Gulf To Rockies: The Heritage of the Fort Worth and Denver–Colorado and Southern Railways, 1861–1898 9781477306239

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Gulf to Rockies The Heritage of the Fort Worth and DenverColorado and Southern Railways 1861-1898

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ulf to Rockies The Heritage of the Fort Worth and DenverColorado and Southern Railways, 1861-1898 By RICHARD C. OVERTON With Pen

Sketches

By REGINALD M A R S H

AUSTIN

:

1953

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS P R E S S

Copyright © 1953 by Richard C. Overton Copyright © renewed 1981 All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be sent to: Permissions University of Texas Press P.O. Box 7819 Austin, TX 78713-7819 http://utpress.utexas.edu/index.php/rp-form

Library of Congress Catalog Number 53-10833 isbn 978-0-292-72712-0, paperback isbn 978-1-4773-0623-9, library e-book isbn 978-1-4773-0624-6, individual e-book

TO FREDERICK M E R K

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Thanh to the scores of people who gave generously of their time and counsel while I was preparing this book would customarily appear at this place in the volume. But will the reader want to pause now long enough to consider, as he eventually should, just what each of these well-disposed persons has contributed? And if he did would he be, in advance of reading, in any position to appreciate the significance of their help? Better by far, I think, to meet those to whom this book owes so much in a more relaxed and informal fashion later on. The reader will find them waiting for him to go "Around the Circle" on page 377. Quite apart from the individuals who helped, however, there have been two institutional sponsors whose role I wish to make clear at the outset. Northwestern University, believing in the potential significance of this story, granted me, over a period of two years, sufficient time from other duties to complete the tasks of research and writing. The Northwestern administration also authorized my entering into an agreement with the Burlington Lines whereby the railroad, which shared the University's hopes for this undertaking, not only guaranteed me unrestricted "access to all company records" but also agreed that I might "utilize all facts," unless libelous, of course, and that I should have "freedom of interpretation of the facts" with the company reserving, at my suggestion, the right to express a varying viewpoint, if it so desired, in a footnote clearly labeled as to purpose and authorship. Finally, with the University's approval, the railroad agreed to reimburse me, as their research consultant during the life of the agreement, for time spent on the assignment and for necessary expenses. Without the time and funds thus made available through the co-operation of Northwestern University and the Burlington Lines, this book could not have been written.

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THANKS

Northwestern has sponsored this work in still another way. Some years ago a Committee on Business History, composed of professors in history, economics, finance, labor, marketing, and administration, with the deans of the Liberal Arts School and the School of Commerce as ex officio members, was set up to consider the merits of proposed business history projects, to assist in the planning and staffing of such projects as were put under way, and to act as a board of critics. Finished works meeting the standards of this committee are designated "A Northwestern Study in Business History." This is the first completed volume to be so designated. Others now in progress will appear under the imprint of various publishers as time goes on. I am deeply indebted to the entire committee, and especially to the subcommittee of critics, for their encouragement and counsel. I should add, however, that responsibility for the final product, specifically for its shortcomings, rests not with the institutions and committee that sponsored it nor with the many individuals who helped me along the way, but with me. R.C.O. Evanston, Illinois April 11, 1953

Contents Thanks

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Note on Documentation Introduction

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vii

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2

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1. The Colorado Setting, 1861-80

6

2. The Texas Homeland, 1873-81

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3. Evans in the Lion's Den, 1881

39

4. Dodge and Evans: A Study in Contrasts, 1881-83 .

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61

5. The Fort Worth and Denver City Steps Out, 1881-83

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89

6. Northward to the Canadian, 1883-86

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7. Breaking the Northern Stalemate, 1883-87

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109

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131

8. The Rails Are Joined, 1887-88

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9. Independence for the Panhandle, 1888-89

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10. The Union Pacific Moves In, 1888-90 . 11. Mounting Incompatibility, 1890-93

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192 .

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217 258

12. The Union Pacific Moves Out, 1893

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289

13. Rehabilitation in the North, 1893-96

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311

14. Revival by Miracle in Texas, 1893-98 .

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331

15. Birth of the Colorado and Southern, 1896-98 . Conclusion .

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354

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375

Around the Circle

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377

Bibliography

385

Index

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x

Illustrations General Grenville M. Dodge Governor John Evans

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facing page 82 .

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83

Main Street, Fort Worth, about 1876

114

Main Street, Fort Worth, 1881

115

Morgan Jones

146

Charles L. Frost

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Frank Trumbull

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Major K. M. Van Zandt

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Fort Worth and Denver City equipment and roundhouse

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147

Texas Spring Palace, Fort Worth.

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178

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Announcement of first passenger service on Fort Worth and Denver City

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179

Union Pacific, Denver and Gulf pass .

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179

Circular letter publicizing town lots along Fort Worth and Denver City . . . . . XI

page 208

Denver Union Depot

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Colorado and Southern No. 410 . Denver, Texas and Fort Worth No. 26 . Colorado and Southern No. 501 . Union Pacific, Denver and Gulf Depot at Main Street, Fort Worth, 1893 . Larimer Street, Denver Repairing a bridge at Boulder

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Maps and Charts Schematic map of principal railways in Colorado, 1883 . Texas Panhandle Route, as originally built, 1888 . Schematic map of principal railways in the Panhandle, 1887 Union Pacific system, 1889 Union Pacific system, 1890-93

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Union Pacific, Denver and Gulf, 1898

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Construction chart of Gulf-to-Rockies route, 1870-98 . Corporate chart of Gulf-to-Rockies system, 1861-98 Corporate control and stock ownership chart of Gulf-toRockies system, 1880-98

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Gulf to Rockies The Heritage of the Fort Worth and DenverColorado and Southern Railways 1861-1898

NOTE ON DOCUMENTATION For simplicity, many common and constantly used names and sources have been abbreviated throughout the footnotes. Except in the most obvious cases, these abbreviations have been fully explained in the first footnote in which they occur. —Annual Report of the company and for the year cited. —Burlington Archives (see Bibliography for description). —Colorado and Southern Railway. —Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company. —Circuit Court Record (see n. 1, ch. 3). —Charles Elliott Perkins (president, CB&Q, 1881-1901). —Corporate History of the CB&Q (see Bibliography under "Baldwin"). CLF —Charles L. Frost (see n. 32, ch. 5). CTI —Colorado and Texas Railway Improvement Company (see n. 4, ch. 5). D&RG —Denver and Rio Grande Railroad. D&RGW —Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad (successor to D&RG). DCD —D. C. Dodge (D&RG official; see n. 95, ch. 4 ) . DE —Dodge-Eddy Correspondence (see n. 10, ch. 5). DR —Denver Republican. DT —Denver Tribune. DT&FW —Denver, Texas and Fort Worth Railroad. DTR —Denver Tribune-Republican. ELB —Evans Letter Book (see n. 61, ch. 3). FW&DC —Fort Worth and Denver City Railway. FWDG —Fort Worth Daily Gazette. FWG —Fort Worth Gazette. FWJ —Fort Worth Journal. FWWG —Fort Worth Weekly Gazette. GMD —Grenville M. Dodge. HMC —Heaviest Moving Commodities (see n. 60, ch. 6). ICC —Interstate Commerce Commission. LPB —Letterpress Book. MCH —Memorandum on Corporate History (see n. 46, ch. 7). MVHR —Mississippi Valley Historical Review. Pers. LPB —Personal Letterpress Book (see n. 17, ch. 4). PM —Poor's Manual for the year cited. RB —Record Book (see n. 4, ch. 5). RCF —Reorganization Committee File (see n. 56, ch. 12). RMDN —Rocky Mountain Daily News. RMNW —Rocky Mountain News (weekly). SRB —Small Record Book (see n. 29, ch. 5). TCI —Texas and Colorado Railway Improvement Company (see n. 29, ch. 5). UP —Union Pacific Railway. UPD&G —Union Pacific, Denver and Gulf Railway. VH —Valuation History of the C&S (see Bibliography under "McMurray"). AR BA C&S CB&Q CCR CEP CH

Introduction

W

I T H O U T RAILROADS the social and economic development of the great American West would have been impossible. Nature, indeed, had endowed the area with fabulous riches and boundless opportunities, but in doing so, as if to tease puny but acquisitive Man, had scattered her gifts over an enormous landlocked territory. There they might have remained, isolated and unused indefinitely, had it not been for the coming of the rails. Even after the steam railroad had proved itself technically feasible, Western railroad-building was not simply a matter of laying track and furnishing equipment whenever and wherever traffic might warrant it. When the Civil War—and this story—began, less than 5 per cent of the nation's population lived beyond the westernmost terminus of the railroad network at St. Joseph, on the Missouri River. Of these, over half were in eastern Texas or eastern Kansas and more than a quarter on the Pacific Coast. Most of the rest were clustered around Santa Fe, Salt Lake City, and the mining camps near Denver. Elsewhere, for all practical purposes, the West was empty save, of course, for Indians, scattered miners, trappers and traders, and a plethora of wildlife. So it was that the railways literally spearheaded the occupation of the West, often piercing beyond the frontier areas which boasted two to six persons per square mile. The roads, in fact, had to create communities as they moved forward so as to generate traffic for a livelihood. This necessity posed difficult problems in both colonization and financing. Could well-balanced towns be brought to life virtually overnight at bar-

3

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GULF TO ROCKIES

ren railheads? Could funds be attracted to wilderness enterprises that had to be in operation before they could begin to pay for their original cost, let alone day-to-day expenses? There were other stubborn problems. As in every new country, labor was scarce and unskilled. It was difficult to obtain supplies, and even more so to keep them moving to where they were needed. Communication was slow and uncertain. Competition among railroads, violent and unrestrained, was a constant threat both during and after construction. And because Western roads were habitually forced to extend to the extreme their slender physical and financial resources, they were peculiarly vulnerable to the onslaughts of floods, droughts, pestilence, and depressions. Yet somehow the Western rail network was built, most of it between the Civil War and the close of the century, the period covered by this story. Some fortunes were made; many more were lost. But the key objective was attained. The treasure chest of the West was opened, and a whole new society, distinctive in outlook and talent, came into being. The speed with which this was accomplished has no parallel in recorded history. This book tells a part—probably a typical part—of that story. Like the history of all human enterprises, it begins with a vision, no less a one than linking by rail the Gulf of Mexico and the heart of Texas with the center of the Rocky Mountain region. There were other dreams too, noble ones about the future of Denver and Fort Worth as commercial centers, about the development of Colorado coal and the colonization of the Panhandle. But the central aspiration was ever the creation of a mighty intersectional steel highway that would bring civilization and prosperity to the territory it served. How that goal was reached and made secure forms the core of this book. Logically enough, the Gulf-to-Rockies enterprise was a dual project throughout, sponsored and implemented in both Texas and Colorado. Yet the final product, still in the form of a partnership, was unified in spirit and purpose. From the vantage point of hindsight, it is a matter of wonderment that, under conditions then prevailing, men had the courage to undertake what they did. It is even more fascinating to watch how, by the slimmest of margins and despite their human fallibility, they finally succeeded. But the most amazing aspect of all is the fact that those primarily responsible for the outcome simply took their achievement in stride. Therein, perhaps, lies the distinctive quality of the American spirit.

INTRODUCTION

5

By and large, this story is told from the standpoint of the entrepreneurs, the men who had to make the specific decisions that determined both short-run tactics and long-run strategy. In time those successive decisions, and the actions and reactions springing from them, gave rise to the policies and standards that constitute the basic heritage of the present-day Fort Worth and Denver-Colorado and Southern. During the half-century and more that has elapsed since this story ends, difficult new problems have, of course, been added to those of an earlier day. Yet the railroad's prime obligation—to move goods and people safely and efficiently and to build up the territory served—has remained unchanged. So it is that fully to understand the present and to face the future with lasting confidence, it is wise, perhaps even necessary, to comprehend the lessons and significance of the past. The prime purpose of this book is to enhance that comprehension: to examine and appraise the motives, techniques, and attitudes that characterized Western railroading in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Gulf to Rockies is by design a human story, told more in terms of people than of things. This is not to minimize the importance of tangible accomplishments, but comes about simply because why and how particular men thought, felt, and acted had far more to do with the heritage they left than what they finally did. Indeed, the Gulf-to-Rockies road of 1898, so far as physical plant and operations went, would seem pathetically crude today. But the spirit that created that system as an institution and guided it up to that point is still an integral part of the modern going concern. Of what stuff was that spirit made? What sort of heritage was it?

1. The Colorado Setting 1861-80

C

OLORADO'S railway history in the 1860's can be characterized by one word: impatience. Small wonder! For a full decade, from 1848 to 1858, the Land of the Columbine had stood virtually abandoned to her lonely grandeur like a mighty boulder in midstream; for even though she lay directly athwart the shortest route from Chicago to San Francisco, her forbidding mountain barrier had deflected and split the swelling flood of westward migration. Pioneers bound for California's gold or the riches of Oregon stuck close to the well-worn trail along the North Platte that led by easy grades through South Pass. Those headed for the Southwest and southern California followed the Santa Fe Trail, which skirted the Rockies to the south. 1 Only a few determined prospectors, many of them drifting back from California, seemed sufficiently convinced that Colorado's towering peaks guarded riches beyond belief to move into the mountain area. There, in 1858, they found gold. True, the extent of the first strikes was wildly exaggerated. Consequently nearly two-thirds of the 100,000odd persons who trekked westward in the spring of 1859 with "Pikes Peak or Bust" painted on their wagons returned within a year to their Missouri Valley homes. Yet those who stayed found just enough of the precious metal to establish beyond a doubt that there really was "gold in them thar hills.5'2 1 Ray A. Billington and J. B. Hedges, Westward Expansion: A History of the American Frontier, 556-64; see also maps at pp. 454, 461, 515, 555; Frederic L. Paxson, History of the American Frontier, 1763-1893, 323-50, 373-76. 2 Billington and Hedges, op. cit., 617-20; Paxson, op. cit., *A1~W.

6

T H E COLORADO SETTING

7

But how to unlock this treasure chest? Men could and did reach this newest El Dorado on horseback and in jolting wagons, bringing with them a minimum of tools and equipment. And what they laboriously wrung from the rich veins and ore-laden streams could, at great expense and even greater risk, be shipped out by wagon freight and stagecoach. But until some means of cheap bulk transport could link the mining areas to the markets and supply centers of the East, Colorado would never fulfill her promise.3 That much was tantalizingly clear. So was the answer: railroads. From a technical standpoint, the ability of the iron horse to solve Colorado's chief problem needed no further demonstration. By 1860 the nation had had a generation of experience with steam railroads; men had overcome the basic mechanical difficulties, learned how to throw lines across rivers, mountains, and plains, and worked out a remarkably standardized procedure for efficient operation. Furthermore, so far as administration and financing were concerned, Americans had devised workable schemes of corporate organization and shown a positive genius for mobilizing sufficient capital and manpower to build and run railways effectively and, if all went well, profitably.4 There had always been one essential prerequisite, however, for bringing a railroad project to life: the promise of an adequate volume of traffic once it was built. That meant population. Along the eastern seaboard there had never been any problem on that score; even the older states of the Middle West were able to justify railroad-building by the time it was technologically possible. But as the network edged forward into the Mississippi Valley, the great dilemma of the West arose: private capital could not afford to build lines into the wide unsettled prairies; yet only railroads could bring in enough people to furnish the requisite traffic.5 To cut this Gordian knot, nearly all the Midwestern states had pledged their credit for railroad-building in the mid-thirties. The experi3

Billington and Hedges, op. cit.s 633-43; J. L. Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the United States, 130, 160; Herbert O. Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," in Colorado and Its People, ed. LeRoy R. Hafen, 635, 64344. 4 Ringwalt, op. cit., 70-111, 115-20, 122-36, 140-66; Slason Thompson, A Short History of American Railways, 43-146; Robert E. Riegel, The Story of the Western Railroads, 1-4; Wint.hrop M. Daniels, American Railroads: Four Phases of Their History, 1-24; Robert S. Henry, This Fascinating Railroad Business, passim; Kent T. Healy, "American Transportation before the Civil War," in Growth of the American Economy, ed. Harold F. Williamson, 125-31; Caroline MacGill and Balthasar Meyer, History of Transportation in the United States before 1860, 319-608. 5 Ringwalt, op. cit., 130; cf. Richard C. Overton, Burlington West, 9-15; see also maps on and facing pp. 12, 24, 190.

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GULF TO ROCKIES

ment was a dismal failure. Most of the projects were far too grandiose, and when the panic of 1837 cast its blight upon the West, the entire structure toppled, forcing more than one state to repudiate its debts.6 From the wreckage, private investors salvaged the most promising projects; but with the sobering experience of the panic behind them, they built only fast enough to keep up with an assured supply of traffic.7 Not until 1850, when the national government finally lent its assistance in the form of the first federal land grant, did the pulse of Western railroadbuilding resume its earlier tempo. First Illinois, then the adjoining states, as well as several in the South, won grants to aid their primary lines.8 The land-grant procedure, much misunderstood even today, was simple enough. A group of railroad promoters, recruited, as a rule, from ambitious towns along a projected route, would form themselves into a company and through their representatives in Congress apply for a certain number of sections of public domain, usually six or ten per mile of line, immediately adjacent to their designated route. If their petition were successful, the federal government would earmark for that company every alternate section (of one square mile each) within clearly defined lateral limits, with the provision that title should not pass to the railroad until the track was actually built and acceptable, as to quality, to the government. If, because of prior occupancy or prior grant under some other act, a company could not lay claim to its full quota of lands within the primary lateral limits, it was authorized to make up as much of the deficiency as it could by selecting "lieu lands" within secondary lateral limits fixed in the granting act. Thus the grants became known as "six-and-fifteen" or "ten-and-twenty," according to the distance of the primary and secondary lateral limits from the track. The pledge of public land enabled the railroads to execute so-called land-grant mortgages upon the acres they would eventually receive, and so raise the cash to finance actual construction. In sum, then, the federal government simply allowed the railways to use the public domain as collateral.9 The grants were not, in any sense, gifts. For one thing, the United 6

MacGill and Meyer, op. cit., 492-97, 503-11; Ringwalt, op. cit., 118, 125. MacGill and Meyer, op. cit., 503-504; cf. Henry Greenleaf Pearson, An American Railroad Builder: John Murray Forbes, 20-55; Carlton J. Corliss, Main Line of Mid-America: The Story of the Illinois Central, 6-29. 8 Paul W. Gates, The Illinois Central Railroad and Its Colonization Work, 2 1 43; Corliss, op. cit., 12-20; Overton, Burlington West, 50-86; Joseph B. Eastman, Public Aids to Transportation, II, 105-107; Ringwalt, op. cit., 225-27. 9 Gates, op. cit., 67-75; Corliss, op. cit., 32-36; Overton, Burlington West, 165— 69, 280. 7

T H E COLORADO SETTING

9

States doubled the price on the alternate sections it retained within the lateral limits of the grant, thus recouping at once the value of the acres patented to the companies. More important, each recipient railway, in accepting its grant, undertook to transport troops, mail, and government property at rates fixed by Congress. In the course of time, rates for troops and property were set at 50 per cent of commercial prices and rates for mail at 80 per cent. By the time all land-grant rates were abolished, in 1946, the federal government had recovered the value of the grants many times over.10 Nevertheless, the device was a godsend to the roads at the time, and even more so to the people of the West, whose very future depended upon adequate transportation. For the Colorado of 1860, however, even this ingenious policy offered scant hope. Throughout the fifties land grants had been made only to railroads that were or would be contiguous to the existing network. 11 True enough, Colorado contained some thirty-five thousand persons, sufficient to generate a modest supply of business, and assuredly population would leap astronomically once rail connections were provided.12 The sticking point was isolation, with all that that word implied. At the moment the solid area of settlement in the United States ended abruptly at a line drawn roughly north and south about a hundred miles west of the Mississippi. Here and there a few prongs reached out farther toward the west, notably in Missouri, where the Hannibal and St. Joseph's terminus on the Big Muddy marked the westernmost outpost of the nation's thirty-thousand-mile network. But from that point it was more than six hundred miles to the rich diggings beyond Denver, and there were not enough people in between to populate a single modest town. 13 Had it not been for the long-standing determination to link California to the rest of the nation by rail, Colorado's plight would have been wellnigh hopeless for years to come. But Asa Whitney's dream of a Pacific railway that had seemed so fantastic when he had proposed it in 1845 10

Despite considerable recent interest in and research upon this point, opinion is by no means unanimous. See Eastman, op. cit., II, 33-48; Robert S. Henry, "The Railroad Land Grant Legend in American History Texts/' Missouri Valley Historical Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (September, 1945); "Comments on T h e Railroad Land Grant Legend in American History Texts,'" MVHR, Vol. XXXII, No. 4 (March, 1946); Robert S. Henry, "A Reply to Comments on 'The Railroad Land Grant Legend in American History Texts,' " MVHR, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (June, 1946); Thomas G. Cochran, "Land Grants and Railroad Entrepreneurship," in The Tasks of Economic History, Supplement X (1950), 5 3 67, esp. 60. 11 Eastman, op. cit., II, 105-106; map, facing p. 42. 12 Information Please 1951 Almanac, 76. 13 Overton, Burlington West, maps on and facing p. 190.

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GULF TO ROCKIES

suddenly moved into the realm of possibility with the acquisition of California in 1848 and progressed to the stage of probability upon the discovery of gold there in the same year.14 During 1853-55 the War Department, under Jefferson Davis, surveyed no fewer than five routes to the Pacific, two in the north, two in the south, and one, passing through either Colorado or Wyoming, in the middle. Thereupon Congress launched upon a six-year nonstop debate on where the nation's first transcontinental railroad should actually be located. So long as the slaveholding South maintained its position in the national councils, action was impossible. To build the road over the logical central route from Chicago to San Francisco would deliver the trans-Missouri West into the hands of the antislavery Northerners just as effectively as if the line were to follow either of the surveys farther north. On the other hand, either southern route, particularly the lower one designed to pass through the newly-acquired Gadsden Purchase, would put the South in a dominant position. From a political standpoint, the obvious solution would have been to build two lines, one for the benefit of each section. From the economic and financial standpoint, however, it was clear that only one road could possibly be justified at the time, and even that would have to be supported by a federal land grant, and perhaps by government bonds as well. So, as the war clouds darkened, the Congressional debate dragged on, first for one road, then for two or three, back to one again, but never to a conclusion. Not until the withdrawal of the Southern delegations from Congress in the winter of 1860-61 was the deadlock broken. 15

The Colorado Central At the very moment when a transcontinental railroad was becoming politically feasible, Colorado was exerting every possible effort to secure for herself another sort of service in connection with the established Pacific Coast thoroughfare so near her borders. Two days after the Territory of Colorado was created on February 28, 1861, Congress authorized the first daily overland mail to California and stipulated that Denver, then a "city" of some 4,700, 16 should receive either main- or branch-line 14 Eugene V. Smalley, History of the Northern Pacific Railroad, 57-68; Lewis H. Haney, A Congressional History of Railways in the United States to 1850, 409-21; Riegel, op. cit., 11-12; Stewart H. Holbrook, The Story of American Railroads, 163-64; Paxson, op. cit., 374-80, 427-31, 467-70. 15 Riegel, op. cit., 14-16, 39-40; Lewis H. Haney, A Congressional History of Railways in the United States, 1850-1887,49-75. 16 Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census (1860), I, 548.

THE COLORADO SETTING

11

service. Denverites instantly took action; Captain E. L. Berthoud was commissioned to search at once for a feasible pass through the mountains. Without awaiting warmer weather, he set out promptly and by mid-May had established the existence of the pass that now bears his name. Mere feasibility, however, was not enough. Nothing was done to improve the path he marked out, and on July 1 the daily mail route was established through Wyoming. 17 Neither Denver nor her deadly rival Golden, some fifteen miles to the west, would give up so easily. On October 11, 1861, the Apex and Gregory Wagon Road Company obtained a special charter to build up Clear Creek as a step toward the faraway pass. There is no evidence that this company ever did anything at all, but it does hold the distinction of being the oldest corporate ancestor of the Colorado and Southern. More ambitious in both title and accomplishment was the Colorado and Pacific Wagon, Telegraph and Railroad Company, chartered by special act on November 6, 1861, and created specifically to build over Berthoud Pass.18 The indomitable John Evans, who arrived in Denver in 1862 to take up his duties as second territorial governor, probably helped raise subscriptions for this project; at any rate, some six miles of rough terrain were graded at a cost of fifty thousand dollars.19 The chief effect of this activity, however, was to prompt William Loveland, a resident and business leader of Golden who was ever anxious to promote his town at the expense of Denver, to organize the Clear Creek and Guy Gulch Railroad Company on November 10, 1862.20 Nine days later Loveland leased the rival Denver concern, but thereupon the projects rested beneath the forbidding mountains while plans for the nation's first transcontinental railroad crystallized.21 Chartered by act of Congress in 1862 as the eastern division of the nation's first transcontinental railway, the Union Pacific finally started to 17 LeRoy R. Hafen, The Overland Mail, 1849-1869, 223; Ralph N. Traxler, "Some Phases of the History of the Colorado Central Railroad, 1865-1885" (Master's thesis, University of Colorado, 1947), 18-19. Traxler gives a brief biographical sketch of E. L. Berthoud, pp. 16-17. 18 Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports, Vol. 134, pp. 674-75 (hereinafter referred to as 134 ICC). 19 Glenn C. Quiett, They Built the West, 147; 134 ICC 674-75; T. S. McMurray, "The Colorado and Southern Railway Corporate History" (manuscript in C&S and CB&Q Archives, hereinafter cited as VH [Valuation History]), 9. See below, p. 43. 20 134 ICC 621. The best recent account of the proverbial Denver-Golden rivalry, with special attention to railroads, appears in Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 637-43. For a brief biographical sketch of Loveland, see Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central," 16. 21 VH, 10.

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push its tenuous way west from Omaha in 1864. It was supported not only by a generous federal land grant but by government bonds as well.22 Then and there the citizens of Golden thought they saw their big chance: Why not build their own railroad over Berthoud Pass and sell it as a ready-made segment to the advancing through line?23 No sooner said than done—on paper. February, 1865, witnessed the birth of the Colorado and Clear Creek Railroad Company, which a year later took the more purposeful title of Colorado Central and Pacific Railroad Company. 24 With five Union Pacific directors on its board, this newest concern was obviously hitching its fortunes to the sought-after transcontinental. So far, the unborn Colorado and Southern seemed destined to become an east-west railroad. But fate—and good engineering judgment —soon upset these rosy prospects. Over the violent protests of both Golden and Denver, General Grenville M. Dodge, chief engineer of the Union Pacific, advised his directors on November 15, 1866, against the Berthoud route; they thereupon decided once and for all to build through Cheyenne. 25 The effect of this decision was to turn the eyes of both Denver and Golden from the west to the north. Loveland, with strong Union Pacific support, at once announced his intention of building to Cheyenne, and Denverites chipped in a third of the cost before they found that, contrary to their understanding, Loveland intended to bring his main line into Golden with only a branch to Denver. Thereupon they severed relations with what they regarded as the perfidious Colorado Central, and, owing to further misunderstandings, the entire plan fell through. 26 Meanwhile the Kansas Pacific offered to build into Denver from the east free, only to renege on its promise in November, 1867, and demand two million dollars as the price of construction.27 It was at this point that George F. Train, the Union Pacific's spellbinder, challenged Denver to stop trafficking with "foreign" projects and to build its own Denver Pa22

69.

