamas sought always to present a ‘win/exit strategy’ for its constituencies. The win/exit strategy for Hamas is to be part of the Palestinian political system represented by the PLO, as a legal and internationally recognised body. If Hamas joins the PLO, it will gain an additional and important platform for political Islam in Palestine. Through the PLO, Hamas would also gain collective support from all sections and factions of the Palestinian people. However, the PLO had concluded international agreements that recognised Israel and renounced violence. Hamas’ pragmatic policy of engagement with the PLO is to legitimize itself internationally; Hamas seeks to undertake the roles and duties of the PLO, such as leading diplomatic positions, security management and other key posts in the Palestinian political system. Hamas’ existence in the PLO will protect the achievements it gained during the last elections and following the military takeover of the Gaza Strip. Through the PLO, Hamas will be fully aware and engaged in the political process and in supervising the PA’s performances in the Palestinian territories. Moreover, the movement would gain immunity from pressure by the PA security forces, for all Hamas members. Simply put, it would be a partner for Fatah in the Palestinian political system in order to avoid any exclusion in the future. In practice, Hamas’ existence in the PLO would restrict Fatah’s dominance within the political system and it would weaken Fatah more than it does today. Hamas’ engagement in the PLO will give it a legitimate role in the politics throughout the Middle East region.

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Arab Spring The Arab spring also posed another challenge to Hamas after the failure of political Islam in those countries where the Arab Spring occurred. Hamas’ chief concern was not to exit as a loser from the Palestinian political scene, and it sought always to project itself as a strong force, by any means required. I believe Hamas feels strongly that it should be consulted at the very least, and not excluded. Hamas believes that it is unlike other Palestinian political parties. Hamas is a movement rooted in a religious and traditional society, unlike the secular parties, which it believes are interchangeable for various reasons. Hamas believes that its doctrine and philosophy will not vanish, because it is culturally and religiously grounded in the history of the Muslim society of Palestine. However, Hamas is worried about its future in the Palestinian division after the rapid changes in the Middle East and North Africa as the Arab Spring failed to improve Hamas’ status as a key political player in the region. These changes in the region united different social and youth forces to end the division in Palestine between Hamas and Fatah. The setbacks of the Arab Spring and the deposition of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has deepened Hamas’ governance crisis in the Gaza Strip. Hamas today is between the hammer of a severe financial crisis and the regional crisis that may affect its political future in Palestine. It is essential therefore, that Hamas find a better space to manoeuvre within the political system, rather than being excluded from it. Hamas must be given a status similar to Israel’s religious political parties that are included within Israel’s political democracy. There are some religious parties in democratic countries that contribute to their societies; these religious political parties are better off playing in a narrow space within the political system, through democracy and public accountability, than they would be if they were excluded from the system. Within the political system, they are required to be accountable and responsible for their actions. If they were excluded from the political system, they would use violence to achieve their goals. Hamas should find a role to play peacefully and constructively through political participation, in accordance with the changes in the region and within Palestinian society at large. As Hamas has already suffered a number of hard lessons as a result of its

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governance in the Gaza Strip and the division in Palestinian society after its military takeover, Hamas is now able to consider this role. I think Hamas will take its future decisions in coordination with Palestinian groups in general. Hamas will not take any unilateral steps that will influence Palestinian politics, in war or in peace, following its difficult experience of governing the Gaza Strip.

NOTES

Chapter One 1- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London 2- Helen Cobban (1984): The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics. Cambridge University Press 3- Ibid 4- Ziad Abu Amr (1994): Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza. Indiana University Press. Bloomington 5- Shaul Mishael & Avraham Sele (2000): The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence and Coexistence. Columbia University Press. New York 6- Jonathan Schanzer (2008): Hamas Vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine. Palgrave and Macmillan. New York 7- Milton Edwards Beverley, Hamas and the Arab Spring: Strategic Shifts? Middle East Policy, Vol. xx, No. 3, Fall 2013. 8- Marwan Darweish and Andrew Rigby (1995): Palestinian in Israel: Nationality and Citizenship. Peace Research Report no. 35, University of Bradford. 9- Hussam Mohamad (1997): PLO Strategy: From Total Liberation to Coexistence. Palestine Israel Journal, Vol.4 No.2 10- Bruce W Dayton and Louis Kriesberg (2009): Conflict Transformation and Peace-building: Moving from Violence to Sustainable Peace. Routledge London-. 11- Natil, I. (2012) ‘ Hamas: between Militarism and Governance’, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Contemporary Themes and Challenges, ed. Marwan Darweish and Carol Rank, London: Pluto Press 12- Veronique Dudouet (2009): From War to Politics: Resistance /Liberation Movement in Transition. Berghof Report Nr. 17. Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin. 13- Ibid 14- Jeroen Gunning (2007): Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion and Violence. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London.

Chapter Two 1- Dan Cohen Sherbok and Dawoud El Alami (2002): The Palestine- Israel Conflict, OneWorld Publications, Oxford. p.28

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2- Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela (2000): The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence. Columbia University Press. New York. 3- Abdullah Schleifer (1993): Izz al-Din al-Qassam: Preacher and Mujahid,’ in Edmund Burke (ed.), Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East, IB Tauris, London and New York 4- Jeroen Gunning (2007): Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion and Violence. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. 5- Andrew Rigby (2010): Palestinian Resistance and Non-violence. PASSIA publications, Jerusalem. 6- Ibid 7- Ibid 8- Jonathan Schanzer: Palestinian Uprisings Compared, Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2002 9- Dan Cohen Sherbok and Dawoud El Alami (2002): The Palestine- Israel Conflict, OneWorld Publications. Oxford. 10- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London p. 3 11- Ibid 12- Militant Islam Monitoring : The Muslim Brotherhood - Al- Ikhwan- Al -Muslim - History and related groups in the United States and abroad, June 16, 2006 13- Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: The Muslim Brotherhood. Military Review, July August 2003 14- Ibid 15- Edwards Beverly Milton (1996): Islamic Politics in Palestine, I. B. TAURIS Publishers, London, p.40 16- Interview, Kalid Mashel, Hayat newspaper, December 15, 2003 17- Ibid 18- David McDowall (1995): The Palestinians The Road to Nationhood Minority Rights. London, p.27 19- Laurie A.Brand. (1988) Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for state. Columbia University Press. New York. p.22-25. 20- Sara Roy (1995): The Gaza Strip: the Political Economy of De-development.: Institute for Palestine Studies. Washington, DC 21- Jamil Hilal (1992): West Bank and Gaza Strip social formation under Jordanian and Egyptian Rule1948–1967.Rreview of the Middle East Studies, pp.33-74 22- Beverly Milton Edwards (1996): Islamic Politics in Palestine, I. B. TAURIS Publishers, London, p. 36 23- Sami Al Astal (2004): The Political Development of Gaza Strip (1948–1963). MA Dissertation, Islamic University. Gaza. p30 (Arabic) 24- Ibid 25- Ibid 26- Ibid 27- Ibid 28- Ibid 29- Ataf Idwan (1991): Sheikh Ahmed Yassin: Life and Jihad. Gaza. p. 21 (Arabic)

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30- Ibid 31- Hussam Mohamad (1997): PLO Strategy: From Total Liberation to Coexistence. Palestine Israel Journal, Vol.4 No.2 32- Ibid 33- Joel Beinen and Lisa Hajjar: 1967 War: Israeli Occupation. The Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)’s.Primer on the Middle East, March 2001. 34- Ibid 35- Ibid 36- Ibid 37- Alan Hart, (1984) Arafat: Terrorist or peacemaker? London.p.33 38- Ibid 39- Ibid 40- Amal Jamal (2005): The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention 1967–2005. Indiana University Press, p. 17 41- Helen Cobban (1984): The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics. Cambridge University Press. p. 48-51 42- The Palestine National Council, Political Program Adopted at the 12th Session of the Palestine National Council, Cairo, 8 June 1974 43- Ibid 44- Donald Neff: PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat’s First Appearance at the United Nations. Washington Report on the Middle East Affairs, November/December 1994,p70- 2 45- Ibid 46- Ibid 47- Sana Abed Kotob (1995): The Accommodationist Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, 321 -339 48- Ibid 49- Ibid

Chapter Three 1- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London 2- Jonathan Schanzer (2008): Hamas Vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine. Palgrave and Macmillan. New York 3- Ibid 4- Washington Post. June 16, 1982 5- Ziad Abu Amr (1994): Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza. Indiana University Press. Bloomington 6- Khaled Hroub (2006): Hamas: A beginner’s Guide. Pluto Press. London 7- Ibid 8- International Crisis Group: Dealing with Hamas, Middle East Report N 21, January 26, 2004 9- Ibid