23

Eastman, op. cit., II, 12-13; Riegel, op. cit., 70-85; Holbrook, op. cit., 167-

Quiett, op. cit., 154. Cf. E. O. Fuller, "Cheyenne Looking North," 4-5. 134 ICC 612, 674; Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central," 21. Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 638-39; Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central," 6-7, 22. For a careful analysis of the relative merits of the various transcontinental rail passes see Ralph Budd, "Railway Routes Across the Rocky Mountains," Civil Engineering, Vol. X, Nos. 2, 3, 4 (February, March, April, 1940), 97-99, 161-64, 222-24; Fuller, op. cit., 5-6. 26 Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 639; Quiett, op. cit., 15455. 27 George L. Anderson, General William J. Palmer: A Decade of Colorado Railroad Building, 1870-1880, 35-36; Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central," 9. 24

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T H E COLORADO SETTING

13

cific. The dare was accepted, and Congress, spurred on by Evans and his fellow delegate in Congress, Jerome B. Chaffee, was induced to grant lands for the project. Before long Evans was at the head of the venture with David A. Moffat, the young cashier of the First National Bank of Denver, as his treasurer. Construction was not easy, but they built the 107 miles down from Cheyenne and brought Denver its first rail service on June 22, 1870. Barely two months later the chastened Kansas Pacific, no longer demanding tribute, rolled in from the east.28 In charge of construction was General William Jackson Palmer, youthful Pennsylvania war hero who before the conflict had served as secretary to J. Edgar Thomson, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and since 1865 had been associated with the Kansas Pacific.29 Loveland, having alienated Denver and lost, for the time being, his Union Pacific supporters, was forced to witness the triumph of his rival. As if to symbolize his diet of humble pie, he dropped the "Pacific" from his company's title early in 186930 and in the summer of 1870 built his modestly styled Colorado Central Rail Road fifteen miles eastward to Cut-Off Junction, just north of Denver, where the Denver Pacific and the Kansas Pacific met. Utilizing the former's rails south of the junction, Loveland brought his first train into Denver on September 23. 31 Even though, by a strange quirk of fate, that particular train very probably included Abraham Lincoln's private car, recently converted into a humble passenger coach,32 its arrival in Denver was something of 28 Quiett, op. cit., 154-64; Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 640-43; Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central," 9-14. 29 Anderson, op. cit., 16-17; Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 30 643. 134 ICC 612. 31 VH, 8-9; Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central," 22-36. This is the most complete and best account of the building of this line. Edgar C. McMechen, Life of Governor Evans, 169; Fuller, op. cit., 11. The Colorado Central built its own rails into Denver in 1874 (VH, 16). 32 Lined with iron and weighing forty tons, this car was built for the President's use during the Civil War; after his assassination, in 1865, it bore his body from Washington to Springfield. In the following year, T. C. Durant, first vice-president of the Union Pacific, bought it from the government at auction for eight thousand dollars and took it to Omaha for use as a directors' car. In 1870 the Colorado Central, while still building its line between Golden and Denver, purchased the car and converted it into a passenger coach; it is therefore logical to suppose that this newly acquired equipment formed a part of the first train. In any event, the car continued in Denver-Golden service for some years, probably until 1878, when, with the revival of the road's expansion, it was fitted out as a construction car. Presumably after restoration it was exhibited by the Union Pacific at the TransMississippi Exposition at Omaha in 1898, sold in 1903 to E. B. Snow, and sold by him in 1905 to Thomas Lowry, who presented it as a gift to the city of Minneapolis, where it was placed on permanent exhibition. The famous old car was destroyed by fire on March 11, 1918. Rocky Mountain News, April 23, 1951.

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an anticlimax for a city that had just welcomed the strategic Denver Pacific and the mighty Kansas Pacific. In Colorado and Southern annals, however, the event was indeed noteworthy, for this modest strip of railroad (running east and west after all) was the first segment of the future Colorado and Southern to go into actual operation. 33 Its completion marked the close of Colorado's first era of railroading. Measured in terms of length, the total number of miles built within the territory—just under three hundred—was hardly impressive. Contrasted to the nation's gain of over twenty thousand miles during 1861-70 inclusive, it was hardly more than a drop in the bucket.34 But for Colorado it was enough to banish forever the curse of isolation. Denver, served by three companies, now had access to both coasts by way of the Denver Pacific-Union Pacific, as well as a competitive and more direct eastern outlet over the Kansas Pacific. The role of the Colorado Central in this scheme of things was modest indeed, but it was by no means insignificant. In addition to linking the two scrappingest towns in the territory, this road provided for all the connecting lines the most direct approach to the mining areas. Yet had it not been for the vagaries of competitive railroad strategy, the Colorado Central might well have remained a strictly local enterprise, its destiny tied to the mercurial rise and fall of mining fortunes.

Construction and Competitive

Strategy,

1870-80

If the preceding decade had been characterized by impatience, so far as railways were concerned, the 1870's could be entitled "Realization— with a Vengeance." As a matter of fact, two dominating forces were at work: (1) Within the Colorado Territory (which gained statehood in 1876), dozens of local roads, most of them narrow gauge, were projected to tap the outlying mining areas. In addition to sharing that objective, General William Jackson Palmer's Denver and Rio Grande even aspired to link Colorado with Old Mexico to the south and Utah on the west. (2) From beyond Colorado's borders the rapidly growing Missouri Valley systems, based upon Chicago, St. Louis, or Kansas City, were steadily pushing toward the Rockies and beyond. 35 33 It is a curious coincidence that the original segments of both the C&S and its present owner, the CB&Q, ran at right angles to the prevailing traffic flows of the present-day systems; the first link of the CB&Q was the Aurora branch, a line running almost due north and south. Overton, Burlington West, 21-23. 34 Ringwalt, op. cit.y 174, 211. Colorado amount estimated on the basis of contemporary and current maps. Cf. ibid., 177-78, 220-22. 35 Cf. Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 6^3-44.

THE COLORADO SETTING

15

The combined effect of these major forces was enough to keep Colorado's railroad situation in an uproar throughout the decade. The local lines, whether actually built or merely projected as threats, competed among themselves not only for access to the mining areas but for the favor and support of the oncoming systems from the east. On the other hand, the Union Pacific and the Santa Fe tried to outdo one another in grabbing the lion's share of Colorado traffic. The result was a bewildering succession of frantic building, outright warfare, and shifting alliances. The situation was doubly complicated by the fact that the Rio Grande, cutting squarely across the disputed area, was determined to remain independent and to compete, notably with the Santa Fe, as an interregional system.36 At the close of the year 1870 the Kansas Pacific appeared to enjoy the most favored position. Its main line ran from Kansas City straight to Denver, whereas the Union Pacific reached that growing center only over the rails of the Denver Pacific from Cheyenne. As a consequence, the U P was likely to find itself cut off from the rich traffic of the Colorado interior, or at least placed at an impossible disadvantage, if the Denver Pacific should become unfriendly or, worse yet, join forces with the Kansas Pacific. The solution for the Union Pacific was obvious. The company officers promptly revived their earlier alliance with the Golden promoters of the Colorado Central and by buying securities of the smaller road made it possible for the Colorado Central not only to expand into the mining areas but also to lay serious plans for building northward to a junction with the transcontinental's main line.37 Both facets of the new policy were promptly put into effect. During 1871 and 1872 the Colorado Central acquired the various wagon road companies holding franchises along Clear Creek and by the winter of 1872 managed to build twenty miles of line up that stream as far as Black Hawk. A short branch was completed to Floyd Hill the next year.38 Simultaneously Loveland, still 36 The best treatments of this confused story are to be found in Brayer, ibid., 643-62; the same author's Early Financing of the Denver & Rio Grande Railway, passim; and Anderson, op. cit., passim. For statistics on construction by years and by companies see Ringwalt, op. cit., 220-25. 37 Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 645. As the Union Pacific's stock interest increased, five of its officials were placed on the Central's board. Ibid. 38 The Clear Creek and Guy Gulch Wagon Road Company had bought the Colorado and Pacific Wagon, Telegraph and Railroad Company on February 27, 1871, and was itself conveyed to the Colorado Central on March 11, 1872. On April 1, 1872, the Colorado Central also acquired the Apex and Gregory Wagon Road Company, the Golden City and Gilpin County Wagon and Rail Road Company, and the Colorado and Salt Lake Railroad Company. With the excep-

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bent on bypassing Denver, began grading a line from Golden southeastward to Littleton, where, by solemn agreement, he proposed to make a connection with the southbound Denver and Rio Grande. 39 Meanwhile, in order to carry out the second part of the program, the Colorado Central ran a survey from Golden down the South Platte, through Boulder, Longmont, and Greeley, and thence on across the cattle ranges of eastern Colorado to a connection with the main line of the Union Pacific at Julesburg. Work was pushed rapidly, but the line was in operation only between Golden and Longmont when the panic of 1873 forced the Union Pacific to curtail all support of the Central's expansion. 40 The only new work undertaken by the Colorado Central in 1874 was the construction of its own three-mile entrance into the city of Denver so as to free itself from dependence upon trackage rights over the Denver Pacific.41 As the worst effects of the panic wore off, however, the Union Pacific returned to the aid of the Colorado Central with renewed vigor. Well it might, for by 1876 the Kansas Pacific had secured a firm grip on the vital Denver Pacific.42 In terms of competitive strategy, this meant that the Union Pacific could no longer play one off against the other. To make matters worse, a new threat to the Union Pacific-Colorado Central alliance was emerging from the confused situation south of Denver. By 1876, General Palmer's Rio Grande had pushed its narrow-gauge line southward through Colorado Springs and Pueblo to El Moro, near Trinidad, and westward from Pueblo to Canon City, up the Royal Gorge, and was even then engaged in building an extension westward from Cucharas, near Walsenburg, toward Alamosa, whence it planned to build into Santa Fe. 43 For its part, the Santa Fe had brought its rails from the east through La Junta and into Pueblo early in 1876 and was already building a cutoff from La Junta to Trinidad. 44 So long as these various developments were competitive with each other, the Union Pacific was in a relatively safe position. But when in March, 1876, the Rio tion of the grading done by the Colorado and Pacific Wagon, Telegraph and Railroad Company, none of these companies constructed or improved any property. 134 ICC 612, 613; Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central,5' 39-50. See chart, p. 362. 39 Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central," 60-61, 65; Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 645. This line was never completed. 40 Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central," 61-65; McMechen, op. cit., 170; Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 645; Fuller, op. cit., 11. 41 134 ICC 615. 42 Henry Kirke White, History of the Union Pacific Railway, 44. 43 Anderson, op. cit., 66-81; L. L. Waters, Steel Trails to Santa Fe, 51. 44 James Marshall, Santa Fe. 396-99.

T H E COLORADO SETTING

17

Grande, the Kansas Pacific, and the Santa Fe concluded a pooling agreement, to become effective September 1, which bound the Rio Grande to divide all its eastbound business between the other two parties to the contract, the situation became serious.45 It was obvious that if the Union Pacific wished to participate in Colorado business at all, it would have to act vigorously and on its own. Hence in the spring of 1877, taking no chances, the U P suspended construction on the "Julesburg branch" from Longmont toward Greeley and, on the principle that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, began extending the Colorado Central directly north from Longmont and south from a point on its own main line about six miles west of Cheyenne. Surveys were made under the direction of the doughty Captain Berthoud of Golden and observed personally by Jay Gould, who was backing the project financially.46 The two railheads were joined at the Colorado-Wyoming state boundary later in the year, thus finally linking the Union Pacific and the Colorado Central, and giving the former an independent entrance into Denver and the mining area. Service began over the new route on November 7,1877. 47 Simultaneously the Central resumed its program of internal expansion. The Floyd Hill branch was carried another eighteen miles into Georgetown in 1877, and the next year the Clear Creek line was extended into the fabulous Central City.48 To make certain that this fastgrowing system, and particularly the vital Cheyenne-Denver artery, should not fall into unfriendly hands, the Union Pacific leased the entire Colorado Central on March 1,1879.49 Although the Union Pacific was now assured of an entrance into Colorado, the heavy traffic to and from Omaha was forced to follow two sides of a triangle, with the right angle at Cheyenne. To overcome the competitive disadvantage of this roundabout route, the Union Pacific 45 Anderson, op. cit.} 138; Brayer, Early Financing of the Denver & Rio Grande Railway, 190, 194-95, 210. 46 Fuller, op. cit., 11, 14; see esp. map, p. 15; Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central," 66-67; E. L. Jones, "Extending the Old Colorado Central Lines." Jones was a member of the surveying party. He tells how, when they went through Uncle Davy Barnes's field, they were asked to go single file to avoid trampling the wheat. That field is now the site of Loveland. 47 Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central," 67-70; VH, 16-17; Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cxt., 646. The railroad in Wyoming was incorporated in that state on September 19, 1877, as the Colorado Central Railroad Company (Wyoming). VH, 16; Fuller, op. cit., 12. 48 134 ICC 615; VH, 14-15; Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central," 51-56. 49 134 ICC 674; Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central," 96. Technically, the lessor was the Union Pacific Railroad until February 1, 1880; thereafter until April 1, 1890, the Union Pacific Railway.

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GULF TO ROCKIES 50

utilized its newly acquired subsidiary's charter right to build, in 188082, the Colorado Central's branch to Julesburg that had been planned a decade earlier.51 As it turned out, the new cutoff was not carried all the way west to the Colorado Central's main north-and-south stem at Longmont as originally planned. The reason lay in the kaleidoscopic events of 1880. In January of that year Jay Gould, who by then controlled not only the Kansas Pacific and the Denver Pacific, but the Missouri Pacific as well, literally forced the U P to acquire the first two roads at grossly inflated values in order to liquidate his threat of a competing transcontinental. 52 Thus, with the Denver Pacific firmly in its hands, the Union Pacific could safely turn over the Julesburg branch traffic to the rails of the Denver Pacific at La Salle rather than build on to the Colorado Central at Longmont. 53 The net result of all this was confusing to say the least. As a by-product of Gould's shrewd and self-serving contrivance, the bewildered Union Pacific, lately worried over not having any sure access to Denver at all, now found itself with two parallel lines between that city and Cheyenne. 54 For the state of Colorado, as well as for the Union Pacific, this was "realization—with a vengeance." But it left the Colorado Central in two disconnected parts, its Julesburg branch separated from the rest of its property by a gap of over twenty-five miles between Longmont and La Salle. In the course of time this peculiar state of affairs was to give rise to more than one headache. 55 50 To build to the northeastern corner of Colorado. This right was originally granted in 1866. Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 638. 51 134 ICC 674-675; Traxler, "History of the Colorado Central," 96-98. 52 Nelson Trottman, History of the Union Pacific, 155-64. 53 See map, p. 54. For the Union Pacific's solution of this duplication of facilities, see p. 233. 54 As it happened, however, the parallel Colorado Central and Denver Pacific were linked in 1881 when the high-sounding Greeley, Salt Lake and Pacific Railway Company connected Greeley and Fort Collins. The GSL&P had authority to build from Greeley through Fort Collins and on up the Cache la Poudre River to the western boundary of the state "and beyond." Many surveys were made, but the line never went beyond Stout. 134 ICC 616; VH, 27. See below, p. 218. 55 See below, pp. 162, 218-19, 233, 240, 315-17, 322, 324-26.

T H E COLORADO SETTING

19

The South Park Lines Like the scion of a royal house of Europe, the Colorado and Southern, which came into being in 1898, had enough famous ancestors to satisfy the most eager railroad genealogist. The Colorado Central, of course, or rather its ancestors, were first upon the scene. But by all odds the most colorful predecessors were those known collectively as the "South Park Lines." Few systems have had a more romantic history, and though now but a memory, the road has inspired a veritable landslide of books, articles, and legends.56 The South Park Lines, like many other forerunners of the Colorado and Southern, sprang from the fertile imagination of John Evans, the doctor-educator-railroader-statesman who came to Colorado as governor in 1862.57 His original scheme in 1872 apparently was to build to Georgetown, tunnel under the mountains, and continue through Utah to the Pacific Coast. He hoped that the Denver, South Park and Pacific Railway Company, organized for that purpose on October 1, 1872, would be assisted in gaining these objectives by serving as a link for the Denver, Georgetown and Utah, the projected mountain extension of the Kansas Pacific.58 But Loveland and his Golden associates were already pushing their Colorado Central toward Georgetown, and a South Park alliance with the Kansas Pacific grew increasingly doubtful. Hence, on June 16, 1873, Evans reorganized his company as the Denver, South Park and Pacific Railroad Company and turned his eyes toward the region southwest of Denver. He completed a narrow-gauge line to Morrison in 1874, but there the project was halted while the panic of 1873 ran its course. Construction was resumed four years later in response to the new discoveries of precious metals in the Leadville region, and by 1879 56 To relate the complex story of the South Park here is impossible, but fortunately the objectives that led to the construction of the system, the salient facts of its corporate existence, and its relation to the Colorado and Southern are sufficiently simple and straightforward to permit summary. The most recent and thoroughgoing book on the subject is M. C. Poor's Denver, South Park & Pacific, which runs to over six hundred pages, including pictures, maps, and charts. I am indebted to Mr. Poor for permission to use information from his manuscript, which was still unpublished when this' chapter was originally prepared. Additional source material, still unused, will be found in the Evans Papers, recently deposited in the Colorado State Historical Society; a microfilm copy of these papers is at the Deering Library of Northwestern University. 57 For a biographical sketch of Evans, see below, pp. 41-46. 58 Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 653 n.; 134 ICC 613. Brayer and McMechen (op. cit., 179) give the "organization date" of the DSP&P as September 30. It was legally incorporated, however, on the following day, the date used by M. C. Poor (op. cit., 113).

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the rails reached Buena Vista whence, in the summer of 1880, trains gained Leadville over Rio Grande trackage. 59 As Evans pointed out repeatedly, and with understandable pride, this line was built to save for Denver the thriving trade of countless mining towns between that city and Leadville.60 At this juncture Jay Gould appeared on the scene. As early as 1878 he had begun to acquire a stock interest in the South Park. In the latter part of 1880, in company with Russell Sage, Loveland, Berthoud, and others, he secured control. 61 The boom that had led to the sudden expansion of the South Park, however, subsided as quickly as it had arisen, and Gould, far more concerned with his own pocketbook than with the destinies of any of the properties in his grasp, promptly unloaded the road on the Union Pacific. On January 25, 1881, he sold practically his entire holdings at par, receiving therefor $3,099,300. 62 With the closing of that transaction, the Union Pacific's control of every railroad leading east, north, and west of Denver became complete. The Kansas Pacific, the Denver Pacific, the Colorado Central, and the South Park Lines all rested in the hands of the mighty transcontinental.

The Situation South of Denver The competitive situation south of Denver during the late seventies was every bit as complex as that in the north, and considerably more bitter. It was, perhaps, natural enough that the arrival of the Santa Fe's rails in Pueblo in 1876 should lead to the pooling arrangement whereby the Rio Grande, in order to keep the peace between its powerful connections and between them and itself, agreed, for a two-year period, to di59 Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 653, 658; 134 ICC 613; McMechen, op. cit., 179-80. 60 See, for example, "Speech of ex-Governor John Evans, President of the Denver and New Orleans Railroad to the Stockholders," October, 1881. Reprint dated October 29, 1881, in Evans Papers. 61 On the basis of documents in the United States District Court, Denver, in connection with John Evans' suit against the UPD&G (Case 3001), Brayer has found evidence that Evans was on the point of selling his line to the Rio Grande when, contrary to Evans' wishes, Gould acquired it for the Union Pacific-Golden interests ("History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 657 n.). Trottman (op. cit., 193-94) confirms the Rio Grande's interest, but points out that Evans cannily played the rival would-be purchasers against each other and so succeeded in selling his road's securities at par, the price being $2,590,800. Further research in the Evans Papers will doubtless reveal where Evans' real sympathies lay. 62 Trottman, op. cit., 194. M. C. Poor (op. cit., 198) gives the effective date of Union Pacific control as January 1; this is entirely possible, as Gould had been aware for some time of the line's decline.

T H E COLORADO SETTING

21

vide all its eastbound traffic equally between the Santa Fe and the Kansas Pacific, and whereby the Kansas Pacific promised not to build into Pueblo, while the Santa Fe implied, at least, that it would not build beyond Pueblo. 63 It was equally natural, and virtually inevitable, that such an expedient truce should promptly be broken the moment any party to it found abrogation to its own advantage or when broader strategy so demanded. The first strain in the uneasy peace came late in February, 1878, when both the Rio Grande and the Santa Fe decided, almost simultaneously, to build southward over Raton Pass, the established gateway into New Mexico. By a matter of hours the latter won the race, but had to assure itself of the Rio Grande's acquiescence by ostensibly giving up its plans to build from Pueblo to Leadville.64 This reported concession on the part of the Santa Fe, however, was short lived. Through a subsidiary, that company for a full year had been quietly laying plans and making surveys up the great canyon of the Arkansas River despite the fact that General Palmer's engineers were doing precisely the same thing on behalf of the Rio Grande; both roads were determined to reach, over their own rails, the fabulously rich ore deposits that had been uncovered in Leadville early in 1877. In midApril, 1878, the Santa Fe abandoned all pretense of neutrality and began active construction just west of Canon City, the established terminus of the Rio Grande's line from Pueblo. 65 Palmer's forces, of course, immediately followed suit. The result was the outbreak of the famous "Royal Gorge War," destined to be fought on the right of way and through the courts for nearly two years.66 One immediate by-product of these hostilities was the breaking off of all prior agreements on rates and the division of business, including the three-way accord of 1876. Consequently, when the Santa Fe line from 63 Anderson, op. cit., 138; Brayer, Early Financing of the Denver & Rio Grande Railway, 190. Anderson says the Rio Grande was to divide its traffic according to a formula devised by referees; Brayer says eastbound traffic was to be split equally. By this arrangement, of course, the Rio Grande was prohibited from turning over eastbound business to the Denver Pacific-Union Pacific and was thereby exposed to the antagonism of the northern roads. The Santa Fe and the Kansas Pacific, however, divided their bridge traffic receipts with the Rio Grande on the basis that one mile on the latter equaled one and a half on either of the former, thus securing 50 per cent higher revenues per mile for the narrow-gauge line. For the Union Pacific's reaction to this agreement, see above, p. 17. 64 Anderson, op. cit., 76-77; Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 654. es Marshall, op. cit., 398. 66 There are many accounts of this famous struggle. See, for example, Anderson, op. cit., 83-118; Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 654-58; Holbrook, op. cit., 211-13.

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La Junta reached Trinidad in the late summer of 1878, officials of that road informed the wagon freighting firms serving El Moro, the southern terminus of the Rio Grande, that unless they transferred their operations to Trinidad, rates to their competitors over the Santa Fe's line from the east would be cut so low as to ruin them. Refusal of the El Moro freighters to move brought the inevitable rate war, with the Rio Grande and the Kansas Pacific matching and outdoing every reduction on the part of the Santa Fe. Eventually, of course, the warring parties composed their differences in this particular theater and boosted all rates back to their old levels, though the Rio Grande continued to discriminate against the Santa Fe on business exchanged at Pueblo. 67 Meanwhile the Royal Gorge War continued. A bewildering series of suits in the state and district courts gave temporary advantage first to one party, then to the other, while on the ground gangs of men supported by armed guards alternately graded right of way and deployed against their enemies. Eventually, in April, 1879, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that the Rio Grande was entitled to the prior but not exclusive right to build through the narrow canyon. In the meantime, however, financial exhaustion and pressure from his Eastern backers had forced Palmer to lease his line, which shortly thereafter fell into receivership, to the Santa Fe. In the fall of 1879, Jay Gould and his Eastern associates took advantage of the narrow gauge's woes by securing financial control of the bankrupt property. 68 Heated legal argument over the extent and effect of these kaleidoscopic changes was still in full swing when, in February and March, 1880, officials of the Santa Fe and the Rio Grande met in Boston to work out a practical compromise. Signed on March 27, and made a part of the. circuit court record at Denver a few days later, the agreement abrogated the Santa Fe's lease to the Rio Grande and provided for the return of all the latter's property and the dropping of all pending litigation. In exchange, the Rio Grande agreed to buy all the Santa Fe's improvements for some $1,400,000. Of equal importance for the future, the Santa Fe promised that for ten years it would not build north or west of Pueblo, while the Rio Grande agreed not to build east of its Denver-El Moro lines or south of a point seventy-five miles below Conejos, in the San Luis Valley. Short spurs were exempted from the arrangement, and the selfdenying provisions themselves were made contingent, in each case, upon various conditions. For example, the Santa Fe was committed not to 67

Anderson, op. cit., 138-40. ™Ibid.t 94-112, 117-18; Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit.s 655-57.

T H E COLORADO SETTING

23

build to Denver only if the Rio Grande refrained from aiding any eastwest line parallel to and south of the Kansas Pacific, delivered half of its eastbound traffic to the Santa Fe at Pueblo, and lived up to an additional traffic agreement signed on March 27.09 There were, obviously, seeds of trouble in such complicated terms. Furthermore, the "independent" Rio Grande was now firmly in Gould's grasp. But for the moment the war was over. Construction was resumed promptly, and on July 20 a Rio Grande train finally rolled into Leadville. A few weeks later the South Park completed its rails to the Rio Grande line at Buena Vista; from there on its trains used the latter's tracks to provide additional service for Leadville.70 For Colorado as a whole, and the Denver-Pueblo area in particular, the significance of these developments lay in the fact that the Santa Fe had succeeded in perfecting its hegemony in the south just as the Union Pacific was gaining undisputed control in the north. The Rio Grande's high hopes of breaking out southward were completely thwarted; even its treasured independence was, for the moment, lost. To cap the climax, on March 27, 1880, the same day on which the Rio Grande and the Santa Fe signed their peace treaty, those two roads brought the Union Pacific into a solemn tripartite agreement which, in effect, provided for the pooling of all Colorado traffic among the signatories.71 So it was that at the close of 1880, precisely one decade had elapsed from the moment Colorado had experienced the thrill of gaining competitive rail contacts with the markets of the nation to the day when her all-important rail arteries were gathered into the firm hands of a single dominant alliance. In a literal sense, her isolation remained broken; there were now over fifteen hundred miles of railroad in the state. 72 Figuratively, she was the prisoner of powerful men who had no intention whatever of sharing her charms with others. The lesson implicit in this state of affairs was plain enough. No powerful transcontinental, as General Palmer had learned to his sorrow, would permit construction of an independent rail outlet for Colorado that might threaten to divert the state's rich traffic away from the established 69

Anderson, op. cit., 116-17; Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 657-58. For the further implications of the March 27, 1880, traffic agreement, see below, p. 59. 70 Anderson, op. cit., 118; Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 658. 71 Anderson, op. cit., 117; Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 659, 668; John Evans, "Memorial to Congress," November 30, 1883, reprinted in Rocky Mountain Daily News (hereinafter referred to as RMDN), December 2223, 1883; McMechen, op. cit., 188-89. 72 Thompson, op. cit., 451; Ringwalt, op. cit., 224, 348.

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east-west railroads. Furthermore, any company outside the dominant transcontinentals, if it wished to exist at all, would have to do business in such places and on such terms as the latter might lay down. Finally, Colorado, as a new state, simply did not possess the financial resources within its borders to establish and operate a home-owned project. Eastern or European aid would be essential for any such undertaking, and in the money markets of the world it was the established lines, or wealthy operators like Jay Gould, who knew their way around. As 1881 dawned, the chances for the people of Colorado to free themselves from the monopoly that held them in its grasp appeared slim indeed.

2. The Texas Homeland 1873-81

T

O S H I F T the scene abruptly from Colorado to Texas is more than a mere feat of geography. It requires a fundamental adjustment of ideas as well. One of the most endearing characteristics of Texans is their uninhibited and unshakable devotion to their outsize state. That superlatives, and only superlatives, should be applied to their incredible homeland is not, for them, a matter of debate, but a matter of course. Furthermore, there are few grays in their manner of thinking; most of the time it is a question of black or white. People and events are either good or bad for Texas. Once Texans accept a person or an idea, they remain staunch defenders, but woe betide him who would suggest something less than the best for the Lone Star State. No story of a Texas institution makes sense except in relation to this fundamental and apparently immutable state of affairs. And only because of it could a present-day Texan thus aptly summarize the place of the Fort Worth and Denver City: "It would be appropriate for a Fort Worth and Denver City Railway Zephyr engine to have an Indian war bonnet, some bows and arrows, a buffalo head, a cowboy's hat and six guns, and a long curling lariat rope on its shiny surface. This railway is a real Texas pioneer pardner, and it has been through hell and high water with the rest of the folk who today make up the greatest state in the Union by all odds and counts." 1 It is fruitless and irrelevant to quibble over the last phrase; the basic point is that the "Denver Road," as it 1 John L. McCarty, "Background History of the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway," Part I, p. 2.

25

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is known in its native state, has been and is part and parcel of Texas. It is a full-fledged "pardner" in every sense. The Texas vocabulary contains no stronger word of acceptance. Certain it is that the history of the city of Fort Worth and of the railway that bears its name have been inseparably linked from the outset. Both were incorporated in the memorable year 1873, when it took a full measure of exuberant optimism to imagine that either would survive the hazards of the boisterous West.2 But so it was with many a frontier project, and indeed with America itself, where faith and hope, rather than experience and cool calculation, were often the only justification for many a major development. In Texas, however, there was a good deal more to go on than a simple faith in the tremendous undeveloped resources of the country. Unlike any other state of the West, Texas, and more particularly her leaders, had had an extraordinary training in matters political and economic. A hard core of practical realism underlay the vision that led to the incorporation of the Fort Worth and Denver City. Texas, in 1873, was a curious compound of cosmopolitan experience and frontier experiment. In all its youthfulness of spirit, it could trace its history of continuous settlement back over the centuries to the early years of the Spanish Conquest. 3 By the time that Mexico achieved her independence in 1821, the Gulf Coast and adjacent hinterland of what is now Texas had long been peopled by a mixed population of Spanish and French, liberally sprinkled with Indians and a few wanderers from the United States. The next fifteen years witnessed a veritable invasion by American frontiersmen. Welcomed at first by the Mexican government, these energetic pioneers soon became so numerous and so selfassertive that a break with Mexico became inevitable. Independence followed the revolution of 1836, and nine years later Texas entered the Union. When the Civil War broke out, the population of Texas already exceeded 600,000; by the time the city of Fort Worth and its railroad were founded it had just about reached the one-million mark. 4 Mere numbers, however, tell but part of the story. Within the brief span of a generation Texas had had the maturing experience of operating under six successive forms of government. Domination by Mexico had taught her leaders the woes of colonialism, and nine years of inde2 Mrs. Eugene McCluney, "History of Fort Worth and Denver City Railway in My Home County," 2. This is one of several prize-winning essays submitted as part of the FW&DC seventy-fifth anniversary celebration. Copies are on file in the company's offices. 3 Billington and Hedges, op. cit., 433-43. 4 Information Please 1951 Almanac, 77.

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pendence had given them invaluable training not only in internal administration but in diplomacy as well. They had faced, and solved with remarkable competence, the manifold problems of a sovereign nation. 5 As a member of the United States during 1845-61, Texas had found herself first an actual battlefield and then a potent factor in the sectional conflict that finally burst into armed warfare in 1861. Although the military operations of the Civil War hardly touched Texas, her role as a supply center for the Confederacy gave her a taste of economic mobilization and speeded both her economic and her spiritual unity. By the time Texas had been "reconstructed" and had resumed in 1874 her good standing in the Union, her leaders possessed a store of firsthand experience that could normally have been acquired only over a century or two. 6 Thus, whereas western Texas was a frontier area in every sense of the word, the policies and leadership of the state were mature and seasoned, a situation unique indeed in the West of the 1870's. Nowhere was this experience more clearly reflected than in respect to railroads. The state's first railroad, designed to link Harrisburg (now a part of Houston) and the Brazos River, put its first twenty miles into operation in September, 1853.7 That was the beginning of a network that gradually worked northwestward from the Gulf Coast to reach a total of more than seven hundred miles by 1870.8 The next three years saw construction that was especially pertinent to the plans of Fort Worth. In midsummer, 1872, the Houston and Texas Central (now Southern Pacific) reached Dallas from the south, thus opening a continuous line from Galveston and Houston. 9 Later that year the Missouri, Kansas and Texas brought its main line from Kansas City across the Red River to Denison, at which point the Houston and Texas Central joined it in March, 1873. 10 At almost the same moment, the Texas and Pacific began construction of its Shreveport-Dallas line, even then projected to continue to Fort Worth and El Paso. 11 Thus in the spring of 1873, Fort Worth lay only thirty-five miles west of the main Gulf-Kansas City artery, to which it would be joined just as soon as the oncoming rails of the Texas and Pacific could provide the necessary link with Dallas. That road would also give Fort Worth an5

Billington and Hedges, op. cit., 482-506. Ibid., 572-84, 613-14; S. G. Reed, A History of the Texas Railroads, 148-53. Reed, op. cit., 60-61; Riegel, op. cit., 24-25; B. B. Paddock, A History of Central and Western Texas, I, 238-39. 8 Thompson, op. cit., 451; Ringwalt, op. cit., 177-78; Paddock, op. cit., I, 237— 55. 9 Reed, op. cit., 209; Ringwalt, op. cit., 221. 10 Reed, op. cit., 209-10; Riegel, op. cit., 108; Ringwalt, op. cit., 221. 11 Reed, op. cit., 361-62; Ringwalt, op. cit., 222. 6

7

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other outlet to the national network through East Texas, and eventually would provide service to El Paso and the Pacific Coast. Under the circumstances it seemed none too soon to strike northwestward toward the rich but undeveloped Panhandle. Furthermore, thanks to the thorough experience of Texas in such matters, the state offered substantial encouragement to serious-minded railroad builders. When Texas had entered the Union in 1845, she had retained her lands, 12 and between 1852 and 1854 the state offered modest grants to nineteen roads then being planned. Only two of these earned their lands by construction, however, and it was soon apparent that offers to individual roads did not constitute a sufficient inducement to build.13 Consequently in 1854 Texas took the novel step, which even the federal government never tried,14 of passing a general land-grant law that awarded sixteen alternate sections (10,240 acres) of vacant unappropriated land for every mile constructed by any duly incorporated railway. Using the federal government's experience as a model, the Texas lawmakers carefully provided that no company could receive its lands until it had completed and filed its survey in the State Land Office and had actually constructed twenty-five miles acceptable in quality to the state engineer. Furthermore the company had to sell one-quarter of its land within five years and another one-fourth every two years thereafter; this provision was obviously designed to speed colonization and to prevent the railroads from holding land off the market for speculative purposes. In time, Texas liberalized the requirements as to the length of line that had to be built before lands could be received, but in essence the law remained unchanged during the fifteen years it was on the statute books, and furnished a criterion for subsequent legislation. Under its provisions well over five million acres passed into the hands of the state's pioneer roads.15 Not only towns and counties but the state as well lent its credit in the form of bonds to the railroads deemed essential to the proper development of Texas. 16 Inevitably, the Civil War played havoc with the orderly implementation of this liberal yet conservatively executed policy of assistance. As a matter of fact, railway construction was completely suspended during 12

Statutes-at-Large, V, 797-98. Ralph N. Traxler, "The Land Grant for the Thirty-second Parallel Railroad" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1953, hereinafter referred to as "Thirty-second Parallel Railroad"), ch. 1, pp. 9-10; Reed, op. cit., 140-42. 14 Riegel, op. cit., 58. 15 Reed, op. cit., 143-49; Traxler, "Thirty-second Parallel Railroad," ch. 1, pp. 10-11. 16 Reed, op. cit., 131-39; Riegel, op. cit., 58. 13

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17

the conflict. The new Texas constitution of 1866, however, sought to make up for lost time by specifically authorizing a state guarantee of railroad bonds, and, of course, the General Land Grant Act of 1854 was still in effect. As might have been expected, however, the carpetbag regime of 1867-74 served only to complicate matters. Rather than relying upon land grants as the safest and most effective means of aiding railroads, the reconstructionists favored the use of bonds, which they proceeded to authorize. As a matter of fact, their new constitution of 1869 specifically put an end to the act of 1854 by prohibiting any further grants. It required every stratagem known to native Texans to procure an amendment thereto on March 13, 1873, which again permitted the legislature to grant state lands in aid of railroads. This action did not restore the General Land Grant Act of 1854, but simply gave the legislature power either to pass such an act or to make grants separately, as was done prior to 1854; actually the latter course was the one adopted. 18 So far as the Fort Worth and Denver City was concerned, the significant fact, in the spring of 1873, was the legal restoration of the state's ability to pursue its traditional policy of assistance by means of land grants. So it was that circumstances beyond the newly staked limits of Fort Worth augured well for the launching of a railroad in the early months of 1873. As 1873 opened, Fort Worth was a bustling trading center of some thirteen hundred people.19 Gone were the howling Comanches who, barely twenty-three years before, had swept out of the hills to attack the military post of Fort Worth. Ever since the tragic scourge of the Civil War, caravans of covered wagons had rolled in from the east until Tarrant County, in which the settlement lay, boasted a population of eleven thousand, just twice as many as in 1870. It should not be inferred from this, of course, that all West Texas was a land of peace, quiet, and settled habits. Even though the Medicine Lodge Treaty, whereby the Army undertook to protect the Indian hunting grounds south of the Arkansas River, had just been concluded, the roving bands of red men were by no means "contained," as subsequent events were soon to demonstrate. 20 Furthermore, in 1873 only three of the ten counties between Wichita Falls and the northwest corner of the state had enough people in them 17

Ringwalt, op. cit., 177-78. Traxler, "Thirty-second Parallel Railroad," ch. 1, p. 11; cf. Reed, op. cit., 19 149-53. RMDN, March 28, 1888. 20 McCarty, "Background History of the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway," Part I, p. 1; Paddock, op. cit., I, 262. 18

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to warrant organization. But there was no question about the potentialities of this "unpeopled immensity/ 5 nor was there any doubt about the fact that the city of Fort Worth was established to stay. Around the site of the present courthouse no fewer than forty stores, most of them one-story frame buildings with the inevitable false fronts, testified to the quickening pulse of trade. Also indicative was the broad stretch of common, in the section between Fourth and Ninth streets. Around its edges immigrants pitched their tents; across it cattlemen coming in from the west drove their herds on the way to market. Load after load of buffalo hides, tongues, and meat provided a steady bass accompaniment to the staccato beat of cattle on the hoof. It was high time that someone built a railway into the northwest to tap one of the principal sources of this trade. 22 "Bring in your lumber, buy your lots, build your homes and settlements, for Fort Worth is bound to go ahead and be the railroad center of the West"—so wrote Captain Paddock, the town's one-man chamber of commerce, in his Fort Worth Democrat of January 25, 1873. 23 Paddock did not have long to wait, for, as it turned out, the man of the hour was ready to act. Born in Ohio, Colonel Warren H. H. Lawrence, like so many others, had sensed the magnificent promise of the West and in the early days of the Civil War had moved to Kansas, where he had devoted his attention to politics. For four years, 1863-67, he served in Topeka as secretary of state, presumably acquiring in the meantime the military title he carried throughout his life. It is likely too that his stay in Kansas gave him ample opportunity to observe the mounting trade that sprang up at the close of the war between that state and the vast area to the southwest.24 About 1868, Lawrence moved to Fort Worth, and it was not long afterwards that the thought of a Gulf-to-Rockies railroad began to take shape in his mind. Writing to Evans, Moffat, and Chaffee, he gained encouragement, if not funds. So it was that, while representing certain Eastern capitalists before the Texas Legislature during the session of 1869-70, he introduced a bill to incorporate, and to aid with a land grant, a railroad from Beaumont, Texas, to Fort Worth and on to a connection with any road that would meet it from Colorado. 25 To say that such action was premature is merely to provide a measure of the Colonel's faith. Fort Worth at the time boasted hardly five hun21 Reed (op. cit., 393) says there were only ten counties between Tarrant County and the northwest corner, but names only those including and north of 22 Wichita County. Ibid., 1-2. 23 Fort Worth Democrat, January 25, 1873. Quoted in McCluney, op. cit., 2. 24 25 RMDN, March 28, 1888. Ibid.

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dred souls, while northwest of that point along the proposed route lay five hundred miles of virtually uninhabited territory. Nevertheless, both houses of the legislature approved both charter and grant, only to have their bill vetoed by the governor.26 Lawrence, perhaps, was hardly surprised. More to the point, he was by no means discouraged. Convinced of the soundness of his idea, he needed only to wait until the inevitable growth of Fort Worth and West Texas could provide the concrete evidence to support his conclusions. Thus, when Paddock's vociferous pronouncements early in 1873 made it clear that Fort Worth was not only in business to stay but determined to grow, Colonel Lawrence knew his time for action had arrived. Working with other leading citizens,27 he drew up a charter for the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway Company. More than that, he put his idea to the acid test by scouring the county for stock subscriptions; when he had secured the promise of twelve thousand dollars, he sent his charter off to Austin, where he entrusted it to Major K. M. Van Zandt, one of Fort Worth's oldest and most prominent citizens, who was then serving in the Texas Legislature.28 Because of his official position, the Major, with a fine sense of propriety, had not felt free to take part in the preliminary promotion that Lawrence had so ably organized. But once the charter and subscriptions reached him at the capital he went to work with vigor.29 Thanks to his capable prodding, the legislature took favorable action on the charter on May 26.30 For some reason the governor did not sign the bill, but neither did he return it to the house in which it originated with such objections as he may have had. Hence, according to the Texas constitution, the act became law without his signature, effective as of the date of its passage.31 On paper, at least, Fort Worth had its railroad. And the city's population, spurred on by the prospects of railway communication, rapidly approached the two-thousand mark. 32 Under the terms of its charter, which, with subsequent amendments, is still in effect, the Fort Worth and Denver City was authorized to build and operate a railway and telegraph line "from some suitable point at or 26 27

Ibid.

Presumably those named as incorporators. See below, p. 34. McCluney, op cit., 2; Paddock, op. cit., I, 263; Dallas News, May 31, 1925. Van Zandt had then been a resident of Fort Worth for at least twenty years. 29 Dallas News, May 31, 1925. 30 Robert L. Hoyt, "Summary History of the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway Company," 1. 31 "An Act to Incorporate the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway Company" (hereinafter referred to as Act of Incorporation, FW&DC Files). 32 Paddock, op. cit., I, 264. 28

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near Fort Worth . . . forming a junction at said point with the Texas and Pacific Railway . . . thence in a northwesterly direction, on the most practicable route through the State of Texas, in the direction of Denver City, Colorado, having in view the route best calculated to develop the mineral regions of Northwestern Texas." 33 That the line would serve the cattle trade seemed too obvious to mention; apparently the incorporators wanted to make sure that other sources of traffic would not be overlooked. The charter specified that the gauge should conform either to that of the Texas and Pacific, then approaching Dallas from the east,34 or to such narrow gauge adopted by the road "now being constructed" southward from Denver.35 The latter reference was obviously to General Palmer's Denver and Rio Grande, which had completed its line from Denver to Pueblo in June, 1872.3G From the very outset, then, the "Denver Road" was designed to live up to its nickname. Like the Baltimore and Ohio, the Erie, and the Northern Pacific, it was conceived as an interregional project; in this respect it was the precise opposite of those great systems like the New York Central and the Burlington which began as modest links or branches and "just growed." 37 In the generous fashion of the day, particularly in the West, the charter gave the company a two-hundred-foot right of way, as well as the privilege of taking and using "any timber or other material used in the construction of railways, found and lying upon any of the public lands of this state." 38 This certainly covered a lot of territory, but then there was a lot of territory; the provision apparently seemed quite reasonable to the solons at Austin. More important was the provision for a state land grant. If the railway were built on standard gauge (four feet eight and one-half inches), the company was to receive sixteen sections (of 640 acres each) "for each and every mile of railway that may be completed and put in successful operation." But if the gauge were less than standard, then the re33

Act of Incorporation, § 6. 35 Reed, op. cit.3 362. Act of Incorporation, § 7. Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 648-49. The Rio Grande did not build farther southward until 1876, when it reached El Moro, five miles north of Trinidad [ibid., 651). 37 Edward Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 18271927, I, 15-36, and Men of Erie, 3-13; Smalley, op. cit., 113-18; Frank W. Stevens, The Beginnings of the New York Central Railroad, passim, esp. pp. 35087; Overton, Burlington West, 20-25; Richard C. Overton, Milepost 100, 6-7, 10, 16-24. 38 Act of Incorporation, § 8. 34 36

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muneration would be twelve sections per mile. Even though the state of Texas specifically declined liability for any deficiency in the total grant owing to prior occupancy of lands, thus eliminating any "lieu land" grant, 40 there was no stated restriction on the lateral limits of the grant. 41 Hence the potential proceeds from such a vast domain would virtually guarantee sufficient funds to build the line.42 In the manner of the earlier act of 1854, it was provided that the company should sell a quarter of its granted lands no later than eight years after receiving them, and an additional quarter by the expiration of each succeeding four years, so that all would pass from its hands in twenty years. No sales could be made to any corporation, except for the immediate business uses of such a corporation, nor to any person or company in trust for the railroad, nor to any firm or company "of which any officer or stockholder of said Fort Worth and Denver City" was a member. 43 These safeguards, written into all grants at the time, clearly reflected the experience Texas had gained from observing the actual operation of her earlier grants as well as those made by the federal government. She was determined that granted lands should be sold only to actual settlers. Another proviso reflecting the growing popular belief in the salutary effect of competition prohibited the company from selling its road to, or merging with, "any other parallel, connecting, or competing line of railroad in the State" on pain of forfeiture of the charter. 44 And, barring natural obstacles, the road was to run through each county seat within five miles of its surveyed route, provided, with characteristic Texas fair play, that "the citizens or corporate authorities" of any such town donated not only a right of way but enough ground, up to a maximum of fifteen acres, for switches, turnouts, depots, and "other necessary buildings." To safeguard the railroad from abuse of these provisions, it was distinctly stated that the line did not have to pass through any county seat that was not already in a "permanent location" when the railway's route was definitely located.45 39 Ibid., § 10. This provision implied that a narrow-gauge line cost roughly 75 per cent as much as standard gauge. It would be interesting to test this assumption against actual experience. Cf. Brayer, Early Financing of the Denver & Rio Grande Railway, 269-70. The FW&DC charter contemplated, on the basis of the eventual length of the standard-gauge line, a maximum grant of over four and one-half million acres. 40 41 See above, p. 8. Act of Incorporation, §11. 42 There were, of course, the usual provisions requiring completion of a stated portion of the line—in this case, twenty-five miles—according to satisfactory standards before title to the granted lands passed to the company. Ibid. 43 44 45 Ibid. Reed, op. cit., 571-74. Act of Incorporation, § 14.

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Capitalization of the new company was fixed at $10,000,000, divided into shares of $ 100 each,46 and it was specified that the issue of first mortgage bonds should be limited to $16,000 per mile; second mortgage bonds could not exceed an additional $10,000 per mile.47 When the incorporators named in Section 1 of the act could secure subscriptions to $250,000 in stock and collect 5 per cent of that sum in cash, the stockholders were to have the privilege of electing a board of directors and officers.48 The charter was to run for sixty years.49 The incorporators who lent their names to this project were among the leading citizens of Fort Worth. In addition to Lawrence, who was something of a guiding spirit, there were D. C. Adams, Giles S. Boggess, John B. Bowman, James Crutcher, E. M. Daggett, J. M. Eddy, J. E. Ellis, C. L. Frost, M. H. Gable, W. A. Huffman, J. H. Jones, M. B. Loyd, John A. McCoy, Howard Schuyler, W. R. Shannon, J. P. Smith, and Daniel Stewart. 50 When news of the granting of the Denver Road's charter reached Fort Worth, excitement knew no bounds. One energetic citizen, C. L. Frost, later destined to play a key role in the new enterprise, 51 prevailed upon a member of the Texas and Pacific's engineering corps named Zane Cetti to prepare a huge canvas map showing nine railroads fanning out from Fort Worth. 52 Fanciful though it may have seemed, in due course Frost's vision was almost literally realized. But that was far in the future.53 For the moment the map was bravely hung in the square in front of the courthouse. The fact that no road was yet within thirty miles of the city merely served as a challenge rather than a damper to hopes for the future. And lest the citizenry forget their destiny with the iron horse, Captain Paddock succeeded in reproducing the map in his paper and persisted in publishing it for weeks on end.54 On August 13, 1873, the incorporators met for the first time—a fact that was, significantly enough, duly reported in detail in Denver's Rocky Mountain News,55 With $250,000 in stock subscriptions on hand, the gentlemen named in the charter proceeded to elect a board of nine directors who subsequently chose, from among their own number, J. M. Eddy president of the railway, W. H. H. Lawrence vice-president, M. H. Gable secretary, and C. L. Frost treasurer. "The men who compose the company," observed the Fort Worth Democrat, "are well known in the 46

47 48 Ibid., § 2 . Ibid., §13. Ibid., § 4. Ibid., § 1. On May 24, 1933, two days before the expiration of the original charter, it was renewed for a period of fifty years (FW&DC, Secretary's Files). 50 51 Ibid. See below, pp. 97-98, 175-77. 52 53 Fort Worth Star, July 19, 1906. See maps, pp. 165, 269. 64 55 McCluney, op. cit., 3-4. RMDN, August 26, 1873. 49

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state, and are numbered among our best business railroad men; . . . we entertain no doubt but that the enterprise under their management will prove a grand success."56 It was announced that an engineering party was to be put in the field at once to survey the line. Actually the crew began work on September 8, and ten days later the company said it fully intended to build through to the Panhandle without delay; only $50,000 more in stock subscriptions was desired at the moment. 57 As it happened, these various developments were reported in the press of September 18. The newspapers issued that day in Philadelphia and elsewhere in the East carried news of a different sort: the great banking house of Jay Cooke and Company, the acknowledged leader in railroad financing, had closed its doors.58 Caught in the maelstrom, bankers and brokers went down to ruin. More than five thousand business houses followed them in the remaining months of 1873 as the acute money panic widened into the most devastating depression yet to afflict the nation. Among the immediate causes of the disaster—apart from the basic recklessness of national expansion—was the enormous undigested glut of railroad securities that had been marketed during the booming days between the close of the Civil War and the inevitable moment of reckoning. Another factor that contributed to the sense of panic, and thus retarded recovery by scaring away "rescue capital," was the disclosure of the malodorous scandals on the Erie and within the Credit Mobilier.59 These, of course, were not the only specific ingredients of trouble, but they were among the principal ones. Consequently, although the potentialities of the Texas Panhandle were as real and alluring as ever, it was simply out of the question to market so much as a gilt-edge railroad bond. 60 Even the Texas and Pacific, which had triumphantly reached Dallas in August, found itself virtually at the end of its resources in November. 61 The chances of selling stock in a project that was scarcely more than a glimmer in the eye were precisely nil. Ruefully work on the Fort Worth and Denver City came to a complete standstill. But the redoubtable 56 Fort Worth Democrat, August 16, 1873, reprinted in RMDN, August 26, 57 1873. McCluney, op. cit., 3-4. 58 Ibid., p. 4; Cf. Matthew Josephson, The Politicos, 186-88. 59 Josephson, The Politicos; Ringwalt, op. cit., 225-29. 60 The Pennsylvania, for example, could find no market even for its 6 per cent consolidated mortgage bonds until late in 1874. George H. Burgess and Miles G. Kennedy, Centennial History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 184661 1946, 350. Cf. also ibid., 335, 349. Ibid., 348; Reed, op. at., 363-64.