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10- Al-Hayat. February 15, 2003 11- Ibid 12- Andrew Rigby (2010): Palestinian Resistance and Non-violence. PASSIA publications. Jerusalem. 13- Ibid 14- Ibid 15- Sara Roy (2007): Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian –Israeli Conflict, Pluto Press, London. 16- Ibid 17- Yehudit Barsky: The New Leadership of Hamas: A Profile of Khalid AlMish’al. American Jewish Committee, May 24, 2004 18- Ibid 19- Shaul Mishael & Avraham Sele (2000): The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence and Coexistence. Columbia University Press. New York. p75-81 20- Gary C. Gambill (September 2002): Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Hamas. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. 21- Ibid 22- Ibid 23- Jeroen Gunning (2007): Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion and Violence. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London 24- Ibid 25- Hamas’ Charter 26- Ibid 27- Hamas’ Charter 28- Ibid 29- Interview, Mr. Osama Atif, the United Leadership Committee for Intifada, December 22, 2006 30Rashid Khalidi: The Resolutions of the 19th Palestine National Council. Journal of Palestine Studies. Institute for Palestine Studies. Vol. 19, No. 2 (Winter, 1990). p. 29-42 31- Ibid 32- Ibid 33- Zaki Chehab (2007): Inside Hamas: Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement. Nation Books. New York. p 15 34- Ben Lynfield (1990): Peace steps could spark Gaza War between PLO and Hamas Backers, Jerusalem Post. 35- Anat Kurz and Nahman Tal. Hamas: Radical Islam in a National Struggle. Jaffe Centre for Strategic Studies, Memorandum No. 48, July 1997. 36- Danny Rubinstein: A Turning Point? The National Dialogue between Fatah and Hamas. Strategic Assessment. Institute for National Security Studies. June 2005, Vol. 8, No. 1 37- Harms Ferry (2005): The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction. Pluto Press. London. 38- Ibid 39- Ibid

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40- Principle Of Declaration- PLO and State of Israel, Oslo Agreement, September 13, 1993 41- P.R. Kumaraswamy: (2001): The Jordan-Hamas Divorce: Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, United States Committee for a Free Lebanon and the Middle East Forum, Vol. 3 No. 8. 42- Ibid 43- Ibid 44- Interview, Hamas Member, September 17, 2007 45- Robert Satloff: Hamas Likely to Gain Considerable Strength in Next Week’s Palestinian Parliamentary Elections, Council on Foreign Relations, interview January 19, 2006 46- Jonathan Schanzer: The Challenge of Hamas to Fatah Middle. East Quarterly Spring 2003, VOLUME X: NUMBER 2 47- Sara Roy (2007): Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Pluto Press. London. 48- Interview, Mr. Basam Deeb. A senior Local Fatah Activist. October 16, 2006 49- Human Rights Watch Report: (September 1997) Human Rights under the Palestinian Authority, vol. 9, no. 10 (E). 50- Ely Karmon: Hamas Terrorism Strategy...," Middle East Review of International Affairs 51- Ramadan Shalah: The Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine: Preliminary Remarks: Al-Intiqad (weekly) no. 924, March 2002 (Arabic) 52- Yoram Schweitzer: Suicide Terrorism: Development and Characteristics, " lecture presented in the International Conference on Countering Suicide Terrorism at ICT, Herzeliya, Israel, February 21, 2000 at http://www.ict.org.il/ (accessed October 10, 2002). 53- Ibid 54- Margot Dudkevitch and Lamia Lahoud: Mofaz denies PA re-arresting released terrorists. Jerusalem Post. October 16, 2000 55- Matt Rees: Going Home To Gaza. Times Magazine, Sunday. Sep. 29, 2002 56- Ibid 57- Human Rights Watch (2002): Erased In a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians. Library of Congress Control Number: 2002114404, Special Report. 58- Gal Luft. From Clandestine Army to Guardians of Terror: The Palestinian Security Forces and the Second Intifada. Journal of Politics and the Arts . Vol. 4 , June 2004 59- Ibid 60- Rema Hammami and Salim Tamari (2001): The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning? Journal of Palestine Studies Winter 2001 (Volume XXX, Number 2, Issue 118) 61- After the Tel Aviv Suicide-Bomb. Economist (June 9-15, 2001) 62- James Hider. Mideast Truce Firms up as Bush Backs Palestinian State. Agence France-Presse, October 2, 2001

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63- Jamie Chosak and Julie Sawyer: Hamas’s Tactics: Lessons from Recent Attacks. Washington Institute for Near East policy, October 19, 2005, PeaceWatch #522 64- Judith Miller: Yasir Arafat, Father and Leader of Palestinian Nationalism. Dies at 75. The New York Times. November 11, 2004 65- Mark Heinrich: Militants Endanger Security Deal-Israeli General. Reuters, September 3, 2002 66- Judith Miller: Yasir Arafat, Father and Leader of Palestinian Nationalism, Dies at 75. The New York Times, November 11, 2004 67- Ibid