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Colonel Lawrence, as certain as ever that his idea was a sound one, refused to let the discouragements of the moment divert men's minds from the project he had fathered. In March, 1874, he sent off printed copies of the FW&DC charter and bylaws to the editor of Denver's Rocky Mountain News, "Two hundred and sixty-two miles of the line have been surveyed," he explained in an accompanying letter, "with entirely practicable results, and as soon as the Texas and Pacific road reaches this point—Fort Worth—it is thought we will be able to put our road in part under contract. A charter through your territory is desirable, and we shall be glad to have your people and your leading men interested with us." Evidently impressed, the News commended the enterprise "to the attention of those interested in railway matters." 02 This gesture, gallant as it was, could hardly have been expected to evoke a tangible response; Colorado, including specifically her moneyed men and railway promoters, was locked in the grip of the depression.63 The destiny of the Fort Worth and Denver City depended upon the revival of its native state. Texas, depression or no, had no opportunity or disposition to wait out hard times in idleness. At the Second Battle of Adobe Walls, in 1874, Bat Masterson and a handful of buffalo hunters held their own against a band of Indians, and at Buffalo Wallow, Billy Dixon repeated the feat in a heroic stand that brought him and four comrades the Congressional Medal of Honor. 64 Meanwhile the Army was swinging into action. Generals Mackenzie and Miles, after fighting the Indians at Tule and Palo Duro canyons in 1874-75, drove them finally from the plains and onto reservations.65 At last the way was open to utilize the rich short grass of the plains, and into the Denver Road's territory poured such cattle kings as Charles Goodnight, Colonel T. S. Bugbee, the Cators, Major Littlefield, and a score of other pioneers who, beginning in 1876, ushered in the era of the open range and the fenced cattle kingdoms. Burk Burnett and W. T. Waggoner joined them later in the region nearer Fort Worth. 66 As significant, perhaps more so, was the arrival of the Texas and Pa62

RMDN, March 28, 1874; McCluney, op. cit., 4. Brayer, Early Financing of the Denver & Rio Grande Railway, 164-73. McCarty, "Background History of the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway," P a r t i , p. 1. 65 Lola Beth Green, "History of the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway in My Home County," 1. 66 McCarty, "Background History of the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway," Part I, pp. 1-2. 63 64

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cific in Fort Worth, an event that might have been long delayed but for the enterprise of the eager citizenry. As 1875 wore on, it was apparent that some time must yet elapse before the Texas and Pacific could accumulate the funds necessary to extend its railhead beyond Eagle Ford, a point about ten miles west of Dallas and some twenty miles east of Fort Worth. Consequently Major Van Zandt, with the enthusiastic support of his fellow citizens, organized the Tarrant County Construction Company to aid the project. Chartered on October 16, 1875, with the Major as president, the new concern promptly found willing subscribers for the $100,000 in stock it was authorized to issue, and thereupon agreed with the Texas and Pacific to grade the twenty-mile gap in exchange for the railway's certificates of indebtedness.67 Despite the vigorous popular approval of the venture, however, its execution was by no means simple. Only $25,000 of the amount subscribed was paid up, much of it in wheat, oats, and corn. Not to be denied, the people of Fort Worth, including Van Zandt, donated 320 acres of what even then was certain to become valuable property in the heart of the city; it was, presumably, the hard cash realized from selling part of this land and the availability of the rest of it for the railway's tracks and yards that spelled success. At any rate, with the grade complete, the Texas and Pacific resumed track-laying the following spring. On July 19, 1876, amid cheers and fanfare, virtually the entire population of Fort Worth, perspiring but proud, turned out to welcome the city's first train. 68 As everyone had freely predicted, the event marked a turning point in Fort Worth's destiny. By the spring of 1877 the population had reached six thousand, triple the figure of four years earlier, and traders were extending their operations regularly into the Panhandle to capture business that had formerly been transacted through Wichita and other Kansas points. Buffalo hides, tongues, and meat flowed into the city in increasing quantity in exchange for the supplies shipped north and west. In 1878 a new cotton compress and steam grain elevator made their appearance, while trade in lumber broke all records.69 67

RMDN3 March 28, 1888. Actually this proved in one way to be a good investment; subscribers who may have lost on the potential value of lands donated were paid off at the rate of 133 per cent when the construction company was liquidated in October, 1878. 68 Ibid.; Paddock, op. cit., I, 250; Reed, op. cit., 364; Traxler, "Thirty-second Parallel Railroad," ch. 5, pp. 3-4. 69 McCluney, op. cit., 4; Paddock, op. cit., I, 265.

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By 1880, Fort Worth itself boasted some nine thousand inhabitants, while Tarrant County was approaching the twenty-five-thousand mark. 70 In that year the Texas and Pacific completed its second eastward line to Sherman, where it joined the Missouri Pacific.71 Shortly thereafter the Katy, having built southward from Denison to Whitesboro (on the T&P's Sherman line), extended by a trackage agreement still another through service into Fort Worth, 72 and in 1881 the Texas-bred Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe brought its direct line from Galveston into the city.73 Meanwhile, the T&P, under the masterly direction of General Grenville M. Dodge, was pushing its main line directly west toward El Paso.74 For Colonel Lawrence it was high time to move. Off his shelves came the Fort Worth and Denver City's records, and out he went among the people of Fort Worth to rekindle interest in the Gulf-to-Rockies route. They, at least, aimed to be ready when the great day came. As it turned out, the call to action came in the early months of 1881 from the faraway city of Denver, toward which Lawrence and his fellow Texans had long turned their eyes. 70 McCluney {op. cit., 4) says there were 9,000 persons "who called Fort Worth home" in 1879; Paddock {op cit., I, 262, 263) gives the population of the city as 6,663 in 1880, and that of Tarrant County as 24,671. Although Paddock was probably correct technically, McCluney may have been nearer the truth in view of the constant influx of immigrants who had not yet gone through such formalities as existed for establishing permanent residence. 71 Reed, op. cit., 365. 72 Reed {ibid., 379-81) says this trackage agreement was made in 1881; Paddock {op. cit., I, 254, 266) places it in 1880. V. V. Masterson {The Katy Railroad and the Last Frontier, 221) says that Katy trains first entered Fort Worth on April 1, 1881. 73 Paddock, op. cit., I, 266. 74 Reed, op. cit., 365.

3. Evans in the Lion's Den 1881

T

HAT J O H N EVANS should be the moving spirit behind the Denver and New Orleans Railroad, incorporated in Colorado on January 25, 1881, to build or connect with a line to the Gulf, was as natural and inevitable as a spring rain. That he should encounter the violent and unyielding opposition of every other Colorado railroad, and yet proceed in spite of it, was equally inevitable. The reasons were as simple as they were compelling. For more than thirty years Evans had been acting upon the ingrained conviction that the development of any community or region depended upon adequate, efficient, and cheap railway transportation, and he had learned long since that reasonable rates could be assured only by truly competitive rail service. As of 1880, Denver was incapable of competing with the Midwest for the business of the industrial East because of the difference in rail rates. But, thought Evans, a line built to the Gulf, where connection could be made with steamers serving the Atlantic coast, would permit traffic to flow between the Rocky Mountain region and the East under joint rail and water rates low enough to permit the equal competition—and hence rapid development—of the DenverPueblo area. 1 Consequently, when he found himself in funds after his

1 These purposes were repeatedly stated at the time. A succinct expression of them may be found in the published version of the Amended Bill of Complaint of John Evans in his case before the United States Circuit (now District) Court in Denver against the Union Pacific, Denver and Gulf Railroad Company (Case 3001). The pertinent documents were published, possibly by the Union Pacific

39

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sale of the South Park to Gould in November, 1880, he persuaded his former colleagues on that mountain road to join him in organizing what he regarded as a necessary and eminently promising alternate rail outlet to the Eastern markets. 2 Nothing, from Evans' standpoint, could have been more logical or more worthy of widespread support. But that was only one side of the picture. By January, 1881, the Union Pacific and the Santa Fe controlled, between them, every railroad crossing Colorado's borders and every railroad within the state except Gould's and Palmer's Rio Grande. 3 Under the Tripartite Pact of March 27, 1880, even the battle-scarred narrow gauge had joined the two transcontinentals in agreeing upon the allocation and handling of all Colorado traffic.4 Competitive rail service, therefore, was nonexistent, and it was simply unthinkable that the two big roads would permit a newcomer to drain off any substantial portion of the lucrative all-rail traffic they were carrying to and from the East. It was equally inconceivable that either Gould or Palmer would sit passively by if Evans' standard-gauge line threatened to offer substantial competition to the Rio Grande's main line connecting Denver, Pueblo, and the Trinidad area. The juxtaposition of these factors pointed to an inevitable explosion; if ever an irresistible force was poised to collide with an immovable object, the place was Colorado, the time 1881. Evans, literally and figuratively, was surrounded by wealthy entrenched interests that were shrewdly led, firmly allied, and ruthlessly determined to hold their exclusive advantages. General Palmer, amply endowed with energy, experience, and public support, had struggled against the same interests for a decade only to lose out tragically in the end. 5 What possessed Evans to believe, as a practical matter, that he could launch any independent Railroad, at Omaha in 1894; the statement alluded to was made by Evans on September 15, 1893, and appears on page 8 in the published version. This volume of documents, based on the originals filed and accessible in the Federal Court Building in Denver, will hereinafter be cited as CCR (for Circuit Court Record). 2 John Evans, interview of 1889 (typescript in Bancroft Library, University of California, copy in Deering Library, Northwestern University; hereinafter cited as Bancroft MS), p. 7. Referring to the reasons why Evans undertook the D&NO project early in 1881, the Rocky Mountain News specifically recalled, some years later, that Evans at the time was in funds as the result of the South Park sale, and added that the Governor was "not entirely happy" unless he had "a railway project in hand" (RMDN, March 28, 1888). 3 The last link in the Union Pacific's control of the State's northerly lines was forged when it acquired the South Park Lines from Gould on January 25, 1881. See above, p. 20. 4 Poor's Manual of Railroads (hereinafter referred to as PM), 1882, p. 852. See 5 above, p. 23. See above, p. 23.

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project that had any chance of success? The reason, incredible as it was, lay in the man himself. Born in Waynesville, Ohio, in 1814, John Evans determined as a boy to become a doctor despite the opposition of his family. Borrowing money from his relatives and friends, he went through medical school in Cincinnati, and after graduation built up a thriving practice in Attica, Indiana. While there he persuaded the legislature almost single-handedly, but only after a hot political battle, to build the state's first hospital for the care of the mentally ill; when it was completed, he became its first superintendent. This achievement, among others, won him a professorship at Chicago's Rush Medical College, and from 1845 to 1848 he commuted by stagecoach between his teaching and practicing posts. That stint, over wretched roads, gave him plenty of opportunity to contemplate the necessity for better transportation and to meditate upon the virtues of the newly developed steam railroad. 6 Moving to Chicago in 1848, Evans not only plunged into his medical work with vigor but somehow found time to play a leading role in establishing a modern school system for the city, to found, along with a small group of influential friends, Northwestern University, to participate in the regional activities of the Methodist church, and to become increasingly active in the metropolitan real estate market. That he was publicspirited, versatile, and breathlessly energetic was already abundantly apparent. 7 More pertinent to his later Colorado career was the fact that despite preoccupation with his manifold other interests, he never lost his painfully acquired conviction about the importance of adequate transportation as an indispensable prerequisite to social and economic development. No sooner had he reached Chicago as a permanent resident than he flung himself into an argument currently raging over the city's first railroad, the Galena and Chicago Union. There were certain merchants, it seems, who stoutly opposed helping the project financially for fear it would drain away the city's trade. With all the logic and rhetoric at his command, Evans worked effectively to set them straight. 8 6 D. W. Yungmeyer, "John Evans, Chicago's Forgotten Railroad Pioneer," address at Northwestern University Centennial Conference, sponsored jointly by the Railway and Locomotive Historical Society, Evanston, Illinois, February 21, 1951, pp. 1-5; McMechen, op. cit., 3-75; Walter Dill Scott, John Evans, 18141897: An Appreciation, 15-16; Kenneth F. Burgess, "A Centennial of Railroad and University Frontiers," address to American Society of Traffic and Transportation, Chicago, September 14, 1951, pp. 3-4. 7 Yungmeyer, op. cit., 4-5; Burgess, op. cit., 8-9. 8 Yungmeyer, op. cit., 5-6; cf. Robert J. Casey and W. A. S. Douglas, Pioneer Railroad: The Story of the Chicago and North Western System, 52-53.

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Even more important was his ten-year association with the Fort Wayne and Chicago (now a part of the Pennsylvania's main line), which was organized in 1852 to bring the Eastern trunk line into the city.9 Upon the recommendation of an Indianapolis friend, who was well aware not only of Evans' abilities but of his ideas on transportation and his shrewd appreciation of real estate,10 Evans was elected to the Fort Wayne's board in 1853. One fellow member was William B. Ogden, mayor of the city and one of the Galena's founding fathers. Evans was at once made responsible for obtaining the right of way in Illinois and the necessary terminal properties in Chicago. With characteristic energy he acquired the city acreage within a matter of months, obtaining not only the Pennsylvania's present strategic entrance from Englewood and on across the South Branch of the Chicago River but the site of Union Station as well. Portions of the latter were shortly sold to the Burlington and a predecessor of the Gulf, Mobile and Ohio, thus laying the basis for the current joint terminal arrangement. 11 By the time the Fort Wayne's railhead reached Illinois, late in 1858, access to the heart of the city had long been assured. Through service to the East began on New Year's Day, 1859.12 Throughout his stay in Chicago, Evans was a tireless advocate of the countless other railway projects that were based upon the city. Sometimes he organized meetings himself; sometimes he served as chairman or as principal speaker; his prime concern was to see to it that Chicago's transportation kept abreast of its commercial potentialities despite the handicaps and objections that plagued every new proposal. As time went on, Evans made money, principally through appreciation in the value of real estate he controlled; but, as throughout his long life, most of his profits went back into civic and educational enterprises, such as Northwestern University, from which he neither expected nor received any return. 13 One final undertaking before his permanent departure from Chicago was typical of Evans' work. The site he had chosen for Northwestern University was on the shore of Lake Michigan some fourteen miles north 9 Yungmeyer, op. cit., 6; Burgess, op. cit., 5-6; Burgess and Kennedy, op. cit., 176-77. 10 McMechen, op. cit., 76-77. 11 Yungmeyer, op. cit., 6-9, 12. 12 Burgess and Kennedy, op. cit., 177-178. 13 Yungmeyer, op. cit., 9-10. "I doubt," writes McMechen, "that Governor Evans ever entered into any business enterprise without the clear intent to make money. But he also was always willing to use his money for worthy objectives."— McMechen to writer, February 27, 1952. See n. 49, this chapter.

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of the center of the city; his associates had insisted on naming it Evanston. To get there, however, was a slow process by horse and buggy. Therefore, in 1861, Evans formed the Chicago and Evanston Railroad and procured the necessary right of way. Eventually the property was sold to the Milwaukee Road, which still owns and operates it jointly with the Chicago Transit Authority and the Chicago, North Shore and Milwaukee Railroad. 14 The project, however, had barely been chartered when, in May, 1862, President Lincoln appointed Evans territorial governor of Colorado. 15 If ever an area needed a leader who would fight for adequate transportation, it was Colorado in the early sixties, still beleaguered in splendid isolation.16 Seldom has such a specific and magnificent challenge faced a man so eager to accept it. John Evans arrived in Denver in time to attend church services on Sunday, May 18, 1862; 17 it was probably one of the few times during his term as chief executive that he sat still. Within a week he was off to visit Central City,18 and before a month had elapsed he had completed an arduous inspection of Berthoud Pass.19 Since Evans was one of the Pacific Railway commissioners as well as governor, the local press was agog. Would he become the new champion of a transcontinental route through Denver? 20 The question was answered almost before it could be asked. On June 27, Evans invited the city's businessmen to discuss the problem with him at City Hall. As usual, he went straight to the point. A first-rate wagon road, and possibly a railroad, said he, could be built over Berthoud Pass, but the first prerequisite was a survey. Thereupon he passed around a subscription list and saw to it that officers were elected to guide the enterprise. 21 Ten days later he happily announced that $166 had been collected, that the surveyors were on their way, and that more money was needed at once.22 Neither former Governor Gilpin's accusations that Evans was the tool of Chicago railroad interests23 nor Surveyor Case's euphemistic observation that a grade of 122 feet 14

16.

15

Yungmeyer, op. cit., 10-12; F. H. Johnson, The Milwaukee Road, 1847-1944,

McMechen, op. cit., 90. See above, p. 11. RMDN,May 19, 1862. 18 Ibid., May 26, 1862. 19 Ibid., June 21, 1862. 20 /fc^.,June 14, 1862. 21 Ibid., June 26, 27, 1862; Rocky Mountain News (Weekly), hereinafter referred to as RMNW. 22 RMDN, JulyS, 1862. 23 RMNW, July 2% 1862. 16

17

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to the mile was a bit stiff for locomotives deterred the energetic executive.24 He promptly announced his intention of attending a meeting of the Pacific Railway incorporators in Chicago, whereupon the legislature, thoroughly infected by the new governor's optimism, not only urged him to take the trip but heartily recommended him as a full-fledged director of the enterprise.25 Evans left, literally, in a cloud of dust on August 18, having established, in precisely sixty days, a reputation for action that was to stay with him until his dying day.26 So long as there was the least possibility of the projected transcontinental^ using Berthoud Pass, Evans left no stone unturned to bring about that result. Not only did he present his case at Chicago 27 but, after his return to Colorado in November, kept local enthusiasm at a peak by addressing packed meetings at Idaho Springs and Denver. 28 A year later he pleaded the cause again before the managers of the Pacific Railroad in New York.29 His resignation as governor in the summer of 1865 gave him even more time to devote to railway affairs, despite the fact that Colorado designated him senator-elect pending approval of her statehood. As it turned out, her admission to the Union was delayed for a full decade, but the constant possibility, for which the former governor fought hard, brought Evans to Washington. 30 There, in June, 1866, he did his best to persuade Congress to require the Union Pacific to locate its line through Denver. 31 Of Evans' persistence there is no doubt. Yet when the Union Pacific chose the Cheyenne route in mid-November, 1866,32 he wasted not a moment with regrets. Within a fortnight he gave the Chicago Board of Trade a vigorous and comprehensive address on the mineral and agricultural prospects of Colorado and wound up with a specific plea for a direct Chicago-Denver railroad. Completely captivated, the board resolved to make "every exertion in its power" to bring such a line into being.33 And lest they might forget their good intentions, Evans addressed them again on the same subject in the spring of 1868.34 ™RMDN, July 24, 1862. 25 Ibid., August 13, 16, 1862. 26 Ibid., August 18, 1862. 27 RMNW, September 18, 1862. 28 Ibid., December 25, 1862; January 15, 1863. 29 Daily Commonwealth, January 23, 26, 1864. 30 McMechen, op. cit., 153-54. 31 RMDN, June 28, 1866; Quiett, op. cit., 154. 33

iPe above n 12

RMDN, December 1, 4, 5, 11, 20, 1866. 34 Ibid., March 31, April 1, 1868; RMNW, April 1, 1868.

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Meanwhile he plunged wholeheartedly into the Denver Pacific project. After seconding the original proposal for the line at a meeting of the Denver Board of Trade on November 16, 1867, he addressed a mass meeting on behalf of the line two days later, was promptly elected a director, and in December set about seeking donations of ground for a depot and shops.35 His next step, now as president of the road, was to secure clear title to the land grant Congress had previously promised a Denver connection of the Union Pacific. This he accomplished in March, 1869,36 and just over a year later was able to promise the citizens of Denver that the "cars" would reach the city within three months. His prophecy was fulfilled, and he continued to work with and for the company until his retirement from its affairs early in 1872.37 As if these activities were not enough for one man, Evans concerned himself, during the late sixties and throughout the seventies, with at least three other roads. As early as 1867 he sought Denver's support for the Colorado Central's line to Black Hawk and Central City; 38 and when the Denver and Golden groups began to go their separate ways during 1870-71, he urged the rivals to compose their differences and get moving up Clear Creek.39 He supported, in 1871, completion of the Longmont-Greeley stretch, as well as the Georgetown branch, 40 and finally, on November 7, 1877, had the satisfaction of joining other Coloradans on the road's first through train to Cheyenne. 41 An interview with Brigham Young in the spring of 1872 convinced Evans that a road directly west to Salt Lake City could and should be built; 42 but after a year's vain efforts to mobilize capital for the stillborn Denver, Georgetown and Utah, he concentrated his attention on the more feasible South Park project.43 Incorporated on October 1, 1872, with Evans as its first president, the Denver, South Park and Pacific Railway cut its teeth in a sharp struggle with General Palmer's jealous Rio Grande. Evans managed, nevertheless, to secure both public and private financial support in the Denver area.44 Through eight stormy 35

RMDN, November 18, 19, 20, December 28, 1867. Ibid., December 12, 1868; Scott, op. cit., 20-21; Eastman, op. cit., II, 106. The grant amounted to over 7,000,000 acres [Ibid., 110). 37 RMDN, April 1, June 22, 24, 1870; May 10, 1871; February 29, 1872. 38 39 RMDN, December 3, 1867. Ibid., April 30, 1871. 40 Ibid., June 27, August 9, 1871. 41 Ibid., November 9, 1877. See above, p. 17. 42 Ibid., April 16, 1872. 43 Ibid., October 6, 12, 16, 19, November 6, 10, December 13, 1872; June 14, 1873. 44 Ibid., October 2, 4, 1872; July 17, 18, 22, 23, 26, 27, August 5, 1873. See above, pp. 19-20. 36

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years he championed his project against powerful rivals, the relentless onslaughts of nature, and financial vicissitudes.45 He finally had the satisfaction of seeing it reach the South Park in mid-1879, lay plans for extension to Gunnison, and gain access to Leadville before he sold it, late in 1880, to Jay Gould. 46 These manifold activities revealed, as nothing else could, several of Evans' chief characteristics. His conviction that railways were an utter necessity for the economy of any growing community was more firmly established than ever. So was his faith that the public, when thoroughly informed, would support and stand by any project that was clearly to their advantage. Nor would he be deterred by alleged physical or technical obstacles to construction, attacks from the press or political opponents, or threats of rivals. Added to this stubborn single-mindedness was a generous portion of broad vision. Just as he could contemplate, with all seriousness, building over or tunneling under Berthoud Pass in the midsixties, so he could propose striking directly west for Salt Lake City in the mid-seventies. Indeed it was this quality, combined with his unquenchable faith in whatever he undertook, that made him impatient with the narrower but coldly realistic schemes of more "practical" men. What excited Evans were broad objectives and long-run goals. He was not, by training or inclination, an operating man or, except in the broadest sense, a railroad financier.47 Supervision of technical details, the solution of engineering problems, and the raising of money were simply means to an end so far as he was concerned. He delved into them when he had to, but his real talent, and consequently his zeal, lay in formulating large schemes, selling them to the community, and watching them, if they succeeded, quicken the pulse of trade and contribute to the general development of society.48 Unfortunately for his peace of mind and 45 E.g., ibid., February 28, June 5, 6, 27, 1874; January 3, 1875; March 3, April 23, 29, 1876; June 7, September 27, 1877; August 27, November 9, 27, December 3, 7, 13, 1878; January 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 31, February 8, 23, 27, 28, March 6, 28, May 4, 28, 1879. Gf. M. C. Poor, op. cit., passim. 4(i RMDN, June 1, 1879; January 11, February 24, November 18, 1880. See above, p. 20. Cf. Clement Francis Bridenhagen, "John Evans, Western Railroad Builder," passim. 47 The principal basis for this conclusion lies in the evidence presented throughout the following chapters. General Dodge, however, who had long worked with Evans and respected him, said this of him in 1893: "Evans has no experience as a railway operator or manager."—Grenville M. Dodge to Teller, Orahood and Morgan, telegram, December 7?, 1893, Grenville M. Dodge Papers (hereinafter cited as GMD), Box No. 366. For context of statement see below, p. 305. 48 Scott {op. cit., 16) contrasts Gould and Evans in this fashion: "John Evans had a background of experience that enabled him to appreciate the significance of the steam engine and the railroad. Jay Gould, a contemporary of John Evans, inter-

EVANS IN T H E LION'S DEN

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his pocketbook, Evans apparently kept hoping that other railroad promoters could and would acquire, if only for business reasons, the same consideration for the general community welfare that he himself possessed. As a result, he more than once either failed to sense the approach of danger, both to himself and to the area he was attempting to develop, or else felt that the essential Tightness of his position would prevail regardless of the odds against him. 49 Evans realized, of course, that he had to make money to live, and at times—as when he sold the South Park Lines—he apparently had profits very much in mind. 50 Throughout his life, however, his steadiest and preted the steam engine and the railroad as an opportunity to amass a great personal profit. J o h n Evans interpreted the steam engine as in reality a public utility. Jay Gould manipulated railroad stock for personal pecuniary reward. John Evans built and managed railroads as a community and as a national convenience and necessity." 49 I am deeply indebted to the late Edgar C. McMechen, lifelong historian of the Evans family, for his help in attempting a correct evaluation of Governor Evans. From the bare documents, and even from Evans' correspondence, it appears that the Governor was at times incredibly naive in not realizing what risks and dangers he was running in trying to promote or carry through some specific policy that ran directly counter to the plans of powerful, and sometimes less than honest, men. When Mr. McMechen kindly read a preliminary draft of this manuscript, however, he replied as follows: " I could not conceive of Governor Evans as naive. I have always felt that he fully appreciated the dangers which he was courting in dealing with such men as Jay Gould, but that he was so sure of the essential 'rightness' of his position that he was willing to run the risk. Like most of the builders of the West, he would gamble with fate any time to develop the Western Empire, and particularly Colorado, which he loved with an abiding devotion."—McMechen to writer, February 27, 1952. This is most certainly a logical explanation, although it may be suggested that at times the Governor's absorption with objectives and his reliance on the basic decency of mankind may have made him less wary than might have been prudent under the circumstances. See below, pp. 59, 245. 50 Bancroft M S , 5-7; T r o t t m a n , op. cit., 193-94; Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," loc. cit., 657 n. See n. 13, this chapter. According to McMechen, not too much trust should be placed in the Bancroft Manuscript. T h e Bancroft interviewer, he explains, "came to Denver, secured the interview with the Governor, returned to San Francisco and, later, the Manuscript was sent to Governor Evans for his approval, and the $150 which Bancroft asked for publication of these biographies. Governor Evans and, I believe, Mrs. Evans, did not approve the Manuscript, and the Governor declined the contribution. These facts were given me by W. C. Evans [son of the Governor], who was familiar with the entire transaction." — M c M e c h e n to writer, February 27, 1952. Whether the Governor disapproved the manuscript because of inaccuracies, or because at the time it was submitted for approval, probably late in 1889 or early 1890, Evans was in the midst of delicate negotiations with some of the people and interests mentioned therein, or because it did not do justice to the full story, is not clear. Unfortunately it is the only readily available source in respect to many of the complicated developments of the period 1871-88, and in the instances where it can be checked against other sources, appears to be reliable. It should, however, be regarded with McMechen's caveat in mind.

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most lucrative source of income was his investments in real estate,51 a direct result of his conviction that cities like Chicago and Denver were bound to wax great. Quite probably it was to speed this outcome that he devoted so much of his energy to promoting rail transportation. Yet when he was in the thick of a struggle to put some railroad venture through, particularly if opposition was stiff, he would pledge his personal credit beyond the danger point rather than yield.52 Money, like other bothersome details, was a necessary means of gaining far greater, more satisfying ends. Others, particularly those he trusted, did not always see matters in the same light. Because he apparently thought they eventually would, he was prone to advance alone far ahead of his supporting forces and to rely upon oral assurances from potential enemies or dubious friends even though he may have realized that the risks involved should have been limited by written commitments. 53 To a man of Evans' intelligence, there must have been little doubt about the ultimate objectives of the Union Pacific. Both physically and policywise that company was a transcontinental railway first, last, and always; its prime concern was the attraction of through traffic to its main line.54 Consequently if it could not prevent the emergence of railway centers located off its own route, it consistently sought to neutralize or, if necessary, embrace them within its own sphere of influence.55 51

McMechen, op. cit., 74-79. Evans Papers, passim. This was especially true in relation to the South Park Lines during the mid-seventies, when the effects of the panic of 1873 were at their height. Evans had persuaded many of his personal friends to subscribe to the venture and, in addition to his intrinsic interest in the project, felt obligated to stand 53 with them. See below, pp. 245, 254, 291, 294. 54 This is a conclusion that needs further investigation; at present it can be substantiated only by scattered though precise examples of the constant emphasis placed on through traffic over the main line as distinguished from attention to branches and local community development. See, for example, Julius Grodinsky, The Iowa Pool: A Study in Railroad Competition, 1870-84, 30-52, 68-87; Overton, Burlington West, 285, 396-400. In 1895, Dodge, who was perhaps the bestinformed man in the country concerning the Union Pacific, wrote one of that road's directors that "the policy of the Receivers in handling the property has not been as successful as they expected, and I think it comes mostly from their idea of the ability of the main line. Their idea of the capacity and earning power of the main line without the help of the surrounding branches was far less than they supposed." —Dodge to E. A. Atkins, GMD, Box 367. McMechen makes the following observation on this point: "I have felt from my study of the Governor [Evans] . . . that all of his completed or projected roads were conceived upon one theory, i.e. that the Union Pacific was interested in its through traffic and that Colorado inevitably would suffer if it did not fight for its life."—McMechen to writer, February 27, 1952. 55 Denver, of course, is the best example of this apparent tendency, though Lin52

EVANS IN T H E LION'S DEN

49

The fact that the Denver Pacific had to be built largely by local effort may have reflected a lingering hope on the part of the Union Pacific that Denver, if left stranded, would wither and die.56 Yet when the city obviously refused to sink into oblivion, and it became evident that Colorado would not only generate valuable traffic but somehow get it to Eastern markets, the U P spared no pains to make sure that the growing network within the state would be tributary to its own main stem. As the seventies wore on, therefore, the Union Pacific constituted, as Evans doubtless perceived, an ever increasing threat to competitive railway service for Colorado. Indeed it seemed as if the transcontinental were following directly in the former governor's footsteps, picking up each line he had pioneered the moment he went on to another project. First came control of the Colorado Central as a prelude to leasing the line in 1879; next the acquisition of the Denver Pacific, along with the Kansas Pacific, in 1880; and finally, on January 25,1881, title to the South Park. 57 Meanwhile, of course, the Santa Fe, as anxious as the Union Pacific to obtain as much Colorado business as it could for the rail haul east, had outflanked Palmer's Rio Grande on the south and joined that road and the Union Pacific in the ironclad Tripartite Agreement. Behind each one of these moves, in one fashion or another, stood the ominous figure of Jay Gould. 58 No "practical" man concerned simply with immediate prospects would have bucked this situation by launching a new project designed to operate squarely athwart the mighty east-west carriers and in direct competition with the captive Rio Grande. Yet because Evans, captivated by a new vision, did just that, the destiny of Colorado was fundamentally altered,59 and the Rockies-to-Gulf route started on its way. coin, Nebraska, is an equally good case in point, as will become evident from further investigation of the Kearney gateway struggle (Overton, Burlington West, 285) and the prolonged struggle between the Burlington and the Union Pacific for control of internal Nebraska business. (Cf. Thomas M. Davis, "Building the Burlington through Nebraska: A Summary View," Nebraska History, Vol. XXX, No. 4 (December, 1949), 317-47, and the same author's "Lines West! The Story of George W. Holdrege," reprinted from Nebraska History, Vol. XXXI, Nos. 1, 2, 3 (March, June, September, 1950), 25-42. 56 McMechen believes that Evans "was always suspicious of the Union Pacific from the time when it refused to build the Denver Pacific or iron the road."—McMechen to writer, February 27, 1952. Cf. n. 54 above. 57 58 See above, pp. 17, 18, 20. See above, p. 23. 59 McMechen observes on this point: "All of Evans' plans were designed to cut across transcontinental lines, intercept them, and profit from their business. This scheme could not possibly succeed by compromise; it meant a battle at every stage and Evans battled to the end."—McMechen to writer, February 27, 1952.

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Not until the opening days of 1881 did Evans openly call into question the motives of the Union Pacific. As he reminded Jay Gould on January 7, he had been specifically asked, at a previous conference in New York City, to represent the Union Pacific in Denver, "so far as its general interests'' went, by serving as president of both the Colorado Central and the South Park. A telegram from Sidney Dillon, U P president,60 however, had recently canceled his appointment to those posts. To this reversal Evans apparently had no particular objection, but he was anxious to have the company define clearly just what he was supposed to do. 61 The Colorado Legislature was in session, and many members were advocating the regulation of rates and the prohibition of pooling. To make matters more difficult "just at such an unfortunate time," the Union Pacific's own newly appointed general freight agent was increasing tariffs on local South Park business "to a prohibitory point." Consequently, not only was there virtually no traffic offered, but those people who had been encouraged by that railroad to go into business along its line were facing bankruptcy. Quite naturally they were raising a "hue and cry against the oppressions of the U. P. monopoly," and in Evans5 opinion it would be difficult to head off hostile legislation. Furthermore, he gravely doubted whether, as a practical matter, the South Park could be operated at all from so great a distance as Omaha, where local questions could not be well understood. "As I now hold a place of nominal responsibility without any definition of my authority," he concluded, " I ask to know your wishes, and that of the UP&Co. before the matter gets any more unpleasant. Of course I cannot stand in a place to be censured for acts I sought to correct without any control over them." 62 The eventual outcome of Evans' protest was his removal from the South Park board of directors at the next election because, as he later observed, of his "disposition, which was rebellious."63 That turn of events, however, bothered him not at all; there was certainly no purpose to be served in his holding a post of "nominal responsibility." More to the point, his plans and prospects for the newly created Denver and New Orleans, revealed to the public in the evening edition of the Denver Times on January 25, 1881, were dazzling enough to keep his mind off the shortcomings of the Union Pacific. ™PMy 1881, p. 726. 61 Evans to Gould, January 7, 1881 (Evans Letter Book, hereinafter cited as ELB, 206, C&S Archives, Denver). 62 Ibid., 207-11. 63 Bancroft MS, 7.

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51

The primary object of the new corporation was to build a railroad and telegraph line from Denver to a connection with the Texas and Pacific, the Texas Central, 64 and the Missouri, Kansas and Texas at or near Fort Worth. On the way south, the main line, as originally contemplated, would cross the Santa Fe at La Junta, while one branch would turn eastward along the Big Sandy and Republican rivers to meet the oncoming rails of the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad in Nebraska, and another westward to join the Denver and Rio Grande at Colorado Springs.65 The advantages that such a strategically placed enterprise would bring to Denver were substantial indeed. In connection with the Texas Central, the new road would form a virtual air line to the Gulf of Mexico at Galveston, while the Santa Fe would eventually provide an equally direct outlet to that road's projected terminus at Guaymas, on the Gulf of California. From Fort Worth the rails of the Texas and Pacific would lead directly to New Orleans, while the Katy's extension to Laredo, then under construction, would offer the least mountainous route to Mexico City. Of even more immediate concern to the businessmen of Denver, the new road would promptly afford both the Santa Fe and the Burlington a broad-gauge entry into their city.66 "So far," the report concluded, "the enterprise is in the hands of Denver men, and it is predicted that it is to remain so." 67 Evans must have bought a wagonload of the Denver Times that wintry January day, for he immediately began sending the article about his project far and wide. To Thomas Nickerson, president of the Santa Fe, and to W. B. Strong, its general manager, 68 to Gould of the Texas and Pacific, and to Perkins of the Burlington he dispatched the clipping with appropriate covering letters, in each case soliciting financial support. 69 He emphasized the fact that the new company was an independent one owned in Denver and told Perkins, for example, that if it could be built "without sacrificing that character" it would remain so. To Strong he was somewhat more candid, observing that he hoped the company would remain independent at least "until we see how much it will pay to sell," while he bluntly asked Gould whether he would help "raise the 64 65 66 67 68 69

Now part of the MK&T. Reed, op. cit., 219, 386-87. Denver Times, January 25, 1881. See map, p. 54. Denver Times, January 25, 1881; cf. RMDN, January 26, March 3, 1881. Marshall, op. cit.y 93, 143. Evans to Thomas Nickerson, W. B. Strong, J. Gould, and G. E. Perkins, January 25, 1881 (ELB, 215-18, 220).

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money to build it quick" if Evans came to New York at once. He added, thoughtfully, that "we have the matter of legislation for railroads in Colorado pretty effectually blocked I think." Evans' letter of the same date to Winslow, Lanier and Company, New York bankers, was a masterpiece of brevity. Referring to his enclosure from the Times, he pointed out that the line "is over an easy country comparatively level & [with] but little obstruction. It can be built quickly and cheaply. Can you raise the money for it on a fair basis?" 70 But what of the Fort Worth and Denver City? Thanks to Colonel Lawrence, Denverites had long since had a chance to learn of its organization. 71 Evans, however, must either have overlooked the modest notices in the Rocky Mountain News during 1873-74 or have forgotten them, for he subsequently recalled that in 1881 he was not aware of the company's existence.72 However that may be, news of the developments in Denver inevitably reached the ears of the little band of Fort Worth men who still had hopes for their "Denver Road," and early in February one J. H. Creighton of Fort Worth sent off a copy of the Fort Worth's charter and bylaws in a letter to C. B. Kountze, a director of the Denver and New Orleans, 73 who promptly forwarded them to Evans. The latter's reply to Creighton on February 11 was cautious and noncommittal : We have propositions for connections from other parties. . . . Before taking action, however, I will examine your maps, profiles, etc., and hear what the status of your company is—whether it is in debt, and what it will cost to avail ourselves of, and vitilize [sic] it, if practicable to do so. I shall have to go to Texas soon on other matters, and will see you when there if convenient. I may say that the route you have marked out suits us, (except perhaps we might not prefer to connect with the Texas roads at Fort Worth, which I shall investigate) and the surveys made may save us much time, which is an important matter. We hope to build the road very rapidly when we get started. He closed with a request for further information and for an estimate of what it would cost to acquire the Fort Worth's franchise and surveys.74 Before Creighton could respond, Evans received another inquiry from Eddy, president of the Fort Worth. This time, Evans' reply was anything but indefinite. "Your suggestion of a consolidation," he wrote on Febru70 71 72 73 74

Evans to Winslow, Lanier and Company, January 25, 1881 (ELB, 219). See above, pp. 34, 36. Bancroft MS, 7. PM, 1884, p. 861. Evans to Creighton, February 11, 1881 (ELB, 233-34).

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ary 173 "strikes me favorably, and if we can unite on equitable terms and keep our entire line independent, I am sure we can make it pay." He pointed out that the offers of other lines to join the Denver and New Orleans northwest of Fort Worth would not answer his company's purposes, presumably because such an arrangement would bottle up the D&NO and prevent it from exercising the bargaining power it would have by building through to Fort Worth. Outright merger, however, would be something quite different. "If there . . . [are] no entangling alliances in the way of the independence of the consolidated company," he went on, "and if you can get a recognition of your chartered rights, so as to extend the time for its requirements, we will be glad to go in with you and build the road quick. We have assurances of the money to build with when we get in proper shape." 75 Thus simply and swiftly were the first links forged between the two companies eventually destined to join the Rockies and Texas. At this point the Fort Worth officials entrusted further negotiations to the capable hands of General Dodge, whom the indefatigable Lawrence had interested in the project.76 For the next month, however, no specific arrangements were crystallized. Apparently the leaders in each camp, acting independently, took steps to implement their own plans and, incidentally, to strengthen their individual bargaining power. Evans5 attention was devoted to the organization of a construction company, capitalized at $1,500,000, and prepared to build the entire line to Fort Worth in exchange for $20,000 of the Denver and New Orleans' stock and $18,000 of its first-mortgage bonds per mile of line. On March 7, he advised Charles Whitney, president of the Texas Central, that $900,000 of the construction company's capital was already subscribed, and that the figure would probably reach the million-dollar mark in a few days. The remaining half-million, he said, would be reserved for "Eastern or Southern parties" with whom the road might connect or who would assist in floating additional securities. To Whitney he repeated his determination to build clear through to Fort Worth or Dallas so as "to maintain an independent position" and do business on the basis of equitable traffic arrangements with all connecting lines "fairly and impartially." 77 On the following day he formally incorporated his construction company and on March 19 signed a contract with the railroad in accordance with the plan outlined to Whitney. 78 75

Evans to Eddy, February 17, 1881 (ELB, 237-38). Evans to Dodge, March 19, 1881 (ELB, 254-55); RMDN, March 28, 1888. 77 Evans to Whitney, March 7, 1881 (ELB, 242-44). 78 John Evans, "Statement regarding the Denver and New Orleans Railroad . . . 76

^ O ^

JJNION

PACIFIC

(18672.

m 545-46. The agreement covered many other matters, such as the joint use of tracks between El Paso and Sierra Blanca, the relinquishment of the Texas and Pacific land grant in Arizona and New Mexico to the Southern Pacific, and so on. Ibid. Cf. Traxler, "Thirty-second Parallel Railroad," passim, 18 R. L. Hoyt, op.cit.,p. 1. 19 Memorandum, December 18, 1882, in FW&DC Minute Book, II, 26-27 (Secretary's File, FW&DC). 16

17

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from doing so only at the last minute by the agreement with Huntington that brought the T&P to a halt at Sierra Blanca. Consequently, there was on hand or en route enough material to build nearly 100 miles of track. It belonged, of course, not to the Texas and Pacific, but to the Gould-Dodge Pacific Railway Improvement Company, which had had the contract to build that road. One story goes that the General intercepted it at Fort Worth and calmly proceeded to use it in building the Denver Road's first division into Wichita Falls, 110 miles away.20 Another version credits Dodge's "hard-drinking, hard-working, fun-loving Irish tracklayers" at Hodge with appropriating the material by their own efforts.21 At any rate, Gould, understandably enough, objected strenuously and wrote the General that under the circumstances he was entitled to an interest in the Texas and Colorado Railway Improvement Company, which had allegedly helped itself to the material. Not even bothering to answer, Dodge went ahead with his work, and about a year later Gould himself came to Fort Worth bent upon squaring accounts. When the two men met in the presence of state Senator A. M. Carter, so the story goes, Dodge opened the conversation by recalling that some time previously Gould had been given two million dollars by the Texas and Pacific to buy new equipment and that Gould himself had sidetracked the new cars in the Missouri Pacific shops at Sedalia, Missouri, painted out "Texas and Pacific," and substituted therefor "Missouri Pacific." He had then, so Dodge recalled, reversed the procedure on some old Missouri Pacific equipment and sent the latter along to the luckless Texas and Pacific. Gould, whose memory was quite as good as Dodge's, was said to have suggested a prompt adjournment of the conference.22 Whatever the precise details may have been, the episode sheds revealing light on the characters of the two principals, and particularly on their extraordinary relationship. It would appear that if he thought he could get away with it, Gould, with a perfectly straight face, would claim everything in sight. But when he found that the sharp-eyed Dodge was fully aware of his game, he was perfectly willing to back down with no hard feeling.23 In any event, the fortunes of the Fort Worth and Denver City, in the General's capable hands, suffered not at all. 20 21

3,4.

Reed, op. cit.3 394; Biographical Directory, 88. McCarty, "Background History of the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway,"

22 Reed, op. cit., 394. According to this source, Senator Carter, who was present at the Dodge-Gould conference, told the story to his law partner, Judge A. H. Carrigan of Wichita Falls, who in turn related it to Reed. 23 Ibid.; Masterson, op. cit., 223; Biographical Directory, 88.

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Meanwhile, grading was well under way. By February 27, 1882, the initial stretch was ready for track, and with appropriate ceremony a shiny silver spike was used to fasten the first rail into place at Hodge. 24 From that moment on, progress was rapid. Within the next sixty days the line was ironed to Decatur, forty miles way, and the Denver Road was ready for business.25 At that very moment, however, the entire enterprise suffered a blow that might have killed a less hardy plant. Early in 1882 the Texas Legislature suddenly awakened to the fact that its various predecessors had granted to railways already built, and had promised to Confederate veterans, a total of some eight million more acres of state land than remained unappropriated. Consequently, on April 22, 1882, a law was passed which, in effect, nullified all railway land grants which had not already been located and certified, including that of the Fort Worth and Denver City.26 Thus in one fell stroke the company lost a potential bonanza of more than four million acres; the difference this would have made in the fortunes of the road could hardly be calculated. 27 Neither Dodge nor Eddy wasted time with regrets; possibly they had foreseen just such a development, for they had not financed their line through the usual medium of land-grant bonds. Moreover, they had a newly completed piece of railroad ready to operate. Hence they wisely concentrated their efforts on putting it to work without a moment's delay. So it was that May 1, 1882, became a day to remember in Texas history. Bright and early on that Monday morning—at seven o'clock to be exact—the Fort Worth and Denver City's first regular trains started their maiden trips simultaneously from both ends of the line, to be followed by afternoon trains in each direction. As might have been expected, the occasion was far from an ordinary one. On board the northbound morning train as it pulled out of the Texas and Pacific Depot at 24

Years later Van Zandt recalled that a silver spike had been used to fasten the first rail laid at Hodge, and believed there had been some sort of celebration, although he had not attended himself (Dallas News, May 31, 1925). There seems little question about the silver spike, since Governor Evans was reported to have displayed it (as the first spike driven in the FW&DC) when he addressed the Denver Chamber of Commerce on March 27, 1888 (RMDN, March 28, 1888). 25 McCluney, op. cit., 5; Memorandum of December 18, 1882, loc. cit. 26 Reed, op. cit., 152-55, 396. 27 By way of comparison, the acreage involved exceeded the total of the Burlington's Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska grants, sale of which contributed much to the strength of that system. Overton, Burlington West, 4, 58; W. W. Baldwin, vicepresident of CB&Q, to W. O. Mitchell, Bureau of Valuation, ICC, March 18, 1922 (CB&Q Archives).

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Fort Worth were those, among others, who were taking advantage of the company's advertised offer of a special two-dollar excursion ticket for anyone who wanted to attend the town-lot sale at Decatur during the day and the grand ball there that evening. Obviously business and pleasure were to march hand in hand. 28 During July the tracks reached and passed Bowie and Henrietta, and on September 21 President Eddy accepted on behalf of the railroad the last ten-mile stretch into Wichita Falls, 110 miles from Hodge. 29 Actually the company operated 114 miles, including the leased trackage between Hodge and Fort Worth. 30 With the completion of this first division, Dodge prudently suspended further construction, as he had said he would, 31 against the day when Governor Evans could resume building south of Pueblo. The General's decision was as wise as it was unusual. Wichita Falls, as matters then stood, could effectively attract business from such points as Seymour, Mobeetie, Clarendon, Fort Sill, and Vernon, thus gathering to itself a considerable and growing trade which had previously found its way to market via Fort Dodge, Kansas, the long-established shipping point on the Santa Fe. 32 The prompt inauguration of Frank Chris's stage line northwestward to Childress and Tascosa opened still other possibilities and constituted a preliminary link with the territory the railway hoped someday to serve.33 Furthermore, although such way points as 23 Fort Worth Daily Democrat-Advance, April 30, 1882. The afternoon trains left Fort Worth at 12:15 P.M. and Decatur at 1:30 P.M. Running time for the forty miles varied between three and one-half and four and one-half hours; all trains were listed as "passenger and freight," i.e., "mixed" trains which were expected to do all pick-up and set-out work on the way. Ibid. 29 Texas and Colorado Railway Improvement Co., Small Record Book, FW&DC Files (hereinafter cited as TCI, SRB), 29. This book, apparently kept by General Dodge to record payments from the railroad company, includes exact transcriptions of resolutions adopted by the executive committee of the railroad. Since the railroad company's own records were destroyed by fire in 1898, this book is the only known record of the railway proceedings in this period, and of course is limited to the transactions specified. The book was borrowed from the executor of the Dodge Estate by the ICC accountants who prepared the Valuation Docket of the Fort Worth and Denver City. Copies of excerpts from this book are in the files of the secretary of the FW&DC, and a duplicate copy has been deposited with the secretary of the CB&Q. 30 Memorandum of December 18, 1882, loc. cit., 1. 31 Dodge to Tyler, August 21, 1882 (GMD, No. 362). See above, pp. 86, 87. 32 Fort Worth Gazette, undated clipping, probably 1883, C. L. Frost Scrap Book in the possession of his son, Norman Frost, of Fort Worth (hereinafter referred to as CLF); Waters, op. cit., 146-52; Marshall, op. cit., 67-73, 396-97. 33 Childress Chronicle, July 14, 1938. On October 22, 1936, the Texas Centennial Commission placed a marker on this route at Buck Creek Stand, seventeen miles northwest of Childress.

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Decatur and Henrietta had been settled in advance of the railway's coming, they were as ripe for development as the brand-new settlements that owed their very existence to the rails, such as Rhome, Alvord, Sunset, and Bowie.34 Despite the temptation, therefore, to press toward completion of the entire line, Dodge, like a seasoned campaigner, chose to consolidate his gains and put the modest railroad he had on a healthy, paying basis before moving forward. By so doing he avoided the fate of many an overambitious builder 35 and laid one of the foundation stones of the company's future prosperity. Physically, the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway of 1882 was hardly imposing. Its total motive power and equipment consisted of eight locomotives; two "first-class," four "second-class," and four "combination" passenger cars; two hundred boxcars; two hundred flatcars, of which fifty were being converted into gondolas for carrying coal; and the usual assortment of handcars and other maintenance equipment. But, the company insisted, the road had been built "in a most substantial manner with heavy steel rails" (52 pounds to the yard), and it was eager to shoulder whatever business it could attract. 36 Not the least of the line's assets was its combination superintendent, general freight and passenger agent, and treasurer, C. L. Frost.37 He it was who had thought up the immense railway map that was hung on Fort Worth's courhouse back in 1873. 38 Now, in charge of a reality rather than a dream, he dived into his work with energy, common sense, and an indispensable talent for winning friends for the railroad. "He understands," wrote an on-line paper some years later, "that the business of the road prospers or suffers as the success or failure of the people along the line; . . . Colonel Frost will work for his road and his people as a beaver works on his dam, with determined mind and steady licks."39 Not long after the line had reached Decatur, there occurred an incident, minor in itself, which gives a clue to his extraordinary popularity. 34

Fort Worth Gazette (?), 1884 (CLF). See, in general, the many accounts of overextended roads in MacGill and Meyer, op. cit., passim. Two specific examples, to select at random, were the Michigan Central, under state ownership (Pearson, op. cit., 21-31), and the Minneapolis and St. Louis (Frank P. Donovan, Mileposts on the Prairie, 123-35). 36 Memorandum of December 18, 1882, loc. cit., 1; PM, 1882, p. 824. 37 FW&DC-WV, passenger traffic department, "Memo Outline of History," April 15, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as FW&DC, Memo Outline), 1; Fort Worth Evening Mail, November 1, 1890; Fort Worth Gazette, November 2, 1890; PM, 1882, p. 824. Actually Frost was probably only the local treasurer, or paymaster. FW&DC, AR, 1883, p. 2; Fort Worth Gazette (?), May 15, 1887 (CLF). 38 See above, p. 34. 39 Quanah Advance, January, 1887 (CLF). 35

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When the offices of the Decatur Independent were completely gutted by fire, Frost shipped in a new press and equipment free of all freight charges. While saving twenty-three dollars was no small matter in getting started again, observed the grateful editor, it was the kindness that was appreciated. "Corporations," he continued, "may generally have no souls, but the F.W.&D.C. Ry. Co. has. Theirs is the best railroad in the state anyway, and if Col. Frost ever has any fighting to do up in this neck of the woods, we'll help hire a man to do it if we can't do it ourself."40 Nor was Frost's reputation built solely on kindness. While the railhead was still at Bowie, he was being complimented on the smoothness with which his trains rode—"no perceptible jar at rates of 28 to 35 miles per hour" 41 —and when another editor praised him for his safety record, he was quoted as replying that it was "far better to keep [the road] . . . in order so that trains will stay on the track than to be continually paying for 'smash-ups.5 " 42 The Denver Road's reputation for dependability and friendliness, solidly established at the outset, was to prove of inestimable value over the years. From the beginning, of course, the railway, or more precisely all those who had a financial stake in its success, were exceedingly active in the promotion of on-line townsites. As at Decatur, so at Bowie, an excursion was organized the moment the rails arrived. 43 At Wichita Falls, Nature played squarely into the hands of the planners and promoters. As originally laid out, the town was neatly bisected by the projected route of the road, an arrangement obviously beneficial both to the company and to the inhabitants. When the threat of floods forced the town fathers to consider moving seven miles to the south bank of the Wichita River, therefore, they urgently requested the road to resurvey its line so that the rails would pass through the new business district. This the company agreed to do upon the condition, which was speedily met, that the landowners donate not only the necessary right of way but half the property adjacent thereto. Thereupon General Dodge and his son-in-law, R. E. Montgomery, organized the Texas Townsite Company to hold and dispose of the lands so acquired. 44 Sales in the new development began the moment the first construction train, with a single passenger car hitched to the rear end, ground to 40

Decatur Independent, 1882? (CLF). Unidentified clipping, 1882 (CLF). 42 Unidentified clipping, 1884 (CLF). 43 Unidentified clipping, 1882 (CLF). 44 Betty Illane Offutt, ' T h e History of the Fort Worth & Denver City Railway in My Home County," 3 (FW&DC Files); Robert Gerner, "History of the Fort Worth & Denver City Railway in Donley County," 4 (FW&DC Files). 41