Chapter Four 1- Natil, I. (2014) A shifting Political Landscape: NGOs Civic Activism and Response in the Gaza Strip, 1967–2014, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 9:3, 82-87, DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2014.983369 2- Roy, S. 2011, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3- Natil, I. (2012) ‘ Hamas: between Militarism an d Governance’, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Contemporary Themes and Challenges, ed. Marwan Darweish and Carol Rank, London: Pluto Press 4- Tariq Mukhimer: State Building Process: The Case of Palestine. Der Philosophischen Fakultät III der Humboldt - Universität zu Berlin, 13 July 2005 5- Ibid 6- Andrew Rigby (1991): Living the Intifada. Zed Books Ltd. London. 7- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London 8- Sara Roy (2007): Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Pluto Press. London. 9- Ziad Abu Amr (1994): Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza. Indiana University Press. Bloomington 10- Hamas’ Charter, Chapter 21 11- Hamas’ Charter, Chapter 18 12- Raed Lafi: Gaza Islamists, Alzaytouna, September 23, 2007 13- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. 14- Ibid 15- Amal Jamal (2005).The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention 1967-2005. Indiana University Press. Bloomington .p109 16- Kim Murphy: Hamas Victory Is Built on Social Work. Los Angeles Times, March 2, 2006 17- Ma’ariv, June 23, 2002 18- Sara Roy (2000): The Transformation of Islamic NGOs in Palestine. Middle East Report. No 214.

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19- Sara Roy (2007): Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Pluto Press. London. 20- Ibid 21- International Crisis Group: Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A Legitimate Target? ICG Middle East Report N. 13, 2 April 2003. p. 3 22- Ibid 23- Sara Roy: The Transformation of Islamic NGOs in Palestine, Middle East Report. 214 ( Spring 2000 24- Ibid 25- Ibid 26- Yousef Darwish (2002): The Role of Islamic Charitable NGOs from their Employees Point of View. MA Dissertation. Islamic University. Gaza 27- Ibid 28- Kim Bullimore: Palestine: Women, the Occupation and Hamas. March 8, 2006. Green Left Weekly, March 8, 2006. 29- Matthew Levitt (2006): Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Services of Jihad. The Washington Institute for the Near East Policy. USAVirginia 30- Ibid 31- Khaled Hroub (2006): Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide. Pluto Press. London 32- Palestinians Freeze Islamic Charity Funds: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-08/29/content_259451.htm, August 29, 2003 33- Ibid 34- Ibid 35- Ibid 36- Ibid 37- Jonathan Schanzer (2008): Hamas Vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine. Palgrave and Macmillan. New York 38- Haaretz , August 19, 2003 39- Ibid 40- Ibid 41- Avi Issacharoff: PA to Launch Welfare Network in Hopes of Countering Hamas. Haa’retz. August 21, 2008. 42- Judith Miller: Yasir Arafat, Father and Leader of Palestinian Nationalism, Dies at 75. The New York Times. November 11, 2004 43- Ibid 44- Gal Luft: From Clandestine Army to Guardians of Terror: The Palestinian Security Forces and the Second Intifada. Journal of Politics and the Arts. Vol. 4 , June 2004 45- Neve Gordon: Why Hamas Won and What it Means. February 07, 2006. 46- Ibid 47- Meir Litvak: Hamas’ Victory in Municipal Elections. Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, no 156, December 26, 2005

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48- Jeroen Gunning (2007): Hamas in Politics: Democracy. Religion and Violence. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. 49- David Yerushalmi: The Hamas Victory Highlights in Stark Terms the Fallacy of the Democracy. Intellectual Conservative Politics and Philosophy, January 31, 2006 http://www.intellectualconservative.com 50- Natil, I. (2013) Women and Citizenship: The Local Councils in Palestine a Case Study, inter-disciplinary.net, >http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/probingthe-boundaries/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/voicecitizenpaper.pdf: Accessed on April, 15, 2015 51- Natil, I. 2013, ‘Turkey’s Human Security Agenda in the Gaza Strip’ in Ozerdem, A. & Ozerdem, F. eds, Human Security inTurkey: Challenges for the 21st Century, London: Routledge Press: 198–210.

Chapter Five 1- Khaled Hroub (2006): Hamas: A beginner’s Guide. Pluto Press. London. 2- Ziad Abu Amr (1994): Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza. Indiana University Press. Bloomington. 3- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. 4- International Crisis Group: Dealing with Hamas. Middle East Report N 21. January 26, 2004. 5- Al-Hayat. February 15, 2003 6- Jonathan Schanzer (2008): Hamas Vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine. Palgrave and Macmillan. New York. 7- Andrew Rigby (2010): Palestinian Resistance and Non-violence. PASSIA publications. Jerusalem. 8- Matthew Levitt (2006): Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Services of Jihad. The Washington Institute for the Near East Policy. Washington. 9- Donald Neff: Israel Created Two of Its Own Worst Enemies—Hamas and Hezbollah, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. November 2002. 10- International Crisis Group: Dealing with Hamas. Middle East Report N 21. January 26, 2004. 11- Matthew Levitt (2006): Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Services of Jihad. The Washington Institute for the Near East Policy. Washington 12- Gary C. Gambill (September 2002): Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Hamas. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. 13- Shaul Mishael & Avraham Sele (2000): The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence and Coexistence. Columbia University. New York. 14- Youssef Ibrahim: Confrontation in the Gulf. Arafat’s Support of Iraq Creates Rift in P.L.O. New York Times. August 14, 1990. 15- Jeroen Gunning (2007): Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion and Violence. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London.