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a stop in Wichita Falls on September 24, 1882. Two days later a special train, offering reduced fares, brought a capacity load of prospective purchasers from Fort Worth and way points to participate in the grand public sale advertised for September 27. Average lots went for prices between two and five hundred dollars, although one choice business location brought more than one thousand. Cash was required for purchases under one hundred dollars; but on sales over that amount only half the price was payable immediately, one-quarter in six months, and the balance at the end of a year. All deferred payments were subject to 10 per cent interest, and to be on the safe side a vendor's lien was placed on the property until all notes were paid. 45 The General, obviously, had had long experience in Western land promotion. 46 Just how Dodge acquired this Wichita Falls property for the Texas Townsite Company is not wholly clear. His Texas and Colorado Railway Improvement Company had the charter right to purchase, hold, and sell town lots if it so desired; 47 and in the contract of April 29, 1881, the railroad apparently assigned to the construction firm any lands and lots it might receive during the life of that contract. 48 But whether title to the lands actually passed from the original owners through the railway and construction companies, or went directly to the townsite company, is not a matter of available record.49 The point is that the railroad corporation as such did not directly participate in the Wichita Falls promotion, but that Dodge, who held a construction contract with the railroad and thus had a beneficial interest in its securities, did. The whole situation was typical of the much-misunderstood relationship that existed frequently at the time between railways on the one hand and construction and townsite companies on the other. Why, if there was money to be made in the construction of railroads and in the promotion of townsites, did railway corporations turn these activities over to separate companies, often with some or all of the same officials in charge, and why did the railway stockholders agree to such a common practice? 45

Offutt, op. cit., 3. Boxes No. 218, 219, 239, and 241 in the Grenville M. Dodge Papers at Des Moines contain material on Dodge's townsite interests. See also Traxler, "Thirtysecond Parallel Railroad," passim. This subject deserves further investigation. 47 CTI, RB, loc. cit., 5, 15. 48 When the contract was canceled in 1885 (see below, p. 121), the railway paid the construction company $340,000 (par value) in stock for the latter's interest in "various claims, town sites, and construction materials." 134 ICG 750-51. 49 The available records of the construction company do not reveal any transaction with the Texas Townsite Company, although the final statement, dated May 25, 1885, shows receipts of $22,468.69 from "depot sites and subsidies." TCI, SRB, loc. cit., 6. 46

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The principal reason, so simple as to sound facetious if not naive, was that whereas money might be made, it might also be lost. The type of risk inherent in building a line through virgin territory or sponsoring a real estate promotion in the raw West was wholly different and far more speculative than that involved in transporting goods and people, once a line was built, under relatively predictable conditions. Preliminary construction estimates, for one thing, were then little more than crude guesses; it was frequently found that topographical or climatic conditions, as well as the availability and cost of supplies, labor, and capital, were far different from what was supposed.50 For much the same reasons, it might be years before a townsite, projected with high hopes, actually "caught on," if indeed it did at all.51 Therefore why should young railroad corporations, whose prime obligation to operate profitably imposed risks enough, borrow the uncharted hazards of construction and townsite promotion as well? The answer is, of course, that many of them did not, preferring to arrange for construction on an agreed per-mile basis, the amount usually payable in securities of the road, 52 and to leave townsite promotion to groups of individuals—frequently their own officers—who were willing to risk their private funds.53 It is perfectly true that in so doing many a line, as it turned out, probably paid more, on a par value basis, for particular stretches of its road than the actual cost of construction; similarly, others doubtless failed to participate in profits from rising land values created by their own coming.54 Meanwhile, however, they had been spared the burden of offsetting failures and, so far as successful boom towns were concerned, immediately derived the full benefit of the traffic they created. 55 50 Even as experienced a road as the CB&Q underestimated the cost of its thirtyeight-mile Aurora Cut-OfT in 1864 by approximately a quarter of a million dollars. CB&Q, AR, 1858, pp. 19-22; 1864, pp. 11-12; 1865, pp. 10-12. 51 The saga of townsite failures is a long one. For six months John Evans and others strove mightily to develop Oreapolis, Nebraska, to no avail (Evans Papers); John Murray Forbes had little better luck with his "New England Colony" on the Hannibal and St. Joseph (Burlington Archives, Newberry Library, hereinafter referred to as BA, G. S. Harris letters, Item 8 H3.12). Excellent examples on the FW&DC were Cheyenne and Tascosa (see below, pp. 172-74). 52 The Fort Worth and Denver City tried building approximately ninety miles of its own line, but later reverted to the construction company procedure. See below, pp. 128-29. 53 Cf. James B. Hedges, The Federal Railway Land Subsidy Policy of Canada. 54 See below, p. 211. 55 E.g., Overton, Burlington West, 288-89; Frank E. Day, Northwestern University, is preparing a doctoral dissertation on railway townsite activities along the Burlington, which should shed much light on this situation.

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Even the more established lines took an extremely cautious view of collateral enterprises that might either involve risking stockholders' money in undertakings not immediately connected with ordinary operations or, if things turned out well, bring personal profit to officials of the road. On May 2, 1881, just when the Denver Road was getting under way, Perkins of the Burlington, for example, had this to say to his general manager concerning some promising coal lands in Nebraska: I have yours about coal in Pawnee. If there is good workable coal there, it will be of great value to us and to whoever gets it. Its great value to the Road will keep you and me from going into it individually, and the question then will be—shall the Company buy a lot of land for this chance, or shall we find individuals not connected with the Road who will go there and either buy land or make leases, using their own money, we agreeing if the case is all right to build a road to it. The latter strikes me as the best scheme, and I think you had better see if you can find parties who possess the necessary knowledge and means to take hold of it.56 The fact that Dodge was in a position to gain a great deal of money because of the railroad's construction and its effect upon town lot values while, at the same time, he held a prospective interest in the railway's stock and most certainly exerted control over its policy, is indisputable; yet that fact is out of context unless related to the risks he and his associates took. In the specific case of the Fort Worth and Denver City, incidentally, the privilege of owning and developing townsites was regarded as a payment in kind for services rendered; in other words, it was another device by which the company got something done without having to produce the one thing it did not have, cash. Montgomery, in addition to his participation in the Texas Townsite Company, had charge of securing the company's right of way beyond Wichita Falls. His only recompense, beyond actual expenses, was ownership of the townsites along the way. In fact, for three years he paid his own expenses out of town lot receipts before charging the company anything. 57 56 Perkins to A. E. Touzalin, May 2, 1881 (General Material, 1879-1892, 41, in Perkins Papers, Overton Collection). 57 On September 11, 1885, when the affairs of the Texas and Colorado Railway Improvement Company were being wound up, J. T. Granger, assistant secretary of that organization, wrote W. A. Ross, auditor of the Fort Worth and Denver City, as follows: "I note what you say about having made no charges so far for right of way on the extension north of Wichita Falls. Mr. Montgomery has filed here a large number of vouchers covering expenditures on account of right of way for the past two or three years, which expenses have been paid by him out of the proceeds of town lot sales, and for which, of course, he must have credit."—FW&DC Files. Cf. Gerner, op. cit., 4.

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So far as construction was concerned, there was another consideration quite apart from the matter of risk which led—and still does—to the employment of separate construction firms. Building a railroad, unlike operating it, was something that was done just once, not year in and year out. This required specialized equipment for such things as surveying, grading, track-laying, and the like, and men in charge who were experienced in purchasing, engineering, and financing. Few if any of the nation's newborn railway companies had, or could afford to acquire, such equipment and personnel. About all they had was a charter giving them authority to build and to issue securities. Hence the logical and usual thing to do was to hire a contractor like Dodge who had not only his own tools and specialists but a wealth of experience and established contacts with Eastern financiers. The same arguments often applied to townsite promotion. That, too, was a specialized operation; young railroad corporations had neither the capital nor the staff to manage it effectively, nor could they afford to wait for their money. Later on, of course, as established railroad companies began to accumulate reserve funds of their own, they tended to take over more and more of the functions originally discharged by the construction companies, particularly over long periods of rather constant expansion.58 Even so, they continued to hire out a substantial portion of any major new building. 59 In the case of the Denver Road, the lack of adequate capital in Texas was enough in itself to force reliance upon the construction company device ; it had taken all the energy the incorporators could muster to bring in enough cash from the initial stock subscriptions to permit organization under the charter. They could not hope to sell their securities on the open market before the road was in operation save for a fraction of their par value; yet their sole negotiable assets were represented by their unissued stock and bonds. Who else but a contractor would accept them at par, as Dodge did, in exchange for work to be performed? He might, and actually did, have to hold them for years before converting them into cash or realizing any substantial return; meanwhile his stock might—and almost did—lose all value if the railway fell into financial straits.60 According to the construction company contract of April 29, 1881, 58 E.g., CB&Q, AR} 1875-1900, passim; Davis, "Lines West! The Story of George W. Holdrege," loc. cit.y esp. pp. 27-53. 59 For a modern example of construction by contract, see current CB&Q files concerning the Brookfield-Kansas City Cut-Off. 60 See below, pp. 331-51.

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the expenses of running the line as completed and accepted were borne by the railroad company, but the cash used to cover actual construction costs came from the treasury of the Texas and Colorado Railway Improvement Company, into which its stockholders had paid, when called upon, assessments upon their subscriptions. U p to the time the road reached Wichita Falls in September, six installments of 10 per cent each had been called for; 61 and since there was at the time $2,735,000 par value in stock outstanding, this represented (assuming it was all paid in on time) a collection of $1,641,000. If, as subsequent records indicated,62 this sum was virtually all spent to build the first 110 miles, it represented an outlay of approximately $14,900 per mile. This obviously was a major operation far beyond the resources of local capital. As might have been expected, over 90 per cent of the Improvement Company's stock was held outside Texas, most of it in New York City, where Dodge maintained an office and enjoyed an excellent reputation among financiers. Of the 166 stockholders in all, 85 were in New York, 31 in St. Louis, 10 in Philadelphia, 5 in Boston, 4 in Louisville, and 1 in Chicago. Of the 30 remaining, just 11 were residents of Fort Worth; the rest were scattered over the nation. Average holdings were just under 165 shares per person, and the pre-eminent position of the New York stockholders was even more sharply indicated by the fact that of the 18 persons or firms who held more than 250 shares each, 14 (with 8,200 shares) were in that city; Dodge himself held 750 shares.63 The four large stockholders living elsewhere included W. T. Walters of Baltimore, the largest single holder of all with 1,500 shares, Charles Baird of Philadelphia with 500, and John C. Brown of St. Louis, who held 300 shares for the Missouri Pacific. The fourth was Morgan Jones of Fort Worth with 800 shares. He, together with ten other residents of the "home city," controlled just under 8 per cent of the total; only Major Van Zandt, with 100 shares, and Mrs. C. L. Frost, with 50, represented those who had originally incorporated the railroad. 64 Logically enough, 61 The first assessment of 10 per cent, it will be recalled, was payable September 20, 1881. Subsequent assessments of 10 per cent each were made payable on January 15, March 15, May 10, June 22, and August 29, 1882, bringing the total paid in to 60 per cent. Texas and Colorado Improvement Company, RB, loc. cit., 14, 20-23, 30. 62 Final Statement, May 25, 1885 (TCI, SRB, 14). 63 CTI, RB, loc. cit., 1-4. The other Fort Worth holders were J. M. Brown (200 shares), Daniel Cooper (100), C. P. Cowen (100), Max Elser (100), George Hendricks (100), Mrs. Sallie Huffman (100), S. W. Lomax, trustee (100), and John D. Templeton (300). Including Mrs. Frost, Jones, and Van Zandt, this local group held 2,130 shares. ^ Ibid.

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however, Jones was elected president and director of the railway in 1883, thus establishing a strong local link between the railway and the construction company. 65 The implications of this situation were several, and they had a fundamental bearing on the company's subsequent internal strategy. For one thing, the geographical distribution of the construction company's stock reflected the usual pattern of Eastern control of Western enterprise and, in this case, concentration of that control in New York. Secondly, in view of the contract between the railway and the construction company whereby the latter was paid in bonds and stocks of the former, it was inevitable that control of the railway should eventually be exercised by virtually the same persons who invested in the Improvement Comany, provided they chose to retain such stock of the Denver Road as they might receive in the form of dividends. Finally, it was apparent—and thoroughly accepted by all concerned—that to all intents and purposes Dodge, despite his relatively small financial stake, was in actual control of the entire situation. It was the General who had placed the construction company stock among his Eastern associates; they, in a very real sense, were investing as much in the man as in the project, for they looked upon him not only as an extremely capable engineer, but as an experienced financier and strategist whose judgment and integrity could be implicitly trusted. 66 The railway's officers at Fort Worth had already demonstrated that they shared this opinion; Eddy's patent anxiety to conform to Dodge's wishes in respect to the issuing of bonds was a case in point.67 Hard as it is to measure human relationships in precise terms, it was already clear that the General's hold over his colleagues, however intangible, was extremely strong. The events of 1882 and thereafter were to prove that bond durable as well. As Eddy, on behalf of the railway, accepted for operation the completed segments of the road, his directors duly authorized the Mercantile Trust Company of New York, as trustee, to deliver the appropriate number of bonds to the Texas and Colorado Railway Improvement Com65

FW&DC,,4tf, 1883, p. 2. See below, p. 343. Cf. W. T. Walters to Dodge, December (no day given), 1890 (GMD, No. 186). 67 See above, pp. 91-92. Cf. the subsequent testimony of C. F. Meek, general manager of the Denver, Texas and Fort Worth and its successor, 1887-91, to the effect that "he always considered G. M. Dodge as owner of the property, and his wishes and commands were always complied with as such whether he held any office or not."—Stanley, Spoonts and Meek, attorneys for the FW&DC, to Dodge, July 25, 1891 (GMD, No. 194). 66

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pany in accordance with the contract between the two organizations; and at the same time an equal amount of stock was transferred directly to Dodge as president of the construction company. 68 At face value, those securities amounted to forty thousand dollars per mile, as against a probable construction cost of about fifteen thousand dollars per mile. Actually, of course, the cash value of the railroad's securities, particularly the stock, was problematical, and in receiving it the Improvement Company was shouldering a substantial risk. In July, 1882, Dodge was empowered by the Improvement Company's directors to sell or transfer such stock as was or might be received, and just a year later the stockholders ratified this action for the specific purpose of "maintaining the price of the securities" in question.69 When, on October 10, 1882, with the road safely built to Wichita Falls and accepted by the railway, the construction company directors finally felt justified in reimbursing themselves for the first time, the 70 per cent dividend they authorized was in the Denver Road's first-mortgage bonds; 70 not until three years later, when the Improvement Company was dissolved, was the railway stock it had received distributed to its stockholders.71 To launch a railroad, even into a most promising area of future development and potential traffic, required men of capital who could take a risk and afford to wait for profits. They, of course, were not the only ones who took a risk under the prevailing dispensation. The Fort Worth and Denver City, like any other railroad under similar circumstances, had had to take a chance of a very different sort for the simple reason that it had no alternative: if Dodge and his construction company associates had been dishonest, they could have ruined, or at least seriously compromised, the railroad itself. If, as in the case of the contractors who built the first forty miles of the Union Pacific,72 they had laid down a jerry-built line unfit for operation, the Denver Road would simply have been stuck. If, to the extent that they controlled the railway officers, they had made one-sided contracts with themselves, paid to themselves construction company dividends out of working capital, or even used funds earmarked for one project on quite a different one—all of which was done on the notorious "River Roads" near Dubuque in the mid-seventies73—the FW&DC would probably have gone speedily bankrupt. 68

TCI, SRB, he. cit., 2-9. CTI, RB, 29-33. 70 Ibid., 28. 71 Ibid., entry of July 1, 1885, no page number. For further discussion of the FW&DC stock distribution, see below, p. 121. 72 Perkins, op. cit., 196-97. 73 J. M. Forbes to Sidney Bartlett (both directors of the CB&Q), November 12, 69

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Worse yet, had they used their construction company stock as a bribe to gain political favors, as was done by the Credit Mobilier,74 everyone involved would have been tarred by the same brush of fraud and corruption. It was precisely such practices as these which brought the entire construction company procedure—and especially the custom of having the same men serve as both railway and contracting officials—under such a dark cloud of public disapproval. 75 Yet the perfectly justifiable clamor, indignation, and legislation these abuses provoked tended to obscure one point: if the individuals involved were honest, the wholly logical construction company device worked to the benefit of all concerned.76 The same thing was true of townsite promotions. What happened on the Fort Worth and Denver City must be judged in terms of performance and in the light of the benefits or handicaps that accrued to the railway company and the territory it served. One thing is clear: both Dodge and the railway officials, as well as all the various stockholders involved, accepted the construction company and townsite promotion activities as a matter of course. There was never, so far as the source records reveal, the slightest disposition on the part of anyone to conceal or misrepresent the rather complex interorganization relationships. In the fall of 1885, for example, the General's secretary wrote Eddy, who by that time had left the railroad, advising him that he had sent Montgomery's vouchers to Dodge's brother for inspection. "You can go over them," said he, u and see what money has been spent for by the Texas Townsite Co. After inspection, send to Morgan Jones [then president of the railway company] at Ft. Worth so stockholders may see before they are paid." 77 Dodge's affiliation with the construction company was equally well understood by all his business connections and was frequently referred to in the press; 78 not only in his me1873 [General Material, 1865-1873, n.p., Perkins Papers, loc. cit.); "Circular to Dubuque River Road Bondholders,'' March 2, 1877, never issued (BA, Item 8 C6.1). 74 Perkins, op. cit., 266-68. 75 James A. Barnes, Wealth of the American People, 635-36; Stuart Daggett, Principles of Inland Transportation, 750. 76 Even James F. Joy, whose railway career was eventually terminated because the directors of the CB&Q ousted him for his allegedly unethical practices in connection with the River Roads, maintained stoutly that despite such mistakes as he might have made, the construction company system as such was effective and not contrary to the interests of any railroad. Joy to Bartlett, February 22, 1875, Illinois Central Archives, Newberry Library. 77 Granger to Eddy, November 18, 1885 (GMD, No. 362); Perkins, op. cit., 184. 78 E.g., DT, December 8, 1886; Fort Worth Daily Gazette (hereinafter referred

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ticulously kept account books but in correspondence as well, he was careful to make perfectly clear in which capacity he was acting. 79 As time went on, the General inevitably acquired a substantial stock interest in the railway, and years later, after completion of the line, he became a director.80 Yet there is not one shred of evidence to suggest that at any time the Fort Worth and Denver City suffered from his acting in a dual or, if the Townsite Company be included, triple capacity. On the basis of his accomplishments, in fact, the evidence points in quite the opposite direction. Certain it was that as Eddy wrote up the railway's first Annual Report for distribution at the end of 1882, the famous eyes of Texas were little concerned with Dodge's precise status, or with the arrangements by which he had coaxed Eastern dollars to transform a Texas idea into reality. Rather they were fixed hopefully upon the smooth new rails, the brightly varnished equipment, and the bustling communities alongside the new Denver Road. "The condition of the track and roadway," reported Eddy with evident pride, "will compare favorably with that of the best railways in the Southwest. The country adjacent to the line is being rapidly settled up, and the new towns show a rapid and healthy growth." New business, he said, was being developed almost daily, and he drew especial attention to the adjacent coal fields, which were expected to satisfy the road's own fuel requirements and provide a steady source of traffic as well. "The line on which your railway is built," he concluded, "controls the trade of the upper Red River Valley, and the Pan Handle of Texas, the finest agricultural and grazing portion of the state." 81 Indeed, the movement of nearly three million ton-miles of freight during the first six months of operation 82 and the fact that earnings had continued to advance, even after the road stopped carrying construction materials in September, 83 were no mean accomplishments. Of the total of 2,765 carloads moved (in trains averaging 13.7 loaded cars each), lumber accounted for 1,081, vividly reflecting the amount of new building in the territory. "Miscellaneous" carloads ranked next with 809, but livestock was close behind with 797, and flour, the only other category given, to as FWDG), March 15, 1888; RMDN, March 28, 1888; Biographical Directory, 88.79 CTI, RB, passim; CTI, SRB, passim; GMD, Nos. 185, 188-93, 197-99, 35158,80361-63, 365, passim. See below, p. 260. 81 FW&DG, AR, 1882, p. 2. 82 Ibid., 4. 83 Memorandum of December 18, 1882, loc. cit.

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last with 78. Separately listed, however, were 3,670 bales of cotton. 84 In another respect, a record had been established that was little short of miraculous for the day: In rolling up over two million passenger-miles, the company had not had a single accident with any passenger train, and "no serious ones" with freight trains. No passenger or employee had been killed or even sufTered "injury to limb." 85 It was an achievement of which the new company might well be proud. As to the future, Eddy simply made the conventional statement that "a steady increase of the business of your Company can be expected" from the development of the Panhandle. 86 An unsigned intracompany memorandum, dated December 18 and probably written by Eddy, made it clear, however, that the hoped-for increase might not come without considerably more effort on the part of the railroad. As it was, construction had halted at Wichita Falls "because the progress of the Denver and New Orleans Railroad [had] been stopped at Pueblo" and because it was thought that from Wichita Falls the road could control the traffic of the Panhandle, "the greatest cattle-raising portion of the Union." But population was already pouring in so rapidly that it was even now apparent that extension to Vernon, fifty miles farther along in Wilbarger County, would be necessary to make sure of the Panhandle business that was fast becoming available. Hence, "as soon as the Denver and New Orleans Company are in a position to continue their road from Pueblo to the Canadian River," continued the memorandum, "it will be advisable to at once continue the construction of the Ft. W. & D. C. road, as the connection between the two roads will complete one of the most important and paying trunk lines in the Union, uniting as it will the Rocky Mountain country with tide water of the Gulf of Mexico and constituting the shortest possible distance between ocean transportation and the great and growing Northwest." 87 This candid analysis made it clear that the sponsors of the Denver Road had by no means abandoned their determination to become part of a great intersectional through route; it was not by choice that they had halted construction at Wichita Falls. For those tenaciously holding to the original Gulf-to-Rockies idea, developments in the north must have seemed discouraging indeed. Yet there was little time to invest in commiseration. As usual in the Lone Star State, there was more than enough to keep everyone busy at home. 84 87

85 Ibid., 4. Ibid., 6. Memorandum of December 18, 1882, loc. cit.

86

Ibid., 2.

6. Northward to the Canadian 1883-86

T

EXAS was growing, and on a scale that demanded railway transportation. During the twelve months ending October 31, 1883, the Fort Worth and Denver City reported that new towns along the line had more than doubled in population and valuation; even the normally dry statistics of carloards shipped from the various stations told a colorful story of colonization and economic development. From the railhead at Wichita Falls and from nearby Henrietta, came eleven carloads of buffalo bones, reminders of the era that was passing. Out from Fort Worth and Hodge went lumber for new buildings, grain and flour to nourish man and beast, and a heavy movement of miscellaneous supplies. Back from the railhead and the bustling towns between came wool, hides, beef, cattle, and cotton, the produce of a new civilization.1 Most significant for the future was the mounting through traffic in stock cattle destined for the grasslands farther north. During April, May, and June no fewer than 80,000 head, received from the Missouri Pacific and the Santa Fe at Fort Worth, had been hauled the entire length of the line. "These shipments," reported Eddy, "proved beyond a doubt to the stockmen that it is great saving of money and time to ship stock cattle by rail, over the old way 'drive on the Trail.' It is estimated that 150,000 head will be offered this coming spring." The local press, even more sanguine, was quick to give credit where it was due. Predicting that 200,000 head would move in 1884, one editor proudly pointed out that the shipment of cattle from south Texas to the Northwest was "an 1

FW&DC, AR, 1883, p. 8; Wichita Daily Times, February 13, 1949.

109

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idea original with the Fort Worth & Denver, and is the death knell to the old system of driving herds, shipping being cheaper and more expeditious." 2 Small wonder that the road hastily built or enlarged its stock pens at Bowie, Alma, and Wichita Falls. 3 These were not the only efforts the company made to keep up with the times. One passenger locomotive, it announced, was equipped with a "new Westinghouse Air Brake.55 And two second-class coaches, the original furnishings of which must have been something less than inviting, "have had seats and backs upholstered with other improvements sufficient to make them equally good and comfortable as our first-class coaches.554 The investment was clearly justified. "Passenger traffic on the F.W.&D.,55 reported the Fort Worth Gazette, "is simply immense, and a puzzle to many railroad men who have seen it.555 Well it may have been, for any 114-mile railroad less than two years old that could run up better than six million passenger-miles in twelve months (ending October 31, 1883) and take in more than $90,000 doing so was well worth watching. The line was stoutly built and carefully operated, too, for the company reported that accidents to passenger trains were "trivial,55 while the only mishap "of any moment55 occurring to freight trains took place when a wandering cow derailed the engine and thirteen cars of a construction train. The five employees who were injured, reported the company, "have long since returned to duty.556 Financially, the record was encouraging. Freight revenues of nearly $250,000 boosted total earnings to $377,093.97, while expenses of $219,090.51 left a comfortable net of $ 158,003.46.T Thus when the hard-working Eddy resigned as president on December 11, 1883, he had the satisfaction of turning over an eminently solvent concern to his successor, Morgan Jones. 8 Despite his relative youth—he was but forty-three at the time—the new chief executive had behind him a solid quarter-century of experience in railway-building, for he had launched his career well before leaving his native Wales in 1866. Once settled in America, he obtained the contract to grade a portion of the Texas and Pacific, and thus met 2

Unidentified clipping, October ?, 1883 (CLF). FW&DC, AR, 1883, pp. 4-12. 4 Ibid., 9; unidentified clipping, 1884 (CLF). 5 Fort Worth Gazette (hereinafter cited asFWG), 1883 (CLF). 6 FW&DC, AR, 1883, pp. 6, 10. 7 Ibid., 6. 8 Lillie Belle Garlington, "History of the Fort Worth and Denver City in Montague County," 4. 3

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Dodge when the latter was serving as chief engineer. He subsequently constructed the line from Dallas into Fort Worth and then joined K. M. Van Zandt in building Fort Worth's first street railway, a mule-powered affair that ran from the Texas and Pacific Depot to the courthouse. After a brief "flyer" in mining at Leadville, Jones returned to Fort Worth to become one of the leading figures in the Denver Road. "Life," it was said of him later, "was strictly a business affair with him Work was all he knew. Making money was at once his recreation and his creed." 9 And indeed, so long as he remained at the helm of the Fort Worth and Denver City, that line prospered. Aside from the usual problems incident to running the railroad, the central matter of policy to be decided and implemented during Jones's administration was that of expansion. With business on the upswing, and more in sight if the rails could be extended, the economic argument for further construction was becoming more compelling almost daily. There was still another source of pressure. The Texas and Colorado Railway Improvement Company had been organized, much like the countless merchant adventurer groups of the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, for one particular enterprise. So long as that venture went forward and payments in the form of railway bonds and stocks were coming in, its backers were content. But as the project lagged, particularly before reaching its goal, sentiment developed for either renewed activity or liquidation and prompt distribution of its assets.10 These alternatives were specifically put forward at the annual meeting of the Improvement Company's stockholders on July 5, 1883. Dodge, in whom his associates evidently had complete confidence, was authorized either to make full and final settlement of the company's affairs and arrange for its dissolution or to go forward and complete the railroad under the terms of the original contract. Taking notice of the fact that the Denver Road's securities were "oftentimes greatly depressed in price" and that it was in the interest of the Improvement Company "that the price of said securities be maintained and supported," the stockholders further authorized Dodge "at his discretion to purchase and sell in open market" any such securities in the Improvement Company's portfolio.11 The implications of these resolutions are revealing. The capitalists Dodge had organized were obviously anxious to move in one direction or another; yet they wisely left the decision of which way to go in the capa9

Fort Worth Record, April 12, 1926. Cf. Granger to J. M. Brown, September 16, 1882 (GMD, No. 362). TCI, Minutes, July 5, 1883 (FW&DG Files), pp. 32-33.

10

11

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ble hands of the General, a fact for which the railway was to be deeply grateful. Meanwhile, as men versed in the ways of finance and concerned about their own investments, they rendered a considerable service to the road by promising a support for its securities which would inevitably improve its credit standing when and if it should need to raise additional capital for its own purposes. These developments, of course, were known to the management of the road; J. T. Granger, a director and treasurer of the railway, served also as assistant secretary and general factotum for the Improvement Company. 12 The chief liaison man, however, was Dodge; his was the primary responsibility for keeping the financial backers and the local organization in harness as a team. It was not always a simple task, but one for which, by temperament and judgment, he was admirably equipped. As 1883 closed, the railway's directors were apparently not yet ready to undertake further extension; their sole recommendation was to construct their own line from the Missouri Pacific junction at Hodge, some five miles outside Fort Worth, into the city itself.13 As 1884 wore on, however, the necessity for full-scale expansion as a matter of business policy became more pressing than ever. Cattlemen were showing a growing disposition to ship their stock cattle north from a breeding location to a grazing one, and their beeves southward when fattened. Determined to take full advantage of this potentially lucrative trade it had brought into existence, the management of the Denver Road sponsored a special excursion to Wichita Falls in the spring of 1884 for stockmen from Chicago and St. Louis so that they could see with their own eyes what was taking place. Aboard the train also were Paul Morton, assistant general freight agent of the Burlington, and H. F. Keenan, his Texas livestock agent, anxious to arrange for participation in the through haul eastward. Asserting that their line, which included the former Hannibal and St. Joseph from Kansas City to the Mississippi, had handled 40 per cent of all the stock from the West reaching Chicago in 1883, they guaranteed sixteen-hour service east of Hannibal, stressed the advantage of being able to hold cars at Galesburg if necessary to gain a better price on the Chicago market, and sang the praises of their comfortable drovers' cars.14 Such attention from a major carrier was flattering indeed, yet well merited; on the return trip to Fort Worth the excur12

FW&DC, AR, 1883, p. 2; TCI, Minutes, passim. FW&DG, AR, 1883, p. 4. This recommendation was not carried out until 1890. FW&DC, AR, 1890, p. 3. See below, p. 259. ™FWG, 1884 (CLF). 13

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sionists passed ninety-six northbound cars loaded with over two thousand head of cattle.15 As a matter of fact, the Denver Road's livestock business increased 76 per cent for the year ending October 31, 1884, and was the chief contributor to an over-all 25 per cent rise in traffic.16 "Superbly managed," exclaimed the Fort Worth Journal, pointing out that the FW&DC, with no floating debt, excellent equipment, and economical management, was the only "Southern" road in the United States to have been wholly self-sustaining from the first year of its operation. 17 Yet unless the railhead could be moved forward, there were serious doubts whether the road could hold this particularly profitable traffic. The Santa Fe, poised near the southern Kansas border, was casting restless eyes across Indian Territory toward the Texas Panhandle. With the aggressive Strong in the presidency, an invasion of the Denver Road's Promised Land might come at any moment. 18 Dodge, whose keen eyes missed little, was fully aware of the threat. But with his railhead a good two hundred miles from the area at stake, his bargaining power was slight indeed. Besides, he was not an official of the Fort Worth and Denver City and hence could not act formally as a negotiator for that road unless specifically authorized to do so. Nor could he commit his own construction company to any offensive or defensive course that might involve heavy future outlays without permission from his codirectors and, ultimately, his stockholders. To obtain their concurrence would be a prolonged and dubious procedure at best. What he did do, consequently, was typical. Apparently with the knowledge of Morgan Jones, but acting wholly on his own responsibility, the General simply assured officials of the Santa Fe that if they would promise to extend no farther southwest than Panhandle City, twentyfour miles east of the present Amarillo, 19 he would see to it that the northbound Denver Road would build to that point so as to afford Strong a through connection to the heart of northwest Texas. Just how he would accomplish this feat, Dodge himself probably did not know. But his word was sufficient for the Santa Fe; the bargain was struck, and 15

Fort Worth Journal (hereinafter cited as FWJ), 1884 (CLF). FW&DC, AR, 1884, pp. 3, 6. ™FW], 1884 (CLF). 18 The Santa Fe, through its subsidiary the Southern Kansas and Western, had built from its junction at Wellington, Kansas, to Harper during 1879-80, and in 1884 continued the line to Attica. Marshall, op. cit., 400, 404; cf. map, ibid., 95. For information on William B. Strong, see Marshall and Waters, op. cit., passim. 19 Marshall, op. cit., 430. 16

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immediate danger from that quarter was averted. 20 Just how long Strong would wait for fulfillment of the General's pledge was another matter; Dodge had staked a good portion of his reputation on his ability to get the Denver Road moving out of Wichita Falls without delay. For a few months during 1884, it appeared that once again, as in 1881, Evans might provide the necessary stimulus to go forward. Apparently he proposed a new joint arrangement to Dodge early in April, but must have neglected to specify just how he proposed to finance it, for on April 4 the General wired him: " I am willing to join in any arrangement that insures the completion of the road, and I think my [construction company] stockholders would also agree to this, but they would first want to know to a certainty that parties taking hold of the scheme had capital to complete it without depending upon the present market." 21 In due course Evans sent down a more specific proposal. If, said he, the Denver Road would build to the Texas state line, rather than just to the Canadian, he felt certain that he could extend the Denver and New Orleans to meet it. On June 7, Dodge laid this proposition before his fellow directors of the Improvement Company. 22 In view of Evans' performance to date, the scheme apparently met with some well-deserved skepticism; if accepted it would mean that the Improvement Company would commit itself to build an additional seventy-five miles beyond the Canadian River, the junction point agreed upon in 1881, over sparselysettled country then dominated largely by the huge X I T Ranch. 23 Despite the appeal of a concrete proposition, this was a risk the shrewd Dodge and his colleagues were not inclined to take at the moment. On the other hand, they had no disposition to discourage the possibility of action on Evans' part. The General's associates authorized him to say to Evans that if the latter could, before September 24, 1884, raise sufficient funds to extend his Denver and New Orleans to the Canadian River within three years, one hundred miles to be completed per year, then the Texas and Colorado Railway Improvement Company would build to that junction over the same period of time and at the same rate. 24 20 G. T. Oliver, "Settlers Clamor, and the Railroads Race to the Panhandle," in Amarillo Globe-News, August 14, 1938. Oliver was the first general agent of the FW&DC at Washburn, and later represented the company in negotiations with the Santa Fe over the Washburn-Panhandle City line. His information as to Dodge's agreement of 1884 came directly from Morgan Jones. 21 Dodge to Evans, April 4, 1884 (GMD, No. 362). 22 TCI, Minutes, loc. cit., June 7, 1884, n.p. 23 Lewis Nordyke, Cattle Empire, 171, passim. 24 TCI, Minutes, meeting of June 7, 1884, n.p. Actually, the Canadian River is, over the existing railway, considerably nearer Wichita Falls (261 miles) than Pueblo (308 miles). C&S-FW&DC-WV, Timetable, November 14, 1948, p. 8.

Main Street, Fort Worth, about 1876, looking toward the Courthouse. Courtesy Fort Worth

Star-Telegram

Main Street, Fort Worth, 1881, looking toward the Texas and Pacific Depot. Courtesy Fort Worth

Star-Tele,ram

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NORTHWARD TO T H E CANADIAN 25

But Evans, still in the grip of his enemies, was apparently powerless, and Dodge, having made his best offer, either could or did do nothing to persuade the Union Pacific to relax its opposition to the Governor's aspirations.26 He very probably felt that unless and until Evans could put his existing railroad on a firm basis and restore his own credit, little or nothing could be gained by seeking to budge the Tripartite group. In any event, whatever Evans thought of the General's counterproposal, September came and went without action. Meanwhile it became increasingly imperative for the Denver Road to move ahead. On December 9, 1884, Jones called the attention of the Denver Road's stockholders to the necessity of extending their line from Wichita Falls "to a point north of the enclosed lands," i.e., about thirty-four miles farther on, giving this explanation: At the time the road was completed, the country around Wichita Falls was open, affording range for cattle shipped there, but since that time, by reason of the influx of settlers, it has been fenced so that cattle shipped there must be driven for several miles through lanes before reaching the open range. After having been carried for hundreds of miles standing in cars, cattle are not in condition to be driven any distance before finding pasture and water, and therefore I believe this extension is necessary to enable us to hold our extensive cattle trade, which this year produced one-fourth of the gross revenues of the company. I also believe that this extension will draw to us business from the northern part of the Panhandle, which now tends toward the Kansas roads.27 On the basis of this recommendation, the stockholders immediately resolved to extend the railroad some thirty-four miles west of Wichita Falls,28 and the next day Jones wrote Dodge calling upon the Improvement Company to build and complete the authorized portion before April, 1885. Otherwise, said he bluntly, "it will be necessary for us to make some agreement to build it ourselves." He added, presumably as a reason for suggesting the latter course, that he had talked with the Texas stockholders of the Improvement Company and found that they were opposed to paying the assessments on their subscriptions that would be necessary to finance the extension, but were "anxious that the Railroad Company build it themselves."29 25 26

See below, pp. 131-37. There is nothing in the Dodge Papers under the appropriate file headings to indicate that the General, at this time, sought to enlist Union Pacific co-operation. GMD,Nos. 186,362. 27 28 FW&DC, AR, 1884, pp. 3-4. TCI, SRB, loc. cit., 12. 29 Jones to Dodge, December 10, 1884 (TCI, Minutes, loc. cit., n.p.). This

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Upon receipt of this letter, Dodge hastened to sound out the Improvement Company stockholders living in New York and found the same reaction; they were no more anxious than their Texas brethren to dig deeper into their pockets.30 On the reasonable assumption, therefore, that the Improvement Company stockholders would gladly waive their right to construct the contemplated portion of line, the directors of the road on January 16 turned over to Dodge 360 first-mortgage bonds they had on hand in the treasury, 31 and on February 3 the General began grading operations.32 Technically, of course, neither the railroad nor Dodge had the slightest legal authority for turning a spadeful of dirt. According to the contract of April 29, 1881, the Improvement Company had the sole contractual right to build, and as yet it had neither decided officially to do so nor relinquished that right to the road. So sure was Dodge that the latter course would be followed, however, that he put his men to work with the promise that they would be paid on the usual basis from one source or another. 33 The vital consideration in the General's mind was plain and compelling: "to get track down," as he put it, "by the time the cattle move." 34 The matter of straightening out the legal complications could be handled later in routine fashion. Construction, incidentally, was not always so simple as might be expected from the generally level aspect of the country. Shortly after the railhead started moving beyond Wichita Falls,35 the swollen waters of Holliday Creek, now on the outskirts of the city, made the railway bridge at that point impassable. Neither Dodge nor his crews, however, had the slightest intention of being halted. Binding ties to wagon beds, they floated their makeshift rafts to the north bank, where they were hauled out by mules and sent forward to end of track. Small wonder that the line kept moving, or that the gangs were always ready for the hearty diet of letter was produced by Dodge at the meeting of the Improvement Company's directors on May 5, 1885, and recorded in the minutes of that meeting. 30 Dodge to Granger (telegram), April, 1885 (TCI, Minutes, loc. cit., reported in the meeting of April 16, 1885). 31 TCI, SRB, loc. cit., 12. 32 Statement of Granger to TCI stockholders, April 16, 1885. (TCI, Minutes, loc. cit., meeting of April 16, 1885, n.p.). 33 Ibid. 34 Dodge to Granger (telegram), April, 1885 (TCI, Minutes, loc. cit., meeting of April 16, 1885). 35 Named, so the story goes, by a Comanche squaw sent to test the depth of the river. Having gained mid-stream, she shouted: "Wee-chee-taw," meaning "waist deep." Later on a dam was built to provide water power. Although the dam was washed out by a flood in 1886, the "Falls" remained a part of the city's name. Offutt, op. cit., 1.

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deer, buffalo, and antelope meat that made up their usual daily fare.36 What happened in the next five months proved again that "the best laid schemes of mice and men gang aft a-gley." More pertinently, it demonstrated how, in the course of railway development, an intrinsically minor technical consideration—much like a foot fault in tennis—could all but wreck the achievement of a crucial undertaking. For the Denver Road, expansion at that particular time and place was essential. The distance involved, to be sure, was only thirty-four miles, but unless it were covered so that the railhead could penetrate the open range, the company ran the risk of losing its chief source of traffic and of yielding the rich business of the Panhandle to fast-building competitors.37 So crystal clear was this situation to Dodge that he could hardly contemplate serious objection to what he was doing; that is probably why, despite his long experience, he dropped his guard just enough to become embroiled in serious trouble. The first suggestion of difficulty appeared at the meeting of the Improvement Company directors on February 26, 1885, the first since the previous July. Present were Judge Dillon, P. J. Goodhart, Henry Walters, and Granger. As assistant secretary, Granger laid before the board two letters from S. J. Mayer, a substantial stockholder, urging immediate dissolution of the company and distribution of its assets. Possibly because the letters were dated the previous September and October and hence were somewhat irrelevant to the existing prospects, these were laid aside for later consideration. The directors turned instead to the immediate matter in hand and, subject to the approval in writing of the owners of two-thirds of their company's capital stock, resolved to waive the Improvement Company's contractual right to build the road between Wichita Falls and Vernon "or so much thereof as the . . . Railroad Company may construct and equip." Granger was instructed to secure the necessary assents.38 This he proceeded to do at once by mailing to all stockholders a circular letter signed by Dodge and dated March 5. Therein the General quoted Jones's statement in the 1884 Annual Report outlining the necessity for extension,39 recited the directors' resolution of February 26, and explained that since the Denver Road had sufficient bonds and surplus earnings in its treasury to finance the project, "the Railway Company sees no necessity for calling upon the stockholders of this company 36 37 38 39

Ibid., 2.

See above, p. 113, and below, pp. 169, 171. TGI, Minutes, loc. cit., meeting of February 26, 1885, n.p. See above p. 115.

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for extension." He might have added, incidentally, that these bonds so conveniently available were those authorized on his own advice in September, 1881; they represented the difference between the issue of twenty-five thousand dollars per mile on the 110-mile stretch to Wichita Falls and the twenty thousand dollars per mile actually paid under contract to the Improvement Company for building that portion of the road. 40 Dodge pointed out that the construction under way would obviously increase the value of the outstanding securities of the railroad, since it was being undertaken without a corresponding increase in obligations. He bluntly asked each stockholder to assent to the Improvement Company's waiver within ten days, saying that if sufficient assents were not received by that time, the stockholders of the Improvement Company would be assessed forthwith, a as it is necessary that the Railway Company or the Improvement Company should at once build this extension in order to retain our profitable cattle business."41 To this plea, the immediate response was favorable, though as the days went by Granger discovered that opposition to the resolution of February 26 was growing. A letter dated March 18 from Myers, Rutherford and Company, who controlled 400 shares, requested that the contract of 1881, vesting the right to build in the Improvement Company, be carried out in the construction of the portion of the line between Wichita Falls and Vernon; five days later J. C. Maben, A. J. Mayer, and J. A. Kahn, holders of 8,700 shares, entered their protest against the resolution and the related waiver. Presumably because of the prompting of these groups, seven holders of 1,150 shares revoked assents they had already mailed to Granger. Finally, all those opposed to permitting the railroad company to build the extension formed themselves into an Association of Stockholders, named a committee headed by Maben, and requested permission for that committee to appear at the next meeting of the directors.42 Granger, situated uncomfortably in the middle of the contest, immediately reported to Dodge and the other directors. The General, who readily enough agreed that the committee might appear to state their 40 Granger to W. C. Hamilton, February 2, 1885. (Excerpts from copies made from the G. M. Dodge Records by the ICC valuation accountants, 1919. Book II, p. 332, FW&DC Files. These Dodge items in the FW&DC Files are hereinafter referred to as Dodge Records to distinguish them from the Dodge Papers at Des Moines). See above, pp. 92-93. 41 Dodge to stockholders of the Texas and Colorado Railway Improvement Company, March 5, 1885 (TCI, Minutes, loc. cit., reported in the minutes of the meeting of April 16, 1885, n.p.) 42 TCI, Minutes, loc. cit., meeting of April 16, 1885, n.p.

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case, was obviously thoroughly annoyed, and probably surprised, by their tactics. To Granger he fired off a series of lengthy telegrams as ammunition for the forthcoming meeting.43 Meanwhile he wrote personally to at least one, and probably more, of his largest stockholders. Recapitulating the familiar facts to S. A. Caldwell, he concluded: "I have acted in the interests of the owners of the road. The Texas & Colorado [Railway Improvement Company stockholders] should remember that the little road built at my suggestion is the only road in Texas today that earns its fixed charges, a result brought about, I think, by good careful management. I hope you and your friends will sustain me as in the past.5544 On April 16, as scheduled, the stockholders' committee met with the Improvement Company's directors; both sides were prepared for a showdown. With Judge Dillon in the chair, Granger reported that as of that date he had received assents to the resolution of February 26 from the holders of 15,430 shares (out of 27,579). While this was short of the necessary two-thirds, he announced that he felt confident he could obtain the requisite number, but in view of the pronounced opposition, desired further instruction from the board. As a broad hint concerning the sort of instructions he desired, he reported that Dodge, at the moment "vigorously pushing the work" in Texas, had suggested three possible solutions: (1) cancellation of the original contract and distribution of the Improvement Company's assets, (2) acceptance of the February 26 resolution, or (3) adherence to the original contract and a prompt assessment of the Improvement Company's stockholders for the entire amount necessary to complete the work in progress.45 The General, Granger continued, was sure he could "convince any stockholder who has monied interest in the road of the soundness" of any of these propositions, and if anyone doubted the quality of the construction completed or contemplated, he had but to scan the profiles and voluminous supporting data Dodge had sent in from the field. Granger closed his presentation by quoting directly from the General's most recent telegram: If the Texas & Colorado [Railway Improvement Company] stockholders prefer to pay assessments and build the road I have no objection, but I don't believe the road with the extension can earn enough to pay the additional interest [on the bonds that would have to be newly issued under the original 43 44

Ibid.

Dodge (writing from Fort Worth) to S. A. Caldwell, March 24, 1885 (GMD, No. 362). 45 TCI, Minutes, loc. cit., meeting of April 16, 1885, n.p.

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contract]; this alone is what decided me to ask for a release of part of contract. Before I left New York in December, I consulted many Texas & Colorado stockholders in regard to calling an assessment, but not one was willing to pay it; but it is for them to decide what they want done, and I am anxious to have prompt action.46 In the face of this barrage, Maben rose to present the opposition's case. But Walters, taking his cue from the General, immediately forced the speaker's hand by introducing a resolution calling for an assessment of 20 per cent upon the Improvement Company's stock payable on April 21. No one seconded the motion, nor could a seconder be found for a substitute resolution calling for a 10 per cent assessment. Called upon to put up or shut up, the opposition chose the latter, thus leaving matters precisely as they were before. Nothing was decided save to adjourn until May 5, when General Dodge himself would return to the city.47 The atmosphere of the postponed meeting on May 5 must have been tense. Present in force were the dissenting committee of stockholders and their lawyer. Dodge, called from the field and bent upon settling matters once and for all, opened the proceedings by reading Jones's letter of December 10 in which that determined Welshman had bluntly indicated that if the Improvement Company did not begin work the Railway Company would. The General then produced profiles of the extension, which by a quirk of fate was being completed on that very day,48 together with a sheaf of documents containing an itemized account of every penny spent. Granger's description of the ensuing discussion as "considerable" was probably euphemistic. But the session resulted at long last in unanimous approval of a compromise resolution tactfully presented by Judge Dillon. Stripped of its whereases and providers, it amounted to an offer on the part of the Improvement Company to turn over to the railway all its rights, material, and interest in townsites pertaining to the thirty-fourmile stretch between Wichita Falls and Harrold in exchange for a flat payment by the railroad of $340,000 in fully paid capital stock. By a second resolution it was agreed that if the railroad should accept this proposal, then the Improvement Company would divide its assets and dissolve.49 This arrangement, of course, was not so favorable to the railroad as the generous resolution of February 26, but under the circumstances was patently the best that could be obtained. 46 47 48 49

Ibid. TCI, Minutes, loc. cit., meeting of April 16, 1885, n.p. FW&DC, "Memo Outline," April 15, 1948 (FW&DC Files), 1. TCI, Minutes, loc. cit., meeting of May 5, 1885, n.p.

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As might have been expected, the railroad acted with alacrity. At a special meeting of the directors on May 13, the board authorized the necessary payment to the Improvement Company and at the same time turned a like amount of stock over to General Dodge to complete payment to him for actual construction.50 Thus as far as the railroad was concerned, the thirty-four-mile extension was built and the claims of the Improvement Company were satisfied by the issuance of twenty thousand dollars' worth of stock per mile and just over ten thousand dollars' worth of bonds per mile, the latter having been handed to Dodge in January. 51 When all was said and done, the road had managed to finance its extension far more cheaply than if the Improvement Company had built it, and in doing so had lowered the average bonded indebtedness per mile by using bonds already issued. For their part, the stockholders of the Improvement Company, having received a dividend of 87.5 per cent in Fort Worth stock and 5 per cent in bonds on June 7,52 met for the last time on July 1, 1885, and cheerfully voted to dissolve and adjourn sine die. 53 From their standpoint, as well as from the railroad's, the venture had been eminently successful. Credit for these various accomplishments belonged almost solely to General Dodge. He it was who in 1881 had advised Eddy to secure authorization for a bond issue of twenty-five thousand dollars per mile, a precaution which provided the railway treasury with surplus bonds when they were needed. And without his firm handling of the dissenting Improvement Company stockholders, the railroad might well have found itself in a legal battle that would have drained its resources. Yet through it all he had watched out for the interests of the men he had attracted into the Improvement Company. Dodge was a builder at heart. The fact that he combined his zeal for construction with an ability to hold his own in the field of finance and administration meant, at that moment, the difference between life and death for the Fort Worth and Denver City. If only Evans had possessed the General's grasp of practical matters and his ability to deal with those who disagreed with him, the stalemate that still blocked progress in Colorado might never have developed.54 Even with the Denver Road's new extension to Harrold in running or50

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pected in the way of traffic and how these possibilities should tie in with preliminary plans for construction. Furthermore, the General was anxious to have a fresh and objective analysis made of the Fort Worth and Denver City. Despite Jones's excellent financial management and Frost's enthusiastic labors, that road, during June, had experienced an alarming increase in its operating ratio. 34 Perhaps there was something wrong that an outsider, free from any preconceived notions and trained as a trouble shooter, could discover. To satisfy himself on these various matters, Dodge in August brought his friend and associate Meek from Des Moines to make a thorough investigation all the way from Trinidad to Galveston.35 What the Iowan told him about the coal and industrial possibilities of southern Colorado served as a virtual blueprint of the Denver, Texas and Fort Worth's successive development of that region,36 and his recommendations concerning the Texas situation led to several major changes at Fort Worth. 37 Dodge had still another purpose in mind. It was high time that someone be broken in as top operating officer for the system. The General had long had his eye on Meek; 38 the current assignment, quite apart from giving Dodge the information he wanted, would permit Morgan Jones to form an opinion of the young man and allow Meek to familiarize himself with the newest and most active portions of the Gulf-to-Rockies system. Matters turned out very much as Dodge had hoped. The Iowan's field reports proved to be veritable mines of useful information. 39 Equally to the point was Jones's response. "From what I see of Mr. Meek," he wrote Dodge on August 18, "I think the company [FW&DC] may do 34

Meek to Dodge, August 13, 1887 (GMD, No. 189). Ibid. Also, Meek to Dodge, August 2, 15, 1887 (GMD, No. 189). 36 37 Meek to Dodge, August 2, 1887, loc. cit. See below, pp. 175-77. 38 See above, p. 159. Meek apparently began his railroad career as a telegraph operator for the Rock Island. His performance was so excellent that he was transferred first to Brooklyn, Iowa, then to Davenport as chief dispatcher, and eventually to Des Moines. While there he enhanced his reputation by rebuilding the main line through Grinnell after a destructive cyclone. He went with the Wabash in 1881, quickly restoring the division there, both as to property and discipline, from a state of near-chaos. Meanwhile he acquired some reputation as an effective lobbyist against hostile railway legislation and became a friend of Thomas J. Potter, then a Burlington official. {RMDN, March 28, 1888; e.g., CB&Q, AR, 1882, p. 3). It was during the mid-eighties, presumably, that Dodge saw much of Meek and persuaded him to act as superintendent for his forty-two-mile narrow-gauge St. Louis, Des Moines and Northern. 39 Meek to Dodge, August 2, 13, 15, 1887 (GMD, No. 189). 35

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well to get him for a General Manager; his ideas on emigration are especially good, and I think," he observed bluntly, "he would like to get the position. In fact, I am in favor of giving him a trial and would suggest that he be appointed not later than the 1st of November, the beginning of our fiscal year." 40 Fortunately, Evans shared Jones's view, writing later that he could work "very cordially" with Meek. 41 Meek's appointment lifted a considerable load from the General's shoulders. On October 24, Dodge resigned as general manager of the Denver, Texas and Gulf with the understanding that Meek would replace him on November 1; on the same date the Iowan was appointed to similar posts on the Denver, Texas and Fort Worth and, with the approval of Jones, on the Fort Worth and Denver City.42 He thus became the first true system officer responsible for operations and traffic. This by no means meant that he was to bypass either Evans or Jones in respect to general administration. Before Meek had been in office a month, in fact, Dodge told him to be sure to consult Evans before selecting an attorney for the DT&G; 43 and he later instructed him specifically to let Jones work with him on rate matters: "His ideas are as a general thing pretty good, and he can be of great help to you." 44 When all was said and done, however, it was Dodge himself who determined top-level policy. Meek recognized this as well as anyone else, and regardless of who his technical superiors were from time to time, he took his orders from Dodge. "His wishes and commands," Meek later testified, "were always complied with as such whether he held office or not." 45 That, probably, is precisely what the General expected; to be able to rely on a thoroughly loyal lieutenant was to gain a considerable measure of freedom. Even before he achieved that desirable status, however, he had turned his attention to the construction problems of the Fort Worth and Denver City. When Evans and Dodge had signed their preliminary agreement in New York on February 15, 1887, the Denver Road was approaching Childress, some 220 miles from Fort Worth. That left just over 230 miles to go to the New Mexico border—by coincidence the exact distance between that junction point and Pueblo. The stage was set for a 40

Jones to Dodge, August 18. 1887 (GMD, No. 189). Evans to Dodge, May 14, 1889 (ELB, 368). 42 PM, 1888, p. 1309; 1889, Appendix, p. 183. 43 Dodge to Meek, November 25, 1887 (GMD, No. 365). 44 Dodge to Meek, May 9, 1888 (GMD, No. 365). 45 Stanley, Spoonts, and Meek, FW&DC attorneys, to Dodge, July 25, 1891 (GMD, No. 194). 41

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race. While Gibson urged his Colorado and Texas forces southward, Dan Carey, a hard-driving Irishman recommended by Jones, 46 led the Panhandle gangs north toward the border. Although the Texans, unlike their northern rivals, had to grade and lay track every inch of the way, the terrain ahead of them was considerably less rugged than that in southern Colorado and particularly in New Mexico. Even so, crossing the Red and Canadian river valleys promised plenty of problems, and pushing any railhead across the dusty Panhandle through the summer months would certainly be no cool job. By way of contrast, Gibson could expect to reach the highest point on the entire route, well over 6,500 feet in the New Mexico mountains, at just about the dead of winter. At the outset, it was anybody's guess who would win. The General, though concerning himself primarily with matters of strategy and co-ordination, kept in constant touch with each railhead and held himself in readiness to go to either front whenever necessary. One thing was certain: the months ahead would be anything but dull. No sooner had Carey reached Childress, a county seat, than the fun began. He and Dodge had supposed that when the rails reached the "new" part of town near the tracks, the citizens would come over in a body from their "old" center three miles away. But with a burst of Texas independence, the voters decided, on April 11, to stay where they were; unless they changed their mind, the railroad would have to move its tracks in order to obey its charter injunction to run through each county seat. And moving would mean delay. Determined to fight it out, some unidentified railroad spokesman charged that the stand-patters had given away town lots in exchange for votes; the sovereign voters replied by building a sizable courthouse on the old location. Clearly contention would lead nowhere. Consequently the railway proposed to the 150 voters that if they would move, the company would see to it that each person received a lot in precisely the same relative position as his old one. This offer—and a second election—turned the trick. R. E. Montgomery was on hand to lay out the lots and name the streets when the move was made. 47 May saw the rails at Salisbury, about three miles south of the present town of Memphis, and late in July they were past Lelia (Lelia Lake) and being spiked down at Clarendon. 48 "New Clarendon" it was called then, because the original Clarendon, founded some ten years before as the old "Saint City of the Panhandle," was located some five miles 46 47 48

Fort Worth Record, April 12, 1926. Childress Chronicle, July 14, 1938. Reed, op. cit, 395.