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16- Yehudit Barsky (June 1996): Focus on Hamas: Terror by Remote Control. Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 2. 17- Rubinstein, Danny (June 2005): A Turning Point? The National Dialogue between Fatah and Hamas. Strategic Assessment. Institute for National Security Studies. Vol. 8, No. 1 18- Jeroen Gunning (2007): Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion and Violence. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. 19- Michael Herzog (March/April 2006): Can Hamas Be Tamed? Council on foreign Affairs From Foreign Affairs. 20- Gary C. Gambill (September 2002): Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Hamas. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. 21- Shaul Mishael & Avraham Sele (2000): The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence and Coexistence. Columbia Universityp. 75-81 22- International Crisis Group: Dealing with Hamas. Middle East Report N 21, January 26, 2004. 23- Gary C. Gambill (September 2002): Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Hamas. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. 24- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London 25- Sara Roy (2007): Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Pluto Press. London. p. 298 26- Jeroen Gunning (2007): Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion and Violence. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. 27- Gary C. Gambill (September 2002): Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Hamas. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 28- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. 29- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. 30- Matthew Levitt (2006): Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Services of Jihad. The Washington Institute for the Near East Policy. Washington. p.44 31- Yehudit Barsky: The New Leadership of Hamas: A Profile of Khalid AlMish’al. American Jewish Committee. May 24, 2004 32- Jeroen Gunning (2007): Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion and Violence. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. 33- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. p.192 34- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London 35- Jeroen Gunning (2007): Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion and Violence. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. 36- International Crisis Group: Dealing with Hamas. Middle East Report N 21. January 26, 2004 37- Shaul Mishael & Avraham Sele (2000): The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence and Coexistence. Columbia University Press. New York.

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38- Joel Greenberg: Bombing in Israel: Hamas; Split in Hamas Seen as Bomb Follows Vow Of Brief Halt. March 4, 1996 39- Joel Greenberg: Bombing in Israel: Hamas; Split in Hamas Seen as Bomb Follows Vow Of Brief Halt. March 4, 1996 40- Shaul Mishael & Avraham Sele (2000): The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence and Coexistence. Columbia University Press. New York. 41- Khaled Hroub (2006): Hamas: A beginner’s Guide. Pluto Press. London. 42- Sara Roy (2007): Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Pluto Press. London. 43- Jeroen Gunning (2007): Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion and Violence. Hurst Publishers Ltd. London. 44- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London p.192-193 45- Gary C. Gambill (September 2002): Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Hamas. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 46- David Schenker: Islamists and the State: Developments in Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. The Washington Institute for the Near East Policy. Peace Watch 220. August 4, 1999 47- Danny Rubinstein: What is a good alternative to statehood? Haaretz. April 23, 1999 48- David Schenker: Islamists and the State: Developments in Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. The Washington Institute for the Near East Policy. Peace Watch 220. August 4, 1999 49- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London 50- Ibid 51- Ibid 52- David Schenker: Islamists and the State: Developments in Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. The Washington Institute for the Near East Policy. PeaceWatch 220. August 4, 1999 53- Los Anglos Times. 4 Hamas Leaders Expelled to Qatar: November 22, 1999 54- Gary C. Gambill (September 2002): Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Hamas. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 55- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. p.199 56- Al-Majd, 24 September 2001 57- The Jerusalem Post, 1 October 2001. 58- Dennis Ross. The Hidden Threat in the Mideast. The Wall Street Journal. July 24, 2002. 59- Palestinian Centre for Information. A close source to Hamas 60- Ceasefire Statement Issued by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. June 29, 2003 61- International Crisis Group: Dealing with Hamas. Middle East Report N 21. January 26, 2004. 62- James Bennet: The Middle East Turmoil: The Leadership; Abbas Steps Dawn, Dealing Big blow to US Peace Plan. New York Times. September 7, 2003 63- The Palestinian Information Centre. A close source to Hamas. March 27, 2004