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northwest near the Salt Fork of the Red River. When its inhabitants realized where the railroad was going, they promptly picked up everything movable, including houses, and resettled themselves hard by the tracks. The only thing they left behind was the rock courthouse, which today stands deserted but picturesque on the ranch lands of cowboyartist Harold Bugbee.49 There was nothing new in the scramble of the local citizenry to attract railroads, or even to move themselves if that was the only way to have service at their door. Anyone building a line under such circumstances, however, had to tread warily lest his desire to please every potential customer and placate every rival road lead to unnecessary or wasteful construction. As Morgan Jones had cannily pointed out in the preceding fall, the Panhandle had suddenly become a magnet for the several lines around its perimeter; 50 at the same time, more than one budding settlement hoped to become the railway hub of the area. Dodge ran head on into the problems such a situation created as his railhead moved out beyond Clarendon during the ovenlike days of August. 51 Back in 1884, it will be recalled, the General had warded off the Santa Fe's potential invasion of the central Panhandle by promising to build the FW&DC into Panhandle City in exchange for the Santa Fe's assurance that it would not proceed beyond that point. 52 It is probable that the Frisco, also dreaming of expansion, likewise agreed to make Panhandle City its western terminus. News of this informal compact promptly spread abroad, with the logical result that settlers began to move into the future junction point. The Frisco, however, soon met financial reverses and was compelled to lay aside such plans as it may have had for expansion westward. 53 But during 1886 the Southern Kansas Railroad, a Santa Fe subsidiary, struck out from Kiowa, Kansas, entered what is now Oklahoma, and reached Shattuck, just short of the Texas border, late in that year.54 By the following summer, when the Denver Road passed Clarendon, the Santa Fe rails were approaching the town of Canadian, on the river of the same name, and it was clear that they would reach Panhandle City early in 1888.55 Had the Fort Worth and Denver City followed its original survey, it 49 McCarty, "Background History of the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway," 50 Part II, pp. 2-3; Gerner, op. cit.} 1. See above, p. 128. 51 52 Reed, op. cit.y 395. See above, pp. 113-14. 53 Bea Lanning, "The History of the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway in My Home County (Carson County, Texas)," 4-5. 54 Marshall, op. cit., 275, 408; Waters, op. cit., 83. "Marshall, op. cit., 410.

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would have proceeded directly to the prearranged junction point and probably would have arrived there at about the same time as the Santa Fe. But Dodge's construction engineers had now concluded that, since their immediate objective was a connection with the railway from Colorado, it would be considerably less expensive and presumably would save time to follow a far shorter route recently surveyed through Washburn, some fifteen miles southwest of Panhandle City.56 The General, therefore, faced a dilemma. Although his agreement with the Santa Fe had never been reduced to writing, a promise was a promise; besides, a junction with that road would open a through, if roundabout, route between Fort Worth and Kansas City and would make possible a lively overhead business on livestock moving from southern and western Texas to markets reached by the Santa Fe. 57 On the other hand, if the Denver Road were to win its race to the New Mexico border, there could be no deviation from the newer, more direct survey. Dodge, who had obviously foreseen the situation, had his solution ready. He instructed his engineers to follow the short route through Washburn, past the tiny settlement that would shortly change its name from Rag Town to Amarillo, around the Palo Duro Canyon, and on to the wide plains beyond.58 At the same time, however, he began building, in advance of incorporation, a separate road to link Washburn and Panhandle City. In due course, on December 13, 1887, he saw to it that Morgan Jones, Major Van Zandt, and others incorporated the new enterprise as the Pan-Handle Railway Company, with headquarters in Washburn. 59 The fifteen-mile line was completed into Panhandle on April 26, 1888, whereupon it was turned over to the Denver Road for operation; the rails of the Southern Kansas had meanwhile reached the town in mid-January. 60 The General's promise was kept, the Kansas route was opened, and progress on the main line had not been delayed a moment. As a matter of fact, July and August of 1887 saw graders strung out all along the road from Washburn to the Canadian. In one of the engineering camps was a young and likely lad named Joe Bar56

Lanning, op. cit., 5; Oliver, loc. cit. FW&DC, AR, 1888, pp. 4-5; 1898, p. 5. The Santa Fe's direct line that now runs between Wichita, Oklahoma City, and Fort Worth had been completed on April 26, 1887. Waters, op. cit., 83. 58 McCarty, "Background History of the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway," Part II, p. 5. 59 Lanning, op. cit., 5; Oliver, loc. cit. 60 McCarty, "Background History of the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway," Part II, p. 5: FW&DC, AR, 1888, p. 5. 57

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61

wise. Of him the railroad and Texas were to hear much over the next fifty-five years.62 Washburn, of course, having attained the dignity of a junction point, immediately conjured up visions of becoming a railway metropolis. Indeed its prospects had brightened rapidly in nine months. When G. T. Oliver, the Denver Road's first general agent at the spot, had set up his headquarters in a boxcar in the spring of 1887, there were only twentyfour families "not including cowboys" in the whole of Armstrong County. There were no houses—only dugouts—nor were there any roads. But now, with two railways, the future seemed assured.63 Washburn's dreams, however, were as nothing compared with those of Tascosa—Tascosa on the Canadian, offspring of the Borregos Plaza of the Mexican past ores; turbulent crossroads of Indians, cowboys, nesters, Scottish and Irish noblemen, Yankee and Confederate veterans, businessmen, gamblers, and their women of diverse virtue; way point for Billy the Kid, Pat Garrett, and even General Dodge; outpost of the X I T , LS, and L I T ranch empires.64 The indefatigable editor of its weekly Pioneer, in fact, was calling it the "Chicago of the Panhandle." 65 Here was a town to reckon with. Ever since news of the Evans-Dodge alliance—enterprisingly gleaned from the New York Times—had reached the town fathers the previous March, they had been wooing the General with every stratagem at their command. Was there a surveying party or FW&DC official in the county? If so, Tascosans were with them as guides and emissaries. Their town, they urged, was the foreordained junction point of the Denver Road and the Rock Island line sure to be built southwestward from Liberal. Besides, they added, it was located at the easiest crossing of the Canadian. Surely the FW&DC could not afford to bypass Tascosa.66 But for Dodge the decision was not so simple. The company had its eye on other townsites; and besides, the mighty X I T Ranch, seeking to dominate the area surrounding its three-million-acre empire, was the sworn enemy of Tascosa, and particularly of its tough-minded editor, 61

Oliver, loc. cit. J. H. Barwise, known to all as "Judge" Barwise, entered the legal department of the FW&DC in 1900 and served as director from 1912 until his death in 1941. He was also a director of the Wichita Valley Railway from 1919 to 1941 and general solicitor of both companies. C&S, AR, 1941, p. 13. 63 Oliver, loc. cit. For the subsequent history of the Pan-Handle Railway, see below, p. 211. See map, p. 184. 64 John L. McCarty, Maverick Town: The Story of Old Tascosa, 56, passim. 65 Ibid., 202. "Ibid., 212-15. 62

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C. F. Rudolph, who bluntly refused to go along with what he considered the highhanded methods of Farwell and Taylor, the ranch owners, or of their manager, Boyce. Yet Tascosa, proud possessor of a post office since 1878, and county seat to boot, could offer traffic; besides, if slighted, it could become not only vocal but dangerous. O n the other hand, the Denver Road was aimed squarely at the X I T lands to the northwest; if it was to cross them in peace, and on schedule, there must be no falling-out with Boyce.67 Late in July, 1887, when his rails were barely past Clarendon, Dodge made his decision, based on a personal visit. Presumably because of the treacherous quicksands near the town, 68 the railroad would follow the south bank of the Canadian opposite Tascosa, crossing the river some two miles beyond. For an instant, Tascosa felt a chill; a bridge could make the tracks accessible, but would the railroad erect a station there? Tascosans, instinctively quick on the draw, took no chances. A committee was dispatched to Austin and an attorney retained to find out what they could force the railroad to do by injunction if necessary. When they discovered the company's charter provision requiring erection of a station within half a mile of the business section of any county seat within five miles of the line,69 they waited upon the railway's officials at Fort Worth. The latter, fully aware of their position, made the most of a potentially embarrassing situation. The thought of passing up Tascosa, said they, was preposterous; of course they were interested in the town and would build a station directly across the river. The committee, their fire quenched, left with assurances of friendly co-operation ringing in their ears, and in September the Pioneer could report that every residence in the town was occupied.70 The tonic of assured railroad service was potent indeed. But railways, as many a hopeful community found to its sorrow, carry freight and passengers in both directions. 71 As the rails pushed 67

McCarty, Maverick Town, 204-206, 218-19; Nordyke, op. cit, 169 ff. McCarty, "Background History of the Fort Worth and Denver City Railway," Part II, p. 3. Rudolph, editor of the Tascosa Pioneer, reported that the railroad missed the town because the route along the south bank of the river was at least two and a half miles shorter, and construction much cheaper (McCarty, Maverick Town, 216). He could hardly be expected to specify the existence of quicksand. Lewis Nordyke, a recent historian of the XIT, suggests that the known desires of Farwell and Taylor to have the railroad avoid Tascosa may have had a bearing on the final decision (op. cit., 169-71). 69 FW&DC, Act of Incorporation, § 14. See above, p. 33. Cf. McCarty, Maver70 ick Town, 219. McCarty, Maverick Town, 220. 71 One of the best examples, on a state-wide basis, occurred in Vermont, where railroad-building was a prime factor in a wholesale exodus of population. Lewis D. Stilwell, Migration from Vermont: 1776-1860, 214-30. 68

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nearer and the two-room wooden depot took shape opposite the projected Canadian River bridgehead, even veteran Tascosans began thinking of better opportunities elsewhere along the bustling line. Jess Jenkins, for example, long-time proprietor of the local saloon, had shrewdly bought, some time back, a section of land in Potter County that contained the first water west of Clarendon. On that spot Rag Town had sprung up; quite apart from the water supply, the location was a natural one for a trading center to serve the vast plains to the south and west. At any rate, Jess now thought enough of the prospects there to persuade some of his fellow Tascosans to go in with him in setting up a saloon, store, and such other enterprises as could be housed, for the time being, in tents. Meanwhile, rumors floated into Tascosa that the railroad's colonization department had schemes for a company-sponsored town to the northwest; farther along, the X I T had high hopes for a city nearer its new headquarters in Hartley County. 72 Quixotically enough, it was Tascosa's own impatience to become a metropolis, combined with an underestimate of its local ranch-owning element, that translated the first rumor into fact. W. M. D. Lee, of the LS outfit, had long let it be known that he stoutly opposed settlement of the country; nesters and herders simply could not mix. Consequently, when Tascosans persuaded the county to authorize bonds and the inevitable taxes for the Canadian River bridge, Lee illogically retaliated by donating a townsite to the railroad three miles to the west of Tascosa. His offer, naturally enough, was immediately accepted. Montgomery, now officially designated as the company's town lot agent, 73 promptly inaugurated a full-fledged advertising campaign on behalf of Cheyenne, as the new settlement was christened. The spot was boomed as the only safe crossing of the Canadian, an ideal, well-watered location for both residences and industry, and the probable junction point with a future Kansas City-El Paso railroad. The company promised to erect stock and feeding pens and to fence off the cottonwood trees along Cheyenne Creek for a town park. 74 To launch the project in fitting manner, a widely publicized sale of town lots was held on December 15, 1887, only a few days after the arrival of the rails. Special excursion trains brought eager buyers from Clarendon and way points, convenient credit terms were offered on purchases over $100, and anyone investing more than $150 had his roundtrip fare refunded by the railroad. The sale was a huge success. A two72 73 74

McCarty, Maverick Town, 223. Gerner, op. cit., 4; DT&FW circular, July 2, 1888 (FW&DC Files). McCarty, Maverick Town, 224-26.

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story hotel, a store, two or three saloons, and a gambling place, along with a few houses, quickly sprang up, and the railroad built a depot, stock pens, and chute. To the glee of Tascosa, however, the town died within a matter of months. Even its name, already pre-empted by another Texas town, was taken away. Rechristened Magenta, it lingered only on time cards as the spot where the railway crossed the Canadian. Its doom held a somber warning: no town, unless sustained by a crossing of through rail lines, could hope to survive in the broken country of the river valley. Even the death of Tascosa, long established and rugged in spirit, could not be far distant. 75 For Dodge, crossing fifty miles of X I T lands in Hartley and Dallam counties was an even more ticklish matter than dealing with the hopes and fears of Tascosa; once across the Canadian in mid-December, 1887, his troubles began. Near where the railway passed from one county to the other, the tracks crossed a jog of land outside the boundaries of the ranch. Here, two weeks after the route was announced, two independent ranchers, Dick Pincham and Rick Tanner, moved in. The X I T reaction was prompt and typical. Wrote Abner Taylor to his manager: We don't want Hartley or any unorganized county in which we have interests organized. You are to do everything possible to keep any people from going in with the railroad and laying out a townsite in Hartley County away from our land. We want to control the selling of any lots in any townsite. There are many places we would not want to build up towns and bring in settlers for the reason that they would be organizing the counties and laying additional taxes upon us. They would be demanding roads and running them through our pastures to the detriment of our cattle interests.76 From this incipient feud, Dodge remained aloof, at least for a time. 77 The X I T , with the eager co-operation of the railroad, laid out the town of Channing well within its own borders, and even built the necessary shipping pens. That was not all it did. To its chagrin, the railroad found that the school district in Channing was thirteen miles long and a halfmile wide, with the tracks running through the long way. As the county's largest taxpayer, the railroad complained, whereupon the X I T amiably shortened and widened the district to more reasonable proportions. Furthermore, when the rails reached Texline, just short of the state border, the big ranch co-operated with the railroad in building a fifteen75 76 77

Ibid., 226-27; Haley, op. cit., 381-82. Taylor to Matlock, n.d., quoted in Nordyke, op. cit., 171. For Dodge's later relations with the XIT, see ibid., 213-14, 224.

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thousand-dollar hotel. Dodge suggested that Boyce plant millet, sorghums, and vegetables along the Denver Road's right of way so that travelers, when they came, could see for themselves what the Panhandle could produce. Impressed, the ranch manager promptly obliged.78 Indeed, there was no ally like a powerful one, provided he felt in a friendly mood. Meanwhile, as in any campaign, life behind the lines was as active, and in many ways as pertinent to the final outcome, as progress of the railhead itself. In mid-April, 1887, the company acquired a generous amount of land in Fort Worth adjacent to its tracks for shops and terminals,79 while Major John Anderson, the Denver Road's immigration agent, went to work on pamphlets and newspaper advertisements describing the broad acres newly opened for settlement.80 Frost, as usual, was up and down the line keeping an eye on service, talking to shippers, and watching out for new sources of traffic.81 One project in particular enlisted his personal support. During 1886, Isaac Dahlman of Fort Worth conceived the idea of slaughtering and freezing beef for export. He built a refrigerating plant, operated it for a year, and went broke. Trying again in 1887, he reassembled his force, got steam up in the plant, and was ready for the trainload of cattle he had contracted to buy when he discovered that Waggoner, who was selling him the stock, demanded cash on delivery. That was the one thing, at the moment, that Dahlman did not have. Frost, learning of his predicament, borrowed the necessary ten thousand dollars by pledging his own FW&DC stock.82 Small wonder that Frost's enthusiasm for and loyalty to the road were infectious. Yet despite Frost's unquestioned devotion to the company, it was becoming apparent that as an administrator he was far too easygoing. Dodge may have suspected as much when he sent Meek to investigate matters in Texas during August; at any rate, the latter's findings pointed 78

Nordyke, op. cit., 181. Dispatch from Fort Worth, April 14, 1887, in Austin Daily Statesman, April 15, 1887. 80 Dispatch from Quanah, May 15, 1887, in FWDG, May 16, 1887 (CLF). 81 Unidentified clipping, April, 1887; FWJ, November, 1887 (CLF). His travels, incidentally, could not always be carried out on schedule. On one extended trip in the fall of 1887, Frost took his wife and three children along in the business car "Marie." A washout along the Pease River near Vernon, however, stranded the train for ten days, and it was cold. Matching her husband in ingenuity, Mrs. Frost took out the sewing machine she carried aboard and deftly produced three warm coats for the children from extra blankets in the car's locker. Related to the writer by Norman Frost, one of the children, March 6, 1952. 82 Fort Worth Star-Tele gram, December 12, 1909. 79

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strongly in that direction. It was a series of relatively minor matters, rather than any one glaring defect, that was causing the trouble, together with Frost's unwillingness to admit laxity or to change his ways. Meek reported the situation tersely and with considerable tact. Aside from his general assignment, his specific job was to find out why the railroad had failed to show the proper proportion of expenses to earnings during the month of June; he used that as his theme. Expenses of the general office, Meek reported, as well as those of the roadway, motive power, and supply departments were no greater than required. But train mileage had been about $1,500 more in June than necessary, for two specific reasons: too many special trains for stock had been run, presumably on Frost's orders, when no more than ten cars were offered, and it had been necessary to run short extras simply to give the Missouri Pacific room in their yards. The former practice, of course, arose from Frost's commendable but impractical desire to please everyone regardless of cost; the latter could and should have been remedied long since by laying an additional and inexpensive sidetrack capable of holding, say, twenty-five cars, a proposal Meek made to Frost without results.83 Another extraordinary expense, amounting to $2,300 in June, was for foreign car mileage, which Frost could have avoided by using his own idle empties had he been willing to seek actively the co-operation of connecting lines. Then, expenses for stock killed, amounting to $10,000 for the first six months of 1887, were "entirely too great"; they could hardly have been otherwise so long as Frost was generously willing to consider a dead longhorn the equivalent of a live Jersey.84 Station service forces, recruited to lessen local unemployment, were costing too much. "Frost contends against it," wrote Meek, "but he is wrong. . . . They have enough force at Quanah to do three times the work they have." Finally, the "worst thing" was the returns of passenger conductors; during the whole month of July they had turned in only $269.20 instead of between $600 and $1,000 as could reasonably have been expected from the number of passengers who paid cash en route. "Frost insists," said Meek, "that conductors are not stealing, but this is where he makes a mistake." "With the right kind of management," he concluded, "expenses in June could have been reduced not less than $2,500." 85 Two days later 83

Meek to Dodge, August 13, 1887 (GMD, No. 189). See above, p. 123. 85 Meek to Dodge, August 13, 1887, loc. cit. 84

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he added: "There is a decided lack of harmony . . . between the departments which must be corrected quickly or will prejudice the interests of the road. I will give my opinion as to this and all details to Mr. Jones." 86 These observations, buttressed with cold facts, inevitably made an impression on the General, as they did on Jones. "The suggestions he makes," the latter wrote Dodge on August 18, "will save the company considerable money, but I don't think they can be carried out through Mr. Frost." 87 Yet to displace a man as deservedly popular as Frost was among shippers and the community generally, would bring repercussions. On the other hand, Dodge needed no one to tell him how essential it was to operate efficiently, and it was all too apparent that Frost neither could nor would change his ways. It was undoubtedly these considerations, together with Jones's essential recommendation, that led to Frost's dismissal on November l 88 —the same day that Meek became, in effect, top operating official for the system.89 As expected, the local press deplored the change. Until competition had "forced other roads into something like decently conducting the live stock traffic," observed the Fort Worth Journal, "it was notorious that there was but one high railroad official whose duties brought him closely in contact with the stock interests of Texas who could be depended upon at all seasons to give . . . all the attention that could in decency be demanded of him. That official was Mr. Frost. . . . On the Denver, the officials will have to rustle to replace him." 90 That Frost had been a tre86

Meek to Dodge, August 15, 1887 (GMD, No. 189). Jones to Dodge, August 18, 1887 (GMD, No. 189). FWJ, November, 1887 (CLF). 89 Wheeler to Dodge, October 26, 1887 (GMD, No. 194); FW&DC, AR, 1888, p. 2. See above, p. 167. 90 In 1890, Frost sued the railway for what he claimed was an unpaid portion of his salary. He maintained that although he had originally been hired as both superintendent and general freight and passenger agent, no stipulated sum had been agreed upon as salary. The directors, he said, had promised him "just compensation" when the road should get on a "proper paying basis"; meanwhile they had paid him what he termed a "nominal" sum, and the matter was still unadjusted when he left the service in November, 1887 (Fort Worth Evening Mail, November 1, 1890). Frost apparently tried to negotiate the matter, but the railroad, having "no apprehensions" as to the outcome of legal action, decided to let the matter come to trial (Meek to Dodge, March 28, 1890, GMD, No. 194). Thereupon Frost sued for $4,700, asserting that whereas he had been paid for his services as superintendent, he had not been paid for his work as general freight and passenger agent (FWDG, November 2, 1890). J. M. Eddy, first president of the road, testified on Frost's behalf, while Morgan Jones, among others, appeared for the company. The trial court awarded Frost $4,151.06 (Fort Worth Evening Mail, November 1, 87

88

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mendous asset to the company was undeniable; that he had been an expensive one was also, unfortunately, true. In any event, the decision had been made. 91 It was now up to Meek to justify the faith Dodge, Jones, and Evans placed in him. One of Meek's first suggestions concerned a nickname for the system. Late in December he wrote Dodge that he thought the through line as a whole should be called the "Texas Panhandle Route," since "this would locate it geographically." 92 The idea, in due course, was adopted. 93 At the same time, Meek passed along some specific recommendations about colonization of the road's territory. For one thing, he thought the headquarters of the State Board of Immigration should, if possible, be located outside Fort Worth—say in Dallas—so as to avoid suspicion of Denver Road influence. "Then," said he, "if we can control them, their work will be more effective for our line." This, from one experienced lobbyist to another, was talk the General well understood. "I expect to make the name of our line," Meek continued, "known in every household in the country that can be reached, and to do it in the most attractive way, both by newspaper correspondence and by the different methods of advertising." 94 What, asked Meek later on, would Dodge think of a round-trip fare of a cent a mile from St. Louis and Missouri River points to Texas and return? That, he said, would be a popular move in Texas and would settle up the state, develop its resources, and increase the value of railway property. "In the discussion of the immigration question," he concluded, "I have noticed that the elements most powerful in molding the policy of Texas have shown a disposition to arrest the hostility that has prevailed toward the railroads in that State." 95 Without waiting for an answer, Meek sent off copies of this last letter to the Missouri Pacific, the Santa Fe, and the Frisco. Land grant or not, the Denver Road was determined to be a potent influence in colonization. Before it could become so, the road must be completed. Jones had put 1890), but on his motion for a new trial, the court set aside the original verdict and rendered judgment for the company. With the case scheduled to come up again in the next term, the railway's attorneys requested Dodge to put a money amount on Frost's services, obviously in an effort to reach a settlement out of court (Stanley, Spoonts and Meek to Dodge, July 25, 1891). The records searched do not reveal the outcome, although Frost's son recalls that some mutually agreeable settlement was eventually reached (interview, Norman Frost with writer, March 6, 1952). 91 See above, pp. 97-98, 175-77. 92 Meek to Dodge, December 27, 1887 (GMD, No. 194). 93 DT&FW, Timetable, February 1, 1889 (FW&DC Files). 94 Meek to Dodge, December 27, 1887 (GMD, No. 194). Not the letter cited in n. 92. 95 Meek to Dodge, December 31, 1887 (GMD, No. 194).

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