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64- Khaled Hroub (2004): Hamas after Shaykh Yasin and Rantisi: Journal of Palestine Studies. University of California Press. Vol. 33, No. 4. p. 21-38 65- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. 66- Shaul Mishal (April 2006): Hamas: The Agony of Victory. Strategic Assessment. Institute for the National Security Studies. Vol. 9. No. 1 67- Washington Post. January 31, 2006 68- Shaul Mishal (April 2006): Hamas: The Agony of Victory. Strategic Assessment. the Institute for the National Security Studies. Vol. 9, No. 1 69- Ilene R. Prusher and Nicholas Blanford: Israel Goes After Both Hamas Leaderships in Gaza offensive, Israel Arrests 64 Hamas officials. The Christine Science Monitor. June 30, 2006 70- Eleanor Hall. Israel-Palestinian Conflict at Crisis Point. The world Today. July 3 , 2006 71- Interview, Adnan Abu Amer, a Researcher in the Islamic Movement and a Lecturer at the Islamic University of Gaza. November 18, 2008. 72- Ibid 73- Ibid 74- Adel Zaanoun: Signs of Discord Within Hamas. November 1, 2007. http://news.iafrica.com/specialreport/middleeast/666050.htm 75- Ibid 76- Ilene R. Prusher and Nicholas Blanford: Israel goes after both Hamas leaderships In Gaza offensive. Israel arrests 64 Hamas officials. The Christine science monitor. June 30, 2006 77- Ibid

Chapter Six 1- Natil, I. (2012) ‘ Hamas: between Militarism an d Governance’, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Contemporary Themes and Challenges, ed. Marwan Darweish and Carol Rank, London: Pluto Press 2- Shai Gruber (Spring 2007): Hamas: Pragmatic Ideology. The Fletcher School Journal- Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization. 3- Shlomo Ben-Ami (2006): Scars of War. Wounds of Peace: The Israeli–Arab Tragedy. Oxford University Press. Oxford. p. 324. 4- Ibid 5- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. 6- Natalie Tocci (2007): What Went Wrong? The Impact of Western Policies Towards Hamas & Hezbollah. CEPS Policy Briefs (CEPS Policy Briefs), Central and Eastern European Online Library, Issue: 1-12 7- Ibid 8- Margaret Warner: Hope and Fear in Palestine: Online News Hour. January 24, 2006. 9- Ilene R. Prusher: Why Hamas is gaining in Palestinian polls. The Christian Science Monitor. January 25, 2006.

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10- Margaret Warner: Hope and Fear in Palestine: Online News Hour. January 24, 2006. 11- Ziad Abu-Amr (1994): Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza. Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. Indiana University Press. Bloomington. p 83. 12- Margaret Warner: Hope and Fear in Palestine: Online News Hour. January 24, 2006. 13- The Palestinian Central Election Commission. January 29, 2006 14- Democracy Reporting International: Hamas’s Victory: Landslide in Seats, Not in Votes. Post- Election Briefing N° 1. Berlin. February 9, 2006. 15- Ibid 16- Ha’aretz. 29 January 2006 17- Aaron D. Pina: Report for the USA congress: February 9, 2006 18- Phyllis Bennis: Hamas Wins the Palestinian Elections. Institute for Policy Studies. January 27, 2006 19- Financial Times, 30 January 2006 20- Palestine Centre for Information. A close Source to Hamas, February 16, 2006 21- Ma’an News Agency. March 3, 2006 22- Henry Siegman: Hamas: The Last Chance for Peace? New York Times Review. Volume 53, Number 7. April 27, 2006 23- British Broadcasting Corporation. Hamas pressured to accept Israel. February 1, 2006 24- Greg Myre: Hamas Rebuffs Palestinian President Over Israel. The New York Times. September 23, 2006 25- Aaron D. Pina: Palestinian Elections: CRS Report for Congress Foreign Affairs Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service. The Library of Congress 26- Dennis Ross: Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. PostPalestinian Election Challenges to the Middle East. March 15, 2006 27- Khaled Hroub (2006): Hamas: A beginner’s Guide. Pluto Press. London. 28- Josef Federman: Israel to shun Hamas-led government. The Associated Press. January 30, 2006 29- Interview. Local Hamas Figure. 21 August 2006 30- Hamas-Led Government Program to the Palestinian Parliament in March 2006 31- Erica Silverman: Stopgap Measures. Al Ahram weekly. Issue No. 800. June 22 – 28, 2006. 32- An Interview with Palestinian Police Officer belonging to Fatah Movement, April 29, 200 33- Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. Security Chaos and Proliferation of Small Arms: Attacks on Public Institutions and Officials. 19 April 2006 34- CNN: Abbas Gives Hamas 10 Days to Accept Israel. May 25, 2006 35- Erica Silverman: Stopgap Measures. Al Ahram weekly. Issue No. 800. June 22 – 28, 2006. 36- Erica Silverman: Stopgap Measures. Al Ahram weekly. Issue No. 800. June 22 – 28, 2006.

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37- Alastair Crooke: From Rebel Movement to Political Party: The Case of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Conflicts Forum, CF Briefing Paper #3 38- The Original Full Text of the National Conciliation Document of the Palestinian Prisoners. May 11, 2006 39- Ibid 40- CNN: Abbas Gives Hamas 10 Days to Accept Israel. May 25, 2006 41- Ilene R. Prusher and Nicholas Blanford: Israel Goes After Both Hamas Leaderships in Gaza offensive, Israel Arrests 64 Hamas officials. The Christine Science Monitor. June 30, 2006 42- Steven Erlanger: Militants’ Raid on Israel Raises Gaza Tension. New York Times. June 26,2006 43- International Crisis Group: After Mecca: Engaging Hamas. Middle East Report N°62. February, 28, 2007 44- Ibid 45- Alzytouna Centre for Studies and Consultancies (2008). The Palestinian Strategic Report 2007. Lebanon. 46- Ma’an News Agency. January 7, 2007 47- An interview, Abed Fatah Dokhan, a Founder of Hamas and Palestinian Legislative Council Member. December 3, 2008 48- Alzytouna Centre for Studies and Consultancies (2008). The Palestinian Strategic Report 2007. Lebanon 49- Ibid 50- Said Syiam, Minister of Interior at Hamas Government, Press Conference, January 27, 2007 51- Ken Ellingwood and Rushdi Abu Alouf: Gaza Factional Clashes Leave 16 Dead, 140 hurt. Los Anglos Times. February 3, 2007 52- Taghreed El-Khodary, Safwat al-Kahlout and George Azar: Hamas Fighters Appear to Tighten Hold in Gaza. New York Times. February 4, 200 53- Ibid 54- Mecca Agreement Document between Fatah and Hamas. February 8, 2007 55- Jerusalem Post. February 10, 2008 56- Ibid 57- Interview, Local Popular Front Leader. February 27, 2007 58- The Palestinian Prime Minister. National Unity Government Political Speech to Palestinian Legislative Council. March 17, 2008 59- Haaretz, April 17, 2007 and Al Majd, April 30, 2007 60- Ibid

Chapter Seven 1- Jonathan Schanzer (2008): Hamas Vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine. Palgrave and Macmillan. New York. P 107 2- The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. Gaza. June 17, 2007 3- An interview, Abed Fatah Dokhan, a Founder of Hamas and Palestinian Legislative Council Member. December 3, 2008

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4- Mohsen M. Saleh (Ed. 2010): The Palestinian Strategic Report 2008. Alzytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations. Beirut 5- Azzam Tamimi (2007): Hamas Unwritten Chapters. C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London. p. 6- Jeroen Gunning (2007): Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion and Violence. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. London 7- Ghasan Cherbl: Yaser Abed Rabo’s Witnesses. AL Hayyat. London. November 26, 2008 8- The Associated Press: Top PLO Body Approves Abbas Decision to Form Government. International Herald Tribune. June 21, 2007 9- Ghasan Cherbl: Yaser Abed Rabo’s Witnesses. AL Hayyat. London. November 26, 2008 10- Interview, Yousef Rizka. Hamas Minister for Information. February 9, 2008 11- Abbas: Hamas Are Murderous Terrorists. Haaretz. June 20, 2007 12- The Palestinian Information Centre, June 15, 2007 13- Ibid 14- Ibid 15- Ibid 16- Jonathan Schanzer (2008): Hamas Vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine. Palgrave and Macmillan. New York. P 155-160 17- Haarretz, June 2007 18- Mohsen M. Saleh (Ed. 2010): The Palestinian Strategic Report 2008. Alzytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations. Beirut 19- P.43-47 20- Khaled Amayreh: Bloody-minded Narrowness. Al-Ahram Weekly. Issue No. 909. August, 7 – 13, 2008. 21- Mohsen M. Saleh (Ed. 2010): The Palestinian Strategic Report 2008. Alzytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations. Beirut 22- Ibid 23- Al Hayyat, 26 August 2007 24- Ibid 25- Steven Erlanger: Palestinians Topple Gaza Wall and Cross to Egypt. New York Times. January 24, 2008 26- Ibid 27- Ellen Knickmeyer: Egyptians Reseal Border, Cutting Access From Gaza. Washington Post Foreign Service. February 4, 2008 28- Ibid 29- Ismail Hania. Hamas Prime Minister. December 14, 2008 30- Mohsen M. Saleh (Ed. 2010): The Palestinian Strategic Report 2008. Alzytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations. p.27 31- Fathi Sabah: Hamas’s PLC Members Ratified Panel Law in Gaza. Daralhayat. December 24, 2008 32- Slomo Brom: Hamas Tightens Its Hold on the Gaza Strip. Institute for National Security Studies. August 11, 2008 33- Mohsen M. Saleh (Ed. 2010): The Palestinian Strategic Report 2008. Alzytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations. P.37-40

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34- Salaah Jum’ah: Hamas Dissatisfied with Egyptian Mediating Role. Asharq AlAwsat, September 2, 2008 35- Saleh Al-Naami: Relief or calm before the storm? Al-Ahram Weekly. June 26 – July 2, 2008. Issue No. 903 36- The Palestine Information Centre. November 5, 2008 37- Maan News Agency. November 6, 2008 38- Ibid 39- Avi Issacharoff: Split Among Hamas Leaders. Haaretz, November 25, 2008 40- The Palestinian Information Centre. December 19, 2008 41- Barak Warns: Hamas Will Pay a ‘Heavy Price’. Haaretz. December 25, 2008 42- Bill Roggio: The State of Jihad: 2008. The Long War Journal. January 2, 2009 43- Gideon Levy (2010): The punishment of Gaza. Verso, London p.78 and Yoram Cohen and Jeffrey White (2009): Hamas in Combat: the Military Performance of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement. P.13.Policyfocus #97. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 44- Saleh Al-Naami: Hamas in the crosshairs. Al-Ahram Weekly. Issue no 887. December 27, 2007 – January 2, 2008. 45- Ismail Hania. Hamas Prime Minister, Gaza, December 27,2008 46- Salama A Salama: What’s Next, Al-Ahram Weekly. Issue no 927. December, 25-31, 2008. 47- Taher Al Nono: Hamas Government Official Spokesperson. December 27,2008 48- Khaled Abu Toameh. Hamas Moves On Fatah Collaborators. Jerusalem Post, January 4, 2009 49- Ethan Bronner: Is the Real Target Hamas Rule? International Herald Tribune. January 4, 2009 50- Ethan Bronner: Is the real target Hamas rule? International Herald Tribune. January 4, 2009

Chapter Eight 1- Milton Edwards Beverley, Hamas and the Arab Spring: Strategic Shifts? Middle East Policy, Vol. xx, No. 3, Fall 2013. 2- Khosrokhavar, F. (2012) ‘ The New Arab Revolutions That Shook the World, London: Paradigm Publisher, 223 3- Pace, M. & Cavatorta, F. (2012) The Arab Uprisings in Theoretical Perspective – An Introduction, Mediterranean Politics, 17:2, 125-138, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2012.694040 4- Linah Alsaafin Imperfect revolution: Palestine’s 15 March movement one year on, 23 March 2012 http://electronicintifada.net/content/imperfect-revolutionpalestines-15-march-movement-one-year/11092 accessed on September 25, 2014. 5- Ahmed El-Sayed, Hamas and Iran: Rapprochement? Al Ahram weekly, Issue No.1237, 12 March, 2015 http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/10706/19/Hamasand-Iran--Rapprochement-.aspx> accessed on May 21, 2015

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6- Natil, I. (2012) ‘ Hamas: between Militarism an d Governance’, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Contemporary Themes and Challenges, ed. Marwan Darweish and Carol Rank, London: Pluto Press 7- Ibid 8- Michal's political speech delivered in Cairo when Fatah and Hamas formally signed the reconciliation agreement under the auspice of the new regime of Egypt on May 4, 2011 9- Ibid 10- Gershon Baskin, Israel’s Shortsighted Assassination, November 12, 2012, New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/17/opinion/israels-shortsightedassassination.html?hp&_r=1> accessed on May 21, 2015 11- Gershon Baskin (2013) The Negotiator: Freeing Gilad Schalit from Hamas, The Toby Press 12- Arab World for Research & Development, July 3, 2013. 13- Asmaa al-Ghoul, Tamarod Calls for Protest against Hamas in Gaza, AlMonitor’s Palestine Pulse, and September 13, 2013: http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/gaza-tamarod-november-11-hamas.html accessed on September 21, 2014. 14- Natil, I. (2014) A shifting Political Landscape: NGOs Civic Activism and Response in the Gaza Strip, 1967–2014, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 9:3, 82-87, DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2014.983369 15- Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1993-30 June 1994 http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e000493b8c/cb7abd 06100ac1348525611d00642037?OpnDocument> accessed on May 14, 2015 16- Pinto, G. (2014) A Cultural Occupation? UNRWA’s Human Rights, Conflict Resolution and Tolerance Programme: Perspectives from Balata Camp, the Journal of Doctoral Research in Education, Educate~ Vol. 14, No. 2, 2014, p. 57-74. 17- UNRWA (2013) Gaza in 2020, UNRWA operational response 18- UNRWA (2014) Strategic Response to Gaza 2014 Hostilities: towards restoring dignity and development for Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip.